[[ Mirrored from archive.org, with more info at http://www.314th.org/times-history-of-the-war/times-history-of-the-war.html ]] The Times HISTORY OF THE WAR PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE. PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE TIMES PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON. PREFACE "THE TIMES" HISTORY OF THE WAR has been framed with the object of producing an account of the great contest now in progress, which shall be at once popular and authoritative. While striving to be popular in the best sense of the word, and endeavouring to discuss the poUtical factors which have led up to the crisis and the military operations of the war, in a manner which will prove useful to those who have not hitherto followed European pohcy with any very close attention, this history will also aim at securing a genuine position as a work of reference. It will be an account written bj' men of great experience in pohtical, mihtary, and naval matters, and will contain a great deal of first-hand material which will be really valuable to historians of the future. Readers of The Times will not need to be told that it possesses unique facihties for supplying a narrative of the kind here indicated. The Times staff of foreign correspondents has for years been celebrated for the knowledge and insight into pohtical and social conditions which its members possess. Their efforts have combined to make the foreign pages of The Times the most accurate review of current foreign affairs pubUshed in any paper in t.he world. Equally well-known are the mihtary and naval correspondents of The Times, who are, by universal consent, amongst the most brilliant exponents of their respective subjects. The services of the special staff of war correspondents now acting for The Times in the theatre of Mar will be available for this history. Many of their graphic and moving descriptions of events in Belgium, and along the Franco- Belgian frontier, have already appeared in The Times. The best of these descriptions of eye-witnesses of the actual scenes of battle will be employed m this woric. As they are the copy- right of The Times it is scarcely' necessary to state that they cannot be used else- where. A word should also be said about the maps which will appear in the present work. They will, for the most part, be reproduced from those appearing in the pages of The Times, but in some cases special maps will be prepared for particular purpo.ses- They are in all cases specially designed to illustrate the immediate points imder review at the moment, and very special pains have been taken to secure their accuracy in every particular. 3 4 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. It is, for obvious reasons, impossible that a history of contemporary events, many of the most important of which are shrouded in the fog of war, can lay claim to the fullness of information, and consequently the stability of judgment, which are within reach of an historian writing many years after the events have taken place. But it will be the endeavour of the composers of this history to approximate as nearly as may be to the historical standard attainable in ordinary circumstances, and so far as the conditions allow to present a faithful record of the progress of the struggle which is the subject of their narrative. The history of this War will not consist merely of a resume of matter which has appeared in The Times, but will draw upon other sources as well, with the object of laying before the pubHc the most accurate and complete account of the War that will for a long time be available. In order to attain this result The Times, in addition to its own staff, has suc- ceeded in obtaining the services of writers well versed in Mihtary and Naval affairs and in foreign poUtical matters not always sufficiently comprehended in this country. The general supervision and arrangement of the volumes is in the charge of the Editor of the various special supplements which, whether dealing with individual countries or with great industries, have been recognized all over the world for their authority and completeness. August, 1914. CHAPTER I. POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE WAR. Birth or German wori,d -policy — Germany and Russia — Germany in South America AND IN Africa — The Kbuger telegram — Exploitation of the Boer War — The Franco -Russian Alliance — Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 — Anglo-Russian Agree- ment OF 1907 — Eastern crisis of 1908-9 and Germany's armed diplomacy — Agadir CRISIS OF 1911 — Growth of the German Navy — The Balkan wars of 1912-13 — Disablement of Turkey — Germany and England — Increase of the German Army — June 28, 1914, murder of the Archduke Ferdinand — Austrian ultimatum to Sbbvia — Analysis of the Parliamentary White Paper — Attitude of Germany — The " infamous " proposal — Appeal of the King of the Belgians to King George' V. — ■ The British ultimatum — German feeling. NEVER probably in the history of the world, not even in the last years of the Napoleonic domination, has there taken place such a display of wai'- like passion as manifested itself in the most civilized countries of Evu-opo at the beginning of August, 1914. Then was seen how frail were the commercial and political forces on which modern cosmopolitanism had fondly relied for the obliteration of national barriers. The elaborate system of European finance which, in the opinion of some, had rendered War impossible no more availed to avert the catastrophe than the Utopian aspirations of international Socialism, or the links with which a common culture had bound together the more educated classes of the Continent. The world of credit set to work to adapt itself to condi- tions which seemed, for a moment, to threaten it with annihilation. The voices of the advo- cates of a World-wide fraternity and equality were drowned in a roar of hostile preparation. The great gulfs that separate Slav, Latin, Teuton, and Anglo-Saxon Were revealed ; and the forces which decide the destinies of the world were gauntly expressed in terms of racial antagonism. Yet, though the racial factor was the pre- dominating force in this tremendous struggle, it was nevertheless the instrument of viiryinir policies and ideals. Russia stood forth as the representative and protectress of Slav nation- ality and religion against Teutonic encroachment THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. H.M. THE KING. THE TIMES Iff STORY OF THE WAB. H.M. THE QUEEN. [Thomson. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LUXEMBURG. and oppression. France, bound to Russia by the exigencies of national existence, meurched to support an ally of alien faith and race. Austria went to war in the hope of cementing her ill- compacted dominions by the subjugation of a race akin to a portion of her own suljjects. Eng- land, the Mother of a w'orld-Eiupire " brought forth in liberty,' stood forward as the friend of Bmall nations, and sis the upholder of the European balance which she had once main- tained against the ambition of Spain and France, and with which her own security was inextricably involved. Together with France, now freed from her old dreams of European domination, she appeared as the protagonist of European democracy and liberty against the militarism of Germany, as the upholder of political idealism against the materialism of lYussia. Germany, nurtured on the doctrines of Clausewitz and Troitschke, strong in her belief in the sufficiency of the law of force and in her power to fulfil its con- ditions, confident in the memory of earlier successes and in the energies of the Teutonic peoples, aspired through European victory to world-wide dominion. Like Nap>oleon she looked for ships, commerce and colonies ; like him she prepared to wage war on land and sea, and like him in the days of hifl decadence, and forgetful of the ally of 1813, she strove to strengthen her moral position by posing as the bulwark of Europe against Muscovite barbarism. Alone of the great powers Italy stood aside. Diplomatically she was justifed in excusing herself from joining the other members of the Triple Alliance on the ground that she was not bound to partici- pate in a war of aggression ; nationally the repugnance of her people for the unnatural alliance with the German Powers made joint action with them impossible. Tlie smaller countries announced their neutrality ; the precariousness of their position was sufficiently emphasized by the fact that most of them, including Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, Holland, and Belgium, thought it necessary to accom- pany the announcement by a complete mobiliza- tion. One feeling, apparent from the first and deepening in strength and volume as the war proceeded, dominated not merely the populations allied against the German Powers, but those beyond the area of confliet. This was antagonism to Germany as the author of the war and to the system for which her Government stood. Outside her frontiers and those of Austria hardly one representative voice was raised in her justification. Her arrogance, her cynical disregard for the rights of others, her dis- graceful treatment of ambassadors and foreigners, her use of brute force, estranged sympathy and roused against her believers in humanity and liberty in all parts of the world. The American Press was not the least loud in its denunciations. In the words of Colonel Stoffcl, the French military attache at Berlin before the war of 1870, it was felt that the Prussians were a race "sans passions g^n^reuses." THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 9 THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBURG The nobler qualities of the German peojjle -were forgotten ; and they were simply regarded as the instrument of a system dangerous to «11 that was best in European civilization. The desperate opposition that their soldiers were to encounter from the countries they invaded was the measure of the intensity of this feeling. The omission of the directors ■of German policy to reckon with it was the measure of their statesmanship. The war was, above all, Imperial Germany's war, not merely because throughout the final crisis she alone of all the I'owers might have averted it and did not, but because it was the direct and inevitable outcome of the trans- formation which her whole policy underwent during the reign of William II. Bismarck, who deliberately fought three wars, 1864. 1800, and 1870, in order to create a Gorman Empire and restore German national imity under the ajgis of Prussia, was a man of blood and iron, but he was also a great states- man. So long as he remained at the helm the policy of Imperial Germany was mainly con- fined to the undiminished maintenance of the dominant position she had acquired in Europe after 1870. This object lu- attained by sub- stituting where he could binding alliances for mere friendships, whilst his diplomacy laboured xinceasingly to keep all other Powers, as far as possible, apart, and so to prevent the estab lishmeut of any other systom of alliances than the Triple Alliance, which Germany dominated. It wa«, in the main, a policy of conservative concentration, and he never concealed his reluctance to take the risks of speculative entanglements, whether in the Balkans or beyond the seas, which might have endangered his main position. This did not satisfy the Emperor William's more ardent imagination. His ambition wa« to transform the German Kinjiire from a purely continental Power into a world Power. Thia involved the substitution of a world policy for Bismarck's policy- of I'^uropean concentra- tion. Let us recall briefly the diief stages of the " Imperial Rake's Progress." The old chancellor was dismissed in 1890, two years after the Kaiser's accession to the throne. The famous " re-insurance " Treaty with Russia was dropped and with it the coping- stone of the diplomatic system which Bismarck's genius had built up. The Kaiser preferred to rely on the Asiatic interests of Russia to THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, M. PAUL CAMBON lUlaytlU 10 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 11 paralyse her influence in Eurojjo mid so his first clriunatic appoaraiico on the largor stage of world-policy was his cooporation with Russia in the Far East at the close of the war between China and Japan, when he joined in 1895 with Russia and her more unwilling ally, France, in iniposii g upon the Japanese the surrender of a largo part of the spoils of victory. China herself was soon to feel the weight of the " nia-iled fist " in the seizure of Kiaochao in 1897, and again in 1900 in the dispatch of a largo expe- Ainerica, and if he could have succeeded in his attempts to use Great Britain against the XTnitod States at the time of the Spanish-American war of 1898 he would soon have driven the " mailed fist " tlirough the Monroe doctrine. But of this pha.so of Cierman world policy the annexation of Samoa remains as the only important achieve- ment. Our loyalty to our American kinsmen ■forced him to fall back upon Africa as the more ])romising field for Gorman expansion. There, however, Great Britain inevitably blockotl his BERLIN. ditionary forc<^ whifh, if it arrived too late for the relief of the Peking legations, spreatl tf^rror of the German name tliroiighout Xorthern China, The severe blow inflicted by the Japanese arms on Russia's policy of ad\onture in Asia, which the Kaiser had steadily en- couraged, was a serious check to Germany's political calculations, but it scarcely affected the campaign of peaceful penetration which she was waging at the same time for the econo- mic conquest of Cliina, chiefly at the expense of British interests. But it was not only in the Far East that Germany was pegging-out claims for " a place in the svin." For a moment the Kaiser undoubtedly cast his eye on Soiith way by her mere presence. Her difficulties could alone be Germany's opportunities. So whilst Germany picked up such cnunbs as she could in West and Central and East Africa with- out coming actually to logperheads with Great Britain, the Kaiser eagerly watched and en- couraged the growing estrangement between Boer and Briton. The Janie-son Raid j>ave him, as he thought, his opportunity, and the notorious Krugor telegram was the first open challenge flung to British p6wer. It miscarried, partly owing to the unexpected outburst of feeling it provoked throughout the British Empire, and partly- owing to the failure of German diplomacy to elicit any cordial respon.se in Paris or St. Petersburg. During the Boer War the Kaiser 14 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 15 from Berlin -won another temporary triimi])li for tlio Kaiser's turned (liplomaey. Nevertlie- ]eas, in spite of this oiitwiird success, the Kaiser had again failed in his main object. The Triple Entente survived this shock just as the Anf^lcj-French Agreement had survived the first Germftn onslaught in Morocco. Tlie Kaiser, however, was not yet cured of his illusions, and in the French occupation of Fez in 1911, at a timo when England was passing through a diflicult domestic crisis, lie saw another chance of smashing the Entente. The dispatcli of the Panther to Agadir was an even more direct provocation to France than had been the Kaiser's own demonstrative visit to Tangier in 1905. It was destined to still more signal failure. Great Britain's loyalty to France again never wavered, nor did French patience and moderation give way. Germany. it is true, secured a slice of French Colonial territory towards the Congo, but the Entente remained intact. Germany's main consolation was a fresh outburst of Anglophobia, with a new Navy Bill deliberately baaed upon untrue statements regarding British naval prepara- tions " to fall upon Germany." In this place it is worth while to summarize the series of steps by which the Emperor William during the past 15 years sought to forward the growth of the German Navy. His embarcation upon a world policy was neces- THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, M. SAZONOFF. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN, SIR EDWARD GOSCHEN. sarily accompanied by the development of the weapon upon which the realization of such » policy must depend. It was, as we have t«en, the South African War that en- abled the Emperor finally to suppress (ierman reluctance to unlimited naval expenditure, and upon ground prepared by an unparalleled campaign of anti-British calumny to create universal enthusiasm for (Jerman sea power. Immediately after Presi- dent Kruger's Ultimatum the Emperor de- clared : — " We are in bitter need of a powerful German navy. Had I not boon refused the increase for which I repeatedly pressed during the early years of my reign, how different would be our position to-day." In 1900 the first great Navy Bill was introduced with the plirase : — " Germany must have a fleet of such strength that even for the luightiest naval power a war with her would involve such risks as to jeopardize its own supremacy." Tlienceforward there wo-s no turning back. There was a second Navy Bill in 1906, a third in 1908, and a fourth in 1912, and although the Bill of 1912 added about 15,000 officers and men there wr.s to havo boon a further increase of personnel in 1914. Most of the increases were carried upon artificial wa\es of Anglophobia, although explained with soft words. Most strenuous resistance wa-s offered to all sugges- tions or proposals of disarmament, and the 16 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS H. [/)'. & D. Downey. THE TIMES IIISTOBY OF THE WAR. BELGRADE. successive efforts of British Governments to arrive at some agreement were always treated as hypocrisy. In 1911, when the Agadir crisis tlireatened war, the German naval authorities had to admit they were not ready. From about 1912 they were able to say that " Germany had a fleet of such strength that even for the mightiest naval power a war with her would involve s\ich risks as to jeopardize its own supremacy." There can be no doubt that tierman naval policy was throughout directed against England. It was explained in all sorts of ways ; at first as aiming only at a modest defence of Gorman trade, but it was always es,sentially a challenge to England in the matter tliat was most vital to England and to her alone. If England remained in " splendid isolation " as far as other Powers were concerned, she could meet the growth of a great navy on the other side of the North Sea only by direct agreement with Germany, at the expense of other Powers and of her own Im- peiial interests, or by war. One effect of Germany's naval challenge — much to her con- tinual surprise — was to weld even more firmly the fabric of the British Empire, and to strengthen the ties between Great Britain and the Dominions beyond the sciis. Tlic ot her main effect was to give England's friendships with France and Ruf«sia a shape which, although the British Government maintained its freedom to the very end, rendered naval and military cooperation more and more probable. Up to the very end Germany could have altered her coiu^e if she had wished to do so, and England remained free to negotiate for the limitation of expenditure upon armaments which she earn- estly desired. But Germany chmg steadily to her ambition.s. Twice — in 1905 and 1911 — - British Governments had to avert European war by plain intimations to Germany that England would .stand by France. In Novem- ber, 1912, the position was defined in an ex- change of letters between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then wrote : — Prom time to time in recent years the French and BritiKh naval and military exix'rts liave con.sulted together. It has always been midei-stood that such con-siiltation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time wliethor or not to assist the f)t.her tiy arme<l force. We have agreed that con-sultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regar<i«><i as, an engagement that commit.s either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never ari.se. The disposi- tion, for inst.ancc, of the French and British Fleets respectively at the present monient is not based upon an engagenxent to cooperate' in war. You have, however, point^tl out that, if either Government hiul grave reason to exix!ct an unpro- voked attack liy a third Power, it might become es.sen- tial to know wliether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of t he other. I agi-et! that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unpn)voked attjick by a thirtl Power, or something that tlireat<>ned the general [K'iice, it should 18 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE KING OF THE BELGIANS. [W. ijr D. Downey. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 19 THE SERVIAN PRIME MINISTER, M. PASHITGH. immediately discuss witli tiie otlicr wiietlier botii Governments siiould act together t<i prevent agf^es- sion and to preserve peace, and, if so, wliat measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. In 1912 came the Turkish and Balkan Wars. The war between Italy and Turkey was by no means altogether welcome to Germany. If, on tlio one liand, it made Italy more dependent upon her German allies, and incidentally created a good deal tf friction between Italj' and France, it was calculated to impair to some extent Germany's position in Constantinople, where tlio Turks felt, not mmaturally, siu-prise and indignation at finding themselves attacked by one of the members of the Triple Alliance. Far more disconcerting, however, to Germany were the results of the Balkan Wars, 1912- 1913. The enfecblement of Turkej- and the new par- tition of her European provinces before Germany had completed her exploitation of the Turkish Empire, and the aggrandisement of Servia and Greece, which barred the way to Salonika against Austria and checked the growth of Austro-Gorman preponderance in the Balkan Peninsula, constituted a severe, if indirect, blow to the whole fabric of European relationships which the Austro-German alliance had slowly an! laboriously sought to build up. Incident- ally, the exacerbation of the always latent jealousy between Austria and Italy, barely veiled by tlie outward appearances of coopera- tion in Albania, undermined, to a degree which tlie Italian declaration of neutrality has suddenly illuminated, the foundations of the Triple Alliance in which Italy \\aA been for many years the prisoner rather than the partner of Austria and Germany. During the first Balkan War Germany un- questionably regarded every defeat by Turkey as a victory of the Slav forces, and as far as Servia was concerned the results of the second v\ar were still more unpalatable to Giermany, inasmuch as the failure of the Bulgarian attack was a furtlier failure for the Austro-German diplomacy which had certainly encourt^jod it. In spite of the recapture of Adrianoplo by the Turks, Germany could no longer count with the same confidence on the cooperation in any European conflict of the large number of Turkish iirmy corps which the Emperor William had been accustomsd to regard as additional army corps of the Gernaan Army. The rapprochement with England during and after the Balkan Wars, out of which German diplomacy made a good deal of capital at the time, was in these circum- stances, as far as Germany was concerned, a com- pulsory rapprochement for a purely temporary purpose. As soon as the fortunes of war turned so unexpectedly against Turkey it was ob- viously Germany's interest to cooperate with THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COUNT BERCHTOLD. Map OF THE AREA OF The European War '-- £M£TLAND'4ij^l'sLANDS Ji r.l" """"Z, ''"'Jll^SUjfMU Itft ffairnautjt. Oirt/ndcJ<r-\ "y Limoges m : k'ljU.ni^ fs Ctptia^J '*■ ■ -'-C!F«'4s?-/'.!3i , ^ , ^ ^ ^ , ■»-- — «... , .^ has \ ,,-'1 _ , ^ivitona -"J^' SX ..T^a! T^f«>. ^^EEEiRO] rferuel tifftiiJ Cuenca X.„ ^«." J f E R"^^^^ E j i^ 22 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN VIENNA, SIR MAURICE DE BUNSEN. England in arresting as rapidly as possible the progress of hostilities during the first war, and for similar reasons again during the second war, as soon as the Bulgarian effort was seen to have failed. How little, nevertheless, German policy was directed towards any permanent preserva- tion of European peace subsequent events abundantly showed. Before the end of 1912 Germany had resolved upon enormous increases of the Army. It was announced in the spring of 1913 that they were to cost from £60,000,000 to £65,000,000. Although the peace strength of the Army had only a year before been increased to 544,000, it was increased further to 661,000, and all the meet important measures were treated as "urgent" and carried out .by October, 1913. In introducing the Army and Taxation Bills the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann- HoUweg, said : — One thing remains beyond doubt — -if it should ever come to a European conflagration wliich set Slavenlum against Germanentum, it is then for us a disadvantage that the position in the balance of forces which was occupied hitherto by European Turkey is now nil<-d in part by Slav states. Ho professed a perfunctory belief in the possi- bilit3{ of continued good relations between Russia and Germany, but the whole speech was full of warnings and forebodings, and was as nearly a preface to the coming conflict as diplomatic decency at the moment allowed. The Army increases were mdeed accompanied by a number of violent Press attacks, now upon Russia, now upon France, and occasionally upon both. England was left as far as possible out of all discussions, and every attempt was made to accentuate the improvement of Anglo - German relations, and to make the most of so-called " negotiations," especially witli regard to the Portuguese colonies in Africa, which Germany believed to be already in her grasp. Interrupted only by a peculiarly venomous Press assault upon Russia in February, 1914, matters drifted on until June 28, 1914, when the Austrian Heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and liis morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were murdered in the streets of Serajevo, the capital of the Bosnian province annexed in 1909. The news interrupted a British naval visit to Kiel. It was a great blow to the German Emperor, who for some years past had conquered his personal antipathy, and had created intimate ties with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, whose policy as Emperor he hoped to guide and to control. His dreams for the next decade were shattered, and the conflict with Russia, which it was probably hoped to postpone a little longer, was brought nearer. Germany, like Austria, chose immediately to assume, without trustworthy evidence, that the Sera- jevo crime was the direct work of Servia. and THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN PARIS, SIR FRANCIS L. BERTIE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 23 METZ. that Servia must be punished. As a matter of fact, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, who had insisted upon accompanying him upon his perilous tour, were wantonl_\- exposed to a deatli for which the true respon- sibility will probably be found to have lain less in Belgrade than in Vienna. Under the circumstances, however, all the Powers were ready to give Austria any reasonable amount of " aatisfaction " and to justify any treatment of Servia which did not menace her existence as a sovereign state. Austria-Hungary, how- ever, was bent upon a military punishment of Servia, and Austria-Himgary and Germany together were bent upon eitlier a fresh humilia- tion of Russia or war. There wa.s a lull of nearly three weeks after the Serajevo crime, and then there was a further fortnight of diplomacy beginning with the presentation by Austria to Servia of a monstrous Ultimatum, to which wa.0 attached a peremptory demand for an entirely favourable answer within 48 hours. VVitliin 48 hours Servia, acting upon Russian advice, accepted all the Austrian demands except two, which she asked to be reserved for The Hague Tribunal. Austria, however, im- mediately withdrew her Minister from Belgrade, and opened hostilities. Germany had placed herself in a situation of nominal detachment by avoiding direct knowledge of the contents of the Austrian Note, and by showing readi- ness to communicate good advice from London *o Vienna. As late as July 25, when Austria broke off relations with Servia, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs " did not believe that Germany really wanted war." Eurojje was soon undeceived. A Parliamentary White Pajjer entitled '■ Correspondence Respecting the European Crisis " told with grim simplicity the grim story of the fruitless efforts to maintain peace. On July 26 Sir Edward Grey inquired whether (iermany, Italy, and France " would instruct their representatives in London to njoet him in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications." Germany alone refused on the ground that " such a conference was not practicable." The German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, advanced many specious ob- jections, and " thought it would be Ijest " (July 27) to await the outcome of an exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The very next day Austria declared war against Servia, and Russia replied by a partial mobiliza- tion of her forces. Three days before, the Rus.sian Minister for Foreign Affairs had impressed upon the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg the supreme importance of England's attitude. If she took her stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If she failed them now, rivers of blood would flow and she would in the end be dragged into the war. Prophetic words ! Similar arguments were used by the French and then by the Italian Governments to press Sir Edward Grey to tlu-ow the weight of British influence into the scale in the only way in which they believed it could effectively redress the balance against the influences which were 24 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BISMARCK. [Augustin Rischgit^. making for war in Vienna and in Berlin. But the Britisli Foreign Minister had to reckon with pubUc opinion in this country, and to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London (July 29), he explained that It approached the present difflculty from quite a different point of view from that taken during the difliculty ns to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of .Morocco, the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and In which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush Prance, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and u.s. In the present c;i«e, the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. . . . If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do ; it was a case that we should have to consider. Prance would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and wc should liave to decide what British interests re. quired us to do. Nevertheless — and the same intimation wa.s conveyed to the German Ambassador — we were taking all precatitions with regard to our Fleet, and Cierrnany was not to count on our standing aside. On the same day that Sir Edward Grey made this cautious communication a council of war was held at Potsdam under the presidency of the German Emperor. Immediately after the Council — at midnight — the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, who telegraphed the following account of the Chancellor's ex- traordinary proposals to London : — He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Genna!iy's obligations as Austria'^ ally, iu spite of his continued ofEorts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to m<ike the following strong bid for Uritish neutrality. Ho said that it was clear, so far ys he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britiiin would never stand by and allow Pi'ance to b" crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Geimany aimed. Provided tliat neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no t>erritorial acquisitions at the expense of Prance should they prove victorious in any war that miglit ensue. I ((uestioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Gemiany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of Prance what openitions Germany might be forced to enter u])on in Belgium, but when the war was over> Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Gemiany. Sir Edward Grey replied : — His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory iis distinct from the colonies. Prom the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for Prance, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of Prance, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away wliatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. In the House of Commons on August 6th the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, branded the Chancellor's proposal as " infamous," and as meaning that behind the back of France we should give free licence to Germany to annex the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France, and as regarded Belgium, moaning that without her knowledge we should barter away to the Power that was tlireatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. Notwithstanding the extent to wliich German diplomacy had now been unmasked, Sir Edward Grey maintained his efforts to the end, and THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 26 actually appended the following passage to liis stinging reply to Germany : — It the jicjioe of Europe can be preserved and the present ci-isis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to proni^>te some arran,L;ement', to which Gennany could be a party, by which she could be assure<l that no aggi'essive or hostile policy would be pursued a);aiiist her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the lust IJalkan crisLs, and, (Jonniiny having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Uto|)ian t<» form ttie subject of definite proposals, but if this y)resent crisis, so much more acute tlian any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely pjissed, I am liopetui that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than lias been possible hitherto. On July 31, the day on which Germany dispatched an Ultimatum to Russia requiring iinmediat3 demobilization and an inquiry to France as to lier attitude, Sir Edward Grey inquired of the French and German Govern- ments respectively whether they would respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violated it. France gave a definite pledge. Germany gave no reply. ' On August 4 Germany was informed that the King of the Belgians had made the following appeal to King George : — Plemembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just, given us again, I make a supreme ayipeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integ- rity of Belgium. England again demanded assurances from Germany, but German troops were then already in Belgium. Luxemburg had been occupied by Germany some days before. The Imperial Chancellor, speaking in the Reichstag which had been specially convened, said : — \Vc are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law ! . . . We were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong — I speak openly — that we are committing we will endeavour to make good jis soon ivs our milit^iry goal lias been reached. ,\nybody wlio is threatened, as we are threatened, and is (igliliug for liis higliest possessions, can have only one thought — how he is to hack his way through. There was nothing left to the British Govern- ment but to send Sir Edward Goschen the following final instructions, which reached Berlin at 7 p.m. on August 4 : — Wo hear that Gennany has a<ldressed Note ' to Belgian Minister for Foreign Aftaii-s stating that Gemiim trovcrnment will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures con- sidered indispensable. We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Genunenicli. In these circiuiist ances, and in view of the fact that Gcrnumy declined to give the same H-ssuraiue respecting Belgium as France gave last week iu rejily to our request iivide simultjineouHly at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat tliat request, and ask tluit a .satisfactory re])ly to it and to ray t;elegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to- night. It not, you are instructed to imk for your p;issports, and to say tliat his .Majesty's Oovem- nierit feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which (iermany is as much a party as ourselves. . Immediately after these instructiona reached Berhn the German Government, without wait- ing for the tdtimatum to ex|)ir(', announced that England liad declared war. There had been disgraceful scenes on the departure of the Russian Amba,ssador, M. Sverbejev, but they were as nothing in comparison with tlie outburst of fiuy when it was found that the efforts to keep England neutral had failed. There was a mob demonstration at the British Embassy, where windows were broken, many Englishmen were arrested as spies, and only the vigour of the American Embas.sy, which had undertaken the protection of British interests, made the situa- tion - thanks especially to Gennan eagerness to court American feeUng — to som3 extent toler- able. As the Government was unable for obvious reasons to explain the fa -ts about the neutrality of Belgium, for which (iermany, as Sir Edward Grey pointed out, was as much responsible as England and the other Powers, it encouraged the public to believe that England had only been waiting her opportimity to strike Germany when she was alrpad\- at war on both VON MOLTKE. [.-lugtisfin RiukgUi, 26 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. frontiers. The world then saw the bad side of her patriotism, wliich wtis in itself admirable. All who had aix opportunity of watching Ger- many during the fortnight of acute tension could testify to the patience, confidence, and en- thusiasm of the people, although in Prussia, and in most other parts of the Empire, practically the whole reserves were called upon at once, absorbing the bulk of the able-bodied population and bringing ordinary life to a standstill. There was no sound of complaint or question of a policy which the country did not understand, and had no opportimity to judge. The Socialists, although they in Germany constituted not less than one-third of the whJle population, and although they had been organizing great anti- war demonstrations, came immediately into line. The Reich.stag passed without considera- tion all the emergency Bills presented by the Government, including war credits of £250,000,000, together with the absorption of the Empire's " war chest " of gold and silver to the amount of £15,000,000, and the author- ization of loans on all sorts of securities to the amount of £75,000,000. But, once England was involved, there appeared beneath all this patriotism and readiness to make sacri- ficas a deep and general animosity against THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN PARIS, BARON VON SCHOEN. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN, M. JULES CAMBON. England. It was the fruit of the teaching of the whole school of German intellectuals ; the fruit of the many violent campaigns against England with which the German Government had accompanied all its efforts for a generation, and especially the challenge to British naval supremacy ; and the fruit of the overweening contempt which sprang from Germany's abnormal and, to a largo extent, unnatural industrial and commercial expansion in a period of only about 20 years. Germany had become incapable of seeing any but one side — the German side — of any question, and although her own moral and intellectual ideals had been' submerged in an utter materialism, she was unable to appreciate interests which did not march with her own — much less to appreciate iTioral obligations and national sentiments which did not suit the ambitions of Germany. The fault lay mainly with the Government and with the Emperor, for they had deceived the German people and led them along paths which ended only in an impenetrable wall. But, as has been well observed, the responsibility must rest, not only with those who constructed an impossible programme, but with all those — and they were the whole German people — who would have welcomed its success. CHAPTER II. THE GERMAN ARMY AND GERMAN STRATEGY. 1'he outbreak of hostilities in Eastern Europe — German declaration of war on RtrssiA — Attitude op France — The British ultimatum — The Powers at war — German offensive against France — The German Army — War organization — Criticism on the German Army — German plan of campaign — Alternative lines of attack on France — Conditions in 1870 and 1914 — The element of time- — Northern line of attack — A question of space — Disadvantages — Advantages. THE first weeks of hostilities, with the remarkable exception of the fighting at Liege, were marked by few collisions of importance. This period was necessarily occupied with the work of mobilization and concentration, and the speed and success with which the&e great opera- tions were completed amply testify to the power which modem conditions of transport and organization confer upon the masters of armies. Austria, the first to take up arms, was natiu-ally first in the field. Her military pre- parations had conunenced before July 25, the day on which slie broke off diplomatic relations with Servia ; on that day a mobiliza- tion of eight of her 16 army corps began, and on the 28th she formally declared war. On the same day her troops began to bombard Belgrade, already deserted by the Servian Government. This act seems to have decided the Tsar ; on the 29th ho signed the Ukase mobilizinj, the 13 Army Corps of the foiu- southern districts lying opposite the Austrian frontier. Austria responded by mobilizing the whole of her army, a step which compelled Russia at midnight on the 30tli to follow suit. On the 31st the German ambassador at St. Petersburg signified that unless Russia agreed within 12 liours to demobilize his Government would order a general mobilization by land and sea. No reply being foi-thcoming orders for a general mobilization were issued by Berlm on August 1, at 5.15 p.m., and at 7.30 p.m. the German ambassador handed to M. Sazonoff the declaration ol war. This step was hailed, both at BerUn and St. Petersbiu-g, with savage enthusiasm. Not since 1812 had a war been so popular in Russia. During the following days skirmishes took place in the frontier districts between German and Russian, and later between Austrian and Russian, troops. But the time necessary to enable Russia to bring her masses into the field, and the defensive attitude assumed by the German Powers, prevented any impor- tant collision. Meanwhile in the west of Europe events had moved fast. As early as the 25th July Ger- many had begun her preparations ; on the 26th General von Moltke had returned to Berlin, and the great General Staff had commenced work in earnest. During the following days, although no piiblic announcement had been made, the military authorities had taken advantage of their ' large independent powers to recall officers and reservists, and had taken steps which practically amounted to a veiled mobiliza ■ tion. On the 28th the German Fleet was reported to be assembling at Kiel and Wilhelms- havon ; a day, that is, before the British Fleet left Portland. On the 30th " mancEUvres " at 27 28 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, M. POINCARE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. j_ " ^ Louvain ■V BRUSSELS oUcnS Ton<,tei° »^»<te? "' NAMUR pV~^ / ' 'Aacfic Charlcroi «' 1 * S'HubsrIS ' I <I ft V^ * «i • ^ LUXEMBURG 3 \ 6eims VERDUl OChilon Ssarrefouis rb' ,S'«//>.«/ ' CJufaju- Sitifla. Vitry ^ OBadet ^•"■^., O '"'■"y 3 ii" Forts ( "Neufchitejii o ) ft s* „ , V\STRASSBUR^''oT», I I Langres ^ ftft ft V BELFOHt'*''' I ftftft *. MAP OF FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER. Sfcrassburg were announced, and by Friday 3lst the German covering troops were close to the French frontier. The rapidity with which tliis opening con- centration was effected oilers a striking con- trast to wliat liappened in 1870. At that time the idea of a covering force in the modern sense scarcely existed. There is no evidence to show that on either side any considerable body of frontier troojis was kept permanently in a state of preparedness higher than the rest of the main armies. Ten days at least elapsed before any seriovis collision took place, and the hostile offensive was not met on the border by a force powerful enough to check the enemy and gain time, but was evaded, as Moltke, had it been ncccaoary to evade it, would have done, by a concentration out of reach of the enemy, even at the cost of aban- doning a considerable part of the frontier provinces. In 1914 the procedure was totally different. For many years it had been the practice both of Germany and France to main- tain the corps localized on the frontier on an establishment which almost amounted to a war footing and capable of mobilization in a very short space of time ; the German corps were held to be cajmble of action within 24 hours. By the end of July it wa.s believed in France — and subsequent events appeared to justify the belief — tliat eight German corps were ready to march. Thesic included, counting from north to south, the \"Iir., with its head- quarters at Coblenz, the X\'I. at Metz, the 30 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE RIGHT HONOURABLE H. H. ASQUITH. [Reginald Haines. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 31 GOBLENZ. XXI. at Saarbriick, the XV. at Stras.sburg, tlie XIV. at Karlsruhe, tlio I!, liavariau in Lorraine and the Palatinate, reinforced by the XIII. from Stuttgart and the XVIII. from Frankfurt. With them wa.s a very powerful force of cavalry. It i.s noteworthy, as showing that mobilization in Germany had begun some days before it was publicly ordered, that none of the infantry belonging to the above forces were employed in the attack on Liege which began very early on the morning of August 5. This was entrvLsted to other troops, including the VII., X., and later the IX. It seems to follow from this that two corps at least, which had nothing to do with the covering fcrce on the side of France, mvist have left their mobilization areas little more than a day after war was formally d.eclared. Luxemburg territory was entered very early on the morning of August 2, and Belgium only two davs later. In tlii? trying situation the behaviour of the French (Sovornmont was admirable. Well aware that in the event of war it must support Russia, and that the first blow of its formidable opponent would be directed against France, it yet decided, as a.procf of the sincerity of its desire for peace, to run the risk of being attacked before its prepaiations were complete ; and in ordei to avoid the possibility ot any prema- ture collision it took the grave and exceptional step of withdrawing all its troops to a line 10 kilometres within the frontier. The mobiliza- tion of the covering troops was not begim till the 30th ; and the order for the general mobiliza- tion was not issued until the night of the 3 1st, when the delivery of the German Ultimatum to Russia had been made known in Paris. The calmness and resolution of the French people were worthy of their rulers, and formed an extraordinary contrast to the hysterical ex- altation of 1870. Such popular demonstra- tions as took place arose not from bellicose but from patriotic feeling. Everyone knew that the national existence was involved ; and all witnesses testify to the quiet self-devotion of the people, and to the smoothness and rapidity of the mobilization. The steady coolness with which they faced this supreme crisis wa.s the more admirable in that until August 2nd they could not be sure what attitude England would adopt. On that day, however. Sir Edwiird Grey was able to give the French Ambassador an assurance that, subject to the approval of Parliament, " if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." The enthusiastic reception of the announcement of this decision in England and throughout the Empire, and the refusal of the British . Government to acquiesce in the Germ&n violation of Belgium, finally dissipated all French approheasions. On the night of Augiist 4 the world was aware that the whole might of the British Empire, directed with a singleness of purpose hitherto unknown, had been tlirown into the s<,"ale of war, Tliis momentous event marks the outbreak of active hostilities in the VWst of Europe. On the same day on which the British time-limit THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE RIGHT HON. SIR EDWARD GREY. i« «"«" H""""- THE TIMES intSTORY OF THE WAR. 33 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, COUNT MENSDORFF. expired Germany liad declared war on France a-id Belgium; and her troops, which had several times violated French territory during the preceding days, definitely crossed the frontier of both states. On the morning of the 5th the attack on Liege begun, and the German mine-layer Konigin Luise was sunk by British gun-fire in the North Sea. On the 6th the grim circle was completed by the Austrian declaration of war on Russia. Five Great Powers were now at wa;-, and some 15 millions of men. if the reserve formations are includi- were arming or already in movement. It wa^ pretty certain that the first great scene of confiict would Ije on the French and Belgian frontiers. So long as the numerical superiorit_%- of the British Fleet was maintained in the North Sea it was unlikely that the German Fleet would risk a general engagement ; while on the Russian frontier the tardiness of the one combatant and the comparative weakness of the other militated against the probability of important collisions. But it wa.s well known that in the event of a double war against Russia and France Germany would take svdvan- tago of the length of time required for the concontration of the Russian armies to spring upon the nearer, readier, and, as slie hoped, the weaker of her two opponents ; and would endeavour by a more rapid concentration to surprise and overwhelm \\'.t in the midst of her mol)ilization. The adojition of such a plan was not merely sound, perhaps inevitable, from a strategic point of view, but it had alao th» recommendation that it would eventually bring the (Jorman armies into a theatre rich in supplies and well roaded, and, above all, famous for earlier victories. Three times during the 19th century had the Prussian soldier entered Paris and looked down from tlie heights of Montmartre on a prostrat* France. The confidence inspired by these recollections would he the most valuable of all auxiliaries in an offensive o|ieration which, was to be carried through regardless of co.st, at the highest speed, and with unflinching reso- lution. The attempt to realize this plan wa«! made ; but before we can follow the event« by which it was marked we must say something about the army which was to es.say it. The German Army ui its modern shape was. simply the extension of the Prussian system tliroughout the whole of the German Empire. This process was not wholly completed at the outbreak of the war of 1870, but ever sincfr the general Prussianization of all the German states from a militars' point of view went steadily forward ; and both in general organiza- tion and in doctrine and spirit they bore a close resemblance to the central source of inspiration and control at Berlin. The division THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, PRINCE LICHNOWSKY. \Ulay,iu^ 34 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE GERMAN IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, DR. VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 35 of the fighting army into army corps, and tlioir establixhmont as well as that of reserve formations of landwehr and laiidstiirm on a territorial basis was a general characteristic of the whole system, as of most great armies. The nimiber of army corps amovmtod to 25. The corps war-organization of 1 870 had >)oen modified and enlarged. Each corps still possessed two infantry divisions, most divisions two brigades, most brigades two regiments, and nearly every regiment throe liattalions, making a total, including a battalion of riflemen, of 25 in all. But on mobilization each corps formed a third or reserve division, presumably of about the same strength as the others and composed mainly of reservists who had recently left the fcolours. The artiller>' had l)oen largely in- creased, and wa.s attached in equal proportions to the divisions, the old corps-artillery wliich played so remarkable a part in 1870 having btien abolished. A cavalry regiment was still attached to the bulk of the infantry divisions. The whole fighting organization, as in the case of other armies, had of course been complicated by the introduction of varied natures of artillery ; not to mention machine gims, air- craft, and the huge impedimenta reqmred to bring so elaborate a machine into effective action. Including its reserve division the average corps in 1914 probably averaged something over 40,000 rifles and sabres, and about 150 guivs. In addition to the army corps there were formed about 10 independent cavalry divisions, consisting mostly of sis regiments in three brigades, each provided with several batteries of horse artillery. Non- combatants, special troops, lines of communica- tion troops and certain landwehr formations included, the total first line German army was computed at 2,300,000 men and 6,000 field gims ; but very largo deductions would have to be made in order to arrive at the actual number of sabres and bayonets available for the shock of battle. Tlie movement and supply of so enormous a mass necessitated a vast number of assistants whose duties did not necessarily comprehend the business of fighting. Opinions as to the real worth of this army had in recent years considerably varied. With the exception of the cavalry and horse artillery, in whoso case it was three, the term of ser- vice with the colours was only two years ; but its brevity was compensated by imremitting work, and no one doubted that the physique and discipline were of a high standard. Its oflicer corps, then as always the heart and soul of the Prussian Army, was probably one of the hardest -worked bodies of men existing. It* machinery for supply and movement was carefully studied and every detail that could (insure smoothness and regularity was tlioroughly worked out. The liigher com- manders were accustomed to deal with large bodies, were trained to disregard loss of life, and to believe in resolute and united action ; and vigorous subordinate initiative was taught as the leading principle of all command. Tlie Staff-Officer remained, as he had done for at least a century, the driving-wheel of the whole organization, and possessed an authority pro- bably unknown in other armies. The great prestige which he had won iinder Moltke was no sudden or ephemeral development. Lastly it may be added that, as at every period of the eventful history of the German Army, exactitude, obedience and a high standard of duty were characteristic of all ranks. So far it was generally admitted that this great organization was a sound and formidable machine. Doubts, the justification of which could only be tested in war, had from time to time been expre8.scd as to how far it was suited, individually and collectively, to the conditions of modem war. The criticism had been made that it was somewhat too much of a machine, and that organically and intellectually it showed signs of ossification. Stress was laid upon the dull and lifeless precision of the German private, and the antiquated nature of some parts of liis armament and equipment. The rise of a French school of tactics and strategy, wliich attributed more importance to manoeuxre and distribution of forces than to the uniform system of envelopnient wliich had been a characteristic of Moltke's victories, challenged the adequacy of German doctrine in the higher branches of generalship ; and the question as to whether the German system either in theory or practice was sufficiently elastic and adaptable was often raised. But in spite of all criticism there were not many who, had they been asked to say which was the best of the great armies, would not liave chosen that of Germany. Its numbers and the fact that its leaders were impregnated with the spirit of the offensive were alone sufficient to render it a most imjiosing and formidable instrument of war. Four-fifths of this mighty host were destined for the attack on France, the remainder being left, in conjvmction with landwehr and other reserve formations, and such parts of the army as Austria could divert from Servia, to contain and check the ponderoiw 36 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GERMAN ARMY, GENERAL VON MOLTKE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 87 THE GERMAN FOREIGN SECRETARY, HERR VON JAGOW. masses of Russia, until tlie overtlirow of France released some of the corps for service on the Eastern frontier. The line of attack had long been decided on ; in fact, so far as can be seen, the Emperor William, less fortunate than his grandfather, had little choice. The conditions governing the invasion of France had greatly altered since 1870. Then, altliough Alsace and Lorraine were not in German hands, the Germans held, with the exception of Strassburg, most of the great bridgeheads on tie Rhine ; and once the isolated fortresses oa the Moselle were passed — and they did not of themselves enforce any obligation upon an invading army beyond that of observation or investment — the heart of France lay open to an advance through the plains of Champagne. Emerging from the almost impenetrable barrier of the Rhine they had been able to meet their opponents in a country suited to large move- ments of troops in which their superior numbers and resolute strategy had been used to the best effect. Once the great battles, with a view to which all Moltke's preparations had been made, had been won France lay at the niercy of the enemy. Moreover, and this entered largely into his plan of campaign, an advance to the South of Metz had offered a fair chance of separating at least a part of the French, armies from their southern and soi.th -western lines of commuixica- tion and retreat and driving them to destruction against the neutral frontier of Belgium. How well this anticipation was founded was shown by the catastrophe of Sedan. Now, however, these favourable conditions no longer existed. The nulitary advantages which Moltke hoped to reap from the annexation of the frontier provinces and the transformation of Metz into an impregnable point de debouche- ment and place d'armes were largely counter- balanced by the elaborate line of forts d'arrel flanked and strengthened by the fortres-ses of Verdun, Toul, Nancy, Epinal, and Bclfort, with which the French had more or less com- pletely barred the central and southern parts of their eastern frontier. The Germans were there- fore compelled either to force this lino of defence, or to turn it and enter France from the north - cast. The first alternative was of itself a some- what desperate enterprise, not certain to be successful, and certain to cost much blood, which the invaders might be willing to lose, and a good deal of time which they were not. For in considering the different lines of attack open to the Germans it must always be remembered that in the case of a war with France or Russia time was the one thing they could not afford to waste. Their whole scheme was, considered in its simplest form, a huge operation on the interior line against divided enemies, only li'^ely to succeed if the first could be defeated before the second came into action. THE FRENCH PRIME MINISTER, M. VIVIANI. 38 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. KING PETER OF SESIVIA. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 39 -Li ^~~" ^1 s r 1 ^ [ A ^A IS 1 THE CROWN PRINCE OF GERMANY. The second alternative, like all solutions of strategic problems, was attended by serious dis- advantages. To tlirow the German Army on a line of invasion to the north of Metz and Verdun inevitably involved the violation of the Duchy of Luxemburg, a territory whose integrity- was guaranteed under a treaty dating from 1867. And since the vast numbers of men employed necessitated a broad front of march it was pretty certain from the first that Luxemburg would not be the only state whose neutrality would be threatened. The breadth of the Duch\- is only about 40 miles, and whether for purposes of march or battle could not be expected under modern conditions to accommodate the columns of more than three army corp.s abreast, or six in double line. To have piled up 12 or 15 corps in the space between Metz and the northern border of the Duchy, would have been an un- thinkable military blunder and would not have saved the Germans from the accusation of vio- lating neutral territory. It followed, then, that if the main attack of Germany was to be made to the north of Metz, a violation of Belgium in the neighbourhood of the Ardennes and Liege was a military necessity, however culpable from other points of view. The only remaining alterna- tive, from the German standpoint a wholly inadmissible one, was to stand on the defensive between the Meuse and Rhine. Their plan of campaign involved the violation of both Belgium and Luxemburg in their first marches. There were obvious disadvantages attendant on such a barefaced affront to international obli- gations. It was not likely that Belgium would consent to allow a free passage to the German troops. Her army was mobilizing, her people were aroused ; and Berlin was aware that by infringing the neutrality of Belgium. Germany was running a grave risk of oblig- ing England to resort tc arms. The entry of (ireat Britain into the struggle would be a terrible blow for Germany ; that her Government prt^ferred to face the risk rather tlian modify its plan, of attack proves either that it con- .sidered that a decisive victory over France A'ould neutralize or outweigh the hostile action of England, or that England, disunited at home and blinded by a genial sentimentalism, would suffer the violation of Belgium to pass with a protest. Apart from these grave considerations, which involved not merely great strategic risks but the reputation of the German Government, certain strategic advantages were undoubtedly conferred by the Belgian line of advance. In the first place, as Clausewitz long ago had pointed out, it was, considered from a military point of view, the natural, that is to say the shortest and straightest, line of attack. As a matter of fact — it is a point of no strategic importance and is merely added by way of illustration — a straight line drawn from Berlin to Pans passes close to Mezieres in rear of the Belgian frontier. In the second place the area of concentration of the main army would be beised on, and might in some measure be THE CROWN PRINCE OF AUSTRIA. 40 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. considered to be protected by, the great Rliine fortress group of Mainz, Cologne, and Coblenz. The great system of railways which had their junction in this part of the frontier, some of them deliberately built for the purposes of such a concentration, all favoured the northern alterna- tive. In the third place the coimtry between Verdim and Liege, badly roaded, broken and wooded though much of it was, was compara- tively bare of fortresses, and offered a strategic screen behind which the invader might conceal his dispositions, and a terrain unfavourable to the action of the superior French artillery. The fortresses on the Meuse, Liege, and Namur were known to be technically strong, but their value would depend on whether the action of Belgium proved prompt and resolute, and on whether, if armed resistance was oi^ered, their garrisons were strong enough to make the most of the forts entrusted to them. When Lord Sydenham reported on them in 1890 he liad estimated the minimum of troops necessary to hold them at 74,000 men ; and it was known to every one that the Belgians were short of men. The policy of a coup de main would at any rate be worth trying, for, as already pointed out, the first essential of German success was speed ; and the loss of many men to an army so numerous was of little account compared with the secure control of the valley of the Meuse and the roads and railways which the fortresses commanded. If such an attack proved successful, if the Belgian Army could be shattered and dashed aside before French support could reach it, a prospect of great suc- cesses would open to the German arms. The barrier of the Ardennes and the Middle Meuse would be turned, the supports of the PVench left shattered, and the German right, freed from obstacles, and gathering weight and speed as it gained space to unfold itself, would descend like an avalanche upon Paris, forcing the French armies to fall back, and so enabling its own centre and left to debouch from the woods of the Ardennes and to press their rear. The combination of momentum and envelopment obtained by such a movement would oifer a fine vindication of German strategic doctrine and, what was more im- portant, might bo expected to result in the defeat and demoralization of the defending army. By the end of August the whole of north-eastern France might be overrun and the German hosts, for the fourth time in a himdred years, might look upon the spires of Notre Dame. The feasibility of the plan still remained to be proved. If it succeeded it seemed likely to satisfy the test by which, we imagine, all strategy on the grand scale must be tried. That is to say, it might be expected not merely to achieve its nearer object, the defeat of the armies immediately concerned, but to dominate the whole campaign and neutralize any local failures in other parts of the theatre of war. No French successes in Alsace, even if pushed to the gates of Metz and Strassburg, would compensate for the driving of the main armies back on Paris. Once the invaders had forced their way to the borders of Belgium they would stand, strate- gically speaking, in the same position as Wellington and Bliicher in 1815 ; and, Uke Wellington, they would possess the assurance that a movement upon Paris from the north- east would inevitably bring a successful French offensive towards the Rhine to a stop and comjjel the troops to which it had been entrusttd to retire and succour the armies in the interior. Such it may be imagined were the calcula- tions of the great General Staff at Berlin, when they issued orders for the concentration on their western frontiers. CHAPTER III. THE BRITISH NAVY AND ITS WORK. Tasks of the Navy — Subsidiary duties — Commerce pbotection^Safeouarding the food SUPPLY — Patrols — Closing the enemy's ports — Transport of an expeditionary force — Main object destruction of the enemy's fleets — General considerations — Conditions OF A German initiative — Strength and distribution of the Navy at outbreak of War. IT is not the purpose of this chapter to deal with technical questions concerning the Navy, or to discuss at length the tactical views held by the British com- manders at the commencement of the campaign. It is rather our object to point out, by illustration when possible, the general tasks which awaited the Navy and the immense, even decisive, importance of their effective performance. The three principal duties that the Navy was called upon to perform were, first, the securing of the seas for the passage of British ships, especially the safeguarding of our food supply and the transport of troops ; secondly, the destruction by capture of the hostile shipping with the object of depriving the enemy of his supplies and rendering futile all projects of in- vasion ; thirdly, the destruction of the hostile fleets and naval bases. It was obvious that the last, for practical purposes, would comprehend the other two ; but it was not so certain that opportunities would offer for its accomplish- ment. In the meantime it was to be hoped that the British Fleet, by reason of its superior battle strength, would be able either to force the enemy to fight or to retire to his ports, and so afford an opportunity for its numerous cruisers to carry, out the subsidiary, but all-important, work of safeguarding their own and destroying the enemy's conunerce. We propose to refer to these subsidiary duties first. The wide development ■ of this closely- , Vol. I.— Part 2. 41 knit system of commercial protection, and the effect of the offensive action of our cruisers upon the enemy's shipping, was perhaps not quite adequately realized by the British public at the commencement of the war. A few days after the beginning, of hostilities nearly every street comer in London displayed a placard bearing the legend, " Olympic saved by British cruiser." The suggestion was that this was an isolated occurrence deserving of special and emphatic notice. As a matter of fact, this was merely one of many such accidents ; or, to speak more correctly, it was an incident of the general situation at sea that the OljTnpic should have come under the duect convoy of the particular cruiser which saved her. \Mmt f«ally saved her, what rendered her practically safe from one end of the voyage to the other, was the fact that the British and French cruisers guarding that particular line of communication were numerous, vigilant, and well-nigh ubiquitous, whereas the enemy's cruisers seeking to assail that line were few and for tlie most part fugitive. This incident has been used to illustrate the true nature imd the immense siguificanee of what our forefathers called " the sea affair." From the moment when war became imminent the main British Fleet melted into space. Nothing was seen of any part of it, except of the flotillas patrolling our coasts. Neverthe- less, although it was invisible, there was never in the world's history a more sudden, overwhelm- ing, and all-pervading manifestation of the 42 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE KING In Admiral's uniform. {W. & D. Dovnuy. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH, (3 "^ H.M.S. "DREADNOUGHT." 44 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LORD NELSON. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. *5 [Ku.^icU iir Sons, Southsea. CAPTAIN CECIL H. FOX of H.M.S. "Amphion." power of the sea than that given by the Britisli Fleet, admirably seconded by that of France, in the first fortnight of the war. The rarity of properly-called naval incidents might have left a different impression. It might well have seemed that the Fleets of France and England had done nothing. As a matter of fact, the,>' had done all in their power, and that all was stupendous. Those weeks saw German mari- time commerce paralysed ; British maritime commerce fast returning to normal conditions in all the outer seas of the world, and not even wholly suspended in the area of im- mediate conflict. Nay, more, it was already seeking new realms to conquer — realms left derelict by the collapse of the maritime commerce of the enemy. That is, in a few words, the long and the short of it. Prize Court notices of German and Austrian merchantmen captured on the seas or seized in our ports appeared daily in increa.sing numbers in The Times. Side by side with them appeared the familiar notices of the regular sailings of our liners for nearly all the ports of the outer seas. The Times published daily accounts of the new avenues of trade, manufacture, and transport opened up by the collapse of our enemies' commerce, and of the enorgj' and enter|}ri.se with which our merchants, manufacturers, and sea -carriers were preparing to exploit them. How it stood with Germany on the other hand we have unimpeachable German authority to show. On Augu.st 20 The Times published the following extract from the VorwUrts, the German Socialist organ : — If the Briti.sh blockade took place imports into Germany of roughly six thoiLnand million inark.s (£300,000,000) and exports of about eight thoiuand million marks (£400,000,000) would bo int<>rriiptcd— tOHolher an ovenw-a trade of 14 mllliardH of marks (£700,000,000). This in ius.iuminK tliat Germany'ii tnvde relations with Aiistria-lluiipiry, Switzerland, Italy, lielgiuin, HoII.iikI, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden rem.ained entirely uiiinflueneed by the war — • an iwsumption tlio oi>timiNni of which is wlf-evidii.t. .\ Klinec at the flgiu'es of the imports shows llio frightful Seriou-sness of the situation. What is the iioNition, for example, of the German textile indastry if it must forgo the imports of oversea cotton, jute, and wool ? If it must forgo the 462 millions (£23,100,000) of cotton front the United States, the 73 millions (£3,(150,000) of cotton from Egypt, the 58 millions (£2,900,000) of cotton from British India, the 100 millions (£5,000,000) of jute from the .same countries, and further the 121 millions (£0,050,000) of merino wool from Australia, and the 23 millions (£1,150,000) of th<? s;vme material from the Argentine ? What could she do in the event of a war of longer duration without these raw materials CAPTAIN ARTHUR A. M. DUFF of H.M.S. "Birfnin^ham.'' 46 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE RIGHT HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. f Bassanc THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 47 r=rT-ai, THE BRITISH SUBMARINE DI. which in one ye<ai' amount in vahie to 830 millions (£41,500.000) ? It may also be mentioned, said the Vorwiirts, that Germany received in 191 S aUjne fiom the United States about 300 millions (£15,000,00(1) o( copper, and further that the petroleum import would be as good as completely shut down. The German leather industry is largely dependent on imports of hides from ovei-sea. The Argentine alone sent 71 millions (£3,550,000) worth of hides. ' .Vgriculture would be sensibly injured by the intt-rniption of the exports of Chilean saltpetre from Chile, which in 1913 were of the value of not less than 131 millions (£6,550,000). The significance of an effective blockade of German foodst.ufts is to be seen in the ff)llowing few figures: — The value in marks of wh(vit from the United States is 165 millions (£8,250,00(1), fnmi Russia 81 millions (£1,050,000), from Canada 51 millions (£2,550,000), from the Argentine 75 millions (£3,750,000) — 372 millions (£18,600,000) from the.se four countries. There will also be a discontinuanc** of t.he importation from Russia of the following foodstuffs : — Eggs worth 80 millions (£4.000,000), milk and butter 63 millions (£3,150,000), hay 32 millions (£1,600,000), lard from the United States worth 1 12 millions (£5.600,000), rice from British India worth 46 millions (£2,300,000), and coffee from Brazil worth 151 millions (£7,550,000) should be added to the foregoing. No one who con- templates without prejiidice, said the Vorwiirts, these few^ facts, to which many others could be added, will be able lightly to estimate the economic conse- quences of a war of lon^ duration. " If the British blockade took place," said the Vorwiirts, and it dwelt on the consequences of a war of long duration. The British blockade was actually taking place at the moment these words were written, though it Was not called by that name forrea-sons which need not here be examined. Acting together with the hostility of Ru.ssia, whicli closed the whole of the Russian frontier of Germany to tlie transit of merchandise either way, the control of sea communication established by the fleets of England and France had already secured the first fruits of those consequences of a war of long duration on which the Vorw'.irls dwelt with such pathetic significance. Thost^ con- sequences were bound to be continuous and cumulative so long as the control of sea com- munications remained unrelaxed. The menace of the few German cruisei-s which were still at large was already abated. Already its bite had been found to be far less formidable than its bark. War premiums on British ships at sea were falling fivst. German maritime com- merce was uninsurable, and in fact there was none to insure. Its remains were stranded and derelict in many a neutral port One of the greatest dangers, in the opinion of some eminent authorities the most serioiw danger, that this country had to guard against in war was already averted, or would remain so as long as the control England had established over her sea 48 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. H.S.H. PRINCE LOUIS OF BATTENBERG, First Sea Lord, in the uniform of a Commodore. {LattyfUt. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 49 H.M.S. SHANNON." communications continued to be effective. This was the first result of our naval preparations, the first great manifestation of sea power. But there was a second result far more dramatic than the first, and not less significant in its implications, nor in its concrete mani- festation of the overwhelming power of the sea. The whole of the Expeditionary Force, witli all its manifold equipment for taking and keeping the field, had been silently, secretly, swiftly, and safely transported to the Continent without the loss of a single man, and without the slight(«t show of opposition from the Power wliich thought itself strong enough to challenge the imaggressive mistress of the seas. " Germany," says the Preamble to the Nav,\- Law of 1900, " must possess a battle fleet of such strength that even for the most power- ful naval adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's own supremacy doubtful." Such a war had now been forced upon England, and one of its first accomplished results had been the entirely successful com- pletion of an operation which, if the enem_\' had deemed oiu- naval supremacy even so much as doubtful, he might have been expected to put forth his uttermost efforts to impeach. That Germany declined the challenge was a proof even more striking of the power of superior force at sea than the, action of the British Navy upon the trade routes of the world. We now come to the third task of the Navy, the destruction of the hostile fleet. Some general remarks on this subject may not bo out of place. However great may be the immediate consequences of command of the sea, these advan- tages do not constitute the final and paramount end at wWch we should aim. That end is the overthrow of the enemy's fleets at sea. We must wait until the enemy gives us the oppor- tunity, but then we must make the best of it. The essential thing is always that if and when the enemy comes out in force lie may be en- countered as soon as may be in superior force, and forthwith brought to decisive action in a life and death struggle for the supreme prize of all naval warfare. Nothing can be further from the purpose of a sujierior navy than to keep the enemy's fleet peiuied jjorts. " I bog to inform your wrote Nelson in 1804, " that of Toulon has never been blockaded by me : quite the rev-erse — every opportunity has been offered to the enemy to put to sea, for it is there that we hope to realize the hopes and expectAtions of our country and I trust they will not be disappointed." But how if the enemy will not put to sea — up in his Lordship,' the port 50 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE, Cotnmander-in-Cblef, Home Fleets. [Russell 6- Sons, Soufhsea. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 51 H.M.S. ' IRON DUKE. with his battle fleet, that is ? Then we must wait until he does, and in the meanwhile we must use our best endeavours to parry his sporadic acts of aggression and to give him as much more than he gef^ as we can manage. He will seek to wear us down, and we on our part must seek to wear him down. The rationale of this type of naval warfare — the type most likely to prevail between two belligerents, one of whom is appreciably stronger in all the elements of naval force than the other — is ex- pounded as follows in Mr. J. R. Thursfield's little book on "Naval Warfare" : — The weaker Ijelligerent will at the outset keep his battle fleet in his fortifled ports. Tlie st njnger may do the same, but ho will be under no such para- mount inducement to do so. Both sides will, how- ever, s»>nd out their torpedo craft and support inii cruisers with intent to do as much Iiarm as they can to the armed forces of the enemy. If one belligerent can get his tor|>edo craft to sea l)efoix> the enemy is ready, he will, if he i.s thn stronger of the two, forthwith attempt to establish as close and sustaimnl a watch of the ports sheltering the enemy's armed forces as may be practicable ; if he is the weaker he will attempt sporadic attacks on the ports of his advei'saiy and on such of his wai'ships as m.ay be found in the open. . . . Sucli attacks may be very effective and m.iy even go so far to redress the b.ilancc of naval strength as to encoin-jige the originally weaker belligerent to seek a decision in the open. But the forces of the stronger belligerent must be very ba<?ly handled and disposed tor anything of the kind to take place. The advantage of suiK'rior foree is a tre- mendous one. If it is associated with energy, deter- mination, initiative, and skill of disposition no more than equal to those of the assailant, it is overwhelming. The sea-keejjing capacity, or wh.at has been called the enduring moljility, of torpedo craft is com- paratively small. Their c<i,al supply is limited, especially when they are st^'aming at full sp<"ed, and they carry no very lai-ge reserve of torp<'does. They must, therefore, very frequently return to a base to replenish their supplies. The sup<>rior enemy is, it is true, subject to the same disabilities, but Ix'ing superior he has mor'- torpedo craft to spai-e and more cruisers to attack the torpedo craft of the enemy and their own escort of crui-sers. When the raiding torpi'do craft return to their base he «nll make it very difHicult for them to get in and just lus diflicult for them to get out again. He will suffer losses, of couiwe, for there is no superiority of force that will confer immunity in that resix-ct in war. But oven l)otweon equal forws, equally well led and handled, there is no reason to suppose that the k>sses of one side will be more than equal to those of the other; whereas if one side is appreciably suiK'Hor to the other it is rea.sonable to suppose th.it it will inflict greater losses on the enemy than it suffers itself, while even if the losses are equal the residue of the stronger force will still Ik' greater than that of the weaker. One must not assume, when the enemy does not come out, that the menace and display of superior force in every direction have acted as a deterrent and quelled initiative to the point of paralysis. No such hypothesis con be enter- tained on tlie merely negative evidence of a situation still obscure and undeveloped. It 52 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LORD FISHER, A former First Sea Lord. [Berssford THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 53 BRITISH TRAWLKRS EQUIPPED AS MINE SWEEPERS. [Fr,d La C^rU,. is far more likely that the enemy is pre- paring some great coup requiring him to keep all liis available forces in hand and to use them when the time comes with the utmost vigour and determination. At any rate, that is what the British Fleet had to be prepared for. It must stand at all times in full readiness to parry the blow, whensoever and wheresoever it is delivered, to anticipate it, if it may be, and in any case to meet the enemy with a vigour, determina- tion, and skill not inferior to his own, and witli a force so superior as to crown our arms with victory. No nation wliich wages war on the seas can hope for anytliing more or better than a decision sought and obtained on t«rms such as these. In the circumstances wliich prevailed in the war between Germany and England in 1914, it was peculiarly probable that Germany would at the outset show an apparent feebleness of initiative. In connexion with the first great German Navy Bill of 1900 it was laid down that the German Navy need not be ivs strong as that of the greatest naval Power " for, as a rule, a great naval Power will not be in a position to concentrate all it:'- forces against us." In the event it was, perhaps, the German Navy that was at the outset least able " to concentrate all ite forces " against " the greatest naval Power." The German Fleet was compelled at first to be a two -fold containing force — against a formid- able military adversary in the Baltic and against an overwhelmingly sujxjrior naval adversary in the North Sea. To go out to fight in the North Sea might be to imcover the Baltic coasts of Germany to the assaults of Rutsiia from the sea and thereby greatly to facilitate the military o[)erations of Russia in that region. We may fitly conclude this chapter with a brief enumeration of the British naval forcet-.. The First Fleet consisted of four battle squadroiis together with a fleet flagship, the Iron Duke, which carried the flag of Sir John Jellicoe, the supreme Conunander-in-Chic f afloe-t. The first battle squadron consisted of eight battleships of the Dreadnought and super- Dreadnought type, seven of which carried tx;n 12in. giuis, together with a secondary anuament of 4in. gims, while the eighth, the Marlborough, a sister ship to the fleet flagsliip, liad ten i;l-5in. guns and a 6in. secondary armament. The second battle squadron con- sisted of eight super-Dreadnoughts, each carry- ing ten 13'5in. gims with a 4in. s(»condary arma- ment. The tliird battle squadron consisted of the eight fine pre-Dreadnouglit shij>s of the Iving Edward VII. type, each carrying four 12in., four 9'2in., and ten 6in. ginis. The fourth battle squadron consisted of the Dread- nought herself and two others of a later type. 54 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. all carrying ten 12in. guns apiece and two of them a 4in. secondary armament, together with the Agamemnon, one of the latest of the pre -Dreadnought ships, carrying four I2in. and ten 9-2in. guiis. As two Turkish ships wore purchased on the outbreak of war and other Britisli ships were nearing completion, it was contemplated that this squadron would soon be strengthened, though not necessarily with the newly commissioned ships themselves. A light cruiser and a destroyer were attached to the Fleet flagsiiip, each battle squadron had also a Ught cruiser attached to it, two repair ships accompanied the whole fleet, and it had also eight attached destroyers. Affiliated to the First Fleet were (1) the battle cruiser squadron, consisting of four ships, three of them carrying eight 13'5in. guns apiece and the fourth eight 12in. guns, all with a 4in. secondary arma- ment ; (2) the second cruiser squadron, consisting of four powerful armoured cruisers ; (3) the third cruiser squadron of four cruisers of the Devonshire type, each carrying four 7-5in. and six Bin. guns ; (4) the fourth cruiser squad- ron, coiviisting of four .ships of the Monmouth type, with an armament of fourteen Gin. guns, and one light cruiser, the Bristol, with an armament of two 6in. and ten 4in. guns ; (.5) the first light cruiser squadron consisting of four ships, and (6) a squadron of six mine- sweeping gunboats. Furthermore, there were four flotillas of destroyers attached to the First Fleet under the command of a Commodore, whose brofid pennant flew in the Amethyst, a light cruiser. Each had a flotilla cruiser attached to it, and a depot ship as well. The first, second, and foiulih flotillas had 20 destroyers apiece, and the third had 15. This, then, was our first line of defence in home waters. But it was not our only line. Behind it stood the Second Fleet and behind that the Third, each with its battle squadrons and its cruiser squadrons. The Second Fleet liad two battle squadrons, each with a light cruiser attached. The first of these squadrons con- sisted of eight ships of the Formidable type, and the second, with the Lord Nelson, a sister ship to the Agamemnon, whose armament has already been given, as fleet flagship, had six other vessels, five of the Duncan type and one of the Canopus type. All these ships of both fleets liad the uniform pre-Dreadnought arma- ment of four 12in. and twalve Gin. guns. For cruiser squadrons the Second Fleet hiid first the fifth cruiser squad -on, coasisting of the Carnarvon with four 7-5in., and six Gin. guns, the Falmouth with eight Gin. and the Liverpool with two Gin. and ten 4in. ; and, secondly, the sixth cruiser squadron, consisting of the four fine armoured cruisers of the Drake type, all armed alike with two 9-2in. guns and sixteen Gin. It had also a mine-layer squadron of seven vessels. Its patrol flotillas, indspeu- dantly organized imda.' the Ad niral of Patrols, were four in nunabor, the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth, with seven flotilla cruisers and four depot ships attached. The sixth flotilla con- sisted of 23 destroyers, the seventh of 21 destroyers and 12 torpedo-boats, tho third of 13 destroyers and 1 1 torpedo-boats, and the fourth of 17 destroyers. Last, but not least, there were seven flotillas of submarines with 1 1 depot ships attached to them. In all they mustered 52 vessels, the balance of submarines in commission being accounted for by the flotillas stationed abroad. Lastly came the Third Fleet, with two battle squadrons, the seventh and eighth, each with a light cruiser attached, and six cruiser squadrons, one of which, however, was " temporarily not constituted " when war began. The seventh battle squadron consisted of five ships of the Majestic type, and the eighth of five of the Canopus type. They were comparatively old ships, the earliest dating from 1895 and the latest from 1902, but they had a good deal of fight in them. All were armed with four 12in. and twalve Gin. guns, not of course of the newest type, but by no means to be despised or neglected. The cruiser squadrons of this fleet mustered 30 vessels in all, of types too various to be enumerated in detail. They were for the most part old ships, but none of them obsolete in any legitimate sense, and they were certain to give a very good account of them- selves in any work which they were likely to be called upon to do. Of the several fleets, squadrons, and flotillas stationed abroad nothing need here be said excppt that in conjunction with the French Fleet in the Mediterranean Euid other waters they were amply strong enough to make snort work of any enemy they were likely to encounter. Such was the material strength of our guard upon the seas. If battles were won by ships nothing more need be said. But battles are not won by ships. They are won by the men who fight them. One spirit animated the whole Navy, a spirit of unswerving devotion to their King, their country, and the call of duty or of danger. CHAPTER IV. THE GERMAN, FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN NAVIES. German Navai, Policy — Von Tikpitz — ^The Navy Law of 1900 — Materiel op the Navy- Personnel — German Naval Bases — French Navy — Policy — Decline — Revival — BouA 13B LAPfeYRi^aiE — Personnel — Dockyards — Composition of Fleet — Russian Navy — The Japanese War — Renaissance of the Navy- — The Navy Bill of 1912 — Standards of Strength and Policy — Gregorovitch — Strength at Outbreak of Wah — Strategic Posi- tion — The Austro-Hunoarian Navy — -An Austrian Tirpitz — Adriatic Bases — Strength of the Fleet. OF all the problems of the war there was none more monientoufi than the trial of strength of the German Navy. It was itself the chief German creation of the past fifteen yearf., the chief work of the Emperor W illiam II., the chief sjinbol and weapon cf Gorman Welt- poliiik. Its rapid ccnstruction had for a decade influenced more than anything else the course of international relations, and been the most powerful factor in determining the respective places of Great Britain and Germany in the grouping of the European Powers. From 1900 onwards German naval ambitions liad enibittered Angle -German relations, and for a good many years the most urgent question in ix)litics liad been whether an Anglo -German war could be averted. The prospect of such a duel had been becoming to all appearance more and more remote wlien Germany took a course wliich set all Europe ablaze and " brought England in," almost as if naval war with the greatest naval Power, with all its menace not only to the German Navy but to Germany's conununications and trade, were a minor issue. Sea-power played no part in the making of modern Germany, and was irrelevant to Ger- many's homo defence. It was sought deliber- ately as an engine of conquest and as the only effective wbapon with which Germany could win power abroad and above all dispute British supremacy. German historians and orators, from the Emperor William downwards, embel- lished their appeals to tne popular imagination with much medieval lore, and regarded the new Navy as the fulfilment of the aspirations of all great Germans who had dreamed of a new and greater German Empire. But in reality the German Navy built up between 1898 and 1914 wiis a new work. Its foundations were on the one hand prosperity and conunercial ambition, and on the other hand a carefully fostered belief in the impending dowiifall and decay of the British Empire. The tliree wars fought by Bismarck for German unity were from a naval point of view insignificant. The war of 1864 gave Kiel to Prussia and secured her position on the Baltic. The war of 1866 gave Prussia the whole North Sea littoral (she had previously purchased Wilhelmshaven from the Grand Ducliy of Oldenburg). But, owing to tlie unpreparedness of France, sea-iwwer played no importart part in the great struggle of 1870, and after the wars which brought Germany so much glory on land Bismarck even diminislied such modest naval proposals as he had hitherto been mailing. 65 56 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GRAND ADMIRAL, PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA, THE TIMES HISTORY OF I'HE WAR. 57 KIEL. There was very little change in the next twenty years, and notwithstanding Bismarck's success- ful policy of tariff protection the Navy esti- mates remained almost stationary or fluctuated within a narrow range imtil some time after the accession of the Emperor William II. in 1888. In the year 1897 the rejection of naval in- creases of no great amount by the German Keichstag caused the retirement of Admiral von HoUmann, the Muster in charge of naval matters, and he was succeeded by a com- paratively unknown naval officer named Tirpitz, who soon obtained the title of a Secretary of State. He appears to have been selected because he had found means to persuade the Emperor William that he could devise and carry out a progressive scheme of naval ox- pan.'sion on lines which would prevent or circmnvent Parliamentary interference. If so, he was as good as his word. Ho began, in 1898, with a Bill which was modest in extent ■ — it provided, for instance, for an establishment of only 19 battleships — but which contained the all-important principle that the strength of the fleet should be fixed for a definite period, and that the dates should also be fixed at which old ships should bo " replaced " by new. The Reichstag was supposed to retain a sort of control over naval finance because, although the programme was determined in advance, the Navy Estimates were presented and voted annually. Tirpitz, however, foresaw acciu-at^ly that this control would be only nominal, and there was hardly an occasion in the next 15 years on which he had the least reason to fear any distiu-bance of his plans from Parliament. The only at all effective checks — and they were seldom exercised — were the occasional qualms of the Foreign Office and the occasional de- mands of the military authorities that the claims of the Aniiy should have precedence over those of the Navy. At the beginning of the year 1912, for example, there was a t harp tussle between Tirpitz and the Ministry of War, and there was even an attempt to upset the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann- Hollweg, in order to make way for the Naval Minister. In any ca.so nothing could mo\e Tirpitz fro:n power. When the war camo he Was still in the office to which he had been appointed 17 years before. He had served under, or rather with, three Imperial Cliancollorg and had seen Ministers come and go in all the other Departments of the State. Having once established liis main principles in the Bill of 1898, Tirpitz seized every oppor- timity of expansion. He Was unscnipulous to a degree in the handling of the Press organizti- tion that was always a feature of his administra- tion, and whenever naval increases were imminent he insisted most emphatically upon their impossibility. In 1899 he denied abso- lutely that there was any intention of going 58 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE GERMAN BATTLE-CRUISER " VON DER TANN." beyond the Navy Law passed in the preceding year. Within a few months he had presented the great measure which became the Navy Law of 1900 and the real foundation of the naval challenge to Great Britain. It practi- cally doubled Germany's naval establishment,, turning, for example, at a stroke of the pen two squadrons of battlesliips into four. It was definitely presented as a measure which would make war with Germany dangerous " even for the greatest naval Power." As we have seen in an earlier chapter, the Navy Law of 1900 was the direct outcome of the passionate Anglophobia which the German Government fomented upon the outbreak of the South African War. Later on the German Emperor and German sailors generally were wont to forget the beginnings of their great endeavour, and to speak as though they had been moved to compete with England only by admiration. In truth the modem German Navy was bom of jealousy and hatred. It was expected that disaster would befall us in South Africa, and it was hoped and believed that the British Empire would crumble and decay, so that our heritage would fall to the Power that was ready to join issue with us upon the seas. Having set about their work, the Germans carried it on with wonderful determination. The Emperor William, hmiseif indefatigable, was ably assisted by his brother I'rince Henry of Prussia, who for some time commanded the High Sea Fleet and at the outbreak of war was Inspector-General. Public opinion was instructed by an elaborate propaganda, and especially by a powerful Navy League and an efficient Admiralty Press Bureau. The universities and schools did their part. In a very short time the Navy became almost as popular as the Army, and public faith in its mission was as firmly established. We need not here discuss the several " amend- ments " of the Navy Law of 1900. There was a Navy Bill in 190C, another in 1908, and another in 1912, and special provision for naval air work was included in the great Army Bill of 1913. The main effect of the Bill of 1912 had been, as regards materiel, to add a third squadron of battleships to the active battle fleet and greatly to increase the number of destroyers and submarines in commiasion. At the outbreak of war the High Sea Fleet, under the command of Admiral von Ingenohl (flagship Friedrich der Grosse) consisted of 21 battleships, of which 13 were Dreadnoughts, four battle -cruisers, eight light cruisers, and some 80 torpedo craft. The full strength of Germany was nominally 37 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 59 battleships and battle-cruisers, nine armoured and 39 light cruisers, 142 destroyers, 47 tor- pedo-boats, and 27 submarines. There wore, however, three Dreadnoughts, the Mark- graf, the Grosser Kurfiirst and the Konig, and one battle-cruiser, the Derfflinger, nearly reiKlx for oomnxissioning, and it was known that the number of submarines was considerably larger than had been officially admitted. AH the later battleships carried a main arnxament of ten 12in. gims, the preceding class having twelve 12in. gims and the earliest Dreadnoughts twelve 11 in. guns. In materiel Germany liad from the begin- ning been content to iniitato English types. and she made no effort to anticipate ' British design.s after inaccurate imformation, too eagerly acquired, concerning the British In- vincible class had led her in 1907 to construct one conspicuously unsucces.sful cruiser, the Bliicher. What of the personnel 1 It was obvious that it lacked both the inspiration of naval traditions and experience not only of actual warfare but of distant voyages. It had been a great event for the German Navy, a few months before the war, to send its newest Dreadnoughts on a tour to South America, mainly for the purpose of attracting orders for the German building yards. A GRAND ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ, Secretary of State for the German Imperial Navy. GRAND ADMIRAL VON KOESTER, President of the German Navy League. great part of the Navy had confined its exercises almost entirely to the North Sea, with occasional exciuT<ions to Norwegian waters. There, however, at any rate, minute local knowledge had been obtained, which it was hop€>d to turn to good accoimt in a war with England. The German imval officers were a.s a whole keen, intelligent, and very ambi- tious, and every observer had been struck by their rapid development and the extent to which they had grow7i away from the routine and machinelike methods of the I^xssian Army. Unlike British officws they hatl, however, entered upon their careers at the age of 18 or later, after an ordinary school education. Of the crews, about one quarter were volunteers or men Who had re-engaged after their period of compulsory service — in no case longer than three years. The rest were coruicripts, whom choice or accident had brought to the Navy rather than the Army. The Navy was originally recruitod es.sentially from the " seafaring "' population, but of necessity, a.s the Navy grew, an ever larger proportion of men had to be drawn from the inland population. That was the main rea.son why the Navy propaganda was carried on with increasing zeal in Bavaria and other States with no seaboard of their own and a population of peasants. A senae of the draw- backs of such recruiting luid been very evident BO THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ADMIRAL VON INGENOHL. Commander-in-Chief, German Fleet. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 01 THE GERMAN GUNBOAT "PANTHER" WHICH WAS SENT TO MOROCCO IN 1911. among the German naval authorities, and large increases had been advocated for the very reiuiou that the training of first-year recruits greatly impaired the fighting efficiency of any ship to which they were allotted. Cemian naval strategy had been concerned ahnost exclusively with possibilities of war with England, just as German sailors had been brought up exclusively on British naval history, and it was improbable that the early stages of the war would bring any surprises from the German side. Germany was operating from one vast war station extending from the island of Sylt in the north to the island of Borkum in the south — a semi-circle with Heligoland as its geographical centre. The whole position was magnificently fortified and equipped, laul, since the completion just before the ■sVar of the widening and deepening of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal for the pa8.sage of the largest ships, there was free and rapid communication between the two great naval stations of Wilhelmshaven and Iviel. Nominally Kiel was the base of two squadrons of battleships and Wilhehnsliaven of the tliird battleship squadron and the battle THE FRENCH NAVY. Within the years inunediately preceding the war the French naval situation had undergone a nidical transformation, due partly to a change in pxiblic opinion, but as much to the circumstance that the eminent men who ruled the destinies of the French Navy during these years were not only inspired by a patriotic desire to restore the prestige at sea of the nation but had taken the best measures to ensure that result. Tlianks to the stable and con^- prehensive progress which the Republican Navy liad nxode under men like Bono de Lapeyrerr, Dolciusse, and Baxidin, it entered upon the struggle with a faith in itself and a conviction of ultimate success which was the beet augury of victory. Strong in tlie un- doubted efficiency of its administration, in the professional competency of its leaders, and in tlio keen fighting spirit of its seamen, it was ready to perform its duties in a mamier worthy of its great traditions and the interests of the Republic. Like the British, the French Navy had seen no serious fighting for over a century. Diu-ing that long iieriod the conditions cf naval war- faro had undergone many and material clianges. The construction and equipment of the Navy had been entirely altered. Steam had taken the place of sail, steel of oak and hemp. Not only had the power a:id range of the gun enonnously increased, but the torpedo liad become its rival. Submarines and air-craft had been added to tlie naval onnoury. In all the permutations wliich had taken THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ^^^^^^K^ l^^^^^^' 1' Pi ^'-^ ■«» ^^^^^^^Kr / ^ ^^Hr r a ^^^ 1 f H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES. [Campbell Gray, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 63 M. DELGASSE. The French Statesman and Diplomatist. It was about twenty years before the out- hreivk of war lliat the decline of the French Navy bepan, but oven b<ifore this the school of tliought known as the Jcune Ecole, with a distinguisiied admiral at it« heM and a talent-txl journalist for its mouthpiece, had already sung the praises of tlie guerre dc cmirse, and prophesied an early victory for the microbe over the msistodon. Then this school hid its way. Battlesliip building declined, cruisers and hundr(!ds of torpedo boats were con- structed instead. For nearly ton years this mischievous policy prevailed, although fortu- nately, owing to a change of Ministry, six battle- ships of the Patrie class were ordered in 1901-2: It was a forward movement, but insufficient to make up for the leeway of the past yoers. Even after these ships were ordered, changes in desiga delayed their completion, while the toqiodo craft that were supposed to supply their place were too small and slight for offen-sive warfare on the high seas. Previously, Franco had been outnumbered only by England in armoured battleships. Hers was the second navy in the world. But then retrogression .set m, the Navy did not find place it was always France that led the way. The genius of her inventors and sciertific men enabled them to foresee and anticii^ate iiaval needs and the requirements of future naval warfare. Yet, ciu-iously enough, the French had failed to take advantage of their initial successes. They had not always devel- oped their ngw ideas along practical lines. It is sufficient to mention that to them we owed the first see^going iroiKilad, and they were likewise the pioneers of the tor|X!(lo boat and the submarine. To some extent an explanation of the extra- oixlinary lack of continuity which obtained in regard to French naval construction may be found in the influence which successive schools of thought exerted upon the Ministers of Marine who ruled the Fleet, and during the many changes in this office the material strength of the Navy gained or lost, according to the whim of the controlling hand. So-called reforms followed one another too quickly to allow of any one of them having its desired effect. Nevertheless, despite all the vicissi- tudes through which its material construction passe<l, the ptrsonnel of the Fleet never lost its vitality, and even the harm done by the administration of M. PoUetan was insufficient to shake its real strength and inJierent buoyancy and patriotism. THE KING OF SERVIA. {Rtcord Prfss. 64 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ■ B ■ ^^^^^H| iP^iii%^ ''^H 1 w^A 101 l^B^^^^^R III/' A ^P' ' " '^ Mm Mil ^M ^^Ki!Su»SHI^^»-'^^^^M|^^^|Hfl m 1 ^^H| 1 ^ ^H 1 1 ^H 1 1 HV^^te '^^1 ADMIRAL BOUE DE LAPEYRERE. Commander-in-Chief, French Fleet. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS. 06 BREST. the encouragement from the country that was its due, and other nations entered the field of naval construction, competing with her for her place as a great sea power. Thus French relative superiority afloat declined, until it was possible for Admiral de Cuverville to state that the fleet had dropped to fifth place among the navies of the world, having been overtaken by the sea forces of Germany, the United States, and Japan. In 1906 another change of Ministry and of policy occurred. Consent was obtained for the construction of six vessels of the Danton class, but these ships were not Dreadnoughts, although the Dreadnought era had begun. The Dreadnought cruisers to a largo extent lessened the value as fighting units of p.11 the earlier armoured cruisers, especially of those of no greater speed than Fruice had then com- pleting. M. Gaston Thomson, whose adminis- tration was in several respects nv.rked both by an improx'ement in construction and in the training of the fleets, was succeeded as MinLst<>r oi Marine by M. Alfred Picprd, a rruxn of scientific ability and considerable organizing power, from whose efforts much was hojied. He liad. however, scarcely taken office before the Gov- ernment again changed, and Admiral Bou6 de Lapeyrere became Minister of Marine. From this date the real renaissance of the French Navy begins. Bou^ de I>apeyrere, when war began Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy afloat, was a man of great initiative, restless energy, and stubborn determination. When he became Minister of Marino he had already naade a reputation as a naval administrator, as well as having had much sea experience. He was also the youngest officer of his rank in the French Navy. It was a daring experiment after a succession of civil administrators to put a seaman at the helm, but it proved entirely successful. LapejTere had had no experience in the command of a battle fleet, but he had been flag-captain to Admiral Fournier, who was the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean from 1898 to 1900. He had also seen war service in China, and had commanded the Newfoundland and Atlantic divisions, as well as having been in charge of the naval establish- ment at Rochefort and acted as Maritime Prefect at Brest. The Admiral set himself about the task of the refonning of the Navy with the same high sense of professional duty and resolute firmness wliich liad already characterized his naval career. Among his first acta was the importa- tion of fresh blood at the Rue Royale, where he formed soTnething in the nature of the British .\dmiralty Board. He also instituted a policy of concentration, bringing all the newer ships into one fleet in the Mediterranean, entrusting the task of training it to Adiriiral C«illard. In every way he set himself, by a courageous sweep of abuses, to dissipate the conservatism, sloth, and inertness which so far had hampered 66 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAM. VICE-ADMIRAL SIR FREDERICK STURDEE, Chief of the War Staff, in Captain's uniform. [hllioll 6r Fry. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 67 ■ 1 ij L. ■*""■ "' - ,HCt mitsmf 1 . . .,-f^- FRENCH BATTLESHIP "DANTON." the efforts of those who tK^heved it incumbent on France to strengthen her naval forces vvitliout delay. A new building programme, which beoiine eventually an organic law, was proposed, the public and private arsenals and dockyard i wero urged to further efforts, their organiza- tion was improved, and money spent on the renewal of their plant and equipment to accord with modern requirements. The prospects of the French Navy became brighter than they had been for many years. Admiral Bou6 de Lapeyrero was succeeded by M. Delcasse, who most energetically pushed the plans of his predecessor, and even enlarged their scojie. This sagacious and able statesman maintained that France must possess " a fleet strong enough to demand the resjject of any rival, and enjoying uncontested supremacy in the Mediterranean." Hi was succeeded by M. Pierre Baudin, wlio caiiie into office about the same tiine that Mr. Churchill became First Lord of the British Admiralty. He again, by a new Navy law, not only provided for the laying down of new ships, but for the acceleration of those already iu\der construc- tion, and at the same time forwarded measures for increasing the number of officers and men and reducing the age of tlie officers serving afloat. At last it appeared to be clearly recognized by, the Government and the people that without a consistent policy, zealously carried out by men of authority and competence, with a firm grasp of essentials, all tlie un- doubted resources of the country would bo of no avail. Thenceforward, although there were further changes at the Rue Royale, there was continuous progress in all directions. The policy of atlvance and development was steadily maintained. To a certain extent the inefficiency of the central Power was boimd to have an adverse effect upon the personnel. Fortunately, the enfeeblement of the Navy in this respect did not go very deep. In her Breton seamen the French Navy possesses the finest possible ele- ment for manning its shit>8. In all seamatilike qualities these men are second to none, and in spite of much that had been written to the contrary, those who knew maintained that the standartl of patriotism, discipline, and devotion to duty of the crews of the French vessels was a very liigh one. Reforms in the methods both of enlistment and training were carried out to great advantage, not only making a much larger number of men available for the service of the Fleet, but also, by a system of long service, ensuring that men holding the higher skilled ratings were fully competent for their 68 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ADMIRAL SIR HENRY JACKSON, F.R.S. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. [LafayeUe^ THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 69 MAP OF THE ADRIATIC SEA duties. As to the officers, they were imbued witli tlie liigliest spirit of devotion to tlie service of their country, and fully recognized Ihat authority, vigilance, and responsibility must bo the watchwords of an efficient navy. The Fleet received under successive admirals con- stant and strenuous training ^at sea, until it had attained a high proficiency in gumiery an<l other battle exercises. Under the leadership of Admiral IJoue de Laj^ejTere there were a number of comparatively young flag-officei's willing and able and ready to assist liim. At the time of the outbn-ak of war Vice-Admiral Charles Chocheprat was the second-in-connnaixd, and Rear-Adiniral Le Bris, well-known au a gumiery expert, was third-in-command, while Vice-Admiral C. E. Favereau was in command in the Channel. In addition, there were among the younger rear-admirals, all under sixty, such men as Senes, de Suguy, Gauchet, Moreau, Nicol, and Lacaze, all of whose names carried weight and confidence. The French pulilic dockyards were five in n\unber, and as in England they wore used both for the construction and repair of all cla.sses of vessels. At Toulon, which since the concentra- tion of the bulk of the Xavy in the Mediter- ranean had 1 een the principal base and arsenal, tl-.ere were throe battleship docks and alwut six for cruisers and torj^edo craft. With its increased u.se as a repairing establishment, new construction had declined, and no armoured ship had been built since 1901, but destroyers and submarines continued to be builti Toulon 70 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ADMIRAL SIR GEORGE CALLAGHAN. Late Commander in-ChUf, Home Fleets, in Rear-Admiral's uniform. [Elliot, & Fry. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 71 TOULON. was filso tlio lieadqimrtors of tho gunnory and torpedo schools. At Brest, and also at Lorient, battleships were constructed, but not small craft. Both the.so Atlantic yards turned o\it some fine vessels, including Dreadnoughts. The other two public jards were Rochofort, on the Bay of Biscay, and Cherbourg, in the Channel, which had not lavuiche:! an armoured ves.sel .since 1900 and 1903 respectively, but con- tinued to build torpedo craft and suiimarines. It will be noticed that nearly all the French Government yards were outside the Mediter- ranean, just as most of the British yards were outside the North Sea, the reason in both cases being that they were founded in times when diiTeront strategical conditions obtained, and tho Chaiuicl and Atlantic were the iwuix cruising and battle groiuids of the fleets. The naval bases used by the French Fleet also included Ajaccio and Bonifaoio, in Corsica ; Bizerta, in Tunis ; and Algiers and Oran, in Algeria. In the Channel, Dunkirk ajid Calais were used as torpedo bases. France was well served with private ship- building establishments, who.se efliciency had been encouraged under recent Administrations. At least four yards could build Dreadnoughts — two at St. Nazaire, one at J^a Soyne, and one at Bordeaux. There were torpedo craft con- 8tn.;ction works at St. Xazaire, Bordeaux, Havre, Nantes, and Rouen. Armour liad been cliiefly supplied by contract, but a certain quantity of desk plates had been manufactured by the Government establishment at Gu^rigny. In view of its economical working, which was about 40 per cent, cheaper than private estab- lishments, the Gu^rigny factory was being equipped with new plant and enlarged to enable it to produce one-fifth of the armour required for the ships in the organic Navy Law of 1912. As regards ordnance, it had for some time been the practice to receive only the element.s of guns from private firms, the Navy fitting together and finishing off it« own weapons instead of having them delivered complete. A number of serious accidents in the French Navy owing to the deterioration of the powders in use led to changes which gave a greater sense of security in this direction. The former intermittent control of the Navy over its powder mmufacture was superseded by a system of permanent control, and naval officers were sent to Ga\Tes and Sevran-Livry to receive instruction in the practical side of minufacturo, while courses in the science of exjilosives wore add«l to the curricuhnn of the gunnery schools. Means had also been found to bring down the moan tomi>©rature of the magazines on board the no west vessels to Sfideg. F., and in some even to 77deg. F. At the outbreak of war tlie French Navy had an effective strength of 23 battleships. 72 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF MARINE, ADMIRAL GREGOROVITCH. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ST. PETERSBURG. 24 cruisers, eight ligiit cruisers, 80 destroyers, about 140 torpedo boats, and over 50 submarines. Individually, these warships were all, on the whole, of good size or power, comparing well with their contemporaries in other navies. The battle fleet was headed by ten ships of the Dreadnought era. Four of them were of ?3,095 tons, or as large as the battleships of the same date in the British Navy, and armed witli twelve 12in. guns, with a broadside fire of ten 12in. guns, the same as that of the newest German battlesliips. The other si.\, although built at the same time as the early British Dreadnoughts, had not a uniform calibre main armament, but were armed with four 12in. and twelve 9'4in. guns. Of the pre- Dreadnought battleships, five were of the Patrie type, of 14,900 tons, which was similar to the British Bulwark type, though with a heavier secondary battery. All the other battleships, with one exception, carried 12in. guns, the oldest having two of this calibre in conjunction with two 10-8in. The "tail" of the French battle fleet was much stronger tlian that of Germany or Austria-Hvuigary. For instance, the Ma-ssena, of 12,120 tons, am^ed with two 12in., two 10-8in., eight 5-5in., and eight 3-9in. gims, and a designed speed of 17 J knots, compared well with the German ^-Egir, of 4,084 tons, armed with three 9-4in. guns, and designed for 15J knots ; or with the Austrian Monarch, of 5,510 tons, armed with four 9-4in. and six 5-9in. guns, designed for 17 knots. All these throe ships were launched in 1895. There were 114 guns of 12in. calibre mounted in the battle fleet, eight of lO-Sin. calibre, 72 of 9-4in. calibre, 30 of 7-6in., and 46 of 0'5in. calibre. In the Austrian battle fleet of 15 units there were 48 guns of 12in. calibre, with 57 of 9-4in. and 36 of 7'5ii . calibre. Thus the French fleet was even more superior in material strength than the mere number of its battleships would indicate. The outstanding feature of the 24 French cruisers, or the latest of them, was their large size and power. As many as 16 were of over 8,000 tons displat!ement. The principal guns moimted were 7-6in., the newest ves.sels of the Edgar Quinet type having as many as 14 of them. There were in the French Navy, however, no battle-cruisers such as the British Invincibles and Lions and the German Goeben, and the construction of the armoured cruisers had ceased for about seven years. Conse- quently 23J knots was the highest designed speed of any Frencli cruiser, although some exceeded this rate, the Ernest Renan making 25 J knots on trial. At the time they were designed the Edgar Quinet class might liavo been thought very fast ships, but they did not compare with the battle -cruisers of a designed speed of from 25 to 28 knots. No 74 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. H.R.H. PRINCE ALBERT. [Emsst Brooks. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 75 RUSSIAN ARMOURED CRUISER " GROMOBOI." Mefliterranean Power however had at the time built any battlo-crviisers. Light cruisers weye a class which had been even more neglected by French constructors, none having been launched since 1897, when the 21 knot D'Estr^es was put afloat. Tlie eight effective vessels provided a sufficient set-off to their contem- poraries in the Austrian Navy, but against tlm four 26-knot vessels of the Admiral Spaiin type in the latter France had no vessels to match in point of speed. A very different state of things prevailed in regard to torjiodo craft. France had taken the lead in all cla.s.ses of the mosquito fleet, sometimes to the detriment of her battleship programme. Her latest destroyers were of 880 tons, armed with two 3-9in. and four 9-poundor guns, and two double torpedo tubes, wliile several other tyjjes wore between 755 and 400 tons, and the speeds ranged from 28 to 35 knots. So with siibinarines. The latest boats wore cf 820 tons and carried ten torpedo tubes, and thanks to the weeding out policy all the 50 odd boats on the list were of inodern and effective types. THE RUSSIAN NAVY. At the commencement of the war of 1914 the Russian Navy laboured imder very con- siderable disadvantages. The war against Japan had ended in tlie annihilation of the greater part of the Fleet ami in a terrible diminution of the prestige of Rassian seamanship. As is usual in such ca^es, the imfortunate fleet, insufficient as its training proved to be, was far less responsible for the repeated disasters it had undergone than were the management of its commanders and the policy of its own Government. While admitting to the full that the almost unbroken series of its failures is attributable in largo part to its tactical inferiority, ship for sliip., to the Japanese Xavy, it must be owned that it had a very full sliare of bad management and bad luck. In the opening days of the campaign it was suriirised and crippled by the sheer incapacity and want of prevision of those who directed it ; in the weeks that followed it lost its one great admiral at the sinking of the Petrojiavlox-sk, and in the first great sea action it was deprived of what chances of victory it ever had by the death of its commander at the critical moment of the fight. The removal of some of its guns to a.ssist in the 76 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. MAP OF THE NORTH SEA. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 77 defence of tlie fortress proclaimed the despair and incapacity of the then directors of naval policy, and tliat iindiu^ tendency to subordinate the Navy to the requirements of the Army wliich has often been a cliaraoteristio of Russian strategy. The destruction of the remainder of its ships in the last stage of the siego by laud artillery — a siege, be it remembered, which was pressed largely with that very object and for fear of their powers for mischief if left intact — was a final and damning comment on the vacillation and mis- apprehension of the meaning of sea-power which prevailed in high quarters. The crown- ing act of the tragedy, the battle of Tsusliima, was no fair trial of strength, no real test of the abilities of the brave a Imiral and gallant crews into whose hands were given the conduct of the last Russian Fleet. With men half trained and ships clogged by a long voyage and indifferently constructed — the voyage of the Baltic Fleet was punctuated at every stage by breakdowns — the Russian commander sud- denly found himself confronted by a fleet hardened by war, encouraged by victory, refreshed by repose, and carefully prepared for the encounter. The result was almost inevitable, and it is scarcely too much to say that hardly once in the war, from the day when two detached ships were overpowered by gim- fire on the coast of Korea to the end of the battle of Tsushima, the Russian officers and sailors had an opportunity of showing the inherent qualities of which all readers of history knew them to be possessed, qualities which had earned them, amongst that of others, the respect of Nelson. • The almost wholesale destruction of the Russian Navy was not to be repaired in a day ; and it was the good fortime of Germany to enter the war when there was no squadron capable of opposing her battle fleet in the Baltic. Nevertheless, the nine years which had elapsed since Tsashima had not been wasted, and much had been done before the outbreak of the war to repair her losses and to reopen the path to her old renown. The date from which the renaissance of the Russian Navy may be said to commence was 1912, in wliich year an epoch-making Navy Bill, which provided for an expenditure of over £50,000,000 on sliipbuilding and on the construction of naval ports, was passed by the Duma by the great majority of 228 to 71. The Bill only included expenditure up to 1917, and even this limited programme was inter- rupted by the war ; but it is not uninteresting to remark that the ultiniate standard tliat was contemplated by the Russian Admiralty for the Baltic Fleet was 16 hattlcsliips, 8 armoured cruisers, 16 light cruisers, 92 de- stroyers, and 24 submarines, all to be ready by 1924. The Fleet was to be "so strong as to prevent any hostile operations, of whatsover kind, giving the enemy victory." In the Black Sea the standard was to be a strength half as great again as any possible combination of fleets in those waters. Throe Dreadnoughts were begun at Nikolaieff in 1911, and in addition to these the Navy Bill authorized the construction of two light cruisers. For the Baltic, in addition to four Dreadnoughts laimehed in 1911, the Bill sanctioned the con- struction of four battle-cruisers, four light cruisers, 36 destroyers, and 12 submarines.! It is interesting to recall, in the light of after events, the views of the Russian Govern- ment as stated in the preamble to the Bill by Admiral Gregorovitch. In this he dwelt re- peatedly on the respective relations of Russia and Germany as a fundamental reason for the revival of Russia's naval power. M. Sazonoff spoke of the imminence of a hostile coalition. The whole policy was drawn on broad lines and was not confined to the building of ships. It was proposed to create a new naval base at Reval, which would possess the great advantage that, unlike Kronstadt. it would not be ice-bound ADMIRAL SIR ARTHUR WILSON. A former First Sea Lord. IRuSi^ll & Sons, Stmthsta* THE TIMES HISTORY OP THE WAR. dtiring the winter inoutlis. A secondary base for torpedo craft had already been prepared at Sveaborir, and this also was to receive an equipment which would enable it to furnish a secondary base for the main fleet. It may be added that the Xavy Bill definitely settled the question as to whether Russia would henceforth confine her naval armament in the Baltic to torpedo defences or would revert to a battle fleet- The fact that during the summer months there is practically no darkness in the Baltic seems to have been one of the reasons which decided the Govemmjnt in favour of the last-named policy. Torpedo-boats and submarines, it was held, could not attack an enemy's squadron except under cover of night ; and as the summer would preferably be chosen as the season for the landing of a hostile force, such craft would become useless just when their services were most required. Nor, it was clear, was it in- tended that the action of the Baltic Fleet should be confined to that sea alone. The four Dread- noughts launched in 1911 were equal to the most powerful ships afloat, and possessed a coal capacity large enough to enable them to operate either in the North Sea or in the Mediterranean. It was therefore evident that they were intended to intervene effectively in the case of any at- tempt to settle the Balkan problem in a manner adverse to the interests of Russia and her friends. The extensive programme outlined above was necessarily only begun when the war broke out, but it had already made good progress and was calculated to place the naval power of Russia on a far larger and stronger basis. Apart from the redevelopment of her fleets indicated above, the practical creation by progressive steps of a national shipbuilding industry was of itself THE CROWN PRINCE OF SERVIA. significant of a policy which was intended not merely to be large and effective, but also a per- manent and expanding feature of Russia's defensive and offensive system. The fact that although the Russian authorities found that their existing resources were in- adequate for the construction of Dread- noughts they yet hesitated to go to foreign firms was a further indication of their intention to nationalize, to a degree not hitherto contemplated, the whole of their naval policy. Ultimately, a middle course was adopted, and a proportion of the work was given to contractors abroad. But steps were taken at the same time to extend the Government works in Russia and to encourage the establishment of private firms with the object of supplementing the State yards and foundries. The initiation of these large constructive operations was principally due to the energy and capacity of Admiral Gregorovitch. Unfortunately, these vigorous aims were not destined to be completed in peace. When the European war began Russia had in the Baltic only four Dreadnoughts, 10 armoured and protected cruisers, two light cruisers, about 80 destroyers, and 24 submarines. The destroyers were regarded as out of date at the time of the Navy Bill, and the submarines were not of the latest types. The Dreadnoughts were, of course, very formidable ships. They carried twelve 12in. and sixteen 4-7in. gunsin addition to their smaller armament. The Rurik was a powerful cruiser, carrying four lOin., eight Sin. and twenty 4-7in. gvms ; her defensive armour was exceptionally heavy, a consequence of the lessons of the Japanese war. With the above exceptions the armoured ships were of but moderate speed and power. The Black Sea Fleet was about half as strong as that in the Baltic. This disparity in strength cannot be said to have been counterbalanced by any decisive strategic advantages. By itself the Baltic Fleet was too feeble to undertake active opera- tions against the German ; and the command- ing position occupied by the Navy of the Kaiser at Iviel and Wilhelmshaven rendered any attempt at cooperation with the British in the North Sea a practical impossibility. On the other hand, th0 withdrawal of the whole of the German Fleet into the North Sea for the purpose of dehvering battle to the British would leave the Russian ships free to under- take operations against the German coast. They were therefore very far from being a negligible factor, even if they could hardly hope to play a preponderant rile in the war. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 70 AUSTRIAN BATTLESHIP "RADETZKV." THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY. The Navy of the Dual Monarchy advanced in the last years before the war, both abso- lutely and relatively, in a manner not unlike the expansion of the German Fleet. It had made a near approach in material strength to the Italian Navy, and had about as many effective battleships as the latter, which was, however, better equipped with cruisers and small craft. The qualities of the later Austrian vessels reflected the energetic and virile spirit which animated those in charge at the Marine Office and the naval ports and arsenals. The ships had nothing of the coast defence as|3ect of earlier types, but were of a size and power enabling them to take the offensive against contemporary \'es8els in other fleets with reason- able probability of success. Admiral Count Montecuccoli, the Austrian Tirpitz, was the leading spirit in the move- ment which had produced a fleet so worthy to xipliold the traditions of Tegetthoff and Lissa. Tegetthoff was Marine Commandant from 1868 to 1871, and formulated an ambi- tious programme, as did his four successors, but they failed to obtain approval from the country. Montecuccoli, with the encourage- ment of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, was more fortimate, and may he said to have rea])ed where they had sown. In the ten years from 1904 to 1914 naval expenditure increased from £2,615,460 to £7,402,333. A Dreadnought programme was formulated in 1909, including four battleships of 20,010 tons. Credits were not immediately forth- coming, but the private yard known as the Stabilimento Tecnico at Trieste was encouraged to begin two of the vessels at its own risk, and did so, laying the keels in the spring and summer of 1910, although the programme was not passed by the Delegations until March 3, 1911. The third ship was begun early in 1912. These three Dreadnoughts were com- missioned as the Viribus Unitis, Tegetthoff, and Priaz Eugcn, the first-named beitig sym- bolical of the spirit of united strength in which the work of building a new fleet was imder- taken. A desire being manifested that the fourth unit should be built in Hungarian territory, the Danubius yard at Fiume, wliich had before only built small craft, was equipped with the necessary plant and facilities, and the Szent Istvan was launched there in 1914. 80 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. POLA. Pola was the fleet's headquarters, and a good deal of money had been spent on its im- provement. It was able to undertake battle- ship construction if required, but had been devoted chiefly to the needs of the seagoing fleet. Well situated at the head of the Adriatic, at the southern end of the province of Kusten- land, Pola forms as it were a dividing point between the routes up the Gulf of Quamero to Fiume on the one hand and up the Gulf of Venice to Trieste on the other. In addition to these three naval stations, a fourth had been established in the last two or three years before the war at Sebenico, on the Dalmatian coast, sonae 70 miles to the south-east. Sites for fortifications were approved and a wire- less station erected. The place was already in use as a torpedo station for the flotillas constantly training along the Dalmatian coast which produced a number of skilful and dashing young officers and seamen. For guns and ajriuuut Austria had no need to go abroad , having noted and well-equipped resources in the Skodawerke establishment at Pilsen in Bohemia and the Witkowitz works in Moravia . The Marine Commandant at the outbreak of war was Admiral Anton Haus, an officer of high attainments and wide experience, who succeeded Admiral Count Montecuccoli in February, 1913, when the latter retired on reaching the age of 70. The commander of the battle squadron was Vice-Admiral Franz Loefler, who took his ships on a visit to Malta in May, 1914, when Captain Paul E. von Mecenseffy was his chief of staff. Rear- Admiral Karl Seidensacher was in command of the cruiser squadron, and Rear-Admiral Ricard Ritter von Barry of the reserve squadron. The devotion of these officers to their veteran chief had been most marked, and they might be expected to be as thorough and energetic in their use of the new material of war as they were in its creation. As regards numbers, as many as 15 battle- ships could be put into the fighting line, in- cluding the three completed Dreadnoughts, but this figure would include the three Monarchs of 1895-6 and the three Habsburgs of 1900-02, which were only of 5,510 and 8,167 tons respec- tively and carried 9'4in. guns as their principal weapons. The six principal pre-Dreadnoughts were the three of the Erzlierzog class, of 10,430 tons, which also had only four 9-4in. guns, but a good secondary battery of twelve 7-5in. ; and the three of the Radetzky class, of 1908-10, which had a displacement of 14,230 tons, an armament of four 12in. and eight 9-4in. guns, and a speed of 20J knots, being fine vessels which had been classed with the British Lord Nelsons. There were two armoured and nine Ught cruisers. Three fast light cruisers were completing. The torpedo flotilla was understood to have attained a high standard of efficiency, and included 15 destroyers, 58 torpedo boats, and six submarines. CHAPTER V. THE FRENCH ARMY. The French Abmy ai'Teu Waterloo — Causes that Contributed to its Decay — Sociai, — Legislative — Political — Military — The Regeneration — Luvws of 1872 and 1889 — The Loi DE DEUX ANS 1905 — Law OF 1913 — France's Last Card— Numbers and Categories of French Army at Outbreak of War — Distribution in Time of Peace — Mobilization — Employment of Reserve Formations — War Organization of J'rench Army — Training — The New School — Minor Tactics — Infantry — Artillery — Cavalry — The Officers — Staff — Literature — Invention — The Higher Command — Decrbtes of 1911 — Character of the French Government — Prognostications Unjustified — French Unity — General Plan op Campaign — The Defensive Phase — Difficulties of Modern Strategic Defensive — Front OF German Concentration and Lines of Attack — Lorraine and Belgium. w ' HEN the successes and failures of the French Republic diu-ing tlie past five and thirty years are placed on record by a competent historian, not the least merit which will justly be claimed for the Republican regime will bo that it restored the military power of France and established a sense of security unknown to any previous generation, or any former rule," So wrote Tlie Times Military Correspondent in March, 1906, a year after the " Loide deux ans " had registered the final triumph of the principle of national service. By way of illustration of the justice of this judgment we propose to recall the general causes which led to the failure in 1870, and then to enumerate rapidly the principal phases tJirough which the Army had passed from that fatal year down to the moment when it again entered the field. The catastrophe of 1870 is attributable not so much to the merely- teclmical inferiority of the French armies and their generals, as to causes which had been operative during the whole of the half century which followed Waterloo, to cankers which had eaten deeply into the life and had perverted the vision of the nation itself. Napoleon I. left many legacies to France — some good, some biul ; but none more ruinous than that loathing of the idea of national service which the long and Vol. I. — Part 3. 81 appalling orgj- of his wars had implanted in the French mind. The splendid energy of 1793 was dead ; the population was physicaUy and morally exhausted ; the ruthless spend- thrift, whose superhuman powers of will and intellect had alone made his system possible, was gone. The result was an inevitable and violent reaction, which his weak and nerveless successors were powerless to control. Wheroaa to Prussia military service appeared as the inistrument which had helped to restore her independence and her national existence, for France it was associated with imbridled and wasteful aggression indulged at the cost of imcoasing and imiversal misery and ending in gigantic disa-sters. Nor was it thLs feeling alone tliat was re- sponsible for the collapse of 1870. The ten dencies of the time were largely accountable. Men saw in the alleviation of the burden of military service the logical consequence of the prevailing political and social dogmas. The pacificist preached the brotherhood of man, and saw in the railway, not a fresh and powerful instrument in the hands of the general, but a new avenue of int«rcouso between the nations. Economists preached the wasteful- ness of war and the advantages of material prosperity. " Get rich," was the advice of one of the most famous of French 82 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL JOFFRE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 83 GENERALS JOFFRE, CASTELNAU (Chief of Staff), and PAU. statesmen. Politicians harped on tlu necessity of retrenchment. Demagogues protested against tlie .sacrifice of the people to the ambi- tions of princes. The individual was exalted at the expense of the State. _ Luxury and in- difference grew apace, and witli these grew selfishness. The consequence was that when at last France found herself at Iiandgrips with a civilization in many ways less generous and less enlightened but of harder fibre than her own, .she was morally and nationally', as well as technicalls', unprepared. It is hardly to be wondered at that the French soldier did not take himself very seriously- in such an atinosphere ; a high standard of effi- ciency is scarcely possible for an army when the nation it is intended to defend is dispo.sed to regard it as a relic of barbarism. The French Army lived on its past ; its victories in the Crimea and in Italy, so far from teaching it the necessity of studying modem conditions, had only confirmed its belief in its own invin- cibility. The more serious-minded of its officers were ridiculed as " officer-professors," the rest were thoroughly well satisfied and generally lazy. Worst of all, it had for a long time ceased to be a reallj- national body. The rage for retrenchment and the hatred of per- sonal service had resulted in a series of measures which had gradually deprived it of its best elements and liad tended to degrade the military profession in the eyes of the people. After the fall of Napoleon the .system h:id been, in theory at least, voluntary-. The hated word " conscription " was banned ; but when volunteering failed to produce the requisite number of men the Government was allow«l to complete the necessary annual contingent by men chosen by lot, and denominated appeles. The supply of volunteers was so small that the appeles soon came to constitute bj- far the larger portion of the recruits ; the system in fact developed into a sort of limited conscrip- tion. This plan was thoroughly unsatisfac- tory. \\'hatever value it possessed was^ mini- mized by all sorts of limiting provisions. In the first place exemptions, often quite unjusti- fiable, were granted ; and these, by favour- ing the men of a higher social scale and members of the learned professions, tended to remove from the Army the more intelligent classes of the jjopulation. In the second the jx-riod of service was rendered larg»>ly illusorj' b_\- the grant of extensive furloughs to the men in the ranks, and by the creation of a second class in the annual contingent which wa-s allowed to remain at home without training unless the Jlinister of War thought fit to call it up. After 1832 the fixing of the numbers of the contingent was left to the Chambers, and, as 84 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. M. ETIENNE, a former Minister of War. [Richard Stanley & Co. economy was preached in and out of season, this second class was practically never trained at all. The same vicious principle reappeared in the provisions for the " tirage au sort " embodied in the law of 1872, and was not finally removed till 1889. Last and worst of all, the law of 1818 had introduced the fatal principle of remplace- ment or substitution, by which an appele was allowed to find a substitute to take his place on payment of a sum of money. It was in- evitable that the well-to-do classes would take advantage of this ; and, as a result, the bulk of those who could afford it evaded their national obligations. The substitutes naturally be- longed to the poorer and less-educated sections of the population, some to the very lowest. Agences de remplacement, known as " Marchands tPHommes" arose for the purpose of exploiting the increasing popularity of substitution ; and the fact that in some cases the substitute was better fitted to be a soldier than the man whose place he took did not prevent the demoraliza- tion attendant on a system which fostered unpatriotic selfishness. The nation was de- graded by this avoidance of its duties ; the Army was degraded by the lowering of the standard of its personnel. As the century advanced substitution became more and more common ; in the contingent of 1869 out of a total of 75,000 men there were no less than 42,000 substitutes. Yet another downward step was taken in 1855, when in order to lighten the " blood -tax " it was enacted that men should be allowed to re-engage, the inducement to do so being a premiinii paid by the person whose place the re-engaged man was to take into the Govern- ment Chest. The results were that all re- sponsibility of the original appele for his rem- pUK^ant ceased ; that the idea of personal service, in one form or the other, was finally lost ; that the Government now dealt directly with the Agences de remplacement and shared i with them the odiimi attaching to their business ; and that the re-engaged men who served for the sake of the money remained in the Army long after they were imfit for duty, and so pre- vented younger men from taking their places. It is not necessary here to refer in detail to the well-intended but unrealized reforms of Napoleon III. Six weeks after Koniggratz he announced his intention of re-organizing the Army, and a high commission of Ministers and soldiers was constituted and sat at Com- piegne. It was determined that the numbers of the Army must be increased, and the mili- tary members asked for 1,000,000 men, to be divided into the now familiar sections of field army, reserve, and territorial army. But the M. MILLERAND, the French Minister of War. THE TIM EH 111 STORY OF THE WAN 85 plan was objected to by the politicians as likely to arouse resistance in the country, especially in view of the fact that Europe was at peace and that the Exhibition of 1867 was in close prospect. The result was that the original scheme was mutilated, and what remained was still incomplete when Marshal Niel, one of the few Frenclimon of real energy and insight then in authority, died. The great feature of the plan, the organization of the Garde Mobile, which was to be a sort of second line army, was never carried out. The re-engage- ment system (known as " exoneration ") was abolished , although its baneful effects were still felt in 1870. Lastly, the period of colour service was shortened, and the formation of a reserve was begun ; but before the full benefits of this measure could be felt the war of 1870 broke out. It foimd the discipline of the rank and file weakened by extended furloughs ; the officers lazy and lacking in authority and without the confidence of <iheir men ; the generals for the most part ignorant of the higher branches of their profession : a staff unpractised in the handling of troops and consisting either of aides-de-camp or clerks. When we add to this that the French Army was heavily outnumbered and constantly out- manoeuvred, that none of its arms knew their projier work, and that the arrangements for supply and mobilization were lamentably deficient, the wonder is not that they were beaten, but that they managed to put up so gallant a fight. Whatever else the war prove<l, it certainly failed to demonstrate the superiority of the individual Prussian over the individual French soldier. Tlie fearful lesson of 1 870 recalled the French nation to its senses. In July, 1872, was passed the first of the great laws which have con- tributed to place the defences of the country on a worthy footing. Substitution was abolished and the principle of universal com- pulst)ry service was reintroduced, the period of service with the colours being five years, followed by foiu- in the Reserve, five in the Territorial Army, and six in the Territ'orial Reserve. But the application of the prin- ciple was still not absolute ; the annual con- tingent was divided by lot into two portions, tmd in time of peace one of them was let off with only one year of service in the Active Army. Thepreviotis exemptions of whole clas.ses. such as bread-winners, teachers, and so forth, were still allowed in time of peace ; and con- ditional engagements for one year only were permitted to students and apprentices. It was hoped by this arrangement to combine an army of veterans with a really numerous and trulj' National Army ; indeed, in some of its features it wa.s a realization, on a far larger scale, of the principles which had underlain the scheme of Marshal Niol. The measure was very far from commanding general approlm- tion. Its acceptance was mainly due to Tliierx, who was strongly convinced that a short - service army could never be efficient. General Trochu was in favour of a throe-year system ; and there was a strong nrunority who were wholly opposed to the idea of a National Arm>-, and were in favour of the retention of the principle of substitution. After-developm<!nt« proved the General to have been right. The law of 1872, though a great advance on its predecessors, showed grave defects. The '■ tirage du sort," which condemned one half of the contingent to five years service and allowed the other to escape with 12 months, was felt to be wholly inequitable ; and strong objection was also taken to the '• volontariat conditioHnol." a provision under which any man could escaije with a year's service by paying l,500f. So many could afford thissvim that the numbers of the fully-trained men wore serioiLsly reduced. Both these provisions were abolished in 1889, when a three-year system was made obliga- tory on all, and service in tho Reserve was raised to seven, in the Territorial Army to six, and in the Territorial Reserve to nine years respec- tively. It was anticipated that this measure would ultimately raise the total number of trained men from two to three millions. But in the years which followed a factor, which far tran.scended in imfKtrtanee these internal arrangements, began to press more and more heavily upon P'rance. This was the alteration of tho balance of population in favour of Germany, and with it a growing disparity in the peace-effectives of the armit^, and con.sequontly in the capiwity for exp8n.=ion in time of war. Other tilings being equal, tlie I arger the peace effectives the more numerous is the annual contingent which can be trained, and the larger become the accumulated reserN'es. As late as 1893 the peace effectives of France and Germany were practically equal, 453,000 to 457,000 ; but from 1899 onwards the equi- poise was lost and in 1905 the figures were .stated to be 109,000 in Germany's favour. The means of neutralizing this inferiority, which was the result of natural causes and beyond the reach of legislation, was the principal preoccupation of French statesmen and soldiers in the years preceding the Great War. The Russian Alliance, however valuable from the paint of view of the general position of France 86 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. GENERAL PAU. in Europe, was not by itself sufficient to redress the balance, because the slowness of the Rus- sian concentration made it possible for Germany to attack France before her ally was ready. It was therefore decided to carry still further the principle of universal service and, by imposing on her people a heavier proportionate denjand than Germany with her larger popula- tion found it necessary to make, to restore as far as possible the numerical equality of the two armies. This was the object of the " Loi de deux ans," which was passed in March, 1905, and came into operation a year later. It was intended to develop to its utmost limit the recruiting capacity of the nation. The term of service with the colours was reduced to two years, but service in the Army Reserve was increased to 11, to be followed by six years in the Territorial Army, and six in the Territorial Reserve. Thus every Frenchman from the age of 20 to 45 became liable for service. No exemptions, except on grounds of physical un- fitness, were granted, although certain modifi- cations of a reasonable character were intro- duced, and the hardships inflicted on separate families were diminished by doles. It was calculated that these arrangements would bring the peace effective up to about half a million of men, and would in time produce an active army and a territorial army, amounting, inclusive of their reserves, to about 2,000,000 apiece. Thus did the need for self-preservation at last compel the French people to accept a system in which " military service was equal for all," and so to fulfil the principle of the law of March 4, 1791, that " tlie service of the Fatherland is a civic and general duty." But these efforts, great as they were, were not long to suffice. Early in 1912 the peace effec- tives of the German Army had been raised ; by the end of that year enormous increases had been decided on. By October, 1913, the pro- posals had become law. Whatever weight is to be attached — and without doubt there was much to be said from a German point of view — - to the argument that Russian military expansion had rendered these additions a vital necessity to the security of the Empire, it weis im- possible on that ground for France to remain indifferent to them. The question was not, as in 1905, so much one of further develop- ing her total resources of men— indeed, as has teen said, her resruiting powers had already been strained to their utmost limit by the law of 1905 — ^but of having a sufficient proportion THE TIMEU imSTORY OF THE WAR. 87 of trained men ready at any moment. It was antici?iated that the German peace-effec- tives would, imder the new proposals, eventually be raised to about 870,000, to whicli France could only oppose about 567,000 ; and it was of vital importance that she sliould find some means of securing lierself against the sudden attack of superior numbers. The only way of doing this was to keep each annual contingent a longer time with the colours, an expedient necessarily entailing a larger expenditure and heavier sacrifices. The Conseil Superieur de la Guerre decided unanimously in March, 1912, that the sole means of diminishing efficaciously the dangerous difference between the French and German peace strengths, of reinforcing the troops on the frontier without disorganizing those in the interior, of ensuring adequate training, and of coping with the accelerated mobilization of Germany, was to introduce three years' service with the colours strictly arid rigorously for all ranks and all branches. " There is something," ran the Preamble of the Bill which embodied this proposal, " which dominates all contingencies, which triumphs over all hesitations, which governs and doc'des the individual and collec- tive impulses of a groat and noble democracy like ours, namely, the resolute will to live strong and free and to remain mistress of our destinies." GENERAL PERCIN. [Henri Manuel, Paris, GENERAL MICHEL. This proposal, in spite of aU kinds of oppo- sition, was eventually carried in 1913. Every Frenchman found fit for service had in future to pass tliree years in the Active Army, eleven in the Reserve; and seven each in the Territorial Army and the Territorial Reserve. Thus the total liability for service was extended by three years, an arrangement necessarily carry- ing with it a considerable eventual increase in the reserve, and raising the peace strength to 673,000 men. Henceforth the recruit was to be incorporated at the age, not, as had hitherto been the practice, of 21 but of 20 ; an alteration calculated to minimize the effects of the additional year of active service on his future career. The first to come under the new law was the class of 1913. In order to obtain the number of instructors necessary for the increased size of the contingent, special bonuses were offered as an inducement to non- commissioned officers and old soldiers to re- engage ; and it was anticipated that by the spring of 1914 the Army would have assimilated its recruits and would bo able to mobilize satisfactorily. From a military point of view it is important to observe that under the new arrangement the infantry on the lugher estab- Ushmcnt on the frontier were raised to 200 per company, and those in the interior to 140, respectively four -fifths and rather over one- half of tlieir war strength. The cavalry regiments were fixed at 740 ; the field 88 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A MITRAILLEUSE ON THE BACK OF A MULE. [Topical. batteries at 140 and 110, respectively about seven-ninths and two-thirds of their full complement. The increased annual cost was reckoned at £7,000,000, the non-recurring cost at £29,000,000. From the broad numerical point of view, as The Times Military Corre- spondent said at the tinxe, the Law was France's last card. But the new burden had its com- jjensations. It was calculated to give greater security in the first days of mobilization, s somewhat larger reserve and, had time been allowed, a longer period of training to her rank and file than was the case in Germany. Un- fortunately its full effects were not obtained when war broke out. At the commencement of the campaign, France possessed, inclusive of the Territorial Army and its Reserve, fully 4,000,000 of trained men. This enormous mass may be roughly divided into six different categories, each averaging close on 700,000 men. Those consisted of the peace establishments of the Active Army, that portion of the Resor\e (about half of the whole) reqviirod to bring the Active Army up to war strength, the remaining portion of the Reserve, the formed troops of the Territorial Army, the depots, and finally the surplus. The comparative values of the last five sections may roughly be gathered from the fact that the Army reservists were liable to be called up twice in 11 years for one month's mancuuvres ; the men of the Territorial Army once in seven years for a fortnight's training ; the Territorial reservists were subject in seven years to one muster of a day. The territorial distribution, whicli formed the basis of the war organization, consisted of 20 army corps dis- tricts, including one in Algeria. These districts again were divided, so far as the infantry were concerned, into districts each furnishing one regiment ; but cavalry, engineers, artillery, and the chasseur or rifle battalions were re- cruited throughout the army corps district, and a large proportion of these troops were located not in the part of the country in which they were raised, but wherever the requirements of in- struction or strategy londored necessary. Thus the bulk of the cavalry and the chasseurs were permanently located on the eastern frontier, and the engineers were assembled foi purposes of ti'aining at special centres. With these exceptions each army corps district comprised all the elements required to form an army corps ; each was mobilized in its own territorial area and thence proceeded to the point allotted te it in the plan of strategic concentration. Mobilization, of course, comprised not merely the Active Army and its Reserve, but the whole of the Territorial Army and its Reserve. Broadly speaking the scheme involved the fol- lowing proeesfics. The peace establishment of the Active Army was to be raised to war strength THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 89 Coro. ■x/ O Hon & Ca. Bla.req /to .»^ / O Crom-lez-Rpuveroy i> '^— sSarts * \cr..Mf''-''-^'^ •J^ OBersillies \ \ SK FelgniesO \-^w^ O \ 1 a Longue\/ille Douiies h DE LEV.EAU £,esm>5QrTp£ BOUSSOIS. tieut-MesmI r^: Harqnies :_ O /Ti.^'r'r^-r^'^--^^,^ ■^'^ >Re.Recquiq"hieS' "™'-a' ; FJDE.CERF0NTA1NE ^ ^ Be}-siTles- . REFERENiE'7'""6'-'"'' F^DU BOURDI'AU Qi Forts / BeaafJ^'"'" . , >V Batteries i. Redoubts Foniajne Choisies "o ^ \J Cousoire tss PLAN OF THE MAUBEUGE FORTRESSES. by the incorporation of a number of reservdsli? about equal in number to the men already serving wi th the colours. The remaining Army reservists wee to be formed into reserve units correspond- ing to those of the Active Army, with the result that jn war time the units of the Active Army would be doubled. These Reserve units were to be officered partly by Active, partly by Keserve ofiRcers, and, it would appear, were to rec ivo in addition a certain proportion of non-commissioned officers from the Active Army. If this Reserve Army were employed at the front the total troops in the first line would consist of an active army of 1,400,000—1,500,000 men.and of a Reserve Arm.v of about half that niunber. i.e., about 2,100,000 in all. The remaining 2,000,000 odd of the Territorial Army and its Reserve were to be formed into three bodies of about equal strength. First of all the Territorial Army proper was to form ur.its corresponding with those of the Active^ Army and the Reserve. Secondly, depots were to be organized to replace casual- ties in the active and reserve regiments at a fixed ratio per vinit, giving, it was anticipated, about tliree men at the depots for every eight in the field. The remaining men of the Terri- torial Reserve were available as a last resoiu-ce for the replenisliment of the depots, and for subsidiary purposes of all kinds. In this way it was possible to provide not merely for a powerful fighting line, but for its maintenance at full strength, and for the auxiliary services in its rear ; in a word, for a national organiza- tion capable of sustaining a war. Everything that forethought and infinite supervision of detail could suggest was done to make the enormous business of mobilization easy and rapid. Special care was bestowed on the boots of the infantry wliich were served out, not new, as was the case in Giermany, but sufficiently worn to be comfortable, .so as to ensure that the exceptional marching powers of the French soldier should be developed to the utmost. Tlie cavalry regiments were maintained on practically a war footing and required com- paratively little preparation. The main diffi- culty was in the case of the artillery and train, the mobilization of which involved the accumu- lation of great masses of materiel, and a con- siderable expansion and redistribution of per- simnel. The method of employment of the French Army remained a secret ; everything dejjending on the use that would be made of the reserve and territorial formations, or, to s|X)ak more exactly, on whether the reserve divisions would be attached to the army corps or formed, either with or without the addition of terri- torial troojjs, in s<iparate army corps of their own. The possibility of variations of this kind, as had been recognized by the Japanese, the German, and other modem armies, could be reckoned on as one of tlie most effective means of producing great strategic surprises. Tliat is to say, while every unit in the 90 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. original Jager army corps was known to any- one who chose to study the ordinary text-books, the position, numbers and compjosition of troops not formed until mobilization could only be guessed at and gave opportunities for secret concentration and unexpected attack. The normal formations in the French Army closely resembled the German. The ordinary infantry regiment contained three battalions, each of 1,000 men, in four companies; the normal brigade two regiments ; the normal division two brigades ; the normal army corps two divisions. To these, as was the custom in the case of the Jager battalions, might be added a battalion of chasseurs. The corps cavalry consisted of a brigade of two regiments, the divisional cavalry of one squadron per division. Only in the artillery organization was there a marked difference from the German arrangement. Whereas in the German Army Corps the artillery was equally divided between the infantry divisions, in the French the corps artillery was retained, and numbered 12 batteries, that of the divisions being nine batteries apiece. The batteries only contained four guns, a numerical inferiority which it was believed would be amply com- jjensated by the great superiority of the gun itself, and by the special skill possessed by the French artillerymen. Inclusive of gunners the normal army corps numbered between 30,000 and 40,000 combatants and 120 guns. A reserve of light and heavy howitzers marched with the different armies. They did not form part of the artillery of the army corps, but were intended to be retained in the hand of the army commander. The only remaining units that require mention here were the eight independent cavalry divisions and the African troops. The normal cavalry division numbered six regiments, divided into two or three brigades, in which heavy, medium, and light cavalry were fairly evenly distributed. The heavy cavalry consisted of the ever -famous Cuirassiers, the nuniber of whose regiments was the same as in the days when they won immortal renown imder the great Emperor ; they still wore the beautiful helmet and cuirass and carried the long thrusting sword. The dragoon regiments, classed as medium cavalry, were armed with the lance. Attached to each division were two batteries of horse artillery, armed with the field guns, but with mounted detachments, and some galloping machine guns. The African infantry consisted of four regiments of Zouaves, each of five battalions, and four of Algerian Rifles or " Turcos," each of six ; there were ten light cavalry regimsnts, six of Chasseurs d'Afrique, and four of Spahis. The Turcos and Spahis were black troops commanded partly by French, partly by native officers. All the infantry were armed with the Lebel, a serviceable but somewhat antiquated type of magazine rifle. Each man, following the old French tradition, seems to have carried some 601b., an enormous weight hkely to tell severely under the exhausting conditions of modern fighting. Inclusive of the rations carried by the soldier, the army corps took with it eight days' supply which was constantly replenished by the rail- ways in the rear. The solution of the problem of the transport of supplies between the rail- heads and the armies had in the years preceding the war been greatly facilitated by the intro- duction of motor -lorries. It was found that a comparatively small number of these vehicles sufficed for the daily supply of an army corps, and rendered the massing of endless trains of horsed wagons in the rear of the troops un- necessary. The practical advantages of the new system need no illustration. Thus far we have confined oiurselves to the history of the construction and organization of the national army — a history which jiistified the proud boast of the French Minister of War in 1908 : " L'Arm6e Frangaise, c'est la France.'' We must now turn to its training. Since 1870 the French Army had undergone a moral and in- tellectual revolution. At that melancholy period it is hardly too much to say that the methods of French leadership had tended to discard or depress all the grand traditions and qualities that had made the French Army the moft famous of modern history. From top to bottom it was characterized by a tendency to exaggerate the defensive power of modern weapons, by a neglect of the theory and practice of the higher art of generalship, and by a tentative and piece- meal employment of all the arms ; a combina- tion of weaknesses which made resolute and effective action on the battlefield impossible, and rendered inoperative those moral factors to which the great warriors of the past had been accustomed to appeal. But ditfing the years of recovery after the Franco-Prussian War, and especially during the first decade of the 20th century, there had arisen a generation which took a juster and more inspiring view of the special capacities of the French soldier. The adoption of a national system and tlie knowledge that upon its soundness would henceforth depend the existence of France as a great Power had placed at the command of the Ministry of War all that was best in the Frerch people and the French mind. The result, was THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 01 A GROUP OF ZOUAVES. TRANSPORT OF A FRENCH HEAVY GUN. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. FRENCH TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH PARIS. HUY. THE TIMES UIHTORY OF THE WAR. 03 le Touquet j QjCSnoysurOeulc PLAN OF THE LILLE FORTRESSES. the development of a national school of tactics and strategy, complete, coherent and woU-flttod to the bold and ardent character of the troops. We do not propose in this place to discuss the French theory of strategy and grand tactics, or to compare it with that which prevailed in Germany. We shall deal with these all impor- tant subjects in a later section ; f this work. and for the present sliall content ourselves with a brief description of French minor tactics. These tactics were, in accordance with tradi- tion and national temperament, dominated by the idea of the offensive ; but they found their technical justification in the superior arma- ment of the artillery and the special support which that arm was expected to afford to the infantry. This, in the opinion of the French, made it possible for them to assign to infantry fire a less important place in the preparatory stages of an action than was regarded as jxr- missible in the German Arm_\-. The busi- ness of the infantry was to " conquer and win ground " ; it had two means of action, " fire and forward movement "' ; " the only object of fire was to prepare for the rosvunptioa of a forward movement." Fire, that is, was to be a means, not an end ; and the idea of a stationary defensive was not sidmitted' This theory of infantry action was intended to be realized by a systJ^m of manoeuvre and distribu- tion which, while it insisted on the use of maas at the decisive point, aimed at com- bining perfect elasticity and adaptability with careful economy of men and anunu- nition. With these objects in view, long range firing, except imder sjjecial conditions and when carried out by picked shots, wa.s discouraged ; the distant zones were to be crossed as rapidl\- as- possible, in close bodies when shelter was forthcoming, in small groups when it was not. The aim of the a.ssailant was to got to within fixed-sight range before firing a shot, or nearer stillif it was possible to do so : and for the same reason the deployment of the firing line was to bo delayed until further advance without firing became impracticable. Only the troops necessary for the special pur- pose were to be deployed, the prematiu« 94 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. expenditure of men in open formations being regarded as one of the most serious of faults. Once, however, a firing line had been constituted, it was to be rapidly reinforced, s that the fire should grow heavier and the 1 ine more dense the nearer the moment of the decisive ttack approached. Fire was not to be continuous, but, as in the case of the artillery, was to be delivered in gusts, " sudden, brief, vicious and violent," according as a target presented it- self. The preparation for the attack was to culminate in an overwhelming short range fire upon the whole of the defender's position, pre- venting the action of his reserves and weakening his fire sufficiently to allow of the advance of those of the assailant. The final assault was to be delivered in mass upon the decisive point ; rapidity and the bayonet rather than fire effect being relied on in this last phase of an action. To the commander was left the selection of objectives, the distribution of the troops, and the choice of the time and place' of the fiinal attack. This method of attack was well calculated to appeal to an ardent and intelligent infantry, and to judge from the manoeuvres it was well understood and executed. Its forms at least had historical sanction. They bore a distinct resemblance to the cumulative and tempestuous attack of the French infantry in the best days of Napoleon. The swarms and chains of tirailleurs, the quick and supple action of small columns, the final advance of heavier masses were all characteristic of the tactics of the Grande Arm^e. That the moral and physical qualities of the men were still the same was not doubted. " There are practically no limits," wrote The Times Military Corre- spondent in 1906, " to the demands which can be made upon the endurance of the Frencli infantry by a leader who understands them, and whom they trust." In support of this quick and daring in- fantry the French possessed what was generally regarded as the best artillery in Europe. The gun was a true quick-firer ; its rapidity, thanks largely to the arrangement known as the independent line of sight,* astonished those who had seen it in practice. It was a powerful and accurate weapon throwing shrapnel or high-explosio.T shell of about 151b. ; its only weak points being that it was some- what heavy and that the shield with which it was fitted was rather small. Its Tie principle of tbis contrivance Ik tbat the work of regulating tbe devatlon and the sighting 1b greatly quickened by being divided between two men iasUiad of. ae in older eytUnnts. beins entrusted to one. technical superiority, combined with the gi-eater handiness of the small battery, seemed amply to justify the belief of the French that four such guns were at least equal to six of the older German type. This belief was strengthened by their confidence in their tactical methods. The principles on which they were based were much the same as those which governed the action of th3 infantry. Here also economy in guns and ammunition was insisted on, while at the same time it was clearly understood that at critical moments the artillery should not hesitate to expose itself to heavy rifle fire, and should advance at all costs if the infantry required its support. Indirect fire was employed whenever possible, and no guns were sent into action unless the tactical situation demanded it. Long range fire, as in the case of the infantry, was unusual ; 4,000 yards was rarely exceeded, the view of the authorities being that in Europe opportunities for long- distance shooting would rarely occur. Within that range various forms of fire were carefully practised, the object being not merely to hit a visible object, but to make defined zones of ground, whether invisible or not, untenable or impassable. Very accurate ranging, carried out slowly and followed by a deliberate fire, as in the case of the German artillery, was not a characteristic of the French gunner, all such elaborate procedures in his view being unsuited to the conditions of the battlefield. He regarded the rafale, that is, a sudden tempest of shell, lasting for a few seconds and sweeping a given area, as the more eiTective method of the two. The expenditure of ammunition in- volved by such a procedure was provided for by an exceptionally large supply, amounting, inclusive of that carried in the army corps park, to about 500 rounds per gun. Tactically the batteries accompanj'ing an army corps in action were destined for separate action, the Corps Artillery ( 1 2 batteries) being intended to crush the opposing artillery, the divisional batteries (18) to shatter the hostile infantry. Naturally such a rule was made subject to infinitely varying conditions, but the defini- tion of the two different tasks that would fall to the lot of artillery and the detailing of special imits for the accomplishment of each, are typical of the French love of clearness and precision. It was generally agreed that the tactical combination of the artillery and infantry was exceptionally well managed, and that the science of the officers and the courage and endurance of the rank and file of the artillery left nothing to be desired. In many respects the French cavalry of 1914 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 95 Giromagnyo ovescemont Auxe//es BdSQ _|y \ Eiueffont BasO ^■1 AnjouteP 'omagny O S' Germain SermamagnyQ /.5a?^S^ " '^^"•'i^'/eo -St?/?...?''"'"""""'' FTduSalbert Vk^/'^'/'- ^ ^^ LaMiotteF' °^^°^- ^/,at...7/a&/"'^'^'''^" F'^DENFERTRoCHEREAUmXt^ ■» |_ '^s Perches OFontenelle -■f^aunvilldrs HericourtO MILES i2±. Fi'duB.d'Oye ChatenoisO BourogneO JreboJJe REFERENCE U Forts ^ BatLeries PLAN OF THE BELFORT FORTRESSES. was tlie best Franco ever produced. The riding was good, the horses excellent, and •if, according to British ideas, the French horse- men were too much inclined to trust to shock- action and too little to the rifle, no one doubted that they fully realized the importance of their strategic mission, and the truth of the old dicta that " Cavalry is made for action " and that " any decision is better than none." For them, also, the principle of economy of forces, late deploy- ment, and strong reserves held good ; and special attention was devoted to the business of scouting. Everything in the case of the French, even more than in that of other armies, depended on the leadership, and doubts were sometimes expressed as to whether the French officer - corps, especially in its higher branches, would prove equal to its task. France did not possess, like Prussia, a military aristocracy, a special class set apart by tradition &iid by its social status for tlie task of leading armies. But the high standard maintained in all parts of the Army, to say nothing of the witness of history, seemed a sufficient answer to such dubitations. The training appears to liave been sound and thorough, at any rat© as far as the officers of the first line were concerned. Ail candidates for commissioned rank, whether they passed through St. Cyr or the Ecole Polyteclmique (the Sandhurst and the Woolwich of France), or were promoted from the ranks, had first to serve as privates and had then to pass qualifj'ing examinations. The final examina- tion was competitive as well as comprehen- sive. Promotion from the rank of major and above it was entirely by selection, in the lower ranks it was decided partly by selection and partly by seniority. The officers of the Reserve and Territorial Army were not required to satisfj- so high a technical standard ; but all had to serve six months with the colours, and were liable to be called up for instruction every two years. The Staff of the Army, whoso weakness largely contributed to the disasters of 1870. had immensely improved. All candi- dates for the Staff had to pass a competitive en- trance examination at the Ecole Sup<^rieure de la Guerre, an institution corresponding to our Staff College, and after passing another at the termination of the course, went through a !)f. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 4^r BELGIAN SCOUTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF WATERLOO. two-years' probation on a staff, being attaclied during that period to other arms than tlieir own. Thenceforward they spent their time, 818 did Prussian Staff officers, alternately' with their unit and on staff duty, every step in promotion being preceded by two years' service with their unit. There is ample evidence to show that their work in all branches was done very efficiently and very rapidly. A striking,, if not an imimpeachable, witness to their high qualities Ls to be found in the large amount of important literature produced during the last 20 or 30 years by individual officers. Milliard, Langlois, Bonnal, and Foch, not to mention others, were men whose historical and pro- fessional studies influenced thought in perhaps a greater degree than any other military writers of the age, and with hardly an exception were far superior to anything produced during the last 30 years in Germany. This literary activity was very cha:a:^:teristic of the renaissance of the French Army ; and it is significant that the new school of writers, throwing aside the decadent ideas of the Second Empire, drew their inspiration not from Germany, but from that supreme repository of military instruction, the theory and practice of Napoleon. Nor did French military thinkers confine themselves to this work of tactical and strategical re- construction. Hand in hand with it the scientific genius of the nation led the way in military invention. The French were the firat to re- arm their artillery with a quick-firing gun ; and in* aviation they had strong claims to be con- sidered the pioneers of the world. It was not merely its generous heart and fiery soul that made the army formidable in 1914 ; with these there also moved to battle that other tutelary spirit of France, her clear and splendid intelli- gence. The question of the higher military com- mand was one that for many years had exercised the minds of Frenchmen, and the solution offered by the decrees of 1911 was not entirely satis- factory. ' Down to that year the business of preparation for war was in the hands of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre, a body pre- sided over by the Minister of War, which could be summoned at'any time by the President of the Republic, and whose deliberations could on those occasions be attended by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Marine. It consisted generally of a committee of ten. and included as its Vice- President the Gerieralissime appointed to direct the principal group of the French armies in lime of war, besides several officers destined for the command of separate armies. The defect of this system was that none of its members THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 97 were in close touch with the (Jeneral Staff, or possessed any staff of their own correspond- ing with the importance of their missions. By the Presidential decree of 1911 these defi- ciencies were repaired. The chiefs of the new Army staffs were formed into a General Staff Committee under the GoneralLssime, to whom was accoi-ded the title of Chef d'Etat Major- (!eneral. In time of war Ke was to be seconde<l by the Chef d'Etat Major de I'armee, who was intended to remain by the side of the Minister of War as the representative of the General Staff. At the same time the work of the (^.eneral Staff was redistributed, the divLsion dealing with preparation for war being placed imder a Sous-Chef d'Etat Major, this officer being destined in time of war to act as chief of the staff of the Gen^ralLssime in the field. The Chef d'Etat Major-General (or future G6n6ralLs.sime) and the Chef d'Etat Major de Tarm^e (or the future adviser of the Minister in war time) were included among the members of the Conseil Sup^rieur. These arrangements made it possible for the Generalissime per- .sonally to direct the chiefs of the separate army staffs, and at the same time to share in the work of the Con.seil Superieur and exchange views with the destined Commandei-s of the Armies, a combination which, it was hoped, would smooth the way to a community of views and policy and would provide all the commanders with suitable staff organs of their own. The plan seemed a cumbrous one, but it was pro- bably the only means by which the General Staff could be brought into line with the Con- seil Superieur, a matter which the military, constitutional and political significance of that body rendered essential to the wellbeing of the Army. The peculiarity of the relation of the Army and of the civil Government is brought out by the fact that the Minister insisted on his right to appoint Army commanders, and that the decree of 1911 actually restricted their tenvu-e of these all important posts to a single year. The advantages posses.sed in these matters by a monarchical Government of the Prussian type over a Republican system are obvious and require no comment. A good deal of criticism both in and outside France was directed to considerations of this kind in the years before the war. It was said that the discipline and spirit of the Army was sapped by anti-miUtarist propaganda, that its per- sonnel was of unequal quality, that the nation was rent by political divisions, that the succee- sive governments were weak and unstable, and that the good of the Army, especially in the matter of the higher command, was constantly sacrificed to intrigue. When war came it was at once evident that theee views were far from being justified by the facts. In face of the national danger divisions disappeared to a degree that those who knew France best would a few weeks earlier liave pronounced impossible. Anti- militarism became voiceless and was abandoned by its foremost advocates, including the lamented M. Jaures, who was assassinated as a " traitor " after ho had made it known that he renounced his ordi- nary views as inopportune and unfMitriotic. How far General Joffre, a soldier of great Colonial distinction and wide ex|}erience of high command, and hia subordinates would prove equal to their task, and- how far the French Army itself would prove worthy of its old "renown, the events of the campaign alone could show. But of the nature of the dominant motive none could doubt for a single instant. Frenchmen had but one object, the preservation of their beloved country ; and but one thought, how best they might serve her interests. A word must be said in conclusion as to the general plan of campaign. Its opening phase was boimd to be of a defensive character, although the defence, concordantly with the national temperament and French militarj' theory, was certain to take an active form. France's policy, and her earnest wish to avoid war if war could be avoided with honour, for- bade the assumption of an aggressive attitude, even if her inferior numbers and the expected slowness of the Russian concentration had not rendered an offensive impossible from a mili- tary point of view. She could not expect her Ally seriously to affect the situation before the 20th day of mobilization, and for the first 30 days at least she could not count on am- diminution of the hostile forces directed against herself. She knew that she would be obliged for a more or less indefinite period to devote her energies to repelling a superior enemy. It was consequently obvious that she would be compelled, at any rate until the enemy's main line of attack became certain, to submit in some mea.sur(! to his initiative and .so to distribute the bulk of her forces as to render them available to meet the impend- ing blow wherever it might fall. Such a ttvsk is one of the hardest that war can demand of an army and a nation. There was a good deal to be said for the view, which was current in Germany, that from the tecluiical as well as from the moral point of view the r61e of the defender had been made more difficult by modern conditions. According to this school 98 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. REPUBLICAN GUARDS IN PARIS. [Daily AUrrcr, of thought, the view of Clausewitz that the iefender would always have on his side the Advantages of concealment and time, and that the assailant would always be exposed to the risk of discovery and of premature commit- nxent, was less applicable than of old. The enormous size of modern armies, the immense breadth and depth of fronts, whether in the theatre of war or on the battlefield, and the consequent difficulty of acciu'ate observation, were believed considerably to have reduced the advantages of that deferred form of action which the great Prussian author, writing of days when armies were comparatively small and visible, regarded as outweighing the moral advantages of the offensive. Most of the experience of 1870 and 1905 seemed to prove that the advantage had passed to the army which was powerful enough to take the offen sive, to seize the initiative, to be first on the spot. On the other hand it was held in France that the counter-attack was a tremendously powerful weapon, perfectly capable of giving victory to the defenders, providing that there were forthcoming on the part of their com- manders the knowledge, judgment, and resolu- tion necessary to enable them to profit by the mistakes and the exhaustion of the assailant ; and on the part of their people the intelligence and endurance necessary to enable them to understand and to wait. Such were, in brief- the two strategic theories which circumstances and policy were destined to bring into opposi- tion on the French frontiers. To find the means, in accordance with their strategic theory, of carrying on an effective defensive until the moment when a suc- cessful Russian advance would enable them to assume the offensive, was the task of the French commanders. Broadly speaking, the possible front of the. main German concentration extended roughly from Aix- la-Chapelle, close to the meeting of the Dutch, German, and Belgian frontiers, to the point of the Vosges at Schirmeck, west of Strassburg, a breadth of about 180 miles ; and whatever the probabilities it would be impossible to say, until the form of the concen- tration was fairly defined, exactly the point where the real effort would be made. All that could be safely predicted would be that once begun, and from whatever point, it would be pushed forward as fast as possible and as straight as possible upon Paris, that is to say that the main fighting was bovmd to take place somewhere within the triangle of Liege, Strass- burg, and Paris, or close to its sides ; an area which, from the French point of view and speaking purely geographically, would be covered by a preliminary concentration from THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 99 DINANT. Maubeuge to Toiil (a breadth of 150 miles). But, while admitting that it would be necessary to occupy in some degree the whole of this por- tion of the frontier, not to mention the spaces towards Lille on the one flank and Belfort on the other, anytliing like an equal distribution of force along it would obviously be a negation of all modern strategic teacliing, a return to the cordon system condemned a century ago. The French concentration had to be fixed with a view to certain definite strategic eventualities. These were comparatively few. It was evident for years before the war that only two main alternatiTes, already referred to in Chapter 2, were open to Germany. It was certain, owing to the lie of French and German territory, the arrangement of the German railways, and the distribution of the French fortress system south- ward and in rear of Epinal, that no large concentration would take place in Upper Alsace ; but that, while leaving sufficient troops between Strassburg and the French frontier to retard any attempt at a French offen-sive from the soufch, the Germans had to clioose bat ween a grand offensive from Loiraine (Thionville-Metz-Scliirmeck) or one from the front Metz-Aix-la-Chapelle, passing througli (he neutral territory of Belgium and Luxem- burg. The first involved the storming of the French barrier forts between t)ie fortresses of Verdun-Toul and Nancy, and could best be met by a concentration of the main French Army on that formidable front, and in the gaps on its flanks. Such a concentration, which 102 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. was rendered feasible by the strength of the covering troops, might be expected to enable the French Army to accept battle under very favourable conditions, for the front of the position would be enormously strong, and the fortresses would ailord excellent pivots for out-flanking operations, or for counter attacks if the entmy endeavoured to turn them. The northern alternative was by some regarded as even more mifavourable to the German Army, on the ground that the passage through Belgium, and the capture of the Belgian fortresses, would occupy more time and cost more men than even the storming of the Verdun- Toul defences. In any case it was certain that even if the Belgian resistance was neg- ligible, som3 days must elapse before the invading hosts could reach the French frontiers ; while, if it was vigorous, it might even be possible for the French Army to join the Belgian Army and operate in conjunction with its Ally. Nor was it to be forgotten that the intervention of a British Army was more likely to take place in the event of a violation of Belgium than otherwise. From the French point of view, moreover, the existence of neutral territory offered another important skdvantage. It was hardly Ukely that Germany would invade neutral territory unless she meant to make serious use of it. The news of the violation of Belgium, therefore, seemed calculated to set doubts at rest as to the zone which the Germans had chosen for their main effort, and therefore to indicate the direction in wliich the main French con- centration would have to take place. Beyond this nothing was certain. The strength of the Belgian resistance, the stopping power of the fortresses, the intended lines of advance and the relative distribution of the German troops, as well as the total strength of the hostile force in the northern area could only be cleared up by the operations themselves. In one other important respect the French were lucky. The neutral attitude of Spain, and especially of Italy, freed them of aU apprehensions on their south-eastern and southern frontiers. It was from the first possible for them to accumulate a considerably larger force of troops on their western frontier than could have been reckoned upon with any safety in the plans drawn up in time of peace. CHAPTER VI. THE ARMY AND THE FORTRESSES OF BELGIUM. BELGiAif Neutrality as a Political Abstraction and its Violation as a Military Theorem- Neutrality Becomes a Focus op Patriotism -The Old Army a Governmental Army-The New Citizen Army-The Creation of the Fortresses-Brialmont-The Problem op Lieoe and Namur— Concrete and Cupola— The Army in 1863, 1899, and 1902— The National Army Acts of 1909 and 1913-Strength in 1914-TheGardeCivique-Organization of the Army on Mobilization— Armament and Equipment— Typical Brialmont Forts— Lateb Designs- Antwerp— LiKOE and Namur— Cupolas verms Modern Howitzers. WHEN Belgium was declared " por- petualh- neutral " it was quife as much in the interests of the Great Powers as in her own. A dangerous crisis over the fate of Limburg had just been passed, and botii France and Prussia had formed the habit of studying the invasion •of their respective covmtrios by way of Belgium. In nearly all Moltke's memoranda of 1859- 1869 on possible Franco-German wars the eventuality of a French attacli from Belgium was taken into considoratioii. Since 1870, however, the question liad been studfed rather from the point of view of German attack upon France thp„n vice versa, and it is safe to say that tiiere was no problem of higher strategy that had been so freely discussed as that of the violation of Belgium's neutrality. That Germany would not be restrained by the old Treaty of London if it suited her to attack France by way of Belgium was assumed on all sides as the basis of discussion. Rightly and naturally, the soldiers left the question of puVilic law and policy to higher authority, and applied themselves to the consideration of the military conditions and consequence?- of an act which was obviously possible. It must be said that, after the formation of the Dual Alliance and the consequent possi- bility of a war on two fronts for Germanj-, military opinion was by no means agreed, either in principle or in detail, on the question of Germany's advahttige in the matter. Some held that the time limit imposed upon Ger- many by Eastern necessities was too small to allow of the march through Belgium. Others considered that Germany's only object would be to pass troops through Southern Belgium only as rapidly as possible, and, deploying for the first time in France itself, to pick up new railway com- munications with (Jermany via Mezieres and Luxemburg — in other words, to borrow part of Belgium for a week or so, to con- front Europe with the fait accompli, and to pacify Belgium by prompt pajment of the bill for damages. Still others held that Germany needed Belgium, south and north of the Meuse alike, both for the deplojiuent and for the subsequent maintenance of her huge forces. In all these studies, as a matter of course, esthnates were formed of the theoretical resistance of the Belgian Ann.v to the invaders. One would assert that mobilization would re- quire such-and-such a period, others would cal- culate in terms of " neutralizing " one, two, or tlu"ee Genn"n army corps, and others imagined that Belgium would only save her face,and worked out their problem purely on the distances and times separating Aix-la-ChapelJe from Mezieres. )03 104 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. PALACE OF JUSTICE, BRUSSELS. LOUVAIN, TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 105 THE KING OF THE BELGIANS. [By the courftsy of Uu Brtgian Reiiij Fund, 106 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Theee frigid calculations and estimates usually ignored the fact that siiice her inde- pendence Belgium had developed a distinct and remarkable national spirit. Yet in some re- spects tliis omission was natural enough, for it was not always that the Belgian authorities themselves realized, before the war, the bearing of patriotism — this new and real patriotism — on their military problem. One of the leading Belgian generals, for instance, defined the role of the Belgian Army as the detaining of such a proportion of the invader's force as would weaken him imduly en his main battlefield. On these cold premises, Belgium was not a neutral nation at aU, but simply a State possess- ing a certain number of soldiers who could be thrown into the scale on this side or that, if her treaty rights were infringed. In fact, in the eyes of the Army, neutrality had become, in a sense, a badge of servitude. Far different were the realities of the case. When Belgium faced the Germans in August, 1914, in defence of her neutrality, that privilege stood for nothing less, in the eyes of the people, than national independence. It was not a question of telling the Army to act ets a make- weight, but a question of fighting the Germans to the bitter end. Belgian patriotism, fre- quently supposed to have been smothered in infancy by sectional, political, and industrial quarrels, was suddenly put to the supreme test and proved its existence. At that moment the Regular Army had only recently come to be representative of that patriotism — ^to be an army, so to speak, of "principals." Up to 1913, or at least up to 1909, it had been conceived of rather as an army of "agents." The com- munity itseK had been too completely absorbed in its industrial development and its social questions to pay much heed to those of defence. It paid, and willingly paid, for its costly fortifica- tions, just as the British public paid for its Navy. But its personal living connexion with the Army was small. The Government, on its part, was certainly somewhat unwilling to smrender to the principle of the armed nation, conceiving that it needed a force of agents of its own to support its authority in time of internal trouble. At the time when the Belgian Army took shape, practically all the armies of Europe were organized on the principle of substitute-con- scription. This principle produced, in prac- tice, armies that were chiefly composed of volunteer professionals, since, on the one hand, the substitute who served on behalf of a con- script was really a volunteer with a bounty. and on the other, the re-engagement of the time-expired substitute to servo for a second conscript gave the State a long-service army that it could fairly regard as its own pro- perty. Until after 1871, therefore, this form of army was as normal and natural as an army of soldiers of fortune in the 17th century or a mechanical army in the 18th century. After 1871, however, the military problem of Belgium was by no means so simple. The most formidable military Power of Europe was to the east, and the second most formidable to the west, of her. At the same time, in Belgium itself both the popular view of the Army as a thing apart and the governmental objections to the arming of a people not easily governed still held good. Whereas in the case of the new French Army the new organization was a recombination of free atoms into which the war had disintegrated it, Belgiiun had under gone no such process of disintegration, and the reforms in her Army after the precautionary mobilization of that year were rather adjust- ments than reconstructions. In fact, for more than 30 years the Army remained, in kind and type, the same. Belgium's answer to the new conditions created by 1870 was fortification. It so hap- pened that she possessed in General Brialmont the greatest military engineer of the 19th cen- tury, and his genius and activity dominated the scheme of defence. As a young officer in the days of smooth-bore guns, he was, like his French contemporaries, a disciple of the orthodox " bastion " school of fortification, but presently he went over to the " poly- gonal " side of Carnot, Montalembert, and the Prussians. The enceinte of Antwerp, built to his designs in 1859, with its chicanes of all sorts — little rises of the parapet level to give fire upon this or that corner, little falls and recesses to protect it from enfilade, in- geniously-curved short flanks to search shy comers of the ditch, and so on — still exists to" attest his skill and ingenuity in a lost cause. But with 1864 and 1870 came the rifled gun, and Brialmont was young enough to adapt his works to the new standard of resistance. For some years after 1870 the question of the Army had precedence over the question of the forts. Strong and determined efforts were being made by the army officers iprial- mont amongst them) and the democrats, approaching the problem from widely different sides, to introduce the principle of the nation in arms, and it was with the arriire pensee of diverting attention from this side of the defence question that the Government took up the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 107 LIEGE. fortification propt^als of Colonel Deboer, Brial- mont's right-hand man. It was already provided in the defence scheme of 1859 that Antwerp should be the main strong- hold of the kingdom, upon which all field opera- tions — whether against French or against German intruders — should be based. Deboer, supported by his chief, proposed some barrier- forts (not, be it observed, a ring of forts) at Liege in 1879. Tliree years later Brialmont himself proposed more im- portant works, both at Liege and at Namur, and with these proposals began three fresh sets of controversies. These were, first, the political disputes which made the expendi- ture of money on those new works a party question ; secondly, the strategical question whether Namur and Liege should be made into important fortresses, a- proposition to which, many senior officers of the Belgian Army would not assent ; and, thirdly, the technical military question of armour and concrete versus earth parapets, which was then at its height in all coiuitries.* Echoes of this last still lingered thirty years afterwards, when war put the Meuse fortresses to the test. The first was set at rest when, under the sj^ell of Brialmont' s personality, the Government decided to make Liege and Namur fortresses after his own heart. The second, or strategical, issue was fought and re -fought throughout the years of iieace, the most serious competing proposal being that of General Dejardin, who lu-ged his countrymen to give up the too exposed Mouse line and to make Brussels itself a first-class fortress con- nected with Antwerp by barrier-forts on the Dyle and Scheldt. The forts as actually constructed were of Brial- mont' s third period — strong simple masses of steel and concrete without chicanes or weak- nesses, but of course very expensive. Tlie course of operations in 1914 may be said on the whole to have justified the money simk in these passive defences. Wliat is more questionable, how- ever, is their service to the general defence of Belgiiun. For beyond doubt Belgians were content to point with pride to these superb structiu-es, the finest miUtary engineering work of the age,* as British people were wont to eniunerate the ships of their great Navy instead of tackling the problem of the personnel. In 1863, on the eve of Prussia's challenge to the old armies of Austria luid France, Belgium possessed a substitute -conscript " standing army" of 73,718 rank and file, which was raised as far eis possible by voluntary enlist- ment, the ballot (with 'jubstitution) making good vacancies, as in other armies. The term of service for all alike was eight years, of which foiu" were spent " on fuiiough," and thus roughly 38,000 men were permanently under arms, with a drilled reserve of 36,000 behind them.f The eleven fortresses that then existed •Major G. S. Clarke (afterwards Lord Sydenham) and Major Ixnili Jackson (afterwards .4^wistant Director of Fortiflcatiom) were amoni;st those who broke a lance with General Brialmont "Though rivalled perhaps by the same enKlneer'u Bucharest works in Kninania. tTben; was also a small naval force. To-day Uie only Govern- ment v&mjIs are fast Channel steamers. 108 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ri0- ^* m^^f GENERAL LEMAN. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 109 oEysdeny \ PLAN OF THE LIEGE FORTRESSES. absorbed practically the whole of tliis force. At that time the population was just under 5,000,000 souls. In 1899, in a population of about 6,750,000, the peace strength was still only 43,000 rank and file, and substitution was still the ruling principle. But the Army had ceased to be the almost ))urely professional force that it had been, for enough non-substitute militiamen had been passed through the ranks into the reserve to give a total war strength (in the ten year -classes* liable) of about 130,000. On the other hand, Namur and Liege had, rightly or wrongly, been raised from the status of forts d'arret to that of fortresses, r.nd their garrisons had been correspondingly enlarged, so that it wa« doubt- ful whether even as many as 80,000 men wouk' be available for the free field army. It was this last fact which more than any other consideration led to the passing of the •I.etfally only eight wore available, but the Govemmeat had «inergeucy powers to call up two more. Army Law of 1902. This Law certainly marked no progress towards the realization of a national militia. On the contrary, it inade \oluntary enlistment of professionals the acknowledged basis of the Army by in- creasing their emolument.s and practicoUy doubling tlie proportion of them on the peace establishment. But two reforms of great import- ance were effected. First, the liability [leriod was extended to thirteen years, and, secondly, the framework of the Army was recast so as to give many cadres on a low peace establish- ment, to be filled on mobilization by the reser- vists, of whom thirteen-year cla.sscs wore now available instead of eight or ten. Thanks to those two reforms, it was expected that on mobiliza- tion 180,000 men would lx> available in organ ized formations. Under this Iawv the strength of the eventual field army — after garri.sons liad been provided for — was supposed to be 100,000. In a few years, however, it became evident that the system of relying upon increased no THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BELGIAN SOLDIERS AT BRUSSELS. CIVIL GUARDS AT ANTWERP. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Ill voluntary enlistinont was a failure. The deficit was not indeed very alarming in itself, considered in relation either to the peace 8trenf,th or to the \iltimate mobilizable force, but it did indicate that no farther expansion was possible on the old lines of a governmental army. The reason for this was certainly not want of patriotism in tlie Belgian people, for national military service was in the creed of the most democratic political parties, as it had been in the creed of the old Radicals ot the 1848 Revolutions. It was due partly to tlie fact that the Army was being kept away from the people by the Government, and still more to the absorption of the unemployed in the growing industries at home and of the most adventurous in the service of the Congo.* Meanwhile the international outlook grew darker. The Russo-,)apanese war, the first Morocco dispute, and the Austrian annexation of Bosnia followed one another swiftly. Every other year at least there was a tlireat of general European war. Every year witnessed some development in mobile siege artillery that was supposed to increase the military chances of a "brusque attack on Brialmont's Mouse fortresses, hitherto supposed to be reducible only by sapping and mining. It was now not the fortresses, but the Army, that took first place in the scheme of national defence. There were moments in the years 1909-1914 when Liege and Namur could fairly have been said to be suffering from neglect — a thing that would have been inconceivable ten years before. Antwerp, on the other hand, resumed the place that it had held in the defence scheme of 1859. While Liege and Namur began to be looked upon again as simple barrier-groups, Antwerp, in its capacity as base of the field army, received an enormous outer ring of new forts, more modern in conception even than Brialmont's.f Almost the last act of King Leopold II. was to give the Royal assent to the Army Bill of 1909. In that Bill substitution and the govermnental army that it produced at last definitely gave way to the principle of the national army. The 'new scheme was in many respects tentative and iniperfect, and in fact had to be thoroughly revised in 1913. But the first and hardest step was taken. The nation was armed, and neutrality as a politico -military abstraction rapidly gave Way to " independ- ence " as a popular creed. By limiting substitution to the one case of l)rothers the character of the Army Was changed •Moreover, the ilrilled volunteer battalioas of the avio Guard ("<>e below) aoubtless aljsorlMd some promising material. tThes^e fort* were comi)let«U and fit to stand a siege, ttcoording to published German reports, iji November. 1913. COUNT DE LALAING, the Belgian Minister in London. \BasuHu. from that of a contract force rendering services professionally to that of a duty force serving as members of society. The peace strength (42,800) remained at much the same figure as before, as also did the periods of colour service required of the militiamen. But tlie absence of a high proportion of long-service men enabled the annual intake of recruits -which is what determines the war strength of an army — to be increased from a nominal 13,000 to a real 17,500. The low-establishment cadres of the previous organization were thus fille<l up to the ordinary standard of active units in peace. At the same time the liability period was re- duced by one yeeir, so that a war strength of 210,000 rank and file could be obtained with certainty so long as the i-olontaires de carriers — i.e., the enlisted professionals — still remained in the Army in great numbers. Given this standard of strength, it was clearly un- necessary to apply the principle of universal service rigorously throughout a population of over 7,000,000.* Accordingly, liability was restricted to one son in each family, and, as above mentioned, one brother could join au substitute for another. But the question was soon asked — Was this war strength itself adequate ? Having regard to the immense development of the new en- trenched camp of Antwerp, not less than 130,000 •The maximum annual oontingent on such a poi>ulation would have been about 67,000. of whom some 33.000 or :M,000 m>:M be fit for servlc»». 112 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. of the 210,000 would l:>e required for fortress duties, and the field army, instead of being increased, would remain 8tfl.tionary at the figure of 80,000.* The second Morocco crisis of 1911, and the Italian and Balkan wars of 191 1- 12, with the con- sequent increases in the strength and war-readi- ness of the French and German Armies, answered the question promptly and decisively ; and in January, 1913, a new Army scheme was brought forward by the Government. It became law in due course and had been about a year and a half in operation when the Great War broke out. Under this scheme the standard of strength on mobilization was to be as follows (rank and file only) :— Field army 150,000 Antwerp 90,000 Liege 22,500 Namur 17,500 Reserves in dep6t« (for drafts) 60,000 340,000 To realize this standard, liability to service was made in fact, as it already was in theory, universal. But certain exemptions were, as usual, granted, and allowing for these and for the physically unfit it was calculated that no more than 49 per cent, of the gross annual contingent would be available for service. The thirteen years' term of liability to serve on mobilization was reintroduced. Had events permitted the scheme to grow to maturity, the above numbers would have been realized with certainty, since thirteen classes each of 33,000 compulsory service men and 2,000 volunteers would have given a total of 455,000. As it was, how- ever, only two classes had become available imder the new scheme, and the resources of the country in trained men (not counting the Civic Guard) were, roughly : — The 1913 class ' .. .. 30,000 Four classes (1909-12), at 20,000 .. .. .. 80,000 Eight classes (1901-8), at 13,300 106,400 Volunteers (steadily decreas- ing from 1901, but averaged at about 2,500) . . . . 34,600 251,000 Plus the recruit class of 1914 33,000 Plus professional cadres . . 12,000 Gross 296,000 Deduct 15 per cent, as unfit and missing on mobilization, and the net strength be- comes 261,000 Add gendarmerie not included in the classes above, about 2,000 Total available 263,000 • Tbl« fljure. Iwwever. would now be a minimum an-l not a mail- aramu^art it would liave proved In a mobilization under the 1902 If therefore, as foreseen, Antwerp, Namur, and Liege were to absorb 130,000 men of the active army and its reserves, only 133,000 at the outside would be available for the field army, even assuming that the new recruits of thelOH contingent could by judicious distribution be safely incorporated in the active ranks, and the hoped-for drafting reserve of 60,000 men at the depots would be non-existent. If, therefore, the war establishment of the field army (150,000) was to be attained, it was necessary to economize on the fortress garrisons, and to that end to call upon the Civic Guard to bear a greater share in the defence than had been contemplated. This call was the final test of the reality of Belgian patriotism. The Garde Civique was one of the few sur- vivors of the National Guards of the days when the citizen-in-arms stood for liberty against Governmental autocracy ; in its virtues and its defects, therefore, it was the true descendant of the citizen bands who had risen against the Dutch in the War of Independence, and of the National Guards that in France, Germany, and Italy played so great a part in the revolutionary movements of 1830-48. As with all formations of this kind, its military efficacy was in proportion simply to its passion. That it could not give full effect to its passion for want of specifically military training may freely bo admitted — the point is that all the value that it possessed was derived from the cause in which it was called upon to fight. On any conception of Belgian defence as a Governmental act, therefore, little reliance was or could be placed upon the Garde Civique ; and, moreover, by its very nature it was rather a counterpoise than an auxiliary to the Army, which, both as a regular force and a Govern- mental force, looked down upon the bourgeois amateur. But, as we have seen, the con- ception of neutrality as an affair of policy involving the use of an army as the agent of policy had given way to the conception of a national independence defended by the stout hearts of the citizens themselves. In making this new patriotism possible the Garde Civique had worthily played its part, as it had done also in assisting to maintain public order during industrial disputes. With the bringing together THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 113 of the Army and the nation that followed the Army Act« of 1909 and 1913, its part seemed to be over, and gradually, am the Army absorbed the citizens, it was intended to die out. But in August, 1914, this absorption had no more than begun, and the Garde Civique still existed in the old form and the old numbers. To it belonged in theory every able-bodied man who was not in the line or the reserve of the regular forces, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-two ; and behind it was its reserve of men of thirty-th-ee to fifty, whose sole peace liability was to report them- selves three times a year. Taking 35,000 as the total able-bodied contingent, and deducting 15,000 as enrolled in the Army, we find the nominal strength of the Ist Ban Garde Civique to be 13x20,000, or 260,000. Actually it was far below that figure, for only in the cities and towns did it possess any effec- tive organization, and it may be as.sumed that not more than 90,000 Gardes Civiques were available for duty. These men had been present at ten drills a year, but (as was to bo expected from their origin and principle) they were imder the Home and not the War Department, and received little if any assistance, either in training or in organization, from the active army. However, in modem Belgium, as in the France of Louis Philippe, the exist- ence of the general liability had given the enthusiasts the opportunity of forming volim- teer corps, and these like the British Volunteers, met habitually for drill and social purposes. and, with little direct assistance from above, attained a fair standard of military oflfieiency. This category included between 37,000 and 40,000 of the 90,000 men in the organized force. How well these men did their duty by the side of the regulars the defence of Li^ge attests. If as a national guard they wore mori- bund, as part of the now National Army that had not had time to grow, they bore their full share of the defence of the kingdom, and this in spite of the brutality of the invaders, who chose to regard them as non-military irregulars, to be shot when caught — a view which might equally well be taken of the police of Great Britain, or oven of the King's African regiments under the Colonial Office. For a moment, when over- whelmed and unsupported by the Allies, the Belgian Government dismissed the Civic Guard, in order to save it from this treatment, but it was soon re-armed and re-employed. The aid of the Garde Civique, then, l>eing justly reckoned upon for the fortresses, it was possible on mobilization to constitute the field army more or less in accordance with the normal scheme. This provided for six divisions and a cavalry division, besides the regular fortress troops. The division consisted of staff and three " mixed brigades " ; each was composed of two tlu-ee- battalion regiments of infantry and a group of three four-g&n field batteries, plus the divisional artillery (tliree groups), divisional cavalry (one regiment) and s}>ecial troops. The order of battle of the division is shown in the accompanying diagram : — Bde. Bde. Bde. Regt. □ □□ Regt. with Machine Guns □ □□1 field ijl ijl ^Batteries Regt. □ □ □ Regt. with l\1achine Guns □ □CZIJ. Field \ l[l ijl Batteries Div. Troops Field ijl iJi ^Batteries fiji i "h aomtzerl 7 7 7 Batteries I'l' '1' 'i' ^ S 12 EI Regt. g| Engineers g^ Flying Corps S^ Supply and L^^sl Transport pf~| Med. Deti Regt. □ □ O Regt. nitti Maciiine. Guns □□tni Field l[l ijl ijl Batteries 114 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. , Hfirf tnLaiiglement ^H'int Entsngjement PENTAGONAL BRIALMONT FORT. TRIANGULAR BRIALMONT FORT. {For description see pages 16 6- 17.) A very interesting feature of this organization, which is almost peculiar to the Belgian Army, is the mixed brigade of six battalions and three batteries. Such an organization, when found in other armies, is usually only for detach- ments stationed in outlying frontier districts (e.g., the Austro-Montenegrin and the Franco- Italian frontiers). In Belgium, on the contrary, it was not detachments, but the parts of the main army itself that were so organized. The needs of modem tactics had produced the idea of the " tactical group " of all arms within the division in the French and the British Armies, but in these armies the grouping was only a temporary ad hoc arrangement, whereas in Belgium it was the basis of the regular organization. The cavalry division consisted of three brigades, each of two four-squadron regiments, a mobilized gendarmerie regiment in addition, and three batteries of horse artillery ; a cyclist battalion, a cyclist engineer detachment on bicycles and a motor-ambulance section also figured in the organization. The establishment-strength of the division was roughly 22,000 combatants, which meant that the so-called division was in reality a small army corps. The cavalry division was about 5,000 strong in combatants. This force of six divisions,* a cavalry division, t with the 13th and 14th mobile brigades at Namur and Liege, was formed on mobilization by the expansion of each of the 20 infantry regiments of tliree battalions, or about 1,650 men, into a six-battalion brigade of about 7,000. This meant a four-fold expan- sion for the regular field army alone, without counting the fortress garrisons, but the Balkan Wars had already shown that for a thoroughly national war it was safe to multiply even by eight. The lieutenant-colonels and the second captains of the active regiments, with a propor- tion of junior officers serving as supernumeraries in peace, commanded the regiment and com- panies newly formed on mobilization. J The cavalry and artillery were maintained on a high establishment in peace, the field artillery being only doubled and the cavalry scarcely •1st Gheut, 2nii Antwerp. Srd Li^ge, 4th '.Namur, 5th Mans. 6th BruHnels, limtead of the two howitz^jr groups of divisional artillery, the 6th division hatl one of horse artillery and one of iieavy howitzers. tBnisseLs. JThe regiments at Namur and Ll^ge forme<l 'ortress battalions in addition. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 115 UTCH \ \ FRONTIER* REF ERENCE . "Y" Forts y BaLLenes & Redoubts THE MODERN DEFENCES OF ANTWERP. increased at all, by the intake of reservists (men and horses) on mobilization.* Of the fortress troops, both artillery and engineer, details need not be given. It will suffice to say that the formations in these branches were numerous, as one would expect from the preponderant part played by the tliree fortresses in the defence scheme. Before we deal with these fortresses in any de- tail, however, we naay sot forth briefly tlie char- acteristic points of the armament, equipment, and uniform of the Belgian Army. The field artillery weapon was a Krupp quick-firer of 1905,* with single long running-up spring and panorama sight, but without " indepen- dent line of sight " — in a word, a typical equip- ment of its date, inferior to the French, Russian, and Britisli models, but superior to the German. At the outbreak of war no definite decision had been made as to the pattern of qtiick-firing field howitzer to be adopted, and the old breech- loading weapons were taken into the field. The rifle, pattern 1889, a Mauser, of -SOliru calibire, was also a typical weapon, differing only in points of detail from the rifle of many other armies. *The periods of militiamen's service with the colours weit3 '.- — Infantry. Heavy Artillery, and Picnsers. 15 morths; Cavalry and Horse Artillerv. 24 months ; Field Artillery and Train, 21 montlis. * Some of the swne were made at Avon, and oCben at t&e ordnance works of Ckxrkerjll. at Seialng. lA^n- 116 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. NAMUR. The machine-guns were of three types — a Hotchkiss, used in the fortresses, a Maxim of much the same pattern and weights as those of other armies, and a new tj-pe named the " Berthier," a Hght automatic weapon weighing only 18lb. This was frequently, if not always, mounted (for transport only) on a light two- wheeled carriage drawn by dogs. The cavalry machine guns had pack transport. W hen in action all field machine guns were tripod- mounted. On the whole, then, as regards weapons Belgium was on a level with her contemporaries, but in no way ahead of them, for even the light machine-gun had been introduced into the Danish, Russian, and other armies. The same can hardly be said of the uniforms and the infantry equipment. The Belgian linesmen went into action against the grey Giermans wearing the blue tunic or greatcoat, the heavy knapsack, and the white buff accoutrements of peace time. Trials had re- cently been made of a khaki field imiform, but none such had been adopted. As we have already seen, the older fortifications of Antwerp represent Brial- mont's youth, and those of Liege and Namur, and some of the newer Antwerp forts, liis maturity, while the newer Antwerp works are more modem in design than even Brial TOont's final plans. The first, constructed before the days of the siege howitzer shell, scarcely concern ug. But the second and third call for more detailed description, and for that purpose we taice two of Brialmonfs designs — one for a large fort with an internal keep, and one for a " fortin " or smaller work- The ring fortresses of Namur r.nd Liege were simply combinations of these forts and " fortius," varied slightly in detail to suit the sites. The larger tort shown is five-sided, and surrounded by a deep ditch, of which the counttw-scarp is a masonry wall, while the earthen escarp is simply the prolongation of the exterior slope of the parapet. Behind the ' counter-scarp wall and running along almost its whole length is a vaulted gallery, which at the angles of the ditch is pierced for machine- guns and rifles, so as to sweep the floor of the ditch at the moment of assault. From this gallery small galleries run outwards and down- wards at right angles to enable the defenders to counter-attack the besiegers' mining operations, and other galleries conimimicate with the fort below the floor of the ditch. This counter-scarp gallery, therefore, is the main defence of the fort during the final stages of the besiegers' advance, both against his assault overground across the ditch, and against his mining operations imderground, and it is itself practically secure against any form of attack except slow and systematic mining — unless, indeed, artillery of quite unforeseen piwer were to be brought against it, in which case it would succumb like any other work.s. In the rear (or "gorge") of the fort the escarp is of masonry, and galleried and pierced THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. W BELGIAN SOLDIERS IN BRUSS-ELS. so as to command the floor of the ditch. The parapet of the fort is a plain infantry breast- work, with steel gun-cupolas bedded in concrete at intervals. Within this five-sided work and separated from it by an inner ditch is a triangular mass of concrete, galleried and pierced on its rear side to sweep the rear of the inner ditch* and on all sides so as to give fire upwards upon the interior of the outer fort, and so to prevent an enemy who has stormed the front part from establishing himself solidly m the interior and to keep open a way for reinforcements by way of the rear side or " gorge." Access from the outer fort to the inner ditch is obtained through a timnel from a well or simk "area,"! all parts of which are kept imder fire by carefully sloping the earth on the inner side, glacis -fashion, so as to bring it under the observation of a cupola in the centre of the triangular keep. •The counter-t:can> galleries at the aijex provide for ditch defence on the front faces. tTbLs sunk ** area " also assists In limiting the spa<« open to the as,sailant after ijenetratiiig the outer fort. The smaller fort is a triangular work of simpler trace, and without provision for interior de- fence. At the angles of the triangle are small cupolas for light quick-firing guns. The in- fantry parapet is traced somewhat in the shape of a heart, and in the hollow of this heart is a solid central mass of concrete, on which are the shelters and gun-cupolas. The mortar-cupolas emerge from the floor of the hollow, outside tlie central mass. Ditch defence is provided for the front faces by counter-.scarp galleries, and for the rear face by the trace and loopholes of the e.s(«rp gallery, as in the case of the larger fort. By the later engineers, though cupolas and concrete were used freely, the upright e.scarps and deep ditches and general costly massiveneas of Brialmont's works were replaced, in Belgium, as in other countries, by glacis-ditches ; that is, the parapet slope was continued outwards and downwards until the proper depth was reached for the building up of a st^ep, forbidding counter- scarp. Entanglements and steel fences were fi.xed on this slope as a barrier to sudden assault. The gun-cupolas were placed much as they were in Brialmont's designs, but in 118 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BELGIAN TROOPS. general the earthen slopes were longer and flatter. The Antwerp fortifications were (1) the 1859 enceinte, already alluded to as a fine example of the old" polygonal " fortification, and still possessing nailitary value against all forms of attack except a regular siege, although, of course, powerless to protect the town against bombard, ment ; (2) the " old " forts, a partial ring of self-contained works at regular intervals of 2,200 yards, and at an average distance of 3,500 yards from the enceinte ; these were built at the same time as the enciente and at first extended only from the river at Hoboken, above the city, to the railway running out of Antwerp eastward, but after 1869 were reinforced by Fort Merxem, north of the city, and Forts Cruybeke and Zwyndrecht to the west of the Scheldt, to which was presently added the combined fort and coast- battery, Sainte-Marie, on the lower Scheldt ; (3) the first instalment of the " new " forts, built in 1879 and the following by Brialmont ; these marked the important points of an immense fended area, Rupelmonde — Waelhem Malines — Lierre — Schooten — Berendrecht ; (4) the second instalment of the " new forts," which were completed in 1913, and filled up the wide intervals left unguarded in the preliminary scheme ; (5) the defences commanding the ship-cliamwl, of which the water battery of Fort years most de- near Sainte Marie witli its long row of casemate guns at the water level behind heavy masses of curved armour was perhaps the most effective ; (6) the inundated areas. It is to be noted that the old forts of class (2) received new cupolas and additional concrete at the same time as the works of class (4) were built. As the base of the field army and the final keep of the Kingdom, Antwerp had generally been well cared for. With Liege and Namur, however, matters were different. They were intended originally as barrier-fortresses, to be held only for a few days, and many authorities declared that any further development of them as fortresses in the ordinary sense was un- desirable in the general interests of the defence. Only the strong will and personality of Brial- mont made them what they were, for good and evil, and the war gave no final answer to the question, since the resistance of L'ege sur- prised those who regarded it as a mere barrier position while the swift overwhelming of Namur was equally startling to those who looked upon it as a fortress. Liege possessed a ring of six forts and six " fortius," Namur a ring of four forts and five " fortius " of the two kinds described above, or analogous types. The armaments were the same in all cases — two 6in., four 4'7in., two Sin. mortars, four light quickfirers for the forts, two 6in., two 4'7in., one (or two) Sin. mortars. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 119 O 77/// er OS' Denis FT DE COGNELEE-A/ '^''''''''"'^^one oRhisnes ^ j^tf'''" ijt Hingeon OGelbressee FT D' Em I N.ES F^'DE Marchovelette ^^^ 5.a./.e ttK y' ., ^'""'"'' /Vfa>c.e -/«.Z^.« ^^^ FTdeSu'arlee-'^-^ CI "I r/an'/nne © ^rse/ayn Namecffe THE DEFENCES OF NAMUR. and three light quickfirors for the " fortius." Including separately em placed guns, Liege had 400 and Namur 350 pieces. Searchlights and the necessary stores and supplies for resisting a siege were reported as ready and complete in the winter of 1913. even the line enlargement being in position. But what was true for the forts individually was not altogether true for the fort ring as a whole, for bomb-proof infantry redoubts would have guarded the intervals of the forts far more effectually than the mere field defences that were hastily tlirown up after mobilization. The uses and design of such redoubts were well known to aL European engineers, and it can only be supposed that no definite decision to treat Liege and Namur as fortresses had ever been reached. One other consideration must be mentioned. At the time when the cupolas, were con- structed and the depth of the concrete determined, the typical siege gun was the 6-inch howitzer. But artillery had made great progress since the siege of Port Arthur )iad afforded definite data as to the numbers and kinds of guns required, and 8-inch and even II -inch liowitzers could now be moimted on wheeled carriages and brought into ectioi without waiting to make concrete beds foi them. The resisting power of the cupolas was there- fore, in August, 1914, somewhat doubtful, and this doubt camiot but have intensified in the minds of the Belgian st^tff their more general doubts as to the wisdom of treating the Meuse places as fortresses at all. These doubts, indeec*. had been partially allayed by the manoeuvres of 1913, in which the "Red" Army attacked Xamur from the East and was repulsed, even though the umpires allowed the attack to smother the cupolas in a few hours. But manoeuvres and realities may differ, and luitil the hea\-ier shell was actually pitted agaiiist the cupola in war, indecision was bound to 120 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ANTWERP. remain. Had the new army scheme been com- plete in August, 1914, a clear policy one way or the other as to the Meuse forts would ipso facto have been, decided upon. As it was, in this as in other matters of defence, Belgium was caught at a moment of transition. CHAPTER VII. THE BRITISH ARMY. Review of the History of the Army — Evolution Without REVOnmoN — Cardwell's Linked Battalions — The Professional Army and the Citizen Army — The Napoleonic War — The Nineteenth Century — Progress of the Volunteer Movement — The Franco- German War — Consequent Changes in the Regular Army — The South African War — The Haldane Reforms — -Drafts and Establishments Between 1904-1913 — Mobiuzation — Reserves — • Territorial Force — Officers and Reserve of Officers — War Office Organization — Fighting Organization of the Expeditionary Force — The Infantry Divi- sion — Auxiliary Services — Line of Communication — Supply — Motor Transport — Medical Service — The Cavalry Division — " An Enemy Not to be Despised." THE British Army was the result of centuries of slow development, at no period of which there had occurred any event or reiorm so comprehensive as to deserve the name of revolution. Organized originally for King's garrisons overseas and King's retainers at home and long styled by constitutional usage " guards and garrisons," the Regular Army had grown up regiment by regiment precisely as needs presented themselves, and had been reduced regiment by regiment whenever a need passed away or the political and social circumstances called or seemed to call for econo- mies. It began with the small remnant consisting of two regiments only, which the Restoration Government of 1660 took over from the Army of Cromwell. To this were added regiments of men who had shared exile with the King — in the nature of things a verj' small body. The King himself was a " King upon condi- tions," and one condition exacted by public opinion was that there should be no repetition of the military occupation of England by Cromwell's major-generals. It was the acquisition of Tangier, which came as Catherine of Braganza"s dowry, that first called for an increase which Parliament would admit. Similar small increases followed, each with its own occasion to sanction it, and were considered so formidable to liberty Vol. I.— Part 4. '21 as to interest Paruament in cancelling them after such occasions had passed. In larger emergencies Great Briteiin raised emergency armies in much the same way as other countries had done up to the time of the introduction of the " standing army " by Louis XIV. and Louvois. These emergency armies were largely foreign troops, taken into pay temporarily, a procedure that to the 18th-century conceptions of statehood and nationality wa»s not in the least shocking, but rather wise. But some were British, and although at the peace superfluous British regiments were disbanded at the same time as the foreign regiments were given back to their masters, yet at the end of each war a few regiments managed to weather the storm of retrenchment, just as a century before temporary regiments in the French Army were now and then " given the white flag," which placed them on the permanent establish- ment. TWs practice was, as regards the French, already 150 years old when Charles II. came to the tlirone in England, and the French had obtained a long start in the formation of regular and permanent armies. In so far as the King was able by a process of " here a little there a little " to expand the force at his personal disposal at home, ho followed the French fa.shion, which in due course was succeeded by the Prus- sian fashion, placed beyond cavil and criticism by Frederick the Great. 122 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. These French and Prussian influences, as well 8s the peculiar conditions which made the British Anny a group of " guards and garrisons," still possessed not a little significance even in 1914, when the circumstances of Great Britain had undergone great transformations. They were responsible, in fact, for three of the most marked characteristics of the Regular Army — its oversea service, it« close regimental system, and its strictly professional type. Up to the time of the Indian Mutiny these characteristics were far more marked. But when oversea garrisons on a really large scale had to be found, it became gradually clear that one characteristic interfered with the other. The Prussian and French armies, which gave the British their regimental system, had no such drain upon them ; while, on the other hand, if fresh men had constantly to be found for the Colonies and India, the essence of the regimental system — the long-service private soldier — was forfeited so far as troops at home were concerned. In fact, the regimental system in its ordinary working broke down utterly when the smallest additional transfer ' of force from home to abroad or vice versa was required. For a century before that date there was no better means of finding the annual Indian draft of men from home, or of reinforcing the home forces for war, than the clumsy expedient of inducing men by a bounty to transfer from one regiment to another. We have said that the Army had evolved gradually without any single event or reform that could be called a revolution. If any reform could be considered as a contradiction to that statement, it would be the reform which Mr. Cardwell introduced of linking the old single-battalion regiments by pairs for purposes of drafting and routine of reliefs. The working of this system, which was still, in 1914, the basic system of the Army, will be examined in due course. It has been misimderstood, in the Army and out of it, and it is all the more important, therefore, that the reader should have a clear view of the conditions that it had to meet. For the pre- sent it will svtffice to note that it only achieved its ends by boldly affronting the old close regimental spirit. Battalions with traditions of their own were amalgamated into two- battalion regiments with no traditions at all. But the regimental system siu-vived, and enough of it still remained in the first years ■of the 20th centtiry to complicate the drafting question, and also that of promotion, to a •degree that Continental armies, with their luniform organizations and uniform service, could never realize. The drafting question, the reader will find, absolutely dominated our Army problem. The promotion problem was simpler, yet its solution was certainly not in sight in 1914. Whereas in Continental armies an officer, above all an excep- tionally good officer, practically never spent his career in one regiinent, in Great Britain transfers were few, and usually limited to the simple case of man-for-man exchanges — which was quite in accord with the general com- petitive outlook between regiments. In con- sequence the rate of promotion was very unequal in the various regiments, notably after the South African War of 1899-1902, in which many men of equal ages and in the same regiment were almost simultaneously promoted. In the case of the rank and file transfer without consent was a form of punishment. That the regiment, thus conceived as the soldier's one home, possessed the fullest measure of esprit de corps goes without saying. With all that that virtue implies the fine regi- ments of the Expeditionary Force can without hesitation be credited. Yet it is important to note that there were certain directions in which the strength of that esprit de corps affected imfavourably the administration and war -readiness of the Army at large. Of the strictly professional spirit of the Regular Army it is hardly necessary to adduce examples' Although the Militia and Volunteer battalions were " affiliated " to the Regular regiment of their county, in practice the tie was only nominal,* and there were cases in which no Regular battaUon had visited its county for a century and more. Voluntary enlistment for service in any part of the world and for any cause in which the Government wished to use it meant that the Army was the recruit's career and business. It was not a national duty imposed upon the citizen as such, but in its essence, contract service. Now, such an Army is a precious possession, and Great Britain was fortunate in that she was the only Eiiropean Power which had force in hand which could be used for the lesser emergencies. It has been aptly remarked that the cominental military machinery will only work at full power. Taking this phrase in the sense in which it was meant, the military advantage of Great Britain was the capacity to work effectively, if not economically, at all powers. A grand battle on the Continent, the maintenance of internal order at home, war upon a kinglet in a tropical forest, and punishment • Save In so tot a« the Mllltlft was used as a " feeder " lor the Armr. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 123 FIELD MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS. IW. ir D. namuy. of a high mountain tribe — all these tasks were luiderstood to be within the capacity of the infantry battalion that found itself " next on the list for duty " at any given moment. Services so different as these imply that it is service for service's sake, and not service on behalf of personal beliefs and passions, that is the main-spring of a professional army- The British professional army went into action against savages or against Boers with as much bravery as against Napoleon or the Kaiser, and we as a nation have the best reasons for real- izing the truth of the remark of M. Psicharri's French officer who, in contrasting the motives of the " colonial " or adventurer army with those of the " Metropolitan " or national army, said that it was " a vulgar error to attribute more patriotism to the former than to the latter " ; that it was " a sub- limated conception of fighting in itself as an ideal " irrespective of victor\'and defeat which Inspired the colonial anny*. But if we recognize that it is not primarily patriotism but high adventiu* that drives the professional soldier to affront the manifold chances of his service, we must accept it as a necessary consequence tliat when the greatest and gravest emergencies — the emergencies that * The oruiiital is beK condensed ^td p&rBpbraaed slUbtly. 124 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. H. WILSON. IH. Waller Barnett. enlist the ordinary citizen — arise, fundamental difference of character between the Regular forces and the citizen forces will make itself felt, however patriotic the soldier may be, and however anxious the citizen in arms may be for pay, separation allowances, &c. — however completely, in short, their formal outward regulations and terms of service may be assimilated and unified. In effect, a citizen army is definitely marked off from a professional army, even thought as in the case of modern European armies, it is trained in barracks for consecutive years, and even though, as in the American Civil War, it goes through three years on hard warfare, a citizen army it remains. The question of voluntary or compulsory service, which agitated Great Britain for some years before the Great War, bears only indirectly upon this larger question. A nominal com- pulsion if combined with substitutions, but only so, will produce the professional type, the armee de metier of the Second Empire, for example ; for the substitute is simply a volunteer with a bounty, and the " principal " who pays him to serve in his stead is a citizen whose ideal may be patriotism, but is certainlj' not war and adventure. And the citizen army is even more an army animated by what is called its voluntary spirit, since it is essentially an army fighting ad hoc for a great and per- sonally inspiring cause, and short of that cannot be used at all. So that when com- pulsion is applied to such a force in peace it must, to succeed, have the certainty that the voluntary spirit will be wholly operative in war. If, then, a nation is to have a professional army of the British type, it should also possess for those graver emergencies a separate army based upon the citizen serving not as an agent of the community, still less as an agent of the Cabinet, but strictly as a member of the com- munity. Continental armies, organized for the great emergency and for that alone, can regard their different categories of armed forces as one in kind though various in degree of fitness.* But the British was necessarily a " two- line army "■ — an army consisting of two differ- ent parts, each self-contained. Now the professional army is always for its numbers the most costly form, whether it be a purely voluntary one, showing the whole of its expenses on the State's budget, or a con- script substitute one in which part of the burden of cost is laid directly upon the indi- viduals who pay substitutes to serve for them. In the given two-line organization therefore it is to be expected that the expenditure for the uniforms, arms, training facilities, per- manent cadres, &c., of this second line will be kept as low as possible. The more professional the first line then the less completely trained the second Une can be. But both must be employed, and must also expand on the out- break of a war of great and deep significance. The only precedent in modem English history for such a war was the Napoleonic, and it is interesting to see how the problem of expansion was dealt with then. The conditions differed from the modem in this much, that in 1793-1815 there was no balance maintained between the Regular Army at home and that abroad — it was, of course, in the days of the " volunteering " system above mentioned — nor was there any Army Reserve, since in the existing small Army service was practically for life. But thanks to the Militia organiza- tion it was possible, in a series of wars that extended over more than half a generation, to develop the Regular Army at home into an expeditionary force, each battalion of which, on going abroad, left behind it a draft-producing •AlthouKh even here the neoepsity for neater techniral efficiency for war — for instance, the prepare<lneHs in certain frontier troops — ■ liad Kone far enouwh to Huiiucst to iuivanceU students the possibility of a return to the old armiie de mitier. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 225 battalion of the Regular Militia. This Militia was raised nominally by compulsion, but in practice by substitution. Insurance societies which were formed to protect their members against the luck of the ballot were able to pay handsome bounties to substitutes, and it was far more profitable for a man wljo intended to anlist to do so in several stages, at each of which he obtained money in some form, rather than to go direct into the line for the single bounty. Behind this Keguhir Militia, which closely corresponded with the later Special Reserve, there was the Local Militia of 1808, equivalent to the modem Territorial Force, in which personal S(>rvice was compulsory and substitution forbidden. This was purely a home-service force, formed out of the Volun- teers previously existing, and there is no evi- dence that it found any reinforcements for the Regular Army, though a certain number of its :nen volunteered for the Regular Militia. After the peace the Militia of both kinds was disbanded and ceased to exist, though Yeo- manry belonging to it were from time to time called out in aid of the civil power in the troubled years of 1820-1850. All foreign and Colonial wars and emergencies from 1815 to 1859 were strictly of the kind to which a professional army, and only a professional army, was adapted, and although the Militia was re-created, and embodied in the Crimean War, it was volun- tarily enlisted from the same classes as those which recruited the line direct. It became an ante-chamber of the Regular service, and as such gradually ceased both to be recruited from citizens or to represent in any way the idea of ser- vice as a duty to society. Into its place stepped the Volimteers, who had primarily been formed, or had rather formed themselves, to meet the most serious danger that had threatened Britain for centuries — the first Napoleon at the head of the best professional army in the world and a navy numerically equal, or even sujierior, to the British Fleet. But, unlike previous emergency forces, this did not vanish when the emergency passed. On the contrary, it grew into a permanent force, witn its own settled habits and traditions and a strong tie of mem- bership to assist or replace the purely military cohesion that its intermittent trainings could not be expected to give. While this process of solidifying the tem- porary Volunteers was going on, the Regular Army was itself undergoing great changes. The Franco-German War of 1870-1871 had revealed the prowess of the short-service national army ; iLs great aptitude for the changed teclinical con- ditions of warfare, its extraordinary numerical strength, and its intensive trftinftig. None of those things made it a type of army that could serve the piiri)oses of a Colonial Empire, but ita munbers and flexibility at any rate were factors in its favour that had to be taken into account and answered by like factors in any professional army that might b<' called upon to face it. TJie only way of increasing the numbers of that professional army was to divide the period of the soldier's service into colour service and reserve service. To those unfamiliar with the working of the Army system it may seem to be a mere truism to say that the war strength of the Army depends on the annual intake of recruits ; yet it is a fact that critics of the system frequently sought to increase that • strength by other means, such as changing the periods of service, re-enlisting reservists, &c. It is therefore important to make it clear that the real gain from short service is the great in- crease in the number of vacancies to be filled annually, and therefore a great increase in the intake of recruits, establishments and cost remaining unaltered.* The short service principle was not, of course, applicable in its entirety. To begin with, service in the professional overseas Army could not be made incumbent upon the citizen as such. Further, when a man enlisted for Army service he did so with the intention of rendering Service for a reasonable number of years, and not with that of receiving training as quickly as possible in view of a future emergency ; and, lastly, the cost of changing the whole of the rank-and-file personnel abroad every three years or so was prohibitive. A compromise therefore was adopted. The period of liability and of pay for that UabiUty was fixed at 12 years, of which six or seven were spent with the colours and six or five in the reserve.f At the same time the Unking of the single battaUons was carried out, and to each regiment thus formed was affiliated one or more Militia battalions, which were closely associated with the dep6t8 of the Regular battaUons, and so occupied a middle position between the old self- contained citizen force and the pure draft -pro- ducing agency, the function of the latter tending constantly to develop in importance at the expense of the fonner. This system — professional Regulars, half at home and half abroad ; MiUtia, half drafts for Regulars, half agricultural volunteers ; Volunteers, townisraen thorouglily organized in • Thus on an establbihiiiunt o( lOC.OOO men alwitrs present » 1th the ooloure 25.000 recruits a >e»r could be taken lor four yem' service. 60.000 for two years', and 200.00<i for si v months'. t The periods have varied slluhtly. «id in one owe, to be lefemd to presently, a mu«h sliorttr terra of (oiour service w«« introduced. The aeriocU vary also acoorUiiiK to the inn of the service. 12» THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL SIR HORACE SMITH-DORRIEN [Newman battalions and looseiy grouped in brigades, and a Regular Army Reserve — was the system in force when the next great occasion for expansion came in the South African War of 1899-1902. The expansion required proved to be too much for the system, especially in respect of mounted men. Battalions of Militia and companies of Volimteers who offered to serve abroad were sent out to reinforce the,i:ifantry and to set free a large number of infantrymen who had been trained in mounted infantry work. Moreover, a very large part of the Yeomanry — ^the light cavalry of the Vohuitsers* — ^was sent out, and fresh regiments raised ad hoc constantly followed them. Other contingents of mounted troops were raised in the Dominions and Colonies, South Africa of course included. These various forms of " expansion," with their unavoidable overlapping and the technical difficulties, both of handling and of administra- tion, owing to the dissimilarities of organi- zation, terms of service, pay, and train- ing, led, after the war, to a re-examination of the whole military system. After variou.s unsatisfactory experiments had been made, a fresh system was matured and brought into operation by Mr. Secretary Haldane in 1907- 1910 Under this system, the Regular forces at home were re-grouped and permanently or- ganized as an expeditionary force of six divi- sions and a cavalry division ; the Militia in its old form was abolished and replaced by the Special Reserve, a force destined on mobiliza- tion to form a reserve battalion upon which the Regular Army fighting oversea could draw .steadily for reinforcements ; and the Yeomanry and Vohmteers were re-formed as the Territorial Force of all arms and branches, with a complete divisional organization analogous tc that of the Regular Army. This was the Army system in force at the outbreak of the great war, and it is now oiu- duty to describe it in some detail. For the infantry of the line, half of which was at home and half abroad, the period of service was seven years with the Colours and five in the Reserve. This division of the twelve years' liability had been found by experience to give the best mean between the length of service necessary to allow the drafts and reliefs to work well and the shortness of service necessary for the production of a large Reserve. After the South African War, which had been carried through, with a little assistance from India, chiefly by the home Army and the Jleserve, the value of the latter had become so con- spicuous that the drafting problem was allowed to 'all into the background. Three years' Colour and nine Reserve service was intro- duced in 1902 for the express purpose of build- ing up a great Reserve. But the conditions of a man's eligibility for service in India — (o) age 20 ; (h) service at least one year ; (c) not less than four years to run before expiry of Coloiu- •Xho^'sh ofBdally a ilWInct roroe. MAJOR-GENERAL ALLENBY. {Gale & Pald^n THE TIMES mUTOHY OF THE WAR 127 FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN FRENCH. l/f. HaiHfi sprvice — obviovisly made it impossible for any soldier enlisted on these terms to bo sent to India at all. It was hoped that between two- thirds and three-quarters of the men would voluntarily " extend their service," and hwl that hojje been realized no difficulty of course would have arisen. But it was not realized, and the working of the draft.'' broke down so badly that nine years' Colour and three Reserve had to be adopted in order to redrosj the balance. Finally, the former seven-five term was reintroduced. But it was not only the years immediately concerned that were affected by these thanges of terms. Until the last men enli.sted on the three-nine year terms of li)02 finally passed out of the Reserve in 1914, tlio routine smoothness with which the recruiting branch had been working in the nineties could not be restored, and just before the Declaration of War the recruiting system was being taxed to the utmost to make good the great efHux of both the nine- year men of 1904-5 and the seven-year men of 1906-7. Inseparable from the question of drafts was that of establishments. The Indian battalion was on a war footing, 1,000 in round munlx>rs, j)ermanently, the home battalion on an establislunent of about 750. Now wlien a battalion went abroad to relieve its sister battalion it had at the .same tinje to increase its establishment, and as the battalion due to come honie included, in the nature of things, very many soldiers in their last \ear of service. i.e., due for discharge, it could leave l)ehind but fev,- for the newcomers to take over. The battalion going out, therefore, would have to [jrovide most of its own extra men. Further — and this was always the mix of the problem — '■ it could not take with it men less tliau 20 years of age. nor recruits. If, therefore, it was to stand on its new footing in trained men over 19, it must have been over-filled with recruits two years beforehand, and — ivs the home establishm nt 128 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. then governed it— serving soldiers must have been dismissed prematurely to the Reserve to make vacancies for these recruits. Under these rigid conditions it w&s possible, and even frequent, for a battalion at home to be below establishment and yet closed to recruiting, and, worse still, these premature discharges to the Reserve might have to take place at a moment unfavourable for recruiting— as was the case in 1912-1913, when in order to make room a very large number of men who would be trained and available for drafts in 1914-15 serving soldiers were prematurely sent to the Reserve by the thousand, though recruiting was far from brisk at the time. Hence there occurred a shortage in the Regular Army, which alarmed the nation not a little, but was, in iact, largely the result of the violent dis- turbance of the seven-five year terin in 1902 and of the limiting conditions of establishment and qualification for Indian service. Undsr these conditions the establishment of a home battalion weis practically determined by the ntunbers of the annual draft for India. In the days of " volunteering," as we have seen, there was no large force of units at home, and the units abroad were fed from depots. But after the battalions were linked, those at home foimd the draft for their " links," and as they were the onjy available expeditionary force it was impossible to regard them as MAJOR-GENERAL ROBB. iGalt & Poldtn MAJOR-GENERAL PULTENEY. lElliol &■ Fry mere dep6t8. It was therefore settled that the home battalion should consist of three sets of men destined for three annual drafts of 150 each, to be sent out as each set becomes qualified, plus 300 men who would grow to maturity in, and remain throughout their service with, the home battalion, which without them would be in the condition de- scribed by Lord Wolseley as that of a " squeezed lemon." All this administrative and actuarial work had been reduced to a science by the recruiting branch, and short of disturbing reforms the system worked with a certainty that would hardly be credible under an apparently hap- hazard system of voluntary enlistment, were it not that the laws of probability act with the greater certainty when the numbers dealt with are large and the causes influencing them manifold, diverse, and independent. In the case of the Expeditionary Force as it stood at the Declaration of War in August 1914, the far-reaching effect of the previous distwbances was completely neutralized by two simple expedients — the lowering of the foreign service age limit to 19 and the abolition of the mounted infantry, which was replaced by additional cavalry, made available by with- drawals of Imperial troops from South Africa in 1912-13. The latter step alone meant that per- haps 50 picked men per battalion remained with their vmits, and the former made THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 129 available 100 to 200 men jwr battdlion who would Imve Ihx^ii too immature for a tropical or sub-tropical war. Mol)ilization therefore was carried tlirough without a hitch, and the Special Reserve battalions were at once ready to absorb the surplus Regular reservists. In the case of the Guards, who were not employed on foreign service in peace, there was no draft question to complicate matters The term of service therefore was three and nine years, and an enormous Reserve wag thereby created.* The Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers were each a single corps. Men enhsted for Garrison Artillery could not be posted to mounted corps, and in the E.igineers tliere was an ela- borate classification of men according to their trades. But apart from these complications drafting presented no problems for the scie.it ific arms, indeed no Engineer units at all were stationed in India.f In the cavalry of the line men were enlisted tor the " corps " of Hussars, Dragoons, &o., and allowed to express preference for particular regiments within these corps. This arrangement *In all calculatfonB of Reserve streiiKth It is Important to note • on the awtUoritv of Sir C. HarriH, the Assistant Financial Secretary of the War (>rti<.^, tlj^it '" wastage," year for year, was not appre- cial)ly greater in tlie case of reserviata tlian In that of uien with the Colours. tllad some grouping of infintry regiments been practicable th« example of the Koyal Artillery shows that many if not most of the complications previously de cribetl would have been removed. Hut this reform, though sugso^tetl and supiK>rlod by high authority, failed to i)entitrate the strong waits of the regimental cattle. GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON. lEUiott Or Fn LT.-GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG. U. RusuU & Sons at once removed most of the complications of drafting, and as cavalry is an arm always maintained on a higli peace footing, there were no seriou.s changes of establishment to be prepared for when units went abroad. In consequence, the mobihzation of cavalry regiments at home presented no special diffi- culty. Each regiment, on proceeding on active service, left behind it a reserve squadron which absorbed tecruits and surplus reservists and continued to feed its unit throughout the war, in the same way as a special reserve unit of infantry.* In the horse mobilization of the mounteu branches both of the Field Force and of the Territorial Army there was the same thorough- ness and attention to detail. Whereas in the Soiitli African War the lack of system liad been quite as marked in the matter of horses as in the matter of men, when tlje European War broke out it found the authorities in all grades prepared to deal witli the situation, for the rapid growth of motor traction in the inter- vening years had drawn public attention to tlie horsing problem. The peace establishments of the Army in horses had been increased, 'li« system of " boarding-out "■^ had been intro- duced, first tentatively and then on a larger * There wa) no draft-flndinff Spjcial Reierv'e dnirr. t Iki^rded-out horses were Cloverimi.'nt-o*wned animals additional to the ordinary peace establishment, and othsis and maintained by them. which were lent to farmen 130 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. scale, oivilian buyers had been appointed in readiness for emergency, and above all a really useful census of, horses had been taken. Built up on these principles of organization, the Regular Army on October 1, 1913, was distributed as shown below : — Militia elements of the force was the '' regular establishment," which carried on the work of the regimental depot and trained the recruits there. This force, however, had in peace times failed to attract sufficient recruits. It was generally thought by the classes likely DISTKIBUnON OP THE BEGUI^AE ARMY. Infantry. Cavalry. Horse & Field Artillery. Garrison Engi- Artillery. neers Flying Corps. A.S.C. Depart- luentii. Colonial Indian troops . ttviops in Irap.pay. Total. ON HOME ESTABLISHMENT Uaited Kingdom IieUmd Cb&nnel Islands 61.442 14.409 1.355 10 673 2.052 13,640 4.0/2 6.728 733 299 5 978 35 822 4.848 889 11 5.161 850 36 - 99.192 2'1.282 1,736 Total 67.206 54.584 12.625 17,712 7.760 7.290 822 5.748 6.046 - - 126 .209 ON INDIAN ESTABLISH MENT 5.695 10.971 4.463 377 - - 638 — ' 602 77.130 ON COLONIAL ESTABLISH- MENT. Gibraltar Malta Egypt and Cyp' us Ceylon. Straits Settlements and China Stations . . Bouth Africa Various, on passage. &(;. 1.830 4.172 4.543 4,069 3.600 3,168 633 1,137 180 453 1.387 1.577 193 1.699 292 846 396 410 163 458 520 399 ~ 85 109 104 120 282 57 179 229 217 300 482 270 437 621 2.867 200 6.267 3.877 6.934 6.233 13.434 6.826 7.607 Totol 21.442 1.770 633 5.994 2.346 10.013 ~ 757 1.077 3,825 6.467 44.911 Grand Total . . 143,232 19,990 29.316 18.217 822 6.505 8,261 3.826 7,069 247.250 The Army Reserve, the strength of which had fluctuated considerably in consequence of the various changes in the terms of colour service, consisted of : — STRENGTH OF THE ARMY RESEEVE ON OCTOBER 1, 11113. A. B. D. Total. Cavalry Horse and Field Artillery Garrison Artillery Engineers . . Inlantry Various 670 426 4.234 493 6.967 13.694 6.023 4,079 62.510 10.823 3.708 4.645 259 959 23.382 2.218 10.675 19.009 6.282 5.464 90.126 13.534 Total 5.823 104,096 35.171 145. 090 Section A consisted of Reservists who had ijndertaken to rejoin the colours if required on an emergency short of general mobilization ; Section B (with C) comprised all who had enlisted for short service (3-7 years) and had discharged their active duties. Section D consisted of men who after the expiry of their 12 years total term had re -enlisted for a further four years in the Reserve. The Special Reserve, which consisted almost entirely of infantry,* was created from the re- mains of the Militia to act as the " Regular Militia' battalions had acted in the Napoleonic wars, as feeders for the Line in war. All ranks were liable for foreign service in war, and the term of enlist- ment was six years. Incorporated with the •At one time a large force of Field Artillery Special Heservlsti was enlisted for the manning of anununition columns. Hut these were no longer required when Army Service Corps motor transport look over this duty. to join that pressure was brought to bear on " S.R." recruits while at the depot to enter the Regular Army ; and in fact many thousands of men annually joined the Special Reserve in order to bring up their physical and other qualifications to the Regular standard before passing into the Line, or in order to see " how they liked the life " before committing them- selves finally. These men were, of course, potential Regulars, and not part-trained Reservists. The Territorial Force since its reconstruction had had a troubled history. Upon it had centred many criticisms that might have been directed against the Army system as a whole. Its weaknesses were naturally more in evi- dence than those of the Special Reserve, or those which were the outcome of drafting difficulties in the Regular Army. Since it was pre-eminently the national army, embody- ing the idea of duty service, those who advocated and worked for compulsory military service focassed their efforts upon it. Whether this volume of criticism affected its material training is doubtful, but at times certainly it did affect the moral of the force, and from first to last it almost controlled the recruiting. Further, the local recruiting authorities were in many cases too much absorbed in the business administration of the units under their charge to be able to deal with recruiting in the more scientific spirit of the Recruiting THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 131 BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR PHILIP CHETWODE. IH. Waller Barnill. Branon of the War Office ; unnecessarily wild fluctuations of intake — alternate " booms " and '" slumps " — were the result. In some years one-seventh, in otliers as much as one-tliird of tiie Territorial Force would be due for discharge, and the problem of making flood the deficiency in advance of its occurrence was a liard one. In the result the force was considerably short of iXs peace ostablisliment of 315,438, tliough it was never much below 250,000. The term of service in the Territorial Force waa four years, re-engageioents being allowed. The training liabilities were ten to twenty drills ix<r aiinimi, two wfteks' continuous training in <'amp, and a musketry course. When the Territorial Force was created, it was intended to form a Reserve for it as soon as possible, and to that end re-engagements of time-expired men were at first discouraged. Owing, how- ever, to inelastic regulations by which com- paratively few men were qualifiiKl to pass into this Reserve*, and to the sudden popularity of the new National Reaer\'e, the Territorial Force Reserve was little more than a list of officers who, while leaving their regiments on change of residence, &c., wishetl to continue in the force against the day of mobilization. Far more satisfactory was the condition of two other auxiliaries of the Territorial Force, the National Reserve and the \'oluntar\- Aid Detachments. The former nimibered over 200,000 old soldiers and sailors divided into three categories, (1) i-egistered for general service ; (2) registered for home service ; (3) not available for service under arms. The provision of officers for these various forces we» regulated thus : — In the ca.se of the Regular Army, officers were appointed (a) from cadets trained at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich (for Artillery and Engineers), or at the Royal Militarj' College, Sandhiu^t (for other arms), to which in- stitutions they were admitted in some cases by Governmental or headmasters' nominations, in the rest by comjjetitive examination ; (6) from •Another branch of this Reserve, wliich was provided for but never formal, w;is the " Technlwil " lte«erve. a reslster of inen available u« local Buldet*. sui>erint.-ndent--4 of works. Ac. VIEW OF SALISBURY PLAIN. />.;.,v Mirror. 132 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. among University students, after examination and preliminary military training in the Officers Training Corps ; (c) from Colonial candidates trained at the Royal Military Colleges of Canada, AustraUa, &c. In the case of the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force, officers were appointed either after service in the Officers Training Corps or direct from civil life. The O.T.C. was composed of senior division contingents belong- ing to the Universities and junior division con- tingents belonging to the public schools. The total strength of cadets in the O.T.C. was approximately 25,000, of whom about 5,000 in the senior division were imdergraduates of military age available for inunediate service. The officers of the corps were drawn from the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force. There were practical and written examina- tions in military subjects for cadets, as well as drill and camp training. In the general organization of the Army the principle had been adopted since the South African War of separating as far as possible command and training from administration. To that end the General Staff of the Army was made distinct from other branches of headquarters and staffs ; the administration, equipment, &c., of the Territorial Force was placed in the hands of a County Association, and that of the] Regular Army in the hands of a special general officer subordinate to the Commands-in-Chief in each region, but endowed with wide powers of Administration. The central administration of the. Army was divided into four n»in departments. The General-Staff dealt with operations, the Adjutant- General's Staff with personnel, the Quarter- master-General's with materiel, and the Staff of the Master-General of the Ordnance with armament. The Army at home, including the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force, was grouped by divisions and brigades into large " com- mands " imder generals commanding-in-chief, each of whom had under him a general staff branch, under a brigadier-general or colonel, and a major-general or brigadier-general in charge of Administration. The London district was separately organized. For recruiting and record purposes, or, so far as concerned the Regular Army and Special Reserve, the Com- mands, except Aldershot, were sub-divided jnto districts. Under the Army Coimcil and directly reporting to it were the Inspector- General Home Forces and the Inspector- General Oversea Forces (who was also Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Com- mand, but had no jurisdiction in India). These officers with their staffs were charged with the duty of constantly moving about amongst the troops and satisfying themselves of the efficiency of their training for war. Such being the general organization of the British Army at home, we now come to consider the fighting organization of its parts as con- stituted for military operations. The unit of infantry was the battalion, com- manded by a lieutenant-colonel. In 1913 the previous organization of eight companies of about 120 each had been replaced by one of four companies of about 240, commanded by a mounted officer, major or captain, with a second captain, and a subaltern in command of each of the four " platoons " of 60 men into which the company was divided. The battalion included, fiu'ther, a machine gun section of two guns, a section of signallers, medical officer and bearers, &c. Its first line transport, which immediately accompanied the troops on the march, comprised eight company ammunition mules and six ammunition carts (one of which was for the machine guns), two tool carts, two water carts, four travelling kitchens (one per company), and a medical cart. The armament was the " short Lee-Enfield " of 1903 and bayonet. The men's equipment was made not of leather but of strong webbing, of the same grey-green colour as the uniforms. The baggage and supply wagons of the infantry formed part of the Train. The brigade of in- fantry consisted of four battalions under a Brigadier-General, which had a small reserve of tools, and also a brigade ammunition ARMY MOTOR CYCLISTS. [Sport Or Getural THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 133 LONDON SCOTTISH RIFLES. reserve formed by assembling some of the battalion c irts. The cavalry regiment consist^ of three squadrons, each of about 150 sabros, divided into four troops, and a regimental machine gun section of two guns. The squadron was com- manded by a major, with a captain as his second. The first line transport included squadron baggage wagons, squadron ammuni- tion carts, and squadron tool carts, and for the regiment a wagon-carryin - raft equip- ment for the hasty crossing of streams, and a cook's vehicle corresponding in cooking capacity to about two of the travelling kitchens used by the infantry. The Cavalry Brigade consisted of three such regiments. The armament of the cavalry was sword, rifle, and in some cases lance. The equipment was light and stripped to bare essentials, but the cloth puttees worn by the men since the loose individual skirmishing of the South African War were less satisfactory for the knee-to-knee charge that was to be expected in Eiu-opean warfare. The Field Artillery unit was the so-called " brigade " (corresponding to the " group " of foreign armies and to be differentiated from the brigade in the larger sense). Each brigade, whether of I8-pounder q.f. gims or of 4-lin. q.f. howit- zers, comprised a brigade headquarters with telephone equipment, and three six-gun bat- teries. For each gun there were two ammuni- tion wagons, one of which, in action, was placed close beside the gun itself. Both gims and wagons were six-horsed flexible double carriages, composed of body (or gun-carriage) and limber, which gave them a balance, and therefore a mobility, which compared with that of the " General Service " wagon in much the same w.iy as a hansom compares with a " four-wheeler." In the Horse Artillery the " brigade " con- sisted of two batteries only. The distinctive mark of this branch was speed, owing to the lighter gim (I2.pounder q.f.), and to the fact that most of the gunners instead of being carried on the gun, gun limber, or first wagon, as in the case of the Field Artillery, rode separately. Heavy Artillery also accompanied the field army. A heavy battery consisted of four 60. pounder guns,* manned by the garrison artil- lery and drawn at a walk or slow trot by eight heavy draught horses apiece. To each " brigade " of field or horse artillery guns was attached a " brigade ammunition column," which provided a third full wagon for each gun, and also a reser\-e of rifle ammuni- tion for the infantry. Tlie howitzer brigade and heavy battery ammunition columns were similar, -except that they provided no rifle ammunition. Another reserve of ammunition behind this was provided by the Divisional Ammunition Column, this also under artillery charge,- and behind this again was the Motor Ammimition Park, to be alluded to presently. The field units of the Royal Engineers wwe : — The " field squadrons " or fielci troops, the signal squadrons and signal troops attached to cavalry divisions or brigades, the field companies and signal companies attached to divisions, and the bridging trains and signal sections at the disposal of commanders of higher formations. Tire details of the Signal Sers'ice cannot here be described, and it must suffice to mention' that the imits of this service included wireless telephone and telegraph operators with their equipment, as well as flag and lamp signallers and dispatch riders, mounted on horses or motor-bicycles. Wireless was employed cliiefly to connect General Headquarters with *Not howitzers, as was almost always tbe case In tbe Ooottnental heavy artillery. 134 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the fast-moving cavalry in advance ; telegraplis (air-line or ground cable) were for general work, and telephones for communication on the battlefield itself. The bridging trains were simply a great mobile reserve of pontoons and trestles, to be used bj' the field companies when the bridging equipment of the latter proved insufficient. The field squadrons, field troops, and field com- panies were the most important and generally useful of the engineer organizations. They provided for bridging, for demolitions, for Such were the constituent parts of the division. The division itself was commanded by a major-general, whose st-aff, like all higher staffs, was divided into a general staff branch, an adjutant general's branch, and a quartermaster- general's branch. It consisted of throe infantry brigades, three field artillery brigades, one field howitzer brigade and one heavy battery, with a divisional signal company, two field companies Royal Engineers, and one squadron of cavalry, in all 18,073 men, 5,592 horses, 76 guns, and 24 machine guns. I NFANTRV ARTI UL.E: R Y dddd X J. X X X X X X X X X X Three infantry br/gac/es iv/t/t batta/Zon macfi/ne ffun seci/ons 'I' 'I' i' [El |. .|. Ill II III ISl i|i .|. i|. lEI Three f/e/c/art///ert/grcy/f be/ffs py/t/> t/?e/r am. co/s. Ill F/e/d Hoiv'rBde. i IS Heavu Baty. ^ Sguac/ron Cava/ry ° g Co</s./^.£. a □ SBrigade A/?^ Sect/ons Sect/on Di\/is/ona/ S/ff. Coy. & & Am. Co/s. Am. Co/s. Three F/e/d Ambu/ances ^ A, /\ Tent AAA AAA a El B Bearers EI H EI EI B EI D/Wsfona/ Train Four /lorsec/ co/r?pan/es Ar/ny Serv/ce Corps. (3 br/gac/e co/npao/es ar?c/ / /7eac/^c/art€rs) co/npany For ar/:///ery, er?q/r?eers e^er.) KE! S la Kl D/'y/s/ona/ Ammun/t/on Co/umn Fhur .sect/ons {/r? arti//ery, cAaryeJ ISS ^^ S^ SIS expert supervision of infantry working parties, £Uid for water supply. The Army Service Corps units in the field fall into two distinct branches, the horsed " trains " and the mechanical transport " columns." The medical service in the field centred around the Field Ambulance. Each unit of that name included three " tent " and three " bearer " subdivisions, etich self-contained and there- fore separable from the rest for the benefit of outlying detachments, flying columns, &c. The catalogue of the necessary auxiliaries to the fighting troops, in itself meaningless to readers unacquainted with the military system, included a coinplete and up-to-date organization, which we may briefly describe under the three headings of baggage and supply, anununition, and medical aid. But before it is possible to do so a few words must be said as to the working of the lines of communication of an army. Perhaps no Army in the world had its lines of communication services so well organized in peace as the British. The reason is simple THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 135 60-POUNDER IN ACTION. [Sport Or Gtiurai. enough, viz., that it was accustomed to fight in ill-developed countries where the Army must create the resoiu-ces of civilization before it could use them. Duties on the line of com- munication were administrative, controlled by an Inspector-General of Communications ; and defensive (for the protection of the line itself), controlled by the " commander of L. of C. Defences." At the safer end of the line lay the base, generally a port, and at frequent intervals along the line were small posts for traffic control. Sometimes an advanced dep6t was formed at some distance up the line, where emergency reserves of stores were accumulated, but the " line " extended far in front of it. At " railhead," the variable point at which railway traffic ceased, there were no accumulations of stores, a day's requirements being sent daily by train to be taken thence by the motor lorries of the " supply columns " to the troops. This motor-transport was a new system, unlike that of anv other armv. and had been introduced in 1911. In it a complete break had been made with the traditions of the old horse -and -cart supply system. Horse trans- port was now used purely for distributing, the conveyance of supplies to the areas occupied by the troops being performed wholly by motor transport. The daily rim of the motor lorry being taken at 90 miles, the army could advance to a dis- tance from its railhead of 45 miles — or rath«r to a distance such that " refilling point," where the horsed trains took over the contents of the lorries daily for distribution, should not be more than 45 miles. But if a new and nearer railhead could be chosen for next day this distance could be by so much exceeded.* Tbe new system thus gave greater range and flexibility to the army's operations. It also cleared the roads in rear of the troops of the vast convoys of horsed wagons which formerly gravely impeded the army's manoeuvres, •As there were no stores aocumulated at milhead, thifi point could t)e chanKed at four to five hours' notice. IRISH GUARDS. iSport 6- Gen/Tji, 136 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. DURHAM LIGHT INFANTRY. [.Sport & Getural, To gfive a practical example. On a Thursday evening the men of an infantry battalion would have Friday's bread and cheese in their haver- sacks {plus a preserved ration for emergencies), and the travelling kitchens (called " cookers ") Friday's meat, groceries, &c. At that time the wagons of the train allotted to the service of the unit would be empty, waiting to meet the motor " supply columns " on Friday. These supply columns themselves would be at railhead, waiting for the rations to be railed thither from down the line. At 3 a. m. or so on Friday these railway trains would have discharged their contents and the lorries would be on their way at a speed of ten miles an hour to meet the enjpty wagons of the train at " refilling point." Thus for the first time in the history of war it had become possible for fresh meat and bread to be supplied to a distant army. The meat that our battalion would eat on Friday even- ing was probably alive on Wednesday morn- ing 100 miles away down the line. This, however was not the only, or indeed the principal, method of supply. As far as possible the resources of the country traversed by the army were utilized by requisitioning. Until a few years* before the war the British Army, with its 18th-century tradition of regarding the civilian as a spectator in the Government's wars, and its experience of wild colonial campaigns, had been quite unfamiUar with this resource ; but latterly much study liad been devoted to it and ample provision of motor-cars had been made for the requisition- ing officers. The replacement of ammunition was con- ducted upon a somewhat similar system. At various posts along the line of communica- tion were dejjots of the Army Ordnance Corps, which forwarded ammunition as required to QUEEN'S OWN OXFORD HUSSARS. [Sport & Central, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 137 GENERAL SIR CH.\RLES DOUGLAS. IRusuO & Sims. railhead, where the motor-lorries of the divi- sional ammunition park took it over for con- veyance to the horsed distritiiting agency (corresponding to the trains above-mentioned ) called C'tB Diviaioiial Ammunition Colunm. This coliunn was generally broken up into sections, each following at some distance one of the artillery brigade ammunition columns, which were the actual issuers to batteries and to infantry brigades. In both these cases the governing principle was that no one should have to go back for food, and no one to retire to fetch ammunition. In the medical service the same thing is observable — persistent effort to keep the front in working condition. In this case the principle was that of " evacuation." The nearer a hospital to the front, the clearer it was kept. This of course served both the interests of the army, which, in theor>% should never be compelled to forgo its Eeld ambulances in an advance after battle, and those of the wounded man, who was removed as far as his condition would allow from the area of conflict and hurry, to recover in quiet. The working of the orgEmization was briefly this : — A wounded man* was taken by the regimental stretcher- bearers (the bandsmen of peace tinie) to the " aid post," where the regimental medical officer ■Etot soldier had a ~ Ont tiM dnniiic " in his pocket. GORDON HIGHL.\NDERS. iSftri S- C tm ml , 138 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A MAXIM GUN ON NEW TRIPOD. [Sport is General. attended to him. To these aid posts came up the bearer subdivisions of the field ambulance, which conveyed the patient to an " Advanced Dressing Station ' ' formed by a Tent Sub division. Thence he was conveyed after treatment, and perhaps a day's rest, by the ambulance wagons (bearer subdivision) to meet a party from the " clearing hospital," a large field hospital at some con- venient point near railhead. It was the business of this hospital, as its name shows, to evacuate the wounded from the field am- bulances, which it did by any available means of transport — country carts, canal boats, railway trains, motor- lorries of the supply columns, or ammi nition parks. Once on the line of communications, the patient could be dealt with by stationary hospitals, the general hospital at the base, or convalescent camps, as required, or .sent back to Great Britain by hospital train and hospital ship. The organization of a cavalry division consisted of four brigades, four batteries of horse artillery, and auxiliary .services, as shown in the following table : — S<juadrons — Machine _ Cun Sections Sym/Troc^-* 000 000 0£ii Brigade of 3Rgts. O 000 000 000 -L i -L Brigade of J ^Ay. 2 "Brigades" Horse ill ill ill ill Artillery ■en ir;i //Je// H S em. cols. D^ field Sijuadron R.C. [X!l Signal Squadron I Cavalry Field Ambulance 000 000 000 Brigade of 5 Rpts. O 000 000 000 Brigade of J Rgts. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 139 MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD MURRAY. iSftaieht. In some cfises cavalry brigades wore formed without being allotted to a cavalry division. Such brigades were given a battery of horse artillery, and enough of other services to render them self-supporting and self-contained bodies. The food and anirnunition systems differed from thos<^ of the infantry divisions, in tliat the motor- lorries delivered food direct to the " cookers " of the regiments and ammunition direct to the brigade ammunition columns, there being no " train " or divisional ammuni- tion columii. The ambulances, too, were differently organized, to provide for the special needs of cavalrj', which had to fight over wide areas and at great distances in front of the main body.* The war strength of a cavalry division was 9,269 men and 9,815 horses, 24 guns, and 24 machine guns. The whole Expeditionary Force as organized in 1914 consisted of six divisions, one cavalry division, and one (or two) unallotted cavalry brigades, with additional troops styled " army troops " at the disposal of the higher com- manders, besides the line of communication troops both for administration and for the de- fence of the line. The army troops included *Tt ithould be noted that all bagease and supply vehicles of cavairr were drawn by four horses of the " vanner " or ortlinary military tyiie, whereas Uiose of the greater iiart of the anny were drawn by two lieavy cart horses each. BRITISH TROOPS AT HAVRE. IDaHf Mimr. 140 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR FIFTH LANCERS. ISport &■ General. the squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps, each squadron being subdivided into three "Flights" each of foiu- aeroplanes with their attendant motors and stores. Taken all in all, the organization and equip- ment of this force was on a more elaborate scale than that of Continental units of corresponding strength. This, and the professional character of the Army, in no small degree compensated for its small numbers, and the German critic who in 1913 remarked that the British Ex- peditionary Force was " not an enemy to be despised " (keine zu verachtende Oegner) was nearer the truth than perliaps he realized k CHAPTER VIII. THE ARMIES OF THE DOMINIONS. Importance of Sea Power Generally Understood — Lack of Organization or Imperial Land Forces — The Value of a Striking Force — The Dominions in Advance of the Mother Country — National Obugation Realized and Enforced — Democracy and National Service — Popularity and Success of the Experiment — Canada — An Army in Embryo — Character of Her Military Institutions — The Australasian and New Zealand Systems— Defence System of South Africa — A Difficult Problem — English, Dutch, and Native — Frontier and Intbpjjal Defence — The Defence Act of 1912 — The Rally of the Dominions — Men — Supplies — Unanimity op Empire. WHEN the war broke out it found Great Britain and the Dominions organically unready, so far at least as military preparations were concerned, to put even a small proportion of their potential strength into the field. The Navy was ready, as it always had been ready. There a sound instinct had warned the British peoples to maintain at all costs the margin of strength which was considered necessary. It was a bare margin, reckoned merely by the niuiiber of ships available, but it was indefinitely increased by the spirit of their crews, men who through years of waiting had always kept their will fixed on the single object that of preparation for the day of trial. In a sense, too, the Navy was representative of the maximum effort of the whole British peoples. The. Dominions had for some time recognized the debt they owed tc its protection. Australia had gone far to complete a squadron of her own. The battle cruiser New Zealand, the gift of the Dominion whose name she bore, was attached to the Home Fleet. Canada had made it perfectly clear some years before that she intended to bear all that she could of the burden imposed on the people of Great Britain by the building of new ships and the CANADIAN TROOPS. THE QUEEN'S RIFLES. 141 [Daily Minor 142 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. cost of their maintenance and equipment. Unfortunate domestic differences had com- pelled the Western Dominion to postpone her offer to provide three Dreadnoughts for the Britfeh Fleet. But it was perfectly under, stood in the British Isles that the will to help was there, even though the power to give it concrete form had been suspended by differ- ences of opinion about the exact shape which the help should take. South Africa, only recently recovered from a period of over- whelming financial depression, and still more recently engaged in the task of forming and establishing the Union of her four self-governing Colonies, had not been able to do much fpr the Navy. But she had contributed yearly a sum towards its upkeep, small in amount but intended as a proof that she had not forgotten what was due from her. There was never any doubt that when the Union of Scuth Africa found itself in a position to do something more substantial it would be done willingly and quickly, for no Dominion owed more, or was more conscious of its debt, to the Navy than South Africa. There had, then, in the years before the war been many signs that Naval Defence would, if time was given, be organized on a truly Imperial basis. There had been no such signs in the case of Land Defence. No uniform system of raising troops had been adopted. Elementary principles were matters of dispute. The need of military organization for the Empire as a whole was more often denied than affirmed. Even within the British Isles popular opinion was, on the v.hole, opposed to any effort to provide Great Britain with an Army sufficiently strong to give her an equal voice in a European war. While the peoples of the Continent had been straining every nerve for years to arm and train every available man for the decisive day. Great Britain and the Dominions had deliberately abstained from any such attempt. It was an axiom of British policy that what was required for each part of the Empire should be for internal defence alone, and though it was vaguely admitted that the Regular Army might, be required to provide an Expeditionary Force, it was thought that this need not be large in numbers so long as its material was good, its equipment efficient, and its transport adequately . organized. .These negative theories were, of course, based on a principle thoroughly sound in itself, though limited in its application, because its con- sequences inevitably required time to show their decisiveness. History had taught the British peoples that control of the sea was the first essential of their existence as a nation. Tliat seciu-ed, they might wait with confidence upon the outcome of any European war, however widespread it might be, and whatever might be its immediate results. Control of the sea, iuk^t the new conditions created by the naval ambi- tions of Germany, had involved a stupendous effort for its maintenance. It had been main- tained, b\it at the cOst of obsciu'ing another principle, more immediate in its application, though more limited in its effects, yet equally sound if the experience of the Napoleonic wars was to be regarded as valid. This principle was that Great Britain, though she could secure her- self from invasion and could protect her com- merce by means of her Fleet, could exercise no real influence upon the result of a Evu-opean war unless she was prepared to take her place on equal terms with the combatant nations. The corollary was equally clear, but had equally been obscured. It was that when the Con- tinental nations were imposing on all their men capable of military service the duty of bearing arms. Great Britain, if she wanted to inter- vene on equal terms with them in war on the Continent, must follow their example, so far at least as was necessary to secure as many recruits for her Army as her military advisers thought necessary. Needless to say, notliing of the kind had been done. Famous generals who had fought and won British battles in all quarters of the globe warned the British people again and again that some form of compulsory military .service should be part of the duties of citizenship. These warnings fell on deaf ears, so far as they were addressed to the people of the British Isles. In some of the Dominions, however, there had been, for some years before the war, a clearer realization of the essentials of military defence. Australia, New Zealfmd, South Africa had all begun the organization of citizen armies. These armies were all based on tlie same principle. The State required all male citizens as they grew to manhood to be registered for military service. Service was not in practice exacted from all thus registered. In South Africa, for instance, registration was merely the means by which the State enabled itself to ascertain the numbers which were available in the last resort. From those thus registered volunteers for military training could l)e called for. If the number of volunteers proved in- sufficient the State held the ballot n reserve. But the number of volunteers was not in- sufficient. On the contrary, in the first year the number of those who volunteered for training THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 143 AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH HORSE. {Topical. greatly exceeded the estimate made b>- the authorities of the number likely to be availal)Ie. In Australia, though every male between certain ,\ears was liaV)le for s(>r\ice, the number of exemptions was in practice large. This was cliiefly due to tlie difficulty of training men in sparsely populated areas. In New Zealand, where th(f cotmtry was more closely settled, the proportion of exemptions was considerably less than in Australia. The details of the different systems will be described later. For the naoment the important thing is to insist on the fact that in three of the Dominions the principle of compulsory military service had been adopted by Parliament and put into practice before the European war began. In Great Britain the popular theory had been that compulsory service was a form of slavery imworthy of free Britons, a tyranny imposed on the imfortunate peoples of the Continent by the ambition of monarchs or by the fears of republican governments tremb- ling at the thought of the ■ consequences that such ambitions might entail for them. In Australia, in New Zealand, in South Africa, the same ideas prevailed for many years. They were dissipated by experience. It became clear, as soon as compulsory military training wa.s given a trial, that a free and self-govern- ing people might deliberately recognize the obligation of each citizen to equip himself for the defence of liis country, might call upon each to fulfil that obligation, and in doing so might confer substantial benefits upon itself. In each case, however, a strong stimulus was required before the experiment could be tried. In each case, when once it was re- cognized that the effort involved in the adoption of military training had to be made, political differences were suspended and men of all parties cooperated in the determination to make the experinjent a success. In each ca^ie the success of the experiment led to an unex- l^ected revelation of social benefits in the new system, suggested indeed by writers and tliinkers in Germany, but .up to that time altogether unrealized by Ebiglish observers. The motives for the adoption of compulsorj service in the three Dominions wore very similar, and quite foreign to the traditional beliefe of the British peoples. Australia and New Zealand suddenly realized that they were isolated outposts of Europe, set in an ocean ringed by Asiatic jieopTes who had begim to show unmistakable signs of waking to the reali- ties of world power. The leiuling men in both countries were no longer content to trust entirely 1 1 ^ mtm 1 M ^^^n^H 1 HON. SAMUEL HUGHES, Canadian Minister of Defence. iTopic i. 144 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLES. [Topical, to the protection of the British Fleet. The fear of Asiatic invasion, or perhaps rather of Asiatic migration from overcrowded countries into their empty lands, took hold upon them. Once convinced that there was real danger of this, they set themselves to provide for their own defence by land and sea. When war broke out in Europe their plans were still incomplete, but enough had been done to prove that. the scheme to which they were committed was well conceived and offered them at least a prospect of being able to give some account of them- selves if they were ever challenged. In South Africa the motive power of the Defence Act was the clear necessity of providing for the security of a country in which the native population outnumbered the European by five to one. Not that there was any suggestion of turbulence or sedition among the natives. But self-respect made self-defence a primary duty, and it speedily became evident to public men of all schools of thought that the Union of South Africa could not rely longer on the protection of Imperial troops. CANADA. Canada, when Great Britain went to war, was less completely organized than Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand, although her potential strength was lar greater. The reason for this condition of affairs was obvious. She had only two possible enemies who might invtide her territory, and the possibility of invasion by either of these was very remote. Japan was the ally of great Britain, and neither from her nor from the United States was an attack within the range of practical politics. It was no.- surprising, therefore, that her army was in an embryonic condition, and that time would be required for the purposes of expan- sion and training. Nevertheless, the embryo was very much alive, and everything was to be expected from the resolute patriotism of her hardy sons. Like other parts of the Anglo-Saxon race her people were not military but warlike ; and her military institutions, though small in themselves, were supplemented by the bold, active, and /.. . »,f, > ■// V y;.'^ THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL*S BODYGUARD (CANADA). T&ptcai THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 145 self-confident spirit of the mass of tlit- pojiulatioii. The strength of the Canadian Permanent Mihtia — Staff, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, and Technical Service Corps all included — was about 270 officers and 2,700 other ranks. These forces trained throughout the year and completed every year the course of musketry laid down for the Regular Army in the Britisli Isles. The " Active Militia " hatl a nominal strength of about 3,850 officers and 44,500 other ranks. But in practice the regiments and corps of this force were considerably below their theoretical strength. Even so, much had been done to improve the Army in the years immediately preceding the war. The Officers' Training College at Kingston was an admirably efficient institution, and there had been a marked improvement in the attendance of the Active Militia at training, drills, and camps. The conditions of service demanded from the Cavalry, Artillery, and Army Service Corps 16 days' training a year. From other amis and departments 12 days annually were required. Besides the Active Militia, there were three other semi-military organizations in Canada. The Royal North-West Mounted Police were organized in 12 divisions, under the Dominion Government, with headquarters at Regina. They consisted in all of about 650 men and were trained as cavalry. Rifle associations, about 430 in all, with something like 24,000 members ready in an emergency to serve in the Militia, SIR ROBERT BORDEN, Prime Minister of Canada. were spread throughout the Dominion. Finally, there were about 270 cadet corps with a total of about 20,000 cadets, divided into senior cadets (14 to 18 years old) and jimior caidets (12 to 14 years). There were, therefore, a considerable " number of men and boys who were more or less familiar with the idea of discipline and with the business of the soldier. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. If there was superficial irony, there was also deep significance in the fact that Australia and New Zealand — pioneers among the British peoples in every democratic experiment — should also have been the first to establish a system of compulsory citizen service. Ob- servers of the progress of democratic institu. tions had already noted this as another proof that the most complete self-government exacts ultimately a more rigid self-discipline than any other form of organized freedom. The people of Germany had been drilled to military service by the iron determination of the ruling «lttss, backed by the teaching of professors who had developed the doctrine of national efficiency to its last word in a severely logical progresi oa The French had been compelled by a sure insight into the essentials of national existence to follow the example of Germany. This Franco-German rivalry had imposed on the whole of Europe a corresponding sub- mission to the dictiun that the life of a people depends on its military efficiency. Only Great Britain, secure in her conunand of the narrow seas, absorbed in the problem of relieving for the poorer cla.s.ses the stress of economic com- petition, had refused to admit the validity of this dictum. So far from following her example, Australia and New Zealand hatl begim to train their young men to arms, and had arrived, though by a quite different road, at the same conclu- sion as the German professors — that national military service yvas a discipline beneficial tr the race. After barely two years' experience of the national training system, this was the conclusion at which Australia and New Zealand had come. The remaining opponents of the system were few and were no longer 146 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. listened to. This was shown in an article contributed to the Empire Number of The Times (published on May 25, 1914) by one who had had spiecial opportunities of studying the effects of national military training in Australia and New Zealand. His conclusion was that " the ordinary citizen of Australia and New Zealand . . . regards it as so self-evident as not to be worth discussing that the only possible way to secure either the numbers or the efficiency required for national defence lies in the enforcement of the duty of military training upon the whole body of citizens. . . . The moral value of disci- pline hsB come to him as a new revelation, too fresh and too vivid to be accepted as merely in the ordinary course of things." The same authority ' may be quoted upon the details of the Australasian system. Its chief characteristics, in his opinion, were "* the early age at which it begins, the ntrmber of \ears for which it is enforced, and the limited time devoted to continuous training in any one year." Australia and New Zealand began to train their boys at the age of 12. The training continued till they reached 25 — a ]5eriod of 13 years. But in each year not more than 16 days of service, or their equivalent in half-days or shorter periods of drill, were required. From the age of 12 to 14 the boys were trained as junior cadets, receiving 90 hours' instruction in physical exercLses and elementary drill a year under the education authorities. At 14 they became senior cadets, passed under military control, and, till they were 18, had to do four \ 11^ THE HON. T. ALLEN. New Zealand Minister of Defence. whole-day drills, 12 half -day drills, and 14 night drills per year. At 18 they entered the Citizen Force, and for seven years were required to do 16 days' training (made up in part of half- day or night drills), with not less than eight days spent continuously in camp in each year. For this they were paid 3s. a day and upwards. At 25 their period of training closed. Those who chose to enter the teclinical branches of the .service at 18 — naval service, artillery, engineers, and other special corps — had to do 25 da>'s' service a year. Of this, 17 days in GROUP OF ALL UNITS, CAPE COLONY. ITopicai THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 147 each year had to be continuous training; on board ship or in camp. " The total length of Service," to quote again the same authority, " is thus some 6^ months in the infantry and moiuited corps and SJ months in the technical corps. This is considerably longer in the aggregate than that demanded by the Swiss system, which only asks 152 days of the infantry and artillery and 180 of the cavalry. But the Swiss training does not begin till the age of 20 and opens with a continuous re-ruit training of 65 days for infantry and 90 days for cavalry, followed by re|)etition courses of 11 days every second year for 14 years.'' " From the military point of view," he adds, "it would undoubtedly be an improvement if at least one longer period of continuous train- ing could be given. This would in all pro- bability also be supported for reasons of con- venience by the community as a whole." Two other essential elements in the Austra- lasian .system of national military training, as it existed at the outbreak of war in Europe, must also be described briefly First, the forces of Australia were organized on what is technically known as the " Area " plan. This had been recommended by Lord Kitchener in a report to the Australian Govern- ment which had formed the basis of the neces- sary legislation. Australia was subdivided into some 200 training areas, each imd^r the sujjervision of an " area officer." The numbers of men imder training in each area varied with the density of the population. Again, every ten areas were grouped under a superior officer, responsible in peace time for the co- ordination of the work of training, and designated in war time as brigade major for the forces of the ten areas. In New Zealand the " area system " was also the main principle of the organization, but the grouping differed in minor details. Second, great attention had been paid to the training of officers. The aim of the organizers of the system had been the combina- tion of a democratic principle of selection and promotion with the most rigid tests of efficiency. A training college for officers had been esta- blished at Duntroon, close to Canberra, the site of the Federal capital which was tmder con- struction. To this ten cadets from New Zealand were admitted each year in addition to about 33 from Avistralia. The age of entry was from 1 6 to 18. The total number of cadets in the college was abovit 160. No charge was made for their training. On the contrary, they received £30 on joining and an allowance of THE HON. E. D. MILLEN. Australian Minister of Defence. 5s. 6d. per day. In return, the authorities were able to exact a high standard of efficiency and to require from each cadet entering the college an undertaking — given by the parent or guardian — of service in the Permanent Military Forces for at least 12 years from the date of joining the college. Tlie course of instruction was exacting. Special attention was paid to the training of character. The cadet, on com- pletion of his training, was guaranteed a com- mission and pay at £250 a jear, and was required to spend his first year of service in Great Britain as a member of some unit of the Imjx-rial Army. The Australasian systems had not reached their full maturity at the beginning of the European War, but it was estimated that when their full effects were operative they would provide a total of about 150,000 men, with from four to 1 1 years' of full training behind them. Tlie object of these citizen forces was the defence of their own countries, and they formed no part of any systematic organization for Imperial Defence, though jirobably the Imjierial Defence Committee had taken them into account when considering the military strength which the Empire could command at a moment of crisis. Whether this was so or not, the crisis, when it came, found the Australasian people ready and eager to send men to the help of the Mother Country. 148 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. SOUTH AFRICA. In South Africa, just as much as in Australia and New Zealand, the defence organization had been expressly designed to meet special local needs, without much thought of Imperial re- quirements as a whole. This was natural. When war broke out the South African defence scheme had been in existence as a working organization barely two years. Its full effects were still to be seen. But it had progressed so far that the Government of the Dominion were able to set free the Imperial troops — to the number of about 6,000 — which were still in the counti-y, undertaking themselves the whole duty of local defence. This was no small achievement, for the work of organizing National Defence in South Africa had been peculiarly difficult and delicate. It had been necessary to make provision for equal conditions of service for English and Dutch, to elaborate the composition of a force in which they should serve side by side, and to provide with the utmost care against anything that might cause friction between them. The Defence Act was passed by the South African Parliament during the Session of 1912. Ten years before Boer and Britain had been at war throughout the country. Those ten years had seen the re-settlement and re-stocking of a devastated country. It had seen the triumph of British methods of dealing with a people whose land had been conquered, whose homes had been burnt, whose people had been com- pelled to accept the will of Great Britain. The work that had been done in those ten years THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR EDWARD MORRIS. Premier of Newfoundland. {J. Russell G* Sons. must stand as an imperishable monument to the genius of Great Britain for winning the respect; the loyalty, and even the affection of peoples whose territory has passed into her possession. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State had been part of the Dominions of Great Britain only for ten years. In that time their people had become loyal citizens of Greater Britain. The Government of the Dominion was actually in the hands of Dutch-speaking South Africans. THE NEWFOUNDLAND NAVAL RESERVES i THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 149 The author of the Defence Act was General Smuts, who had fought against Great Britain ten years before. The Commandant-General of the Citizen Force was General Beyers, another Boor general of conspicuous ability. And in the ranks of the force English and Dutch served side by side — all thought of race dis- tinction obliterated — all equally ready to do their utmost for the Empire in the crisis that had come upon it so suddenly. But the task of combining Dutch and English in one homogeneous force had not been the only difficulty which those who had designed the scheme of National Defence for South Africa liad had to meet. The European population of the Dominion was small, the native popula- tion large. The natural increase of the natives was greater than that of the Europeans. The distribution of the European population was also a difficulty. A few large cities — Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Bloem- fontein — absorbed a very large proportion of the white people of the country. The rest lived on scattered farms, at considerable dis- tances from each other, separated in such a way that it was difficult to provide for their training except by means of an excessive number of small units. Yet these difficulties were balanced by some advantages. South Africa had known many wars. Its early days had seen constant conflicts of white men against the natives. These had happily passed away and left a native population contented on the whole with its conditions of life and extraordinarily loyal and devoted to the British Sovereign. Later war& between English and Dutch had loft a white population trained to arms by the stem discipline of actual warfare and equipped with a knowledge of the meaning of modern war far in advance of that of any other part of the Emjiire. The organization of the South African Defence Force had naturally been adapted to these con- ditions. It was the work of practical men who knew the nature of the material available. The force which was required was one that would safeguard the position of the white population. Its organization was not directed in any sense against the native peoples, who were perfectly peaceable and loyal. But it had in view the possibility — however remote — of a change in the attitude of the natives. If such a change should come, if the native tribes should grow discontented, if some revolutionary leader should arise and win them over to discontent and hostility, then it might be necessary in the future, as it had been iu tlie past, for the Europeans to defend them- GENERAL THE HON. J. G. SMUTS. Minister oi Defence Union of South Airica. selves, their institutions, and their civiliza. tions, against, an organized attack by natives who, for all their amazing progress, were stijl in the mass barbarians. Little, naturally, had been said about this while the Defence Act was before Parliament. There had been no necessity to talk about it. Such a threat to European civilization in South Africa was a remote contingency. But it was still a con- tingency, and provision had YvaA to be made against it. There were two other reasons why South Africa should have created a Citizen Army for her own defence by land. First, her frontier on the north-west marched with that of Germsa South-West Africa. In a European war, if the British Navy should prove unable to guard all the oceans of the world, it might have been possible for Germany to pour troops into German South-West Africa and to in"ade the Union of South Africa by that route. This, too, was a remote contingency, but provision had to be made against it. Secondly, troops were needed in South Africa — as in oth?r countries — to safeguard law and order in the last resort against internal disruption. The industrial con- ditions, especially in the Transvaal, where the gold-mining industry had collected a large number of artisans and laboiu-ers in a relatively small area, made the country specially liable 150 TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. to sudden outbreaks of social unrest. And the railways, which were essential to the life of the people, because food had to be imported and transported to the inland districts, were State-owned railways worked by labourers and artisans, who were naturally subject to iieriods of acute discontent. Less than a year after the Defence Organization had been set on foot these industrial conditions caused a great upheaval. It was suppressed by the help of Imperial troops. Six months later it broke out again. Tliis time the Defence Force was an instrument ready to the hands of the Govern- ment. It was at once called into being. Its members responded with marked alacrity and the disorders were suppressed without blood- shed. To have been able to use with such efficiency an organization so recently begun, to have dispensed, in- this second trial, with Imperial troops, the Grovemment must have had full confidence in the work which the Defence Act had given them the power to do. Their confidence was not misplaced. What South Africa required, then, was a mobile and efficient force, ready for mobilization at any moment, not very large in numbers at first, but with ample reserves available if they were required. The Defence Act of 1912 aimed at the provision of such a force. A small body ( f permanent mounted men was main- tained, ready for service at any moment and in any part of the Union. These mounted troop were available for police duty in the outlying districts diu-ing peace time. If war broke out, reserves were available to do pdice duty while they were on active service. Next ctune the organization known as the Active CStizen Force. This was obtained bj' a system of registration and volunteering, w ith the ballot in reserve. The " area system," as in Australia aoA New Zealand, was the basis of this organiza- tion. In each area all males between the ages of 16 and 25 were compelled to register them- selves. A certain number of volunteers were called for from among those registered. If in any area the number of volunteers was insufficient, the Government had the right to ballot for the men it required. In practice this power proved unnecessary. The number of volunteers for service in the two years during which the system had been working before war came upon Europe had largely exceeded the number estimated as likely to be available when the details of the system were being worked out. The training of these volunteers was similar to that adopted in Australasia. But although founded upon the cadet system, it did not give such definite recognition to that system as the Australasian organizations did. The course of training prescribed by the South African Defence Act of 1912 was to extend over four years. In the first year the days of train- ing required were not to exceed thirty ; in the other three years they were to be limited to twenty-one. In the first year there were to be not more than twenty-two days of con- tinuovis training ; and in each of the other years not more tlian fifteen days of continuous training. Days of non-continuous training were carefvilly defined. Each day was to be made up of either " a period of instruction or exercise lasting eight hours " ; or of " two periods of instruction or exercise each lasting 'four hours " ; or of " six periods of instruction or exercise each lasting one hour and a half." Such was the organization of the Active Citizen Force. It was, of coiu-se, supplemented by provisions for training officers (South Africa had naturally a large niunber of men equipped by actual war experience for command) ; for coast and garrison defence and for artillery training. But it was also backed by an elaborate organization of trained and partially -trained reserves. Men who had completed their four years' training (there were no such men when war broke out, as the Act was only passed in 1912) were to be drafted into Class A of the Reserves, where they would remain till they were over forty-hve. Men registered who had not volunteered for service or who, having volunteered, were not accepted, were trained to shoot in Rifle Associations. These formed Class B of the Reserve. Thus every male between sixteen and twenty-five passed through the hands of the Government either as a member of the Active Citizen Force or in one of the Rifle Associations. Males under twenty-iOne who were registered but did not volunteer for service had to pay £1 per annum to the Govern- ment and were still liable to be called on to serve by ballot if the number of volunteers was insufficient. Men in Classes A and B of the Reserve, when they reached forty- five, were to pass into what was known as the National Reserve until the age of sixty. The whole force thus organized was imder the control of a Council of Defence, appointed in practice by the Ministry in power. This Council exercised advisory functions without executive power. It acted as a body assisting the Minister of Defence and was composed of men who were experts in military matters, irrespective of their political opinions. In South Africa, as in Australia and New Zealand, the defence organization was the work of all THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 151 political parties. The \i.sual conditions of Parliamentary life were suspended whil(> it was under discussion. All cooperated in devising the best possible system, considering the needs of the country, and the advice of men like Field-Marslial Lord Methuen, who was then Commander-in-Chief ot the Imperial Forces in the Dominion, was asked and freely given. The result was that the system estab- lished under the Defence Act of 1912 had the full support of the whole country and had given every promise of providing the Dominion with an efficient and adequate force for its land defence at the moment when Great Britain was plunged into war. Such were the organizations of the Dominions for their internal defence. If there had been no organized system before the European War of raising and training troops for the defence of the Empire, it was speedily clear that when the crisis came Great Britain could rely upon them for their utmost efforts in the common cause. The South African War, fifteen years earlier, had gone a long way to prove this. But there had then been nothing like the spontaneous rally of all parts of the Empire to the help of Great Britain that marked the declaration of war against Germany. The people of the Dominions seemed to realize, with an instinctive insight which was the best testimony to their patriotism, the full extent of the issues involved. Offer.s of help in men, money, and supplies came pouring in. Canada immediately offered 20,000 men and let it be known that if more were required thej- would be forthcoming. Within a month another 10,000 had been added to this number, and the pressiu-e of men clamouring to go to the assistance of the Old Country swelled the recruiting lists of the Govenunent of the Dominion. Australia also offered 20,000 men. In her case, too, this nimiber was speedily augmented hy the addition of an Infantrj' and a Light Horse Brigade. Xew Zealand's first offer was 8,000 men, and she, too, made it known that more would be sent if they wt^re needed. South Africa released at once the Im- jierial troop.-i within her borders, thus showing the value of the Home Defence Force that she was creating. Besides these 6,000 Imperial troojjs — a true contribution to the common cause — there were offers from all parts of the Union for service in additional special contin- gents. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand at ynce undertook the whole cost of equipment and maintenance of their contingents. To tliese offers were added numberless other acts, equally valuable and equally welcome ai showing the intense devotion of the oversea j)3opl;>s. The Royal Australian Xavy was placed under the control of the Admiralty, while New Zealand and Canada alao made free gifts of all their available resoiu'ces in shijw and men. The Now Zealand, the magniticent battle-cruiser which had been presented without condition of any kind to the British Fleet, was already on service in Home waters. Canada put her two cruisers, the Niobo and the llain- bow, fully equipped for service, under Admiralty orders for purposes of commerce protection. Her Government also purcha-sc^l two sub- marines to be used in the same way and for the same pvupose on her Pacific coast >. Thus the doubts that had been entertained by many obscsrvers of the development of the armies and naval forces of the Dominions vanished at the first threat to the integrity of the Empire. Without a moment's hesitation, with a magnificent unanimity that will live in the records of British honour, each of the TYPE OF CWADIAN .SOLDIER, STRATHCONA'S CORPS. LORD [Topicd 152 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Dominions tlirew its immediately available strength into the scale. The new worlds re- dressed, in a new sense, the balance of the old. They " let everything go in," and set themselves at once to continue their efforts vmtil success should be assiu^d. Their public men expressed this far-sighted determination in words of reso- lute enthusiasm. Differences of race, minor con- tentions of party, doubts, hesitations, com- plaints about the inertia and slackness of the people of the British Isles — all disappeared in a night. The first morrow of war found the whole Empire, in the inspiring words used by the Iving in his Message to the Dominions, " united, calm, resolute, trusting in God." The resources of a country engaged in a great war do not consist only in the numbers of its armed men or the spirit of its citizens. The women of Carada equipped a hospital ship for the British Navy. Newfoundland, unable to provide an army out of her small population, did nobly in raising 500 men for service abroad, while she increased her Home Defence Force by 500 men and her naval reserve by 400. In many of the great cities of the Empire funds similar to that initiated by the Prince of Wales in Great Britain were started and met with the most open-handed support. In Australia a fund of this kind was specifically de- voted to the purchase of food supplies for the British Isles. In Canada, gifts of food in many kinds were immediately organized. The Dominion led the way with 1,000,000 bags of flour, the first instalment of which reached Great Britain less than a month after the declaration of war. Similar gifts in kind were made by the Provincial Governments. In such acts of beneficent generosity private citizens vied with public bodies, and in both public and private generosity the other Dominions did their best to rival Canada. A complete list of all such offers of aid to the Mother Country wovJd be difficult to compile. The examples given are sufficient to show the splendid spirit which aninaated the Self-Governing Dominions in the hour of crisis. Most conspicuous of all was the absolute unanimity of all races within the Empire in support of the Mother Country. The French of Canada, the Dutch of South Africa, were heart and soul with their fellow-citizens in support of the British cause. The native races of South Africa lost no time in giving equally striking proofs of their loyalty. Amid all the anxieties of the moment these proofs of the success of British policy were welcomed with pro- found gladness in Great Britain. There had been many who, in earlier days, had doubted whether the Empire would endure the strain of a great crisis. All such doubts were now resolved. The people of Great Britain prepared themselves for the long trial of an unexpected war with all the more confidence in the final success of their arms since the very first result of that trial had been to prove the essential soundness of their Imperial policy and the strength of the fabric based on that foundation. CHAPTER IX. THE NATIVE INDIAN ARMY. Britain's Position in India— Supposed Source of Weakness— Indian Troops at Malta- - Effect of Good Government in India— Employing Coloured Troops against White Foes- The Gurkhas— The Sikhs have First Place— What is a Sikh ?— The Punjabi Musalmans^ The Pathans— Baluchis and Brahuis— The Brahmans— Rajputs and Mahrattas— Madrasis —The Dogras— Difficulties of Creed and Caste— The Loyal Native States' Contingent.?— No N.\tive Field Artillery — Abolition of the " Colour Line " in War. BY the possession of India, Britain at the outbreak of the great Euro- pean war occupied a vinique position among the empires. A compara- tively small European coimtry herself, relying for self-defence chiefly upon a powerful Navy, she was at the same time the ruler of vast Asian territory with an extended land frontier. It is true that along practically the whole of this frontier the Himalayas, with the spurs and buttresses of minor mountain ranges, constituted a mighty barrier ; but it was a barrier which had many times been pierced by successful invasion within historical times and the burden of maintaining it in an efficient state of defence had been heavy. Heavy too had been the burden of maintaining peace within the borders of India, wher6 rival nations with jarring creeds seemed ever ready to fly at each other's throats and only likely to unite in a common effort to shake off. our yoke. Thus, although we had always set ourselves the task of governing India so justly and sympathetically that her peoples might be on our side in the day of trouble, our position in Asia had always been regarded by our pro- spective enemies in Eiu'ope as a source of weak- ness. It is true that Lord Beaconsfield, by bringing Indian troops to Malta on an occasion of crisis, gave the world a hint of future possi- bilities ; but his bold stroke was derided as a theatrical coup, and other European nations had continued to regard India as a country where the great Mutiny would be surpassed in horror by the upheaval that would inevitably follow the entanglement of Britain in a great war. At the outset of the present conflict the German Press confidently relied upon trouble in India as a large factor on their side. But in the meantime the sympathetic justice of our rule in India had been doing its silent work ; and the superficial splashes of sedition in densely-populated centres were as nothing compared with the steady undercurrent of loyalty all over the peninsula, which had resulted from the trarwparent sincerity of our efforts to govern India in her own best interests. Yet the very success of these efforts had brought to the siu-faee new difficulties, arising directly from our anomalous position. We, a free and independent people, were governing — by the power of the sword in the last resort — a larger people that was not free and independent. The more they learned of the goodness of our Western civilization and the higher, especially, we raised the standard of our native Indian Army, the stronger became the pressure upon us from below, seeking some outlet for the high ambitions which we ourselves had awakened. Looking only at the military side of the question, no one conversant with the facts could fail to see that the time was at hand when we could no longer deny to a force of British subjects, with the glorious record and splendid efficiency of our native Indian troops, the right to stand shoulder to shoulder with their Britisli comrades in defence of the Empire, wherever it might be assailed. 153 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 155 TYPICAL GURKHA RIFLES. iVnderwood &■ Underwood We British are constitutionally the last people in the world to take unfair advantage in sport, conmierce or war of our opponents. The instinct which intde us such sticklers for propriety in all our dealings made us more reluctant than other nations would feel, to employ coloured troops against a white enemy. But the very success of our rule in India had been based upon our conscientious disregard of colour. The very value of our dasky native troops lay in the fact that they had proved themselves wo"^hy, in victory and defeat, to fight by the side of our own white men. So, e\en if our active alliance with the yellow people of Japan in the Far East and the employment of dusky French Turcos in Belgium could not have been quoted as pre- cedents for ignoring colour in this war, it would scarcely have been possible and certainly not wise for us to refuse to our native Indian Army the privilege of taking its place beside British troops against the Germans. What, then, was this native Indian Army, of which we ha\e such good reason to be proud ? To begin with, the average Englishman, who talked about the Indian Army, generally fell into a large error at the very outset ; be- cause he almost always began to sing the praises of the " little Gurklias." With them he usually mentioned the Siklis ; but it waa only lui if the little Gurkha cast a large Sikh shadow. The substance of his admiration was always for the former. Far be it from us to under- value the splendid fighting qualities and the glorious military record of the Gurkha. The ten regiments of Gurkha Rifles — little, stocky men in dull green uniforms, all looking exactly alike, " as if they had come out of a quarter- master's store " - — are probably surpassed in fighting value by no block of ten regiments of their kind in any other army. The names of Bhurtpore, Aliwal, Sobraon, DeUii, Kabul, Chitral, Tirah, Burma, and China appeared among their records, a glorious summary of British military history in Asia ; and if some European names are to be added now, there is no doubt that the additions are equally honour- able and well deserved. But this was no reason why Englishmen, in speaking or writing of the native Indian Army, should put the Gurkha (even with the Sikh for a shadow) first and the rest almast nowliere, seeing that, strictly speaking, the Gurkha did not belong to the native Indian Army at all. He was a mercenary, a subject of the independent Kingdom of Nepal, in which we had by treaty — a " scrap of paper " which has been faithfully observed by both sides since 1814, when General Ochterlony's soldierly generosity to a brave enemy converted the defeated foe into a loyal friend — the right to recruit these active little hilimen for the army in India. Cheery and self- confident, with none of the shyness and reserve which embarrass acquaintanceship with the natives of India, the Gurkha exhibits a natural aptitude for making friends with the British soldier. Stalwart Highlanders were always his especial chums : and on our side Tommy Atkins was never slow to reciprocate the friendship of these smart little Nepalese, whose fidelity to the British had been so often shown, notably at Dellii, where they fought on with us until 327 out of a contingent of 490 were killed. No Briton can visit the monument on Delhi's famous Ridge without willingly grasping a Gurkha hand in friendship whenever it is proffered. All the same, when we talk of the Indian Army proper, we must not give the Gurkha the first place. Nor did his employment in Eurijpe raise the same permanent world-wide issues which were involved in putting our Indian fellow-subjects by the side of the British soldier in the fighting line against the Germans. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the Gurkha is a Hindu, but is free from many caste prejudices of his co-religionists. 156 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GROUP OF INDIAN OFFICERS, with Orderlies, etc., and British Staff Officers in mufti. [Sport i}r Centra'.' On the other hand he is a great believer in devils. Undoubtedly the first place among the races and castes which compose our native Indian, Army must be given to the Sikhs. Not only were they the most numerous among the native wearers of his Majesty's uniform, but, without any disrespect to the other factors of our Army, they might be described as the backbone of British military prestige in the East. It was always understood, of course, by our enemies that there was the British soldier, supported by the British Fleet, to be reckoned with : but, in the East, British soldiers were — compared with the vast interests which we had to safeguard — few and, through difficulties of distant transport and other causes, very expensive. We were,, therefore, peculiarly fortunate in having, in the Sikhs, material for our Army which, for trust- worthiness and courage, for confidence in its British leaders and stern devotion to duty, for dis- cipline and soldierly skill, could not be surpassed. When Ranjit Singh, the " Lion of the Punjab," lived, mutual respect and courtesy marked the relations between our Indian territories and the warrior dominion which he had established over the Land of the Five Rivers ; but after his death restless spirits among the Sikhs forced war upon us, and it is admitted in our military annals that if the enemy had been better led the vary- ing fortunes of our Sikh wars might not have ended finally in our favour. But so it was ; and, like the Gurkhas, the Sikhs quickly turned from formidable foes to staunch friends. From the date of the Sikh wars, when the strongest provinces of our modem India were still foreign territory, there was no great episode in the history of British arms in India which is not enrolled upon the colours of Sikli regiments. In all Asia there was scarcely a mile of British terri- tory which had not known the Sikh soldier or policeman, dean, tall, and magnificently bearded, with an upward sweep which took beard, moustache, whiskers, and hair, all together, under the turban, the Sikh looked the embodiment of the high soldierly virtues which he possessed, witli a suggestion of the tiger's ferocity, should his passions be let loose. The desperate stands which small parties of British Sikhs have made against hopeless odds are chronicled among the glorious incidents of British history in India — one such was the occasion of the establish- ment of the " Indian Heroes' Fund " some years ago — and so truly were the Sikhs bred to the fighting type that it is scarcely an exag- geration to say that whenever you saw a man in the uniform of a Sikh regiment, you saw a man who would be a steady and courageous comrade to you in the- worst circumstances oi war. Who, then, is the Sikh ? As enlisted in our Indian Army, the Sikhs were neither a race nor a sect. Nor, although they were Hindu by origin, could they be described as a caste. Every Sikh enlisted in our service was a Singh, meaning " lion," i.e., a member of a fighting brother- hood. No one was born a Singh and no woman could become one. Each man was initiated into the faith — a purer faith than Hinduism, involving little more than worshipping God as- " the Timeless One " and reverencing the Gurus as His prophets — by certain rites on reaching the prescribed age. Thenceforward he was bound by vows to avoid idolatry, to abjure alcohol and tobacco, and to cultivate all the manly virtues. His hair was never cut. Cattle were sacred to him. Love of military adventure and the desire to save money have been well described as his ruling passions. Of course, the Singh was human and sometimes, especially among the higher classes, the vows of abstemiousness might sit lightly on his con- science ; but, take him all in all, the Sikh THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 157 soldier of to-day is a worthy representative of the warrior fraternity which raised the " Lion of the Punjab " to his great miUtary eminence. Into the differences between the Sikh clans, such as the Jat Siklis and Mazbi SikJis, there is no need to enter liere ; but the latter provided us only witli some Pioneer regiments, and when we spoke of a Sikh sepoy or sowar, it was alm( st always a Jat Sikh that we meant. The name " Jat," pronounced " Jut," meant that the Sikh was by descent a " Jat," pro- nounced " Jaht," a strict Hindu caste of the Punjab plains. From this caste, a race of superb horsenien from childhood, some of our finest Iiidiau cavalry was recruited, and Indian mili- tary liistory is full of gallant incidents to the credit of the Jat horse. One regiment, the 14th Murray's Jat Lancers, retains the caste name in its official title. INDIAN CAVALRY: a Typical Sowar. {Topical. Next to the Sikhs in numbers in the British 8«r\-ice, and therefore before tlio Gurkhas, the Punjabi Musulmans must be placed. They were, of course, Mahomedans, though not of a fanatical kind. They were of mixed descent, but uniformly strict in observ- ance of their religious obligations. They were, however, very tolerant of the religious beliefs of others and gave very little trouble in canton- ments. Good all-round soldiers, easy for any real soldiers to be friends with, the Punjabi Musulmans deserved a much higher place than was asually given to them in British ostoem, seeing that, next to the Sikhs, they were the most numerous class of natives in our Army and it was they who had been recruited to fill the places of abandoned regiments of other less useful races. " Sikhs, Punjabis, and Gurkhas, side by side with their British comrades " — this quotation from a Mutiny record placed the tliree most distinguished and valuable elements of our Indian Army in their proper order ; and it WEis to be hoped that one result of the use of Indian troojjs in European war would be to bring home to the British public tliat the Indian Army did not entirely consist of the Gurkha with a Sikh shadow, but that, next to the Sikhs, the Punjabi Musulmans deserved the highest place in oitf esteejn and gratitude. Not far behind the Punjabi Musulmans an accurate judge of the fighting values of the native factors of our Indian Amiy would probably have placed the Pathans. These — although hastily-raised Pathan levies did grand service for us in the Mutiny — were a com- paratively recent addition to the fighting strength of our Indian Empire, representing as they did the gradual spread of British prestige and the influence of the Indian rupee over the wild fastnesses which make the natural frontier between India and Afghanistan. Formerly the " Gate of India " on the North- West Frontier used to stand open for anysufli- ciently bold and powerful invader. Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Afghans, Tartars, and others — at least thirty distinct iixvasions, all more or less successful, of northern India, besides inniunerable plundering forays, are recorded in liistory ; but, although it is true that, when this great war broke out in Europe, the Pathan still foimd liis shortt-st cut to wealth and honour through the rocky defiles between Peshawar and Kabul, it was only as a recruit for oiu- Army that he came. With strong featiu-es, wliich support liis claim to be a descendant of tlie lost tribes of Israel — a claim almost substantiated, too, by the fac^- 158 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR: that his names reminded us r-lways of the Old Testament, as Ishak (Isaac), Yakub (Jacob), Yustif (Joseph), and so on — the wild Pathan was a very unktmpt and unclean looking person. But, on the other hand, he had almost all the soldierly virtues in a high degree. He was a bad enemy — one of the worst — but a good friend ; and his record in British service was splendid, both for dare-devil dash and dogged endurance. He was the ideal skir- misher in difficult country. His language was the guttural but eeisily-learnt Pushtu, and in religion he was a Mahomedan of the most fanatical kind. He was a sharp weapon which needed careful handling ; but a British officer who knew how to handle his Pathans would be followed cheerfully to death any- where. From the Pathans, whose very name con- jured up memories of all the stormy history of our hard-fought North-Western Frontier of India, the mind's eye naturally travelled down that frontier to the lemd of the Baluchis, increasingly employed in our frontier line. Here, too, the mountain barrier was pierced by passes which lead from Afghanistan to India ; but compared with the stormy torrent by which our military position at Peshawar, with its fljTng buttress in the Ah Masjid Fort, had so often been shaken, the stream of fitful human traffic which flowed slowly past our Quetta stronghold might be regarded as a peaceful backwater ; and to some extent this wa^ reflected in the character of the native troops, Baluchis and Brahuis, which we derive from this region. Devout, but not fanatical, Mahomedans, they made cheery, tough, and courteous warriors, serving always with credit to us and to them- selves. Fine, well-set-up men, the Baluchis always made a good show among other troops ; and they were as useful in the field as amenable in cantonments. Turning now to the Hindu regiments, we come at once to an element which, for exactly opposite reasons, needed as careful handling aK the fiercely fanatical Moslems of the North- West Frontier. The leading infantry regiment on the Indian Army list was the 1st Brahmans, and the 3rd regiment was Brahman also. These Brahmans are Hindus of the Hindus, so fenced round with holy caste restrictions that it was high testimony to the sympathetic skill of our military administration that these fine old regiments still retained their pride of place in the Army List. It was not too much to say that if by any mischance in peace the men of a Brahman regiment and a Pathan regiment were left together without any control there would not be a man left alive in the weaker corps, whichever that might be, on the following day. War makes large differences, of course, for Brahmans and Pathans are both human and both soldiers at heart ; but against the extended employment of the very highest Hindu castes always had to be set the difficulties which religious restrictions im- posed upon them. Nevertheless, the Brahmans had done good service, both in Afghanistan ar.d Burma. Other high-caste Hindus who supplied our Indian Army with splendid fighting men were the Rajputs and the Mahrattas. Both names loom large in the history of India ; and pro- bably there was no living race of men who had more reason to be proud of their lineage than the Rajputs. Their very name meant " of Royal blood," and in no community had the pride of ancestry worked so strictly to keep the blood pure from age to age. The story of Chitor, where the beleaguered Rajputs killed all their wives and children and perished, fighting, to a :nan themselves rather than give a Rajput princess as wife to Akbar, the mighty Moslem Emperor of Delhi, makes one of the bloodiest and most glorious pages in the history of the world's chivalry ; and the modern Rajput, although he might be only a foot soldier in our Indian Army, was instinct with the spirit of his race.' Great credit might our government of India take from the fact that the oldest of our Rajput regiments, the Queen's Own Rajputs, still held its place as the second corps of infantry in the Indian Army List. High-caste Hindus, proud, pure-blooded warriors, the Rajputs were not men whom we might fear to place before the most determined European foe, if caste restrictions could be observed unbroken. Much that has been said of tlie Bralmians and Rajputs applies to the Mahrattas, who were also Hindus and inclined to be fanatical in all matters affecting their caste and creed. This was the natural result of their history of almost ceaseless warfare against Mahomedan invaders. Holding their mountain strongholds of the Western Ghauts against all assailants* and occupying the plains on either side of the great hills, the Mahrattas were a power to be reckoned with in the destinies of India ; and our Mahratta wars were protracted, difficult, and costly. Now, in our service, these high-spirited mountameers, although not great in stature, nor thick-set in physique, made very tough, good fighters. Of the remaining Hindu elements in our Indian Army, only two need be mentioned. The Madrasis, natives of the Madras province, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 15'J were a dwindling factor. Intelligent and well- educated as a class, they had impressed many of t hoir liritish officers with a high sense of their value )XS figliting men ; but this opinion had not been reflected in the military policy of the years before the war. It was only natural that officers who had devoted their lives to per- fecting a regiment should take a pride in its merit ; and in no service in the world, perhaps, was this tendency more marked than among the British officers of the Indian Army, who were entrusted with material which varied in every detail. Hence it arose that the " shop " talk of a British officer of a Ourklia battalion was often almost intolerable to officers of other units ; wliile the nickname of one brilliant frontier corps as " God's Own Guides " is elo- quent of the mental suffering which a mixed mess had often endured when an officer of the Guides was fairlv started talking about his men. So the Madrasi sepoy had enthusiastic defenders of his reputation as a fighting man ; but, even if all that his apologists said was true, it could not be suggested that in finding more room for the Dogra the Army suffered by the loss of the Madrasi. For the Dogra, who was also a high-caste Hindu, filled three entire regiments, besides " class " squadrons or companies of many others. He was the typical stalwart yeoman of the Punjab, recruited from the sub-Himalayan regions of the North-west. Like the Mahrattas, the Dogras had retained their spirit as fighting Hindus Vjy constant contact with Mohainedan neighbours ; but their Hinduism was not fanatical. In many re- spects they resembled the Sikhs. Patient as their own bullocks under hardship, they were sturdy and manly, courteous and brave. Per- haps it was the wide horizon of the Punjab plains and the community of interests which must be felt by all dwellers therein, who were equally at the mercy of the weather which God sends to them, that had given to the Punjabis, whether Musulman or Hindu, that broader spirit which rendered possible the rise of the Sikh brotherhood with its pure religion and high ideals. However this may be, it is certain that in the Dogras of the Punjab we had a Hindu factor of great military value, resembling in many ways that of their neighboiirs, the Punjabi Musuhnans. From this brief review of the materials from which our native Indian Army was drawn we can see that it was composed of pure-blooded races with fighting traditions, of proved service, and splendid conduct in the field, in every way worthy to be welcomed as comrades by the British troops who were to serve with thenj against the King-Emperor's enemies. We can also see that those upon whom the duty fell of .^electing Indian units to sers'e with our own Expeditionary Force in Europe had an invidious and difficult task. Not only was there einbarras rfe richesses in the wide range of varying merits to be con.sidered ; but there were also the practical obstacles, much greater in the case of some units than of others, of bringing into the close cohesion necessary for distant service the mixed force selected. This difficulty was not les.sened by the natural desire of the authorities to recogm'zo the self-sacrific- ing loyalty of the rulers of the Native States I GROUP OF MAHOMEDAN OFFICERS AND MEN, LANCERS AND INFANTRY. 160 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. by gi\'ing to their Imperial Sendee Troops a chance of distinction by the side of our own regiments on European service. In our native infantry regiments each battaUon had from thirteen to fifteen British officers in addition to sixteen native officers, whereas the Im- perial Service Corps of the Native States were commanded entirely by native officers with British advisers only. Although the troops themselves might fairly be described as crack corps, the want of British officers would \m- doubtedly be felt in employment on any large scale in Europe. The readiness of the Imperial Service Troops, however, to fall into line for the defence of the Empire was fine evidence of the status which our British Government of India occupied in the native mind ; and even in the case of our own Indian troops it must always be remembered that the best native soldiers, especially in the cavalry, did not really serve for their pay, but, as befits men of good family, for military honour. Another point to be remembered in con nexion with the Indian Army is that it could not have furnished a complete field force of natives alone. So far as the cavalry and infantry are concerned the native regiments might always be trusted to give a good account of them- selves, even without any " stiffening " of British troops ; but the instinct of self-pre- servation, engendered in the mind of British rulers in India through the experience of the Mutiny, insisted upon the paramount necessity that artillery in India shall be entirely in British hands. There were indeed twelve mountain batteries, in which service is so popular, especially among the Sikhs, that they could always command recruits of exceptional physique and the highest quality, with the result that in our frontier wars the little guns were always served to the admiration of all beholders ; but with this exception there were no native gunners in India. Horse, field, and garrison artillery were solely British. In any case, therefore, a force in which Indian troops were included must necessarily have been a composite force, although in the thirty IHIR^ I^H H^HJl^^^^ vQ^^^I jA|H wU^^^^BKmp^^ K'»9^^^^H r^^^^^^Bs^H^ I^HH 4^^^^^^^^^H M ■ A VETERAN SUBADA-MAJOR OF THE 45th RATTRAY'S SIKHS. nine regiments of cavalry and 130 regiments of infantry, in addition to the mixed Corps of Guides and the ten regiments of Gurkha Rifles, there was ample material from which to select as fine a contingent of the two arms as any general officer could desire to command. The real difficulty was to make the selection and at the same time to remember the claims of the loyal Native States, and to disappoint the legitimate ambitions of the bulk of the eager troops as little as might be. And of course only those to whom the task was given were cognisant of all the circumstances which influenced the selection. It was made with a care appropriate to the occasion ; for the occasion was the most momentous which had occurred in the history of the Indian Army — momentous not only for that Army or for India, but also for the world at large, as definitely erasing the " colour line " in war. CHAPTER X. THE RALLY OF THE EMPIRE. Moral as well as Material Support — Opinion in Canada and Australia — The Kino's Message to the Dominions— Effect of Sir Edward Grey's Speech — The Canadian and South African Press — The King's Second Message to the Dominions — Loyalty of India — Lord Hardinge's Speech in Council — Indian Ruling Princes' Offers of Men, Personal Service, and Money — Statement in Parliament — The Kino -Emperor's Message to India — The Empire United. IMPORTANT as were the offers of help, both of men and of provisions, which the Self -Governing Dominions and the Indian Empire made to the Mother Country almost unmediately after the outbreak of the war, the knowledge that these great daughter- nations were morally convinced of the justice of the British cause was a factor of even more far-reaching importance. Great as was the necessity of organizing and expanding the Imperial forces, and thus creating an extra army or armies to reinforce the British Expeditionary Force in France, urgent as was the need of taking advant- age of the prompt offers of help which came from all parts of the Empire, the necessity of convincing the Self-Governing Dominions and the Empire at large of the righteousness of the cause for which Great Britain was fighting was more imperative still. For in the long run the consciousness of the justice of the principles for which a people is fighting alone can ensure the massing of material force sufficient to socvire material victory. Evidence that the case for Great Britain was fully understood and thoroughly approved, not only by our own peoples but by the bulk of the neutral States of the world, was not long in presenting itself. The Dominions as a whole had satisfied themselves that the British cause was just before Sir Edward Grey had made it plain by his speech of August 3 that the British Government had Vol. I. — Part .5. Ifil done everything short of sacrificing the honour of the country to avoid war. In the words of Sir Richard McBride, the Premier of British Columbia, " Should it unfortunately develop that Great Britain is compelled to engage in hostilities, Canada will automatically be at war also " ; while in Australia Mr. Fisher, the ex-Prime Minister, declared, " Should honour demand the Mother Coimtrj- to take part in hostilities, Australians will stand beside her to the last man and the last shilling." These sentiments found expression in the offers of lielp of men and material which have been described in the preceding chapter. To these offers the King replied by a message to Ihe Overseas Dominions : — I desire to express to my people of the Overseas Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days. These spontaneous assurances of their fidlest support recall to me the generous, self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother Country. I sliall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibility which rests upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm resolute, trusting in God. — George R.I. Sir Edward Grey's speech produced its inevitable effect throughout the Empire. In 162 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the words of Sir James Whitney, the Premier of Ontario : The momentous crisis we are now facing makes it plain what Canada's course must be. That course is to exert our whole strength and power at once on behalf of the Empire. I know my fellow Canadians too well to doubt they ^v^ll respond with en- thusiastic loyalty to the appeal. Sir Robert Borden has all Canada behind him if steps must be taken to join in fighting the Empire's battles, because the contest is forced upon Great Britain. It is our contest as much as hers, and upon the issue of events depends oiu- national existence. Never before in our history has the call to duty and honour been so clear and imperative, and Canada will neither quaU nor falter at the test. The British Government have done every- tliing possible to avoid war and sought peace with an earnestness worthy of responsible statesmen. But a dishonourable peace would prove disastrous to the Empire. We should be unworthy of the blood that runs in our veins if we sought to avoid an inevitable conflict. I rejoice at the evidences of Imperial umty displayed on all sides, and if our cause is to preserve liberty and to resist unjust aggression, it will evoke all that is best and noblest in the Canadian character. Not the least remarkable of the utterances of the Dominion statesmen was that of General Botha, foiuiieen years before the ablest and the most dreaded cf the Boer leaders. In the course of a speech delivered on September 9, he said that at the request of the Imperial Government his Government had decided to undertake opera- tions in German South- West Africa. Then he continued : — t There could only be oae reply to the Im- perial Government's request. There were many in South Africa who did not recognize the tremendous seriousness and great possi- bilities of this war, and some thought that the storm did not threaten South Africa. This was a most narrow-minded conception. The Empire was at war ; consequently South Africa was at war with the common enemy. Only two patlis were open — the path of faith- fulness to duty and honour and the path of disloyalty and dishonour. A characteristic of the South African jjeople was their high sense of honour, and they would maintain their reputation for honourable dealing unlamishod. To forget their loyalty to th(; Empire in this hour of trial would bo scanda- lous and sliameful, and would, blacken Soutli Africa in the eyes of the whole world. Of this South Africans were incapable. They had endured some of the greatest sacrifices that could be demanded of a people, but they had always kept before them ideals founded on Christianity, and never in their darkest days had they sought to gain their ends by treasonable moans. The path of treason was an unknown path to Dutch and English alike. Their duty and their conscience alike bade them be faithful and true to the Imperial Government in all respects in tliis hoiu" of darkness and trouble. That was the attitude of the Union Government ; that was the attitude of the people of South Africa. Nor was the Press of the Dominions less em- phatic in the position it assumed. Before the outbreak of hostilities the Toronto Olobe said : — Of one thing let there be no cavil or question ; i£ it means war for Great Britain, it means war also for Canada. If it means war for Canada it means also the union of Canadians for the defence of Canada, for the maintenance of the Empire's integrity, and for the preservation in the world of Great Britain's ideals of democratic government and life, while an article in the Cape Times after "the publication of Sir Edward Grey's speech gave a fair example of the effect of that utterance in the South African Union : — We shall fight to save Europe from the threatened tyranny which has troubled her peace since the German Empire was first founded upon blood and iron, to guard for ourselves and for those who have put their trust in us the heritage of freedom, and, above all, to redeem the solemn pledges given many years ago that the might of Britain should be inter- posed to shield the weaker nations of Western Europe against aggression. Never did a nation go into war in a cause better fitted to draw together the peoples that have learnt to know liberty under the British Flag . . . Britain has stood for peace until the arrogance and madness of the German Emperor have forced the sword into her hand. Germany has deliberately taken the role of international highway- man, and the highwayman,' sooner or later, meets his deserts. The sentim.ents felt by the whole Empire were finely expressed in the further message which the King issued to the Governments and people of liis Self-Governing Dominions : — During the past few weeks the peoples of My whole Empire at Home and Over- seas have moved with one mind and pur- pose to confront and overthrow an un- paralleled assault upon the continuity of civilization and the peace of mankind. The calamitous conflict is not of My seeking. My voice has been cast tlirough- out on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which My Empire was not concerned. Had I stood THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 163 H.M. THE KING. l(f. Or D. DowMf. 164 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS. SIR PERTAB SINGH, the Veteran of the Indian Expeditionary Force. [Lafayttte, aside when, in defiance of pledges to whicli My ICingdom was a party, the soil of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed My honour and given to destruction the liberties of My Empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is with me in this decision. Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of Great Britain and of the Empire. My peoples in the Self-Goveming Do- minions have shown beyond all doubt that they wholeheartedly endorse the grave decision which it was necessary to take. My personal knowledge of the loyalty and devotion of My Oversea Dominions had led me to expect that they would cheer- fully make the great eflorts and bear the great sacrifices which the present conflict entails. The full measure in which they have placed their services and resources at My disposal fills me with gratitude, and I am proud to be able to show to the world that My Peoples Oversea are as determined as the People of the United Kingdom to pro- secute a just cause to a successful end. The Dominion of Canada, the Common- wealth of Australia, and the Dominion of New Zealand have placed at My disposal their naval forces, which have already rendered good service for the Empire. Strong Expeditionary forces are being pre- pared in Canada, in Australia, and in New Zealand for service at the Front, and the Union of South Africa has released all British Troops and has undertaken important mili- tary responsibilities the discharge of which will be of the utmost value to the Empire. Newfoundland has doubled the numbers of its branch of the Royal Naval Reserve and is sending a body of men to take part in the operations at the Front. From the Dominion and Provincial Governments of Canada large and welcome gifts of supplies are on their way for the use both of My Naval and Military forces and for the relief of the distress in the United Kingdom which must inevitably follow in the wake of war. All parts of My Oversea Dominions have thus demonstrated in the most unmistakable manner the fundamental vinity of the Empire amidst all its diversity of situation and circumstance. GEORGE R.I. Even more striking and not less spontaneous were the expressions of passionate loyalty to the Throne and Empire which came from India. Assurances of Indian support were imanimously forthcoming, and as early as August 6 The Times Correspondent in Bombay was able to announce that the military Princes of India had placed the whole of their resources at the disposal of the Emperor. Later on in the Viceroy's Council Lord Hardinge, speaking of the employment of the Indian Army in the War, said : — It was, moreover, with confidence and pride that I was able to offer to his Majesty the first and largest military force of British and Indian troops for service in Europe that has ever left the shores of India. I an. con- fident that the honour of this laud and of the British Empire may be safely entrusted to THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 105 LORD HARDINGE OF PENSHURST, Viceroy of India. [EWolt Or Fry. our brave soldiers, and that they will acquit themselves nobly and ever maintain their high traditions of military chivalry and courage. To the people of India 1 would say at this time, let us display to the world an attitude of unity, of self-sacrifice, and of unswerving confidence under all circumstances in the justice of our cause and in the assur- ance that God will defend the right. A summary of the various offers of service, money, and so forth made by the rulers of the native States was given in a telegram from the Viceroy dated September 8, which was read by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords, and by Mr. Charles Roberts, Under-Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons on September 9 : — Following is a summary of ofJers of ser- vice, money, &c., made in India to the Viceroy. The Rulers of the Native States in India, who number nearly seven himdred in all, have with one accord rallied to the defence of the Empire and offered their personal services and the resources of their States for the war. From among the many Princes and Nobles who have volunteered for active service, the Viceroy has selected the Chiefs of Jodhpur, Bikanei, Kishangarh, Rutlam, Sachin, Fatiala, Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, the Heir Apparent of Bhopal, and a brother of the Maharaja of Cooch Behar, together with other cadets of noble laniilies. The veteran Sir Pertab would not be denied his right to serve the King-Emperor in spite of his seventy years, and his nephew, the Maharaja, who is but sixteen years old, goes with him. All these have, with the Commander- in-Chief's approval, already joined the hixpeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of Gwalior and the Chiefs of Jaora and Dholpur together with the Heir- Apparent of Palanpur were, to their great regret, preventetl from leaving their States. Twenty-seven of the larger States in India maintain Imperial Service Troops, and the services of every corps were immediately placed at the dis- posal of the Government of India on the outbreak of war. The Viceroy has accepted from twelve States contingents of cavalry, infantry, sappers, and transport, besides a camel corps from Bikaner, and most of them have already embarked. As particular in- stances of generosity and eager loyalty of the Chiefs the following may be quoted : — Various Durbars have combined together to provide a hospital ship to be called '' The Loyalty " for the use of the Expeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of Mysore has placet! Rs.50 lakhs at the disposal of the Government of India for expenditure in connexion with the Expeditionary Force. The Chief of Gwalior, in addition to sharing in the expenses of the hospital ship. THE MARQUESS OF CREWE, Secretary of State lor India. 16(5 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE MAHARAJA OF MYSORE. t [Sporl & General. the idea of which was originated with himself and the Begum of Bhopal, has offered to place large sums of money at the disposal of the Government of India and to pro- vide thousands of horses a? remounts. From Loharu in the Punjab and Las Bela and Kalat in Baluchistan come offers of camels with drivers, to be supplied and maintained by the Chiefs. and Sardars. Several chiefs have offered to raise additional troops for military service should they be required, and donations to the Indian Relief Fund have poured in from all States. The Maharaja of Rewa has offered his troops, his trea«ury, and even his private jewelry for the service of the King-Emperor. In addition to contributions to the Indian Fund some Chiefs — namely, those of Kashmir, Bundi, Orchha, and Gwaiior and Indore — have also given large sums to the Prince of Wales's Fund. The Maharaja of Kashmir, not content with subscribing himself to the Indian Fund, presided at a meeting of 20,000 people held recently at Srinagar and delivered a stirring speech, in response to which large subscrip- tions were collected. IMaharaja Holkar offers, free of charge, all horses in his State Army which may be suitable for Government purposes. Horses also offered by Nizam's Government, by Jamnagar, and other Bombay States. Every Chief in the Bombay Presidency has placed the resources of his State at the disposal of Government, and all have made contribu- tions to the Relief Fund. Loyal messages and offers also received from Mehtar of Chitral and tribes of Khyber Agency as well as lUiyber Rifles. I^etters have been received from the most remote States in India, all marked by deep sincerity of desire t'> render some assistance, however humble, to the British Government in its hour of need. Last, but not least, from beyond the borders of India have been received generous offers of assistance from the Nepal Durbar ; the military resources of the State have been placed at the disposal of the British Govern- ment, and the Prime Minister has offered a sum of Rs.3 lakhs to the Viceroy for the purchase of machine guns or field equipment for British Gurkha Regiments proceeding overseas, in addition to large donations from his private purse to the Prince of Wales's Fund and the Imperial Indian Relief Fund. To the 4th Gurkha Rifles, of which the Prime Minister is honorary Colonel, the Prime Minister has offered Rs. 30,000 for the purchase of machine guns in the event of their going on service. The Dalai Lama of Tibet has offered 1,000 Tibetan troops for service imder the British Government. His Holiness also states that Lamas in- numerable throughout length and breadth of Tibet are offering prayers for success of British Army and for happiness of souls of all victims of war. The same spirit has prevailed throughout British India. Hundreds of telegrams and letters received by Viceroy expressing loyalty and desire to serve Government either in the field or by cooperation in India. Many hundreds also received by local administra- tions. They corne from commimities and associations, religious, political, and social, of all classes and creeds, also from individuals offering their resources or asking for oppor- tunity to prove loyalty by personal service. Following may be mentioned as typical examples : — The All India Moslem League, the Bengal Presidency Moslem League, the Moslem Association of Rangoon, the Trustees of the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 167 Aligarh Collogo, the Behar Provincial Moslem League the Central National Mahomedan Association of Calcutta, the Khoja Com- munity, and other followers of Aga Khan, the Punjab Moslem League, Mahomedans of Eastern liengal. Citizens of Calcutta, Madras, Rangoon, and many other cities, Behar Landholders' Association, Madras Provincial Congress, Taluqdars of Oudh, Punjab Chiefs' Association, L^nitod Provinces Provincial Congress, Hindus of the Pimjab Chief Klialsa Divvan representing orthodox Sikhf^, Bohra C^omniimity of Bombay, Parsee Commimity oi Bombay. Delhi Medical Association offer field hospital that was sent to Turkey during Balkan War ; Bengalee students ofTer enthusiastic services for an ambulance corps, and there were many other offers of medical aid ; Zemnidars of Madras have offered 500 horses, and among other practical steps taken to assist Government may be noted the holding of meetings to allay panic, keep down ]irices, and maintain public confi- dence and credit. Generous contributions have poured in from all quarters to Imperial Indian Belief Fur.d. These great and splendid ofTers of service were acknowledged by the King-Emporor in the following terms : — To the Princes and Peoples of My Indian Empire : Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the popvilations of My Empire in defence of its tinity and integrity, nothing has mover ine more than the passionate ottvotion to My Throne expressed both by My Indian subjects, and by the Feudatory Princes and the ruling Chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their re- soiirces in the cause of the Realm. Their one-voiced demand to l)e foremost in the conflict has touched my heeirl, and ha« in- spired to the highe&t issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked My Indian subjects and Myself. I recall to mind India's gracious mesf>age to the British nation of good will and fellowship wliich greeted my return in February, 1912, after the solemn cere- mony of My Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfilment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked. — GEORGE R.L It is unnecessary to dwell upon the tremend- ous significance of these documents. The British Empire went to war for ju.stice, mercy, and righteousness, knowing that those great principles of human government were not merely endorsed by its imited conscience but that in India not less than elsewhere they had been put to the practical proof and had not been found wanting. Indian loyalty owed its existence not only to the monarchic instincts of its peoples and to their martial pride, but to* their gratitude for the benefits of British Government and to their determination to uphold at all costs the Empire to which they were so deeply indebted. CHAPTER XI. THE WAR AND FINANCE. Financial Conditions when War Broke Out — Paris a Source of Weakness — Rise in London; Open Market Discount Rate — Heavy Borrowing from the Bank of England — Fall in Paris Cheque on London — Rise in New York Sterling Rate — Advance of Bank Rate — Clearing Banks Decide to Pay in Notes — Bank Applied to for Gold — Official Minimum Eight,. THEN Ten per Cent. — The Banks Lending Freely — Some Relief Experienced — The Pro- longed Bank Holiday — The Moratorium Act- — The Difficulties of the Accepting Houses — Small Bank Notes Issued — Large Gold Imports — Bank Rate Five per Cent. — Money Market Still Dead — Government Help — Bank Guaranteed Against Loss on Bills — Slow- Revival of Money Market — Prolongation of the Moratorium — Effects of the War: ON Trade — Clearing House Retihins Greatly Reduced — Big Drop in Imports and Exports: — The Stock Exchange — Collapse of Markets — Panic on the Continent — Closing of the; " House " — Continental Bourses — New York. SINCE the end of the Napoleonic War there has been no such general dis- turbance to finance, commerce, and industry as resulted from the de- claration by Austria - Hungary of hostilities against Servia on July 28. The momentous character of that declaration was perceived by every banker, merchant, and manufacturer in Europe, and although many business men found it hard to believe that the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were on the eve of battle, a feeling of sick apprehension at once seized on the consciousness of all. Those who took the most unfavourable view of the political probabilities were right, but even their prevision failed to foresee how prompt and benumbing would be the effect of the catastrophe on the world's economic life. The actual outbreak of the war, in which five out of the six Great Powers speedily became involved, paralysed, and for the moment seemed, indeed, to have destroyed, the complicated and delicate economic organs of the world. These organs were not, of course, destroyed any more than a man's lungs are destroyed when he unwittingly walks into an atmosphere heavily charged with carbonic acid gas ; but they were rendered temporarily unable to perform their regular functions. In the case of an animal oppressedl with an excess of air for which its respiratory organs are unsuited, death would follow promptly unless it were withdrawn from the- baleful atmosphere. But modern communi- ties of men whose complicated economic organisms have been paralysed by a recrudes- cence of the semi-barbaric conditions created by a general European war can adopt measures, for preventing a stoppage of the life of the community. The general financial condition of the world's money markets was far from satisfac- tory when the fear of war became definite on Tuesday, July 28. The condition of the- Paris market was unusual. Until about thre» years before the war Paris had been a constant source of support to London and the World's money markets generally, because of the large amount of balances which Fren' h banking houses always had at their disposal, owing to the thrifty character of the French people and their readiness to be led as regaids their invest- ments by the big French institutions. During. this time, and especially since the end of the Balkan wars, these institutions had become involved in financial commitments-, abroad on so large a scale that Paris had. 1P8 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 109 litlte tree money for financing othor places of business either by teniiJorary advunces or by taking up loans as an investineat. During the year 1914, however, Paris had called in a great deal of what was owing to it in various countries, and brought it home in gold, so that the Bank of France was better supphed with the metal than any other coimtry. except Russia, a result which, in view of the coming catastroplie, was certainly matter for congratulation. Now York was in no condition to meet the heavy demands made on it from Europe, to which it was always indebted, owing to the enormous quantity of United States securities of all kinds held by European capita lists and investors, and the very largo credits always open here and in Paris for supplying the requirements of Ameri- can residents and visitors in the Old World. In normal times this big liability to Europe was kept within bounds by constant remittances, chiefly to London, against exports of American produce which in the autumn assumed very large dimensions, owing to the marketing of the grain and cotton crops. The stability of the equilibrium, however, depended on the readiness or ability of European holders of American securities to retain them. The excessive issue by American railway and other companies of short-term notes, the bad state of affairs in Mexico, and the sudden ooUapse of tlio St. Louis and San Francisco railroad in the spring of 1913, at a time when short-term and other securities were being issued too freely by Canadian and other borrowers, greatly injiu'ed the market for American issues, especially in Paris, where the leading houses were already beginning to feel over-loaded with foreign issues of all kinds. The result was that Paris had for some time been ro'ilizing its American seoviritios and bringing the money home in gold. Tins movement had been especially conspicuous during the first six months of 1914, during which France imported £26,486,000 of " bullion iind specie," the bulk of which was gold, and exported £7,297,000, giving a net import of £19,189,000; the whole of this did not come from the United States, but a considerable rjroportion was received thence. On Saturday, Julj' 25, the Austro -Hungarian Bank raised its rate from four per cent, to five per cent. ; in this comparatively modest manner the gigantic crisis first made itself felt. It was noticed that in spite of this rise the Vienna oxchango on London moved in favour of the THE RIGHT HONOURABLE DAVID LLOVD GEORGE. \Ulavellt. latter place, the discount rate here having risen sharply close up to the Bank of England' s official minimum, which was then three percent., as it had been since January 29. On .Monday, July 27, the London Money Market began to adopt the measures of defence which have usually been foimd effective in the past at times of difficulty. Apart from the portentous aspect of foreign politics and the known financial difficulties in Paris and else- where, the situation here did not, on the sur- face, suggest that anything extraordinary was about to occur. The Bank possessed, according to the return of July 22. a reserve of £29,297,000, which, though somewhat less than it had been hoped would be held on the eve of the August Bank Holiday, was about £1,500,000 better than was held on July 23, 1913. The private deposits, the variations in which were a rough indication of the magnitude of the bankers' balances, were £42,185,000, a figure which, in normal circumstances, moans that these balances are ample and that the market should consequently be ea,sy. Nevertheless, on that Monday the market rates of discount for two, three, and four months' bills were 1 per cent, and the six months' rate was i per cent, above Satiu-day's level. In other words, the market quotation was 1 per cent, over Bank rate. In spite of this high level th*; 170 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Paris cheque* fell 3c. to 25f. 14}c. The clearing banks called a good deal of money from the discount houses, and the latter, of course, applied to the Bank, which did a large business, chiefly in short bills. Heavy calls from foreign banks were also experienced. On Tuesday the market, meaning the discount houses and bill brokers, again had money called from them, but not to so large an extent as on Monday, and the applications to the Bank of England were on a smaller scale. It was noticed that the calls of money proceeded chiefly from the foreign banks, and that the external character of the crisis was becoming more marked, the most striking features being the unprecedented fall in the Paris cheque to 25f. 5c. after official hours and the equally sur- prising rise in the New York sterling exchange to §4.93c.f owing to the difficulty of insuring gold shipments, wliich were much in demand owing to the disappearance of ordinary means of remittance to London from New York. The dro i in the Paris rate was partly due to large French selling of securities here, the coulisse, or unofficial bovirse in Paris, being closed. On Wednesday the situation became very much worse, the Austro -Hungarian Declaration of War on Servia having reduced the Money *Tbe teim '* Paris cheque '* means the rate of exchanze In the case of payments at sight, as by cheque. Thus the value of the BovereiKn for such pajouents fell from 25 francs 17 i centimes to 23 francs 141 centimes. tin other words the value in New Yorlt of a sovereign in London rose to the erceptionally higli level of 4 dollars 93 cents. Market to a condition of paralysis. Discoiml quotations were nominal at 4|-5 per cent, for all dates, the applications to the Bank were very large, a big total of sovereigns was withdrawn from the Bank for the Continent and Egypt, and the Paris cheque fell below 25f. In these cir- cumstances an iimnodiate advance in the Bank rate was inevitable. The following day, Thurs- day, July 30, the rate was raised from 3 to 4 per cent., and the Bank of France rate was raised from 3^ to 4 J per cent., while the Belgian, Swedish, and Swiss State banks also raised their rates by 1 per cent. It was evident that a further advance would be necessary very soon, in view of the fact that over £1,000,000 in gold was withdrawn on balance from the Bank for export. The Bank return (dated the previous day, July 29) was of a very imusual character, though not unexpected by the well- informed. Its cliief features were increases of £13,675,000 in the "other" seciu-ities, representing the additional accommodation in loans and discounts fvirnished to tlie market by the Bank, and £12,234,000 in tlie private deposits, which indicated that nearly all the money borrowed by the market was still on the bankers' balances. There was a decrease of £2,422,000 in the reserve, of which about £1,600,000 was coin and notes taken out for internal purposes, which, though a good deal more than was withdrawn for holiday purposes at the end of July, 1913, was not considered very surprising in view of the alarm due to SCENE IN FRONT OF THE ROYAL EXCHANGE- \SpoTt and General THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 171 tho political situation. The drop in tho pro- portion of tho reserve to current liabilities by 12| per cent, to 40 per cent., tho fact that nearly all tho Continental exchanges had become nominal, that tho Paris clvequo was, in spite of a sUght recovery, well below 25f., and that, on the other hand. New York sterling was close on §5, all tended to show that the financial and commercial business of the whole world, already in a somewhat uncomfortable state had received a blow diu-ing the week from wliich an early recovery was not probable, even in the event of a general Eiu-opean war being averted During that week the Bank of France's holding of bills discoimted increased by £;!6, 125,000. and as a result of this additional aid to the public £30,851,000 of notes were withdrawn by the Bank's customers. Tlie Bank's current accounts (Paris and branches) were only increased very slightly. Friday, July 31, was a day unexampled in the history of tho City as we and our fathers had known it. Soon after tho commence- ment of business — a little later than 10 a.m. — tho Stock Exchange was shut, by order of the committee, until further notice. A deep im- pression was produced by this announcement, as the pressure in the Money Market was greatly increased by it ; it was also learnt that a large total of gold, amounting on balance to over £1,200,000, would bo withdrawn from the Bank for export. Very big amounts were called by the clearing banks from tho discount houses, thus obliging them to apply for aid to the Bank, which did a huge business in short bills. Tlicse tho Bank at first bought at 6 per cent., but tho demand on it was so strong that it had to raise tho rate rapidly luitil tho rate for such bills reached 10 per cent. ; lOi per cent, was charged for loans for a week. About 3 p.m. the Bank Court decided to raise its official minimum to 8 per cent., and the committee of clearing bankers, after dis- cussion, fixed their deposit rate at 4 per cent. ; the discount houses and bill brokers then decided to allow 4 J per cent, and 4| per cent, for money at call and notice respectively. The discount houses did hardly any business apart from procuring money from the Bank. When tho first New York cables arrived in tho afternoon ■t was announced that tho New York Stock Exchange had been closed, but a more cheering piece of news was received to the effect that over £1,000,000 in gold had been engaged for shipment to London. No quotations were received for the Continental exchanges ; tho New York sterling rate for demand drafts was nominally S5.20o. and that for cable SIR WILLIAM PLENDER. ,Swa,n4. transfers §6, quotations never before heard of. The Silver Market was closed. The Reichsbank raised its rate to 5 per cent., and the Austro-Hungarian Bank moved up to 6 per cent. During the day several of the clearing banks refused to give gold to customers in exchange for their own cheques, but paid the cheques in bank notes. This policy had the un- fortunate result of producing tho unseemly spectacle of a large crowd of persons at the Issue Department of the Bank of England, at that time undergoing some repairs, bringing £5 notes to be converted into gold. Most of those who presented the notes required money in small amounts for holiday purposes, and others required cash for paying weekly wages, for both which purposes tho notes were un suitable. On Satiu-day morning tho discount houses were in a state of serious anxiety as to how far the clearing banks and the Bank of England would a.'^sist them by buying bills or granting loans ; large sums had again been called from them by banks, though not to such an extent as on Friday by the clearing institutions, several of which not only did not make calls but were actual lenders to a fair extent. The discount houses, however, were very uneasy until after midday, when the Bank Court, after raising the official minimum to 10 per cent. — thus making the official rate identical with the actual charge on Friday afternoon — let it be known that the 172 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN. [Swame. Bank would help the market in the usual manner. The amount of money asked for was much less than was taken on Friday, and some relief was experienced when, at a later hour than usual on Saturdays, City men went home with the feeling that, as Monday was a Bank Holiday, there was a two days' respite from further strain on their resources. Naturally no discount business was done in the open market. The disorganization of the foreign exchanges was, in some respects, the most serious feature of the breakdown of credit caused by the War. We have already referred to the extraordinary fall in the Paris cheque, which usually moves between what are called the gold points — 25f. 32Jc., being the price at which, in theory, gold should come to London, and 25f. 12Jc. that at which the metal should leave London for Paris. On July 28 the cheque was quoted 25f. lljc, and on the 29th it hid dropped to 24f. 90c. ; on the following day, Thurs- day, July 30, there was a slight recovery to 24f. 95c., but on the 31st there was no quotation at all for Paris or any other Continental exchange. The meaning of this decline was that remittances on Paris had been very saroe for several days and that finally the scarcity had become so great that thosa who wanted them bought gold to send to the French capital. Tha movements of the New York exchange were equally surprising, but in the opposite direction. In the United States, which is always in debt to Europe, remittances on London were unusvially keenly sought for towards the end of July ; they wore wanted to I^ay for huge masses of American securities sold by London and other European places, most of which wore disposed of through London. In addition. New York houses were, as usual, buyers of remittances on London to meet the constant requirenieiits of American residents and visitors in Europe. The pressure increased so much that the New York sterling rate on London, which does not usually rise above S4.89c. even for cable transfers, had risen by Saturday, July 25, to $4.89ic. for that class of exchange, and during the momentous' week which enc'ei August 1 rose nominally to §6, a level never before seen. After July 31 quotations from the French and American exchanges were either not received or wore purely nominal. The collapse in the machinery of remittance of money from the United States was accom- panied by the collapse of most of the foreign exchanges of other countries which owed money to London ; and this had the very serious e3ect of )i;aking it doubtful whether the accepting houses, on whose operations the import trade of the country largely depended, would be able to continue them. There was thus some danger lest, in spite of our command of the sea, supplies of food and othpr necessaries might before long be seriously reduced. To mset this danger the first of the impjrtant financial measures adopted by the Governm:;nt in order to deal with a wholly abnormal situation was taken. On Monday, August 3, an " empowering " Moratorium Act was rapidly passed tlirough Parliamont, and the Royal Assent was given to it the same evening. The Act is entitled "The Postpinemant of Pajinsnts Act, 1914," and its terms are as follows : — 1. — (1) His Majesty may by Proclamation authorize the postponement of the payment of any bill of exchange, oi' o£ any negotiable instrument, or any other payment in pursuance of any contract, to such extent, for such time, and subject to such conditions or other provisions as may bo specided in the Pro- clan. ation. (2) j»o additional stamp duty .shall be payable in respect of any insti-ument as a consequence of any postponement of payment in pursuance of a Pro- clamation under this Act unless the Proclamation otherwise directs. (3) Any such Proclamation may be varied, extended, or revoked by any subsequent Proclamation, .and separate Proclamations may be made dealing with separate subjects. (4) The Proclamation dated the third day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen, relating to the post- pouemeut of payment of certain bills of exchaugs THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 173 is hcroby (^onfiiinpil and shall be deemed to have been made under the Act. 2. — (1) Tlii.s Act may bo cited as the Postpone- ment of Payments Act, 1914. (2) This Act sliall remain in force for a period of six months from the date of the passing thereof. Tho saint) evening the pjwors granted under the Act were put in force as regards '* certain bills of exchange " by tho following Royal Pro- clamation, accompinied by a form for reaccept- anco : — It on tlic prcsent.ation for payment of a, bill of exchange, otiier than a cheque or bill on demand, which has been ac- ecptcKl before the beginning of the fourth day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen, the acceptor reacccpts tlie bill by a declaration on the face of the bill in tlie form set out hereunder, that bill shall, for all purposes, including tho liability of any drawer or indorser or any other party thereto, be deemed to bo due and be payable on a date one calendar niontli after the date of its original niaturity instx^ad of on the date of its original maturity, and to be a bill for the original amount thereof incrciused by tlie amount of interest thereon calculated from the date of reacceptance to the new date of payment at tho Uanlc of England rate current on the date of the reacceptiinco of the bill. At a meeting of bankers and other persons held at the Bank of England the same evening suitable machinery for acting on the Proclama- tion was agreed vipon. Towards tho end of August the difficulties of these houses received further attention from tho Chancellor, who had a series of confer- ences with a largo number of bankers, heads of accepting houses, and traders, the out- come of which was an arrangement designed to put an end to tho dislocation of the foreign exchanges and thus facilitate the importation and exportation of goods. The main features were thus summarized in The Times of September 5 : — 1. The Bank of England will provide where required acceptors with the funds necessary to pay all approved pre-moratorium bills at maturity. This couisu will release tho drawers and endoreers of such bills from their liabilities as parties to these bills but their liability under any agreement with the acccptora for payment or cover will be retained. 2. The acceptoi-s will be under obligation to collect from their clients all the funds due to thenj as soon as possible, and to apply those funds to repay- ment of tlie advances made by the Bank of England. Inteivst will be charged upon these advances at 2 per cent, above tlie ruling Bank rate. .3. The Bank of England undertakes not to claim repayment of any amounts not recovered by the acceptors fiom their clients for a period of one year after the close of tlie war. Until the end of this perio<l the Bank of England's claim will rank after clamis in iTspect of post-moratorium transactions. 4. In order to facilitate fresh business and the movement of produce and mercliandise from and to .all parts of the world, tlie joint stock banks have arr.anged, with the co-operation, if necessary, of the Bank of England and tho Government, to advance to clients the amounts necessary to pay their accept- ances at maturity where the funds have not been piov'ded in due time by the clients of the acceptors. MR. BONAR LAW. \Bas;jito. The acceptor would \iavo to satisfy the joint stock banks or the Bank of England both iis to the nature of tho transaction and iis to the reason why the money is not forthcoming from the client. These advances would be on the same terms jis regards interest a.s the pre-moratorium bill advances. The Government is now negotiating with a view to assisting the irstoration of exchange between the United States of America and this country. An Act prolonging the Bank Holiday of August 3 for tliree more days was also pa.ssed ; it was explained during tho brief debate on it that it applied only to banks. In the course of years it had been very generally forgotten that, on all Bank Holidays, closing is obligatory only on banks. Tlie same evening on which these measures were taken the State Scheme for War Insurance dealt with in tho next chapter was announced. The three days prolongation of tho Bank Holiday was asked for by bankers and business men generally ; it was needed in order to give banks and discount houses time to ascertain liow they stood, and to give the Government time to prepare and issue £1 and lOs. notes in order that the banks should be able to meet demands on thfm for smaller currency than £5 notes. The new notes, which were payable ill gold at the Bank, were ready to the extent of over £3,000,000 on August 7, when the banks reojiened ; tlie pressure was greatly reUeved at once in London, and the subsequent issue ot notes at the rate of £5,000,000 a day soon supplied all that was needed elsewhere. In order to supply further currency, pending 174 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. M. RIBOT. The French Minister of Finance. [Nadar, Paris, the issue of sufficient new banU notes, postal orders were made legal tender, temporarily, on the same terms. These arrangements were announced by the Cliancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons on Augast 5. The Chancellor stated on that occasion that the Bank of England was satisfied that it would be able to reduce its rate to 6 per cent, on Friday, August 7. He announced that a S3cond Mora- torium Proclamation would be issued as soon as its terms could be settled ; and pointed out the danger to the national welfare of the hoarding of gold. The following day he gave further explanations as to the second Mora- torium Proclamation, which defined more in detail the effect of this instrument on the pay- ment of debts. On August 6 Mr. Lloyd George intro- duced the Currency and Bank Notes Bill, wliich became law that evening, and Mr. Asquith obtained from the House a Vote of Credit for £100,000,000. On the same day (Thursday, August 6) the Bank reduced its rate to 6 per cent. On the following day, when the banks reopened, there was an entire absence of excitement. The new notes were well received, though their appearance was criticized ; and although there were during the first day or two com- plaints that they were not sufficiently plentiful, the supply was soon ample. According to a return published in the Gazette of August 28, the total of notes outstanding on August 26 wan £21,535,064. On August 27 Mr. Lloyd George stated that instructions for stopping the issue of further postal orders as ciurency had been given, and that when they were all got back a Proclamation that they were no longer legal tender would bo issued. No poundage was charged on them while they were being issued H'^ currency. On Saturday, August 8, only a week after the breakdown of credit, the Bank reduced its rate to 5 per cent. The clearing banks fixed their deposit rate at 3 J per cent., and the dis- count houses and bill brokers fixed theirs at 4 per cent, and 4J per cent. There was no fresh business in the Money Market, but the feeling was hopeful. During the week ended August 5, which included only three working days, £2,298,000 of gold had left the Bank for export, chiefly to Paris, and a still larger amount, £8,211,000 in coin, besides £6,399,000 in notes, was withdrawn for " home purposes," much of it to be placed in hoard?. The foreign movement, however, promptly turned in favour of the Bank, which received during the last three days of the week £0,300,500 in gold, on balance, including £2,000,000 released for Indian purposes by the India Council, and a good impression was produced by the announce- ment of these additions to the Bank's gold resources. So ended one of the most extra- ordinary iDeriods of eight days ever experienced in the City, probably the most extraordinary since the time of tho " Bank Restriction " in the Napoleonic Wars. The measures taken were unusual, like the evils they were intended to remedy. On Monday, August 10, over £2,600,000 of imported gold was received by the Bank, chiefly from the United States, and it was known that a good deal more gold was afloat for London ; the problem of providing currency was being successfully met by the issue of the new Government notes ; there had been no suspen- sion of specie payments and no actual suspension of the Bank Act, though power had been taken to suspend that Act if necessary. But the Money Market was still in a state of catalepsy, no new busine.ss being undertaken.' " This inactivity was partly due to the enormous amount of office work which had to be done by everybody in order to " straighten out " the tangle into which business had become in- volved. It had become evident that some- thing more would have to be done by the State to relieve the dead-lock, and accordingly it was announced on Wednesday evening. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 175 August 12, ailor careful oonsultiition with the Hank of England, the clearing bankers, and other parties, that the Government would guarantee the Bank of England from any loss which it might incur in discounting approved bills of exchange accepted prior to August 4, 1914. The following announcement was pub- lished in The Times of August 13 : — Thi' Bank of Kngland arc prepared, on the applica- tion of tlie holder of any aiiproved Ijill of exchange jiccepted before August 4, 1914. to discount at any time before its due date at Bank rate, witliout recourse to such liolder, and upon its maturity tin- Bank of England will, in order to assist the resump- tion of norraal business operations, give the acceptor the opportxmity until further notice of postponing payment, interest being payable in the meantime at 2 per cent, over Bank rate varying. Airangi^- raents will be made to carry this scheme into effect so a-s to preserve all existing obligations. The Bank of England will be prepared for this purpose to approve such bills of exchange as are customarily discounted by them and also good trade bills and the acceptances of such foreign and Colonial firms and bank agencies aa are established in Groat Britain. It was also announced that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had appointed Sir George Paish, who retired from the editorship of the Statist, to assist the Treasury in dealing with economic and financial questions arising out of the war. The effect of this decision to make a coacreto reality of the credit of the United Kingdom was very groat, but it was not so groat at first as was expected by many people. The scheme worked marvellously well ; a large quantity of " pre-moratorium " billa was taken by the Bank daily under the arrangement, and, when allowance is made for the novelty of the business, the disputes and mis- imderstandings arising out of it must be regarded as quite trivial. The Money Market began to show signs of life again within a week; banks and discount houses commenced very cautiously to take a few " post-moratorium " bills as SDon as they had got rid of an adequate amount of their " pre-moratorium " paper, which had been, as regards a large portion of it, a source of anxiety and embarrassment. The full results nf the Government's action, of which advan- tage was freely taken, as was intended and expected, could only develop later. Some of the normal phenomena of the market soon reippeared. Quotations re- appeared first for day-to-day advances, as was natural, for the sale of bills under the scheme to the Bank placed a very largo amount of money in the hands of the banks and discount houses, and every day they had big balances wliich they found it difficult to lend or to employ in discounting bills, partly because they were SCENE IN THROGMORTON STREET. THE STOCK EXCHANGE CLOSED. {Daily Mirror, 176 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. very careful, some critics said over-careful, as to the securities they took, and partly, it must be admitted, because bills of a suitable class were undoubtedly scarce, owing to the contrac- tion of trade due to the war. A few days after the Bank's announcement was made several discoimt houses began quoting rates for short Ixtures as well as for daily advances, and quota- tions were also obtainable for bills ; the latter, however, were very nominal, and the terms on which actual transactions were aone depended more than usually on the quality of the bill, fine paper* being taken at very much lower rates than were quoted. Moreover, there was little or no distinction for over a fortnight between the dates of discountable paper, desirable bills being taken whether they ran for two or six months. This lumping together of the quotation for all maturities ceased only at the end of August. The slow revival of the market and gradual differentiation of dates for bills were very interesting phenomena to watch, but they did not proceed with sufficient celerity to satisfy people who had not realized the violence of the blow which credit had received. As already indicated, the purchase of " pre- moratorium " acceptances by the Bank was not carried on without a certain amount of friction. A day or two after the scheme was in operation it began to be seen that the Bank would probably have physical difficulties in working so big a discount business by its ordi- nary methods. Questions of interpretation also had to be dealt with, but they were settled quickly, as they arose, with the good sense characteristic of the City, which has a mar- vellous power of adjusting itself to new situa- tions if given a little time to think things over. The Bank's difficulty of dealing with the huge mass of bills presented to it daUy threw a very great strain on its staff, which was met with admirable determination, formidably long hours being endured for several days with cheer- fulness and assiduity. On Monday, August 17, matters camie to a head, the mass of bills put in early in the day being so great that a notice was posted up that no more would be taken till the following day. The exact terms of this announcement were as follows : — The number of bills tendered for discount to-day having reached the maximum limit with which it Is physically possible for the Bank to deal, no further oills can be accepted until to-morrow. The Bank takes this opportunity of assuring all holders of bills of exchange that the facilities promised on Thursday, the 13th inst., will not be withdrawn. •The term " flne paper " is applied to bills of the best dcBcrlp- tion : that is, hills Khlch are backed with the names of houses of the highest financial credit. There was a little griunbling at this by houses who had been too late to get their bills taken, but the market at once recognized the reason- ableness of the Bank's decision. It became the practice to send the bills in when the Bank began business, and in a day or two clerks began to wait outside the Bank for the doors to be opened, a rather ludicrous situation which was put an end to on August 23 by the following notice : — Houses who wish to discount pre-moratorium bills at the Bank of England should hand in their applica- tion before 4 p.m. on the preceding day. They will be infoi-med at or before 5 o'clock on that day as to the amount of the bills that the Bank will take from them on the following morning before 11 o'clock. This arrangement will begin on the afternoon of Monday, the 24th of August. The new plan met with general approval. On August 31 the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer announced that the Government had come to the conclusion that the moratoriimi, which would end on September 4, must be extended for at least another month, although the majority of the traders who had been con- sulted " were rather in favour " of bringing it to an end. He went on to say, as reported in The Times of September 1 : — During the last few days there had been signs that people were in increasing numbers taking the view that it was their duty to pay if they could. At the end of the present term the Government would have to consider the advisability of limiting the class of debts to which the moratorium should extend. It would evidently be impossible at the end of the month to bring the moratorium absolutely to an end. In the case of bills of exchange the moratorium would have to be prolonged for a very considerable time, probably, some suggested, to the end of the war. He was glaid to be able to state that the attitude on which he had animadverted on the part of some timid bankers had largely disap- peared and that there was a very considerable change for the better. In the main people wanted to behave fairly towards their neighbours. He believed con- fidence would broaden at an accelerated pace and that in the course of the next few weeks they would be able to take a step forward and get rid of the morator-um. A Proclamation on the subject was issued on Tuesday, September 2, and revoked by another two days later. We have already referred to the effects pro- duced on the situation of the Bank of England by the beginning of the war, but it will be useful to set forth briefly the figures of the Bank returns published since that for July 29, the last normal return. The amounts are in millions sterling. Other Reserve. arcula- Bullion. Private Securi- Public tion. Deposits. ties Deposit July 29. . 26,9 29.7 38,1 64,4 47,3 12.7 ».ug. 6.. 10.0 36.1 27.6 66,7 65,4 11,5 .. 12.. 1B,5 36,9 33.0 83,3 70,8 7,9 .. IB.. 19,2 37,2 38.0 108,1 94.7 13,7 ,. 26.. 26^4 35,6 43.5 123,9 109.9 23.9 Sept. 2.. 30.9 36.3 47,8 133,8 121.8 28,7 The return for July 29 had shown a rather THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 177 ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF A MORATORIUM READ IN THE CITY {Daily Graphic. liirger reduction in the reserve than is usuiil just before an August Bank Holiday, and much larger increases than usual in the private tleposits and " other " securities ; it conse- quently showed a reduction of 12| per cent, to 40 per cent, in the proportion of the reserve to current liabilities. The next return showed a fall in the proportion of no less than 25| per cent., to 14f per cent., the lowest point touched as yet; the proportion rose to 17 per cent, on August 12, and fell to 15J per cent, on August 19, recovered to 17J per cent, on August 26, and to 19 per cent, on Septem- ber 2. Owing chiefly to the Government's finan- cial operations the Government securities rose from £11,005,000 on July 29 to £29,779,000 on August 26, but fell to £28,027,000 on Septem- ber 2, owing to the repayment of Ways and Means advances. The recovery in the Bank's gold stock was mainly due to imports, which amounted in the four weeks ended September 2 (including the £2,000,000 released by the India Council) to £18,639,000. The withdrawals for homo purposes were at first large, £13,621,000 being so taken during the three Weeks ended August 12, but during the three weeks ended September 2 £5,709,000 came back. The Bank showed its power to attract gold oven when the ordinary machinery of the London Money Market was paralysed, as was the case at the end of July. One of the delusions which was entertained by enemies and timid friends of the United Kingdom was that it would be possible to " break " the Bank of England on the eve of a war by large withdrawals of gold, and thus cripple the execution of our mobilization arrangements and other measures rendered necessary by war. But no trouble worth mentioning arose on this score, for even during the week ended August 5, when a total of £10,509,000 was withdrawn from the Bank, it was well known that gold to a large amount was already engaged abroad for shipment to London. The internal withdrawals looked menacing only during that week ; the issue of the new currency notes reassured those who had made a rush to secure gold, and also incidentally gave a demonstration of the con- venience of notes smaller than £5. The follow- ing is a statement of the gold movements at the Bank during the six weeks ended September 2 : — Week ended External. Intenial. Total. July 29 August 5 August 12 August 19 August 28 September 2 - £820.000 - 2.298.000 + 9.590.000 + 3.402.000 -H 4.297,000 + 1.350.000 - £1,213.000 - ^.21!.000 - 4.197.000 + 1.643.000 ■1- 1.217.000 -H 2.949.000 - £2.033.0011 - 10.509.000 -f- 6.S93.000 -1- 4,945.000 ■V 5,514.000 + 4,299.000 Among the remarkable minor events of the month of August was the negotiating and put- ting in operation of a scheme, which had often been talked of as feasible, by wliich the Bank of England bought gold in Canada and South Africa, to be held, imtil it was convenient to ship it to London, by the Finance Ministers of the Dominion of Canada and of the t!nion of South Africa respectively. The Bank announced the purchase of the gold, when duly informed of it by cable, in the usual manner in London. This arrangement is a remarkable example of the enormous influence the Bank could exert when the national welfare demanded it. 178 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. An interesting episode in the series of events affecting the City since the war began was the closing of the branches of the German and Austrian banks which for a groat many years had been doing business in London. These branches were not allowed to reopen on August 7. A notification was issued on August 11 that they had been granted licences to carry on business under strict conditions, including supervision by a nominee of the Treasury, to which post Sir William Plender had been ap- pointed. On August 14 Sir William was also appointed to take charge of the branches of the Austrian banks in London. Wliile the outbreak of war paralysed the money market, its effect on the London Stock Exchange was equally disastrous. Fi'oni the moment that war became imminent, the Stock Exchange was inundated with sellini; orders. They came from every quarter of the world, and intrinsic values were thrown to the winds. Owing to the rush to sell, prices of practically every stock and share in existence fell heavily, the amount of buying on each fresh decline being a negligible quantity. JIarkets shivered and colla^psed, not only ail over Europe, but all over the world wherever securities are dealt in. The perpendicular fall in prices which occurred during the disastrous 19- day account which ended on July 29 followed a steady shrinkage in values which had been going on for months previously. Except for a brief period in January, when the highest prices were reached, quotations had drooped nearly all the time, and in some instances the decline was colossal. Fortunately the open account had been greatly reduced in the last couple of years, although even then the amount of stock being carried on margin by the joint stock banks must have been very large at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. London is, of course, a market to which every Bovu-se abroad turns for help when there is any pressure ; consequently for at least a fortnight the London Stock Exchange had to bear the strain of a flood of selling orders from Europe. Right up to the hour of closing on July 30 London faced the panic-strickon selling with wonderful steadiness, although for several days the jobbers ceased to make prices in the more speculative securities, thus bringing about a virtual sus- pension of business in those stocks in which dealings were regarded as dangerous. While the Bourses had to all intents and purposes suspended busineas, there was a fairly free market in London in the great majority of inter- national securities almost up to the last, though in many stocks it was difficult to deal. Any panic that occurred originated on the Conti- nental Bo\irses, which sent streams of selling orders to London owing to the inability to deal in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and elsewhere. The breakdown of practically all the Bourses caused enormous sales here ; therefore, naturally, the securities which showed the heaviest fall in prices were the favoiirites of the Bourses, notably Canadian Pacific Railway shares, Brazil- ian Traction stock, and the various Foreign Gov- ernment stocks held by international operators. During the course of a few days the new Austrian 4i per cent, loan fell 13, Hungarian bonds in the .same period losing from 2 to 8J points, but the collapse in Canadian Pacific Railway shares indicated more remarkably the complete de- moralization of markets generally, when deal- ings in a security so universally held as " Canadas " are were reported within the space of a few minutes at a difference of $9 in the price. In order to give a clear indication of the course of events in the Stock Exchange during the eventful week which culminated on the morning of Friday, July 31, when the Committee decided to close the House indefinitely, it is necessary to outline very briefly the daily occurrences which led up to this decision. On Friday, July 24, the Stock Exchange opened in a very depressed manner as advices from Paris indicated that the market there was in a condition approaching panic, and the state of affairs on the other Continental Bourses was equally unsatisfactory, so that dealers took the precaution to mark down prices all round in anticipation of sales. While Continental operators proceeded to effect heavy realizations with a view to a reduction of their engagements, the stocks thus offered did not find ready buyers, particular weakness naturally being shown by all securities susceptible to foreign influences. The next day foimd the Berlin Bourse wildly excited and the selling continued unabated. Per- sistent rumours were circulated with regard to the position of German banks of high standing and great apparent wealth. Then came the definite announcement of the break- down of the Ulster conference which had been sitting at Buckingham Palace, and in passing it may be noted that for several days previously a nervous feeling had been caused as to the solution of the Ulster problem, although it was not until the publication of the Austro-Huii garian ultimatum to Servia, quickly followed by the interposition of Russia, that the un- easiness became acute and took on some of tlio THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 179 qualities of panic. Mark(!ts then reelod iindor two simultaiioons strokes of throatonod disiistor, and prices foil before the pressure of real and speculative offers of stock. It has to bo borne in mind that, unfortunately, the blow fell on markets already rendered timorous, not only by the Ulster question but by the prolonged trouble in Mexico, and the uneasiness caused by the financial difficulties in Brazil. Saturday, July 25, was a veritable " Black Satiu-day." Demoralized by the European crisis the feeling was one of the deepest depres- sion, and conditions generally were reminiscent of those which niiirkod the outbreak of the Balkan War in October, 1912. Every market in the Stock Exchange was impartially iiit by the prevailing pessimism, investment securities as well as the speculative descriptions being drawn into the vortex of the debacle ; no market escaped the shrinkage in values, which aifected all alike and ranged from Consols to rubber, oil, and mining shares. The fear of a possible European conflict had already affected the Money Market, so that the firmer tendency of discount rates was also a minor factor in the collapse. Those with capital available, which they were prepared to lock up until the trouble was over, showed their courage by acquiring the best class of gilt-edged securities at the time when Consols were falling by points in a fashion without precedent so far as thi' memory of the oldest members of the Stock Kxchang(» went. On the following Monday the bie coljapso in prices which had taken ploco during the previous week-end was followed by a further decline, any hopes that had been ontertainetl that markets would rally being completely shattered, as heavy selling from all quarters absolutely demoralized the House. Mar.y job- bers soon declined to " inake prices " at all, or at any rate insisted on It^timing which way a broker wished to deal before quoting a price. Others made very wide quotations, so wide in fact as to check the desire to enter into a bargain in all but the most determined sellers. This was the general carry-over day, and matters were made worse by the discovery that facili- ties in connexion with the carry-over were being: curtailed in that foreign institutions which were in normal times lenders of largo sums of money were withdrawing it. The withdrawal of this enormous amount of money by the foreign banks cansed serious embarrass- ment to many who had counted on the usual facilities being granted. But the joint-stock banks lent every assistance, with the result that rat«s of continuation* at the last carry- over before the Stock Exchange closed were a •That is. the rates raid by specul'itive buyers for tlie privilege of postltoning payment of the purdiase pritw until the following settlement. SCENE IN THE CITY DURING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. ISport and Gtneral 180 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. mere J per cent, heavier than at the previous settlement. Covering a period of exceptional anxiety the 19 day account thus came to an end. The differences to be met by speculators having accounts open for the rise had reached app>alling proportions, the trend of prices practically throughout the account having been in the downward direction. To mention a few of the differences which hsA to be met. Canadian Pacific Railway shares made up 22J points lower. There wore falls of 11 J in South-Eastern Railway Deferred stock \\5\ in Baltimore and Ohio ; 13J in Brazilian Traction stock ; 10 in Buenos Aires and Pacific Railway Ordinary ; 8J in Rio Tinto shares ; and 7 J in Peruvian Corporation Preference stock. Some of these securities had been pressed for sale by weak Continental holders in inconveniently large quantities. The financial position here was then found to have been aggravated by the above-mentioned with- drawals of credit by the foreign banks, and as many operators were then feeling the full effect of these withdrawals, the result was further persistent selling for cash of such securities as Canadian Pacific and Union Pacific shares and Brazilian Traction stock. There appeared to be a fair amount of investment buying of gilt-edged stocks and certain Home Railway securities, although the purchases effected were not of sufficient magnitude to absorb the liquidation sales, all stock which could not be contangoed* being thrown on the market regardless of price. The dealers in the Foreign market were now flatly refusing to make prices, and there was a general marking down of quotations throughout the list. But with it all the solidity displayed by London was in marked contrast to the weakness of the Conti- nental Bourses, several of which had by this time entirely ceased business, thus throwing the whole burden of absorbing sales made by embar- ra.ssed holders of international securities on this market. Masses of stock usually held abroad were offered in London, and the way in which it was taken was highly creditable to the Stock Exchange. The sales were only effected at considerably lower prices than were ruling even a week earUer, but the remarkable fact was that such big blocks of securities were taken at all by a single market, which was not merely deprived of the assistance which in normal times the more important Bourses are able to give in holding existing issues and financing new ones, but was compelled to •When stock cannot l»e coutangoe<l it means that the speculator who han hought It cannot iwstlionc payment for It even by pnyliiK a iat« o( continuation. Jle has to pay the purclinse price at the settlement. take up large amounts previously held in Paris, Berlin, and other centres. In spite of the formidable dimensions of the differences which had to be met, the Stock Exchange completed the settlement on Wednesday, July 29, without any serious disaster, and even with fewer small casualties than had been expected. When allowance was made for the unexampled conditions under which business had to be con- ducted during the week, experienced men had no hesitation in declaring that the general state of the stock markets was sound and even healthy. A good many people had had doubts as to whether the Stock Exchange would be able to stand the enormous strain placed upon it by the breakdown of practically all the Continental markets. Nine failures, involving 20 members in all, were announced, though it was known that a number of other firms were not at the moment in a position to meet their differences. On Thursday, July 30, the London Stock Exchange opened for its last session. During the first two hours no attempt was made to transact business, and, needless to say, such a thing had never happened before within the recollection of the oldest members. Though the feeling was one of deep dejection, there weis nothing in the nature of panic, simply be- cause there were no dealings. While several failures had been announced, only two of the suspensions were important, but many cheques were held over in the hope that the clients of the firms concerned might be in a position to settle their differences later. During the closing hours it was again possible to deal with a fair amount of freedom, and in view of all the circumstances the whole of the markets displayed a quite commendable amount of steadiness. Much gratification was expressed at the manner in which New York had with- stood the avalanche of selling on Conti- nental account. To some extent the em- barrassed sitxiation in Paris arose out of the fact that financial institutions there were loaded up with a large accvimulation of short-dated se- curities created in the previous year in order to fuiance Turkey and the Balkan States. In London conditions were aggravated by the fact that the collapse occurred on the very eve of the settlement. When it became known that the Paris Bourse had postponed its settlement for a month fears were first entertained that the London market might have to be closed. The Committee of the London Stock Exchange met very early on the morning of Friday, July 31, and decided not to open at all. Had this drastic step not been taken there was the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 181 SCENE AT THE BANK OF ENGLAND certainty that as the result of the speculative transtictions entered into between the previous settlement and the date of suspension of busi- ness, and which involved huge sums in the shape of differences to be met at the mid- August account, there would be many more than the comparatively few failures that were actually announced at the end- July settlement. In all markets there was an over-weighted accoxmt which had to be liquidated. For a considerable time previously the public had been selling stocks on the London market, until it had got far more than it could digest. Consequently many of the dealers were overloaded at the moment when the blow fell. Then it also became impossible to obtain remittances from Berlin or Vienna in payment for the stock sold to those markets. Closing prices given in the Official List of .July 30 were in many instances purely nominal, as the dealers decided not to alter them, thougli the bargains marked, which of course repre- sented actual business, were usually effected at well below the current quotations. Having ordered the House to be closed, the Committee at once announced that the fort- nightly settlement and also the monthly settle- ment in Consols had been postponed. At all the provincial stock exchanges business auto- matically came to an end. On Monday, July 27, business was offi- cially recorded in Consols for cash at 73, 72, 71, 72^four consecutive bargains in Consols showing a movement of £1 between each deal never before having l)een recorded. By the DURING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. [Daily Graphic. time the House closed there had been dealings reported down to 69j. Not since 1821 had the quotation fallen below 70. The closing of the London Stock Exchange \\as preceded by that of the Continental Bourses. Rmnours of the coming war had affected the Continental markets quite early in July. On July 13 the Vienna market was described as having become quite demoralized by the fear of hostiUties. Now and then, in the early part of the month, these rumours reached the London market, and though the seriousness of the posi- tion was realized there was no general inclina- tion to take a pessimistic view of the outlook. Thus, while the Viemia market was depressed the more important centres remained com- paratively calm, except the Berlin Bourse, which was rendered more susceptible to the adverse political reports from Vienna in consequence partly of persistent liquidation from local and Austrian sources. Moreover, Germany Ls Austria-Hungary's cliief moneylender, the Austrian and Hungarian Government loans, the Bosnian loan, and Vienna and Budapest loans being held in Germany to the extent of over £200,000,000 ; and the heavy fall on the Vienna Bourse naturally unsettled the holders of these securities. That the dread of war wa.s seriously exercising the minds of financiers and business men on the Continent before the Austro-Servian crisis passed into aa acute stage has been demonstrated since. For instance, a Paris correspondent pointed out that a war clause was inserted in the contract for the 182 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Bulgarian loan, providing for its cancellation i£ a European war broke out between the date of its signature and the time fixed for the emission of the two series of the loan. A little before the presentation of the ulti- matum to Servia the Vienna Bourse developed marked weakness, which was attributed to hquidation by those who were reported to be conversant with the terms of the Avistrian Xote. Berlin was sympathetically affected, and later, when the terms of that diplomatic document became known, other markets lost tlieir equanimity. Prices tumbled quickly under pressure by speculative holders anxious to sell what stocks they had bought and weio not in a position to pay for. As the political tension increased the pressure to sell grew more pronounced, and very soon all markets became demoralized. On Monday, July 27, the day before the declaration of war by Austria, the panic in Vienna was such that the Bourse was ordered to be closed imtil Thursday, Jvdy 30, but as subse- quent events showed it was destined to remain closed indefinitely. Curiously enough the posi- tion in Berlin on that day improved, and there was some buying of German and Russian bank shares. The Bourse, however, remained very unsettled ; for though it was confidently believed that the large banking institutions would in their own interests endeavour to prevent any further heavy fall in prices, German capitalists were naturally alarmed at the prospect of a country in which they had considerable interests de- claring war. The Brussels market, too, seemed to have be- come rather alarmed, for it immediately followed the lead of Vienna, ceasing operations on July 27, and the Paris Coulisse, or outside unofficial market, suspended operations on the same day. On Tuesday, July 28, before the declaration of war by Austria had become known, business in Paris and Berlin and the lesser German markets had become very difficult to transact. Dealings were often a matter of negotiation. A great many stocks were unquoted on the Paris official market, wliile Berlin was wildly excited, grave fears being entertained as to difficulties at the Settlement. On the following day, July 29, all account dealings in Berlin were suspended transactions being confined to cash bargains. The Amsterdam and Petrograd Bourses were entirely closed that day ; while on Thursday all markets suspended business, except Berlin, Paris, and New York, but the Settlement in Paris, fixed for July 31, was postponed. Busi- ness on the Berlin Bourse was ordered to come to a standstill on PViday, though the Bourse was kept open. The Paris market remained open, though on that day, July 31, only six quotations were available out of some sixty stocks and shares usually quoted. The New York Stock Exchange had the mis- fortune to be open on Tuesday, July 28, when the news of the declaration of war by Austria- Hungary against Servia first became known, and as the European centres were then closed the American market had accordingly to withstand the first flood of selling which developed as a result of that declaration. Heavy liquidating oi'ders came from Eiu-ope, and Wall-street seethed with excited crowds. Large blocks of stock were flung on the market to be realized at any price, and every fresh fall in quotations had the effect of increasing the pressure rather than of alleviating it, as fresh selling limits were thereby uncovered, bringing out further stock wliich had been left with brokers to bo sold should the price descend to a certain level. By the end of the session it was found that transac- tions had for the first time this year reached a total of considerably over one million shares. The liquidation from Europe was heavy, but less so than it might have been if the demoralized state of the sterling exchange had not restricted transactions with London. On Tviesday the Toronto Stock Exchange was closed after having been open for ten minutes, so great was the rush to sell, and business in Montreal was suspended in the afternoon, a result which tended to in- crease the pressure in New York. Some support was forthcoming on Wednesday, July 29, but the tendency to recover was offset by heavy selling from Paris of Copper shares, and from Berlin of Canadian Pacific and Baltimore and Ohio shares. The behaviour of Wall-street was commend- able throughout this trying period. On July 30, the last working day, violent declines occurred, and it is doubtful whether such a perpendiciilar fall in prices had ever taken place before. Euro- pean holders of American securities who desired to liquidate had no other market open to them^ and accordingly sent their orders to New York, and these were of such volume that together with the home business they almost ovei"whelmed the market. Nevertheless, there was a market at all times down to the close, but on Friday the authorities decided to follow the lead of London and to close the exchange until further notice. The Paris Bourse was the cnly stock :narket to keep open its doors after Thursday, July 30. But unlike the Stock Exchange here the Paris market is vmder the direct control of the Govern- ment. Its seventy members, agents de change, as thev are called, are under the disciplinary rule THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP,. 1S3 WALL STREET, NEW YORK. \Und4ncood a»J U luUrvtioJ, erf the Minister of Finaiicu ; and tlio authority ol>tainable, but on that day, owing presumably of the Government was, no doubt, responsible to the near approacli of the German invaders to for the Bourse being kept open. Down to the French capital, the authorities decided to September 2 a few quotations were frequently close the Bovirse until further notice. 18): THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. s o s II II is CO E g II a-? (4 HHfj^^^^^^^^^Hlj^^^HCv -Mtl^^^BK ' ^^^S^^HPIIi^ ,-.agT.:' 1 Hib ^^^^^■^^^^^^■^ o 3 a d -. O H U O CO i> oM Maco ^ 2 5 OS < I CHAPTER XII. BRITISH COMMERCE, SHIPPING, AND WAR FINANCE. The State Insurance Scheme — Speech bv the Chancellor ok the Exchequer — Agree- ment WITH the War Insurance Clubs — Rates Charged for Hulls — The War Risks Office FOR Cargo — The First Premium Quotation- — Subsequent Reductions — The Open Market — I^osses of Underwriters — German Mines and Neutral Shipping — State Insurance Schemes IN France, United States, and New Zealand — Captures of German Vessels — British Ship.s IN German Ports — German Liners Detained at New York — Proposed Purchase by United States Government — Admiralty Statement on Trade Routes — Additional Freight Chaboss — Chartering on the Baltic — Attempts to Preserve German Shipping Connexions — Offer to British Owners — Chartering of Norwegian Vessels — The Maintenance of British Oversea Commerce — Effects on Trade — Labour Statistics — Bankers' Clearing House Returns — Sugar Supplies — Advances in Iron and Steel — Cotton Trade Disorganized — Woollen Industry and Khaki Orders — Financial Position in the United States — British Government Finance. SPEAKING in the House of Common.s on August 4 the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer said it was vital that in order that we sliould have an uninterrupted supply of food and material our trade should go on during the time of war an it did in the time of peace. The Government was perfectly convinced that by the powerful aid of the British Navy, supplemented by a scheme of this kind (State War Insurance), that vital object of our people could be secured. On Bank Holiday August 3, there had been issued as a White Paper the report of a sub- committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the insurance of British shipping in time of war. This report had been under con- sideration for months previously, and in normal circumstances would probably have been issued for public discussion and detailed consideration during the late summer and autumn months. The sub-committee consisted of the Right Hon. F. Huth Jackson (in the chair). Lord Inch- cape, Sir A. Norman Hill (the secretary of the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association), Sir Raymond Beck (deputy-chairman of Lloyd's), and Mr. Arthur Lindley (a well- known average adjuster). In the emergency it was decided to put the scheme into opera- tion at once. The scheme was divided into two parts dealing respectively with the war insurance of hulls and of cargoes. That part which dealt with hulls was largely in- fluenced by the fact that during recent years the insurance of steam.ships against war risks had largely been transferred from underwriters to mutual insurance associations or clubs. There were three principal associations of this kind in existence at the time, namely, the North of England Protecting and Indemnity Associa- tion, the London Group of War Risks Associa- tions, and the Liverpool and London War Risks Insiu-ance Association. Of these the last two had only been formed during the past two years, and the total values insured in the tliree associations amounted to about £87,000,000. These clubs only covered the vessels against the war risks which were specifically excluded from the ordinary marine policies, and then, only 185 186 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. provided cover of a limited natvire. Thus, they only covered vessels actually at sea or in an enemy's port on the declaration of war or on the outbreak of hostilities imtil their arrival at a British or neutral port. It was apparent that one main effect of this scheme would be to keep vessels in port, a result wliich, in the interests of British commerce, was altogether short of the requirements. But the existence of these clubs supplied a foundation on which the Government scheme could be built. In virtue of a special agreement between the clubs and the Government the clubs agreed to continue the protection of their policies until comple- tion of the voyage, 80 per cent, of the risk to be insured with the Government and 20 per cent, to be retained by the clubs. For the voyages still to be completed no premium was to be levied on the owners of the vessels, but for subsequent voyages a premium was to be charged, such percentage not to exceed a maximum of 5 per cent, or to be less than 1 per cent. As under the cargo in- surance scheme only cargo in vessels entered in one of the approved clubs could be insured most of the owners entered their vessels in the flubs within a very short time of the outbreak of war. At first rates on hulls of IJ per cent, for the single voyage and 2^ per cent, for the round, voyage were charged ; then in the middle of August it was decided that vessels might be covered for a period of three months for a liremium of 2| per cent. At the beginning of September premiums for the single and round voyages were reduced to 1 and 2 per cent, respectively and the rate for tlie three montlis' policy was reduced to 2 per cent. The further important concession was made that a ballast voyage not exceeding 800 miles in length might be treated as part of the following voyage.* The finance of the scheme rested on the hypothesis of a loss of nearly 10 per cent, of the value of British steamers which on the outbreak of war and for six months thereafter were at risk. The State's share of tlie total losses of hulls incurred without premium was estimated at £3,460,000 and that incurred against premiums £4,907,000. A feature of the scheme was that ships so insured should \mder- take, as far as possible, to carry out the orders of the State through the clubs in regard to their routes, ports of call, and stoppages. "Tnis meant that owners could insure their vessels to a loading port and thence onwards to the final port of discharge at a premium of 1 per cent., instead of having to cover them for a period of threj ni:inths at 2 per cent. SIR SAMUEL EVANS PRESIDING OVER THE FIRST PRIZE COURT SINCE THE CRIMEAN WAR. iBanati. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. is: 'I'ho arrangomonts connocUd with tlio h\ill insurances were outside the province of tho War Risks Insuranco Office and wore carri(>(l out between the chil..« and tlio Board of Trade. Tlio second part of the scheme provided for tlie institution of the Government War Kisks Insurance Office to undertake the insuranco of cargoes limited to the case of cargoes carried in British vessels insured against war risks with approved clubs. Estimates of the values of cargoes were necessarily problematical, but in preparing the scheme the Committee suggested that the value of the cargo lost in the steamers which it had assumed might be seized or cap- tured by the enemy would be £8,000,000. Taking the figures for losses of hulls given above, the grand total of the State's share of estimated losses on hulls and cargoes within six months, without allowing for premiums received, would thus be £16,367,000. It was recom- mended that the maximum rate to be cliarged on cargo should bo five guinejxs por cent, and the minimum rate one guinea per cent. On Tuesday, August 4, tho Chancellor of the Ex- chequer described in the House of Commons the double scheme for the insuranco of hulls and cargoes in tlie speech to which wo liave referred above. At 2 p.m. on the following day, August 5, the Government War Risks Insurance Office opened its doors for cargo business and an- nounced that until further decision the rate of insurance would be five guineas per cent. The able manner in which the authorities had arranged within two or three days for the complete inauguration of the scheme deserves recognition. The management rested with an expert Advisory Board, whose names are given below,* with Mr. Douglas Owen as chairman. During the first afternoon the office was mainly engaged in answering inquiries. But tho more fact that it was pre]3ar.'d to accept risks at a maximum rate of five guineas per cent, as a maximum had a wonderfully steadying effect on commerce. The office, in accordance with the terms of the scheme, was not accepting risks on vessels actually at sea when war broke out, and therefore high rates, such as 15 or 20 per cent., had to be paid for insuranco on tliese in the op; n market. Arrangements were soon made, however, for an extension of the system •Mr, Dou2hw Owen (Chairman) ; Sir Ktlward Reaiichaiiip. M.P.: Sir Raymond IJeck (l)eputy-CUairman of Lloyd's) ; Sir .Macljenzic Chalmera. K.C.B., C.S.I. : Sir Algernon Firth ; .Mr. W. K. Ilar- greavea (C. T. BowTing and Company, Limitcil) ; Mr. E. G. llannan. C.IJ. ; Mr. H. T. Hines (Koyal Kxchange As-surance) ; Lord Inelicape. a.C.M.G.. K.C.S.I.. K.C.I.E. ; Sir Henry .lolmson ; Mr. K. B. Lemon • The Marine Insurance Company) ; Mr. .\rthur Litidley : Sir John Luscombe : Mr. 11. A.. Ogilvie (late Alliance Assurance Com- oany) : Mr. W. Klchanls ; Jiear-.\dmiral Sir E. Slade. K.C.I.E.. .v.C.V.O. : Mr. J. 11. Warrack; Mr. J. A. Webster; .Mr. Walter Carter (secretaryi. SIR SAMUEL EVANS. The President of the Admiralty Division. U- Rusull & Sons. to enable the Office to accept insurances a.s from the time that vessels at sea arrived at a port of calj. Vessels could thus be insuretl from the time that they left, say, an Australian port for the United Kingdom and also from a South American port of call, such as Montevideo or Rio de Janeiro ; but vessels at some pomt in the ocean between Australia and South America could not be insured. Where owners desired to cover cargo from such points it was necessary to apply to imderwriters and jiay market rates. On Saturday, August 8, the Government rate was reduced to four guineas per cent., on Tuesday, August 18, to tlu«e guineas per cent., and on Tuesday, September 1, to two guineas por cent. Throughout August an immense amount of business was placed, and the influence of the scheme in main- tahiing commerce was incalculable. Merclianta tlirpughout the world knew that the highest rat< they would be called upon to pay would Ijt limited to five guineas per cent, as a maximum and they could conduct their business ac- cordingly. Private underwriters felt that in order to attract business they must offer oven lower terms than those of the Government, and trade benefited thereby. At various times there were certain areas deemed by the Govern- ment inadvisable for shipping, and such risks had of necessity to be offered in the market. 188 THE TIMES HISTORY Olf THE WAR. At a certain period of the hostilities cargo in a number of vessels from the Baltic was thus covered at a rate of 10 guineas per cent. Such losses as there were at first apjjeared to fall on the open market. There was the seizing of the British steamer City of Win- chester off the East African Coast, while homeward bound from Calcutta with a valuable cargo of tea and other Indian produce, which was at sea when war broke out ; the sinking of the British steamer Hyades off the South American coast while homeward bound to Rotterdam from the Plate with grain, with a cargo believed to be insured in (Jennany ; the sinking of the Kaipara off the Canaries while heavily laden with New Zealand produce ; and the sinking of the Nyanga in the same locality on a voyage from West Africa. Xhesi> two latter vessels fell a prey to the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, well-known as a North Atlantic liner of the Norddeutscher Lloyd and con- verted when hostilities broke out into an armed merchant cruiser. Happily the German vessel was herself sunk later by His Majesty's Ship Highflyer. The British steamer Holmwood was sunk, while outward bound to the Plate with coal, by the German cruiser Dresden ; and the British steamer Bowes Castle was also sunk off the South American coast, while bound from Chile to the United States with nitrate believed to be owned in America, by the German cruiser Karlsruhe. . The Wilson liner Runo while bound from Hull for Archangel struck a mine in the North Sea on September 5, and f oimdered. Many trawlers and neutral ships were sunk by German mines strewn indiscriminately in the North Sea. How severely neutral vessels suffered is shown by the following list of vessels which struck mines and foundered. NETJTEAL VESSELS SimK BY MINES. Date. Vessel. NAnoNALm. Aw. 8 Tysla Norwegian .. 28 Maryland Danlah .. 23 Chv. Brobem Daniah .. 23 Alloe H. Dutch .. 23 Hoatdijk Dutch .. 27 SkiUi FSKoU Danish .. 27 Gottfried Norwegian .. 27 Ena Danish .. 27 Gaea Danish Sept. 2 St. Paul Swedish A scheme of war insurance on hulls and cargo somewhat similar to the British plan was adopted by the French Governnaent in the middle of August, and State war insurance schemes were also introduced by the United States and New Zealand Governments All, like the British system, had as their object the maintenance of the overseas trade of the respec- tive countries. SIR JOHN SIMON, The Attorney-General. ILalayette, Dublin. The London Marine Insurance Market was one of the few important markets which were very active during the first weeks of the war. Apart from war insm-anoe, a good deal of busi- ness was brought to London through the collapse of the German insurance centres. In the years preceding the war German offices had been very enterprising, and had collected large premium inconxes as the result, to a con- siderable extent, of cutting rates. These offices had branch establishments or agencies in this country, and it had been maintained that there were sufficient funds held here to meet all claims that might be expected to fall on the offices. But in some instances after the outbreak of war the German agents reinsured their accounts wholesale with British office's, while in others brokers them- selves hastened to effect fresh insurances in British offices for their clients. Comparatively high rates had to be paid, not merely because British underwriters realized that they were being made a convenience of, but also because, owing to increased risks of navigation, all rates had advanced since the war began. Thus many British firms which before the war broke out had been accepting German policies pro- bably found their choice expensive. British Fire Insurance offices had large reinsurance contracts with German com- panies, and the value of these during the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 189 period of the war was considered problematical. In spito of the few captures already recorded British shipping services were maintained, while German merchant vessels did not ■dare to venture out of port. During the first few days of the war large numbers of German steamers were seized in British ports or wore captured at sea. On September 4 the first Prize Court since the Crimean war, 60 years ago, was held in Admiralty Coijrt II. for the hearing of the cases. Sir Samuel Evans, the President of the Probate, Divorce, ana Admiralty Division, presided, and after a simple ceremony the Attorney-General ■(Sir John Simon, K.C.) gave a short account of ■the history of the Prize Court. Then two cases were hoard. The Coiu-t directed that the •German barque Cliile, seized at Cardiff, should be detained imtil further order and the ship Perkeo, captured off Dover by H.M.S. Zulu, was condemned. As a small set-off against the Harge numbers of German vessels seized in British ports about two dozen British vessels were seized in Hambiu-g and other German ports. A suggested agreement between Ger- many and Groat Britain respecting similar •treatment for each country's vessels failed to be reached, though later a reciprocal arrangement between the A\iatro-Hvmgarian Government and this country was accepted, and the vessels which had arrived at enemy ports before the declaration of the war or without knowledge of the war were allowed so many days within which to return to their own country. Much attention was directed at the out- break of the war to the interrupted voyage of the Norddeutscher Lloyd liner Kronprinzessin Cecilie, known as " the gold ship." The liner left New York on July 28 with £2,000,000 in gold for London and Paris, largely insured in London. It was thought that the vessel might attempt to make the passage direct to Bremerhaven and that complications about the gold might ensue ; but on August 5 the liner put back to Bar Harbour, Maine. The passengers and the gold were dispatched thence to New York. A vessel of the same name belonging to the Hamburg-Amerika fleet was seized at Falmouth. Some uneasiness similar to that felt for the Norddeutscher Lloyd liner was expressed on account of other liners, British and French, which were bound from New York for Europe with large consignments of gold ; but each vessel safely reached port. The Lusitania, strangely enough, made her slowest passage from New York to THE MARIE LEONHARDT, a German vessel, captured in the Port of London, being unloaded. \AllUTi. 190 THE TIMES HISTORY UJf' THE WAIi. THE OCEANIC. Wrecked off the north coast of Scotland. [Spari and General. Liverpool owing to the breakdown of a turbine and after sighting a destroyer made the voyage with lights out. Other vessels had exciting passages. The Kronprinz Wilhelm, of the Norddeutscher Lloyd fleet, left New York on August 3 heavily laden with coal, and it is believed acted as collier to the German cruisers which were at largo in the Atlantic. Numerous German vessels were detained at New York, notably the Vaterland, Amerika, George Washington, Barbarossa, Pennsylvania, President Grant, and Grosser Kiirfurst. Offers were mado to purchase some of the flamburg-Amorika vessels and a proposal was set on foot that the United States Government should acquire a number of the German liners. Opposition was at once started among certain sections of the United States public, and it is understood that the French Government pro- tested against the proposed purchase as involving a breach of neutrality. The sailing of the Imperator, which was to have left Cuxhaven for New York on August 1, svas cancelled, and the giant liner remained in port. On August 12 a notable announcement was made by the Admiralty describing the steps which had been taken to ensure the safety of British shipping. They stated that at the request of the Fort ign Office they had considered attentively the position of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, with the intention of so concerting naval measures as to protect British trade with those countries. They had dispatched a large number of mobilized cruisers to their stations commanding the trade routes, nearly trebling the superior cruiser forces there. Twenty-four British cruisers, besides French ships, were searching for the five German cruisers known to be in the Atlantic. A number cf fast merchant vessels, fitted and armed in British naval arsenals, were being commissioned by the Admiralty for the purpose of patrolling the routes and keeping them clear ol German commerce raiders. " With every day that passes," the annovincement continued, " the Admiralty's control of the trade routes,, including especially the Atlantic trade routes, becomes stronger. Traders with Great Britain of all nations should therefore continue con- fidently and boldly to send their ships and cargoes to sea in British or neutral ships, and British ships are themselves now plying on the Atlantic Ocean with almost the same certainty as in times of peace. In the North Sea alone, where the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately and where the most formidable operations of naval war are pro- ceeding, the Admiralty can give no reassur- ance." Yet it may be noted that as regards the North Sea the trade had very largely reasserted itself, since as from August 10 coal shipments to Norway were permitted and there had been a resumption of the mail and passenger services to Northern Europe. Following this official announcement the International ]\Iercantile Marine Company an- nounced the immediate departure of four liners from New York for this country. Although British services were maintained shippers were at first, at any rate, asked to pay very much higher freights. Some lines, which had advanced their rates by as much as 50 per cent., within a month reduced the increases to 2& per cent., and then reduced them further to 20 per cent. As reasons for the formidable increases they pointed out that the insurance of the hulls wa.i a serious burden and that bunker coals were costing more. But when a reduction of the war premiums on hulls was made owners in the Australasian and South American trades announced an immediate reduction in freights to meet the new situation. These movements of rates related of course to the regular lines. Although no official intimation was made beyond that contained in the an- nouncement reproduced above, it may be- assumed that many vessels were acquired by or chartered to the Admiralty either for the patrolling of trade routes or for transport purposes, and the removal of these vessels from their regular trades naturally involved adjust- ments in services. On the Baltic, where tramp cargo tonnage is dealt in, business was at first brovight practi- cally to a standstill. The main difficulty was- financial. Cargoes of grain are bought largely on the strength of drafts, and as credit was very seriously curtailed during the first few days oJ the war there were few, if any, dealings. Gradu- ally, however, the position improved through- out August, and early September found quite THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 1»1 a fair amount of activity. Rates before tlio war wore on a very low level, owing to the superabundance of tonnage, and the situation was aggravated when many contracts were broken in consequence of the war and vessels were thus liberated. Owners complained that tlie low rates did not meet the expenses, swollen as they were by the additional costs of the war, and it was not until there was some hardening of rates that owners showed much inclination to transact new business. Charter- ing of tramp tonnage by the Government for coal and other purposes was probably a favourable factor in stiffening freights. But if there were certain inconveniences in carrying on British trade German shipping came to a standstill. Various efforts were made by German agents in neutral countries to coiLserve their interests. Those attempts were specially notable in the United States, where German agents tried to come to an arrangement with British lines to carry on their business for .them during the war, and then organized a service from New York to South America under the N'orwegian flag. British vessels were wanted for the trade partly because of the protection given by the British Navy and partly because the British Government's scheme of cargo in- surance was only available for goods shipped in British vessels insured against war riskii with approved British clubs. No doubt inducements were offered to British companies to step into the breach, but they were not at all disposed to accept them. All the working agreement* which had existed between British and German lines before the war natiu-ally camo to an .md, and, with the Continental ports closed, lines sailing under the British, French, Russian, and neutral flags were quite able to take care of the triido that was offering. There was no closing down of British oversea commerce. Trade with North and South America, Austra- lasia, India, and the Far East was maintained, ensuring a supply of foodstuffs and of raw material for the factories. During the first weeks of hostilities it was impossible to furnish much quantitative evidence of the injury that had been done by the war to trade. Some of our best means of measuring the commercial and inoustiial activity of the country were temporarily in abeyance, such as the railway traffic returns, whicli had ceased to bo available after the lines were taken over by the Government on U.S.A. CRUISER TENNESSEE, the "relief" ship with cargo of gold. \ Daily M'rror. 192 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. U.S.A. CRUISER TENNESSEE. Sailors carrying kegs of gold for aid of American refugees. [Daily Mirror, August 5. Other periodical statistics re- specting August were meagre. The market reports and other similar evidence from the various centres of industry are valuable, so far as they go, but do not lend themselves to the presentment of a really adequate survey of the state of industry and trade. The information collected by the Labour Department of the Board of Trade is useful; it showed that the number of people unemployed liad not in- creased so quickly as was feared from the rapid rise in it during the first half of the month. The Board of Trade " figure of unemplojmient," ■which shows the state of the insured trades, was only 4'0 on August 7, but by the 17th it had risen to 5-1, and on August 21 to 5-8; during the next week, however, ended August 28, it only increased to 6-2, and there was practically ' no increase for the week ended September 4. These trades, however, were not sufficiently representative of the whole labour position, though they included several big groups of workmen, especially those engaged in shipbuilding and engineering, as well as the building operatives. The drop in the rate of increase was probably duo to the recent improvement in recruiting — the result of the growing comprehension of the objects of the war by the people generally. In uninsured trades' there was hardly any increase during the last week of August in the number of persons registered as unemployed, which on the 28th was 80,868, and on September 4 their number had fallen to 73,891. Distress was not widespread, and thougl) trades largely engaged in manu- facturing for export, especially the cotton in- dustry, at once were affected, some branches of the clothing trade were benefited by the demand due to the war. The heavy steel trades were active, the branches producing war material for the Government having big orders on hand, and firms and companies which made small arms and articles necessary for naval and military equipment were very busy. The cliief actual evidence of the falling off of general business was the decline in the London Clearing House returns, from wliich, however, too much in the way of inference could not be safely drawn, as owing to the closing of the Stock Exchange the clearings were curtailed by a large mass of transactions which, though economically of importance, do not directly represent industry and commerce. The fol- lowing is a statement of the amounts paid at the London Bankers' Clearing House at the undermentioned dates (OOO's omitted) : — Amount. Inc. or Dec. Weeks ended 1914. 1 1913. Amount. Per (ent July 29 August 5 Augu.st 12 Auiust 19 .. August 26 Septemlier 2 £ 337.450 161.929 187.317 179.421 150,432 155,707 £ 328.280 305.297 274.092 315.412 255.204 324,544 £ + 9.170 - 143.368 - 87.375 - 135.991 - 104,772 - 168.837 + 2-8 - 470 - 81-8 - 43-1 - 410 - 52-0 Total. January 1 to September 2 . . 10,965,273 11,165,445 - 200,172 - 1-8 The total clearings to July 29 showed an in- crease on the corresponding period of 1913 of £440,000,000, or 4J per cent., which was after- wards converted into the decrease shown in the table. The falling off in the country cheque clearing up to the same date was less than 1 per cent. ; these clearings were probably a better test of the decline in the general business of the country than the total. They were as follows for the five weeks ended September 2 (OOO's omitted) : — Amount. Inc. or Dec. Weeks ended 1914. 1913. Amount, | Ter cent. £ £ £ August 5.. 12,059 25.312 - 12.653 - 60-0 August 12.. 30.125 27.778 -1- 8.347 + 30-0 August 19.. 24,157 26,491 - 2,334 8-8 August 20 . . 20.632 22.1B8 - 1.536 6-9 Sei)tember 2 20,010 23,364 - 3,354 - 14-8 The principal grain markets remained open throughout the crisis, although the declaration of war caused considerable nervousness and there was a rush to buy wheat, which advanced at Mark-lane on August 6 about 7s. per quarter, English being offered at POs. per quarter as compared with 37s. before the crisis, and a corresponding advance was paid fir flour. The business, however, was put tlirough without excitement or speculation. Within a few days the market assumed a more normal THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 193 state luxder the influence of the Government war insurance scheme, the reduction in the Bank rate, and the diversion to this country of grain cargoes primarily destined for German and Scandinavian ports. Prices of wheat fell rapidly and settled down to a basis of about 40s. per quarter, though at this level the market remained very firm owing to tiie some- what tardy resumption of Atlantic shipments and encouraging advices from the American markets. Other food products generally wore unduly inflated in price early in August by the anxiety of consumers to lay in stocks. This was checlced by reassuring statements from the Government as to supplies of the principal products both present and prospective, and tlie inflation of prices was prevented on the appointment by the Government of a standing committee of retail traders who fixed from day to day maxi- mum retail prices. The principal articles dealt with were siigar, butter, cheese, lard, margarine, and bacon. The price of sugar, as might have been expected, advanced much more rapidly than other foods. At first cubes sold at as much as 40s. per cwt., as against ISs. per cwt. before the war, but there was a drop from the high figure to about 33s. 6d. per cwt. For about a week the homo refiners withdrew all their offerings from the market in order to protect their stocks while the rush to buy was in pro- gress. There was no serious scarcity of raw sxigar, but the initial difficulty experienced in obtaining supplies of the finished article was duo chiefly to the inability of the British refineries to cope with the extra work thrown upon them by the sudden cessation of the output from Continental refineries. Supplies of sugar were drawn from the West Indies and other 'sources, but it was obvious that those would be by no means sufficient to fill the large gap caused by the loss of imports from the Continent. As regards meat the price remained at a normal level. In fact, September supplies at the principal markets were more than sufficient to meet the demand in spite of a sharp con- traction in shipments from Argentina diu-ing August. Bacon, cheese, and butter also re- turned to almost normal prices consequent on the opening of the trade route from Denmark to tliis country. After the first shock a remarkable change came over the iron trade, which before the war had been suffering considerably owing to keen foreign competition, principally from Germany. Busi- ness was resumed ratlier unexpectedly on the Glasgow warrant market, and prices imme- diately took an upward turn. 1 lie reason for this was the temporary interruption of the import of foreign ores and the complete stoppage of supplies of semi-finished iron and steel from Germany and Belgium, which forced manufacturers to obtain their require- ments from the home markets. Substantial advances took place in the price of iron and steel, wliich adversely afiected business, especially in regard to exports. Another influence which had an injurious effect on export business was the action of shipowners in raising freights from 25 to 50 per cent. Still man .facturers wore receiving orders that would otherwise have gone to the Continent. After the outbreak of war the London Metal Exchange remained closed as far as dealing was concerned, though transactions were on privately ; no prices were available except those fi.xed by the committee of the exchonge. The statistics of copper and tin for July showed no remarkable changes, but copper producers in the United States took measures to curtail the output to the extent of about 50 per cent. The action of the Govern- ment in <ommandeering most of the supplies of spelter in England caused the price of that metal, which is obtained largely from Germany, to be more than doubled. Heavy arrivals from America,' however, considerably I ^^K' tI^^I \ • \ » ' ^M^^^^^^^^^B .^^^^^^^hI 1 ^^^^^^^^^^n ^^v^^IhH U.S.A. CRUISER TENNESSEE landing stranded Americans from France at Weymouth. [Oailv M.rror. 194 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Cdlieved the pituation. Trade requirements of lead were naturally small and there was an adequate supply for armnunition purposes. The cotton trade was thoroughly disorganized, and considerable alarm was at first felt as to the effect on Lancashire, though this subsided with the improvement in the financial situa- tion. Some confidence was also gained from the announcement that the trade route through the Mediterranean to the Far East was open, while it was realized that the cessation of exports of cotton goods from Germany and Austria would divert some business to Man- chester. The first step taken to relieve the situation was a restriction of output of yam and cloth, which was eiTected by the decision of the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' Associations to stop the mills for a period of three weeks. This affected 30 million spindles ; in addition other mills outside the federation announced their intention of falling into line. Dealing on the Liverpool and Manchester Cotton Exchanges was entirely suspended for a few days, and cash transactions only were resumed on a moderate scale after a plan had been arranged by the Liverpool Cotton Associa- tion whereby no cotton should be sold below a minimum price to be fixed by the committee. The scheme was devised solely with the object of safeguarding the interests of importers and consun»ers, and was generally approved by spinners. The liquidation of existing contracts proved to be a difficult task, but machinery was set in motion whereby good progress was made in this direction. Although several Liver- pool firms were badly hit by the slump in prices and the failure of a large New York house con- sequent on the crisis, no financial trouble W£t8 reported at the Settlement held on the Jjiverpool Exchange in the middle of August. Similar conditions prevailed on the New York and New Orleans Exchanges, where dealings in futures were suspended. Three delegates from I..iverpool were sent to New York to discuss the situation, and a scheme was arranged between the two Exchanges for the liquidation of inter- national cotton obligations. The marketing of the American crop was greatly retarded, and a proposal was put forward by the United States Government for advancing funds to growers to enable them to hold their cotton until a more rapid movement was possible. In the woollen industry the loss of the im- portant Continental trade had a serious effect in Bradford and Leeds, where the working hours at the factories had to be greatly reduced owing to the cancellation of orders or indefinite postponement of deliveries. On the other hand, several firms were kept busy on orders for clotliing for the Army, and the Government were urged to distribute their orders among as many firms as possible in order to prevent the closing down of the mills. Prices of the raw material were very little disturbed, though some descriptions required for khaki cloth showed a hardening tendency. The sales in Australia were either postponed or abandoned owing to the absence of European buyers. It was a fortunate circumstance that sea-going commerce in the first weeks of the war was almost free from molestation by German and Austrian war ves.sels. This was especially the case as regards the United States, from which very large supplies of food and other com- modities were expected. From South America, also, valuable imports were obtained, but the poorness of the Argentine harvest curtailed these supplies ; less maize was available from that quarter than in 1913, when the maize crop was magnificent. But a serious obstacle to the further importation of goods came into existence when the war began, in the form of a paralysed sterling exchange market, as already mentioned. Arrangements wore, however, made, with the object of overcoming this, by the Government and the Bank of England on September 4. In an article on the grain situation in Finan- cial America of August 24 the difficulties created by the exchange situation as it appeared at that date were thus discussed : — British and French buyers have shown willingness to cooperate with shippers here to bring about a satisfactory settlement o£ the situation. On account of the almost total paralysis of shipping, which lasted about a week, and the fact that, while improved, the shipping situation is by no means normal as yet, it waa recognized that it might be impossible for sellers in many cases to make deliveries on contract time. Of the 60,000,000 bushels or more wheat under contract in this market tor export, the greater part is for September or October delivery. Buyers were sounded as to whether they would consent to an ex- tension of the time for delivery, anl answers received by the North American Grain Export Association from many buyei-s all indicate that buyers are willing to make every allowance and to grant all the exten- sion necessary. This will go a far way toward elimizLa- ting the need for cancellation of contracts. No shipments can be made to Germany, of course. The occupation of Brussels and the turning of Antwerp into an armed camp will also debar dealers here who have contracts for that port from filling them. Shipments to Rotterdam will also, it is said, be cancelled, as British vessels bearing grain to that port have already been diverted to home ports and shippers are not willing to run further risks of loss in this manner. The disturbance of ordinary business caused by the war was necessarily felt keenly in the United States, owing to its dependence on large amounts of capital from London in order to THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 196 ■carry on the development of the enormous natural resources of the country, its own capital, though increasing yearly, being in- sufficient for the purpose. The indebtediiess of New York to London was largely in short-dated securities, and in normal times there is no difficulty in providing for their renewal on matiu-ity, as British and other Eiu-opean capital- ists are glad to hold such very satisfactorj' paper. But the financial position during the early weeks of the war caused anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic. The leaders of business in the United States were fully aware of the profound change that the war had created in the economic situa- tion all over the world. A country like the United States, which is almost self dependent as regards the necessaries of life, was less affected in some respects than older countries, but the speed of the fiu-ther development of its resources was, for a time, slower than the United States had been accustomed to. An interesting event was the dispatch of the cruiser Tennessee from the United States with £1,600,000 in gold " for the protection of American credit in London." The cruiser, accompanied by the Carolina, arrived at Fal- jnouth on August 16. Officers proceeded to Paris shortly afterwards with £50,000 in gold to meet the immediate needs of Americans in France and to provide for their repatriation. The" initial financial arrangements made by the British Government for meeting the cost of the war were on a very large but not on an unusual scale. The first measure was the voting on August 6 of a credit of £100,000,000. This was promptly made use of by obtaining £9,000,000 of Ways and Means advances from the Bank ; a fiu-ther £5,720,000 . of these advances was taken during the week ended August 15, during which week also tenders were invited (on Friday, the 14th) for £15,000,000 of six months' Treasury bills which were allotted on August 19 at an aver- age discount rate a shade over 3| per cent, per annum. An additional £l,340,000of Ways and Means advances was obtained during the week •ended August 22. In the week ended the 29th another £15,000,000 of Treasury bills were placed (on the 26th) at a shade over 3£ per cent., and £410,000 of Ways and Means advances were received into the Exchequer. Of the second issue of Treasury bills, £10,000,000 were for the purpose of making a loan to Belgium. The total of Ways and Means advances re- ceived during the four weeks ended August 29 was £46,470,000; but as £8,000,000 of such advances were paid oil during the last of those weeks the net amount of Ways and Means debt on that date duo to the war finance was £38,470,000. The revenue got in during this four weeks was £9,975,000, again.st £10,680,000 in the corre- sponding period of 1913. The decrease was £705,000 — a moderate loss, in the circum- stances, even if it were not almost wholly accounted for by a decline of £671,000 in the Death Duties. The only important reduc- tion was £301,000 in stamps, the revenue from which had necessarily suffered from the contraction of trade. It was satisfactory to note that the Customs showed an increa.se of £103,000. As regards expenditure, the issues for supply services for the four weeks ended August 29 amounted to £32,246,000. Dujing the corre- sponding four weeks in 1913 the issues for supply were £9,621,000, so that the known additional expenditure on war in August, 1914, taking what we may call normal outgo for the four weeks at £10,000,000, appears to have been in the neighbourhood of £22,250,000, about £5,550,000 per week. The expenditure was very much greater in the first week thtwi in the others. There was much discussion of the issue of a big loan early in the month of August, but the ease with which Treasury bills were placed, owing to the big mass of money con- trolled by the clearing banks, con\dnced most good judges that issues of similar paper affo rded the British Government its best means of financing its current requirements. After a number of meetings the British Life Assurance offices decided to make no extra charge on the policies of members who might serve abroad in the Territorial Forces, Yeo- manry, or new armies raised during the war, provided that members effected their poUcies when civilians. It had at once been decided that no extra premium should be charged on account of home service. Officers in the Royal Navy afloat or abroad and in the Expeditionary Army who had not paid the ordinary additional rate in peace time for naval or military service were charged an additional premium of £5 Ss. per cent, for the period of the war, and non- combatants were asked to pay an extra rat« of £3 3s. per cent. On new policies of com- batants in the Expeditionary Force the extra rate charged was £7 7s. per cent., and on the policies of non-combatants £5 5s. per cent. Friendly alien combatants were charged an additional rate of £10 10s. per cent. CHAPTER XIII. GERMAN FINANCE. Gebman Indebtedness — A " Levy " on Pbopebty — Internal Stbuctube of Germak Industby and Trade — ^The Test of Wab — ^Was Gebmany Self-Suppobting ?— The German Banks — Mortgages and Cash Reserves — The Morocco Cbisis, 1911 — Financial Position in FiEST Half of 1914 — The War Crisis — Rush for Gold — Suspension of Payments — Apprehen- sions — A Short ob a Long Wab — Extbaobdxnaby Measubes — Impobts Made Feee — Fixing OF Prices — Loan Papeb — War Credit Banks — A German Victory Essential. FOR a good many years before the war Germany's financial position had pre- sented not only Germany but all the world that had dealings with her with a set of problems of extraordinary com- plexity. Most countries had been made pain- fully conscious of the formidable character of German business competition, and every- body was aware of the rapid growth of Ger- many's internal and foreign trade and of the abundant outward evidence of strength and prosperity. On the other hand, she was for ever piling up debt on unfavourable conditions, and repeated political crises showed that she had the greatest difficulty in adjusting her con- stitutional and fiscal systems to the growth of expenditure which was rnainly due to the extravagant demands of hor Army and Navy. " Finance reform " had been again and again the one great problem of German politics. Partial solutions of the problem had been effected only at the cost of great internal upheavals and bitter but indecisive battles between the agrarian and industrial interests, between the reactionary and the " liberal " forces, and indeed between the different States of the Empire. When, in 1913, Germany made the last and enormous addition to her Army, to which reference was made in an earlier chapter of this work, the Imperial Treasury coxild not face another battle about direct and indirect taxation, and had recourse to the simple but medieval method of imposing a direct " levy " on all property on a scale which was expected to produce about £50,000,000. When war broke out the assessments for this " levy " had been made, but not a penny had actually been collected. The " levy " was by its nature war and not peace finance, and one immediate result was that, while other countries, immediately the war began, had recourse to a moratorium, Germany preferred to adopt all sorts of special remedies and precautions, the main reason being that while the Government could not suspend the heavy taxation upon which it was relying, it could not collect the taxes if the people could not collect their debts. Peculiar as was the financial system of the German Empire, not less peculiar was the internal structure of German finance, industry, and trade. There was no doubt that, from having been a proverbially poor country, Ger- many had in a very short time become, statistic- ally, at any rate, a very wealthy one. It was a favourite pastime of German financiers, in the period immediately preceding the war, to com- pile and publish dazzling estimates of the whole national wealth. As nobody in Germany had ever seriously considered the possibility of Germany being defeated in war, the figures were ever fresh incitements to industrial ex- pansion and speculation and also to almost unlimited expenditvu-e on armaments, and yet there was no reason to be sure that .the statistico would ultimately carry more weight in history than the far more stupendous statistics which have often been compiled about the wealth of the Chinese Empire. 190 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 197 THE DECLARATION OF WAR IN BERLIN. Scene in front of the Royal Palace. The course of the war will, however, toll its own tale as regards the general soundness of German calculations. It was sure of neces- sity to change the whole course of German development, and above all to move the founda- tions of German industry and finance. There are only two or three vital points to bear in mind. The first question which war was to answer was to what extent Germany, still and notwithstanding her industrial expansion a very great producer of corn and cattle, wa,s " self-supporting." The second question was to what extent her resources and credit could stand the strain of a war which, as long as the Britisn Navy existed, was sure to close her ports, stop most of her supplies of raw materials, shut down her factories and mills, and test all her reserves. Two things at least wore clear. Germany had retained a wonderfully antiquated system of payments, innocent of the most ordinary cash-sparing devices, cheques being almost unknown to a great part of the population. On the other hand, Germany had developed with extraordinary daring every method of employing all available capital. The German banks, working moreover in the closest possible community, became ever more and more money-lenders and organizers of industry, themselves directly involved in every great industrial and commercial concern in the cocintry, competing eagerly for the deposits which fed these concerns, and encouraging and directing private enterprise in every direction. Jlortgage transactions assumed enormous pro- portions, and even the Prussian savings banks, which held deposits of more than £550,000,000, had more than half of their whole funds in mortgages. Even in peace time the state of the cash reserves of the banks caused grave misgivings, and when war broke out a dis- cussion was proceeding with a view to com- pelling the banks to maintain 10 per cent, of their deposits in cash or bills at the Imperial Bank. At the time of the Morocco crisis, in the autumn of 1911, the German Foreign Office was embarrassed at the critical moment by strong warnings from the German financiers. After the crisis there was a general feeling that Ger- many ought to make more definite financial pre- parations for war. A good deal was indeed done, partly in the directions already indicated, partly by municipal and other local enterprise, wliich paved the way for the measures actually taken when the war broke out, and psirtly by measures — which were helped by the general course of trade and finance — for strengthening the money mtirket. During the spring and early summer of 1914 Berlin was indeed quite abnormally strong, and although it was obvious that the strength was mainly due to the falling off in trade in a country which, as we have seen, employed all available capital to an extra- ordinary extent, the abimdance of money was contemplated with pride by the Emperor and his political advisers, and no doubt affected 198 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR RUN ON A BERLIN BANK. [Topical, their actions. On April 23, for instance, the Imperial Bank return showed increases during the preceding week of more than £2,000,000 in gold and more than £1,000,000 in silver, while the note circulation had been reduced by £6,000,000 and the total note circulation was £22,593,000 below the tax-free maximum. The position remained very strong until the end of the half-year. There was then an un- expectedly large drain on the Bank. The return of June 30 showed, for example, a re- duction of gold by £3,246,000 and a reduction of deposits by more than £10,000,000, while the note circulation increased by more than £30,000,000. During July there was again steady all-roimd improvement. The retiu-n of July 23, the day before the publication of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, showed a large increase in gold and in deposits, while the note circulation had decreased by more than £5,000,000 and was £22,804,000 below the tax- free maximum. The development of the crisis very rapidly changed the aspect of affairs. Between July 23 and July 31, the eve of the declaration of war on Russia, the stock of gold decreased by more than £5,000,000 and the notes in circulation increased by more than £62,000,000. In the course of the next few days the special war legislation which we sha" describe was passed and fundamentally altered the working machinery of the Imperial Bank. The main featiu-e during the next few weeks was an enormous increase in the circuitttion of notes. In the days preceding the war there were all the expected financial phenomena. The German Bourses were kept open for a few days, thanks to the intervention of the banks, but business was practically stopped on July 29. There were very severe runs on the savings banks, especially in places near the frontiers, on July 27 and the following days. There was a great rush on the Imperial Bank of people trying to get gold for paper. Meanwhile, although it was certain then that there would be no moratorium in Germany, traders hastened to annoimce that they would suspend payments, and the great industrial and commercial organizations began to prepare for cooperative action. The general situation in Germany at the outbreak of war can be described as one of t<::mporary financial strength and gtave industrial and commercial appre- hension. It was pretty generally believed that Germany could well stand a short war, but few people cared or dared to think of the possibilities of a long one. It was obvious that, unless disaster befell the British Navy, German ports would practically be closed, and it was evident that, esRept as regarded the manufacture of war material, industry would soon be brought to something like a standstill What Germany had to do wae not so much to attempt the hopeless task of "keeping things going" THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 1U9 CROWDS IN BERLIN CHEERING FOR WAR. ^Topical. a8 to readjust her whole structure to an ex- tremely uncomfortable situation which she could only hope would not endure. The first measiu-e adopted was to authorize extraordinary expenditure to tlie amount of £265,000,000. Loans to the amount of £250,000,000 were to be raised as need occurred, and the Imperial Bank was placed in possession of the stock of gold and silver which Germany had for a good many years stored up as a " war chest." The Imperial Bank was relieved of the obligations to pay a tax on the amount by which its notes in circulation exceeded its stock of cash. Other far-reaching facilities were offered for the covering of the note issue. All paper money was made legal tender, and the bank was relieved of its obligation to give gold in exchange for paper. As for food supplies, all restrictions on im- ports were removed. The local authorities wore given power to fix maximiun prices of food- stuffs, natural products, and fuel, and to compel sales. As we have seen, there was no question in Germany of a general moratorium, and people pointed with much pride to the fact, although the truth was that Germany was not in a posi- tion to introduce a general moratoriujn and had to deal with the situation in other ways. The most important action was in the direction of supplying cash, or rather paper, to anybody and everybody who possessed property of any value. Special loan institutions in connexion with the Imperial Bank were established and authorized to issue special " loan " paper up to a total amount of £75,000,000. They were empowered to grant loans not only on stocks and shares but on non-perishable goods of all Idnds, doing business down to amounts so small as £5. The " loan " paper was given nearly the same status as bank-notes, although the public was not obliged to accept them in payment. One of the main objects of all this was to enable the public to borrow on their existing investments in order to be able to subscribe to the new war loans. In addition to these Government loan esta- blishments " war credit banks " were set up 200 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. in all parta of the country in the course of a few weeks and proceeded to do business especi- ally with small traders and others. By these and similar methods Germany patched up the situation and made it appear fairly tolerable to the ordinary citizen. There was inevitably a great deal of unemployment from the very outset, notwithstanding the fact that almost the whole able-bodied population was in the field. There was also a good deal of distress, but it was perhaps at first due in great part to the dislocation caused by the mobilization and movement of troops. There was want in some places and plenty in others, but there was at the outset little to warn the people generally of the appalling risks of Ger- many's great adventure. The real question was not whether the position was superficially sound, or what was the particular merit of ingenious financial devices. The only real basis of the whole business was confidence in the success of German arms. CHAPTER XIV. THE GERMAN ARMY— 1870-19 14. Traditions of the Army — The New Arms — Literature — Moltke- — His Colleagues — The War of 1866 and its Lessons — 1870 — Prussian Strategy — The Tactical Envelopment — Criticisms — Meckel — Genbkal Effect of 1870 on the Army — The German Constitution — Increases of Strength to 1890 — The Law of 1893 — Further Increases — The Law of 1913 — Application of the Principle of National Service- — Numbers of Trained Men — The Age Factor — Categories of Troops — Ersatz Reserve — First Ban of Landsturm — One-Year Volunteers — Non -Commissioned Officers — Corps of Officers — Paramount Influence of Army on German Society — Territorial Distribution of the Army — " Inspections " — Army Corps — Commanding Officers — Fortresses — The Military Cabinet — Wab Ministry — Finance — Readiness for War — Emigrant Law of 1913. THE rise and decline of armies i.s an aspect of universal history which never fails to interest, and with armies as with States the past has in it the seeds of the future. As it is impossible to understand the character and organization of the formidable enemy opposed to the Allies in 1914 without some knowledge of its develop- ment in the preceding decades, we propose to revert in greater detail to a subject already referred to in Cliapter II. The most natural starting point is the war of 1870-1, at which time the German Army, after a period of laborious evolution, reached a remarkable standard of efficiency. Several factors had contributed to this result. In the fir.--t place, the traditions of the old Prussian Army had been revived by the study of the Seven Years' War. In the second, the traditions of the War of Liberation and the teaching of the school of Biiicher and Gneisenau were still living. In the third, the idea of tmiversal service intro- duced by Schamhorst had been carried to a logical conclusion. Th science of leadership, built up by a long series of distinguished soldiers, culminated in Moltke, who founded a school of which perhaps the most distinguished survivor was Marshal von der Goltz. The great " battle-thinker " found apt pupils amongst the Prussian aristocracy, who formed a military Vol I. Part 6. 201 caste steeped in the precepts of Clausewitz. Full-blooded manhood in Germany manifested itself in military study and military exercises, just as in England at the same period it began to manifest itself in athletics. Among the troops esprit de corps was fostered by a real territorial system by which the men of the soil were gathered together in their own dis- tricts, and were nourished and trained by and among the people to whom they belonged. The Silesiana formed one corps, the Pomer- anians i nother ; the corps leader was a fort of military governor in his own province and the autonomy of the corps was carried to the point of equipping the troops out of local funds. The women were no less enthusiastic than the men. A sickly family " thinking of a coming war deplore the fact that they will have no relations in the Army." The mechani- cal genius of Nicholas Drejse produced the first breech-loading rifle which was sufficiently strong to imdergo the wear and tear of cam- paigning, and Krupp's cannon foundry yielded one of the first rifled breech-loading cannon. The mental activity of officers found vent in books and pamplilets of an astonishing variety and excellence, as, for example, the " Tactical Retrospfct," written by a company com- mander after the war of 1866, in which the defects of the Army as discovered during this 202 THE TIMES HI8T0BY OF THE WAR. THE CROWN PRINCE OF BAVARIA. [£. O. Hoppr. brief campaign were frealy exposed. More remarkable still, the thinker of the 'sixties became the man of action in 1870, avoiding the reproach so often levelled at arm-chair critics. Although since Waterloo the Prussian Army had rested on its laurels, it proved itself a trustworthy and efficient instrument in the hands of its great strategist. The pub- lished works of Moltke show that he had fore- cast almost every military situation that could arise in the case of a quarrel with neighbouring Powers, and his strategical conceptions have formed the starting point of most of the military thought of the past half century. This was very Itirgely due to the fact that he was the first to grasp the potential effects of the railway, the telegraph, and of modem arms on the handling of great armies, and the modifica- tions which these new factors had rendered necessary or desirable in the earlier practice of Napoleon. The view that his strategy was based on different principles to that of the Emperor has been strongly contested ; certainly, so far as their practice was concerned, it would be possible to quote a good deal of evidence in favour of the opposite opinion. That Moltke was not afraid to adopt wide strategic fronts, and relied rather on envelopment than penetra- tion of the hostile front tis the means of victory, was probably due more to the practical changes in the conditions than to divergencies of funda- mental theory. Like all great soldiers he was, as the Germans say, a realist ; and as he said himself, strategy is a matter of " makeshifts," not of hard and-fast system. Moltke was happ>- in his associates, for he had the personal support in the field of King William, and as a general rule he saw eye to eye with Bismarck in questions of State policy, a necessary condition of all effective strategy. He had, moreover, at Ixis disposal that remarkable administrator. Von Roon, who fis Minister for War kept ready sharpened the sword which it was Moltke's business to use. It was, indeed, a galaxy of talent that took the field against the French in 1870 ; Steinmetz, " the lion of Nachod," Prince Frederick Charles, and the Crown Prince of Saxony commanded armies ; Blumenthal, Stiehle, Sperling, and Stosch were the chiefs of the Army staffs ; and amongst the corps leaders were Goeben and Werder, both of whom showed themselves capable of commanding armies, Manteuffel, who had led the Army of the Main in 1866, Fran- secky, the hero of Maslowed, Constantin Alvens- leben, who was to immortalize himself at Mars la Tour, Kirchbach, who had led the famous 10th Division at Nachod, and Skalitz, Tumpling, Zastrow, Manstein, all well-tried as divisional commanders in 1866 ; the Bavarian generals, Hartmann and Von der Tann, and two Prussian generals. Von Beyer and Von Obernitz, the leaders of the Baden and Wurtemberg inde- pendent divisions. Moltke's immediate en- tourage included General von Podbielski, who served as Quartermaster-General, and the three " sous-chefs " of staff, Bronsart, Verdy du Vernois, and Brandenstein ; and it was said that so perfect an understanding existed between them that if one was suddenly called away while drafting an Army order another could take up the pen and finish the document in the spirit of 'ts author. They were, indeed, a " band of brothers." Major Blume, who afterwards com- manded the 15th Army Corps, was chief of the Executive Department, and the present com- mander of the 8th Corps, von Biilow, was then a captain on the staff. Of these members of the General Staff in 1870 two became Ministers of War, six were given command of Army Corps or held the post of Inspector-General, two became generals, and four became major- generals. The German Aimy had the advantage of entering upon the war of 1870 while its experi- ences of war in 1866 were still fresh ; the earlier campaign was, in fact, a much-needed prepara- tion for the later one. The well-known letters of Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe enumerate the prin- cipal changes that were effected within four years to make good the deficiencies that had been discovered in the war against Austria. It was found, for example, that the value of the Krupp gun in 1866 had been insufficiently realized THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 203 IHE CROWN PRINCE OF GERMANY IN THE UNIFORM cji 1 HL UL-ATH'S HEAD HUSSARS. [Ctn'reU NrtDs. through want of tactical training among tlio artillery officers. Kraft, who was a gunner himself — he commanded the artillery of the Prussian Guard Corps — is unsparing in liis con- denuiation of his own arm. He says, " our artillery on almost every occasion entered upon the scene far too late and with'far too small a lumber of guns." Yet they had gone into action with a feeling of absolute certainty that notlung could resist them, for it was considered tliat ten Prussian guns would o\ercome IG Austrian guns, so superior were the former to the latter in point of construction. With regard to the cavalry it had been found that Napoleon's practice had been so far mis- read that the mobile arm was kept in large masses in rear of the Army with the idea that it should be carefully preserved with a view to its possible employment as a reserve on the battlefield, a remark that applies equally to the so-calletl reserve artillen,', which absorbed more than half of the gims of the Army and retained them a day's march distant from the battlefield. Such is the influence. of a mere phrase on the practice of war. The infantn,' alone escaped criticism, as indeed it might, smce it won the decisive battle. In the words of the oflicial lustory " the infantry fought almost alone." But the success of the infantry was largely ascribable to the powerful influence brought to bear on the battle by the intelligence of the nation in arms. 204 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL VON KLUCK. {Record I'ress. A striking instance of the correction on the battlefield of the terrors of peace training may be mentioned. Captain May, author of the " Tactical Retrospect," says : " When tlie needle gun (breech-loading rifle) at the com- mencement of the fifth year of its existence was first generally issued to the troops, a standing order, insisted on by generals who preached at all inspections and parades, was : ' Gentlemen, throw out very few skirmishers — only one section ; that is now as efficient as an old sub-division ; let all the rest be kept well in hand.' Experience, however, soon showed that the exact reverse of these theoreti- cal rules, which appeared so judicious at the time, was the right practice. Above all things, every one sought to give full effect to the efficiency of his trustworthy arm. Why should they be held back ? Why not strike with the full weight of the weapon in their possession ? Thus they all dissolved themselves into a swarm of skirmishers, because in that formation the breech-loader can be best used, and because i t was, besides, sufficiently analogous to a company coliunn, which often stood more than ten deep and fired from all possible-positions. And this would take place not so much at the word of command of their leader (who perhaps could only hear himself from the deafening noise of the guns and small arms) as from a natural consequence of the circumstances in which they were placed." The Army of 1870, then, was the finished article which had been proved iii its rougli state in the furnace of Sadowa. 1870 showed how greatly it hal benefited by its ex- perience. ' The mobilization wa-scanied out un- disturbed by fears for what tlio- entimy might do on the frontier. The concent lation was effected at points which enabled the Supreme Command to defend the whole of 190 miles of frontier while acting in a mass offensively against the enemy's main army, and even the encounters at Spicheren and Worth on August 6, which were spoken of afterwards as hors d'ceuvres and were said to have ruined Moltke's plan for a great battle on the right bank of the Moselle,, proved to be of considerable value in a tactical sense as enabling the troops to test their powers in non-conimittal actions against a foe who was known to be in. possession of a superior fire-arm, the Chassopot. The manner in which all units marched to the soiuid of the cannon showed that the value of co- operation had been thoroughly realized. The artillery, determined to remove the stigma that rested upon their service, came into action ;early -and in mass, and, where necessary, brought their guns up into the firing line to cope with the French rifle and thus cover the advance of their infantry. The German gunners re- ceived their guerdon when the Frencli Emperor, an artillerist himself, remarked after Sedan, " In my artillerj^ I feel^ myself per- sonally conquered." The cavalry had begun to grasp the importance of its strategical mission^ — " Cavalry forward " was an injunction inscribed in .almost every telegram in the early days-of August — apart from its use on the battle- field ; and the infantry, now screened by its cavalry and protected by its artillery, never hesitated to come to close quarters. The higher leading, generally speaking, was extra- ordinarily successful. This was due in the first 'place to Moltke, in the second to the fatviity of the French generalship ; in the third to 'the loyalty with which the different com- manders supported one another. It is com- paratively rarely that we hoar of friction be- tween commanders and staffs, and when it occurred the obstructionist was quickly removed, as -.in the case of Steinmetz. In a general way harmony was preserved by the exercise of tact, of which Verdy du Vernois gives an early example. On July 31 the Crown Prince demurred to an order to advance on the ground that the Third Army was not yet ready for the field. A somewhat peremptory telegram was about to be dispatched from the Royal headquarters when Verdy du Vernois remarked : " I knew THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 205 that staff very well in the last war. If j on wish to create strained relations with them during tlio whole of tliis campaign send it ; but I am perfectly sure that they will be offended, and I think not without some cause. For a good reason there must surely bo for their not yet fixing the date of starting." Moltko re- 1)1 ied, " Well, but how are we to manage it, tlion ? " Vordy then proposed tliat ho should himself go to the Crown Prince's head- quarters and personally explain the need for immediate action. And accordingly he journeyed from Mayence to Speyer, and returned within 72 hours to say that General von Blumenthal, who was the Crown Prince's Chief Staff Officer, had agreed to cross the frontier at Weissenburg on August 4. Prussian strategy in 1870 may be sumuipd up in foiu' aphor:sms : — ( 1 ) that errors in the original assembly of the Army can scarcely ever be rectified during the course of the campaign ; (2) that no plan of operations can with safety go beyond the first meeting with the enemy's main army ; (3) that the only geographical point to be considered is the point where the enemy's main army will be found ; (4) that the enemy's main army is to bo assailed wherever met. The form of strategic attack generally used by Moltke was that called by some the turning movement and by others strategic interception. Bazaine's army was cut off from Paris before battle was delivered at Gravelott« ; and Mac- mahon's army was completely surroimded before it was decisively attacked at Sedan. This form of strategic attack naturally led to that of tactical envelopment on the battlefield ; and as in all the earlier battles, except Mars la Tour, the factor of numerical superiority was on the side of the Germans, the first condition of successful enveloping tactics was secured. For a general to attempt to envelop an army equal in number and quality to his own obviously e.xposes his over-extended line to the danger of being broken by the more compact masses of the enemy. This danger the Germans usually managed to avoid during the campaign of Metz and Sedan, and later on, when with armies inferior in numbers tliey had to oppose the numerous but ill-trained troops of the Bepublic, the superirr quality of their own troops enabled them to adopt breadths of front wliich under other circumstances would have proved disastrous. GENERAL VON HEERINGEN. {Internationa! Itlustralions, The general success of the envelopment m 1870 did not deceive them as to its limitations or as to the necessity of strong reserves. As Von Meckel, the future teacher of the Japanese, pointed out after the war. " depth and breadth of front stand in opposition to, and mutually control, each other. Broad fronts have great strength at the commencement of an action, but depth alone secures its being thoroughly carried out. . . . It is a common fault to under- value the waste and the necessity of feeding [the fr )nt line] in a battle . . . and on many occasions during the last war we stood for hours on the brink of disaster, all our forces being used up . . . The greatest opponent of a judicious relation between depth and breadth is the desire to outflank. Though this is imiato in all minds it must be combated." A notable change was evident in the miner tactics of infantry. The tendency to dis- persion which in 1866 startled the Prussian leaders as an unauthorized improvisation calculated to deprive the company conmiander of the force necessary to execute the assault had in 1870 been accepted as inevitable and the cry had arisen to " organize disorder," in other words, to methodize a form of tactics which, strictly considered, wi^s no form at all. That it had the advantage of decreasing loss in a series of battles in which for the first time both sides were armed with broech- 206 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN, Prussian Minister of War. • [Cenlral N^w^* loading rifles was evident, but it was accompanied by a drawback until then unheard of, which WBS, only revealed to the world by independent writers after the war, as, for example, the author oi the famous " Summer Night's Dream." The example to which tlie writer, Meckel, called attention was that of Gravolotte, where, according to the Oflficial ■ History, 43 com - panics of different regiments were at oiie and the same time in the Auberge of St. Hubert. " You have seen the farmhouse and know the building is scarcely large enough to contain a single company on war strength, especially when you remember that the low garden was com- manded from Moscow farm and under a heavy fire. Forty -three companies are more than 10,000 men. Where were the 9,800 men who had no room ? " The explanation lie gives is that " this epidemic of withdrawing from the battle begins with the game and spreading with pestilential rapidity rages over the battlefield like a fever." The writer emphatically declares that at his first battle in France, on reaching the scene late in the day, " the field was literally strewed with men who had left the ranks and were doing nothing. Whole battalions could have been formed from them. From where we stood you could count hundreds. Some were lying down, their rifles pointing to the front a.s if they were still in the firing line and were expecting the enemy to attack them at any moment. Those had evidently remained behind lying down when the more couraaeous had advanced. Others had squatted like hares in the furrows. Wherever a bush or ditch gave shelter there were men to be seen.who in some cases had made themselves very comfortable." In short, this kind of straggling was the consequence of teaching men to take cover in attack. " In dispersion it is difficult to be steadfast, in close order it is difficult to be weak. Under the leader's influence the ex- ample of the strong impels the whole. Among the leaderless. the example of the confused and the cowards has the upper hand." Moreover, the vice of " extended order," as Meckel con- ceived it to be, produced anothei phenomenon, namely, " the effort of the lieutenant to release himself from company ties, and the similar effort of his captain to release himself from battalion ties, in order to seek opportunities of distinction by individual acts-of heroism." In these excerpts, as the reader will perceive, are raised many of those burning questions with which the British Army became familiar in the course of the South African War, and the solution of which was attempted in Manchuria in 1904-5 and in Europe in 1914. ^Vithout pro- posing to enter upon the later developments of the German tactical school, it is worth noticing here that as the war of 1870 proceeded there was a tendency to abandon the closer order of battle and to fight in more extended formations. How tar this was due to the general nature of the operations, how far to the diminished capa- city of the French troops, how far to the growing experience and confidence of the Germans them- selves cannot be discussed here. But there is no doiibt that in the concluding period of the war the German infantrymen had learnt to fight effectively and with far less loss to themselves in comparatively open order. The army that recrossed the frontier in the spring of 1871, now truly a German Army, had on the whole vindicated the principles on which it had been formed and led. In spite of the friction which from different causes had arisen between some of its component parts, they had shared the same experiences and were therefore likely to respond to the same teaching. The war had prepared the way not merely to politi- cal but to military unity. The road to Prussian hegemony in soldiership as well as in statesman- ship had been opened, and when the Army again entered the field it was to demonstrate the thoroughness with which the consolidation had been effected. We now propose to sketch the developments which the German military system underwent in the period between 1871 and 1914 THE TIMES in STORY OF THE WAR. 207 The great purpose pursued by Bismarck was the imification of Gorinariy and the founda- tion of a German Empire mider tlio lead and control of Prvissia. Ho attained Iiis end by tlio wars of 1864, 1806, and 1870. The results were then put on paper in the shape of a " Constitu- tion of the German Empire," which became law in the spring of 1871. This Constitution laid down the main principles of military organi- zation, and was supplemented, as regarded the relations between the most important of the Geniian States, by military conventions con- cluded by Prussia with Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg. It was laid down in the Constitution that every German capable of bearing arms belonged for seven years — in principle from the end of his 20th to the beginning of his 28th year — to the active Army. Ho was to pass tliree years with the colours and four in the reserve, and then, for five more years, belong to the Landwehr. From the end of 1871 the peace strength of the Army was fixed at one per cent, of the population, which was then just over 41,000,000. The whole military forces were placed under the control of the Emperor, subject only to the nieasiu'e of military independence preserved to some of the States in peace time. Even in Bavaria tlie Emperor was to have in peace time a right of inspection, involving the responsibiUty for elYiciency of the forces. In war ho bocann- altogether supreme. Bavaria retained lier own military organization . and administration, and her " contingent " consisted of two Army Corpe, which were called, as hitherto, the I. Bavarian Corps and the II. Bavarian Corps. Saxony re- tained some autonomy in that she had a Minis- try of War (but not a General Staff ) of lior own, and, as in 1870, gave her name to an Army Corpn (the XII.). Wurtemberg had much the same rights 'as Saxony and provided the XIII. Army Corps. Baden, with no special rights, provided the troops of the XIV. Army Corps. Some otlier units were given^ a territorial character — for example, the 25th Hessian division. The whole peace strength of Germany, after the French war, waa one per cent, of a population of 41,000,000. It was actually fixed by a Law of 1874, for the period from January, 1875, to December, 1881, at 401.059 non-commissioned officers and men. There were 18 Army Corps — the Prassian Guard Corps, 11 Prussian Army Corps, the XII. (Saxony), the XIII. (Wurtemberg), the XIV. (Baden), the XV. (Alsace-Lorraine), and the I. and II. Bavarian. These 18 Army Corps comprised 469 battalions of infantry, 465 squadrons of cavalry, 300 batteries of field artillery, 29 battalions of garrison artillery, 18 engineer battalions, and 18 train battalions. THE JULIUS TOWER, SPANDAU, WHERE THE GERMAN WAR CHEST WAS STORED. [Undtncood &■ UnJcrzcooJ, 208 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL VON EMMICH. [Ort/ro/ /^*a'S. The number of officers, a3 well as of officials of all sorts, was not fixed by law, but decided aixnually in the Budget. In 1880 began the long series of in- creases, justified fyartly by the constitutional principle that the peace strength should be one per cent, of the population, but mainly by pjlitical considerations and the alleged strength of other countries. All the official explanations oi later increases were, indeed, variations of the explanation given of the Bill of 1880 : — Since 1874 consideralile military reforms h.'vve been carried out in other States. These reforms are of capital importance for Germany. Bounded along aii immen.se frontier by three great Poweis and four smaller Powers, and accessible from the sea along a great stretch of coa.st, Germany must be constantly ready to defend her liberty and her security. It is absolutely necessary to increase the effectives and the number of units, unless we want the efforts made in time Of peace to be rendered fruitless in time of war because of the numerical superiority and sounder organization which our enemies could set against us. So the peace strength was raised, for the period 1881-1888, from 401,659 to 427,274, by the increase of the infantry from 469 battalions to 503, of the field artillery from 300 batteries to 340, of the garrison .artillery from 29 batteries to- 31, and of the engineers from 18 battalions to 19. It was also decided to give some aimual training to part of the so-called Ersatz Reserve, vhich consisted of men who by good fortune or for some slight physical reason escaped their military service, but were liable to be called up in the event of mobilization. About 20,000 or 30,000 a year of these men were thus trained until 1893, when the training of the Ersatz Reserve was almost entirely abolished. In 1886, two years before the completion of the period covered by the Law of 1880, tlie Government proposed fresh increases, calling attention once more to the incresised strength of France and Russia and other neighbouring States. The Empire, " tlie child of a glorious war," must again be put in a position to enforce its policy when " tiie day arrived of the menace of an European conflict." Bismarck was at the time engaged in a fierce confiict with the German Catholic Party, and dissolved the Reichstag on account of its opposition to the new increases. After the elections the Law was passed in 1887. [t increased the peace strength of the Army, for the poriod from 1887* to 1894, from 427,274 to 468,409, the infantry being increased from 503 battalions to 534, and tlie field artillery from 340 batteries to 364, the strength of the other arms reinaining unchanged. In 189(1 tlie niunber of Army Corps was raised from 18 to 20 by the formation of the XVI. Army Corps in Lorraine and of the XVII. Army Corps on the eastern frontier, and a few montlis later the peace strengtli was again increased, for the period from 1890 until 1894, from 468,409 to 486,983. The infantry was increased from 534 battalions to 538, the field artillery from 364 batteries to 434, the engineers from 19 battalions to 20, and the train from 18 batta- lions to 21. In 1893 came far more important changes, effected again only after a Parliamentary con- fiict and a dissolution of the Reichstag. The Government announced, once more with sjjecial reference to both France and Russia, that the gradual increases of the peace strength were no longer sufiicient. The Emijire must proceed " to utilize to the full all its resources in men." Tho Govermnent said : — We must adopt an oiganization involving the em- ployment of all the men i-eally lit for service. Only then shall we be able to face calmly the possibility of an attack. The system which consists in slow and steady progress must now be abandoned and give way to the immediat« application of the principles upon H'liich our military constitution rests. This application of principles will be piLShed iis far a-s the economic and linancial resources ot the Kmpire allow. It was found impjssible for tho present to increase tlie number of Army Corps. The increase in the number of men taken up im- plied, therefore, some shortening of service with the colours, and colour service was to bo reduced from three years to two with all arms except cavalry and horse artillery. The peace strength of the Army was increased fron. THE TIMES HISTORY Oh' THE WAR. 20!) GERMAN INFANTRY 486,983 to 557,193. But the main effect of the reorganization was that the Army was pre- pared to mobilize with a larger number of young and well-trained men, the total being estimated at 4,300,000. In 1899 the Government was again alarmed by the progress of France and Russia, and found a fresh argument in tlie Spanish-American War, whiclx liad " proved with terrifying clearness what a price has to be paid for lack of regular preparation for war in time of peace." T)io number of Army Corps was now increased from 20 to 23, by tlie formation of the XVIII. Army Corps at Frankfurt-on-the-Main, theXTX. (2nd Saxon) Army Corps, and a III. Bavarian Army Corps. T}ie peace strengtli of the Army was increased bj' 10,000 men, apart from noncommissioned officers. The 23 Army Corpi now comprised 625 battalionS of infantry, 482 squadrons of cavalry, 574 batteries of field artillery, 38 battalions of garrison artillery, 26 battalions of engineers, 11 battalions of communication troops, and 23 battalions of train- In 1905 tJiere was a further increase of the peace strength by 10,000 men, together with an improvement of the provisions for the training of the reserves. There was a similar increiuse of tlie peace strengtli in 1911, and great technical improvements were effected, especially by the creation of machine gim companies and by a large increase of expenditure on instruction. Tlie internal political situation was not then favourable for the Government, and it needed the Morocco crisis of 1911 to give full liberty to the appetites of the military authorities. Even then they were somewhat hampered by the competition of the naval authorities ; and MARCHING THROUGH BERLIN. [Cenlral News. there was open strife for a time between the then Prussian Jlinister of War, General von Heoringen, and the Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy. There was a general election in Germany at the beginning of 1912, and the Govermnent aimounced that it was necessary to have a Reiclistag " ready to maintain the Army and Navy in a perfect state of preparation and to fill up the gaps in Germany'si armaments." Although the elections resulted in tremendous Socialist victories, and the Iniperial Minister of Finance, Herr Wennuth, resigned office, the F1ELD-MARSH.\L VON DER GOLTZ. 210 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. OFFICERS OF THE DEATH'S HEAD HUSSARS. The Crown Prince in the Centre. military mcrease.s were obtained. The Law of 1912 raised the peace strength of the Anny to 544,211, and the number of Army Corps was increased from 23 to 25 by the creation of t^ie XX. Army Corps for the eastern frontier (AUonstein) and of the XXI. Army Corps for the western frontier (Saarbriicken). It was decided that the most important provisions of the Law of 1911, as well as of the new Law, should be carried out immediately, instead of being Bpread over the period until 1915. The Law involved a considerable reorganization and re- distribution on both frontiers. It increased enormously the readiness of the Army for war, and was the greatest efiort made by Gennany since 1870. As regards numbers, the total peace strength became approximately 723,000, all ranks included, that Ls to say, 544,000 privates, 30,000 officers, 95,000 non-commis- sioned officers, 14,000 one-year volunteers, and 40,000 officers and others of the admini- strative cadre. Nevertheless, the Law of 1912 was hardly in force before fresh increases began to be de- manded and predicted. The inspired news- papers pretended to castigate the military authorities for their slowness, and the Emperor delivered a speech referring to the " thorough application of the principle of obligatory service." The new Bill itself very soon appeared. It proposed the increase of the peace strength from 544,211 to 661,176 privatf^s, and the addition cf 4,00") officers, 15,000 non-commis- sioned officers, and 27,000 horses. Adding the administrative cadre and 18,000 one-year vokmteers the total peace strength was raised to about 870,000 men. Most of the increase was to be effected immediately, although the Bill covered a period of three years. The number of Anny Corps remained 25, but the various arms were ultimately to be raised to totals of 669 battalions of infantrj', 550 squadrons of cavalrj-. 633 batteries of field artillery, 55 battalions of gairison artillery, 44 battalions of engineers, 31 battalions of communication troops, and 26 battalions of the train. We are dealing here only with peace strengths, but the ultimate effect of the Law of 1913 and its predecessors would have been, after the lapse of 24 years, to provide Germany with a fully trained reserve of 5,400,000 men. The Imperial Chancellor, in introducing the Bill in the Reiclistag, said : — The directing thought of the Bill is the adoption of military service for all, according to the resources of the population. In round nuiiil)ers we niu.st incorporate 03,000 more men annually. Tlieir in- corporation must, above everything, serve to raise the strength of certain troops. This incrca.se of the strength of units will render mobilization mon' rapid, will facilitate the transition from peace to war footing, will give us younger reservists on mobili- zation, and will augment their number. The Law was passed in June, 1913, together with the extraordinary financial "levy" which was mentioned in a previous chapter of this work The great increase of numbers allowed battalions. batteries, and cavalry regiments to be raised to such a high establislunent that not more than one or two classes of the Reserve would be THE TIMES niSTURY OF THE WAR. Ill reqiiirod to mobilize the first line. Hence. the quality of the atitive Army and its training in peace was improved, mobilization was accelerated, and the covering troops on the frontiers were made strong enougli to take the field and deal a blow against an unprepared enemy without waiting for reservists from the interior. Although little definite information was forthcoming, it was evident that the number of units of the German covering troops and their effectives, whose business it is to protect the mobilization and concentration of the main armies, was to be largely increased. All German troops had increased strengtlis under the new Law, but the troops of 11 corps — six on the French frontier and five on the Russian frontier — had a higher establishment than the rest. One marked feature of the new plans was the strengthening of fortified places, especially Konigsberg and Griiiiden-/. in the east. Judging the Law of 1913 as a whole just after it had been passed, the Military Correspondent of The Times made the following very accurate estimate : — Thiire is no evidence of any marked change in the principles which liave hitherto guided German military administrators, nor in the strategical use of the great Army which has been fashioned with such splendid continuity of purpose during the past 40 years. There is still the underlying design, academic though at present it be, to crush France by a vigorous offensive before the weight of Russia can be bi'ought to bear. There is still a very plain temptation on military grounds to travei'se neutral States in an offensive cami)aign against France. There is still the obvious intention to fight a defensive campaign at fu'st against Kussia, and this intention is made moi-e manifest by the plans for improving the fortresses THE KAISER IN UHLAN UxNIKORM. [R€.otd rrtis. A TROOPER OF THE DEATH'S HEAD HUSSARS. [f^ewspjper Ittuitraiions, in East Prussia. Tlic determination to wage oflensivo war with the utmost energy and ruthlessness remains to-day as always the central idea of the German strategist, and the main clTect of the new naval and military laws is to second oflen.sive • policy by placing in the hands of German diplomacy a weapon fashioned for offensive war. We have seen that, by the terms of the Imperial Constitution, every Gflrman capable of bearing arms was rendered liable to three years' service with the colours and foui' years' service in the Reserve, followed by five years in the Landwehr. We have seen also that, by the Constitution, the petice strength of the Army was fixed at one per coat, of the popvilation, and that, by a series of Army Laws, the German Army between 1870 and 1913 kept pace with the growth of the population from 41,000,000, just after the Franco-Gorman War, to the total of nearly 05,000,000 shown by the census taken at the end of 1910. We must now consider in more detail the application of the principle of national service. Liability to military service began at the ago of 17 and ended at the age of 15. Liability to active service began at the age of 20. The normal military record of a German citizen, recruited for the infantry, was as follows : — He joined the colours at the age of 20 and remained in them for two years. He then joined the reserve of the active forces for approxi- mately five-and-a-half years, being called up for periodical trainings. He then belonged to the First Ban of the Landwehr for five years, and to the Second Ban of the Landwehr for six years. While in the First Ban he was liable to be calliHl up twice for training of a week or fortnight. 212 THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR. In the Second Ban of the Landwehr he was not liable to training but could volunteer for train- ing. Leaving the Landwehr at tl.e age of 39, lie was enrolled in the Second Ban of the Land- stumi until the end of his 45th year. In tho cavalry and horse artillery the period of active service was three years instead of two, followed by only about four-and-a-half years in the reserve of the active Army, only three years in the First Ban of the Landwehr, and. finally, eight years, instead of six, in the Second Ban of the Landvvelir. The development of this system, which was very different from the original idea of universal and uniform service of three years with the colours, four years in the active Reserve, and five yoirs in the Landwehr, was marked by the lollowing stages : — In 1888 it was observed that Germany, with the 12 years' service system, had only 12 classes to set against the 20 classes of France and the 15 classes of Russia. It was therefore considered necessary to increase the number of men available in the event of mobili- zation by using a part of the Landwehr in the reserve formation. It was accordingly decided to lengthen the period of service with the colours, in the active Reserve and in the Landwehr from 12 to 19 years, to re-establish a Second Ban of the Landwehr, and to lengthen the period of service in the Landsturm by three years, lu this way service with the colours, in the active Reserve, and in the Landwehr ended at the age of 39, instead of at the age of 32: and the liability to service ceased at the age of 45. in- stead of at the age of 42. In 1893 came the reduction of service with the colours from three years to two, except in the ca\alry and horse artillery. We have explained that the main effect of the Law of 1893 was to en- able the Army to mobilize with a larger number of young and well- trained men. There was in this no intention whatever to reduce the biu'den of military service, and all efforts to do so were throughout resisted with the utmost energy. Again and again in the following years the Socialist Party in the Reiclistag attempted without the least success to get service in the cavalry reduced from three years to two. The only purpose of the reduction of the period of colour service of immountcd troops was to seciu-e the training of a far larger proiwrtion of the population. Although there was an annual available contingent of about 465,000 men, it was not possible, under the syste:n of universal three years' service, to take up more tlian from 175,000 to 178,000. The remainder 1 1 -- - 'dl * -I ; illN-,:'^ Vi i THE ALEXANDER GRENADIER GUARD REGIMENT, OF WHICH THE TSAR WAS COLONEL. THE TSAR AND THE KAISER IN THE FOREGROUND. [Sport & G*n*Tal, THE TIMES IIISTOHY OF THE WAR. •iU wore left at liomo or subjected to a short traiiiiut; of little military value. The authors of the haw of 1893 calculated that, with shortened HiM'vice, there would bo about 229,(K)() instead of 175,000 recruits a year, and that the ulti- mate result would be 24 classes of trained men, making a total of about 4,:{00,000. The ultimate effect of the Law of 1913 would have been, as already stated, to increase this number to 5,400,000. So much for the increase in the number of trained men. Almost as much importance was attached to the consequent lowering of age of tlie troops destined to form the main field armies. The war of 1870 had shown grave defects in the troops of the Landwelir— lack of physical and moral force imder great strain, a large proportion of sick, and insuffi- cient vigour in attack and stubbornness in defence. The annual contingents being in- creased, it became less necessary to call up the older men. If, for instance, on the three years' system, it had been necessary to fill the reserves of the field armies with men from the oldest class of the First Ban of the Landwehr, men of from 32 to 33 years of age, these same places would in future bo taken by men from 25 to 28 years of age. Where it had previously been necessary to go back to the 13th class, it would in future be necessary to employ only 8 classes. We ha\e sp.)ken hitherto of the normal case of the recruit taken up at the age of 20 and passing through all the normal stages to exemption from service at the age of 45 At no time, however, did the number.-! recruited exhaust all the available re- soiu-ces. There were considerable numbers of men who obtained total or temporary exemption from service — apart from the exclusion from the Army of common criminals and of men who remained totally unfit for five years after the eommencoment of their legal obligation to military service. The main causes of exemption were, of course, physical, but there was a large measure of consideration for men with peculiar family or business ties, as well as for men destined for careers in which they woxild- be seriously handicapped by the interruption of tlieir studies for the purpose of military service. Upon the whole, however, there was very little disposition to avoid military training, even in cases where exemption could be obtained. The untrained men of the German Army belonged to the Ersatz lUserve or the Fii-st Ban of the Landstm-m. The Ersatz Reserve consisted, first, of men who were liable and fit for ser\'iee but who, owing to the excess of the DUKE ALBRECHT OF WURTEMBERG. [Ctntral Ntwi. supply of recruits, had not been embodied by the age of 23 ; secondly, of the various classes of men who for one reason or another had been allowed to postpone their military service ; and, thirdly, of men suffering from slight physical defects, but regarded as " moderately fit " for service. The importance of the Ersatz Reserve lay in the fact that upon it in a large degree depended the filling up of the depdts after the active and reserve units of the field armies had been mobilised ; upon these depflts formed of cadres from the active army, the Ersatz, and the annual contingent of recruits, depended the replacing of casualties in the fight- ing formations. The First Ban of the Land- sturm consisted (1) of all boys over 17 years of age who had not begiui their military serviw? ; (2) of young men who were jx>rmanently unfit for service in the field, but who could bo used as workmen or for purposes for which their ordinary occupations specially fitted tliem ; and (3) of young men who would have been em- bodied in the Ersatz Reserve, but were rejectetl owing to excess of numbers. Over and above the ordinary troops thus recruited and distributed there was the very important class (in 1913 about 18,000) of so- called one-year volunteers (Einjiihrige) They consisted of practically all the sons of well- 214 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL ULRIGH VON BULOW. to-do classes, who bod had a Oymnasium educa- tion and had passed the examination on leaving school which was the one and only certificate of aptitude for the University and subsequently for any of the superior branches of Government service. Armed with this certificate and with sufficient means to provide their own food and equipment, they were allowed to serve in the Army for one year only, and enjoyed great privileges during the period of their service. They could choose their own year of service up to the age of 23, or, for any reasonable cause of delay, up to the age of 26 or 27. They could select, moreover, the arm, and in many cases the regiment, which they wished to join. They formed, afterwards, the main source of supply of officers and non-commissioned officers of the Reserve. The number of non-commissioned officers in 1914 was about 100,000. As in almost all other German walks of life, they bore a great variety of titles, Ijut they could be divided for practical purposes into a superior class and an inferior — the Feldwebel, or sergeant-major, and the Vizefeldivebel, who wore swords with the officer's knot, and the Sergeant and simple UtUeroffizier, who had not this distinction. The great niajority of the non-commissioned officers rose from the ranks, and were either men who had volunteered at the age of 17 or had re- engaged at the end of their two or three years of military service. Men with any special aptitude, who during their service showed an inclination to rejoin, were given special instruction for the duties of non-conimissioned officers. A niinority — perhaps one-quarter — of the non- commissioned officers came from special schools, wliich were of two kinds — preparatory schools for boys of 15, who remained two years, and " schools for non-commissioned officers," which took the pupils from the preparatory schools, and any other candidates between the ages of 17 and 20 who had good recommendations and a good elementary education. Those who passed tlu"ough both schools could become non- commissioned officers at the age of 19. The quality of the non-commissioned officers was certainly very various. The general level of education, both general and military, was high, but system was more powerful than initia- tive, and especially aniong the younger non- commissioned officers there was a lack of real discipline combined with a taste for authority which developed easily into brutality. The corps of officers of the German Army was composed in the main of two classes of can- didates, " cadets," who had received all their education in the special cadet schools, and youths who, at the end of their ordinary school education, had joined the rank-, as Fahnenjiinker with a view to obtaining commissions. The second class, which fonued about two-thirds of the whole, enjoyed preliminary advantages in proportion to their educational attainments, and the Enaperor William had always endea- voured to raise the general level by giving special advantages to those who had passed the " abiturient," or leaving, examination of the public schools. A small percentage, about five or six per cent., had passed one year at a university before entering the Army. Two tests had to be satisfied by every candidate, whatever his origin. He had to pass the general examination qualifying him for a commission. His nomination had also to be approved by a vote of the officers of the regiment which he was to join. This requirement was main- tained with absolute rigour, and served to uphold the very strong class distinctions in the different arms and even in different regi- ments of the same arm. It was an absolute barrier to the entrance, for instance, of Jews, whether as officers or reserve officers. The cadets were for the most part sc^s of officers or of Civil servants of the higher grades. Having obtained a nomination they entered a cadet school at the age of 10, passed a prelimi- nary examination at the age of 17, and then, normally, served with the colours for six THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 215 months as non-commissioned officers. Thence thoy passed into a war school, and obtained their commissions at about the ac;o of 19. Trained to arms as it were from the cradle, and imbued with military traditions and military doctrine, the officers who came from the cadet schools retained the stamp throughout their lives. Curiously enough, the first cadet companies formed in Prussia in 1686 were composed of French children whose families had emigrated after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. When the French supply of candidates fell oft, Frederick William I. reorganized the corps by bringing all the schools together in Berlin. Frederick the Great improved the system, especially by mitigating the severities of the training and treating the boys, a^ he sadd, " not like farm hands but like gentlemen and future officers." In the Seven Years War ho employed as officers cadets hardly 14 years old. The schools were kept up with varying success. After the war of 1870 there was a great increase in the number of candidates. The Berlin cadets were established all together in the famous cadet school at Gross-Lichterfelde. There were cadet schools also at Bensberg, Ccislin, Karlsruhe, Naiunburg, Plon, Potsdam, and Wahlstadt. The great Army Law of 1913 involved, as we have seen, an addition of no less than 4,000 officers. Matters were so arranged as to secure a considerable improvement in the rate of promotion. For some years discontent had been growing among the officers themselves, and the congestion in the lower ranks of the officers' corps of this enormous Army which had seen practically no wiu' for more than 40 years, caused grave misgivings as to its real efficiency in the field. The statistics of 1910 and 1911 showed that, on the average, Prussian officers had to wait from 14 to 16 years for promotion to the rank of captain, and from 11 to 12 years more for promotion to the rank of major. In Bavaria promotion was considerably more rapid, but for the young Prussian officer the main hope was to find his way into the General Staff, where advancement was sure. We have now reviewed the main elements in the composition of the great German military machine. It is easy to realize that its worldng affected closely the whole fabric of society, and that the claims and the spirit of the Army per- \-aded everytliiug. Although the wars of 1864> 1866, and 1870 were but a faint memory to the greater part of the population, the military spirit was kept alive by every possible means, in the schools, in the Army itself, and in politics. As regards the corps of officers, tradition was GENERAL VON HAUSEN. enormously strong, and it was well supported by family and personal interest. The Army was ever the most important of all professions, and every attempt to lower its position was resisted with the utmost vigour. All the well-intended and ingenious proposals which emanated from Great Britain and other countries for reduction or limitation of armaments were of necessity doomed to failure, because the German Empire wiis saturated with the belief that the future belonged to the strong, and that the only way to keep Germany strong was not only to train every available man for service in the field, but to keep the whole nation in the strong military grip of Prussia and to maintain as the head and the mainspring of the State the Prussian military caste. Notwitlistanding all theories of equal opportunity, and even the sincere efforts of the Emperor William to check the growth of luxury in the Army and especially in " crack " regi- ments, social gradations continued to be reflected nowhere so accurately as in the German Army List. Commissions in the Prus.sian Guard, for in.stance, and especially in the more exclusive regiments, such as the famous regiment of Gardes du Corps, Wfie the undis- puted preserve of the great landowning families. And so down to the humblest line regim?nt in the dullest and least desirable frontier garrisons. If the prevailing motive at the top of the sca'e was the determination to retain power — luid power in the Anny meant power throughout i he 216 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMAN SIEGE GUN. \1 opicai. State — the prevailing motive lower down in the scale was pride. For some years before the Great War the Army had begun to be infected by the luxury and materialism which had come of too rapid prosperity and increase of wealth. But the great majority, especially of regimental officers, were keen, hard, simple, and devoted soldiers, whose only reward for their work was the proud position which they enjoyed. On the other hand, the level of real intelligence was not high. Like people in so many other sjiheres of life in Germany, the officers were often well- instructed without being well-educated, cock- sure and self -satisfied without being intelligent. Judged even more by the officers than by the men, the German Army was an Army which badly needed some sharp lessons from ex- perience and especially from defeats. Throughout the officers' corps ran an almost universal, if at most times good-natured, contempt for civilians as such, and a conviction that, while political freedom must be tolerated to a certain extent, there were well-defined limits beyond which freedom must not go. The field of German politics was dotted with landmarks and boundaries defining the points at which " the military " would as a matter of course inter\'one. The Army devoted its speciel attention on the ono hand to the growth of Socialism and on the other hand to any culpable moderation in dealing with the frontier populations — Alsa- tians, Poles, and Danes. In the year before the war the famous Zabem affair afforded a peculiar illustration of the fact that the Army, and not the Governnient or the Civil Adnainistration, was the supreme force in the provinces whicli Bismarck had taken from France. Similar tendencies were at least as strong in Posen and even in Schleswig-Holstein. As for Socialisiu_ it was ono of the groat resources of militarx- argument — just as, for the matter of that. " militarism " was one of the gieat resources of Socialist argiunent. Year after year the Reichstag debates on the Army estimates consisted of sham fights between the Prussian Minister of War, whoever he might be, and the Socialist leaders. The Socialists carried on an incessant campaign against the brutal treatment of recruits, a campaign which had some, but not in latter years very much, foundation in fact. The Minister of War invariably railed against the perils of Socialism in the Army, and accused the Socialists of sowing the seeds of mutiny and even of treason. Both parties to these disputes knew very well that the Anny was in no danger whatever from public opinion and that in tho liour of need every Gennan would rally to the flag. As to Gennan feeling generally, it woiikl he too much to say that tho Army was universftll\- popular, but military service was accepted as a matter of course, and with absolute belief not only in its value for the country's defence but in its vast importance as a training for civil life and for all organized effort. Tho Socialist party itself based its unequalled organization upon military standards, and the TUE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 217 training of the whole youth of the country at an improssionablo age to regard thomsolves as part of one groat machine was the root of most of tho order and discipline that {wrvaded Ciorman hfo and was so impressive and so deceptive. It was especially decejitive as regards the " pea(!e-lovinp " character of tho (iernian people, and concealed realities that were all too horribly revealed as soon as tho Gorman people went to war. Frojii the Army tho whole people learned tho bolicifs and habits that were afterwards the strongest in daily life. They learned to control and also to obey, to organize and be organized, and to ivcoept as in the nature of things a sj'stematiza- tion of life that was nothing but a reflection in every sphere of the spirit and methods of the F^riLssian Army. We have seen that at the outbreak of war the German Army consisted of 25 Army Cjrps. Since the increases and changes effected in 191.') they were grouped in eight " inspections." These insijections wore at Danzig (General von I'rittwitz und Gaffron) for tho I., XVII., and XX. Army Corps ; at Berlin (General von Ifeeringen) for the Prussian Guard Corps, tho XII. Army Corps, and tho XIX. Armv Corps ; at Hannover (General voa Bu'ow) for tho VII.. IX., and X. Army Corps; at Mimich (Prince Kupert of Bavaria) for tho UI. Army Corps and the I., II., and III. Bavarian Corps ; at Carlsruhe, the capital of Baden (the Grand Duke of Baden) for the VIIT., XIV., and XV. Army Corps ; at Stuttgart, the capital of Wurtemberg (Duke Albert of Wurtemberg) for tho IV., XT., and XIII. Army Corjjs; at Saarbriicken (General von Eiclihom) for tho XVI., XVni, and XXI. Army Corps ; and at Berlin (General von Kluck) for tho II., V. and VI. Army Corps. The peace distribution and composition of Army Corps ia shown in the accompanying table : — PEACE DISTRIBUTION AND COMPOSITION OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY* ON OCTOBER 1, 1913. Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. Uegiments. ■^ Bat- teries. Corps H.Q. 1 1 i c Corps. 1 § > i 1 i s c 0* c .2 1 i I "a ■31 i £ •c 1 '3 i 1 3 3 23 8 •a 3. •E a 4) S 5 ii n 1 2 ^ 5 ^ K a f-i n |K X a U n n e » £ Prussian Guard Berlin . . 2 11 33 c> 4 8 40 2 2 I 3 _ 2 9 24 3 F. Corps . . KoniRsberg 2 4 8 24 - 3 6 30 1 - 2 2 2 9 24 3 II St<-W.in.. 2 4 27 _ 2 4 20 2 _ 1 _ 2 8 24 — iir H<Tlin 2 8 24 2 4 20 1 1 1 1 - 2 « 24 3 IV Ma^iloburg 2 8 24 2 4 20 _ 2 1 .. 2 8 24 _ V. „ .. Poscn 2 10 30 2 4 20 _ 1 _ 2 1 2 » 24 3 VI Brcslau 2 10 30 3 6 30 I 2 1 1 2 8 24 _ Vll .Miinster 2 10 t 2 4 20 -. 2 1 — i 8 24 . vin. , (Koblenz 2 8 _ 2 4 20 .,. 2 _ I 2 8 24 _ IX. Altona 2 10 30 2 4 20 - 2 2 _ _ 2 8 24 - X Hannover 2 8 24 2 i 4 20 _ 2 I 1 — 2 8 24 - XI (Xssel 2 8 24 2 ! 4 20 _ 1 1 _ 2 2 4 9 24 3 X ll.( 1st U. Saxon) Dresden 2 8 24 2 2 i 4 20 I _ 2 I _ 2 9 24 3 XIII. Corps Wurt<>nibcrg . . 2 it 27 - 2 ' 4 20 - 2 - 2 - 2 8 24 - XIV. , Karlsruhe 2 10 30 _ 2 4 20 _ 3 _ - 1 2 8 24 — XV Str.xssbui'g o 4 8 24 2 2 4 20 _ 2 1 1 2 8 24 - XVI Metz .. 2 8 24 - 3 6 30 _ 2 1 I 2 2 8 24 . XVII Danzig 2 A 8 24 1 2 4 20 _ _ 3 _ 1 2 8 24 - XVII I. „ .. Fi'ankturt - on - Main 2 9 27 _ 2 4 20 _ 3 _ I _ 2 8 24 - XIX.(2n(l H. Saxon) Leii)zig 2 8 24 - 2 4 20 1 - 1 2 - 2 9 24 3 XX. Corjw .. Allenstein 2 8 24 1 2 4 20 I 2 1 — _ 2 9 24 3 XXI Sjuirbriickon . . 2 9 27 _ 2 4 20 _ 1 3 — 2 10 24 6 1. Havarian. . Munich 2 8 24 1 2 4 10 — _ _ 2 2 8 24 _ II. Bavarian Wiirzburg 2 8 24 1 2 4 20 _ _ - 2 2 i 9 24 3 III. Bavai-ian Xiirnberg 2 * 1 8 24 - 2 4 18 ■- 7 . - - 4 2 *l 8 24 - 1 50 108 217 ,131 . TTlsTi no 547 14 28 iT 25 20 50 |100 2ll 000 33 66 » 110 633~ *The above table is compiled from Lob^II's Jalirbericlit<^. 1013. telegraph troops, flying corps, and train battalions are omitted. Fortress artillery, pioneers, nilway and 218 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. GERMAN TELEPHONE RANGEFINDER. [Ctniral Ntws. lie Generals-in-Command were Baron von Plettenberg (Prussian Guard) ; von Francois (I.) ; von Linsingen (II.) ; von Lochow (m.) ; Sixt von Arnim (IV.) ; von Strantz (V.) ; von Pritzelwitz (VI.) ; von Ein^m (VII.) ; Tiilfi von Tschepe und Weidenbach (VIII.) ; von Quast (IX.) ; von Enunich (X.) ; Baron von Scheffer-Boyadel (XI.); von Elsa (XII.) ; von Fabeck (XIII.) ; von Hoiningen (XIV.) ; von DeimUng (XV.) ; von Mudra (XVI.) ; von Mackensen (XVII.) ; von Schenck (XVIII.) ; von GERMANS TAKING OBSERVATIONS. [Kicord Press. Kirchbach (XIX.) ; von Scholtz (XX.) ; von Billow (XXI.) ; von Xylander (I. Bavarian) ; von Martini (TI. Bavarian) ; and Baron von Horn (III. Bavarian). ^■ Apart from the eight army inspectors there were an inspector-general of cavalry in Berlin, with inspections of cavalry at Posen, Stettin, Strassburg, and Saarbriicken ; an inspector- general of field artillery in Berlin ; an inspector- general of garrison artillery in Berlin, with inspections at Berlin, Strassburg, and Cologne ; an inspector-general of engineers and fortresses in Berlin, with inspections at Berlin, Posen, Strassburg, Mainz, and Thorn ; an inspector- general of communication troops in Berlin, with inspections of railway troops, military telegraphs, and military aviation and aeronau- tics ; a train inspection ; and an inspection of machine gims. There were also military governors and com- mandants at the following strong places : — Altona, Borkum, Cuxhaven, Geestemiinde, Heli- goland, and Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea ; Danzig, Friedrichsort, Kiel, Konigsberg, Swine- iniinde, and Pillau on or near the Baltic ; Broslau, Glatz, and Glogau in Silesia ; Posen, Thorn, Grandenz, and Feste Boyen, and other barrier forts along the eastern frontier ; Metz, Bitsche, and Diedcnliofen (Thionville) in Lor- raine ; Neu Breisach, Hiiningon, Freiburg, Strassburg, Germersheim, Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne, and Wesel along the Rhine ; Custrin on the Oder ; Ulm and Ingolstadt on the Danube. The Emperor, who became supremo in war, was supreme in peace also, except for the degree THE TIMES HISTORY OF TUK WAR. 219 of indopondcnce retained after 1870 by the Bavarian army and to some extent by the Saxon and Wurtemberg forces. Apart from the Groat General Staff, which is dealt with else- wliore, and the " inspections " alreiwly enume- rated, the Emperor's fimctions were performed through the Ministry of War and through his Military Cabinet. The existence of the Military Cabinet, whose head wiis at all times the Em- peror's chief agent and mouthpiece, was a frequent subject of controversy and the charge of dual control and of interference with the powers of the Imperial Chancellor (who was responsible for the Ministry of War as for all other Departments of State) and of Parliament was often made. In reality serious difficulties only arose in times of political crisis, wliich were always in Germany to a peculiar extent times of intrigue, and the Emperor's Military Cabinet, no less than his Naval and Civil Cabinets, was a necessary part of the machine of " personal " government. It was the business of the Military Cabinet to report to the Emperor on all military questions and to form a channel of communication between him and the generals in command of army corps, and also to deal with promotions, transfers, and other personal questions. GENERAJ^ VON EINEM. The Ministry of War was the supreme ad- ministrative authority of the Army responsible for recruiting, equipment, commissariat, forti- tications, pay, and mobilization. It was divided into some half-dozen departments, which were subdivided again into sections. The finances of the Army were managed tlirough a central bureau (Oenerai Militiirkaase^ GERMAN SIEGE GUN IN TRANSIT. Ttt-xat. 220 TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN ARMY CORPS AREAS. HEADQUARTERS ofARMYCORPS [xtoIdantzig BAVARIAN AND SAXON CORPS BAV. SAX HEADQUARTERS ofDIVISIONS 3B.OERFURT ,, ,, nuRTTEMBURG DIVISIONS - Oil-W) ,, ,, CAVALRY INSPECTION... di 4 ,, „ ARTILLERY .. A3 ,, „ ENGINEERS ., tfl2 ,, „ PIONEERS ., ▼ I M lies 2 9 20 40 ^6 S O 100 221 ?/C «)0O THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. COLOUR-SERGEANT, ALEXANDER GRENADIER GUARD REGIMENT. [Ball. Tile organization of the Army was immensely assisted by the perfection of the general organi- zation of the State services — for example, rail- ways and telegraphs. Not only was the Army ready to assunae control of these services, but the services were ready to be taken under mili- tary control. Immediately after the war of 1870 the Airny began to pay special attention to the training of railway troops, able both to manage existing railways and to construct new ones. The establishment of military control of the postal and telegraph systems was effected without the least difficulty or confusion. Within an hour or two of the dispatch of the ultimatums to Russia and France and the declaration of the " state of imminent peril of war," the telegraph offices all over Germany were in the hands of the military, working indeed at higher pressm-e but without any disturbance. Not content with universal service at home, the German Govermnent in 1913 passed an im- portant Law definitely linking up rights of nationality with the performance of military service. It was always one of the bitterest blows to German pride that the vast majority of German emigrants were finally lost to the country. The provision, hitherto existing, that residence abroad for more than 10 years involved loss of German nationality unless the emigrant in Berlin, with a branch for each army corps district. As soon as the Finance Law for the year had been passed the Ministry of War fixed the distribution of the credits, and communi- cated with the Army through the Intendantur of each army corps. So the funds passed down to the smallest administrative units — a company, or a battery, or a squadron. All I he administrative services of the Army were governed by minutely detailed regulations, and , the whole machine was constructed with a view to smooth and uniform working in peace time — an aim which was certainly attained — and to the utmost possible speed and precision on mobiliza- tion. There was, indeed, no army that ever existed which was so sure to be found completely ready when war began, so perfectly able to strike at once with all its force. Only defeats, and a series of defeats, could seriously upset such an organization. Only a long process of attrition could dangerously disturb the elaborate prepara- tions for the concentration and movement of troops, and for supplying them always and every- where with all that they would need in the field. GENERAL VON HINDENBURG. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 223 took special steps to preserve his Glerman status was repealed. On the other hand, loss of nation- ality was rendered certain in the case of Germans who failed to perform their military service GERMAN SIEGE HOWITZER. i*'""' /•'«»• witliin a fixed time of having been declared deserters. Special facilities and extensions of tune, however, were granted to Germans hving abroad. CHAPTER XV. THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE FIELD. The Reserve Formations and their Us ic — The "Sudden Maximum" — Speed in Action — The General Staff — Violence in Execution — Studv of Detaii. — Expansion in War -Estimate OP Available Numbers — Use of Reserves — The Emperor and his Moi.tke — Commanders — The Army CIorps Organization — CAVAiiRv and Resmrve Divisions — Infantry and Machini> ouN Tactics — Cavalry Tactic-s— Artillery Tactics — Artillery Armament — German Heavy Howitzers — Other Troops — Supplies — Hospitai s — Mechanical Efficiency. THE peace organization of tlie German army gave, of course, a very in- adequate notion of its full strength when mobilized for aition. Behind the units which figured on the peace establish- ments, even after their completion to war strength, were huge reserves, and the intended composition and employment of these reserves — whether in the form of duplication or triplica- tion of active army units or of attachment of newly -formed reserve units to each Army Corps, or, again, of their grouping in fresh and indepen- dent Army Corps of their own — ^was, as a French student remarked but a short time before the war, " the great secret of the Supreme Com- mand." For that reason it was somewhat futile to condemn, on the authority of Clause- witz himself, the two-unit organization (regi- ments paired in brigades, brigades paired in divisions, divisions paired in Army Corps), for nothing would be simpler than to convert the binary system into a ternary one, by adding a reserve regiment to each brigade, a reserve brigade to a division, and so on at the moment of mobilization. These, and similar possibilities of variation, however, must be considered as the unofficial student's reserN-ations forced upon him by the imjjerfection of liis data rather than as matters kept open for eleventh hour decision by the German authorities. The use to which reserve formations would be put was, as we have said, the secret of the higher command. But it was certainly settled both in principle and in detail long before the v/ar. Similarly, wliile to outsiders it appeared doubtful whether Germany would employ the vast masses of able- bodied men who had received no training, no such doubt existed in the confidential mobiliza- tion schemes. This mobilization scheme presented the sharpest contrast with that of Great Britain. For the characteristic of the latter was that it was based upon the assumption of a long war, in which the British Army, small at first, would be expanded by an elaborate machinery of recruit depots and reserve battalions at home, until at the end of the war its strength was at a maxunum. Under the German system its strength was at its greatest in the first days and at its lowest at thcs close of a war. Continental critics were well aware of this difference, and, as most of them subscribed to the ruling opinion that the war would be a brief shock of extreme violence, they reproacheil Great Britain with keeping too largo a propor- tion of the available trained men in reserve formations, destined only to fill gaps in the first line and iricantime idling at a moment when every soldier's place was at the decisive point. Such was the rcproivch. Whether it was well or ill deserved we need 224 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 22.5 not inqiiirn. It was connected only indirectly, if lit all, with the other favourito reproacli that British citizens would not take the " manly resolution " of adopting compulsory service ; and, indeed, it was only natural that a Con- tinental Army which developed its whole power in a fortnight or three weeks should read with amazement that with 120,000 odd serving soldiers at homo and some 140,000 regular reservists, besides special reserves and terri- torials registered for foreign service, Great IJritain could only produce, at the outset, an tlxpeditionary Force of 170,000 men. No army in the world represented the theory of the sudden immediate maximum better than the German, not even the French, for the doctrines of strategy held in honour at the JCcole de Guerre were based upon the " offensive return," and by that very fact admitted that every day had a to-morrow, whereas the ideal of the Kriegsaladcmie was " the day," i.e., the battle without a to-morrow, complete and all sufficing. The question for the French was, whether a short service national army would be capable of enduring till their to-morrow came. And it was the cliiof virtue of the German theory of war that it was, in theory at least, based upon the human natiu-o of citizen-soldiers, men capable of one effort of maximum violence and possibly little else. In the event the French proved their case by proving that the staying power of human nature, when fortified by a just cause and an honest anger, was far greater than the German theory admitted. But, bearing in mind the likelihood of Germany's having to fight for existence on " two fronts " and the consequent desire to bring the struggle on one of these fronts to the speediest possible HERR KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH. issue, the German theory of war had much to recommend it. The bases of that theory, in principle and in detail, will be discussed later. Our present concern is to show the mutual relations of the theory and the army that was to put it into practice. The theory demanded, first of all, speed in action on a large scale — not so much actual speed of manoeuvre or of march as reduction to zero of the waste of time that would result from imperfect arrangements for the larger movements of Army Corps and armies — and NEW GERMAN BOMB-GUN. BOMB-GUN READY FOR FIRING. 226 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. soxmd staff-work was the essential condition for securing this speed. How successfully diis condition had been met 1870 and the Kaisermaniiver of the years of armed peace showed. In respect of what may be called its business side the German General Staff had no superior in the world. It is recorded that the casualty and ammunition returns of the troops that fought at Gravelotte and St. Privat, on August 18, 1870, were in the hands of the general headquarters before dawn on the 19th, to serve as the basis for Von Moltke's next decision. More than this no staff could do. But even this staff had its imperfections, both on service (as in the cases of the lost dispatch of Rezonvilie and the army orders of Worth) and on manoeuvres, and if its occa- sional errors were to be neutralized this had to be done by the troops. Hence the over- marching so often noted and criticized on manoeuvres. The possibility of over -marching the men was itself another means of obtaining speed. The condition of weary blanknf ss to which it reduced the men was accepted as a necessary evil. What mattered was the punctual execution of the programme laid down at all costs. But here again it was minutely careful organization of regimental detail rather than the pace of the individual that was relied upon to produce the resvilt. Thus it was that in 1870, in modern manoeuvres, and in 1914 alike the ground covered by German units was astonish- ing, even though the troops in themselves were slow and heavy. The theory demanded, further, extreme violence in execution — that is, an output of power so great that it wovild liave wrecked delicate machinery. Simplicity and strength, therefore, were just as characteristic of the German Army system as thorough organization. Lastly, as the attempt to produce by envelop- ment a day of battle that needed no morrow of pursuit required great extension of front, and therefore either extraordinarily high develop- ment of the lateral communications or, in the alternative, deployment at the outset in accor- dance with a preconceived and unalterable plan, it followed that the German Army and all its material auxiliaries, such as railway platforms and loop lines, could and had to be arranged and prepared in peace in accordance with plans and time-tables studied and considered at leisure — in accordance, in fact, with the " Fundamental Plan." On these foundations the German Army organization was built up until 1912. After that year, indeed, there was a noticeable ten. dency to develop it on different lines, owing to the rise of new militarv Powers to tlie south- GERMAN MILITARY MOTOR CAR. GUN IN POSITION FOR FIRING AT AEROPLANES. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 227 east of Austria and to the " specding-iip " of the Russian Army. But up to the declivrii- tion of war in 1914 the tendency had done no more than round off the old system as a preparation for a new one, and in point of organization the army that took tlic field in that year was, substantially, the army that had been conceived 20 years before and felowly matured. What other qualities and possi- bilities had been sacrificed to the perfection of the organization the story of the war itself will show in due course. But the military machine, as a machine, was strongly built, powerful, speedy, and well oiled. Let us see, first, how the peace organization of the active army was supposed to function on mobilization. At any given moment the infantry — to take the most important arm first — consisted of the professional officers and non-commissioned officers and two-year con- tingents of conscripts. The peace establish- ment of the infantry battalion stoqd in 1914 atabo-ut740 for certain corps* and 670 for the rest. To complete to a war establishment of about 1,080, no corps required more than 35 per cent, of ie&ervists,t and some needed only 20 per cent. In other words, hardly one year's contingent of reservists was needed for the completion of the active unit to war establishment. Cavalry, as in most other countries, had one more squadron in ))eace than in war — in this case 5 to 4 — and it rode out of barracks for field service with few or no reservists, either men or horses, in its ranks. In the artil- lery, the serious defect of low horse establish- ment had been removed, and the foot (heavy) artillery had been increased, both as to number of miits and establishment, an increase wliich was to have no small influence on the w^ar. These few details will servo to show the care that was taken to make the first-line army as professional as was humanly possible within the limits imposed by citizen recruiting and short service. It is true that the increased establishments referred to were recent — they formed, in fact, the greater part of the changes consequent upon the Balkan wars — but it is equally true that they took effect upon the army of 1912. It was as though a rebuilding of the old edifice upon new lines had been begun by the strengthening of the structvire as it stood. Another portion of the peace mechanism provided the cadres for reserve units. GENERAL VON MOLTKE. Chief of the Great General Staff of the German Army. Following the example of France, Germany had provided her active peace regiments with supernumerary officers of the higher ranks, whose future ta-sk it was to form the thousands of reservists whom the mobilized active unit did not need (viz., the four classes aged 25-28) into reserve regiments. Up to 1913 it had been intended to form one reserve battalion, but the increase of recniit intake and establishments in 1913 set free enough reservists for the formation of two reserve battalions per active regiment. And not only the reserve, but also the Landwehr of still older men, had its expansion mechanism. The majors administering Landwelir districts became, on mobilization, commanders of Landwehr batta- lions. In sum, the units of the principal arms in 1914 could be estimated with fair accuracy as follows : — — Battalions of Infantiy. Squadrons of Cavalry. Batteries ot Field Art.* Active llcscrve . , Liandwelir 669 434 310 650 > About { 300t 633 300t • About 45 per cent, of the Infantry were on Ihe hlsher estab- lishment. tVery small doiluctions need bv nwdc for unfit, ns the c?t.nbiisli- mcnt » a minimum anil not a niaxinmm ; 8 to 9 per cent, additional conscripts bciuL- taken in yearly to meet " wastece. •InclndiDg horse artillery batteries. IWonld probably Include Landwehr men to some extent, as nv servtsts were required to man the nuiumnition colucuu of the mobilized active army. :Reserve squadrons, i.e., drafting dcrOts, of active ngimenis not included. SLack of horses would make the mobilixatiou of tiese batteries very dithcult. 228 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. iv y ) > ^ ''^l g| 1 ^^^f -• R \ 1 PRINCE VON BULOW. rr«(.«*'. Formations of older men (Landsturm) for local defence scarcely concern us, except in so far as they released Landwehr units for line- of -communication service near the front. In respect of this branch, the German organization was in no way superior to that of France and other belligerents, more stringent administra- tion of the liabihty lists being counterbalanced by the lack of that local initiative which in this local service is worth more than bureaucratic efficiency. As regards the total military force at the disposal of the Emperor, an estimate of 1918 gave : — Active army reserve, and Landwehr, all trained (3,700,000 gross), net .. 3,100,000 Ersatz reserve (surplas of annual con- tingents— —i.e., men of active army and reserve age, who, though fit, had never sei'ved) . . . . . . . . . . 900,000 Others liable, mostly untrained, of all ages and trained men over 36 (gross about 6,000,000), net, say .•5,000.000 7,000,000 net Of these trained men, the units of the active army, reserve and Landwehr (1,403 battalions. 850 squadrons. 933 batteries, pins engineers, train, &o.) would absorb about 2,100,000, or somewhat less, leaving one million trained men. as well as nearly the same nimiber untrained in hand. More than half of these 1,900,000 would be available for replacing casualties in the active army, even after all garrisons, railway guards?, &c., had been jirovided for on a liberal scale, both in ofTicors and in men. Now this capacity for sustained war at firat sight appears to be opposed to the first objects of Gerrnan organization — the sudden blow of maximum violence. The discrepancy is, how- ever, only apparent, for however boldly Ger- many staked the whole of her finest troops on the chance of crushing her western neighbour in three weeks, she had to make allowance tor the needs of " containing " that neighbour when the active regiments hastened eastward to deal with the Russians. Just as in the first stage little more than reserve formations would be told off to delay the Russians while the active army crushed France, so too in a second stage, not only had the gaps in her active army, now opposed to Russia, to be filled, but extra reserve formations had to be provided on a grand scale in order to hold France down when conquered. A single active army — as nearly professional and as independent of reservists as possible — two sets of reserve formations, one to go west with the Active Army and to remain in the west, the other to ho.d the east until the Active Army could be transferred thither ; in addition, coiist defence troops, fortress garrisons, and railway guards, and unformed masses of indi- viduals to replace csisualties in each and all of these categories of service units — such, in brief, seems to have been the composition of the German Army in 1914. The effective command of these millions was, as in 1870, vested in the Kaiser, who as " Supreme War Lord " (Oberste Kriegsherr) of the Empire enjoyed powers, even in the kingdoms of other members of it, such as not even the Tsar exercised over the Russiar armies- He was both King and commander-in-chief, as every Hohenzollern ruler had been before liim. His experience in handling troops on manoeuvres was probably as great as that of any man living, and his favourate finale, the charge of cavalry masses, though ridiculed in other countries, was regarded by some few level-headed critics as a proof of nerve and judgment, for men who can handle 50 or 60 squadrons at the gallop are, and always were, rare in any army. What was more doubtful than his cavalry qualities was his THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 229 capacity as supreme director of millions. Of the cold, steady mind, the slirewduoss, the sonso of proportion of Moltko, he had given no evi- dence. It was fortunate for Prussia that her modern military system had been designed at a time when tlie ruling HohcnzoUern was not a first-class soldier, and needed a chief of the great General Staff to " keep him straight." The institution of tliis office had had as its result, first, the offacement of the King as initiator of strategical and tactical operations ; secondly, the possibility of selecting the best general of the Army, irrespective of seniority, as the real direc- tor of operations (since he was only an adviser to the King and not a commander sot over his seniors) ; thirdly, the intimate correlation of peace -preparatioa and war-action, in that the same officer and his staff managed both ; and, lastly, tlie com.bination both of authority aiad of responsibility in the head of the State. This peculiar method of command, tried in two wars, had succeeded. But William I. was both a veteran of the campaigns' against Napoleon, iind a man of remarkable solidity of character, and liis Moltke was a very great soldier. No one could prophesy an equally easy woridng of the system when the commander-in-chief was both imaginative and erratic and the chief of staff an ordinary general. But the Germans pinned their faith to the system of combining the man of highest authority with the man selected for greatest technical ability. The system — always the system ! For the purpose of operations the General Heatlquartcrs then consisted of the Kaiser and t lie Chief of the General Staff. The units inmie- diately controlled by them were styled armies, and numbered I., II., &c. In many cases, though not in all, the army conmiaiiders were the " Army inspectors " of peace. For some years before the war the 25 Army Ck>rp8 had been grouped for purposes of inspection and training under those inspectors, of whom latterly there wero eight. It had been assumed that these generals would command armies composed of the army corps with which they had dealt in peace. Tliis was not in all cases done. But the principle remained, and the forces in the liold wero divided into armies, each under it.* own army commander and consisting of three or more army corps and one or more cavalry divisions, according to the part entrusted to each in the " fmidamental plan." The army corps, without reserve formations incorporated in it, was the ba^io unit of the Army. In peace time it consisted of two divisions, each of two infantry brigades ( = four regiments. = twelve battalions) ;* one cavalry brigade, and one field artillery brigade. To one or other of the divisions were attached a light infantry battalion, a pioneer battalion (equivalent to the British field units of Royal Engineers), and a battalion of train (Array Service Corps). As a rule each corps, division, &c., was recruited and stationed in its own area, and from this fact had resulted a considerable advantage in speed of mobilization, since the unit's reservists wero close at hand. But the absorption of all the Polish, Alsatian and Lorraine recruits in the units of the V., XV'., and XVI. corps was naturally dangerous, and these corps drew recruits from all over the Prussian dominions, as also did the Corps d' elite of the Guard ; as, however, these units were frontier corps, they stood on an exception -^ ally high peace footing and needed few reser- . ♦ This sUtement held lood In the cms oI 15 corvs : the otbcn oonlalnerl fl. 10 and. hi the rase of the Guard. 11 rartmcnt*. Al corp« with 10 or more regiments formed an extra brixade. UHLANS. 230 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB vists, so that their more general recruiting did oot impair their rapidity of mobilization.* In close connexion with this territorial re- cruiting stood the organization of " Landwehr districts " above mentioned, whereby the closest touch was maintained between the recruits of the district, its serving soldiers, and its reservists of all ages. It had formerly been the practice to split up the units of each corps in many towns, with a view to preserving this local touch ; but in more recent years the risk of small isolated units falling into a stagnant condition had been seen, and though the system was retained, it was supplemented, at great expense, by the provision in each corps area of a central training camp, in wloich the troops spent the summer in company. •The former objectioiiR to tlie employment of Hanoverians in the X. Corps had practically ceased to be vaiid. and tliat corps waK to aU iBteutJi and purpoises territorially recruited. In war, one division of each corps gave up its cavalry brigade and its horse artillery, which went to form part of a cavalry division,* and the other brigade was broken up so as to give each division of the corps a regiment of divisional cavalry. Thus cleared of the units that belonged to it only for purposes of peace recruiting and administration, the normal corps consisted of two divisions and an extra battalion of infantry, two cavalry regiments attached to the divisions, two field artillery brigades, f one to each divi- sion, and technical and departmental troops, as shewn in the diagram annexed. *Tliere had l)een prolonged controversy on the subject of the permanent cavalry division, but. except in the Guard, no organized cavalry division existed in peace. tThese were far larger units than the British Field Artillery " brigade." which was a lieutenant-colonel's connnand of tliree batteries, whereas tne German was a major-general's commaud of two held artillery regiiueatfi. ORDRE de: bataille 2^° DIVISION OF A NORMAL CORPS l?T DIVISION iii iii 666 666 666 666 iii 666 _L J_ _L J_ J_ _L X -L Infantry Regiments and Machine Gun Companies Infantry Pediments and A/lachine Cun Companies Inf. Brigade Inf Brigade Inf Brigade Inf Brigade Field Artillery Brigade Field Artillery Brigade F Arty Regt. F Arty. Regt F Arty Regt F Arty. Regt. f^Arty. Croup FArty. Croup FArty. Croup FArty. Croup FArty. Croup FArty Croup FArty Croup F Arty. Croup 1' 1' 1' 'i' 1' 1' •1' 1' 1' 'i' 1' 1' •J. .J. ;[. 1' 1' 1' ill 1' 1' i 1' 1' lEI ^ IS ISl m IS IS IS Croup Am. Column Croup Am. Column Croup Am. Column Croup Am. Column Croup Am. Column Croup Am. Column Croup Am. Column Croup Am. Column 6 6 1^ li ^ ^^'^- ^^3*- lAl^lillS ICav.Regt. 1 1 / Pioneer Company □ / Pioneer Company O-O / Telephone DetdcM 0<3 / Telephone Detach^ W 1 Bridging Train W 1 Bridging Train f+] / Sanitary Company [+J / Sanitary Company THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. CORPS TROOPS 231 l[l Ijl lll lll 13 Heet/j' Hoivit^er Bdttdlion and Am. Column O o o o o Air Service Signal iV/reless ■• Telegraph •• Telephone •• DIVISIONAL TRAINS Etc. . CORPS TRAINS Etc. DIVISIONAL TRAINS Etc. + e Field Hospitals O Veterinary Section Corps Bridging Train [+] 6 Field hospitals O Veterinary Section Field Bakeries o o Ammunition Columns —,,^,^,„ Field Cun SS^S and lioiv'r Am. Ammunition Column 13 Hvy. Artillery Ammunition Co/umns ir-, le-. . . _. '^e/o' Gun IE33I3 ^nd Hoyvr. Am. Train Y^ Baggage ^ Supply Train [3 Baggage ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF A CAVALRY DIVISION Brigade Brigade Brigade Regt. 0000 Regt 0000 Regt Regt Regt 0000 Regt 0000 Q Wireless Section Q Pioneer Section 1' 'i' i' J Horse Batteries and am. cols. Machine -L Cun Section 232 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A Reserve division, whether forming tlie third division of an active corps or grouped with other reserve divisions, was similar in strength and organization to an active division- except that it had only one regiment of field artillery (6 batteries) instead of two. The larger units of the Landwelir, grouped by themselves or with reserve units, varied m composition according to the resources available on mobilization and their special tasks. The strengtli of the army corps of 25 battahons, eight squadroixs, twid 24 field batteries, with its combatant and non-combatant auxiliaries, was, according to Lehnerts Handbuch for 1913, 41,000 all ranks with 14,000 horses and 2,400 vehicles, guns included- That of a cavalry division, without auxiliaries other than those shown in the diagram (*) was 5,000 men, 5,300 horses, iind 200 vehicles inclusive of guns. It will be observed, therefore, that the Gorman army c(Mps was practically equivalent to two British divisions, but that a German cavalry division was little more than half as strong as, and much less completely equipped in teclmical troops than, the British. Nor had the German division fuiy heavy guns, although the army corps was usually provided with one heavy howitzer battalion. The equipment of the Germans in machine guns was also less complete. We have hitherto considered the units of each arm simply as blocks to be arranged in large and small boxes called corps, divisions, and brigades. It remains to described their structure and their working in rather more detail. The infantry regiments, commanded by a full colonel, had three battalions, each com- manded by a lieutenant-colonel or a major, and a machine gun company. The battalion had four companies, commanded by mounted captains, and the company three platoons, under subalterns. The war strength of the company in officers and men was 270, which gave about 250 rifles for the firing line. Thus, broadly, the strength of the 12-oompany regiments was 3,000 rifles. ' The machine gun company of the regiment had six guns, the same proportion to the battalion as in the British Army. But the different organization must lie noted, for it had reference to a different idea of the uses of macliine guns. Whereas in the British and French Army these weapons were scattered by pairs amongst the battalions at the outset with a view to aiding the development of maximum fire power from a minimum number of men, thus economizing defensive forces for the benefit of the eventual counter-attack, the German machine guns were massed in a group and regarded as a reserve of fire, which enabled the local commander to dispense with human reserves and to put his whole force of rifles into action from the first without fear. Here is an example of tactical doctrine and formal organization dovetailing into one another. The machine gim is a compendium of some fifty rifles, and was so regarded in all armies ; in the French and British it was deployed at the outset in order to allow the equivalent number of men to be reserved, and in the German it was reserved in order to allow these men to be deployed at the outset. The Gennan infantry machine guns were conveyed on the march in a wagon, and when unpacked for action were fitted imderneath with sleigh-rvmners and dragged across country.* (•) The provleioii of a cavalry train was another controversial sublect in Germany. Tliere was much to be said for it. but it is wortll noting that in Great Britain tlie cavalry train introduced in 1911 waa alx)li«ht'd in 1913. •The cavaby machine gim battery (one per division) was somewhat (litferently organized. GERMAN FIELD BATTERY. THE TIMES HlSTOliY UF THE WAR. 233 THE PRUSSIAN GOOSE STEP. Tlio weapon of the infantry soldier was the excellent long riflo of 1898, with a box magazine taking a clip of five cartridges at a time. In the infantry company a certain number of buglers, range-takers, and signallers formed a small party under the captain's orders, distinct from the platoons- — an arrangement that had been copied by the British Army from the German a short time before the war. The ruling idea of infantry tactics was the de\ elopnient of the greatest possible fire-power, which it was sought to produce by forming very strong firing lines at long range so as to open fire simultaneously when more eflective ranges were reached. Behind this strong firing line came supports, also denloyed, so as to be able to fill up the gaps along the length of the firing line as men were shot or straggled away for safety. Not dasli, but sheer power, w-as the ideal. Even the bayonet charge was regarded as merely a way of "presenting for jiayment the cheque drawn by rifle-fire," as the sequel rather than the culmination of tlie infantr> attack. In the interests of this theory tlio Germans had tlieir infantry formations princi- pally selected, if not exclusively, with a view to rapid deployment. Tlie old " company column " of 1870 — platoons in line one behind the other — was freely used under the name of " colunui of platoons," and a new " company column " had been introduced which affords yet another example of the dovetailing of doc- trine and organization. In appearance it was exactly the same as a French or British " line of platoons in fours," but whereas in the armies of the Allies it was a formation for manoeuvring under fire in Germany it was used to reduce the time of deployment to a minimum, so as to show that powerful fire-front to which the Germans pimied their faith as rapidly as possible. Their confident belief in the power of fire to win battles has already been mentioned in connexion with machine guns, and it will be sufficient here to note that it underlay all their severely practical formations, from that of the GERMAN MILITARY MOTOR-CAR, ARMED WITH A KRUPP GUN FOR FIRING AT 234 THE TIMES HlSTORi OF THE WAR. di\-ision on the march down to that of the platoon under shrapnel fire. The unit of the cavalry, as always, was the squadron of about 150 sabres — " lancos " would be a better expression, since the whole of the German cavalry, and not the Uhlans alone, were armed with the lance. The regi- ment on service had four squadrons of this strength, commanded by captains with subalterns in charge of the " troops," of wliich there were four to the squadron. No arm of the service had been the object of more severe criticism and attack than the cavalry, and the events of the South African War and the Manchurian Campaign had not been en- couraging to the champions of the old knec- to-knee charge, in which for a generation before 1900 the Germans had excelled all others. Even in Germany the orthodox views on cavalry had been rudely challenged, and so liigh an authority as Bernhardi had openly joined the heretics. At one time, only a couple of years before this war, it had even been seriously proposed that the Gennan trooper should bo armed with the rifle and bayonet. In this instance, then, German tactical ideas both official and imoffieial were in a state of flux, and no certain indication as to the details of cavalry action could have been discerned in advance. There were, of course, general principles, such as that of reconnaissance by cavalry masses as the best basis of general strategic dispositions^ — a principle wliich the opposite party flatly denied — but in so far as these were true there was nothing new about them, and in so far as they were new the doctrines of the Bernhardi school were at least questionable. What the special quality, the differentia, of German cavalry was to be was then unknown. Formerly it had excelled on its own solid groiuid in the horsemastership and individual riding that Schmidt, Rosenberg, CONCEALED OERMAN ARTILLERY. [Central Neus, THE TIMES iniSTORY OF THE WAR. 235 Seufft-Pilnaoh, and cavalr^• leaders of their stamp had made the basis of the grand charge. Now, not only had its enemies learned as much, hut it was doubtful whether the grand charge would figiu"e in the new cavalry tactics at all. The regimental organization of the field artillery is shown in the diagram. For each infantry division one regiment was available, each of two groups (Abteilungen) of tliree six-gun batteries and a light ammunition column, In one of the two regiments a howitzer grou]) was substitutt^d for one of the gun groups. Kach battery had, in addition, an " ob.servation wagon," from the ladder of whicli its captain directed the fire. To each gun one battery wagon was allotted, but all these wagons, collectively called the echelon (stajjel), marched in rear of tlie guns and only tliree were normally brought up alongside the guns in action. Herein the German artillery procedure presented a sharjj contra.st to tlie more up-to-date methods of the French and the English, whose batteries always had one wagon per gun and sometimes more in the fighting line, as well as a second and even a third in the wagon line. This comparative poverty of immediate ammuni- tion supply tlie Germans expected to make good by means of the light ammunition column, which was organized on the basis of one wagon per gun. The British and German systems may thus be compared : — Wagons per battery — German firing battery, 3 ; staffel, 3 : light ammunition column, 6=12.* British firing battery, 6.; wagon line, 6 ; brigade ammunition column, 6=18.* As in the case of the cavalry, so in that of the artillery, tactical ideas in Germany were ill a state of flux. But whereas in. the case of tiie cavalry the disputants on both sides were well abreast of the times, in that of the artillery an imfortunate blunder of the higher authorities had compelled the arm to lag behind the same arm in other countries, and that at a peritd in \\liich artillery was developing with unheard of rapidity. In 1896 the German tiovernmcnt decided to rearm its field batteries with the 0/96 gun, a breech-loader that was probably better than any gun of corresponding date in other armies. This was carried out at enormous expense almost immediately. But in 1897 France rearmed with an entirely new class of gun, the quick-firer, and it soon became evident that artillery tactics and even tactics in general had been revolutionized. Germany, found •IMuB gun-limbers in each case ; the observation wagoD of the CJerman battery also carried wmie jumu'iiiUiou. L e^ E J J '^JhSh' ^^^^H Tf -1^3 h:. ^^^^m T^ * » '4HHI MEMBKK.S Ot i HE GKKMAN HlvU C;ROSS CORPS. [Smspjper ItltistrstioHS. wanting for once in that slirewd foresight with which she is generally credited, luwi to face the fact that her brand-new guru* were out of date. But as it was impossible to spend fresh millions on a reannament there was notliing to bo done but to watch and wait. Lest moral should suffer it was asserted that the -96 gim was " jiractic- ally " a quick-firer, and that no revolution in tec- tics, artillery or other, had come about in con- sequence of the new French weapon Thus the methods and instructions of field artillery training remained in the breech-loader era while other armies were successively following the lead of France. The points of the quick- firer are soniewliat tecluiical, but they can be summed up roughly in. one plirjvsc — the steady carriage and the free-recoiling gun. The anchoring of the 'Carriage made it possible to (ire with far greater speed, since the giui- carriage did not leap back on tiring, and had not to be re-laycd at each roiuid, as of old. It made indirect tire from behind cover com- paratively easy, since the ctirriage accurately kept its position and angles once mea.stired from an observing station hold good in action. The recoil of the gun along the set path of its guides or rumiers was so smooth that the accuracy of tire was greater than it had over been. And, lastly, the gun-carriage remaining steady, the men serving the gun coidd take cover Ix'hind a gun-shield and had not at every roimd to stand clear of the wheels. In every one of these important points the German gun, fiood 236 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMAN TRANSPORT. of its kind as it was, was totally wanting, and its tactics had necessarily to conform — or rather were prevented from following the progress of other artilleries. Presently the crisis passed as a means was found of converting the guns so as to recoil on an anchored carriage. [t became " 96/NA," a true quickfirer, though, as was to be expected, not a very successful one. In power and general quality it was inferior to the gun of any European Power's first line army, and equivalent, or nearly so, to the British Territorial Arrny's converted 15-pounder. One advantage, however, it possessed over better models — it was very light «D man-handle in action. What other possi- bilities had been sacrificed to this rio one but the designers could tell. But the ^vantage, so far as it went, was incontestabl*. It must be noted however that the gun limbered up and travelling was quite as iieaVy as other field - gun equipments elsewhere. In other respects, such as speed of ranging and accuracy of slirapnel fir© under normal conditions,* ease of switching batteries on to successive targets, &c., the Germans were at a very great dis- advar>tagc, and if the infantry that underwent its fire in 1914 spoke of it with respect, it was chiefly because time-shrapnel fire on a large scale had never been experienced by that infantry. Destructive bombardment of ac- curately located trenches by German field- guns was occasionally, if not frequently, re- corded, but in its function — the chief function "Hence, probably, the denperate eftorls made by the OermanB to take riuHiee by means oi spies, reported by British and other aoliien* In the west. of field artillery — of covering the infantry's advance to the assault, the cool shooting oi the British infantry on the defensive proves it to have failed. But if the field gun and its tactics were below the most modern standards, the howitzers, both great and small, were of the most modern and formidable types, and it is probable that most of the effect achieved by the German artillery in the v/ar was the work of the howitzers. The field howitzers (•t-lin. calibre), as we have said, formed part of the field artillery of the divisions and were organized in the same wa^ in a group (ableilung) of three six-gun batteries and anmumition column. The heavy howitzers were, however, manned by the foot artillery (corresponding to the British Royal garrison artillery). A heavy field howitzer battalion horsed for field service with an army corps consisted -of four four-gun batteries of Gin. (15c/m.) howitzer.-i with two extra observa- tion wagons to enable the whole to work in two two-battery groups. The 'battery of four guns had an observation wagon, four first wagons with the gims, four second wagons in the ataffel. and a liglit ammunition column. The mobility of these weapons was roughly that of the 6(1- pounder long gun of the British Army Heavier still were t)ie mortars*, of 8.4in. and, for siege purposes, of llin. calibre, on special wheeled carriafjes, of which the wheels were equipped so as to give a good bearing both on •A certain number of batteries were equipped with 41n. and 5in. lonfE Ruus instead of he:ivy howitzers anu mortars. THE TIMES HlSTOkf OF THE WAR. 237 FORTIFICATIONS OF THE RHINE FRONTIER. 238 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMAN FIELD POST-OFFICE. [NewspapfT lUustratwns. the road and on the ground when firing. This device had been so far perfected that the great llin. howitzers (mortars) which had hitherto required concrete beds were brought into action before the Belgian fortresses on their own wheels. The horse artillery, of which 11 groups were provided for the service of 11 line cavalry divisions, were organized in four-gun batteries. The gun was simply the field gun stripped of the gunners, their kits, and various other weights, and not a lighter piece in itself as was the British horse artillery gun. The foot artillery allotted to fortresses and the fortress engineers falls outside the scope of the present chapter, which deals with field armies and field units only. Little need be said, too, of the field engineers, who were styled pioneers, except that the sharp division ^ of the whole technical arm into fortress and barrack engineers and field pioneers is in complete contrast to the organization ot the British royal engineers, who form one large corps, of which all parts are ofiBcially considered •Eather becaune only 22 were available . under the itrevioun ■ix-Run battery orKanizatlon for 33 cavalry brigades than from general acceptance on tactical grounds of tlie four-gun ijrinciple. which in other countries hiui rapidly grown in favour since the xlopticn ot the auick-Hier. to DO interchangeable. Shortly before the war it had been suggested that the German system should be adopted in Great Britain, but the controversy which grew out of the suggestion showed a very strong opposition to the pro- posal, and while pioneer battalions are abso- lutely indispensable in undeveloped countries such as India, there was certainly nothing in the performances of the German pioneer companies in 1870 to warrant acceptance of the dual organization by others. Another point to be noted is that all such branches as telegraphy, air service, and railway troops were in Germany completely separated from both the engineers and the pioneers, and formed a class by themselves as " communica- tion troops " (verkehrstruppen). How far these communication troops entered into the composition of the army corps the diagrams above indicate ; the remainder wore, of course, allotted to the service of lines of communication. Cyclists, other than those employed as dispatch riders, had been for many years regarded with disfavour in Germany. A short time before the war, however, their utility for certain combatant services was at last admitted, and detachments (of the strength of a small com- pany) were formed by the light infantry battalions (jiigers) as infantry supports for the advancea cavalry divisions. Signallers, other than telegraphists, were an ill-developed branch in Germany as else- where, for it was only in the British Army that visual signalling had been brought to any high degree of usefulness. In Germany, as late aa five years before the war, fiag signalling had only been used for communication between butts and firing points at target practice. Supply was controlled by the train and the staff officers representing that branch of the service on the staffs of armies, corps, and divi- sions. In general, local resources were used as far as possible, but there was of course a full organiza- tion for supply from the rear, and in the soldiers' haversacks there were two or more " iron " rations as emergency supplies. The complete break with horsed transport traditions that had been possible for Great Britain, with her small Army and her large resources in motor lorries, was not so for Germany, whose mechanical transport vehicles, in spite of heavy subsidiee from the State, were not-.numerou8 enough to deal with the supplies of her huge forces in the British way. In its broadest outline, therefore, the system of supply from the rear was a construction of horsed magazines and " road-trains " (petrol tractors with trucks) analogous to that of the British Army between THt: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 239 1905 and 1911, with the exception- — an impor- tant one, as all staff officers know — that thoro seems to have been no accumulation of stores at an " advanced dep6t," but a daily dispatch to one or more clumgeable " railheads." Such magazines as there were in the neighbourhood of the fighting area were " field depots " for the storage of requisitioned supplies. Infantry companies, &c., were furnished with travelling kitchens. The train was as usual divided into baggage sections and supply portion-s, and the latter were organized and their wagons packed by sections of one day's food each. The system of medical aid in the field differed from that of the British Army chiefly in^-the greater development of the regimental aid post system and the absence of the clearing hospital, which in the British system was intended to free the field ambulances of wounded at the earliest possible moment. The German system, in short, was one of field hospitals rather tlian one of field ambulances.* But the main point, the principle of evacuating wounded us fast as possible and placing them in line of communication or base hospitals, was common to both — indeed to all — armies. The ammuni- tion supply of the infantry was secured first by company ammunition wagons, whose contents — as in the British service — were brought to the firing line by the incoming supports and reserves ; PRINCE OF LIPPE. iCtnUal Nms. and secondly by the divisional ammunition columns*, wliich formed the most advanced portion of the train, half a day's march behind the troops. The organization of these auxiliary services *Field hospitals formed part of the trains and not, as did British fleid ambulances, of tlie liist-iine transport. *Not tlie itirtit ammunition columns of the artillery, as in Uie British service. GERMAN INFANTRY CELEBRATING SEDAN DAY IN BERLIN. {CtHtfot Ntm. 24U THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. was, in short, minute and thorough. But it was certainly questionable whether it was up to date. The same might indeed be said of the fighting troops themselves. Foreign observers who had attended the KaisermanGver year after year were agreed upon the fact that the German Army was a wonderful machine. But many if not most of them noted at the same time that the elements of the machine — the human beings, the short-service citizens — had been sacrificed to mechanical efficiency, and that if the fate of a raodem battle, as all asserted — Germans as emphatically as any — depended upon the qualities of the individual soldier, the German Army would fall far below the reputation for invincibility that it had arrogated to itself. CHAPTER XVI. THE GERMAN THEORY OF WAR. Historical Development Since 1870 — Prussianizing the Army — Large and Inefficient VERSUS Small and Efficient Akmies — ^Wab on Two Fronts Determining Factor — The Battle WITH " No Morrow " or " Battle of Reversed Fronts " — The Napoleonic and 1870 Examples — Close Group and Deploying of Central Reserves Impossible — The " Tidal Wave " Envelopment — ^Moltke's Practice — Objections to the " Tidal Wave " Theory — ^Need for Accurate Information as to Position of Enemy — Means of Obtaining Information Am- craft — Use of Cavalry and Machine Guns — The German Railways — ^Necessity of a Wide Strategic Front and Consequent Need fob Invading by Luxemburg and Belgium ^Move- ments OF Corps had to be Simultaneous and According to a Time-table — Danger of counterstrokes protective detachments initiative of commanders rfstricted German Tactics Accompanying the " Tidal Wave." ON land, the conflict of Germany with France and Great Britain was a conflict not only of principles and of men and of weapons, but also one between different ideas on the methods of conducting miUtary operations. Some of the differences were derived from and others governed the principles, the men, and the arms. If, therefore, we are to understand the opera- tions of the war aright, it is necessary to reaUze the nature of the rival, almost opposed, theories of war wliich were put into practice in those operations. It has already been remarked that the German organization stands in closer relation to the German doctrines of strategy and tactics than the French organization to the French principles. For in Germany the Government through its police-like bureaucracy has a far greater hold on the individual citizen than in France, and it had had that hold for so long that several successive army systems based upon it had come and had their day and gone again. In other words, purely strategic and tactical lionsiderations could be allowed for in the forms and framework of the Army to an extent that would not have been possible in a comnumity less wealthy (like Japaji) or one more in- VOL. I.— Part 7. 241 dividualized (as in the case of France), or one in which defence problems were manifold in kind and varying in degree (as in Great Britain). Germany's military problem, on however great a scale it seemed to be set, was in reality a simple one, and simplicity and power were the main elements of the military system adopted to solve it. Nevertheless, traditions and matters of external and internal policy had their effect here as elsewhere upon the military system, and it was not a slight one. To begin with, 1866 and 1870 had imbued the German Army and the German people at large with a conviction that, in general, their organi- zation — a single-line army which was a com- [iromise between the regular profassional type and the national militia type — -was that most suited to the circumstances of a European War of the future, and the fact that other nations copied, their system more or less slavishly after 1870 made of tliis conviction a creed of self- satisfaction. When from time to time German officers preached that the Empire was in danger, it was not in the belief that matters were really in that case, but with the intention of improving still more upon their formidable war engine. The bible of this tradition \raa the Official History of the 1870 war. But the authorities 242 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL GALLIENI. Military Governor of Paris in 1914 and observant officers of all ranks who had been through that war knev? vpell that the army of 1 870 was imperfect in many vital points, and, as a first reform, the authorities set about imposing the Prussian military institutions upon the South German contingents, in the name of simplicity, and sous-entendu in that of power, since it was not only the want of homogeneity but also the lack of discipline and " drive " in battle that had made those contingents so feeble. The process of forming the homogeneous army was neither easy nor pleasant, for it involved putting strict officially-minded Prussians in the midst of easy-going South- erners as comrades in field and mess ; and in one respect it was even necessary to infringe upon the historic territorial system of recruitment, since it was obviously impossible to put Hano- verians en masse into the X. Corps, or Alsatians in the XV. This process of Prussianizing the Army was praictically completed in about 30 years, and thus, when the Great War came, it had taken effect for 15 years or so. There were yet other things to be done. The tactical results of 1870 — the first war in which breech-loader met breech-loader— were hard to digest, and it is safe to say that for many years no two groups of officers held exactly the same opinions on the most serious questions of tactics. No authority in the world has less liking for chaos than the Prussian, but authority was powerless to deal with the men of 1870 — whom it had so well taught to exercise " initiative " — and the old 1812-1848 drill-book was retained for parade purposes till 1888, while outside the limits of the barrack square all was opinion and controversy. When homogeneity of organization and type was fairly well completed, homogeneity in the tactical sphere was still far distant. Each master-mind evolved his own tactical theories, and the rest followed agape. Tn those days there were giants — Bronsart, Verdy du Vemois, Meckel, Scherff, Boguslawski, Hoenig. The phenomena which these men set them- selves to examine were the same for each, the battlefield phenomena of 1870, the " dis- solving " effect of rifle fire, and above all the problem of preventing, imder the new condi- tions of warfare, the wholesale skulking of unvvounded men.* Time after time in the earlier battles one- third and more of the m.en nominally engaged had been missing as unwounded stragglers — runaways in some cases, but chiefly skulkers who, after lying down to fire, were " deaf to the call of the whistle " when their comrades rose and pushed forward, and who lay cowering or, worse still, kept up a fusillade against all troops that approached them. The problem of these " squatting hares " (Driickeberger) dominates the military thought of the eighties and nineties, and at the close of this epoch two broad ideas, understood rather than expressed in words, had taken shape in men's minds. One was that, human nature being human nature, the only way in which to ensure that all the available brave men were brought into action was to bring into the army every possible man, even at the cost of shortening the term of service and lowering the physical standards, since no test really told except the psychic test of battle itself. Tactically (according to the supporters of this school of thought) the mass was to be handled in the simplest possible fashion— quietly deployed in full strength at the outset, and then at the proper momem launched in full sudden violence to drive through to victory by its inherent worth alone. All manoeuvres and dispositions were to bo made in view of the one purpose of giving effect to the will power of those private soldiers who possessed it. Of the rest some would be carried on by their brave comrades, and as •Mttssendriickeberaertuvi is the technical term Invented by the Germans for this phenomenon. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 243 for thn romainder, who enciunbered the battle- field, matters would be no worse after all than in 1870. The other school, or rather the other tondoncy (for the word school is too definite and formal), had as its starting point the principles of Frederick the Great ; it was proposed to sacrifice quantity to quality and initiative to hard discipline, and to seek victory with a smaller army trained to mechanical per- fection. For the supporters of this school the secret of victory was speed of onset coupled with crushing volleys* during the advance. At the same time those leaders who knew 1870 from the company and battalion point of view, and were now risen to higher rank, no longer influenced the company and battalion training upon which controversy then centred. Younger men had taken their places, and it was these who fou2id themselves in the superior commands when the war of 1914 broke out. Below them again was one generation after another, from major to subaltern, which knew nothing of 1870 at first hand, and in their case experience of the realities of the battlefield no longer operated as a check upon attempts to harden extreme theories into practice. Those " realities " were indeed brought into the light by the published works of Meckel, Hoenig, and otliers, but they were regarded by some of the new generation as an almost treasonable attack upon the sacred and also profitable legends of 1870. Those who looked upon them calmly, how- ever, tended to regard them as proving the case for the small, iron quality-army. But the controversy, as a controversy, entered on a new lease of life owing to the introduction of the magazine rifle with its smokeless powder ; when first introduced it threatened to chastise with scorpions the errors and weaknesses that the rifles of 1870 had only beaten with whips. Some held that the Frederician discipline was more than ever necessary, and others that nothing but the thin-swarm method of attack could cope with the fire power of the new weapons. But the former class had the prestige of war experience and the latter, with few exceptions, had not, and the theory of the thick-volley firing line was practically in possession of the field, when a new set of conditions — this time political — arose to confirm it. Before the time of which we axe speaking the game of diplomacy had been played between the •Not literally the old I'redericlan volleys, but what are now railed " bursts of nre." GENERAL D'AMADK. \H. Walltr BjimU. league of the Three Emperors and the Triple Alliance, with Bismarck as " honest broker," and a war with Frahce was the focus to which all ways of German military activity converged. But at that moment of military development the Franco-Russian imderstanding hardened into alliance and Germany was faced with a new problem — the " war on two fronts " — one to which the Austriaji and Italian alliances were no more than a contribution or aid. The shape that German strategy and war doctrine was to take, then, depended cliiefly upon the time which the inunensa Russian Emjiire would need to bring its forces into action. Hitherto this had been in- ordinately long, but now French capital was employed for Russian strategic raihvajis, and the Russian Army, instead of being a peace army distributed tlirough the whole Empire, became a frontier army, with seven-eighths of its strength permanently stationed in Poland and the Balkan provinces. The danger then was really simultaneous action of France and Russia on the two frontiers. But thii danger was rather in the futiu-e than in the present. Many years must elapse before Russian mobilization could be " speeded up " to anything approach- ing that of France or Germany, and there was, therefore, so far as the generation of 1890- 1910 was concerned, an appreciable interval 244 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. between the French side of the possible war and the Russian. That interval it was proposed to use for the crushing of France, whose mobiliza- tion period was two days longer than the German,* and an army that could overwhelm France in a month or six weeks and still be fit afterwards to deal with the Russians had to be an army of high quality and training. But if the conditions of foreign politics favoured the supporters of the quality-army, those at home told almost as much in favour of the quantity-army. While the population had been rapidly growing, the proportion of the recruit contingent taken in annually had not increased. The " universal service " theory had become a farce in practice,- since not much more than one-third of the available recruits were taken, and the others were allowed to go scot free. The result was, on the one hand, a separation of army and nation and an unfair method of recruiting which was creating dis- content and disaffection, and, on the other hand, too few men were undergoing the educa- tion of military discipline which the Government regarded as its safeguard. But unless the peace establishment of the Army was considerably increased, which was impossible, the only • Owing chiefly to the fact that the French Atmy was recruited generaiiy. the regiments drawing their recruits witiiout regard to territorial connexions, whereas in Germany the recruiting system was (save in case of Hanoverians, Alsatians, &c.) strictly local, ail reservists, therefore, living within easy reach of their regiments. The German system was tried In France in the regime of General Andr6, but was a failure. method of passing more men through the ranks was the reduction of the term of colour service, and accordingly the two years' term was in- troduced instead of the old three years', except for cavalry and certain other branches. These conditions, of course, tended to support the adherents of the quantity army. But both the external influences which meule for the quality army and the internal which produced the quantity army were equally power- ful, for their needs were equally imperative. And so the attempt was made to produce the quantity army by conscription and to make it, when produced, into a quality army by cease- less, ruthless intensity of training. From these antecedents and in these condi- tions the modem German doctrine of war grow up. Before it came to its test in 1914, however, the army which was to be its instrmnent had begun over again the cycle of progress. The population continued to increase, while the Armj' strength and the recruit contingent to furnish it remained much the same. Even with two years' service — a minimum that- Germany, with her internal political difficulties, dared not reduce — ^by about 1905 less than half the able- bodied men were being taken into the Army. More and more, then, the notion of the small quality army was gaining ground, while to produce it on a two years' term meant an intensive training which dulled the men by its monotone intensity. But Ru.ssia, mean- while, though temporarily put out of action THE KAISER INSTRUCTING HIS GENERALS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS. 245 by her Japanese war, began — horn 1910 especially —to organize not only her troops but her administrative services, and General Sukliomlinov's reforms rapidly brought tlio day nearer upon which Ruasia could feel sure of concentrating all her forces in three weeks. Thus approached the really simultaneous war on two fronts, not to be met by two successive blows, however fierce they might be and however higlily-tempered the army that delivered them. The hmit was reached in 1912, when the rise of Serbia and Greece made it apjiarent that sometliing less than the whole Austrian Army would be free to serve in Galicia. A halt was called in expenditure on the Fleet. Money was voted to the Army and the peace establish- ments enormously expanded with a view ( 1 ) to reducing the number of reservists required to complete the " active," or liighly-tempered, anny to war strength ; and (2) to providing a cadre of active officers and non-commissioned officers for the reserve formations. The development of these reserve formations, which has already been alluded to in an earlier chapter, was the most important feature of recent military reforms in Germany. Viewed in one aspect, it was a partial return to the principle of two-lino armies, discredited since 1870 ; viewed from another, it was an attempt to secure the worldng of the previous war-plan and war-theory by the old army, by keeping the ring clear for it, under new conditions that had not been allowed for in the original scheme. It may be assumed, then, that the blow upon France was delivered in accordance with the doctrines accepted and the plans prepared in accordance with them. The exact terms of the doctrine or creed are unknown. All that had become known about it before the war was that there was a confiden- tial " instructions for higher commanders," revised in 1910, distinct from the Field Service Regulations of the Army. That being so, the only foundations for what were necessarily guesses were (a) manoeuvre practice ; (b) trend of opinions in German military literatvire ; and (c) the location of the strategic railway stations. These however, taken together, afforded plenty of trustworthy evidence, and the character of the doctrine itself, its plainness and its scorn of artifice and variants indicated that the facts could bo trusted as premises for a conclusion. Its aim was the " battle with no morrow," the complete and self-sufficing decisive victory. As we have seen, temporizing in any form had become less and less possible as against France in pro- portion as the Russian mobilization had become more rapid. If, then, a new Sedan htul been GENERAL DE CASTELNAU. [Pitrrt Pllil. the ideal of the generation of Verdy du Vernois and Bronsart, Moltke's confidential assistants, how much more was it that of the newer genera- tion whose problem demanded speed above all else, and whose manoeuvre experience had not told them the limits imposed by human nature upon the process of speeding-up, nor brought home the fact that in war an army marches not to the " stand-fast " of a field day but to the strain of battle. Policy thus demanding the single decisive victory at the earhest possible date, strategy, called upon to find the means of achieving it, answered with the " battle on reversed fronts.'' If the German Army could place itself in rear of the French, the French would ipso faclo be in rear of the Germans — that is, in each case, the army would be cut off from its mother country. Obviously such a battle would be decisive enough, since the retreat of the beaten side into hostile territorj' instead of friendly woxild be sheer dissolution, not to mention that the descent of one side upon the enemy's rear would inevitably breakup or capture his wagon trains of all sorts. It is true that this is a double-edged weapon, for the Germans woiJd expose their wagons — or more strictly speaking their lines of comminiications — to the same fate. But it was held that success in this 246 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMAN FIELD ARTILLERY. [Centra News. extremely dangerous game would go to the side which sViowed the most desperate resolu- tion and driving force, and compelled the enemy to submit to it, or to try to evade it, rather than to answer it with its like. German authorities spoke of the battle with reversed fronts as the purest form of strategy — as indeed it is, for it plays for nothing less than the annihilation of one side or of the other — but though, with Von der Goltz, they went on to a.ssert that such strategy needed the German Army to execute it, the fact was rather that the German Army needed such strategy. Exceptional circumstances call for strong measures. But whereas in Napoleon's days it was quite feasible, with a compact army in a theatre of war spacious relatively to the army's area within it, to bring about a battle with fronts reversed as at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena, in the modem war of citizen masses its achieve- ment was by no means so easy. In 1870 the great battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat was fought with fronts reversed, bvit it was not the Prussian armies as a whole that brought about the decision, but the few brigades that were still in hand after the French right flank had been found and their whole front engaged. In the case of Sedan it was onlv the forward plunge of McMahon's army that enabled the Crown Prince to get in his rear ; far from deliberately naanoeuvring for the purpose, the German Army III. simply fovmd itself in a position to cut the ]\Iarshal from Paris, and did so.* The possibility of a group of armies on the modern scale passing coinpletely round another similar army was, to say the least, doubtful, and the problem had to be tackled in a different waj. Instead of by passing round, it was to be achieved by a<lvancing in a long deployed line, the flanks of which would, it was expected, lap round those of the more closely grouped enemy, wherever he was met with. This theory of envelopment was the basis of all modern German strategy. Envelopment is simply the surroxmding of the enemy. Supposing that enemy to be stationary (as the French were at Sedan) there are two waj'S of bringing this about — ^(a) by advancing in a close group imtil the enemy is met and then deploying the central reserves out to one or both flanks so as to swing them in upon the enemy's rear ; (b) by starting from a very wide front and gradually converging •The operative strategy of the Sedan Campaign was far from being as simple as tills, and still repays the closest study as a piece of " start work." But as regards theory alone, the above generaliza- tion is correct enough. GERMAN MEDICAL CORPS AND FIELD KITCHEN CROSSING A PONTOON BRIDGE. ICfntral Nfws, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 247 Concentration o- o- ^ o n '^ O c5 ^O----- o- o- Marching otT _j— -□ t ^- I l/Vin§ Centre H J All ip Line Idling - < I Dei^elopment iNing _ | | oF the\Nings O-D \ -D 1 -D I ■D-a \ Qentre Wing -C -D -a •a -a Centre "D -D -D -a -a -a ^/•/7^ <- swinging in Centre ^ t^' y /Vb/'e Aoiy the outer Corps on the right is sa ving time by crossing the tafi oF the other J'HASES OF A GERMAN " ENVELOPMENT " MOVEMENT. 248 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMAN INFANTRY ABOUT TO ATTACK. [Central News, upon the enemy's assumed position. Both methods had been tried on several occasions, the first tactically and on a small scale at Worth in 1870 and strategically on a big scale at Mukden ; the second in 1866, 1870, and at Liao-Yang in 1904. Each had successes and also failures to its account. But with armies of the size that a Franco-German conflict would bring into line the first method was almost, if not quite, impossible owing to the time which the massed central reserves would take to work away to the flanks before they could overlap the enemy and swing in upon his rear. The only form of offensive in which it could be employed was, in fact, the counter-offensive which could be initiated on the basis of a faiily clear military situation, and the counter- offensive ana even the delayed offensive A CUIRASSIER WITH CARBINE. were forms of war in which the Germans, situated as they were with respect to Russia, could not have indulged in if they had wished to do so. • The German envelopment, then, would start from a very wide base on the frontiei- itself — or rather on the line of railheads where the troops were detrained — and thence convoige upon the enemy. It is qviostionable whether Moltke himself ever accepted this principle in toto. In 1866 a strategic deployment of this kind was forced upon him by the lie of the Prussian railways, and many were the risks run in carrying it forward to an issue of de- cisive victory. In 1870 the tendency to envelop certainly appeared on every occasion, but it was coupled with constant striving on Moltke's part to keep his forces in hand and to avoid over-extension. His ideal, if he had ono^and he himself defined strategy as a " system of expedients " — was a hne of closely grouped masses each so far separated from its neighbours as to have elbow room not only for plain de- ployment for battle but for manoeuvre as well. But those who regarded themselves as the inheritors of the Moltke tradition based thein- selves frankly upon the dispositions of 1866, which only came to a happy issue through the enemy's internal dissensions, and of August, 1870, which completely failed in the attempt to envelop the French Army on the Saar. In 1914, then, there was more " system " than " expedients." In other words, the standard enveloping strategy was preconceived — based upon peace-time studies and preconceived ideas as to how the enemy must act according to the rules of the game. As Moltke remarked, " One must always credit the enemy with doing the right thing." But such a saying, axiomatic as it looks, must on no account be treated as an axiom THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 240 It Was all very well for Moltke to say so, but lio himself had on more than one grave occasion, in 18C0 and 1870, seen his best-laid schemes crumble to nothing because the enemy did not take tl:e correct military course — as it api«>ared to Moltke on the data before him. From this it is no groat step to the belief that the onomy must do as our best general tells him, and the expression of this belief is the doctrine that by rapidity and violence of action we can compel an enemy to conform to our own moves. That doctrine and the doctrine of envelopment wore the two principal articles of the German military faith before the war. Their connexion it is important to realize. It is true that with the small armies and slow travel- ling of Napoleon's day the seizure of the initia- tive by sudden violence was quite possible in combination with a close, deep grouping of the forces. But modern conditions of national recruiting and railway transport had, as we have already observed, made this form the instrument of the reserved counter-attack. The side which aimed at the speediest decision could make no use of a form in which the depth of the army during its advance was five or six days' marches. The deployed line, or I.DAYA ^> (B.) ' tidal wave,' on the other hand, was a form that gave the minimxim depth for a given force, hence a minimum lime for deploying to the front for battle, and consequently the speediest decision one way or the other. By the same token, it gave the widest possible front for the given force, and, therefore, the greatest possible chances of overlapping the enemy's front and so of ensuring by envelopment the completest decision. On the other hand, an army deployed to ita greatest possible lateral extension was irre- , trievably committed to the direction then given it. It could not regroup itself to meet new situations on account of its very length. If the point at which the enemy was met lay upon one flank of the line (diagram a) instead of at the centre, as had been presumed GERMAN WAR ROCKET PHOTOGR.\PHY. The Camera is fitted to a parachute which is fired into the air lilce a rocket. 1. Sighting. 2. The Rocket fired. 3. One of the photographs obtained. \,Nras lUusirttions. 250 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMAN CAVALRY TAKING UP POSITIONS. {Central News, (diagram h), the attempted envelopment might, and with an active adversary would almost certainly, come too late. If, again, the enemy's group lay conipletcly outside the sweep of the enveloper's flanks, the latter would have struck the blow in the air, exposed his flank and rear before reaching the enemy's, and, in short, squandered the assets of his initiative to no purpose. If, again, the enenxy were after all in the area presumed, the enveloper would have no small difficulty in so timing his marches as to achieve his purpose, for the enemy, retarding his advance by rearguards, would detain some of the oncoming colunuis far longer than others. These disadvantages of the enveloping method being recognized, let us see how the side that intends to adopt it can neutralize, or attempt to neutralize, them. It is clear, first of all, that everytliing, or nearly everything, depends on the accuracy of the forecast which determines the direction of the line's advance. A part of this informa- tion can be collected, classified, and studied in peace. The remainder must be observed during the course of the operations themselves, either by one or more of the following means : a detachment of all arms carrying out a " reconnaissance in force," and holding the enemy, when found, long enough to ensure that the information gleaned will be still valid at the time of the action based upon it ; or cavalry masses flung out far ahead to ascertain the general outline and apparent movements of the hostile group ; or air reconnaissance ; or, lastly, the reports of spies, newspaper checkers, and other individual agents. Practically all these means are employed by all armies, for information is of very high importance for the working of any form of strategy ; it is in the relative utility of these means that we find divergencies of doctrine. Air reconnaissance being an unl«iown factor, no defiaite weight could be attached to it before the war, for, considering the magnitude of the stakes, it would have been sheer gam- bling to allow great resolutions to depend upon aircraft roconaissance. Apart from the fact that both airships and a roplanes wore hardly out of the experimental or embryonic stage of their development, aircraft, even if they had been perfect, could not have seen into the mind of the hostile general, or taken prisoners with tell-tale regimental numbers on their buttons and caps and divisional colours on their shoulder- straps. Spy reports, &c., on the other hand, were neither more nor less trustworthy than they had been in past wars ; they were, in tact, a constraint for all armies. The divergencies of method referred to lay in the relative im- portance assigned to the detachment of all arms and to the cavalry mass for the service of information. In France and Great Britain, as we shall see, the two were combined ; in Germany, however, it may safely be said that the mixed detachment was anath-. ma, and that the securing of information during the operations was the task of the cavalry alone. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 251 In spite of tho lopend of tho " ubiquitous Uhlan," export opinion was agreed, oven in Germany, that tlie performances of tho re- connoitring cavalry in 1870 were modiocro. In France, after the revival of Napoleonic studies had shown that even the famous squadrons of Murat could not give tho Emperor a firm basis for his manoeuvres, it was hold that the capacity of cavalry for useful strategic reconnaissance was limited by the nature of tho arm itsolf. " Cavalry can reconnoitre, but it cannot hold,"* that is, by the time that tlio cavalry reports had reached headquarters and action liad been taken on them they were out of date and misleading, since the enemy was meantime free to move. In Germany, on tho contrary, it was considered that cavalry reports, transmitted with all tho speed that wireless and motor-cars made possible, were good enough to go on. Certainly the German form of strategic deployment admitted of no other, since the attempt to obtain information by largo detachments of all arms would be contrary to the principle of the simultaneous onset of all parts of the line, to which allusion will presently be made. •Colonel F. N. Maude, C.R At tho same time, attributing tho inability of tho old-fashioned cavalry to ponotrnto an enemy's screen to their feeble fire-power (though nowhere was the shock action of cavalry lield in higher honour than in Germany), the Germans did their utmost to increano it ; carbine, pistol, horso artillery gim were all developed and made use of, and it is significant that the machine-gun, long regarded with suspicion on the Continent, was first adoi)tod by Germany as a fire auxiliary for her cavalry.* At one time, 1912-13, there was even a pro- posal to give tho trooper a bayonet, and finally cyclists — another arm that German military opinion had formerly thought useless — were grouped into companies for the fire-support of the cavalrj'.f These innovations might bo looked upon as a tentative concession to the notion of the all-arras detachment, but it is more accurate to regard thorn as attempts to fortify tho one-arm reconnaissance by enabling it to keep to its main task.| This main task. •Infant rjr iiuwbiiie Kun9 CMiie later — Indeed, the (nrmatloD of infantry maclUiic Kiltl companies wtka only Just cumplated at ttie outbreak of war. tit was also proposed to attach tlia light iDfantnr (.IHcer) battalions to the cavalry. Jin battle the Germans, like other Powers, used their caralrr to contribute to the volume of (ire as well as for shoctt action. IN THE KRUPP WORKS AT ESSEN. [L.N.A. 252 TEE TIMES HISTORY OF TEE WAR. FRENCH FORTRESS ARTILLERY. Charging a 95 mm. gun. as we have seen, was the discovery of the enemy's grouping. As a rule, the defeat of the enemy's main bodies of horse was a necessary preliminary, but in all cases the main body of the German cavalry was meant to pierce the protective cordon which sur- rounded the enemy and to hold the gap for the safe return of the patrols that were immediately pushed into the enemy's area. One requisite for a successful envelopment then was information. But it was admitted that information would not necessarily be forth- coming at the very outset, and an army situated as the Germans were could not wait. So, in the first instance, the long line was directed upon the area in which the enemy were supposed to be moving. In the deter- mination of this area the cavalry naturally played a smaller part than peace-time study and careful agent work. But its part in cutting out, one after the other, Wrong hypotheses as to the enemy's position in that area was expected to bo very consider- able. When all was said and done, however, it was not believed that the cavalry could do more than help to clear up the situation. The real beginnings of the envelopment were in the railway lines of Germany. In this fact — so German authorities con- sidered — lay the best guarantee of all. Not only were nunxerous through lines of railway transport and railheads provided with platforms for the detrainment of guns a.id animals* essential for speed in the operations, but they 'Aa ererr tiaveUer knovs. ordioaiT aeiman raUwsj itatloni bave uo platfornui In the British seiue. ensured a simultaneous controlled start of the whole line by marking a limit which every corps could reach within a given period, and further enabled the whole frontier line to be taken as the forward edge of the zone of concentration.* The extent of frontier intended to be taken into this zone was not easy to foresee. That portion of it adjacent to the French frontier was com- paratively narrow, and on both sides portions of it Were closed — whether partially or com- pletely war alone could prove — by barrier forts. In France the gap of ]l)pinal-Toul, in Germany the gap of Dehne-Mutzig were the only really clear avenues of hostile approach. Therefore, though the numbers of troops on both sides wei-c continually growing, and progress in armament too was enabling a force to fight on an ever wider and wider front for the same numbers, tlie opposed fronts of battle wore equally strong against direct attack and equally difficult to tarn without violation of Luxemburg, Belgian, and Swiss neutrality. Now these new condi- tions told rather against Germany than against France, for the latter's war doctrine did not favour extension of fronts and the former's did so. As civilization knov\s to its cost, Germany thought it necessary to expand the front of concentration so as to take in practically the whole of her frontier hne from Emmerich to Basle. It is not credible that a doctrine of war that was no more than skin-deep, a peace-time strategical essay, would have brought this about. It must therefore bo held to be finally •They did not, however, contribut« It, but were rather detri- mental to Becrecy, for railway worl(8 are constructed and run openly in peace. It. was, possible for . any foreign staff officer, therefore, to work out time tables for the concentration. FKKNCH FORTRESS ARTILLERY. Officers watching effect of fire. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 253 proved, what other evidence had already indicated more and more strongly, that accord- ing to Gorman ideas tlie envelopment mvst start by converging marches, and not be de- veloped from an initial close grouping. Wliother or not such procedure was correct under tlie circumstances was a question upon which strategists were by no means agreed. Some of the most eminent held that by extending tlio aone of concentration along the Luxemburg- Belgian frontier the Germans sacrificed in speed what they gained in width, in that the entry of the enveloping wing into Franco was delayed by the amount of time required for its traversing of Belgium, so that to ensure simultaneous onset it became necessary to hold back the central or Franco-German frontier portion of the lino for an appreciable number of days. But that German soldiers believed it to be the correct procedure is evidenced bj' the price that they ivere prepared to pay for it. Before discussing the mechanism of the envelopment, let us consider for a moment this factor of simultaneity. Wo have noted that it is essential to the working of the German type of envelopment that the taking of contact with the enemy should be practically simultaneous at all points. This is necessary, because, in the first instance, the front of deployment is as wide as nature allows, and each of the nuclei that form at the railheads presents a separate weak target for the blow of a better prepared enemy, and in tlie later stages the deeply- disposed opponent will have detachments called protective troops pushed out in all dangerous directions. We shall have to deal at greater length with this conabination when we come to discuss the French doctrine in which it played an important and even dominant part. Hero it only need be pointed out that these protective detachments would delay those portions of the long deployed line of the Germans which they met, while the rest progressed with less retardation. If that line was to be kept intact, therefore, parts of it must be held back and others pushed on, regardless of the purely local circumstance of each part. But such a theory, which might have been possible with nonchalant professional armies of the eighteenth century kind,* was less securely based when the army to execute it was a high-tension citizen army. If it was a re- proach to the French school of strategy that its methods overstrained the instriunent, in some respects at any rate the German doctrme was •If lhe7 had possessed DUmbers and raanoftuvrinu capncJtr. wblcb they did not. FRENCH ARMOURED TRAIN GAR. The upper picture shows the Observation Tower raised. in no better case. The soldier is influenced chiefly, if not entirely, by the local situation ; and though a professional would slirug his shoulders if told to attack an obviously im- pregnable position or to abandon a pursuit, a citizen soldier would not bo so philosophical. In August, 1870, for instance, Moltke intended his right and centre armies to lie low for five days on the Saar until the Crown Prince's left army could come into line with them and commence the envelopment of the French right. But on the very first of these five days the units of these centre armies were moving about amongst themselves, and on the third day a piecemeal attack by parts of these mixed-up commands ended in the defeat of a French detaclunent at Spicheren and a general advance over the Saar. Not only was the Crown Prince's army unable to come up in time for the pro- jected envelopment of the area of the Saar, b>it also the French Army was — save for the detachment above mentioned — not in that area at all. 254 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. The instance just quoted shows further that timing is quite as important an ingredient of success as is direction. For not only the central armies, but those on the flanks as well must be pushed on or held back so as to form a continuous line with its neighbours, and the wing armies have to choose the exact moment for swinging in, lest the enemj', instead of standing spellbound as the magic circle formed itself round liim, should retire in time and leave the enveloper facing inwards on the circumference of an empty circle — than which no more ludicrous position can be conceived* either in strategy or in tactics. And there were more dangerous, if less absurd, possibilities than this. If the wing that was to envelop went too far before swinging, the enemy could counter-attack the dormant centre, and, if it swung too soon, a mistake in the choice of enveloped area would expose it to be taken in reverse. Qui tourne est tourne. The dilemma was, in short, this. Nothing but a fierce simultaneous onset upon every hostile body that presented itself would prevent an opponent from manoeuvring for a counter- stroke, but this attack all along the Une was itself dangerous, if not fatal, to simul- 'Grand Duke of Mecklenburg before Nogent-Ie-Rotron. 1870. Japanese at Mukden. taneous action. But all these questions were mere details of greater or less importance according to the circumstances of the case and the skill and resolution of the leaders. The one great and controlling principle in this form of strategy is its finality. All means tending to the decisive issue are deployed at the outset in a formation that gives either the maximum victory or the maximum disaster. For the long deployed line once launched is incapable of manoeuvring in any new direction or meeting any new emergency. Once and for all the die has been cast. These being some of the pur- poses, advantages, and risks of envelopment, we may sketch very briefly the mechanism of execution, first in the strategical and then in the tactical sphere. The first phase is the selection of the front of initial concentration, which is as broad aa circumstances allow, to ensure of the overlap later, and also because the broader the front the greater the number of through railway lines available and the shorter the time required to concentrate. This line of railheads is so chosen that its flanks are safe by position from a swoop of the enemy's readiest troops, and if no natural obstacle is available the railheads are slanted back en echelon on the exposed flank so as to increase the time of marching and to place the inner and more forward railheads on the flank FRENCH MOBILIZATION. Drawing up Orders in a Railway Car. {Topical. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 255 FRENCH HEAVY ARTILLERY. of an enemy desirous of attacking them.* The second phase — wliich is hardly distinguish- able from the first — is the protection of the central railheads against the immediate and direct onset of the enemy's readiest frontier forces diu'ing the period of concentration. In 1870, leaving no protective forces in advance of his centre, Moltke was compelled on the first threat of a French offensive to put back the line of railheads from the Saar to the Rhine, a step which, taken in the very middle of the delicate phase of concentration, produced a most dangerous situation, f From 1871 on- wards therefore the Germans so far accepted the idea of protective detachments that a very powerful force in a high state of readiness was maintained on the frontier districts at all times. The disadvantages attacliing to such a force — its liability to attack before the main armies had gathered, and the necessity of mobilizing in two stages — were accepted with it. These were inconveniences, but hostile interference with the strategic deployment when the latter was preparatory to a simultaneous advance would be a disaster. For, as we have seen, the flanks of the line were, in the first instance, echeloned back, whQe during the advance they must be level with the centre, and as the moment for their swing came nearer they must be 6clieloned forward. Simultaneous action, difficult enough to obtain on a level line, might seem to b(> more so when the flanks had to move fasti r than the centre. Yet if the direction of the advance had boon well chosen, the centre, full in front of the enemy's main body, would automatically be slowed down enougli for the •The protective troops ia front of the centre alluded to a little later do not extend tar enouRli to the flanks to afford direct pro- tection to the whole lonit line of railheads. tThat It had been foreseen and its detjiils fixed lieforeliaiid made little or no difference. It wa-s nothing les.s than the plan of ui>eration8 iteelf that was thrown out of gear by tlie variant. wings to <5chelon themselves forward. One difficulty neutralized the other, provided only that the supreme command had made his choice correctly. But, as we know, his decision Was founded upon a preconceived idea and supported by a certain amount of cavalry information, and, therefore, liable to error. In this 6cljoloning out o* the flanks, as in all other details in the act of envelopment, the straightforward workini? of the plan depended wholly upon correct premises. Sup- pose that one of the wings met with sharp opposition that slowed it down to the pace of the centre, the whole system would never succeed in forming the forward crescent that was the immediate prelude of envelopment. It would remain a line, and a thin line at that. GENERAL BONNAL. The eminent French strategist. 256 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. M. MESSIMY. French Minister for War at the outbreak of hostilities. and the solid counter-attacking mass would roll it up. The deployed line cannot retrieve its mistakes. Another factor, which is strictly speaking of the moral and not of the mechanical order, is the necessity of restricting the initiative of subordinate commanders. Every student of 1870 knows that the history of that war teems with examples of reckless acts of initiative, sometimes fruitful, sometimes dangerous, but always bearing the stamp of official approval, fhe heavy precision of the Prussian mind had liad to be educated to display " initiative." and it gave out its lesson, once learnt in season and out of season.* By 1914 this freedom had been almost wholly withdrawn. The form of envelopment having been chosen, and its attendant difficulties of timing accepted, the least that could be done was to restrict the subordinate initiative that had caused most of the' mistiming of 1870. No army did more hearty lip-service to the god of initiative than the German. No army allowed less of it in practice. The commander with initiative as understood and encouraged in Germany was simply what in Great Britain would be called the " thrustor," the man of energy who, somehow, anyhow, carried through the set task within the set limits. The initiative of o Kameke or a Schkopp, the initiative which without reference to the higher authorities evolved new plans of general battle whenever confronted with local emergencies, had been altogether suppressed. Yet another point of German procedvire may be noted before we pass on to the tactical outcome of this strategy. As has been re- marked, the long deployed line is incapable of manoeuvre, meaning by manoeuvre-capacitj' the power of moving in any direction and not merely forward and back. A change of front, say from south to east, would take for a line 100 miles long swinging on one of its flanks as a •It mislit bt! KUBSestcJ that the iicte o( barl.'arity which so utterly dlsgraceii the army In 1914 can be attrlhuted in part at least to tb« same psychology as the^e f?cts of iiiitiatlTe of 1870 — a mentality which is not capable of nuances, but can only take in its lesson if It iB put in its crudely ab'iolute terms and reproduces it exactly as learnt. FRENCH FORTRESS ARTILLERY— 22 CM. MORTARS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 257 A VIEW OF THE BATTLEFIELD NEAR SEZANNE. iL.N A. fixed pivot no loss than ten days of ordinary inarching (the outer-flank troops liaving to move along an arc of 150 miles). Certain Ger- man writers, therefore, Bernhardi amongst them, had proposed to use the principle of Echeloning in cases of change of front with the pivot at the centre. This obviously shortens the time of wheeling through a right-angle, the arc being now 75 miles, equivalent to five days.* But while one half of the line swung forward the other would have to swing back, and it was perhaps doubtful how far the moral of modern national armies would be affected by a retrograde movement that neither was com- pelled by the enemy nor had any obvious ad- vantage. And naturally the advantages of the great arm's length swing as well as its dis- advantages were halved by this procedvu-e. Without entering into any discussion of this highly technical point, we simply note it as one of the methods at the German strategists' disposal. The type, or rather the tendency of the Germans' tactics was in complete accord with their tendencies in strategy. It would be more accurate to say that the strategy from the detrainment on the line of railheads to the inward swing of the flank armies was simply the first chapter of the same book. Even in 1870 this was true to some extent. But then the numbers available were comparatively small and the, density of the battle-grouping comparatively great, so that the armies con- verged more sluirply than was the case in the war with which we are concerned. In 1914 the thin battle-front of the deployed millions tvas almost as long as the line of railheads itself, and the lines of advance of the various armies were almost parallel. More than ever, in these conditions, the strategy and the tactics •There were illso ctrtain technical advautnges attnchinff to this [>rocetUire in the matter of preveutiiiK the w:\Kon trains of cue corps from hnpetluis the flghtiiis troops of auother. are simply part i. and part ii. respectively of the same work. Did our space permit it would be interesting to discuss the several methods by which the battle and the approach were made to dovetail into one another — for in this branch and in this branch alone* of the art of war the Germans appeared to be theoreti- cally ahead of their opponents. But it must sufRce, as a prelude to our brief study of the German battle, to mention that the greatest possible attention had been paid to the smooth and quick deployment of long marcliing columns. In France and Great Britain the word deployment is tised in two senses — in its true meaning for the forming combatant lines on the battlefield and more loosely for the arraying of masses in a general line before action. The Germans, on the other hand, dis- tinguished carefully between Aujmarach (march •Not strictly true, for the Ochelon morements of armlen, however, had also been practt*ied more often and were raliie<l more hishl7 br the Cerroans than by other* PART OF A BATIERY OF 155 MM, REMAILHO Q.F. GUNS 258 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A FRENCH INFANTRYMAN SHOWING MODERN EQUIPMENT. [Topical. up to the field) and Deployieren (deploy- ment on the field), and the intermediate stage, too, had a designation of its own, Entfaltung (unfolding), which was the process by which the thirty-mile deep marching columns of the army corps on the main roads broke up into smaller columns moving on all available by roads and even across cmmtry preparatory to the deployment proper. The high training of corps and divisional staffs in the management of the Entfaltung made itself felt in the early stages of the war, in which time after time we find the Allies taken aback by the rapidity with which the enemy developed his huge masses from their columns of route. By this well-managed transition the Germans were brought out of the domain of strategy into that of tactics. In that field their constancy of strategy was expected to reap its reward. The theory of the enveloping battle is that under modern conditions the number of men suscep- t ible of useful employment on a given frontage is small, and that no good purpose is served by piling up reserves behind the fighting line, since only one rifle per yard of front can be effective. Granting, though not admitting, this proposition, then it follows that every increment of force beyond that required to establish and to maintain a firing line of one rifle to the yard (with its immediate aids of artillery) can only be employed towards the flanks. Only superiority of fire can justify assault and ensure victory, and superiority of fire is gained by a superior number of rifles* in action. Now, yard for yard, the maximum number of these rifles is the same on both sides. Superiority therefore can only be ob- tained by contriving the convergence of fire •This proposition, agulu, is not one that would be accepte.i without many re^^ervations in Great Brifciin. FRENCH OFFICER INSTRUCTING HIS SOLDIERS BEFORE GOING INTO ACTION. [Rtcord Press. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 259 FRENCH INFANTRY IN ACTION. Irom a wider arc than that held by the defence. Extension towards the flanks and incurving of the line thus extended are therefore the main characteristics of the German battle, and the logical extreme to which they tended were of course complete envelopment of a smaller de- fending circle by a larger attacking circle. Such a result, even if only partially obtained, gave, so the Germans held, the greatest chances of victory, and as we have seen, the victory of envelopment is definitive, a " crowning mercy," as Cromwell would have said.* It was ad- mitted, at the same time, that the issue might be definitive defeat, but as, tactically, envelop- ment and convergence of fire went hand in hand, victory was much more likely than defeat. The attempt to realize superiority of fire is made not only by deploying on the outer are, but by all available means, whether on the front or the incurving flanks. Most of the character- istics to which we have already alluded in the province of strategy appear also in that of tactics — methodical advance during the ent- faltung, methodical and complete preparation during the initial stage, and then the fierce simultaneous onset in maxinmm force and at maximum speed upon a spellbound adversary. We have watched the component masses of the army advancing first in deep columns along the main roads, then in shallower columns on all available tracks, the wings first echeloned back, then cpming up into line, and then drawing out forward for the decisive blow. The columns are preceded by very small advanced guards •Worcester haa been callci hy the eminent German critio Friti Uoeuis the " irchetrpe of Sedan." [Rtcord Pun. which are purely for local defensive purposes and as soon as the enemy is met with spread out as a screen for the deployment, carefully avoiding serious encounters. Under cover of this — the adversary of course being presumed to have been dazed by the tremendous sweep and power of the approach marches — the masses of artillery trot forward and spread out in their positions, reserving their iire until the highest authority on the groimd speaks the word. It is with these artillery masses rather than with the small advanced guards that it is sought to forestall the enemy in possession of ground, and it is under cover of the same organs that the infantry establishes itself on the outskirts of the battlefield. Here appears the factor of timing — nothing is launch('d until everything is ready. WTiether a Corps in Column of Route. 4 1 H» M- (♦ « (^ l-5•^ r o o o 'Entfa.ltunq". -H- - - - - -^ *l i 1 >.- ~. :- H 1 o -a^-f • i- / ^ — ^,'' o o o ° -H :g Deployment. ^ -a ^ -a ° ^ a a o -^ -a •a 260 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ZOUAVES WORKING MITRAILLEUSE. [Topual. the Germans would not lose in this phase a good deal of the momentum that they had gained in the rapid and powerful strategical advance was questionable. But, for good or evil, matters were so ordained, for the need of simultaneous general action overrode all local con- siderations. The Germans would sooner with- draw their advance guards altogether than reinforce them. Intimately connected with these special features of the German doctrine, and indeed more important than any of them, is the absence of reserves. As we have seen, the Germans held that over and above a certain small number of men to the yard and the appropriate gun power in support of them, no force could make its action felt in the front-to-front engagement. They must, therefore, be employed on the flanks, and it is better to place them there in the first instance, by converging marches from a previous still wider front, than to march them out from behind the centre after contact has been made there. Hence it follows that the only functions of a reserve in the centre were that of a reservoir to keep the firing line up to strength and that of acting as small change to deal with local emergencies as they occurred.* The whole of the artillery likewise are given over to the divisional commanders, the corps com- mander retaining nothing but some technical troops in his own hands. This theory was acted upon in all its risky simplicity until about 1912, when the extreme danger of deploying all available means in front of a mere false position or advanced guard of the enemy was ' so far recognized that reserves of fire — ^not be it observed, of men — were constituted in the shape of machine-gun batteries (companies) and heavy artillery units at the disposal of the liigher commanders. But this was the only precaution taken ; in general the old doctrine remained unchanged. While the unit might be, and was. disposed in successive lines, no two self-contained units with different functions were disposed one behind the other.* Every man behind a given part of tlie front was simply a second or third or fourth instalment of the effort already begun on that part of it. Behind the front, then, was no manoetivring body whatever. Fast, smooth deployment, precaution against premature or partial engagement, and absence of reserves, then, are the elements of the German battle. Suppose now that it proceeds as arranged, undisturbed by counter-attack. The fully-arrayed Germans need not hiu'ry. The enemy is bound to accept the fight — he cannot, so they said, break away and manoeuvre, once lie has been subjected to the sudden intense fire simultaneously opened by all the concealed batteries of the attack. Tlie firing line of the frontal attack can form itself methodically, at a range well beyond that at which decisive losses can be inflicted on it, and wait for the •Save in so far as the process of developing the frontage might momentarily place a marching wing unit in rear of a fighting frontal unit. ^4"'-^p5t^ •In one Kaixermanaver after another such tiny reserves as 1/10 imd 1/12 of the total are found. FRENCH MOUNTAIN ARTILLEKV. [Tcpica!. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 261 A FRENCH GUN TRAVELLING OVER ROUGH GROUND. [Topual, enveloping or decisive attack to como into line with it. In this waiting phase, which may be— and in the event was — prolonged over days, a great strain is put upon the discipline and endurance of the rank and file, subjected night and day at irregular intervals to gusts of shell fire and all the time to the fear of the next gust. But supposing that this test — for which the iron " Old Prussian '• discipUne has prepared them — is passed successfully, then the whole line, centre and wings together, deployed at 1,000 yards or so from the enemy in its " principal fi»o position " opens the decisive attack, fighting its way in by sheer battering volume of fire from gun and rifle. As the fresh wing will necessarily progress faster than the tired centre the line automatically becomes a crescent, and the envelopment and convergence of fire, already half effected thereby, wUl become more and more pronounced until it is complete and triumphant. The final assault is merely the act of " cashing the cheque drawn by frre-pcwer." This is the, full envelopment by both flanks in which there is no pursuit, as there is no enemy free to run away. But it is possible and likely that only one flank of the adversary will be successfully enveloped. But the course of events is pretctically the same. A pursuit will be necessary, and in its reckless vigour every man and horse must be used up in the pursuit, but once the enemy begins to break up, under the stress of partial envelopment and consequent pursuit, the decisive and complete envelopnient is only a matter of days. Such, then, were the German conceptions of modern war and tho tendencies to be foreseen in putting them into practice — the long line held completely under control up to the proper moment and then launched with all possible speed and violence, without partial engagements, feints, or adroit, individual strokes of any kind. 262 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. CHAPTER XVII. THE FRENCH THEORY OF WAR Historical Evolution of P'rench Strategy since 1870 — Influence of Napoleon ; His Four Maxims — The " General Reserve " — Criticisms on Neo -Napoleonic Strategy — ^The Flank Attack and Envelopment Doctrine — Shrapnel and the " Canon de 75 " — The " Mass of Manoeuvre " — Importance of Manceuvbes — Protective Detachments — Strategic Advanced Guards — The " Manceuvre upon a Fixed Point " — Concentration on a Flank — The Lozenge Formation of Napoleon— Colonel db Grandmaison's Chain of Independent Masses with Reserves — French Tactics. THE conceptions of modern war- fare held in France were very different from the German ones> though the forms in which these were expressed in practice possessed certa n outward similarities, which deluded some people into imagining that there was much in common with, and little difference in, the rival doctrines. It was not so. For though the French and the German infantries formed their outposts, assaulted with the bayonet, drilled and carried out many other operat ions in practi« cally the same way, yet as to the ideas and ob- jects whii'h these forms were meant to realize they differed fundamentally. After the defeats of 1870 France was for years the very humble pupil of Moltke, and, moreover, foreseeing that her mobilization was bound to take longer than that of Germany, she had resigned herself to meet the naked simple offen- sive of her neighbour with a naked simple defensive. The expression of this negative doctrine was the lines of fortresses and barrier forts Lille-Valenciennes-Maubeuge, V^erdun- Toul, and Epinal-Belfort-Besan«;on with their Irouees or gaps that were intended to " canalize the flood of invasion." This conception hard- ened during the troubled years in which France was settling down to the new system of republi- can government and personal military service. But from about 1888 a new current of idea?; set in. For one thing, the advent of smokeless powder seemed to challenge the data of 1870, and for another, a peculiarly brilliant group ol military thinkers, men who had been ardent young soldiers in the disasters of Vanned terrible and had come to maturity in the study of their disasters, come at the psychological moment to positions of influence. These men aet to work to discover the key of Prussia's successes, and found it in the fact that Moltke had gone back to Napoleon. So back they too went to the Emperor. The archives were ransacked. Volume after volume of original documents, edited and annotated, were published by the new military history section of the General Staff, and a new doctrine began to take shape. It was in the spirit of this doctrine, tempered by a more recent intellectual revolt against the more extreme advocates who had sought to apply it in season and out of season, that the French took the field in 1914. This doctrine, soimd in itself, found a favour- able milieu for its propagation. The conditions imposing a momentary defensive upon Franco still existed in 1890-1900, but the army and the people, less and less influenced by memories of defeat as the years went on, were chafing at the Germans' assumption of a monopoly of offensive spirit. And, more important for once than moral conditions, the ntat«rial advances in armament due to smokeless powder were about to place the French Army in possession of the very weapon wliich was needed to give effect to the doctrine. The bases of the doctrine were four aphorisms 263 264 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. of Napoleon in which his system of weir was concentrated : (1) " One can never be too strong at the decisive point " ; (2) " Engage every- where, and then see " ; (3) " Be vulnerable nowhere " ; (4) " Manoeuvre only about a fixed point." The first of these is in direct conflict with the German principles of lateral expansion and equal density at all points at the moment of crisis. As we have seen, the German view was that men over and above the number re- quired for maintaining one firing line could not usefully be put into action in one area. The ' after an interval of years and controversy, by the British General Stafi, whoso definition of the assault as the " culmination of gradually increasing pressure " on a selected portion of the enemy's line may be taken as one of the best expressions of the principle. This phrase is a definite assertion that greater pressure (subjectively) should be exercised at some points than at others, and that the greatest pressure of all should be applied at a chosen point. The principle niay be represented diagrammatically thus, each line representing French, on the contrary, sought to reproduce, with all necessary modifications, the Napoleonic blow of concentrated thousands upon a selected point, and in that view they wore followed, FRENCH SOLDIER WITH NEW SERVICE EQUIPMENT. [ Topical. fighting troops at the standard minimum density and the point chos?en for attack being opposite the loft centre. The corollary of this principle was the notion of the " general reserve " as a separate body ; in French practice this body was over one-third, and in British " at least half " (in some cases) of the total available force. Now, opponents of the '■ new French " theory could argue plausibly enough that nothing like this proportion of force could be reserved while the rest was called upon for days together to sustain the whole fury of the German onset. They could point to frequent instances in Napoleon's own campaigns and elsewhere in which the decisive attack at the selected point was delivered by a compara- tively small portion of the forces on the ground, the rest having been used up in holding and wearing down the enemy. And when, as sometimes happened on manoeuvres, the Napo- leonic forms as well as the Napoleonic idea were used, they could carry all level-headed soldiers with them in denoimcing as absurd a theory which asserted that masses of men shoulder to shoulder and line upon line could live for five minutes under the fire of modern weapons. They could assert, moreover, that superiority of fire was essential to success, and ask in what way the rear lines (other than those used as reservoirs to replace casualties) could con- tribute to the obtaining of this superiority. But what these critics failed to see was the fact that it was not their own type of battle at all that was intended to be produced. Subject to the adoption of suitable formations — which, as we liave just THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 26S FRENCH ARTILLERY. A 75 mm. Gun en route. [Rtcmd Pnts. observed, were not always seen on manoeuvres — none of the criticisms summarized in the above lines will boar close examination. The remedy for absorption of force in the wearing-down engagement lay in the great principle of " economy of force." If the effective density n-ith modern arms was one rifle to the yard (five reservoirs) the front of an army fighting on the French principle was just as capable of resistance as that of an opponent fighting on the German, and every man economized in tho non -decisive areas was a man more for the general reserve, or the " mass of manoeuvre," as the French more correctly termed it. Further, field fortification was an aid to economy of force that Napoleon had never enjoyed.* Rough field defences had enabled Lee at Richmond (1862) and Chancellorsville (1863) to deliver crushing blows with his mass of manoeuvre while the rest of the line was held by an absolutely trifling force, and this lesson at least was learned by Europe fiom a war which it had been fashionable to caU a conflict of armed mobs. In short, the very factors which were supposed to authorize and compel the Germans to expand laterally equally allowed French and British generals to form a sub- stantial " mass of manoeuvre " in rear of the front — or elsewhere, for the Napoleonic attack might be delivered either on the centre or the flanks, and indeed under modern conditions (size of armies and length of fronts) the latter was the more likely alternative. But there was this vital difference between the envelopment as conceived in Germany and the flank attack as conceived in France. The •Owing to the time and laliour required In his day for the oon- Unictlon o( works that had to present a material barrier to assault and not pimply a certain amount of cover (or riflemen as is the case nowadays. former was, as we know, based upon a pre- conceived idea and a prearranged programme while the latter was initiated not in the phase of strategic concentration, but subsequent to contact. For the Germans the " zone of manoeuvre " was the open country in front of their advanced guards ; for tho French that term implied the zone behind them, in which tho "mass of manoeuvre" could move freely. It is in this, and its consequences upon tho battlefield, that we seem to find the answer to those opponents of the French doctrine, who asserted that, superiority of fire being essential, no man was being usefully em- ployed wliile he did not contribute to that result. Napoleon himself said that fire is everything. But superiority of fire in his sense was a local and temporary, but overwhelmiiic, accom- paniment, and not a preparation, of the decisive attack. This being so, the decisive attack was, as the British regulations above quoted say, a culmination. How, then, was to be obtained the increment of fire power that would make this general reserve, engaged after contact, effective, given tho fact that along the whole front one rifle per yard and a proportion of guns were already in action ? The answer is in the material advances above alluded to — viz., the coming of th? time shrapnel. In Napoleon's day, with short- range muskets, the prelude of the smashing " decisive attack " was the launr'hing of a mas.s of field batteries which galloped up to a range at which, immune from bullets, they could deliver their terrible " cekse " and "grape" shot. Often a portion of the enemy's line was so thoroughly destroyed that the assaulting infantry marched into it with their arms at the slope. But the coming of the infantry rifle 266 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. FRENCH ARTILLERY CROSSING A ROAD. presently forbade the guns to drive up to case rancres, and the part of artillery in the attack was for a long time insignificant. Even in 1870, effective as was the Prussian field artillery, its role was simply the pre- paration of the attack by methodical bombardment with common shell.* To cover the assault, as distinct from preparing it, artillery had to reproduce the effect of case-shot with some long-range projectile. This pro- jectile, of British origin, was the shrapnel with time fuse. For technical reasons which cannot here be discussed no satisfactory time fuse could be designed for use in modern rifled guns for many years after the introduction of the latter. Nor was the rapidity of fire that was needed to cover the Napoleonic attack feasible at the new long ranges until the gun itself (or rather its carriage) had been revolu- tionized. This was achieved by French de- signers in 1897, and with the appearance of the famous " canon de 75 " Napoleon's tactics came to their own again. The increment of fire-power being thus ob- tained, the French doctrine formulated for tactics by General Langlois, even before the introduction of the " 75," was placed on secure ground. But though the Napoleonic principle be admitted, it still remains to be seen whether the proper point for its application can be dis- cerned, and, if so, on what grounds. This brings us to the second point of doctrine, " engage everywhere, and then see," a point upon which there was almost as much contro- *Owine: t.) the technical deficiencies of the German gun (alrendjr dealt witti in a previous chapter) many traces of 1870 procedure Htm lingered in 1014. versy as over the first — with which, of course, it is integrally connected. The theory was that, information having been obtained from the cavalry and other sources sufficient to define the enemy's limits — more was not expected — the troops told off to the " engagement " (as the French " Field Service Regulations " of 1913 called it) would advance and engage him wherever found. A general line of contact would thus be formed, upon which the French advanced guards would seek to press sufficiently hard to compel the enemy to develop his forces. This " engagement " might take days, perhaps a week or more, and it would impose on citizen- soldiers of a sensitive race a most severe test of endurance and solidity. Many critics indeed asserted that the Napoleonic battle would break down on this weakness alone if on no other. But it is fair to point out that even in the GJerman war-theory much the same strain would be im- posed on the men concerned. The only differ- ence which told against the French lay in the fact that to carry out the mission of " engage- ment " the troops would have to make ceaseless local attacks in order to wear down the enemy and compel him to feed his firing lino, whereas in the case of the Gernnan doctrine the infantry at least was (in the interests of timing) kept out of action until the general advance sounded. This was evidently not a small disadvantage against the French. But it must be assumed that the French generals knew their country- men, and it is the fact that though the doctrine had in recent years been subjected to a good deal of criticism, this particular part of it was made an article of faith by the 1913 edition of the " Service en Campagne," above quoted. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 267 Granted the necessary solidity, then the course of the battle would go on from engage- ment to serious frontal fighting with attack and counter-attack, and thus the fighting itself would, by cutting out, one after the other, the alternative hypotheses that had V)een formed as to tlio enemy's grouping, afford enough evidence for the timely placing of the " mass of mano3uvre." At the proper moment the battle would in the environs of the selected area gi-ow in intensity by fresh feeding ol the firing line, until in the selected area itself it would culminate in a fierce attack by every available man and gun of the reserve, the men advancing as fast as possible, halting to fire as little as they could help, and covered by an appalling rain of time slirapnel from every gun that could be brought to boar. This is the phase tersely described by Napoleon as the evenenmni. But, as Napoleon reniarked, all this requires un peu d'art et quelques evenenients. Germans excepted, there were few soldiers who denied the decisive effect of this attack, if it got home, tor when you break the enemy's centre you ttirn two flanks and roll them up outwards. Controversy, however, never reached finality, even in France, as to the peu d'art. As we have seen, the Germa,n doctrine was wholly destivate of arts, and the question was. Was it practicable, with modern armies, to finesse with men's lives ? Was t.he moral of the citizen- soldier such that he would calmly give his life in a fight which ho knew to be a non-decisive part of the ensemble ? Moreover, allowing for the characteristic " emptiness of the battle- field " due to the use of smokeless powder, and tor the consequent difficulty of distinguishing between false positions and real, advanced lines and main, was it certain that any tentative, non-decisive engagement of forces would either reveal or pin the opponent T To the«e ques- tions the answer? were, if not exactly negative, at least doubtful. Accordingly it was laid down that every attack was locally a " decisive " attack, that no troops should bo put into action for any other purpose thtui to close with the enemy, and that the great Napoleonic evenemenl must be, as the British regulations above-mentioned say, tho culmina- tion of gradually increasing pressure. But in that case, bearing in mind that the preliminary fighting would take days and tho placing of the " mass of manoeuvre " yet more days, would national short-service troops be capable of fighting time' after time on ground where they had failed once, twice, and thrice T Although in fact the French regulations of 1913 accepted the " engagement " for good or evil, still these risks were evident enough to make it desirable to ensure in every other way possible the freedom, of action of the conunander who disposes of the mass of manoeuvre. This was sought in two ways, defined by the two remain- ing Napoleonic aphorisms that we have quoted — " be vulnerable nowhere " and " manoeuvre only about a fixed point." Freedom of action the Germans expected to obtain by stunning or dazing their opponent. Not so the French, who held that only positive freedom secured by means within his own control was of any use to the conamander. But before stating these means in general terms* let us understand •The expanded theory and the executive detail may be best studied In the Princives de laQuerre of General Foch. who In 1914 commanded the Nancy Conw. FRENCH ARTILLERY. Placing in position a 75 mm. Gun. 268 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. what we mean by freedom of action. It is freedom to carry out an intention without hostile interference. The later the intention is formed the more serious the risk of the interference with it, and the larger the de- tachments that must be placed as advanced guards, flank guards, and rearguards to prevent it, the smaller, accordingly, will be the force available for carrying out the intention it-self when formed. It was the tendency to wait for too many data before taking a definitive resolution that gave rise to the criticisms of the doctrine which arose within the French Army itself about 1910. Nearly all of these alleged that in the attempt to be "vulner- able nowhere " French generals were far too lavish in the use of protective detachments. Further, with the million -armies of the present day, action taken cannot become effective until a period of days ha.s elapsed, and if the army, already in contact with the foe, is not to be overstrained, it must be taken very early — practically on the first reasonable data to hand. The most dangerous case of infringed liberty is that which occurs when an army is caught in a state of " inevitable unreadiness "* half- soncentrated, over-dispersed in rest quarters, and so on. In this case almost any proportion of detachments from main body is justified — witness the placing of no less than six French frontier army corps permanently on a war footing in peace time in 1913. And even so, the commander is rarely able to wait upon events before committing himself to an •This aspect of the question is dealt with at length In Major- General Aylmcr's work " Protection." •' intention," and that intention as often as rot is simply one of self-defence. None of this, however, alters the fact that the French doctrine, construed roasonabh\ does — and in war did — give the only guarantee of freedom of action thar can really be depended upon. Whether in certain cpses freedom is not bought at too high a price is doubtful. But in general the doctrine as formulated by General Bonnal and General Foch held its own against criticism, and the events of the war of 1914 showed that almost any sacrifice of men and ground was better than the forcing of the commander's hand. An initial defensive, coupled with the preservation of the army at all costs, was imposed upon France by broader political and military circumstances. Un- official criticism might question the application of the principle of self-contained protective detachments, but it could not alter the fact of their necessity, nor of their value, when rightly employed. For in France the defensive was regarded as the auxiliary of the offensive. The mission of the protective detachments was not simply to protect, but to offer a bait. Their authors confidently expected that by rearguard- like fighting they could not only gain time for offensive dispositions to be made elsewhere, but also provoke the enemy into deploying in a wrong direction, draw him across the front of the main body, and generally play the part of will o' the wisp. It is questionable — and it was questioned by the younger critics — whether these manoeuvres, applicable enough to the old small armies, had not something of the character of minor chicanes about them when regarded FRENCH PATROL GUARDING RAILWAY LINE. [Record Press. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 269 ZOUAVES. \Topitai, from the point of view of the million-army. But, on the other hand, it is certain that smokelesA powder and long- ranging weapons have made rearg\]p,rd actions. Smokeless powder and long-ranging weapons have enabled a rearguard to keep at a distance the pursuing enemy in a way which was in former times impossible. The offensive counterpart of the protective detachment (couverture) is the " strategic ad- vanced guard " — another focus of controversy. Its r6le is that defined in the last of the aphorisms which we have used as our texts, " Manoeuvre only about a fixed point." Never officially recognized by the French regulations, though partially accepted by the British and Italian, the strategic advanced guard was nevertheless the corner-stone of the " New French " doctrine. It was a very large force of all arms — in Napoleon's campaigns at) army corps, in our own times a whole army — which preceded the main body by as. many days' marches as its own capacity for fighting unaided permitted. It was handled strate- gically on the same principles as the fanious Prussian advanced guards of 1870 were handled tactically, with the exception that in the hands ■of a first-class leader like Lannes it never com- mitted itself so deeply as to involve the main army in its affair witliout direct orders to that effect from the Emperor. In the absence of such orders, it was merely a potential pro- tective detachment, latent if the enemy did nothing and active if he tried to advance. But its proper purpose was very different. It was with its cavalry* to find, and with its infantry and artillery to engage, the enemy's main body, thereby giving the Emperor the '■ fixed point " upon which to build up his manoeuvre. It had, furtlier, by hard fighting, and if necessary by sacrificing itself, to holdtlie enemy's attention and effort for tlio time needed for that nianoeuvre without support from the " mass of manoeuvre," every regiment of which the Emperor jealously reserv-ed. In the great majority of cases the sacrifice was not in vain- There are few of Napoleon's victoi'ies which are without any traoo of tlie idea, and when it failed it was because the movements of the main body, by reason of weather or unforeseen emergencies, were de- layed beyond the calculated time. The action was perfectly familiar to the Prussians, for it had not escaped Clau-sewitz's observation, t and one of the most magnificent examples of its working had been given by Ckjiistantin von Alvcnsleben, when with the 3rd Coqjs on August 16, 1870, he engaged the whole of Bazaine's army single-handed in order to prevent it from marching away until •Often two or more divisions. tThotuh CUusewitz was tar from suspecting its importance. 270 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Prince Frederick Charles should have gathered liis scattered amiy for a decisive blow upon it. But the idea had been deliberately rejected in toto by the more modern Germans, who disbelieved in the power of modern armies, fighting at long range, to fix one another, and in the pcwer of modern unprofessional troops to fight at a sacrifice. How little they expected from the " combat of fixation " may be gauged from the fact, already alluded to, that they engaged their artillery alone in the phase of . battle to which it applied, keeping their in- fantry back until the real general attack was ripe. The only effective fixation they, held was the previous overpowering of the enemy's will by the speed and power of their strategic advance. In short, they contributed nothing, either by way of objection or acceptance, to the controversy which centred on the strategic advanced guard. The whole " order of ideas " wa.s different. The application of the theory to the first phase of a Franco-German war was admitted to be difficult if not impossible, owing to the fact that the armies were almost in face of one another at the outset, whereas in proportion to their length, and therefore to the tinxe-relations of manoeuvres based upon the advanced guard, the main bodies should have been separated by a hundred miles or so for an army of three or four corps to have elbow room for action as strate- gic advanced guard. It was when the armies had fallen apart again after a first clinch that this organ woiild come into play, and if at that point the huge masses became divided up into smaller bodies, each with its own theatre of war and set of tasks, Auerstadts and Friedlands would become possible. Intimately connected with the theory of the strategic advanced guard (though it dated from the piu-ely defensive period of French nulitary policy) was the idea, which had many ardent supporters and many fierce opponents, of fixing the concentration area of the French armies well back from the frontier and somewhat to a flank — at Dijon, for example. Many of the partisans of the strategic advanced guard considered that this retired concentration, coupled with skilful handling of the (then) three frontier corps as a strategic advanced guard and strategic rear guard by tiu-ns, would infallibly result in the Germans being drawn so far westward from Lorraine as to be cut off by the offensive from Dijon. But neither General Bonnal himself, nor Langlois nor Foch (both of whom commanded the Nancy Army Corps) seem to have shared in this opinion, since, as Moltke remarked a propos of the Silesian FRENCH CYCLISTS' COMPANY. \Topicat. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ni SN I Ul Corps 40 miles Diagram showing the "lozenge" with the first corps used as strategic advance-^uard. (See pp. 273-4.) 272 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. concentration of 1866, " one does not, in practice, abandon rich provinces." If, liowever, the main armies of the Germans were to pass through Belgimn, a broad belt of country ■n-ould be open between the initial concentra- tion areeis, and in that belt a great French advanced guard might well operate with a view to provoking the Germans into a premature Entfaltung in a more or less doubtful direction. In combination with these protective or provocative detachments, the main army itself was to be grouped, according to the accepted doctrine, in a deep lozenge formation similar to that which Napoleon adopted in the Jena campaign of 1806. This great lozong), preceded by its strategic advanced guard, would advance in the direction where the enemy was a priori most likely to be found. If the advanced guard came into contact, the head of the lozenge would reinforce it on one flank within 48 hours, the flanks of it would come up into line within foiir or five days, ^ ^ ^ -'0 ,, r^ ^ ^ -'0 4-, ■ r^ ^ . 1 . ■ fj-i _JL_. H^ 3 ,-■ ^ 1 ' ' \ 1 Lozenge with Strategic advanced guard. Lozenge changing direction on its own ground. • \ V / 1 \ Lozenge manoeuvring about a Fixed point Formed^by the strategic advanced guard. The ** lozenge" formation and its uses. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 278 FRENCH MOTOR AMBULANCE. [Rtcori P'tss. and the rear group would be still in hand. If the advanced guard missed its target, or only came into touch with its extreme flank, then the rdle of advanced guard would fall to ono of the flank masses of the lozenge itself, and the original advanced guard would become part of tlie mass of manoeuvre. The virtue of the lozenge formation, in a word, is its capacity for changing direction — a capacity which the long deployed line of the Germans almost entirely lacked. And the virtue of the strategic advanced guard, from whichever side of the lozenge it emerged, was that it provided a C.Ked point about which this supple mass could manoeuvre. Of all criticisms of the strategic advanced guard, none was as serious as that which pointed out that its flanks would be overlapped by superior forces before the head of the k zenge could act. This danger was admitted, but minimized by the allotment to it of almost all available cavalry, which by the combination of its fan -wise reconnaissance, its fire power, and its shock action would prolong the front to either flank sufficiently far to compel the enemy to make long turning movements and so to waste the critical hours. As compared with its defensive counterpart, the protective detachment, the strategic advanced guard, whose very mission it was to affront superior numbers of the enemy, un- doubtedly ran more rislis, since it w; s eSect as well as endurance for a given time that was expected of it, and it could not break off the engagement so readily.* On the other hand, the troops composing it did enjoy all the mora! advantages of- the sharp offensive, whereas those of protective detachments were condemned to the disillusionments of retreat. These differences of principle and intent were explained, so far as the French Army was concerned, in the regulations of 1913, which made it clear that the detachment with a separate temporary mission was a self-contained force while an advanced guard was integrally connected with its main body, since " it cannot be admitted that a leader would send troops against the enemy without his . having the intention to tight." The accompanying diagram shows how a strategic advanced guard extended its flanks for protection in this manner (formations and distances being of course no more than indica- tion of the general tendencies). It illustrates also how, instead of being a self-contained body additional to the lozenge, as at ono time it was conceived to be, it has become simply an ad- vanced portion of the head of it, specially dis- posed for its special functions and dangers. It shows, moreover, that in practice there was no real discrepancy between the advanced •German advanced suards. aa w« haT« seen, weie deUberatelr kept snuU in order that they should not be tempted br ahy con- sciousneiis uf their own stiecgtli t3 eiuage ct an Inopportune moment. 274 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. guard and lozenge tj-pe of strategic advance and tliat which Colonel de Grandmaison {the intellectual leader of the revolt against the tendency to multiply advanced guards and protective detachments) proposed, viz., a chain of independent masses, each disposed internally according to its own needs in echelon, lozenge or otherwise, and all together forming a long line with reserves massed behind at one point of it. The Grandmaison conception was better suited to the management of the huge armies of to-day than a crude reproduction, on five times th# scale, of Napoleon's " battalion square of 200,000 men." But it' shared the characteristic principles and incoiijorated the characteristic forms of the Napoleonic method, of which indeed it wa=i simply a speciarcase. The outstanding features 'of French tactical methods of course expressed the same doctrine. In the battle as a whole, fire superiority was not regarded as the con- dition of success as it was in Germany. On the contrary, it became the accepted idea in France and in Groat Britain that the chief use of fire was to cover movement, and that it was but an auxiliary to the actual assault. Hence came the characteristic division of the attacker's artillery, not " counter batteries " whose mission it was to account for the enemy's artillery and " infantry batteries " which were to support the infantry advance with their full fire-power at everj' stage, and, above all, in the final assault. Hence, too, the development of infantry formations* in close order that could live and move in the zone of hostile artillery fire by fitting into even the smallest covered lines of approach and need only extend for fire action of their own at the very limit of cover. Henco also the " burst of rapid fire " from rifle and from gun in which the British Army ex- celled friend and foe alike. And hence, the tremendous violence of the action of the "mass of manoeuvre " — its surprise effect, its speed, •Irregular lines of platoons or hair-platoons In fours or file. Uiaracterlstic also of British infantry tactics. GENERAL CHEVENET. Military Governor of Belfort. and its overwhelming weight of " covering fire." Such a blow was only possible when enough data had been obtained to ensure it agiinst being a blow in the air, and the advanced guards had to pay for this insurance. It was only possible when the commander-in-chief was insured against anxieties in other directions, and the protective detachments had to ensure this by resisting to the utmost limit of their powers and their ground. And it was only possible when all ranks, whether in the " wear- ing-down " engagement or in the swift decisive attack, were imbued with the desire to close with the foe. CHAPTER XVIII. THE BRITISH THEORY OF WAR. Advantage of Practical Experience— Lord IOtchener on the Ibiportance of Feeding Soldiers and of Cover— Small Armies with Lono Training— Individual Efficiency- Quality Rather than Quantity— India as a Training Ground— The Wellington Tradition —Crimean War— Indian Mutiny— Lord Roberts and Lord Wolseley— South African War WHILE German and, to a large extent, French strategy had been based mainly on tradition and theory controlled by peace manoeuvres, the British strategy was the out- come of practical experience in numerous and various theatres of war. The campaigns, it is true, in wliich the British Army had been tested were against barbaric and semi -civilized coloured races or against the half-organized nations in arms of the Transvaal Republic «nd the Orange Free State, and only a few living Britons {e.g., Sir Evelyn Wood, Lord Kitchener, and Sir Ian Hamilton) had taken part in or observed with their own eyes wars on the Continental scale. A large pro- portion of the British troops, however, had been under the fire of modern weapons, and in the South African War very many officers had learnt what their men could and could not do in face of the terrible instruments of destruction created by science during the latter half of the 1 9th and the beginning of the 20th century Thus Lord Kitchener, addressing the Is Punjab Rifles in March, 1906, remarked as follows : — You must not get into the way of thinking that men can go on fighting interminably. Men get hungry, men get thirsty, men get tired. In real warfare, Avlicre many hours of hard marching and . fighting may pass before you achieve success, you have to ask youreelves at the critical moment : Can I trust my men, with gnawing pains of hunger in their stomachs, with a depressing s^usj of having suffered casualties, and witli fatigue in all their limbs ; can I trust them to press upon the retreating enemy and ci-ush him ? And therefore I say to you olTlcei's — -Look after your men's stomachs. Thcsa field days of two or three houis' duration do not bring the lesson home to you with sufllcient force. Men cannot fight wcU unless they are fed well, and men cannot fight well when they are tired. I have more than once on active service taken the ammunition out of my ammunition carts and loade<I up the carts with bully beef. . . . Gentlemen, I wish to add a word about the behaviour of your men in the field. Colonel Western, without a word or a suggestion from me, spontaneously came >ip and said, '' I think the men are taking cover very intelligently." Cover, as you know, is all-important in modern warfare, and soldiers who know how to take advantage of every possible cover on the battle- field have learnt one of their greatest and most valuable lessons.* Doubtless the German leaders would have ac- quiesced in the above observations, but few of them had had the facts driven into their souls on the battle-field. Lord Kitchener's audience must have felt that they were in the presence of an artist and not of an art-master of war. Like the Russian and Serbian, the British generals had made war, and, as Napoleon said, " It is necessarj' to have made war for a long time to be able to conceive it." The Russian and Serbian generals had also handled men in action, but they had been dealing with a material substantially different from that with which the British officer worked. The Slav soldiers were conscripts ; the British were volunteers ; the former had had a short, the latter a long training. The British officers alone had at their disposition forces similar to the small, highly -trained, professional armies of the 17th, 18th, and the earlv 19th centuries. •Thi!< lesson liad been thonmithly le.init by the British lrooi«. " Tlie Knelish." wrote a Ginimii offcer to lils parcDts on 8<.iit«mber 17. 1914. " are marveilou-sly trained in making u>;e of tbe ttround. One never f-eei them, and one is con.'itantly imder tire." Here is an extract from anotlier letter found on a German otfiwr ; — " With the Knglish trooiw we liave grwit diflleulties. They have a queer way of caui^ing losses to the enemy. I'Ley make good trelicbes lo wliich they wait fiatiently. They carefully measure the ransw for their rille tire, and they then open a truly hellish tire on the un- smiiecting cavaliy, Ihi;> ns Uie rwsoa tluit we had such beary losses." 275 276 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES FERGUSSON, commanding 5th Division. \H. Waller Banietl. The result was that British strategy and tactics differed in many respects from Con- tinental. Compared with other European Armies, the British corps resembled the legions which guarded the frontiers of the Roman Empire during the fii'st two centuries of the Christian Era, with this im- portant distinction, that the army of Augustus and Trajan was recruited mostly in the provinces, whereas the bulk of the British Army was composed of citizens drawn from the British Isles. A British general was unable, as Continental generals were, immediately to tap an immense reserve of more or less disci- plined soldiers and he was consequently obliged to husband his resources. " I can spend a hundred thousand men a year," said Napoleon, who oft«n spent more. No British general before the Great War could have ven- tured to talk in that fashion. The British aims had perforce been to inflict a maximum while suffering a minimum loss in war, and to render the individual soldier and the tactical units superior to those produced imder a universal military service system. The second of those aims was admirably expressed in the Infantry Training manual issued by the General Staff : — The objects in view in developing a soldierly- spirit are to help the soldier to bear fatigue, privation, and danger cheerfully ; to imbue him with a sense of honour ; to give him confidence in his superioi*s and comrades ; to increase liis powers of initiative, of self-confidence, and of self-restraint ; to train him to obey orders, or to act in the absence of orders tor the advantage of his regiment under all conditions ; to produce such a high degree of courage and disreurard of self that in the stress of battle he will use his brains and his weapons coolly and to the host advantage ; to impress upon liira tliat, so long as lie Ls physically capable of fighting, surrender to the enemy is a disgraceful act ; and, finally, to teach him liow to act in combination witli his comrades in order to defeat the enemy. Like Alexander, Hannibal, Marius, Sulla, Caesar in Ancient, and like Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick the Great, Lee, and Stone- wall Jackson in Modern times, the great cap- tains of the British nation relied on quality rather than quantity. They did not believe that God was on the side of the big battalions, and it was significant that the campaign of Napoleon most admired by Wellington was that of 1814, when the French Emperor with a small army, by his manoeuvring and tlirough the superior merits of his troops, held at bay for many weeks the enormous hosts of the Allies and inflicted a crushing defeat on Bliicher between the Marne and the Seine. The business of a British commander was to fight with every natural and artificial advantage on his side. In other words, he trusted by his art, and the art of his men, to overcome the hordes of a modern Attila. British generals' MAJOR-GENERAL SNOW, commanding 4th Division. lEllhtl Or Fry. THE TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 277 contrary to thr fond belief of the Kaiser and his advisers, were thoroughly up to date. They had studied with p articular attention the Russo- Japanese and Balkan Wars, and the Kaiser was to find that the British Army, thougli " little," was very far from being " con- temptible." The British praoube of pitting small armies against large continental armies dated from the Hundred Years War. During the struggle with Louis XIV., the next occasion on which we exerted a decisive influence on the Continent, the British contingent and Marlborough were perhaps the chief cause of the victory gained by the Allies over the French monarch. But at the opening of the French Revolutionary Wars oiu: troops, whose prestige had been lowered in the American War of Independence, did not at the outset distinguish themselves. In his first encounter with the French Wellington had to help to conduct a retreat before them. Fortunately the efforts of Abercrombie, Moore, and others to raise the standard of efficiency in our Army were successful, and at the battles of Alexandria and Maida it was clearly demonstrated that the British could hold their own against forces trained by Napoleon him- self or under his direction. Fortunately, too, in India we had acquired a unique training ground for our soldiers. En- camped among a vast and then hostile GENERAL SIR HENRY HILDYARD, late Commander-in-Chief in Soutli Africa. MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON, Director of Military Training. [From a painting by J. St. Htlitr Lander, population the British garrison had to struggle fiercely for its existence, and in the struggle characters as daring and resourceful as any produced by the French Revolution were de- veloped. One of them, Wellington, was des- tined to destroy the reputation for invincibility gained by the Marshals of Napoleon. While the Prussians (who, be it remembered, rose against Napoleon only when he had lost hia Grande Arra^e in Russia) were cowering before Davout, French leaders whose mere names struck terror throughout Germany and Austria- Hungary were being worsted by Wellington. The strategy and tactics of Wellington in Portugal, Spain, and the South of France were, in 1914, still sovirces of uispiration to British soldiers. The infantry of Wellington, as Marbot points out, shot better than the French, and a bayonet charge by them was almost irresistible. Wellington in India had predicted that against British infantry the tactics of Napoleon would be unavailing. If on the defensive, Welling- ton was accustomed to await the attack of the French with his infantry drawn up in lines and under cbver. When the enemyli columns had been shattered by musketry and artillery fire they were attacked with the bayonet. But it must not be forgotten that for every defensive battle the Iron Duke fought five on the offensive, and the masterly manoeuvres by which from 1813 onwards ho drove the French from Spain belong piu-ely to this class. As a strategist, Wellington was equally remarkable. His march to emd crossing of S78 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. VICKERS' LATEST QUICK-FIRER. Firing 600 rounds per minute. [By courteiy of Vickers, Ltd. the Douro in front of Soult, whom Jl^apoleon called " the first manoeuvorer of Europe," is a model of its kind. By constructing the lines of Torres Vedrns and devastating Portugal he ensured the failure of Mass^na's invasion in 1810. Napoleon, who earlier had sneered at Wellington as a " Sepoy General," expressed to Foy his admiration of the methods employed by the British generalissimo on that occasion. Wellington's sudden pounces upon and storm- ings of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos in 1812 were masterly. His advance in 1813 against the French lines of communication, and the skill with, which, availing himself of the com- mand of the sea, he shifted his base from Lisbon to Santander, was as brilliant a feat as Napoleon's campaign of Marengo. In the Waterloo campaign he had few of his Peninsular veterans with hinx, and the majority of his troops were Belgian, Dutch, and German soldiers. According to Lord Roberts, Wellington made no mistake in 1815, and, had the Prussian army been also placed under his command, it is improbable that the French Emperor would have succeeded in winning, as he did, p. battle (that of Ligny) after he had crossed the Sambre. The value set upon Wellington by contemporary Prussians may be gathered from the fact that, according to report, years later, when war between France and Prussia seemed imminent, the Prussian Government offered the command of its forces to the Iron Duke. Between Waierloo and 1914 a British army apoeared only once on the Oonti- ncut. In the interval between Waterloo and the Crimean War a wave of comnier- cial prosperity had swept over the country. The warning of Wellington that steamboats had altered the conditions of warfare and that our islands might be invaded fell upon deaf ears. Like Lord Roberts in the years preceding the Great War, the Duke was pronomiced by demagogues to be in his dotage. Our Army was qiiite imprepared when the Crimean War broke out, and though the British infantry at the Alma and Inkerman and the British cavalry in the charges of the Heavy and Light Brigades exhibited the same stubbornness, energy, and courage they liad shown in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, the reputation of the British Army was not increased. A year after the con- clusion of peace the Indian Mutiny broke out, and the British soldier, divorced from a civilian- encumbered War Office, astonislied the world by his sublime courage and resourcefulness. The officers and men who fought at Mens and on the Marne remembered the capture of Delhi and the raising of the siege of Lucknow, just as the Nicholsons, Havelocks, Outrams, and Hodsons remembered Assaye, Albuera, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo. In the Indian Mutiny two soldiers who wero to keep the Army abreast of the times cam J lo the front — Lord Roberts and Lord Wolseley. The latter had distinguished himself in the Crimea. From the respect in which he was held by officers of unquestionable ability, there can be no doubt that he was one of the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 279 foremost captains of the ago. Like Havelock, he had studied profoundly the campaigns of Napoleon, the lessons taught by Lee, Jackson, and Grant in the North and South War, by Moltko in the Sadowa and the Gravelotte- Sedan campaigns were not lost on him. It is interesting to note that, while Moltke cast a disdainful eye on tho deeds of the American generals. Lord Wolsoloy (as also Colonel Henderson) examined with sympathetic atten- tion their achievements. Lee, in Lord Wolsoley's view, was greater than, Jackson (according to Colonel Henderson) was as great as. Napoleon. Such obiter dicta might smack of exaggeration, but they were characteristic of the independent attitude of British military men. Napoleon was admired in Great Britain, but he was not worshipped as ho was in Prussia. The blind admiration felt for Napoleon by Imperial Germany would not have been tolerated in our military circles. " You think that Wellington is a great general because he defeated you," said Napoleon, for the purpose of hoiu'tening his men, to SouJt on the morning of Waterloo. The Prussians, because they had been so often routed by Napoleon, had deified him. It was Lord Wolsoley who superintended the metamorphosis of the British from a Long into a, comparatively, Short Service Army, from one led by men who had purchased their commissions into one with officers selected by competitive examination. We turn now to Lord Roberts, whose brilliant march to Candahar brought him prominently before the public. No one had done more than he to convert tho private and non- commissioned officer into the chivalrous, clean- living, and intelligent soldier who was to win the admiration and aflection of the French Allies. As a strategist and tactician. Lord Roberts had been always alertly appreciative of new fivctors in warfare. His orders issued, and his speeches before the Boer War show that he accurately calculated the effect of the modern artillery, of smokeless powder, and of repeating rifles on the battle-field. After the battle of Colenso he was dispatched with Lord Kitchener to South Africa. He took over the command of a half-dispirited army which had not been trained to meet mounted infantry who were also m&rk.smen. The Spectator, a representative organ of British opinion, was then hinting that the war might last 20 years. Lords Roberts and Kitchener landed at Cape Town on Janutuy 10, 1900, and by February 18 Cronje had been out- manoeuvred and surrounded at Paardeberg. The surrender of Cronje a few days later led to the raising of the siege of Ladysmith and was followed by the occupation of Bloemfontein and Pretoria. Seldom in history has tho arrival of two men on a theatre of war wrought a transformation so sudden. One may be per- mitted to wonder what would have happened if Von der Goltz and the younger Moltke had been set tho same problem ! Lords Roberts A VICKERS 75 M.M. GUN. [yidUrs, LimiUd. 280 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. and Kitchener had not been deputed to prepare for the cantpaign, and, until the Boer War, if we except the skirmishes of Laing's Nek and Majuba, the British Anny had had no experi- ence of fighting against white men armed with modem artillery and rifles. Lord Roberts's bold inarch from the Modder River to Bloem- fontein and the turning movements by which he subsequently drove the Boers from their kopjes decided the struggle. After his return to England he had striven successfully to iiiq>ress on the Army the paramount importance of accurate shooting, unsuccessfully to rouse the nation to a sense of the German Peril. Among the other officers who, with Lord Wolseley tuid Lord Roberts, prepared the British Army for a European war may be mentioned Sir Evelyn Wood (also the first British Sirdar of the Egyptian Army), General Sir Henry Hildyard (first Commandant of the Staff College and afterwards Commander-in-Chief in South Africa), Sir Edward HaTnley (the author of an original text book on the Art of War), Colonel Henderson (also ' a Commandant of the Staff College), and Colonel Reping- ton. Standing entirely in a class by himself was " Chinese " Gordon, a Nelson on land. If, as Napoleon asserted, the moral are to the material factors in war as three to one, Gordon's services to his coimtry cannot be overrated. The avenger of Gordon was Lord Kitchener, whose direct and indirect influence on the Army which fought in the Great War, was of the most decisive kind. He was not permitted by the politicians to superintend the preparations for it. ^ In our next chapter we shall give a brief biography of this extraordinary man. CHAPTER XIX. LORD KITCHENER. l>ORD Kitchener — His Appointment as Minister of War — His Qualifications for the Po8t AND Qualities — Lord Kitchener's Career — Education and Early Life — Serves in the French Army in Franco -Prussian War — Surveys Western Palestine and Cyprus — Second - IN-COMMAND of EGYPTIAN CaVALRY ViSIT TO Mx. SiNAI ADVENTURES AmONG THE ArABS His Efforts to Save Gordon — Governor-General of Suakin — Struggle with Osmau Digna — Kitchener Wounded — Adjutant-General of Egyptian Army — Succeeds General Grbnfell AS Sirdar — Lord Cromer's Opinion of Him — The River War — Action op Firket and the Battles of the Atbara and Omdurman — Lord Roberts on His Tactics — Fashoda — Lord Salisbury's View of Him — Founds Gordon Memorial College and Refounds Khartum — BoEB War — Promotes Union of Races in South Africa — Ideas on Universal Military Service — In India Abolishes Dual Control of, and Remodels and Redistributes Army — Staff College at Quetta Created — His Conception of a Modern Officer and a Modern Army — Visit to Far East, Australia, New Zealand, and United States — British Consul- General IN Egypt — A Prussian Officer's Judgments on Him — His Place in History. ON Sunday, August 2 — the day after Germany's declaration of war on Russia and her violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg, and the very day on which she delivered her ultimatum to Belgium and her troops began crossing the French frontier — The Times announced that Lord Kitchener was " leaving England for Egj'pt." It was then believed that Lord Haldane would succeed Mr. Asquith, who had himself succeeded Colonel Seely as Minister of War. The previous activities of Lord Haldane at the War Office had not been calculated to inspire confidence in such an appointment at such a time. Despite his great services in helping to create the Terri- torials, Lord Haldane's record seemed to many people to be an illustration of the truth of an axiom of Napoleon hurled in 1813 at his brother Joseph, who had interfered with the French commanders in Spain, that "it is the greatest of all immoralities to engage in a profession of which one is ignorant." The profession of arms in 1813 was a far less serious one than in 1914, and the common sense of the British people revolted at the notion that a civilian who had not even had a business education Vol. I. — Part 8. should conduct a war to be waged for the very existence of the British Empire. The Socialist, Mr. Blatchford, had advised in 1909 that Lord Kitchener should prepare the nation for an Anglo-German war. Like Lord Roberts's, Mr. Blatchford's warnings and advice had been disregarded. But when Germany threw her gigantic forces into Belgium and France it was no longer possible for the politicians to withstand the popular demand that one of the foremost generals, if not the foremost general, of the age should sui-ceed the Prime Minister at the War Office. On August 5 The Times voiced the people's wishes, and later on the same day the Premier announced that Lord Kitchener had been offered and had accepted the post of Minister of War. It was contrary to Constitutional precedent, but the appointment was acclaimed by the Colonies and Dependencies, and by the French Allies, for whom Lord Kitchener in his teens had voluntarily served, when France, after the defeats of Spicheren, Worth, Mars-la- Tour, Gravelotte, and Sedan lay at the feet of the insolent soldiery of the King of Pru.ssia- At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War 281 :;s-' THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. SNAPSHOT OF LORD KITCHENER. [Daily Mirror. Moltke was 70 ; at the outbreak of the Great War Lord Kitchener was 64 years old. With Sir Evelyn Wood and Lord Grenfell he had organized the Egyptian Army ; he had crushed the hordes of an African Attila at the action of Firket and the battles of the Atbara and Omdurman ; by his tact at Fashoda he had largely prevented a collision between the British Empire and the French Republic ; he had been the loyal lieutenant and successor of Lord Roberts in the South African War, and had brought it to a satisfactory termination. Again, by the exercise of tact he had con- verted Boer generals, like General Botha, into loyal Britons ; he had remodelled and " speeded up " the Indian Army ; and he had laid down the lines of the new military forces which had sprung into existence in Australia and New Zealand. Until he was turned thirty his life had been filled with dangerous adventures ; but, from the time when he entered the Egyptian Army, he had been in positions of ever-increasing responsi- bility. Smce the days of the Lawrences no administrator (with the exception of Lord Cromer) in the service of the Crown had exhi- bited more transcendent abilities. Appointed British Agent and Consul-General to Egypt in 1911, by his justice and far-seeing measures he had conciliated the Nationalist party, had gained the love of the peasants in the Valley of the Nile, and he had managed to keep the Mahome- dan population from aiding their co-religionists in Tripoli against Italy, a country for which he felt the sincerest admiration. " Every English- man," he is reported to have said to Sir Reiinell Rodd, " has two countries — old England and young Italy." In 1899 he had refounded Khartum, and collected the money for and founded the Gordon Memorial College there. From 1911 to 1914 he was reforming the Egyptian system of education. A yovmg man, he had helped to survey and map Western Palestine and the district of Sinai. He had also surveyed and mapped Cyprus, and established land courts and a system of land registration in that island, and he had been Vice-Consul in Anatolia. Later he had been on a commission to delimit the frontiers of Zanzibar, the protectorate of which was soon to be ceded by Germany to Great Britain in exchange for the cession to Germany of Heligoland. Under his directions a railway and telegraph line had been run up the Valley of the Nile from Sarras to Wady Haifa, from Wady Haifa across the Nubian Desert to Abu Hamed, and thence by the Atbara fort to Khar- tum. Strategic railways were also constructed by him in India. During his administration of Egypt the road from Cairo to Alexandria was repaired, Helouan connected by one with Cairo, the draining of the Delta commenced, the Suevs Canal fortified, and plans were prepared for a barrage across the White Nile. Lord Ivitchener had failed in nothing which he had undertaken. On the rare occasions when he had delivered speeches in public his utterances were as judicious as they were weighty. His writings, from which we sliall quote, showed that he possessed both a massive, clear, and masculine style, and also humour and imagination. He spoke more than one Oriental language like a native. As a gardener and a collector of blue china and other curios his skill and knowledge were remarkable. Recognizing the importance of supplying cotton to Lancashire from areas within the British Empire, he had encouraged to the utmost cotton-culture in Egypt and the Sudan, and experimented on its cultivation atBiala. While he was governing Egypt a parasite, the Rhogas Kilcheneri, had been discovered to destroy the boll-worm which preyed on cotton. Whether from pride or a sense of the fitness of things, he did not court popular applause, and in a period when most personages were advertising themselves, he preferred to let his reputation grow without the assistance of the newspapers. He did not pam- per journalists, although his kindly words on THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 283 GUNSBOROUGH HOUSE, NEAR TRALEE, IRELAND. Lord Kitchener's Birthplace. [Daily Mirror, loarning of the death at Ladysmith of the most Ijrilliant of war correspondents, George Steevens, showed that he appreciated sincere men who, at the risk of their lives, endeavoured to convey to the pubHc information that could be spread without injury to the interests of the com- munity. Physically, morally, and intellectually he wae a big man, and his dauntless courage had been shown on innumerable occasions. At this great crisis in the history of the British Empire men naturally turned to him as people had turned in the past to Wellington and Nelson. Even the Thersites of the day, Mr. Keir Hardie, had admitted that Lord Kitchener was a " big, brainy, brawny man, to whom all littleness and meanness were foreign." Unlike Wellington, and like Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener had never hesitated to acknowledge the share of his subordinates in his victories. His piercing blue eyes and quiet, firm voice ex- pressed his character. A German who saw Napoleon driving his tired troops through the streets of Dresden remarked that he had " the eyes of a tyrant and the voice of a lion." Lord Kitchener's eyes were the eyes of a master whose will was chained to duty and not to personal ambition. Horatio Herbert Kitchener was born on June 24, 1850, at Gunsborough House, near Tralee, in Ireland. The day after his birth, Lord Palmer- ston de'.ivered the famous Don Pacifico speech, in which ho asked the House of Commons to decide whether or not, " just as in days of old a Roman held himself to be free from indignity when he could say civis Romanus sum, a British subject should consider himself in foreign countries as protected by the vigilant eye and strong arm of his Government against injustice and wrong." Lord Kitchener's father. Colonel Horatio Kitfihener, belonged to a Suffolk family. but, before Lord Kitchener's birth, he had become an Irish landowner. On the side of his mother, nee Chevallier, Lord Kitchener was descended from Huguenots. French as woU as English blood ran in his veins. The early years of his life were spent in Ireland. At the age of thirteen ho was sent by his father to a school near Villeneuve, at the eastern end of the Lake of Geneva. Colonel Kitchener had perceived that steam transport was drawing all the nations of the world together, and that a knowledge of foreign languages was becoming every day of more value to his countrymen. At Villeneuve the boy was in one of the most interesting regions of Europe. He was in siglit of the Castle of Chillon, and of Clarens, immor- talized by the revolutionist, Rousseau. At the other end of the Lake had lived two other revolution-producers, Voltaire and Byron. Between Geneva and Villeneuve lay Lausanne, where Gibbon, the historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, had resided. Away to the East of Villeneuve stretched the Valley of the Rhone, from which Bonaparte had :.^H t ' W^ii, w ^MM'^' ' mjkL. ] f - — -t| IL \ \ 9 .^\m '^ li r'v- %pf i /^ m^\ ^J m ^ % P ) -*<« -m^g < HORATIO AND WALTER KITCHENER. {Daily Mirror 2S4 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. i V !» .'>■■ r r ' * / j>f^h ■\i j-'^*^^ < Koi^^ 1 \ t ^■l^^^B ' ^'' ^^^^^^^^1 FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS. [RusstU Or Sons. descended on Italy in 1800. The Marengo campaign had been the first of the vast strategic combinations of the Corsican genius who was strangely destined nearly a hundred years after his death to be adored at Potsdam. in 1863 the district to the west of Villeneuve had not yet been wholly captured by hotel keepers. From the school at Villeneuve Horatio J<itchener proceeded to a London coach, the Rev. George Frost, of 28 and 29, Kensington Square. A few doors away lived Green, the historian of the English People ; Mill had been living in the same square, Thackeray in the adjoining Young Street. Like Bismarck, Lord Kitchener appears to have been indebted to one of the race so much abused by teachers with licences. When Mr. Frost died, a letter of thanks from Lord Kitchener for the congratulations which his .old tutor had sent him on the occasion of the former's victories in the Sudan was found beneath the dead man's pillow.* Kitchener was seventeen years old when he entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, the more scientific of the two colleges for the training of future officers in the Army. He had not received a public school education. When he was at Woolwich he was distinguished for his pro- ficiency in mathematics and for a bold breach of (ii^^cipline. In 1866 Prussia, under the leadership of Moltke, Roon, Bismarck, and its King William (styled by the Emperor William II. "the Great"), had crushed Austria-Hungary. In 1870 Prussia performed a similar operation on France. Horatio Kitchener, whose father was now living at Dinan, in Brittany, was sta.ving with Colonel Kitchener at the time of the war. Without consulting his father, much less the Woolwich authorities*, he chivalrously joined as a private the losing side. He was in the second army of the Loire, commanded by the capable General Cliaazy, who was being inter- fered with by Gambetta. After having opposed Marshal Kiel's wise proposals, before the war, for strengthening the French Army, the French Dictator felt it incumbent upon him to direct the operations of the armies improvised after the disaster at Sedan. Kitchener may have con- trasted Gambetta's conduct with that of Lincoln during the North and South War, which had been concluded in his boyhood. One thing is certain. Though his service with the French was ended by an attack of pneu- monia, and his chief experience of campaigning was a perilous ascent in a warballoont.hesaw quite enough of the frightful results which follow unpreparedness for war to make him realize • Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. By the author of " Kins Edward the Seventh " (Nlsbet), p. 10. ♦ It may be mentioned that on December 29. 1913, Lord Kitchener w ent for an aeroplane fliKht with tlie airman Olivier. ■Lord Kitcbeoer. iI-lmHrd). iei4 Br H. O. GroHer (d. 2:11. C. Arthur Pearaoa THE LATE FIELD-MARSHAL LORD WOLSELEY. \^EllM & Frv. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 285 the responsibility attending tiis future pro- fession, and the need for organizing an army with the greatest thoroughness before, and not after, war breaks out. By the irony of fate, 43 years later he was set by Mr. Asquith the same task that Clmnzy had been set by Gam- betta, that of improvising an Army in time of war. Happily for Great Britain there have been factors in the British Constitution which constitutional lawyers and historians forget to mention. These factors are the sea and the British sailors who patrol it. We may here observe that Mr. Churchill, the first Lord of the Admiralty at the outbreak of the Great War, like Lord Kitchener, had served in a foreign (the Spanish) Army. Horatio Kitchener, French private, was not unnaturally looked at askance by the rulers of the Royal Military Academy, and his father had to bring very powerful influences to bear in order to enable him to re-enter Woolw.jh.* On leaving Woolwich he entered the Royal En- gineers. It was fortunate that he joined a branch of the Army which was, thanks to the improvements in guns and rifles, becoming every day of more importance. The Napo- leonic dynasty, too, had ceased to reign, and Carlylo's misreading of Prussian history had led superficial observers to beheve that the creation of a German Empire was almost tanta- mount to a guarantee of universal peace. Wliile the aged Bismarck, sated with honours, ruled Germany, this behef had justification. The interests of peace for nearly twenty years dominated those of war in the European- controlled world, and the opportunities of an engineer, whether military or civil, to come to the front were excellent. A military engineer may be a producer as well as a destroyer, and in peace time ho is more directly useful than a gunner or a cavalry or foot soldier. Lieutenant Kitchener specialized in field- telegraphy, the making and working of rail- roads, photography, and surveying. His expert knowledge of the two latter subjects was the cause of his being employed by the administrators of the Palestine Exploration Fund to help Lieutenant Conder to survey and map Western Palestine. Whether by design or chance he had laid the foundations of a great career. The Suez iiial and a short sea-route to India had been opened in 1869, and Syria and Egypt had suddenly become of vital importance to the British Empire. That the British might be forced to •Lord Kitchener ol Khartoum : By the Author ol • ' KJni Edward the Seventh " (page 19). Nisbet. MAJOR-GENERAL HUBERT I. W. HAMILTON, Military Secretary to Lord Kitchener in South Africa and India. lEUkt & Fry. interfere in the affairs of the heavily -mortgaged Egypt was in 1874 probable. An enemy ad- vancing from the east to cut the Su3z Canal and to drive the British from Egypt would pass tlirough Western Palestine, and a minute acquaintance with the topagraphy and the inhabitants of the Holy Land might be expected, sooner or later, to be profitable to its possessor. One may remember that the Kaiser and a Staff, disguised as pilgrims, visited Jerusalem in 1898, to observe the same locality. In Palestina, moreover, Turkish and Arabic (the most im- portant language for an officer who might be sent to Egypt) could be more easily mastered than in England. From 1874 to 1877 Ki(chen?r worked at the survey, and some of tha results of his labours are embodied in tliree monu- mental volumes of observations, a paper on Remains of Synagogues in Galilee, and the map of Western Palestine set up by himself and Conder. The surveying was hard and risky work. In an affray with the natives Conder, who had been saved from drowning at Ascalon by Kitchener, owed hi? life to his colleague's cooln3ss and courage. Kitchener was himself wounded, and subsequently suffered 283 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 28 AND 29, KENSINGTON SQUARE : HOUSE OF KITCHENER'S COACH. from malaria. When in Palestine he became friendly with Holman Huiat, the sincerest and most religious of English painters. " Lieutenant Kitchener," wrote the pre-Raphaelite artist, " . . was completing the survey. We . . . had many opportimities of talking about the future military prospects of Syria." On his way home from Palestine in 1877, Kitchener visited Constantinople, Adrianople, and Sofia, all disturbed by the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. He had in the Turkish Army a second opportunity of observing an army unprepared for war. A virile article contri- buted to Blackwood's Magazb^e for February, 1878, contains his impression of the Turkish soldiers : — " Always ready to fight (he wrote), they are perfect heroes, never conquered except by over- powering numbers, their motto might well be ' While we have life we will fight.' " The Turks defeated in the Balkan War njay well lia%-e regretted that in 1 883 this magnanimous Englishman was not employed by the Sultan to remodel the Turkish Army. The task, as it happened, was entrusted to the military theorist. Von der Goltz. Though, as Von Bemhardi subsequently pointed out, it was to Prussia's advantage that Turkey should have a strong armj', her agents failed to create one. Gokz, like Moltke before him, could not, or did not, do full justice to the splendid raw material for armies in the Nearer East. Kitchener's next tasK was to survey Cyprus, which Sur Garnet Wolseley had been sent out to govern. He organized a system of land registration, made a map of the island, and contributed to Blackwood's Magazine a bright description of the country, with suggestions how it might be developed commercially. During his stay in Cyprus he was appointed Vice-Consul at Erzeroum in Asia Minor.* Since 1874 he had become familiar with the manners, character, and languages of Arabs, Turks, and Greeks. In 1882 we find him in Alexandria when the bombardment of the city was imminent. He took refuge on a ship during the shelling of the forts, and doubtless witnessed Beresford's daring handling of the Condor. When Wolseley arrived to restore order in the Valley of the Nile emploj'- ment was naturally found for the Arabic- speaking Kitchener, who served through the Tel-el-Kebir campaign as a major of Egyptian cavalry. His knowledge of Arabic and of Orientals had stood him in good stead. Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, and Kitchener became second-in-command of the Egyptian cavalry. At the end of 1883 he took a holiday in the form of joining a party which proposed to survey the Sinai peninsula — a dangerous undertaking, since the Arabic scholar. Pro- fessor Palmer, with two officers had just been murdered in that district. He started from Suez on the 10th November, 1883. On the last day of December Kitchener, at ended by four Arabs, returning to Egypt, left for Ismailia. The return of Kitchener to Egypt coincided with the departure of Gordon to the Sudan, a province Gordon had already governed from 1877 to 1879. TheMahdi had appeared in July, 1881, and, after several reverses which had not shaken the belief of his adherents in his divine mission, had annihilated an Egyptian Army under Hicks Pasha, sent to suppress the rising in the Sudan. In accordance with the wishes of the popular journalist, Mr. W. T. Stead, and contrary to those of Lord Cromer (then Sir Evelyn Baring), the rfe facto ruler of Egypt, Gordon was dispatched . to Khartum and appointed Governor-General of the Sudan. His glorious and astonishing record in China had apparently hypnotized the British Govern- ment into imagining that among black savages, who were as unlike the Chinese as any persons could well be, he could perform mira(des at a trifling cost. Gordon disobeyed orders from home, but that was to bo expected from ono • " The Life of Lord Kitchener," by F. W. Haokwood (Collins). P. 07. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 287 FIELD-MARSHAL EARL KITCHENER, Secretary of State for War. [From thg painting by AnfieU, w}io did not regard material as superior to naoral considerations. Some of liis mea.siires may have been wrong, but errors may be excused in a white man isolated among cruel black men, who were then very low down in the scale of humanity. He reached Khartum on February 18, 1884, but by that date the defeat ■ of Baker Pasha on Fcbruar^■ 5 at El-Teb had rendered his position most precarious. Kitchener had in 1877 met Valentine Baker commanding Turks during the Russo-Turkish War. The victories of General Graham over the Mahdi's general, Osman Digna, at the second battle of El-Teb and at Tamaniab (March 13, 1884) were not sufficient to restore the situation. Kliartum had beou 288 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ^/Ui ^ l^ct::: ^.^yl^ ^w^ .L^ ^ >- -i' ~ *-y^'" *^-t~.i^ v-vwXj "ZSCr .-^^L-O^ - W^C/A-i./». _ t//vw«<< ioo. «-K-. uJLl^^i~r ^ IfXiUU. At^t'^ ""vR A. ««n^ aO^,»0 COPY OF ENTRY IN GORDON'S JOURNAL REFERRING TO LORD KITCHENER. \by permission of Messrs, Ke^an, Paul and Trench, besieged in April, and Gordon witli Colonel Stewart and Mr. Tower were the only white men left in the city. The news that Gordon was cut off from Egypt reached England, and the British people realized that something was at stake higher than the lowering of the franchise. If Gordon were left to perish the honour of tlie nation would be tarnished. The Goverimient decided that Lord Wolsoley was at all costs to relieve Khartum. Meanwhile, Kitchener was acting a no less heroic part than Gordon himself. As an officer of the Egyptian Intelligence Department he had gone alone, or accompanied by Lieutenant (now General Sir Leslie) Rundle, among the tribes tlirough which a relieving force would have to move. Disguised as an Arab, and, Hke Napoleon in the Russian campaign, carrying poison about his person, bo proceeded to Dongola and beyond, en- deavouring by argument and bribes to keep the natives from joining the False Prophet. The war correspondent, Bennet Burleigh, who with reckless courage had passed through Dongola, met him at Debbeh. " In manner," wrote Mr. Bennet Burleigh, " Captain Kitchener is good-natured, a listener rather than a talker, but readily pronouncing an opinion if it is cafled for. All his life," added Mr. Burleigh, " ho has been, par excellence, a ' volunteer ' noldier — volunteering, time and again, for one difficult and dangerous duty after another." If Gordon could have followed the movements of Kitchener, he would have deleted certain criticisms in his Journal. It is pleasant, however, to reflect — as the passage reproduced above from the original journal shows — that he realized to some extent the unique qualities of his fellow countryman. " I like Baker's description of Kitchener," he wrote on Novem- ber 26, 1884, two months before he was killed. Baker had observed in a letter to Gordon that Kitchener was " one of the few very superior British officers." By October Wolseley had arrived at Wady Haifa and Kitchener (now a Major), as Deputy Assistant Adjutant — and Quartermaster-General on the Intelligence Staff, accompanied General Stewart in his dash across the desert from Korti to Metemmeh. To his annoyance Kitchener was recalled before Metemmeh was reached. Though Stewart won the battle of Abu Klea, the expedition failed. Gordon perished, and the Sudan was abandoned for years to the Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa. When Gordon fell. Kitchener was thirty-four years old. His intellect hai been sharpened and his character hardened through years of semi-solitary and dangerous work. Masterful and original by nature, as his action in joining the French Army had shown, he had been steadily moving away from the beaten track followed by the vast majority of his stereotyped contemporaries. To them he bore much the same relation as Sven Hedin* did to the ordinary globe-trotter. He now, in disgust, threw up his commission in the Egyptian Army and paid one of liis infre- quent visits to England. A I,ieuten ant-Colonel, he next accepted the post of a Boundary Com- missioner for Zanzibar.f His knowledge of •surveying had again stood him in good stead. • The Swedish traveller : lie Is au almircr ot Lord Kitchener, t " lord Kitchener." by H. G. Groser, p. 10.>. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 2S9 GORDON'S LAST STAND AT KHARTUM. January 26, 1885. I From tin painting by George IV. Joy. By courtesy c/ the Graphic The next year (1886) he was appointed Govemor- •Coneral of the Rod Sea Littoral and Comman- <lant of Sviakin. Hitherto, when not on his lonelyand venturesome journeys, he had been a ser\'ant. He was now, in no small measure, liis own master. At Sualdn he was on the eastern flank ■of the Dervisli theocratic despotism. The Mahdi had died a few months after his cele- brated victim's murder. Ho had shifted the capital from Khartum, which hes in the fork formed by the confluence of the WTiite and Blue Nilcs, to Omdurman, a Uttlo to the north, below the junction of tlic two rivers, on the west l)ank. Ho had chosen as liis successor his lieu- tenant, a villain, by nanw AbduUahi. The most 290 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE BOMBARDMENT MEN OF H.M.S. INVINCIBLE thoughtful of modern historians, the Italian Ferrero, in his work on Militarism has lucidly de- cribed the characteristic features of the short- lived Kaliphate of Omdurman. The reader who wishes to contrast African with German barbarities may be referred to Ferrero's book, to Mr. Winston Chiu-chill's " River War," to the reminiscences of the Khalifa's captive, Slatin Pasha, and to Steevens's " With Kitchener to Khartum." From the intellectual standpoint the Khalifa's FIELD-MARSHAL SIR EVELYN WOOD. {Laiay0lt*. OF ALEXANDRIA. CHEERING THE CONDOR. I By courtesy of The Graphic. tyranny was contemptible. The Khalifa, with' the assistance of slave-dealers and mercenaries, ruled by brute force alone. The population and the resources of his kingdom dwindled year by year. Kitchener began a crusade against the lascivious monster who had pushed against Suakin the ablest of his officers, the ubiquitous Osman Digna. The advantage of having at Suakin an officer who could speak Arabic like a native, and under- stood the Arab character, was at once apparent. Kitchener made friends with tribes in the neighbourhood, and speedily precipitated them on his clever and cunning opponent. On October 7, 1886, Osman Digna's stronghold at Tamai was stormed by " Friendlios," and a great store of rifles and ammunition captured. At the end of 1887 the " Friendlies "again routed the Dervish leader, and Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchener decided to make an effort to capture him. On January 17, 1888, he surprised Osman Digna's camp, but was struck by a bullet which traversed his jaw and entered his neck. To get cured of his wound, Kitcliener departed to Cairo, and, later, to England. He was, however, soon back at his post and assisted the Sirdar, General GrentoU, on December 20 of the- same year to rout the Dervishes at Gomaizeh, in the vicinity of Suakin. The following year he led the decisive charge of the Hussars and Egyptian cavalry at the battle of Toski, August 3, 1889. Sir Evelyn Wood had ceased to be Sirdar in 1885, and had been succeeded by. Sir Francis (afterwards Lord) Orenfeil. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 291 Kitchener was now Adjutant-General of the Egyptian Army, and from 1890 to 1891 tom- porary commander of the Police.* In 1892, on the resignation of Sir Francis Grenfoll, he was chosen by Lord Cromer for the post of Sirdar. That illustrious statesman, nine years his senior, had been through Woolwich, had entered the Royal Artillery and won the Wellington Prize. Lord Cromer's opinion of Lord Kitchener as a soldier contained in his "Modern Egypt," published in 1908, is not, therefore, the opinion of a mere layman. He is describing Lord Kitchener at the opening of the campaign which was to end with the capture of Omdurman :^ A better choice could not have been made. Young, energetic, ardently and exclusively devoted to his profession, and, as the honourable scars on his face testified, experienced in Sudanese warfare, Sir Herbert Kitchener posssssod all the qualities neces- sary to bring the campaign to a successful issue. Like many another military commander, the bonds which united liim and his subordinates were those of stern discipline on the one side, and, on the other, the respect duo to superior talent and the confidence felt in the resourcefulness of a strong and masterful spirit, rather than the afftictionate obedience yielded to the behests of a genial chief. When the campaign was over, there were not wanting critics who whispeied that Sir Herbert Kitchener's success had beec duo as much to good luck as to good management If, it was said, a number of events had hai/pened, which, as a matter of fact, did not hapf-en, the result might have been different. The samo may be said of any military commander and of any campaign. Fortune is proverbially fickle in war. . . . The fact, however, is that Sir Herbert Kitchener's main merit was that he left as little as possible to chance. A lirst-rate military a<lministrator, every detail of the machine, with which he had to work, received ' " Lord Kitchener." by H. G. Groser. p. 106. ADMIRAL LORD CHARLES BERESFORD, who commanded the Condor at the bombardment of Alexandria. 1 LalayetU. adequate attention. Before any decisive movement was made, each portion of the machine was adapted, so far as human foresight could provide, to perform its allotted task. Sir Herbert Kitchener also possessed another quality which is rare among soldiers, and which wa3 of special value under the circumstances then ^m '■■■Se?**'*.' %f>^ MAIN ATTACK ON DERVISH POSITION, BATTLE OF FIRKET. [By courtisy o] thi CrapkU. 292 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL SIR F. R. WINGATE. lEIlioll & Fry. existing. He did not think that extravagance was the necessary handmaid of elViciency. On the contrary, he was a rigid economist, and, whilst malting adequate provision for all essential and necessary expenditure, suppressed with a firm hand any tendency towards waste and extravagance. Lord Groiner's selection of Lord Kitchener was amply justified. At last the engineer, in Egypt turned cavalryman, was to have an opportunity of organizing a large body of troops and preparing for a campaign, not merely for a battle. " In all our recent expeditions," wrote Sir Samuel Baker to him in 1892, " one notes a general absence of military science." There was an absence of the absence of military science in the operations of Kitchener in the valley of the Nile. For the moment, indeed, there was small prospect of . the Egyptian Army being used to recover the Sudan. Lord Cromer, owing to financial reasons, was not anxious to spend Egyptian monoj' on extending southwards the Egyptian frontier, and the British Premier, Lord Salisbury (re- placed later in the year by Mr. Gladstone), distrusted enthiwiastic soldiers. " If the soldiers were allowed full scope," he wrote privately to Lord Cromer, " they would insist on the importance of garrisoning the moon in order to jjrotect as from Mars."* The Radical Party, though it was a mistake (as the Germans • ■■ Modem r.trvt." \ir tlie Va rl of Oromer. Vol. II.. p. 75. afterwards discovered) to suppose that they wore completely dominated by pacifists, also opposed a forward policy. The Sudan was associated in their minds with unpleasant memories. Not until the return of Lord Salisbury to power in 1896 was Kitchener to be unleashed on the Khalifa ; and then only at the instance of Italy, which had met with a severe reverse (the battle of Adowa) at the hands of the Abyssinians, who, it was then rumoured, were in league with the Dervishes. The now Sirdar's duties were at first confined to com- pleting the process — commenced by Sir Evelyn Wood and Sir Francis Grenfell — of turning Egyptian peasants and Sudanese nomads into brave, disciplined, and intelligent warriors, and to discovering the resources and plans of the Khalifa. For Colonel Kitchener those duties were easy. He had assisted Wood and Grenfell in the task of training Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers, and he fully understood the value of and the appropriate measures for ascertaining the forces and designs of an enemy. He had himself been an Intelligence Officer of extraordinary merit. He may have known from personal experience, or from the reports of eye-witnesses of the Franco-German War, how greatly the triumph of Moltke had been due to the services of the spy, Stieber. That a British general would resort to the dis- gusting methods by which Stieber and his successors prepared the way for German in- vasions was, of course, unthinkable. Between discovering through spies the plans of a savage enemy, who is waiting at any moment to devas- tate a civilized community, and sending in effect an advance guard during peace time into a civilized country, and instructing members of that guard secretly to construct platforms for heavy guns, or to manufacture bombs for the destruction of bridges, railways, canals, and reservoirs, there is a difference which, though it may not be apparent to same Teutonic minds, is a very real one. Bismarck might say, and in- deed said, that Germany ought to be grateful to him for " pursuing reptiles into their caves " to .see what they were scheming ; the peoples " peacefully " penetrated by Bismarck's reptiles might be excused for resentting his treacherous conduct. Lord Kitchener made a legitimate use of spies, and Major (now General Sir Reginald) Wingate, who was at the head of his Intelligence Department, abiy carried out his instructions. The Khalifa's secrets were soon no secrets to the Sirdar. Ifi 1895 an Austrian, Slatin Pasha, who had been captured by the Decvishes, escaped, and Slatin THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. 293 CAPTURE OF THE KHALIFA'S BLACK FLAG AT OMDURMAN. [By Courtesy 0/ the Graphic. confirmed or added to the information already collected by Major Wingate. As has been mentioned, it was Italy's inter- vention that set in motion the Egyptian Army. On March 12, 1896, Lord Salisbury's Cabinet— the Conservatives had been returned to office in 1895 — suddenly decided that Dongola, which had been abandoned, should be reoccupied, and in June 2,500 Indian troops arrived at Suakin, thereby releasing its Egyptian garrison for a war in the valley of the Nile. The general lines of the plan of campaign were settled by Kitchener with Lord Cromer at Cairo ; a statesman with a military training consulted with a soldier who was to prove that he too was a statesman. Seldom in British history had there been 294 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE FIRST BRITISH BRIGADE MARCHING OUT OF WAD HAMED. [By courtesy of the Graphic, 80 fortunate a coiabination. Behind the ruler of Egypt stood the wisest and most ex- perienced of British diplomatists. Bismarck might call Lord Salisbury a " lath painted to resemble iron." To the brutal and cynical Prussian Mr. Gladstone (whom the acute Ameri- can psychologist, William James, credited with as much or more will-power than was possessed by Napoleon) was " Professor " Gladstone. The conjunction of Salisbury, Cromer, Kitchener pointed to the immediate destruction of the detestable tyranny of the Mahdi's successor. Two questions dominated the coming cam- paign. Would Egyptian troops, even with superior weapons, face the most fanatical savages in Africa ? How was the Army to bo fed and supplied with ammunition on its advance to the Dervish capital ? " The main point," we quote from Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt, " was to bring on an action at an early period of the campaign. Once victorious, even on a small scale, the Egyptian troops would acquire confidence in themselves, and the enemy would be proportionately discouraged." The disastrous defeats of Baker Pasha and Hicks Pasha were still present in the minds of the Egyptian soldiers, and the recent discom- fiture of the Italians by the Abyssinians had shaken the prestige of Eiu'opeans. The Der- vishes at the battle of Debra Sin in 1887 had routed the Abyssinians and sacked Gondar, the ancient capital of the Negus, and though the Negus John had -won a victory over the Dervishes in 1889, the Abyssinian monarch had been killed in the action, and the Abyssinian rearguard, retiring before the Dervishes, cut to pieces. The body of the dead Negus had been captured and carried in triumph to Omdurman. If attacked by the Khalifa's followers, would the small Egyptian Army fare any better than had the large armies of the Abyssinians who had been beaten by the Dervishes ten years before ? As Lord Cromer observes, " the smallest check had above all things to be avoided. It would be magnified in the eyes of the world, and although perhaps of sUght intrinsic importance would produce a bad moral effect." The Commissioners of the Egyptian Debt representing France and Russia, then opposed to Great Britain's guardianship of Egypt, objected to the expedition and to the expenses being paid out of the General Keserve Fund, from which £E.500,000 had been drawn THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 296 to cover the outlay. The dissenting Com- missioners liad at once commenced an action against the Egyptian Government in the Mixed Tribunal of First Instance at Cairo. The other question, the feeding and muni- tioning of the Army, was also a difficult one. Omdurman, it is true, was on the Nile, which might be used for the transport of food, baggage, and arms. But it was by no means certain that the capture of Omdurman would end the war. The expedition'b base would be Wady Haifa on the Nile. There was a railway as far as Sarras, a little to the south of Wady Haifa and of the second Cataract. But between Sarras and Omdurman four more cataracts obstructed tlie Nile. During high Nile, however, the river between Wady Haifa and Omdurman was navigable, and gun- boats could accompany the invaders as they advanced, though " everybody told the Sirdar that he would never get the gunboats over the Fourth Cataract."* With unlimited money — the money, it happened, was ,very limited — the navigation of the Nile would have been, com- paratively speaking, an easy affair. The ascent of the Nile with second-rate steamboats, sailing boats and barges was another matter. The wind would not be, nor was it always, favourable, and delays on the banks of the Nile under a blazing sun might spell disease and insubordination among the troops. • •■ With Kitchener to Khartum." bj O. W. Steevens, p. 103. There were those further considerations. If the Salisbury Cabinet fell, the expeditionary force might be recalled, and also — if he did not hasten his progress — the Sirdar might find on the Upper Nile a French expeditionary force in theoretical, or the Abyssinians in actual, possession of the lost Egyptian province. On July 26, 1890, indeed. Major Marchand landed at Loango, in the French Congo, to organize an expedition to the Upper Nile. The contention of the French diplomatists was that the Sudan had become a res nullius — a no-man's land which, like a desert island, might be appropriated by the first comer. The perfection of the Sirdar's arrangements for surmounting the obstacles in his path diminished those obstacles in the eyes of hia contemporaries. On Slarch 20, 1896, Akaslia, fifty miles south of Sarras, was occupied and by the beginning of June joined by a railway to Sarras. On the night of June 6 the Sirdar directed two columns, numbering some 10,000 men, on a Dervish force of less than 4,000 encamped at Firket, sixteen miles south of Akasha. The next morning the Dervishes were surprised and routed at the trifling cost of 20 killed and 80 wounded. Don- gola was in the Sirdar's possession before the end of September and the furthest Egyptian outpost was fixed at Meroe (the frontier post of THE BATTLE OF ATBARA. FINAL CHARGE OF BRITISH AND EGYPTIAN TROOPS. [By aourUsy of 'flu Graphic 295 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LORD KITCHENER LAYING THE FOUNDA- TION-STONE OF THE AGRIGITLTURAL COLLEGE, LUXOR. Roman Egypt), situated at the foot of the Fourth Cataract. The first Act of the campaign had cost 411 lives (364 soldiers had died from cholera and other diseases) and £E. 7 15, 000.* Ascending the river, the Nile from VVady Haifa to Korti runs southwards, from Korti to Abu Hamed it turns north-eastwards. Along the base — Wady Haifa-Abu Hamed — of the triangle, Wady Haifa, Korti, Abu Hamed, the Sirdar determined to construct a railway. The line would run through the Nubian desert, and he " launched his rails and sleepers into the water- less desert wliile the other end of the line was still held by the enemy."t Bimbashi (Sir Percy) Girouard, who superintended the build- ing of the railway, was a Canadian, afterwards Director of Railways in South Africa. Before the work was completed General Sir Archibald Hunter, the sword-arm of the Eg3rptian Army — to use Steevens's phrase — had moved from Meroe to Abu Hamed. A Dervish garrison had scattered before him. From Abu Hamed 'the course of the Nile is again southwards, and nearly half-way between Abu Hamed and Omdurman a tributary, the Atbara, rvms into it. A little to the north of the junction of the Atbara and the Nile lies Berber,on the eastern bank of the river. On August 31, 1897, this town was in the hands of the invaders, and the railway was now pushed forward from Abu • •■ Modern Egypt IL," p. 91. t •* With Kitcbeoet to Khartum." p. 39. Hamed to Berber. January 1, 1898, the Sirdar telegraphed to Lord Cromer that he thought that " British troops should be sent to Abu Hamed," and that " the fight for the Sudan would appear to be likely to take place at Berber." His request for reinforcements was complied with and a British brigade had joined him by the beginning of March. The Sirdar's " forecast of the force which would be neces- sary," remarks Lord Cromer, " was wonderfully accurate. . . . Amongst other high military qualities the Sirdar possessed the knowledge of how to adapt his means to his end." The second and last Act of the River War is divided into two Scenes. The first ends with the battle of the Atbara, the second with the battle of Omdur- man. To parry a counter-offensive against his commimications, garrisons were kept by the Sirdar at Meroe and Korti. In the angle north of the junction of the Atbara and the Nile an entrenched camp. Fort Atbara, was made. In February, 1898, the Emir Mahmoud,who com- manded the Dervish division on the western bank of the Nile at Metemmeh, nearly half-way between Fort Atbara and Omdurman, threw his troops across the river and effected a junction with the Sirdar's old enemy, Osman Digna, on the oppo- site bank, at Shendi. The combined Dervish forces advanced up the right bank of the Nile to Aliab and then struck across country to the Atbara. They were forced by the Sirdar, who had moved up the Atbara to Hudi, to take up a position at Nakheila, some 35 miles from its mouth, on the north bank. THE EARL OF CROMER. W. Wdtet Barnett. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 207 THE " SUDAN MILITARY RAILWAY. Moving camp to Abu Hamed section. The intention of Mahmoud had been to cross the river, at that period of the year waterless, at Hudi, and attack Berber and the railhead. Mahmoud had been anticipated by the Sirdar, whose east flank the Dervish leader was unable to turn because the wells on the line of march to Berber were either held by the Egj'ptians or filled up. The Dervishes had reached Nakheila on March 20. Tlie following day the Sirdar moved nearer to tlie enemy. " The deiour" says Mr. [By coHTtfsy of The Graphic. Winston Churchill, " which the Arabs would have to make to march round the troops was nearly doubled by this movement. The utter impossibility of their flank march with a stronger enemy on the radius of the circle was now apparent." The Sirdar's next step was to capture their base on the Nile at Shendi. A flotilla, consisting of tliree gunboats and boats on which were em- barked some Egyptian troops, ascended the river and took the town. On April 4 the Sirdar's force C^ THE MAHDI'S TOMB, OMDLiRMAN. Showing the damage caused by the gunboats. 'Captain E. A. Stanton^ Ov courtesv ot Th« Grat>hie. 298 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. of 14,000 men, including the British brigade under General Gatacre, advanced still nearer to Mahmoud's position, which had been located by General Hvinter and reported by him to be "a strong one with zariba (stockade) and in heavy bush." The Sirdar took no un- necessary risks, and a final reconnaissance was made on April 5. Two days later, the Egyptian Army, by a night march, arrived before Mahmoud's zariba. At dawn the bombardment of the Dervish camp began, and at 7.40 a.m. on April 8 the Sirdar ordered it to be stormed. "By 8.20 a.m.;" writes Mr. Churchill, " the whole force " had " marched completely through the position and shot or bayoneted all in their path." Eighteen British, 16 native officers, and 525 men had been killed or wovmded. Of Mahmoud's force scarcely 4,000 escaped ; thousands had been killed and Mahmoud himself was a prisoner. Sir Horatio Kitchener's first engagement on a large scale resembled a deftly performed surgical operation. Among the civilians who entered into the zariba was the journalist, George Steevens. He had reminded the British public that the Sirdar's army was nearly 1,400 miles from the sea, and about 1,200 from any place that the things armies wanted could possibly come from. " It had," ho said, " to be supplied along a sand -banked river, a single line of rail. MAJOR MARCHAND. IBy courtesy oj The Graphic. OSMAN DIGNA, The Chief of the Mahdi's Generals. [By courtesy of The Graphic. which was carrying the material for its own construction as well, and various camel-tracks. That 13,000 men could ever have been brought into this hungry limbo at all," he added, " shows that the Sirdar is the only English general who has known how to campaign in this country." Steevens was a man who had had a most brilliant career at Oxford and in journalism. It may interest the reader to see, if he has not already seen it, the character-sketch of Kitchener from the pen of one who was by nature and education critical and who had trained to a very high degree his powers of observation and analysis. Major-General Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener is 48 years old by tlie book ; but that is irrelevant. He stands several inches over 6ft., straight as a lance, and looks out imperiously above most men's heads ; his motions are deliberate and strong ; slender but firmly knit, he seems built for tireless, steel-wire en- durance rather than for power or agility : that also is irrelevant. Steady, passionless eyes sliaded by decisive brows, brick-red rather full cheeks, a long moustache beneath which you divine an immovable mouth ; his face is harsh, and neither appeals for aftec- tion nor stirs dislike. All this is irrelevant too : neither age, nor figure, nor face, nor any accident of person has any bearing on the essential Sirdar. You could imagine the character just the same as if all the externals were different. He has no nge but the prime of life, no body but one to carry his mind, no face but one to keep his brain behind. The brain and the will are the essence and the whole of the man — a brain and a will so perfect in their workings that, in the face of extremest difiiculty, they never seem to know what struggle is. You cannot imagine the Sinlar other\visc than as seeing the right thing to do and doing it. His precision is so inhumanly unerring, he is more like a machine than a man. You feel that he ought to be THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 299 MAP ILLUSTRATING BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN EGYPT. 300 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LORD KITCHENER Talking to Egyptian Officials. [Zola^s Studios. patented and shown wifcli pride at tlic Paris Interna- tional Exhibition. British Empire : Exhibit No. I. hors coytcovrSy the Sudan Machine. The battle of the Atbara had been fought to the east, the battle of Omdurman was fought to the west of the Nile. The Army, reinforced by a second British brigade and the 21st Lancers, and by a battery of howitzers and two large 40-pounder guns, began in August to march up the western bank. Three new gun-boats had been brought up in sections, put to- gether and launched. An advanced base was formed, first at Wad Hamed and afterwards upon Royan Island. Friendly Arab irregulars kept step with the Expeditionary Force on the opposite bank of the river. It was on September 2, 1898, that the African Attila was routed. He could oppose 50,000 fanatics against Kitchener's 22,000 troops. But the fanatics were badly, the Egyptian and Britisli soldiers well, armed. Tlie lOialifa's eole chance of success had lain in a night attack on the Egyptian camp, but he had unaccountably preferred to stake his fortunes in the daylight. Tlie details of the battle can be studied in Mr. Churchill's " River War " and in other works ; the criticism on Kitchener's tactics may be left to Lord Roberts. The Battle of Omdurman [he wrote] is a proof that the Sirdar possesses all the qualities which are neces- sary for a general commanding an army in the field : clear judgment, sound common sense, tenacity of purpose, quickness of i)erception, promptitude of decision, and, above all, an infmite capacity for taking pains, whilst his talent for organiz<vtion has shone most conspicuously. It is owing to Iiord Kitchener that the Egyptian Army has been turned into such a splendid fighting machine, and it is to the system of organi7.ation which he perfected in such a masterly manner that the several details of the cam- paign in the Sudan wore carried out without a hitcU in the" face of considerable dilTiculties, and lie was enabled to concentrate his force on the pl.-iins of Omdurman almost to the hour at which he had pre- dicted long before that Gordon should at last be avenged."* Judged by results, the Sirdar's conduct of the battle was beyond reproach. Of the Dervish host it has been estimated that 11,000 or so were killed and 16,000 wounded. The British losses did not exceed 400, of whom only a small proportion were killed. Omdurman fell into tlie hands of the conqueror, the Khalifa fled, and Gordon had been avenged. Kitchener's campaign in the valley of the Nile had set up a new standard of efficiency in mili- tary matters ; the tradition of " mudc'ling through " was ended, and the result had been obtained at a trifling cost in naen and money. Naval officers who, like Lieutenant (now Rear- Admiral) Beatty,took part in the expedition may have had little to learu in respect of efficiency, but to some soldiers in the British Army — and, above all, to the British War Office — ^Kitchener had tacitly administered a needed lesson. In an article entitled " Campaigning with Kitchener," which appeared in Blackwood's Magazine for December, 1902, a staff officer — glancing at the War Office — indicated one of the causes of Kitchener's success. None of our generals before Kitchener [wrote this officer] ever attempted, still less succeeded in attempt- ing, to wage war without orders, without forms, with- 'The Times, December 2. 1898. The Late GEORGE W. STEEVENS. lEUioU & Frv. . THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 301 -:-i'-:.i - ' i^ 'j i i i y i " V THE SIRDAR, SIR H. H. KITCHENER, AND HIS A.D.C., BIMBASHI J. K. WATSON. [By courtesy of The Graphic. out states or paperasserie of any sort or kind. A normal year's campaign in tlie Sudan began with the issue of the ordre de bataille to tliose concerned and ended witli the promulgation of the Queen's con- gratulations at the close of the war. The rest of the usually voluminous documents incidental to cam- paigning are wanting, for the best of all reasons — namely, that none ever existed. When the average Aldershot general takes the field he has foisted on him a mass of phenomenally useless documents, which do more to cause general (rouble and paralysis than any acts of the enemy. I could name a campaign not a thousand miles from Suakin that was entirely ruined by them. But Kitchener's oilice stationery consisted of a sheaf of telegraph forms which he carried in his helmet and a pencil which he carried in his pocket — 'and that sufficed. Moreover, he soldoni read an official letter, and never wrote one, and how much wear and tear was thereby saved let those say who have had the misfortune to serve under generals afflicted with the curse of penmanship. The picture might be overcoloiired, but it threw into relief an essential feature of 20J THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. . 1 1 1 1 I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^BB^t ,<^ ■«5»^^^^^^^B ^ I^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HJ L ^^^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B ^P'**"* H^E^^^B 1 1 COLONEL SIR PERCY GIROUARD. [LafayttU. Kitchener's methods. He saved time and lie saved money by ignoring antiquated precedent and out-of-dat« examples. " The financial Buccess," comments Lord Cromer, " was no less remarkable than the military. The total cost of the campaign of 1896-98 was £B.2,354,000, of which £E. 1,200,000 was spent on railways and telegraphs and £E. 155,000 on gunboats. The military expenditure, properly so called, only amounted to £E.996,000." Five days after the battle of Omdurman, on September 7, news of a grave character reached the Sirdar. Europeans had arrived at Fashoda on the White Nile. Sending the jour- nalists back to Cairo, he steamed up the river to ascertain the facts for himself, taking on board his boats a considerable force, a battery of artillery and four Maxim guns. On September 18 he approached Fashoda and discovered Major Marchaud there with a handful of black soldiers and a few French officers. Marchand was claiming the country in the name of France. An interview took place between the French ex- plorer and the British general, who, as a youth, had fought for France. Marchand reports the conversation that passed between them : — " Do you know. Major, that tliia affair may set France and England at war ? " I bowed, without replying. General Kitchener (ose. H^ was very pale. I also rose. Kitchener gazed at his 2,000 ; then at my fort, on the ramparts ot which the btfyonets gleamed. " We are the stronger," Kitchener remarked after his leisurely survey. " Only a flght can settle tliat," was Marchand's reply. " Right you are," was the Englishman's reply, " come along, let's have a whisky and soda."* According to Dr. Emily, who was with Marchand, the Sirdar, unlike one of his com- panions, was exceedingly tactful. A slip on his part might have caused war between France and England and the history of the world have been changed. If he was, it is not to be wondered that the Sirdar was " very pale." The cautious Bismarck had been dismissed by tlie flighty William II. in 1890, which was the year of the publication of Captain Mahan's " Influence of Sea Power upon History " — a work which was to have such an in- fluence on the Kaiser. The Kiel Canal had been opened in 1895, the Kaiser's telegram dispatched to Kruger in 1896. German intrigues in Turkey were notorious, and it was announced that the German Emperor and Empress were to visit at the end of 1898 Constantinople and Jerusalem. A war between the two groat democracies of Western Europe would have been for both suicidal, and, thanks mainly to Kitchener's delicate handling of the negotiations with Marchand, the danger of a collision between France and Great Britain vanished. It is not the least of the services which have been ren- dered by Kitchener to the British nation. The victory of Omdurman was rewarded with a peerage, and Lord Kitchener returned to England. He met with an enthusiastic wel- come. Lord Salisbury, who as a scientist dis- liked rhetoric, praised him unreservedly. He will remain [said tlie then Premier] a striking figure, not only adorned by the valour iiiul patriotism which all successful generals can show, but with the most extraordinary combination of calculation, of strategy, of statesmanship, which it ever fell to any general in these circumstances to display. . . He took exactly the time necessary tor his work ; he made precisely the preparations which that work required ; he expended upon it the time, the resource, and the military strength precisely which it demanded, and his victory came out with absolute accuracy, like the .answer to a scientific calculation. Perhaps, however, the tribute which Lord Kitchener valued most was the £120,000 raised at his instance for the foundation of a Gordon Memorial College. " Those who have conquered." he said, " are called upon to civi- lize," and he proposed to civilize the Sudanese by educating them. The foundation-stone was laid by him in January, 1899, and the College opened by him in 1902. Tlirough the Gordon Memorial College he spread the English language and British ideas on the • " Lord Kitchener of Khartoum," by the Author of Edward the Seventh " (Nlsbet). p. 92. King THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ■6^'S Upper Nile. Further, a new Khartum was planned by hira. At the end of 1899 he was suddenly sum- moned to the seat of the Boer War. As Lord Roberts's Chief of the Staff, he contributed greatly to the victories of the Field-Marshal. At Paardeberg he was virtually in command, but, as General Maurice observed, " he entirely lacked any stafi adequate to watch over for him the general scope of the action." Paarde- berg, though a drawn, was for the British a successful battle. " Cronje's mobility," again to quote General Maurice, " was destroyed and his oxen and horses killed and scattered, the spirit of his burghers crushed. The Boer commandos imprisoned in the bed of the Modder were, in fact, doomed." Lord Roberts had eulogized Lord Kitchener's tactics at Omdurman. He had now an oppor- tunity of personally acquainting himself with Lord Kitchener's qualities. After resigning the command in South Africa to him, he told the public that he had " implicit confidence " in Lord Kitchener's " judgment and military skill " and that " no one could have laboured more incessantly or in a more self-effacing manner than Lord Kitchener had done, and no one coiild have assisted him more loyally without a thought of self-aggrandizement." In the latter connexion we may mention that, when it was suggested by the Government that Sir Evelyn Wood, his old chief, should serve under him in South Africa, Lord Kitchener refused to entertain the idea, but offered instead to serve under his senior offiier. As Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, Lord Kitchener will be chiefly remembered for his blockhouse system and his efforts to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion without humiliating the Boers. Wliile there can be little doubt but that the bloclthouse system, and the "drives" incidental to it, materially shortened the war, it is certain that the loyalty of the Boers during the Great War was very largely due to his firm but kindly treatment of that brave and patriotic people. Years after. General Botha publicly called Lord Kitchener his " old war friend." The quotation below is from a report of a speech of Lord Kitchener delivered at Cape Town when he was on the point of leaving South Africa : — Lord Kitchener, in reply, said he accepted the presentation sword as an honour dono to the Army. To liis relief he had found that the Capo Colonists did not denounce martial law, for which he was primarily responsible. Without it the farmers of the colony would have been either actually or politically dead. The farmers hud been fed with lies, not always told thorn in Dutch, until they thought the British people were a nation of monsters. Martial law had then stepped in and prevented people from taking a fatal step. It had also been effective in preventing munitions of war from reaching the enemy. Now that peace had come, he asked them all to put aside racial feelings, and also to put aside " leagues " and " bonds," and to strive for the welfare of their common colony. Briton and Boer had had a good fujht, and they uere now shaking hands after it. It was a happy augury for the future that the people of Cape Colony had not dealt in a vindictive spirit with the ques- tion of the rebels. Lord Kitchener con- cluded by expressing the hope that all the colonists would soon become again a happy and united family as Providence meant- them to be. The Boer War had ended by June, 1902, and once again Lord Kitchener was in his native country. During his brief stay he made some weighty pronouncements on the duty of pre- paring in peace time for war. Thus, addressing FIELD-MARSHAL LORD GRENFELL. ILafayilU. 304 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Yeomanry at Welshpool in September, 1902, he spoke as follows : — You Yeomanry have had some experience of what it means to be more or less untrained in war, and how greatly a man, whatever his spirit and pluck may be, is handicapped by want of training in a fight. Y^ou, therefore, well realize witli mo how essential it is that the j'oung men of the country should join the military forces and become trained by those who have reaped experience during this war, so that they may in their turn be ready, if the necessity should arise, to take their place as trained men in the ranks. You must not for- get that we shall not always have, nor do we wish to have, a war that lasts long enough to train our men during the campaign. It is, therefore, I think, of vital importance that everyone, whether in this country or in that Greater Britain beyond the seas, should rea- lize that it is the bounden duty and high privilege of every British able-bodied man to defend and maintain that great Empire, the citizenship of which we have inlierited and the honour and glory of which the men of the Empire are determined shall, as far as lies in their power, be handed on untarnished to those that foUow us. A few days before he had spoken to much the same effect at Stockton-on-Tees and had, besides, appealed to capitalists to employ, whenever they could, the soldiers who had fought in South Africa. I would take this opportunity of reminding you that a great number of the very best of those men who were with me in South Africa have now returned, or are returning, to their homes in this country. These men have a certain amount of money which will enable them to have a holiday with their people. But after that tliey will want em- ployment ; and I maintain that, . having merited the approbation of their countrymen by their services in South Africa, it is not too much to ask that some direct step should be taken in great industrial centres like this, and amongst large employers of labour, to find them good, permanent, wage-earning posi- tions. The next post to be filled by Lord Kitchener was that of Commander-in-Chief in India, where he resided from the en dof 1902 to September, 1909. The term Commander-in-Chief was, however, a misnomer, since th? Commander- in-Chief's control of the Army was shared with another soldier, the Military Member of Council. To abolish this dual control became an object of Lord Kitchener. The Viceroy, Lord Curzon, opposed him, and an unfortunate quarrel arose, which finished with the resignation of the Vioerov. VIEW OF KHARTUM AND OMDURMAN. [Record Press. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 305 In his Mimite.s of January 1 and March 18, 1905, Lord Kitchener stated his ciuso against dual control. In no other department of the Government of India, he objected, was it considered necessary to liave a dual control. The offices of the Commander-in-Chief and Military Member, owing to the dual system, became " paper- logged with more or less unnecessary verbiage." One of the chiej faults of tlie Indian system is the enormous delay and endless dis- cussion which it involves. It is mipossiblo to formulate or carry out any consistent military policy. No needed reform can he initiated, no useful measure can he adopted, without being subject to vexatious and, for tJie most part, unnecessary criticism — not merely as regards the financial effect of the proposal, but as to its desirability or necessity from, the purely military poini of view. The fault lies simply in the system, which has created two offices which have been trained to un- fortunate jealousy and antagonism and which, therefore, duplicate work, and in the duplica- tion destroy progress and defeat the true ends of military efficiency. The system is one of dual control and divided responsibility. It is a system of " want of trust," such as that which has recently been condemned and abolished in the Army at home. In India, as in England, it was " owing to the defects in the higher administration of the Army that essentials had been disregarded and military progress and efficiency had not kept pace with the times." The Military Department had no direct relations with the Army, and, being a civil department, were out of touch with the troops. " It is true," he added, " they keep records and opinions which thej' quote from time to time ; but these are generally anti- quated." He felt it was his " imperative duty " to state his conviction that the then present system was " faulty, inefficient, and incapable of the expansion necessary for a great war in which the armed might of the Empire would be engaged in a life and death struggle," and he quoted the example of Japan as showing what could be done by thoroughly enlightened and up-to-date methods of army administration. Lord Kitchener had, to a considerable extent, his own way. The Military Member disappeared ; the new Viceroy, Lord Minto, sympatliized with Lord Kitchener's aims. The reforms which the Commander-in-Chief made both during and after Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty were far-reaching. In a Memorandum of April 11, 1904, he had pointed out that " nothing was more essential for complete preparation in peace and for LORD KITCHENER'S STATUE AT CALCUTTA. IBoumt Gr SfupJurd, India. successful operation in war than that an army should have a thoroughly trained and highly educated general staff." Accordingly a Staff College at Quetta was created. The stress which he laid on education may be gathered from an extract from the same Memorandum : — We must follow a system of training for war suited to the vastly changed conditions of the present day, and stedfastly eliminate all obsolete traditions. In all ranks, from the private soldier to the General Officer, each step up the ladder requires a corresponding increase in knowledge, in self-reliance, in the power of initiative, in the habit of readily accepting responsibility, and in the faculty of command, qualities which can be attained only by unremitting study combined with constant practice. It is recognized that it is the duty of a com- manding officer to educate and train his men in all branches of soldiering, but hitherto it has not been so generally imderstood that this holds equally true as regards tlie education and training of the officers serving under him. The plea that teaching is a difficult art which it is given to few to acquire is one wlueh cannot be accepted. The whole secret of preparing for war is a matter of training and instruction, and commanding or other officers who profess or show their incapacity as instructors, ^nd their inability to train and educate those under them for all the situations of modern war, must be deemed unfit for the positions they hold. 306 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL DE WET. [Russell & Sons. [By courtesy of tlie Graphic. The system at present in force in India, whereby officers are sent to garrison classes to prepare for their promotion examinations, is particularly faulty. Knowledge thus crammed up in the course of a few weeks, only to be forgotten as soon as the examina- tion is passed, is in no sense education. In future the military education of officers must be imparted within their, regiments ; it must commence from the day they join and con- tinue until they leave the service. Among other measures he rearmed and .re- distributed the Army and did everything he could to promote decentralization of work and devolution of authority. His object throughout was to prepare the Army for war, not peace manoeuvres. " My sole aim," he said m a farewell speech, " ... has been to place the administra- tion of the Army in India on a business footing." ) A modern army [he continued] is not, as is sometimes erroneously supposed, a costly toy maintained for purposes of ceremonial and display, nor, on the other hand, is it an instrument of aggression to be used for national or individual aggrandizement. It is simply an insurance acnins-t national disaster ; and the expenditure incurred on it is strictly comparable with private expendi- ture on similar precautionary measures. The first business condition necessary to justify our military expenditure is that the army maintained should be in a thoroughly efficient state, and, therefore, able, at all times of need, to carry out whatever may be expected from its numerical strength. Expenditure of money on an inefficient army can no more be defended than the pay- ment of premia to an insolvent company. Created Field-Marshal in 1909 he returned home from India via China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand called him in as a specialist to advise them on military affairs. In 1911 he was appointed British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, and he was holding that position when the Great War broke out. His reports on the finances, ad- ministration, and condition of Egypt and the Sudan are additional evidence of his untiring energy, comprehensive ability, and genuine benevolence. Here is a last quotation from his writings : " The development and elevation of the char- acter of a people depends mainly on the growth of self-control and the power to domiaate natural impulses, as well as on the practice of unobtrusive self -reliance and perseverance, com- bined with reasoned determination." Such in brief outline had been the career of the British Minister of War who succeeded Mr. Asquith in the " paper-logged" offices at White- hall. Respected and admired in Great Britain, the Colonies, India, France, and Russia, and feared in Germany, Lord Kitchener was obviously the right man to direct the military forces of the Empire. A Prussian Staff Officer who had been sent to study him during the Omdurman Campaign published at the time his impressions of the Sirdar " Lord Kitchener is animated," Major von Tiedemarm informed the Germans, "with keen ambition, but he does not covet favour with the crowd ; he knows that everytliing he does and orders is right and proper." At the Battle of Omdurman the Prussian remarked that Lord Kitchener " was cool and perfectly calm " and " gave his orders without in the least raising his voice " and " always made the right arrangements at the right moment." . . . He seemed to be " absolutely in- different to personal danger," but never to do THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 307 anything o>ib of bravado. " Acting," said tliis critic, " is out of the question with him ; he is alv\ays porfoctly natural." Summarizing the campaign, Major von Tiodo- mann observed : — " Thus Lord ICitchoner waited unconcernedly for the right moment, but pounced with eaglo-Iike swiftness and certainty upon his prey and dealt the decisive blow in a surprisingly short time. He had neglected nothing." From the Omdurman campaign onwards the over-trained soldiers of Germany, who had come to believe that they had almost a mono- poly of military science, watched with uneasiness the movements of the " Man of Khartiun." If in the years before the Great War he had been placed at the War Office and not at Cairo, it is conceivable that the German plans for leaping upon Europe would have been laid aside, or, at all events, postponed. The Omniscient at Potsdam had a wholesome respect for him — a lespect which the Germans certainly did not extend to any " political " Minister of War. Carljle had told the Germans that Great Britain was inhabited mostly by fools. The knaves at Berlin perceived that here was a Briton who was neither fool nor Ivnave. Lord Kitchener was the soldier-representative of British civilization, just as the barbarian who invited his soldiers to contemplate with cheerful submission the possibility of their having, in The late GENERAL CRONJE. [By courtesy of Tbs Graphic obedience to Jiis orders, to shoot their own fathers and brothers, who bade liis soldiers give no quarter to the Cliinese, and who commanded SIGNING THE TREATY AT THE END OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR. ISydiuy P. Hall, MMJO. By courttay of Tht Graphic SOS THE TJMESi HISTORY OF THE WAR. LORD KITCHENER LEAVING BELGRAVE-SQUARE. [A/«(J5 Futures. or acquiesced in the devastation of Belgium re- presented the forces of disorder that had sur- vived from ages when brigands and pirates were revered as heroes. To Lord Kitchener waging war was a painful duty, not a pleasant, exciting and lucrative occupation. While General von Liebert, ex-Governor of German East Africa, was asserting in a German Court of Justice that " in Africa it was impossible to get on without cruelty," Lord Kitchener's life was one long protest against that inhuman doctrine. His character and conceptions of government take us back through the centuries to the wisest and noblest of the Roman administrator- soldiers. A few years before the birth of Christ there was living in the Roman Empire a personage who, allowing for the progress that humanity has made in the interval, possessed many of the qualities which distinguish the refounder of Khartum. The character of Agrippa, the bvisinoss manager of Augustvis, has been drawn by the inspiring historian, Ferrero. " Agrippa," ho observes, " was a representa- tive of the true Roman character. . . . To tlio fine qualities of his race ho had been able to add the attractions of culture. Gifted with an intellect both bold and agile, practical and eager to learn, proud but at the same time simple, strong, sure, and faithful, he had been both a general and an admiral, an architect, a geogra- pher, a writer, a collector of works of art, and an administrator of public departments. For 32 years without a moment's relaxation his varied and inexhaustible talents had been placed at the service of his party during the civil wars, and afterwards devoted to the republic and its people. . . . Destiny had for ever attached his name to the facade of the Pantheon, in the centre of the world, and had placed it above the generations who were to pass before this imperishable monxunent, but destiny had been unwilling to make him Caesar's equal by granting him time for the conquest of Ger- mania." Lord Kitchener had kept aloof from the mimic warfare of party politics. When the Great War burst forth he had been serving his Monarch and his country in the field or in the Council Chamber for over 40 years. His childhood had been spent amid the echoes of the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny. He had lived to see the Russians and the Indians facing with the British the same foe, and to see his countrymen as a body follow the example he had set them in 1870, when, a youth, he had joined the heroic Frenchmen who were struggling with the forces of " blood and iron" which then, as in 1914, were seeking to destroy France. Would destiny grant Lord Kitchener time to organize the military forces of the British Empire so that they might decisively tiirn the scale in the struggle with Pan-Germanism ? On August 5, 1914, he shouldered the immense burden which had been suddenly thrvist upon his shoulders. As his instructions to tho soldiers who were leaving for the seat of war show, he was, as ever, calm and self-reliant. Between those instructions and the Kaiser's orders no greater contrast could well be imagined. We end this chapter by quoting in extenso THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAU. 3u:) Lord Kitchoiior's messajie to each member of the Expeditionary Army : — You are ordered aliroad as a soldier of the King to help our French comrades against tlie invasion of a common enemy. You have to perform a task which will need your courage, yoiu- energy, your patience. Re- member that the honour of the British Army depends on your individual conduct. It will be your duty not only to set an example of discipline and perfect steadiness imder fire, but also to maintain the most friendly relations with those whom you are helping in this struggle. The operations in which you are engaged will, for the most part, take place in a friendly country, and you ■can do your own country no better service than in showing yourself in France and Belgium in the true character of a British soldier. Be invariably courteovis, considerate, and kind. Never do anything likely to injure or destroy property, and always look upon looting as a disgraceful act. You are sure to meet with a welcome and to be trusted ; your conduct must jUstify that welcome and that trust. Your duty cannot be done unless your health is soimd. So keep constantly on your guard against any excesses. In this now • experience you may find temptations both in wine and women. You must entirely resist both temptations, and, while treating all women with perfect courtesy, you should avoid any intimacy. Do your duty bravely. Fear God, Honour the King. KITCHENER, Field-Marshal. The personality of a man is not always exp'-essed by his style, but Lord KitcViener's style was the man. A PHOTOGRAPH OF LORD KITCHENER TAKEN IN JAPAN. [By courissy of Ths Graphic, 310 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. if /'x X Scale of Mites LUXEMBURG AND THE SURROUNDING COUNTRY. CHAPTER XX. THE GERMAN INVASION OF LUXEMBURG AND BELGIUM. Thk Wak Begins — Gebman Seizure of Luxembubg — Useless Protests— Prepabations voes Defence — Unexpectedness of German Attack — Courageous Belgian Resistance — Negotia- tions Still in Progress — Object of German Strategy — Speech by Kino Albert — The Cross- ing OF THE Belgian Frontier — Limburg and Verviers — Meuse Bridges Destroyed^Thb Attack on Vise — First Reports of Massacres Untrue — Anomalous Position of the Gardb CiviQUE — German Force Ambushed — Belgian Civilians Involved — German Reprisals — " Frightfulness." IN the very early days of August, 1914, Europe passed suddenly from the cool ante-chamber of politics into the heated arena of war. The war, as we have seen, opened with the German invasion of Belgium. The first military operation of real importance was the attack on Liege. In order to comprehend the purport of the sudden onslaught upon Liege and the full importance of the check which its unexpectedly gallant defence inflicted upon the Germans, it is necessary to note the success which had attended the first step of their advance, in Luxemburg. Here almost everything went in accordance with the general German plan, which was secretly and swiftly to move a large but lightly-equipped force towards the Franco-Belgian frontier. The light equipment was due to the necessity for rapid and secret movement and also to the belief in Berlin that the troops would obtain provisions in Belgium and that ammunition and transport trains with the heavy artillery could be sent on after the mask was thrown off and would reach the troops before they were seriously needed. Thus it was possible for the advance guard to ta1<e Luxemburg completely by surprise. During the night of Saturday, August 1, German soldiers arrived and occupied the station as well as the railway bridges on the Treves and Trois Vierges lines so as to ensiu-e the subsequent passage of Ger- man troop trains through the Grand Duchy, and on Siuiday, August 2, the population of Luxemburg awakened to find that they were no longer free citizens in their own country, because all the means of communication wero- in the hands of detachments of soldiers in. German uniform, conunanded in many cases- by officers in whom the surprised citizens recognized men who, up to two days previously, had been masquerading as employees in offices in Luxemburg. There, of course, they had acquired an intimate knowledge of the topo- graphy of the place and all its internal arrange- ments, which enabled them not only to place the soldiers everywhere to the best advantage, but also to indicate where stores of provisions- could be commandeered and what persons should be arrested in furtherance of German plans. Against a plot so cunningly devised and so- effectively carried out the citizens .of Luxem- burg were helpless. This might not have been the case if Europe, only half a century ago, could have foreseen the rise of a great military Power in Germany which would regard international treaties a» mere " scraps of paper," because the position 311 312 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE REIGNING GRAND DUCHESS MARIE ADELAIDE OF LUXEMBURG. of l,uxemburg, which has sometimes been compared to Jerusalem and sometimes to Gibraltar, makes it one of the great natural strongholds of the earth. The city stands on a rocky plateau, with precipitous descents of several hundred feet upon three sides, and is only connected with the neighbouring country on the west — i.e., towards France. Thus it seemed to have been placed as the natural barrier against advance from the German side ; and the fortifications, chiefiy hewn out of the solid rock, had been so increased and strengthened by the Spaniards, Austrians, French, and Dutch, who had held Luxemburg in successive age.^, that in the middle of the last century, before the days of high explosives, it was held to be second only to Gibraltar in impregnaVjility if resolutely defended. But, as has been said, Europe did not foresee that a time could come when an armed German P'mpire would strive to abolish international honour as a factor in world-politics. So the mighty fortifications of Luxemburg were de- molished in accordance with the Treaty of London in 1867 and beautiful public gardens were laid out in their place. This was a great triumph of civilization, substituting a mere scrap of paper and the national honour of its signatories for the frowning forts with their snarling embrasures toothed with guns ! No doubt there were many among the cultured German officers who strolled amid the roses and lavender, never more beautiful or fragrant than in the early August of 1914's wondrous summer, who had studied the liistory of Europe enough to realize that their Kaiser had in very deed made a name for himself unlike that of any potentate in the previous annals of the world. At this time, of course, the great gorges of Luxemburg were spanned by fine viaducts, and of these the most important to the Gernains was the Adolf Bridge, which they had carefully seized on the night of August 1. ■ The first to attempt a futile resistance was M. Eyschen, a member of the Cabinet, who drove his motor-car across the Adolf Bridge and confronted the leading officer of the German advance guard with a copy of the Treaty, guaranteeing the neutrality of the State. To this the German officer merely replied that he was acquainted with the Treaty, but had his orders. The Archduchess Marie Adelaide, who also tried to block the bridge with her motor-car, and General Vandyck, Commandant of Luxemburg, who arrived in anger to protest, fared no better, for the former was simply told to go home at once and the latter was confronted with a revolver. On the same day the Imperial Chancsllor at Berlin telegraphed to the Luxemburg Govern- ment that no hostile act against the Grand Duchy had been taken, but only measures necessary to secure the safety of German troops by protecting the railways of Luxem- burg against a possible attack by the French. Having thus seized Luxemburg the Germans lost no time in strengthening their position against attack, destroying for this purpose all the villas, farm-houses, woods, and standing crops which might have provided cover for an enemy. At the same time no pretext was too flimsy for the arrest of the citizens as spies. Thus Luxemburg began to appreciate fully the blessings of German rule. In a few days Luxemburg began to wonder why the tide of German invasion did not pass on more quickly towards France ; but the fa< t was that the tide had received an unexpected check elsewhere, which delayed it all along the line. The light equipment of the invading force had proved to be too light to break down the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR :ii3 Bolgiiin baiTier at Lie^e. Provisions nnd ammunition ran sliort, and the attaclsing army was obliged to wait not only for tlieso, but also for the heavy guns which, according to the original plan, were to have been sent on com- fortably through Belgium, behind the victorious army of occupation, because tliey would pro- bably not be needed, except to batter down the forts of Paris ! The resistance of Liege upset all these plans, altlioiigii the actual circujnstances of the fighting which led to this result were equally puzzling at the moment to Belgium's friends and foes. It was on August 2 that Germany Jiad already signified the value which, she attached to " scraps of paper " by seizing Luxemburg, whoso neutrality she was bound by treaty to respect and protect. Baron de Broqueville, Chief of the Belgian Cabinet, declared on that date his con\'iction that Belgian territory would not be violated. Nevertheless, no effort was being spared to make ready for the worst, altliough perhaps not even the Belgians dreamed at that moment of the frightful ordeal which was coming upon their country — almost with the suddenness of a thunderbolt from a blue sky — or the splendid heroism with which it would be met. At the end of July, when the storm was about to burst, 13 classes of Belgian recruits had been called to the colours ; but even so the entire army numbered only 200,000 men — a total which in a historical retrospect of the forces subsequently engaged, scarcely seems M. EYSCHEN, The Minister of State for Luxemburg. more than a group of men struggling against the first waves of the grey-green tide of troops by which they were soon inevitably sur- rounded and thrown back. Perhaps no better evidence of the unexpected- ness of the smashing blow, deliberately pre- pared and , remorselessly delivered, against Belgium can be found than the fact that in The Times report of the British Cabinet meeting in London on tihe following day it was pointed out that no necessity had as yet arisen for dissensions in the Government ranks. VIEW OF LUXEMBURG. From a corner of the old fortifications, wliicli were turned into public gardens because the European Powers had signed a " scrap of paper " which was supposed to render the fortress unnecessary. 314 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE ADOLF BRIDGE AND VIADUCT, LUXEMBURG. It was in order to obtain possession of this bridge that the German plot to seize Luxemburg by sui-prise was necessary, because it was practically the only means of access to the city from the side of Germany. It wai at this spot that the Archduchess and the Commandant and M. Eyschen offered a futile opposition. because the occasion had not yet arisen at which " the plain and acknowledged duty and interest of this country — tlie preservation of Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg against German invasion " needed to be fulfilled. So far were British observers from comprehending the cynical contempt of Germany for her sacred obligations that in reviewing the con- siderations which impelled Britain to support France it was pointed out by The Times that ' ' if once the German armies are allowed to crush France, not only will England be unable tr preserve the independence of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg," &c. \Vliat was in British minds was that we should be compelled to support France primarily to prevent the violation of Belgium, not that we should need to combine with France to exact vengeance for imhappy Belgium ruthlessly outraged and shockingly mutilated. And if few of us anticipated the callous brutality which the Teuton was about to dis- play to an indignant world, still fewer could liave foreseen the magnificent courage with which the little Belgian nation flung itself in the way of the Kaiser's armed millions. Had even the Belgians been able to calculate before- liand the price which they would be called upon to pay for doing their duty to themselves and to Europe, flesh and blood might have proved too weak. But honour does not count costs be- foreliand, and to the eternal glory of Belgium be it said that she went straight with head erect and step unflinching into the hell upon earth which tlie Kaiser's hordes had prepared for her. Even after the German guns had spoken to Liege, so little did wo think in Britain of the value of Belgian resistance that in the tables then published, in Berlin as in London, of the armed strength of the conflicting parties no mention whatever was made of the Belgian army ; for who could have foreseen that its gallant handful of men would be able to do much more than vehemently protest against the high-handed breach of treaty obligations by the German hosts ? Even the Belgians themselves seem to have expected to make little armed resistance ; because, several days after the outbreak of war, the Paris correspondent of The. Times stated that among the foreigners applying for enrolment in the French Army " Italians, Belgians, and Dutch form the majority." If those Belgians had orJy dimly foreseen the halo of military glory so soon to crown their countrymen in arms at home it would not have been in the ranks of France that they would have sought to answer the call of honour. And it is greatly to the credit of the Belgian Government that, even when the army had been mobilized and 100,000 men were hurrying to the frontier in every direction, it endeavoured to maintain the strictest neutrality, as was shown in Brussels on August 2 by the seizure of the Petit Bleu for publishing an article headed " Vive France ! " ; and in the British Press of the same date it was merely announced that " genera) mobilization is taking place in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland," THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 3J5 as though these four counlries were placed on the same level of semi-detached interest in the threatened war. Even while the violation of Belgium was in progress Europe had no knowledge that the crime was done. The leading article in The Times of August 3, dealing with the situation generally, said : — " Yesterday it was Luxem- burg. To-day it may be Belgium or Holland." And so it was : for on that day we learned that Germany had followed up her illegitimate invasion of Luxemburg by an ultimatum to Belgium. She had indeed offered terms. If Belgium would but allow German (roops to use hor territory as a basis for an attack on Franco, Germany would undertake to respect her integrity. In case of refusal Germany tlireatened to treat Belgium as an enemy. To this the Belgian Government worthily replied that Belgium had too high a regard for her dignity to acquiesce in the proposal, that she refused to facilitate the German operations, and that she was prepared to defend energetic- ally her neutrality, which was guaranteed by treaties signed by the King of Prussia him- self. Subsequent rapid negotiations made no im- pression upon the little country's loyalty to her treaty obligations ; and, even whOe these negotiations were proceeding, Germany, with cynical disregard of the international etiquette which would have embarrassed at this juncture the action of any more punctilious Power, had already sent troops across the Belgian frontier near Liege. The obvious object of the Germans in in- vading Belgium was, as lias been adequately ■explained in Chapter II., to avoid a difficult frontal attack upon the troops and fortresses on the eastern frontier of France, by using the triangle of Belgium between Namur, Arlon, and Aix-la-Chapelle as a base from which to turn the left of the French defences ; and it was expected that, in this case, Belgium, taken by surprise before her new Army organiza- tion was complete, could do no better than give way before the German hosts and unite her Army with the left of the French line. But Belgium could do better ; and the defence of Liege against the Germans at the outset of the great war of 1914 took its place in history, at once and for all time, among the most glorious events in the annals of Europe. For the national spirit and the spirit especially of the Artny had risen in worthy response to the brave words of King Albert, who, addressing (ho extraordinary sitting of the Belgian Par- liament — a largo proportion of whose members were already in campaigning kit, ready to start for the front — had said : — " Never since 1830 has a graver hour sounded for Belgium. The strength of our right and the need of Europe for our autonomous existence make us still hope that the dreaded events will not occur. If it is necessary for us to resist an invasion of our soil, however, that duty will find us armed and ready to make the greatest sacrifices. Our young men have already come forward to defend the Fatherland in danger. " One duty alone is imposed upon us, namely, the maintenance of a stubborn resistance, courage, and union. Our bravery is proved by our faultless mobilization and by the multi- tude of voluntary engagements. This is the moment for action. I have called you together to-day in order to allow the Cliambers to par- ticipate in the enthusiasm of the country. You will know how to adopt with urgency all necessary measures. Are you decided to maintain inviolate the sacred patrimony ot our ancestors ? " No one will fail in his duty, and the Army is capable of performing its task. The Govern- ment and I are fully confident. The Govern- ment is aware of its responsibilities, and will carry them out to the end to guard the supreme PALACE OF THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBURG. 316 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. welfare of tho country. If a stranger should violate our territory he will find all the Belgians gathered rovmd their Sovereign, who will never betray his constitutional oath. I have faith in our destinies A coiuitry which defends itself wins the respect of everyone, and cannot perish. " God will be with us." It may seem surprising that the attack upon Liege should itself have been in the nature of a surprise, seeing that it was not a frontier town and fighting between the Belgians and Germans had already been taking place. But tlie fact was that the German occupation of Verviers near the frontier had been so sudden that there was no adequate Belgian force to resist them there, and the German troops, coming by train part of the way to Liege, were themselves practically the first to announce their arrival on Belgian soil. Before they actually reached Liege, however, the Belgians had had time to tear up the rails, and the last part of the German advance was completed by road. To under- stand what had happened up to this point — • and in view of the subsequent savagery of the German invasion, it is essential to know how it all began^we must go back to the frontier, to Verviers, and try to realize the actual conditions imder which German troops, trans- gressing international law, crossed the Belgian frontier. BELGIAN SOLDIERS SNIPING FROM A BRIDGE. [Sport &■ General. As far as Herbesthal, the German town whose suburbs actually touch the frontier nearest to Liege, the troops had been conveyed by train, and they.simply formed up after detraining and took their places in the lengthening coliunn on the road into Belgium. Thus on the actual frontier there was abso- lutely no resistance, although the cavalry which advanced in front of the main force and penetrated to a distance beyond the frontier reported that stray shots had been fired upon it. These came, no doubt, from Belgian sentries or scouts ; but there was no military opposition to the German occupation of Lim- burg, the first Belgian town on the road to Liege. So unexpected, indeed, had been the turn of events that the Germans found not only the railway intact, but also the locomotives and rolling stock, wliich were very useful for their transport towards Liege. The next Belgian town beyond Limburg wa» Verviers ; and from this place a weak Belgian force had easily been driven by the German cavalry. The panic-stricken inhabitants offered no resistance, only peeping tlirough closed shutters at the invaders, who quietly took possession of the public buildings and issued proclamations announcing the annexation of the town and district, appointing a German officer as Governor and warning the populace that any resistance to German authority would be punished immediately with death. So far, no doubt, events had marched exactly in accordance with the Gennans' plan ; and, as- they had expected, the people were not only meek and zealous in carrying out orders for provisions, but very soon overcame their fear sufficiently to come out of their houses and converse freely with the enemy. On the same day German troops entered Belgium without opposition at Dalhem, Franconchamps, and Stavelot. This auspicious beginning was, however,, much too good to last. The " peaceful occupa- tion of Belgian territory " reported in the first telegrams to Berlin did not extend for many miles ; and unexpected opposition had a bad effect on the German temper. The first serious intimation to the invader that Belgian words of protest meant effective deeds to follow was found by the German troops advancing towards Liege by Dalhem and Herve in the blown-up bridges of the Mouse and the Trois Fonts tunnels. Thus the German attempt to seize these bridges by surprise was foiled, and their efforts to throw others over were at first successfully resisted. These,, however, were only affairs of outposts ; and THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 31- VIEW ON THE RIVERSIDE, LUXEMBURG. [Underwood^ Undeiwood, ihough the fortifications of Liege were in iptidiness and order and tlio garrison of 22,5(10 men apportioned to them complete in numbers and high in courage, it was not expected any- where that the defence of Liege by the Belgians could exert any real influence upon the course of the campaign. This was no iloubt in the minds of the Germans when they had crossed the Belgian frontier. One of their first objectives was naturally Vise, a qviiet little Belgian town just outside the Dutch frontier, and occuiiying a strategic position on the flank of any forc;^- !Ki\ ancing from the east upon Liege. Here, how- ever, the Germans discovered that, prompt iw their advance had been, the Belgians had been at least equally prompt ; because the bridges had been blown up and they were forced to stop to build others. Nor was this an uninterrupted work. In one case the German encineers wero 318 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ONE OF THE INCIDENTS WHICH IMPEDED THE GERMAN ADVANCE. [Sporl & G^nfral. allowed to proceed until the new pontoon bridge was just completed. Then a concealed Belgian force opened fire upon it and most of the engineers perished with their construction. Thus the capture of Vis6, which should have been a preliminary to the partial investment of Liege with a view to attacking the forts, was itself delayed until the general assault upon the forts was already being delivered. After fierce fighting the Germans then succeeded in entering Vis6. At first, however, they did Dot, as was reported at the time, massacre the inhabitants, although those who assisted the Belgian troops, including women and boys who threw stones, were remorselessly shot down. There was, however, no indiscriminate slaughter ; and it is some satisfaction to make this record, because the first accounts which reetched England of the capture of Vis^ accused the Germans of wholesale atrocities, and these accusations were re- peated without reservation and evidently without inquiry in later accounts professing to be historical. The indictment against the Germans under this head is heavy enough without adding thereto charges which can- not be supported by evidence. Moreover, it is particularly important that we should be scrupulously just and accurate with regard to these initial proceedings, because outragtis committed by the Germans before they had received any provocation at all would mani- festly fall under a worse category of crime than similar outrages perpetrated as " reprisals." even if the provocation, judicially "onsidered, did not justify them. For we must not forget that amid the excitement of war, and especially under the aggravation of an unex- pected and humiliating reverse, most men's mindsarevmfitted to takea calm, judicial view of things in general, and, least of all, the conduct of the enemy. You have only to listen to the unfair and often absurd insinuations which the defeated team in a hotly-contested football match usually make against their rivals to understand how roused passions impair fair judgment ; and it is certain that in Belgium not only were the German " reprisals " based upon untrue rumours of the conduct of Belgian civilians, but also that they were exaggerated in extent by rumour current upon the Belgian side. In the interest of fair play it is necessary to remember this, and also to bear in mind that the international military situation was gravely complicated by the ahomalous position of the Belgian Garde Civique. As has been pointed out in a previous chapter, the outbreak of war came aipon Belgium at a peculiarly awkward moment, when her military forces were in a state of transition. The problem which she had had to solve was how to obtain enough men to garrison her great fortresses of Antwerp, Liege, and Namur, to fill the ranks of her mode.«t field Army of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 319 *«50,000, and to maintain adequate rcsprvos in the depots. Without a more stringent system of conscription it was only possible to bring the Army up to strength by allowing it to absorb the old Garde Civique, a relic of the days when Belgium had no national policy and therefore needed no force more military than a sort of armed police. So it wa.s decided to absorb the Garde Civique into the Army ; but war came before the process could be carried out, and when the Garde Civique gallantly fell into line with the regular Army to oppose the German invader the latter insisted upon; re- garding it as a civilian force which was breaking the rules of war by taking part in military operations. The Garde Civique possessed all the attributes of soldiers, and wore a distinct uniform. But the Germans found in them a part of the Belgian forces which might be excluded by the tlu'eat of treating tliem as non- combatants. Eventually Belgium withdrew them. The shooting of a captxired member of the Garde Civique was inevitably regarded by the Belgians as the miu^er of a prisoner and by the Germans as merely the execution of a spy. Such occurrences, however, naturally exasperated the Belgians ; and it is therefore some consolation to know that even Belgian witnesses exonerate the Germans from the charge of committing entirely unprovoked atrocities on the occasion of the capture of Vise. Til the first full narrative of the attack upon Li^ge. which was sent to The Times, it is expressly stated : — " After fierce fighting the German troopt succeeded in entering Vis6. They did not, however, as has been reported, massacre the inhabitants of this place. With the exception of a few civilians who were shot during the attack, the civil population was not much interfered with. Fire broke out in several quarters, but the town was not fired deliberately." This passage, quoted from a narrative wliich was instinct tliroughout with sympathy and tidmiration for the Belgians in their gallant struggle, is very important, because it shows that the Germans, whatever their sub- sequent conduct may have been, did not deliberately adopt brutal methods against the Belgian population as part of their plan of cam- paign at the outset. Yet, although the passage quoted above fairly summarizes the facts, it waa really at Vis6 that the Germans first showed how quickly their methods wore changing for the worse. According to a Belgian eye-witness the troubl* materialized when the Germans attempted to seize Vis6 bridge over the Meuse. The Belgians had destroyed about 50 yards of it in the centre, and when the first party of Prussian cavalry arrived to take possession they were almost annihilated by a hot fire which was opened upon them by infantry hidden among the BELGIAN EXPERT SHOTS ON A FAST AUTOMOBILE. Who were continually harassing the Germans. iR^cord />«5. 320 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMANS MARCHING THROUGH A BURNING VILLAGE. [Dally Mirror- piers of the broken bridfje. At the same time shots were fired from houses near the bank ; and, according to the account- of the eye-witness, it was then that German troops, coming up in support of the ambushed cavalry, commenced an indiscriminate massacre of the inhabitants, although they had no proof that the shots from the houses were not fired by Belgian soldiers. When the latter had retired and all resistance was over, the remaining inhabi- tants were rounded up likf; sheep in the centre of their shattered town and surrounded by the troops, whoso commander addressed the sullen crowd in French, explaining that Germany was " not at war with Belgium," but that they must submit to German military law, and that any attack upon the troops would immediately be punished with death. At that' moment a pistol-shot rang out and the officer fell wounded ; whereupon a group of eight persons from whose midst the shot had come were seized and executed, although it was known to all that only one shot had been fired. This was the small beginning of the reign of " frightfulness " which subsequently became the admitted rule of German work in Belgium, increasing in ferocity as the invaders' prospects became more gloomy and culminating in the senseless acts of vandalism so numerous and so terrible that the accounts of them make (to Germany's everlasting shame) a separate entire section of this history of the war. The reference above to " frightfulness " as the " admitted " rule of German work in Belgium is based upon an official German statement of policy circulated by wireless telegraphy from Berlin for tlie informati on of tlu' world at large. The statement was as follows : — " The distribution of arms and ammunition among the civil population of Belgiiun had been carried out on systematic lines, and the authori- ties enraged the public against Germany b>- assiduously circulating false reports. They were under the impression that, with the aid of the French, they would be able to drive the Germans out of Belgium in two days. The only means of preventing surprise attacks from the civil population has been to interfere with un- relenting severity and to create examples, which by their frightfulness would be a warning to the whole coimtry." The opening sentence of this statement wns a deliberate falsehood ; because the German commanders in the field had all seen the pro- clamations of the Belgian Governmint in the villages which they destroyed, lU'gii^g the in- habitants to take no part in the fighting for their own and their neighbours' sakes ; and the concluding sentence — cahnly and complacently issued by a Government which had admitted doing " wrong " by invading Belgium as an excuse for unspeakable atrocities committed upon Belgian men, women, and children who resented that wrong — threw such a lurid light upon the thing which the Germans of the day regarded as their national " conscience " as to horrify the civilized world. CHAPTER XXI. THE STORY OF LIEGE. The " Birmingham " of Belgium — Its Stormy History — Physical and Architectural Beauties — Belgium's Bavarian Queen — Germany's Checked Plan— First Attack on Li'kge — Misemployment of Massed Infantry — Skilful Belgian Defence — The Decisive Bayonet — The Error of German Discipline — Strength and Weakness of Liege — Facts ABOUT the Forts — -Secret German Work in LifcoE — General Leman's Narrow Escape — Massacre of Li{:ge Citizens — Disingenuous Statement from Berlin — International Law Misapplied — Dishonesty of the German Case — Parallel of the Self-Righteous Burcilar — Golden Opportunity Neglected by the Germans — Evidence of Atrocities at Likoe — Excuse for Belgium — General von Emmich and His Task — Value of Initial Belgian Successes — ^Terrible Slaughter of Germans — Three Army Corps Brought to a Standstill — ^Inexorable German Advance — More Brilliant Belgian Successes — Cross of the Legion of Honour for LikoE — Records of Individual Gallantry — Nothing Availed against the Big Guns — Difficulty of their Transport — Collapse of the Forts — ^Messrs. Krupp's Triumph — Summary of the Siege — Playing Hide-and-Seek with Shells — Destruction of Buildings — Occupation of the Town — ^Unique Position thus Created — Ill-founded Re- joicings IN Berlin and Mist.\ken Hopes in London — In Spite of Checks German Advance Irresistible — LiteE and Namur Compared — The Value of Ring Fv/Rtresses — General Leman " Plays the Game " — Moral and Political Effects of Belgian Success in Resistance — ^Destruction of Forts and Capture of Genf.ral Leman — ^Pathetic and Gallant Finale — Testimony of British Statesmen. THE usual description of Liege as the " Birmingham of Belgium " gave one no idea of the peaceful beauty of the town with its numerous spires and spacious streets, fringed with boule- vards spreading outwards from the wide waters of the Meuse toward the undulating country with its mi ny lovely woods, the haunts of butterflies and birds. Between these were situated the forts, like great iron ant-hills, each cupola crown- ing the smooth glacis on wliich on the night of August 5 tl e German dead lay in high ridges like the jetsam of the tide upon a beach, each ridge indicating the high-water mark to which the futile rush of a wave of infantry had reached. But as the sun set peacefully on Augvist 3 the forts were no more conspicuous than usual Vol. I. — Part 9. amid their picturesque surroundings. They werp always familiar features in a bird's-eye view of the environs of Liege, but they did not dominate the landscape ; and there was little, even in the minds of the Liegeois as thoy listened to the music of St. Bartholemy's evening chimes, to suggest that the morrow would see that landscape ringed with steel or that for many days the incessant thunder of tho guns would be speaking to the world of the heroism and the wreckage of Liege. Indeed, oa that close, hot evening at the beginning of August the wooded slopes beyond which the Germans were waiting for nig'itfall seemed to contain nothing more dangerous than the magpies that flickered black and wliite along the margins of the thickets ; and the quiet fields :\1\ 322 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LIEGE. The above, with the illustration on the opposite page, forms a panoramic view of Li^ge as it was,, and sliows tlie entrance to the Hallway Station. around the farms showed no worse enemios than the family parties of crows prospecting for early walnuts — crows that would soon fatten on horses' entrails and pick the eyes of men. No serious shadow of the coming evil had yet fallen across those fair hUls. There had been rumours, of course, and of course the troops were ready in Liege ; but the contented Walloon farmer paid little attention to rumours or the activities of the soldiers. He hoped the sultry sunset did not portend thunder — little dreaming of the thunder of the guns that would be in his oars for many nights and days. Perhaps he thought, as he looked over the rolling fields, ripe through abundant simshine with early crops, that the harvest of 1914 would be one that the Liegeois would remember for many years. And so indeed it was ; for it proved to bo the crowning harvest of the city's stormy prominence in history, passing back for pearly 1,200 years. Liege made her entry into the field of political history in the year 720, when, with the consent of Pope Gregory the Second, the Bishop of •Maestricht transferred the See from that sleepy city to its fast-growing rival at the junction of the Meuse and the Ourthe. In the following century the Bishops of Liege added to their honours the titles of Princes of the Empire and Dukes of Bouillon. Their residence in the city of Liege added of coiu'se vastly to its dignity and consequence, and their eccle- siastical and military subordinates swelled its population and fed its growing trade. But there was another side to these benefits. The difference between the lay and ecclesiastical aristocracy of the Middle Ages was often merely skin-deep, a matter of title and costume rather than of nature or of habit of life ; and the long list of the Prince -Bishops of Liege comprised few individuals who were not as insolent in their pretensions, as sudden and quick in quarrel, as vindictive in revenge, and as extortionate as their unsanctified brethren. The history of Liege is the story of a long struggle between the turbulent and liberty- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 323 LIEGE. Centre o£ the to^\'n, and the nver, with a view o[ tlie bridge tliat was destroyed. loving citizens and thoir priestJy oppressors, many of whom were only able to enter the city either at the head or in the rear of armies of mercenaries. Revolts were frequent and bloody, and sometimes more or less successful ; but on the whole the Prince-Bishops of Liega held their own so well that the French historian, Jules Dalhaizo, tells us that even in the eighteenth century they were still absolute rulers, and that Gerard de Hoonsbroeck, who occupied the episcopal throne in 1789, " knew no other law than his own. will." The continuance and growth of the Priiice- IJishops' power would indicate that most of them must have been men of considerable political talent, with a keen eye for the winning side, as, in the interminable quarrels between the Empire and the Papacy, they pursued no settled lino of policy, but fought with or against the Holy See as their personal interest tended. One of them, Henry of Leyden, Prince-Bishop from 1145 to 1164, followed Frederick Bar- barossa to Italy, helped in the downfall of Pope Alexander III., supported the Anti-Pope Victor, and consecrated his successor, Paschal. In strange contrast with rebels of this type were Bishop Alexander, who, deposed in 1134 by Innocent the Second, died of shame ; Al- beron of Namur, whose heart broke at an angry summons to the presence of Eugenius the Tliird ; and Raoul of Zeringhen, who, admonished for malpractice by the pontifical legate, laid asidi, his crozier and expiated his offences as a crusader. Best known of all to history is Louis de Bourbon, the victim of the ferocity of William de la Marck, " the Boar of the Ardennes.' Far from an ideal priest, worldly, luxurious, and indolent, the courage and dignity with which he met his death would have earned pardon for much lieavier offences. Amid all these turmoils Liege had flourisheil and grown, and about the year 1400 the demo- cratic element had held its own so well that it could bo described as " a city of priests changed into one of colliers and armourers." "' It was," we are told, " a city that gloried in its 324 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. STEPS LEADING UP TO THE FORTS, LIEGE, iUndtrwoo.i c- UnJauo..d. rupture with the paat," but " the past " rose and reasserted itself in 1408, when the Prince- Bishop John of Bavaria, assisted by his cousin, John the Fearless, broke the forces of the citizenK and excluded them ruthlessly from power. A generation later democracy triumpheu again, again to be overthrown, this time by Charles the Bold of Burgundy, who, in 1467, defeated the Li^geois in the field, and reinstated the Bishop and his kinsman, the afore-mentioned I^uis de Bourbon. In the following year the undismayed burghers rose in fresh revolt, provoked thereto by -the intrigues iind promises of tlie crafty Louis XI. of France, Charles's seeming friend and deadliest enemy. It was probably the most triumphant hour of Charles's life, and the bitterest hour that Louis ever knew, when, in the enforced presence and ^vith the extorted consent of the latter, Charles stormed Liege, put its inhabitants to indiscriminate slaughter, and, save for its pillaged churches, razed it to. the ground. It was characteristic of Charles that he failed to complete the political annexation of the THE TIMES aiS'lORY OF THE WAR. 325 princ-ipality ho had so frightfully chastised. At his death, nine years later, in 1477, the un- conquorablo spirit of the Walloon population had already done much to restore the city to its forirjer strength, and a single generation sufficed to erase the last vestiges of her ruin. Liege passed practically unscathed tfirough the long agony of the struggle of the Netherlands against Philip II. and the Duke of Alva, and underwent no such calamities as those which desolated the sister cities of Maestricht, Brussels, and Antwerp. She was stormed and occupied by the soldiers of Louis XIV. in 1691, and in 1702 was occupied by the English under Marl- borough. Her occupation in 1792 by a French contingent commanded by La Fayette con- cluded the tale of her warlike experiences uatil the outbreak of the present struggle. In its modern aspect Liege, as the centre of the coalmining industry of Eastern Belgium, has always exhibited to the traveller, even at a distance, the signs of its occupation in the pall of smoke overhead, to which the countless chimneys of the factories which the output of coal supports are constantly contributing. One of the mines is the deepest in the world, and many others, now abandoned, pass beneath the city and the river. Among the chief industries for which Liege lias long been, and will doubtless again be, famous through the world is the manufacture of arms and weapons of all kinds — congenial work, one might suppose, for the quick-witted Walloon people, who have always in their city's stormy history shown that they know how to use weapons as well as how to make ihem. Perhaps a little over-readiness in this direction on their part, forgetting that modern war is confined to combatants only, offers some explanation, but no excuse, for the savagery of the German " reprisals." Besides the manufacture of arms, of which there were more than 180 factories, the Liege zinc foundries, engine factories, and cycle works were all world-famous, and the zinc works ot Vieille Montague were the largest in existence. But though this vast industrial activity clouded the air above Liege with smoke, and though wherever one looked upon the en- circling hills the chimneys and shafts of mines were to be seen, the town itself was pleasant and well laid out, and tJie surrounding land- scape beautiful. Many of the improvements in Liege dated from 1905, when an International Exhibition was held there ; and in preparing the area for this the course ot the river Ourthe, which here joins the Meusc, had been diverted from its GENERAL LEMAN, The Gallant Defender of Lidge. old bed and convened into the Canal de Derivation, the old ri\Br course being filled up and added, with the adjoining land, to the Exhibition grounds. A fine park was also laid out on' the Plateau de Cointe, whence the best general view of Liege is obtained, and several new bridges and streets were made, including the handsome and spacious boulevards. Another grand view was obtained from the Citadel, an ancient and disused fort close to the north side of the town, which was built on the site of still older fortifications by the Prince- Blsliop Maximilian Henry of Bavaria after the famous siege of Liege in 1649. No doubt ho thought that he was makiiig the city impregnable for over ; but three centuries had not passed before the newer fortresses, whose construction relegated the Citadel to the level of an antique curiosity, had themselves fallen utterly before the power of modern guns. The position of the Citadel, however, still remains commanding, and the view therefrom includes the entire city, of which all the centre from north to south looks like a cluster of islands between the canals and winding rivers, as well as the thickly-wooded background of the Ardennes Moimtains on the right, and on the left the hills near Ma( stricht in Holland and the broad plaina of Liinburg, whence the German armies crossed the frontier in three streams at the beginning of the gieat war. 326 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. Between this distant historic landscape and the near view of Liege, rising from her ashes, the valleys of the Meuse, the Oiirthe, and the Vesdi* diverge, thickly dotted with populous Walloon villages. This had been a favourite country for German tourists and a rich field for German commercial enterprise; but 1914 wrought a change. On the other side of the city another disused fortification. Fort Chartreuse, gave an almost equally fine prospect from the opposite point of view ; and although the old fort itself was blown up by the Belgians during the siege in order that it might not provide cover for the enemy, the hill remained a vantage point from which, as far as the eye can reach on either hand, evidence of German devastation could be seen. Before the bombardment the general aspect of the city was that of a place of parks and pleasure gardens, fine churches and spacious buildings. Among the latter the University, by its prominence, became a magnet for the German shells, and though only founded in 1817 as the central seat of learning for the Walloon race, no priceless heritage of ancient days could have been more thoroughly smashed and pulverized. The grand Palais de Justice also, with its picturesque courts and vaulted pillars, blending late Gothic and Renaissance styles — and its west wing used a.s the Government House, faced by pleasure grounds and fountains on a picturesque slope — was only a product of 16th to 19th century genius ; and the Town Hall only dated from early in the 18th century, although it contained pictures and tapestries of great age and value. But in the Church of St. Jacques, with its famous stained-glass windows, the western facade was nearly 700 years old, while parts of the Cathedral Church of St. Paul, also con- taining beautiful stained glass and statues, dated back to 968, 1280, and 1528. The Church of St. Jean belonged to the 12th, 14th, and 18th centuries, that of St. Croix to the 10th, 12th, and 14th, St. Martin to the 16th, St. Antoine, with its wood carvings and frescoes, to the 13th, and St. Barth^lemy to the 11th and 12th, with its two towers and well-known chimes and famous bronze font of 12th-century work. In addition there were the domed church of St. Andrew, used as the Exchange, and the baroque foimtains in the Place du Marche. Thus, as a subject for German bombardment, it may be seen that Liege had many attractions, even if it did not come up to the standard of Louvain or Reims. Such, then, was the ancient town which lay sleeping peacefully amid its ring of watchdog forts that nestled so comfortably between the wooded uplands on the night of August 3, 1914. The stirring events of the following day, ■ culminating in the tragedy of Vise, have already been narrated, sliowing that varied fortunes had so far attended Germany's first steps in the war. The successful seizure of Luxemburg and the quiet crossing of the Belgian frontier, with the occupation of Limburg, had promised well for her. At the moment, indeed, it looked as if the Kaiser's plans for an invasion of France would be smoothly carried out and his Majesty would be able to count Belgium among the dutiful children of his Empire. Perhaps he even found some hope in the fact that the Queen of the Belgians was a German Princess, born at Possenhofen, and before her marriage known as the Duchess Elisabeth of Bavaria. But Germany who treated the claims of national honour so lightly herself had yet to learn that others placed them above ties of family and even above considera- tions of self-interest ! Instead of an obedient vassal the Kaiser found in Belgimn a most resolute antagonist ; and, when the storm broke. General von Em- mich's three Army Corps, travelling lightly- equipped for speed, discovered that it was not so much an attack upon France through Belgium as a serious invasion of Belgium itself which lay before them, while the taking of even the little town of Vise had caused so much bloodshed and provoked such bitter enmity as augured ill for future progress. The bombardment of Liege commenced in the early morning — a dull and hot morning — of August 5, the advance of the artillery having been covered — as is always the case in a German movement — ^by masses of cavalry, and it was continued without cessation imtil the 8th. The Germans attacked along a very wide front, stretching north to the smoking ruins of Vis6 close to the Dutch frontier, and on the south a considerable distance below Liege ; but the artillery employed was not heavy enough. The big siege guns had not arrived and the forts had the best of the preliminary duel. Then the amazing thing happened. It was as though the German generals, loiowing noticing of war, had just read in some book how Napoleon won victories by the sudden, imexpected use of solid masses of men and had said to them- selves, " Good ! No one will expect the sudden application of masses of men in a case like this : so we will apply them." The result almo.st moved even the busy Belgians in the trenches THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. m THE QUEEN OF THE BELGIANS. 328 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. WHERE THE GERMANS ARE SAID TO HAVE FIRST GROSSED THIi iMEUSE. to pity. " It was death in haystacks," said one of them afterwards, trjdng to describe the eSect of the combined field-gun, machine-gun, and rifle fire upon the masses of men. Another eye-witness stated that the average height of the ridges of German dead was \\ yards. Many corpses are required to reach that level. It was the visible result of a form of military enter- prise which a civilian who had dined too well might conceive. As the day wore on the battle became more fierce, for the simple reason that the successive waves of Germans jammed each other on, until oefore one of the forts a great host of men succeeded in gaining a footing on the near slopes, where the great guns could not be depressed to roach them. For a brief space they seemed to think that they were on the threshold of victory and rushed forward, only to discover — what, surely, their oflficers should have known all along — that the machine guns were waiting for them. Further back their comrades had been killed : here they were massacred. In contrast with this useless waste of German life, the Belgian troops in the trenches appear to have been kept admirably in hand. Some of the subsiding ripples of the tide of German assault wGTO only definitely suppressed by rifle fire at .'50 yards ; and often the ideal distance for a bayonet charge, when you can see the whites of you' enemies' eyes, seemed almost reached. Now anf) auain it actually was reached ; and then the. staggering German ranks appeared to have no stomach for cold steel. Many turned and ran ; many held up their hands and sur- rendered ; the rest were killed. It was rather surprising that men who had gone through so much should have been cowed at the last by the bayonet. Considered in cold blood, as a feat performed by intelligent men, it should seem a much more terrible test of courage to march, as on parade, in solid ranks into the hell of an entrenched enemy's com- bined and concentrated fire of big guns, machine guns, and rifles than to meet a bajimjt charge in which such solidity as the raiUo retained would have been all on the side of the Germans. Yet it was not only at Liege, but also on many fields of subsequent battle, that the Belgian and allied troops discovered to their surprise and almost to their disappoint- ment that the German infantry would not wait for the applic.ition of steel. Scores of instances could be quoted in which British soldiers, after expressing their personal contempt for the German niie-fire — " they can't shoot for nuts " was a favourite conmient — still ex- pressed their great admiration for the way in which those ranks of men, came stumbling over the corpses of their slaughtered comrades to be slaughtered in their turn. And then always ^ame the final criticism — " but they won't wail for the bayonet." This seeming anomaly is ex- plained by one word used above, in considering THE TIMES UltSTORY OF THE WAR. 329 wlii'thor the courageous advance of the Oerniiiii soldiers to almost certain death was *' a feat perfoi'raed by intelligenl men." That is just what it was not. The German system of disfi])luie took a human being and conv'erted him, in spite of wliatever individual inleUigence he miglit possess, into a military machine which could exhibit no individual inteOigence whatever. The British system, and the French and Belgian also, set a higher vaUie upon the men, seeking to convert each lumian being in the ranks into an intelligent fighting man. The result was that in action the Allied troops did not perfunctorily loose oH their cartridges at the landscape in general. Each man of them tried to kill as many Germans as he could. Hence the tremendous difference in the effective- ness of the rifle fire on the two sides ; and, of course, when it came to bayonet work the difference was more marked still. Behind each Belgian, French, or British bayonet was a trained man intelligently determined to do as much damage with it to the enemy as he could. Behind the rows of German bayonets were almost mechanical combatants, whose discipline and courage had already been strained to the breaking point by the fearful ordeal through which they had been marched. Of course, t,hey did not want to wait for the cold steel. Yet it is not to be denied — as indeed the Belgians admitted without reservation — that up to this point the unfortunate 'German soldiers showed most stoical courage. The blame tor the disaster rested with their com mander. It was as though he had heard that you cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs, and so flung a whole ba.sketful of eggs upon the floor to show liimself a cook I Contrast this with the wiser and, as it proved, much more rapid method adopted against the equally strong fortress of Kamur later on. Then the first news which we recei\ed came, at the end of a long telegram describing the con- tinued advance of the German Army towards Paris, in the following words : — " They (the Germans) have, too, partially invested Namur and opened upon its forts with heavy artillery." This was, of course, the right coiu-se to adopt in attacking a ring fortress. Such a fortress is comparable to an encircling wall, and the first thing to do is to invest it and make a breach in it. Then and not till then is the time to send ma ses of infantry forward — tlu-ough the breach. At Liege the masses of infantry were sent against the unbroken wall. At Namur the fire of the heavy guns was so overwhelming that the ring was broken in several places almost simultaneously. No wonder that at Liege the THE CHURCH AT VISii. Probably the First Church Destroyed by the Germans. [Ntaspjptr lltustrJiions, 330 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Germans wore sent staggering back or that at *famiir they quickly advanced to victory. To understand why Liege could not be taken by assault, in spite of the great force which was hurled upon it ; why, up to a certain point, it was able to resist the determined and con- tinuous attack subs?quently made upon it by s\ip?rior force ; and also why it inevitably fell, we must have a clear picture of the defences in our minds. The diagram maps published on pages 340 and 341 illustrate the main facts of the position, and we must remember that the ring of twelve forts was 33 miles in circumference, and that they were situated each about four miles from the town and on the average about two to three miles from one another. Thus the interval between fort and fort was too large to be held by a garrison which was numerically so weak as was the force under General Leman's . command. It is true that during the earlier stages of the fighting, when the German attack developed only on a narrow front, the superior mobility of the Belgian forces, moving hither and thither on short interior lines of communica- tion, enabled them on each occasion to oppose a withering machine-gun and rifle fire to the German advance and even to fling back the shattered ranks of the assailants finally with resolute bayonet charges ; but this advantage was lost so soon as the widening area of the German attack involved so many of the forts that no man could be spared from the defender's trenches between any two of them to strengthen the defencft elsewhere. It was then that the necessity of withdrawing the field forces became apparent to General Leman, who elected to hold out with the forts alone. By this time, however, the 400 guns, which represented the total armament of the forts, were both out- numbered and outclassed by the heavy artillery which the Germans had brought into position, and tlie last stand of Liege was quite hopeless. All that General Leman could hope to do — and grandly succeeded in doing — was to delay the German advance a little longer and to make sure that the forts on falling into the hands of the enemy should be only masses of ruins. The conflicting nature of the accounts which were published at the time concerning the resistance offered by the forts was largely due to confusion between the large and the small forts. Of the ring of 12, three on the north and east, namely Pontisse, Barchon, and F16ron, and three on the west and south, namely, Loncin, Fl^malle, and Boncelles, were large and strong. The other six were com- paratively small and unimportant as strong- holds, although if the whole ring had been held by an adequate force they would have con tinued to be, as they were at first, invaluable as buttresses to the fighting line and connecting links between the large forts. They were not, however, strong enough, when isolated, to withstand a siege with modern artillery ; and in regarding Liege as a ring fortress for this purpose only the six forts named above should be taken into considera- tion ; and when the Germans claimed to have demolished three of the south-eastern forts, namely, Embourg, Chaudfontaine, and Evegnee, this did not really affect the claim of the Belgians that " the forts on the east and south," namely, Barchon, Fleron, and Boncelles, were " still holding out." All of the larger forts were constructed upon the same plan, being triangular in shape, with a moat on each side and giuis at each corner. In the centre of the interior space was a steel turret with two 6in. howitzers, and in a square round this four other steel turrets, all armed with Sin. quick- firing guns. All these turrets were embedded in one solid concrete block ; and in addition, besides searchlights and many machine guns, the corners of the triangle held quick-firing guns in disappearing turrets. Against any known artillery at the time of their construction these forts were probably impregnable ; and oven at the time of the war they were doubtless capable of holding out for months against any ordinary field force. But the big siege guns which the Germans brought against them were another matter ; and the daily legend, " Liege forts still holding out," only continued to bo true until they had been bombarded. In order to understand some of the curious incidents in the first stages of the attack upon Liege we must remember that the same secret preparations which succeeded so well in Luxem- burg had been made in Liege also. In many of the houses, occupied by unsuspected citizen.s who were really secret German agents, were found thousiAids of rifles, quickfiring gims, and sets of harness, intended for the armament of the Germans who had entered the city in mufti and unarmed. It was this arrangement, only very partially successful, which nearly cost the life of General Leman on the occasion when Colonel Marchand was killed, at the beginning of the siege, because it enabled a party of armed Germans surreptitiously to surround the house where the Commandant was conferring with the General Staff. Various accounts are given of the melee which followed, but all agree as to the circumstance of Colonel Marchand' s death and the saving of General Leman by an officer of Herculean build whc THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 331 BRAVO, BELGIUM! This cartoon, reproduced by special permission of tiie proprietors of "Puncli," admirably expresses the true spirit of the Belgians' resistance to German aggression. forced him over the wall of an adjoining foundry. It was, no doubt, this startling discovery of the presence of concealed enemies in Liege which led General Leman — who in many of his methods and the personal enthusiasm which he evoked reminds the British reader of Baden- Powell in Mafeking — to lay the trap which led to the annihilation of one German band and the capture of another. From the welter of confusetl accounts of the bloody happenings on the night of August 7 one fact seems to stand out boldly, that, while the German demand for an armistice for the alleged purpose of biu-ying their dead was supposed to be still under consideration. 332 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. PLACE ST. LAMBERT AND PALACE OF JUSTICE, LIEGE. German troops succeeded in entering the town of Liege and fiei-ce street fighting ensued, as a result of which the greater part of the Belgian garrison retreated in good order from the town. Unfortunately, as at Vis6, some of the inhabitants had taken a prominent part in the fighting, and in retaliation the Germans shot every one, man, woman, or child, who fell into their hands. There appears to be no doubt that this was done, or that it was done by order. A semi-official statement, issued in Berlin on August 9, ran : — " According to news re- ceived here about the operations around Liege the civilian population took part in the struggle, and German troops and doctors were fired upon from ambush. . . . It is possible that these facts were due to the mixed population in industrial centres, but it is also possible that France and Belgium are preparing a Jranc- tireur war against oiu* troops. If this is proved by further facts our adversaries are themselves responsible if the war Ls extended with inexor- able strength to the guilty population. The German troops are only accustomed to fight against the armed power of a hostile State, and cannot be blamed if in self-defence they do not give quarter." If the severely judicial note of the first part of this proclamation had been maintained in the conduct of the troops in the field the world might have had little reason to com- plain of Teuton brutality. Non-com- batant Belgians undoubtedly took part m the defence of Li6ge as well as of Vise. But everything had happened so suddenly through the treacherous completeness of Ger- many's plans for the invasion of Belgium without warning that there had been little time for the Belgian authorities to issue any effective advice to the Belgian population as to the rules of war regarding non-combatants. Every effort was made indeed to placard the villages with warning notices ; but there is no evidence that such notices wore or could have been placarded in the neighbourhood of Liega in time to anticipate the events of August 5-/ If, moreover, there could be any circumstances in which the plain duty of an invader was to waive the strictness of the rules of war and to strain his spirit of mercy and forbearance to the utmost those circumstances were present here : because the German Government openly admitted before the world that it was doing a " wrong " to Belgium by breaking down her sanctioned neutrality. Indeed, unless inter- national law is based upon s me lower ideal of justice than that which inspires all civilized law as between man and man, the Germans could not lawfully appeal to the rules of war at all. The armed burglar cannot take legal proceedings for assault against a householder who arrests him. It is true that according to law the right to arrest belongs to the police, and that one ordinary civilian who violently seizes another commits an assault ; but the armed biu-glar, by doing wrong himself in the first instance and thus provoking the plucky householder to seizo him, has deliberately discarded that status ol THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. %ZZ ordinary citizenship which would have entitled him to protection by the law. If, then, there had been an adequate force behind international law, as there is behind the ordinary law of all civilized countries, the Belgian civilian who resisted the German in- vader should have been able to say to his oppo- nent, as the householder can say to the armed burglar : " If I kill you, it is only justifiable homicide, but if you kill me, it is murder." This difference in their positions before the law would directly follow from the fact that the burglar had caused the whole trouble by doing wrong. Yet we have the spectacle of the Ger- man Government admittedly doing wrong and at the same time claiming the right to take extreme advantage of international law ! Moreover, even if the German Government had not deliberately placed itself outside the pale of international law by committing the " wrong " to which it brazenly pleaded guOt^, any claim which it might have to execute inter- national law would only hold against those who had committed breaches of that law. Great latitude is necessarily given to civilized com- manders in the field in interpreting the law of war and in carrying out their judgments. A civilian strongly and reasonably suspected of having fired upon the enemy's troops, who has fallen into that enemy's hands, cannot claim to be defended by counsel ; nor is ho often able to call witnesses in his behalf. His trial ia brief, often with — it is to be feared — a strong bias against him in the mind of his judge. The fact that in war time many an innocent citizen thus gets shot by the enemy as a spy is one which international law is forced to over- look as one of the incidental evils of war, which can be neither prevented nor remedied. But this shooting of an innocent citizen on sus- picion only, after a mockery of a " trial," is the utmost limit to which the inflamed passions of civilized men can claim the sanction of inter- national law in shedding innocent blood. Therel a no " law," human or divine — or one might even say devilish — which could sanction the hideous and wholesale atrocities committed in Liege by these sanctimonious apostles of German culture. Still further — in order to leave no loophole for casuistry to wriggle out of the frightful charge recorded against Germany in this war — even if the German Government had not, on its own admission, placed itself outside the pale of international law, and even if the outrages committed by its agents had not gone far beyond the worst form of reprisal which that law could sanction, this mock-serious " warn- ing " of reprisal was deliberately issued by the German Government after it knew that the bloody deeds had already been done. SQUARE OF THE VIRGIN, LIEGE, BEFORE BOMBARDMENT. 334 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. CHURCH OF ST. JACQUES, LIEGE. It was on August 9 that in Berlin the Kaiser's Government proclaimed : " If this (that France and Belgium were preparing an illegitimate form of war against the German Army) is proved by further facts our adversaries are them- selves responsible if tlie war is extended with inexorable strength to the guilty population." And it was on August 7, two days earlier, that the German Government had full information of the atrocities committed by its troops upon unarmed Belgians in Liege, where there was general massacre of " tous ceux qui leur sont tombes sous la main, hommes. femmes el enfants." Think of the hideous irony of it all ! Here was the armed burglar who had, by his own confessed crime, put himself outside the pale of the law, not only claiming a legal right to execute the householder who resisted him, but also self -righteously tlireatening to apply " inexorable strength " to the rest of the household two days after he had murdered them all and burned down the house. It has been necessary thus to deal somewhat fully with the terrible charges which lie at the door of the German Government at this point of our narrative, because it was here, in and near Liege, at the very outset of the campaign in Belgium, that the German commanders had a golden opportunity to strike a high and noble keynote of the war. Since their Government had admitted doing a wrong to Belgium and had promised . reparation later, they should have realized that they lay under a moral disadvantage and should have done everything in their power to put themselves right with the Belgian people. Instead of insisting upon their " right " to enforce, and even to exceed, the rules of war in dealing with civilian belliger- ents — like a burglar demanding the observance of Queensberry rules, with additions of his own, in a fight with an aggrieved householder — they shoiild have been watchful for opportunity to exhibit forbearance and clemency to civilians taken in arms, thus illustrating their Government's professed desire to make repara- tion for its wrongdoing. But this did not satisfy the Germans. They were in a hurry to begin with. Like a man who has wagered to go round the world in a certain time and has missed his train at the start, they were already infuriated by their own failure to bring up their heavy artillery and ammunition in time to make short work of the Liege forts. They were further enraged by the vigorous resistance of Belgian troops, which they did not expect to find in their way so much ; and the fact that patriotic Belgian civilians took part in the fighting caused their fury to boil over. So they sought to terrify ihe Belgian nation by massacre ; and Liege's blood-drenched ashes bore the first signature of the new German war-spirit on Belgian soil — an evil spirit for which, as the evidence shows, not merely the German soldiery were to blame, nor even merely their com- manders in the field, but also the coldly biutal centre of military power in Berlin. Among other specific charges, supported by evidence, which were issued on August 25 by THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 335 the British Press Bureau on the authority of the Belgian Minister, it was stated that on August 6, before one of the forts of Liege, the Germans surprised a party of Belgian soldiers engaged in digging entrenchments. The latter, being unarmed, hoisted a whit" flag ; but the Germans ignored this and continued to fire upon the helpless party. On the same day, before Fort Loncin, a case of treacherous abuse of the white flag occiu-red in the case of a body of German troops who hoisted the signal of surrender and then opened f5re at close range upon the party of Belgians sent to take charge of them. Contrast such conduct as this with the war-spirit of Belgium. The victim of an un- provoked attack and almost unprepared for the storm that had biu-st upon her, she gave to the world an example of public spirit which electrified Europe. That in the excitement of the moment she struck with both hands at the invader, obviously unaware that the laws of war permit the use of the swordhand only — for the Belgian Government had not had time then to post up in the villages the official warning to civilians not to take part in the conflict — was a venial offence, which a generous enemy would have met by a serious warning of the consequences which would follow its repetition ; and for a generous enemy Belgium and her alUes would have felt at least respect. But that was not the German way ; and for the evil conBequenoes which fol- lowed the brutalization of war in Europe the Kaiser's Gtovemment is directly re- sponsible. General von Emmich waa at this period the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army of the Meuse. He had been previously in conunand of the 10th Army Corps at Hanover, and this, with the 7th Corps, was the part of his force which he employed to carry out the orders that had evidently been given to him to cap- ture Liege quickly at all costs. He used 88,000 men on the first day, increased to 120,000 on the second, against the Belgian 22,500, which the Germans knew to be in- adequate for the complete defence of the fortress ; and what was more natural than that he should have determined, even without the explicit orders from Berlin, to sweep them out of his path £is a preliminary to swift advance tlirough Belgium towards the French frontier 7 His officers certainly believed that they had an easy job before them — a task pour rire, as one of them, a prisoner, explained afterwards — and entered into action in the gayest spirits. Bitter must have been their disappointment when the great 7th Army Corps, after concen- trating its attack upon the three eastern forts — naniely, Barchon, Evegnee, and Fleron — was met with such devastating artillery fire from the forts and such well-directed machine- gun end infantry fire from the trenches and THE CLOISTERS, PALACE OF JUSTICE. 336 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A RUINED STREET IN LIEGE. [Newspaper Illustrations. barricades which had been thrown up between then) that only a remnant came reeling back. The value of the success gained by the Belgians in witlistanding the first German onset was incalculable. Not only did it destroy one large factor in the Kaiser's scheme for the con- quest of France, i.e., the belief that, as he him- self had said, he could sweep through Belgium as easily as he could wave his hand ; not only did it disarrangs the time-table by which the conquest of France was to be completed before Russia could come to her assistance ; it also shattered the European reputation of the Kaiser's Army for invincibility ; it had been supposed that German officers necessarily were prodigies of military efficiency and that the troops which they commanded were the most perfect man-slaying machine which human genius and German " thoroughness " could create. But at Liege the German commanders showed themselves to be grievous bunglers in setting their men tasks which mere flesh and blood could not perform, while the men also bhowed themselves to be inept with the rifle and to have a wholesome dislike for the bayonet. British troops made these discoveries on their own account later ; but in the initial stages of the campaign in Belgium it was worth another 100,000 men to General Lemanthat his soldiers should know that they had only to use their rifles and bayonets with intelligence and courage to beat the Germans every time if they met on anything like equal terms. At the outset, therefore. General von Emmich's effort to overrun Liege — to " take it in his stride," as it were, on his march to Paris — with the 7th Army Corps failed utterly ; and when the 7th was reinforced by the 10th and 9th Corps, and six of the forts were simul- taneously attacked, no better results, from the German point of view, followed the assault in force. That the Belgians should thus have hold up 120,000 of the best German troops for two whole days of fierce fighting was a splendid feat of arms which gladdened the hearts of the Allies as an omen of ultimate victory. Some notion of the carnage which resulted frona the German niethod of attack may be gathered from the following description given by a Belgian officer who took part in the de- fence : — " As line after line of the German infantry advanced, wo simply mowed them down. It was terribly easy, monsieur, and I turned to a brother officer of mine more than once and said, ' Voila ! They are coming on again, in a dense, close formation ! < They must be mad ! ' They made no attempt at deploying, but came on, line after line, almost shoulder to shoulder, until, as we shot them down, the fallen were heaped one on top of the otlier, in an awful barricade of dead and wounded men that threatened tc mask our guns and cause us trouble. I thought of Napoleon's saying — if he said it, monsieur ; and I dc ubt it, for he liad no THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. $37 care of human life ! — ' C'est magniflque, mais CO n'est pas la guerre ! " No, it was slaughter — just slaughter ! " So liigh became the barricade of the dead and wounded that we did not know whether to fire through it or to go out and clear openings with our hands. We would have liked to extricate some of the wounded from the dead, but we dared not. A stiff wind carried away the smoke of the guns quickly, and we could see some of the wounded men trying to release themselves from their terrible position. I will confess I crossed myself, and could have wished that the smoke had remained ! " But, would you believe it, this veritable wall of dead and dying actually enabled these wonderful Germans to creep closer, and actually charge up the glacis ! Of course, they got no fui'ther than half-way, for our maxims and rifles swept them back. Of course, wo had our own losses, but they were slight compared with the carnage inflicted upon our In spite of these terrible experiences General von Einmich appears to have adhered to the old-fashioned German idea that a fortress like Liege could be rushed if you only hurled a suflficiont number of men against it. But the third day of the assault added nothing to the result of the previous two, except that a division of German cavalry which had forded the Meusp was surprised and cut up by the Belgian Mixed Brigade ; and the 9th f lerinan Army Corps had been brought to a standstill by the side of the 7th and 10th, with enormous losses — although these do not appear to have ap- proached the number of 25,000 given in con- temporary accounts, which was more than the strength of the entire Belgian garrison. Yet how severely the Germans' advance had indeed been checked appeared from their request for an armistice of 24 hours to bury the dead and collect the wounded ; and it was not inhumanity but reasonable distrust of German honour which prompted the Belgian commander's refusal. EFFECT OF GERMAN SHELL FIRE. INtwspaptr Jtiustrations, 338 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LEFT SIDE OF THE FAMOUS BRIDGE AT LIEGE. Blown up by Belgians to impede the German Advance. [Newspaper /Uuslrtiions. Practically the sole witnesses of this terribly imequal duel between the advancing German hosts and the intrepid defenders of Liege were the Dutch, who at Maestricht, just within the safe frontier of Holland, were almost within eyeshot of it all. Thus, on the afternoon of the fateful August 6 came the following glimpse through the fog of war which had settled around Liege from a correspondent at Maestricht : — " I could clearly see from the hill the Germans in little boats and others building a pontoon over the Mouse south of Vis6. The horses were swum across. The crossing was carried out in half a dozen places with great regularity. The Germans did not seem much concerned at the fire of the Belgian forts. The Belgian troops were spread out over the rising ground. Fire from a German mitrailleuse kept the Belgians at a distance, and slowly the whole hillside became covered with German soldiers, who drove the Belgians before them. " By 5 o'clock a large force of Germans had crossed the Meuse and commenced to march south on Liege. The Belgians tried to harass tlHj Oennans by firing into tTie progressing columns. At last the Belgians cease firing and retire. From the houses along the road the people take to flight in despair. " In the village of Eben I find people calm, looking with astonishment at the tremendous body of troops passing along the route. They were not molested at all as the Germans pro- gressed towards Liege along both banks of the Meuse. " With characteristic optimism Germans said, ' In two days we will have Liege, and within a week we will be before Paris.' " This brief telegram gives a picturesque but accurate summary of the whole tenor of the campaign not only before Liege but beyond Liege and Namur and Brussels to the line where they first encountered the shock of the allied French and British in battle. First, we see the steady inexorable advance of the German hosts swarming forward like ants — even when, as happened later, the ground was increasingly cumbered with their own dead. We see tlie spirited but futile counter-attacks of the numerically weak Belgian forces. We see in every direction small but gallant parties of the defenders of Belgium swallowed up and des- troyed by the advancing grey-green flood of German soldiery. In many places we see the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 339 ■1 RIGHT SIDE OF BRIDGE AT LIEGE. Left side shown on opposite page. lN*vspap*r lUustratiom, rural population fleeing along the crowded roads in mad panic before the German advance. In others, we see them lining the streets of towns and villages, staring in stolid despair at the seemingly interminable hosts of Germans marching in columns to the west. That is the whole picttire of the war around and beyond Liege ; but its minor episodes varied dramatically from day to day. Thus, on the eve of that fateful August day when Liege town surrendered and the forts of Barchon, Evegnee, F16ron, Chaudfontaine, Embourg, and Boncolles were all subjected to bomoardment, one counter-attack by the Belgians was crowned with brilliant success. This was delivered from the heights of Wandre, a position to the west of Barchon, which was the most northerly of the forts then involved. It was in fact an assault upon the outposts on the right flank of the Germans ; and the Belgians succeeded in slaughtering many and driving the rest northwards, away from their main army, to Maastricht. From here they were said to have been sent by the Dutch authorities to Aix-la-Chapelle, an instance of misguided assistance to belligerents which might have raised serious international ques- tions. The Dutch, however, claimed that the only persons thus befriended were Gorman civilian refugees from Belgium ; and the neutrality of the Dutch had been so correctly maintained in other respects that this was probably the case, although of course great numbers of the German refugees were spies and military agents. On the same day, at the other extremity of the semi-circular line of battle, on the outside left, that is to say, of the German advance, the Garde Civique of Liege gained a brilliant little success and practically destroyed an attacking force near the fort of Boncelles. Here, too, international questions were involved, because the Germans insisted upon regarding the Garde Civique as non-combatants. Yet another trivial Belgian success on this day stands out from the battle smoke envelop- ing two sides of Liege at the Chateau de Langres. Here the Belgians made a show of resistance before'taking to flight ; and when the victorious Germans crowded into the stately building, intent on loot, a terrific explosion for a moment drowned even the deafening noise of the big MAP OF LIEGE AND T Showing the roads, railways, rivers, etc., and indicating 340 RROUNDING COUNTRY. erence between the large and small forts defending LiSge. 341 342 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ONE OF THE FAMOUS GERMAN SIEGE GUNS. [Nmstafer ulustratiom. This photograph shows part of gun mounted on a special trolley to facilitate transport. The photograph below illustrates the lower mounting of the gun, with recoil cylinders. The gun is mounted up and placed on a concrete foundation for firing. guns which were battering the forts. The chateau had been skilfully mined. Thus the fortunes of the day seemed to vary 80 much in detail that the Belgians, who had taken many prisoners and seven guns and had certainly defeated the crack corps of Branden- burg, were elated with the result. Already, too, the gallant defence of Liege had won for the city the highest honour wliich the French Government could bestow. Anti- MOUNTING OF THE GUN SHOWN ABOVE. ^Newspaper illustrations. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 343 cipating the impulse of gratitude and admira- tion which went out not only from France but from the entire civihzod world to this battered and blood-stained Walloon town, M. Poincar6, President of the Republic, sent on August 7 the following message to the King of the Belgians : — " I am happy to announce to your Majesty that the Government of the Republic has just decorated with the Legion of Honour the valiant town of Liege. " It wishes thus to honour the courageous defenders of the place and the whole Belgian Army, with which since tliis morning the French Army sheds its blood on the battlefield. " Raymond Poincab^." To the Belgian nation no doubt many names, both of regiments and individuals, have been con.secrated by the martyrdom of Liege as worthy to be placed with that of General Leman in the roll of undying honour ; and even to the necessarily superficial view of the international historian the valour of the 13th Mixed Brigade in meeting the brunt of the German assault stands out as a permanent record of fame. The successful charge of a single squadron of the Belgian lancers upon six squadrons of German cavalry was another brilliant episode of arms which Belgians will never forget when the Great War is discussed ; while of individual heroes — from Colonel Marchand, who gave his life for his chief, to Private Demolin, who carried out a bayonet charge on his own account against the advancing Germans and returned safely after killing four — these were enough at Liege alone to satisfy any nration's pride. Of tlie Belgian heroes of Liege, Europe will always cherish a grateful memory. But the high hopes awakened by these Bel'gian successes, which had so deservedly earned this tribute from the French Republic, were entirelj' fallacious in so far as they en- couraged the belief that the Germans had been worsted in a trial of strength. This was not so. Nothing which the Belgians could have hoped to do could have been of any avail against the overwhelming German numbers and the great gims which slowly liunbered up into position and to wliich the Belgians had no artillery that could hope to reply effectively, nor any fortifications that could offer resistance. According to eye- witnes.ses. nothing so terrible had ever been seen in war as the effect of the great shells fired into the Liege forts. Men were not simply killed or wounded ; they were blackened, biuTxt, and smashed. No wonder that three of the forts, although they had been expected to hold out for at least a month, surrendered within the week, when the real bombardment DISMANTLED CUPOLA. [Newspaper illustrations^ began. Indeed, the only reason why all the forts in the ring around Liege were not quickly reduced was the difficulty encountered by the Germans in bringing up these monstrous engines and moving them into position. Although many rumours had been rife on this subject, it was not imtil September 22, more than a month after the centre of war interest had been shifted from Liege, that any detailed account of the method by which these big 42cm. (16.4in.) siege guns travelled was re- ceived. For its hauling each gun required no fewer than 13 traction engines. Each gun was in four pieces and each piece was drawn by three engines, the extra engine going ahead to test the road and being used as a helper up hills. The engines were all of the broad-wheeled steam-roller type, and it was noted, as a sort of compliment to Britisli engineering, that very nearly all the engines bore the name plates * of an English firm. The delay in getting these guns for ward was not due to the slow pace of the traction engines, but to the difficulty of finding or making roads suitable for such heavy traffic. During the first few days of assault upon Liege these siege guns were not available ; and the Belgians seemed still to be fighting with success xintil the morning of the 7th, when the German enveloping movement extended to the north-east beyond Fort Barchon and Fort Pontisse became involved. On the opposite side of the ring fortress — namely, the extreme south- west — Fort Flemalle was also attacked, being bombarded like Pontisse from across the 344 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Meiise, which ran close to both of these forts on the south-eastern side and through the town of liege, which lay in a direct line between them. This, however, was the limit for the time oeing of the effective range of the German artillery from the wooded heights south of the Meuse ; and the forts of Loncin, Lantin, and Liers, on the north-west side of the town of Liege, were able to hold out and, with the aid of the small but mobile and energetic force which General Leman still maintained in the op)en, to embarrass all the attempts of the Germans to cross the Meuse in force. It would almost seem as if the Belgian head- quarters were unaware of the possible value wliich the -second line of defence, consisting of the four north-western forts with the river Meuse across the whole front at a distance of about five miles, might have possessed if it had been strongly held. Even with the skeleton force at his disposal General Leman was able to hold up the main force of the enemy for days on the other side of the river. Even so late as August 21 these forts -were still able to harass the Grermana by destroying their pontoon bridges across the Meuse. One Belgian gun alone had, it wan said. succeeded in smashing ten of these structures. On Thursday, August 13, however, the boom- ing of the heavy guns recommenced after two days of quietness. The Germans had succeeded at last in getting them across the Meuse and through the town of Liege. Such elaborate machines of war were these terror-striking guns that the German gunners were not com- petent to handle them. This was done by specialists from the factories of Messrs. Krupp : and no doubt their admiration of the short work which they made of the Belgian defences was sweetened by patriotic recollections of the way in which Messrs. Krupp, on one excuse after another, had delayed delivery of fortress guns ordered by the Belgian Government until it was too late. Promptitude and dispatch were not characteristics of Messrs. Krupp's dealings with a neutral Power upon which Germany was planning a secret attack. The guns, however, had no more qualms of conscience than the Krupp experts who handled them. They at any rate did their business for the Germans with promptitude and dispatch. The forts were silenced in two hours, one being destroyed in foiu' shots. GERMAN SOLDIERS STANDING ON ONE OF THE OVERTURNED BELGIAN GUNS. [StvjspapfT lUusira'ions. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 345 GROUND SURROUNDING ONE OF THE LIEGE FORTS. Showing shattered armour plate. [Daily Minor. Notliing like these guns had been expected, otherwise no doubt much greater efEorts would have been made to prevent them from being brought across the Meuse ; for, as it was, they introduced a new factor which entirely vitiated all the calculations of the Allies as to the holding power of the fortresses of Liege and Namur. Owing to the departure of the field troops and the flight of the populace, the demolition of the forts and the capture of General Leman with the survivors of his staff, followed by a rigorous German occupation of the place, nothing in the shape of an authentic record of the last days of Liege before its fall has been available ; but the following facts deserve permanent record. The Gennan attack commenced on the night of Tuesday, August 4, with an advance of the 7th Army Corps against the Forts F16ron and Evegnee. The point was well chosen because the approach was made tlirough undulating and heavily-wooded country, in which the troops were able to occupy a natural semi- circle, opposite which an interval of more than three miles separated F16ron from Fort Chaud-- fontaine on her right. This space was, of course, strongly entrenched and occupied by Belgian troops full of the courage and confidence en- gendered by their previous successes. This was shown by the fate of the 3rd Battalion of the German 125th Regiment, which, in taking up position, got too close to the Belgian lines and was cut t<i Diecest Bv tb« lurid light of subsequent events such successes seem trivial indeed ; but the excitement of the moment had magnified them into victories. Neverthe- less, had the Germans been able to employ the same tactics here as they did subsequently at Namiu- and deferred action until they were able to concentrate an insupportable artillery fire from heavy guns simultaneously upon all the forts and the trenches between them* the result would not have been many hours in doubt. Instead, after an ineffective bombard- ment of the two forts selected for attack with badly-timed shells wliich made no impression upon them, masses of infantry were sent forward. Of course, the inevitable happened. Under the glare of searchlights the solid ranks of men were simply m.owed down by machine guns and field gvms, until the shattered remnant was ripe for retreat before the bayonets with which the already victorious Belgians charged upon them from the trenches. Thus the first attack of the 7th Army Corps was brilliantly, if easily, repulsed ; and on the morning of the 5th the Liege forts on the east opened fire upon the Germans and the latter replied ; but, although the noise of the guns drove the inhabitants of Liege into their cellars at first, it was soon discovered that there was little danger, becau.se the enemy evidently had few guns in position and these were out- classed by the artillery in the forts. So during the day most of the Liegeois learned, as besieged peoples do so quickly, to play hide-and seek w^ith the shells, bolting into shelter only when the 346 TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. look-out bell, signalling the flash of a German gun, was heard. During the day, however, there were ominous rumours that the Germans had threatened a heavy bombardment of the town unless both it and the surrounding forts were surrendered ; and it was stated that, while the Mayor, in order to save the helpless houses from destruction, was then willing to yield. General Leman decisively refused to give up the forts. Then real panic seized part of the population, who stormed the train leaving the city, while :nany returned to their cellars. So the day of dread passed, and on the follow- ing day (August 6) the Germans, having got their heavy guns into position, commenced bombardment of the town as well eis the forts. One shell completely wrecked the roof of the Cathedral, and the University — which the Germans appear to have mistaken for the Government House, as they made it a special target — was destroyed ; but most of the buildings were still intact when the town siurendered, though the forts still strove to maintain the un- equal struggle. Meanwhile the invaders marched into Liege, singing patriotic songs, but maintaining good order ; although a hint of the German methods was immediately given to the people in a proclamation by the German Commander that if a single shot were fired the town would bo devastated. The actual bombardment of the town occupied only seven hours, with an interval of one hour ; but many people were killed and wounded and the general effect was so terrible that further resistance would have been useless folly on the part of the unprotected town, since it could do nothing now to aid the doomed foi'ts. To vmderstand why Liege thus surrendered in the midst of a seemingly brilliant defence, we must realize that when the attack which commenced on August 5 was continued until the morning of the 6th by the united strength of the 7th, 10th, and 9th Corps, the chief brunt of the extended assault fell farther to the south between the forts of Flemalle, Boncelles, and Embourg ; and to meet this the Belgian general was compelled to move down his field force to fill the entrench- ments between those forts. Although here also the German advance of massed infantry was again met and repulsed, the simultaneous reopening of the attack upon Forts Fl^ron and Evegn6e warned General Leman of the in- adequacy of his force to hold the entire 33-mile ' THE LIEGE FORTS A photograph taken after bombardment. [N*XBSpaptr JUustrations. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 347 EFFECT OF FIRING ON CUPOLAS. [C. B.ndaiU Top dotted line shows the line of flight of siege howitzer shell, flniilly bursting on top of cupola, the exact TMiige having been asceriained by tlie Germms long b 'fore war was declared. The bottom dotted lines represent Oeld-gun fire and sliow shell glancing off cupola. circle of the fortress. He wisely took the warning, and even in the hour of victory successfully sent back his little field army across the Meuse, leav- ing the town of Liege open to the invaders. Thus the very peculiar position was created of a great industrial city, only partially demo- lished by bombardment, peaceably occupied in force by an enemy who had appointed a military government and had entrenched his forces in the sviburbs, surrounded by the forts which had been constructed for its defence and wore still occupied by the defenders. The explanation of this unique situation was, however, simple. There was now nothing whatever to prevent the free passage of German troops, especially in small parties and at night, through the wide intervals between the forts, thus keeping open the comnumications between the investing force and the force in oo cupation of the town ; while on the other side the Belgian forts refrained from opening fire upon the town fro:n patriotic considerations. In war, however, obedience to the nobler sentiments is usually — at any rate temporarily — costly, and the Germans in Liege of course took advantage of the inaction of the forts to entrench themselves more completely while the siege batteries were being erected for the final demolition of the forts. Thus ended Act I. of the drama of Liege; and although the fortune of war had no choice but to declare on the side of the " big batta- lions"— or, perhaps it would be more correct to say, the " big guns " — the honours of the war lay so completely on the Belgian side that the report — often contradicted and as often " confirmed " — that the German Commander, General von Emmich, had committed suicide excited no surprise. Whatever the orders given to him may have been and however great may have been the difficulties which he had encountered in bringing up his heavy siege gims, the attempt to rush a modern fortress with mere masses of flesh and blood was not even magnificent — and it cer- tainly was not war. A remarkable contrast to the unfortunate, blundering von Emmich was presented by General Leman, the astute and cool-headed defender of Liege. Althougli a martinet in discipline, his own life was so strictly soldierly that he commanded the absolute loyalty of all ranks vmder him. Like Lord Roberts, he seemed incapable of fatigue ; and it is related of him, before the outbreak of the war, that he would often after a ride of 30 miles return to the Military School, of which he was Commandant, and discuss strategical and tactical problems with his officers until early morning. Many other anecdotes are told to his credit, for he evidently possessed the remarkable personality which almost always distinguishes the bom commander. Thus the two most striking incidents which are narrated by the survivors of Liege relate to him personally. One of these is to the effect that by means of a clever ruse, " the character of which [says the special correspondent who narrates it] had better be left undescribed," the General tempted a number of Uhlans to enter the town of Liege on the morning of August 6 in the hope of 348 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. capturing him. The Uhlans came in two patrols, every man of the first being killed and of the second captut-ed. The other incident occurred when, according to the Brussels Special Correspondent of The Times, two German spies, disguised as French officers, gained access to the town and desired to be conducted to the General. " Their plan miscarried, however, and they were arrested just in the nick of time. They were taken out and shot at one of the gates of the town." Although such narratives may have little connexion with the serious history of the war, they are interesting as showing the gi-eat in- fluence which the personality of General ssa^*'^ No. 1 DIAGRAM SHOWS A CUPOLA RAISED FOR FIRING. No. 2 SHOWS CUPOLA LOWERED. [C. BmdaU. These cupolas were main features of the Brial- mont Bystcm of ring-fortresses, which have been proved by this war to be incapable of withstand- ing artillery heavier than their own. Leman had upon the opening phase of the campaign. It is probable that when, as com- mander of the Liege garrison, he was shut up in the fortress, and later was nearly killed in the explosion of Fort Loncin and taken prisoner by the Germans, Belgium lost the services of one of its finest soldiers. In addition to his practical mastery of strategy and tactics in the field, he was a recognized expert in Roman law, military architecture, and engineering science. -With ready skill he had so handled the opening phase of the great game of war, which his cotintry was playing for her very existence, as to inflict greater damage than perhaps even he could have hoped upon the enemy, and then to extract his force from a position that was destined to become almost immed lately hopeless. Thus he brilliantly commenced that long series of withdrawals before superior force which marked the whole of the first chapter of the great war, until in fact the wearying German hosts were brought up " with a round turn " almost under the walls of Paris. The great fault of the German attack upon Liege was its total lack of co-ordination. It commenced with an ineffective bombardment against which the Belgian artillery, whose fire was accurate and well-directed, easily held their own, with the result that dviring the three hours' duel two heavy pieces of German artillery had been destroyed by the guns of Fort Evegn^e, where not a man was killed or wounded and the cupola was undamaged. Having thus completely failed to prepare the way for an assault, the German commander, nevertheless, flung a solid army corps at the fortress. As was inevitable, the advancing ranks were cut down like standing wheat by the concentrated fii-e from the trenches and the forts. The trenches were never reached, and the 7th Army Corps staggered back more than decimated. Next day, when it was too late to repair his initial blunder. General von Emmich began to make some use of his superior strength by bringing the 10th Army Corps, the famous Iron Division of Brandenburg, to the support of the 7th, and thus extending the front of hir operations so that five of the Liege forts, instead of two only, were involved. Later the 9th Army Corps and a division of cavalry were brought up to assist the other two, and thus the entire force of 120,000 men to which the Kaiser had entrusted the prospective honour of sweeping through Belgium to the French frontier was held up before Liege by General Leman and 40,000 Belgians. So unequal a THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 349 ANOTHER TYPE OF GERMAN GUN— SIEGE HOWITZER. [R.cord Prisa. ■contest could not, however, be maintained in- definitely ; and although the second German onslausjVit was no more effective than the first, the ill -served artillery proving unable to make more impression on the forts than the mis- directed infantry fire had upon the trenches, while the massed cavalry had no opportunities &t all, nevertheless General Leman recognized that he had done all that could be prudently attempted to stay the German advance, and adroitly withdrew before his powerful enemy could recover from his second staggering blow. The chief excuse which can be offered for the German mismanagement of the attack upon Liege is that tlie Belgian resistance must have come upon General von Emmich as a surprise. All his plans were made with a view to a rapid advance through Belgium towards France. These plans were in complete readiness before the ultimatum to Belgium was sent. Indeed, a calculation of the time necessarily occupied by the German corps in getting from their headquarters in Germany to the frontier shows that they must have commenced their march on July 31, before the declaration of war. The disposition of the entire Belgian force at the time was well known to tbe German staff, and no considerable part of the Belgian Field Aimy was on August 3 nearer tlan Diest, where the 3rd Division, under General Leman, was stationed. So there is little doubt that the German commander, when he arranged his night attack upon Liege on August 6, imagined that he had only to reckon with the garrison of the forts and one mixed brigade of the Belgian Army. His intention appar- ently was to engage heavily the three eastern forts with his artillery and push his forces through the wide intervals between them, when the town of Liege in the centre would have been at his mercy. What he had not cal- culated upon apparently was the possibility that in the 48 hours which had elapsed between the delivery of the ultimatum and the preparation for attack. General Leman, with the 3rd Belgian Division, would, by forced marches, have covered the 80 miles from Diest to Liege and be occupying the trenches between the forts. This probably explains why the German attack was delivered in such a way as to render disaster inevitable in the circum- stances ; and it would seem to show that at the outset the blind confidence of the Germans, that Belgium would be unable and unwilling to offer serious resistance, was such as to render them temporarily oblivious of the plainest dictates of prudence. In the subsequent phase of the campaign, indeed, when German anny corps were crowd- ing upon the rear of the British Anny, as it retired, fighting step by step, towards Paris, there was always the same waste of Gorman troops tlirough sending them forward in masses against an entrenched enemy. But there this 350 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. prodigality of luinian life may have been de- liberately calculated expenditure, the only weak point of the calculation being that it under- estimated the steadiness of the British soldier. Had the Germans been able to smother Tommy Atkins, even with heaps of their own slain, I he game would have been worth- the stakes. ft is just possible, too, that even at Liege the importance of swift passage through Belgium in order to strike France down before help could come to her so dominated all other considera- tions that prudence in tactics was thrown to the winds. These are the opportunities of the Nemesis which waits upon unjust invaders ; and the disaster 'which marked the first step of the Gennans on Belgian soil was ominous. It was not so accepted in Berlin, however, for news came thence that on the 7th the happy tidings of " the fall of Liege " had spread with lightning-like rapidity throughout the city and created boundless enthusiasm. The Kaiser himself, never reluctant to pose with theatrical effect, sent his own uniformed aide-de-camp out to the crowds before the Palace to give the news, and policemen on bicycles dashed along Un^r den Linden with the joyful tidings ! Imagination fails utterly to conceive a similar scene being enacted before Buckingham Palace and in the Mall over the first reports of a pre- liminary success in war. But allowances muai be made for the Germans, who knew at the back of their minds that their Emperor had staked all the interests of their country upon a gambler's throw. No wonder that they listened with excitement to the first rattle of the dice, and the German Press raptiu-ously exclaimed that the line of advance into Northern France waa assured. This was not, of course, exactly the way to state the case. So far as the figliting wliich had then taken place was concerned, the advantage had all been on the side of the Belgians. Yet, as happened more than once diu-ing this first phase of the great war, the conclusions draviTi from false news of " victories " in Berlin were nearer to the truth than the hopes based upon accurate accounts of successes in Paris or London. The explanation of this seeming anomaly was that the Germans were fighting at- this stage — as they had carefully arrangod that they should be fighting — with prejjonderating odds in their favour. So immense was the volume of their initial moving strength that local reverses scarcely checked it at all. They caused little more than swirls in the resistless tide of advance. So when Berlin, shouting itself hoarse over b victory which had not been won, declared that ONE OF THE FORTS AT LIEGE AFTER BOMBARDMENT. Showing damage caused by German siege guns. {Daily MiiTor. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A5\ ANOTHER VIEW OF THE RUINED BRIDGE. the way was now open to tho French frontier, it was nearer to the truth than London, which calculated that, if 40,000 Belgians could thus clieck the German hosts at Liege, the combined P'rench and Belgian armies might fight a de- cisively victorious battle not much farther west. At that time people in England were not thinking much about what the British soldiers might bo able to do. They had heard that there was to be a substantial " expeditionary force " ; but the very title suggested its em- ployment in some side-issue of the war, and all eyes were fixed in hope upon the gallant defenders of Liege. Disappointed bewilderment therefore ensued when it was seen that, although the Berlin reports of victory were indubitably false, the subsequent course of events was no better than if they had been true. The German hosts poured through Liege into the heart of Belgium, and the fog of war settled deeply over the ring of forts, which daily bulletins assured us were " still holding out." Thus it was that the crucial test of war had definitely decided the much-debated question of the value of great ring-fortresses like Liege and Namur. Liege and Nainur were sisters, and it is not possible to draw definite conclusions from the determined re- sistance which one was able to ofier to the invader, without considering also the reasons why the other fell so quickly. For both of thess strongholds represented the mature genius of Brialmont in the science of fortification ; and the success or failure of both to hold the Germans would have been taken by rival schools of theorists as conclusive evidence for or againsl the principle of ring-fortresses. AVliat actually happened was therefore entirely unexpected by both sides ; for while Liege seemed to crown the memory of Brialmont with glory, all the costly and extensive fortifications of Nam\ir served no better than a trap for its unfortunate defenders. The fact is that both were strongholds which would have been absolutely impregnable if two conditions had been fulfilled. One con- dition was that the cupolas of the forts in their • beds of cement should be strong enough ta resist the enemy's heaviest guns ; and the other was that an adequate force should be available to hold the trenches which occupied the interval* between the forts. If these conditions were present Brialmont 's ring fortresses might be compared to gigantic entrenched camps, with invincible artillery placed at all the numerous salient angles. Such a position would un- doubtedly be impregnable. But at Liege one, and at Namur the other, of these conditions was not present. Namur fell quickly because the Germans, profiting by the experience of Liege, had brought up artillery of sufficient strength to smash the forts by bombardment at the commencement. Liege also fell quickly as a military position, although the forts held out gallantly, because the adequate force to. 35" THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. GERMAN SOLDIERS MARCHING THROUGH LIEGE. occupy 33 miles of entrenchments was lacking. This was not generally understood outside the war councils of General Joftre and the Belgian King. In Berlin the people rejoiced in the fruits of a fictitious victory, and in Britain the people wondered why victory had no apparent fruits. Even with all the facts of the situation before us, we are inclined to wonder at the self- sacrificing steadiness with which General Leman adhered to his part in the general plan of cam- paign. The war which was being waged was so vast that his handful of 40,000 men at Liege was only a pawn in the game. Yet it was a pawn which in the gambit selected had occupied so brilliant a position that a less cool-headed and less dutiful player would have been excused in history if he had been tempted to sacrifice it in a glorious " check " to the opponent. But checkmate was the end for which the Allies were playing ; and in the alert and mobile Belgian Army — which, more than a month after the defence of Liege had become past history, commenced to harass the German army corps hurrying Pariswards to help their comrades sorely pressed by those pestilent British — were many men who would have been sleeping in their graves among the ruins of Liege's defences if General Leman had not known when to move back his pawn. It was dismal experience of the same kind OB General French endured when the compact British force, admirably fitted in every detail to be the spearhead of a victorious advance, was [Newspaper Illustrations. compelled day after day, week after week, to fight rearguard actions against superior forces in order to keep the general plan of campaign intact. The reward of such devotion to duty may seem slow in coming, but it is sure ; and in the aggressive activity of the Belgian Army of Antwerp, even after Namur had fallen and Brussels had been occupied. General Leman, then a prisoner in Germany, must have seen, with justifiable pride, a factor of ultimate success to which his own self-denial had largely con- tributed . But the really great service which the Belgians who defended Liege so gallantly had done for the cause of the Allies lay in shattering the Continental superstition that German armies were invincible. This did not affect the British soldier, who always has a cheery confidence — which this war has done nothing to shake — that he is as good a man as anybody else in any company into which he may happen to be tlirown by the exigencies of service. Bia every man in the French ranks was the son of parents who had seen France, after prolonged and desperate resistance, forced under the heel of Prussia ; and just when he was nerving himself to the supreme effort to endeavour to right his country's ancient wrong in spite of this previous disparity of strength, it was like a message of hope from heaven to learn that 40,000 Belgians had held back 120,000 Germans for days, slaughtering them wholesale arid coming out of the encounter almost unscathed themselves. Thus General Leman's success, fruitless as it THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 353 may have seemed in tactical results from a superficial point of view, was infinitely valuable to the Allied Armies in consequence of the new spirit which it gave to all the Continental enemies of Germany. It was the first prick to the bubble of the German reputation. Equally important was another result of General Leman's success : that it threw out of gear the whole time-table of the German campaign. In any case this would have been a serious matter, because all the detailed arrange- ments in connexion with the transport of a great army are necessarily co-ordinated with the utmost precision. An army in the field is a vast and complicated fighting machine, of which every nut and bolt must be exactly in its right place at the right moment to ensure smooth working. If any part of it is seriously and suddenly obstructed, the whole machine may be unexpectedly delayed, and it is true of all armies in the field that unexpected delays are very dangerous. In th^ case of the German Army which was invading Belgium this was doubly true, because the necessity for promptitude and dispatch in the performance of the task which had been allotted to it was paramount, inasmuch as the greater "part of it would almost certainly be required, after defeating France, to hurry back in order to confront Russia. For thisi reason delay at the outset of its advance amounted to a defeat much more serious in ita conneqiienoea than there had been any reason to hope tlmt the Belgian Army would bo able to inflict. To this extent, then, it was easy to award the honour due to General Leman's gallant little force ; and it was a happy day for Belgians all over the world — except in Germany — when the news of the Battle of Liege was received. In Berlin, indeed, by some process of sancti- monious casuistry, Belgium, against whom the Kaiser's Government admitted that a wrong had been done, was regarded thenceforward as an associate of the Evil One and a sort of rebel against God, because she fought against the wrong. No German seemed to realize that Belgium by admitting the German Army would in effect be declaring war upon France, and that even the almighty Kaiser could not at that moment have protected Belgium's western frontier from the hostile onslaught which France would have been justified in making. But in all the world, except Germany, the heroism of Belgium was worthily acknowledged, and the newspaper headlines of " Gallant Little Belgium " in every language must have gladdened the eyes of Belgian exiles, who were, of course, not unaware how often in the past the phrase " les braves beiges " had been used in irony. Thus time brings its revenges and teaches mankind that in the issue between right and wrong the strong are still liable to be humbled by the weak. GERMAN SENTRIES ON THE BANKS OF THE MEUSE. 354 THE TIMES HISTORY . OF THE WAR. Tlie<50 considerations rendered it difficult for contemporary onlookers to appreciate the kind of courage — moral courage of a high order — wliich the Belgian commander displayed in deliberately depri\'ing himself of the chance of winning further glory, in order that ho might not imperil the success of the war drama as a whole by over-acting the minor part which had been assigned to him. For, when the psychological moment had arrived when, In General Leman's cool judgment, it was time to abandon Liege as a stronghold and use it merely as a place d' arret, he had sent back his 40,000 men to their place in the Belgian field army, remaining himself as Military Governor of Liege in order to co- ordinate the defence of the forts as much as possible and to exercise moral influence upon the garrison. This is the explanation of his decision given by himself in a pathetic letter written from captivity to his master, the King of the Belgians, narrating how the Fort Loncin, where he had establishec^ his headquarters when the town of Liege had been occupied by the Germans, was blown up, " the greater part of the gaiTison being the The letter buried under continues : — " That I did not lose my life in that. catastrophe is due to the fact that my escort, composed of Commandant Collard, a sub-officer of infantry, who has undoubtedly perished, the gendarme Thevenin, and my two orderlies, Vanden Bossche and Jos Lecocq, drew me from a position of danger where I was being asphyxiated by gas from the exploded powder. I was carried into a trench, where a German captain named Griison gave me drink, after which I was made prisoner and taken to Liege in an ambulance. " I am convinced that the honour of our arms has been sustained. I have not surrendered either the fortress or the forts. Deign, Sire, to pardon any defects in this letter. I am physically shattered by the explosion of Loncin. In Ger- many, whither I am proceeding, my thoughts will be, as they have ever been, of Belgium and the King. I would willingly have ^iven my GENERAL WONTERS AND HIS AIDES-DE-CAMP. The General who directed most of the tactical moves against the Germans in Belgium. [Newspaper Illustrations. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 355 BELGIANS LOADING A GUN. Actual photograph taken in the firing line. {Daily Mirror. life the better to serve tliem, but death was denied me." It would scarcely bo possible to add a more illuminating commentary to this simple, soldierly letter than the following testimony of a German officer : — " General Leman's defence of Liege com- bined all that is noble, all that is tragic. " As long as possible he inspected the forts daily to see everything was in order. By a piece of falling masonry, dislodged by our guns, both General Leman's legs were crushed. Undaunted he visited the forts in an auto- mobile. Fort Chaudfontaine was destroyed by a German shell dropping in the magazine. In the strong Fort Loncin General Leman decided to hold his ground or die. " When the end was inevitable the Belgians disabled the last three guns and exploded the supply of shells kept by the guns in readiness. Before this General Leman destroyed all plans, majis, and papers relating to the de- fences. The food supplies were also de- stroyed. With about 100 men General Leman attempted to retire to another fort, but we had cut off their retreat. By this time our heaviest guns were in position, and a well-placed shell tore through the cracked and battered masonry and exploded in the main magazine. With a thunderous crash the mighty walls of the fort fell. Pieces of stone and concrete 25 cubic metres in size were hurled into the air. When the dust and fumes passed away we stormed the fort across ground literally strewn with the bodies of the troops who had gone out to storm the fort and never returned. All the men in the fort were wounded, and most were uncon- scious. A corporal with one arm shattered valiantly tried to drive us back by firing his rifle. Buried in the debris and pinned beneath a massive beam was General Leman. " ' Rospoctez le general, il est mort,' said an aide-de-camp. " With gentleness and care, which showed tliey respected the man who had resisted them so valiantly and stubbortdy, our infantry re- leased the general's wounded form and carried him away. We thought him dead, but he re- covered consciousness, and, looking round, said, ' It is as it is. The men fought valiantly,' and then, turning to us, added, ' Put in your dispatches that I was luiconscious.' " We brought him to our commander, General von Emmich, and the two generals saluted. We tried to speak words of comfort, but he was silent — he is known as the silent general. ' I was unconscious. Be sure and put that in your dispatches.' More ho would not say. 356 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. " Extending his hand, our commander said, • General, you have gallantly tuid nobly held your forts.' General Leman replied, ' I thank you. Our troops have lived up to their repu- tations.' With a smile he added, ' War is not like manoeuvres ' — a reference to the fact that General von Emmich was recently with General Leman during the Belgian manoeuvres. Then, unbuckling his sword. General Leman tendered it to General von Emmich. ' No,' replied the German commander, with a bow ; ' keep your sword. To have crossed swords with you has been an honour,' and the fire in General Leman's eye was dimmed by a tear." Many similar authentic cases were recorded during the war of Germans, both officers and men, behaving with true chivalry and kindness to French, British, and Belgian wounded and prisoners. If only this had been the guiding spirit of their conduct in general ! In the foregoing, however, we are anticipating the finale of the last chapter of the glorious story of the defence of Liege. The forts, bereft of support from the Belgian Army in the field, with the city and ancient citadel which they were designed to protect in ruins, with an insolent enemy in occupation lording it over the trembling populsuje — the forts maintained their gallant resistance, the Military Governor, shut up in one of them, continuing to exercise, so far as was possible, his moral influence upon the scattered garrison. This was the position of affairs from the night of August 7 onwards, for Liege was then closely invested by the Germans and all com- munication between the forts and the outer world was completely cut off. They were, however, still intact, and, being well supplied with food and ammunition, they were expected to hold out for a long time. At the same time the Belgian field force wliich had taken so brilliant a part in the de- fence, including the Third Division and the Fifth Brigade, had joined the headquarters of the Belgian Army, when it was reviewed by Kirg Albert, who congratulated all ranks upon their achievement. The Tsar also telegraphed to the King an expression of his sincere admira- tion for the valiant Belgian Army and liis best wishes for their success in this " heroic struggle for the independence of the country." In the circumstances it was perhf ps inevit'ible- that the General Staff of the Belgian Army should have overrated the tactical value of the success which had been achieved ; and on the night of August 9 the official announcement was BELGIAN SOLDIERS. In iront of the tree trunk a pit has been dug, and covered over with branches. \Undervo'-d ir Undtrwood. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THu. WAR. 367 INSIDE A BELGIAN TRENCH. \Rtcofi Prea. iniide that " the offensive movements of the enemy had been completely stopped " and that the French ard Belgian Armies would " take offensive action simultaneously in accord- ance with their concerted plans." If, at this time, offensive action was really con- templated by the Allies, it must have beeu through lack of jjerspective, because the losst« suffered by the three army corps which had assaulted Liege, heavy as they were, were mere trifles compared with the price which Germany was prepared to pay on the spot for a rapid advance through Belgiuin upon France. This more serious note in the struggle had been emphasized in the deep tones of the big ^ms which had arrived at last and began to speak to the Liege forts in a way that there was no misunderstanding. These heavy siego guns were supposed by Messrs. Krupp and their patrons the German War Department to be the last word in modern artillery, and their existence had been a jealously-guarded secret for " der Tag." It must be admitted, too, that they were a secret worth keeping ; for the havoc which they wrought in the forts of Liege was terrible and insupportable. From that day — since the relief of Liege by any adequate force was not possible — :the question whether the forts should surrender or bo destroyed was only a question of the com- parative endurance of steel and concrete on the one hand and of flesh and blood on the other. To the everlasting honour of the Belgians bo it recorded that the indomitable courage of the garrison of Liege outlasted the strength of the shattered cupolas. Perhaps we camnot more fitly close this blood-stained but glorious chapter in the history of Belgium better than by quoting from the measured utterances of leading British states- men in the two Houses of Parliament on August 27. In the House of Commons the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, rising to propose a resolu- tion of sympathy and gratitude to the Belgian Government and the gallant Belgian nation, said : — " The defence of Liege (cheers) will always be the theme of one of the most inspiring cliapters in the annals of liberty. The Belgians have won for themselves the immortal glory which belongs to a people who prefer freedom to ease, to secm-ity, even to life itself. We are proud of their alliance and their friendship." (Cheers.) He was immediately followed by Mr. Bonar Law, the Leader of the Opposition, who said : — ■' Belgium has deserved well of the world. She has added another to the long list of great deeds wliich have been done by the heroic patriotism of small nations." As furt her proof of the solidarity of the British in their admiration of Belgian pluck and prowess, Mr. Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalist Party, said that there was no sacrifice wliich the Irish would not willingly make on behalf of Belgium. 358 TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. In the House of Lords Lord Crowo, on behalf of the Government, and Lord Lansdowne, speaking for the Unionist majority, expressed similar sentiments ; and the former uttered a solemn warning to Gennany with regard to the atrocities committed by her troops at Liege. '■ I do venture to declare," he said, " that any nation that so conducts itself pays, soon or lato, and pays to the uttermost farthing." With the British nation it had already become a serious resolve to see that fartliing paid. The story of Liege leaves us with a sense of having witnessed a drama complete in its thenoie and glorious in its motif. And the glamour of it seemed to ennoble every contem- porary reference to its circumstances. At Dublin, on September 25, 1914, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, expressed in measured words no more than the heart-feolitig of every man in his vast audience when he said that the indomitable resistance of the Belgians " proved to the world that ideas which cannot be weighed or measured by any material calculus can still inspire and dominate mankind." Those are not the words in which the man in the street would have clothed the thought. He would have been content to say : — " Belgium is in the right and, by God, we'll see her through ! " There are times when an expletive becomes dignified as the very spirit of a sentence ; and this was one of them. The words italicized in the supposititious sentence above, common as it may seem, were the national British expression of the " ideas " which still dominate mankind, in spite of Kaisers. Belgium was " right " and " by God " we would see her through. That was the idea. jVIr. Asquith rose to the level of that idea. So did Mr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer ; so did Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty ; so did all the other Ministers in their degrees and according to their abilities. So did the leaders of the Opposition. So did the Irish Nationalists and the Ulstermen, lately so ready to fly at one another's throats. So did the Boers and the British, not long ago deadly foes and until then mostly suspicious of each other's motives. So did Canada and Australia and New Zealand. So did all the diverse races with jarring creeds which compose Britain's most magnificent heritage, the loyal Indian Empire. So did all our Crown colonies. So did all our Allies and our friends in other lands. Nor did Mr. Asquith overstate the case when he said that by establishing this idea Belgium had done more than change the whole face of the German campaign. Even the tremendous political results of the war wore not so important as this new unity of mankind in defence of the Right. It is not a coincidence that throughout AN 11-in. GERMAN MORTAR. This is the barrel section on a special carriage for transport. [Record Press. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. :539 BELGIAN SOLDIERS FIRING AT A PASSING AEROPLANE, [ J opicul. Britain the war period was marked by aa amazing absence of crime. There may seem to be no direct antagonism between a scheme of world-\\ar hatched at Potsdam and a. burglary l)laniied in Whitechapel. But many a burglar, moved to honest indignation by the German outrage, enlisted as a soldier or foimd some other way to declare himself on the side of the Right ; and thus many police were set free to protect the nation's interests, instead of watching the criminals. And what happened in Britain occurred in varying degress throughout the civilized world. Men became better. This is what Belgium did for the world ; and it was a service for which mankind can never sufficiently thank her. The crisis was one towards which the civilized world had been inevitably {advancing for many 3 ears ; and to the historian of the distant future the era of 1914 will still stand out as a great lardmark, for' a companion to which liis eye may even travel down the long perspective of centuries to that time when Christ preached " peace on earth and goodwill towards men " — the idea which, to repeat Mr. Asquith's plirase, " still dominates mankind." That in most Hplieres of human activity it has seemed little more than an " idea," as far removed from daily practice in individual as in international life, lias been due to the stress of the persistent struggle for existence. The " idea " was in every heart ; but the pressvire of necessity controlled everj' brain, and the brain was, almost N always, the working partner. And out of the struggle for existence en- gineered by the brain arose tlio armed might of the German Empire, a gigantic organism deliberately constructed in every detail upon theories of hard science. Christ's " idea " had no place in this ; although even in German dreams it asserted itself as the final ambition — a .world-peace of goodwill and content under the sheltering wings of the Prussian eagle. Thus the real question at issue was whether or not Christ's teaching should definitely bo shelved until Germany, after subduing the world, had time to attend to it. It would have been difficult, and rightly so, to per- suade the British nation that so plain an issue was involved in the quarrel between Servia and Austria, or between Austria and Russia, or Germany and Russia, or even Ger- many and France. Treaty obligations might have compelled the British Government to declare war against Germany under conditions whicli did not apparentlj' involve this issue ; for treaties are entangling things which some- time? drag a nation in the direction whither it should not go. 360 THE TIMEIS HISTOUl OF THE WAR. Whether wo should necessarily have been enabroiled in a war between Germany and France would have depended upon circumstances ; and if the Kaiser had realized that the British Empire would go headlong into war for the " idea " of which Mr. Asquith spoke at Dublin, his diplo- mats might have been adroit enough to shift the rupture with France on to ground where the " idea " had no place. But the fact was that the German mind, having itself shelved the " idea " — ^that the Right must prevail by the will of God — did not conceive that it could still be the mainspring of British policy, nay, more, that it should, as Mr. Asquith said at Dublin, " still donainato mankind." So the German, claiming to be a superman, did not trouble himself to be adroit in- diplomacy. " Finesse and scruples," he said — in action, if not in words — " for weaker folk ; for me the mailed fist and the big batta- lions — and the big gxms." So the German deli- berately embarked upon his course of war by committing a wrong — by outraging the neutra- lity of a Uttle State which he had pledged his honour to protect. His lofty excuse to God and his own conscience was that he would make it all right afterwards. " I shall defy God now," he said, " in order to win this war easily by a dis- honourable trick, and then, when I have won the war and all Europe is at my feet, I shall con- descend to make amends to poor little Belgium who will then be my grateful slave." From this mad dream he had a rude awakening at Liege. And in describing the German's dream of treachery and conquest as " mad," we are not going beyond the facts of the case. " Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat " — " Whom God decides to ruin He first makes mad " — is the ancient Christian form of a still more ancient classic proverb, founded — like our own simple old proverb, " Pride goeth before a fall " — upon the immemorial theme of the oldest Greek tragedies in which Nemesis always waited grimly upon the insolence (6/3pts) of trium- phant tyrants. This was the ailment of the Gterman. Ho was too swelled with pride in tht» Teuton " thoroughness " of his own prepara tions for the conquest of the world in peace and war to be able to give way to the " rights " of little peoples. He would look into the matter after he had finished his conquest. Belgium and . Britain — and God — must wait until then These may not be the exact words which the German Government used, but they convey no exaggeration in fact of the attitude which that Government adopted. It had quite forgotten the idea which still inspires and dominates mankind — the idea that in defending the Right we fight on the side of God. Thus the German, who deliberately omitted the Right from his scheme of world-conquest, unconsciously did greater service for the Right than any philanthropist could have conceived in his wildest dreams. " It is my Imperial and Royal intention," said the Kaiser in effect on August 3, 19; 4, " to give consideration to the wishes of God with regard to Belgium when I shall have executed my Imperial and Royal will with regard to France and the pestilent and con- temptible English." As a foreigner his Imperial and Royal Majesty was not to be blamed for failing to observe that, besides the English, there were Scotch, Irish, Welsh, Canadian, Australian, South African, Indian, and manj' other contingents concerned in the offence of lese majeale which he so much resented. Even those natives in South Africa who are wisely prohibited from carrying arms had petitioned the Government that they might be allowed to " throw a few stones " at the Germans 1 The Kaiser did not dream of the magnificent work which he was doing ; how he was welding the Empire upon which the sun never sets into a single active organism for the good of the world and to the glory of God. He was thinking only of Germany as typified in its Supreme War Lord, himself. CHAPTER XXII. THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO BRUSSELS. Belgiums Real Ambitions — Social Reform — The Neglect of Militarism — Preparations Come too Late — Hopes or Foreign Assistance — The Peasant Guards— German Cavalry Advance — First Skirjushes — The Battle of Haelen — Eghezee — French Troops ix Bel- gium — The German Advance in Earnest — Belgian Retreat on Antwerp — Belgian Staff Explanation — The Position in Brussels — Refugees — Growing Public Alarji — Goverxjient Retires to Antwerp — False Hopes of Victory — M. Max — The German Entry into Brussei^. THE position of Belgium in tho days immediately following the outbreak of the war was one of obvious peril. Tho forts of Li^ge controUod tho main roads from Germany to the coast, but Liege could not hope to hold out against a resolute German attack for more than a few days. Once Liege fell, there were no effective fortress defences between the German frontier and Ant- werp. Brussels was an open city, and the battles for its possession mast be fought, not in its suburbs, but fartlier afield, in the neighbouring districts of Aerschot, Diest, Louvain. and Wavre. If Germany made a sustained attempt to conqvier Belgium, it was evident that no unaided effort of the Belgians could save it. The hope of the nation lay in two possibilities, the arrival of immediate aid from England and France, or the chance that the German Armies would advance, not to the coast, Ijut straight to Paris. The road to Paris lay to the west. Hence, even although day by da>' the news from the front foreshadowed the early capture of Liege, the people of NorthtTu Belgium hoped against hope that their homes, at least, would escape the horrors of foreign occupation. Tho country on the Franco-Belgian frontier between the Lys and the Yser and the valley of the Somme below Amiens could be flooded, from which it seemed to follow that the right ot Vol. I.— Part 10. 3fil the main German advance on Paris woidd be limited by tho lino Liege-Bru.ssels-Lille-Amiens. The Germans were very vmlikely to make con- siderable detachments imtil after their main object — the rout of the hostile field armies — had been attained. Hence it was likely that the whole country west and north of tlie line indicated would escape effective occupation until after the German advance on Paris hfd succeeded or failed. To the people of Belgium war came un- desired and unsought. They had nothing to gain by it and everything to lose. Social re- form, not militarism, had been their aim. Tlio Army, and all that had to do with the Army, was for long regarded with a feeling of in- difference not untouched wth contempt. There was no strong military caste, as in France and Germany. Trusting to the pledged word of Europe, guaranteeing Belgian independence and permanent neutrality, the Belgian Parlia- ment had until 1912 neglected adequate jjrepaia- tions for national defence. Compulsory service was only com]>ulsory tor the po:)r or those with- out influence ; the time of training was far too short. Service in the ranks was regarded as a task to be avoided whenever opportiuiity offered. While France and Germany endured the hea\iest burdens to maintain their fighting strength, Belgiiun devoted herself to commercial and in- dustrial progress. 362 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. NAMUR, FROM THE MEUSE, BEFORE BOMBARDMENT. Showing the Citadel Hotel and Fortifications. Social problems, arising out of the density of the populati jn and the comparative poverty of a large number of the people, were the main subjects of public concern. Industry was care- fully encouraged. Cooperative experiments were initiated, and the standard of well-being of the people was appreciably raised. The Bel- gians were able to boast — with a large degree of truth — that their country afforded the maxi- mum of comfort and the minimum of expense for those Uving in it of any part of Western Europe. Belgian manufactures steadily gained reputation. Tlie products of the Cockerill Ironworks at Liege, for example, competed successfully with those of Germany, England, and America; Belgium became a favourite centre for the erection of factories, many German and British firms maintaining works on the various river banks. Antwerp grew to be one of the largest and best-equipped shipping ports in Europe. Belgian finance was making itself more and more felt in certain specialized fields. The Belgians were markedly active in the newer markets of the world. In China and in Central Africa, in South America and in Manchuria, their representatives were found seeking concessions, laying railways, promoting electrical schemes, and acquiring power. Belgium, with its ideal geographical position and its widespread prosperity, aroused the envy and desire of its ambitious and powerful neigh- bour to the south-east. Germany wanted an outlet to the sea — ^Antwerp and Zeebrugge would afford it. Germany wanted an open road to the heart of France — the road lay right through Southern Belgium. It was the unhappy fortune of this little kingdom to be the Naboth's Vineyard of Europe. It is true that since 1912, alarmed by the growing German menace, sustained efforts had been made to remedy the backward defences of the country and to recreate the Army. But a great national army cannot be created in less than two years. Thus Belgium found herself at the outbreak of the war lacking trained fighting men, lacking in equipment, lacking in officers, and lacking in experience. What was not lacking, as events soon proved, was bold- ness, courage, and eagerness to meet the foe. Had the Belgians been given time, they might have raised and trained within a few months a force of half a million men that could have at least held up the Germans along prepared lines of fortified places until France and England could come to their aid. But time was the one thing denied Belgium. Her borders ran, from Vise to Luxemburg, next to those of Germany. The German railways from THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 303 Diissoldorf, Cologne, and Coblentz could bring strong armies into Belgian torritory in a few hours, and lino after lino of long sidings wero already prepared at each frontier station from which the troop trains coiild disgorge their men in the shortest possible time. The mili- tary headquarters at Aix-la-Chapelle were practically within sight of Belgian soil. Germany had made all her preparations to strike at Belgiuni suddenly and overwhelmingly. Even before war was declared German troops crossed the border. Allowing for the necessary troops for the fortresses of Namur and Antwerp, Belgium could put on the fighting line after the fall of Liege only a Field Army of aVjout 110,000 men to guard the road to Brussels and the north. Against these the Germans could easily bring a quarter of a million men and as many more a.s might be necessary. The Belgians did not, perhaps, anticipate having to conduct their own defence for more than a few days at the outside. They believed that the British and the French would be able to give them strong help at once. Day after day, at the beginning of the war, crowds of people stood on the front at Ostend, many of them with powerful glas.ses, searching the horizon for the first signs of the coming of the British Relief Expedition. Every Englishman throughciut the country was constantly asked : " When will your troops arrive ? " When news came to hand that a British Expeditionary Force had left England, Brussels papers stated that it was landing at Zeebrugge and Ostend, and would soon be fighting on the Meuse. On more than one occasion crowds hurried to the Garo du Nord at Brussels on the rumour that the British had come, prepared to give them a great welcome. The Belgians were equally confident of French assistance. They assumed that French armies assembled between Namur and Verdun would move eastwards through Belgian Luxem- burg and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. Belgian hopes of the cooperation of the French were encouraged by the appearance of French Staff Officers in Brussels and of French cavalry in apparent strength from Longwy northwards to Gembloux. Reports wero received that the French were iKlvancing in force eastwards from Namur along the" banks of the Meuse towards Li6ge. It was known that they were strongly holding the strategic triangular position where the Sambro and the Meuse meet close to Namur. The Belgian people, as has been said, Icnew that their Army was in itself insufficient to offer any permanent resistance to a German attack. This, however, did not check t\v resolution of the people to fight to the last. A wave of patriotism swept over the nation that wiped away all local and party differences. The King voiced the cry " Aux armos !" and led the way to the trenches. He became in an hour the popular idol, and men who had persistently sought his overthrow admitted gladly : " If we make Beigiimi a republic, we will have Albert as our first President." Th<^ Socialists, a powerful and numerous group, who in the past had led the cause of pacifism and opposed Army reform, were now among the first to volunteer for war. The Prime Minister invited the cooperation of all parties. M. Vandervelde, the Labour leader, was appointed a Minister of State and voiced the sentiments of his party when ho declared that the workers would defend their country when attacked with A BELGIAN LOOK-OUT MAN. \ Daily Mirror. 364 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR GERMAN FIELD KITCHEN CAPTURED AND USED BY THE BELGIANS. [Sport and General. the same ardour with which they had defended their hberties in the past. Le Peuple, the organ of the Labour Party, called upon the workers to arm : " Why do we," it asked, " as irreconcilable anti-militarists, cry ' Bravo ! ' from the bottom of om hearts to all those who offer themselves for the defence of the country ? Because it is not only necessary to protect the hearths and homes, the women and the children, but it is also necessary to protect at the price of our blood the heritage of our ancient freedom. " Go, then, sons of the workers, and regipter your names as recruits. We will rather die for the idea of progress and solidarity of humanity than live under a regime whose brutal force and savage violence have wiped out right." While the German troops were flinging them- selves against Li6ge, the Belgians were preparing for a stubborn national defence. The Army was aLready at its post, the reserves had been called up, the Civil Guaid were being armed, and the towns and villages south of Biussels from flasselt to Gembloux and Namur were hi Id in force. The peasants in many villages gethered together. Thoy brought out their guns — ancient fowling-pieces, rook rifles, sporting guns, anything they had. Those who had no ^uns could at least secure knives. They banded themselves together and formed local guards. No stranger could pass without satisfying them concerning his business. " As showing how all the roads leading to tlie fiont are guarded," wrote one correspondent who attempted to reach the front at this time, " I me y say that I was stopped during a joiu'ney of 70 kilometres no fewer than 52 times by police, civil guards, soldiers, and, last but not least, by peasants. These latter are* armed with the most varied collection of guns, far more fearful and wonder- ful than any I have seen outside of a museum. Many carry in addition bayonets which certainly must have been picked up on the field of Water- loo. They shout in bad French and Flemish for any innocent voyager to stop, and swarm round youi car with the firm conviction that you are a spy. Passports signed by the highest military and civil authorities in the country are often of no avail whatever." A spy fever spread over the country, and there was good cause for it. People who had lived in different parts for years a.ii trusted neigh- bours suddenly disappeared, only to return later as guides for advance parties of the German Army. Others were discovered attempting to injure telegraphs and railvvay^'or endeavouring, by carrier pigeons and other mtans, to keep up communication with the Germans on the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 365 frontier. Some wore disguised as monks or nims, some as parish priests, some con- trolled secret wireless apparatus. The German espionage department proved its efficiency liore o! elsewhere in the early days of the ivar. The uprising of the peasants, admirable as it was as a revelation of national spirit, was use- less, if not worse tlian useless, from the point of view of real fighting strength. Chance groups of ill-armed and untrained civilians con present no eflective resistance to regular troops. The Belgian peasants caught a certairi number of isolated Uhlans, thus giving an excuse for subsequent German severity against ,tho people at large. Soon their own authorities asked them to desist. The German coin- manders let it be known that they would show no mercy to civilians who took up arms, but would treat them and the districts from which they operated with the utmost rigour. For civilians generally there was to be one penalty for resistance — death. The places where they fought were to be burned to the ground. Even the civil guards, uniformed though they were, were to be treated as civilians and shot at once when caught with arms in their hands. The Belgian authorities posted notices through- out the country warning civilians that they must not resist German troops, but must leave military measures to the Army. The peasant uprising did not delay the main advance of the German Army for an hour. It ended almost as quickly a? it began, but not before a large num- ber of men and boys of all ages throughout Brabant, Namur, Liege, and Belgian Luxem- biu-g had been sacrificed. It served to empha- size the lesson that resistance to a powerful enemy must be organized in advance. The man who refuses to sjrve his country in times of peace by preparing for war may find, when real nations 1 danger comes, that his only occupation must bo to sit down and do nothing because he is — from a military point of view — good for nothing. Tl»e little Belgian Army used thi tune at its disposal during the German delay in front of Liege to the best advantage. The whole southern countryside was prepared for resist- ance. Roadways were blown up with dyna- mite sticks. Cunning traps were laid across the roads for the Uhlans, low and almost invisible barriers of barbed wire being arranged in two parts in such a way that ordinary traffic could pass in safety with carr) but any attempt BELGIAN SOLDIERS HAVING THEIR MIDDAY MEAL. [L/r.^ruxtd and UnJtnrood, 366 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. to rush hy would inevitably bring horses and riders to the ground. The country southward bf Louvain lent itself to guerilla warfare, being well wooded and suitable for the conceal- ment of small parties of troops. The sustained resistance of Gteneral Leman and his garrison at Li6ge, described in the previous chapter, gave the main Belgian Army a few days of grace. Li^ge was the principal railway centre for the lines southwards, the main roads ran through there, and the im[)ortant bridges across the Meuse lay under the reach of its guns. When the Belgian troops blew up the bridge at Vis6 in the opening hours of the war, the Germans at once attempted to tlirow pontoon bridges across the river. Their first efforts were continuously xinsuccessful. At Vis6 itself they built no fewer than 20 pon- toon bridges, it is reported, each one being immediately destroyed by the guns of the Liege forts. One bridge was, however, erected within 200 yards of the Dutch frontier and considerable forces were poiu-ed in over it. While the Germans were waiting around Li6ge for the arrival of their large siege gims BELGIAN SOLDIERS FIRING FROM COVER. lUndtmood & UnJiraood. which were to destroy the forts, a strong force — no fewer than five army corps — ^was brought into the region to the south of the river. A cavalry screen was thrown across the river and proceeded to overriui the countrj'- side. Following the plan that had proved so successful in the Franco-Prussian War, little bands of Ulalans, Hussars, and Cuirassiers were sent out throughout the north. Many of these were apparently ill-equipped for their task. They had no proper supply of maps, and they did not seem to have any definite plan except. to move ahead until they got in touch with the Belgians. They had very little food. This was probably deliberately arranged in order to make them live on the country. Many of them were captured and many were killed. It is possible that the dispatch of these unsupported and isolated little bands was purposely devised, not alone to keep in com- plete touch with the enemy, but also to give the Belgians a false idea of the German prepara- tions. It is a well-known and adnaitted principle of German niilitary strategy to make a show of weakness until preparations are completed which enable an army to strike with its full strength. And if the German cavalry were defeated at some places they drove terror home in others. Soon the reputation of the Ulilans spread through himdreds of villages, as that of men who spared neither themselves nor their foes, who rode recklessly against any enemy in sight, who died with a laugh when beaten, and who slew man and boy, ruined women and burned homes without compimction and without mercy wherever they went. It is not necessary at this point to inquire how far this reputation was deserved, or how far the advancing German cavalry were actually guilty of the charges soon to be laid against them. It is clear, however, that their instructions were not only to find out what forces were in front of them and what serious resistance would have to be faced, but also to strike fear into the hearts of the people. The countryside between Li6ge and Louvain presented a sombre picture in these early days of the war. The fields were ripe for harvest, but there were no men to spare to gather the crops of golden com, and the women and children had in many cases fled northwards. In the villages some houses had been destroyed by the Belgians thenaselvos lest they should afford protection for the enemy, while others had been biwned down by advancing Germans. Every road was barricaded, and behind the lines of barrels and bushes and the eeurthen THE TIMES FI I STORY OF THE WAR. 367 GERMAN SHELLS BURSTING IN A FIELD NEAR THE BELGIAN POSITION WHERE INFANTRY WERE CONCEALED. ^OaUy Mirror. embankments little companies of soldiers and civil guards lay waiting. Many of these men were reservists who had been called up almost without notice — fathers of families and respon- sible citizens whose hearts were still full of anxiety for their families and their affairs. Already they showed, however, abundant signs that the ancient coiu"age of the men of Flanders could still be coimted upon. There was a gay grimness a:nong them that betrayed the born fighting man. Their discipline was lax, their military loiowledgo was in many cases trivial, and they were ill-prepared for the physical and material strain of day-and-night work against an active foe in the open. But none oould deny their courage or their zeal. The pity of it was that men so brave and so fine should not have been more fully prepared for the tremendous task ahead. Many regiments started out accompanied by priests, who exhorted the soldiers to fight for their country and their faith. The wives and friends of the soldiers visited them in the very front lino of trenches, bringing them food and cigarettes. These men were fighting, many of them just by their homes, almost within sight of their own families. They did not liesitate, however, to sacrifice overj-thing in front of them that could help the enemy. The rail- ways were torn up, bridges were blown into the air whenever possible, and tunnels were blocked by derailing locomotives and then sending others crashing into t'hem, forming one great tanirled and mixed mass. The Belgians laid part of the country to waste — the Germans, as they advanced, completed the work. The Belgians at first made some use of Ckero- planes for reconnoitring purposes. But their own peasants and volunteers fired on every aero- plane they saw, and there is only too much reason to believe that they brought do\vn several Belgian aeroplanes in that way. Orders were issued when too late to stop this indiscriminate shooting. Gradually, as the German armoured Taube aeroplanes came into action, less and less was heard of the Belgian aircraft, and before the fall of Brussels the German aeroplanes appa- rently held supremacy of the air. At the end of the first week the Belgian mili- tary authorities expressed considerable satisfac- tion with the state of affairs. Li^ge was still holding out and was engaging the attention of three German Array Corps. In numerous minor engagements the Belgian troops had proved their mettle. The Belgian cavalry in particular had distinguished themselves by the most reckless bravery. " Tout est calme. Tout va bien " was the phrase on many lips. Reports were oven circulated that the Germans were con- templating retirement and were entrenching 368 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE LAST STAND MADE BY THE BELGIANS AT LOUVAIN. [Record Press.. themselves on the banks of the river Ourthe and in Luxemburg to protect their retreat. The reality was very different. The Germans had at last succeeded in erecting a bridge at Lixhe over which their cavalry and heavy artil- lery could be conveyed. A considerable force of cavalry had already crossed the river, and this made a preliminary advance while the main force took up its position. On Sunday, August 9, two divisions of German cavalry, numbering about 7,000 sabres, and supported by infantry, moved upwards towards the Hesbaye. The people of Tongres were sur- prised that day to find a detachment of the enemy riding down their main street. There was a sudden panic, and people hastily closed and barred their windows and locked their doors, leaving the roadways deserted. The cavalry rode to the town hall, and there ordered the mayor to produce his money chest and to lower the Belgian flag hanging out of the window. The mayor refused to lower the flag, whereupon the Germans lowered it for him. They appro- priated the town's money and seized 10,000 francs at the post office. Then they ordered food, for which they paid, and had a meal in the market place. Cavalry moved forward along different roads ana joined issue with the Belgian troops all along the line at St. Trend, Tirlemont, Osmael, Guxenhoven, and at smaller places. The Gorman troops were accompanied by motor machine-guns, which did great execution. It is evident that their purpose was only to reconnoitre and not to engage in serious battHoi- for, after some skirmishing, they retired. The Belgians imagined that they had defeated and driven them back. On the next day word came into Louvain, the Belgian Military Headquarters, that a German scouting force of 6,000 cavalry was moving up- wards close to the Dutch frontier. That same afternoon the Germans captured Landen, only 38 miles east of Brussels. A passenger train was stopped when it arrived there by a strong force- of the enemy. The Germans destroyed the telegraphic apparatus and the railway signals- and tore up the rails, and then moved on. In addition to the cavalry recoimaissance,. military aeroplanes were now to be seen advanc- ing and hovering at groat height over the Belgian positions. Another engagement was reported at Tirle- mont, where there was a fierce charge of Belgian lancers against German Uldans. The lancers routed the Germans, who returned later, how- ever, witli reinforcements and witli machine- guns and forced the Belgians, in turn, to fall back upon their infantry supports. Hasselt was the scene of a sustained fight. Here a Gorman cavalry division supported by a battalion of infantry and 12 guns attacked a Belgian force consisting of a cavalry division and a brigade of infantry. The place was taken and retaken three times. It became evident that the plan of the German Army was to move northwards through the plain between Hasselt and Htielen and to seek. THE TIMES HlSTOliY OF THE WAR. 369 to turn the Belgian Army. So long as the Belgians could, hold the line they had taken up from Hasselt to St. Trond and Tirlemont, all was well. But this lino was soon broken, and strong German forces attacked Hasselt on the one side and Haelon and Diest on the other. Early on the morning of August 12 a force of German cavalry, estimated at 10,000 men, accompanied by artillery and a few infantry, moved forward from various directions towards Haelen and Diest. The country in this region is intersected by three tributaries of the River Domer, the Herck, Gethe, and Velp. In order to reach Diest it was necessary to cross the Gethe at Haelen. The Belgians were fully informed of the German advance and had laid their plans to meet them at this spot. Barricades were erected and entrench- ments dug and field artillery placed in advantageous positions. The Germans ap- proached about 11 o'clock in the morning and •were allowed to draw comparatively near, when the Belgian artillery opened on them. The German guns were quickly unlimbered and an artillery duel followed. The Belgians had their ranges and were able to plant their shrapnel over the cavalry with groat effect. The utmost violence and covirage were shown on either side. The Belgian cavalry attempted to charge the Germans but failed on account of the broken nature of the ^onnd. The German cavalry in turn camo on at a gallop againnt the Belgian barricades. As they approached, machine guns that had been concealed opened on them, sweeping many away. Notw^ith- st'vnding their losses the Germans rode right up to the barricades, attempting to break through them or to tear them down. The effort was hopeless, and after losing throe- Rftha of their effective strength the Germans had to retire. Other German forces attempted to advance at Cortenaeken. There were fights at several river bridges. Everywhere the result was the .same. The Belgians themselves were the first to proclaim the great courage shown by the Germans in this sustained engagement. At one point when they were driven back the survivors sought to entrench themselves behind a rampart of dead horses and dead men. Compared with the fighting that was soon to follow, the engagement at Haelen and Diest may seem too small to demand much attention. It was a strildng example, however, of the way in wliich the Belgian soldiers, many of them called to the colours from the re.serves only a fortnight before, were able to face the foe. Several stories were told of the conduct of the Belgian troops. Here is one : — " One notable instance of Belgian bravery GERMANS HOLDING A REVIEW IN RUINED LOUVAIN. [Nmspaptr lllustrationu 370 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE CHURCH AT HAELEN. All Belgian Churches appear to have afforded special targets for the Germans. [Newspaper Ilhislrjiions. is found in the conduct of a farrier sergeant, Rousseau, of the Chasse\.irs a Cheval. At the head of eight men he charged a whole squadron of Uhlans, who dispersed, leaving many dead and wounded. The brave squadron of Belgians returned in triumph to Haelen with a dozen excellent horses as trophies of their exploit. " During the afternoon Lieutenant Van Doren, who was specially detailed to defend Diest, was asked to send reinforcements to the neighbouring village of Zechk. .There was a difficulty, insomuch as practically all the available troops had been sent forward to Haelen, but, undismayed. Lieutenant Van Doren summoned the town fire brigade and, picking up as many soldiers as he could from different posts on the road, made a dash for Zechk." There was a fight at Eghezee, 10 miles to the north of Namur, where a party of 350 Uhlans rode up, preceded by 60 cyclists, who had forcibly requisitioned three motor-cars, one of them belonging to a doctor of the Belgian Red Cross Service. The Germans stayed at the place for the night, and in the morning a Belgian airman, flying low over the cornfield in which they had parked their horses, drew their fire, thus revealing their whereabovits to some Belgian cyclist scouts, who hurried in the direction of the firing. " The Uhlan cyclists, who were out scouting, saw them coming," wrote the special correspondent of The Times in describing the scene, " and rode back as hard as they could to give the alarm. At once there was a general sauve qui pent. Most of the Germans were sitting quietly in the cafes of the village of Bonoffe at the time, talking to the villagers. They rushed off down the road away from_ Eghezee leaving everything behind them, horses, rifles, mitrailleuse guns, and the re- quisitioned motor-cars. Tlie few men who wore looking after the liorses in the cornfield lot them loose, the bugler who was with the fugi- tives sounded a call to which they rallied, and as the pursuers, only about 30 in number, came round the corner of the road into view, the Uhlans tlirew themselves on to their horses and galloped off. The Belgians meanwhile dashed into a trench in a field of beetroot, about 500 yards off, which had been thrown up last week to repel the expected German advance, and opened fire on the horses and the retreating Uhlans on the road. They killed four or five men in the field and about 35 more in the retreat, including an obor-lioutenant and, it is thought, the colonel and several of the horses." Oia Friday, August 14, it was officially an- nounced that French troops had entered Belgium by Charloroi and had joined forces with the Belgian Army. Three French officers had been attached to the Belgian headquarters and two Belgian officers were to represent the Belgian Army with the French troops. The French ad- vanced northwards from Charleroi in the direc- tion of Wavre. They were reported to be hold- ing a very strong position, and numerous engage- ments were reported between the French and German cavalry. Then followed a slight pause. The Germans, having discovered the strength of the enemy, awaited reinforcements. Thoii cavalry scouting parties, however, kept creeping around by the Dutch frontier until some of them were within 25 miles of Antwerp at Gheel and Moll. The Germans, as they travelled acro.ss the coimtry, ruined most of the villages they left behind them. They hanged or shot every pe.isant suspected of resistance ; they returned to places where isolated Uhlans had been killed a few days earlier THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 371 and razod tlioin to tlio ground. Tho inoro suspicion of having attacked Germans was suflieiont to ensure doatli. Tho policy of wlioio- salo terrorism was carried out on too wide ii scale to have been anything but a deliberate plan executed in obedience to oidors from head- quarters. Tho German General Staff probably aimed not only at terrorizing the Belgians and stamping out any sign of civilian resistance, but also at creating such alarm throughout the neighliouring Dutch districts that tho people of Holland would not permit their Governmont to take steps against so merciless a foe. Tho Belgian General Staff continued to issue reassuring bulletins concerning tlu) position at the front, but it could have had no delusions about the real state of things. It became evi- dent, hour by hour, that the position of Brussels was becoming more perilous. Once tho Belgian Armj' was turned Brussels must fall. Should the Germans renew the attack at Diest and succeed, not only would Brussels itself be open, but the entire Field Army would be threatened with capture. Brussels could not be defended. It is true that 20,000 civil guards had been armed with Mauser rifles and tho environs of the city had been entrenched and protected with barbed wire entanglements. Trenches manned with civil guards might bo of some service in checking a slight cavalry raid — they could do nothing of any value against the serious advance in force such as it was now more and more apparent the Germans were attempting. On Monday, August 17, the Germans began their advance in earnest. One strong force drove itself in like a wedge between tho French and Belgian Armies in the neighbourhood of Wavre. From Diest, from Tirlemont, and from a hundred villages around came news that the Germans were moving forward in over- whelming force. The Belgian Army rosi.sted desperately a\\ along the line, but it was hopelessly out- numbered in men, in field artillery, and in machine-guns. All the villages had been made into entrenched camps, with wagons upset across the roadways, wire entanglements erected, and trenches dug. But the Germans adopted tactics before which such precautioris were use- less. Villages wore first overwhelmed witli artillery fire. When the Belgian cavalry attempted to repeat their former exploits and charge the enemy they were met by the fire of well-placed machine-guns, before which they were swept away. At the least sign of weaken- ing tho German cavalry came on at tlio charge. THK VlLLAGi: OF MELLE. Scene of very fierce fighting. Remains of a German gun carriage. 372 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMAN SOLDIERS TENDING THE WOUNDED. ^Newspaper Illusiralwns, Tirlemont was the scene of a specially vigorous attack. Powerful German guns shelled the place with great effect, and then the German cavalry suddenly charged. Their advance was 80 rapid and so unexpected that numbers of peaceful villagers, women and children, were unable to escape. Hurrying across the fields as quickly as they could it was impossible to get away from the German cavalry, who followed them, shooting and stabbing men and women alike, riding down children, sweeping over the place in a mad, reckless charge. It became obvious that the Belgian Army could stay no longer in its positions. Further delay might well lead to total destruction. Some regiments were already almost completely wiped out, particularly some of the cavalry. Two mixed brigades wore given orders to hold the enemy back at any cost and to cover a retreat in the direction of Antwerp. The defeat of the Belgian Field Army all along the line was complete and overwhelming. The fighting started early on Monday, August 17th. In the darkness of that night the Belgian retreat began. ■ Everywhere it was the German artillery that broke the Belgian defence Now the Belgians were forced back to Vertryck. Next they were at Corbeek Loo, and from Corbeek Loo they had to retire on Louvain, whert they were prepared to make a last stand. At this point one consideration stay«d them. In view of the way they had been forced back, they could hope to do no more at Louvain than temporarily to arrest the Ger- man advance. The Germans, already pressing up, would imdoubtedly shell and destroy the town, and would probably put it to the flames as they had already that day burned numerous villages. To every Belgian Louvain was a city of pre- cious memories, regarded with veneration, to be guarded, protected, and shielded from harm. Its ancient University, its beautiful Town Hall, its quaint 14th-century buildings, and its price- less library, once lost could never be replaced. To risk the destruction of these would be a crime against civilization. Yielding to this considera- tion, the Belgian Army retired beyond the city and allowed the Germans to enter without oppo- sition. They little imagined — for they had not yet realized the depths to which some German commanders wovild go — that in surrendering Louvain as they did they were only handing it over to a worse fate and a more remorseless slaughter than any which fighting could have involved. The position of the Belgian Army was im- possible. It could not hope to keep back the Germans. To remain in the open much longer was to invite needless destruction. The spirit of the men was for the moment shaken by the terrific attacks they had endiu-ed. The Army was separated from tlio French. Only one course remained — to abandon Brussels and to retire upon Antwerp. The main fighting had fallen on the 1st, the 2nd, and the 3rd divisions of the Army. The two mixed brigades that covered their retreat held out for some hours against a formidable attack made by the Germans between Becquoboort and Gelrode. The Belgian Staff considered it necessary to issue a somewhat elaborate explanation of the retirement. It ran as follows : — " At the present moment the general situation in the Belgian theatre of war may be described as follows : — After having lost a great deal of tim », a large number of men, and a great quan- tity of material, the Prussian Army has manago^l to gain ground on both banks of the Meuso up to a line where it is in contact with the Allied armies. The German troops on the north side of the Mouse belong to various corps whose operations THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 373 have boon