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The Times HISTORY OF THE WAR Vol. II

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE. 

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES"

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON. 

1915


CONTENTS OF VOL II. 



PAGE 

CHAPTER XXX. 
THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF NAVAL WAR 1 

CHAPTER XXXI. 
THE NAVY'S WORK IN THE OUTER SEAS ... 25 

CHAPTER XXXII. 
THE BATTLES OF THE MARNE... ... ... ... ... ... 41 

CHAPTER XXXIII. 

THE DEFENCE AND FALL OF ANTWERP ... ... ... 81 

CHAPTER XXXIV. 
THE BATTLES OF THE AISNE ... ... ... ... ... 121 

CHAPTER XXXV. 
MILITARY AERONAUTICS AND THE BRITISH Ant SERVICE ... ... ... ... 173 

CHAPTER XXXVI. 
THE AUSTRO -HUNGARIAN PROBLEM ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 197 

CHAPTER XXXVII. 
THE ARMY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY ... ... ... 221 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 
THE RESPONSE OF THE DOMINIONS ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 237 

CHAPTER XXXIX. 
THE SERBIAN ARMY ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 277 

CHAPTER XL. 
THE AUSTRIAN INVASION: BATTLE OF THE JADAR ... ... ... ... ... 291 

CHAPTER XLI. 
THE INDIAN ARMY IN FRANCE ... ... ... ... 317 

CHAPTER XLII. 

THE INDIAN ARMY IN THE TRENCHES ... ... ... ... 333 

CHAPTER XLIII. 
EARLY EAST COAST RAIDS ... ... ... ... 357 

CHAPTER XLIV. 
JAPAN'S PART IN THS WAR ... ... ... ... ... 397^ 

CHAPTER XLV. 
PARIS UNDER THE GERMAN MENACE ... ...... 437 

CHAPTER XLVI. 

THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE FROM THE AISNE TO YPRES ... ... 477 



CHAPTER XXX. 

THE FIRST THREE MONTHS 
OF NAVAL WAR. 



INTRODUCTION THE NATURE or NAVAL SUPREMACY AN UNSEEN DOMINATION PROTECTION 
OF TRANSPORTS SECURITY OF COMMERCE AND SUPPLIES ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY 
- THE NEW MATE'RIEL MINES SUBMARINES AIRCRAFT A BRILLIANT RECORD THE 
KING'S MESSAGE ADMIRAL JELLICOE'S COMMAND INITIAL OPERATIONS THE NORTH SEA 
AREA GERMAN STRATEGY MINE-LAYING Loss OF THE " AMPHIOK " THE " BIRMING- 
HAM'S " SUCCESS MINE-SWEEPING A SWEEP OF THE GERMAN COAST VICTORY OFF 
HELIGOLAND A BRILLIANT ENGAGEMENT SCHMARINE RECONNAISSANCE - - GAINS AND 
LOSSES BRITISH MINE-FIELD IN THE NORTH SEA Loss OF " ABOUKIR," " HOGUE," AND 
" CHES.SY " FOUR GERMAN DESTROYERS SUNK THE MEDITERRANEAN FRENCH NAVAL 
POLICY ESCAPE OF THE " GOEBEN " AND " BRESLAU " THK BALTIC BRITISH MONITORS 
ON THE FRENCH COAST. 



THREE months of -war shed light 
upon the conduct of naval opera- 
tions in. modern conditions, and 
threw into strong relief alike the 
efficiency and the predominance of the British 
Navy. In his memorable interview with the 
British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, 
on August 4, the German Imperial Chancellor 
for a moment revealed his real convictions. 
The idea of British intervention was, he said, 
" terrible to a degree." The conjectures of 
the eager experts, who laboured to make 
their countrymen believe that naval supremacy 
no longer counted as in the past, and that 
modern weapons, combined with steam and 
speed, had imposed heavy disabilities upon 
the superior fleet, were soon brought to the 
test and proved unfounded. To Germany 
the might of the British Navy showed itself 
" terrible to a degree." 

In the broad sense it can be said that the 
i. Id lessons of naval war were strikingly re- 
affirmed, and that those who had strongly 
niMiiitniiied tlijit (he miUiy *l nrtliNg ehimifes 
of niiili'i-ii'l luid not iinp':i.ircd (lie [>oli-ne\ of d. 
Vol. 2. Part 14. 



superior fleet, or prevented our Navy from 
discharging its 'vitally important functions 
in war, were amply justified. In 1804 tie 
positions of the British battle squadrons and 
the nature of the duties they were carrying 
on were almost unknown to the public. Yet, 
as Admiral Mahan has pointed out, " while 
bodily present before Brest, Rochefort and 
Toulon, strategically the British squadrons 
lay in the Straits of Dover barring the way 
against the Army of Invasion." More than 
this could be said of the British Grand Fleet 
after three months of war. Unseen since the 
war began it dominated the Western Campaign 
in the strategic sense. If it had not existed 
or had been overwhelmed, the sea-board of 
France would have been at the mercy of the 
enemy. Large forces might have been landed, 
which would have gravely embarrassed the 
French Armies. No British troops would have 
been available to stem the first German onset 
and steadily reinforced to have co-operated 
powerfully in hurling back the invaders and 
holding them fust, at a long distance from their 
ol)jei-ii\e J'.-nis. Itritish HIM! I'Yeneh li-nde 



; TIMI-:s IIISTOUY OF THE WAR. 




AJ. A 



FIRST AND SECOND SQUADRONS AT SEA, 
Headed by the "Iron Duke'' and the " Marlborough." 



\Cribb, Southscu. 



would have been paralysed, and no oversea 
possession of either would have been secure. 
England would have been daily expecting 
invasion, with an unemployed population 
clamouring for food. Now, as in the great 
wars of the past, the better fleet proved not 
only the " sure shield " of the nation, but 
the firm basis of offensive action. The British 
Xavy set free the whole military forces of the 
Kinpire and enabled them to bo brought to 




, 

REAR-ADMIRAL C. E. MADDEN, 
Chief of the Staff. 



bear upon the needs of the land campaign. 
More than 350,000 men were transported 
across the seas without a single mishap. ( !cr- 
man shipping was either captured or driven 
to seek refuge in neutral ports, with the result 
of economic pressure upon Germany that \\ n s 
certain to increase with every month of war. 
The attack upon British commerce, elaborately 
planned and supported by measures taken 
before the outbreak of war, proved far less 
serious than had been expected. The Admiralty 
was able to point out in October that only 
1 per cent. " out of 4,000 British ships engaged 
in foreign trade " had been sunk, and that tho 
rate of insurance for cargoes, originally fixed 
at 5 per cent., had " been reduced to two 
guineas per cent, without injury to the sol- 
vency of the fund." Moreover, a portion 
of the relatively small losses that caused by 
the Emden especially was due in 'part to 
the preoccupation of the ships of war in con- 
voying troops, while " a. large number " of 
Iheso losses was "caused by merchant vessels 
inking everything for granted arid proceeding 
without due precautions." Lastly, as at the 
I in itli- of the Alma, but with infinitely greater 
effect. British ships had directly co-operated 
with military forces and powerfully aided in 
defeating violent attacks on the left of the line 
of the Allies in Flanders. 

While thus, in the strategic i-onse. the effect 
of changed materiel had been to extend the 
power of the superior Navy, and to enable 
that power to be exerted in a shorter time than 
formerly, the new conditions had led to signifi- 
cant results. The large use of mines by the 



THE TIMES HISTORY -OF THE WAli. 



Germans, in direct violation of accepted 
restrictions, caused the Admiralty to adopt 
similar measures, and ultimately to proclaim 
the North Sen a " military area." Germaiinaval 
activity at the outset was practically confined 
to mine-laying and to the employment of 
submarines ; hut our losses in ships of war 
relatively to our strength were small compared 
with those of the Japanese in 1904. We had 
to deplore the deaths of too many gallant 
men, deprived by the new methods of warfare 
of the chance of striking a blow ; but our naval 
strength was not sensibly reduced, and our 
moans of carrying on the war remained un- 
impaired, and were in some respects increased. 

Of the powers of submarines we learned 
many valuable lessons. They proved to be 
dangerous antagonists, as was expected. They 
also showed their disabilities during the action 
off Heligoland on August 27. Vice-Admiral 
Beatty states that several attacks by submarines 
were made ; but " our high speed," " rapid 
manoeuvring," and " the use of the helm," 
combined with a smooth sea, effectually 
frustrated them. On the other hand, when 
continued patrolling at slow speed without 
destroyers in company, or when slowing down 
to search craft which may have been decoys, 
was resorted to, we paid the penalty. Of the 
work of our own submarines, as described 



by Commodore Keyes, it is impossible to speak 
too highly. For reconnoitring purposes they, 
from the first days of war, proved invaluable. 
Their officers showed skill and daring beyond 
all praise, and that their successes were fewer 
than those of the (jlermans was wholly due 
to the fact that the number of enemy ships 
at sea was trivial compared with our own. 
British destroyers were able to sink only 
one ship with the torpedo ; but their varied 
and strenuous work was supremely valuable, 
and as a deterrent to the submarine they 
showed their importance. The prompt action 
of the Commander of the Badger is significant, 
and we learned that the submarines must 
always be attacked, and that " low visibility 
and a calm sea " are " the most unfavourable 
conditions " for their activity. Finally, in 
the new arm, the Navy gave proof of the 
highest efficiency and boldness. The raids 
on Diisseldorf and Cologne rank among the 
finest instances of the successful and legitimate 
use of aircraft. 

Such were the achievements of the Royal 
Navy in three months, and the history of naval 
war records none equal in importance, or so 
far-reaching in scope, within such a period. 
No great fleet action was fought, which was 
in accordance with the teaching of the past ; 
but the unseen battle flet controlled that of 




SUNDAY SERVICE ON BOARD H M.S. "NEPTUNK." 



(Cribb, 



Till-: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 





A DREADNOUGHT STEAMING THROUGH A ROUGH' SEA. 



t he enemy, provided the support upon which the 
whole of the British nnvnl operations depended, 
and thus brought enormous weight to bear 
upon the cause of the Allies. British naval 
strength was growing. The one defect 
the paucity of light cruisers, due to five years' 
neglect of this valuable type of vessel was 
being gradually remedied. The Empire and 
its Allies could continue to repose the fullest 
confidence in the " tremendous weapon" of 
British sea-power. 

"At flu's L'rave moment in our national 

history I semi to you. and through you to the 

ollieers and men of the fleets of which you ha\e 

Mii-d eoiiiinaiid. the assurance of my con- 

fidenee I hat undi r your direetion they will 

l-evi\e and renew tin. old olories of (| 1( . Uoyal 

Xavy. and pn,\e i. nee aeain the sure shield 
of Britain and of her Kmpire in the hour of 
trial. 

" (ii-:oj:c:i. : . H.I." 

The al.oxe messaire was communicated to 
the senior naval i.flic-ers on ,il! station- outside 
of home waters, and published on August .',. 

The Admiraltx at the -ame ti,,,e issued the 
follow iity : 

" \\'i:h the approval of His Majesty the 
Kinu'. Admind Sir John R. .lellieoe. K.C.I!.. 
K.C.V.O., has assumed supreme command of 



the Home Fleets, with the acting rank of 
Admiral, and Rear-Admiral Charles K. Madden, 
C.V.O., has been appointed to be his Chief of 
the Staff." 

On Monday, August 3, 1914, in a supple- 
ment to the London Gazette the following 
proclamation was published : 

1. Men of the Royal Naval Reserve and 
Royal Fleet Reserve, and officers and men of 
the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, are called 
out " into actual service." 

2. Officers of the Koyal Naval Reserve arc 
called out " for actual service." 

3. The term of service of time-expired men 
in the Royal Navy is extended for five years 
should their services bo so long required. 

4. The Admiralty may requisition for use, as 
transports ami for similar purposes any British 
ship or British vessel within the British Isles 
"or the waters adjacent thereto"; payment 
(111 tetHM to be arranged afterwards to be made 

for Slich Use. 

I hi- was lolloued by a supplementary pro- 
clamation. "For extending the services of 
time-expired men in the Uoval Xavy." All 
Admiralty notice eallinu out the Reserves had 
been published in '/'//< '/'//, .v on the previous 
( I . i \ . 

" Three hours after the outbreak of war, 
Submarines Kii. Lieutenant-Commander Cecil 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



P. Talbot, and E8, Lieutenant-Commander 
Francis H. H. Goodhart, proceeded unaccom- 
panied to carry out a reconnaissance in the 
Heligoland Bight. These two vessels returned 
with useful information and had the privilege 
of being the pioneers on a service which is 
attended with some risk." This sentence is 
extracted from the despatch dated October 17 
of Commodore Roger Keyes, and demonstrates 
that no weed accumulated on the bottoms of 
the ships of His Majesty's Navy while they 
were waiting to attack the foe. 

War on the sea, no less than war on the land, 
is influenced by the area in which it is waged ; 
and although all the seven seas are open as a 
battle-ground for the opposing fleets, as a 
matter of practical "fact the struggle^ which 
matters has to be fought out in the North 
Sea, " and the waters adjacent thereto," as 
is set down in the proclamation already quoted. 

If we draw a line across the North Sea due 
west from Hantsholmer Light on the coast 
of Denmark, we shall strike the coast of 
Scotland at Girdleness, just to the southward 
of Aberdeen ; and it is roughly 380 miles from 
one point to the other. From Hantsholmer 
to the Elbe the coast runs nearly due south, 
then turning sharply to the west, it creeps 
through sand and shoal to Terschelling ; here 
it trends south-south-west to the Texel and on 
in the same general direction to Blankenberg 
and Ostend through the maze of shoals off 
Rotterdam and Antwerp. From the mouth 
of the Scheldt it turns sharply to the westward, 
the lie of the land to Grisnez, near Calais, being 
west-south-west ; here is the narrowest portion 



of the sea known as Dover Straits or the Pas 
de Calais. Our own coast trends in a south- 
westerly direction from Girdleness to the 
Forth and then south by east to the Wash ; 
then south to Winterton, Haisborough, and 
Lowestoft, afterwards in a generally south- 
westerly direction to Dover Straits. The 
course from Dover Straits clearing all obstruc- 
tions to the Hantsholmer-Girdleness line would 
be about north-east by north. The area thus 
defined may be conceived to be the southern 
manoeuvring area in the North Sea for battle 
fleets in time of war. It is 380 miles wide at 
the north, it is 21 miles wide at the south ; a 
clear run through it is 360 miles ; but we have 
yet to observe how this area is further circum- 
scribed. 

The North Sea is of all seas the most shallow, 
and from the Hantsholmer-Girdleness line to 
the Dover Straits you may seek long for a 
depth of 60 fathoms and then in all pro- 
bability you will not find it while in a line 
from Great Gn'msby to Terschelling which 
is where the absolute definite contraction of 
the coast begins, and which is some 180 miles 
in length from east to west you will be hard 
put to it to find 20 fathoms. If we study 
the chart to the southward of a line thus 
drawn and consider it as a manoeuvring area 
for the deep-draught ships of modern navies 
we shall see how constricted it is ; as from 
Dover Straits to the Grimsby-Terschelling line 
a fleet to have open water must stand outside 
the Goodwins, the Galloper, and the Outer 
Gabbard. There is then, from Orford- 
ness to Scheveningen, an area which is clear 




H.M.S. "BADGER," 



[Symonds, f ortsmoufh. 



Which rammed and sank a German submarine off the Dutch coast. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. 




MINES. [<&**.*"*. 

Photograph to illustrate the position of mines 
and ship. 

of shoals, that, begin again at Smith's Knoll 
on the west and the Texel on the east. It is 
from Dover Straits to the Grimsby-Terschelling 
line some 170 miles ; from Smith's Knoll to 
the Texel about 85 miles. The area is small 
indeed, and owing to the speed of modern 
battleships, opposing fleets in this area would in 
all probability not be long before they met ; 
especially having in view their heavy draught, 
which precludes any close approach to the 
shore. England has access to the sea from 
scores of magnificent ports ; Germany by means 
of infinite labour and appalling expense lias 
driven channels through the sands by which 
she is surrounded to enable her heavy-draught 
battleships to reach such open ocean as is 
provided by the North Sea. West from 
Terschi'lling to the Elbe, and north from the 
Kllie aiMiii to (lie Muni reefs on the coast of 
I >eniniirk, the coast is a seaman's nightmare. 
That such n littoral should shelter the second 
greatest naval 1'ower of the day is a measure 
of the stern activity, of the resolute determina- 
tion, displayed by these seekers for the sea. 



It may be asked why this point has been 
dwelt upon. The answer is that it is here. 
in the area described, that must bo fought out 
the battle for the mastery of the sea. It 
was not for us to cherish delusions that the 
High Sea Fleet of Germany was going to remain 
in port for over. Naval strategy, 110 less than 
that of the land, decrees the waiting for the right 
moment to strike. In the past many people 
\\ere misled by "frantic boast and foolish 
word " of the self-appointed champions of 
German sea expansion ; and were intensely 
surprised that the lightning-like " hussm- 
stroke," which was to follow immediately 
on the declaration of war, was not attempted. 
But however much the gallant officers and men 
of the High Sea Fleet might be longing to get 
at their enemy, it was certain that they would 
not be loosed on their mission until a favourable 
opportunity occurred. In the meanwhile tin- 
policy of attrition on the military side, and tin- 
destruction of mercantile shipping on the com- 
mercial side, was being worked for all that it 
wate worth. Also, " in spite of spite,' 1 we have 
to admit that the German Navy did well. 
Both their torpedo attacks and their raids on 
our merchantmen were attended with far 
more success than we cared to contemplate ; 
and we could salute those brave and enter- 
prising officers who had deserved so well of 
their service and their country. 

In the past we heard that war if it came 
would most certainly be at " Germany's 
selected moment " ; that the programme she 
had mapped out for herself would be carried 
out, and that before war had been declared half 
an hour determined and desperate attacks by 
torpedo craft would have seriously impaired 
the fighting efficiency of our fleet. As wo all 
know, this did not happen ; England was ready 
and there was no chance for the surprise attack. 
What, then, was left for the weaker combatant 
to accomplish ? We were not left long in 
doubt ; with an utter disregard of the rights of 
neutrals, mines were laid wherever the mine- 
Livers could succeed in dropping their deadly 
cargoes near by the waters of the United 
Kingdom. On Wednesday, August 5, H.M.S. 
Amphion and the third destroyer flotilla fell 
in with the Konigin Luise some forty miles from 
Antwerp ; this vessel, a Hamburg-Ainerika 
liner of about 2,000 tons, had been converted 
into a minelayer, and probably carried four to 
five hundred mines. What her destination wa.- 
is unknown, but it is likely to have been the 



THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. 



mouth of the Thames, where, had she succeeded 
in her mission, the destruction wrought would 
certainly have been considerable. Summoned 
to surrender after a chase which lasted some 
hours, she declined, and was accordingly sunk 
by gun fire ; twenty-eight wounded men from 
her crew were brought into Harwich and landed 
from the destroyers. We had not long to wait 
for an indication of the deadliness of the mine 
as- a passive instrument of warfare, as on the 
following -day H.M.S. Amphion struck a mine 
and foundered almost -immediately. She was 
a new ship of 3,440 tons and had cost some 
280,000 ;.jn her case, fortunately, a consider- 
able proportion of the crew, including her 
commanding officer, Captain Cecil H. Fox, were 
saved. On Sunday, August 9, an attack was 
made by German submarines on the nrsttlight 
cruiser squadron ; this was quite in accordance 
with the " attrition " tactics- of the foe, but it 
ended unfortunately for him, as one German 



submarine was sunk, the U15. Subsequently 
the First Lord of the Admiralty telegraphed to 
the Lord Mayor of Birmingham as follows : 
'' Birmingham will be proud to learn that the 
first German submarine destroyed in the war 
was sunk by K.M.S. Birmingham." 

Whenever and wherever it was possible the 
enemy laid his mines, and had it not been for 
the counter measures of the British Admiralty 
the narrow seas by a very early date in the 
course of hostilities would have been closed to 
navigation altogether ; save at a risk that few 
mariners would have cared to undertake. An 
antidote was provided in the shape of a special 
section of the Royal Naval Reserve, which was 
employed in mine sweeping. At the beginning 
of the war there were 142 officers and 1,136 
men employed in this duty, and the numbers 
both of men and craft employed were after- 
wards considerably augmented. The craft were 
trawlers, the men fishermen, brave men, almost 




SINKING OF H.M.S. "AMPHION." 
This photograph was taken 30 seconds after the magazine had exploded. 



[Bcckc't. 



8 



THE ILMKft HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




H M.S. "PATHFINDER." 
Sunk by a German submarine on the East Coast. 



unimaginably hardy, and who knew the North 
Sea as intimately as the landsman knows the 
inside of his bedroom. Their method of con- 
ducting their special business was with a 
weighted steel hawser between two trawlers, 
which, going ahead abreast of one another, in 
this manner sweep the bed of the ocean. When 
the hawser strikes the mooring of a mine, the 
mine is brought to the surface and rendered 
harmless by being exploded by a shot from an 
accompanying destroyer. 

On August 19 the British Admiralty, 
through the Press Bureau, announced that 
" a certain liveliness " was noticeable in 
the North Sea ; that enemy vessels had 
made their appearance : destroyers, scouting 
cruisers, and suchlike pouasiere navale, as 
the French call their subsidiary units ; but 
although some long-range shots were exchanged, 
and although cruisers wore invited to come out 
from the coast and to destroy destroyers flvini: 
the White Ensign, which were moving with 
somewhat suspicious slowness towards sister 
vessels tucked away beneath the distant blue- 
ur'-y horizon line, the net was spread idly in 
tin sight of a bird too wideawake to be thus 
decoyed. The ' h\ eliness " announced by the 
IY'.-* Mureau did not extend itself to the main 
fleet of Admiral von Ingrnnhl. 

During the third \\rek in August a sweep had 
been made of the waters between the British 



[Cribb, Sou'hsca. 



the German coasts, but the naval force* of 
the German Empire were still apparently 
stowed away in the Kiel Canal, or in the well- 
protected waters adjacent to that strategical 
waterway. 

Then at last came an action in the Heligoland 
Bight. Both strategically and tactically this 
action was full of instruction. It was also the best 
of omens for subsequent battles afloat, as the 
insight displayed by the higher command was 
no less admirable than the tactical dispositions 
carried out, and the gallantry of the officers 
and men employed in the action. " The Saucy 
Arethusa " added another wreath to that 
chaplet of fame which has ever surrounded the 
name of the famous frigate that captured the 
Belle Poule. In what manner it was discovered 
that the enemy was on the move, that cruisers, 
submarines, and destroyers were " showing a 
certain liveliness," we have not been told ; 
but from the despatch of Vice-Admiral Sir 
David Beatty it is easy to see that the fleet 
did not reach a certain rendezvous merely to 
take part in another sweeping movement ; in 
fact this theory is disposed of by Rear-Admiral 
Christian, H.M.S. Euryalus, who speaks of "a 
reconnaissance in force with tho object of 
attacking the enemy's light cruisers and 
destroyers." The disposition of force steins 
to have been as follows : Outside of all were 
the battle cruisers .which were " watchfullv 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE- WAR. 



waiting"; then the cruiser force, waiting also 
" watchfully " to intercept any enemy vesse's 
chased to the westward ; and lastly the 
Arethusa and Fearless, accompanied by the 
first and third flotillas of destroyers, which 
flotillas were short of four ships the Hornet, 
Tigress, Hydra and Loyal. 

On August 21, while the cruiser force was 
coaluig, a message was received from a light 
cruiser by wireless, " Am being chased by 
enemy's cruisers," followed a few minutes after- 
wards by " Am engaging enemy's cruisers." 

Great is the discipline of the Navy ; but it 
is to be feared that the busy silence of coaling 
ship on this occasion was broken by many 
whispered conversations ; to be exchanged for 
a subdued cheer when through the coherers 
of the wireless came the message, " Proceed at 
once to the assistance of Fearless." The colliers 
were immediately cast off and tho five cruisers 
swept out to sea like greyhounds slipped from 
the leash. But in the end disappointment 
awaited them. The elusive, tantalising, well- 
named Fearless had drawn the enemy away 
from his coasts near enough even to shell the 
audacious fleeing twenty-seven-knot light 
cruiser. 

But the ecstasy of combat for which they 
yearned was not long to bo denied to them ; 
for at 3.30 a.m. on Friday, August 28, the 
Fearless and Arethusa, the latter vessel the 
pioneer ship of a new class and less than three 
days out of the builders' hands, escorted by 
some twenty destroyers, were advancing in a 




[Heath, Plymouth* 

COMMODORE TYRWHITT. 
H.M.S. "Arethusa." 

south-westerly direction at twenty knots, on a 
course that would bring them to a point some 
six miles south and three miles west of Heligo- 
land. Before we proceed with the story of the 
action it is well to draw attention to the 
Arethusa and the conditions in which she went 
into battle. Whenever a ship is commissioned 




H.M.S. "BERWICK," [London Nms Agaic; 

Which captured a German armed merchant cruiser and two colliers in Atlantic waters. 



1(1 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




VICE-ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY, 
In command of the First Battle Cruiser Squadron. 

it naturally takes her some time to shake down ; 
for the officers to know their men ; for the men 
to know their officers. There are naturally a 
thousand and one things to be done before she 
attains to the status of a well-ordered man-of- 
war. None of these things had been done, none of 
them could have been done ; save and except 
the assignment of the company to their stations. 
They had never worked together ; they were 
strangers in all to one another ; strangers save 
for that cord which bound them indissolubly. 
The day on which the battle occurred was 
brilliantly fine but extremely hazy, while the 
sea was so smooth that Admiral Beatty reports 
the track of a torpedo fired could easily be 
traced by the wake of bubbles that these fear- 
some instruments of war leave upon the surface 
of the water. At 8 o'clock dim shadows 
became visible through the mist to the recon- 
noitring English ships ; these were soon dis- 
covered to be six German destroyers. Course 
was altered six points to port and orders given 
to engage as soon as possible. At 8.30 a.m. 
fire was opened by the Arethusa and some of 
the di'-itroyr rs, and at 8.45 a.m. the course was 
altered again, bringing the rest of the destroyers 
into the fight. 

At the same time three German cruisers 
of the same class as the British " Town " 



cruisers were sighted. (The "Town" class, 
of which tit the outbreak of war there were 
fifteen in the British Navy, are light cruisers 
ranging from 4,800 to 5,400 tons). These 
ships came into action and the fight became 
general. The German fire was fairly well 
directed on the whole, though many of the shuts 
fell short and exploded on striking the water. 
In spite of this the Arethusa came in for severe 
handling between 9 a.m. and 9.45, and at 
10 o'clock she had to haul out temporarily, 
as only her foremost 6-inch gun was capable 
of continuing to fire. Why at this juncture 
the German cruisers did not close in and 
complete her destruction only the commanders 
of thoso vessels could explain. The fact 
remains, however, that they did not follow 
up what was an undoubted success, and after 
55 minutes' strenuous work on board of the 
British light cruiser she steamed into action 
again. In Commodore Tyrwhitt's official 
report he states : 

Two cruisers with four and two funnels respectively 
were sighted on the port bow at 7.57 a.m., the nearest of 
which was engaged. Arethusa received a heavy firo 
from both cruisers and several destroyers until 8.15, 
when the four-funnelled cruiser transferred her fire to 
Fearless. Close action was continued with the two- 
funnelled cruiser on converging courses until 8.25, when 
a 6-^nch projectile from Arethusa wrecked the forebridge 
of the enemy, who at once turned away in the direction 
of Heligoland, which was sighted slightly on the starboard 
bow at the same time. All ships were at once ordered to 
turn to the westward, and shortly afterwards speed was 
reduced to 20 knots. During this action Arethusa had 




Hfls, rortsmouili. 

COMMODORE W. E. GOODENOUGH 
Who took part in the action in the Heligoland Bight. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



II 




H.M.S. "CUMBERLAND." 
This cruiser made many captures off the Cameroon River. 



[London News Agency. 



been hit many times and was considerably damaged : 
only one 6-inch gun remained in action, all other guns and 
torpedo tubes having been temporarily disabled. 

By this time the German formation had 
become very ragged and several of their, des- 
troyers were out of the fight, apparently fully 
occupied in attempting to keep themselves 
afloat. As the struggle progressed, the Arethusa 
continued to monopolise most of the enemy 
fire, and a shell which damaged her feed tank 
materially reduced her speed. She was, not- 
withstanding, able to continue, and it soon was 
evident that one of the German cruisers was 
in a bad way : two of her funnels had gone, 
iilso her mainmast, and she was blazing furi- 
ously amidships ; she continued, nevertheless, 
to keep up a spirited fire from her foremost 
and after guns. 

A comparison between the Arethusa and 
the Mainz may be appropriate here. The 
British ship launched in 1913 was 3,520 tons ; 
30,000 horse-power ; speed, 29 knots. She 
was armed with two 6-inch and six 4-inch 
guns and four above-water torpedo tubes 
that discharged the 21 -inch torpedo. The 
German cruiser was launched in 1909 and was 
4,350 tons ; horse-power (designed), 20,000 ; 
speed, 25-5 knots. Armament, twelve 4 - l-inch 
guns ; two machine ; and two under-water 



torpedo tubes firing the 18-inch torpedo. 
It will be seen that the British cruiser design 
was much superior to the German. The 
smaller vessel was 3-5 knots the faster. The 
British 6-inch gun fired a 100 Ib. projectile, 
the British 4-inch gun fired a 25 Ib. shot, the 
German 4-1 one of 31 Ibs. 

So far the battle had been waged by the 
light cruisers and destroyers alone on our side ; 
out to seaward, however, enemy submarines 
were engaged in attacking the Battle Cruiser 
Squadron ;the water was smooth, the submarines 
were detected in time, and Admiral Beatty, 
manoeuvring at high speed, had no difficulty 
in avoiding these unpleasant attentions. Mean- 
while all ears were strained on board the big 
ships listening to the sounds of the distant 
firing. No doubt many impatient comments 
were passed at not being allowed to have a 
hand in the game. But at last their time 
came. The official report from Admiral Beatty 



At 12.15 Fearless and First Flotilla were sighted 
retiring west. At the same time the Light Cruiser 
Squadron was observed to be engaging an enemy ship 
ahead. They appeared to have her beat. I then 
steered X.E. to sounds of firing ahead, and at 12.30 p.m. 
sighted Arethusa and Third Flotilla retiring to the 
westward engaging a cruiser of the Kolberg class on our 
port bow. I steered to cut her off from Heligoland, and 



1-2 



////: V/.Wfc'X HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




[Heath, Plymouth. 

COMMODORE ROGER KEYES, 
Commanding Submarine Flotilla. 

at 12.37 opened fire. At 12.42 the enemy turned to the 
N.K., and we chased at 27 knots. At 12.56 p.m. sighted 
and engaged a two-funnelled cruiser ahead. Lion fired 
two salvoes at her, which took effect, and she disappeared 
into the mist burning furiously and in a sinking con- 
dition. In view of the mist and that she was steering at 
high speed at right angles to the Lion, who was steaming 
at 28 knots, the Lion's firing was very creditable. 

It would appear that only the Lion among the 
big ships actually fired, the remainder arriving 
on the scene to see the German cruiser Mainz 
lying on her beam ends with only a propeller 
and her starboard quarter showing, while a 
l.c'ip of wreckage marked the spot where the 
Koln had gone down ; and a dim ruddy glare 
in the haze showed where the third cruiser 
was drifting away, her hull a blazing furnace. 

The account of the action issued through the 
I'rcss Bureau speaks thus of the destroyers 
engaged : 

Although only two of the enemy destroyers were 
illy observed to sink, most of the eighteen or twenty 
boats rounded up and attacked were well punished, and 
mily saved themselves by scattered flight. The superior 
I lower and strength of the British destroyers, ship 
for ship, was conclusively demonstrated. The destroyers 
tin m-elvca did not hesitate to engage the enemy cruisers, 
Imili with gun and torpedoes, with hardihood, and two 
of them, the Laurel and Liberty, got knocked about, in 
the process. Intercepted Gorman M_<uals and other 
information iroi TOM > "minus the report of 

\ii-c Vhninil I'-Mlty a- I., the sinking of the third 
<;>rrri.iii <TIII IF, \\ liii'li now appears to have been the 

Ariadne. . . . 'The complements of the five German 

vessels known to have l ( >> Mink aggregated about 

1,1'iHP ullicers and men, all of whom, with the exception of 

Tin wounded and nnuoiinded | risoncrs, perished. 



liesides this there is the loss, which must have been 
severe, on board the German torpedo boats (the Germans 
ne\er use the term " destroyers") and other cruisers 
which did not sink in the action. The total British 
rii.-ualtios amounted to 69 killed and wounded, among 
whom must, however, be included two officers of excep- 
tional merit Lieutenant -Commander Nigel K. W. 
Barttelot and Lieutenant Eric W. P. Westmacott. All 
the British ships will be fit for service in a week or ten 
days. The sueeess of this operation was due, in the first 
instance, to the information brought to the Admiralty 
by the submarine officers, who have during the past 
three weeks showed extraordinary daring and enterprise 
in penetrating the enemy's waters. 

A remarkable description of this action 
was given in a letter of an officer to the Morn ing 
Post : 

The Mainz was immensely gallant. The last I saw 
of her, absolutely wrecked alow and aloft, her whole 
midships a fuming inferno. She had one gun forward 
and one aft still spitting forth fury and defiance, " like a 
wild cat mad with wounds." Our own four-funnollBd 
friend recommenced at this juncture with a couple of 
salvoes, but rather half-heartedly ; and we really did not 
care a damn, for there straight ahead of us in lordly 
procession, like elephants walking through a pack of 
pi-dogs, came the Lion, Queen Mary, Invincible, and 
New Zealand, our battle cruisers. Great and grim and 
uncouth as some antediluvian monsters, how solid they 
looked, how utterly earth-quaking ! We pointed out our 
latest aggressor to them, whom they could not see from 
where they were, and they passed down the field of 
battle with the little destroyers on their left and the 
destroyed on their right, and we went west while they 
went east, and turned north between poor four-funnels 
and her home, and just a little later we heard the 
thunder of their guns for a space, then all silence, and we 
knew. Then wireless Lion to all ships and destroyers 
" Retire." 

That was all. Remains only little details, only one of 
which I will tell you. The most romantic, dramatic and 
piquant episode that modern war can ever show. The 
Defender, having sunk an enemy, lowered a whaler to 
pick up her swimming survivors ; before the whaler got 
back an enemy's cruiser came up and chased the Defender, 
and thus she abandoned her whaler. Imagine their 
feelings : alone in an open boat without food, 25 miles 




[Central Newt. 

REAR ADMIRAL A. H. CHRISTIAN, 
H.M.S. "Eurvalus." 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



18 




THE SINKING OF THE "MAINZ." 

Sketch, constructed from authoritative sources, depicting the last moments of the " Mainz," which was 
finished off by the " Fearless," and Commodore Goodenough's Light Cruiser Squadron. (Seepage 12.) 



from the nearest land, and that land the enemy's fortress, 
with nothing but fog and foes around them. Suddenly a 
swirl alongside, and up, if you please, pops His Britannic 
Majesty's submarine E4, opens his conning tower, takes 
them all on board, shuts up again, dives, and brings 
them home 250 miles ! Is not that magnificent ? No 
novel would dare face the critics with an episode like 
that in it, except, perhaps, Jules Verne ; and all true. 

At the time of the action it was widely 
reported that German officers had fired on their 
men while in the water. This, however, 
appears not to have been the case. What 
happened was that the men in the Mainz, seeing 
the approach of the battle cruisers, were seized 
with panic and were deserting their guns. Then' 
it was that the officers fired upon them as they 
fled across the deck and flung themselves over- 
board. Out-generalled, out-manoeuvred and 
out-fought, we can still give every credit 
to the German officers ; they fought their ships 
till they sank beneath them, and more than this 
no man can do. 

It is perhaps somewhat difficult to take a 
perfectly calm and judicial survey of a success- 



ful feat of arms performed by one's own 
countrymen ; nevertheless, restraining all 
enthusiasm, let us look at it from four points 
of view. These are (1) reconnaissance, (2) 
strategy, (3) tactics, (4) discipline and training 
as exemplified in the actual fighting. 

In all military operations efficient recon- 
naissance must precede action. From August 5 
until August 28, the date of the Heligoland 
action, the enemy must have been kept under 
constant surveillance by the submarines. 

The doings of the enemy were faithfully 
and accurately reported to the higher command. 
In their hands lay the decision when, where, and 
at what time to attack ; also to decide what force 
was necessary. Here, again, nothing was 
left to chance, and that first principle of having 
an overwhelming force at the right place and at 
the right time was carried out with success. 
The question arises very naturally, what 
would have happened had the main German 
fleet sallied forth, as it might very well have 



14 



Till-: 7/.W/-;,s' HISTORY OF THE WAli. 



done, iii su]>|ii>rf of its lighter craft ? In that 
case would not the whole operation have been 
seriously endangered '! The answer to this is 
that though wo know Vim-Admiral Beatty mid 
his Battle Cruiser Squadron were in support, 
and that they came into action exactly as it 
\\cre to time-table, we are not told what ships 
were held in reserve behind his force. Had 
the enemy battle fleet elected to come out, 
no doubt they also would have found as warm 
a welcome as did their sisters, the cruisers 
and destroyers. Tactically the battle left 
untliing to be desired. With the screen of 
cruisers for " cripple stopping," with the sup- 
port of the battle cruisers, the light cruisers 
and flotillas went gaily about their work. 
There were moments of peril for some, as we 
have seen in the case of the Arethusa, also in 
the Laurel, the leader of the third flotilla, 
which came upon the German cruisers un- 
supported by any of our vessels of that class. 
Being in action with two destroyers and a cruiser 
at the same time, she was badly knocked about, 
and was only saved by the timely appearance of 
the British cruisers when only three rounds of 
ammunition remained in her lockers. But 
there must be critical moments in any battle 
either by land or sea. 

Fine and gallant as was the action in the 



Heligoland Bight, it was still, as an operation 
of war, of comparatively minor importance 
from the point of view of the number of enemy 
ships destroyed and of officers and men put 
out of action. Where its real importance 
lies is as a test case of capacity from the 
Commander-in-Chief in his flagship down to 
the boy on the lower deck. The nation was 
entitled to draw from this brilliant little affair 
the highest hopes for the future. 

Continuing our record chronologically we 
next come to the loss of the Speedy, a gunboat, 
which struck a mine and foundered, her 
bottom blown out by one of those con- 
trivances with which the North Sea had been 
strewn by the enemy. She was an old vessel 
of small fighting capacity and the casualties 
were few in number. It was noticed at this 
time that in nearly every case the locality 
in which the mines were laid was some thirty 
miles from the shore, and almost opposite to the 
commercial harbours on the East coast. 

The loss of the Speedy occurred on Septeni 
her 3, and on Saturday, September 5, the nation 
had to mourn the loss of the Pathfinder, a 
light cruiser of 2,940 tons, and a complement 
of 268 officers and men ; unfortunately in her 
case there was considerable loss of life. This 
vessel was sunk off May Island, Firth of Forth, 




AN ENGLISH MINE READY TO BE PUT OVERBOARD. 



[Record I J re>s. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



16 





A SUBMARINE MINE EXPLOSION. 



[Sport anil General. 



by a German submarine. There was some 
question at first if she had not struck a mine, but 
the statements of the survivors are quite clear 
that the periscope of their assailant was seen. 
The survivors were rescued by the destroyer 
Stag after being in the water for an hour and 
seventeen minutes. On September 15 the 
Hela, a German light cruiser, was sunk by 
Submarine E9 six miles south of Heligoland. 
She was a vessel of 2,040 tons, with a comple- 
ment of 178, and was of small fighting value. 

During September an order was issued by 
the Admiralty to the effect that, as it had 
become obvious that minelaying was still 
going on, also that no ship dared to show a 
German flag in the North Sea, the mines must 
be laid by vessels under a neutral flag. Con- 
sequently it was the duty of all ships, while 
observing due courtesy to neutral countries, 
to stop and search every vessel that hove in 
sight. Such an order as this is much easier 
to give than to obey, as the North Sea compared 
to other highways of the ocean is as the Strand 
at midday to a sleepy country lane. On the 
Dogger Bank, and in the shallows between 
the Maas Light and Tersclielling, fishing boats 
alone are often to be counted by the score ; 
and active agr.iits of the enemy no doubt 
frequently received most valuable information 
as to thr movements of British men-of-war 
from perfectly well-meaning and unsuspicious 
fishermen. It is the opinion of many persons 



that it was this that led directly to the 
misfortune which happened on September 22. 

For weeks after the outbreak of war calms 
and fogs and smooth seas prevailed in the 
North Sea. On September 11 a complete 
change came in the weather, and for the 
next ten days, right up to the morning of the 
22nd, it blew furiously with a high short steep 
sea, characteristic of these waters, and the wind 
was accompanied by frequent blinding deluges 
of rain. The line of the patrol was moved 
something further along to the north, and was, 
for the most part, carried out without the 
accompanying destroyers, th- weather being 
far too bad for these small craft to keep the sea. 
This weather culminated in a whole gale on 
September 18, in which the force of the wind 
was quite exceptional for northern latitudes, 
and almost paralleled that of the cyclone or 
the typhoon. On the 21st, the wind having 
motlerated somewhat, arrangements were made 
for the destroyers to come out of harbour on 
the morning of the 22nd arid to join the 
Aboukir, the Hogue, and the Cressy about 
lo a.m. The morning broke cloudless with 
iiu haze, a brisk northerly wind and a short 
choppy sea. The cruisers had just separated 
out to their day patrol stations, three miles 
apart; when a few minutes before 6.30 a.m. 
the Aboukir was seen to reel violently and then 
settle down with a list to port. The Aboukir 
had been struck by a torpedo. 



16 



////. TIMES HISTORY OF THE TIM/;. 




H.M.S. " ABOUKIR," 
Sunk by a German submarine in the North Sea. The " Hogue " and " Cressy " were of the same class. 



We will now quote the words of an eye- 
witness of the disaster : 

There was only one explosion, and most of the onlookers 
were of opinion that she (the Aboukir) had struck a 
mine, and following their first and strongest impulse, 
both the Cressy and Hogue closed in at once to save life. 
At 6.55 a.m. the Hogue was within a quarter of a mile of 
the Aboukir on her starboard bow, with the Cressy a 
similar distance away on the other side. The Aboukir 
had started to lower her starboard seaboat, but the list 
had become so great that she stuck and could not be got 
away. The sun was shining very brightly, and the red 
glow of her copper bottom with the pink naked bodies of 
the men as they climbed down her sides made a picture 
that will never be forgotten. 

Some jumped in, others sat down and slid, still others 
contented themselves with walking a few paces as the 
vessel heeled over. Suddenly, with two tremendous 
crashes, one immediately after the other, the Hogue was 
struck, both torpedoes exploding in the same place, just 
aft of the starboard after bridge. The ship leapt up 
like a rowelled horse (she is a vessel of 12,000 tons, so 
this gives some idea of the violence of the explosion) ; 
and quivered all over, just as a steel spring will quiver 
when firmly held at one end and sharply struck at the 
other. Looking over the side the twin lines of bubbles 
made by the torpedoes were plainly visible and led the 
eye at once to the first sight of the submarine's periscope. 
The Hogue's two seaboats had been got away, together 
with the launch, in aid of the Aboukir, and the latter with 
a number of saved was close to on the port bow. 
\Vlion the Hogue was struck she stood off a few yards 
and waited. Meanwhile another party were busy 
throwing overboard several planks and baulks of timber 
which had been used for the construction of targets. 
The rest of the men stood quietly by waiting for the 
order to jump, and passing the time in slipping off their 
clothes, ifter a few minutes the order came and the 
men went in. Unfortunately, obeying a natural impulse, 
by far the greawr majority wont off the port bow close 



to where the launch lay, and as the Hogue disappears I 
about six minutes after she had been struck scores of them 
clung to the gunwales of the launch until she was unable 
to stand the strain and fell to pieces, precipitating her 
own crew and those unfortunates already saved from th<- 
Aboukir. What followed is best left to the imagination, 
suffice it to say that nearly all those from the Hogue who 
were lost perished here. 

By something like a miracle, as the Hogue 
went down, she partially righted, with the 
result that the steam picket boat and steam 
pinnace both floated off her undamaged, and 
in this manner many of the survivors were 
saved. At this juncture the Cressy came up, 
and says the narrative " opened fire with 
both batteries on the submarines (sic)." She 
continued the work of rescue until she herself 
was struck amidships by two torpedoes and 
sank almost at once. The Flora, of Ymuiden. 
and a Lowestoft trawler did noble work in 
rescuing those still floating about in the water 
when they arrived on the scene, also the Titan, 
of Rotterdam. The men from the boats were 
taken on board the steamers, and when it 
became clear that no more survivors could be 
picked up each left for its own port. As the 
Flora steamed away eye-witnesses stated posi- 
tively that three conning towers of submarines 
were sighted, yet the German account declared 
that only one was engaged in this action, so 
disastrous in its loss of life to the British Navy. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



17 



Judged by modern standards the fighting 
powers of the sunken cruisers was not great, 
and, as a purely material loss, the deduction 
from our sea strength was insignificant. Part 
of the official comment issued by the Secretary 
of the Admiralty runs thus : 

The loss of nearly 60 officers and 1,400 men would not 
have been grudged if it had been brought about by 
gunfire in an open action, but it is particularly dis- 
tressing under the conditions that prevailed. The 
absence of any of the ardour and excitement of an 
engagement did not, however, prevent the display of 
discipline, cheerful courage, and ready self-saerin'ee 
among all ranks and ratings exposed to the'ordeal. 

We cannot close this episode in the history 
of the war without recording the noble sym- 
pathy, the practical goodness, the whole- 
hearted compassion shown to the British 
sailors by the Dutch people of all ranks and 
classes. Their true philanthropy was one of 
the brightest spots in the almost unrelieved 
gloom of a terrible sea tragedy. 

On October 3 the Secretary of the 
Admiralty communicated the following : 

The German policy of minelaying, combined with 
their submarine activities, makes it necessary on military 
grounds for the Admiralty to adopt counter measures. 
His Majesty's Government have therefore authorised a 
mine-laying policy in certain areas, and a system of mine- 
fields has been established and is being developed upon 
a considerable scale. 

In order to reduce risks to non-combatants, the 
Admiralty announce that it is dangerous henceforward 
for ships to cross the area between 

Latitude 51 15' N. and 51 40' N. and 
Longitude 1 35' E. and 3 E. 

In this connection it must be remembered that the 
southern limit of the German mine field is Latitude 



52 N. Although these limits are assigned to the danger 
area, it must not be supposed that navigation is safe in 
anj' part of the southern waters of the North Sea. 

Instructions have been issued to His Majesty's ships 
to warn east-going vessels of the presence of this new 
mine field. 

On October 15 H.M.S. Hawke, a cruiser of 
7,350 tons, was torpedoed and sunk " in the 
Northern waters of the North Sea." Her 
complement was normally 544 officers and 
men ; of these three officers and 49 men were 
landed at Aberdeen fish market by the steam 
trawler Ben Binnes, and subsequently one 
officer and twenty men were saved from a raft. 
H.M.S. Theseus, asister ship to the Hawke, was 
also attacked at the same time, but was un- 
damaged. The Hawke was an old ship of the 
1890-91 programme. 

We now come to the next act in this tre- 
mendous drama which, on October 17, 
resulted in the sinking of the four German 
destroyers S115, S117, S118 and S119 off the 
Dutch coast. The official report ran : 

The new light cruiser Undaunted (Captain Cecil H. 
Fox), accompanied by the destroyers Lance (Commander 
W. de M. Egerton), Legion (Lieutenant C. F. Allsup), 
and Loyal (Lieutenant F. Surges Watson), engaged four 
German destroyers off the Dutch coast yesterday 
afternoon. All the enemy's destroyers were sunk. The 
British loss in the destroyer action yesterday was one 
officer and four men wounded. The damage to the 
British destroyers was slight. There are 31 German 
survivors prisoners of war. 

An interesting circumstance in connexion 
with this lively and successful little action is 
the fact that the senior officer present in the 
light cruiser Undaunted was Captain Cecil H. 




H.M.S. " HAWKE," 
Sunk by a German submarine in the North Sea. 



1S 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 




H.M.S. "LION" SINKING THE " KOLN." (Seepage 12.) 



Fox. This olh'cer took part in the first action 
of the war when, in the Amphion, he was 
instrumental in the destruction of the mine- 
layer Konigin Luise; his next adventure was 
when the Amphion was pent to the bottom by 
a mine, and he himself had a marvellous escape. 
The explosion of the first mine knocked him 
insensible. He recovered, and was able to 
leave the ship three minutes before she went 
down under the shock of a second explosion, 
when he saw a 6-inch gun belonging to his 
wrecked command turning over and over in 
the air like a baby's toy. He was then 
appointed to the new (lest rover leader Faulkner, 
which was building in this country for Chile 
when war was declared. Only a few days 
before the action he was transferred to the 
1 iidauntcd. the second light cruiser of anew 
.lass to be commissioned, the first having been 



the Arethusa. The destroyers of the " L ' 
class were part, of the 1911-12 programme. 
They were formidable vessels of 35-knot speed, 
armed with three 4-inch guns and four torpedo 
tubes in pairs discharging 21 -inch tor- 
pedoes. 

The German destroyers were older boats, 
carrying -only two 23-pounder guns, and not 
only were they slower, but there was absolutely 
no comparison between the accuracy of their 
shooting and that of the British craft engaged. 
The destruction of the Hawke took place on 
October 15, and by the sinking of the four 
(lennan destroyers two days afterwards the 
balance as between the two navies was more 
than satisfactorily adjusted from our point of 
view. The loss of life, some 300 men in each 
case, was about the same, but the value of an 
obsolescent cruiser like the Hawke was far less 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



serious to England than that of four destroyers 
to Germany. 

In less than two hours the whole affair was 
over. In one account of the fight it was said 
that firing began at a range of from four to 
five miles. Whatever the distance may have 
been, the result was never in doubt for a 
moment owing to the superior accuracy of the 
fire of the British destroyers. On the return 
of the Undaunted and the four destroyers that 
had been engaged they were given a warm 
reception by the warships in Harwich, by the 
general public, and particularly by the wounded 
soldiers in the hospital who were strong enough 
to get to the windows and cheer. 

On or about October 18 we had to mourn 
the loss of submarine E3. What her exact 
fate was, how she came by her end, even the 
British Admiralty did not seem to know. Her 
fate, no less than that of the ships lost on both 
sides, demonstrated how costly in human life 
modern naval warfare had become. Not only 
was it a fight to a finish as it had always 
been but he who lost the battle lost his life 
also, almost automatically, as the steel shells, 
the hulls of the warships, were no match for the 
steel shells from the guns. 

In war, as Admiral Mahan has said with so 
much point, " It is no good snapping at the 
heels, one must strike straight at the heart." 
The stroke at the heart had to be delivered in 
the waters of the North Sea, but there was one 
subsidiary theatre of enormous importance, 
even when compared with the northern area 
the Mediterranean. By agreement with 
France, Great Britain, in the event of war, 
charged herself with the entire range of the 
northern waters she was also to lend assistance 
in the southern. The result of this compact 
was that the French Battle Fleet was at the 
outbreak of hostilities in the Mediterranean, 
and here the Republic was supported by the 
British Mediterranean Fleet. 

Those who had studied war in time of peace 
knew that one of the principal preoccupations 
of the French General Staff had been for 
years the question of how, in the event of col- 
lision between the Triple Alliance and the 
Triple Entente, the French armies in Algeria, 
numbering 120,000 first-line troops, were to he 
ferried across the tideless sea from Algeria to 
the Midi. Most of the manoeuvres undertaken 
by the French Navy of late years had had 
this problem as one of the underlying ideas of 
their work, and much ingenuity had gone to 



its solution. Italy, however, having refused to 
come in and wage a war of pure aggression 
that was none of her business, and for the 
waging of which she was not even consulted, 
the problem was reduced to elemental sim- 
plicity. In the Mediterranean there only 
remained the weak Austrian Fleet, which, 
imitating the example of " the predominant 
partner," elected to remain " stowed away up 
a drain." This is not meant as any reflection 
on the gallant seamen of Austria. To come 
out was merely to invite destruction at the 
hands of overwhelming superiority of force. 
Alone among the conscript navies of the world 
our allies, the French, had to their hands a 
large supply of seamen upon whom to draw 
for the manning of " 1'Armee de la Mer." And 
the French " loup de mer " is a fine fellow, as 
our seamen could testify who fought with him 
so many tough battles from the day of Sluys, 
in the year 1340, down to the end of that 
" great war " that had its apotheosis in Tra- 
falgar. At the head of the sea forces of France 
was Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, in whom 
England, no less than France, had supreme 
confidence. No politician, even although he 
had held the position of Minister of Marine in 




[Record PffSS. 

A GERMAN FLOATING MINE. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 





BELGIAN FISHERMEN WATCH A BRITISH 

MONITOR SHELL THE GERMAN 

TRENCHES. 

Paris, no respecter of persons, all through his 
career thin great seaman had but one ideal, 
the greater glory and the higher efficiency of 
the service. 

It would be the height of ingratitude on our 
part to undervalue the priceless service that 
France was to render to us on the sea. It was 
by the action of Boue de Lapeyrere and the 
fine fleet that he commanded that the Medi- 
terranean was a French and English lake ; also 
that the Grand Fleet could keep intact that 
iron ring which was drawn around the sea 
forces and the sea communications of the 
enemy. Also let it not be forgotten that France 
was also rendering assistance in the Northern 
area of conflict, where she had a squadron of 
armoured cruisers, as well as quite a consider- 
able number of those small craft, such as 
destroyers and submarines, which, as has been 
said, the Navy of the Republic designat(p as 
poussiere navale. Early in the war La Vie 
Maritime el Flufiale published a conversation 
between " un ancien commissaire " and its 
editor. Monsieur ( 'liarles BOP, once " rapporteur 
(lu budget de la marine." 

The " ancien commissaire," like a good manv 
i it her people, hud observed lliat no action had 
been fought between the French Fleet and 
Hint of the enemy, and asked the question. " X 



quoi bon desormais entretenir des escadres 
aussi nombreuses ? " the point of his argument 
being, that, as the Navy was not fighting, it 
would be much better for the ships to return 
into port and utilise the mariners in the fighting 
line on shore. Driven into a corner, and 
being made to admit that it was some use to 
allow the merchant ships of France and 
England to proceed without let or hindrance, 
the commissaire returned to the charge willi 
the demand to know why Cattaro had been 
bombarded by the Fleet ? 

The answer to this was fairly comprehensive : 

He (that is to say, Admiral Bou6 de Lapeyrere) has 
done that which was imperative. He has seized upon 
Lissa as a base of operations. He has thus blockaded 
from a distance all the Austrian ports from Trieste as far 
as Pola. He bombarded Cattaro to facilitate the action 
of Montenegro ; and lying in wait in front of Pola, after 
having eleared the minefields with which the sea was 
strewn, lie awaits the time when the Austrian* shall issni- 
from their ports . . . what he has done, in effect, is 
what the English Admiral has done in the North, who 
has blockaded Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, and, in con- 
sequence, Bremen and Hamburg and also the Cattegat, 
with the result that the German fleet dares not come out 
into the open. I would ask you also to observe that at 
this moment German and Austro-Hungarian commerce 
is ruined. Surrounded as they are by enemies nothing 
can reach their countries. 

At the outbreak of war the German battle 
cruiser Goeben and the cruiser Breslau were 
in the Mediterranean. On August 6 it was 
reported that these two ships had been driven 
into Messina by British cruisers after an 
exciting chase, and on August 8 it was further 
reported that they had left Messina for an 
unknown destination. That destination was 
the Dardanelles. A plucky attempt was made 
by the light cruiser Gloucester to prevent the 
escape of the German ships. After a farcical 
sale of them to the Turkish authorities, German 
crews and officers were sent to Constantinople, 
nominally to man other ships of the Turkish 
Fleet. Finally, xinder the stimulus of his 
German friends, Enver Pasha induced his un- 
happy country to declare war on the Allies. 

Otherwise, nothing of first-class importance 
from the naval point of view happened, or 
seemed likely to happen, in the Mediterranean. 
This is easily explained by reference to the 
opposing forces afloat in the middle sea. 

The Austrian forces consisted of three Dread- 
nought battleships, the Viribus I'nitis. Tegett- 
hoff, and Prinz Eugen ; six smaller so-called 
battle-ships, of which the Zrinyi \vas sunk, 
and two armoured cruisers, besides small craft. 
To oppose this force the French had eight 
first-class Dreadnoughts in their first Battle 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




THE BRITISH MONITOR 'SEVERN." 
In the operations off the Belgian Coast the British monitors fired on the Germans with great effect. 



Squadron, five pre-Dreadnought ships in their 
Second Squadron, six reserve battleships, six 
armoured cruisers, and a number of older 
vessels, no doubt put into commission after the 
war began. The English Mediterranean Fleet 
at the beginning of hostilities consisted of 
three battle cruisers, four armoured cruisers, 
and four light cruisers, besides small craft. 
When Turkey had been drawn into the war 
we had to reckon with her fleet, such as it was ; 
but apart from those modern units the Goeben 
and the Breslau, the remainder of this sea force 
consisted of obsolescent vessels, and the service 
was informed throughout with an inefficiency 
and a slackness on which German methods of 
hustle were likely to produce a confusion worse 
confounded. Since the days when the Ottoman 
emerged from the back of beyond in Asia 
Minor in 1453, down through the time of 
Soliman the Magnificent when Turkey was 
at her apogee to the present day, the Turk 
had been a useless person on the sea. 

Before leaving the subject of the Mediter- 
ranean it is necessary to touch on a notification 
issued by the British Government to the repre- 
sentatives of foreign maritime powers in Lon- 
don concerning the Suez Canal. It appeared 
that, contrary to all right and precedent, certain 
enemy merchant ships were using the Canal 



as a sanctuary or refuge from capture. The 
conclusion of the notification of our Govern- 
ment runs thus : 

His Majesty's Government do not admit that the con- 
ventional right of free access to and use of the Canal 
enjoyed by merchant vessels implies any right to make 
use of the Canal and its ports of access for an indefinite 
time to escape capture, since the obvious result of 
permitting any such course must be greatly to incom 
mode and even to block the use of the ports and Canal 
by other ships, and they are consequently of opinion 
that the Egyptian Government are fully justified in 
the steps that they are taking to remove from the Canal 
all enemy ships which have been long enough in the Canal 
ports to show clearly that they have no intention of 
departing in the ordinary way, and that they are putting 
the Canal and its ports to a use which is inconsistent 
with the use of the Canal in the ordinary way with other 
shipping. 

One answer to the question why the German 
High Sea Fleet did not leave the security of 
its harbours is to be found in the fact that on 
Germany's flank was another " fleet in being," 
in the shape of the sea forces of Russia. It is 
true that, measured by the modern standard, 
these were not very formidable, but Russia had 
a considerable number of cruisers, and in the 
interests of Germany Russia had to be watched 
closely in the Baltic, lest she should embark 
in transports some of those troops that wore 
bound for Berlin. To leave the Baltic alto- 
gether unguarded by sea would be to invite the 
landing of Russian troops on the then abso- 



24 



////: TIMES 



i' rni-: WAT*. 




THE "GOEBEN 1 ' FLYING THE TURKISH FLAG. 



lutely defenceless littoral. It is true that the 
Russian Fleet was static while her army was 
dynamic, but to release this static force, by 
the advance of al! her available naval power 
into the North Sea, was a thing that Germany 
could not and dared not do. 

Early in the war the Germans lost their fine 
new cruiser Magdeburg, a sister ship to the 
Breslau, in the Baltic. She was of the 1911 
programme, and was 4,550 tons displacement. 
It was reported that she ran on shore in a fog 
and was blown up by her crew as a superior 
Russian force was approacliing. The Times 
naval correspondent, commenting on this, said, 
" It seems more probable that the Russian ships 
engaged the enemy vessel, and that she was 
run ashore in the course of the action, and 
t hat the fight and her violent beacliing accounted 
for the heavy casualty list." On Septem- 
ber 4 the Admiralty issued the statement 
that " seven German destroyers and torpedo 
boats have arrived at Kiel in a damaged con- 
dition " ; adding that, " it is understood that 
several others have been sunk in the vicinity 
of the Canal." At the time no explanation 
was given as to who was the enemy on this 
occasion. The Times published the following 
despatch from Petrograd on September 10 : 

The news of a disaster to the German fleet in the 
Baltic, already reported abroad, is confirmed by infor- 
iimtion received here. There appears to be no doubt 
whatever that the German warships fired on each other. 
All rumours of an engagement with the Russian fleet in 
the Baltic are untrue. I gather from trustworthy 
information that a fairly numerous flotilla, attended by 
cruisers, while engaged in hunting down pnsxenger 
steamers, mistook their own for enemy ship* and 
i-ngaged in a lively battle. The number of \c--cl, 
4-ripplorl is unknown, hut I hnvn ascertained tt.>n vi rail 



cruisers and destroyers entered Kiel badly mauled and 
riddled by shot and shell, and that many wounded 
were conveyed ashore. 

On October 10 the Russian armoured 
cruisers Admiral Makaroff, PaK.ida and Bayan, 
were on patrol duty in the Baltic. That morning 
tho (Admiral Makaroff was attacked by an 
enemy submarine as she was in the act of 
searching a sailing ship that she had stopped. 
Several torpedoes were fired at her, but happily 
none took effect. On October 11, at 2 
o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy's sub- 
marines again attacked the Bayan and the 
P illada. A lively fire was kept up by the 
cruisers, but in spite of this, one of the sub- 
marines got home on the Pallada with a tor- 
pedo ; an explosion followed the Pallada 
having probably been struck under her maga- 
zine and the ship sank, carrying all her ill- 
fated crew with her. The Pallada, an armoured 
cruiser of 7,775 tons, was built in 1906. 

On October 22 the Secretary of tho 
Admiralty made the following announcement : 

The monitors Severn, Commander Erie J. A. Fullerton ; 
llumber, Commander Arthur L. Snagge ; and Mi-rsry, 
Lieutenant-Commander Robert A. Wilson, have recently 
been engaged in operations on the Belgian coast, firin;,' 
on the right flank of the German army. Owing to their 
lid 1 1 draught they have been able to contribute materially 
to (he success of the operations in the district, and have 
ly abundantly justified their acquisition on the 
(iiuliroak of war. In addition, detachments with 
machine nuns have been landed from these vessels to 
in tho defence of Nieuport, where they performed 
meritorious service. 

With this announcement, of great importance 
for the operations in France, we close this 
phn.se of naval operations in the North Sea, 
Baltic, and Mediterranean. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 

THE NAVY'S WORK IN 
THE OUTER SEAS. 



THE NAVY'S TASK PROTECTION or BRITISH TRADE AND SUPPLIES DESTRUCTION OP THE ENEMY'S 
COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL LAW THE DECLARATION or PARIS CRITICISMS THE HAGUK 
CONFERENCES THE RIGHT OF CAP-TORE THE DECLARATION OF LONDON GERMAN FORCES IN 
TEE OUTER SEAS AHMED LINERS PRIZES AND PRIZE MONEY THE " EMDEN " AND HER SUC- 
CESSES THE " HIGHFLYER " A NAVAL DUEL WORK OF BRITISH CRUISERS GERMAN ACTIVITY 
IN THE ATLANTIC ATTACKS ON GERMAN COLONIES WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
GERMAN EAST AFRICA SAMOA THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY AT 
WORK JAPAN AND KIAO-CHAU INLAND FIGHTING IN AFRICA GAINS AND LOSSES. 



MORE than a century had elapsed 
since Britain had been engaged in a 
war which seriously affected her 
maritime interests. Her mercantile 
marine had meanwhile increased enormously, 
and she was more than ever dependent upon 
over-sea supplies for her very existence. Food 
of almost every description, supplies of material 
to feed her huge factories, and a host of other 
things which, if they cannot be regarded as 
necessaries, nevertheless play a not unim- 
portant part in the round of barter for all 
these she relied to an increasing extent upon 
sea-carriage ; to such an extent, indeed, that 
anything approaching complete stoppage 
would involve disaster, and possible conquest. 
Germany had also, during recent years, 
developed a large mercantile marine, and had 
maintained persistent competition with Britain 
all over the world, both in freight and passenger 
services. Although the entire closing of the 
seas to her would not involve consequences 
so immediately disastrous as in our case, it 
would nevertheless occasion a fatal stagnation 
of her industries which could not fail very 
seriously to hamper her resources. 



It is an axiom, maintained by all the highest 
authorities, and sanctioned by history, that 
the power of destroying or driving off the seas 
the commerce of the enemy, while preserving 
one's own more or less intact, is the sure road 
to ultimate victory, even against a vastly 
superior military State. It was this power 
which, in the years following Trafalgar, slowly 
but surely tilted the scale in our favour. It is 
as though one should block the main arteries 
of the body, leaving the heart to pulsate fruit- 
lessly, until it becomes atrophied, flaccid and 
powerless through continued futile effort. 
While armies furiously contend on land, the 
persistent, silent, and relatively humane pres- 
sure of the stronger afloat is steadily achieving 
ultimate victory, by sapping the commercial 
resources of the other. 

These pregnant facts, of such paramount 
importance to Britain, had not been lost sight 
of, despite our long immunity from peril afloat. 
The subject had formed the basis of many 
arguments, in the Press and in Parliament, 
and had called forth exhortation, and occa- 
sionally denunciation, from naval officers and 
others of high repute. " Cruisers, cruisers, and 



2fi 



THI-: 



HISTOKY OF THE WAR. 




/>}' . 



REAR-ADMIRAL A. G. H. W. MOORE, 
Who took part in the action in the Heligoland Bight. 

yet more cruisers ! " This was their cry. The 
enormous extent of our trade routes could not 
he covered in war time save by lavish expendi- 
ture in this direction in time of peace. It was 
almost a truism, but the actual provision neces- 
sary to secure adequate protection remained, 
after all, more or less a matter of opinion. 
The Admiralty had done a good deal, more 
especially in the years immediately preceding 
the war, both in shipbuilding and in organi- 
zation ; but the verdict must be that it had not 
done quite enough. 

For years we had been told of the elaborate 
preparations in progress by Germany for 
preying upon our commerce, more especially 
by means of fast merchant vessels converted 
into warships : and it had come to be regarded 
as at least a possibility that, in the event of 
war, we should immediately be plunged into a 
condition of semi-famine, with prices rising to 
a tiL'iire prohibitive except to the wealthy. 

The consideration of the matter of attack 
and defence of commerce lands us at once in 
the qiuiamire of Maritime International Law. 
Quot homines, t<,l untentias. It is related that 
one of the delegates at the <;enc\a arbitration 
on the Alabama claims declared : " There is no 
Int.-rn.itional Law!" I'erhaps, like David, 
he said it in his haste ; and, also in common 



with the psalmist, he enunciated a half truth. 
l"p to the time of the Crimean War certain 
standing laws, or traditions, based upon 
ancient maritime law and centuries of usage, 
had been universally recognized- 

1. The right to supplement the fleet by 
means of " private armed ships " ; that is to 
Bay, ships which were owned by private indi- 
viduals or companies, but were licensed by u 
commission from the Government to be armed 
and to attack and capture the enemy's ships. 
The owners provided the ship and her whole 
outfit, and paid the crew ; and the value of the 
prize, when duly ascertained, went almost 
entirely to the owners and the crew, in pre- 
arranged proportions. As will be readily 
imagined, it was sometimes a very paying busi- 
ness, and in the wars of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries privateers swanned 
upon the seas.* Some of the commanders 
were, however, very great rascals, and got the 
business into disrepute by their piratical 
practices. Nelson was very much down upon 
them, as well as other naval officers of repute, 
because, the privateer owners alleged, they 
were deprived of some of their prize money ! 
Who shall say ? However, there was the 
practice, permitted by the consent of all 
nations. 

2. The right to capture enemy merchant 
ships and their cargoes. This had always been 
recognized as a natural condition of warfare ; 
but there was a proviso, dating from a con- 
siderable time back, that .cargoes owned by 
neutrals, even in an enemy ship, should be 
immune, unless they were contraband of war. 

3. The right to seize the property of persons 
of enemy nationality, even though carried in a 
ship under a neutral flag, involving, of course, 
the right to board and search neutral ships. 
This, as will be realized upon the smallest con- 
sideration, was an eminently reasonable, stipu- 
lation, and of very great value to a maritime 
power at war with another and yet it was the 
first to be thrown overboard ! 

In 185G, after the Peace of Paris had been 
concluded, a document, entitled the Declaration 
of Paris, drawn up by the Peace Plenipoten- 
tiaries, was offered for the acceptance and 
recognition of all the Powers. 



* A an instance, the privateers Duke and Prince FrtHlerick 
captured, in 1745, three French ships bound from Lima to St. 
M.I In, aud a seaman's share of prize money was 850, the officers' 
of course larger according to rank, while tlio owners pocketed 
700, 000, which rthey patriotically or prudently offered .-is a 
loan to Government to assist in dealing with " the '45 " rebellion. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



27 




[Cribb, Southsfa. 

A 12-INCH PROJECTILE BEING HOISTED 
ABOARD. 

In the later pattern this missile is sent to its mark by 
a 307 Ib. charge of cordite. 

It embodied some drastic alterations in 
Maritime Law ; the four effective clauses being 
as follows : 

1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's mer- 
chandise, with the exception of contraband of 
war. 

.'!. Neutral merchandise, witli the exception of 
contraband of war, is not capturable under the 
enemy's flag. 

4. Blockades, in order to be obligatory, 
must be effective. 

The tliird clause, as will be realised, is in 
accordance with ancient usage. The subject 
of blockade need not here be entered upon. 
Probably there will never be another blockade 
on the old lines ; modern conditions of naval 
warfare do not lend themselves to the process. 
Blockades had, in some instances, been 
effective in the past, and in others had been 
rather of the nature of a fiasco. 

The first two clauses of the Declaration, 
however, demand attention ; and it is remark- 
able that they had been anticipated by Britain 
at the commencement of the war in 18o4 
an announcement having appeared in the 



London Gazette, March 28, in the form of a 
declaration by the Queen, to the effect that, 
being " desirous of rendering the war as little 
onerous as possible to the Powers with whom 
she is- at peace," she will, while reserving the 
right of seizing contraband of war, and pre- 
venting neutrals from carrying despatches or 
breaking blockades, " waive the right of seizing 
enemy's property' laden on board a neutral 
vessel unless it be contraband of war " ; and, 
finally, the Queen declares that "it is not her 
present intention to issue letters of marque for 
the commissioning of privateers." 

This voluntary abnegation of important 
rights was, it is true, labelled as a temporary 
or tentative measure, by the occurrence in the 
preamble of the words, " for the present " ; 
but in the Declaration of Paris, of course, it 
bears no such stamp. 

This declaration stands upon very infirm 
ground. It is decidedly doubtful, to start with, 
whether the Peace Plenipotentiaries, having 
performed .the task for which plenary powers 
had been conferred upon them, were com- 
petent, without further authority, to transact 
international business of such weighty nature ; 
and the bestowal of such authority by the 
Sovereign is not in evidence : indeed, there is 




[Cribb, Southsta. 

WAITING FOR THE GERMANS. 

A pile of 6-inch projectiles, each weighing 

100 pounds. 



28 



THE TIMES HISTOHY <>!' THE WAR. 




H.M.S. "DREADNOUGHT" 
Cleared for action. 



[Cribb, Souths. 



ground for strong presumption that it was 
never conferred. 

Finally, as Mr. Gibson Bowles puts it, " It 
has never received, either from the Sovereign, 
from the Privy Council, or from Parliament, 
that subsequent formal sanction which alone 
could suffice to give a semblance of adequate 
authority to an alteration in the rules of war- 
fare so tremendous, a surrender of maritime 
rights so unprecedented."* 

Spain and the United States of America 
declined to subscribe to the Declaration, while 
Russia repudiated the privateering clause ; so, 
when all was said and done, there remained 
1 1 in tonal for drastic differences in case of war 
with any of these Powers. 

There ensued a long period free from any 
further tampering with maritime law ; but at 
the second Peace Conference, held at The 
IhiL-iir in 1907, some effort was made at inter- 
national agreement upon several points. The 
niDst important of these, from our present 
point of virtt , \\ as the question of the conversion 
of merchant ships and warships, upon which 
(rtniri rules \M-rr nmved to 



* " The Declaration ot I'arln of 1850," p. 1:!2. 



1. Such a ship must be under the direct, 
authority and responsibility of the Power 
whose flag it flies. 

2. It must bear the external marks which 
distinguish the warships of its nationality. 

3. The commander must be a genuine naval 
officer, his name appearing in the Navy List. 

4. The crew must be subject to military dis- 
cipline. 

5. The ship must observe the laws and cus- 
toms of war. 

6. The conversion of the ship must be 
announced as soon as possible by the belli- 
gerent in the list of its warships. 

These rules, however, were prefaced by the 
statement that the delegates had been unable 
to come to any agreement as to whether the 
conversion of a merchant ship into a warship 
might take place upon the high seas. Germany 
stoutly maintained the right, England as 
stoutly opposed it ; result : the right remains, 
for tho.se who elect to make use of it. 

Probably all such conferences as this are pre- 
doomed to futility. To quote the concluding 
words of an article on the subject in the Edin- 
burgh Revieu- for January. 1908 : " A Peace 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. 



29 



Conference which is forbidden to discuss 
expenditure upon armaments, and from which 
the rules of naval warfare have admittedly 
to be withdrawn, a world congress which the 
world treats with silence or with ridicule, an 
assembly in which diplomacy and law confound 
each other, does not justify itself. It provides 
opportunities for political demonstrations, but 
to Powers which do not make use of those 
opportunities it brings little but humiliations 
which are unrequited by any sense of lasting 
service done to the cause of peace." 

Concurrently with the assembly of The Hague 
Conference, though initiated previously, in 
1905, at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese 
war, an agitation was being carried on for the 
abolition of the right of capture of enemy 
merchant ships and cargoes at sea. Private 
property, it was alleged, was immune in land 
warfare. Why not at sea ? The allegation of 
the immunity of private property on land was 
certainly liable to liberal discount, even before 
the war of 1914. A humane general will 
certainly spare " household gods," but he 
will seize any property, private or otherwise, 
which will serve to further his end?. It has 
always been done, and always will be done, and 
the seizure of enemy ships and their cargoes 
serves a most vital end to a belligerent. 

The proposal was strongly supported by Sir 
Robert Reid (afterwards known, by his title of 



Lord Loreburn, as Lord High Chancellor) in a 
long letter to The Times of October 14, 1905, 
and by other persons of influence, but the argu- 
ments in favour of it would not stand the test 
of history and common sense, and the agitation 
came to nothing. Our acquiescence in such an 
arrangement would certainly have been throw- 
ing away a trump card. 

Then followed the Declaration of London, of 
1909, the outcome of a conference of the repre- 
sentatives of all the great Powers, at the 
invitation of the British Government. On this 
occasion, as at The Hague Conference, the 
question of converting merchant ships into 
warships on the high seas was ignored. There 
were long lists of " absolute " and " con- 
ditional " contraband of war ; it would serve 
no good purpose to transcribe them ; as a 
matter of fact, belligerents usually make their 
own lists, and what is contraband in one war 
is permissible in the next. Definition is almost 
futile. 

The main object of the London Naval Con- 
ference> as set forth in the final protocol, was 
to establish a code of Internal ional Law, with 
the further view of setting up an international 
Prize Court, as proposed at The Hague Peace 
Conference ; but the Declara h on of London 
was never ratified, nor was tho International 
Prize Court established before the war broke 
out. 




H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA.' 



[Cribb, Southsea. 



30 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




FIRING A TORPEDO FROM A DESTROYER. 



(Cribb, Southst-u. 



The Navy was thus left bound by the 
Declaration of Paris, but the Government, 
immediately after war was declared, intimated 
that the Declaration of London was to form 
the basis of naval procedure, as though it had 
been ratified ; and this would concede the 
right to search neutral ships, and, under certain 
conditions, to condemn their cargoes, or even 
to destroy the ships. The clauses which dealt 
with these matters were, however, far more 
favourable to a military State than to Great 
Britain. 

What, then, were the circumstances, with 
regard to the attack and defence of commerce 
afloat, when war wasrdeclared ? 

The German main fleet, through the prompt 
action of the British Admiralty, was locked up, 
its movements confined to Kiel Harbour, a 
portion of the Baltic, the Kiel Canal, and the 
estuary of the Elbe, unless it should elect to 
come out and risk . encounter with a vastly 
superior force. 

The outlying British squadrons available 
were pretty nearly as follows : 

China : One battleship, four cruisers, six 
M miller vessels, eight destroyers, four torpedo 
boats, three submarines. 

East Indies : One battleship, two cruisers, 
I "in- smaller craft. 

Ciipc : Three cruisers. 



New Zealand : Three cruisers, one sloop. 

West Coast of A'ric i : Three sloops. 

West Coast of America : Three sloops. 

East Coast of South America : One cruiser. 

Australian Navy : One battle cruiser, three 
light cruisers, three destroyers, two submarines. 

The Fourth Cruiser Squadron, consisting of 
five ships, was on the point of returning from 
Mexico and the West Atlantic. 

This, however, does not represent the total 
force available for the defence and destruction 
of commerce, for a number of fast liners were 
immediately put in commission under naval 
commanders. These were, of course, genuine 
warships, flying the White Ensign, without any 
attempt at disguise. 

Furthermore, a certain number of merchant 
steamers were, at the request of the owners, 
provided with guns, mounted only astern, for 
the purposes of defence in the event of being 
chased. The status of an " armed merchant 
ship," as distinguished from a warship or a 
privateer, had always teen recognised. Such 
a vessel is permitted to use her guns only in 
self-defence, and must not initiate an action. 
If, however, she should prove strong enough 
to overcome and capture her assailant, such 
capture is recognised, and the enemy ship is 
"good prize"; a trifle paradoxical, perhaps, 
but not unreasonable. Instances of such 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



31 



captures were by no means lacking in the old 
wars ; as witness the case of the Ellen, of 
Bristol, which, in 1780, brought into Port 
Royal, Jamaica, as prize a Spanish sloop 
of war. 

Against us there were known to be some 
eight or nine German cruisers abroad, all 
efficient for commerce-destroying purposes, 
end several with very high speed, which it was 
recognised would require a great deal of 
catching. 

As to the number of armed liners which 
would be opposed to us, this was, of course, at 
first mere matter of conjecture. Germany, as 
we have seen, had asserted her right to con- 
vert merchant ships into men-of-war or, in 
reality, privateers at a moment's notice, on 
the seas, or even in a neutral port ; and it was 
well known that some of these vessels carried 
their war equipment below decks, in readiness 
for mounting ; also, it was said, the cap- 
tains and superior officers held naval com- 
missions, to come into force upon the declaration 
of war. These matters had been discussed in 
the Press at intervals, and even in Parliament, 
it being urgea by many persons that some 
similar move should be. made by Britain to 
safeguard our interests/. The danger was con- 
siderably exaggerated, as was proved upon the 
declaration of war ; the number of German 
converted liners available was obviously small, 
and a couple were accounted for by our ships 
before the war had been many weeks in pro- 
gress. 

As in every instance of maritime war, there 
were merchant vessels of either side in enemy 
ports, and these, of course, were liable to 
seizure ; while our cruisers were speedily busy 
picking up prizes all over the world, and the 
Prize Courts had work cut out for many weeks. 

It had been notified, however, by the Ad- 
miralty that there was to be no prize money 
for British naval officers. The motive of such 
a novel regulation was somewhat obscure ; it 
did not appear to be covered by the rare 
possible instances in which a naval com- 
mander might be tempted to subordinate his 
duty to his pocket ; nor was it, indeed, very 
complimentary to the cloth to assume that 
such temptation would prevail. Some years 
previously, during the agitation before alluded 
to, for the abolition of the capture of private 
property at sea, it had been suggested by some 
interested quasi-humanitarians that the oppo- 
sition of naval officers was based upon an 



avaricious greed of gain a hypothesis which 
was very warmly and justly repudiated by Mr. 
Julian Corbett in the Nineteenth Century, of 
June, 1907. 

The German commerce destroyers displayed 
no lack of enterprise ; their raids and captures 
were soon reported from various quarters of the 
globe. This was, indeed, to be expected, for 
our merchant vessels are ubiquitous ; nor- was 
the rounding up of these cruisers an easy task. 
Landsmen, perhaps, scarcely realise how minute 
is the ground covered on a large-scale chart by 
the limit of vision, even in bright daylight ; how 
immense is the area of, say, the Bay of Bengal, 
when it comes to hunting down a single vessel 
a vessel, moreover, which is provided with 
wireless apparatus, and is thus in direct com- 
munication with a friendly base, whence she 
can sometimes be warned of danger. 

The thing cuts both ways, of course, and any 
number of possible prizes may, and do, escape 
from the same cause. The captures of our 
ships were, indeed, trivial compared with the 
number which our cruisers brought in, but they 
were sufficient in some quarters to occasion 
indignant enquiries as to when the Navy was 
going to put a stop to them. 

The Bay of Bengal has been mentioned 
above as a sample of an extensive exoanse in 




[CrM, Soulksea. 

COALING A WARSHIP AT SEA. 



82 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




Topical. 

"CAP TRAFALGAR." 
Sunk in the famous duel with the " Carmania." 

which the running down of a single enemy 
cruiser might be a difficult task, and the selec- 
tion is apposite, for it was in this region that 
a German cruiser, the Einden, commanded 
by Captain Karl Von Miiller, particularly 
distinguished herself. 

The Emden was a small vessel of some 
3,500 tons, with a speed of about 25 knots 
quite fast enough to overhaul any British 
steamer she was likely to encounter, and fast 
enough also to run away if necessary. 

The exploits of the enterprising commander 
of this vessel recalled those of Robert Surcouf, 
the famous French privatcersman, in the same 
quarter, over one hundred years previously. 
Like the Confiance, Surcouf 's swift, rakish 
craft, the Emden was generally heard of where 
she was least expected, and, after reaping her 
harvest of merchantmen, as unaccountably 
disappeared. In something under six weeks 
she had captured nearly twenty steamers, 
always contriving 1o pick up a collier among 
them, so that she was able to keep her bunkers 
replenished. It was her captain's invariabl. 
practice to sink his pri/.es, reserving one in 
which to send all the crews and pa. enters into 
port ; indeed, it is not easy to see what else 
he i-.. ill. I have done, as he could not Imv 
hoped to take them into any friendly port, nor 
could he cumber his own .-hip with the crews.* 
As a variety of adventure, the Emden 
nted one evening into Madras roads, and 
threw shell into the outskirts of the town for 

II \va- lir^r.l at III" time that tllf d''-' Mlrt I'm o! 1 1 !> w-sels 

\v;isei,ntrary In International Law, and lli.it Dritiiin should make 
reprisals. It is. IIUUVMT. and ahvav- has li'-en <|iiite within tin; 
captor's riaht t<i -lestntv enemy pro]KTty at se:i ; a neutral 
\es-el (Mptiirinl is upon : diderent Kxitiii-.'. anil must not l>e 
de-troyed save under i-uvptinnal nt innstjuice*. 



the space of half an hour or so some oil tanks 
were set ablaze, and two or three natives killed ; 
Fort George returned the tire probably with- 
out effect and the Emden retired. 

It may be assumed that the German captain 
received information by wireless of the probable 
approach of colliers or other vessels as he was 
so very much on the spot ; in any case he was 
a very courageo'us and enterprising in. in, and a 
good sportsman ; but we wanted very badly to 
catch him. There are so many holes and 
corners in that part of the world, where a vessel 
may lie for a time with little chance of detection, 
and the Emden's speed would have enabled her 
to reach some such refuge very quickly. 

It was alleged against the Emden, and some 
other German ships, that they approached 
under British or French colours in order to get 
within range, a proceeding strongly condemned 
as " not playing the game." It may not be 
very admirable, but it has always been con- 
sidered admissible, so long as no hostile act is 
committed ; a vessel which tires upon another 
under a false flag is guilty of an act of piracy. 

Towards the end of August there arrived 
intelligence of the destruction of one of the 
most formidable of Germany's converted com- 
merce raiders. This was the Kaiser Wilhelm 
der Grosse, a liner of 14,000 tons and 22 knots 
speed, armed with ten 4-inch guns. She had 
made good her escape from Bremerhaven soon 
after war was declared, and was probably one 
of those vessels already provided with guns, 
etc., converted, quite irregularly, according to 
our notions, into a man-of-war or privateer after 
leaving port as an ordinary merchant ship. It 
was this ship which was supposed to have 
sunk the British vessel Hyades, off Pernambuco; 
thence she had crossed the Atlantic and haunted 
the route of our Cape steamers, holding up 011 
one occasion the mail steamer Galician, which, 
however, she left in peace, and hurried away 
possibly warned by wireless of the proximity of 
a British cruiser. 

She was not permitted a long respite ; 011 
August 27 she was sighted by the Highflyer, 
a cruiser of 5,600 tons, carrying 0-inch guns, 
but not as fast as the German ship by two 
knots or more. The latter had a couple of 
colliers in company, one alongside coaling her, 
and the Highflyer was within range before she 
could get fairly under way. 

There was a light, but it wte not of long 
duration, the liner being clearly outclassed ill 
the matter of ordnafice. She hit the cruiser 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



33 




H.M.S. "PEGASUS." [London News Agency. 

Completely disabled in Zanzibar Harbour by the German cruiser " Ktinigsberg." 



with a shot or two, killing one man and wounding 
five, but her doom was sealed, and she shortly 
went down, her crew being rescued by the 
colliers. 

This was a very good score for us, as the 
German ship might have been very troublesome 
on that route. The fight took place somewhere 
off the round of the coast of Africa, north of the 
Cape Verde Islands, near the Rio de Oro. 

The Highflyer had been commissioned in the 
previous year as a training ship for the " Public 
School " naval cadets, a new institution for the 
recruiting of naval executive officers ; probably 
some of these young gentlemen were on board 
at the time, and were thus brought face to face 
with the realities of naval service at this early 
period of their career. 

Another incident which aroused immense 



interest was a duel between the Carmania, one 
of our converted liners, commanded by Captain 
Noel Grant, and a German ship of like nature 
and about equal force, the Cap Trafalgar. 

These two antagonists encountered on Sep- 
tember 14 off the east coast of South America, 
and there was a stubborn fight. For an hour 
and three-quarters they engaged fiercely, 
exchanging hard knocks. It was a revival of 
the old duels in wars of the past ; with the 
difference, however, that these almost invari- 
ably involved the capture of the vanquished 
vessel, very often by boarding. In the war of 
19 14 boarding was, of course, out of the 
question ; actions were fought at anything from 
3,000 to 10,000 yards, and they banged away 
until one or the other went down with colours 
flying. 




THE " CARMANIA." 



[Central News. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



- -*j-. 




"KAISER WILHELM DER GROSSE." (Topit 

Used by the Germans as an armoured cruiser. Sunk by H.M.S. " Highflyer" off Rio de Ore. 



So it was in this instance ; the Carmania 
commenced the action at 9,000 yards, and a 
lively mutual fire was maintained at various 
ranges, but never within 3,000 yards. The 
British gunners, however, proved themselves 
the superior marksmen, getting their hits in on 
the hull at or near the water-line, while the 
German projectiles mostly crashed into the 
boats and upper works ; moreover, from the 
account of an eye-witness, Captain Grant 
appears to have manoeuvred his ship more 
cleverly, often contriving to present her end-on 
to the enemy, and using his guns ahead or 
astern with fatal effect upon the huge target, 
presented by the Cap Trafalgar, broadside on. 



There was no blenching, however ; the German 
commander took his gruelling like a man, and 
the survivors of his crew got away in the 
cjlli3r, thanks to the approach of a German 
cruiser, with which the Cap Trafalgar was in 
wireless communication during the action. She 
did not heave in sight, but Captain Grant, 
having picked up the wireless message, thought 
it was time to be off. The Carmania had nine 
men killed and twenty-six wounded ; the 
German, which was repeatedly hulled, must 
have suffered a far heavier loss ; she was in 
flames before the action had been half an hour 
in progress, and capsized before she sank. 

Meanwhile our regular cruisers had not been 




THE GERMAN CRUISER " EMDEN." 



[C.nlral Nat's. 



THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. 



85 



idle. The Berwick, Captain Lewis C. Baker, 
captured in the North Atlantic the Harnburg- 
Amerika liner Spreewald, which was known to 
be fitted as an armed cruiser ; also two colliers 
with about 6,000 tons of coal, 180 tons of pro- 
visions, destined for the enemy's cruisers ,t 
very useful haul. The Berwick also captured 
an American ship laden with ammunition, and 
a Norwegian with coal, and the French cruiser 
Conde made a similar capture. 

On the east coast of Africa the small British 
cruiser Pegasus met an untimely fate. Sho had 
done some useful work, including the destruction 
of Dar-os-Salaam, in German East Africa, with 
its wireless station, the sinking of a gunboat 
and of a floating dock. On September 20, 
while she was lying at Zanzibar, giving her 
engines and boilers a necessary overhaul, the 
German cruiser Koiiigsberg appeared and 
attacked her. The Pegasus, thus taken at a 
disadvantage by a vessel carrying more up-to- 
date ordnance and outranging hers, had no 
chance. She was terribly battered, and had 
eventually to be beached, with 25 killed and 
80 wounded out of a crew of 234 a very heavy 
loss. The Konigsberg steamed away, and her 
damages are not known. 

The Yarmouth, Captain Henry Coclirane, in 
the East Indies, captured and sunk the Ham- 
hurg-Amerika liner Markomania, and the Greek 
steamer Pontoporos, with coal, which latter 
was taken into harbour.* 

On the west coast of Africa the cruiser 
Cumberland, Captain Cyril Fuller, made an 
excellent haul in the middle of September at 
the German port of Cameroon (Kamerun), in 
the Bight of Biafra, destroying two small river 
steamers laden with ammunition, appropriating 
the gunboat Soden for our own use, and cap- 
turing no fewer than nine merchant steamers, 
all 'in good condition, of a total of over 
30,000 tonnage. This was a good off -set 
against the Emden'.s achievements, with a 
decided balance in our favour; for, thanks to 
our command of the sea, we were not compelled 
to sink our prizes, and these vessels, with their 
coal, etc., were probably worth some 400,000. 

Another German cruiser had been busy, how- 
ever, in the Atlantic, and exacted a pretty 
heavy toll. This was the Karlsruhe, which 
intercepted and destroyed no fewer than thir- 
teen steamers in the course of a week or two. 

* The owners of the Pontop iros protested that, if she was 
coiilins! the German ship, it was by compulsion, though it lud 
irru.Hisly bii-n reported that she was acting as collier for the 
Emden. 




[Record Press 



CAPTAIN KARL VON MULLER, 
Commander of the " Emden." 

In the Pacific the Leipzig and Nurnberg had 
some success. The Dresden, Strassburg, and 
Bremen were also known to be at large in the 
Atlantic. 

On September 22 the two cruisers Scharn- 
horst and Gneisenau arrived off Papeeta, the 
chief town of Tahiti, in the Society Islands, a 
French colony, entirely unprotected. They sunk 
a n-mall and harmless disarmed gunboat, and 
then proceeded to shell the open town. This 
cruel and absolutely useless proceeding was on 
a par with many other incidents, apparently 
the outcome of wanton mischievousness. 

The end of October came with a further 
exploit on the part of the Emden, which, 
disguised by an extra dummy funnel, and 
flying the Japanese colours as she approached, 
contrived to torpedo a small Russian cruiser 
and a destroyer in the British harbour of 
Penang. At last, on November 10, came the 
welcome news that the Emden 'had been caught 
at Keeling Cocos Island by His Majesty's 
Australian ship Sydney, and driven ashore and 
burned. 

Such was the position at the end of three 
months' war. So far from suffering from 
famine prices and shortage of food, the people 



8G 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




'Mil, Southsta. 



THE NAVAL BRIGADE HAULING THEIR 4V GUN ASHORE. 



of these islands were able to live much as 
usual, with a slight rise on some commodities 
thanks to the silent pressure of our sea-power, 
at home and abroad. 

Despite her complaints to the contrary, 
Germany possessed, at the opening of the war, 
a good number of " places in the sun "- 
colonies scattered about in various warm 
quarters of the globe ; to wit, German East 
Africa, German South West Africa, Cameroon, 
and Togoland ; in the Pacific, German New 
Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, one of the 
largest of the Solomon Islands, the Caroline, 
Ladrone, Pellew and Marshall Islands ; and 
further east the Samoa Islands, or at least the 
chief portion of them. All these possessions 
were accessible from seaward, and consequently 
fitting objects for the attentions of the British 
Navy ; and there was one very important par- 
ticular in which they were worthy of notice 
namely, that every one of them was probably 
fitted with a wireless telegraphy installation. 

The remarkable development in wireless 
telegraphy which had occurred during the 
ten or twelve years previous to the war had 
been exploited by Germany with characteristic 
energy, and it is not easy to over -rate the 
importance of this somewhat uncanny means 
of communication. Like -many other very 
admirable and iisi-ful inventions, it has its 
drawbacks during time of war ; enemy messages 
may be intercepted and utilised to his dis- 
advantage, and a code will not always avail to 



ensure immunity from this ; but on the whole 
it is the most valuable medium of communi- 
cation ever invented. 

t Kealizing the importance of this new tactor 
in warfare, Germany had, in 1906, erected at 
Nauen, aboat five-and-twerity miles from 
Berlin, an experimental wireless station on a 
grand scale, and had there gradually developed 
apparatus of immense range and power ; while, 
at the same time, wireless installations were 
set up in all her chief dependencies ; indeed, it 
was not known in what quarter they might not 
exist, for they need not have been confined to 
German territory. It is not absolutely neces- 
sary to set up a great mast or tower in order 
to establish, at least, an effective receiving 
station ; an unobtrusive arrangement at a 
window will serve very well, and may remain 
altogether unnoticed ; and it is certain thii 
such means were employed in this instance. 

The range of modern wireless telegraphy is 
immense ; more than two years before the war 
the Nauen station covered a circle of some 
3,500 miles radius, and this had been increased 
until it was certain that German cruisers and 
others on the coast of South America, over the 
whole of German Africa and in the East Indies 
could be reached from Berlin ; in fact, with 
reinforcement by powerful inter, nediate 
stations, the whole world wa^ practically 
covered. 

The fact was not overlooked by British 
soldiers and seamen ; and wherever a German 



THE TIMES H18TURY OF THE WAR. 



37 



station could ho successfully attacked the first 
business \vas to locate mid destroy the wireless 
station. 

The cruiser Pegasus was busy, quite early in 
the war, in German East Africa, and was 
responsible for the destruction of the wireless 
apparatus at Dar-es-Salaam, a little north of 
Zanzibar ; unhappily, as previously recorded, 
she was caught at a disadvantage and put out 
of action before she could perform other 
valuable service. 

Early in August mi expedition was planned 
from New Zealand to capture Samoa Islands, 
and it was very ably carried out, under Roar- 
Admiral Sir George I 'a toy. Samoa had been 
the scene of much international wrangling in 
past years I Ii-ii.iin. Germany and America 
all having a finger in the pie. It was one of the 
resulting crises which caused .the squadron of 
man-of-war to be assembled iit Apia in 188!l, 
when every ship in the harbour was wrecked 
in a furious cyclone, except the British cruiser 
Calliope, commanded by Captain H. C. Kane, 
who, with a combination of skill and resolution 
which evoked enthusiastic admiration on the 
spot and at home, took his ship out through 
the reefs in the teeth of the storm. Eventually, 
in 1890, a solution .of the difficult international 
problem was arrived at Germany retaining the 
principal islands, America the others, while 
Britain retired from the scene with certain 
compensations, including the possession of 
the greater part of the Solomon Islands, and 



also the Tonga Islands. On March 1, 1900, the 
German flag was hoisted with due ceremony 
at Samoa ; it was now, with a dramatic absence 
of ceremony, to be hauled down again. 

The expedition left Wellington, New Zealand, 
on August 15, bound for the French island 
New Caledonia, it being considered prudent 
to pursue an indirect course, in view of possible 
interference from two large German cruisers, 
the Seharnhorst and Gneisenau, whicli wen- 
known to be about in the Pacific. At an 
appointed rendezvous the British cruisers 
Psyche, Pyramus and Philomel met and took 
charge of the expedition. 

Arriving at New Caledonia on August 20, 
the British vessels left again on the 23rd, 
strengthened by the addition of the French 
cruiser Montcalm, and subsequently by the 
battle cruiser Australia and the cruiser Mel- 
bourne, of the Australian Navy the former 
flying the flag of Rear- Admiral Sir George. 
Patey. After a call at Fiji Islands, the expedi- 
tion arrived off Samoa on August 30, and 
steered for Apia, on Upolu Island, the head- 
quarters of the German government. After 
some preliminary precautions to ascertain that 
there were no mines about, the Psyche steamed 
in under a flag of truce, and conveyed to the 
authorities the demand of the British Admiral 
for the surrender of the Island. 

The Germans were considerably taken aback, 
as they had been expecting some of their own 
warships ; but they had no force available 




SAMOA. 
The Harbour of Api. 



THE TLMI:S HLSTOHY OF THK W.I I!. 




HARBOUR 



AND FLOATING 
Surrendered to the 



which was capable of offering any effectual 
resistance, so there was nothing for it but to 
yield. The surrender being made known by 
signal, the squadron immediately steamed in 
and anchored, armed parties of bluejackets 
were quickly landed, and took charge of the 




[RaordPrm. 
ADMIRAL MEYER WALDECK, 

( icnnaii Governor of Kiau Tschau. 



chief streets and bridges, &c., while the main 
body was disembarked. The government 
buildings were seized, the plugs in the telephone 
exchange pulled out to prevent any incon- 
venient conversations among the residents, and 
an armed party started out to seize the wireless 
station, conspicuous by its tall, latticed iron- 
work mast, some three or four miles distant. 
Meantime the German flag had been uncere- 
moniously hauled down by a soldier, the Ger- 
mans ruefully saluting it before it was carried 
out of sight. 

On the following morning at eight o'clock 
the British flag was slowly and solemnly 
hoisted, to a salute of twenty-one guns from 
the Psyche, reaching the summit of the stall 
with the final report : the troops gave the 
"Royal Salute," and the ceremony ended with 
the National Anthem, and three rousing cheers 
for the King. 

It was very well done, and there were no 
unnecessary and aggravating international con- 
troversies to detract from the success of a per- 
t'eetly legitimate and humane operation. The 
i 'ti mans, since the declaration of war. had 
treated the British and French residents with 
courtesy, and received, it is needless to say. 
similar treatment at our hands ; the Governor 
was sent to New Zealand for detention, but 
\\as treated as a distinguished guest. 

The largest island in the Bismarck Archi- 
pelago, to the North of New Guinea, is NCH 
.fuuuiiem (New 1'umcraniii, formerly New 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF '////; WAE. 




DOCK OF TSINGTAU. 
Allies. November 7, 1914 



Britain) ; the centre of government is at 
Herbertshohe, at the north-east end of the 
island, upon what is known as the Gazelle 
Peninsula. It was known that there was a 
wireless station in this vicinity, and an attempt 
had been made early in August to reach it, 
but it had only been found possible to destroy 
the post office. On September 11, however, 
a naval landing party, under Commander 
J. A. H. Beresford, managed to get on shore 
at daybreak unobserved presumably at some 
distance from the town and at seven o'clock 
presented themselves to the astonished resi- 
dents, mid proceeded, without opposition, to 
hoist the British Flag. They then set out to 
destroy the wireless station, but here they 
encountered considerable opposition, and having 
reason to suspect that the road was mined and 
ambushed, they fought their way through the 
bush for four miles, with very little loss; the 
Germans in charge of the station surrendered, 
iind on the following day guns were landed, 
and the place fo mally occupied ; two German 
officers and five non-commissioned officers 
were made prisoners, also thirty native police. 

The German governor had retired to the 
island of Bougaiville, in the Solomon Islands, 
and two days later our forces paid a visit there ; 
they met with but little resistance, and after a 
parley the governor surrendered. 

Wilhelmshaven, in German New Guinea, 
was occupied on September 24, without 
resistance. 



The Australian squadron, in conjunction with 
the local military, thus performed excellent 
service, accounting eventually for pretty well 
all the German wireless stations in the Pacific. 
It was reported from Sydney in October that 
those on Yap (or Uap) in the Caroline Islands, 
and Pleasant (or Nauru) Island had been 
destroyed. Pleasant Island is a very small bit 
of terra firma, lying to the south-west of the 
Gilbert Islands, and really forming practically 
one of that group, which is British ; it if 
included, however, with the Caroline Islands in 
the German sphere. 

These satisfactory operations were to bo 
balanced by a sad ' misfortune, involving the 
loss of two officer's and thirty-two seamen. 
The submarine A.E.I, built only in the previous 
year for the Australian navy, a most valuable 
and up-to-date craft of her class, was un- 
accountably lost that is to say, she dived on 
September 14 and never reappeared. Her loss 
was attributed to accident. She and her sister 
vessel had made the voyage to Australia under 
their own power, by far the longest voyage 
then undertaken by a submarine. 

Meanwhile Japan had taken a hand in the 
war by sending an ultimatum to Germany, 
on August 15, demanding the surrender of 
Kio-chau. This was a very fine harbour, on 
the south side of the Shantung Peninsula, 
which Germany had acquired, on a ninety-nine 
years' " lease " from China, as an offset against 
Britain's acquisition of Wei-hai-Wei, facing 



40 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE \VAB. 



Port Arthur. A certnin amount of territory 
inland was included in tlic lease, and the 
liennans proceeded to fortify the town and 
harbour, which had many natural advani 

The Japanese Government declared that the 
possession by Germany of this place was a 
source of irritation and possible mischief in tin 
Kar East, and on the refusal of Germany to 
give it up, commenced combined naval and 
military operations against it, in which some 
of our warships took part ; the Kennct, 
destroyer, chasing a German destroyer into the 
entrance to the harbour, came urider the fire of 
the shore batteries, and sustained some damage, 
with several casualties. The affair developed a 
more military than naval side, and the Germans 
offered a stubborn resistance. Tsingtuu, 
however, fell at the beginning of November. 

The Japanese navy rendered good service by 
the capture of Jaluit, or Bonham Island, in 
the Marshall Group, where the Germans had 
considerable supplies and a wireless station. 
The island is of considerable size, and has good 
anchorage within the coral reefs, with a clear 
wide entrance on one side. 

In Africa there was some inland naval 
righting paradoxical as it may appear at first 
sight on the great Nyaasa Lake, the northern 
portion of which runs into German East Africa, 
while the whole western shore is in British 
Central Africa. 



On this inland sea Mritain and Germany had 
each some small armed steamers, and these 
naturally came into conflict on some OOCaeioHS, 
the Gwendolen, l.ritish. capturing a German 
craft in August. The Gwendolen was a vessel 
of about 350 tons, and was built on tin Chdc. 
taken out in sections to Central Africa, and 
commenced her genuine aquatic existence 
when launched on the lake in 1898. These 
minor operations, however, could have no 
weight in thi' matter of the conquest of German 
Kast Africa, which was essentially a military 
work. 

As an offset .iLainst the capture of Samoa, 
and ec>nsec|Ucnt loss of a wireless station, a 
German cruiser, probably the Niirnberg, on 
September 9, visited Fanning Island, the 
intermediate station of the Fiji and British 
Columbia submarine telegraph, and subse- 
quently cut the cable. Fanning Island is one' 
of a somewhat scattered group of small islands, 
in lat. 4 N, long. 160 W ; it was annexed, 
with the others, by Great Britain in 1888. 

Thanks chieHy to the enterprise of the 
Australian squadron, u .great deal had been 
done by the end of October towards the com- 
plete interruption of Germany's chain of 
wireless communication ; but there remained 
the mighty sweep from Nauen, which could not 
be controlled, and which was doubtless being 
used with effect over its vast radius. 




CHAPTER XXXII. 



THE BATTLES OF THE MARNE. 



END OF THE GREAT RETREAT THE ARMIES MANCEUVRE FOR POSITION VlTAL EFFECTS OP THREE 

EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED ON AUGUST 22 SAARBURG DETERMINES THE EASTERN FRONT CHARLEROI 

DETERMINES THE NORTHERN FRONT rGUMBRINNEN DETERMINES GERMAN STRATEGY THE GREAT 

RETREAT DETERMINES MORAL FACTORS MORAL OF FRANCE, OF PARIS, OF THE ARMY NUMBERS 

ENGAGED AT THE MARNE OBJECTIVES OF THE RIVAL ARMIES CHOICE OF THE GERMAN OBJECTIVE 

THE SCENE OF CONFLICT TACTICAL ISSUES AT STAKE DISPOSITIONS OF THE RIVAL ARMIES 
VON KLUCK UNDERESTIMATES BRITISH ARMY GERMAN RIGHT BREAKS GERMAK LINE GIVES 
WAY ALLIES' LEFT REACHES THE AISNE CRITICISM OF LEADERS AND TROOPS EFFECT OF THE 
VICTORY ON FRANCE -THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ THE BRITISH ADVANCE. 



T 



|HURSDAY, September 3," said 
the British official report, " marked 
the end of our Army's long retire- 
ment from the Belgian frontier 
through Northern France." For the next few 
days there was a lull in the fighting, which had 
been continuous since the first collisions on the 
frontier. 

On September 3 (said Sir John French) the British 
forces were in position south of the Marne between 
Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been 
requested by General Joffre to defend the passages of 
the river as long as possible, and to blow up the bridges 
in my front. After I had made the necessary dis- 
positions, and the destruction of the bridges had been 
effected, I was asked by the French Commander-in- 
Chief to continue my retirement to a point some 12 
miles in rear of the position I then occupied, with a 
view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. 
This retirement was duly carried out. In the meantime 
the- enemy had thrown bridges and crossed the Marne 
in considerable force, and was threatening the Allias all 
along the line of the British Forces and the 5th and 9th 
French Armies. Consequently several small outpost 
actions took place. 

Air reconnaissances revealed to the Allies 
that the columns of the German First Army 
had turned south-eastward. 

That army since the battle near Mons had been 
playing its part in the colossal strategic endeavour to 

Vol. 2. Part 15. 41 



create a Sedan for the Allies by outflanking and envelop- 
ing the left of their whole line so as to encircle and drive 
both British and French to the south. There was now 
a cha ige in its objective ; and it was observed that the 
German forces opposite the British were beginning to 
move in a south-easterly direction instead of continuing 
south-west on to the capital. 

Leaving a strong rearguard along the line of the River 
Ourcq (which flows south and joins the Marne at Lizy- 
sur-Ourcq) to keep off the French 6th Army, which by 
then had been formed and was to the north-west of 
Paris, they were evidently executing what amounted 
to a flank march diagonally across our front. 

I met the French Commander-in-Chiof at his request 
(continued Sir John French) and he informed me of his 
intention to take the offensive forthwith by wheeling 
up the left flank of the 6th Army, pivoting on the 
Marne, and directing it to move on the Ourcq ; cross 
and attack the flank of the 1st German Army, which 
was then moving in a south-easterly direction east of 
that river. 

He requested me to eiiect a cnange of Iront to my 
right my left resting on the Marne and my right on 
the oth Army -to fill the gap between that army and 
the 6th. I was then to advance against the enemy 
in my front and join in the general offensive movement. 
. . . German troops, which were observed moving 
south-east up the left bank of the Ourcq on the 4th, 
were now reported to be halted and facing that river. 
Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing at 
Changis, La Ferte, Xogent, Chateau Thierry, and 
Mezy. 

Considerable German columns of all arms were seen 
to be converging on Montmirail, whilst before sunset 
large bivouacs of the enemy were located in the neigh- 



////; TI.MKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




GENERAL SARRAIL. 



[Otto Paris. 



bourliood of Coulommiers, outh of Rebais, La Fert6- 
Gaucber, and Dagny, 

There was considerable fighting with the 5th 
French Army, which fell back from its position 
south of the Marne towards the Seine. 

These combined movements practically commenced 
on Sunday, September 6, at sunrise ; and on that day 
it may be said that a great battle opened on a front 
i \t> nding from Ermenonville, which was just in front 
tit' the loft flank of the 6th French Army, through Lizy 
<MI the Marne, Mauperthuis, which was aboiu the British 
centre, Courtecon, which was the left of the 5th French 
Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the 9th 
Acmy under General Foch, and so along the front of 
the 9th, 4th and 3rd French Armies to a point north of 
the fortress of Verdun. . . 

The dispositions of the rival armies on the 
front Paris-Verdun-Belfort were the direct 
outcome of three events which happened many 
hundred miles apart on August 22. 

The factor of time required that the French 
Army should not be merely dispersed for an 
army dispersed in its own country has every 
chance of rallying further back but disabled. 
For this reason the Germans had evolved a 
plan of strategical deployment leading up to a 
battle formation consisting of a comparatively 
thin centre with enormously strong wings. 
The former was to engage the enemy closely 
iiml keep him pinned to his ground while the 
l.i m T should swing around his flanks, completely 
envelop him, and produce the " super-Sedan " 
so confidently anticipated by German theorists. 
Tin' I'l-cut strength of the French fortifications 



along the frontier common to the two nations 
induced the Germans to apply their plan to 
the French frontier north of Verdun, i.e.. 
through neutral territory. Here the gap 
between Thionvillo. and the Ardennes would 
permit the passage of the Left-Attack. The 
rugged region of the Ardennes, traversed by 
few roads and railways, was allotted to the 
Centre. North of the Ardennes the Belgian 
plain, covered by a network of roads, railways 
and canals, was an ideal theatre of operations 
for the Right- Attack.* 

On August 16, while the Right-Attack was 
still endeavouring to burst its way through 
Belgium, the French 15th Corps from Luneville 
reached Saarburg, cut the railway between 
Metz and Strassburg and threatened the flank 
and rear of the German Left-Attack. On 
August 22 a powerful German detachment 
perhaps four Corps hurled the French out 
of Lorraine with heavy loss in men and guns. 
Thus the French offci si /e in the lost provinces 
ended in tactical defeat, but it proved that there 
was no strong German force south of Metz, 
and it induced the enemy to make such a power- 
ful detachment, afterwards reinforced to two 
complete Armies the 6th and 7th as amounted 
to the diversion of his whole Left-Attack into 
the lost provinces, where, during the Battles of 
the Marne, they found themselves faced by 
that very barrier of French fortresses which 
the German plan of campaign had proposed to 
ignore. 

The whole of this incident is very interesting 
as being the first suggestion of divided counsels 
in the German Headquarters.. Purely strate- 
gical reasons required that the Germans 
should send a force only just strong enough 
to check the French advance in Lorraine. 
The success of the Left-Attack would auto- 
matically clear the enemy out of their lost 
provinces. To detach sufficient troops to 



That this was really the German Intention is Indicated by 
four th iims . - 

1. It was in consonance with oft-declared German theory. 

2. The situation of the fortified line Verdun-Toul and the 
nigged Ardennes, coupled with the factor of time, practically 
compelled the Germans to restrict themselves to a demon- 
stration against the line Verdun-Belfort, pass their main nias-a-" 
through the two gaps, Luxemburg and the Belgian Plain, and 
connect them by a thin centre passing through the Ardennes. 

3. The known jiositions of German Corps at noon on August 10, 
as published in The Times of August 12 and 16. 

4. Of the twenty-four Army Corps liegions into which Germany 
is divided, at least seven lie south of a line drawn cast and west 
through Metz. If there had been any intention to deploy a 
large force in Alsace-Lorraine these Corps would have teen 
railed and marched straight to their front viz., due west; 
but the French offensive in the lost provinces proved that, 
up to August 22, there was no large German force south of 
Metz. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



smash the hostile force at Saarburg was to 
cripple the Left-Attack, to preclude the 
prospect of breaking the French line opposite 
Luxemburg, to abandon the hope of a new 
and greater Sedan, to abort the whole plan 
of campaign at its very inception. It meant 
ascribing to the Left Wing a defensive 
instead of an offensive role just when the 
Right Wing had lost several precious days 
before Liege and the adoption of a new plan 
of campaign at the very moment when the 
main army was about to seek a decisive result. 
The other line of argument was this : After 
the Zabern incident, General von Falkenhayn 
had declared that Alsace-Lorraine might as 
well be an enemy's country. The French had 
now b^en conducting offensive operations in 
their lost provinces for a fortnight. If 



this state of affairs were allowed to continue 
much longer, it might result in an insurrection, 
which, of course, would have a terrible effect 
on friends and foes and neutral powers. It was 
necessary to make such an example of the 
presumptuous enemy as would impress all 
beholders. Even on military grounds there was 
something to be said for this line of action. 
Thirteen years before, the world had been 
startled to learn from the evidence given in the 
Dreyfus trial that, in the event of war with 
Germany, the French would take the offensive 
in their lost provinces. It was, therefore, 
quite possible that the French Corps at Saar- 
burg was not the main body, but the advanced 
guard of a very powerful offensive. Every 
plan of campaign is necessarily liable to modi- 
fication as the result of the first collisions. It 




EARLY MORNING AT THE FRONT. 
French Dragoons and British soldiers in the foreground. 



\Pholff press. 



44 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




FRENCH MARCHING TO THE FIGHTING LINE. 



[Photo press 



was true that the Right- Attack had experienced 
some delay, but it had now burst its way 
through Belgian opposition and was about to 
fall upon the enemy's main army with about 
twice the numbers he was expecting. There 
could be no doubt that it would annihilate 
liis flank and roll up his line. 

On this same day August 22 the French 
5th Army was defeated at Charleroi. The 
French troops which had formed for battle 
along the Meuse and Sambre had been organised 
into five " Field Armies," numbered from 
right to left. When the 5th Army was driven 
back from the Sambre, the British and 4th 
French Armies found their flanks uncovered and 
were obliged to conform. In the same way the 
retreat of the 4th Army necessitated that of the 
3rd. The right flank of the latter, however, 
was protected by the great fortress of Verdun. 
One of Napoleon's four strategical maxims 
was " always manoeuvre about a fixed point," 
and there can be no doubt that Verdun was 
General Joffre's " fixed point." Verdun was 
the centre on which the whole forces north 
of it pivoted as they fell back through an angle 
of 90 degrees until the British on the left of the 
line had reached the northern outworks of Paris. 
Meanwhile, a new 6th Army, which had been 
secretly concentrated in Paris, was brought up 
on the British left ; and a new 9th Army 
was formed and brought up into the French 



battle-front between their 4th and 5th Armies. 
Thus did the Battle of Charleroi influence 
the position of the Franco-British line between 
Paris and Verdun during the Battle of the 
Marne. 

Again, on this same day August 22 - 
the Russian covering troops on the Niemen 
defeated the Prussian covering troops near 
Gumbinnen and Insterburg. Three days later 
the Russian left wing advancing westwards 
through Galicia, met the Austrian Second 
Army at Lemberg in the first great battle of 
the eastern theatre of war. By August 28 
or 29 the Russians in East Prussia had laid 
siege to Konigsburg and pushed on to Osterode. 
The inhabitants having a lively recollection 
of the Cossacks of a century back, and being, 
perhaps, not altogether ignorant of German 
methods in Belgium incontinently fled for 
Berlin, where they filled the capital with panic 
and the ears of their King with cries for 
rescue. We may be sure that we have here 
another instance of divided counsels at the 
German Headquarters. It has been laid down 
that " concentration of superior force at the 
decisive point is the grand rule of war," for 
" success at the decisive point if success 
everywhere." Tt is also an axiom in strategy 
that there is not any place or district the pos- 
session of which is decisive in any campaign 
not even the fall of Paris will be decisive. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



45 



There is only one thing which is decisive, and 
that is lh<- destruction of the enemy's main 
field armies, not a detachment. The Russian 
forces in East Prussia may have amounted to 
a few hundred thousands, but it was not a 
question of hundreds of thousands but of 
millions. Therefore no victory in East Prussia 
could be decisive, nor could any conceivable 
pursuit carried out from East Prussia bring 
the Germans to any point of real importance 
to them or to the Russians. If reinforcements 
were to be sent to any place in the eastern 
theatre of war, it would be better to send them 
to Lemberg, because Germany could not afford 
to see her ally smashed up. A little arithmetical 
calculation would suffice to show that the main 
Russian Army could not be up for a long time 
yet. The Russians may have had enough men 
to smash the Austrian Second Army, if given 
the chance ; but they must not be given the 
chance. It was the business of the Second 
Army to fight falling back continually till joined 
by the First Army on the line of the San ; and 
it was the business of the combined Austrian 
Armies to fight falling back continually until 
the Germans could come up after they had 
decisively defeated the French. The decisive 
point, therefore, was in France ; and it wa.s 





I'aris. 



GENERAL FOCH. 



[Otto, Paris. 

GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPERAY. 

here and at once that the Germans should 
" concentrate superior force." To weaken 
themselves at the decisive point at this moment, 
would be a fatal mistake. What could the 
Russians do to injure permanently Germany or 
their ally ? Those that were in East Prussia 
could not possibly force the impregnable line 
of the Vistula : those that were in Galicia 
could not cross the Carpathians into Hungary 
to the south leaving undefeated armies on 
their flank they must advance westwards 
against those armies. Those armies had 
a succession of excellent defensive positions, 
such as the San, the \\istoka, the Donajee. 
The Russians could not exercise any material 
pressure on their enemies until they should 
reach the rich industrial region of Silesia. 
They were now at Lemberg 2/>0 miles from 
Silesia. If the Austrians could reduce the 
rate of the enemy's advance to five miles a 
day. he would not reach Silesia for seven or 
eight weeks. It is true that by then they 
would have lost the whole province of Galicia 
for a time, but it was better to lose it for a time 
than to lose it, and much else, for ever. In 
seven weeks the Germans would join them, 
having accomplished the complete defeat of 
the French. In seven weeks in 1800 the 

152 



40 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




A BRITISH COLUMN HALTS BY THE WAY. 



[L.K.A. 



Germans had broken the Army of Austria to 
pieces, in less than eight weeks in 1870 they had 
destroyed the whole Regular army of France. 
When the French advanced beyond the Moselle 
in 1870, von Moltke detrained on the Rhine 
instead of on the Saar, and thus, apparently, 
abandoned ninety miles of country to the 
enemy. In that crisis the Germans had kept 
their heads, and, in these exactly similar 
circumstances it behoved their sons to keep 
theirs. On the other hand it might be objected 
that the continued occupation of East Prussia 
and Galicia by the Russians could not fail to 
.have a terrible effect on friends and foes and 
hesitating neutrals. East Prussia must be 
cleared of the enemy and the Austrians must 
stand their ground at Lemberg. The Army 
in the East must be reinforced by troops 
from the West. The French and the British 
had been hunted from pillar to post. What 
guarantee was there that they would not 
continue to retire indefinitely ? If they should 
decide to stand their ground now, who could 
doubt the issue ? The Germans might be 
at some slight disadvantage in point of 
numbers in the whole field, but, since the ini- 
tiative lay with them, they would naturally 
spread a screen along the enemy's entire 
. trout, hurl overwhelming forees against a 
selected point mid smash up a |l opposition. 



' Success at the decisive point is success every- 
where," not only in strategy but in tactics 
also. If the French could be beaten at the 
decisive point they would be beaten every- 
where. 

The distracted Kaiser compromised : no 
troops were transferred from France, but all 
the troops on the eastern frontier of Germany 
were sent to East Prussia not to Lemberg 
and the Kaiser could not bring himself to advise 
the retreat of the Austrians until too late. 
Von Hindenburg inflicted a heavy defeat on 
(Samsonoff at Osterode (or Tannenberg) on 
the last day of August, but this was a very poor 
set-off for the utter debacle of the Austrians 
two days later at Lemberg, where they wen- 
said to have lost 130,000 men killed, wounded, 
and captured and 200 guns. Four or five 
(ienuan Army Corps were immediately hurried 
from the western to the eastern front again 
too late, for the Russians caught the Austrian 

l-'ii-st Army at Tomasow on September 5 and 
drove it westwards. Thus, by the time that 
the lighting began in the basin of the Marne, 
the whole Austrian Army was in full retreat 
on Cracow, and the Germans were advancing 
to the decisive battle of the west with the 
numerical odd.- >ome\\here ...bout 100 to 85 
against them. Moreover, and most serious of 
all, the German plan of campaign had been 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



4.7 



changed twice : first, when the Left-Attack 
was changed into a Left-Defence ; and, 
secondly, when troops were transferred from 
the western to the eastern front before a decisive 
issue had been obtained in France, which obliged 
the Germans to turn their Right-Attack into 
a Right-Defence. The net result, as far as the 
struggles on the Marne were concerned, w.as to 
substitute an attempt to break the Allies' 
front for the attempt to envelop their flanks 
or flank. Thus did the battles of the east 
influence the numbers and dispositions of the 
Germans in the decisive battles of the west. 

It was on the last day of July, 1914, that the 
Kaiser and his advisers took the step which 
flung the fate of man into the melting pot of 
war. Just about a month later they took 
this other step of transferring troops from the 
western to ths eastern front, which decided 
the issue, for within the octave, the fiery 
flood of German invasion which had swept 
across the fields of France and Belgium, 
burning and blotting out like molten lava, 
burst in thunder on the steel-bound barrier of 
the Franco-British Army at bay and recoiled .' 

The Marne was no ordinary battle. History 
records a score or more of so-called " decisive 
battles," each of which in its turn has stood 





Kttu, Pant 

GENERAL DE LANGLE DE GARY. 



\ptto, Parts. 

GENERAL MANNOURY. 

like a mighty rock to divert the fortunes of the 
human race into this channel or that ; and 
there is hardly one of these which has not been 
more immediately decisive in itself and, there- 
fore, more apparently decisive in its effects 
upon history than the " Battle of the Marne " ; 
but the more we appreciate the issues at stak 
and the really final character of the decision 
determined in the basin of the Marne, the more 
we shall be convinced that the importance of 
that tremendous trial was as much greater than 
that of any previous conflict as the population 
and prosperity of the world to-day exceeds 
those of times past. The tide of Teutonic 
invasion here reached its pitch. For months 
the rollers continued to hurl themselves upon 
the breakwater, but the barrier did not break 
the tide was on the ebb. 

" The moral," said Napoleon, " is to the 
physical factor as three is to one." " There is 
a force in war," says Henderson, " more potent 
than mere numbers." Of all the factors which 
went to determine the issue in the basin of the 
Marne, there was, we may be sure, none so 
decisive as moral. As was inevitable, the Great 
Retreat had profoundly affected the issue of 
the whole campaign not only in its material 
results, but more particularly in its moral 
results. It had settled far a "eneration to 



7///. Tl.MKS 



01' THE \YAlt. 



come the estimation in which the lighting nma 
on each -ide would n-L'.inl iii^ opponent. 'I'll 
Itntish soldier liiiil formed a very il 'finite 
appreciation of his antagonist, as a soldier and 
as a man. As a soldier he admired the ( 'er- 
nian's coumifo. hut he marvelled at his poor 
shooting, his mass-taeties. his lavk of initiatix e 
and intelligence, and the way in which he per 
mittod himself to !> herded and drivon into 
fiction l>y his officers. He was, of course, not 
able to appraise correctly (ionium higher 
leadership and staff work, hut he was a lirst- 
class judge of matters within his competence. 
He conceived a profound contempt for the 
(lerinan company officer and his utter want 
of consideration for his soldiers and the in- 
habitants of the country through which he 
passed. As a man he considered the Oerman 
both a bully and a brute who had no notion 
of " playing the game." At Mons and after 
he had had some opportunity of witnessing 
German atrocities. The extracts given below 
from letters written and statements made by 
British officers and men are typical of those 
which must be within the knowledge of every 
English citizen. 

Never was attack made with more reckless courage 
nor pressed with such relentless ferocity. And never 
was defenc? conducted with greater heroism. Every 
mile has been contested with stubborn gallantry, British 
and Frenrh retiring with their faces to the foe. . . . 
Their numbers were overwhelming. They gave us no rest.' 
Night and day they hammered away, coming on like 



gml wav. The j..\\>- we ina ',< were filled instantly. 
Their iirlillery. which i- well handled, played up. in 11- 
iuee^-.i'ii l\ . Their eavalry >uept do\\n u|niu u- with 
MILI, i/ing recklessness. . . . Column after column. 
sipiadron after s,|ualron, mas- afh-r nia^~. the I-IH r 
r.i n .in lilu' a hiiltrriiiL.' ram i-ni-hiux i-vi-ryl hinfc' in it- 
\\,i\. Sliat icrrd to fraL r nieiiis by sliot ami slirll il: 
liiinl.'- nf the eni'iiu -ITMU'C! in~lanll> tci ivucvv thiMii- 
:.cl\r~; tlu-y ^wariiii-l OH all sil. 1 -. N'othiiiu lint tlu- 
-h .'IT plu'-k. thi' sli'.ltn-r i-iiurn^i- anil the iiiifliiichinc 
il-'ii-i'inination of our soldiers saved tin- Army from 
annihiltit ion. 

Tin 1 i.ii 1 - i:itli-!i',l nil Ilif cniMny inu>t lia\<- 
cnin-rnous. They attacked iu >u!iil formation, ami 
whole brigades nt" infantry wi-rc di>cim:itd by tl:'- tin.- 
c>f our rifles and j^'ims. No army of civili-e.l men rai 
enilurc such devastation as was wrought ainon--! III.- 
Germans in this long battle over scores of mile-. 

A private soldier says : 

They come up like a football crowd leaving Hamp- 
Mead Park. They come marching up iu drove*, fiiiim 
their rifles from their right hips. They have absolutely 
no i lea of aim. If their rifle fire is bad, there i.- no cl,iiKi 
about the accuracy of their work with the machine gun^ 
and heavy artillery. The aeroplanes gave them _!<>: 
help in fin ting the range, and most of our soldier- \\ en- 
injured by the shrapnel. 

Private Whittaker, of the C'oldstream (luanU. 
writes : 

The 'Germans rushed at us like a crowd strramiiu 

from a cup-tie at the Crystal Palace. You could not 

miss them. Our bullets ploughed into them but still 

on they came. I was well entrenched, and my rifle got 

'so hot I could hardly hold it. 

Sir Robert Edgeumbe. of Xewquav. received 
a letter from his son, Lieut. O. P. Edgoiimbe, 
1st Battalion D. C.L.I., on the staff of General 
Making, in which the following passages occur : 

My regiment has had a bad time, and L am dread- 
fully afraid that thry have been badly cut up. although I 




SOME OF OUR MEN RESTING IN GAMP. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE. WAP. 



49 




A MORNING TOILET ON THE RAILWAY LINE. 



L' ttcienfood & 



can a* yet get no details. They were caught in a village 
by Germans in the houses, who had managed to get 
there by wearing our uniforms. Never again shall I 
respect the Germans. They have no code of honoui, 
and there have been several cases of their wearing 
French and British uniforms; which is, of course, against 
the Geneva Convention. 

The following is from an officer of the Royal 
Field Artillery : 

One night we had a great attack on us from a wood 
near our camp. Over 800 Germans were counted next 
morning. They attacked shouting, " Vive 1'Angle- 
terre," headed by men dressed as peasants in French 
uniforms. 

A sergeant, wounded in the action near Mons 
says that : 

As he lay helpless oil the ground the German infantry 
f-wept by. He could hear from the imploiing cries of 
the wounded in hi* front that they were being ruth- 
lessly put to death by their savage foes. Closing his 
eyes and simulating death, the wounded sergeant lay 
perfectly still. As the Germans passed him he received 
a violent blow in the chest from the butt end of a rifle 
which broke one of his ribs. 

It is only fair to state that the 'Germans were 
not always brutal and callous. 

H. G. \Y. Irwin, of the South Lancashire 
Ht-giment, writes that after three days' hard 
fighting, in which the men behaved splendidly 
against overwhelming odds, he was wounded by 
shrapnel. Owing to the darkness he and other 
wounded were overlooked, and were loft lying 
all night in a turnip field. Eventually ihe 
ii- discoverer! him and offered the 



kindest treatment to him and other wounded. 
A German soldier brought him a bundle of hay 
to lie on, and later he was taken by stretcher 
bearers to a temporary hospital where he 
lay for a fortnight. He was then taken to 
Valenciennes, and by the kindness of the 
German commandant was permitted to write 
to his friends, the letter being forwarded 
through Germany. 

Lieut. Irwin says the hospital was left to the 
Germans when the Allies retired. All the 
French doctors and nurses remained on duty 
and the wounded prisoners received every con- 
sideration from the German officials. 

And what of France and the French, upon 
whom the brunt of the fighting and losses in 
men and material were bound to fall at first, 
at all events ? 

The Germans had advanced from Mons to 
near Luzarches with a venom never surpassed 
and a vigour never equalled in history. On 
August 31 they were as near Xotre Dame as 
Tilbury or Staines, Hertford or Reigate is to 
St. Paul's. The Military Governor of Paris, 
wishing to be rid of " les benches inutiles," had 
invited the citizens to leave, and nearly a third 
of the population had departed and the Govern- 
ment had withdrawn to Bordeaux. Those who 
remained were calm. The Gorman airmen 
who had sought to terrorise the people by a 



50 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




[ft aespaper- Illustration*. 

FRENCH OFFICERS TAKING A HURRIED MEAL UNDER CANVAS. 



daily shower of bombs had achieved nothing 
more than the murder and mutilation of a few 
elderly men and little girls. Even this had 
practically ceased, since half a dozen French 
airmen had been detailed to attack the German 
aeronauts at sight. 

In 1871 the advocates of uncompromising 
national defence were the object of merciless 
attacks at the hands of vindictive political 
opponents ; 43 years later no voice was 
raised in captious criticism of the statesmen 
or strategists responsible for the national 
safety. 

The defence of the great city had been 
completely thought out and calmly prepared. 
Hundreds of civil engineers, masons, and other 
; rtisans had volunteered to clear the fields of 
tire around the outer and inner rings of forts 
and to connect up the forts themselves and to 
block or cover all roads leading into Paris with 
entrenchments, barbed wire entanglements, 
chevaux de frise and abattis. Aeroplanes 
armed with mitrailleuses continually circled in 
the sky. Immense quantities of food and 
munitions of war had been concentrated in and 
al ii nit the city. Cattle, sheep and milch cows 
in tens of thousands were corralled on almost 
every green space within the defensive peri- 
meter of !)<> miles. The Bois de Boulogne was 
one vast stockyard. Thousands of soldiers 
wen- i nciunpi-d at such places as Versailles and 
Fontainebleau on the outskirts. 

Myriads of refugees had poured into Paris 
friim all the country to the north and east. In 



many townships in the track of the advancing 
Germans even the authorities had fled to avoid 
^he certainty of being arrested as hostages and 
the probability of being shot on any pretext. 
Everywhere, however, the cure stood his 
ground, the father of his flock, the comforter of 
the bereaved, the mayor, the village constable, 
and the general factotum of the neighbourhood. 
He often paid for his fidelity with his life, but 
he never flinched from his post. Hundreds of 
thousands of people had been induced to move 
on from Paris by the offer of free fares on the 
railway. Many refugees left by road. Inter- 
minable files of ox-wagons, tradesmen's carts, 
horse-carriages and motor-cars stretched along 
all the roads leading southwards from Paris, 
and everywhere might be seen broken-down 
vehicles, jettisoned luggage and stranded way- 
farers. 

But Paris herself and France like Paris 
awaited the stroke of impending fate, quietly 
and hopefully prepared to resist to the death, 
and comforted with the thought that, if the 
worst should come to the worst, the fall of Paris 
would not again involve the fall of France. As 
Bernhardi had pointed out, the fall of a fortress 
even that of Paris herself would not again 
necsssarily decide the issue of a campaign. 

It was estimated before the war that Germany 
would mobilize some 25 Army Corps (3 Divisions 
each) of First Line troops and a like number of 
" Reserve " Army Corps (2 Divisions each) of 
Second Line troops. . It was expected, and the 
event went to show, that Germany would 



THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAP. 



51 



allocate a fifth of her forces to a defensive 
campaign against Russia, while with 100 
German and 36 Italian Divisions she over- 
whelmed the 90 or 100 First and Second Line 
Divisions which, it was thought, France might 
be able to put in the field. The defection of 
Italy and the accession of Britain and Belgium 
to the side of the Dual Alliance brought the odds 
about level. Germany, however, designed to 
gain time as well as to save it. She, therefore, 
commenced her mobilization secretly some days 
before her prospective adversaries, and it is 
probable that on August 22 there were 100 
German Divisions against, perhaps, 75 French, 
British and Belgian Divisions. During the next 
fortnight the Franco-British Army must have 
been raised to about 95 Divisions, while, as we 
have seen, the Germans were reduced to, 
perhaps, 80 Divisions by the transference of 
troops from the western to the eastern front 
and the necessity of providing a garrison for 
Belgium and the lines of communication. 
Allowing 20,000 men to a Division, and adding 
Staffs, Cavalry, Army Troops, &c., there must 
have been rather more than two million French 
and British and rather less than that number 
of Germans extended on the front Paris-Verdun- 
Belfort. Of combatants actually engaged 
there might have been about three millions 
altogether. 

On September 4, as we have seen, it became 
known to the Allies that the columns of von 
Kluck's German First Army which had pursued 



the British from Mons south-westwards to the 
outworks of Paris had suddenly turned sharp to 
their left i.e., south- eastwards. At the time, 
and for some time afterwards, the reason for 
this sudden change of objective, which clearly 
indicated a change of plan, was much debated ; 
but it is now certain that it was due mainly to 
the transference of German troops from the 
western to the eastern front, which necessitated 
a closing in towards the left. This move of 
the 1st German Army to its left was a bold 
and most perilous operation, for it required 
von Kluck to execute a " flank march " along 
the front of the British and 6th French Armies 
and exposed his right flank to attack by those 
Annies. Everything now depended on which 
belligerent could attain his object first. Could 
the French Centre, possibly dispirited by 
retreat, withstand the rush of the victorious 
Teutons ? Could the British, exhausted by 
their long retreat and possibly by their 
losses, participate effectively in the counter- 
attack ; and, if so, could the German First 
Army, after all its immense exertions, support 
the impact of a determined counter-stroke ? 
It was obvious that if the Allies were to 
achieve success that success would not be 
complete unless the 6th French Army could 
make itself master of the railway by which the 
F*rst German Army was supplied. 

The question arose, " What point will the 
Germans select for their attempt ? " It was 
obvious that they would strike as near to the 




FRENCH SOLDIERS CARRYING A MACHINE GUN. 
Each man has a section. 



[Newspaper Illustrations 



////: V/.VL'N HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




OUR MEN ARE GREAT FAVOURITES 
WITH THE VILLAGE CHILDREN. 

line of the French fortresses as possible, because 
success in this direction would enable them to 
drive the Allies' centre and left away from the 
resources of the rich south and the great pen- 
tagon of ring-fortresses (Belfort, Epinal, Lan- 
gres, Dijon, Besan9on) especially designed to 
shelter beaten armies ; to cut off the French 
frontier fortresses and eastern armies ; and 
reduce those fortresses and thus open a shorter 
and better line of supply with Germany. But, 
not only was the line of the Meuse heavily 
fortified, but the adjacent country was very 
hilly, covered with forests separated by strips 
of pasture land studded with spinneys and 
copses, traversed by hedges and broken by 
ravines. Running north and south parallel 
with the terrain of the Meuse, and separated 
from it by a comparatively narrow and broken 
\alley, was the long forest-clad hill-barrier of 
tlie Argoime ending at Triaucourt and con- 
tinued southwards by a line, of lakes and vast 
lon-sts. In all these regions the population was 
comparatively sparse, supplies scanty, rnacls 
and railways few and far between, whii-h 
prohibited the operations and supply of a large 
force, and nothing but a large force could hope 
to break the French line. 

\\Vst of the difficult country of the Meuse and 
tln> Argonne stretched the interminable plain 
of the Charapagne-Pouilleuae, the plain of 
1 'halonx, the Aldershot of France, a hundred 
miles and more from north to south and 



-nine forty miles in width. A bare, open 
undulating country of alternate heath and 
plough, scarred here and there by lines of 
small newly planted firs. A lonely, lost, 
depressing region, but sacred to Gaul and Frank 
as the ground on which from time immemorial 
thev have repulsed invasions from the east. 
Here and there amid these endless wastes there 
is to be found some place of interest the field 
of Valmy and the tomb of Kellerman, the 
house where Joan of Arc was born, the spot 
where Goethe stood and wondered if tliis were 
the beginning of a new world, the home of 
Daiiton, the " Camp of Attila '' a huge oval 
bank, several hundred yards in length, towering 
massive and lonely above the desolate rolling 
plain. Here, then, was the ideal terrain for the 
German effort. History was about to repeat 
herself. Once more the fate of France would be 
decided on the field of C 'halons. 

On the west of the plain of Champagne lies 
the Plateau of Sezanne. If we imagine that 
plain and plateau were once on the same general 
level, that a; long irregular fissure running 
roughly north and south suddenly appeared 
between the two, and that the plain then sank 
some 300 ft., we should have the line of bluffs 
in which the plateau falls to the plain under the 
name of " Les Falaises de Champagne." At 
the foot of these " cliffs " runs the road from 
La Fere -Cham penoise to Rheims. Some fifty 
miles west, in the neighbourhood of Meaux, 
the plateau sinks into the Plain of Paris. 

Linking plain and plateau lies the Marne. 
It rises near Langres and flows northward 
through hilly and thickly wooded country to 
St. Dizier, north-westward across the Plain of 
Champagne, past Vitry-le-Francois and Chalons, 
and westward through the Plateau of Sezanne, 
by Epernay, Chateau Thierry, La Kerte-sous- 
.fouarre and Meaux, to join the Seine south of 
Paris. In the neighbourhood of Meaux the 
Marne receives three tributaries the Ourcq, 
from the north, and the Grand Morin and the 
Petit Morin, from the east. Towards the eastern 
borders of the Plateau of Sezanne lie Les Marais 
de St. Gond ten miles long from east to west 
and a mile or two broad- the source of the Petit 
Morin, which has been converted into a drain 
to carry off the waters of the marshes now in 
process of reclamation. 

The right halt of the Allies' line was based on 
the fortified line Belfort- Verdun. The left 
half of their line extended from Verdun and the 
difficult country of the Argonne and the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



53 




BRITISH, FRENCH, AND MOROCCAN TROOPS AT THE FRONT. 



153 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




FRENCH AEROPLANE BEING REPAIRED ON THE FIELD. 



Mouse to Paris the greatest fortress in the 
world. Therefore both flanks were secure from 
being turned, and the Germans were reduced to 
the attempt to break the centre, while their 
right was exposed to an attack in flank. Their 
i roops in this direction had made such enormous 
exertions during the last three weeks and their 
losses had been so heavy that they must have 
been brought perilously near exhaustion. Their 
lines of communication, stretching over 200 
miles to Brussels, must have presented many 
difficulties and many anxieties. Their whole 
Army was committed to a tactical effort 
abhorred of German theorists. From Frederick 
the Great, who declared that above all things 
it was necessary for the Prussians to throw 
their greatest weight on their adversaries' 
wings, down to von Schlieffen, who points out 
that, tin 1 effort against the Austrians at 8ado\\a 
was futile, the envelopment of an enoimV 
Hank or flanks, not the breaking of his line, had 
been the aim >f German taetieians Sedan, 
not Ligny. had been their ideal. Moreover, in 
this particular instance Mice-ess against the 
Allies' centre would not necessarily have been 
decisive. The Germans would still have Paris 
upon one flank and the Krench frontier fort- 
mi armies upon the other flank; and 
the Allies' lines of retreat across the Seine were 
all open and offered the means of rallying 
further back. But for the Germans defeat 
must inevitably mean that downfall which 



General von Bernhardi said must follow the 

failure of her bid for world-power. 

\ 

The Allies can face defeats. For Germany a single 
defeat in a buttle on the grand scale must now mean Hnal 
failure. She fights with every civilized nation praying 
for her downfall, and for the obliteration of the perverse 
ambitions which have led her to plunge the world into 
strife. . . . We note that the Crown I'rinci-'s Army is 
believed to bo near Chalons, a place of evil omen for any 
Attila or his offspring. ... Here Attila was over- 
whelmed and here prophets innumerable liave declared 
that some day Armageddon would be fought. It is being 
waged upon the very ground where Napoleon conducted 
his campaign of 1814, which still remains a masterpiece 
of defensive strategy. Fere-Champenoise . . . was the 
scene of the famous resistance of a French force which 
refused to surrender to the Allies even when its general 
had delivered up his sword. The whole region is full of 
inspiration for the Army of France. (The Time*, 
September 9.) 

The higher command on both sides took their 
soldiery into their confidence. The Krem-li 
ollicers were directed to explain to their men 
that the retreat from the Belgian frontier 
had been a strategical movement designed to 
^un time ; that the plans of the Great General 
Staff had now matured, and that the moment 
hud arrived for decisive action. 

Oil September ti General Joffre. the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, issued an order to all the 
Krench troops in the following terms : 

At the moment when a battle on which the we.lhirc 
oi the country depends is about to begin. I feel it incum- 
bent upon me to remind you all that this is no longer the 
time to look behind. All our efforts must be directed 
towards attacking and driving back the enemy. An 
Army which can tio longer advance must at all costs 
keep the ground it has won, and allow itself to be killed 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



55 



n the spot rather than give way. In the present, 
circumstances no faltering can be tolerated. 

On the same date Sir John French issued 
the following Special Army Order to the British 
troops : 

After a most Trying series of operations, mostly in 
retirement, which have been rendered necessary by the 
general strategic plan of the Allied Armies, the British 
forces stand to-day formed in line with their French 
comrades, ready to attack the enemy. Foiled in their 
attempt to invest Paris, the Germans have been driven 
to move in an easterly and south-easterly direction, with 
the apparent intention of falling in strength on the 
5th French Army. In this operation they are exposing 
their right flank and their line of communications to an 
attack from the combined 6th French Army and the 
British forces. 

I call upon the British Army in France to now show 
the enemy its power, and to push on vigorously to the 
attack beside the 6th French Army. 

I am sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, 
on the contrary, by another manifestation of the mag- 
nificent spirit which they have shown in the past fortnight, 
they will fall on the enemy' .s flank with all their strength, 
and in unison with their Allies drive them back. 

On the entry of the victorious French into 
Vitry-le-Francois there was found in the house 
that had been occupied by the staff of the 8th 
German Army Corps the following order signed 
by Lieut. - General Tiilff von Tschepe und 
Weidenbach : 

Vitry-le-Fran9ois, Sept. 7, 10.30p.m. 

The object of our long and arduous marches has been 

achieved. The principal French troops have been 

'forced to accept battle after having been continually 

forced back. The great decision is undoubtedly at 



hand. To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of the 
German Army, as well as all that of our Army Corps, 
are bound to be engaged all along the line from Paris to 
Verdun. To save the welfare and honour of Germany 
1 expect every officer and man, notwithstanding the 
hard and heroic fights of the last few days, to do his 
duty unswervingly and to the last breath. Everything 
depends on the result of to-morrow. 

Both Armies the German and the French 
were numbered from the right. By the 
morning of Sunday, September 6, the French 
1st and 2nd Armies, based on the line Belfort- 
Yerdun, were facing the German 7th (von 
Heeringen) and 6th (Crown Prince of Bavaria) 
Armies in AJsace and Lorraine. The extreme 
right of the French still clung to a corner of 
Alsace, and their centre to Nancy, while the 
left of the 2nd Army lay east and north of 
Verdun. 

During the Battle of the Marne these German 
Armies attacked the French Armies opposed to 
them. At Nancy, in particular, these attacks 
were of a desperate nature. There was a great 
unfortified gap between the fortresses of Toul 
and Epinal, and the object of this attack on 
Nancy was to penetrate behind the main French 
Army, so that a success on the Plain of Chalons 
would enable the Germans to cut off the 2nd, 
3rd, and part of the 4th French Armies, together 
with the fortified line Verdun-Toul with its 
garrisons. 




MEAUX. 
The Pont du Moulin, destroyed by French Engineers. 



'Topical 



06 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




[Newspaper Illustrations. 



THE BRIDGE AT PONTOISE. 



General San-ail's 3rd French Army was based 
on Verdun and the Meuse Heights. His right 
extended to a point north of Verdun and his 
left towards Bar-le-Duc. Thus he faced west 
and stood back to back with the 2nd French 
Army. The 3rd German Army (Crown Prince) 
which had poured westwards through Luxem- 
burg and turned south through the Argonne, 
now faced to attack the 3rd French Army, with 
the object of breaking the French fortified line 
Verdun-Toul at Fort Troyon and thus complete 
the investment of Verdun. 

A glance at the map of the districts adjacent 
to the frontiers common to Germany and France 
will show that all the railways which cross this 
frontier are led through the great French 
frontier fortresses and diverge again on both 
sides. 

General de Langle's 4th French Army was 
south of Vitry-le-Francois, facing north. It 
stretched across almost the whole plain of 
Chalons, which had been selected by the 
Germans for their principal effort, and it hud 
for its chief opponents the 4th German Army 
(Prince of Wiirtemberg). 

The 3rd German Army (von Hausen's Saxon 
Army) seems to have been much reduced by 
this date. Most of its units reappeared later on 
the eastern front. The gap thus created in the 
German strategical line had been filled by 
von Billow closing in to his left and by von 
Klurk turning sharp to his left when almost in 
touch with the outer defences of Paris, so as to 
close in on von Biilow. 

General Foch's newly formed 9th Fronrli 



Army had just been brought up between the 
4th and 5th Armies. According to Le Temps of 
September 5 it held the line Camp de Mailly- 
Sezanne, but it is probable that its left flank 
extended further west. Its principal opponent 
was the 2nd German Army (von Biilow). 

General d'Esperey's 5th French Army held 
the line Esternay-Courtecon with Conneau's 
Cavalry on its left flank, while General Pan's 
6th French Army, advancing from the north 
of Paris, pushed eastward with its right 
on the Marne, near Meaux, and its left 
towards Betz. These two French Armies had 
for then* chief opponent the 1st German Army 
(von Kluck). The latter proceeded to act as 
if he had only these two armies to deal with.. 
He left the 2nd and 4th Reserve Corps on the 
east side of the Ourcq, between La Fert6 Milon 
and the Marne, facing west, to hold off the 
6th French Army, while with the 4th, 3rd and 
7th Corps he advanced to Coulommiers, 
Rebah, La Ferte Gaucher, and points between 
that place and Montmirail, with the apparent 
intention of attacking the centre and left of the 
5th French Army. It is difficult to understand 
how any German General could have come to 
consider the British Army a negligible quantity. 
It is true that for more than a generation the 
Germans had been engaged in persuading their 
fellow-countrymen, particularly their troops, 
tlmt their own Army was very much superior to 
any other in the world. Being driven by 
necessity to adopt universal service, with a 
very short Colour-Service, they had sought to 
establish the great superiority of the new 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



57 



system by decrying the old. The volunteer 
fon,<7-service Army of Britain was to them a 
relic of the Dark Ages, and they never lost any 
opportunity of declaring that its officers were a 
sport-loving band of amateurs and its rank and 
file a mob of " mercenaries " recruited by crime 
and hunger from the dregs of the population. 
It is related that when someone suggested to 
Bismarck that the British Army might be 
landed in Germany, he very quietly replied : 
" If it does, I shall ring for the police and have 
it locked up." We have related how a general 
order issued by the Kaiser in August had 
described it as '* contemptible." It had been 
forced to retreat from its position at Mons and 
had been driven back for nearly a fortnight. 
Taking one consideration with another, the 
German authorities seem to have concluded 
that the British Army really could be ruled out 
of the immediate problem. Anyone who has 
been in touch with German thought for the 
last generation must have observed in them the 
peculiarly Chinese characteristic of deciding 
that a tiling must be so because they wish it to 
be so. On this occasion it was very incon- 
v ardent for the Germans that the British Army 
should be able to intervene in the approaching 
struggle, and, therefore, of course, it could not 




'nderwood <S- Underwood 

LIVE SHELLS LEFT ON THE BATTLE- 
FIELD BY THE GERMANS IN THEIR 
RETREAT. 

do so. The only other possible explanation 
is that the Germans had to " chance it." 
There was a gap between the 5th and 6th 
French Annies, and the Germans proposed to 
hold off the latter while they enveloped the 




[Sport * General. 

GUN TRENCH AND SHELL CASES ABANDONED BY THE GERMANS. 



58 



THE TIMES HISTORY ()! THE \V.\11. 



left wing of the former, bnt the troops 
in the latter operation would themselves be 
liable to an attack in flank by any troops which 
illicit rome up in the interval between tin- t.wo 
French Armies. As a matter of fact at this 
moment the British Army, to the extent of 
five strong Divisions, with five Cavalry Brigade^. 
was lying concealed by the Forest of ('nv\ 
from Villeiieuve-le-Comte to Jouy-le-Chateau. 
That von Kluck thought that there was at least 
a remote possibility of the intervention of th<> 
British is suggested by the fact that he des- 
patched his 2nd Cavalry Division towards 
Coulotnmiers, and his 9th Cavalry Division to 
a point west of Crecy. Thus placed, the 
Herman horsemen should be able to notify the 
approach of any hostile troops from the 
south-west. 

The battle may be said to have commenced 
with the advance of the 6th French Army 
against the Ourcq. The Germans consisted of 
three First Line Divi>ions of the 2nd Corps and 
two Second Line Divisions of the 4th Reserve 
Corps. They held the plateau on the east bank 
of the Ourcq, which here runs in a deep trench 
or ravine. They held most of the villages 
on the plateau west of the Ourcq as advanced 



I>OM.-V The lith French Army consisted ot three 
" Active " and four Second Line Divisions, mid 
had to capture the villages on the west bank ot 
the Ourcq before they could proceed to the 
attack of the enemy's main position across the 
river. The fighting resolved itself into as many 
separate combats as there were villages held by 
the Germans, who, on being obliged to evacuate 
any point held by them, proceeded to set it on 
tire to postpone the enemy's occupation, and to 
permanently deny to him any shelter it might 
afford. The other French Annies all became 
engaged in a series of furious, but practically 
stationary, combats, in which neither >ide 
made any progress except on the right of the 
3rd French Army, which was gradually pushed 
southwards along the heights of the Meuse. 

It was at this moment that the British con- 
tingent entered the fight and created a situation 
which was both dramatic and almost imme- 
diately decisive. It was organized in three 
Army Corps.* The First and Second consisted 
of the 1st and 2nd, 3rd and 5th Divisions, 
all of which had fought at MOILS. The 



* Lieut.-General \V. P. Pulteney took over the command of 
the 3rd Corps just before the commencement of the Battle of 
the Mame. 




GERMAN SOLDIERS IN THEIR TRENCHES. 
In the foreground is an Officer superintending the sighting of a machine gun. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. 




FRENCH ZOUAVES BURYING THE DEAD AFTER 



[Underwood & Underwood, 

BATTLE. 



so-called 3rd Army Corps consisted of the 
4th Division, most of which had been engaged 
on August 26, and the 19th Brigade, which 
had been formed of battalions on the lines of 
communication and rushed up to the front 
when it was discovered that the enemy's forces 
opposed to the British at Mons were very much 
larger than had been anticipated. Thus the 
British Army may be put down at five Divisions 
with five Brigades of Cavalry. These Divisions 
broke up from their billets and bivouacs at 
dawn on Sunday, September 6, and advancing 
north-eastwards through the Forest of Crecy, 
drove in the enemy's Cavalry Divisions and 
Infantry Advance Guards. By nightfall they 
had established themselves on the line Dagny- 
Coulommiers-Maison. " I should conceive it 
to have been about noon on September 6," says 
Sir John French, " that the enemy realized the 
powerful threat that was being made against 
the flank of his columns moving south-east." 

On September 7 the British Army continued 
to drive the enemy in front of it, and by night- 
fall had reached the line of the Grand Morin ; 
and it may be noted that five British Cavalry 
Brigades (45 Squadrons) engaged and defeated 
the 2nd, 9th, and Guard (German) Cavalry 
Divisions (72 Squadrons). 

The enforced retreat of the enemy's Corps on 
the west uncovered the west flank of the troops 
operating against the 5th French Army, and 
obliged them to retreat, so that by nightfall the 
.">th French Army had advanced up to the Grand 
Morin between Esternav and La Ferte Gaucher. 



On September 7 (says Sir John French) both the 5th 
and 6th French Armies were heavily engaged on our 
Hank. The 2nd and 4th Reserve German Corps on the 
Ourcq vigorously opposed the advance of the French 
towards that river, but did not prevent the 6th Army 
from gaining some headway, the Germans themselves 
suffering serious losses. The French 5th Army threw 
the enemy back to the line of the Grand Morin River 
after inflicting severe losses upon them. . . 

The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by 
his 2nd and 9th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, which 
suffered severely. 

Our Cavalry acted with great vigour, especially 
General De Lisle's Brigade with the 9th Lancers and 
18th Hussars. 

On Monday, the 7th (says the Press Bureau), the 
Germans commenced to retire towards the north-east. 
This was the first time that these troops had turned back 
since their attack at Mons a fortnight before, and, from 
reports received, the order to retreat when so close to 
Paris was a bitter disappointment. From letters found 
011 the dead there is no doubt that there was a general 
impression amongst the enemy's troops that they were 
about to enter Paris. 

The fighting further east was everywhere 
furious. The battle swayed backwards iand 
forwards with " charge, counter-charge, and 
rally," but with little definite result, except that 
a succession of determined assaults hi the 
neighbourhood of Nancy were repulsed with 
heavy loss under the eyes of the Kaiser, and 
the right of the 3rd French Army was pushed 
sufficiently south to enable the Crown Prince 
to bombard Fort Troyon. Maubeuge is re- 
ported to have fallen this day, and a number of 
German troops were set free to reinforce their 
field armies ; but the defence of the place had 
obstructed the main line of railway required 
for the supply of von Kluck's Army, and its 
capture had only been effected with enormous 
losses. 




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enChausseP \ 7/J m Cou~cy x^"^ A/- 

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Montcorrn 



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"Dormant 

Epern^y 



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Champenois 



orbeil 

MELVX 



Longuevillej^r 



ibhivrers 



Landono 
Scale of Miles 




THE MAR 



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//(jr/tte(^_ ^'?' , 

ContrextviUejdjjr ^ ^~E 




TTLEFIELDS. 



62 



////: TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




r 
II 




'A**-: 



r Illustrations. 



BRITISH ARTILLERY PASSING THROUGH A VILLAGE. 



On September 8 the French 6th Army got 
to grips with the German Flank Guard on the 
Ourcq, and the fighting became of the most 
sanguinary character. 

The British fought their way to the line 
of the Marne and Petit Morin from near 
Trilport to near La Tretoire. 

The 1st Army Corps encountered stubborn resistance 
at La Tretoire (north of Rebais). The enemy occupied 
a strong position with infantry and guns on the northern 
bank of the Petit Morin River ; they were dislodged 
with considerable loss. Several machine guns and many 
prisoners were captured, and upwards of two hundred 
German dead were left on the ground. 

The forcing of the Petit Morin at this point was much 
a-.si.sted by the Cavalry and the 1st Division, which 
linked higher up the stream. Later in the day a 
counter-attack by the enemy was well ivpuUt.-d by the 
1st Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns 
ML-iiin falling into our hands. . . . The 2nd Army Corps 
encountered considerable opposition, but drove back 
the enemy at all points with great loss, making con- 

Mil'Tahh.- captures. 

Thn 3rd Army Corps also drove back considerable 
bodiiv. nt the enemy's infantry and made some captures. 
- SIK JOHN FRENCH. 

Tin- .")th French Army, greatly assisted by 
the British operations, attacked the enemy 
fiereely, stormed Montmirail and two other 
villages by hand-to-hand fighting, and estab- 
lished itsolf on the l j etit Morin. The flank of 
the 2nd German Army being now uncovered, 
was obliged to withdraw, and the !)th French 



Army was enabled to advance its left and 
centre to the line of the Petit Morin. 

On September 9 the enemy had resigned him- 
self to the idea of a general retreat. He there- 
fore held La Ferte-sous-Jouarre strongly, re- 
inforced his Flank Guard on the Ourcq, delivered 
a number of furious counter-attacks on the 
6th French Army, and under cover of these 
demonstrations withdrew the whole of his 
west flank. The (5th French Army was iio\v 
in full possession of the west bank. The 
fighting was of a peculiarly desperate character, 
but the French hold upon the positions they 
had won was unshaken. At one spot the 
Germans tried all day to complete a pontoon 
bridge. The French allowed the Germans 
nearly to complete this, and then opened on it 
with their guns and destroyed it. The went her 
which up to now had been perfect, in fact, too 
hot, changed, and rain fell in torrents, accom- 
panied by a terrific wind. 

The 3rd Army Corps on the British left was 
unable to bridge the river at La Fertc-sous- 
Jouarre in the tare of a strong rearguard witli 
machine-guns, and, therefore, did not get across 
here until after nightfall, but it pushed a party 
_ across near Ghangis which established itself 011 
the north bank in the afternoon. The 1st and 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



2nd Army Corps had little difficulty in driving 
in the enemy's rearguards on the Petit Morin, 
whence they advanced upon Charly and 
Chateau Thierry, where they forced the pas- 
sages of the river and established themselves 
some miles to the north. 

The advance of the 1st and 2nd British Army 
Corps had driven a wedge between the Germans 
n the Ourcq and von Billow's west flank, and 
the German Armies found themselves con- 
strained to give way in sections commencing 
from the west. Sir John French says : 

During the day's pursuit the enemy suffered heavy 
loss in killed and wounded, some hundreds of prisoners 
fell into our hands and a battery of eight machine guns 
was captured by the 2nd Division. . . . 

The left of the 5th French Army reached the neigh- 
bourhood of Chateau Thierry after the most severe 
righting, having driven the enemy completely north of 
the river with great loss. 

The fighting of this Army in the neighbourhood of 
Montmirail was very severe. 

As an example of the spirit which inspired 
our Allies the following translation of the 
Ordre du Jour published on September 9 after 
the battle of Montmirail by the Commander of 
the French 5th Army is given : 

Soldiers, Upon the memorable fields of Montmirail, 
of Vauchamps, of Champaubert, which a century ago 
witnessed the victories of our ancestors over Blucher's 
Prussians, your vigorous offensive has triumphed over 
the resistance of the Germans. Held on his flanks, his 
centre broken, the enemy is now retreating towards 
east and north bv forced marches. The most renowned 



army corps of Old Prussia, the contingents of Westphalia 
of Hanover, of Brandenburg, have retired in haste 
before you. 

This first success is no more than a prelude. The 
enemy is shaken, but not yet decisively beaten. 

You have still to undergo severe hardships, to make 
long marches, to fight hard battles. 

May the image of our country, soiled by barbarians, 
^always remain before your eyes. Never was it more 
necessary to sacrifice all for her. 

Saluting the heroes who have fallen in the fighting of 
the last few days, my thoughts turn towards you the 
victors in the next battle. 

Forward, soldiers, for France ! 

Montmirail, September !), 1914. 
General Commanding the Vth Army, 
FKANCHET D'ESPEBEY. 

The 3rd French Army, attacked in front, 
flank, and rear, was very hard pressed this day, 
but managed to hold out. On the French 
right (or east face) a number of assaults de- 
livered by the Germans were repulsed, and some 
slight advance was made. We may suspect 
that the German attacks in these parts were 
designed to conceal the transference of troops 
from Alsace-Lorraine to the west flank. Here, 
also, were concentrated the troops set free by 
the fall of Maubeuge and others which had 
hitherto been holding such places as Amiens 
and Arras. 

On Thursday, the 10th, the 1st German Army 
beat a hasty retreat, which obliged their 2nd 
Army to conform. The British Army led the 
pursuit in echelon from the right that is to 
say. the 1st Army Corps from Chateau Thierry 




FRENCH OUTPOSTS. 
This Photograph is typical of the Plain of Champagne. 



[Newspaper Illustrations. 



:////: 7/.W/-N 



OF THE WAR. 



a- the most advanced., while the 2nd Army 
( ( , n .s follow.-d to the left rear of the 1st, and 
the 3rd Army Corp* from La Ferte-sous- 
Jouarre followed to the left rear of the 2nd. 

The advance was resumed m Daybreak on the 10th 
,, to the line of the Ourcq (which here runs east and 
wiwt), oppowd l-y strong rearguards of all arms. 
1,1 ,ind 2nd Corps, assisted by the Cavalry Division on 
thr right, the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades on the left, 
drove the enemy northwards. Thirteen guns, seven 
machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and quantitie 
transport fell into our hands. The enemy left roanj 
dead on the field. On this day the French 5th and 6 
Annies had little opposition. SIB JOHN FRENCH. 

It was raining in torrents and the roads were 
"bad going. The Germans had got their heavy 
guns away the evening before, but even so it is 
wonderful that they should have succeeded in 
saving them. 

The retreat of the Germans on the 9th had 
evidently been carefully prepared, and the last 
of their infantry escorting their guns were 
hurried away in motor cars. 

The 6th French Army, and what had been 
von Kluck's flank guard, moved rapidly to- 
wards the line Compiegne-Soissons ; the 5th 
French Army reached the Marne from Chateau 
Thierry to Dormans. By nightfall the left of 
the 9th French Army had followed in echelon 
to the right rear of the 5th Army, and the centre 
of the 9th French Army had driven the Prussian 
Guard Corps into the marshes of St. Gond, 
while its right was still engaged in a furious, 
but practically stationary, combat between 
Fere-Champenoise and Mailly-le-Camp. 

The unfortunate Prussian Guard set out to 
retreat across the swamps by the four tracks 
which lead across them northwards, but just 
at this time it came on to rain, and men, 
horses and guns were said to have been en- 



gulfed in considerable numbers. This corjm 
ftlite had suffered heavily, and achieved litth. 
during the whole campaign. It is true that 
they broke the French line on the Sambre on 
August 22, but they here encountered the 
formidable Algerian Corps, and, like theil 
opponents, suffered' terribly. On August 2(i 
they were employed against the British at Lo 
Cateau, and were decimated. Three days later 
they were assailed by the 5th French Army 
and flung back at Guise. By the time they 
emerged from the slough of St. Gond they woro 
little but the wrecks of the proud Corps which 
had left Berlin five weeks before with such 
confident anticipations of adding to its laurels. 
On the plain to the east a violent engagement 
raged, in which, however, the French made 
little progress. Here both sides sought to 
advance, each hi turn attacking the other's 
trenches at the point of the bayonet. Back- 
wards and forwards swayed this deadly, hand-to- 
hand conflict, in which an observer estimates 
the Germans lost from 15,000 to 20,000 dead 
alone. 

Many of the enemy were killed and wounded, and the 
numerous thick woods which dot the country north of 
the Marne are filled with German stragglers. Most of 
them appear to have been without food for at least tv.o 
days. Indeed, in this area of operations the Germans 
seem to be demoralized and inclined to surrender in 
small parties, and the general situation appears to 1> 
most favourable to the Allies. 

Much brutal and senseless damage has been done in 
the villages occupied by the enemy. Property has been 
wantonly destroyed, pictures in the chateaux have been 
ripped up, and the houses generally pillaged. It i 
stated on unimpeachable authority, also, that the inhabi- 
tants have been much ill-treated. 

Interesting incidents have occurred during the 
fighting. On the 10th, part of our 2nd Army Corps 
advancing north found itself marching parallel will. 
another infantry force at some little distance away. At 
tir,t it was thought that thi- a-; another British unit. 




REMAINS OF A GERMAN ENTRENCHMENT NEAR THE MARNE. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



05- 




THE MARNE. 

' We harried them before the crossing and drowned them during it." 
(See page 77.) 



Alter some time, however, it was discovered that it was 
a body of Germans retreating. Measures were promptly 
taken to head off the enemy, who were surrounded and 
trapped in a sunken road, where over 400 men sur- 
rendered. 

On the 10th a small party of French under a noi- 
commissioned officer was cut off and surrounded. After 
a desperate resistance it was decided to go on fighting 
to the end. Finally the n.c.o. and one man only were 
left, both being wounded. The Germans came up and 
shouted to them to lay down their arms. The German 
commander, however, signed to them to keep their 
arms, and then asked for permission to shake hands with 
the wounded non-commissioned officer, who was carried 
oft on his stretcher with his rifle by his side. 

The arrival of the reinforcements and the continued 
advance have delighted the troops, who are full of zeal 
and anxious to press on. 

Quite one of the features of the campaign, on our side, 
has been the success attained by the Royal Flying 
Corps. In regard to the collection of information it is 
impossible either to award too much praise to our 
aviators for the way they have carried out their duties 
or to over-estimate the value of the intelligence collected, 
more especially during the recent advance. In due 
course, certain examples of what has been effected may 
be specified and the far-reaching nature of the results 
fully explained, but that time has not yet arrived. 
That the services of our Flying Corps, which has rea'.ly 



been on trial, are fully appreciated by our Allies is 
shown by the following message from the Commander- 
in-Chief of the French Armies received on the night of 
September 9 by Field-Marshal Sir John French : 

" Please express most particularly to Marshal French 
my thanks for services rendered on every day by the 
English Flying Corps. The precision, exactitude, and 
regularity of the news brought in by its members are 
evidence of their perfect organization and also of the- 
perfect training of pilots and observers.* 1 

To give a rough idea of the amount of work carried 
out it is sufficient to mention that, during a period of 20 
days up to September 10, a daily average of more than 
nine reconnaissance flights of over 100 miles each has 
been maintained. 

The constant object of our aviators has been to effect 
the accurate location of the enemy's forces, and, inci- 
dentally since the operations cover so large an area 
of our own units. Nevertheless, the tactics adopted for 
dealing with hostile aircraft are to attack them instantly 
with ono or more British machines. This has been so 
far successful that in five cases German pilots or obser- 
vers have been shot in the air and their machines brought 
to the ground. As a consequence, the British Flying 
Corps hts succeeded in establishing an individual 
ascendancy which is as serviceable to us as it is damaging 
to the enemy. How far it is due to this cause it is not 
possible at present to ascertain definitely, but the fact 
remains that the enemy have recently become much 



66 



7///-: //.WAX HIXTOHY 01-' THE WAR. 




BRITISH SOLDIERS CUTTING UP RATIONS AND COOKING. 



IPA*> 



less enterprising in their flights. Something in the 
direction of the mastery of the air has already been 
gained. 

In pursuance of tlje principle that the main object 
of military aviators is the collection of information 
bomb-dropping has not been indulged in to any great 
extent. On one occasion a petrol bomb was success- 
fully exploded in a German bivouac at night, while, 
from a diary found on a dead German cavalry soldier, 
it has been discovered that a high explosive bomb 
thrown at a cavalry column from one of our aeroplanes 
struck an ammunition wagon. The resulting explosion 
killed 15 of the enemy. An " KYE-WITNESS " on Sir J. 
French's Staff. 

As the 1st and 2nd German Armies were now in full 
retreat, this evening marks the end of the battle which 
practically commenced on the morning of the 6th 
instant ; and it is at this point in the operations that 1 
am concluding the present dispatch. 

Although I deeply regret to have had to report 
heavy losses in killed and wounded throughout these 
operations, I do not think they have been excessive in 
view of the magnitude of Ihe great fight, the outlines of 
which I have only been able very briefly to describe, 
and the demoralization and loss in killed and wounded 
which are known to have been caused to the enemy l>y 
the vigour and si-verity of the pursuit. 

In concluding this dispatch I must call your Lordship's 
special attention to the fact that from Sunday, 
August 23, up to the present date (September 17), from 
\li ins back almost to the Seine, and from the Seine to 
the Aisnf. the Army under my command has been 
ceaselessly engaged without one single day's halt or ivst 
of iiny kind. Sin.JuHN KUENCH. 

The Ourcq flows from I-H.-I in \\est as i.n u 
I.. i I 'i -iti' Milon, and thence south. It was alonn 
this north and south stretch that von Khu-k's 
flank guard had stood. "In the early 
morning of the llth," says Sir .lohn French, 
"the further pursuit of the enemy was oorn- 
menced ; and the three Corps crossed the 
Ourcq practically unopposed, the Cavalry 
reaching the line of the ALsne River ; the 3rd 



and 5th Brigades south of Soissons, the 1st, 
2nd, and 4th on the high ground at Couvrelles 
and Cirseuil." 

From the Ourcq to the Aisne the British 
pursuit was so hot that the enemy found 
it all he could do to keep ahead of it, and 
that any attempt at resistance meant annihila- 
tion or capture ; and it is here in particular that 
an acknowledgment is due to the Air Service. 
It would often have been impossible to say 
whether a position was or . was not held in 
strength ; in which case, under ordinary cir- 
cumstances, it would have been necessary to 
halt and make some sort of reconnaissance, or 
take some action to force the enemy to show 
his hand ; but as our airmen kept our leaders 
constantly informed of what they hat! in front 
of them, it was always safe to rush any position 
which the airmen reported was not held in 
force. An acknowledgment must also be made 
to the Army Service Corps ; its work throughout 
the operations was really wonderful, for the 
men were kept fully supplied, and that, as we 
know, goes such a long way towards keeping 
uji the elliciency of troops ; in fact, both these 
I 'ranches of the British Service commanded 
i lie unbounded admiration of our Allies. 

On Friday, tin- llth, but little opposition was met with 
by us along any part of our front, and the direction of 
advance was, for the purpose of cooperating with our 
Allies, turned slightly to the north-east. The day was 
spent in pushing forward and in gathering in various 
hostile detachments, and by nightfall our forces had 
reached a line to the north of the Ourcq extending from 
Oulchy-lo-Chateau to Long Pont. On this day thero 
was also a general advance on the part of the French 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR, 



67 



along their whole line, which ended in substantial 
success, in one portion of the field Duke Albrecht of 
Wurtemberg's Fourth Army being driven back across 
tho Saulx, and elsewhere the whole of the corps artillery 
of a German corps being captured. Several German 
colours also were taken. 

It was only on this day that the full extent of the 
victory gained by the Allies on the 8th was appreciated 
by them, and the moral effect of this success has been 
enormous. . . . 

It seems probable that the Germans not only expected 
to flnd that the British Army was beyond the power of 
assuming the offensive for some time, but counted on the 
French having been driven back on to the line of the 
Seine ; and that, though surprised to find the latter 
moving forward against them after they had crossed tho 
Marne, they were in no wise deterred from making a 
great effort. " Eyewitness " on Sir J. French*s Staff. 

Since the 10th the whole of the German right wing has 
fallen back in considerable disorder, closely followed by 
the French and British troops. Six thousand prisoners 
and 15 guns were captured on the 10th and llth, and 
the enemy is reported to be continuing his retirement 
rapidly over the Aisne. evacuating the Soissons region. . . 

While the German right wing has thus been driven 
back and thrown into disorder, the French Armies further 
to the east have been strongly engaged with the German 
centre, which had pushed forward as far as Vitry. Be- 
tween the 8th and 10th our Allies were unable to makt- 
much impression west of Vitry. On the 1 1th, however, 
this portion of the German Army began to give way, and 
eventually abandoned Vitry, where the enemy's line of 
battle was forming a salient under the impulse of French 
troops between the upper Marne and the Mouse. The 
French troops are following up the enemy and are 
driving portion of his forces northwards towards the 
Argonne forest country. PRESS BUREAU. 

The 6th French and British Armies reached 
the Aisne west and east of Soissons on the 12th, 
followed by the 5th. 9th, 4th, and 3rd French 



Armies in echelon from the left. The official 
communique issued at Paris at midnight said : 

In the centre the German Armies are continuing 
their movement of retreat. We have crossed the Marne 
between Epernay and Vitry-le-Francois. 

On our right wing also the enemy began to retire to- 
day, and have abandoned the country round Nancy. 
We have re-occupied Luneville. 

In spite of the fatigue caused by five days' incessant 
fighting, our troops are strenuously pursuing tho enemy in 
.their general retreat, which appears to be more rapid 
than their advance. At certain point? it was so pre- 
cipitate that our troops have collected in the German 
headquarters, notably at Montmirail, maps, documents, 
and personal papers abandoned by the enemy, as well as 
parcels and letters received or ready for posting. 

Everywhere, particularly around Fromentieres, the 
enemy has abandoned batteries of howitzers and numbers 
of ammunition wagons. 

The prisoners give a strong impression of starvation, 
overwork, and depression. The horses are particularly 
exhausted. 

The enforced retreat of the Crown Prince's 
Army came just in time to save Fort Troy on, 
and perhaps Verdun as well. It was afterwards 
ascertained that Fort Troyon was in extremis. 
The fort itself had been reduced to a heap of 
ruins, and its garrison to 44 men with four 
serviceable guns. With the instance of St. 
Mihiel before us, it seems probable that if the 
Germans had succeeded in breaking through 
at Fort Troyon, and in cutting off Verdun, they 
would have maintained their position ; in which 
case, of course, Verdun would have fallen, the 
whole problem of supplying the German Armies 




LA FERE CHAMPENOISE. 
German dead evideutly killed whilst charging. 



[\swspaper Illustrations, 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




{UnatrwooU & Underwood. 

FRENCH TROOPS. 
AD hour's respite. 

would have been immensely simplified, and a 
pivot of manoeuvre which might yet prove 
invaluable not to mention the large numbers 
of men that would have been captured would 
have been lost to the Allies. There was no 
real victory- until all danger to the frontier 
fortresses had been eliminated. 

On this day the French had the great satis- 
faction of retaking Luneville, a town of 26,000 
inhabitants near the German frontier, which had 
been occupied by the Germans since August 22. 
In fairness to the Germans it should be stated 
that they had neither bombarded the place nor 
ill-treated the inhabitants. 

The recapture of Luneville goes further to 
suggest that German troops were being with- 
drawn from this wing to reinforce the German 
right, and there is no doubt that all the German 
troops that could be spared from Belgium were 
hastening south. This fact was discovered 
by King Albert, who made a sortie from Ant- 
werp, which considerably alarmed the Germans 
for the safety of their communications. 

Thus ended the Battles of the Marne. The 
German offensive had fr.iled, and with it all 
I irospects of final success, for, as von Caemmerer 
said a generation before the war, " an offensive 
which has to retrace its steps before the 
gates of Paris, or cannot even reach them, 
means a complete fiasco of the whole 
enterprise." 

In many instances the German higher leading 



had proved itself really brilliant. For instance, 
the conception, organization, energy, and 
execution of the advance to, and the retire- 
ment from, the Marne, compel our admiration ; 
but these things leave us all the more astonished 
at the palpable blunders which the Kaiser's 
chiefs committed in other directions. Those 
which preceded the battle have been men- 
tioned already to them we may add the adop- 
tion of too many tactical objectives in the 
battle itself. Thus, at one and tho same time, 
they tried to turn the left flank of the 5th 
French Army, and to break through at Vitry- 
le-Francois, at Fort Troyon, and at Nancy. 
In tactics as in strategy they attempted too 
much at once, with the result that they were 
stronger at Nancy and in the direction of Fort 
Troyon than was necessary to pin the enemy 
in those parts of the field to his ground, and 
not strong enough either towards Coulommiers 
(where it was necessary that they should main- 
tain their position) or towards Vitry-le-Fran- 
cois (where they desired to break the enemy's 
line). The fact is they excelled in dealing with 
material factors, but they lacked inspiration. 
They could neither gauge the spirit of the 
enemy's troops nor penetrate the mind of the 
enemy's general. The word " Grand Tactics " 
had no meaning for them. Their training seems 
to have made their minds as precise, but also 
as wooden, as their manoeuvres. 

Some day, when criticism of the Allied 
operations becomes permissible, critics will 
suggest that General Joffre lacked enterprise. 
They will say that he should have retired still 
further perhaps even to the line Orleans - 
Nevers-Dijon-Langres-Epinal hi order to im- 
pose upon the enemy longer marches and longer 
communications ; to induce the enemy to 
weaken himself by sending detachments to 
attack Paris and the fortress group Verdun - 
Toul ; and to give the Allies time to develop 
their resources. They will also suggest that the 
force which he allotted to his counter-stroke 
at the Marne the 6th French Army was too 
weak to achieve much they will say it would 
have been better to have placed tho 9th French 
Army with the 6th. The first criticism 
assumes that a prolonged retreat would have 
had no very serious effects upon the Allied 
Armies and upon France, her friends and those 
neutrals who were waiting " to rush to the 
rescue of the conqueror." It forgets, too, that 
the fall of the frontier fortresses must have 
ensued and would have opened shorter and 



THE TIMES HltiTUhY OF THE WAK. 



G'J 



letter railway communications with Germany 
and would have immensely simplified the supply 
problem of the German Army. The second 
criticism loses sight of the fact that to have 
weakened the Allied line in order to strengthen 
its decisive counter-attack would have been to 
take the serious risk of the Allies' line being 
pierced. Since it was the Germans and not the 
Allies who were pressed for time, it was General 
Joffre's business not to run any considerable 
risks in the effort to gain considerable successes. 
If he could gain time he would gain all. That 
he achieved his object is now clear. 

As for the troops themselves, a comparison 
is easily instituted. At Mons four British 
Divisions beat off the attacks of eight German 
Divisions. At Coulommiers and La Ferte 
Gaudier four German Divisions were imme- 
diately crumpled up by the onslaught of five 
British Divisions comment is superfluous. 

In a letter found on a dead German officer 
occurs the remark, " German infantry and 
cavalry will not attack English infantry and 
cavalry at close quarters. Their fire is murder- 
ous. The only way to attack them is with 
artillery." 

As for the French, " the immediate interest to 
us," said the Military Correspondent of The 
Times on October 7, " is the proof which this 



battle affords of the capacity of the French 
leading, and of the resolution of the French 
troops. For a fortnight the French Armies 
had been in retreat. No Army likes to retreat, 
and a French Army least of all. Yet directly 
General Joffre called upon his lieutenants they 
responded nobly, and the leading of the various 
Armies by their commanders is deserving of the 
highest praise. The German Armies in their 
full career of victory were immediately checked, 
stubbornly fought, and rapidly driven back with 
heavy loss. . . . The Germans hoped to obtain 
a decisive victory. They suffered, on the 
contrary, a severe defeat. 

" The French Armies, in the battle of the 
Marne, performed prodigies of valour, and 
changed the aspect of the campaign. The 
French staff and Commands gave to the world 
a convincing proof of their worth and com- 
petence. The cavalry were active and audacious. 
The famous ' 75 ' shattered the German 
infantry and overwhelmed the German guns. 
The French infantry fought with all their 
legendary dash, and were not to be denied with 
the bayonet. All the German Armies in France 
were in line and bent upon victory. It was' a 
fair field with no favour. The good ordering 
of the battle, its methodical conduct by the 
French Army commanders, and the self- 



FerVen-Tardenois -/^' /? * 

V_X. - .^_ jZsfcf/P,'* 



KEFERENCE. ^ Roioy^en 
ALLIES 
GERMAN 




THE CEKMAN RIGHT AT THE MARNE. 



70 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




[Tof>ical. 

TURCOS BRINGING IN GERMAN ACCOUTREMENTS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD. 



sacrificing of France's gallant soldiers brought 
victory to the French standards. France has 
every reason to be proud of the splendid valour 
of her sons." 

The effect of the news of the victory on the 
French population cannot be better described 
than by the following extracts from The Times 
Special Correspondent on " the extreme right 
of the French Army," dated Dijon, Septem- 
ber 12 : 

We reached Paris ... on Thursday (Sept. 10) 
morning . . . started again at midnight, and did not 
get to Dijon till 12.30 next day (Friday, Sept. 11) ... 
Between Paris and Dijon we stopped at practically 
every station. The train, which was just about half a 
kilometre (550 yards) in length, was packed. . . . 

We were not at heart a cheerful crowd. Many of us 
had come long distances, some even from America. . . . 
Except in the deserted streets of Paris ... I have never 
seen such uniform sadness on so many faces at once. 
The women especially, bravely as they tried to face 
their griefs and their anxieties, kind and helpful as they 
were to one another and the tiny babies that some of 
them had with them, were indescribably pathetic. 

These people were not refugees like the trainload 
fcnd seen lately in Belgium and Holland. They were 
going to the scene of the war instead of away from it. 
Most of them were reservists and their wives and chil- 
dren, bound for their old home< nt-nr ihe various head- 
quarters to which the men had been railed np. Some 
of them were nurses of the Croix Rouge, middle-aged 
women and quite young girls; some were on their \\ay 
t.> visit wounded relations. Each and all carried the 
name heavy burden. Not one but many of those near 
and dear to them were at the front. They knew in 
pome cases that tiny were already among the dead or 
wounded or missing. Generally they knew nothing 
except that, if they were still alive, they were there 



sdmewhere on one of the many battlefields on the long 
line of the Allies' front, face to face with the enemy and 
death. 

We made many friends of different conditions in life 
during the slow hours between dawn and midday, and 
all had the same story to tell. But there was no need 
to ask. It was written in their faces. The natural 
vivacity of these sorrowing women of France was gone. 
They talked, when they did talk, quietly and sadly, and 
of only one subject. More often they sat with unseeing 
eyes, looking far off into the darkness of the unknown 
future, fearful of the fate that waited for the men by 
their sides, and of the ruin and suffering that threatened 
their homes and their children. The tragedy that has 
brought sorrow to the women of half the world had come 
upon them with the suddenness of a bomb from a Taube, 
and some of them were wounded and all were stunned 
by its effect. 

That was when we were still in the dark about the 
result of the great battle that had begun to rage on the 
left wing near Paris, before the German retreat began. 
On the second day of our stay in Dijon there was a 
sudden change in the emotional atmosphere. Directly 
1 left the hotel in the evening I felt that good news had 
come. Relief and happiness were in the air. In the 
newspaper oftices, where the daily news of the war is 
posted up, the look of the people was absolutely different. 
For the moment personal griefs and losses were forgotten. 
(General Joffre's general order of September 11 had been 
published to the troops, and from them the news had 
spread so quickly that in half an hour everyone seemed 
to know what had happened. 

It was the first real success of the war, the first time 
-JTice its very early days that the French had begun to 
lo-e the feeling of apprehension produced in their minds 
by the steady retreat of the Allied troops from the 
Belgian frontier, after the battles of Charleroi and Minis. 
Even the officers at Dijon were affected by it. Up tilt 
then, though they spoke confidently enough of eventual 
success, the subject uppermost in their minds and their 
conversation was the wonderful perfection of the German 
organization. That was a nightmare which they had 
not so far been able to shake off. Now suddenly it waa 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



71 



gone. Tn a day it had become evident that France and 
England had their organization as well as the common 
enemy, and that the strategy of the Allied forces was 
beginning at last to tell. And the really hopeful sign of 
it all was . . . the . . . way in which Dijon and France 
received the good news. . . . There was no . . 
hysterical excitement, but only a more determined 
resolution to see the thing through to the end, a strength- 
ening of the national spirit of unity and a fuller reali- 
zation of the value and sincerity of the alliance with 
England and the fine fighting qualities of our troops. 
. . . They are taking the ups and downs of the war 
with a quiet and level-headed resolution that surprises 
even their own critics. . . . That, as well as their valour 
and fighting skill, makes them an ally in whom we may 
have double confidence. The French are friends worth 
having. 

The incidents of the battle which have come 
to our knowledge are so disconnected, and so 
very much fuller of some parts of the struggle 
than of others, that to include them in any 
general description of the conflict is not only 
to overload the narrative with detail, but to 
present a very distorted impression of the 
fighting as a whole. And yet these details 
permit us a peep behind the scenes ; they bring 
us more in touch with the human side of war ; 
and give us a sense of a more intimate know- 
ledge of the sort of thing modern fighting really 
is. The incidents in the Battle of the Ourcq 
and in the British Advance described here are 
compiled from the narratives of eye-witnesses. 

General Pau's 6th Army advanced eastwards 
against the Ourcq, with its right on the Marne, 
and its left towards Betz. The German guns 



were in action across the river, some miles to 
the French front. Their shells were falling in 
the field just beyond Meaux. From the rise 
that overhangs the little town looking towards 
the valley, white puffs of smoke in the air 
betrayed the bursting shrapnel. Tremendous' 
explosions of high-explosive shells, followed 
by clouds of greasy black smoke, flung fountains 
of mud to the sky, devastated the farmhouses, 
and set the haystacks in flames. 

In one part of the field a French battery set a 
sugar refinery on fire. The unfortunate Ger- 
man garrison was trapped, and the men, 
attempting to jump out of the windows, were 
shot down by the French infantry, which had 
got within close range. It is said that scarcely 
200 of the 2,000 Germans in and about the 
building escaped. The French infantry, lying 
close in its trenches, probably suffered little. 

Elsewhere, wide open country spread before 
the French in gentle undulations, covered with 
green fields and stubble, interspersed with 
farmhouses and copses of big trees. Field 
glasses revealed the figures of French soldiers 
moving across the open disappearing and re- 
appearing. Here and there a cloud of oily, 
yellowish smoke betrayed the bursting of a big 
shell. Haystacks were burning in the French 
lines. Away on the horizon, towards the 
German artillery position, a big farmhouse, or 




[Topical. 

WOUNDED AND DYING FRENCH AND GERMAN SOLDIERS IN A CHURCH 

NEAR MEAUX. 



////; TIMES HISTORY Of THK \VAR. 




CHOISY AU BAG. [Topical. 

Bridge destroyed by French Engineers. 

perhaps it was a whole village, was burning 
brightly. The landscape was dotted by burn- 
ing homesteads and hayricks. 

The town of Meaux itself was a scene of ruin 
IK .uses wrecked, the bridge destroyed. Shells 
were bursting overhead and aeroplanes were 
circling in the blue. The road to the east was 
Ftrewn with the bodies of Zouaves, Turcos, 
French riflemen, grey-clad Germans, and 
slaughtered horse*. 

Some four miles east of Meaux the ground 
rises steeply to the north, and is covered with 
trees. Beyond the woods were broad, undu- 
lating stretches of cultivation, dotted with 
farmsteads ; under the screen of the trees the 
Germans had levelled gun-platforms. Near the 
crests of the rises were the trenches, extending 
for nearly a mile parallel with the edge of the 
wood. The position was skilfully chosen, with 
a -,,o(l field of fire to front and Hunks. The 
French had attacked these trenches from the 
nOTth-WMt, scourging the enemy's lines with 
shrapnel. Covered by this fire the infantry 
advanced against the trenches, but it \viis not 
till late on Sunday that the resistance began t" 
weaken. 

On .Monday. September 7. the fighting on 
the Ourci) wns MLain extremely severe. There 
was a great deal of bayonet work, and the 
colours ,,i the Magdeburg ((ierman) Regiment 
w.rc captured in a terrible melee, in which 
the lieutenant colour-bearer was killed. to- 



Let her it h a uumix T of men who had attempted 
to defend the flag. 

The fighting was from village to village, the 
Zouaves and the Turcos having their fill of 
ha \onet work. The whole landscape was 
full of burning villages, farms, and haystacks, 
from which columns of smoke and flyinii sparks 
rose up and spread out in a dense dark pall over 
the blue sky. Everywhere the ground was 
strewn with (.ennaii wounded and dead: in 
some places they lay in heaps. Hut the 
enemy's machine guns took a heavy toll of the 
French their fire was held to the last, and 
then opened with annihilating cfYeet. The 
French losses appear to have been especially 
heavy at Bregy and Penchard, where there 

was so very heavy fighting The French 

infantry was located by a German airman, 
and came under a very severe fire of all 
sorts. 

When darkness fell each night the country- 
side was lit by burning villages flaming more 
furiously at every puff of wind. It was during 
these hours, and by the light of burning 
homesteads, that the Germans collected their 
dead, piled them into great heaps on pyres of 
wood, saturated them with paraffin, covered 
them with straw, and cremated them. 

On Tuesday, September 8, the English left, 
with some heavy batteries, came up to the help 
of the French near Meaux and shelled the high 
ground west of the junction of the Ourcq and 
the Marne. The road here is lined with 
particularly large Lombardy poplars : and the 
country beyond consists of orchards and copses 
and acres of rolling wheat land studded with 
patches of potatoes and maize. The position 
soon became an indescribable scene of mangled 
bodies, shattered guns, and splintered and 
uprooted trees. 

On the 9th, near Meaux, a French battery- 
was shelling the enemy across the river. The 
scene is thus described in The Times of Septem- 
ber 12: 

Sinark, smack, -mark, smack go til*' Fr-Mn -h ^nii^: 
ami then, n few seconds later, four white mushrooms of 
-moke spring up over the tar woods and .-louly the pop, 
pop. pop, pop of the distant explosions com--- lark to 
you. Knt mm ii i- thr (German gunners' turn. liang 
<:<> his guns two miles away : there is a moment of eerie 
and nni'ninlorl ii lilr -ilrur,- uneomfortahle h'-cause there 
is just a chimee they might have altered their ran^e 
and then, ipiit,- rlo-r ]>\ . o\ ,T the \vooo when- the hattery 

i-. eome tl rashes of ilie bursting shells. They -omul 

like a Titan's hlows on a -i.rantie kettle tilled with tons 
of old iron. 

. . . What we saw to-day was the German guns 
covering the retirement of their right wing, with the 



I HE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIl. 



Fivm-h artillery replying and the French infantry 
advancing to keep the retreating enemy on the move. 

Meaux w<\< still a town of blank shutters and empty 
streets when we got there this morning, but the French 
>;i!>prrs had thrown a plank gangway across the gap in 
the mined old bridge, built in A.D. 800, that had sur- 
vived all the wars of France since the 16th century, only 
to perish at last in this one. 

At Trilport there is a yawning gap- where one 
arch of the railway bridge used to be, with a solitary 
bent rail still lying across it. And among the wreckage 
of the bridge below, lying on its side and more than half 
henoath tho water, is the smashed and splintered ruin 
of a closed motor-car. 

" Three Germans were in it," explains a French sentry 
" two soldiers and an officer; they did not know the 
bridge had been blown up, and they came down this 
road last night at top speed, going towards Meaux, until 
suddenly, when they got here " and a wave of his 
hand indicated the probable trajectory of the car through 
the air to the bed of the river below. " It was a nice 
little surprise for them." 

Beyond the town was a ridge on which the French 
batteries were posted. We could see the ammunition 
wagons parked on the reverse slope of the hill. More 
were moving up to join them. 

The village beyond Penchard was thronged with 
troops and blocked with ambulance wagons and ammu- 
nition carts. . . . Through the rank grass at the side 
came tramping a long file of dusty, sweating, wearied 
men. They carried long spades and picks as well as 
their rifles. They had come out of the firing line, and 
were going back to Penchard for food. And from the 
next ridge we. really see a firing line at last. The hill 
elopes steeply down to the hamlet of Chambery, just 
below \is. The battery of which I spoke just now is in 
the wood on this side of it to our right. The Zouaves' 
firing line is lying fiat on the hillside a little way beyond 
the village, and behind them, farther down the hill, are 
thick lines of supports in the cover of entrenchments. 
It is a spectacle entirely typical of a modern battle, for 
there is scarcely anything to see at all. If it were not 
for those shells being tossed to and fro on the right there, 
and an occasional splutter of rifle fire, one might easily 
suppose that the lines of blue-coated men lying about 
on the stubble were all dozing in the hot afternoon sun. 



Kven when sonic of thrin move they seem to do it 
lazily, to saunter rather than to walk. ... It is only in 
the kinematograph or on the comparatively rare occasions 
of close fighting at short range that men rush dramatically 
about. For one thing, they are too tired to hurry ; and 
anyhow, what is the use of running when a shell may 
burst any minute anywhere in the square mile you hap- 
pen to be on V 

We talked with the company officers who were plan- 
ning a fresh advance, map in hand. They had gained 
the village in which we were that same morning, but at 
tremendous loss. " Out of my company of 220," said 
one captain, " there are only 100 left. Of our four officers 
two are wounded and one dead. I am left a' one in 
command." It was the same story the German 
machine guns. " Their fire simply clears the ground 
like a razor," said the captain. "You just can't under- 
stand how anyone gets away alive. I had men fall at 
my right hand and at my left. You can't look any- 
where as you advance without seeing men dropping." 

All round us and for two miles back of Chambery the 
bodies lay. Germans and French mingled, dead men 
among the cornstooks, dead on the stubble, dead in the 
turnip fields, in the ditches, in the woods. Horses, too, 
everywhere, lying with a hind leg thrust out stiffly into 
the air ; cows torn open by the shells. The whole fair 
countryside, radiant under the golden harvest sun, sent 
up the sickening stench of death. 

The British communications ran through 
their left flank to Paris. At Lagny bot 1 1 
bridges over the Marne had been demolished 
by the British on Thursday, September 3. 
They lay half submerged in the water, the 
windows of neighbouring houses had been 
shattered by the explosion, the streets in the 
vicinity were strewn with glass, telegraph and 
telephone wires hung down in festoon < from the 
positions on the water's edge, and all the 
boats in the vicinity were sunk. The road 
from Lagny, along the British front, runs 




WOUNDED GERMAN PRISONERS OUTSIDE A CHURCH NEAR MEAUX. 



[Topical. 



74 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




WOUNDED TURCOS BEING CARRIED IN BY FRENCH HUSSARS. [Topical. 



through a beautiful wooded country, now 
utterly silent and desolate ; every home 
shuttered and deserted. 

The British started from their bivouacs and 
billets on Sunday, September 6, just as a 
perfect summer's day was dawning. Reveille 
alled the men from their slumbers, and pro- 
duced an immediate bustle, in which, however, 
there was no sign of confusion. A meal of 
biscuits and hot coffee was succeeded by the 
fall-in, and in an incredibly short time the 
troops were on the white roads running north- 
east from Pontcarre, Tournan, and Rosny, 
through the green forests of Crecy. A whisper 
had run through the ranks that at last they 
should take the offensive against the enemy, and 
the men stepped out with a will which had lately 
been lacking in their stride. Hour after hour 
the beat of marching feet resounded on every 
road to the front. Every now and then 
someone would start to whistle or sing some 
popular air, and would soon be joined in 
chorus by all who were within hearing. At first 
the country round was gay with golden corn ; 
little farmhouses, amid their bright flower 
gardens and heavily-laden orchards, completed 
a scene of peace. Old men and women, girls 
and fresh-faced children waved to the troops 
a.- they |ia-.-ed. 

By noon the heat was tremendous, so that 
the 1 in It for a much -needed rest and a meal 
wus very welcome. As the afternoon wore on, 



signs of the enemy's recent presence began to 
multiply. Acres of corn land were now mere 
stretches of ashes and dust. The humble 
homes of the hard-working peasantry were 
wrecked and burnt. Here and there some 
more pretentious dwelling had been pillaged 
and gutted by fire. Broken picture frames, 
marble statuettes, crockery, children's toys, 
furniture, and goods and chattels of all sorts 
once the treasures of departed households 
now littered the floors indoors, or were flung 
broadcast over the ground outside. The 
village church had been burnt, the flowers 
that fond hands had placed upon the gr&\ e 
had been trampled flat : crosses had been 
trodden underfoot and tombstones smashed. 

When the march was resumed there was a 
distinct change in the bearing of the men ; 
there was no more whistling, singing, or chaff. 
It had gone home to them that this might be 
their own country, and the rumble of the guns 
in the distance reminded them that they would 
soon have the opportunity of striking a blow for 
their own hearths and homes, and of those of the 
poor people through whose country they were 
passing. 

Beyond the forests spread some open country, 
where a belt of timber marked the enemy's 
position. The woods were alive with armed 
men ; beyond the woods were liis guns. Sud- 
denly from the distance came the " thud-ud 
of a heavy gun. and a shell passing overhead. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



75 



with a long-drawn wail, burst with a tremend- 
ous roar just behind the extended lines. The 
whole of the enemy's artillery quickly joined 
in chorus, and it was not long before the British 
guns took up the challenge. The ear was 
stunned with the sound of roaring guns, flying 
projectiles and bursting shells. The infantry 
advanced, and ere long little spurts of dust and 
the zip-zipping of flying lead showed that they 
were coming under rifle fire from the woods in 
front. 

Presently the enemy attempted a counter- 
attack, and at last the British infantry com- 
menced to fire. A few seconds sufficed to dash 
the enemy back to cover. After a couple of 
hours' fighting, the infantry was close up to the 
enemy's position. Above the rattle of the 
rifles rang the order to charge, and " with 
that stern appalling shout which no enemy 
every heard unmoved," the British dashed 
upon the foeman and drove him headlong from 
his position. The trenches were full of dead 
and dying men ; the ground around was 
covered by wounded horses and wrecked guns, 
and was pitted with great holes where high 
explosive shells had burst, or was pock-marked 
by the British shrapnel. 

On Monday, September 7, the British con- 
tinued their advance in touch with the French 
Armies on both flanks. In the small hours of 
the morning the roads leading north from 



Coulommiers were filled with long columns of 
retreating Germans of all arms. The heads 
of the English columns reached the village at 
5 a.m. From here the battle rolled on to 
La Ferte Gaucher and the marshes of St. 
Gond. 

The following extracts from a letter written 
by a German officer, which appeared in the 
Intelligenzblatt of Berne, and afterwards in 
Le Temps, are interesting : 

We were obliged to retreat as the English were at- 
tempting a turning movement, which was discovered 
by our airmen. During the last two hours we were 
continually exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, 
for our artillery had all been either put out of action or 
had retreated and had csased to fire. The enemy's 
airmen flew above us describing two circles, which 
means : '' There is infantry here." Then hell was let 
loose. The enemy's artillery " mowed " the ground 
with its fire. In one minute's time I counted 40 shells. 
The shrapnel exploded nearer and nearer ; at last it 
reached our ranks. I quickly hugged a knapsack to my 
stomach in order to protect myself as best I could. The 
shrieks of the wounded rang out on all sides. Tears 
came to my eyes when I heard the poor devils moaning 
with paia. The dust, the smoke and the stench of the 
powder were suffocating. 

An order rang out, and bending as low as possible we 
started up. We had to pass right in the line of the 
enemy's fire. The men began to fall like ninepins. 
God be thanked that I was able to run as I did. I 
thought my heart would burst, and was about to throw 




WRECKED CHATEAUX. 

On the left the remains of the Manor House, at La Ferte Gaucher, and on the right the remains of 

President Poincare's Chateau. 



76 



THI-: 77.U/-;.S //7>TO/,'Y' (>[' THE WAR. 



i 1 .MI llir Around, uimblr i<> i-unt innr. wln-n your 
mid ilint of H.>lli ro-r lii-fun; my eyr,. mid 1 
ran oiv. 

At last we reached our batteries. Three uuri- rn- 
^mashed to pieit-s and t lie L'nn i-iiri -iimi-s urn- burnt. 
A\V halted for a few XIM-UIK!.- In take breath. And all 
l In- time' that whiitlin): and banging of the shells con- 
tiniu'd. It is ft wonder out- i- not driven mad. 

When the British advanced on tin- morning 
of Tuesday, September S, the sky was already 
full of aeroplanes and the air full of the humming 
of their engines. On the south side of La 
Kerte I ' niicher stands a manor-house, froi 11 which 
the enemy was driven. It had been mercilessly 
pillaged. The dining-room table was heaped 
with the wreckage of a drunken meal. The 
floor \\as strewn with bottles ; all the drawer*. 
cupboards, wardrobes, and presses had been 
forced open and their contents thrown about 
the rooms. Beds, telephone instrument, 
gramophones, and records were smashed to 
pieces. 

The fighting here between the British and 
the 5th French Army against the Germans 
began at dawn, and was of a most sanguinary 
character. The British artillery got into 
action about 5 a.m. The German guns at 
La Kerte Gaucher were posted on the heights 
beyond the Grand Morin. The line of battle 
extended right away to Sezanne and Vitry-le- 



Franeois. All along their position the Germans 
I mil heavy guns in action au.ong their lighter 
field pieces, and their fire was extremely heav\ . 
but fortunately not very accurate. The gun- 
of the Allies, lighter- and better in quality and 
better handled, covered the advance of their 
infantry with excellent effect. It was not long 
before the latter were loosed from the leash. 
All that afternoon a furious struggle raged Hlonu 
the British right and the left and centre of the 
5th French Army, but towards night the Ger- 
man resistance began to weaken. Their infan- 
try was pushed across the Grand Morin and 
across the plateau of Sezanne. The battle, how- 
ever, never ceased. 

West of La Ferte Gaucher the engagement 
continued towards Coulommieis and Rebais. 
Here British cavalry were pressing eagerly 
forward. Everywhere the British found that 
the poorest of the poor had been robbed 
of all the money and food they had, with 
the result that the British gave away half 
their rations and more to the destitute 
peasantry. 

The fighting was very fierce by La Tretoire, 
where the British guns were in action against 
the Germans across the Petit Morin. The 
country here is covered with fruit trees and the 




LA FERTE GAUCHER. [v 

A German officer'! cap lies on the floor, amidst the scattered contents of drawers and cupboards, 

emphasizing the enemy's hurried retreat. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



77 




INeaspaper Illustrations. 
GERMAN PRISONERS ON THE ROAD TO PARIS GUARDED BY CUIRASSIERS. 



open roads are lined with the pears and apples. 
Under cover of artillery fire, the infantry 
fought its way steadily through the orchards 
and across the corn fields, where the un- 
harvested sheaves still stood. Wherever they 
were checked or halted to fire, they quickly 
found or extemporised some sort of cover, 
behind which they lay down, rising again 
sharply when the order to advance was given, 
for the advance was steadily pressed and the 
British not to be denied. In widely extended 
lines they swept across the terrain under a fire 
from guns, machine guns, and rifles, which 
would have made a holocaust of troops in close 
formations. Taking advantage of all cover- 
farmsteads, hayricks, undulations, trees, rocks, 
hedges, and ditches they closed steadily with 
the enemy, pouring on from point to point 
until at last the welcome order to fix bayonets 
was received, and with a roar they burst upon 
the Germans and drove them headlong from 
their lines. 

In The Times of September 15 it is stated 
that 

At Coulommiers, on Tuesday morning . . . General 
Smith-Domen . . . who was seated in a high-powered 
car, called a group of young officers fresh from England 
to him. They had been marching all night until 2 a.m. 
with British reinforcements. It was now about 7.45 
a.m. The sun had been up two hours, and the heat was 
already great and the roads, dusty. General Smith- 
Dorrien said to these officers : 

" You have done some snlendid marching, but I want 



you to push on another nine miles to the fighting. The 
Germans are on the run, and we hope to keep them 
going. If you do these nine miles your men will get a 
clasp. There will be great fighting to-night or to- 
morrow morning.'* 

The officers saluted and were delighted with their 
orders. Their men, when met later the same day near 
the end of their march were still cheerful and looking 
eagerly for a fight. 

From Doue my informant made his visit to the 
fighting line towards the Petit Morin River. It was 
getting dark, and the Germans were making desperate 
efforts to cross the river by the bridge, retreating before 
our shell fire. Our artillery was on the right and had 
the range of the bridge perfectly, dropping shells on it 
as soon as a wagon attempted to cross. German artillery 
from the far side was replying without much effect. 
One shell burst close to a group of our men. The men 
laughed. Only three or four were hit, and they showed 
torn putties and coats. 

A private in the 1st Lincolns states : 
During the German retreat the British were held 
up on a ridge by a battery. Two companies of us made 
a detour on the right, marched down a valley out of sight 
of the German gunners, and entered a wood on the 
enemy's left. The German battery, about 200 yards 
away, were busy with their work in front, not dreaming 
that we were on their flank. In extended order we took 
steady aim, and at the first round every man of the 
German battery fell. That was all we fired. Our 
artillery continued firing on the guns and smashed four. 
The other two were taken. 

On Wednesday, September 9, the enemy 
were driven across the Marne closely pursued 
by the British, one of whom said of the cross- 
ing : " We harried them before tl! crossing 
and drowned them during it " (Times, Septem- 
ber 14), for the river was filled with German 
dead. The German artillery came into action 



78 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




GERMAN TROOPS PASSING RED CROSS 

FROM THE 

again from the heights across the river, and 
there was a certain amount of hand-to-hand 
fighting with small bodies of German troops 
who had been unable to cross in tune. By 
Tuesday night the British were in possession of 
La Fert6-sous-Jouarre, Charly, and Chateau 
Thierry. 

Near Chateau Thierry there was more 
fighting. The road runs straight across the 
Plain of Chezy before it plunges into the dark 
shadows of the Grande Foret. As soon as the 
British infantry entered the woods it could be 
no longer supported by their artillery, and the 
fighting developed into an immense hunt, in 
which the British pursued the Germans from 
tree to tree, capturing them in little blocks 
every here and there, and making a rather 
larger haul of a number of the enemy who were 
cut off by the marshes of Hotisseaux and 
Bergis. 

Just beyond Chateau Thierry itself the 
Germans had left a considerable rearguard 
with a few large guns on the heights above the 
town. As the British approached they came 
first under the fire of these heavy guns. Some 
of them pushed into Chateau Thierry itself, 
with the result that many of the houses were 
destroyed by shell fire. The fronts of the 
houses on the road towards Soissons were 
furrowed deep by flying shot and shell ; their 



WAGONS WITH 
BATTLEFIELD. 



[Underwood & Und'ru'ood. 

WOUNDED RETURNING 



sides in many cases presented gaping holes ; the 
tall trees which lined the road had been stripped 
of their leaves, and often topped and lopped by 
shell fire ; the beautiful country around was. 
burnt and charred. Every here and there 
individuals or groups of Germans were forced 
to surrender -often under circumstances which 
suggested that they had been left without 
much hope of avoiding capture, in order to 
secure the safe retirement of their main body. 

The following " from an English Officer's 
diary " appeared in the Paris edition of the 
New York Herald : 

My regiment has crossed the important River X 
(evidently the Marne near its junction with the Ourcq). 
The bridge was blown up by the Germans, but was 
replaced by pontoons. In front of us the British tiel.l 
guns are pouring a hail of shot against the German 
batteries posted on hills to the north. Above our head- 
"old cow guns" supported the advanced batteries. 
We were ordered to occupy the hill south of a mill 
round which the Germans were strongly entrenched. 

Lying flat on the ground I could see through my 
Bfl an extraordinary spectacle. The mill was three 
or four miles away, the roof seriously damaged by the 
French "."num. guns. For two hours ths German 
position was bombarded : then some of the enemy's 
infantry tried to flee from their tivnrhrs, but were forced 
to return at the point of their orticers' revolvers. Km 
another hour the relentless French artillery poured 
shrapnel on the position, which routed stoutly until 
-u.l.lenly a dozen white flags waved above the trenches. 
A section of Zouaves, carried away by excitement, at 
once rushed forward. Forgetting that they had sur- 
rendered, about 100 German infantryman ran away, and 
they were allowed to escape, while the Zouaves took 
possession of the trenches, in which only 115 mea wro 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



79 



found alive, starving, covered with mud and glad to be 
taken prisoners. 

The fighting at La Fert6-sous-Jouarre is thus 
described by The Times own correspondent : 

An eye-witness has given me a description of the fight 
at Ferte-sous-Jouarre on the night of September 10 (? 9). 
The Germans crossed the river, blowing up the bridge 
between them and the English on the other bank.* 

Immediately after the firing had ceased, my informant 
entered the town. A weird effect was created by the 
houses burning in the night, and to these sights was 
added the sounds of a hand-to-hand encounter in the 
streets. 

The English passed over the Marne on a pontoon bridge, 
which they had thrown across in two hours. Over this 
construction numbers of French troops also passed. The 
swiftness of everything surprised the observer. In the 
morning there was no sign of the pontoon bridge. The 
English and the enemy had cleared off. It was difficult 
to realize that the town had been the scene of a fierce 
fight in the night, for beyond the gaunt walls of a burnt- 
out or half-demolished house there was no sign of war. 

When the British transport was on the road, a hundred 
Germans, with about a dozen officers, suddenly emerged 
from a wood and held up their hands. Accustomed to 
the enemy's wiles, the Army Service Corps men grasped 
their rifles ; but they soon discovered that the enemy 
were anxious to give themselves up. They were utterly 
starved and worn out and had no more fight left in them ; 
they ate dry bread ravenously. 

This Is said to have happened at 4 p.m. The Germans 
left a party with two Maxims to command the passage. 



An officer writes : 

The other day, Thursday (September 10) I think it was, 
we, a battery of the X division, were marching along tlw 
road towards - River. The day before there had 
been a small advance guard action and we were expecting 
a peaceful march. However, as we neared the river the 
battery was ordered to trot and I guessed something wag 
on. Soon we passed through a email village and saw 
some dead and wounded lying about, also we heard the 
rattle of Maxims. The major had ridden on with ma 
and showed me where the battery was to come into 
action. I sent back word and selected a position, which 
was soon taken up. We fired a few rounds and very 
shortly after I was ordered to take my section on down 
the hill towards the river. Well, I found that the road 
was blocked by a section of another battery. I stopped 
my section and tried to find out the situation. 

The Germans were holding the opposite bank, a verv 
steep bluff, with a battalion of the Jaegers and eight 
machine guns. These guns were trained on the road 
where it was fully exposed for about 100 yards, and 
nothing could cross. The section of the other battery 
were trying to locate them and knock them out. So I 
took my section up the hill behind these and waited for 
any targets to appear. The advance guard had been 
working well. By taking cover of the woods they had 
managed to get down into the river bed and round the 
flanks. From there they opened a hot fire on to the 
German machine guns. 

From my position I could see a portion of the road on 
the opposite bank. I had just got the range to this when 
a machine gun came galloping up. I fired two rounds 
at it. The first was over and just behind ; the second 




[Spirt 6- Genera! 



FRENCH AND BRITISH SOLDIERS TOASTING THEIR COUNTRIES. 



80 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



short. However, I had never seen anything move 
quicker than that gun. By now our infantry had forced 
the Jaegers back, and we had orders for a general advance. 
As we crossed the bridge I heard that seven of their 
machine guns had been captured. We wound up and 
up, and on all sides saw evidences of our fire. In one 
place an ammunition wagon had been hit. Both horses 
were blown over into the ditch. A bit higher up was a 
young boy hit in the back. All that we could do was to 
give him water. He told me that his orders had been 
to stay till shot or captured. These German infantry are 
a brave lot. 

Well, we went on into the village at the top of the 
hill and came into action again. Our job there was to 
shell retiring infantry. We soon got a target and started 
away. Everything was working like a well-oiled machine. 
Suddenly I saw spurts of dust in and about my section 
and also heard the unpleasant noise of Mauser bullets 
round my head. Some one was firing at my section 
from a wood 150 yards on the right front. I promptly 
switched my two guns half-right and fired at 300 yards 
into the wood. Also our spare gunners turned up with 
rifles and fired. After about five rounds, out came what 
I thought was a French officer and two Germans. I ran 
out with two gunners to take them over, but on neariug 
them saw they were all three Germans. However, they 
were very much more frightened than I, and put their 
hands up. 

Soon after about eight more came out. I interrogated 
them, and they said that they were lost and had boen 
wandering about for two days. I got a revolver off one, 
and a young horse, thoroughbred, four years old. This 
was brought in by one of the men, and had belonged to 
one of their officers, who had got away. In the bolsters 
I found a large bottle of eau de Cologne, sweets, and a 
box of matches. While this excitement was going on 
the other two sections had also been busy, one firing at 
German infantry and one at a German battery. The 
total capture that day was 300 Germans and seven guns. 
Not bad for advanced guard action. Still, they had 
held up our Division for a day and done their job well 
and bravely. 

The following letter from a Major, R.F.A., 
gives an account of a wild exploit, in which 
nine men and a trumpeter captured 50 Germans 
and two Maxim guns : 

SEPTEMBER 14. 

We got the order to go off and join a battery under 
Colonel Carey's orders. We came en route under 
heavy shrapnel fire on the road. I gave the order to 
walk as the horses had hardly had any food for a couple 
of days, and also I wanted to steady the show. I can't 
say I quite enjoyed the " swank " of walking along at 

the head with old behind me, especially when six 

shrapnel burst right in front of us. ... We got there 
just in time, rushed into action, and opened fire on a 
German counter-attack at short range, destroying the 
lot as far as I could see. We then moved slightly to 
another position to take on a valley, down which they 
were attacking, and were at it the whole day, firing about 
900 rounds into quantities of German attacks and counter- 
attacks. They cannot stand the shrapnel, and the 
moment I got one on them they turned and bolted back 
to the wood. I got on to their trenches, one shell 
dropped in. I was enfilading them and they tore out 
of the trenches, and so on, each trench in turn, and fell 
in hundreds. Also through the rangeunder Cox saw 
I'd hit a machine-gun and they had abandoned it and 
another. So it went on all day, shell and bullets hum- 
ming round, but only one of my staff horses hit. Our 



infantry advancing and retiring others advancing and 
coming back Germans doing likewise, a hellish din of 
shell fire, and me pouring in fire wherever I could see 
them. 

At last I got six shrapnel into a wood and cleared 
a heap of them out and got into them with shrapnel. 
It is awful. The sergeant-major put his hand up to 
his head and said : " Oh, sir, it's terrible." That seemed 
to settle them, and at last we saw the infantry advancing 
to their position without resistance. Now was my 
chance. I determined to get those machine-guns if I 

could, as otherwise the infantry would. So I left 

to command and got the trumpeter, sergeant-major, and 
six men with six rifles, and went forward " to recon- 
noitre," as I reported to the Gen. by , after I had- 

gone. It was a weird ride, through thick black woods, 
holding my revolver ready, going in front with the little- 
trumpeter behind and the others following some way in 
rear. We passed some very bad sights, and knew the- 
woods were full of Germans, who were afraid to get away 
on account of the dreaded shell fire. We got in front 
of our infantry, who were going to fire at us ; but i 
shouted just in time. 

At last we came to the edge of the wood, and in front 
of us, about 200 yards away, was a little cup-shaped 
copse, and the enemy's trenches with machine-guns a 
little farther on. I felt sure this wood was full of 
Germans, as I had seen them go in earlier. I started to 
gallop for it, and the others followed. Suddenly 
about 50 Germans bolted out firing at us. I loosed off 

my revolver as fast as I could, and loosed off 

his rifle from the saddle. They must have thought 
we were a regiment of cavalry, for except a few they 
suddenly yelled and bolted. I stopped and dismounted 
my lot to fire at them to make sure they didn't change 
their minds. I held the horses, as I couldn't shoot 
them like that myself. I then suddenly saw there were 
more in the copse so I mounted the party and galloped 
at it, yelling, with my revolver held out. 

As we came to it I saw it was full of Germans, so I 
yelled " hands up " and pointed the revolver at them. 
They all chucked down their rifles and put their hands 
up. Three officers and over 40 men to 10 of us with 
six rifles and a revolver. I herded them away from 
their rifles and handed them over to the Welsh Regiment 
behind us. I tore on with the trumpeter and the sergeant- 
major to the machine-guns. At that moment the enemy's 
shrapnel, the German infantry who'd got away, and our 
own howitzers, thinking we were hostile cavalry, opened 
fire on us. We couldn't move the beastly things, and 
it was too hot altogether, so we galloped back to the 
cup wood and they hailed shrapnel on us there. I 
waited for a lull, and mounted all my lot behind the 
bushes and made them sprint as I gave the word to. 
gallop for cover to the woods where the Welsh com 

pany was. There I got who understands them, 

and an infantryman who volunteered to help, and 

and ran up to the Maxims, and took out the breech. 

mechanism of both and one of the belts and carried 
away one whole Maxim. We couldn't manage the other. 
The Welsh asked what cavalry we were. I told them. 

we were the staff of the Battery and they cheered 

us, but said we were mad. We got back very slowly 
on account of the gun and the men wild with excite- 
ment, and we have got the one gun complete and the 
mechanism and belt of the other. The funniest thing 
was the little trumpeter, who swept a German's helmet 
off Ins head and waved it in the air shouting " I've got 
it," wild with excitement. He is an extraordinarily 
brave boy. 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 



THE DEFENCE AND FALL OF 

ANTWERP. 



THE FORTIFICATIONS AND PLAN OF DEFENCE POSITION DURING THE GERMAN "ADVANCE ON 
PARIS " CAPITULATION OF GHENT BELGIAN ARMY RETIRES ON ANTWERP SORTIE IN FORCE 
FRESH GERMAN* PROPOSALS TO BELGIUM MADE AND REJECTED GERMAN STRATEGY BOMBARD- 
MENT OF MALINES ANTWERP FORTS SHELLED OUTER FORTS FALL SITUATION IN THE CITY 
GERMAN PROCLAMATION GOVERNMENT PREPARES TO DEPART BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS 
REASONS FOR THE BRITISH EXPEDITION CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS WORK OP NAVAL 
BRIGADES RELIEF Too LATE GERMANS CROSS THE RIVER GOVERNMENT AND LEGATIONS 
DEI-ART GENERAL EXODUS THE BELGIAN ARMY'S ESCAPE COSTLY GERMAN DELAYS THE 
BOMBARDMENT OF THE CITY PLIGHT OF THE POPULATION A DREADFUL PILGRIMAGE DUTCH 
HOSPITALITY FIRE AND DESTRUCTION IN ANTWERP THE FORMAL SURRENDER FATE OF THE 
NAVAL BRIGADES GERMANY'S EMPTY TRIUMPH AND MILITARY DISAPPOINTMENT BELGIAN 
HEROISM. 



ANTWERP, with its elaborate defences 
evolved through 30 years of addition to 
and improvement of Brialmont's ori- 
ginal plans, was designed to be the great 
stronghold of Belgium : " the base of the field 
army and final keep of the kingdom." To this 
role it seemed to be admirably adapted by 
nature, with access to the sea on one side, and to 
landwards being practically encircled at an 
advantageous distance by the rivers Scheldt, 
Kupel and Nethe. The fortifications, with their 
successive developments, have already been 
fully described in a former chapter of this 
History.* It will only be necessary now to 
recall that the " old " or inner ring of forts, 
placed at regular intervals of 2,200 yards at an 
average distance of about 3,500 yards outside 
the enceinte of the city itself, were planned, 
and mostly built, before the year 1869. The 
first of the " new " or outer forts (Rupelmonde, 
Waelhem, Lierre, Schooten and Berendrecht) 
were designed by Brialmont in 1879 ; while 
tin- final forts and redoubts of this series were 



See Chapter VI. (Part 3) on " The Army and the Fortresses 
nl 1 Belgium." pp. 10:1-120. 

Vol. 2. Part 16. 81 



only completed as recently as the end of 
November, 1913. The inner forts, like tin- 
defences of the enceinte itself, were excellently 
planned to resist the assaults of an enemy 
armed with the weapons of the period in which 
they were built namely, half a century ago. 
Properly held (as the Belgians could have been 
relied upon to hold them), they would have 
rendered Antwerp impregnable to direct in- 
fantry attack or to bombardment by the field 
guns of those days. The more modern outer 
forts, with the line of the rivers, would have 
similarly furnished a complete defence against 
any artillery that had been recognized as 
employable in field or siege operations up to 
the outbreak of the present war. Military 
authorities were entirely justified in believing 
Antwerp to be a position of practically incom- 
parable strength. But the large German or 
Austrian howitzers, with a range exceeding 
any pieces which had heretofore been regarded 
as. mobile, and far exceeding that of any guns 
mounted in the Antwerp forts, and with tin- 
extreme destruetiveness of their projectiles, 
introduced a new element into the situation. 



THE T1MI-IS HISTORY OF 'I HE WAU. 




[Ortmans, Antwerp. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DEGUISE. 
The gallant defender of Antwerp. 

Against them even the holding of the line of 
the rivers Rupel and Nethe, which had seemed 
so valuable a feature of the defensive works, 
was useless for the protection of the city. The 
average distance of the rivers from Antwerp 
itself is about 6 miles. The 28 cm. guns have 
an effective range of over 7 miles, with an 
extreme range of some 2 miles more. As 
soon as the enemy could approach his guns, 
therefore, to the further side of the river, the 
town was at his mercy. So that all that stood 
between him and the capture of Antwerp was 
in fact the guns of the outer forts. And these 
themselves, as we have seen, would be helpless 
as soon as the enemy had placed his big guns 
in position against them. 

This, then, was the actual condition of 
Antwerp as a defensible position when, towards 
the end of September, 1914, it began to be 
evident that the Germans meditated a serious 
attack upon it. But before proceeding to 
the narrative of that attack it will be necessary 
to give a brief survey of the events which had 
been going on in Belgium since the gallant 
defence of Liege, the fall of Namur. and the 
German occupation of Brussels, though some 
outstanding incidents of that period have al- 
ready been touched upon. 

As the mass of the German army swept 
.southward in what was to have been the 
triumphant dash on Paris, there remained in 
possession of the Belgians as much of their 



country as lies between the sea coast and the 
line made by the river Scheldt from Antwerp 
to Ghent and thence by the river Lys to 
Deynze. thence to Roulers, Ypres, Poperinghe 
and the French frontier. To south and east of 
this line was a strip of debatable territory, 
which the Germans made no attempt to occupy 
with any permanent force, but which continued 
to be the scene of desultory fighting throughout 
the latter part of August and the whole of 
.September. Some of the more conspicuous 
incidents which disgraced the German arms in 
the course of this fighting have been already 
mentioned, as the repeated and wanton 
burnings of Termonde and the dropping of 
bombs on the Convent at Deynze and other 
defenceless places. The Belgian forces through- 
out this period at any point along this line 
were insignificant. The army as a whole had 
been withdrawn within the fortified area of 
Antwerp, and the holding of this long front, 
even of the important lines of communication 
by rail, road and water, between Ghent and 
Ostend, Bruges, Zeebrugge and other points, 
as well as the defence of the towns themselves, 
was largely left to the Civic Guards and the 
Gendarmerie. It was immensely to the credit 
of the vigilance and valour of these small, and 
often untrained, forces that the Germans, in 
whatever strength they sought to penetrate 
this front, never failed to find their opponents 
ready for them. This strength, it should be 
said, was rarely considerable. The chief object 
of the Germans was now tc pour all the troops 
which they could send down to the main battle 
front in France, where unexpected difficulties 
had arisen. They evidently hoped that their 
methods of " frightfulness " had sufficiently 
terrorized the Belgians, so that they would not 
venture to provoke them to further " reprisals " 
by interfering with this process and, on those 
terms, they were for the present content to 
leave this unviolated portion of Belgium 
territory in Belgian hands. 

Meanwhile fencing and petty skirmishes went 
on along the whole line. At one time (on 
August 26) a mixed force of a few hundred 
German infantry and cavalry approached to 
within five miles of Ostend, where, at a small 
engagement at Snaeskerke, they were pluckily 
driven off, with the loss of a material portion 
of their numbers in wounded and prisoners, by 
the gendarmes. Later (on September 25) an 
airship dropped bombs on Ostend itself, without 
causing any loss of life, and doing but insignifi- 



'1'HK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



38 



cant damage to property. There were con- 
tinual minor affairs at a score of different, 
points, and in the early part of September 
these were so frequent and occurred simul- 
taneously at so many points that there is 
reason to believe that the story told by Ulilans 
who were captured was true namely, that a 
force of 1,200 Uhlans had been sent out with 
instructions to break up into smaller parties 
and, at all hazards, to got to the coast and find 
out what, if any, reinforcements of French or 
British troops had been, or were being, landed 
at Zeebrugge or Ostend. The prisoners added 
that all members of the force who got back 
alive bringing any trustworthy information 
were to be decorated with the Iron Cross. ]t 
is certain that none earned the decoration ; 
but for a week or so there was a very lively 
time at villages, cross-roads and railway cross- 
ings all up and down the front. 

More serious was the demonstration against 
Ghent on September 0, when General von 
Boehn, in command of large reinforcements 
for. the southern army, appeared at Oordeghem, 
some 12 miles south-east of Ghent, and sent on 
an advance force of some 5,000 infantry with 
machine guns towards the city with a view, 
presumably, to occupying it if it was found 
undefended. This force, however, found the 
Belgians well entrenched in a strong position 
between the river Scheldt and the line of the 
railway embankment at Melle, where a lively 
action took place. The Belgian loss, owing to 
superiority of position, was slight, amounting 
to less than a dozen killed and only a score of 
wounded. The wreckage of their machine guns 
left by the roadside and the size of the trenches 
in which the Germans buried their dead (two 
officers being buried in separate graves) showed 
that their loss was much heavier. They, as 
usual, burned, with the fusees which they 
curried for the purpose, every house in that 
portion of the long, straggling village which 
they were permitted to reach ; then, under 
cover of night, they retired on the main army. 

On the following day General von Boehn 
sent the Burgomaster of Ghent a summons to 
surrender under threat of bombardment of 
the city. The destruction of Ghent, just 100 
years after the famous Treaty of Peace between 
Great Britain and the United States had been 
signed within its walls, would have been a 
crime which would have shocked the world 
even more than did the destruction of Louvain 
or Rheims Cathedral. The Germans were un- 




SIR CECIL HERTSLET. 
British Consul-General at Antwerp. 

doubtedly willing to perpetrate the crime, and 
to avert it the Burgomaster visited the German 
General at Oordeghem on the following morn- 
ing, when a convention was entered into which 
provided that, on the one hand, the city should 
not be bombarded nor should any German 
armed force enter it ; while, on the part of the 
. Belgians, any soldiers that were in the town 
should be withdrawn and the Civic Guard dis- 
armed, and, in addition, certain supplies of 
grain and fodder, petrol and cigars should be 
furnished by the city to the German troops. 

As the Burgomaster was a civic officer, the 
Belgian military authorities were afterwards 
disinclined to regard the convention as binding 
upon them. But it was, on the whole, suf- 
ficiently observed by both parties, and it 
undoubtedly saved the city of Ghent from, at 
least, partial demolition. And it was followed 
by other consequences. 

The whole episode served to advertise the 
fact that large German reinforcements were on 
their way south. The supplies requisitioned 
from the city of Ghent were, according to the 
convention, not to be delivered at Oordeghem, 
but at different points on each of the next two 
days ; on the second day, as far south as at 
Beirlegem, a village nearly 20 miles by road 
south-west of Oordeghem, and only about nine 
miles north-east of Audenarde. This suf- 
ficiently indicated the route which General von 



84 



THI-: 



HIXTOHY <>!' mi-: ir.i/;. 




A JOYOUS SCENE. 
German prisoners passing through Antwerp, before the siege, on their way to England. 



Boehn's force was taking. In fact, it did go as 
far as Audenarde, where it divided into two 
columns, and followed the same two roads to 
the French frontier as had been used by the 
first advancing German army. But the whole 
force did not get far upon these roads. 

When the Belgian Army retired on Antwerp 
the King of the Belgians is believed to have 
declared that it should not again act as a field 
army in operations on a large scale. Its losses 
had been terrible in the early fighting, and the 
^arnfiees, not only among the rank and file 
but among the officers, drawn from the first 
and oldest families of Belgium, had deeply 
i ' inched his Majesty's heart. He decided not 
lo permit their repetition: a decision as 
honourable to tin King us it was complimentary 
to the heroism of his tr.iops. When, however, 
it was known that General von Boehn with his 
large force was on hi.-, way south an immediate 
sortie in force from Antwerp was determined 
upon. 

Advancing from Termondc and Lierre the 
Belgian left reeaptuivd Aln.-t .mil pushed its 
uuy to and beyond Acrsehot ; on the right, 
issuing by \\ aelhein, it reoeeiipied .Malinrs and 
|K*netrated to Xosseghem and C.irtenberg 

between l.oiivain and Brussels. Tl eon -ted 

story of the u nek's fighting which followed hits 



not, and probably never will be, told, but it 
was undoubtedly the heaviest which took 
place in all this phase of the war in Belgium. 
The Belgian casualties were large. Antwerp 
alone, by the end of the week, contained 8,000 
wounded, and many also were taken to Client . 
Bruges, and other places. But the German 
losses were greater. For some days it looked 
as if they would be compelled, and intended, 
to evacuate Brussels, and the real object of 
the sortie a great part of General von Boehn's 
force which had reached the other side of 
Audenarde hurried back over the road it had 
so recently travelled to help to repel the threat 
against the German position in Belgium. It 
was presumably this manifestation of what the 
Belgian Army in Antwerp was still capable of 
doing that decided the Kaiser to order an 
immediate attack upon that place. 

It was characteristic, of him, however, and 
it showed how little he understood the Belgian 
temperament, that, before facing the losses 
which the taking of Antwerp must involve, he 
should ha\e ordered that another attempt be 
made to induce the King of the Belgians, even 
at this date, to consent to observe- a species of 
neutrality. Direct negotiations were opened 
with the King in Antwerp. The intermediary 
selected was an eminent Belgian, resident in 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



85 



Brussels, well known in civil li!?. He was 
approached by General von der Goltz and 
asked if he would undertake to carry overtures 
to the Belgian Government suggesting that, 
in return for an engagement on the part of the 
Germans not to molest Antwerp, the Belgian 
army on its side would remain quiet within the 
defences and refrain from harassing the Ger- 
mans in their occupation of the country or 
from interfering with their communications 
with the main battle line in France. 

The gentleman in question undertook the 
mission, while frankly declaring his conviction 
of its hopelessness. Hopeless, indeed, it was. 
Neither the King nor his Ministers gave the 
dishonourable proposal a moment's considera- 
tion, and the message which the intermediary 
took back to Brussels was terse and unmistak- 
able in its tenour. 

Ik is not easy to understand the strategy 
which determined upon a direct attack on 
Antwerp without any vigorous attempt first 
to isolate it, at least to the extent of severing 
its communications with the coast at Ostend 
and Zeebrugge. So long as the roads and rail- 
way lines to those places were intact the way 
remained open both for the receipt of reinforce- 
ments and, if need be, for retreat. Whether 
the Germans failed to appreciate until too late 
the importance of those communications, or 
whether they were deceived as to the strength 
in which they were held (which is unlikely, 



seeing that Belgium throughout all these weeks 
was swarming with German spies, who were 
continually being arrested in all sorts of queer 
and ingenious disguises, as priests, as Belgian 
soldiers, as rural postmen and a woman), or 
whatever the reason was, no serious attempt 
was made to cut the Belgian lino anywhere 
west of Termonde ; a fact for which the Allies 
had cause in time to be abundantly grateful. 

Simultaneously with the beginning of the 
attack on Antwerp, indeed, a demonstration 
of some seriousness was made on poor, stricken 
Termonde itself, resulting in fairly heavy fight- 
ing to the immediate south of that town on 
September 26 and 27. The fighting of the 
former day is known as the battle of Audegem, 
from the village two or three miles to the 
south-west of Termonde, which formed the 
centre of the engagement. In the early part 
of the day a force of some 700 Belgian infantry, 
without any guns, was attacked at Audegem 
by a much superior German force, which bom- 
barded the village (especially, as usual, 
battering the church to bits) and succeeded 
in driving the Belgians out, inflicting on them 
a loss of about one-third of their total strength. 
The Belgians fought with extreme stubbornness, 
however, giving way only, as it were, by inches 
until early in the afternoon, when, being rein- 
forced, they counter-attacked and drove the 
enemy headlong down the road towards Alost. 
In this latter part of the action the German 




THE NAVAL BRIGADE'S ARMED MOTOR CARS. 



162 



8C 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




BEFORE THE SIEGE. 

Removing Rubens' masterpiece, " The Descent 
from the Cross," to a place of safety. 

losses were heavy and the Belgians took 117 
prisoners.* 

The Battle of Lebbekke (from another 
village, lying to the south-east of Termonde) 
on the 27th followed much the same course, 
commencing with the surprise of an inferior 
Belgian force in the early morning, followed by 
the arrival of reinforcements and the complete 
rout of the enemy, who were driven back as 
far as Maxenzee and Merehtem, on the roads 
to Brussels, by the middle of the afternoon. 
A very considerable Belgian force had by this 
time been massed about Termonde and Grem- 
bergen, on the north side of the river, and tin- 



* In one batch of these prisoners, 47 in number, which the 
Special Correspondent of The Times saw at Greinbergen. on the 
morning after their capture, there were. 4 who wore the Red 
Cross. The correspondent was informed that they had been 
armed both with rifles and revolvers and, before their captim^ 
ha-i brrn - t >. [] to lake \n\rt in the fighting, so he obtained leave 
l the Belgian commandant in charge to interview them. The 
lii-t ijUiMion asked of them was: Why, when they \\oie thr 
Uril Cross, had they taken part in tin- lighting? The prisoner 
''I iephc:i immediately: "Because our oflieers would 
have shot us if we had not." When asked if this was nut un- 
usual, he replied with warmth that it eertainly was not. |,,,t that 
tin- Hod Cross contingent was always counted in the fighting 
strength of a battalion. 'I'll otlu i> agreed with him and -poke 
in all sincerity, evidently c|inti> ignorant of the larger bearing of 
what they were saving. They knew only the orders to which 
thev were individually obedient. Reports of similar eases were 
H lre,|in-nt in the lighting in Belgium that it was impossible not 
to believe that the conditions whieh they indicated wen- general 

in, at least, a large part of the German troops engaged. 



( ;i>rmans gave up the attempt to force a croasing 
at that point. 

Simultaneously with the fighting at Termonde, 
minor attempts to cross the river were made at 
other points, from Schc-Ilobelle, on the \\c-.-t 
to Baesrode, on the east. They were made by 
small parties of Germans and were in each 
case repelled. All this activity may only 
have boon intended to distract the attention 
of the Belgian army from the attack which 
was being prepared on Antwerp itself ; but 
the earnestness of the two days' fighting at 
Termonde indicated at least a willingness to get 
across the river, so as to approach Antwerp 
from the west^as well as from the south, if it 
could be achieved without too heavy sacrifice. 
The futility of the endeavour, however, was 
soon evident and the real attack on Antwerp 
was developed. The Allies were well aware 
of what was in progress, and the Belgian army 
within the defences made all possible arrange- 
ments to meet the attack. 

By referring again to the map of the fortifi- 
cations of Antwerp, published on an earlier 
page, it will be seen that the rivers Rupel (from 
its junction with the Scheldt) and Nethe, make 
a 1 rough semicircle round the southern and 
south-eastern sides of the city at an average 
distance of about 6 miles from the walls of the 
town. Outside the line of the rivers, in this 
section, were, besides various minor defence 
works, the forts (counting from the west) of 
Bornhem, Liezel, Breendonck, Waelhem, Wavre 
Ste. Catherine, Koningshoyckt, Lierre, and 
Kessel. It was 011 these forts (though the first - 
named and the last were not at once engaged) 
that the initial attack was delivered, com- 
mencing on September 28. 

On the preceding day, being Sunday, the 
Germans had advanced as far as Malines and 
had subjected the now defenceless town to a 
new bombardment. Characteristically, they 
selected the hour when the people were assem- 
bling for worship as the time for opening fire and 
the Cathedral as their immediate target. The 
only possible justification for the attack was 
that the civil population was compelled to flee 
northwards to Antwerp, where its coming 
might embarrass the defenders. If this was 
the object, the citizens could as easily have been 
driven out of the town by mere occupation and 
proclamation, without the gratuitous cruelty of 
bombardment. 

On the following day, Monday, September 28. 
as has been said, the German guns advanced 



THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAP. 



87 







A ZEPPELIN IN FLIGHT. 



{.Drawn by Joseph Pamctt. 



lieyond Malines could reach the southernmost 
of the Antwerp forts, and it was on these on 
Waelhem and Wavre Ste. Catherine that the 
brunt of the initial attack fell. 

The actual forces which the German com- 
mander, General von Beseler, had in hand for 
the attack on Antwerp is not known. The 
Special Correspondent of The Times, who was 
in Antwerp during the siege and had access to 



the best information available, placed the 
number at 125,000 men. After the fall of the 
place there was a disposition to minimize the 
force used, and it was placed as low as 60,000. 
Against this, however, is to be set the semi- 
official statement made in Berlin, in the exul- 
tation of victory, that the fall of Antwerp 
released 200,000 troops for use in the main 
theatre of war. However many were at any 



Till- TI.MKS ///STORY 01' Till'. WAR. 




BRITISH NAVAL BRIGADE WAITING ORDERS TO LEAVE FOR THE TRENCHES. 



time actually engaged, it is probable that 
125,000 is not an overestimate of the force 
which was ready to be used. As a matter of 
fact, however, the decisive factor was not the 
weight of men but the calibre of the guns. No 
guns in any of the Antwerp forts or defences 
could range with the German 28 cm. howitzers. 
The inner forts in particular are believed to have 
been armed with nothing more formidable 
than 4-inch guns of an obsolete pattern, firing 
black powder. 

Throughout the day and night of September 
28, and on the following day, Forts Waelhem 
and Wavre Ste. Catherine were subjected to a 
truly terrific bombardment. The guns in the 
forts were backed by field batteries, which were 
skilfully masked in the intervals between the 
forts and at various points on the other side 
of the Nethe, and, putting the big howitzers 
out of the question, there was no evidence that 
the Belgian artillery was not fully able to hold 
its own against that of the enemy. It was. 
indeed, curious how little damage the German 
fire did, except, in these first days, to the 
forts themselves and, later, to the various 
villages which they successively bombarded and 
to the men in open trenches. On the other 
hand, there were occasions when the Belgian 
fire was conspicuously effective. But no skill 
or gallantry could long delay the end against 
the superior weapons. 



Wavre Ste. Catherine was the first fort to be 
silenced, on September 29. It had been badly 
battered by the big howitzer shells, which 
smashed concrete and steel cupolas alike, and 
half its guns were out of action, when the final 
catastrophe came in the explosion of the maga- 
zine. It is uncertain whether the explosion 
was caused by a projectile of the enemy or by 
the premature bursting of one of its own shells. 
Apart from the wreckage to the structure 
wrought by the explosion, the galleries were 
filled with fumes so that (or so it was consis- 
tently reported at the time) many of the garrison 
lost their lives and most of the rest, including 
the commander, were dragged out of the ruins, 
as had occurred also at Liege, half asphyxiated. 
New men were put into the fort, the gallant 
commander, it is said, insisting on returning 
with them ; but it was found that no gun could 
be effectively used, and Wavre Ste. Catherine 
was abandoned. 

The German attack was now concentrated 
on Forts Waelhem and Lierre, especially on the 
former. Not far in the rear of Waelhom were 
the main waterworks of Antwerp, and on Sep- 
tember 30 the enemy succeeded in destroying 
the waterworks and bursting the great reser- 
voir. One of the curious sights of the bom- 
bardment was said to be that of a 28 cm. shell 
falling in the middle of the reservoir, with the 
enormous column of water which it threw up 



THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAIL 



89 



to an almost incredible distance. The bursting 
of the reservoir had two results. In the first 
place it flooded certain of the Belgian trenches, 
nearly drowned out some of the field guns, and 
made the carrying of supplies and ammunition 
to parts of the defence works very difficult. 
Second, it cut off the city's water supply. 

Antwerp had, indeed, an auxiliary supply 
from artesian wells ; but this was quite inade- 
quate to the needs of the population. All water 
for domestic uses had after this date to be 
carried from central points in pails and buckets, 
and the poorer parts of the town especially 
suffered severely. As there was no water in 
the pipes, the danger of fire was very great, and 
even more serious was the threat of epidemic 
diseases arising from insanitary conditions. 

By the night of September 30 Waelhem Fort 
was badly crippled, but it continued to reply 
to the enemy's fire with such guns as could be 
worked throughout October 1. The defence of 
Waelhem, indeed, longer continued, was charac- 
terized by the same tenacious courage as 
had been shown in Wavre Ste. Catherine. 
When the remnant of its garrison was finally 
compelled to relinquish it they left behind them 
little more than a shapeless heap of tumbled 
earth and steel and masses of concrete. They 
themselves had difficulty in getting away, one 
by one, by a ladder which made a temporary 
bridge across the moat. On the same day 
Forts Koningshoyckt and Lierre were silenced 
after three days of almost continuous bombard- 
ment, and part of Lierre village was set on fire 



by shells, the great column of smoke rising 
from it in the still air being visible from the 
whole circuit of the fortifications. 

There is some uncertainty as to the size of 
the guns used against the Antwerp forts. 
In Antwerp at the time, among the Belgian 
troops in the forts and in the trenches, it was 
universally believed that the Germans had two 
or more 42 cm. howitzers in action. Colour 
was given to this by the undoubted fact that 
four of these great pieces had, shortly before, 
been laboriously brought back from Maubeuge 
northwards after that place had fallen. Their 
progress had been noted across the plain of 
W T aterloo as far as Brussels, and it was generally 
opined that they were being brought for use 
against Antwerp. But it is difficult to get 
positive evidence that they were in use there. 
The 28 cm. shell is such a formidable projectile 
it spreads such havoc when it falls effectively 
that it was easy for those who witnessed its 
effects for the first time to believe that it 
belonged to one of the very largest pieces. 
That the 28 cm. howitzers were employed 
against Waelhem, Wavre Ste. Catherine, 
Koningshoyckt, Lierre and Kessel all the 
forts of the southern section is certain ; and 
even before the fall of these forts occasional 
shells were thrown from the howitzers among 
the trenches and batteries well across the river. 
The normal range at which they were used 
against the forts appeared to be 12,000 metres 
(7J miles), but the time-fuse of one which was 
thrown a mile or so across the river, and failed 




SOME OF THE BELGIAN GARRISON. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP. 




THE BRIDGE OF BOATS oVfiR THE SCHELDT. 



[LN.A. 



to explode, was said to have been set for 15,200 
metres, or 9J miles. This is a materially longer 
range than the 28 cm. gun is commonly credited 
with being capable of, and it is possible that 
the Germans had in use some pieces intermediate 
in size between 28 and 42 crn. 

With the fall of these outer forts that is, 
from October 1 the situation of Antwerp 
became practically hopeless. The way of the 
attacking force was still barred by the line of the 
river Nethe, on the holding of which the 
defence was now concentrated, the Belgian 
troops withdrawing across the river on October 
2, destroying the bridges behind them. But, 
as has already been said, it would not in fact 
have been necessary for the enemy to advance 
their heavy guns further than to within a mile 
or two of the river to be able to pound the city 
to pieces. 

The people of Antwerp in the mass had no 
way of gauging the seriousness of the situation. 
The firing was still so distant that, from the 
Directs, it was only occasionally faintly audible 
in thi> stillness of the night. In the day 
nothing could be heard. But all day great 
i-rnwd-i surged about the main thoroughfares 
of the town- the Avenue de Keyser, the Place 
de Meir, in the Place Verte and along the 



quays while all manner of contradictory 
rumours flew abroad. The local Press was, 
by authority, studiously and persistently 
sanguine, and the only evidences of the near- 
ness of the enemy which the populace in general 
possessed were the abiding inconvenience of 
the shortage of water, the continued dashing 
of military motor-cars through the streets 
and the daily circling of aeroplanes generally 
friendly in the sky for purposes of observation. 
These, from their height, were commonly 
visible from all parts of the city. 

The visiting aircraft was not, however, 
always friendly. Early in the morning of 
October 1 an aviator circled over the outskirts 
of the town and dropped bombs without doing 
any harm in the neighbourhood of Broechem 
and Schilde. On October 2 a Taube flew over 
the city and let fall quantities of copies of a 
proclamation from the German commander 
of the attacking army to the Belgian soldiers. 
This document, translated, ran as follows : 

PROCLAMATION. 

BRUSSELS: October 1, 1914. 
JiELoiAN SOLDIERS ! 

It is not to your beloved country that you are giving 
your blood and your very lives ; on the contrary, you 
are serving only the interest? of Russia, a country 
which is only seeking to increase its already enormous 
power, and, above all, the interests of England, whose 



THE TIMES H1STOHY OF THE WAR. 



1)1 



perfidious avarice is the cause of this cruel and unheard- 
of war. From the beginning your newspapers, cor- 
rupted by French and English bribes, have never 
ceased to deceive you and to tell you falsehoods about 
the origin of the war and about the course of it ; and 
this they continue to do from day to day. Here is one 
of your army orders which proves it anew ! Mark what 
it contains ! 

You are told that your comrades who are prisoners 
in Germany are forced to march against Russia, side by 
side with our soldiers. Surely your good sense must 
tell you that that would be an utter impossibility ! The 
day will come when your comrades, now prisoners, 
returned to their native land, will tell you with how much 
kindness they have been treated. Their words will 
make you blush for your newspapers and for your 
officers who have dared to deceive you in such incredible 
fashion. Every day that you continue to resist only 
subjects you to irreparable losses, while after Antwerp 
ha.s capitulated your troubles will be at an end. 

Belgian soldiers ! You have fought long enough in 
the interest of the Russian princes and the capitalists of 
perfidious Albion ! Your situation is desperate. Ger- 
many, who fights only for her own existence, has de- 
stroyed two Russian armies. To-day there is not a 
Russian to be found on German soil. In France our 
troops are setting themselves to overcome the last 
efforts at resistance. 

If you wish to rejoin your wives and children, if you 
long to return to your work, in a word, if you would 
have peace, stop this useless strife which is onlv working 
your ruin. Then you will soon enjoy the blessings of a 
happy and perfect peace ! 

VON BESELEH, 
Commandant in Chief of the Besieging Army. 

The proclamation is worth publishing in 
full as a characteristic example of German 
fatuousness (in that General von Beseler 
should hope, after Germany's treatment of 
Belgium, that anything that he could say 
would influence the enemy's gallant troops) 
and German tactlessness, in the sneers at the 
patriotic Belgian press and the officers of the 
army who had shown such devoted courage 
and possessed the entire confidence and affection 
of their men. One sentence only of the docu- 



ment was, perhaps, approximately near tho 
truth, namely, that which said that the situation 
of Antwerp was desperate. But the mass of 
the people and the rank and file of the army 
were very far from believing it. 

In official circles, however, the seriousness 
of the outlook was recognised. . On the after- 
noon of Friday, October 2, it was decided that 
the Government should leave Antwerp for 
Ostend. Two boats were ready at tho Quai 
du Rhin. It was arranged that one of these 
should sail for Ostend at 10 o'clock on Saturday 
morning, having on board the members of the 
Government and the foreign legations. On 
the second the British and French Consuls- 
General, Sir Cecil Hertslet and M. Crozier, 
were to invite the members of their respective 
colonies to be on board by 5 o'clock on the 
Saturday evening, with a view to leaving for 
England either that night or early on Sunday 
morning. It was understood that this was a 




THE ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION IN THE TRENCHES. 



'.'2 



7V//-: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



prelude to the evacuation and surrender of the 
city. 

This, as has been said, was the plan on Friday 
niglit. Many of the Government officials and 
others slept that night on board, where nearly 
all their luggage was also taken during the night. 
By nine o'clock on Saturday morning (October 
3) cabs and motor-cars were already leaving 
for the boat, carrying the passengers with 
their personal belongings, when suddenly 
there came a dramatic change of plan. The 
Government would not leave. The sailing 
of the earlier boat was countermanded, and 
it was given out that it had been determined 
to defend Antwerp to the last. The second boat, 
containing the majority of the French and 
British colonies (though without Sir Cecil 
Hertslet and M. Crozier, who stayed behind), 
left according to programme. 

It was soon known that the cause of the 
sudden change of plan was the receipt of news 
that British reinforcements were on their way. 

Not much of the foregoing facts was known 
to the people of Antwerp in general. None the 
less, a suspicion spread that the outlook was 
sufficiently gloomy, and from this date onwards 
there was a constant trickling away of the 
[population, especially of the more well-to-do, 
chiefly by railway to Ghent, Bruges and Ostend. 
'As for the soldiers, whatever they may have 
thought, they maintained the same gallant 
and cheery optimism as was characteristic 



of the Belgian troops through nil the (rials to 
which in the first months of the war they wriv 
subjected. Their courageousness and gaiety 
were the admiration of all who saw them. 

One most important fact was that the 
Belgian soldier (as did the British, French 
and Russian soldiers no less) early acquired 
confidence that he was individually a better 
man than his enemy. This conviction, "horn 
of experience, was too universal in all the 
allied armies to be without foundation. How- 
ever devastating the German artillery might 
be, and for all that the German massed troops 
would come heroically again and again to 
almost certain death, British, French, Belgian 
and Russian soldiers alike soon learned that, 
when it, came to work at close quarters witli 
the rifle or, still more, at even closer quarters 
with bayonet, lance or sabre, they were always 
more than a match for an equal number of 
the enemy. How much the moral strength 
created by this confidence counted for in the 
success with which, on countless occasions, the 
Allies in almost absurdly inferior numbers 
held and drove back bodies of the enemy 
which should have overwhelmed them, it is 
impossible to say. That it counted enor- 
mously is certain. 

It is said that in the Revolutionary War in 
America the great importance of the Battle of 
Bunker Hill was that it taught the Colonists 
that, untrained as they were, their levies could 




MARINES MARCHING TO THE TRENCHES, 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



93 




[Newspaper Illustrations. 



AN ARMOURED TRAIN WITH BRITISH NAVAL GUNS IN ACTION. 



fairly hold their own in open fight against the 
trained British troops, with their world-wide 
reputation ; and that discovery was calculated 
to be equivalent to a multiplying of the 
American armies by four or five fold. Some- 
thing similar to this happened in this war. The 
Allies soon learned that, so far as infantry 
attacks were concerned, they had nothing to 
fear from much superior numbers of Germans. 
In Antwerp, as elsewhere, the result was that 
the Belgian soldier went daily to the front 
and to his place in the trenches lightheartedly, 
filled with a certain gay contempt for his 
opponent, only desiring to have a chance to 
get at him, serenely assured that at anything 
like reasonable odds he would have the best of it. 
None the less, there had never been a time 
when the Belgian army had not been acutely 
aware of its hopeless numerical inferiority. It 
knew that the odds against it were not reason- 
able. And there had been no time when it 
had not earnestly longed for reinforcements, 
especially British reinforcements. It has been 
explained in an earlier chapter why the hope of 
the Belgians in the very first stages of the war 
that Great Britain would at once throw all her 
strength into Belgium itself had of necessity 



to be disappointed. In Antwerp this hope 
had grown again. Antwerp was easily accessi- 
ble from Great Britain, and it seemed to the 
Belgian army and people that here was an 
occasion, when a definite fortified position was 
being desperately defended against immense 
odds, where British reinforcements, even in 
such numbers as could be easily spared from 
the main theatre of war, could render a vital 
service to Belgium and to the Allied cause. At 
last the Belgian Government made a direct 
appeal to the British Government for rein- 
forcements. In an official statement issued 
on October 11, Mr. Winston Churchill, Secre- 
tary of the Admiralty, said : 

" In response to an appeal by the Belgian 
Government, a Marine Brigade and two Naval 
Brigades, together with some heavy naval guns, 
manned by a detachment of the Royal Navy, 
the whole under the command of General Paris, 
R.M.A., were sent by His Majesty's Govern- 
ment to participate in the defence of Antwerp 
during the last week of the attack." 

Mr. Churchill himself accompanied the 
expedition, remaining in Antwerp nearly to 
the end, and on more than one occasion going 
under fire and visiting the men in the trenches. 

lf> 3 



94 



////: v/.u/-> HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




THE NAVAL BRIGADE AT ANTWERP. 
Men of the Royal Naval Division carrying ammunition intc the trenches. 



As a result of these facts, coupled with the 
purely navai character of the force, there was 
a tendency in England to represent the expe- 
dition, after Antwerp had fallen, as in the 
nature of a personal adventure on the part of 
the Secretary of the Admiralty, and there was 
a good deal of criticism of " amphibious war- 
fare." Point and bitterness were lent to this 
criticism of Mr. Churchill by the fact that a 
large proportion of the Naval Brigades con- 
sisted of very young men who had so recently 
joined and were so untrained that some of 
them literally did not know how to use a rifle. 
In not a few details the equipment also was 
sadly inadequate. It is evident, however, 
that such net ion could not have been taken 
without the approval of the Cabinet as a whole 
or the consent of the War Office The reason 
why those particular troops were employed 
was explained in a message sent by Mr. Churchill 
to the Royal Naval Division on October 17, 
which, besides being a message of congratu- 
lation to the Division. was also in a measure a 
reply to the criticisms which had been made. 
He said : 

"They (the Naval Brigades) were chosen 
because the need for them was urgent and 
bitter ; because mobile troops could not be 



spared for fortress duties ; because they 
were nearest, and could be embarked the 
quickest ; and because their training, although 
incomplete, was as far advanced as that 
of a large portion not only of the forces 
defending Antwerp, but of the enemy forces 
attacking." 

After arnving at Antwerp General Paris's 
command was, of course, under the direction 
of General Deguise, the officer commanding 
the defending army. 

The lirst detachment of British troops 
reached Antwerp late in tho evening of Satur- 
day, October 3, and the effect on the people of 
the city and on the Belgian soldiers was 
electrical. Not only were the khaki -elad 
companies received with the greatest enthu- 
siasm by the people, but " for the first time 
since I have been here," wrote the Special 
Correspondent of The Times in Antwerp on 
October 4, " I have heard the Belgian soldiers 
singing triumphantly as they marched ; not a 
few or a single regiment, but every troop that 
passed through the streets swung along joyously 
singing. And for the first time since I have 
been here everywhere the crowds rushed to 
cheer them. I sincerely believe that it is 
no exaggeration to say that every Belgian 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



soldier in the trenches to-dny is worth three 
of what lie was yesterday." 

The melancholy fact had soon to be recog- 
nized, however, that British help had come too 
late. Whether the number of troops that were 
actually sent, with the guns that they had, 
would at any time have been of material 
assistance is another question. It lias been 
said that " with five times the number of 
men and ten times the number of guns sent a 
fortnight earlier, Antwerp could have been 
held indefinitely." That is probably true. 
Mr. Churchill has stated that " the Naval 
Division was sent to Antwerp, not as an isolated 
incident, but as part of a large operation for 
the relief of the city. Other and more powerful 
considerations prevented this from being carried 
through." In Antwerp itself it was believed 
by high military authorities until as late as 
October (i that British troops, largely regulars, 
sullicient to bring the British contingent there 
up to a total of 35,000 men were close at hand. 
Precisely what troops and how many had been 
" I'urmarked " for dispatch to Antwerp, and 



exactly what the " other and more powerful 
considerations " were which prevented their 
being went, has never been disclosed. All that 
arrived seem to have been the Marine and 
Xaval Brigades mentioned, or about 8,000 
men in all, and " some " naval guns. Jt ha-s 
never been stated that more than six of the guns 
were ever in action, two being mounted on an 
armoured train, and four of 6'5 in the neigh- 
bourhood of forts 3 and 4 of the inner ring. 
Arriving as late as they did it is very doubtful 
if a much stronger force could have been success- 
ful in materially delaying the inevitable end, 
except at the cost of the prolonged bombard- 
ment and wrecking of the city. 

On October 2, as we have seen, the Belgian 
forces in the south-eastern section had been 
withdrawn to the right bank of the Xethe. As 
the outer forts had been silenced, the German 
guns were pushed up nearer to the river, and 
by October 3 their shells were searching the 
country as far on the road to Antwerp as the 
villages of Waerloos and Linth, and an ex- 
tremely heavy fire was poured upon the Belgian 




A MAGAZINE OUTSIDE ANTWERP EXPLODED BY GERMAN HOWITZER SHELLS. 



96 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



tri-nclios nearest to the river. Under cover of 
this fire the Germans made determined efforts 
to cross the river at Waelhem, and desperate 
lighting occurred there through the night of 
October 3 and the early morning of October 4, 
but the attempt to force a passage entirely 
failed. At one time in the night the enemy 
had succeeded in getting a pontoon across the 
river, and troops in solid masses hurried to 
cross it. Before any had reached the right 
bank the pontoon was blown to bite by the 
Belgian fire, and it is believed that in the losses 
suffered by the masses of German troops as they 
advanced to cross occurred the heaviest 
casualties suffered by either side in any indi- 
vidual incident of the attack on Antwerp. 

Apparently discouraged by the experiences 
of the night, the Germans withdrew from their 
attempt to make a crossing at Waelhem, and 
turned their attention further east, to between 
Duffel and Lierre. Throughout the night of 
October 4 and the day and night of October 5 
the battle raged .about Lierre with great 
severity, British marines having now relieved 
the Belgians in some of the most advanced 
trenches at this point. These trenches were 
not of a character to afford much protection 



against shell fire, and the position in which 
our untrained troops were placed was one 
which would have tested tried veterans. But 
British and Belgians alike did all that was 
possible. In the afternoon of October 5 the 
casualties from shrapnel fire, to which the men 
had no chance of replying, were so heavy that 
it was decided to be too costly to endeavour 
to hold any longer the line of trenches nearest 
to the river, and these were evacuated in favour 
of a line a few hundred yards further back and 
less exposed. During that evening and night 
the enemy made repeated attempts to cross 
the river, only to be beaten back by machine 
gun and rifle fire. More than once small 
parties succeeded in reaching the right bank, 
only to be shot down, and it was not until 
4 a.m. of October 6 that the Germans made 
good their footing across the river. According 
to the official report of the British Admiralty, 
the circumstances in which the crossing was 
effected were that " the Belgian forces on 
the right of the Marines were forced by a heavy 
German attack, covered by very powerful 
artillery, to retire, and in consequence the 
i whole line of the defence was withdrawn to the 
inner line of forts." 




BELGIAN SOLDIERS ENTRENCHED BY THE RAILWAY. 
Pieces of exploded shells may be seen on the lines. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



97 




LIERRE. 
Here the British Naval Brigade erected a barricade with wagons and sandbags. 



The inner line of forts, however, old as they 
were, even when supported by the British 
naval guns referred to, were quite incapable of 
resisting for any length of time the assault of 
such artillery as the Germans could bring 
against them. They could doubtless have held 
out for some days perhaps for a good many 
days- and any advance of infantry, through 
the barbed wire entanglements and other 
obstacles, could have been made very costly. 
But it would only have been delaying the 
inevitable for a comparatively short space of 
time ; and it must have been at the price of 
many lives, the probable .surrender of either 
the whole or a large part of the defending force, 
and the more or less complete destruction by 
bombardment of the city of Antwerp. It was 
decided not to make any more prolonged 
resistance than would suffice to cover the 
retreat of as many as possible of the Allied 
troops. 

Arrangements were made for the immediate 
departure of the Government and Legations of 
the Allied Powers for Ostend. Since the 
earlier abortive plan for the transfer of the 
Government, two packet boats the Amster- 
dam and the Brussels had been kept in con- 
stant readiness with steam up. On the evening 
of October 6 the Ministers and other official 
passengers went on board the Amsterdam, and 



the remaining members of the French and 
British colonies on board the Brussels, and 
both sailed early in the morning of the 7th. 

On October 5, while the struggle for the 
Nethe still hung in the balance, the City Council 
of Antwerp had adopted a fine and spirited 
resolution, bidding the general commanding the 
defence to be guided solely by military con- 
siderations without regard to property interests 
in the city, and pledging him the support of the 
civil population. On the same day, however, 
both the Burgomaster and the general com- 
manding issued proclamations, advising the 
citizens to leave Antwerp, and warning them 
as to the'course they must pursue in case either 
of the bombardment or the entry of the 
enemy into the city. The public rightly 
accepted these as ominous of the serious situa- 
tion of the city, and from October 6 onward 
great numbers of fugitives passed all day across 
the ferry which led to the Gare Waes and the 
railway lines to Ghent, and not a few left also 
by vehicle or on foot along the road to the 
Dutch frontier. 

During the night of October 6, also, the Bel- 
gian army began to be withdrawn. That evening 
and continuously thereafter there was a con- 
stant succession of troops of cavalry and 
carabineer cyclists and auto-mitrailleuses pass- 
ing through the city, not, as heretofore, 



: 77U/-:N 



01-' THE \V.1H. 



towards tho Porto do Malines and the front. 
but in the reverse direction towards the 
bridge of boats which crossed the Scheldt Hose 
I ii -side the ferry to the (.Jure Waes. The 
significance of this, however, was perhaps only 
partly understood, even by the soldiers them- 
selves. Persistent reports of the nearness of 
the remainder of the 35,000 British troops 
continued to circulate, and in the army it 
seemed to be generally believed that the reason 
why they did not appear in the city was only 
because a great surprise was being prepared 
for the enemy. Instead of being brought to 
Antwerp, the reinforcements were engaged in 
a great enveloping movement on the German 
left, from the direction of St. Nicolas towards 
Malines, which would isolate the army besieging 
Antwerp and crush it against the defences of 
the city. Whether such a manoeuvre was truly 
in contemplation will only be known, if at all, 
when all the secret history of the war comes 
to light. Certainly it was believed hi high 
military circles in Antwerp. Perhaps it was 
only interrupted by those " other and more 
powerful considerations " of which Mr. 
Churchill spoke. At least, the belief ui it 
sustained the spirits of those who witnessed 
the last phases of the struggle for Antwerp 
with the hope -that the nearer the besieging 
force approached to the city the more certain 
would be its destruction when caught between 
the guns of the inner forts and the assault of 
the enveloping troops. 

If the plan had been in contemplation, how- 
ever, it must have been abandoned before 
October 6. The Belgian troops, who on that 
day began to be withdrawn, were not detained 
to take part in any enveloping movement, but 
with some exceptions, as will be noted later on, 
were moved steadily, by road and railway, 
towards Ghent and on towards Ostend. The 
actual evacuation had indeed begun. Already 
all the larger German ships lying in the Ant- 
werp docks some 30 in number had been 
rendered useless for immediate service by 
blowing up the machinery with d3 r namite. It 
was generally reported in the Press at the time, 
and appears not to have been contradicted, that 
the ships were sunk. This was not true. What 
was done was that charges of dynamite were 
exploded in the cylinders and boilers of the 
engines, necessitating long and difficult repairs 
before they could be made serviceable. On 
October 7 also, the oil tanks on the west side of 
the Scheldt were set on fire. Antwerp was the 



oil depot not only for Belgium, but for much 
of Holland and tin- northern part of France, 
and immense stocks were stored there which 
it was plainly undesirable to allow to fall 
into the enemy's hands. At first the tanks 
were tapped and the contents allowed to run 
off ; but this was seen to be too slow a process, 
and in the night of October 6-7 the tanks were 
fired. 

So on the morning of Wednesday, October 7, 
with the Government, the Legations,, and all 
the members of the French and British colonies 
departed ; the civil population, though not yet 
in any panic, prudently withdrawing in con- 
tinually increasing numbers ; the defending 
troops coming in from the fighting line and 
steadily passing westward out of the city, and 
with the work of destruction of property which 
might be useful to the enemy already going on, 
it was evident that the end was near. Near. 
too, were the enemy's guns to the doomed city. 

With his heaviest artillery, as we have seen, 
the enemy could indeed have reached the city 
without ever crossing the Nethe. It does not 
appear, however, that the L'S em. howitzers 
,were brought into advanced positions aftt r 
they had done their work in battering the outer 
forts to pieces. The German official reports 
explicitly denied that these weapons were used 
against the city itself, and there is every reason 
to believe that this is true. Meanwhile the fire 
of the other heavy artillery drew daily closer 
to the inner defences. As early as October 2 
the village of Waerloos had been under fire. 
In the afternoon of October 4 the first shrapnel 
shells burst over Contich (about half way 
between the river and the gates of the city), 
driving the householders in panic through the 
streets. The 5th pf the month was occupied 
with the desperate fighting for the river between 
Duffel and Lierre, but on that day and on the 
6th Contich suffered severely, and the villages 
of Hove, Linth and Vieux Dieu were all sub- 
jected to heavy bombardment. The village of 
Mortsel also was practically obliterated, not 
by German shells but by Belgian troops clearing 
t he field of fire of the guns in the inner forts. 

This is a fact which must be taken into con- 
sideration in subsequent calculation of the ruin 
wrought by the German advance. Not all the 
destruction visible was caused by German 
guns. It is said that, in preparation for the 
defence, within the whole fortified position of 
Antwerp (a radius of, perhaps, 15 or 20 miles 
from the city itself) no less th'in 10.000 buildings 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



99 




TYPICAL BRITISH MARINES AND OFFICERS AT ANTWERP. 



100 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



were levelled by the Belgians. It was evidence 
of the heroic spirit in which the civil population 
faced the hardships of the war that the officers 
who had charge of the work of demolition 
declared that in no single case did they receive 
any protest or complaint from those whose 
houses were destroyed. It was enough that 
the sacrifice was demanded for the welfare of 
their country. . 

Whether the destruction was wrought by 
friend or enemy, however, the effect on the 
inhabitants of farms and villages was equally 
to leave them homeless and to drive them into 
Antwerp for shelter. It has been said that 
this was the effect on the people of Malines 
when that place was bombarded at the very 
commencement of the- operations. Every day 
since then the stream of refugees into the city 
had increased in volume. By the night of 
October 6 practically the whole district from 
Malinee to the walls of Antwerp had been ' 
swept bare of inhabitants, all of whom, who 
had not been killed, had fled into the city for 
refuge. Even before the end of September a 
great number of refugees had come to Antwerp, 
but in the 10 days from September 27 to 
October 6 the influx had increased until the 
population was swelled by certainly not less 



than 100,000 extra people. These counter- 
balanced the exodus of the real residents of 
the city who, in their turn, when the danger of 
bombardment began to be imminent, sought 
some place of greater safety, so that until the 
very last days Antwerp continued to be fully 
populated, and the crowds in the streets 
especially along the quays and in the region of 
the Cathedral and Place Verte remained as 
dense as ever. On the night of October 6 and 
the morning of the 7th the exodus of the civil 
population, however, began in earnest. The 
defending forces, as we have seen, had fallen 
back within the ring of the inner or second 
line of forts', some of which commenced firing 
that night. It was no longer possible to go 
out of the city on the roads to Contich or 
Vieux Dieu any distance beyond the line of 
these forts. 

On the morning of October 7 the streets of 
Antwerp presented an extraordinary spectacle. 
It was known that the city now lay at the mercy 
of the enemy's guns. Somehow a rumour had 
got abroad that bombardment was to begin at 
10 o'clock in the morning, as if it were some 
new and portentous kind of theatrical entertain- 
ment. Notification of the intention to bombard 
the city if it was not surrendered had been sent 




MARINES IN THEIR IMPROVISED SHELTER. 
Our men sustained their refutation for cheerfulness in spite of hardships 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



101 




BRITISH AND BELGIANS JOIN HANDS IN WORKING THE GUNS. 



to the defenders on October 0, and General 
Deguise had replied refusing to surrender and 
accepting the consequences. A request was 
also made by the German commander for a 
map of the city with the situation of the chief 
architectural and artistic treasures, as well as 
of the hospitals, marked upon it, when it would 
be endeavoured to respect them as far as was 
consistent with the conditions of present-day 
artillery fire. Such a map was taken to him 
by the American Vice-Consul, and copies are 
said to have been placed in the hands of each 
artillery officer. The Correspondent of The 
Times in the city wrote that it was significant 
of the amount of confidence that was placed in 
German promises that, after these pourparlers, 
it was the general opinion in Antwerp that 
perhaps the most dangerous spot in the city 
was likely to be the immediate neighbourhood 
of the Cathedral. 

Up to October 6 the newspapers of Antwerp 
had continued to endeavour to encourage the 
people, and even the editions of that evening 
declared in large type that " La Situation est 
bonne," and held out hopes of a speedy hurling 
of the invaders back beyond the river Nethe. 
On October 7 it was no longer possible to ignore 



the gravity of the crisis. Le Matin that morn- 
ing declared that it intended to continue 
publication until the last possible moment, 
but announced that some of the second line 
of forts had, on the preceding night, come into 
action, and that the Administration had 
arranged for a special service of boats to leave 
for. Ostend at 1 o'clock, on which, as there 
would be no restaurant facilities, passengers 
were advised to take their own provisions. 
" Whatever the future may have in store," 
wrote the editor of that paper, " all our people 
have behaved worthily and like heroes. We 
must now prepare to face the time of trial 
which we have to go through. Whatever 
bitterness it may contain, Belgium will emerge 
from it greater than ever." Similarly La 
MetropoU, in an article " Sous la Menace du 
Bombardement," acknowledged the critical 
nature of the situation and, while congratulating 
the people of Antwerp on their sang-froid, which 
enabled them to " contemplate with a certain 
amusement the precipitate departure of a 
large number of their fellow-citizens," recounted 
the steps which the people were taking for their 
personal security ; how the majority had 
stored food, candles and fuel in their cellars, 



TllK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



BERGEN OP/ZOOM (, 



', 



DRYHOEK 

C*pr/lcr& RED"DECAPE^'LEN 
' *Rl-QlD'OORDEREN -* 

./. ,<, t <M L ''"^^ *" "'"""" \ V ED-sSVjTAKKE 



Termonag^'"""" 




ANTWERP AND ITS ENVIRONS. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAll. 



108 




A HAVEN OF REFUGE. 
Belgian families arriving at Dover Harbour in a fishing smack. 



Illustrations. 



and not a few had banked the openings into the 
cellars with earth from their gardens or other 
material. But " although there is evident 
recognition of the gravity of the hour, nowhere 
does one see any sign of depression. . . . 
Antwerp awaits events with serenity and in 
confidence." 

These were the last newspapers to be pub- 
lished in Antwerp. The bombardment did 
not begin at the appointed hour, and through- 
out the day the city waited in anxious suspense. 
In the morning the streets were crowded with 
people hurrying to take passage on the boats 
which were leaving or to the railway station. 
Vehicles and porters to carry luggage being 
equally unobtainable, the spectacle was seen 
of well-dressed and evidently well-circumstanced 
men and women dragging trunks along the 
pavements or bearing portmanteaux on their 
shoulders. By noon the chief streets were 
curiously empty. The post offices and most 
of the public bureaux were closed. The majority 
<>f the leading hotels, including those which had 
been occupied by the members of foreign 
Legations, Government officials and so forth, 
had shut their doors. A great proportion of 
the shops, restaurants and cafes, especially in 



the more fashionable parts of the city, were 
barred and shuttered. There waa an almost 
total absence of vehicular traffic, except as an 
occasional military or Red Cross motor-car 
dashed by. In the course of the day the 
Correspondent of The Times visited the famous 
Zoological Gardens and found the keepers at 
work with carbines killing all the dangerous 
animals, lest the cages should be broken by 
shells and the beasts escape into the streets. 
In one great grave lay the bodies of two 
magnificent lions and two lionesses. So every- 
where the shadow of its coming doom hung 
over the city ; and all day long there was a 
constant defiling of Belgian troops along the 
quays and over the bridge of boats which led 
to the roads westward. 

This withdrawal of the troops, however, wns 
skilfully screened, not only by the fire from the 
forts in the inner line most directly in the line 
of attack and from batteries dispersed behind 
various kinds of cover at points before the town, 
but also by the continued holding of some of 
the advanced trenches well beyond Contich and 
not far from the river. The troops who held 
these advanced trenches until the last, suffering 
heavy casualties and running evident risk of 



104 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



bring cither annihilated or captured, were both 
British and Belgian, and they clung to their 
dangerous work with equal courage. One must 
presume that the German commander was 
completely deceived. It is true that the 
Belgian artillery was, as always, admirably 
handled, and that the inner line of forts would 
have made a direct attack in force by infantry 
very costly. But it is also true that if General 
von Beseler, after he had made good his footing 
on the north side of the river at daybreak of 
October 6, had pressed his advantage at once, 
he must, whatever his own loss might be, have 
taken a very much larger number of prisoners 
from the enemy, besides a great quantity of 
guns and supplies. As it was, he was content 
to spend two days in searching the intervening 
country with his artillery, making no effective 
attack upon the trenches beyond the constant 
harassing of them with shrapnel, causing not a 
few casualties, indeed, but by no means 'forcing 
their evacuation. Perhaps he had difficulty 
in getting guns across the river. In any event, 



nearly 48 hours elapsed after the forcing of the 
crossing of the Nethe before the first shells fell 
on Antwerp ; and with every hour his prize 
was melting away from his grasp. 

It was not until three or four minutes before 
midnight of October 7 that the actual bombard- 
ment of the city began. It has already been 
said that the Germans did not bring up their 
heaviest guns against the city itself. From the 
first until the end, though high-explosive shells 
were also employed, the great majority of the 
projectiles used were shrapnel, which generally 
burst above the roofs. The actual destruction 
of the fabric of buildings, therefore, was at no 
time large in proportion to the severity of the 
bombardment. The object of the attacking 
force was evidently to terrorise and to kill, 
rather than to destroy buildings. And from 
the first the fire was distributed with curious 
impartiality all over the city. This had, 
indeed, been the German plan throughout the 
approach to the city. So long as the outer 
forts had presented a definite and stationary 




BRIDGE AT LIERRE, 
Blown up by the British Marines. 



THE TIMER HISTORY OF THE WAP. 



105 




ANTWERP REFUGEES CROWD THE QUAY AT OSTEND. 



riHgUun Photo Co. 



objective, fire had been concentrated on one 
or another until the big howitzers had battered 
it to pieces. Thereafter the way in which the 
Belgian guns and trenches were scattered over 
a large area made any concentration of fire in 
the attack difficult. At moments there was 
evident a definite aiming at a village, a captive 
balloon, a certain section of the trenches, a 
railway bridge, or the supposed whereabouts of 
an armoured train. But for the most part the 
fire was extraordinarily diffused : a general 
searching of the country without, apparently, 
any particular objective, the result being that 
in proportion to the ammunition expended the 
casualties were few, except in those trenches 
immediately confronting the points (first at 
Waelhem and later near Lierre) where the 
attempts were made to cross the river. 

So it was in the city. A lively controversy 
afterwards developed as to which part of 
Antwerp had the honour of receiving the first 
shells ; and half a dozen different localities 
claimed the distinction with equal confidence. 
In fact, even the first half-dozen shells which 
came in rapid succession were widely scattered, 
and shells which burst over the roof-tops 
seem in the silence of midnight very close to 
all parts of a wide area. 

For many nights before the end Antwerp 
had been going to bed early. The streets w un 



in darkness after 8 o'clock, and from that hour 
no restaurant or hotel was permitted to serve 
food, nor was any light allowed to shine from 
a window into the street. Beginning with the 
evening of October 6, the regulations were even 
more strict. No street lamps were lighted at 
all, and the tramway service ceased at 6 o'clock. 
No illumination, visible from without, was per- 
mitted after dusk. As the obscurity of night 
settled down, therefore, Antwerp was as dark 
as the heart of a fore-st. There was hardly a. 
vehicle or a footfall in the streets, and indoors 
the larger proportion of the population with- 
drew at evening to if it had not spent the day 
in its cellars. Few people probably slept in 
their beds on that night of October 7, and 
fewer still slept at all after midnight. By far the 
greater number spent the last hours of darkness, 
while the shells crashed outside, in gathering 
together such household goods as it was possible 
to carry away, and with the dawn began that 
amazing outpouring of the population of the 
city which will probably live in history as one 
of the pathetic incidents of all time. 

It has been explained why, in spite of the 
emigration of a considerable proportion of the 
more affluent classes of the citizens, in spite of 
the departure of the British and French resi- 
dents and the Government officials, and of the 
commencement of the withdrawal of the troops,. 



106 



THE TIME* HIXTOHY (>!' THE W.-tlf. 




ELECTRIFIED BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENT OUTSIDE THE CITY. 



Antwerp was still populous. It had received 
the immense influx of refugees who came to it 
for safety and were reluctant to go further. 
On October 7 there were probably still 400,000 
or 500,000 people in the city. By nightfall of 
October 8 there remained only a few hundred. 
By far the greater portion of this immense 
population left the town between daylight and 
the middle of the afternoon of that day by a 
single high-road and mostly on foot. Like the 
population of any other large city, it included 
people of all walks in life, of both sexes and all 
ages, and it had the usual proportion of very 
old and very young, of sick and infirm. 
Obviously also, the fact that so large a number 
were refugees who had already fled from other 
places, coupled with the further fact that all 
had been under peculiar mental strain for some 
days and practically all had spent at least one 
sleepless night, made them in the mass more 
than ordinarily unfitted to face the hardships 
of the journey. Nearly all carried burdens, of 
food or bedding or household effects, to tilt- 
limit of their strength. v 

From early morning on October 8 on immense 
mass of people, estimated at one time to number 
"\IT 100,000, crowded the Steen and the Quai 
\ "nn Dyi-k. waiting for the ferry-boat to take 
tin-in ncross the river to the railway. Close by, 
"\er the bridge of boats, pressed an uninter- 
rupted stream of soldiers, military motor-cars, 
and transport wagons. All along the Quai 
lordiu-ns and about the dooks people swarmed 



on to craft of every kind : packets, tugs, cargo 
boats later in the day coal barges and lighters 
anything that would float was pressed into 
service for the urgent need of the moment 
namely, to get the fugitives away from Antwerp. 
The destination was immaterial. Flushing. 
Folkestone, Tilbury, Ostend, Zeebrugge, Lillo, 
Terneuzen, Rotterdam ; it did not matter so 
long as the boat would go somewhere away 
from the Germans. 

By these various channels it may be that 
150,000 to 200,000 people made their escape ; 
but the outstanding episode of the exodus was 
the pitiable procession which poured out by 
road by Wilmansdonck and Eeckeren to the 
Dutch frontier. Probably not less than a 
quarter of a million people took that route. 

" Moving at a foot's pace went every con- 
ceivable kind of vehicle ; great timber wagons, 
heaped with household goods topped with 
mattresses and bedding, drawn by one or two 
slow-moving stout Flemish horses, many of the 
wagons having, piled upon the bedding, as many 
as 30 people of all ages ; carts of lesser degree 
of every kind from the delivery vans of fashion- 
able shops to farm vehicles and wagons from 
the docks ; private carriages and hired cabs ; 
occasional motor-cars, doomed to the same pace 
as the farm team ; dog-carts drawn by anything 
from one to four of those plucky Belgian dogs, 
the prevailing type of which looks almost like 
pure dingo ; hand-trucks, push-carts, wheel- 
barrows, perambulators, and bicycles ; every- 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



107 



tiling loaded as it had never beon loaded before 
and all alike creeping along in one solid un- 
ending mass, converting the long white roads 
into dark ribands, 20 miles long, of animals and 
humanity. 

"Between and around and filling all the 
?aps among these vehicles went the foot pas- 
sengers, each also loaded with bundles and 
burdens of every kind, clothes and household 
goods, string bags filled with great round loaves 
of bread and other provisions for the road, 
children's toys, and whatever possessions were 
most prized. Men and women, young and old, 
hale and infirm, lame men limping, blind led by- 
little children, countless women with babies in 
their arms, many children carrying others not 
much smaller than themselves ; frail and delicate 
girls staggering under burdens that a strong 
man might shrink from carrying a mile ; well- 
dressed women with dressing bags in one hand 
and a pet dog led with the other ; aged men 
bending double over their crutched sticks. 

" Mixed up with the vehicles and the people 
were cattle, black and white Flemish cows, 
singly or in bunches of three or four tied abreast 
with ropes, lounging with swinging heads amid 
the throng. Now and again one saw goats. 
Innumerable dogs ran in and out of the crowd, 



trying in bewilderment to keep in touch with 
their masters. On carts were crates of poultry 
and chickens, and baskets containing cats. 
Men, women and children carried cages with 
parrots, canaries, and other birds ; and, peep- 
ing out of bundles and string bags generally 
carried by the elder members of the families 
were Teddy bears, golliwogs, and children's 
rocking-horses. It was impossible not to be 
touched by the tenderness which made these 
wretched folk, already overburdened, struggle 
to take with them their pets and their children's 
ilaythings. 

" From Antwerp to the Dutch frontier, 
whether at Putte or by Santvliet and Ossen- 
drecht, is about 10 miles. But the actual . 
frontier was only a half-way stage on the 
journey. There on Thursday and Friday nights 
there was a huge and pathetic encampment. 
Some hundreds of tramcars had been run down 
to the terminus of the line at the frontier, and 
gave sleeping quarters to thousands of the 
refugees ; but the great majority slept, of 
course, in the open air. 

" As a means of conveyance the tramways 
could not accommodate more than a very small 
percentage of the crowd, the volume of which 
poured on almost without diminution over 




GERMANS REJOICE OVER CAPTURE OF BELGIAN GUN. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




GERMAN TROOPS PREPARING TO CROSS THE SCHELDT. 



the roads to Bergen-op-Zoom or Roosendaal, 
whence trains of immense length, loaded to the 
last inch of standing room, carried the fugitives 
to Rotterdam, to Flushing, and other places. 
Only a small proportion of the mass of people, 
burdened as they were and in the congested 
condition of the roads, covered the 20 miles 
from Antwerp to Bergen or Roosendaal in one 
day. To the vast majority it was a two-days- 
long tramp under most distressing and arduous 
conditions before the railway was reached."* 

Of course, the dreadful pilgrimage had its 
individual tragedies. Here were the sick, no 
matter what their disease or how critical its 
stage, on wagons, in wheelbarrows and hand- 
carts, being carried on improvised stretchers or 
hobbling on their feet as best they could. In 
such a -concourse, also, it was inevitable that 
there should be mothers who had just been 
confined, with babies, in some cases, only a 
day or two days old. Babies also were born 
upon the road. There were some deaths by the 
wayside ; more in the succeeding days as a 
result of the shock and exposure of the journey. 
Hiippily, however, the weather tliroughout the 



From the correspondent of The Times (The Times, October 13, 
1914), who witnessed the exodus from Antwerp on the inoniing 
of October 8, and accompanied the fugitives for a few miles 
at >n? tin: road, thfit rejoined the procession on the afternoon of 
October 9. and walked with and as part of it :is far as Bergen- 
op-Zoont. 



time was beautiful, with bright autumn sun- 
shine, not too hot, during the days, and crisp,, 
cool nights. Happily, too, the road lay through 
an almost perfectly flat country. 

Here, also, mention should be made of the- 
extreme kindness and hospitality of the Dutch 
people. It is said that in all over 1,500,000 
refugees from Belgium sought safety in Holland 
in the months of August, September and October. 
Probably not less than half a million crossed the 
frontier in the course of the three days from 
the 7th to the 10th of October, for, besides the 
stream which poured from Antwerp, minor 
streams flowed into Holland, wherever there 
was a road, from all the towns and villages 
along the north of Belgium, and these streams 
continued to flow until the beginning of Novem- 
ber, as the population fled from one place after 
another in all the country from Antwerp to> 
Ostend. At the time of the fall of Antwerp 
the chief volume of this incoming fide bore 
heaviest upon the town of Bergen-op-Zoom. 
With a total population in ordinary times of 
about 16,000, it had suddenly thrown upon it, 
in the course of two or three days, over 300,000 
people. Every effort was made to get them 
out by railway as fast as possible to Roosendaal. 
whence they could be distributed to other parts 
of Holland. But it was not possible to pass 
them out as fast as they came in, and for 



THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. 



109 



several days Bergen fed and cared for a refugee 
population of upwards of 100,000. The problem 
of feeding them was a very serious one. Five 
or six days passed before supplies in sufficient 
quantities could be brought in from other 
towns which were also feeling the strain upon 
their stores and during those days the regular 
residents of Bergen suffered no little privation. 
A month afterwards 20,000 Belgians, more than 
doubling the population of the town, remained 
either distributed among the private houses or 
quartered in two large camps, being supported 
at the pxiblic expense. But though, perhaps, 
the burden fell more heavily on Bergen-op- 
Zoom than on any other town, nothing could 
exceed the universal kindliness and ungrudging 
generosity with which the " vluchtelingen " 
were treated tliroughout Holland, by the 
Government and by all classes of the people. 

As soon as the fugitives had fairly left the 
city of Antwerp behind they were beyond the 
reach of the German guns ; but it was curious 
that no shells fell at any time among the crowds 
as they were struggling through the streets. 



Shells reached the quays and fell in the river 
one narrowly missing a crowded Ostend boat 
as it put out and wrecked, later in the day, 
some of the structures by the riverside ; but 
nowhere, during those perilous hours, did one 
fall anywhere among the massed people. To- 
wards noon, as the procession struggled along 
the road to Holland, a German aeroplane circled 
overhead, apparently studying what was going 
on below, and was fired upon by guns from the 
forts on the west side of the Scheldt. All day 
long also on the west of the Scheldt there 
rose into the air, steadily increasing in volume, 
the great triple column of black smoke from the 
burning oil tanks. 

The bombardment, which had begun at mioV 
night on October 7, continued with varying 
severity throughout the 8th. As the Germans 
drew nearer to the city all the inner forts on 
the south and east sides of .the ring took part in 
replying to their cannonade. Some of these forts 
notably Forts 2, 3, 4 and 5 were badly bat- 
tered, but with the. guns posted between and 
before them, continued to answer vigorously\the 




ON THE OUTSKIRTS. 
Germans pause to regard the work of their shells. 



no 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



ninny's fire, while trenches two miles in advance 
weft still held by both British and Belgian 
troops. The Crnnnns made no attempt to 
rush these trenches or the zone of barbed wire 
entanglements which would have to be crossed 
to roach the city; but contented themselves 
with pouring shell fire upon the trenches, the 
forts, and the city it-self from beyond the reach 
of rifles. 

Shelling the city, however, after noon of 
October 8 could do little good ; for Antwerp 
was no longer a city but only the husk of one. 
All the streets, usually so busy and so gay, 
were shuttered, silent and deserted. By the 
shells as they continued to fall now chipping 
the corner off a building, now crashing through 
a wall or falling harmlessly in an empty square 
or garden there was hardly a human being 
to be either hurt or frightened. Devoted 
nurses and doctors there were struggling to get 
their wounded patients to places of safety.* 
Craft of various kinds was still passing out of 
the dock basins into the Scheldt, and in the 
immediate vicinity of the wharves a few 
cabarets kept open. Two or three hotels, in 

Three British hospitals in Antwerp continued to operate 
until noon of October 8 and all succeeded in getting their patients 
away, namely, the English Colony Hospital, under Nurse Edith 
Ward, the British Field Hospital, and Mrs. St. Olair Strobart's 
British Women's Hospital. 



safer positions in the city, with much-reduced 
staffs, also did not close up. With these excep- 
tions, the nurse-; and their wounded, the mili- 
tary, some city officials, half a dozen British 
newspapar correspondents, and a certain number 
of dubious citizens who had good reason to 
know that they had nothing to fear from falling 
into German hands, represented practically the 
whole population of Antwerp. In the shuttered 
and desolate streets not a vehicle moved. Now 
and again a solitary figure hurried along, 
stopping to shelter in a doorway as a shell 
screamed overhead. Otherwise Antwerp, which 
yesterday had held half a million people, was 
like a city of the dead. 

As dusk fell a detail of Belgian soldiers sank 
by rifle fire a number of lighters in the channel 
from the outer to the inner dook basin, so closing 
the last exit by water ; and then followed a 
night which offered, to those few who witnessed 
it, what was perhaps one of the most terrible 
spectacles that the world has seen. 

Across the river still rose into the sky the 
great triple pillar of smoke from the burning 
oil tanks. The air was windless and the thick 
vapour rose straight upwards for some hundreds 
of feet. There it apparently encountered a 
light breeze, for, very slowly, still black and 
solid as a pall, it drifted steadily but almost 




A LONDON MOTOR OMNIBUS TAKEN IN ANTWERP BY THE ENEMY. 
Motor Omnibuses have done excellent service in the transport of troops and supplies. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



Ill 




ADMIRAL VON SCHROEDER, 
German Governor of Antwerp. 



[Underwood & L'mlenf 



imperceptibly north-eastwards, spreading out 
till it covered half the sky. By nightfall this 
heavy curtain overlay the greater part of the 
city and stretched away into the distance. In 
the darkness the blaze of the burning oil 
became visible, tossing into the air and throwing 
off great masses of flame to float away like 
individual clouds of fire. The red glow from 
below lighted up the whole underside of the 
black canopy, making such a scene as a man 
might dream of in visions of the Inferno. 

Resting almost stationary overhead, so slow 
was its drift to east and north, this cloud left 
below it to the south-east a strip of clear starlit 
sky, ringing one-third of the horizon. Against 
this, looking from the quays or the river, the 
outline of Antwerp was silhouetted : the stately 
spire of the cathedral, the noble tower of St. 
Jacque, the dome of the Central Station, and 
other conspicuous buildings being clearly dis- 
tinguishable above the dark mass of the body 
of the town. Then, as the night wore on, out 
of this mass rose other fires one, two, three, 
six, ten, fifteen making almost a continuous 
ring round the southern and eastern sides of 
the city. Some of these fires were burning 
dwelling-houses which had been set on fire by 
shells ; others had been caused on purpose by 
the Allies, who were destroying whatever stores 
might be of comfort to the enemy! 



All these the flames of the burning oil and 
of all the lesser fires threw their glow upwards 
on the pall overhead, caught the points of all 
the buildings in the city with flame, and were 
again reflected in the water of the Scheldt, until, 
above and below, heaven and earth and water 
were all blood-red the inside of a hideous 
furnace, the lid of which was the terrible black 
cloud of smoke. And inside that furnace, 
adding immeasurably to the horror, the guns 
roared, the shells bursting in little lightning 
flashes of quick spurts of white flame against 
the black and red. 

Intermittent and desultory perhaps not 
more than one shot to the second for the 
earlier part of the night, about half-past ten 
the cannonade became truly terrific, by far the 
heaviest that had occurred at any stage of the 
siege. In the continuous and deafening uproar 
it was no longer possible to distinguish the 
screaming of the shrapnel, the bursting of the 
high-explosive shells, or the hurtling of the 
projectiles from the long naval guns, but all 
blended into one great roll of thunder. It was 
Chaos come again. Antwerp was in its last 
agony ; and never surely did great city have a 
more terrific passing. 

Before the first grey of dawn the clamour 
subsided. Cannonading went on in desul- 
tory fashion. But the morning had a terror 



112 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



113 



of its own, for the black pall .still shrouded the 
sky. No longer illumined with the flames 
for the oil had burned itself out it hung a 
leaden shield between the sun and half the 
city and all the country to the north, so that 
the day could not break, but until an hour or 
two of noon twilight prevailed. It truly 
seemed as if the day itself mourned for fallen 
Antwerp. 

For Antwerp had fallen. Nothing but the 
necessary formal preliminaries stood between 
the Germans and their entry into the town. 
Under cover of the tremendous artillery duel 
of the night most of the remaining infantry, 
Belgian and British, had been brought in and 
passed through the city on the long tramp to 
the bridge of boats across the Scheldt. In the 
early hours of the morning the garrisons began 
to retire from the forts. Several, not already 
rendered useless, were blown up ; guns which 
could not be taken away vtere rendered worth- 
less and quantities of ammunition were 
destroyed, much of it being thrown into the 
Scheldt. By seven o'clock in the morning of 
Friday, October 9, the last of the defending 
troops was believed to have crossed the river, 
and the bridge of boats, which had done such 
good service, was, prematurely as it proved, 
destroyed. Between 8 and 9 o'clock the 
Burgomaster went out to meet the German 
commander and make formal surrender of the 
city. At noon the Germans entered the city 
by the Porte de Malines. 

The actual damage done to Antwerp by the 
bombardment was comparatively slight. 
Though a certain number of high-explosive 
shells were used, by far the greater proportion 
of the projectiles, as has been said, were 
shrapnel, which generally burst well over the 
roofs. Neither the Cathedral nor any of the 
most precious historic buildings in the city were 
damaged, though all had narrow escapes, as 
was inevitable in a bombardment so promiscuous 
and diffused as this was. The most notable 
building which suffered but that not very 
seriously was the Palais de Justice. All parts 
of the city bore traces of its experience. There 
was considerable miscellaneous wreckage about 
the Place Verte and in the business section of 
the town, notably in the Marche aux Souliers ; 
but the chief injury was to private houses about 
the Boulevard Leopold and the rich residential 
quarters on the north-east side of the city. 

Attention has already been drawn to the 
doubtful quality of the German strategy which 



directed the attack on Antwerp while leaving 
uninterrupted the communications between the 
city and the seacoast at Zeebrugge and Ostend. 
We have seen how these communications were 
used for bringing to Antwerp the reinforce- 
ments of British troops and guns while the 
siege was in progress. What was even more 
important, the route still lay open for the 
retirement of the evacuating army. 

It will be remembered that simultaneously 
with the preparations for the attack on Antwerp 
serious fighting took place around Termondc, 
in the battles of Audegem and Lebbekke, on 
September 26 and 27. If the Germans hoped 
thus to force an easy passage of the Scheldt at 
that point, they were disappointed. The fight- 
ing on these two days ended distinctly in favour 
of the Belgians ; but the repulse which the 
Germans suffered there by no means ended 
their efforts to get across the river. Through- 
out the days of the attack on the city, indeed, 
there was almost constant pressure on the whole 
line of the Scheldt from Baesrode, to the east 
of Tennonde, as far almost as Melle, in the 
vicinity of Ghent. At Termonde itself, at 
Schoonaerde, and at Wetteren the attacks 
were at times pushed with great violence, and 
it was estimated that a minimum of 30,000 men, 
with a great number of guns, were employed 
in these operations. From what we know of 
the forces which were present in this western 
theatre of action at the time when the main 
besieging army was entering Antwerp, it is 
evident that this estimate is not too large. 

Interest during these days was so concen- 
trated on Antwerp itself that few details are 
known of this fighting which went on along the 
river, but for several days the thin screen of 
Belgian troops succeeded in holding back the 
German attacks at each critical point. On 
October 6 and 7, however, the Germans at 
last succeeded in forcing a crossing at three 
points namely, at Termonde, Schoonaerde, 
and Wetteren. At Termonde, under cover of 
heavy artillery fire, they managed to repair the 
often-wrecked bridge sufficiently to make it 
once more serviceable. At Schoonaerde the 
crossing was made, similarly protected by great 
superiority in weight of artillery, by pontoons. 
It was evident that the advance of the enemy 
north of the river would seriously threaten the 
retreat of the troops defending Antwerp unless 
it was checked. 

Recurring to the narrative of the attack on 
Antwerp, it will be remembered that on the 



114 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




GERMAN MARINES iQN A TRAIN 
Which did not reach its advertised destination. 



night of October 6-7 certain troops began to 
be withdrawn from the city, especially cavalry. 
carabineer cyclists and mitrailleuses mounted on 
armoured cars. These constituted in them- 
selves a mobile and useful force. And it soon 
proved its usefulness. To it was entrusted the 
task of checking and holding the German 
advance until the main Allied forces could get 
away. This function it performed admirably, 
successfully holding the roads northward against 
much larger forces for two days, in the course 
of which sharp fighting occurred at several 
points, notably at Zele and around Overmeire. 
Thanks to the obstruction offered by these 
troops, it was not until the evening of October 9 
that the Germans penetrated as far as the 
railway line at Lokeren. By that time the main 
body of the retiring Belgian and British armies 
had already passed westwards. Had General 
von Beseler succeeded in striking the railway 
twenty-four hours earlier, it is probable that, 
instead of the mere husk of Antwerp, which is 
all that fell into his hands, he would either have 
captured or would have driven into Holland the 
whole Belgian army, together with the British 
contingent. Ho had neglected what seemed an 
obviously necessary measure until too late. 



Not that the retirement of the defending 
army was effected without mishap. According 
to the official statement of the Secretary of the 
Admiralty issued on October 16 : " After a 
long night march to St. Gilles the three Naval 
Brigades entrained. Two out of the three have 
arrived safely at Ostend, but, owing to circum- 
stances which are not yet fully known, the 
greater part of the 1st Naval Brigade was cut 
off by the German attack north of Lokeren, 
and 2,000 officers and men entered Dutch 
territory in the neighbourhood of Hulst -and 
laid down their arms, in accordance with the 
laws of neutrality." In a later communique 
the Secretary of the Admiralty spoke of the 
loss of these men as having occurred " through 
a mistake." It is to be feared that neither of 
these statements tells the whole story. The 
actual number of British troops who then came 
to be interned in Holland seems to have been 
1,560. In addition, the official casualty lists 
showed a total of 967 members of the Royal 
Naval Division " missing," of whom 200 were 
reported to be prisoners of war in Germany. 
The number of killed was given us 32, and of 
wounded as 189. 

Out of many fragmentary and sometimes 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. 



115 



conflicting reports it is not easy to tell what 
happened. The initial "mistake" seems to 
have been that some of our men in certain of 
the inner forts and the neighbouring trenches 
were forgotten, or, at least, that the message 
telling them to withdraw never reached them. 

In the final disposition of the Royal Naval 
Division on this last night, the second Brigade 
was on the right of the road from the Porte de 
Malines towards Vieux Dieu (in and about 
forts 5, 6, and 7), and the First Brigade was on 
the left of the road (in and about forts 1, 2, 13, 
and 4). The Second Brigade received the order 
for retirement in proper season. The order 
was also given to fort 4 (the nearest fort on 
the left of the road), which was occupied by 
the Drake Battalion of the First Brigade. 
This battalion made its retreat without misha[ . 

But, by whose fault cannot be statod, the 
order never penetrated to the Hawke, Colling- 
wood and Benbow Battalions, which held the 
line further to the left. They retired from the 
position, which they had held with great 
gallantry, of their own accord when they found 
that they were practically deserted. Some of 
them arrived, after many difficulties, at the 
bank of the Scheldt, but the bridge was already 
destroyed in the rear of the army which had 
gone. They managed to get across the river 
on barges, and found a train which took 
them as far as Lokeren. There they learned 
that the Germans were already in possession of 



the railway line ahead of them, and, detraining, 
they made their way, not without some rear- 
guard fighting on the road, to the Dutch frontier. 
Another and lattr | arty similarly succeeded 
in crossing the river, and attempted to make 
their escape on a train already partly loaded 
with civilian refugees ; but the train failed to 
get as far as St. Nicola?. It seems that it 
arrived unsignalled and unexpected (it is pre- 
sumed that the men were running the train 
themselves without assistance from the railway 
staff) at the station of Nieuwkerken, east of 
St. Nicolas, when it was already in German 
hands. The train was deflected on to a side- 
track, so that some of the carriages left the 
rails, and it was captured. The Germans began 
firing on the train and, in order to save the 
refugees, the officer in command surrendered. 
Eye-witnesses estimated the number of British 
troops on board at between 500 and 600. Part 
of the occupants of that train were undoubtedly 
the 200 members of the Naval Division who were 
reported to be prisoners of war in Germany ; 
but more is needed to explain the whole number 
of 967 " missing." An authoritative account 
of what occurred will probably not be forth- 
coming until after their release. What is 
certain is that the First Brigade of the Royal 
Naval Division arrived at Antwerp (aftei 
leaving some 700 of the most recently joined 
recruits behind in Walmer) a trifle over 3,OOC 
strong. The Drake Battalion, which numbered 




STABROECK FORT. 
Destroyed by the Belgians before leaving Antwerp. 



lit) 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



about 800 returned, pm< -tirally complete. Of 
the Benbow Battalion less than 70 members 
returned, and only about 20 and 30 respectively 
of the Collingwood and Hawko Battalions. A 
few stragglers came in later ; but practically 
the whole of these three battalions were lost. 
I Scsides the British troops, some 20,000 Belgians 
also crossed the Dutch frontier and were 
interned. 

It is unfortunate that these mishaps marred 
the withdrawal of the defending forces from 
Antwerp. But, even as it was, the fact that the 
Belgian army as a whole succeeded in getting 
away caused unconcealed disappointment in 
Germany, and converted the capture of the 
place into a barren and unsubstantial victory. 
In so far as the sending of the British reinforce- 
ments delayed the surrender of the city by 
some five or six days .and helped to screen the 
retirement of the Belgian forces, the adventure 
which was so much criticised had justification. 

That that justification was an extraordinary 
piece of good luck need not be denied. It has 
already been seen that a more vigorous and 
masterful commander in General von Beseler's 
place would probably not have allowed his 
prey to escape him. And the same failure to 



grasp the fruits of his success characterized tho 
German commander's subsequent movements. 
He appears to have wasted precious days in the 
occupation of the city and the ostentatious 
parading of the empty streets. Though Antwerp 
was entered at noon of October 9. Ghent u ; s 
not occupied until the 12th, nor Bruges until 
the 15th. The value of the week thus given (o 
the Allies cannot be overestimated, allowing 
them, as it did, to withdraw unharassed beyond 
Ostend to consolidate their position vipon the 
Yser. There the Belgian army surprised the 
world by the spirit and courage with which it 
once more turned to face its enemy. 

And with the Belgian army, now as always 
since the war began, was its King. Few things 
in the early part of the war were rnoro remark- 
able than the ascendancy which King Albert, 
in the very first weeks, came to exercise over 
the minds and hearts of his people. Of his 
personal courage he gave repeated proof?. 
During the siege of Antwerp and, later, on the 
Yser he was frequently under fire in the trenches, 
where he went to encourage his men. Of even 
greater value were the larger soldierly qualities 
wjhich he displayed, the fortitude, the clearness 
of vision, and the strength of character which 




BRITISH MARINES UNDER ESCORT OF DUTCH GUARDS. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



117 




THE RUSH FOR THE BOATS 
At the Perry to the Gare Waes. The bridge of boats is seen beyond. 



won for him the sincere respect and admiration 
of all especially the military officers of experi- 
ence who came in immediate contact with 
him. It was not a little thing for Belgium that 
at such a moment she had such a King. 



A NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF 
ANTWERP. 

In 1914 there were still among us some whose 
personal memories of Antwerp went back to 
that sinister autumn of 1870, when Prussia had 
just beaten unhappy France to her knees and 
the Empress and the Prince Imperial were 
fugitives in England. The stately city on the 
Scheldt had no premonitions then of the grirn 
series of events which were dsstined to bring 
upon her. too, all the horrors and sufferings of 
Paris. She was at that moment en fete, cele- 
brating the fortieth anniversary of Belgian 
independence. 

In Antwerp itself the revolution which had 
freed Belgium from the domination of the House 
of Orange did not become effective until after 
two years of desperate righting, during which 
the Dutch (leneral Chasse, holding the old 
C'itudol, gave the sturdy burghers a foretaste 



of modern German methods : for on October 27, 
1830, he bombarded the helpless town "with 
red-hot balls and shells, setting it on fire in 
many places and doing immense mischief." 
His day of reckoning came, however, two years 
later when a French army of 50,000 men under 
Marshal Gerard bombarded him in turn and. 
after reducing the interior of the Citadel to a 
heap of ruins, forced him to capitulate. Antwerp 
was then formally handed over to the Belgian- 
by the French, thus completing the revolution 
of 1830, which by the irony of history the 
city was celebrating at the moment when France 
herself was in the grip of the Prussian invader. 
And in 1914, after almost the same period, we 
could read in retrospect the same irony of 
history : for another autumn had come, when 
helpless Antwerp, bombarded and in flames, 
again turned her despairing eyes westward for 
that help from France which was almost her 
only hope. 

Not necessarily French help, for during the 
last grim hours of Antwerp's defence against 
overwhelming odds she actually received an 
earnest of Britain's immediate desiro anil 
ultimate power to succour : and it had been 



Till-: TIMES HISTORY OF THE \VAh. 



reliance ii|ii)!i this help in need which even in 
1870 had made tin- British so \\eleome. merely 
l>ee:iuse they \\cre British, at the commemora- 
tive fi'irx of Belgian independence. 

It \vus a new sensation for the Briton landing 
on fort-inn soil, perhaps for the first time, at 
Antwerp in those days to find that, provided 
his credentials were in order, he was honoured 
wherever he went as a guest of the city. On the 
tirst evening at his hotel arrived invitations 
from the various cercles social, musical and 
artistic to their pending functions, and his 
British nationality seemed the only passport 
needed to free admission wherever he desired 
to go. For, although it was to a French army 
that in 1832 Antwerp had owed her final release 
from Orange domination, it was British influence, 
British protection and British example which 
had inspired her progress during those forty 
years of wonderful prosperity which culminated 
with the epoch of the great Franco -Prussian 
war. 

Thereafter, although the prosperity of 
Belgium, and especially of Antwerp, con- 
tinued, not only unabated but with the steadily 
increasing flow of a stronger current, new forces 
were at work. While shattered France was 
feverishly reorganising her forces, the new 



German Empire, strong in the pride of conquest, 
was extending its influence with sleepless 
activity in every direction, and in- none more 
energetically than in the regions that lay 
between its ambitions and the North Sea. Not 
until Antwerp had witnessed in 1914 the exodus 
of Germans after the outbreak of the war to 
Dutch territory, where they waited to return 
with the victorious German troops, did the 
citizens realize how great a part of their civic 
and commercial life had filtered into German 
hands during the forty years which had elapsed 
since the defeat of France by Prussia. 

Another potent factor in creating this new 
situation had been the changed relations 
between Britain and Belgium. While the great 
war of 187071 had opened the eyes of Queen 
Victoria's advisers to the necessity for main- 
taining the defences of the Empire in a state of 
efficiency, economy was always their guiding- 
star : and the one thing dreaded above all 
others' was the " entangling alliance." So 
whenever policy offered two alternatives, thnt 
one was almost always chosen which involved 
the less responsibility in Continental affairs ; 
( and thus, although Britain never failed in her 
readiness to stand by engagements which had 
been deliberately undertaken, the tendency of 




THE FLIGHT INTO HOLLAND. {Underwood. & 4. 'w 

Refugees crossing the border. Note the Dutch ag and Dutch soldiers. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




THE DUTCH FRONTIER. 
Dutch soldiers behind a barrier of barbed wire and revolving spikes. 



British policy from 1871 onwards was to with- 
draw more and more from the risk of European 
complications. 

Belgium on her part, with neutrality guaran- 
teed by all the Powers, was also drifting away 
from her old position of reliance upon British 
friendship. National and dynastic ambitions 
were pursued, especially in Africa, in a manner 
which did not always commend itself to British 
ideas. The very wealth which Antwerp, with 
its strong leaven of German enterprise, was 
amassing tended more and more to come into 
direct competition with British trade. So there 
was some justification for the confidence with 
which Germany laid her plans for the Teutonisa- 
tion of Antwerp as soon as the word should be 
given for the occupation of Belgium at the 
beginning of the war. Had those plans pros- 
pered and had Germany thus quietly succeeded 
in obtaining command of Antwerp's clustered 
waterways commodiously opening toward the 
sea, respect for the neutrality of Holland would 
hardly have restrained her from the navigation 
of the Scheldt. 

But events in the early stages of the war dis- 
located the German plans ; and those desperate 
weeks when the heroic Belgians drenched their 
fields with their own and German blood so 
changed the position of affairs at Antwerp 
that it was only as returning exiles in the rear 
of the conquering German hosts that the 
German colony were able to re-establish them- 
selves, instead of, as had been hoped, themselves 



inducting the new rulers into the City of the 
Wharves. 

It is this aspect of Antwerp in Flemish 
" Antwerpen," meaning "on the wharf''- 
which most strongly strikes every visitor who 
penetrates ever so little in almost any direction 
beyond the usual routes of city traffic. Wharves 
and canals, canals and wharves, bales of mer- 
chandize and ships loading and unloading 
these seem to confront you at every turn. But 
this is probably one of the less familiar aspects 
of the many-sided city to the ordinary 
visitor. 

The first and strongest impression upon the 
mind of the newcomer to Antwerp must un- 
doubtedly be that produced by the fairy-like 
structure of the Cathedral spire, with its flying 
buttresses, rising high above the expanse of 
the city, in such strong contrast to the low 
horizon fringed with poplar trees like rows of 
round-headed pins which, with windmills, are 
the characteristic features of the Sc'heldt land- 
scape. And as the delicate magnificence of the 
Cathedral is the first impression which one 
receives of Antwerp, so it remained the last, 
even on that awful night of October 8, 1914, 
when its dainty masonry was silhouetted 
against the blazing sky under the black pall of 
smoke. At frequent intervals during each 
hour of day and night the Cathedral with the 
music of its carillon of 99 bells always domi- 
nates the newcomer's thoughts of Antwerp, 
especially if, as is probably the case, his bed- 



1-20 



TtlK TJ.Ml-:s HISTORY OF THE WAll. 



room in our of the hotels luircl by vibrates In 
(lie sonorous liiinnony. Very soon the habit 
is acquired of hearing the chimes without 
hearing them, so to speak ; and one becomes 
immersed in the absorbing interests of life in 
the riimiiit old city, a veritable Museum of 
Musees. (inllery upon gallery of the Old 
.Masters await inspection. Libraries, societies, 
and clubs invite your visits, and Antwerp also 
lias its spacious edifices and fine boulevards, 
with a magnificence of open spaces all the 
more striking by contrast with the artistic 
jumble of the fifteenth-century Flemish streets 
in the central town. If the genius of an Old 
.Master had been set to the modern pastime 
of city-planning, he could not have evolved 
better pictures in brick and stone than 
Bruges for artistic beauty and Antwerp for 
contrasts. 

Two of the world's most famous painters, 
Quentin Matsys and Rubens, belonged espe- 
cially to Antwerp ; and nowhere else could you 
find such array of their masterpieces, the Cathe- 
dral itself rightly keeping Rubens' two greatest 
works for the safety of which with charac- 
teristic Flemish devotion to art even in war 
I lie defenders of Antwerp seemed almost equally 
concerned with that of the fortress itself. But 
it is, of course, in the world-famed Picture 
(iallery, more important even than the Cathe- 
dral, that Antwerp's pride in the genius of its 



nun Rubens has been most rightly justified 
and most amply displayed. 

The records of Antwerp as a place of note gn 
back to A.D. 517, more than five cent urics bet'i >n 
the British King Harold was killed near Hast- 
ings by the invading Normans ; and from the 
seventh century onwards for several hundred 
years it was admittedly the first commercial 
town of Europe. But in those days, as in these, 
the owners of wealth always suffered when war- 
like ambitions were let loose, and during the 
conflicts of the sixteenth century the prosperity 
of Antwerp dwindled, until in 1648 it seemed to 
have received the coup de grace by the Treaty of 
Miinster, when the Scheldt was closed to 
traffic. Early in the eighteenth century Ant- 
werp surrendered to Maryborough, and forty 
years later was taken by Marshal Saxe ; but the 
close of the century saw it in the possession of 
the 'French. Then came the stormy period of 
its possession by Holland, which was ended, as 
already narrated, by the French bombardment 
in 1832, when it was annexed to the kingdom of 
Belgium, under international guarantees. From 
that time, still rich in treasures of architecture 
'and painting, it became richer still in the world's 
goods from year to year ; and, in spite of the 
burning of the beautiful old Exchange in 1858, 
its career of continuous prosperity knew no 
check until in 1914 it unfortunately barred the 
way of German aggression. 




The Times History of the War. Part XVII. 



Reference 
BRITISH TROOPS 
GERMAN TROOPS 

Main Roads Secondary Roads 

Heights in Feet thus...4B 
20 Metre (=65'618Feet) Contours 



y^ tpSfeUJH 



Scale or Miles 

1 '/2 1 2 




THE PASSAGE! 




THE AISNH. 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 



THE BATTLES OF THE AISNE. 



GERMANS MAKE FRESH STAND AFTER RETREAT FROM THE MARNE THE POSITION ON THE AISNE 

THREE SECTIONS DESCRIBED THEIR STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS DISLOCATION OF GERMAN PLANS 
PASSAGE OF THE AISNE LINES OF ADVANCE POSITION OF BRITISH DIVISIONS THE FRENCH 

ADVANCE STRATEGY OF THE ALLIES THE GERMAN FRONT EFFECT OF FALL OF MAUBEUGE 

FURIOUS GERMAN ASSAULTS DIARY OF THE OPERATIONS THE " HELL IN THE TRENCHES " 

GERMAN LETTERS AND ADMISSIONS THE AISNE BATTLE AND THE LESSONS OF MANCHURIA 

EFFECT OF GERMAN REINFORCEMENTS SITUATION UP TO SEPTEMBER 24 LIFE IN THE BRITISH 
LINES DESCRIBED SNIPING BOMBARDMENTS TRIALS OF TRENCH LIFE THE SECOND LINE. 



THE war with France had been long 
prepared, the possibility of checks 
clearly realised, every position from 
which a reverse might be retrieved 
carefully studied, and the plans for holding it 
patiently elaborated. 

When the Kaiser sanctioned the step of 
transferring troops from the western to the 
eastern front before he had achieved a decisive 
result in France, the German Headquarter 
Staff must have foreseen the possibility of a 
reverse and the necessity for some position in 
which they could shelter their discomfited 
hosts until such time as they could spring upon 
their enemies still one more of those " little 
surprises " which had been prepared in long 
years of peace. That Germany had quite a* 
many able-bodied untrained men as she had 
trained men was well known, but that she 
would venture to use vast masses of untrained 
men ; that, in the short space of two months, 
she could train them sufficiently to act by 
Divisions and Army Corps ; and that she could 
find the officers, staffs, guns, stores, equipment, 
transport and subsidiary services required, does 
Vol. II. Part 17. 121 



not seem to have entered into the calculations 
of military experts. This, however, is just 
what she had secretly prepared to do, and the 
Germans retiring from the Marne, pivoting 
still upon the left flank of their 5th Army (Crown 
Prince), fell back through an angle of some 
30 degrees, and turned to bay in a carefully- 
prepared position to gain the time required for 
putting in the field those great masses of un- 
trained men with whom they proposed to 
resume the offensive and the march on Paris. 

This* position was perhaps as strong as any 
to be found between the Urals and the Bay of 
Biscay. It extended from a point on the 
" Heights of the Meuse " north of Verdun we't- 
wards across the Argonne and the Plain of 
Champagne to Reims, where it turned north- 
west along (and including) the Forts de la 
Pompelle, Nogent 1'Abesse, Berru, and Brimont,. 
and across the Aisne near its confluence with 
the Suippe to Craonne, whence it ran westwards 
along the heights of the Aisne to the Foret de 
1'Aigle, north of Compiegne. This position 
falls into three very different sections. Tho 
heavily wooded, contorted country of the Meuse 



122 



THE T1MLS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




BEHIND A BRITISH TRENCH. 
Showing the entrance to the dug-out covered with wire netting. 



and the Argonne and the open rolling plain of 
the Champagne-Pouilleuse, which formed the 
eastern and central sections, have already been 
described, and we need only pause to note that 
tin? German centre stretched south of and 
parallel to the railway from Bazancourt to 
Grand Pre, >by which the defenders of this 
section were supplied. 

The western section, from near Craonne to 
Compiegne, lay along the crest of the main ridge 
from three to five miles north of the Aisne. 
From the crest the ground sloped gently south- 
wards until it reached a line a mile or two from 
the river, when it fell steeply for some 300 or 
400 feet to the meadows which border the 
stream. The gently-sloping plateau above the 
meadows offered an excellent field of fire, but 
the steep slopes referred to provided a belt of 
dead ground, that is ground which could not be 
hit by rifle or shell fire from positions to the 
north ot it. Moreover, the plateau was every- 
where eroded by a number of short, <l<,|>. 
heavily-wooded ravines which met to form still 
deeper ravines running southwards to the Aisne. 
These ravines broke up the southern portion of 
the plateau into a number of rounded spurs and 
re-entrants A notable feature about these 
spurs is that the crest lines were very gently 



rounded. Trenches on the actual crests would 
app'ear on the " sky-line " to an enemy ap- 
proaching from the south and would present 
too good a mark to him. It was, therefore, 
necessary to retire them ; but concealment was 
gained at the price of restricting the field of 
fire from the trenches. On the other hand, the 
assailants must necessarily cross the ridges, 
where they would find their advance obstructed 
by barbed wire entanglements under a close 
and terrible fire from the trenches beyond. It 
was, therefore, natural that the assailants 
should dig themselves in as near as they could 
to the trenches to await a more favourable 
opportunity of attacking them. And thus it 
came about that the opponents on the heights 
of the Aisne were often separated only by very 
narrow strips of neutral territory, across which 
there raged for weeks an interminable and 
deadly series of charge and counter-charge. 

The south side of the Aisne that which 
provided the 6th French and British Armies 
with a base of supplies and positions for their 
heavy artillery partook of the general charac- 
ter of the terrain on the north bank. The 
valley bottom was flat meadow land, 800 to 
3,000 yards wide, through which the placid 
stream some 60 to 70 yards in width and 15 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



128 



feet in depth took its tortuous course to the 
west. The whole terrain was open downland, 
entirely unenclosed except for occasional ditches 
and the walls and fences in and about inhabited 
localities. The ground was interspersed with 
patches of lucerne, wheat or beetroot, studded 
with compact little villages, farmhouses, 
chateaux and woods ; and intersected by 
straight unfenced roads, lined by poplars, fruit 
trees and tall white telegraph posts The 
patches of woodland, often enclosed by high 
rabbit netting supported by strong iron stan- 
chions, provided the Germans with little 
natural fortresses and served to screen their 
troops and guns. The trees which lined the 
roads served to conceal columns moving along 
them, but also betrayed tho positions of the 
roads themselves. The villages and buildings 
which nestled in the valleys and hollows and 
the cave-dwellings which honeycombed the 
steeper slopes afforded shelter and accommo- 
dation for the troops in second line on both 
sides. The best places for the construction of 
bridges were naturally just where the bridges 
destroyed by the Germans had existed, nor was 
it generally possible to choose other sites, 
without constructing a prohibitive amount of 
roadway, and thus it happened that the bridges 
had to be placed near the villages, which 
resulted in their being exposed, like the villages 
themselves and the roads leading to and from 



them, to the fire, either direct or high angle, 
of the German guns. 

The question arises, what were the weak 
points of this position ? It was undoubtedly 
one of great strength, and if the defenders wero 
in good heart and well supplied, a frontal 
assault must necessarily be very costly and of 
doubtful success. Had the Allies been pressed 
for time and had there been no " way round.'' 
they would have been constrained to undertake 
the venture, cost what it might. But sinco 
time was, or seemed to be. on their side, their 
procedure must obviously be to deliver only 
such frontal attacks as would be sufficient to 
hold the enemy to his ground while endeavour- 
ing to turn one or other of his flanks. To try 
to turn his east flank through Alsace would 
entail moving a very large body of men on a, 
narrow front between the Vosges and the 
Rhine, Liable to attack in flank by troops from 
across the Rhine, and separated by the Vosges 
from the main body of the Allied Army. 
Moreover, this turning movement must needs 
go such a long " way round " that the enemy 
would have ample time to head it off. Such a, 
manoeuvre seemed foredoomed to failure. 
There remained only the enemy's west flank. 
The vulnerable point about this flank was that 
the German right depended for its supplies 
upon the railways which ran from Tergnier 
through Namur and Liege to Aachen, and that 




PONTOON BRIDGE AT COMPIEGNE. 
Convoy of Algerian soldiers crossing with their horses. 



[Topu.l. 

172 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



von Kluck's right barely covered his communi- 
cations. It is true that the German flunk was 
covered by the Oise in much the game way as 
it had been covered by the Ourcq in the Battle 
of the Marne, but it is also true that the Oise 
was no very formidable barrier. 

On Friday, September 11, the Allies' Loft 
was in full pursuit of the Germans retreating 
from the basin of the Marne. At dawn the 
British Army broke up from its billets and 
bivouacs, which extended along the Ourcq 
from La Ferte Milon eastwards with the 6th 
French Army abreast of it to its left and the 
5th and 9th French Armies following in echelon 
to its right rear. The British Cavalry reached 
the line of the Aisne that day and found the 
enemy in occupation of the heights south of the 
river. The 1st Cavalry Division (1st, 2nd, 
and 4th Brigades) passed the night on the 
high ground about Couvrelles and Cirseuil 
and the 2nd Cavalry Division (3rd and 5th 
Brigades) south of Soissons. 

On Saturday, September 12, it was officially 
announced that the German 3rd, 4th, and 5th 
Armies had given way in front of Vitry-le- 
Francois, along the Saulx, and in the Argonne ; 
and that the Belgians from Antwerp had em- 
barked on a vigorous sortie against the German 



communications east of Brussels. At the same 
time the Russians claimed that they had 
inflicted a signal defeat on von Auffenburg's 
Austrian Army at Rawaruska in Galicia. 

The retreat of the 4th and 5th German Armies 
must have been received with intense relief 
by the French General Headquarters. Both 
these armies had missions of special importance, 
and the sviccess of either must have had very 
serious consequences for the Allies. The 
former was commissioned to break the French 
battle-line in the Plain of Chalons, the latter 
to pierce the Verdun-Toul fortress-barrier at 
Troyon. The fracture of the French front 
must have had results plain to view. The 
western half would have been hunted away, 
while the eastern half would probably have been 
driven into the frontier fortresses, interned, and 
captured in due course. The piercing of the 
fortress-barrier would not have had such serious 
consequences, but it would have permitted the 
investment of Verdun with its garrisons and 
such portions of the French 2nd and 3rd 
Armies as might be caught north of Troyon, 
and the fall of Verdun would have opened up 
very much better railway communications 
with the Fatherland. The reverse suffered by 
the 1st German Army east of Paris and its 




BRITISH ARTILLERY AND FRENCH DRAGOONS. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



125 




A FRENCH 75-MM. GUN, SHOWING BREECH MECHANISM AND 
AMMUNITION LIMBER. 



enforced retreat had necessitated the retirement 
of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Armies in suc- 
cession and had obliged the German Head- 
quarters to abandon for the time its designs 
on the French centre and fortresses. 

On Saturday morning the reconnaissances of 
the 1st British Cavalry Division discovered 
that strong hostile detachments, supported by 
guns and machine guns, were holding the 
town and bridge of Braine and the heights- 
beyond. General Allenby set to work imme- 
diately to drive the enemy out of his positions. 
In these operations, in which the Queen's 
Bays were conspicuous, effective support was 
received from the advance guards of the 3rd 
(Infantry) Division. By midday the enemy 
iiad been driven north, a hundred prisoners 
had been captured around Braine, and a large 
amount of field-gun ammunition had been 
found in the River Vesle, where it was visible 
in two feet of water. On the British left the 6th 
French Army was approacliing the heights to 
the south of the Aisne, and on its right the 5th 
French Army had reached the line of the Vesle. 
On Saturday afternoon and all through the 
night heavy rain fell, which severely handicapped 
the transport. 

In the afternoon the 1st British Division had 
arrived at Vauxsc're, the 2nd at Vauxtin, and 
the 3. d at Brenelle without encountering any 



opposition other than that already mentioned. 
The 5th Division approached Missy, but was 
brought to a standstill by the enemy's fire. 
The 4th* reached the neighbourhood of 
Buzancy, where it found the right of the 6th 
French Army endeavouring to dislodge a 
German advanced post on the Mont de Paris, 
south of Soissons, and immediately brought 
its guns into action in co-operation with the 
French, with the result that the enemy was 
driven across the river at Soissons, where, how- 
ever, they destroyed the bridges. The 10th 
Brigade captured a ridge overlooking the valley 
of the Aisne. From a spur here the Germans 
could be seen retiring along the Maubeuge 
road to the north-east. Then" last files were 
scarcely over the river when the bridge at the 
little town of Venizel was blown up with a 
loud explosion. The British Field Artillery was 



* Official reports are accustomed to describe the 
operations by " Army Corps," but this is confusing to the 
lay mind, since French and German 1st Line Corps 
consisted of 3 Divisions each, 2nd Line Corps and British 
1st and 2nd Corps of 2 Divisions each, while the British 
so-called "3rd Army Corps" consisted of the Fourth 
Division with an attached Brigade the 19th and was, 
therefore, merely a strong Division. To avoid confusion 
the operations are here described by Divisions, which in 
the French, German and British services consisted of 
12 battalions, one or more squadrons, a dozen or more 
batteries, and some subsidiary services, the whole 
totalling nearly 20,000, of whom perhaps some lo.OOO 
were combatants. 



I2fi 



'////-; TJMUti HISTORY OF THE WAIL 




FRENCH INFANTRY WATCH BRITISH GUNNERS BRING UP ONE OF 

THEIR HEAVY GUNS. 



able to shell the enemy all the afternoon and 
evening at a range of 2,700 yards with such 
accuracy that it forced some of them to evacuate 
their trenches. Night fell in torrents of rain. 

For several miles west of Soissons the French 
found themselves under infantry and artillery 
fire from points on the hither bank, as well as 
from heavy guns on the plateau across the 
river. The heavy battery of the 4th British 
Division now occupied high ground on the 
south bank just east of Soissons, and from here 



supported the French guns on their left in a 
long-range artillery duel with the enemy's 
artillery on the opposite heights, which con- 
tinued throughout the remainder of the day 
and until nearly midnight. The opposition 
encountered by the British and 6th French 
Armies east and west of Soissons suggested 
that ithe passage of the Aisne might be disputed 
by something more formidable than mere 
rearguards. As Sir John French says, " The 
Battle of the Marne, which lasted from the 




BRITISH GUNNERS PLACING A HEAVY GUN IN POSITION. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



127 



morning of the 6th to the evening of the 10th, 
had hardly ended in the precipitate flight of 
the enemy when we were brought face to face 
with a position of extraordinary strength, 
carefully entrenched, and prepared for defence 
by an Army and a Staff which are thorough 
adepts in such work." 

In spite of the exceeding strength of the 
enemy's position, an attempt to force the 
passage must be made. Yet the task was no 
light one. The river was swollen with rain, 
bridges must be built and crossed and repaired 
whenever necessary under a devastating fire 
at ranges carefully measured by the enemy from 
every point of vantage on the opposite bank. 

It does not appear from official reports that 
the Aisne was crossed by any troops on the 12th, 
but from private letters received it seems 
certain that a detachment of the 1st Division 
got across this evening near Bourg and that the 
llth Brigade (4th Division) crossed near 
Venizel at night in pouring rain, and gained 
the line Crouy (exclusive) to Missy (exclusive). 
Their officers claim that the brigade maintained 
this position unshaken until the whole British 
Army was relieved by French troops more than 
three weeks later. 

On Sunday, September 13, it was officially 
announced that French troops had crossed the 
Marne between Epernay and Vitry-le-Francois, 
and had occupied Bevigny, Brabant-le-roi, 
St. Die, Luneville, Baon 1'Etape, Baccarat, 
Remereville, Nomeny and Pont-a-Mousson ; 
that the enemy's retreat had been so precipitate 
that he had abandoned maps and papers, 
official and private, and letters and parcels just 
received or about to be dispatched ; and that the 
Russians had defeated the Germans on the 
Niemen. 

In front of the 6th French and British Armies 
the situation was obscure. " The tract of 
country," says Sir John French, " which lies 
north of the Aisne is well adapted to conceal- 
ment, and was so skilfully turned to account 
by the enemy as to render it impossible to judge 
the real nature of his opposition to our passage 
of the river, or to gauge accurately his strength ; 
but I have reason to conclude that strong 
rearguards of at least three army corps* were 
holding the passages on the early morning of 
the 13th. On that morning I ordered the 
British Forces to advance and make good the 
Aisne." 




* Eight or nine Divisions. 



GERMAN GUNS DESTROYED BY THE 
FRENCH. 

The British artillery, which had got into 
position overnight, opened on the enemy's 
positions and particularly on his guns, as far as 
they could be located, for until their fire could 
be subdued a little the passage must be ex- 
tremely costly, if not impossible. Hour after 
hour the shells wailed and shrieked across the 
vailey from both sides ; and hour after hour 
the engineers toiled at getting up their pontoons 
and launching them. The labour was immense, 
the danger imminent, and yet the bridges 
steadily grew under cover of the tremendous 
fire of the British guns, and under that same 
cover the infantry advanced to the passage of 
the Aisne under storms of shrapnel and high- 
explosive shell and in squalls of cold and driving 
rain. 

The lines of advance for the British Divisions 
were, practically speaking, Troyon* for the 1st 
Division, Braye for the 2nd, Aizy for the 3rd, 
Sancy for the 5th, and Margival for the 4th. 

On the right' the 1st Division and the 1st 
Cavalry Division were directed on the canal 
bridge at Bourg. To the east of this bridge a 
small pontoon bridge had been constructed, and 
a body of infantry belonging to the 1st Division 
was pushed across it. A brigade of Cavalry 
began to follow them, and two regiments had 
crossed when the Germans opened fire with 
guns and rifles from all sides. High-explosive 

* This, of course, is not the same Troyon as the fort of 
that, name in the fortress-barrier from Verdun to Toul. 



128 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



pitted the approaches' to the bridge with 
holes three feet deep, and shrapnel from the 
flanks burst around it. The horsemen, however, 
reached the town on the far bank, and 
endeavoured to make ground up the heights, 
but found it impossible, either to advance or to 
get to the flanks. The town was now subjected 
to a bombardment by high-explosive shell*; 
houses collapsed as though made of cardboard, 
and part of the town took fire. A message was 
sent to the infantry to ask if they wanted any 
help, and, a negative reply being received, the 
CHvalry, after three hours' sojourn on the 
north bank, undertook the apparently suicidal 
task of retiring by the bridge, which was now 
swept by the enemy's fire. Marvellous to relate, 
they reached the south bank with the loss of a 
few wounded and none killed. The whole 
movement advance and retirement was an 
xample of the finest courage and discipline. 
The main body of the 1st Division met with 
slight opposition. It crossed by means of the 
aqueduct which carries the canal across the 
river, and pushed on, supported by the Cavalry 
Division on its outer flank, driving small parties 
of the enemy before it. By nightfall the 
1st Brigade had occupied Paissy, the 2nd was 
in billets and bivouacs at Moulins, with an 
advanced post in Vendresse, and the 3rd was in 
Geny. 



The 2nd Division advanced on the left of the 
1st Division, its leading troops reached the 1 
river by 9 a.m. The 5th Brigade found that 
the only means of passage consisted of the 
broken and partially-submerged girders of the 
demolished road-bridge at Pont-Arcy, which 
were crossed in single file under considerable 
shell fire. The construction of a pontoon bridge 
was commenced at once and was completed by 
5 p.m. The 4th (Guards) Brigade attempt' d 
to cross the canal and river at Cys and Cha vonne, 
but encountered such vigorous opposition at 
the latter place that it was not till nightfall that 
one of its battalions managed to cross in boats 
and effect a lodgment on the far bank. Thus 
the 6th Brigade and three battalions of the 
Guards Brigade were obliged to bivouac on the 
southern shore. 

The 3rd Division advanced on the left of the 
2nd. The 8th Brigade got across at Vailly 
and established itself on the north bank before 
nightfall, but the 9th and 7th Brigades had to 
bivouac on the hither side. 

The 5th Division advanced on the left of the 
3rd. The only bridge which had not been 
destroyed in the whole British front was that at 
Conde, which, however, was found to be covered 
by such a murderous fire as to be quite un- 
approachable. The 13th Brigade, therefore, 
essayed the passage opposite Missy. The 




STRETGHEK PARTY WORKING BY SEARCHLIGHT. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



129 




BRITISH GUNS COVERED WITH BRUSHWOOD TO CONCEAL THEM 
FROM THE GERMAN AIRMEN. 



southern heights here stand back from the 
stream, leaving an open space which was under 
a close and accurate fire from the slopes above 
Missy, the 13th Brigade was therefore obliged to 
convert its advance into a demonstration while 
the 14th Brigade moved upon a less exposed 
point between Missy and Venizel, and by rafting 
managed to reach the opposite side and secure 
itself on the steeps above with its left in Ste. Mar- 
guerite. The 15th Brigade followed the 14th and 
later on cooperated with it in repelling a heavy 
counter-attack delivered upon the 4th Division. 
The 4th Division advanced on the left of the 
5th. The llth Brigade had established itself 
overnight on the heights above Bucy-le-Long 
and found that a strong force of the enemy was 
securely entrenched upon the Vregny plateau. 
The road bridge at Venizel had not been com- 
pletely demolished, and was repaired during the 
morning to an extent which allowed field guns 
to be man-handled across it, while an attempt 
was made to throw a pontoon bridge across near 
Soissons. The 12th Brigade crossed at Venizel 
and was massed in Bucy by 1 p.m. An hour 
later it advanced between the 14th and llth 
Brigades with the object of securing the heights 
west of Chivres as a base for a further advance 
against the plateau above Vregny. By 5.30 p.m. 
it was astride the Chivres brook, but found that 
a very heavy artillery and machine-gun fire 
from the north forbado further advance. 



About this time a pontoon bridge had been 
completed at Venizel and the 10th Brigade 
advanced to Bucy ; but the attempt of the 
Bridging Train of the 3rd Corps to throw a heavy 
pontoon bridge across the river east of Soissons 
had to be abandoned owing to the fire of th 
enemy's siege howitzers. Before nightfall the 
whole 4th Division was across the river, with 
the exception of one Brigade of Field Artillery 
and the heavy battery, while the 19th Brigade 
remained at Billy, south-east of Soissons. 

At nightfall the enemy withdrew to his main 
position on the ridge along which runs the 
Chemin-des-Dames, about tw.o miles north of 
the river, but retained strong detachments of 
infantry and machine guns, heavily entrenched, 
on commanding points on the spurs in front. 

During the night the positions gained by 
the 12th Brigade (4th Division) east of the 
Chivres brook were handed over to the lltli 
Brigade (5th Division). 

During the crossing, a German aeroplane 
attempted to reconnoitre the British lines from 
an altitude beyond the reach of rifle fire, but a 
British airman shot up to the attack, tracing 
a wide circle in the endeavour to get above 
his adversary. The German tried to close on 
him from above and there quickly ensued a 
giddy circling of machines like two gigantic 
birds in combat, punctuated by the exchange 
of shots between the aviators. Suddenly the 



130 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




BRITISH SOLDIERS DISMANTLING A MAXIM. 



German reeled. Wounded in mid-air, he yet 
retained sufficient strength to get his machine 
slowly to the ground, but it was within the 
British lines. 

The passage of the Aisne, effected in the face 
of an enemy heavily entrenched in a carefully 
selected and prepared position, was one of 
the most remarkable river crossings in military 
history. During the climax of the conflict 
the valley of the river had become a perfect 
inferno, filled with a pandemonium of sound. 
From height to height the rival artillery dis- 
charged a never-ceasing flood of projectiles 
across the valley. At the selected crossing 
points the engineers laboured to construct 
the bridges. Successive lines of khaki-clad 
figures, in extended formation, advancing from 
cover to cover, sought to reach their objectives. 
The air above was filled with the buzzing of 
aeroplanes and the bursting of shrapnel. The 
rattle of riflery, the insistent rat-rat-rat of 
machine-guns, the explosions of shells in the air 
and on the ground, and the thunder of the 
artillery produced an indescribable medley of 
tremendous sound. The meadows by the 
river side became a hell of fire in which it seemed 
impossible that anything could live. But foot 
by foot the unmoved engineers built their 
bridges, and foot by foot the dauntless infantry 
won their way to the river, across it and up the 
further steeps. All night long the enemy's 
searchlights swept the southern shores, seeking 
insistently to discover any attempts to mov 



troops down to the stream. It was not till 
morning that comparative silence fell upon the 
valley of the Aisne. 

The French 6th Army had advanced to the 
attack on the left of the British. There was a 
fierce interchange of artillery fire between the 
guns posted on the opposite sides of the stream. 
The 1 German artillery greatly overmatched 
their rivals in number, range, and power, and 
their heavy howitzer shells detonated with 
tremendous violence all along the southern 
heights, but were not causing as many 
casualities as one would have expected from 
the noise and number of the explosions. The 
French had seized the upper half of Soissons, 
but the lower half was in flames. Volumes of 
black smoke mixed with the dust of collapsing 
walls rose to meet the fleecy white puffs of 
bursting shrapnel ; the thunder of the guns 
shook the houses, and yet some of the popula- 
tion, among them women and children, remained 
stupefied but calm. Above all this smoke 
and flame and ruin arose the twin towers of 
the doomed Cathedral, which had dominated 
the old town for seven long centuries. A 
large body of French Reserves was formed up 
behind some high ground 600 yards south of 
Soissons. Further to the left the 8th Army 
Corps crossed the river under cover of a furious 
cannonade from the southern heights, and 
further west still a body of Zouaves, who had 
won their way across at Vic-sur-Aisnc, v.as 
endeavouring to turn the German right. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



131 



On Monday, September 14, it was officially 
announced that the German centre had taken 
up a position behind Reims ; that the Germans 
had fallen back in the Argonne beyond the 
Forest of Belnoue and Triaucourt ; and that, 
in the direction of Nancy and the Vosges, 
they had completely evacuated French terri- 
tory. 

For some days and nights after the passage of 
the Aisne the engineers laboured incessantly 
to improve and add to the bridges constructed 
on the 13th. In the British section nine pon- 
toon bridges one of them only a footbridge 
were laid across the river under heavy artillery 
fire ; the road bridges at Venizel, Missy, and 
Vailly, and the railway bridge east of the 
latter were sufficiently repaired to take road 
traffic, and the bridge at CEuilly strengthened to 
bear weights up to six tons ; and preparations 
were made for the strengthening of the road 
bridges already mentioned and that at Bourg to 
bear heavy motor lorries. At .the same time 
the continuous rain made the already indifferent 
approaches to the bridges soft and easily cut up, 
which entailed a great deal of work to repair and 
improve them. Altogether, it would be difficult 



to realize the amount of labour thrown on the 
Engineer Field Companies or to overpraise their 
devotion and skill. 

The partial passage of the Aisne on Sunday, 
the 13th, had left it still in doubt whether the 
enemy was fighting a delaying action to cover 
a further retreat or whether he proposed to 
definitely check the Allies on the line they 
had now reached. With a view to clearing up 
the situation Sir John French ordered a general 
advance. He reports that : 

" The action of the 1st Corps on this day " 
[September 14] " under the direction and 
command of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skilful, 
bold, and decisive a character that he gained 
positions which alone have enabled me to 
maintain my position for more than three 
weeks of very severe fighting on the north bank 
of the river. 

" The corps was directed to cross the line 
Moulins-Moussy by 7 a.m." f 

The 2nd Brigade from Moulins and the 25th 
Artillery Brigade (less one battery) under 
General Bulfin, pushed northwards to cover 
the advance of the rest of the Division up the 
Vendresse valley. An officer's patrol from this 




GERMAN TRENCH, SHOWING THE ZIGZAG FORMATION AND TRAVERSES. 

17 C 



TJII-: TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 



Bripide having reported a considerable hostile 
force near a factory on the north side of Troyon, 
the Brigadier directed the King's Royal Rifles 
and the Royal Sussex Regiment to advance 
against it at 3 a.m. The Northamptonshire 
Regiment was to move an hour later and occupy 
a spur east of Troyon, while the Loyal North 
Lancashiie Regiment was to move at 6.30 a.m. 
straight upon Vendresse. The enemy at the 
factory was f ound to be in such strength that the 
North Lancashire Regiment was ordered up to 
support the King's Royal Rifles and the Sussex. 
Even with this support, however, it was found 
impossible to advance, and it became necessary 
to reinforce the Brigade by moving the Cold- 
st;eam Guards (1st Brigade) to the right of the 
three battalions, while the remainder of the 
1st Brigade moved to their left. All these 
battalions became hotly engaged, and a thick 
mist which shrouded the slopes prevented 
l heir artillery affording them effective support 
till after 9 a.m. An hour later the 3rd Brigade 
reached the hollow south of Vendresse, and was 
directed to move up on the left of the battalions 
engaged in order to prolong their line and to 
connect up with the 2nd Division. This 




GERMAN OFFICER DISTRIBUTING 
IRON CROSSES. 



Brigade was just in time to deliver a vigorous 
counterstroke with two of its battalions against 
a strong German force advancing upon tha 
right of the 2nd Division. By noon a party of 
the North Lancashire Regiment had secured 
the factory at Troyon, and the whole of the 
eight battalions comprising the 1st and 2nd 
Brigades were extended upon a line imme- 
diately north of Troyon, confronting a strong 
German force securely entrenched along the 
Chemin-des-Dames. Repeated attempts to 
advance against the Germans were driven baek 
by tempests of shrapnel and machine-gun 
fire, and for the rest of the day the combat 
resolved itself into a series of attacks and 
counter-attacks, in which those delivered by 
the enemy gradually decreased in vigour and 
were finally repulsed with heavy loss. 

The 2nd Division was to have cooperated 
by sending the 6th Brigade through the line 
held by the 5th Brigade to occupy the ridge of 
the Chemin-des-Dames south of Courtecon, 
while the 4th (Guards) Brigade and the 36th 
Brigade R.F.A., under Brigadier-General Per- 
ceval, were detached to secure the heights east 
of Ostel. The 6th Brigade crossed at Pont- 
Arcy, pushed up the Braye ravine, and by 
9 a.m. had reached a line south of Braye, where 
it W(OS checked by heavy shrapnel and rifle fire. 
The General Officer Commanding 2nd Division, 
therefore, sent up the 34th and 44th (Howitzer) 
Brigades, R.F.A. and the Heavy Battery to 
support the 6th Brigade. 

The 4th (Guards) Brigade crossed at 
Chavonne at 10 a.m., and immediately encoun- 
tered severe opposition. It had to fight its 
way through dense woods, which made it very 
difficult to afford it any supporting arullery 
fire, but a section (2 guns) of field artillery was 
eventually pushed right into its firing line, and 
by 1 p.m. the left of the Brigade was south 
of the Ostel ridge. By this time the enemy, 
who had passed around the left flank of tha 
Guards Brigade, had penetrated between the 
2nd and 3rd Divisions and threatened to cut 
the communications of the latter.* Sir Douglas 

* An Irish Guardsman relates the following incident 
connected with the advance of the Guards Brigade : 

" There were several regiments involved in this affair : 
a company of the Coldstream Guards, half a company of 
the Irish Guards, and a lot of t'onnaughts and Gronadisra. 
While the fight was going on the Germans in front of in 
hoisted the white flag and we all went forward to take 
them prisoners. As soon as we got into the open there 
burst out a ring of fire from concealed artillery, and then 
the Germans seized their rifles and joined in the slaughter. 
It was awful. We were helpless ; caught in .a trap ; 
the whole lot of us were practically done in." 



THK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




SOISSONS. 

Entrance to the Quarries where the Germans imagined they were impregnable, 
but which were taken by the French. 



i Toptcal. 



Haig, commanding the 1st Army Corps, was 
very hard pressed and had no Reserves in hand, 
but Sir John French was unable to do more 
than place the 1st Cavalry Division at his dis- 
posal. Fortunately the British Cavalry had 
long been trained in dismounted work and 
could use the rifle just as efficiently as the 
infantry. Part of the Division was sent to 
prolong the left flank of the Guards Brigade 
and. after some severe fighting, assisted in 
driving back the enemy with heavy loss. 
About four hi the afternoon the enemy's 
attacks began to weaken the crisis had 
passed and Sir Douglas Haig took the bold 
resolution of ordering a general advance. Al- 
though the 1st Army Corps encountered con- 
siderable opposition and a heavy fire of all 
sorts, it had secured by nightfall a position 
which ran from a point on the Chemin-des- 
Dames north-east of Troyon through Troyon 
and Chivy to La Cour des Soupirs. This line 
was extended by the 1st Cavalry Brigade down 
the valley to the Chavonne-Soissons road ; and 
the right of the Corps was secured by the 
arrival of the Moroccan troops of the 18th 



Corps (5th French Army), who entrenched 
themselves in echelon to its right rear. During 
the night the 1st Army Corps dug themselves in 
along the positions they had gained and held 
them unshaken throughout the subsequent 
operations, day and night, for three weeks. 
During the 14th the 1st Corps took 12 field 
guns, several machine guns, and 600 prisoners,* 
besides those taken by the Cavalry. The 
prisoners belonged to the Reserve and Land- 
wehr as well as to the Active Army, which 
suggests that the enemy was already using the 
older classes to meet the wastage of war. The 
casualties in the British 1st Army Corps were 
very severe and included three out of the four 
Colonels in one Brigade. 

The 3rd Division attempted an advance on 
the left of the 2nd and had almost attained the 
high ground east of Aizy when it encountered 
a very superior force of the enemy and fell back 
in good order to a position north of Vailly, 
which it entrenched, effectively protecting the 

* During the past week the British had captured 
about 60 guns, 30 machine-gima. and 40 wagons, besides 
a considerable quantity of ammunition and several 
thousand prisoners. 



184 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




GERMAN GUNS CAPTURED BY THE BRITISH. 



bridge to the south. The 5th and 4th Divisions 
found themselves unable to do more than 
maintain their ground. They were mercilessly 
shelled all day with practically no opportunity 
to reply. For instance, an officer of the Sea- 
forth Highlanders writes, " They fairly shellrd 
(our) trenches in the afternoon. Evening put 
an end to the show, fifteen hours of real hard 
shelling, and yet . . . the regiment's . . . total 
casualties were (only) 3 officers killed and 1 
wounded, and between 60 and 70 men killed 
and wounded. It was a hard ordeal for the 
men, but they were quite splendid, cool and 
confident all day." 

On Tuesday, September 15, it was officially 
announced that the Germans had taken up the 
front Noyon, Vic-sur-Aisne, Soissons, the Mount 
of Laon, the heights north and. east of Reims, 
a line north of Ville-sur-Tourbe and Varennes, 
and thence towards Le Bois de Fourges on the 
Mouse north o:" Verdun. 

Tuesday dawned damp and dismal. A 
careful examination of the position and reports 
from the French Armies right and left of him, 
served to assure Sir John French that it was 
no mere rearguard opposition, but a deter- 



mined stand with which the Allies had to deal. 
The enemy had evidently been strongly rein- 
forced, and the fall of Maubeuge had enabled 
him to bring up a quantity of siege artillery, 
for during the 15th many shells fell in the 
British positions which must have been thrown 
by 8-inch siege guns with a range of at least 
10,000 yards. Throughout the whole course 
of the fighting on the Aisne the Allies suffered 
severely from the fire of heavy artillery, to 
which, as yet, they could make no adequate 
reply. Not till bridges in the rear had been 
built of sufficient strength would the Allies be 
able to bring up siege artillery. Everything 
possible was done by way of concealment and 
entrenchment to protect the troops from the 
devastating fire of the enemy's heavy artillery, 
and the countryside around was searched for 
digging implements, of which a large number 
was collected. 

In the afternoon the Germans subjected the 
4th Division and the right of the 6th French 
Army to a tremendous bombardment from 
heavy guns, preparatory to delivering a furious 
counter-attack upon them, supported by 
the fire of machine guns and field artillery 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



13", 



The Allies, however, held their ground with 
splendid tenacity, poured a murderous fire into 
their assailants and repulsed them everywhere, 
in some oases at the point of the bayonet. 
These counter-attacks were accompanied by 
others on the 1st and 2nd Divisions, and 
though repeated six times were driven back 
with heavy loss, particularly one made on the 
ith (Guards) Brigade. Meanwhile the 3rd 
Division advanced from Vailly with great 
vigour and regained all the ground it had lost 
on the 14th, thus securing positions which 
effectively covered the river passages to its rear. 
The 5th Division, however, was not so fortu- 
nate. It could not stay where it was, since its 
trenches along the southern edge of the Chivre 
plateau were rendered untenable by enfilade 
fire from the enemy's position about Vregny, 
neither could it advance, since the ground to its 
front was not only swept by fire from the north, 
but was also enfiladed from the high ground 
east and west of it. The Division was, there- 
fore, obliged to withdraw to a line which ran 
from a point on the river immediately east of 
Missy through the northern edge of that 
village to Ste. Marguerite. Even here its 
position was not an enviable one, as its trenches 
could be fired into from above by the enemy 
about Fort de Conde, at a range of only 400 
yards. 

During the closing hours of Tuesday it came 
on to rain more heavily than ever, soaking the 



fighting men and flooding the trenches, while 
the continuous roar of the artillery and detona- 
tions of bursting shells made one thunderous 
and monotonous noise in which individual 
explosions became indistinguishable. Above 
all this turmoil and bloodshed hung the airmen, 
driven at times to descend dangerously close 
to earth in their efforts to locate the enemy's 
positions in the faulty light. 

During the night ten more counter-attacks 
were delivered upon the British front, those on 
the left wing being particularly vigorous, but 
all were defeated with great slaughter. 

While the British and the right of the 6th 
French Army were subjected to these furious 
assaults the battle spread westwards, and an 
enormous number of guns were in action on 
both sides, so that the roar of their fire became 
like monstrously magnified musketry. At 
nightfall the French left began to drive the 
enemy back towards Xoyon, but their right, 
north of Soissons, could make no progress. In 
this direction the enemy held a number of 
quarries, which apparently had been owned by 
Germans for some years before the war and 
had been turned into veritable fortresses. The 
slopes around them were simply shambles. 
Soissons itself had been subjected to a regular 
daily bombardment, in which the cathedral and 
the churches suffered as much as the humble 
dwellings around. 

,On Saturday the 6th French Army had 




BRIDGE DESTROYED BY THE GERMANS IN THEIR FLIGHT. 



inc. 



'////; 



H1STOHY <>!' THE \\'Mi. 




GERMAN ENCAMPMENT ON THE AISNE. 



crossed the Aisne at Vic and Fontenoy. On 
Monday they had thrown pontoon bridges 
across the river at those places under heavy 
gun fire, had driven the German rearguards 
through St. Christophe, and had established 
themselves in Nouvron, Autreches, and the 
valley of Morsain. On Tuesday night a furious 
German counter-stroke from the neighbourhood 
of Nampcel drove the French out of all their 
advanced positions and back to the edges of 
the plateaux where they overhung the stream. 
All Wednesday and Wednesday night these 
French positions were pitilessly shelled. 

On Wednesday, September 16, the 6th 
(British) Division* arrived from England. Sir 
John French had proposed to use the 1st, 2nd 
and 6th Divisions to drive the enemy from 
their position on the Chemin-des-Dames, so 
that from this point a fire could be brought 
to bear across the front of the 3rd Division to 
enable that Division to advance and thus re- 
lieve the pressure on the 5th and 4th Divisions 
in succession ; but he found that the forward 
movement of the British right could not be 



* 6th DIVISION. Kith Brigade : 1st E. Kent, 1st 
Leicester, 1st Shropshire, 2nd Yorks and Lanes, llth 
Brigade : 1st Royal Fusiliers, 1st N. Staffs, 2nd Leicester, 
3rd Rifle Brigade. 18th Brigade : 1st W. Yorks, 
1st E. Yorks, 2nd Notts and Derby, 2nd Durham. 
Artillery Brigades : 2nd, 24th, 38th, eighteen pounders 
and 12th Howitzer^ 



supported by the left of the 5th French Army, 
and that, therefore, the former would be 
dangerously exposed. He also heard from 
General Joffre that since the Germans obviously 
intended a serious defence of their position, he 
proposed to turn their west flank rather than 
attempt to break their line, and had begun to 
strengthen his own left accordingly. The 6th 
Division, therefore, was sent to the south side 
of the river behind the British left, to serve as a 
General Reserve. 

The Germans continued to bombard the 
British positions throughout the day, but their 
counter-attacks were rather in the nature of 
demonstrations than of serious efforts. Indeed, 
the extreme accuracy of the British artillery 
fire obliged them to evacuate some of thoir 
trenches for the time, but as they reoccupied 
them at night, the situation remained un- 
changed at the close of the day. 

On Thursday, September 17, the Russian 
official report recorded the utter rout of the 
Austrian Army in Galicia, with losses of 250,000 
killed and wounded, 100,000 prisoners, 400 
guns, and flags and stores. The 6th French 
Arrny, which had been heavily reinforced, 
retook all the positions it had lost on Tuesday 
night and even drove the Germans beyond 
Nampcel itself. 

This day the German heavy artillery bom- 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAK. 



187 



barded the whole British position more vigor- 
ously than on the previous day, but their 
infantry was quiescent except in front of the 
British right. Here a number of attacks were 
made and, as usual, repulsed with heavy loss 
on this occasion mainly by the field artillery. 
Nevertheless the 1st Division was in action the 
whole day. 

It has already been related how, on Monday, 
the 14th, the right of the 2nd Brigade had won 
very advanced positions on the Chemin-des- 
Dames, near Troyon. The Northamptonshire 
Regiment was on the right, which was the 
most advanced and the most exposed portion 
of the British line. One of its companies u 
captain, two subalterns, and 160 men held a 
trench along the road. It had poured with rain 
for a week, the water draining in from the road 
stood knee-deep in the trench, the men had lost 
their great-coats in the retreat from Mons, they 
had now held their position under a continuous 
bombardment for four days with scarcely any 
rest or sleep the whole time, and they had in 
front of them, across a turnip field only 250 
yards wide, trenches held by an enemy three 
times their strength. Picked shots on both 
sides made it certain death to show above the 
parapet. Sentries peeping through their look- 
outs had been shot through the mouth, the 
captain had been shot through the head, a 
lieutenant had been mortally wounded, and 



food and water could only be brought up at 
night by men who crawled out and back on 
their stomachs. The best shot in the company 
had been accustomed to adorn his " balaclava 
helmet " with turnip leaves and to crawl out 
towards the enemy's trench after nightfall. 
Here he would lie patiently amid the turnips 
and in the soaking rain until a foeman's head 
showed above the " sky-line " a press of the 
trigger, and a gasp or a cry announced that a 
German had gone to his last account. In rear 
of the trench was a haystack known as " the 
hospital," because behind it the British had 
collected some 70 Germans who had been 
severely wounded in Monday's fight. These 
men were fed and attended to at night, but 
the enemy's fire made it impossible to reach 
them during daylight. On Wednesday a German 
shell set fire to ' the haystack. The more 
severely wounded were burnt alive and, of 
course, the " cover " which had so far pro- 
tected the others from their countrymen's fire 
was destroyed. The cries of the wounded were 
horrible to hear, but tho deadly nature of the 
enemy's fire made it impossible to afford them 
any assistance. On Thursday the Germans 
in the trench opposite made two or three 
ineffectual attempts to advance, and then 
put up their arms or their rifles and made 
other signals of surrender. The British signed 
for them to come out and the Germans streamed 




GERMAN ROLL CALL AFTER AN ENGAGEMENT. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




THE FOREST OF COMPIEGNE. 
Motor omnibuses bringing up supplies for the troops. 



across the intervening space. The only sur- 
viving British officer a second lieutenant of 
less than a year's service advanced and called 
for an officer to come forward. A private 
ha-tened out. The subaltern told him to retire 
and again shouted for an officer. The private 
withdrew and another private advanced. The 
subaltern ordered him back and again shouted 
for an officer to come forward. All this time the 
Germans were moving on and had nearly 
reached the trench. At last a German officer 
with a sergeant and a private came forward. 
" You surrender you are my prisoner," said 
the British officer. Whether the German 
officer now perceived how small was the force 
opposed to him and changed his mind about 
surrendering, or whether the act of treachery 



had been intended from the outset, is not 
known, but certain it is that the German officer 
replied, " No, you are mine," waved his men on 
and made for the British officer. The latter 
raised his revolver and shot both the German 
officer and the sergeant, but the private closed 
with him and the Germans began to shoot. 
One shot went through the subaltern's cap and 
another through his shoulder, and he was 
knocked down and stunned at the same time. 
Further away some of the Northamptons had 
left their trench and were taking over rifles or 
shaking hands with their prospective prisoners, 
but^ far the greater number of the Germans had 
pressed forward to the parapet, where they 
started firing point blank at the men in the 
trenches. A scrimmage ensued between the 




BRITISH TRAVELLING REPAIR SHOPS. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



139 



leading Germans and the Northamptons. and 
the remaining Germans began running up to 
reinforce those on the parapet. It so happened 
that the Northampton's trench was flanked at 
a range of 400 yards by a machine-gun detach- 
ment in a neighbouring trench held by the 
Queen's Regiment. The latter had been very 
interested observers of the supposed surrender, 
but they immediately grasped the situation, 
switched on the machine gun and cut down 
the Germans. Out of 400 Germans 300 were 
killed by bayonet and bullet and 100 surrendered 
to a detachment of Coldstreamers who had 
doubled up to the scene. Of the Northamp- 
tons only 12 men were left on their legs, and of 
these 4 were wounded.* 



* " Eyewitness " gives a bnei account of this incideni 
e.s happening to a platoon of the Northamptons. Ho 
remarks of the German behaviour in general : 

" The Germans are a formidable enemy, well trained, 
long prepared and brave, their soldiers are carrying on 
the contest with skill and valour. Nevertheless they are 
lighting to win anyhow, regardless of all the rules of fair- 
play, and there is evidence that they do not hesitate at 
anything in order to gain victory. A large number of 
the tales of their misbehaviour are exaggerations, and 
some of the stringent precautions they have taken to 
Luard themselves against the inhabitants of the areas 
traversed are possibly justifiable measures of war. But 
wt the same time it has been definitely established that 
they have committed atrocities on many occasions and 
they have been guilty of brutal conduct. 

" Further evidence has now been collected of the misuse 
of the white flag and other signs of surrender during the 
action of the 17th, when, owing to this, one officer was 
shot. During the recent fighting also some German 
ambulance wagons advanced in order to collect the 
wounded. An order to cease fire was consequently given 
to our guns which were firing on this particular section of 
ground. The German battery commanders at once took 
advantage of the lull in the action to climb up their 
observation ladders and on to a haystack to locate our 
guns, which soon afterwards came under a far more 
accurate fire than any to which they had been subjected 
up to that time. 

" A British officer who was captured by the Germans 
and has since escaped reports that while a prisoner he 
saw men who had been fighting subsequently put on Red 
Cross brassards. That the irregular use of the protection 
afforded by the Geneva Convention is not uncommon is 
confirmed by the fact that on one occasion men in the 
uniform of combatant units have been captured wearing 
the Ked Cross brassard hastily slipped over the arm. 
The excuse given has been that they had been detailed 
after a fight to look after the wounded. It is reported 
by a cavalry officer that the driver of a motor-car with a 
machine-gun mounted on it, which he captured, was 
wearing the Red Cross." 

Mr. H. W. Forster, M.P. for the Sevenoaks Division, 
has received a letter from an officer at the front, in which 
he refers to the death of his son, Second Lieutenant 
Forster, who was killed in action. The following is an 
extract from the letter : " It was a terrible day for our 
battalion. By midday there were only six company 
officers left. We lost fifteen officers out of twenty-four, 
and 283 men. These heavy losses were mostly caused by 
those dirty Germans holding up their hands in token of 
surrender, and then opening fire on us when we got within 
twenty yards of their trem-hes," 




WITH THE FRENCH RED CROSS. 

Entraining a wounded soldier at the rear of the 

fighting line. 

Later in the afternoon the German 53rd 
Regiment (three battalions) advanced against 
the trenches held by the Northamptons and 
Queen's, but was driven back. The two British 
battalions were then reinforced by the King's 
Royal Rifles from the divisional reserve and 
directed to counter-attack the enemy. Under 
cover of a mist the Northamptonshire Regiment 
crept close up to the enemy's trenches undis- 
covered, charged with the bayonet and drove 
the enemy up the hill. They then found that 
the crest itself was held by a very strong force 
of German infantry, but the Queen's on the 
left managed to reach a point from which they 
could enfilade the enemy's line, and the King's 
Royal Rifles on the right, wheeling up to their 
left and supported by a squadron of cavalry, 
promptly joined in a concerted attack which 
drove the enemy back with heavy loss. 

All night long a gale raged and the rain 
poured, flooding out the trenches and drenching 
the unfortunate soldiers that held them. The 
men were soaked to the skin, covered with mud. 
their faces caked with greyish clay, chilled to 



I 10 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




$ 

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jw 22 



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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



141 



the marrow by the wind and wet, and shaking 
with cold. Said one man : " It is absolute hell 
in the trenches, and the rain and the cold are 
worse than the shrapnel."* 

During the day fire was opened upon a 
German aeroplane which attempted to fly over 
the British lines, and a sudden rocking of the 
machine showed that a bullet had found its 
billet. The aviator, however, managed to turn 
northwards, began to descend very gradually, 
and it seemed for the moment as if he would 
succeed in reaching his own lines, but when 
within a few hundred feet of the ground the 
machine suddenly dived head-first downwards, 
and though the result was not visible from the 
British trenches, it was afterwards ascertained 
that the machine had been smashed to pieces 
and the aviator injured, if not killed. 

The following, given by "Eyewitness" and 
published by the Press Bureau, are interesting 
as giving some idea of the condition of the 
German Army at this time : 

The following is an epistle from a German soldier of 
the 74th Infantry Regiment (Xth Corps) to his wife : 

" My dear Wife, I have just been living through days 
that defy imagination. I should never have thought 
that men could stand it. It was horrible, it was ghastly. 
But I hav been saved for you and for our happiness and 
I take heart again, although I am still terribly unnerved. 
God grant that I may see you again soon and that this 

* A doctor with the K.A.M.C. at the front writes : 
" We speak of brave men. Yes, these men are brave ! 
If the people of the United Kingdom could see the 
conditions under which our fellows fight and how they 
die, I swear that every head would uncover to the 
colours of any regiment bearing the name of a battle, 
because that name had been won through the blood of 
real heroes. For example, some colours- will have 
' Marne ' upon them. I know what deeds were done, 
what lives were given, what wounds were received to 
have that one name so inscribed. Believe me, the 
Victoria Cross is won over and over again in a single day. 
They are brave. What if you were to see how the 
wounded act after the excitement of battle ? They 
suffer their wounds, great and small, without a murmur ; 
they get their wounds dressed and take chloroform, give 
consent to have their limbs amputated just as if they 
were going to have their hair out. They are gloriously 
brave. Men who have been in the thick of the fight all 
day, seen their chums wounded and killed, their own lives 
not. worth a second's insurance, still these men cook their 
food and go off to sleep, and, most wonderful of all, go 
back to the thick of it next day. 

" It is Sunday and we have had Holy Communion 
administered in a cowshed, and very impressive it was 
in the circumstances. In the evening we had another 
service in a barn, conducted by the Chaplain and a 
Wcsleyan minister. A great crowd of the officers and 
men collected. The scene was very impressive, with 
Ihe room only lit with camp candles, the soldiers rough 
and dirty with the work of war, some of them just 
returned from the trenches and others going there the 
same night some who in all probability would be dead 
before another night came along. The men sang 
heartily, but when the prayer for dear ones at home was 
ln'in^ offered there were few dry eyes among those brave 
men who faced death daily." 




MOTOR AMBULANCE WRECKED BY 
GERMAN SHELLS. 

horror may soon be over. None of us can do any more, 
human strength is at an end. 

" I will try to tell you about it : 

'* On September 5 the enemy were reported to be taking 
up a position near St. Prix (N.E. of Paris). The Xth 
Corps, which had made an astonishingly rapid advance, 
of course attacked on the Sunday. We were met with 
shell fire and a violent fusillade from the enemy's 
infantry. Our Colonel was badly wounded he is the 
third we have had. Fourteen men were killed round 
me. . . . We got away in a lull without being hit. 

" The 7th, 8th, and 9th of September we were constantly 
under shell and shrapnel fire and suffered terriblo losses. 
The fear of a death of agony which is in every man's 
heart, and naturally so, is a terrible feeling. 

'* How often I thought of you, my darling, and what I 
suffered in that terrifying battle which extended along a 
front of many miles near Montmirail, you cannot 
possibly imagine. For four days I was under artillery 
fire. It is like Hell, but a thousand times worse. On 
the night of the 9th the order was given to retreat. 
The First and Third Armies had not been able to attack 
with us, as we had advanced too rapidly. 

" Our moral was absolutely broken. 

" They say nothing has been lost. We hear that 
three armies are going to get into line, entrench, 
rest, and then start afresh our victorious march on 
Paris. It was not a defeat, but only a strategic 
retreat. I have confidence in our chiefs that everything 
will be successful. Our first battalion, which has fought 
with unparalleled bravery, is reduced from 1,200 to 
194 men. These numbers speak for themselves. ..." 

The prisoners recently captured appreciate the fact 
that the march on Paris has failed, but state that the 
object of this movement is explained by the officers as 
being to withdraw into closer touch with supports which 
have stayed too far in rear. The officers are also en- 
deavouring to encourage the troops by telling them 
that they will be at home by Christmas. A large 
number of the men, however, believe that they are 
beaten. The following is an extract from one docu- 
ment : 

" With the English troops we have great difficulties. 
They have a queer way of causing losses to th enemy. 



142 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




FRENCH HEAVY HOWITZER AT THE MOMENT OF FIRING, AND SHELLS. 



They make good trenches, in which they wait patiently. 
They carefully measure the ranges for their rifle fire, 
and they then open a truly hellish fire on the unsuspect- 
ing cavalry. This was the reason that we had such 
heavy losses. . . . According to our officers, the 
English striking forces are exhausted. The English 
people never really wanted war." 

From another source : 

" The English are very brave, and fight to th*> last 
man. . . . One of our companies has lost 130 mmi out 
of 240." 

The following letter, found on an officer, has been 
printed and circulated to the troops : 

" My dear parents, . . . Our Corps has the task of 
holding the heights south of Cerny in all circumstances 
till the XV. Corps on our left flank can grip the enemy's 
flank. On our right are other corps. We are fighting 
with the English Guards. Highlanders, and Zouaves. 
The losses on both sides have been enormous. For the 
most part this is due to the too brilliant French Artillery. 
The English are marvellously trained in making use of 
the ground. One never sees them, and one is constantly 
under fire. The French airmen perform wonderful 
feats. We cannot get rid of them. As soon as an airman 
has flown over us, ten minutes later we get their shrapnel 
tire in our position. 

" Three days ago our division took possession of these 
heights, dug itself in, etc. Two days ago, early in the 
morning, we were attacked by immensely 'superior 
English forces (one brigade and two battalions),* and 
were turned out of our positions ; the fellows took five 
guns from us. It was a tremendous hand-to-hand fight. 
How I escaped myself I am not clear. I then had to 
bring up supports on foot (my horse was wounded, and 
the others were too far in rear). Then came up the 
Guard Jager Battalion, 4th Jager, 65th Regiment, 
Reserve Regiment 13, Landwehr Regiments 13 and 16,t 
and with the help of the artillery drove back the fellows 
out of the position again. 

" Our machine guns did excellent work. The English 
fell in heaps. 

" During the first two days of the battle I had only one 
piece of bread and no water, spent the night in the 
rain without my great coat. The rest of my kit was <m 
the horses, which have been left miles behind with the 
baggage (which cannot come up into the battle), because 

* An English " brigade and two battalions " would 
be G battalions. 

f A German " Regiment " consists of 3 battalions. 
This reinforcement apparently consisted of 14 battalions. 



as soon as you put your nose out from behind cover the 
bullets whistle. The war is terrible. We are all hoping 
that the decisive battle will end the war, as our troops 
have already got round Paris. 

" If we first beat the English, the French resistance 
will soon be broken. Russia will be very quickly dealt 
with, of this there is no doubt." 

By Friday, September 18, the situation had 
become much clearer. The Germans' defences, 
long prepared, were of an extremely formidable 
character. They were retired just behind the 
crests of the ridges or followed the edges of the 
woods. They were protected against direct 
attack by barbed-wire entanglements and rabbit 
fencing, and every avenue of approach was 
covered by a cross fire. The Germans boasted 
that they could hold their positions for three 
months, if necessary, and indeed their positions 
constituted a series of natural fortresses of 
hills, woods and quarries, which in some places 
were backed by eight or nine successive lines of 
trenches. Considering that neither side had a 
great preponderance of force, it was not likely 
that either could attain definite results until 
heavily reinforced or greatly weakened by the 
necessity for making considerable detachments. 
It was. therefore, apparent that the operations 
might drag on for an indefinite period, and Sir 
John French considered it necessary to establish 
a regular system of relief, by which one brigade 
in each Division could be brought back in turn 
to some place out of reaoh of the enemy's fire. 
The arrival of the Oth Division and the employ- 
ment of the cavalry in the trenches enabled this 
to be carried out. 

At night the scents was magnificent. A number 
of German searchlights continually moved like 
ghostly fingers up and down and along the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



143 



opposite landscape, pausing with minatory 
glare upon suspicious localities and objects. 
It was only during these hours of darkness that 
the relief of the trenches and the portage of 
food and ammunition to the men in them could 
be effected. The use of searchlights and large 
numbers of siege guns by the Germans suggests 
that this materiel had been destined for the 
siege of Paris. 

All day an intermittent artillery fire was kept 
up by both sides. In the course of the day 
General French and the officers commanding 
the 2nd Army Corps and the 3rd and uth 
Divisions discussed the possibility of capturing 
Conde, which lay between the two Divisions, 
and securing the bridge, which had remained 
in the enemy's possession throughout. They 
concluded, however, that the bridge being 
commanded at close range from many points 
on the south side, the enemy would be unable to 
make any use of it, and that as a further advance 
of the 3rd and 5th Divisions would threaten 
to cut off the enemy's troops in Conde, it was 
not advisable to incur the heavy losses of a 
direct attack. 

During the day anti-aircraft guns, belonging 
to the 4th Division, accounted for a German 
aeroplane. After nightfall the Queen's, on the 
extreme right, were heavily attacked. About 



midnight the 1st Division as a whole was 
attacked, and shortly afterwards the 2nd 
Division had their turn. In every case the 
attack was supported by an artillery bombard- 
ment,, and in every case it was repulsed with 
heavy loss. Before dawn the Gloucester Regi- 
ment had advanced from their position near 
Chivy and had captured the enemy's trenches 
opposite to them and two Maxims, and had filled 
in the trenches. On the whole the Germans had 
succeeded in maintaining their positions, but 
the uniforms of the prisoners taken from them 
revealed the fact that they were mixing together 
units of the Active Army, the Reserve and the 
Landwehr, which suggested that their losses had 
been extremely severe. Prisoners' reports of 
terrible losses among the Germans are corro- 
borated by such entries in the diaries of captured 
German officers as the following : 

1. " Modern war is the greatest folly of peoples. In 
the 10th Corps companies of 250 men have been as a rule 
reduced to 70. There are companies of the Guard which 
are now commanded by cinjdhrige, all the officers having 
disappeared." 

2. " For tactical reasons the Guard had to retreat, 
abandoning 10 officers and 800 wounded. The 1st 
Battalion of the 1st Regiment of the Guard has not a 
single officer left." 

3. " On the 16th we advanced, and, after about one 
hour, during which time the company lost about 25 men, 
we were forced to retire. This brought our total strength 
down to 80 (we started with 251 men). We had no 
officers left. . . . 




GERMAN HEAVY GUN IN POSITION. 

The men are bringing up baskets containing shells. 



144 



////; 7'/.W/-;.s HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




A FRENCH FIELD AMBULANCE CORPS AT WORK. 



"(tn tin- 18th, at 4.30 a.m., we reached a village 
where we expected to be able to rest. Before halt 
an hour had passed, however, the shrapnel again found 

ua out Our condition is now really awful, for 

we have to lie out in all weathers ; and we are all looking 
forward to a speedy end. We are very badly off as 
regards food. . . . Some of our regiments * can only 
muster three to four companies." 

4. Another letter written during the retreat in front 
of the French from Montmirail contains the following : 

" After a 36 hours' march we had a rest, and arrived 
just in time for the fight. For three days we did not 
have a hot meal, because our field kitchens wore lost. 
We got a hot meal yesterday evening. Though we are 
all just ready to drop, we must march on. ... 

" We found great quantities of food, but for fear of 
poison did not take possession of it until wo had got hold 
of the proprietor of the house and forced him to taste it. 
. " We are near Reims, after having gone through hard, 
bloody, and most horrible days. Thank God I am still 
alive. Of our regiment of 3,000 men there are now only 
1,600. Let ua hope that this battle which ought to be 
one of the greatest in history will leave me safe and 
well, and give ua peace. I am absolutely done, but we 
must not despair." 

For six days and nights this tremendous artil- 
lery duel had continued, varied only by repeated 
attacks. In the British section a score of 
attacks and counter-attacks had been delivered 
in the last twenty-four hours. No sooner had 
one German line been decimated and driven 
baok than another had come on, to be mown 
down in its turn and to be followed by otln i- 
like it in endless succession. But if the Ger- 
mans failed utterly against the section held by 

* A Gorman infantry regiment consists of 3 battalions. 



the British, they had better fortune further 
east. During Thursday and Friday they 
carried out a series of furious attacks upon the 
French in the neighbourhood of Reims, securely 
established themselves in the heights crowned 
by the forts of Brimont, Nogent 1'Abesse and 
Berru, commenced a sustained bombardment of 
the Cathedral town* and seriously prejudiced 
the defence of this part of the French front. 
If they could break that front at any time it 
would have all those far-reaching consequences 
that would have ensued from a similar success 
at Vitry-le-Frangois. 

On Saturday, September 19, the German 
bombardment of the British lines was resumed 
at daylight and was answered intermittently 
by the British artillery. At different times 
and at different places during the day the 
German infantry advanced as though to 
attack, but retired on coming under fire. The 
object of these advances was not very clear 
unless it was to make certain that none of the 
British had been withdrawn for employment 
elsewhere. 

* " Eyewitness " says : " The Germans bombarded 
the Cathedral twice with their heavy artillery. There 
was no justification on military grounds for this act of 
vandalism, which seems to have been caused by the 
exasperation born of failure. It is noteworthy that a 
weD-known hotal not far from the Cathedral which was 
kept by a German was not touched." 



THE TIMES H1STOHY OF THE WAR. 



14o 



A strong wind and driving rain made the 
conditions very unfavourable for aerial work, 
which perhaps accounts for the fact that a 
German airman ventured rather too close to 
earth and was brought down within the British 
lines. A British airman was more successful, 
for he managed to drop a certain number of 
bombs in the German trenches and landed an 
incendiary bomb upon a German transport 
park near La Fere, which was set on fire. A 
cache of German war stores, consisting of 10 
wagon loads of shell and 2 of cable, were dug up 
near the river, and signs were found that they 
had burned large quantities of stores which 
they had been unable to remove. 

It was not till one o'clock in the afternoon 
that the Germans made any serious effort. 
They then directed a strong attack, supported 
by artillery fire, upon the 2nd Division, which 
repulsed them with heavy loss. The attempt 
was renewed at dusk with a like fate.* 

* The following appeared in The Times of Septem- 
ber 19 : 

." And in the trenohea too, the tale of heroism unfolds 
itself hour by hour. Here is an example, one among 



The following extracts give some idea of the 
general character of the fighting in which the 
French were engaged : 

A British officer ou the staff of General Jeffro wrote 
home as follows : 

" I have been here for over a week, during the whole 
of which a fierce battle has been raging and still continue*. 
The Germans had evidently fortified their present 
position very .strongly in case they were obliged to retreat 
after their dash on Paris. This, of course, they had to 
do after their defeat a fortnight ago. The English and 

ten thousand, the story of a wounded private : ' We lay 
together, my friend and I . .. the order to fire came. 
We shot and shot till our rifles burned us. Still they 
swarmed on towards us. We took careful aim all the 
while. "Ah, good, did you see that." I turned to 
my friend, and as I did so, heard a terrible dull sound, 
like a spade striking upon newly turned earth. His head 
was fallen forward. I spoke, I called him by name. 
He was moaning a little. Then I turned to my work 
again. They are advancing quickly now. Ah ! how 
cool I was. I shot so slowly ... so very slowly. 

" ' And then, do you know what it feels like to be 
wounded ? I rose just a little too high on my elbow. 
A sting that pierces my arm like a hot wire too sharp 
almost to be sore. I felt my arm go away from me it 
seemed like that and then my rifle fell. I believe I 
was a little dazed. I looked at my friend presently. 
He was dead.' " 

An officer in the Army Service Corps writes : 
" Lately I have had to transport wounded on my 
lorries, and pending the arrival of a medico I was 




LOADING UP SUPPLIES FOR THE FIGHTING LINE. 



1-lf. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




SOISSONS. 
Removing harness from wounded horses. 

A shell exploded in this street a few minutes before the photograph was taken. 



French Armies pursued them closely, taking numbers of 
prisoners, guns, ammunition. &c., but when we got to 
this place we found the Germans so strongly entrenched 
in the position they had prudently fortified against such 
an eventuality that it has so far proved impossible to 
dislodge them. There have been fierce attacks and 
counter-attacks all the time, and the losses on both sides 
have been enormous. Most of the fighting has been in 
the nature of a violent artillery duel. The pandemonium 
has been indescribable ; indeed, as I write, the guns are 
Btill thundering all round. The effect of the big shells is 
simply tremendous. Wherever they fall great clouds 
of earth and rock are blown up, and if they happen to fall 
at all near the shock is terrific. I was with the French 
General and his Staff the other day in a little town about 
three kilometres behind our firing line when the Germans 
evidently got. to know that the French Staff was there, 
and began to shell the place with their big guns from a 
distance of about nine kilometres. Since then they have 
bombarded this poor little town at odd moments of the 
flay and night, though the French Staff left it after a few 
hours. 

" I was there the day before yesterday, and the 
whole place was quite calm, though full of reserve 

virtually medical man. It is extraordinary how cheerful 
these wounded men arc indeed, the general cheerfulness 
and adaptability of the British soldier is wonderful. 
Nothing disturbs him, and in this way they have suffered 
us no other troops could have stood without a complete 
collapse of their moral. I am glad our troops are still 
the British soldier of history, taking everything that 
comes in a most philosophical and courageous manner. 
Lying in rain-soaked trenches for three days under a 
murderous and hellish fire, wet, hungry, merely provoke- 
him to song and laughter. Give him a comfortable 
camp and plenty of food and comfort and he never 
ceases ' grousing.' Curious fellow. We are unable t<> 
get any matches or cigarettes now, and a match is the 
purest thing imaginable. I lost my pipe three weeks ago, 
and have been disconsolate." 



troops, transport, etc., when suddenly one heard the 
familiar singing noise of a big shell coming. Kveryone 
craned their necks and some ran for shelter, while the 
singing came nearer and nearer, and then with the most 
terrific bang the shell landed, followed a few seconds 
later by a second and third. A singing and bang, one 
more in the same place, and the third a little further off. 
Then all was quiet again. It was evidently a case of 
' Good morning ' from our friendly Germans. These 
big shells are very unlikely to do you much harm at a 
distance of more than 15 yards, but up to that they 
smnsh everything to bits. The shrapnel is far worse. 
Apparently the German infantry are very poor, and the 
cavalry not much better, but their generals are evidently 
very good and their organization extraordinarily perfect. 
As to their artillery, I can vouch for its excellence after 
watching it closely for nearly a week. Whenever the 
French infantry advance out of their shelters to charge, 
their whole front is at once regularly covered with 
shrapnel, and the unfortunate men are knocked over like 
rabbits. They are very brave, and advance time after 
time to the charge through an appalling fire, but so far 
it has been of no avail. No one could live through the 
fire that is concentrated on them the moment they leave 
their shelter. I have seen some wonderful acts of 
bravery the last few days. The officers are splendid : 
they advance about 20 yards ahead of their men a* 
calmly as though on parade, but so far I have not seen 
one of them get more than 50 yards without beinf: 
knocked over. The French artillery is also splendid much 
better than the Germans in a way but they cannot tell 
exactly where the Germans are. and the latter art- 
so strongly entrenched that gun fire cannot make much 
impression on them. However, of course they cover the 
infantry to a certain extent ; otherwise the latter would 
:ill In- wiped out pretty quick. Still, the Germans must 
have lost pretty heavily, in spite of their strong trem-he-;. 
as the fire of the French guns has been incessant, and 
whatever they try to hit they do. At the same time 
it can only lie largely guesswork to know where to aim. 
I was with u French liattrry for about five hours the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



147 



other day, and was much impressed by their very rapid 
firing and wonderful coolness. They laughed at the 
German shells and played cards during the lulls in the 
fight." 

The following is an extract from the letter of an 
officer in a Highland regiment at the front : 

'* These Zouaves are priceless fellows ; about 30 of them 
go off every night to the enemy's trenches, and stand 
about 200 yards in front and start hooting and booing, 
calling forth a perfect fusillade of musketry, which always 
goes over their heads, and then they return, and as 
regularly as clockwork the 30 always come back. This 

was told me by one of our own officers in the who 

are up in the trenches quite near me." 

An inkling of the mental, moral and physical 
condition of the German Army at this time 
is to be obtained from statements of prisoners, 
diaries found on German officers, and other 
documents. The following extracts are from 
the diary of a German found dead in a trench 
captured by the French and published in 
Le Temps : 

September 5 : Yesterday we received the news of great 
victories. It appears that in Russia, after a ten days' 
battle, we have gained a brilliant victory. Our first 
Army is before Paris. The French have been thrown 
back on Paris and an English cavalry division defeated. 

September 6 : The enemy occupies the heights near 
Vitry. We approach the French. We are met with so 
fierce an artillery fire that we retreat. It is not 
precisely a defeat, merely a retreat. Our losses are 
heavy, but not as heavy as the enemy's. 

September 1 : The troops occupying the bridge of the 
Marne Canal have suffered terribly. Of sixty men only 
twenty-five remain. We leave the trenches at 11 
o'clock and look for potatoes to stay our hunger after a 
day of fasting.* 



September 9 : Wo have been four days in the trenches. 
We have time for rending, and one would soon pet used 
to this mode of existence if the corpses of men and horses 
did not smell so badly and the flies multiply so rapidly. 

September 10 : We have been in the trenches all night 
under torrential rains. We are soaked to the bones. 
There has been heavy fighting on the right wing. It 
appears that the French army is in a bad way. 

September 11 : At two o'clock we got orders to retire. 
We thought we were going to attack. They say that 
two French army corps have pierced our line?. \Ve fly 
without eating anything. We march with great speed. 
Our first and only meal is taken at ten o'clock at ni'^lit, 
and after it we walk the whole night through. 

September 12: We are worn out. They tell us that 
we are executing a turning movement, and not a retreat 
at all. It looks more like a flight. We halt at four 
kilometres from Souain and entrench the heights. We 
are still hungry, and find nothing to eat. It is raining in 
torrents. We are soaked. War is a plague. At half- 
past four we have to turn out again to the trenches. 
Suddenly French shells burst over us, and we are com- 
pelled to retire, as our trenches are not yet complete. 

September 14 : We have eaten nothing all day, and 
are terribly hungry. I don't know when it will end. It 
has never stopped raining. 

September 15 : All our killed and wounded are " on 
the conscience " of the artillery. At nine o'clock we go 
for our one meal a little meat and rice, coffee, and little 
biscuits which ought to have been kept for to-morrow. 
It is a dog's life. Soon we shall have a long sick list. 

September 16 : We are always hungry, hungry, 
hungry. We dare not lift our heads above the trenches. 
That would mean death. 

September 17 : Raining in torrents. We have no 
fires. We are still in trenches. Since we have been 
suffering so terribly from hunger our mentality and 
enthusiasm are no longer what they were. At eleven 
o'clock at night we at last have a meal, but not enough 



* Almost all the German prisoners admitted that their 
food supplies had been irregular and scanty. They had 
subsisted largely on vegetables torn from the fields. A 



letter found on one man says : " How long is this misery 
to continue ? We have only seen bread thrice since the 
war began." All such letters agree as to companies 
being reduced from 250 to 40 or 50 men. 




FUNERAL OF A GERMAN OFFICER PASSING THROUGH A FRENCH VILLAGE, 



148 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




RETHEL. 
The Germans spared the Church, the clock tower of which is conspicuous among the ruins. 



t satisfy us. The night is cold and damp, with a 
terrible north wind. 

September 18 : Bain has stopped, but there is a fierce 
storm of wind. Still hungry as usual. It seems as if 
we are always to be hungry. 

Here the diary comes to an end. 

An entry in a captured field note-book runs thus : 

September 16 : At dawn the shelling began. We 
retired with the prisoners. My two prisoners work 
hard at digging trenches. At midday I got the order to 
rejoin at the village with them. I was very glad, as I 
had been ordered to shoot them as soon as the enemy 
advanced. Thank God it was not necessary. . . . 

On Sunday, September 20, it was officially 
announced that in spite of the most violent 
attacks the Germans had failed to gain any 
ground in front of Reims, except that part of 
Mont Brimont which had been captured by the 
French and was now recaptured by the Germans ; 
that without the least military reasons they 
had bombarded and set on fire the Cathedral 
at Reims, and that the French had captured 
the Fort de la Pompelle, the village of Souain 
and the district of Avricourt. 

During the night of th'e 19th-20th there 
was a recrudescence of activity on the part of 
the Germans. Shortly after nightfall they 
launched a severe attack upon the 3rd Division. 
From dawn on Sunday they directed a number 
of similar attempts on various points held by 
the 1st Division ; later on they made a more 



serious effort upon the 2nd Division ; in the 
course of the afternoon they made a number 
of 1 desperate attempts against all the points 
' held by the 1st and 2nd Divisions ; and after 
nightfall made yet another assault upon the 
2nd Division. All these attacks were repulsed 
with fearful losses to the enemy, whose killed 
and wounded were left lying in front of the 
British trenches. But the 1st Army Corps, 
whose positions had been the chief objectives 
of" the enemy's efforts, incurred considerable 
losses and were, naturally, much exhausted 
by the continuous fighting, and it became 
necessary during the day to reinforce them by a 
Brigade from the Reserve and by the 1st 
Cavalry Division. 

During the afternoon there was a brief but 
welcome break in the weather, and a little 
sunshine served to cheer the troops, though 
not to dry their clothes. But in spite of hostile 
attacks and inclement weather, of living and 
sleeping in the trenches deep in liquid mud, of 
continuous bombardment and incessant night 
alarms, the British infantry remained un- 
shaken and were invariably able to beat back 
the superior numbers of the enemy's masses.* 

* " Eyewitness " says, " The British soldier is n 
difficult person to impress or depress even by immense 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF I' HE WAR. 



149 



On Monday, September 21, it was officially 
announced that the French had occupied the 
heights of Lassigny (west of Noyon) also Mesnil- 
les-Hurlus and Massiges in the centre ; and 
that the Germans had bombarded Hatton- 
cha*el in the Woevre. 

Before nightfall on Sunday the look-outs in 
the advanced British positions had observed 
the signs of an impending attack, and some 
hours later sounds of fierce firing were heard to 
the front, though no bullets fell about the 
British trenches. The solution of the mystery 
was forthcoming on Monday morning, when 
evidence accumulated to the effect that in the 
German attacks of the preceding night their 
columns had fired into one another as the result 
of the notoriously dangerous attempt to bring 
off a converging advance in the dark. 

On Monday morning the weather improved, 
but little beyond an artillery bombardment was 
attempted by the Germans. At one point they 
commenced the construction of a redoubt, but 

shells filled with high explosives which detonate with 
terrific violence and form craters large enough to act as 
graves for five horses. The German howitzer shells are 
8 to 9 inches in calibre, and on impact they send up 
columns of greasy black smoke. On account of this 
they are irreverently dubbed ' Coal boxes,' ' Black 
Marias,' or ' Jack Johnsons ' by the soldiers. Men who 
take things in this spirit are, it seems, likely to throw 
out the calculations based on loss of moral so carefully 
framed by the German military philosophers." 



were shelled out of it by the British <runs. The 
only serious attack made by the Germans this 
day was directed after nightfall against the 
3rd Division, with the usual result. 

Up to this date it was calculated that the air 
mileage made by British airmen since the begin- 
ning of the war amounted to 87.000 miles, an 
average of 2,000 miles per day, and that the 
total time spent in the air was 1,400 hours. 

The net results of the fighting up to this time 
went to show that the operations on the Aifne 
could no longer be regarded as a battle in the 
general acceptance of the term. The fighting 
obviously approximated more nearly to that of 
the trenches before Sebastopol or the protracted 
engagements of Manchuria. The really serious 
point revealed by the fighting was -that the 
enemy had received considerable reinforcements, 
and that it was rather he who attacked the 
Allies than the Allies who attacked him that 
is to say the initiative wa^ gradually passing 
into his hands. Even on the west flank, where 
General Joffre had proposed to make hU 
principal effort, the Germans were successfully 
engaged in heading off the French attempts to 
envelop their right : only qn the east flank were 
the Germans failing to stop the French attacks 
pushed into Southern Alsace and ths valleys of 
the Vosges. 

The development of the action on the flanks 




SEN US. 
A demolished portion of the business quarter. 



150 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



had now brought the Allied positions to a lino 
which ran from the extreme south of Alsace 
through St. Di6 (in the Vosges), Luneville (on 
tho Mourthe), Point-a-Mousson (on the Moselle), 
Consenvoye (on the Meuse), Montfaucon, Grand 
1're (in the Argonno), Souain, Fort de la Pom- 
peUe, a lino west and south of Berru, Brimont 
and Craonne, Noyon, Lassigny, Roisel to Le 
Catelet ; while strong German forces were in 
possession of St. Quentin. The extension 
of tho French flank to PeVonne and towards 
St. Quentin was, of course, made by fresh 
troops. We now know that these ii^^. been 
brought up from the extreme right flank and 
that they were commanded by General de 
Castlenau. 

On the left of the British contingent the 
6th French Army had been heavily engaged 
during the past week. Reinforcements received 
by the Germans had enabled them to drive the 
French back, but the French declined to accept 
defeat, and, coming on again, recaptured their 
positions and even took a German Colour. 

On Tuesday, September 22, the weather was 
fine and the wind had dropped. During the 
previous night British patrols discovered that 




the Germans had abandoned their advanced 
trenches, together with over 100 dead and 
wounded and a quantity of rifles, ammunition 
and equipment. The day was uneventful along 
most of the British front, but, as usual, the 
1st Army Corps was given no rest. In front 
of the trenches throughout the British lines, 
but more particularly in front of those held by 
the 1st Army Corps, the bodies of the Germans 
killed in their repeated counter-attacks were 
lying in rows where they had fallen. Neither 
would the enemy remove them himself nor 
would he permit the British to do so. Some 
of the bodies had lain in this " No Man's Land " 
for several days, and each German attack as 
it swept across this deadly zone had added its 
quota of dead and wounded to those who already 
lay there. 

A prolonged stalemate had now set in all 
along tho British front, and the effort to attain 
a decision was transferred to other parts of the 
field, chiefly to the west flank. 

No detailed accounts of the French operations 
are available, but the severity of the fighting 
may be guesset 1 from the following letter 
which appeared in the Norwegian newspaper, 
Oesterdaeles Avis, and was published in the 
Globe of October 30 : 

( BERLIN: October 9 (Friday), 1914. 

HEBE EDITOB, I had yesterday the opportunity erf 
seeing a letter from a twenty-one year old " Jaeger " 
soldier who has been given the Iron Cross. With his 
mother's kind permission I have translated the letter. 
As it will certainly not be passed by the German Censor, 
I am sending it with a Swede who is returning to-morrow 
to Sweden. Yours, etc., 



Then follows a translation of the German soldier's- 
letter referred to : 

Written on the battlefield of Nouvron,* September 22, 
1914. 

MY DEAR MOTHER, I received yesterday your first 
letter, dated August 24. That is to say, nearly a month 
on the way. We are at present in the tenth day of 
battle with the Frenchmen, and have suffered frightful- 
losses. Of my earlier 4th Company there were yesterday 
still 39 men remaining, and yet wo were 250 men when we- 
moved out. The dear God has always conducted me 
in the most wonderful manner unscathed through a 
rain of shell and bullets. To the right and left I saw my 
dear comrades fall, and I, as by a miracle, escaped. We- 
will thank our dear God and beg Him also in the future- 
graciously to aid us. 

Our Army Corps, owing to its enormous losses and 1 
sickness the result of the eternal rainy weather is to- 
be withdrawn from the fighting line. This will be- 
splendid, because we shall then, possibly for some time, 
not have to fight. It is also inhuman what we have had' 
to do and suffer. Last Sunday we made a storming- 
attack on the French position. It was simply a blood 
bath. French as well as German corpses lay in heap* 
upon one another. Should I ever return, I shall always- 



FRENCH MILITARY POSTMAN 
DELIVERING LETTERS. 



* Nouvron is on the heights north of the Aisne five' 
miles west of Soissons, opposite the centre of the 6th. 
French Army. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



151 




TEAM OF HORSES KILLED BY A BURSTING SHELL. 



remember for the rest of my life, and with terror, these 
days. Fancy ! Of our battalion there are only four 
officers left, and of 1,200 men only about 370 remaining. 
And yet we are only a reserve battalion, consisting 
entirely of married reservists and Landwehr, which 
should rather have been taken care of. How, then, must 
the active troops of the line have fared ? 

What want and nameless misery must occur in such a 
frightful war. Would to God it were soon at an end. 

Live well, dear mother. Until our next meeting. 
With hearty greetings. Your faithful son, 

FRITZ. 

On Wednesday, September 23, there was a 
marked diminution in the enemy's efforts, 
which suggested that he had been obliged 
to withdraw forces from all along his line to 
cope with General Castlenau's enveloping 
operations on his west flank. 

Sir John French had been so much impressed 
with the work of the enemy's heavy artillery 
during the earlier part of the campaign that 
he had asked for four 6-inch howitzer batteries 
to be sent out from home. These batteries 
arrived to-day and were equally divided 
between the 1st and 2nd Army Corps. These 
weapons are not very mobile and are, conse- 
quently, difficult to get away in a retreat or 
to bring up in a pursuit, especially when the 
enemy has broken down the bridges behind 
him, luit they possess tremendous power and 
arc indispensable in protracted operations of a 
more or less stationary character in which 
both sides are able to entrench themselves 



heavily. The past ten days of wet and cold 
had been- exceedingly trying to the troops, 
who had been obliged to fight day and night, 
drenched and shivering, in trenches deep in 
mud and water. The roads in all directions 
were quagmires, and it was really wonderful 
that the Army Service Corps should have been 
able to bring up everything that the Army 
equired with certainty and in sufficient 
quantity. 

On Thursday, September 24, the weather still 
remained fine, and the heavy guns which had 
arrived the day before were brought into action 
with excellent effect. The statements of 
prisoners taken during the last fortnight made 
it clear that the German soldiers had been 
systematically deluded by their officers. One 
prisoner said that when his battalion was 
mobilized the commanding officer informed them 
that they were going to cooperate with the 
English in repelling a French invasion of 
Belgium. They had all been seriously informed 
that Germany had achieved an unbroken 
series of successes by land and sea, and that the 
retreatof then- own particular units had not 
extended to the rest of the army it was part 
of a successful strategic movement. They were 
all quite convinced of the eventual triumph 
of German arms and simply could not envisage 
the possibility of final defeat. They were 



152 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




BRITISH IN THE TRENCHES. 



evidently sore and astonished at the prowess 
of the British Army, which they had been 
taught to believe was very inefficient in leading 
and in quality, as well as in numbers. They 
were particularly struck by the invisibility of 
British troops, the accuracy of their shooting, 
and the disconcerting manner in which they 
appeared in positions from wliich it was thought 
every living thing must long before have been 
driven by the fearful deluge of shell fire poured 
upon them. 

The corpses which littered " No <Man's 
Land " between the British and Germans had 
been lying there for many days and the smell in 
the advanced trenches was almost unbearable, 
but no sickness had as yet appeared among the 
British troops. The latter took advantage 
of the lull in the fighting to improve their 
cover and to construct or improve underground 
shelters in which men, after duty, could rest 
in security from the enemy's fire. All the 
steeper parts of the slopes in this part of the 
terrain were honeycombed with caves cut out 
of the soft sandstone, which in times of peace 
had been the dwellings of a considerable 
population. The soil on which the advanced 
trenches were situated was a sticky white 
clay, which, on being turned up, was very 
visible from the front and from aircraft. 
Therefore the trenches themselves, as well 



as guns and all other objects within range of the 
enemy's artillery, were assimilated to their sur- 
roundings by pine branches and facings of sods. 
It is very hard for anybody, impossible for 
most of us, to realise what life in the trenches 
on the Aisne was like, and yet the effort must be 
made if one is to appreciate at all what the 
soldiery on both sides had to endure. Let the 
reader imagine himself a soldier in one of the 
British trenches near the Chemin des Dames 
about this time. For days a gale has roared 
through the forests of Compiegne and de 
1'Aigle, tearing the yellow autumn leaves from 
the trees and hurling them with sheets of cold 
rain across the sodden downs, howling around 
the chateaux and farmsteads, flooding the 
trenches and drenching the soldiers in them. 
The small hours of a September morning are 
growing towards dawn ; the mere in the trench 
are lying on bundles of hay and straw, through 
which the liquid mud has percolated into their 
clothes. Every here and there along the 
trench a worn-out sentry is straining his 
hearing and his sight in the darkness to detect 
the approach of the enemy. The men are got 
under arms before the dawn comes. Gradually 
the light grows, and presently a slight rustling 
to the front falls upon the sentry's hearing. 
" Halt, who goes there ? " he hisses. " Friend," 
comes a whisper from the front, and the private 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



153 



signal, and out of the darkness crawls a figure, 
his " balaclava helmet," his shoulder straps and 
liis khaki jacket decorated with turnip-tops, 
liis clothes, his face, his hands, caked with 
whitish clay. Numbed and chattering with 
wet and cold, worn out, utterly exhausted 
with his long vigil among the turnips in front 
of the enemy's lines, he half stumblcs : half 
slides into the trench. It is a sniper returned. 
He catches the officer's eye, and a feeble smile 
of good comradeship is exchanged. " What 
luck ? " says the officer. " Three, I think, 
sir," says he ; " two for certain. I think I 
killed one so dead he had no time to make any 
sound at all ; one of them moaned, so he was 
number one, and another cried : " Ach Gott, 
ach du lieber Gott " once or twice, so he was 
number two. But they nearly got me," he 
adds, as he points to the tip of his ear which 
has been flayed by a bullet. " Well, you had 
better turn in," says the officer, who marks the 
strained, white face and the red-rimmed eyes 
of the draggled figure, and, nothing loathe, the 
sniper moves off to his well-earned rest. 

Tho daylight broadens. Suddenly a shot 
rings out from the front, and a sentry who 
has been looking through a " look-out " in the 



parapet staggers back and subsides in the 
bottom of the trench, shot tlirough the face. A 
moment later is heard that peculiar singing, 
shrieking, wailing sound which announces tho 
approach of a, " Black Maria." and presently 
the huge shell lands just beyond tho trench 
with a terrific thud, bursts with a truly appal- 
ling crash, shoots a fountain of mud and greasy 
black smoke into the air, and shakes the earth 
with a concussion like an earthquake. In a 
moment or two a second, and then a third 
arrives, one after the other and, from that on, 
through the rest of the day, there rages a deluge 
of these monstrous projectiles, each of which 
tears a crater out of the ground large enough to 
bury a motor-car. Presently one lands beside the 
trench, blows the edge of it in and buries three 
men alive. The nearest men crawl up with 
shovels and commence feverishly to exhume 
their comrades. Here a foot protrudes, there 
an arm and hand. Gradually the men are un- 
covered. The first is unhurt, the second is 
dazed, almost unconscious ; a third is simply a 
mangled mass of humanity. The earth around 
him 'is carefully cleared away. He is moaning 
slightly, with the blood oozing out of the corner 
of his mouth. The problem is how to move 




PONTOON BRIDGE. [Central Press. 

This bridge was built in less than three hours to facilitate the pursuit of the Germans. 
The wrecked permanent bridge is seen in the background. 



154 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




BRITISH CAMP IN FRANCE. 



him without causing him the most exquisite 
pain. He is just a khaki uniform full of 
smashed humanity. But why move him ? His 
case is obviously hopeless. In any case, he 
cannot be carried from the trench till nightfall, 
and by that time he will be beyond all help. 
Suddenly the shelling stops ; a sentry says, 
" Here they come, sir ; here they come " ; and 
out of the driving rain and mist, over the 
gently swelling rise in front, comes a German 
attack mobs and mobs of men shouting as 
they come to encourage themselves and each 
ether, and ever above all other sounds can be 
heard, " Vorwarts, vorwarts," from the officers. 
A whistle goes in the trench and the order rings 
out, " Rapid fire," and immediately sheets 
of bullets fly from the trench into the 
packed mass in front. A machine gun on 
the flank opens with that metallic, jarring 
rat-rat-rat which is so startling to young 
soldiers. The mass in front reels like a fainting 
man. Men from behind rush up. The mass 
pulls itself together and comes on again. 
Once more it wavers under the terrible tempest 
of lead. More men rush up. The officers 
shout, " Vorwfirts, vorwarts," and the mass 
comes on. Still the flood of shrapnel, rifle and 
machine-gun fire pours into it, and still it comes 
on. But 30 yards from the trench it has had 
enough. The mass breaks. Those who have 
survived the holocaust flee, panic-stricken, for 
the other side of the crest, and one more of the 
innumerable German attacks has been repulsed 
with terrible slaughter. The shelling recom- 
mences. Here and there a few brave German 
snipers from the crest fire into the trench as a 
target offers. Now and then bursts of shrapnel 



sweep the trench, but the defenders are 
lying close, and only the sentries put their 
heads up occasionally to look through the pro- 
tected " lookouts." And so the weary day 
wears away. The rain and the wind never 
stop ; the shelling only does so just before an 
attack, and recommences immediately it is 
repulsed. The ground in front of the trend i 
is covered with dead and wounded men in grey. 
Most of the dead seem to have pitched on their 
faces with their heads towards the trench ; 
some of them seem to have fallen with their 
knees doubled under them. There are hun- 
dreds of wounded : some try to crawl away, 
others try to crawl towards the trench. Of 
those who are too badly hurt to move, some 
are silent, some moan, and some shriek aloud 
in agony. Many of the dead have been there 
for days, and the air is charged with the foetid 
odours of the charnel-house. Night comes, 
but not yet any respite from the dreadful 
shelling, nor any respite from the drenching 
rain and howling wind. The wounded are 
collected and carried away by stretcher parties. 
Food and water are brought up from the rear. 
The enemy's snipers crawl as near as they dare, 
and prevent any free movement in the neigh- 
bourhood of the trenches. It needs a great 
effort of the imagination to realize the mental 
and physical strain on these men, ceaselessly 
exposed to the rain and cold, incessantly 
shelled, constantly attacked, always outnum- 
bered, their strength worn away with much 
watching and fighting, their nerves racked by 
the imminence of a dreadful death, by the 
unending difficulty of maintaining their 
positions (so necessary to the safety of the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



155 



whole army), by the constant loss of comrades 
to whom death and wounds have come in such 
dreadful forms, often known to have dear ones 
and dependents at " home." But through all 
these unspeakable trials they are upheld and 
supported by the natural tenacity of their 
race, perfected and fortified by military dis- 
cipline and an unfailing confidence in them- 
selves and their comrades, among whom, be it 
noted, the officer is ever a very " guide, 
philosopher, and friend." 

And so night falls, the darkness deepens, 
the shelling ceases. The wind still howls, and 
out in the front the wounded moan and wait 
for death otherwise silence reigns and the 
worn and weary soldiers huddle down on the 
muddy straw. The hours pass. Anon a 
sniper crawls back out of the night. " They 
are coming," he says, in a tense whisper. The 
slumbering men are shaken up. They stand 
to arms dazed with sleep and weariness. 
There is a period of electric silence broken only 
by gusts of wind and driving rain. " Here 
they are," runs the whisper through the ranks. 
There is a blurred shadow in the darkness, a 
deepening of the darkness rather than a 
definite shape, but to experienced eyes it 



reveals the oncoming of a German night - 
attack. Each man experiences the thrill of 
intense excitement. " Here they come," runs 
down the ranks once more as the mass in front 
looms more clearly into view, and the trampling 
of many feet and the crackling of breaking 
sticks and crumpling leaves falls upon the ear. 
" Here they come," runs the whisper. " They 
ain't 'arf coming, I don't think," says one man 
quite loud, and, indeed, the obscurity in front 
is one great, black, trampling mass of humanity. 
" Run back, Smith, and warn the supports," 
says the officer, and then loud raps the order, 
" Rapid Fire." A sheet of flame blazes along 
the trenches, the mass in front staggers and 
for one moment seems about to collapse ; shouts, 
moans, cries of anguish ring out, above all the 
inexorable, " Vorwarts, Vorwarts," shouted 
insistently, savagely. Some haystacks are 
set on fire. They burn with upward flying 
columns of smoke and sparks, lighting up the 
scene of strife. Strong reinforcements join 
the reeling mass and sweep it forward. On 
it comes, its weight and momentum make it 
irresistible. On it comes, shouting and yell- 
ing, trampling its hundreds of dead and dying 
under foot. On it conies up to the trenches. 




WAR CORRESPONDENTS NEAR THE FRONT. 
French Officer examining papers on the road to the fighting line. 



156 



THE TIMES HJSTOUY OF THE WAR. 



Out jumps the .-lender line of defenders and 
dashes at the mass with the bayonet. They 
are thrown down, dashed aside, swept away. 
The triumphant mob surge* over the trenches 
and beyond them with indescribable tumult 
and turmoil. But its triumph is short lived 
111.' British supports are upon it, a terrible fire 
strikes it, stops it, breaks it ; and high above 
the racket of battle peals the terrible " hurrah " 
of the charging British, and a thousand bayonets 
glittering in the lurid light of burning haystacks 
sweeps the assailants back into the darkness 
from which they so lately burst. Quickly the 
defenders rally and move to their trenches, 
desperate efforts are made to hurry the wounded 
under cover ere the vengeful shelling comes to 
make impossible all movement in the neigh- 
bourhood of the trenches. And so once more 
to rest for a few hours. Long before dawn the 
men stand to arms. A rustling and shuffling of 
many feet behind the trenches betrays the 
approach of armed men, who file into the 
trenches. They take the places of the defenders, 
who arc told to file out. They have been 
here for several days and nights. It seems to 
them as if they had been here always. Some 
of them are almost incoherent with their long 
vigil. All the storms of Nature and man have 
gone over their heads and now they are told 
to " file out " they have been relieved. They 
shuffle away down the slopes. The light 
grows stronger. They are plastered with 
grey mud. Some of them seem to have 
wallowed in it. The men are mostly young, 
but their faces seem to have aged, they are 
pinched with weariness and watching and 
anxiety, and the eyes are tired and sleepless, 
but the lips are set and hard. They have been 
tried very high, higher than British officers, 
with all their experience of war, would have 
believed they could stand without breaking, but 
there is plenty of fight left in them still. Never- 
theless, it is time they had a rest and they are on 
their way to the cave shelters in the steep slopes 
that overhang the meadows of the Aisne ; and 
after a sleep and a " wash and brush up " 
someone will produce a football and they will 
be running about and playing football as if 
there weren't any Germans, or any trenches, 
or any night-attacks on the Aisne. And if the 



sufferings nnd gallantry of the British command 
our sympathy and our admiration, we may well 
spare some of these emotions for their Allies 
and their enemies. The Germans had skilfully 
chosen and carefully prepared positions, innu- 
merable machine guns, and a monopoly of 
.-iei^e artillery ; but they were half -starved 
and driven like sheep to the slaughter. The 
French and the British were worse off in 
respect of positions and of heavy guns, but 
they were better fed. The British were also 
seriously outnumbered, but they were far better 
found and fed than either the French or the 
Germans. All through the battles on the 
Aisne the British artillery had been heavily 
outnumbered by the German guns and prevented 
by the ground from affording its infantry close 
support. The latter had, therefore, been ex- 
posed to a heavy artillery fire to which it could 
make no reply and from which it suffered 
severely. For this reason the British guns 
were obliged to devote their fire to keeping 
down that of the German guns. Thus the 
German infantry did not have to endure any- 
thing like the nerve-racking bombardment which 
fell to the lot of the British horse and foot, 
whose courage, intelligence, initiative and 
wonderful shooting made it possible for them to 
teke up far more widely extended formations 
than were permissible according to German 
theory. This, and this alone, accounts for 
their comparatively small losses. It is obvious 
that if two trenches of equal length, the one 
held by 100 rifles and the other by 1,000 rifles, 
be subjected to bombardments of exactly equal 
severity the defenders of the latter trench will 
lose ten times as many men as the defenders of 
the former. The British suffered far less relative 
casualties than the Germans, but they had to 
endure the dreadful shelling by heavy artillery 
hour after hour and day after day, from which 
the Germans were practically immune. Indeed, 
had not the German officers persisted in their 
futile and foolish attacks their losses would 
have been very small and their moral unshaken. 
As it was they shattered their armies to pieces, 
and broke the moral of their choicest triuips 
against the trenches of the Allies. 

(To be con/iiuicfl.) 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 

THE BATTLES OF THE AISNE. 

(Continued.} 

SITUATION ON SEPTEMBER 25 GERMAN MORAL AN OFFICER'S DIARY GERMANS ACROSS 
THE MEUSE THEIR OBJECTIVES-MENACE TO VERDUN GENERAL JOFFRE'S STUBBORNNESS 
HEAVY FIGHTING ALL ALONG THE LINE GERMANS FALL BACK EXHAUSTED BOMBARDMENT 
OF REIMS GREAT CASUALTIES THE ALLIES' LINE AT END OF SEPTEMBER ENTRENCH- 
MENTS GERMAN ARTILLERY AN ABSOLUTE IMPASSE ON THE AISNE BRITISH ARMY SECRETLY 

MOVED TO THE NORTH REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS STRATEGICAL AND MORAL RESULTS 

APPARENT GERMAN ADVANTAGE ITS COSTLINESS ITS QUALIFICATIONS CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE TIDE OF TEUTONIC INVASION DEFINITELY STAYED. 



A FORTNIGHT had passed since the 
British horsemen heading the pursuit 
from the Marne were brought to a 
halt on the banks of the Aisne. 
On Friday, September 25, it was officially 
reported that the Germans had pushed along 
the " Promontory of Hattonchatel " towards 
St. Mihiel and were bombarding the forts 
" des Parodies " and " Camp des Remains " ; 
and that a French detachment was hard put 
to it to maintain itself at Peronne. 

On the Aisne for the last four days the weather 
had been fine and there had been comparatively 
little fighting ; such as there was resulted in 
little gain and no loss to the British. The 
enemy's attacks had been isolated and in- 
coherent ; some, indeed, appeared to be 
indifferently led, and, therefore, to bear out the 
statements of prisoners as to the great losses 
in the German corps of officers. 

The moral of the German Army may be 
gauged by the following extracts from a diary 
found on an officer of the 178th German 
Infantry Regiment published by the Press 
Bureau on October 17 : 

August 9 : Near Gouvy, Belgium (X.E. of Houffulize), 
7.30 a.m. We are still without any orders to move. 

Vol. II. Part 18. 



r . . One of the brigade staff officers came out in the 
evening and was astonished to find us still here. Our 
orders must have been lost on the road. . . . 

August 15 : I had a look at the little chateau belonging 
to one of the King's secretaries (not at home). Our men 
had behaved like regular vandals. They had looted the 
cellar first, and then had turned their attention to the 
bedrooms, and thrown things about all over the place. 
They had even made fruitless efforts to smash the safe 
open. Everything was topsy-turvy. Magnificent fur- 
niture, silk, and even china. Things that happen when 
the men are allowed to requisition for themselves. . . . 
I am sure they must have taken away a heap of useless 
stuff simply for the pleasure of looting. . . . 

August 18 : Late in the evening the train arrived 
(about fifty vehicles). They had come from Gouvy 
after doing 60 kilometres, probably the result of a 
mistake in reading an order. . . . 

August 23 : ... A spy was caught and shot. We 
marched to Lisogne, but after passing Dorinne the 
column went astray ; we had to return on our tracks. 
. . . Our men came back and said ... we could not 
get on any further as the villagers were shooting at us- 
from every house. We shot the whole lot, sixteen of 
them. They were drawn up in three ranks ; the same 
shot did for three at a time. Two 6-in. howitzers 
succeeded in getting into position, and in twenty shots 
reduced the village of Bouvines to ruins. The men were 
absolutely mad at this sneaking way of fighting. They 
wanted to burn everything, and they succeeded, too, 
in setting light to several houses. In the afternoon our 
artillery fairly sprinkled the principal buildings in the 
place the whole length of the village with incendiary 
shells. It was a marvellous sight, the high ground from 
Dinant to Leppe (?) overlooking the Meuse, all in flames. 
The division crossed the Meuse ; you never saw such 
disorder. . . . 



157 



158 



HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




BKIT1SH HEAVY ARTILLERY LEAVING A BASE TOWN. 



A ugust 26 : ... we came to Villers-en-Pagne. The 
inhabitants had warned the French of the arrival of our 
troops by a signal from the church tower. The enemy's 
puns opened on us and killed and wounded quite a few. 
So in the evening we set fire to the village ; the priest and 
some of the inhabitants were shot. We passed through 
Pettigny and Couvin. Couvin had been partially 
looted. . . . The villages all round were burning. . . . 
The inhabitants fired on our men again. The division 
took drastic steps to stop the villages being burnt and 
the inhabitants shot. The pretty little village of Gu6 
d'Ossus was apparently set on fire without cause. . . . 
At Leppe apparently 200 men were shot. There must 
have been some innocent men among them. . . . 

August 29 : ... The other side of Dommery we 
came on a wood where a hellish fire stopped us. ... 
There was a panic ; everybody gave orders and nobody 
thought of telling us to lie down. . . . There was a 
shocking mess, shots in every direction. I wouldn't live 
through those moments again for worlds. At last the 
captain managed to get a few men together to form a 
firing line. We were being shot at by friend and foe. 
It was a grave error on the part of the Staff to start the 
regiment on a night march "after three tiring days. 
After the fight the night before one might have foreseen 
that the enemy would take up a strong position and try 
to surprise us. It was dawn before we could resume 
our march. Suddenly firing began again. . . . We got 
on to some high ground about 1,000 metres from Launois, 
when our own artillery opened fire on us. Some shells 
burst only forty metres away from us ; it wasn't a bit 
nice. . . . Our machine-gun company suffered heavily 
from our own shells, unfortunately. Several officers 
were wounded. Suddenly we came up against the 
enemy's artillery, which was in a position on a flank. 
The men fell back. . . . The whole of Launois was in 
flames. We advanced again and by means of a very 
heavy fire forced the Zouave battalion to retire. Launois 
was the 178th's baptism of fire. 

. . We marched to Villers le Tourncur. The division 
bivouacked ; all the villages in (lie neighbourhood \\n> 



blazing, as our artillery had set them on fire to protect 
us against attacks. 

August 30 : ... The fight began again. . . 

September 3 : Still at Rethel, on guard over prisoners. 
The houses are charming inside. The middle class r> 
France has magnificent furniture. We found styli-h 
pieces everywhere, and beautiful silk, but in what a 
state ! . . . Good God ! . . . Every bit of furniture 
broken, mirrors smashed. The Vandals themselves 
could not have done more damage. This p.'ace is a 
disgrace to our army. . . . The column commanders are 
responsible for the greater part of the damage, as th.-\ 
could have prevented the looting and destruction. The 
damage amounts to millions of marks ; even the safes 
have been attacked. In a solicitor's house in which, as 
luck would have it, everything was in excellent taste 
including a collection of old lace and Eastern works cf 
art, everything was smashed to bits. I couldn't nvsist 
taking a little memento myself here and there ... a 
splendid aquaseutum and a camera for Felix. 

September 5 : Les Petites Loges, Tours-sur-Marnp : 
I never want to make such marches again ; .-imply 
tests of endurance . . . absolutely exhausted, we wuite 1 
for the night. In front of us all was still. 

September 8 : We went forward again to the attack 
against an enemy perfectly entrenched. In spite of his 
artillery fire, which nothing could silence, we passe.l 
through the wood again. As soon as we reached the 
northern edge a perfectly insane fire opened on us, 
infantry and shell fire with redoubled intensity. \\ 
to the village at last, but were driven out of it again with 
heavy loss. Our losses were enormous. The 178th 
Regiment alone had 1,700 mon wounded, besi le- tlms>> 
killed. It was hell itself. There were practically no 

ollieers left. . . . 

*> pfinil" / !> : We marched tn (Kuvry. Tin 1 enemy \va- 
appareiit ly two kilometres in front of us. Where \vas 
our intelligence branch ? Our artillery arrived half an. 
hour too Inte, unfortunately. . . . 

tirpli'iiihrr \~i : We marched to Pont Givart. Ville- 
aux Hoi-. After marching till we were all absolutely 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



159 



done and our feet knocked to bits, wo were sent into the 
fight again. And they call us Reserve troops ! . . . 
After a murderous fight we entrenched at Ville-aux- 
Bois. 

September 16 : We were attacked several times by the 
enomy, but each attack was broken by our machine- 
gun fire. Our last officer fell, shot through the head. . . . 

September 18 : The air is absolutely poisoned. . . . 
Wounded men keep on coming in. In the evening the 
enemy mode another attack, which was beaten off. . . . 

September 22 : Troops of the 18th Corps passed all 
day. Apparently they are to come up on the right wing. 
Their infantry has lost as heavily as ours. God knows 
what the idea of this reinforcement is ! I am convinced 
that this country will give us all a grave. The 105th 
Regiment lias had a furious fight with the English. . . . 

On Saturday, September 26, the Germans 
in Belgium commenced operations against 
Antwerp by advancing upon Malines. It 
was officially announced that " the enemy has 
crossed the Meuse near St. Mihiel." Thus, 
laconically, was dismissed an event fraught 
with the gravest possibilities. It has been 
already remarked that in the Battle of the 
Marne the 4th and 5th Gerinan armies " had 
missions of special importance .... the fonner 
was commissioned to break the French battle- 
line .... the latter to pierce the Verdun-Toul 
fortress-barrier," and that the German Head- 
quarters had been obliged " to abandon for 
I he time its designs on the French centre and 
fortresses." We have seen that on Thursday 
and Friday, September 18 and 19, the Germans 
had not been so very far off realizing the first 
of these propositions in the neighbourhood of 
Reims, and now we find that they had actually 
succeeded in the second of their plans to the 
extent of creating the opportunity ; but oppor- 
tunity and success are not quite the same thing. 
Success postulates not only opportunity, but 
the ability to use it Could they use it ? If 
the Germans could drive a considerable force 
through the gap they had broken in the line 
of French barrier-fortresses they would at least 
be able to compel the retreat of the French 
3rd and 4th Armies, to invest and, in due 
course, to capture Verdun and all French troops 
north of St. Mihiel, and to open up new and 
far better communications with Germany. 
If at the same time the 5th (Crown Prince) 
Army could advance again in cooperation 
with the German columns pushing westward 
through St. Mihiel, the Germans might be able 
to meet in the neighbourhood of Revigny and 
cut off a considerable part of the French 3rd 
Army. In any case, the retreat of the French 
in this part of the field, after the recent suc- 
cesses, could scarcely fail to have a most 
unfavourable effect upon the Allies' moral 




LEAVING FOR THE TRENCHES 
BY MOTOR OMNIBUS. 

and prestige. At the same time, it was scarcely 
possible that the Germans could have con- 
centrated in the Woevre a really considerable 
force, say, 150,000 men, without the knowledge 
of the French Commander-in-Chief, and there- 
fore it may be assumed that the Germans 
would not be able to avail themselves of the 
opportunity they had created until the fortunes 
of war should once more give them a prepon- 
derance of force in the western theatre. Mean- 
while, their move against the French fortress - 
barrier could have only one object, and that was 
to frighten the French Commander-in-Chief 
so much for Verdun and the forces in its 
neighbourhood that he would divert troops 
to this portion of the field and so slack off his 
efforts to envelop the German right. Had 
General Joffre allowed his will to be shaken 
by this apparently serious threat against his 
right flank, those vast masses which the Ger- 
mans were preparing to hurl against the extreme 
left flank of the Allies would scarcely have 
failed to break down all opposition in this 
direction, and it is even conceivable that the 
Germans might have been able to resume their 
march on Paris. That the stroke against 
the fortress-barrier was really a feint was further 
suggested by the cunning allusions of the 
German Press to an advance in force from 
Lorraine. 



160 



THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. 




SERVING OUT BREAD IN THE BRITISH LINES. 



During the last four or five days there had 
been comparative quiet along the fronts on the 
Aisne. This was apparently due to the fact 
that the Germans were engaged in reorganizing 
and refitting their units which had suffered so 
heavily in the long series of unsuccessful attacks 
which they had delivered upon the British 
and 6th French Armies ; and in redistributing 
the units to meet the developments on the west 
flank. On the 26th. however, there was 
renewed activity along the British front. The 
heavy guns which had arrived from England 
silenced a German heavy battery which had 
been located just above Conde and had caused 
the British much annoyance for nearly a 
fortnight. At the same time the Germans were 
busy with a heavy bombardment, maintained 
steadily throughout the day, and accompanied 
by attempts to " sap " up to the advanced 
trenches of the 1st Division. A series of 
attacks were delivered by the Germans at 
8 a.m. and again in the afternoon with the 
usual result. " The Germans came on in a 
T-shaped formation, several lines shoulder to 
shoulder, followed almost immediately by a 
column in support. After a very few minutes 



the 1 men had closed up into a mob, which 
afforded an excellent target for our fire". 
(Eyewitness.) Later in the afternoon it 
became apparent that the German efforts to 
re-establish themselves closer to the British 
advanced trenches must be checked, and, there- 
fore, the 1st Division delivered a sudden and 
timely attack which drove them back and 
stopped their approach operations. 

The attacks delivered by the Germans on 
Saturday the 26th had apparently served to 
satisfy them as to the dispositions of the Allies 
in their front, and they utilized the following day 
to perfect their arrangements for the operations 
they had in view, and thus it happened that 
Sunday was one of the most peaceful days 
known during the past fortnight ; but from 
nightfall on Sunday, September 27, to nightfall 
on Monday, September 28, the Germans 
made a series of most vigorous and most 
determined attempts along almost the whole 
line of the Allies.* These desperate attacks 
succeeded one another like waves of the 



* It is diiVirult to reconcile the following extract from 
' Eyewitness " report with Sir John French's report 
(quoted on next page) which is supported by the French 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



161 



sea which break, recoil and rush on again 
with greater vigour than ever. " It is 
certain," says Sir John French, " that the 
enemy then made one last great effort to 
.establish ascendancy. He was, however, un- 
successful everywhere." It is, perhaps, true 
to say that his most serious efforts were reserved 
for the trenches of the 1st Division. The 
ground in front of these trenches was alive 
with wave after wave of oncoming Germans. 
" The same futile attempts," says Sir John 
French, '' were made all along our front up 
to the evening of the 28th, when they died 
away, and have not since been renewed." 

Along the whole line from the Somme to 
the Meuse these German efforts persisted with 
an energy and a desperation which are as 
astonishing as -their costliness. They clearly 
indicate action on a concerted plan dictated 
from the German Headquarters Staff, and the 
Germans fell back at last broken and exhausted 
after their incredible efforts. They even 
evacuated some of their natural fortresses 
among the quarries which had hitherto been 
impregnable. Rumour has it indeed that 
they abandoned these positions, not so much 
under stress of French attacks, as owing to 
the noisome odour emanating from their 
own unburied dead. The condition of these 
quarries when the French came to occupy them 
was absolutely indescribable, but was only one 
degree worse than those of many German 
trenches which have fallen into the hands of 
the Allies before and since. 

The German efforts opposite Reims reached 
their climax on Monday, the 28th, when the 
intensity of their bombardment surpassed 
anything that had hitherto been experienced. 
The town was set on fire in many places ; 
blocks of buildings were completely demolished 
and many of the inhabitants were killed. 
From every part of the line came the same 
story of attack and counter-attack, of desperate 
bayonet fighting and of terrific losses, in which 
the Allies had by no means escaped scatheless. 
Five weeks' fighting shows a loss of over 1,200 
oflirers killed, wounded and missing in the 
British Expeditionary Force, to which must 
be added a certain number of sick. These 
figures go to show that during this time the 

Official communiquia and roportH from many private 
sources : 

" Monday, the 28th, there was nothing more severe 
than bombardment and intermittent sniping, and this 
inactivity continued during Tuesday, the 29th, except 
for u night attack against our extreme right. 1 * 



casualties among officers in the first five 
Divisions amounted to nearly fifty per cent, of 
those who originally took the field. ATI that 
can be said is that the German casualties 
must have greatly exceeded those of the French 
and British. 

The number of lives that the Germans have 
squandered in their attacks, most of them purely 
local attacks, is incredible and cannot but have 
had an unfavourable effect upon the moral of 
their troops. That this was so is suggested 
by the fact that when the Allies made their 
counter-efforts towards the close of the 28th, 
the Germans were found to have withdrawn 
for three or four miles in many places. Per- 
haps the most notable gain of the Allies was 
the position of La Neuvillette, a couple of 
miles north-north-west of Reims. The Ger- 
mans had managed to establish themselves 
here, whence they threatened to pierce the 
French line, but a well-timed counter- 
attack on the evening of the 28th, in which 
British troops cooperated with great effect, 
stormed the German position in the face of 
a murderous fire. In another part of the field 
the Gei-mans were so shaken that a squadron 




DEVASTATING EFFECT OF A 
GERMAN SHELL. 

182 



162 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




MEMBER OF THE RED CROSS TENDING THE WOUNDED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. 



of Cuirassiers are reported to have captured 
the wreck of a battalion of the 3rd Prussian 
Guard Regiment, of whom the survivors 
numbered a captain, two lieutenants and 
136 rank and file. 

From Tuesday, September 29, to Saturday, 
October 3, comparative calm prevailed along 
the British front. The weather, though fine 
and considerably warmer, was misty and 
therefore unfavourable for aerial reconnaissance 
On the other hand, bright moonlight militated 
against night attacks. On Tuesday it was 
officially reported that the Allies' line ran from 
the plateaux between Albert and Combles, 
past Chaulnes (held by the Germans), Ribe- 
court (held by the French), the Foret de 1'Aigle, 
Soissons, Troyon, the road to Berry-au-Bac 
and thence to Reims, along the Roman road, 
to a point north of Souain, Varennes, along 
the heights of the Meuse (east of the Meuse), 
to St. Mihiel (held by the Germans), and Pont- 
a-Mousson (held by the French). 

The British were now securely entrenched 
and were able to regard frontal attacks even 
by night with perfect equanimity. These 
night attacks were invariably preceded by 
an artillery bombardment commenced during 



daylight and continued, sometimes, into the 
darkness. The actual attacks had usually 
been made from the reverse sides of the hills 
and presented as they came over the crests 
a blurred silhouette against the starlight sky 
behind. They were always allowed to come 
within a hundred yards or so, when they were 
decimated by rifle fire from in front and cut 
down by the scythe-Eke fire of machine guns 
from the flanks. 

The relief of the men in the British trenches 
had now been carefully arranged. The sections 
which were relieved were sent back to places 
more or less protected from the unceasing 
flood of projectiles from the German positions. 

On Sunday, October 4, a military band 
began to play patriotic airs in one part of the 
German lines and a number of men collected 
to enjoy the music, but a few lyddite shells 
from the British howitzers presently pitched 
among the assembled soldiery and caused 
a rapid dispersion of the audience. Later 
in the day the French and British carried out 
a successful combined attack upon the German 
trenches north of Soissons. For some days 
beforehand they had been gradually working 
up to the enemy's trenches until they had 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS. 



103 



managed to establish themselves within 200 
yards of them. Across this narrow strip a 
tempest of rifle and machine-gun fire raged 
all day and practically all night for 48 hours. 
Attempts on either side to cross the inter- 
vening space were unavailing, and it was found 
necessary to leave the wounded where they 
lay. At last, on the morning of the 4th. under 
cover of the misty weather which had lately 
prevailed, a tremendous rush carried the 
British and French into and over the German 
trenches, and thus ended one of the most 
fiercely contested series of trench fighting in 
the history of the war. 

On Monday, October 5, the Germans were 
thrice repulsed in their attempts to cross the 
Nethe near Antwerp, and the British Naval 
Brigade arrived at that city ; but the place was 
evacuated by the Allies and occupied by the 
Germans on the 9th. On Monday an aeroplane 
duel between German and French airmen was 
visible from the British trenches. After con- 
siderable manoeuvring and an interchange of 
machine-gun fire the German observer and 



pilot were killed and their machine brought to 
earth. 

From Tuesday, October 6, to Thursday, 
October 8, there wa=i comparative quiet along 
the British front. On Tuesday afternoon 
the German guns broke into activity, appar- 
ently as a reprisal for the British howitzer 
fire, which had dropped two high-explosive 
shells in the enemy's trenches and had killed 
a number of men. The Germans attempted 
to sap up to the British lines at one or two points 
with the idea of gaining points from which 
their machine guns could bring a cross-fire 
to bear on the space between their trenches 
and those of the British, and also to enfilade 
the latter. These machine guns are mounted 
on low sledges instead of wheels, which make.s 
them less conspicuous. One of these guns 
had long been a thorn in the flesh of a French 
corps recruited mainly from miners, who 
proceeded to drive a gallery under the gun 
and blow it up. The British were now suffering 
very little loss. Firstly because they were well 
entrenched and had a number of subterranean 




[By permission of " Tki U'ar Illustrated," 

A GERMAN SHELL ABOUT TO BURST. 
Men and horses alike realise the danger of their position. 



164 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



shelters.* and secondly because the ( icniuui 
bombardment had decreased very considerably 
in intensity and was now either confined to 
firing as a target offered or to suddenly dropping 

* Kycwitiwss " writes: 

Considerable ingenuity hus lu'rn rxi-rciscil in naming 
the shelters. Amongst other favourite* are "the 
Hotel Cecil," " the Ritz," " Hotel Billet-doux," " Hotel 
rue Dormir," etc. On the road barricades, also, are to 
be found hoards bearing the notice, " This way to the 
Prussians." Obstacles of every kind abound, and at 
night each side can hear the enemy driving in pickets for 
entanglements; digging trous-de-loup, or working 
forward by sapping. In some places the obstacles 
constructed by both sides are so close together that 
some wag has suggested that each should provide 
working parties to perform this fatiguing duty alternately, 
siiiL-o their work is now almost indistinguishable and 
serves the same purpose. 

And through this pandemonium the inhabitants 
go about their business as if they had lived within the 
sound of guns all their lives. A shell bursts in one street. 
In the next not a soul pays any attention or thinks of 
turning the corner to see what damage has been done. 
Those going to the trenches are warned to hurry across 
some point which the enemy have been shelling and 
which has already proved a death-trap for others. After 
running across it some mortification may be felt at the 
sight of an old woman pulling turnips in the very line of 
fire. Along certain stretches of road which are obviously 
" unhealthy " the children continue to play in the gutter, 
or the old folks pass slowly trundling wheelbarrows. It 
may be fatalism, for not all these people can be deaf, nor 
can all be so stupid as not to realize how close they are 
to death. 

It has already been mentioned that, according to 
information obtained from the enemy, fifteen Germans 
were killed by a bomb dropped upon an ammunition 
wagon of a cavalry column. It was thought at the 
time that this might have been the work of one of our 
airmen, who reported that he had dropped a hand- 
grenade on a convoy and had then got a bird's-eye 
view of the finest firework display that he had ever seen. 
From the corroborative evidence of locality, it now 



a number of heavy shells on localities which 
appeared likely to be occupied by Staffs, or 
resting troops, or transport. 

Some of their guns were undoubtedly detailed 

appears that this was the case, and that the grenade 
thrown by him must probably have been the cause of 
the destruction of a small convoy carrying field gun 
and howitzer ammunition, which has now been found, 
a total wreck, on a road passing through the Foret de 
Retz, north-east of Villers Cotterets. 

Along the road lie fourteen motor-lorries, which are 
no more than skeletons of twisted iron, bolts, and odd 
fragments. Everything inflammable on the wagons 
has been burnt, as have the stripped trees some uitn 
trunks split on either side of the road. Of the drivers 
nothing now remains except some tattered boots and 
charred scraps of clothing, while the ground within a 
radius of fifty yards of the wagons is littered with pieces 
of iron, the split brass cases of cartridges which have 
exploded, and some fixed gun ammunition, with live 
shell, which has not done so. 

It is possible to reconstruct the incident, if it was, in 
fact, brought about as supposed. 

The grenade must have detonated on the leading 
lorry on one side of the road and caused the cartridges 
carried by it to explode. The three vehicles immediately 
in rear must then have been set on fire, with a similar 
result. Behind these are groups of four and two vehicles, 
so jammed together as to su^Mt that they must have 
collided in a desperate attempt to stop. 

On the other side of the road, almost level with the 
leading wagon, are four more, which were probably 
fired by the explosion of the first. If this appalling 
destruction was due to one hand grenade, and there is a 
considerable amount of presumptive evidence to show 
that this was the case, it is an illustration of the poten- 
tialities of a small amount of high explosive detonated 
in the right spot ; whilst the nature of the place where 
it occurred a narrow forest road, between high trees 
is a testimony to the skill of the airman. 

It is only fair to add that some of the French newspapers 
claim that this damage to the enemy was caused by the 
action of some of their Dragoons. 




GERMAN SHELTERS ON THE AISNE. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



165 




ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY FROM INDIA AT THE FRONT. 



to watoh particular roads. The fire of their 
artillery was wonderfully accurate and they 
were very quick in picking up a target, but 
they had comparatively little success against 
the carefully-entrenched British. Things were 
far otherwise at the outbreak of the war, 
before the British aircraft had been able to 
take the field. At that time cooperation 
between the German aeroplanes and their guns 
gave the latter an enormous superiority over 
their British rivals. Even now, of course, 
the German airmen gave their artillery a great 
deal of assistance by dropping smoke balls 
or strips of glittering tinsel directly over any 
suitable targets they might discover. In 
addition to the annoyance and losses caused 
by their artillery, the Germans employed 
snipers with good effect. That, however, 
was a line in which the British were by no 
means behind them.* 

* An officer at the front writes : 

I organized a stout band of five to ten volunteers 
who used to creep out at dawn down a belt of wood 
and snipe the blighters whenever they showed themselves, 
and they used to stay out till dark. In this way 
they shot eight to twelve Sausages and effectually 
damped their zeal to snipe us. Our fellows were per- 
fectly splendid one chap coolly crept up to the enemy's 
trench and collared the helmet, fur knapsack, and 
forty -five rounds of ammunition, besides a pair of French 
patent leather boots (evidently looted) belonging to 
a German who was asleep in the trench. I wish I 
could have seen his puzzled face when he awoke and 
found them gone. . . . 



From Friday, October 9, to Tuesday, October 
13, there was again calm along the British 
front. There was the usual sporadic shelling, 
resulting in little damage to the British, and 
on the night of the 10th there was the night 
attack, which had lately become -as -rare as it 
had formerly been common, but" the * result 
was that which" it had always been. 

On Wednesday, October 14, >the British 
7th Division, which had covered ; the with- 
drawal of the Allied troops from Antwerp, 
occupied Ypres. 

The operations of the Aisne had now 
degenerated into an absdute impasse. Nearly 
a month ago it was the A lies who were .the 
assailants, and it was right to speak of any 
offensive movements executed by the Germans 
as counter-attacks, but in the course of a few 
weeks the Germans first definitely stopped 
the advance of the Allies and then gradually 
became rather the assailants of the Allies' 
positions than the defenders of their own, 
and it becomes right 'to speak of German 
attacks and the Allies' counter-attacks. In 
the meantime the efforts of the French to out- 
flank the German west wing had resulted in 
extending the fighting from the neighbourhood 
of Lassigny towards Lille. The Germans 
had at first been hard put to it to head off these 
efforts, but after a time it was the outflankers 
rather than the Germans who were in danger 



166 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




TRENCH ABANDONED BY THE 
GERMANS. 

of being outflanked. In fact, it only needed 
the arrival of those vast numbers of untrained 
men, to whom reference has already been 
made, to .place the initiative very definitely 
in tho hands of the Germans.' The British, 
who had started the campaign on the 
extreme left of the Allies' line, now found 
themselves somewhere about its centre. Their 
lines of communication ran back through 
Paris to the Biscay coast and, of course, 
crossed those of all the French armies on their 
loft, which was highly inconvenient to both 
parties. It is obvious that if the British were 
to resume their original place on the left of 
the line which would now be somewhere 
immediately east of Dunkirk, Calais and 
Boulogne they would enormously shorten 
their lines of communication by transferring 
their bases to those ports and to Le Havre, 
and would obviate the inconvenient crossing 
of communications. Moreover, they had a 
particular interest in preventing the ports of 
Northern France from falling into the hands of 
the Germans, who would assuredly use them 
as bases for submarine raids on enemy shipping 
in " the narrow seas." And thus it came about 
that the British Army on the Aisne was gradu- 
ally replaced section by section, night after 



t. by Fri'iich troops and railed and marched 
to their new scene of activity. The operation 
commenced on October :!, when the 2nd Cavalry 
Division left for the new theatre. 

The relief of the British was a wonderful 
piece of Staff work. Frenxh troops appeared 
out of the darkness and took up the British 
positions trench by trench and section by 
section night after night. " They had 
marched," says an officer, " many miles, but 
\\ere quite cheerful and calm, their only desire 
seemed to be to get into our 'dug-outs' and 
go to sleep. They cared notliing for Un- 
expected pressure of the enemy." Another 
officer says : " No sooner were the French 
installed in our places than their look-out 
sentries lay down full length on the top of 
the parapet. We warned them that tin.-, 
was a most ' unhealthy ' proceeding, but they 
quite cheerfully replied that they liked doing 
it that way, with the result that one of them 
was shot before we left." 

Some, if not all, of the British units were 
moved through Paris, but without having an 
opportunity for tasting its joys. The troops 
were detrained at St. Omer and other places 
not far from the English Channel, and once 
more had the pleasure of doing a little shopping, 
buying bread, cakes and chocolate, and laugh- 
ing and chaffing with the cheery French people 
of the district. 

The question arises, what was the outcome 
of tho fighting of tho past month ? The 
general strategical <results were important 
if not very obvious. Early? in October the 
Russian Press gave some details as to the 
identity of the German Army Corps operating 
in the eastern theatre. They claimed that the 
German Army defeated on the Niemeii was 
found to comprise portions of the following 
Corps : at Augustowo, 1st, 5th and 17th 
Corps ; at Suwalki, 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th and 8th 
Corps ; at Mariampol, 1st, 17th and 2(>th 
Corps ; in Galicia and Western Poland, 3rd, 
llth, 12th, 18th, 21st and two Bavarian Corps. 
According to this statement there remained 
in France only 10 of Germany's 25 1st Lino 
Corps, but there was obviously confusion 
between the " Active " and " Reserve " Corp>, 
since there were 20, if not 21, German First 
Line Corps* in the western theatre as late as 
Sunday, November 22. From this we may 

Viz., Guard, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th. 9th. 
10th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 19th, 21st, and 
tho 1st and 2nd Bavarian Curp.s, perhaps also the 3rd. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



167 



conclude that some of the First Line Corps had 
been brought back from the eastern to the 
western front at the end of September, which 
goes to show that, though the fighting of the 
past month had apparently been inconclusive, 
it had induced the Germans to once more rely 
on Second Line troops wherewith to check 
the Russian landslide. The work of the Allies 
in France was, therefore, of far greater import- 
ance to the common cause than is apparent 
on the surface. Before the war it was estimated 
that the French would be able to mobilize 
80 to 100 Divisions of field troops. Large 
numbers of untrained men had been called 
up in France as well as in Germany, and masses 
of recruits were being hurriedly put together 
for service in the field. But there was this 
great difference the Germans would have to 
use their new formations earlier and in a less 
efficient condition than the French, and would 
have to divide them between the two fronts. 
Consequently the French new formations would 
be more numerous than those which the 
Germans could allot to the western theatre, 
and General Joffre could wait till his new levies 
had matured a little, not only as individual 
fighting men, but as collective fighting masses. 
From which it followed that these new French 
formations, together with those others which 
were gradually growing in numbers and in 



efficiency in England, would ultimately give 
the Allies in the west that numerical pre- 
ponderance from which alone decisive results 
might be anticipated. 

Even more important are the moral results. 
These, again, have resulted from the tactical 
collisions of the belligerents. Eyewitness says : 

The following description was given by a Battalion 
Commander, who has been at the front since the com- 
mencement of hostilities, and had fought both in the 
open and behind entrenchments. It must, however, 
be borne in mind that it only represents the experiences 
of a particular unit. It deals with the tactics of the 
enemy's infantry : 

" The important points to watch are the heads of 
valleys, the ravines, woods especially those on the side 
of hollow ground and all dead ground to the front and 
flanks. The German officers are skilled in leading 
troops forward under cover, in closed bodies, but once 
the latter are deployed and there is no longer direct 
personal leadership the men will not face heavy (ire. 
Sometimes the advance is made in a series of lines, with 
the men well opened out at five or six paces interval ; 
at other times it is made in a line, with the men almost 
shoulder to shoulder, followed in all coses by supports 
in close formation. The latter either waver when the 
front line is checked, or crowd on to it, moving forward 
under the orders of their officers, and the mass forms a 
magnificent target. Prisoners have described the lire 
of our troops as pinning them to the ground, and this 
is certainly borne out by their action. When the Ger- 
mans are not heavily entrenched, no great losses are 
incurred in advancing against them by the methods 
in which the British Army has been instructed. For 
instance, in one attack over fairly open ground against 
about an equal force of infantry sheltered in a sunken 
rood and in ditches, we lost only ten killed and sixty 
wounded ; while over 400 of the enemy surrendered 
after about fifty had been killed. Each side had the 




FRENCH INFANTRY BRING UP REINFORCEMENTS OF FOOD AND AMMUNITION. 



168 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



support of B battery, lint tin' light fur superiority from 
infantry lire took place nt uliont 7011 yards and la-te.l 
only half an hour. When the Hermans wen- wavering 
some of them put up the white flag ; hut others went on 
firing, and our men continued to do thn si.7iir. Kventu- 
allv a large number of \vliile fla^s, improvised from hand- 
kerchiefs, pieces of shirt, white biscuit baus ^'e.. were 
exliihiteil all along the 1 line ; and many men hoisted their 
helmets on their rilles. 

" In the fighting behind entrenfhments the Germans 
endeavour to gain ground by making advances in line 
at dusk or just before dawn, and then dicing themselves 
in, in the hope, no doubt, that they may eventually get 
so near as to be able, as at nmmeuvres, to reach the hostile 
trenches in a single rush. They have never succeeded 
in doing this against us. If by creeping up in dead 
ground they do succeed in gaining ground by night they 
are easily driven back by fire in the morning. A few 
of the braver men sometimes remain behind, at ranges of 
even 300 or 400 yards, and endeavour to inflict losses 
by sniping. Sharpshooters, also, are often noticed 
in trees or wriggling about until they get good cover. 
The remedy is to take the initiative, and detail men to 
deal with the enemy's sharpshooters. 

" A few night attacks have been made against us. 
Before one of them a party crept up close to the British 
line and set alight a hayrick, so that it should form a 
beacon on which the centre of the attacking line marched. 
Generally, however, in the night and early morning 
attacks groups of 40 or 50 men have come on, the groups 
sometimes widely separated one from another and making 
every endeavour to obtain any advantage from cover. 
Light-balls and searchlights have on some occasions 
been used. 

" Latterly the attacks have become more and more 
half-hearted. Against us the enemy has never closed 
with the bayonet. The German trenches I have seen 
were deep enough to shelter a man when firing standing, 
and had a step down in rear for the supports to sit in. 
AB regards our own men, there was at first considerable 



reluctance to entrench, as has always been the case 
at tho commencement of a war. >iow, however, having 
bought experience dearly, their defences are such that 
they can defy the German artillery fire."* 

It seems to be a cardinal point in (iermau 
theory that the bombardment with which 
they prepare all their attacks must shatter 
the nerve of any troops and render them an 
easy prey to the masses with which they 
expected to overwhelm all resistance. Aa 
examples of blind obedience these German 
attacks were wonderful, but such discipline 
seerns to be instilled by severity and fear. 
It has its admirers in many countries, but it ia 
not calculated to appeal to men of the free 
Anglo-Saxon races. It inspired the legion of 
Pembe and the iinpi of Tchaka to sweep like 
a tropical tornado over every obstacle, but it 
has broken again and again against the steady 
front and deadly fire of British battalions. 

* The following criticism of the German Army appears 
in a letter from an officer who has had ample experience 
of it in the past six weeks : " As regards the German 
Army itself, except for its overwhelming numbers and 
the undoubted skill of the General Staff, it is no match 
for our own : on each and every occasion \ve have met 
them we have outmarched, outmanoeuvred and out- 
fought them. Their artillery is very good, but .... 
their shrapnel does extraordinarily little damage, except 
against troops in masse-, and their H.K. shells none, 
unless they drop within 20 yards of anyone. .1 k f >w 
because I have been under fire of earh." 




SOISSuN... 

In the centre of the picture is seen smoke from exploding German shrapnel, and along the back 

smoke from the French Artillerv. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



169 




MEN OF THE 1st CAVALRY DIVISION CROSSING THE PONTOON BRIDGE 
AT BOURG UNDER TERRIFIC FIRE. 

(See page 127.) 



The Germans achieved absolutely nothing, 
in spite of an incredible expenditure of energy 
and human life. In no direction did they 
succeed in driving back the British, because 
they overrated the effect of their artillery fire 
arid underrated the rifle fire of the British 
infantry. Their devastating bombardments 
and whirlwind mass-attacks did not demoralize 
the grandsons of those whose steadfast valour 
on the field of Waterloo broke every onset 
of the veteran cavalry and infantry of the 
finest army France has ever placed in the field. 
From prisoners' statements it is clear they 
found it difficult to believe that the concen- 
trated fire of high-explosive shells, with which 



they had deluged the British trenches, should 
really have failed to shatter the moral of their 
defenders. 

The German practice in the attack was the 
very antithesis of all that British soldiers 
had been taught on the subject. It was an 
article of faith with them that the modern 
magazine rifle in the hands of good and un- 
shaken infantry had made absolutely impossible 
the movement of troops in close order over 
open ground within effective range. They 
knew that even " Brown Bess " in the hands 
of their grandsires had never failed to shatter 
the columns of Napoleon's veteran infantry, 
and yet at Mons, at Le Cateau, on the Marne, 

183 



170 



7///-; 77 .!//>>' I1ISTOHY OF THE WAR. 




RED CROSS OFFICERS HAVING A MEAL IN A DUG-OUT. 



and here on the Aisne, the Germans came at 
them in mobs so dense that the ground itself 
and everything on it was blotted out by a mass 
of moving humanity slipping towards them like 
a landslide. That anyone should attempt 
the thing seemed the height of folly, but to 
persist in such folly in the face of punishment 
so bloody and so oft-repeated seemed mere 
midsummer madness. Again and again these 
attacks were literally " wiped out " by " rapid " 
fire. This " practice " had been so assiduously 
cultivated in peace that the British infantry- 
man or cavalryman could fire 15 rounds per 
minute at disappearing targets and make a 
high percentage of hits without bringing the 
rifle down from tho shoulder. A German 
mass which found itself in the open and within 
600 yards of British infantry was assured of 
two things, firstly, that it would have dis- 
charged at it at least 10 rounds per rifle per 
minute, and. secondly, that the number of 
hits registered upon such a favourable target 
as it presented would be considerably in excess 
of anything ever attained by British troops 
against the much more difficult vanishing 
targets of peace practice. It is no exaggen> 
tion to add that these two things spell simpl 
annihilation After the first week or ten dayi 
on the Aisne it was found that German troops 
which had faced the British fire a few times 



had begun to lose that resolution which is 
essential to a successful assault. They obvi- 
ously wavered. That this was so is not at all 
surprising ; it is only wonderful that they could 
be got to come on at all. Not till the British 
encountered new opponents, and particularly 
the newly raised levies, in Flanders did they 
again meet an enemy who came at them with 
the " will to conquer." 

The general result of the fighting was that 
the Germans commenced the operations of 
mid-Septembe along two lines which met 
north of Verdun to form a right angle and 
faced inwards, so that all movements behind 
the line had much further to go than similar 
movements behind the Allies' lines which 
faced outwards By the end of a month the 
Germans had managed to reduce operations 
along their original fronts to a stalemate and 
to add a new face to their line, which now 
reversed the situation, as far as it concerned 
movements behind the fighting fronts. More 
important still was the recovery of the initiative. 
One of the chief objects of strategy is to main- 
tain the initiative, or to regain it if it has been lost, 
and it must be frankly confessed that it was 
the Germans who had regained and the Allies 
who had lost, the initiative. But the advant:i<ji 
was rather apparent than real. The great object 
which I lie Allies had always set before them- 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



171 



selves was to check the German advance, in 
order both to wear them down and to gain the 
time in which they, and especially the Russians, 
might develop their strength, and in which 
sea-power might do its slow but deadly work. 
The Allies in France did not possess sufficient 
strength to achieve any very decisive results, 
nor could they hope to push the Germans back 
very far for the present. It was, therefore, 
not a matter of very great moment to them 
whether the Germans were pushed back a little 
or not. It was really more important to avoid 
serious defeat than to gain the indecisive victory 
which was all they could hope for at present. 
Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of fresh 
troops were maturing in every part of the 
British Empire, the grey legions of the Czar 
were tramping up in millions from the vasty 
deeps of Russian and Siberian steppes, and the 
inexorable pressure of sea-power was gradually 
choking the life out of the nations of the 
Duplice. Moreover, the gain of the initiative 
had cost the Germans very dear in three 
commodities which they could by no means 
afford to squander men, materiel and money. 
In all three directions the resources of the 



Entente Powers were far superior to those of the 
Central Powers. The German losses in human 
life were the more serious, inasmuch as they 
had no reserve of trained men. At the end of 
the Greal Retreat the British losses were 
officially reported at something over 15,000 
men, and it was distinctly stated that these 
were not a third of the losses inflicted upon the 
enemy. When we consider that the British 
losses included between 8,000 and 9,000 
prisoners, many of them unwounded, it is 
obvious that the enemy's losses in killed and 
wounded were a good deal more than three 
times the British losses in these categories. 
Arguing by analogy and remembering that the 
British on the Aisne suffered none of those losses 
in wounded or physically exhausted men who 
fall into an enemy's hands in a retreat, we may 
confidently reckon that the 13,541 lost by the 
British on the Aisne in killed, wounded and 
missing are scarcely a quarter of those lost by 
the Germans along the same front and at the 
same time. Curiously enough, this estimate 
agrees closely with that given by a Staff 
Correspondent of the New York World, who 
says : "As the Germans were usually the 




GERMAN CAVALRY. 



172 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




GERMANS ERECTING AN IRON BRIDGE IN PLACE OF THE ONE IN THE 
BACKGROUND, WHICH WAS DESTROYED. 



aggressors their losses must have been between 
40,000 and 50,000 and may have been more." 
By the time the British came to move from the 
Aisne their total losses amounted to less than 
33,000 men killed, wounded and captured, but, 
in seven weeks, they had put out of action at 
least 100,000 Germans, which is a larger num- 
ber of combatants than the British had ever 
had in the field to date. There can be no doubt 
whatever that the German losses, particularly 
in officers, had been relatively greater than 
those of the French and much greater than those 
of the British. They had usually been the 
assailants ; they had always been prodigal of 
life ; they were unable to replace the wast- 
age of war by trained men, and the vast 
losses among German officers obviously told 
upon the leading 'and handling of their 
troops. Moreover, the German corps of officers 
is mainly recruited from a distinct class of 
limited numbers, whereas the French system 
has always been to draw something like two- 
thirds of their regimental officers from the 
ranks, and they therefore have a much larger 



reserve to draw upon. The lact is that the 
victory of the Marne was one of those which, 
like Gravelotte, results in driving the vanquished 
into a fortress. Subsequent operations are 
directed to rivetting the ring of steel more 
tfghtly round the discomfited hosts Once that 
is effected the fate of the interned army is 
sealed. Its only hope of escape lie? in relief 
from outside. The victory of the Marne was 
decisive because the fighting of the next two 
months saw the lines of circumvallation com- 
pleted round the Powers of the Duplice. 
Henceforward their only hope of relief lay in 
finding a neutral Power, or group of Powers, 
able and willing to raise the siege. No victory 
over Russia could save Germany, for Russia 
could retreat to the Pacific without exposing 
any really vital point and Germany would not 
have the strength to follow far. The victory of 
the Marne stayed the tide of Teutonic invasion 
the Aisne and Flanders confirmed the 
decision. The Allies set out to gain time, to wear 
down, to exhaust, in a word to besief/e the enein v , 
and in this they were distinctly successful. 



CHAPTER XXXV. 

MILITARY AERONAUTICS AND 
THE BRITISH AIR SERVICE. 



NAVIGATION OF THE AIR AEROPLANE AND AIBSHIP EARLY BALLOONS THE " ZEPPELIN " 
EVOLUTION OF THE AEROPLANE SIR GEORGE CAYLEY CONQUEST OF THE Ant BY THE BROTHERS 
WRIGHT NOTABLE EARLY FLIGHTS THE FRENCH LEAD AND THE PICARDY MANCEUVRES, 
1910 THE REIMS MEETING, 1911 FIRST USE OF AEROPLANES IN WAR THE BRITISH AIR 
SERVICE ORIGIN OF MILITARY AERONAUTICS THE BALLOON SCHOOL AT CHATHAM THE 
NVLLI SBCUKDUS ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS THE AIR BATTALION THE 
ROYAL FLYING CORPS THE CENTRAL FLYING SCHOOL THE MILITARY WING, ITS GROWTH 
AND EXPANSION ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE SEAPLANES NEW -BRITISH AIRSHIPS AND 
SHEDS AEROPLANE EQUIPMENT. 



THE great war, unexampled for its 
magnitude and unprecedented in 
many of its aspects, will be ever 
memorable among other tilings for 
this, that in it for the first time the recently 
acquired art of navigating the air was syste- 
matically employed by all the principal com- 
batants for purposes of both attack and defence. 
Military aeronautics had become a new and 
formidable arm. Its rise had been almost 
startling in its suddenness. When hostilities 
began it was little more than ten years and a 
half since the brothers Wilbur and Orville 
Wright, in a secluded spot among the sand 
dunes of North Carolina, had for the first time 
in the history of man achieved sustained flight 
against the wind on a power-driven machine 
rising from the level ground ; it was not 
quite six years since the elder of these two 
brothers had given his first public demon- 
stration in France, when, on August 8, 
1908, at a race-course near Le Mans, he as- 
tonished the world by flying a distance of a 
mile and a quarter in 1 min. 47 seconds. From 
that momentous gathering may be dated publi" 



recognition of the fact that the air had been 
" conquered " by man, who was thenceforward 
free to navigate it at his pleasure, subject 
to ever-diminishing restrictions, in machines 
heavier than the medium in which they moved. 
For these machines the name " aeroplane " 
was forthwith invented. 

But the aeroplane is not the only device by 
which the air is navigated, and which has been 
turned in recent years to military account. 
The airship, or dirigible balloon, inflated with 
hydrogen so that it rises in the air with a lifting 
power that can sustain considerable weights, 
belongs to a wholly different category, and 
was evolved by a different process of experi- 
ment, from an origin that was quite distinct. 
But these two independent types of aircraft 
the heavier than air and the lighter "than air 
became almost simultaneously available for 
purposes of war. This was no mere acci- 
dental coincidence, but was due mainly to the 
same cause, the invention and development in 
connexion with the motor-car of the petrol- 
driven engine, which combined very high 
power with remarkably light weight. For the 



173 



174 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




Q 

- 

X 
c/3 

o 
z 



- 
J 

z 

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w 

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



175 



dirigible balloon this combination of qualities 
was of the utmost importance ; for the aero- 
plane it was a fundamental necessity. 

This is not the place to describe in any detail 
the steps by which either the airship or the 
aeroplane has reached its present excellence, 
but one or two salient facts relating to their 
development may ei-able readers unfamiliar 
with the subject to understand more clearly 
the position of affairs when the war broke out. 
Let us take the airship first. The main out- 
lines of its history can be covered in a few 
sentences. In 1782 the two brothers Mont- 
golfier discovered half accidentally, it would 
seem by experiment at Avignon that a bag 
of silk when filled with heated air would rise 
from the ground ; and, proceeding along the 
line of this discovery, they constructed a large 
oval balloon, with an open neck at the lower 
extremity, in the centre of which a brazier was 
fitted, and round the outer circumference of 
which ran a wicker gallery whence fuel could 
be supplied to the brazier. In this balloon a 
certain M. Pilatre de Rozier made a public 
ascent in October, 1783. The balloon was then 
captive ; but the same adventurer made a short 
free voyage in the following month. Meanwhile 
experiments with- hydrogen had placed at 
the disposal of balloonists a gas very much 
lighter than hot air, and in December, 1783, 
a voyage of over 20 miles was made from Paris 
in a free balloon inflated with hydrogen. The 
first successful attempt to propel through the 
ah- a hydrogen balloon of elongated shape was 
made in 1852 by Henri Giffard, who used a 
light steam engine to turn the propellers, but 
the speed obtained was unsatisfactory. Elec- 
tric motors were applied in the 'eighties of the 
last century with somewhat better results, but 
nothing really practicable was produced until 
a German officer, Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin, 
appeared upon the scene with methods of his 
own. This remarkable man began in 1897 the 
construction of an immense airship, designed 
with great care and forethought to carry a 
crew of five men. It was to be driven through 
the air by two 16 h.p. petrol motors, carried 
singly, each in a separate car, and actuating 
propellers attached not to the cars but to the 
body of the ship. This method of attachment 
was rendered possible by one of the principal 
distinguishing characteristics of the Zeppelin 
ship, which was built with a rigid aluminium 
framework. This was divided into sixteen 
separate compartments along the length of the 




COUNT VON ZEPPELIN. 

structure, and each compartment enclosed an 
independent gasbag, the collective capacity of 
the bags being nearly 400,000 cubic feet. 

This wonderful vessel, the pioneer among 
dirigibles of the " rigid " type, was tested in 
June, 1900, when it travelled 3J miles at a 
speed of 18 miles an hour, before its journey 
was cut short by a mishap to the steering 
gear. It was followed in rapid succession by 
other Zeppelins of larger size and greatly 
increased engine power, until by the year 1914 
the German army and navy were in possession 
of Zeppelins of nearly 30 tons displacement 
and 720 horse-power, with a speed of 50 miles 
per hour, and an endurance of 30 hours at full 
speed. The type was adopted in Germany for 
fighting purposes by army and navy alike, and 
in spite of its unwieldy bulk and the impossi- 
bility of diminishing its size by deflation for 
purposes of transport or storage, it has many 
formidable qualities among them, it is said, 
the capacity to mount 1 -pounder and Maxim 
guns not only in the cars but on the top of 
the envelope. 

Let us now turn to the evolution of the 
aeroplane, and briefly note the steps by which 
man has discovered how to make aerial voyages 
in machines heavier than air, which, so far from 
floating above the earth when motionless, must 
begin to fall the moment their speed is arrested. 

From very early times, as the story of Icarus 
reminds us, the imagination and aspirations of 



171) 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 






NAVAL ZEPPELIN "L.I" FLYING OVEK HELIGOLAND. 



men have been turned, through watching the 
movements of birds, to the far-off ideal of 
flight, and much effort has been expended in 
the endeavour to master its secret ; but until 
our own day the obstacles have been insur- 
mountable. The subject was one of those 
which occupied the many-sided and penetrating 
genius of Leonardo da Vinci about the begin- 
ning of the sixteenth century ; but it was an 
English man of science, Sir George Cayley, 
who earlv in the nineteenth century, after the 




PARIS, 1871. 
Escape of Gambetta by balloon. 



invention of the steam engine, first worked at 
the problem on really practical scientific lines. 
His claim to be regarded as the true founder of 
aerodynamic science is hardly open to dispute. 
Not only did he declare power-driven flying 
machines to be theoretically possible, provided 
that an engine could be produced of sufficient 
power in proportion to its weight, but he 
actually invented many of the leading features 
of the aeroplane as it exists to-day. But the 
indispensable light and powerful engine was 
no* forthcoming in his time, and the oppor- 
tunity was therefore denied him of carrying 
his theories into practice. The subject was 
pursued experimentally at intervals by, among 
others, Mr. Horatio Phillips and Sir Hiram 
Maxim in England, C. Ader in France, and 
Professor S. P. Langley in America, while the 
investigations of Otto Lilienthal in Germany in 
connexion with an apparatus for gliding through 
the air from heights, with which he assiduously 
practised from 1891 until 1896, when he met 
his dwath, provided much valuable material 
for the development of the aeroplane. The 
death of Lilienthal, indeed, which occurred 
through a mishap to his machine, brings us to 
the very threshold of the long-desired success. 
An account of the accident was read by Wilbur 
and Orville Wright among the ordinary news 
of the day, and it was not without its influence 
in starting them upon their career of brilliant 
achievement. If this were a chronicle of dis- 
covery it would be necessary to mention many 
other names ; but we are here concerned only 
with results, and particularly with those that 
have a bearing upon war. 

It was, as we have seen, the invention of the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



177 



petrol engine and its rapid ' improvement in 
connexion with the motor-car that provided 
the one thing postulated by Sir George Cayley 
a century earlier as indispensable for successful 
flight. Here at last was an instrument develop- 
ing immense power in proportion to its remark- 
ably light weight. The Wrights applied it, in 
a form modified by themselves for their novel 
purpose, to an aerial glider perfected by pro- 
longed experiment ; and independent flight 
was at once accomplished. The date of this 



momentous event was December 17, 190,'!. 
They had achieved the conquest of the uir; 
but for reasons of their own they kept their 
triumph secret. Meanwhile other experi- 
menters, working independently in France 
Santos Dumont, Delagrange, Archdeacon, and 
notably Henry Farman, the Voisins, and Louis 
Bleriot achieved no small measure of success 
in the same direction ; but it was not until 
the demonstrations given by Wilbur Wright in 
the same country, in 1908 first at Le Mans 




A GERMAN AIRSHIP IN COURSE OF CONSTRUCTION. 



178 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




[Swaine, 



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR DAVID 
HENDERSON, K.C.B., D.S.O. 

and afterwards >at Auvour that the world at 
large began fully to recognize the new era that 
had dawned. 

Our view is restricted here to the domain of 
war, and at the outset we must acknowledge 
the credit due to France for realizing with 
almost instantaneous promptitude the value of 
the aeroplane for military purposes. As early as 
1905 the French Government endeavoured 
to buy the Wrights' machine. The attempt 
came to nothing, but it was characteristic of 
French alertness, wi ich justly won for France 
the leading place in this new department of 
military preparation. Wilbur Wright's per- 
formances upon her own soil stimulated her 
afresh. A French officer took his flying 
certificate in January, 1909, and after the 
Rtims meeting in the summer of the same 
year the Government begin to buy machines. 
In this coun ry interes; in the science and 
practice of flying was greatly stimulated by a 
series of valuable money prizes offered by the 
Daily Mail for the first successful flight over 
courses then regarded as long and difficult. 
Tht; first of these, announced as early as 190G, 
when flying was in its infancy, was a sum of 
10,000 for a flight from London to Manchester 
in twenty-four hours, with not more than two 
halts on the way. IThis was won by Louis 
Paulhan in April, 1910. Other nations more 



or less promptly followed the French initiative ; 
for before long all had come to recognize the 
importance of not being left behind in the new 
arm. But France, the pioneer, rotamrd the 
lead, and in order to gain a clear view of the 
rapid development that followed we must for 
the moment keep our attention fixed on her. 

As already indicated, notable advances had 
been made in France before the year 1909. 
The brothers Charles and Gabriel Voisin, 
working at their factory near Paris, had pro- 
duced a biplane which was tested for them by 
Henry Farman, a well-known racing motorist, 
who, on January 13, 1908, won the Grand Prix 
d' Aviation of 50,000 francs by a flight of one 
kilometre in a closed circuit without touching 
the ground. This he accomplished at Issy- 
les-Moulineaux on a Voisin biplane, the average 
height above the ground maintained during 
the flight being between four and six metres. 
During the same period another great French 
pioneer of flying, Louis Bleriot, was conducting 
experiments with a monoplane, on original 
lines of his own, and a little later he won 
permanent fame by flying for the first time 
across the Channel, on July 25, 1909, and 
thereby winning the prize of 1,000 offered by 
the Daily Mail for the accomplishment of this 
feat. In the same year, which was marked 
from beginning to end by wonderful progress, 
an aviation meeting was held at Reims, 
where remarkable flights of as much as three 




[SptatfM. 
CAPTAIN F. MURRAY SUETER. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



179 




[F. N. BirktU, 97, Percy Road, Skcpkerd's Busk, W. 

WRIGHT BIPLANE "BABY." 



hours were accomplished by Farman on a 
biplane of his own construction, fitted with the 
now famous " Gnome " engine, whose seven 
cylinders revolved around the crank shaft, cool- 
ing themselves automatically in the air. In 
1910 flights became ever higher and more daring, 
and great cross-country journeys, such as that 
from London to Manchester already recorded, 
made it plain to military authorities that 
the aeroplane must be invaluable for recon- 
noitring. By this time the French Govern- 
ment had provided itself with several biplanes 
of various makes and a few monoplanes also, 
and the time had come to give them a serious 
military trial. The opportunity was afforded 
by the army manceuvres in Picardy, in the 
autumn of the same year, and the results were 
highly favourable. About a dozen machines 
were employed for scouting. They were 



divided between the opposing forces and sub- 
jected to tests as complete as possible. Both 
military pilots and civilian volunteers served 
as airmen, the latter including M. Hubert 
Latham and M. Louis Paulhan. .. It was the 
first time aeroplanes had ever been employed 
at manoeuvres, and everything was novel and 
experimental. Most remarkable results were 
secured by officers already trained in military 
observation. Two of these, Lieutenant Sido 
and Adjutant Menard, brought to head- 
quarters information of the utmost importance 
after two early morning nights, one of which 
covered 60 kilometres in 65 minutes, while the 
other established with certainty the fact that 
the " enemy " was in retreat, a matter of vital 
consequence for their Commander-in-Chief to 
know. It was declared on authority at the 
time that the value of these two reports could 




VALKYRIE MONOPLANE. 



[F. N. Birkelt. 



180 



Till-: 77.W/-:.s' JIISTOHY OF THE WAR. 




Mr. T. O. M. SOPWITH. 

not be overestimated. The Military Corre- 
spondent who attended these manoeuvres for 
The Times bore emphatic testimony to the 
same effect. " In my belief/' he said, " the 
aeroplane, given a trained pilot and a skilled 
observer, must revolutionize the whole service 
of reconnaissance." 

The effect upon the French Government was 
decisive. They resolved to create an aeroplane 
fleet, and before the end of 1910 the dozen 
possessed during the autumn manoeuvres had 
been increased to 32, of which six were mono- 
planes and the rest biplanes of five different 
makes. It is interesting to note, as some 
indication of the attention bestowed upon the 
subject at this time by the various Powers, 
that early in December of the same year one 
of the foremost aeroplane manufacturers in 
France stated that he had received the following 
orders for military machines : from the 
Government of France 35 aeroplanes, Russia 20, 
Spain 3, Italy 2, Belgium 1, Japan 1, Britain 1. 
A German order was received a few months 
later. The policy embarked upon in France 
was consistent ly pursued. Early in the sunn HIT 
of 1911 orders were placed on account of the 
French army for nearly 150 machines, of which 
80 were Bleriot monoplanes of two types one 
a machine with seats for two, and the other 
single-seated, but of high speed. Conditions 



were imposed as to speed, lifting capacity, 
rapid climbing power, and the lik: . 

A further impetus was given by the great 
meeting at Reims in October, 1911, for trials 
of war aeroplanes, for which more than 50,000 
was set aside in prizes and other rewards. 
Competitors had to fulfil exacting tests, which 
in themselves supplied clear evidence of the 
advance that had been made ; for one of the 
aims was to secure a macliine at once swift and 
" air-worthy," which could fly long distances, 
carrying both a pilot and a passenger. Among 
other conditions to be complied with was that 
of rising with a full load from a ploughed field. 
The winning machine, a Nieuport monoplane, 
flew across country, conveying two men and 
fuel, at a speed of over 70 miles an hour. Some 
of the flying was accomplished in gusty winds 
blowing as much as 40 miles an hour, and 
notliing was more remarkable than the regu- 
larity and trustworthiness of the performances. 
There was an astonishing growth in engine 
power, some of the aeroplanes being fitted with 
Gnome engines of fourteen cylinders and de- 
veloping 100, and even 140, horse power. One 
biplane weighed, with passengers and load 
complete, 2,420 Ib. The meeting was attended 
by' representatives from all countries, and as a 
consequence of its success military orders for 
machines flowed in to all the successful makers. 
It convinced the British War Office of the 
necessity for a really decisive move. 

But before we turn to British military 
aeronautics, it may be convenient to summarize 
the experience obtained in actual warfare before 
the date of the great European war an 
experience confined to nations that did not join 
in the conflict of August, 1914. The first 
occasion on which an aeroplane was ever used 
in war was in February, 1911, when an airman 
flew over Ciudad Juarez, in Mexico, while 
fighting was in progress between the rebel 
troops and the Government forces, and reported 
the situation to the latter. But the first 
Power to employ the new weapon systematically 
in warfare was Italy, between whom and Turkey 
hostilities began at the end of September, 
1911, a few days before the Reims meeting 
just described. The operations in the air, 
which were confined to Tripoli, were entirely 
one-sided, and were not opposed by anything 
more serious than occasional rifle fire from the 
Turks and Arabs. Nevertheless much was 
learned from these Italian operations. . They 
may, in fact, be regarded, from our present 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. 



181 




M. LOUIS PAULHAN. 
Who flew from London to Manchester, 183 miles, in 1910, winning the "Daily Mail" prize of 10,000. 



point of view, as experiments conducted with 
an immediate practical object and under the 
influence, at once searching and stimulating, 
of serious warfare. In the course of six 
months four officers made an average of 78 
flights each, for purposes of survey as well as 
of reconnaissance} but owing to the low power 
of the motors available it was never possible to 
carry a second man as passenger. The lessons 
deduced from the exploits in Tripoli have been 
set forth in THE TIMES, and may be briefly 
epitomized as follows : ' 

1. It was found to be unsafe to fly above an enemy's 
rifle fire in an unarmoured machine at a height of less 
than 3,000 feet. 

2. Reconnaissance by an untrained observer was worse 
than useless. A period of continuous training in obser- 
vation from a height above the range of fire was indis- 
pensable before the airman could be trusted to supply 
information of any use to his commander. 



3. Mere casual dropping from an aeroplane of bombs 
or grenades such as the Italians used was futile. 

4. Results of the utmost value were obtainable from 
aerial photography. By photographing the enemy's 
positions the Italian air-scouts discovered trenches of 
which no sign was visible from below, and they were able, 
further, to make beautifully accurate and detailed maps 
of the country. By tele -photography these advantages 
have been much extended. 

During the same, campaign the Italians em- 
ployed airships also, for molesting the enemy 
and for making observations and taking 
photographs. 

Aeroplanes were brought into use again in 
the Balkan War, which began a year later ; 
but here, again, they were confined to one side 
that of the Allies. The only opposition they 
encountered from the Turks was in the form of 
shooting from the ground. Many photographs 
were taken in scouting expeditions, and bombs 




TWO-SEATER HENRY FARMAN BIPLANE. 



[F. N. ll,rkai. 



182 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP. 




AN AVIS MONOPLANE. 



[F. N. Bwkdt. 



were dropped with little more result than the 
Italians achieved in Tripoli. Thirty bombs 
discharged in one day from a Bulgarian aero- 
plane over Adrianople killed or injured a total 
of only six persons. 

The British Air Service won its laurels within 
the first six weeks of the war. On September 14 
was made public a report from Sir John French's 
Headquarters in France which contained the 
following passage, dated three days earlier : 

Quite one of the features of the campaign, on our side, 
has been the success attained by the Royal Flying Corps. 
In regard to the collection of information it is impossible 
either to award too much praise to our aviators for the 
way they have carried out their duties or to overestimate 
the value of the intelligence collected, more especially 
during the recent advance. In due course, certain 
examples of what has been effected may be specified 
and the far-reaching nature of the results fully explained, 
but that time has not yet arrived. . . . The constant 
object of our aviators has been to effect the accurate 
location of !he enemy's forces, and, incidentally since 



the operations cover so large an area of our own units. 
Nevertheless, the tactics adopted for dealing with hostile 
aircraft are to attack them instantly with one or more 
British machines. This has been so far successful that 
in five cases German pilots or observers have been shot 
in the air and their machines brought to the ground. 
As a consequence, the British Flying Corps has suc- 
ceeded in establishing an individual ascendancy which 
is as serviceable to us as it is damaging to the enemy. 
. . . Something in the direction of the mastery of the 
air has already been gained. 

This emphatic testimony was confirmed 
by another tribute quite as striking. On the 
night of September 9, Sir John French tells us, 
he received the following message from the 
Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies : 

Please express most particularly to Marshal French 
my thanks for services rendered on every day by the 
English Flying Corps. The precision, exactitude, and 
regularity of the news brought in by its members are 
evidence of their perfect organisation and also of the 
perfect training of pilots and observers. 




DUNNE STABILITY BIFLANE. 



[F. l\. VMt.l. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



183 



There is special interest in following the 
history, brief though it be, of a brilliant young 
corps of which at the very outset of its first 
trial in war so much could be justly said, and 
whose later achievements in the field amply 
confirmed the good opinion thus early put on 
record. On whatever work engaged -whether 
some daring raid upon German airsheds at 
Diisseldorf or Friedrichshaven, or the honour- 
able duty of mounting aerial guard over the 
person ot their Sovereign during his visit to the 
troops in France and Flanders, or the constant 
and more ordinary task of observation and 
direction of artillery fire at the front the 
British airmen always proved alike trustworthy 
and indispensable. The origin of the Flying 
Corps can be traced back through the airship 
to the early days of military ballooning, before 
aeroplanes were thought of or their name was 
invented ; for, as we have seen, it is the airship, 
not the aeroplane, that is the true descendant of 
the simple captive balloon with which military 
aeronautics was originally associated. The 
balloon, which in its simplest form was first 
used in warfare almost exactly 120 years ago, 
was, at last, after many vain attempts, rendered 
navigable by the invention of the petrol 
engine, as already described. The same inven- 
tion brought into being the aeroplane, which, 
although itself a startling novelty of the 
twentieth century, gives embodiment to one of 
the early aspirations of mankind. 

In the first years of the French Revolutionary 
War a school of aeronautics was founded at 
Meudon, and the French victory at Fleurus, 
in 1794, was attributed in great part to the 
observations made from a captive balloon 
before the battle. To come down to later 
times, similar balloons were a good deal used 
by the Federals in the first two years of the 
American Civil War (1861-63). McClellan's 
army had a regular balloon staff, consisting of 
a captain, an assistant-captain, and about 
fifty non-commissioned officers and privates. 
For apparatus they had two balloons, one 
containing about 13,000 feet of gas and the 
other twice as large, each drawn by four horses ; 
two generators, also drawn by four horses 
apiece ; and an acid cart drawn by two horses. 
By means of these much useful information was 
gained on several occasions, but eventually 
difficulties of transport and unsuitability of 
locality made ballooning impracticable. In 
the siege of Paris (1870-71) balloons were the 
sole means of communication between the city 




A WATERPLANE OFF WESTMINSTER. 

and the outer world. They were dispatched 
free, over the heads of the investing force, 
conveying information and also pigeons, which 
afterwards returned with news from the 
provinces to the beleaguered city. Altogether, 
from September, 1870, to January, 1871, as 
many as sixty-four balloons were sent out, 
carrying passengers among them Gambetta 
and dispatches. All these, however, were but 
interesting episodes of warfare. Military 
ballooning as a science did not receive anything 
like general recognition until the early 'eighties 
of the nineteenth century, when balloon estab- 
lishments were organized on a regular footing 
by most of the Powers. It was formally 
introduced into the British Army in 1879, 
when a Balloon School was started at Chatham, 
and in the following year the 24th Company of 
the Royal Engineers was chosen for special 
instruction in aeronautics. Later this school 
was removed to Aldershot, and there it remained 
with its headquarters at South Farnborough, 
until, when the great development of aero- 
nautics came, it was expanded, or rather 
merged in an organization of much wider 
scope. 

The Balloon School did good and useful 
work, and under the last commandant who held 
office before its organization was changed, 



184 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




LATEST PATTERN HENRY FARMAN BIPLANE. 



[F. N. Birke'.t. 



Colonel (afterwards Brigadier-General) J. E. 
Capper, C.B., an enthusiastic and accom- 
plished balloonist, serious progress was made. 
A small airship, the Nulli Secundus, was 
constructed, which in October, 1907, made 
a voyage with two passengers from Farn- 
borOugh to London, encircled St. Paul's 
Cathedral, and then returned as far as Sydenham 
a total distance of fifty miles, which was 
covered in three hours thirty-five minutes. 
The vessel was anchored at the Crystal Palace, 
where it was damaged by a high wind before 
the journey could be resumed, and had to be 
deflated ; but in the following year it made 
numerous further experimental trips. Other 
small, non-rigid dirigibles followed the Beta, 
the Gamma, and later on the Delta useful 
rather for experiment and instruction than for 
serious military operations. Meanwhile public 
opinion was moving faster than the Government, 
a Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee was 
formed to act as a stimulant to the official world, 
and, as the result of a public subscription 
organized by the Morning Post, a large Lebaudy 
airship was bought for our army in France, 
and made a good voyage from Moisson to 
Aldershot on October 26, 1910. This was a 
few weeks after the French army manoeuvres 
in Picardy. at which the value of the aeroplane 
for military purposes was for the first time 
conclusively demonstrated. It is an inte- 
resting coincidence that in the same autumn 
dirigibles were employed at the manoeuvres in 
CiTinany. In England we had got as far as 
tin).' six aeroplane sheds on Salisbury 
Plain, two of which were used by Captain 



Dickson and Mr. L. Gibbs while attending 
manoeuvres. 

In April, 1909, the Government appointed 
a permanent Advisory Committee for Aero- 
nautics, composed of eminent scientific and 
practical men, under the chairmanship of 
Lord Rayleigh, and charged with the general 
direction of experimental research work, which 
was conducted mainly by the engineering 
department of the National Physical Labora- 
tory. In the same year the Committee of 
Imperial Defence decided that airships were 
necessary for military purposes, and after 
prolonged inquiry the Advisory Committee 
recommended that the army should be supplied 
with a small non-rigid type of airship, which 
could be deflated and conveniently transported, 
and that a large airship of the rigid type 
should be provided for the Navy. A great 
step forward was, therefore, contemplated, 
though, as far as the naval ship was concerned, 
it unhappily came to nothing. The ship was 
ordered, indeed, from Messrs. Vickers, and 
built in their works at Barrow ; but when 
launched, in the summer of 1911, it met with 
an accident and collapsed. In size it was 
comparable with a Zeppelin, being 512 feet 
long and 48 feet in diameter. The effect of 
this disaster was so great upon the official 
or political mind that for two years no effort 
was made to repair it. 

It was at the end of February, 1911, that a 
Special Army Order was issued describing the 
peace organization of the new Air Battalion 
of the Royal Engineers, the formation of 
which had been announced in Mr. Haldane's 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



185 



Memorandum on the Army Estimates a few 
days earlier. It was to supersede the Balloon 
School, and to come into being from April 1 
of the same year. It was explained, rather 
cumbrously, that to this new battalion was to 
be entrusted " the duty of creating a body of 
expert airmen, organized in such a way as to 
facilitate the formation of units ready to take 
the field with troops and capable of expansion 
by any reserve formations which may be 
formed in the future. In addition, the training 
and instruction of men in handling kites, 
balloons, aeroplanes, and other forms of air 
craft will also devolve upon this battalion." 
The establishment of the battalion was 
organized into (1) headquarters, and (2) two 
companies, numbering together 14 officers and 
176 of other ranks, each company being a 
separate and self-contained unit. The officers 
were to be selected from applicants from any 
regular arm or branch of the Army on the active 
list, and were to serve in the Air Battalion for 
a period of four years, of which the first six 
months were probationary. The rank and file 
were to be chosen from men in the Corps of 
Royal Engineers. 

The Balloon Factory at Farnborough was 
reorganized and expanded and renamed the 
Army Aircraft Factory, and Mr. Mervyn 
O' Gorman, a civilian engineer, was placed at 
its head. 

The Air Battalion was a transitory and short- 
lived institution. It was necessary to proceed 
much farther and create a truly comprehensive 



organization which should meet the require- 
ments of Navy and Army alike, and by opening 
the door to civilian talent should be capable 
of freer and more natural growth. This point 
was reached in 1912, under the joint auspices 
of Mr. Winston Churchill at the Admiralty and 
Lord Haldane at the War Office. On March 4 
in that year Colonel Seely, Under-Secretary of 
State for War, who, like Mr. Churchill, took 
a strong personal interest in aeronautics, des- 
cribed in the House of Commons the fresh 
. scheme which had been elaborated, and on the 
2(ith he announced that the King had approved 
of the title " The Royal Flying Corps " for the 
newly-constituted aeronautical branch of his 
forces, while the Army Aircraft Factory was in 
future to be designated " The Royal Aircraft 
Factory," and to be available for the whole 
aeronautical service. He added that a standing 
committee would be appointed, with Brigadier- 
General Henderson as its first chairman, " to 
co-ordinate action in dealing with questions 
that arise in connexion with the Corps." This, 
which is known as the " Air Committee," has 
the status of a permanent Sub-Committee of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence. 

The scheme in full was published on April 12, 
in the form of an official Memorandum, based 
on the recommendations of a committee which, 
under Colonel Seely's own chairmanship, had 
been commissioned by the Government to 
consider and report upon the whole subject. 

It was apparent at the first glance that this 
War Office Memorandum embodied a scheme 




SOPW1TH SCOUT SPEED 114 MILES PER HOUR. 



IF. N. Birkttt. 



136 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



that beloiifjert to a wholly different order of 
things t'roin the. Air Battalion which the new 
organization was to supersede. It was devised 
on large, bold and elastic lines. It treated 
flying as a thing in itself, and not as a mere 
function of any existing arm. It embraced all 
the requirements of both Navy and Army and 
found a place for civilians also. It created for 
the first time a truly national Air Service. 

This fruitful document, starting from the 
categorical statement that " aeroplanes have 
now to a great extent passed out of the experi- 
mental stage as regards their employment in 
warfare, and an active and progressive policy 
has therefore become imperatively urgent," 
laid down among the general principles adopted 
as a basis for the new organization that it 
must both meet present requirements and also 
be sufficiently elastic to permit of considerable 
expansion ; that it must be capable of absorbing 
and utilizing the whole of the aeronautical 
resources of the country ; that, while supplying 
the peculiar and different needs of both Navy 
and Army, the Royal Flying Corps must be 
available in its entirety for either service if 
necessary ; that it must encourage private 
enterprise, and offer inducements to civilians 
to join ; that experimental work in all branches 
of the corps must be co-ordinated. In order 
that it might fulfil these requirements it was laid 
down that the corps was to embrace a Naval 
Wing (with headquarters at Eastchurch) ; a 
Military Wing (Headquarters, South Farn- 
borough) ; a Central Flying School, to be estab- 
lished at Upavon, on Salisbury Plain ; and " The 



Royal Aircraft Factory," whose duties would be 
the higher training of mechanics, the recon- 
struction of aeroplanes, repair work for the 
corps, tests with British and foreign engines 
and aeroplanes, and experimental work. An 
officer from the Central Flying School and one 
each from the Naval and Military Wings would 
be added to the Aeronautical Advisory Com- 
mittee, which would continue its research work 
on existing lines. The new " Air Committee " 
has been mentioned above The ultimate 
development of the Naval Wing, it was ex- 
plained, could not be foreseen, inasmuch as it 
depended largely upon the result of experiments 
which were about to ' be undertaken with 
hydro -aeroplanes or, as they have since been 
named, seaplanes. The Military Wing would 
consist of a number of Squadrons, of which 
eight were urgently required to equip the 
Expeditionary Force seven being aeroplane 
squadrons and one consisting of airships and 
kites. Besides all this, the Royal Flying Corps 
was to possess a Reserve of unspecified dimen- 
sions, capable of absorbing in case of emergency 
the whole of the resources of the country in 
this branch of science. The Central Flying 
School was intended, not to teach officers of 
the Army or civilians to fly, but to give more 
advanced instruction to those who had learnt 
the elements and taken their Royal Aero Club 
flying certificate at a private aerodrome. The 
Central School would teach the things which 
make the difference between the mere airman 
and the military airman, the scientific* as 
opposed to what has been called the acrobatic 




MAURICE FARMAN BIPLANE, 
Known as the Gun 'Bus. 



IF. N. Birkttt. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



187 




AEROPLANE USED BY THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 



side of the business ; and the course of in- 
struction would include " progressive flying," 
observation and photography from the air, 
meteorology, flying by compass, signalling, and 
the like, as well as mechanics and the principles 
of construction. 

After successfully completing a four-months' 
course and " graduating " at the Central 
School, officers would be eligible for appoint- 
ment either (a) for continuous service in the 
Naval or Military Wing of the Royal Flying 
Corps, or (6) to the permanent staff of the 
Flying School, or (c) to the Royal Flying Corps 
Reserve. The term of continuous service 
under the conditions (a) and (6) was fixed at 
four years. Civilians were to pass as a rule 
direct into the Reserve with the rank of 
officers. This Reserve was divided into two 
classes, a First Reserve and a Second Reserve, 
in which the obligations undertaken in time of 
peace differed ; but both classes were equally 
liable to be called upon for service in war. 

A new and important feature of the scheme 
was the fact that now, for the first time, was 
undertaken the training of non-commissioned 
officers and men as well as of officers. They 
were either to be transferred from other arms 
of the service, naval or military, or enlisted 
specially for a period of four years. The Naval 
Flying School at Eastchurch, Isle of Sheppey, 
was to undertake more advanced and specialized 
training in observation, the transmission of 



intelligence and the like, together with experi- 
mental work and developments peculiar to the 
Navy ; while similar provision for special 
training in the Military Wing was made at 
the flying establishments of the Army. 

Officers in the Royal Flying Corps were 
graded in four ranks namely, Commanding 
Officer, carrying the temporary rank of lieu- 
tenant-colonel in the Army ; Squadron Com- 
mander, with rank of major ; Flight Com- 
mander, captain in the Army ; and Flying 
Officer, with subaltern's rank ; and the duties 
of all carried special rates of pay, terms as to 
pension, etc. 

The Commandant of the Central Flying 
School which was the joint property of the 
Navy and the Army, but was administered 
by the War Office might be appointed from 
either Service, and as a matter of fact at 
the moment when the War broke out the 
post was held by a naval officer. Captain 
Godfrey Paine, R.N. It was estimated at the 
outset that the total number of flyers required 
to be passed through the Central School in each 
year would be 179, made up as follows : For the 
Navy, 40 ; for the Army. 91 (half the number 
being officers and half non-commissioned 
officers) ; to make good failures and w astage, 
33 ; civilians, 15. 

As far as the Military Wing of the new corps 
was concerned, attention for the time being was 
concentrated upon the effort to supply the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




NAVY AIRSHIP, THE " ASTRA-TORRES.' 



requirements of the Expeditionary Force. The 
purposes for which aeroplanes would be 
required in land warfare were enumerated as 
follows : (a) Reconnaissance, (6) prevention of 
enemy's reconnaissance, (c) intercommunica- 
tion, (d) observation of artillery fire, (e) inflic- 
tion of damage on the enemy. For the Expe- 
ditionary Force of 6 divisions and 1 Cavalry 
Division the following establishments were 
laid down : 

Headquarters. 

7 Aeroplane Squadrons, each providing 12 
aeroplanes. 



1 Airship and Kite Squadron, providing 2 
airships and 2 flights of kites. 

1 Line of Communication Flying Corps 
Workshop. 

It was reckoned that the minimum number 
of trained flyers should be two per aeroplane, 
of whom one should be an officer, though in the 
case i of one-seated machines both should be 
officers. For purposes of calculation, however, 
one officer and one non-commissioned officer 
were allowed. On this basis the flyers required 
for the 7 squadrons were enumerated as 
follows : Officers, 7 commanders and 84 




THE "GAMMA" LEAVING HER SHED: THE "BETA" IN THE AIR. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



189 



others ; non-commissioned officers, 7 sergeants 
and 84 others. In addition, a Reserve calculated 
on a basis of 100 per cent, for 6 months' wastage 
exactly doubled the numbers, making a total 
of 182 officers and 182 non-commissioned 
officers, besides a considerable force of " air 
mechanics " ranking lower. Sheds for the 
aeroplanes were also to be provided for use in 
the field. The whole of this computation was 
regarded as a war establishment, to be com- 
pleted as rapidly as possible. The Memorandum 
recognized the great advantage of the airship 
in being able not only to transmit wireless 
messages, but to receive them also, and to 
transmit them to greater distances than the 
aeroplane, but declared that for the purposes 
of the Expeditionary Force " any immediate 
extension of the existing equipment of airships 
is unnecessary." In conclusion it insisted upon 
the importance of cross-country flights as an 
essential part of the training of military airmen, 
and announced certain steps that were to be 
taken to make provision for these through 
cooperation with private enterprise, to the 
encouragement of which, as also of meteoro- 
logical investigation, attention was being 
devoted. 

The Military Wing came into existence on 
May 13, 1912, on which date the Air Battalion 
and its Reserve were absorbed into it. 

This great scheme was hailed with welcome in 



The Times, whose Aeronautical Correspondent 
declared : 

It is hardly too much to say that now, for the first 
time, the Government show that they take flying 
seriously and that they intend that the British Navy 
and Army shall be equipped, at the earliest possible 
moment, with a sufficiency of the human and mechanical 
instruments of aerial warfare to bring them up to, and, 
it is hoped, to surpass, the standard in this respect 
already aimed at by other Great Powers. 

The sentences already quoted from Sir John 
French's dispatches throw into almost startling 
relief the progress OUT youngest military corps 
had made towards the attainment of this* ideal 
within a period of less than two years and a half. 

The Royal Flying Corps showed from the very 
first, in its vigorous capacity for growth, con- 
vincing proof of a healthy constitution. Not only 
did its numbers and its plant increase with 
rapidity, but the organization itself developed 
beyond the original limits of the scheme. It 
had existed little more than a year when it was 
found necessary to establish at the War Office 
a separate Department to administer the 
Military Wing of the Air. Service. The new 
post of Director-General of Military Aeronautics 
was created, and Brigadier-General David (now 
Major-General Sir David) Henderson, D.S.O., 
was selected as its first occupant. He was 
himself a certificated airman and an officer of 
the Royal Flying Corps Reserve. Further 
considerable changes came to pass before long. 




A PARSEVAL AIRSHIP. 



190 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




ZEPPELIN SHED AT DUSSELDORF. 
This photograph was taken from a Zeppelin. 



On January 1, 1914, the Army airships were 
turned over to the Navy. It had been found 
advisable for various reasons to make a clear 
line of division between the lighter-than-air 
machines and the heavier-than-air machines, 
and to administer them separately. The whole 
of the former were allotted to the Naval Winj;, 
although such airships as were suitable for 
purposes of land warfare were to be held at the 
disposal of the Army when required ; while the 
Army was to devote its whole effort henceforth 
to the heavier-than-air service. Some of the 
officers of the Military Wing passed over with 
the airships into the Naval Wing. 

This change was followed a few months later 
by a development of the Naval Wing itself in the 
direction of greater independence from the Army 
and closer incorporation in the structure of the 
Navy. It did not cease to be the " Naval Wing " 
of the Royal Flying Corps, but at the same t imc 
it acquired the new and more distinctive title i it' 
" The Royal Naval Air Service," and became 
in effect a new branch of the Royal Navy, in 
some respects analogous to the Royal Marines, 
although with regulations to suit its own 
peculiar requirements. Officers and men belong- 
ing to it were to be promoted independently of 



their rank in the Navy ; and, on the other hand, 
civilians might enter as officers, on engagements 
which would enable them if they proved suitable 
to make a career in the Royal Naval Air 
Service, while holding a position of ent in- 
equality with officers of the Navy and Marine- 
who were of the same grade and seniority. 
Civilians who so entered were to go to sea for a 
definite period in each year, in order that they 
might learn to identify themselves closely with 
the Navy and might acquire its traditions. 
They were to be required on entering to sign an 
engagement to serve four years, with four years 
more in the Royal Naval Air Reserve. 

The 'administration of the Royal Naval Air 
Service rested with the Admiralty, and con- 
sisted of : 

The Air Department, Admiralty. 

The Central Air Office at Sheerness. 

The Royal Naval Flying School at East- 
church. 

The Royal Naval Air Stations. 

All types of aircraft that might from time to 
time be employed for naval purposes. 

A portion of the staff of the Central Flying 
School was drawn from the Naval Wing. 

Officers in the Royal Naval Air Service were 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



191 



graded in the following ranks. The words 
within brackets indicate the relative rank in the 
regular naval service : 

Wing Captain (Captain, R.N.) ; Wing Com- 
mander (Commander, R;N.); Squadron Com- 
mander, when in command (Lieutenant-Com- 
mander, R.N. ) ; Squadron Commander, when not 
in command, Flight Commander, and Flight 
Lieutenant (Lieutenant, R.N., of various degrees 
of seniority) ; Flight Sub-Lieutenant (Sub-Lieu- 
tenant, R.N.) ; Warrant Officer, 1st and 2nd 
Grades. 

All promotions were by selection. 

As to the men of the Royal Naval Air 
Service, all classes of ratings on the active list 
of the Navy were eligible for selection to serve ; 
and it was expressly laid down that the service 
embraced employment hi connexion with any 
type of aircraft, in any part of the world, either 
ashore or afloat. 

The Air Department at the Admiralty was 
placed under a Director, and at the outbreak 
of the War this post was filled by Captain 
Murray F. Sueter, R.N., the recently appointed 
(and first) Director of the Air Department. The 
Central Air Office was at Sheerness, under the 
Inspecting Captain of Aircraft. Under him also 
were the Commanding Officer of the Naval 
Airship Section, the Commander of the Naval 
Flying School at Eastchurch who when the 
war broke out was the brilliant airman, Wing 



Commander Charles R. Samson and the 
Commanding Officers of the Naval Air Stations 
round the coast. The Commandant of the 
Central Flying School, as we have seen, was 
placed under the Director of Military Aero- 
nautics at the War Office, but was himself a 
naval officer. 

Naval Air Stations existed at various places 
round the coast, and the number was being 
steadily increased. By the summer of 1914 
there were seven, at the following places : 
Isle of Grain, Calshot, Felixstowe, Yarmouth, 
Kingsnorth (on the Medway, a few miles below 
Chatham), Fort George (Inverness-shire), and 
Dundee. Of these, Kingsnorth was an airship 
station, like the Farnborough station inland, 
which it was to supersede as headquarters of 
the Airship Section as soon as completed ; 
the rest were seaplane stations. The men at 
the seaplane stations occupied the old Coast- 
guard buildings and took over the Coastguard 
duties. 

The term " seaplane " was adopted by the 
Admiralty in 1913 to denote the naval hydro- 
plane, or hydro-aeroplane, an aeroplane which, 
in the place of wheels for alighting on the 
ground, had floats, various in design, for 
supporting it upon the water. Great progress 
had been made in this country both in the 
invention and in the provision of such machines, 
which could rise from, and alight, travel, or 




GERMAN MILITARY AEROPLANE PACKED FOR TRANSPORT ON A MOTOR. 



192 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



ri >( upon, the surface of the sea. even when 
not entirely calm. When the airships were 
handed over to the Navy at the beginning of 
1914, and the aeroplanes were allotted to the 
Army, this specialized form of aircraft was 
retained by the Admiralty as a distinctly naval 
instrument. It was tried with success at the 
Naval Manoeuvres of 1913, when the cruiser 
Hermes (which was sunk on Oct. 31, 1914, by a 
German submarine) was fitted with a launching 
platform and accommodation for several sea- 
planes on board, in order that these might be 
submitted to an exhaustive test. A large num- 
ber of flights were made, and as a result of the 
experience so gained it was decided to provide 
for the Navy a special vessel as a seaplane - 
carrying ship. At the same time advances 
were made in the designing of the seaplanes 
themselves, and, although many competing 
makes had been adopted experimentally in the 
service, the development of certain standard 
types for war purposes progressed rapidly. In 
the great fleet assembled for inspection by the 
King at Spithead about a fortnight before war 
was declared an imposing array of aircraft 
formed the most novel feature, and in the 



Solent, off (iilkieker Point, two down seaplanes 
rode at moorings alongside the ships. They 
had arrived and taken up their stations through 
the air, and they manoeuvred between or over 
the great lines of battleships and cruisers, 
sometimes 011 the surface of the water, some- 
times on the wing aloft, like so many gigantic 
seabirds. One, a Short machine, with a 14- 
cylinder Gnome engine of 160 horse-power and 
a speed of about 78 miles per hour, had a total 
weight with pilot and passenger, wireless 
equipment, and fuel and oil for five hours on 
board of over 3,000 Ib. Another, a Sopwith 
machine of 200 horse-power, carried and could 
fire a IJ-pounder gun. 

It is impossible to give statistics or anything 
like full particulars of our equipment in aircraft, 
anti-aircraft guns, and kindred matters ; lor 
details of this kind were, in this country as 
elsewhere in Europe, sedulously concealed ; 
but some facts had been made public in Minis- 
terial speeches or official publications. The 
number of airships in our possession was known, 
and was very few. In this department we had 
allowed ourselves to be far outstripped, espe- 
cially, of course, by Germany. We possessed 




LATEST TYPE GNOME ENGINE. 



[F. N. Bvkctl. 



THE TIMES HISTORY Of THE WAR. 



193 







FRENCH AEROPLANE ATTACKING A GERMAN TAUBE (ON THE LEFT). 



none at all of the larger "battle" class, to 
which the Zeppelins belonged ; but a contract 
had been made with Messrs. Vickers for a large 
rigid airship, to be built in England on the same 
general lines and of the same description as 
the latest type of Zeppelin, and with about 
the same displacement. With airships of the 
second class, for mine-laying and scouting, 
more progress had been made. An Astra-Torres 
ship, the most striking peculiarity of which was 
the shape of her envelope, which looked like 
three sausages tied in a bunch, giving a cross- 
section like the ace of clubs, had been delivered 
early in 1914 by the Astra Company of Paris. 
.She had a displacement of seven tons, was fitted 
with two 200 h.p. Chenu engines, and had at- 
tained the remarkable speed for a vessel of this 
class of 51 '1 miles per hour. A Parseval airship 
of 8'5 tons since increased to 10 tons was 
delivered from Germany in the summer of 
1913. She had two 180 h.p. engines and a 
speed of 42 miles an hour. Both these were of 
the non-rigid type. A second Astra-Torres, 
with a displacement of 12 tons, was under 
construction for us in France. Messrs. Vickers 
had contracted to supply three non-rigid ships, 
and Messrs. Armstrong, who had recently 
added a department for the building of airships 
to their extensive business, had undertaken to 
supply three 15-ton ships of a new Italian 



semi-rigid design, known as the Forlanini. The 
airships taken over from the Army were small, 
and useful rather for training and experimental 
work than for purposes of war. They con- 
sisted of the Eta of 3'5 tons, the Delta of 5'3 
tons, the Gamma of 3*4 tons, and the Beta of 
1'2 tons, besides the airship built by Mr. 
Willows, No. 2, which had been renovated and 
brought up to date for use in training. 

Airships require sheds. Of these Germany 
had a large supply, which she was rapidly 
increasing. Great Britain, on the other hand, 
was only beginning to provide them. The 
biggest we possessed were the two fixed sheds 
at Farnborough, built in 1909 and 1911, each 
300 feet in length. In place of these, which 
were ultimately to be removed, the Admiralty 
were constructing at- the new Kingsnorth 
airship station two sheds 600 feet long and 
80 feet high, but of different breadths 
120 feet and 160 feet. The larger of these was 
of German make, but was being erected by 
Messrs. Vickers, who were putting up a similar 
shed at their own works on Walney Island, 
. near Barrow, where they were about to build 
the rigid airship for which they held the con- 
tract. These two German-made sheds would 
hold four 10-ton ships each, or two rigids. 
It was in contemplation also to erect another 
shed in Norfolk. The small canvas portable 



lt4 



THE TIMES H1STOKY OF THE \YAlt. 




BATTERY OF MITRAILLEUSES USED 
FOR BRINGING DOWN AEROPLANES. 

i 

shed at Farnborough and the shed at Worm- 
wood Scrubs only 300 feet long and destitute 
of equipment were the only other things of 
the kind we had to show. 

Of seaplanes the Navy possessed in March, 
1914, a total of 62, but this species of craft was 
undergoing rapid development in both numbers 
and power. They had already reached a stage 



at which they could drop formidable explosives 
upon hostile vessels, and could signal 120 miles 
effectually by wireless telegraphy, and they 
had even received wireless messages while in 
the air. At the same date there were 125 
officers and 500 men in the Naval Air Service, 
with a rapid prospective increase of numbers 
in view. During the year 1913 the Naval 
Wing had accomplished nights of 131,000 miles, 
in all weathers and mainly across country. 

The Military Wing had been undergoing 
similar development, and had made great 
progress in the matter of the aeroplanes to 
which its efforts were now restricted. In the 
original scheme, it will be remembered, when 
the Royal Flying Corps was established in 
1912, the provision of eight squadrons was 
aimed at, of which seven were to be aeroplane 
squadrons and one an airship squadron. The 
latter was retained upon the establishment as 
an additional squadron of aeroplanes when the 
airships were handed over to the Navy, but by 
the summer of 1914 it had not been , actually 
formed. Each squadron was to be prepared at 
any given moment with 12 machines instantly 
ready for active service in war. These were 
organized in three " nights " of four aeroplanes 
apiece, much as a battery of artillery is divided 
into sections. But experience showed that for 
every machine required to be always ready for 
instant service it was necessary to have two 
machines in hand ; consequently the eight 
squadrons necessitated a stock of, in round 
numbers, 200 machines. In addition, 50 more 




THE ROYAL FLYING CORI S IN FRANCE. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



195 




LANDING AN AEROPLANE IN FRANCE FROM A BRITISH TRANSPORT. 



were wanted for the Central Flying School, 
besides a large provision of spare parts, and, 
of course, a proper equipment of accessories 
for repairs, etc. This made the establishment 
of aeroplanes for full equipment of the Expe- 
ditionary Force and the Central School 250 in 
all, when the whole eight squadrons should be 
complete. Towards this total, according to 
Colonel Seely's statement in the House of 
Commons in February, 1914, the Army at that 
date possessed 161 machines, having struck oft 
52 from, and added 100 new ones to, the total 
of 113 that existed at the end of the previous 
July. No doubt this number had been in- 
creased before the beginning of the war. The 
machines were of various types, but that most 
approved and comprising the majority in use 
was a product of the Royal Aircraft Factory, 
evolved after careful scientific and practical 
experiment in this country. It is known as 
the " B.E.," and exists in a variety of some- 
what differing designs. In the field aero- 
planes are attended by motor-cars convoying 



the equipment for supply and repairs upon 
which their continued efficiency depends. 

The excellence of the " B.E." machine proba 
bly contributed its share towards securing that 
"individual ascendancy" over the aircraft of 
the enemy to which Sir John French has borne 
such emphatic testimony. It is stated on com- 
petent authority to have proved its superiority 
in two qualities of prime importance, namely, 
speed and climbing power. The second is 
hardly, if at all, less valuable than the first ; for 
to be able to outclimb your enemy is practically 
to escape him. By getting above him you 
acquire command of all methods of attack. 
Climbing power is, indeed, to aircraft much the 
same as the possession of the weather gauge to 
line-of-battle ships in the old days of sailing 
navies. If the position of greater altitude does 
not in itself secure safety, so that escape by 
flight after all becomes necessary, you still hav^ 
the advantage, inasmuch as by diving at the 
start you can secure an enormous initial speed 
of flight. The carbine, the revolver, bomb- :.:: I 



lite, 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




METHOD OF DROPPING AIR BOMBS FROM AN AEROPLANE. 



multiple darts the dreaded steel flezhes are 
among the weapons at the disposal of the air- 
man holding the upper position ; moreover, he 
can head his adversary off by diving into his 
line of flight. The British " B.E." machine is 
also declared to be handier in steering than the 



G,erman " Taube," and much quicker in re- 
sponse to its controls. 

Its advantages were at once turned to full 
account by our brilliant and accomplished 
airmen, as soon as opportunitv was given them 
in actual warfare. 




CHAPTER XXXVI. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN 
PROBLEM. 






THE ANCILO-GERMAN AND AUSTBO-SLAV PROBLEMS- THEIR CONNEXION ORIGINS OF AUSTRIA 
THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE THE 1848 REVOLUTION AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY THE "COMPRO- 
MISE " FRANCIS JOSEPH'S POLICIES POSITION or THE CROWN RACIAL DISTRIBUTION ANALYSED 
GERMANS CZECHS SLOVAKS POLES RUTHENES SLOVENES SERBS AND CROATS ITALIANS 
RUMANIANS RACIAL PROBLEMS THE AUSIHO-GERMAN ALLIANCE THE MACEDONIAN QUES- 
TION SERBIA THE ANNEXATION CRISIS or 1908 THE REVOLUTION IN TURKEY THE ANTI- 
SERB CAMPAIGN FORGED EVIDENCE AUSTRO- GERMAN RELATIONS SUBORDINATION OF AUSTRIAN 
INTERESTS THE BALKAN WARS THE SERAJEVO MURDERS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF HUNGARY 
SOME AUTHORS OF THE WAR. 



FEW problems could have seemed at 
first sight more entirely separate than 
the rivalry between Germany and 
Great Britain and the feud between 
Austria -Hungary and the Slav populations 
within and without her borders. They were 
localized in different regions and appeared to 
involve quite distinct interests. But history 
shows that when problems of this kind reach a 
certain' state of tension they exercise a fatal 
attraction upon each other ; and these two 
questions were, as a matter of fact, much less 
distinct than might have been supposed. 
Amidst very differing circumstances the same 
powerful idea was at work the cause of 
Germanism. In Germany, the heart of the 
race, it displayed itself as a deliberate bid for 
world-dominion, prompted by the new gospel 
of power. In Austria-Hungary it took the 
form of an attempted chastisement of the 
Slav the last stage of a long warfare which 
had begun when Austria was a'medieval duchy. 
Whether this policy was primarily inspired by 
German or by Hungarian feeling, the main- 
tenance of Austria -Hungary's position in South - 
Eastern Europe was recognized at Berlin as a 
German interest. It is: this which unites the 
two cases, and explains why 'the murder of the 
Vol. II. Part 19. 197 



Austrian Heir-Presumptive in a Bosnian town, 
followed by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum 
to Serbia, laid a train of consequence which was 
to be felt in every town and village of the 
United Kingdom. 

Austria came into existence in the Middle 
Agos as a southern outpost of the Teuton 
against the Slav. As she absorbed large Slav 
populations in her own realm, this side of her 
policy faded into the background, from which 
it only emerged again with distinctness in the 
twentieth century. She soon occupied herself 
with other tasks and larger ambitions. Rudolf 
of Habsburg brought her, in the thirteenth 
century, the imperial title and the grandiose 
but unsubstantial dignities of the Holy Roman 
Empire. They gave her the right to supremacy 
in Germany, and the astuteness of her rulers 
gave her the power to make it effective. The 
extraordinary Habsburg talent for match- 
making enabled her patiently to lay field by 
field, not only in Germany, but in the Nether- 
lands, in Spain, and in Italy, and gave rise to 
the saying that while other nations made wars, 
Austria had only to make marriages. She long 
dominated Germany ; and for a moment, on 
the accession of Charles V., the greatest Habs- 
burg in history, she seemed likely to dominate 



198 



THE 37.1 //:> HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




, Vienna. 



THE KAISER AND THE AUSTRIAN EMPEROR. 



the world. But a division of the empire too 
vast and miscellaneous for a single ruler 
inevitably followed ; and in the seventeenth 
century the ravages of the Thirty Years' Win- 
with the rise of France as a great military- 
monarchy, began to undermine Austria's 
imperial position in Germany. The aggrandise- 
ment of Prussia uncLr Frederick the ( Jreat still 
more decidedly challenged her claim to the 
control of German interests. In 1806, while 
the Napoleonic wars were breaking up the map 
of Europe, Francis II. of Austria recognized in 
theory what was already becoming a fact, and 
took the title of hereditary Emperor of Austria, 
in exchange for that of Holy Roman Emperor, 
which had descended from Charlemagne. 
Austria's real position was defined. She had 
surrendered her patent of German sovereignty. 
Her power was now definitely localised in the 
Habsburg dominions and settled there on the 
dynastic basis of allegiance to the Habsburg 
House. She was still, as she issued from the 
struggle against Napoleon, territorially a most 
imposing State ? for, though she had sur- 
rendered the Netherlands and the last Habsburg 
domains upon the Rhine, she had acquired, in 
addition to her broad dominions in central 
Europe, the Illyrian and Dalmatian coastlands, 
and a great block of territory in Northern Italy 
which formed the kingdom of Lombardy- 
Venetia. On the strength of this she still 



dominated German politics as long as the 
old system of disunited German States 
survived. 

JThe chief political ideas of the nineteenth 
century were liberty and nationality, and each 
presented Austria with a crucial problem to 
solve. For a generation after the battle of 
Waterloo she was governed on Metternich's 
principle of iron resistance to change. No doubt 
it was for this reason that when the fateful 
"March Days" of 1848 shook the Habsburg 
throne to its foundations, and Austria was con- 
fronted at once with revolt in Italy and revolu- 
tion in Vienna, in Hungary and in Croatia, she 
failed disastrously to deal with the constitu- 
tional problem, and showed her recognition 
of nationalities mainly by using one race 
against another. She turned her composite 
army against Italy, the Germans against the 
Czechs, the Croats against the Magyars, called 
in a Russian army to complete the work, 
and then lapsed into ten years of repression 
even more sordid than the era of Metternich. 
Her best excuse is that the cause of liberty 
was bound up with nationalist claims which 
threatened the unity of the empire, but for 
her ruthless victory a price had to be paid. It 
was paid in part when France and Piedmont 
took up arms for Northern Italy in 1859 and 
Austria found herself powerless to prevent its 
liberation after the battle of Solferino because 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THK WAli. 



reactionary government had left her without 
any means to go on with the struggle. The 
rest of the penalty was exacted in 1866, when 
Prussia compelled Austria to decide by arms 
the question which State was to control the 
future of Germany. The minor German king- 
doms took Austria's- side, but the swift advance 
of the Prussian armies upset all calculations, 
and after six weeks' war Austria was decisively 
beaten and Bismarck had settled once for all 
that German unity would be established under 
Prussian leadership. More than this, Austria 
was by the battle of Sadowa definitely driven 
outside Germany. What 1 806 had foreshadowed, 
186ti realized. Her sole link with German y 
now was the German population inside her 
borders, and that was only one element in her 
strangely miscellaneous empire. Her ambitions 
could only lie eastwards. Her whole future 
depended on her adopting a wise internal policy 
which would satisfy the claims of her mixed 
populations, and breathe into them the sense 
of common interests and a common destiny. 
Perhaps this demanded superhuman statesman- 
ship ; it proved, in any case, far beyond the 
sagacity of the Emperor Francis Joseph and 
his advisers. 

The great question for Austria when she set 
her house in order in 1867 was how to deal with 
Hungary. Hungary, like every other part of 
the empire, had racial problems of her own, 
but she had been effectively dominated for 
centuries by her original conquerors, the 
Magyars, a high-spirited aristocracy alien in 
race both to the Germans and the Slavs, filled 
with a strong sense of their past glories and 
constitutional privileges, and firmly believing 
in their mission to govern less distinguished 
peoples. They roused much sympathy in 
Western Europe by their brilliant defence of 
political liberty in 1848, when they were only 
crushed after Austria had mobilized the rest 
of her empire against them and called in 
Russian aid. At the height of the crisis the 
Emperor Ferdinand had sanctioned laws 
which made Hungary almost an independent 
State, and though these were afterwards with- 
drawn the Hungarians clung to the ideal they 
embodied and refused to recognize any arrange- 
ments for merging them in the rest of the empire. 

Hungary's attitude had been a serious weak- 
ness to Austria in the war of 1866, and directly 
this was over k was clear that a settlement must 
be arrived at. The most hopeful arrangement 
would have been one giving to the Czechs 




GENERAL ALEXANDER KROBATIN, 
Austro-Hungarian Minister of War. 

of Bohemia and the Slavs in the southern 
part of the empire approximately equal 
privileges with those of the Germans and the 
Magyars, and Belcredi, the Austrian Premier, 
was in favour of a federalising plan which 
would have done this. But Francis Joseph, 
on the morrow of the war with Prussia, 
cherished the idea of revenge, and his new 
Foreign Minister, Beust, a Saxon, and a 
jealous enemy of Bismarck, was willing to 
give Hungary her independence if he could 
thereby get a solidarity of feeling in case of 
war. The settlement of 1867 reflected their 
state of mind ; it showed every sign of being 
made in an emergency. Instead of dealing 
comprehensively with all the races in the 
empire, it. was a purely dual arrangement 
between Austria and Hungary, after a nego- 
tiation in which Hungary held the stronger 
cards. The two countries came out of it 
apparently equal partners, and " Austria- 
Hungary," or the " Dual Monarchy," became 
recognized names for what had before been 
only known as " Austria." The first link 
between them was the person of the Monarch 
" Emperor " in Austria and " Apostolic King " 
in Hungary. The second was their common 
share in .three joint departments of State 
Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance. These 
departments were not directly responsible 
either to the Austrian or the Hungarian 
Parliaments, but to two Delegations of sixty 
members, chosen from each, and meeting in 
alternate years at Vienna and Budapest to 



200 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




COUNT VON AERENTHAL, 

Late Minister for Foreign Affairs "The Bismarck 

of Austria-Hungary." 

discuss joint affairs and estimates. A Customs 
Alliance, renewable every ten years, settled 
the commercial relations of Austria and 
Hungary. This was a matter for direct arrange- 
ment between the Ministries and Parliaments of 
the two countries, and in case it lapsed Hungary 
retained the right of regulating her own economic 
interests as she pleased. Such, in outline, was 
the famous " Compromise " or Ausgleich, which 
governed the internal relations of Austria- 
Hungary up to 1914. 

It was just the sort of arrangement which 
looks very fair on paper and demands an 
immense amount of mutual reasonableness 
in practice: This might be hoped for from 
Francis Joseph, who had been trained in 
the school of adversity, and had a strong 
sense of his duties as a ruler. It might be 
hoped for and was loyally given by the politi- 
cal leaders who first guided Hungary after 
the settlement, statesmen of real distinction 
like Deak and Andrassy, who took a broad 
and far-sighted view of the settlement they 
had made. Still, the Hungarians had ex- 
posed themselves to temptations to which 
sooner or later they were bound to yield. 
They had created a position which overbalanced 
that of their partners in the Monarchy. Austria 
was not a thoroughly coiistitutionalized State 
like Hungary : her Constitution had been issued 
for her at the Emperor's pleasure, whereas that 



of Hungary had been an equal contract betweea 
the Magyar nation and the Crown. Nor did 
the character of the Austrian-Germans in the 
least resemble that of the Hungarians. The 
Hungarians were born leaders, orators, and 
politicians, and had been trained for centuries 
in the art of government. The Austrian- 
Germans were easy-going, pleasure-loving 
people, accustomed to having their govern- 
ment done for them. They could not even 
oppose to Hungary the compact racial strength 
which she possessed. The Magyars of Hungary 
secured this by the simple expedient of practi- 
cally shutting out the other nationalities 
from the franchise, but in the Austrian lands 
the supremacy of the German element was 
challenged by the Slavs, who were actually 
more numerous, and in Bohemia, at least, 
had a sense of national patriotism and historic 
unity like that of the Magyars. After 1871, 
when German victories in France and the 
foundation of the German Empire robbed 
Austria-Hungary of any lingering desire she 
may have had for revenge or interference in 
German affairs, the Emperor Francis Joseph 
sought for a few months deliberately to promote 
the influence of the Austrian Slavs at the ex- 
pense of the Austrian Germans. His efforts 
were checked by the combined opposition of 
Bismarck, Beust, and Andrassy, and, until 
1879, Austrian-German influence in Austria 
was unchallenged. But from 1879 onwards 
Francis Joseph reverted to his plan of promoting 
Slav development, and the Austrian-Germans 
became even less the equals of the Magyars 
than they had been before. 

The real countercheck to Hungarian self- 
assertion, in point of fact, has always been, not 
Austria, but the Crown. It was only the im- 
mense influence of the Sovereign which kept his 
ill-assorted empire together, saved apparently 
impossible situations, and, it must be added, 
sometimes took liberties which would have been 
the death-blow of any parliament. This suc- 
cess must not be ascribed to any extraordinary 
wisdom on the part of Francis Joseph, amiable 
and devoted as his private character was. 
His public policy on occasions has been rather 
aptly compared to that of "a landlord who 
ignores the petty tyranny exercised by his 
estate -agent and dismisses the agent only 
when revenue falls off or disturbances occur." 
But he knew how to make a constant and tactful 
use of that remarkable blend of personal 
authority and dynastic prestige which the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



201 



Habsburgs have possessed beyond any other 
riders. They gained it, no doubt, because they 
were the one institution in which all the races 
of the empire shared, and because they had 
been in a real sense the makers of their realm. 
They were the more popular since they had 
aggrandized it not so much by warfare, like 
the Hohenzollerns, as by statecraft of a personal 
kind. Even the heavy-handed policy of their 
severer moments had not quite robbed them of 
popularity, and it had certainly paved the way 
for their unchecked power. In few times or 
countries has State action been more ruthlessly 
applied than it was by Ferdinand II. in en- 
forcing the Catholic Counter-Reformation on 
unwilling subjects, by Joseph II. in laying 
out his backward dominions on ready-made 
philosophic principles, or by Metternich and 
Bach in stifling the soul of a people through 
official tyranny. The accumulated result of 
this was an immense fund of personal 
authority for the Habsburgs. Francis Joseph 
drew freely on it, and as he and his peoples fared 
together through the occasional triumphs and 
the more frequent disasters, public and private, 
which marked his reign, the feeling grew that, 
whatever the shortcomings of Austria-Hungary 
might be, a really paternal relation had been 
established between the Monarch and his 
subjects. 

Unfortunately, this did not prevent much 
dangerous friction from arising with Hungary 
when the patriotic generation of 1867 had 
passed away. The most serious internal 
crisis which the Dual Monarchy went through 
was that which, from 1902-1906, threatened 
the unity of the Monarchy in its most vital 
point the Army and almost paralysed the 
working of the whole constitutional machine. 
The affair showed how inflammable was 
" Magyar Chauvinism," and how little the 
Hungarian extremists cared for the common 
interests of the Monarchy when they had 
become excited over their own point of 
view. A quarrel arose because Bills had been 
presented to the Austrian and Hungarian 
Parliaments for an increase in the numbers of 
the army, and the Government had been ill- 
judged enough to retain several thousand 
supernumerary recruits with the colours, 
pending the adoption of the Bills. This was 
enough for the Hungarian nationalists, who at 
once came out with the demand that the 
Magyar language should be used in commands 
to Hungarian regiments, or else that the Bills 




, Vienna. 

BARON FRIEDRICH VON GEORGI, 
Minister for National Defence. 

should be withdrawn. The Crown was obliged 
to withdraw the Bills, though the Austrian 
Beichsrat had already passed those affecting 
Austria, and regarded them as a patriotic 
measure. But the conflict was far from 
calming down. Ministry succeeded Ministry 
in Hungary, government was almost brought 
to a standstill, and the controversy went on 
raging as to how the extremist demands could 
be reconciled with the Sovereign's prerogatives 
as " supreme war-lord " and his unitary direc- 
tion of the army. It was only ended by 
the Crown's threatening Hungary with universal 
suffrage, whereupon the Magyars grew so 
alarmed at the prospect of losing a political 
ascendancy that depended on their narrow 
franchise that they were willing to compromise. 
But the dispute had strained to the last point 
of tension both Royal influence and Hungarian 
polisy, and it had placed a deliberate slight on 
Austria by obliging her to repeal, at Hungary's 
dictation, Bills which she had already passed. 
It was by crises of this kind that the relations 
of the Austrian-Germans and the Magyars 
were embittered, and if there had been no 
counteracting influence it is not very likely 
that the framework of the Dual Monarchy 
would have survived up to 1914 without a 
change. But a common enemy is an excellent 

192 



202 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



political bond ; nnd the Austrian-Germans and 
the Magyars were both so apprehensive of the 
Slavs that they recognized an advantage in 
keeping together. Finally, the development 
of Slav States like Serbia and Bulgaria beyond 
the frontier, and the intense racial feeling among 
the Slav populations within it, established that 
real community of policy between Germans and 
Magyars which was one of the chief causes of 
the war. 

The whole question of the races in the empire 
which is at once the "Austrian " question and 
the question of 1914, can only be appreciated 
if we realize how they are distributed and what 
is their relative weight. 

Taking the Austrian territories first, we find 
that according to the census of 1910 they con- 
tained approximately nine million Germans, 
nearly six million Czechs and Slovaks, four 
million Poles, three million Ruthenes, a million 
Slovenes, 700,000 Serbs and Croats, 700,000 
Italians, and 200,000 Rumanians. It will bo 
seen that the Germans thus numbered only 
about a third of a population which was 
mainly Slav. The Slav peoples fall, roughly 
speaking, into three groups. First come the 
" Northern Slavs," as they may be called, 
the Czechs, or Slavs of Bohemia, and the 
Slovaks in Moravia, the contiguous province. 



They were isolated from the " Southern Slavs" 
by the two German-speaking provinces of 
Upper and Lower Austria. Bohemia, the 
centre of this group, was a province with a 
distinct national consciousness and a long 
history, in which the Hussite struggles and the 
Thirty Years' War had left an ineffaceable 
stamp on the people. The ancient Bohemian 
kingdom dated from the eleventh century, and 
had passed to the Habsburgs in the sixteenth. 
Ferdinand II. in the seventeenth century and 
Joseph II. in the eighteenth had each con- 
tributed to extinguish it, Ferdinand by sup- 
pressing its free constitution, and Joseph by 
refusing to be crowned as King of Bohemia in 
its capital, Prague. None the less, the Bohe- 
mians had never really lost their sense of 
independent existence, and as the smaller 
nationalities revived in Europe during 'the 
nineteenth century under the stimulus of the 
nationalist movement, the Czech race and 
Czech language increased until nearly three- 
quarters of these provinces could be reckoned 
Slavonic. Their commercial importance Bo- 
hemia stood first among the Austrian provinces 
as regards industry, and had become a great 
manufacturing centre made it impossible for 
them to be ignored ; and their lively intelligence 
was sure to make the most of political oppor- 




THE ARCHDUKE FRIEDRICH (Commander in-Chief) and 
GENERAL BARON KONRAD VON HC-TZENDORF (Chief of the General Stafl). 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



tunities. In the education of the people they 
had advanced beyond any other Austrian 
province. 

The next great Slav group after the Czechs 
and Slovaks was to be found in Austrian 
Poland, which formed the province of Galicia. 
Galicia, the north-eastern corner of the empire, 
was the largest of the Austrian lands. It was 
dominated, politically speaking, by the Poles, 
though relatively they were not much more 
numerous than the Buthenes. Between these 
two Slav peoples the relation was that of 
master and subject. The Poles, like their 
fellow-countrymen in Germany and Russia, 
belonged to the hapless race which, after a 
brilliant if wayward history, had lost their 
unity and independence through their own 
factiousness and the greed of their more power- 
ful neighbours. Those of them who had fallen 
to Austria's share were very much better off 
than the Poles in Germany or Russia, for 
Austria had thought it best to conciliate 
them by giving them a large share of autonomy 
and confirming their supremacy over the 
Ruthenes. In fact, if she had not done so she 
would have found it difficult to induce the Poles 
to vote for the settlement of 1867. The 
Ruthenians were racially the same people as 
the Litti - Russians, their neighbours across the 
frontier, who inhabited the wide Ukraine region 
of the Russian Empire. There was always a 
potential menace to Austrian rule in Galicia 
through the presence of this large Russian 
element, indistinguishable from their 30 million 
kinsmen in the neighbouring governments of 
the Czar. They were divided from the Poles 
not only by race but by religion, the Poles being 
ardent Roman Catholics, while the Ruthenes 
belonged either to the Orthodox Church or the 
" Greek United," which combines Roman 
Catholic doctrine with Orthodox rites. More 
recently Austria changed her policy and began 
to encourage the Ruthenes, aiming apparently 
at the creation of a new Ruthene border 
province which might prevent them from 
hankering after Russia. This was not very 
agreeable to the Poles, who also had to compete 
with a large Jewish population, holding most 
of Galicia's commerce in their hands a fact of 
importance in view of the large transit trade 
with Russia in the east. 

The third substantial Slav group in the Aus- 
trian Empire were the Slovenes. These were 
chiefly to be found in the southern provinces of 
Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, specially the 




GENERAL KONRAD VON HOTZENDORF. 
Chief of the General Staff. 

latter. Being a tractable people without an 
uncomfortably historic past, they had been more 
liberally treated than most of the Austrian Slavs 
in the matter of their language, and had pre- 
served their identity without giving political 
trouble. The Serbs and Croats, the other block 
of " Southern Slavs," were chiefly of importance 
in connexion with their brethren under direct 
Hungarian rule in Croatia, where the racial 
question, as we shall see, was acute. Finally, 
the Italians in Tirol and the Trentino and 
Istria must not be forgotten. They were still 
another discordant element in the polyglot 
empire, vociferous out of all proportion to their 
numbers and importance, but a perpetual 
anxiety both to Austria and Italy, because they 
kept alive the old grievance of " Irredentism," 
recalled the time, not far distant, when Austria 
had tyrannized over some of the fairest lands 
of Italy, and prompted the question why 
Austria should still detain this Italian remnant. 
Such was the miscellaneous grouping of races 
in Austrian territory, without reckoning for the 
moment the equally crucial questions of the 
same kind which belonged to Hungary. In the 
main it was a problem of German and Slav, 
and the Slavs were in a majority. From the 
time of the Dual Settlement, save for a brief 
interlude in 1870, up to the conclusion of the 



204 



7V//-; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



Austro-German Alliance in 1879, Austrian policy 
favoured the Germans ; but after the conclu- 
sion of the Alliance it took a new turn, .and 
proceeded to favour the Slavs at the expense 
ot the Germans. It may have been more 
than a coincidence indeed, that almost directly 
after the German victories of 1870 over the 
French, Francis Joseph -held out hopes to 
Bohemia of a constitution on the Hungarian 
model, -and led the Czechs to believe that he 
might be crowned as King of Bohemia at 
Prague. This, of course, would have delighted 
the Slavs, but it would have upset the Dual 
basis of the empire, and the Austrian-Germans 
and the Hungarians alike united to prevent it. 
Francis Joseph had to recede from his position, 
and the later developments of his Slav policy 
were less 'demonstrative. None the less, it was 
steadily carried out through the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century by the Emperor and 
a Slav-Clerical majority, led first by Count 
Taaffe and then by Count Badeni. It was the 
will of the Emperor rather than the will of the 
people which prevailed, but political conditions 
were equalized and a surprising sign of confi- 
dence in democracy was given in 1906 by the 
establishment of universal suffrage. The result 
of this, combined with a redistribution of seats, 
was that 259 Slav deputies were sent to the 
Lower House of the Austrian Roichsrat as 



against 233 Austrian-Germans. Even with the 
deputies of " Latin " race the Germans were 
still in a minority compared with the Slavs, and 
as the electoral law made parliamentary con- 
tests between different races impossible, this 
meant that the Slavs were placed permanently 
in a majority, especially as the Italian deputies 
cooperated with them rather than with the 
Germans. So far as Austria was concerned, 
therefore, the Slavs had won their way to a 
very tolerable position ; they predominated in 
the Reichsrat, even if the administration was 
still German. The Slav question would pro- 
bably have solved itself if it had not been for 
the acute form in which it reappeared in Hun- 
gary ;_ and we have now to see what the con- 
ditions were in that half of the Dual Monarchy. 
In Hungary there were, in 1910, ten 
million Magyars, including a million Jews, 
two million Germans, nearly two million 
Slovaks, nearly three million Rumanians, 
the same number of Serbs and Croats, and 
400,000 Ruthenes. The Magyars chiefly occu- 
pied the great central plain of the Danube and 
the Theiss, and had kindred settlers long estab- 
lished eastwards, in Transylvania. They were 
neither Germans nor Slavs, and their origin and 
affinities have always been perplexing. Racially 
tb^y were akin to the Finns, and l^d swept 
into Central Europe among the invading hosts 




SWEARING ALLEGIANCE AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY, VIENNA. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



205 



of the Dark Ages ; linguistically they belong, 
like the Turks and Mongols, to the Turanian 
family. The Magyar aristocracy of the present 
day have kept a good deal of the high spirit 
and gallantry which their ancestors displayed 
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
when they were the foremost champions of 
Europe against the Turks. In the fifteenth 
century Hungary had been one of the strongest 
and wealthiest of medieval States ; but the 
Tiu-kish attacks and occupation thinned the 
numbers of the Magyars greatly, and the mixed 
population of the present day is the result of 
the immigration which took place afterwards to 
fill up the land. It will be seen, however, that 
the position of the Magyars in Hungary was 
relatively stronger than that of the Germans in 
Austria, and their numbers were increased by 
the deliberate " Magyarization " of other races 
which they, carried on in recent times. None 
the less, they kept, much more decidedly than 
the Austrian-Germans, the character ot an 
aristocracy dominating over inferiors, and the 
basis of this was a franchise which has been 
described as the most illiberal in Europe, which 
gave votes to only 6 per cent, of the population, 
and was, in fact, simply an instrument for 
keeping the Magyars in power. There were 
two races whose grievance against them was 
particularly strong. The Rumanians, who were 
mostly localized in Transylvania, were treated 
by the Magyar minority practically as a subject 
population, a condition all the more galling as 
just across the frontier men of their own race 
had built up the independent kingdom of 
Rumania, the earliest of the Balkan kingdoms 
to reach stability and power. There was always a 
chance that the cry might be raised of Rumania 
Irredenta, and schemes for the formation of a 
" Greater Rumania " be formed on both sides 
of the border. 

But a much more critical question was 
raised by the large population of Croats 
and Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia, Istria, and 
Dalmatia the lands to the south of Hungary 
and those along the Adriatic coast. Here 
was the germ of the real " Southern Slav " 
problem. Croatia, which had belonged to 
Hungary since the eleventh century, was still 
ruled from Budapest. It had a one-Chamber 
assembly which dealt with public worship, 
education, justice and some provincial affairs ; 
but its important measures had to be counter- 
signed by the Minister who represented Croatia 
in the Hungarian Government. The effective 




PRINCE BISMARCK IN 1894. 

administration of the country was in the hands 
of the Ban or Viceroy, who, though nominated 
by the Crown, was practically both appointed 
and removable by the Hungarian Premier. 
There had been one moment in the nineteenth 
century when the Croats played an independent 
part in history, with unfortunate results for 
themselves. That was in 1848, when Jellat- 
chich, a Croat who held the office of Ban, used 
the forces of his country on behalf of the 
Austrian Government against Hungary in the 
revolution which had torn the empire asunder. 
It was Kossuth's intolerant Magyarism which 
led Jellatchich into the field against him, and 
made the cause of Hungarian liberty odious in 
Croatian eyes. Between the Croats and the 
Russians, Hungary was subdued, but the Croats 
did not escape from her dominion, and the recol- 
lection of what Jellatchich had done was not 
likely to make the Magyars tender to Croatian 
feelings. The Croats and Serbs were held 
sternly down and governed by repression or cor- 
ruption, or a combination of the two. As Fiuine, 
Hungary's one port and outlet to the sea, lay in 
Croatian territory, she had another reason for 
not relaxing her grip in this quarter. So the 
Croats and Serbs remained in political thraldom, 
which might well have seemed hopeless till the 
rise of Serbia and the military triumphs of the 
Balkan States gave a fresh stimulus to Southern 
Slav feeling. But that belongs to a later phase, 



200 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



which must be dealt with in its place ; here it 
need only be said that, while the treatment of 
the Serbs and Croats by Hungary was a serious 
(law in the Dual Monarchy, it did not become a 
pressing danger till the Balkan problem grew 
acute between 1908-1914. Its gravity was that 
it illustrated the reckless particularism of the 
Magyars in dealing with these racial questions 
a frame of mind which might one day threaten 
the whole of Austria-Hungary with ruin. 
Austria, under pressure of circumstances, had 
learned to treat her Slav subjects in a fairly 
comprehensive spirit. But Hungary remained 
unteachable, and even her virtues 'seemed to 
become vices when she had to deal with the Slavs. 
On the morrow of the Franco-German War, 
however, the uncomfortable possibilities of the 
Slav question were still latent. What Austria- 
Hungary, like the rest of the world, had to do 
was to adapt herself to the new situation created 
by the foundation of the German Empire and 
the overthrow of France. She frankly recog- 
nised the fait accompli. Under the guidance of 
Beust's successor, Andrassy, the last Hungarian 
statesman who played a really great part on the 
European stage and refused to limit his vision 
by the interests of his particular race, she 
accepted her exclusion from Germany and put 
away her resentment towards the new German 
Power. The first form which the cooperation 
with Germany took was the Three Emperors' 
League, not a formal alliance, but a more 
or less personal understanding between the 
Sovereigns and Ministers of Germany, Austria- 
Hungary and Russia. This lasted from 1872 
to 1877, and during that time it guaranteed 
Germany the fruits of her victory over France 
by condemning the latter to isolation, and it 
established a political entente between the 
Powers of Central and Eastern Europe. But 
Russia did not remain in league with the central 
European Powers. In 1879 a new combination 
was formed between Austria-Hungary and 
Germany only. This was the Austro-German 
Alliance which was still in force in 1914 and 
which, widened afterwards by the inclusion of 
Italy, was to be known as the Triple Alliance. 
The terms of its two operative clauses were 
published in 1888, and in view of their great 
importance they may be given here : 

Clause I. " Should, contrary to the hope and 
against the sincere wish of the two high con- 
tracting parties, one of the two Empires be 
attacked by Russia, the high contracting parties 
are bound to stand bv each other with the 



whole of the armed forces of their Empires, 
and in consequence thereof, only to conclude 
peace jointly and in agreement. 

Clause II. Should one of the high contract- 
ing parties be attacked by another Power, the 
other liigh contracting party hereby binds 
itself, not only not to stand by the aggressor of 
its high ally, but to observe at least an attitude 
of benevolent neutrality towards its higii 
co-contractor. 

If, however, in such a case, the attacking 
Power should be supported by Russia, either 
in the form of active cooperation or by military 
measures menacing to the party attacked, the 
obligation defined in Clause I. of reciprocal help 
with the entire armed strength, comes im- 
mediately into force in this case also, and the 
war will then also be waged jointly by the two 
high contracting parties until the joint conclu- 
sion of peace." 

In form it was a defensive alliance directed 
against Russia. Germany, foreseeing the possible 
Franco -Russian combination against her, did 
not want to have to meet Austria-Hungary 
also. Austria -Hungary did not want to have 
to fight Russia single-handed. It was not likely 
that Germany would join Russia against her, 
but it was only too probable that if Germany ab- 
stained she would put in a claim at the peace for 
substantial compensations. Looking retrospec- 
tively at the alliance, we see that it only reached 
its full scope when France and Russia formed 
their counter-alliance afterwards. Its terms 
and liabilities were in themselves perfectly clear. 
But Austria-Hungary was not aware that 
within five years of its conclusion it had been 
undermined by a secret agreement between 
Germany and Russia. This was Bismarck's 
famous " reinsurance treaty." The old Chan- 
cellor enlivened his retirement by letting out 
the secret in 1896, and it threw a curious light 
on the diplomatic chessboard and particularly 
on Bismarck's stratagems. It appeared that 
in 1884 the two Empires had made an agree- 
ment that, if one of them was attacked, the 
other would remain benevolently neutral. Of 
course there was nothing in this arrangement 
which expressly contravened the terms of the 
Austro-German alliance, as that provided simply 
against an attack by Russia on Austria-Hungary 
or Germany. The "reinsurance treaty" con- 
cerned itself only with the contingency of an 
aggressive attack on Russia. Bismarck even 
went so far as to maintain, in the controversy 
which followed his indiscretion, that it would be 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



20? 




VIENNA. 

The Schotten-Ring in the Kingstrassc. 



[Underwood & Underwear. 



a good thing if the whole Triple Alliance con- 
cluded similar treaties with Russia. But the 
impression was that he had been a little too 
clever. If Austria-Hungary and Russia had 
gone to war Germany would have had to decide 
which was the aggressor whether, in fact, she 
was to grant the Austrian demand for armed 
help or the Russian demand for benevolent 
neutrality. " Too complicated," was the epithet 
applied to this position by Bismarck's successors 
in Germany, and they let the reinsurance treaty 
lapse. Austria-Hungary received Bismarck's 
disclosures calmly, but they were bound to 



make her feel uncomfortable, and she gave 
signs of having taken them to heart. Without 
departing from her obligations under the 
German alliance she drew closer to Russia, and 
in the next year, 1897, an Austro-Russian 
agreement was made for the pursuit of a common 
policy in the Balkans. This put an end, for the 
time, to the rather dubious relationship of 
Austria-Hungary towards Russia during the 
last half -century. Russia had saved the Austrian 
Empire from disruption in the revolution of 
18489 by sending in an army to reconquer 
Hungary : and Austria, fulfilling Schwarzen- 



208 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




FELDZEUGMEISTER OSKAR POTIOREK, 

In charge of the Transport Department of the 

Austro-Hungarian Army. 

berg's prediction that she would astonish the 
world with her ingratitude, had repaid this 
assistance by failing to aid Russia against the 
Western Powers during the Crimean War, or 
even to assure her of neutrality. The estrange- 
ment which natuially followed was checked 
when Austria-Hungary and Russia combined 
in the Three Emperors' League, an arrange- 
ment which satisfied at least the conservative 
instincts of both. When the Eastern question 
was reopened in 1875 by the rising of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina against Turkish rule, and the 
Russo-Turkish war followed, Russia purchased 
Austria-Hungary's acquiescence in the con- 
quests she expected to make from Turkey by 
agreeing to Austrian acquisition of the two 
revolted provinces. But Austro-Russian rela- 
tions seemed fated not to work smoothly, and 
here, again, there was a hitch, for ultimately 
Russia would not allow Austria-Hungary to 
annex Bosnia-Herzegovina, though she con- 
sented to an Austrian occupation and adminis- 
tration of the provinces. Russia's own aims 
had been thwarted by the Congress of Berlin, 
and she probably held that the situation had 
been changed since the first agreement. A 
similar misunderstanding, though a more 
dangerous, and on Austria-Hungary's part a 
more deliberate, one, was to put an end eventu- 
ally to the Balkan agreement of 1897. At first, 
however, the relations of the two Powers went 



smoothly. Russia was chiefly occupied at the 
moment with pursuing her ambitions in the Far 
East, and she was quite ready to work in concert 
with Austria-Hungary in the question, which 
was now coming to the front, of getting reforms 
in Macedonia. 

It was from the raising of the Macedonian 
question at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and the discordant interests involved, 
that events led almost continuously on to the 
crisis of the great war. We have glanced 
already at the complicated race problems of 
Austria-Hungary, and seen how the most impor- 
tant of them all was likely to be presented by 
the Slavs. We have now to look at the Slav 
problem as it had developed itself beyond the 
borders of the Dual Monarchy, and trace the 
way in which this question and that of the 
Austrian Slavs reacted on each other. The 
history of South-Eastern Europe in the nine- 
teenth and twentieth centuries is a tale of the 
successive liberation of tracts of territory and 
the formation of Christian States out of the 
dominions of the Turk. Greece, Serbia, and 
Rumania had all attained full or modified 
independence at the time of the Russo-Turkish 
War. After that struggle, which had been pro- 
voked by Slav risings in the Bosnian and 
Bulgarian provinces, Rumania, Serbia, and 
Montenegro became fully independent, Bulgaria 
was made an " autonomous vassal State," and 
soon after successfully defied the shortsighted 
decisions of the Berlin Congress by annexing 
Eastern Rumelia the Southern Bulgaria of 
to-day and Austria-Hungary entered into 
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By 
the freeing of Serbia and Bulgaria two powerful 
centres of Slav nationality had been created, 
or rather revived. When reference is made to 
a " Pan-Serb agitation " or " Bulgarian propa- 
ganda " it must not be supposed that these 
movements appealed to feelings which have 
been entirely created since 1878. The semi- 
historical, semi-legendary glories of the Serbs 
and Bulgars have a considerable basis of fact, 
and strike their roots very deeply into the past. 
In the tenth century and again in the thirteenth 
there had been a Bulgarian Empire which 
covered all the modern " Balkans," and left 
the Byzantine Caesars with little except Con- 
stantinople and the cities nearest it. In the 
fourteenth century Stephen Dushan had founded 
a Serbian Empire of even larger dimensions and 
led an army of 80,000 men within striking dis- 
tance of Constantinople. The possession of 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



209 



Constantinople by a line of vigorous Slavonic 
princes might have repulsed the Turk and 
changed the whole history of Eastern Europe. 
But Stephen died in his camp, and the Balkans 
lapsed under the crushing weight of Turkish 
dominion till the nineteenth century. The 
Turks did their work more thoroughly here 
than they did when masters of Hungary. 
While the aristocracy survived among the 
Magyars, it was crushed out in Serbia and 
Bulgaria, which emerged when they gained 
their freedom as peasant States of a democratic 
type -and perhaps none the weaker for the 
fact. But the strength which they displayed 
in the Balkan War was not gained in a day. 
For a long time Austria-Hungary held Serbia 
in tutelage. Serbia had no outlet to the sea, 
and practically no markets for her agricultural 
produce except that afforded by her powerful 
neighbour across the Danube. She was also 
unlucky enough to have, in King Milan, a 
shiftless and expensive Monarch, who was always 
out of pocket, and found Vienna the easiest 
source for replenishing his purse. The part 
which Austria-Hungary played in these circum- 
stances was anything but creditable. She con- 
trolled Serbian commerce, exploited King Milan's 
vices, and set Serbia on to fight Bulgaria just 
when the latter was freeing her southern terri- 
tory from Turkey. As long as the Obrenovitch 
dynasty sat on the Serbian throne this ascen- 
dency of Austria-Hungary continued. The 
savage murder of King Alexander and his 
Queen at Belgrade in 1903 enthroned the 
Karageorgevitch dynasty instead, in the person 
of King Peter, and was a first step towards 
Serbian emancipation. Whether the conspira- 
tors acted with pro-Russian aims or not, stress 
of circumstances was to draw Serbia before long 
away from Austria-Hungary and into the orbit 
of her more natural protector, Russia. In 1905 
she struck a blow for freedom by concluding a 
Customs Union with Bulgaria. Austria-Hun- 
gary, disturbed at this symptom of independence 
and cooperation among Balkan States, replied 
by making a tariff war on Serbia the " Pig 
War," which was to exclude the large supply 
of Serbian swine and cattle from the Austro- 
Hungarian market. The weapon she used 
recoiled to some extent on herself ; the price of 
meat rose and her agrarian parties profited 
freely from the situation at the expense of the 
people generally. But for Serbia the affair was 
vital. It drove her to look for markets beyond 
Austria-Hungary, and she displayed a spirit of 



independence in so doing which carried her far 
on the road to power. It saved her also from 
falling into military dependence on the Dual 
Monarchy. Instead of relying on Austrian 
factories for the purchase of materiel to equip 
her new army, she went westwards, and bought 
Creuzot guns and ammunition from France. 

In the meantime the development of the 
Macedonian question was leading to a change 
in the relations of Austria-Hungary with 
Russia. The two Powers had successfully 
pressed upon Turkey their " Miirzsteg pro- 
gramme " for the reform of the Macedonian 
vilayets, and under the eyes of Austrian and 
Russian Civil Agents and a gendarmerie con- 
trolled by foreign officers a great deal of useful 
work had been done. Very much of the credit 
for this was due to Lord Lansdowne, who as 
British Foreign Minister had done his best 
to internationalize the reforms and disarm 




A PIONEER IN MARCHING ORDER. 

193 



'210 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



Turkey's fears that they would lead to an 
.\ti.-t ro-Kussian partition of .Macedonia. Russia, 
too, chastened by her defeat in the Kur F.ast. 
entered into the work in a more liberal spirit 
and accepted the principle of Kuropean control. 
But this was not so congenial to Austria- 
Hungary. She had designs of her own in the 
Balkans which Kuropean supervision might 
upset. She wanted to enter into formal 
annexation and possession of the two Bosnian 
provinces which she had occupied since 1878. 
She meant to prevent the rise of Serbia, and, if 
necessary, to annihilate its independence and 
incorporate it with the rest of her Slav dominions. 
She also cherished the dream of advancing to 
the Aegean at Salonika, a project for which 
a private understanding with Turkey might 
be necessary, and which an internationalized or 
liberated Macedonia might upset. The new 
trend of her policy became visible when Baron 
von Aehrenthal succeeded Count Goluchowski 
as her Foreign Minister in 1906. Aehrenthal 
had been ambassador at St. Petersburg, where 
his natural conservatism had been deepened 
by intimacy with the party of reaction. He 
was devoted "to the idea of making his own 
country great, but his scheme of political 
greatness was borrowed from the old days of 
the Three Emperors' League. In the light of 
later events the idea of reviving that alliance 
of sovereigns, with Austria-Hungary as the 
predominant partner, seems a baseless dream. 
It was she who was in reality far the weakest of 
the three Powers. But this was not so clear 
when Aehrenthal came into power, and under 



his resolute guidance she entered on a policy 
which was full of danger, but which, while he 
lived, might seem to promise success. Aehren- 
thal's first idea was to tighten the Austro- 
Russian understanding so as to thwart thorough- 
going reform and international control in Mace- 
donia, both of which he profoundly distrusted. 
When he found that Russia was inclined to 
approve the internationalizing of the remaining 
reforms he had to modify this policy. He 
proposed, then, an entente between Austria- 
Hungary, Russia, Germany and France on a 
" conservative " basis. The result of this 
quadruple entente would have been, of course, 
to upset the understanding between France 
and Great Britain, and to block the way 
effectively against the further understanding 
between Great Britain and Russia which Sir 
Edward Grey and M. Isvolsky were in process 
of negotiating. Aehrenthal's plan failed because 
Russia saw the hand of Germany behind 
Austria-Hungary, and her experience of Ger- 
many's advice at the time of the Japanese war 
did not incline her to closer combination. If 
a compact had to be made she preferred to 
make it with Great Britain, who had warned 
her steadily that Japan would fight, rather 
than with Germany, who had encouraged her 
to believe the contrary. Events thus drew on 
to the Anglo-Russian understanding, and 
Aehrenthal had to devise a new line of policy. 
He took one which disregarded Russia, and 
pursued simply Austro-Hungarian interests 
without looking for the cooperation of other 
Powers. While pretending to work for the 




INFANTRY AND MARINES. 



THE TIMES HISTOKY OF THE WAR. 



211 



accomplishment of the reforms which were 
still to be carried out in Macedonia, he ceased 
to give support to Russia and the other Powers 
and began to negotiate privately with Turkey. 
He agreed to drop the Macedonian reforms if 
Turkey would give Austria-Hungary the con- 
cession for a railway through the Sanjak of 
Novi Bazar the small Turkish enclave which 
ran up into the heart of Bosnian and Serbian 
territory. Aehreiithal's real objects in de- 
manding this concession are a matter of doubt, 
for the Austrian General Staff held that from 
a military point of view the Sanjak was worth- 
less to Austria-Hungary. But whether he was 
mistaken as to this and othSr aspects of the Novi 
Bazar Railway, or whether he simply devised 
to strike a blow against Russia, the effect of 
his action was to rouse Russian indignation 
against such a piece of diplomatic treachery, 
and to place the Powers of the Triple Entente 
in antagonism to Austria-Hungary. 

Such was the position when the revolution 
in Turkey broke out in the summer of 1908, 
and the Young Turks came into power. The 
contradictory elements which composed the 
movement Ottomanism, militarism, Jewish 
finance, and constitutional reform were not 
then disentangled, but the view commonly 
taken was that it would strengthen Turkey. 
She was pretty certain to assert herself for the 
salvage of outlying parts of her empire, and 
so Austria-Hungary had to consider what would 
be her own position in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
These provinces were still nominally Turkish 
and owned the suzerainty of the Sultan. But 
Austria-Hungary, as has been explained, had 
occupied them effectively for thirty years, and 
had only failed to become their actual possessor 
through a turn of the diplomatic game. On the 
whole she had carried out her work very 
thoroughly. At first she had to go through a 
lot of hard fighting to subdue the provinces, 
but afterwards, thanks largely to the genius 
of a single administrator, de Kallay, she had 
established an effective, albeit a demoralising, 
rule. It was not an easy task, and the addition of 
nearly two million Slavs as virtual subjects of the 
Dual Monarchy for the population was almost 
wholly Serb or Croat was not regarded as an un- 
mixed blessing either by the Austrian-Germans 
or the Magyars of Hungary. As the peasantry 
were exceedingly divided in religion, consisting 
partly of Serbs who had embraced Mahome- 
danism, and partly of Christians, who were 
again opposed as Orthodox or Catholic, the 




GENERAL HORSETZKY, 

Commanding the cavalry in Poland a well-known 
military author. 

work of conciliation was all the more difficult. 
But Austria never let embarrassments of this 
kind stand in her way when it was a question 
of acquiring more territory. This is the most 
persistent feature in the history of the Habs- 
burgs. The reason why Austria-Hungary had 
displayed so much eagerness to secure the 
Bosnian provinces in 1878 was, no doubt, 
because the Emperor Francis Joseph wanted to 
wipe out the loss of Lombardy and Venetia. 
He was disappointed that he could not annex 
them, and he was firmly resolved not to let 
the last chance slip when it came in 1908. 
But how should annexation be carried out ? 
To snatch the provinces just when Turkey 
seemed to be in the act of reforming herself 
was not a policy that would commend itself to 
Europe. The idea of beginning with the grant of 
a Constitution was rejected, perhaps as too 
surprising a departure from Habsburg methods. 
A case had to be got up, and the materials 
for it were sought in the Hungarian kingdom 
of Croatia-Slavonia. If it could be shown that 



21-2 



'I III'. TI.MI-;* HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




PROFESSOR DR. FRIEDJUNG. 

Austrian historian author of baseless charges 
against the Serbo-Croat leaders in 1909. 



a deep conspiracy was being carried on by the 
Serbo-Croats inside the Dual Monarchy, their 
kinsmen in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 
Serbians themselves outside, to realize the old 
dream of a " Greater Serbia," Austria-Hungary 
might hold herself politically justified in thwart- 
ing a policy that menaced herself. It was true, 
in a sense, that the Southern Slav problem tran- 
scended all frontiers, and that was why it was 
so necessary for Austria-Hungary to treat it 
wisely. Her mistake was to put a criminal 
interpretation on the stages of a perfectly 
natural development. While Serbia was ac- 
quiring a keener national sense and laying the 
base of economic and military independence, 
the Serbs and Croats in Croatia had laid aside 
mutual antipathies and combined in a political 
coalition. Together they were strong enough to 
break down the corrupt Government majority, 
and there seemed a chance that Croatia might 
be fairly ruled in the interests of the Croatians 
at last. It was the time when the conflict 
over the Army was raging in Hungary between 
the Hungarian political parties and the Crown, 
and the Serbo-Croats at Agram managed to 
improve their position by making a fighting 
alliance with the Hungarian Coalition at 
Budapest. For a moment they secured the 
political justice which they had sought in vain 
since the compact of 1867 placed them in 
Hungary's hands. But it was too good to 
last, and the Governments of Vienna and 
Budapest combined again to check the move- 



ment. The Hungarian Government pagorly 
accepted "revelations" of a treasonable [Jan- 
Serb movement, which was said to be fomented 
among its subjects by the Serbian Government 
at Belgrade ; upwards of fifty Serbs till 
innocent were arrested in Croatia ; and a 
huge treason trial began at Agram, the capita), 
where it dragged on for months in conditions 
that became a public scandal. The charges 
trumped up against the victims at Agram were 
reinforced on March 25, 1909, by a denunciation 
from Dr. Friedjung, the Austrian historian, 
in the Neue Freie Presse, who, basing his 
statements on secret documents supplied to. 
him by the Foreign Office, accused some of 
the leading members of the Serbo-( r.iit 
coalition of treasonable correspondence with 
Serbia. When the crisis over th3 annexation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina had passed, these Serbo- 
Croat leaders prosecuted Dr. Friedjung for 
libel, and the utter baselessness of his allegat ions 
was revealed. Some of the documents, pur- 
porting to be lists of payments by the head of a 
Serbian student society to the Croatian leaders. 
were exposed by their alleged author, a Serbian 
professor, who had been studying at Berlin at 
the moment when he was supposed to be making 
plots in Belgrade. Others, which Dr. Fried jmiM 
had declared to be official dispatches from the- 
archives of the Serbian Foreign Office, were- 
demonstrated by Serbia to be complete inven- 
tions ; and, finally, Professor Masaryk, a 
distinguished Bohemian savant and politician, 
discovered the fact that most of these documents 
had' been concocted and photographed in the 
Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. Tilt- 
Minister at Belgrade, Count Forgach, was 
transferred by Austria-Hungary to Dresden, 
but was afterwards recalled to Vienna, and at 
the outbreak of war in 1914 he was in a re- 
sponsible position of control at the Foreign 
Office. The whole affair had shown that tin- 
influences dominant in Austria-Hungary would 
stop at nothing to crush the growing feeling of 
solidarity among the Serbs. It', as seemed po-^i- 
ble at the moment, war with Serbia had broken 
out while the Serbo-Croat leaders were under t lie 
shadow of Dr. Friedjung" s charges they would 
undoubtedly have been shot without scruple. 

Fortunately matters were not then carried 
to the point of war, though the tension wiia 
extreme. Russia knew that Austria-Hungary 
contemplated the annexation of Bosnia -Herze 
g.jvina and the declaration of full Bulgarian 
independence. She expected to receive suffi- 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE \VAIL 



213 



cient notice of tho date for her own arrangements 
and those of Serbia to be made in view of the 
changed situation. Aehronthal, however, 
sprang tne change upon the world in October, 
1908, and the astonished Foreign Ministers of 
Europe found that Austria-Hungary had 
revised the Treaty of Berlin without consulting 
anybody. Even Germany had only been told 
at the last moment (though she may originally 
have suggested the idea of the annexation) and 
had scarcely had the option of refusing her 
support. But " the Austrian Bismarck " was 
running groat risks in his ambitious policy. 
He had deliberately challenged Russia. He had 
treated Serbia's attitude with contempt, and 
assumed that Turkey had nothing to complain 
of in the loss of her title to the annexed pro- 
vinces. The Young Turks took a different 
view and began boycotting Austro-Hungarian 
trade. Faced by a possible war with Russia, 
Servia, and Turkey, Aehrenthal was obliged 
to compensate the late owners of the provinces. 
He signed a convention by which Austria- 
Hungary paid a money indemnity, guaranteed 
the rights of the natives of the two provinces, 
and agreed to meet various Turkish demands. 
Meanwhile Russia, as well as Austria-Hungary, 
had begun to mobilize. But she had not yet 
reorganized her army, and was far from the 
state of military preparedness which she showed 
in 1914. Aehrenthal was confident that she 
would yield under tdie threat of war, even 



though her surrender would be a blow to Slav 
prestige. She did yield, as he had expected, 
only the triumph of compelling the surrender 
came not to him, but to Prince Btilow. Germany, 
after a short hesitation as to whether she should 
back up Austria-Hungary, decided to do so and 
forestalled her partner by being the first to 
mention at St. Petersburg her readiness to act 
in case of war. This was the appearance " in 
shining armour " to which the Kaiser made his 
famous allusion eighteen months later. Aehren- 
thal hardly concealed his mortification that 
German assistance had taken such a demon- 
strative form. 

It was at this point that the relations of 
Austria-Hungary with Germany under ..ent 
a change, and took the form whicli they kept 
until the great war. Up to the annexation 
crisis Austria-Hungary had played for her own 
hand. Afterwards she appears more and more 
as the accomplice, if not the satellite, of Ger- 
many. There could not be a better measure 
of the difference than the coolness and want 
of combination between Austria -Hungary and 
Germany in the crisis of 1908 and the complete 
understanding between the two Powers in the 
crisis of 1914. Whether the alteration would 
have been so great if Aehrenthal had not died 
in 1912 is, perhaps, a question. It was under 
his direction that Austria-Hungary had made 
her most distinct and resolute bid for diplo- 
matic independence. But, greatly as per- 




DRAGOONS IN FULL DRESS UNIFORM. 



'214 



////; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




GENERAL AUFFENBERG. 

sonality still counts in international politics, 
it is not likely that his survival would have 
much modified the course of things. The 
force of circumstances was too strong. The 
flaw in his policy and it was one which 
nothing could very well compensate was that 
Austria-Hungary was essaying a task beyond 
her powers. The Government at Berlin had a 
much clearer perception of this than the states- 
men of Vienna. The idea that Austria-Hungary 
could ever be the predominant partner, or 
could be safely allowed a policy which was not 
inspired from Berlin, must have appeared a 
singular delusion to the Germans. If it had 
ever had any basis in fact, that disappeared 
from the day when the spirit of aggressive 
Germanism took possession of German states- 
manship. A world policy of pan-Germanism 
could only be directed from one centre. But 
the supremacy of Berlin was quite consistent 
with allowing Austria-Hungary to follow, up 
to a certain point, what she believed to be her 
interests. She might be permitted, and even 
encouraged, to cherish the dream of an advance 
on Salonika, and to frustrate the growth of a 
strong Slav nucleus in the Balkans, provided 
these ideas did not encroach on the larger 
ambitions of Germany in the Xear East. For 
herself Germany needed the command of the 
roads to Trieste and Constantinople, and an 
influence in Turkey predominant enough to 
secure her great political enterprise of the 
Baghdad Railway and her economic develop- 



in Asia Minor. For the present all this 
might be accomplished by peaceful penetration 
penetration of Austria-Hungary just as much 
as of Turkey. On the larger field of European 
politics Germany found the support of Austria- 
Hungary also worth retaining. If, as the 
Emperor William remarked, every Turkish 
army corps was a corps added to the German 
Army every Austro-Hungariaii army corps 
was worth as much, or more, on the same 
assumption. But for this purpose unity of 
control was clearly needed. Austria-Hungary 
could not be allowed to place Germany again 
in the awkward position of 1908, when 1 1n- 
German Government was obliged to support 
an Austrian challenge to the new Turkish 
Government from which Germany hoped much. 
The backing which Germany then gave to 
Austria-Hungary showed that she was not 
prepared to sacrifice the Austrian alliance. 
But it was only worth having on her own 
terms. Germany was, and intended to remain, 
the managing partner of the Triple Alliance, 
and this was made clear to Austria-Hungary 
when she seemed to be forgetting it. In his 
last years of office Aehrenthal had reached a 
clearer knowledge of the limitations to an 
independent policy, and also of the advis- 
ability of cultivating better relations with 
Italy. The position of the third partner in the 
alliance was always thankless, and specially so 
when she was snubbed not only by Berlin but 
by Vienna. It was really to the interest of 
Austria-Hungary just as much as of Italy to be 
on cordial terms, because this was the only 
way by which the two Powers could attain a 
certain independence of Berlin. For the very 
same reason Germany looked with suspicion 
and disfavour on any 'improvement in Austro- 
Italian relations. Nothing could show more 
clearly the artificial nature of the Triple 
Alliance as a combination to promote German 
interests. If there were any two Powers who, 
it might be supposed, would not work har- 
moniously together, they were Austria-Hungary 
and Italy, with the memory of a secular feud 
between them, its survival in Irredentism, and 
the clash of counter-interests in the Adriatic 
and the Balkans. Yet it was only in unison 
that they could hope to assert a reasonable 
control of their own policy in the face of 
Germany. Meanwhile Germany, for her own 
part, was careful to discourage the idea that 
they had any such right to mutual consultation 
and independence. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



215 



It may well have occurred to Austria- 
Hungary to ask herself what she had to gain 
by the alliance. Were the common interests 
more than a dream ? The alliance had been 
founded when the German element in Austria- 
Hungary was much stronger than it became 
afterwards, and while Austria-Hungary, 
though excluded from the German Empire, 
was more under the influence of German 
feeling. It was understood by its authors as 
a pendant to the Dual System of 1867 an 
arrangement which would guarantee the 
supremacy of the Germans in Austria and the 
Magyars in Hungary. But the Dual System 
worked so decidedly in favour of the Magyars 
that it was clear the Austrian-Germans lost 
more than they gained by such an arrangement. 
They would probably have fared much better 
under a fecieralized or centralized system which 
would have secured fair play all round. Nothing, 
at any rate, could have been more of a dis- 
illusion for them than to be governed, as they 
were, by Hungary through the Crown, or to be 
reduced to an instrument for the use of the 
Crown against Hungary. The Triple Alliance 
was a monument of this state of things. It 
perpetuated a false idea and a false direction 
of the destinies of Austria-Hungary. It 
meant that her foreign policy was to be 
governed, not in the interests of the whole 
Monarchy, not even in those of the Austrian- 
Germans, but ultimately in those of the Mag- 
yars of Hungary and the powerful Jewish 
financiers who held sway at Vienna and Buda- 
pest. Its continuance implied the sacrifice 
of any claim of Austria-Hungary to be regarded 
as a whole, or as a unit. That ideal could only 
have been realized if she had fully accepted 
the consequences of her expulsion from Ger- 
many in 1866, and worked out her salvation 
as a South-Eastern Power by creating an 
adequate system for the Slavs. In choosing 
the opposite policy at the dictation of the 
Magyars she did, indeed, discover a common 
interest with Germany, but it was a negative 
and artificial one. She allowed herself to be 
used as an advanced guard of Germanentum 
against the Slavs. It was the line of develop- 
ment she had followed in her earliest history, 
but in the changed world of the twentieth 
century the resemblance became ironical. 

It was this anti-Slav, or rather anti-Serbian, 
influence which mainly controlled Austro- 
Hungarian policy from 1908 to 1914. It was 
repeatedly in evidence during the Balkan War, 



which greatly intensified it. The vigorous 
offensive of the Balkan States and their military 
successes over the Turks made the anti-Serbian 
party impatient for action. Everything was 
done to excite Austrian opinion against Serbia ; 
the advisability of an immediate attack on her 
was considered by the Austro-Hungarian War 
Office. When the terms of peace between the 
Balkan States and Turkey came to be discussed 
Austria-Hungary stood firm against Serbia's 
ambition to get access to the sea. Rather than 
see a Slav State established on the Adriatic, she 
invented the plan of an independent Albania and 
prepared to support it with her full military 
force. When it was a question of evicting 
Montenegro the other Serb State and Serbia's 
ally from Skutari in Albania, she risked a 
joint action with Italy which would almost 
certainly have landed both Powers in war but 
for the conciliating influence of the Triple 
Entente. She did more than any other Power 
to promote the Second Balkan War by steadily, 
refusing to Serbia and Greece the fruits of their 
victories in the West, and by the direct instiga- 
tion of a Bulgarian attack upon them. When 
the war broke out she gave considerable assist- 
ance to Bulgaria, and Count Stephen Tisza, the 
Hungarian Premier, made a speech openly 
endorsing Bulgaria's attitude. Meanwhile, her 
treatment of the Slavs within her borders had 
become more relentless than ever. The Govern- 
ment of Croatia had improved, indeed, for a 
time after the exposures of the Friedjung trial, 
and Baron Rauch, who then held the office of 
Ban, had been removed. But after a short 
change for the better the intransigent system 
was restored. The constitution of Croatia was 
abolished and the charter of the Serb Orthodox 
Church suspended. It was a dangerous plan 
to try repression at the moment when Serbia's 
victories over Turkey were setting the Serb 
provinces of Austria-Hungary ablaze with the 
spirit of enthusiasm for their race. But the 
successes of the Balkan States threatened the. 
dominance of Germany and Austria-Hungary 
in South-Eastern Europe. If the result of tho 
war with Turkey had been indecisive thoy 
would have had a pronnising field left open for 
interference. As it was, all they could try was 
to break up the Balkan Confederation which 
they successfully did in the second Balkan War 
and to play off Bulgaria and Turkey against 
the Slav and Greek confederates. With this 
policy abroad went the policy of repression at 
home. In defence of it Austria-Hungary could 



m 

Veszppc 






Mravnik 
B O\ S 



International Frontiers 
Provincial Boundaries 

Scale oF Miles 

10 Z03(HO 50 100 



GERMANS CZECHS ITALIANS SLOVENES SERBO-CROATS 



ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP 




210 



A 



\ Czestochona 

*>.. r \ 

\ \ \ \ Sandomierz 



'.vfi'-.- v^-.'.'-: .'.''.^.'O.''.'. -.'^i oKremenetz 

T^sJ^"?*?? 2 .^- '.- : '.'.Brody \ 

'.-. ::*:: ': 



Kalocsa 

Ml I 

Szeqediri 

i t i j i j 



Plevna 

ARIA 




J Kerstatz 

./Nikshitz 
Tr|bi'ije ( 

" ^' 



POLES ' RUTHENES SLOVAKS MAGYARS RUMANIANS 








OF^AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 



2H 



218 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




THE DANUBE IN WINTER. 
Showing the Houses of Parliament and Margaretheuse Bridge at Budapest. 



plead that her own unity was threatened by 
Serbia. Not only had Serbia become an 
aggressive military State, but by a propaganda 
encouraged from Belgrade she was tampering 
with the loyalty of Serb subjects in Austria- 
Hungary. The existence of this pan-Serb 
propaganda cannot be denied. It was promoted 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the newly- 
acquired provinces, with their Serb population 
of nearly two millions, and in Hungary. Serbia 
was inevitably the focus of the movement, and 
if it was not encouraged by the Serbian Govern- 
ment it received support, at any rate, in Serbian 
official circles. The parallel between Serbia's 
relation to the Serbs and Croats under Austrian 
rule and the relation of Piedmont to her Italian 
fellow-countrymen whom Austria held down 
till 1859, is not merely one which suggests itself 
in retrospect ; it was consciously adopted and 
developed by Serbian politicians and military 
officers before 1914. But this was hardly 
political crime. There would be some incon- 
sistency, at least, in combining an enthusiastic 
approval of Piedmont and the Italian liberators 
with a su-eeping condemnation of Serbia and 
the Serb propagandists, because the latter did 
not appeal so strongly to the Western sense ..t 
poetry and culture. And it would be equally 
uncliscriminating to hold the entire Serb move- 
ment guilty because of the lamentable murders 
at Sarajevo. 

There was nothing, except the bare asser- 
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
to identify the Serbian Government with the 



crime. Nothing that could be called evidence 
was produced in support of the charge, which 
in itself was inherently unlikely. The mur- 
ders were committed at a time when Serbia 
was busy with critical affairs, economic, military 
and, dynastic ; the last thing she would be 
likely to have wanted was trouble with a power- 
ful neighbour. Those who knew the sinister 
role played by agents provocateurs in Eastern 
Europe found several mysterious features in 
the crime which made them all the more un- 
willing to accept the Austro-Hungarian theory. 
There was a lack of the most obvious precau- 
tions for the Archduke's safety during his 
Serajevo visit, which was all the more surprising 
as Bosnia was believed to be seething with 
treason. If, as there w*as some reason to 
think, the existence of a plot against him WHS 
known in Vienna, this neglect of police measures 
was all the more suspicious. Whatever it was 
that gave a free hand to the Serb fanatics, 
whether it was negligence or crime, the murder 
of the Archduke was a deep personal tragedy, 
and perhaps the gravest of the many calamities 
which have befallen the Austrian Empire anc 
its dynasty in modern times. Francis 
Ferdinand was the hope and embodiment of a 
liberal policy for the races of the Empire. 
He represented the only programme in the field 
against Hungarian particularism and the 
intolerance of the war party. It was believed 
that if he came to the Throne he would have 
worked for a drastic change in the Dual System 
and the raising of the subject races to a position 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



of equality with the Germans and the Magyars. 
Practically this would have meant the rise of 
the Slavs and the destruction of Hungarian 
dominance. Historically if there can ever 
be a step backwards in history it would have 
meant a return to the conditions before 1867, 
to the position as it was in 18601, when 
short-lived constitutional experiments were 
made, only to be sacrificed to the call for an 
immediate settlement with Hungary. Francis 
Ferdinand might have followed the federalist 
lines of the first of these or the centralist lines 
of the second, but it is fairly safe to assume that 
his plan would have been a combination of the 
two, with the modifications suggested by recent 
history and the great development of the 
Slavs. There would have been far-reaching 
questions of principle to settle, whether, for 
instance, the equalization of races should be 
recognized by substituting a " triple " or 
" quadruple" for the " dual " form, or whether 
it should repose on a broader basis, representing 
the ten principal nationalities. There would 
have been almost equally difficult questions 
of detail, such as the position of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, hitherto administered as an 
Austro-Hungarian Reichsland, and the relations 
to it of the kindred provinces of Croatia and 
Dalmatia. Whether any modern ruler could 
have carried through such a transformation 
of his empire may be thought doubtful, but 
there were strong considerations in Francis 
Ferdinand's favour. First of all, was his own 
strong, although erratic, will, which had made 



him already an outstanding figure in Europe. 
If an unfavourable picture of his aims and 
character was drawn at one time in Western 
countries, that was because it was chiefly 
inspired from adverse Hungarian sources. As 
time went on people came more and more to 
realize that he had devoted himself with 
singular resolution to what was possibly the one 
hopeful plan for the future of Austria-Hungary. 
The mere fact that he was a Habsburg gave 
him a unique power to further it. The prestige 
of the Sovereign was still extraordinary, and 
might have been equal to carrying through 
a change which would have been scouted in 
other countries as an impossibility. The 
Crown was still by far the most living of the 
political institutions of Austria-Hungary. 
There could be no instance more striking 
of the deep-seated authority of the Habsburgs 
than the way in which it survived the racial 
hatreds of the empire and the heavy disasters 
of Francis Joseph's reign. Francis Joseph, 
too, in one important respect had paved the 
way for Francis Ferdinand. Quite early 
after 1867, as we have seen, he had begun to 
work for the conciliation of the Slavs ; 
later on he had governed with a Slav majority 
under two Premiers, Taaffe and Badeni ; and 
he had finally endorsed the political pre- 
dominance of the Slavs in the Austrian Reichs- 
rat by his universal suffrage measure. To 
this extent he had prepared for a conciliatory 
policy. If he allowed the opposite party to 
take control, it was largely from inertia, and 




THE LATE ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND INSPECTING TROOPS. 



._)._), I 



Tin-: 77.1 //;> HISTOHY or THI-; WAR. 




[Topical. 



ARREST OF PRINCEPS, 
Aisassin of the Arohduke Francis Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg. 



because after the Archduke's death the strongest 
personality was to be found on that side. 
As the policy of constitutional reform had 
been embodied in Francis Ferdinand, so the 
reactionary policy of the Dual System was 
incarnate in Count Tisza, the Prime Minister 
of Hungary. He belonged to that Calvinist 
aristocracy which preserved the traditions 
of Magyar dominance in their purest form. 
\\'ith a devoted loyalty to his Sovereign he 
combined a belief in his cause as unyielding as 
that of the Protestant leaders of Northern 
Ireland. He was a man of unflinching courage, 
u-hich he had proved again and again, not only 
on the duelling ground, but in tho not less peri- 
lous scene of the Hungarian Chamber. His per- 
sonality could not be ignored and was bound to 
win respect ; the pity was that he identified 
himself wholly with the old ideal of Hungarian 
self-assertion in the Dual Monarchy and 
supremacy over the Slav races. It was for 
tliis that he clung to "dualism," and mu 
prepared to submit it even to the fiery trial 
of the great war, as he described it to the 
Hungarian Parliament. He must, therefore, 



rank as one of the chief authors of the conflict. 
Many and diverse were the influences for war 
which were brought to bear on the aged 
Emperor in the fateful days after the Arch- 
duke's murder. Herr von Tschirschky, the 
German Ambassador at Vienna, who was the 
working agent of DeiUschtum ; General Koiirad 
von Hotzendorf, the Chief of the Austro- 
Hungarian General Staff, who was bent on the 
annihilation of Serbia ; Count Forgach, the 
.Tudaeo-Magyar diplomatist, who had been 
already involved in a sinister plot against 
Serbia, and was now controlling the threads of 
anti-Serbian policy in the Foreign Office, all con- 
tributed their share. But the chief responsibility 
for embracing a policy which invited war lay 
probably with Hungary and her representatives, 
ancestrally unwilling to see a diminution of 
their power or to deal fairly with the Slavs. 



Illustrations 4vill be found in Volume I., Part I, of 
the following: The Emperor Francis .loscph, p. 14; 
the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, p. li : Tin.' Uurlics, 
G Hohenberg, p. 12; Sir Maurice <!< Itunsm. p. 22; 
Kine 1'i'tiT of Serbia, p. 38; Serajevo, p. 13; 

I M-l^r.nli- p. 17. 



CHAPTER XXXVII. 



THE ARMY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 



THE ABMY AND ITS UNIFYING EFFECT ON THE EMPIRE THE OFFICERS, THEIR INFLUENCE RACIAL 
FEELING IN THE STATE THE EMPEROR'S VIEWS THREEFOLD ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 
THE RULES OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE THE NUMBER OF ARMY CORPS THE INFANTRY THE CAVALRY 
THE ARTILLERY THE ENGINEERS COMMUNICATION TROOPS HIGHER ORGANIZATIONS THE 
DIVISION THE ARMY CORPS THE CAVALRY DIVISION MOUNTAIN BRIGADES FORTRESSES. 



THE Austro-Hungarian Army has 
always held a position quite unique 
among the States of Europe. Com- 
posed of a number of races differing 
in varying degrees from one another, and in the 
case of the Hungarians definitely hostile to the 
Slavonic elements, it would naturally be thought 
that, founded on such a basis, it would be a very 
inefficient instrument of war. Yet its history 
has told a different tale. It has always fought 
well, and its troops have displayed a bravery 
quite equal to that of the soldiers of other 
countries. It is true that Austria in many, 
campaigns justified the " tradition de defaite " 
which Napoleon ascribed to her. For this 
unhappy result there have been many reasons, 
but among them there cannot be included any 
lack of warlike energy among the soldiery. 

The Austro-Hungarian Army, moreover, was 
one of the main factors concerned in the preser- 
vation of the Empire, inasmuch as it formed 
a nursery of dynastic feeling ; all members of it, 
no matter what their race, felt a personal 
allegiance to the Emperor and the House of 
Habsburg. The chief reason for this was that 
officers and soldiers alike knew that they were 
under the Emperor's personal control and 
received his personal care and attention. He 
was indeed the father and head of the military 
forces of the double crown. This feeling tended 
to make the army a school which inculcated a 
feeling of trust and reliance on the monarch, 



and through him a sentiment of unity and 
recognition of the country as a whole which 
counteracted the particularist ambitions of 
some of its composing elements. The army 
was for the Empire, and was not Hungarian 
or Czech, Italian or German, Serbo-Croatian 
or Polish, Ruthene or Rumane ; politics, 
very properly, had no place in military organi- 
zation. Another important influence for unity 
was the corps of officers. Drawn from all 
classes of society, it formed a microcosm of the 
State. No longer composed of so-called nobles 
though, of course, in a country of universal 
service many of them were found in it the 
bulk came from the middle and lower middle 
classes, a large portion belonging to families 
which have for generations found their life's 
employment in a military career. * Spread over 
the whole army, no matter from what race they 
might come, the officers had a unifying influence 
which brought the various nationalities to- 
gether in a common devotion to the Emperor- 
King and to the country he ruled. 

Of all armies it is true that this class of 
hereditary soldiers furnished the best officers, 
thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the 



* Germans are u 
bear the particle r( 
The real equivalent 



England a captain 



the habit of describing those who 
( in front of their names as n*,ble. 
n English is esquire. Frederick the 



Great always enno led a man he made captain. In 



called esquire in his commission. 



junior ranks only gentleman. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP. 



service, filled with an honourable regard for 
the position they and their forbears have held, 
inspired by their deeds and determined to 
carry on untarnished the name they hold for 
the sake of the regiment and for the benefit 
of the army. This was certainly the case in 
the British forces, and although this class 
received no special recognition, politicians of 
all classes being quite incapable of appreciating 
its value, we still draw a considerable portion 
of our officers, and those the very best, from it. 
It was curious when every effort was being 
made to draw candidates from the Univer- 
sities and Public Schools, because in both 
cases the education of association was sup- 
posed to have some value ; when marks were 
given in the competitive examinations for 
entrance to the army to those who had 
obtained certificates of a certain (no very 
high) standard of proficiency in military 
duties at these institutions that the scion 
of a race which has for generations devoted 
itself to the fighting services of the Crown 
received no consideration whatever, no advan- 
tage from the devotion of his forefathers. If 
half the vacancies of Woolwich and Sand- 
hurst had been confined to them, we should 
have given some reward to old officers and 
have obtained a better class than was other- 
wise to be obtained. This was fully appre- 
ciated in Austria, and the consequence was that 
the Austrian Corps of officers possessed a well- 
founded reputation for professional knowledge, 
zeal and devotion, second to no similar body 
in Europe. They were more intelligent than 
their Prussian rivals, less hide-bound by the 
" Reglement," * of easier manners, entirely 
free from that arrogance which produced the 
saying, " grob wie ein Preusse " (rude as a 
Prussian), and, as they wore in more intimate 
and kindlier relationship with their men, they 
were more likely to get greater efforts out of 
them : when in difficulties, than their northern 
neighbours ; they had the devotion of all ; 
they led them, and did not merely drive them 
on by fear. 

But the Austro-Hiingarian Army suffered 
from one great disadvantage, which was indeed 
common to the whole Austro-Hungarian ad- 
ministrative system. It was true the Aulic 
Council had disappeared, but it had left behind 
it a numerous illegitimate progeny, whose 
octopus-like grip strangled all the administra- 

* The German name for drill-book. 



live offices of .State and endeavoured to reduce 
the whole government of the country to one 
dead level of red tape, incompetent, dull 
mediocrity. Initiative was foreign to Austrian 
bureaucrats, and it was they who directed the 
entire administration of the country. Their 
influence was felt with force in the army, and 
it was doubtful for this reason whether the 
administration services i.e., the commissariat 
and the like were up to the highest standard 
required for a modern army, which, to be 
successful in war, must develop initiative in 
all branches. A business which pretends to 
be guided entirely by rules must fail when 
dealing with men, for it is impossible to devise 
regulations to meet every possible situation. 
Administrators who act on the belief that such 
is feasible, fail entirely when circumstances 
do not exactly fit in with the hard and fast 
code. They cannot improvise, and are apt 
to indulge in the procrustean method and make 
the circumstances fit the rules, instead of wisely 
adapting the latter to the former. Officers of 
the fighting branches who had been well edu- 
cated in their duties would feel the necessity for 
acting on their own intelligent conception of 
the situations arising on the battlefield, but 
non-commissioned officers, still influenced by 
the doctrine of passive obedience taught them 
in the ranks, were not likely to display similar 
characteristics. Their tendency was to be- 
come wooden in movement and in thought, 
and hence they could not efficiently replace the 
disabled officer in war. This was recognized 
by the military authorities, and efforts were 
made to improve them and induce them 
to prolong their service by re-engagement, 
so that they might by longer service become 
more efficient. 

The higher ranks of the army were undoub- 
tedly efficient so far as study could make them. 
It was no longer the practice to appoint men of 
high birth to posts for which their only claim 
was family. A modern Liechtenstein would 
have to prove his ability, not his quarterings ; 
a Clam Gallas would be impossible, or if such a 
man by chance obtained a high position, he 
would, if he behaved like his namesake in 1866," 
certainly be tried by court-martial and pro 
bably shot, as the latter ought to have been. 
It was inconceivable that a Benedek would 
nowadays be made a scapegoat to bear away 
the sins of his mutinous subordinates and 
pledged to secrecy to cover the delinquencies of 
his incompetent superiors. It was incredible 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



2-23 




ARMY CORPS COMMANDERS. 

1. General Blasius Schemua (2nd); 2. Lieut. -General Colerus von Geldern (3rd); 3. General Hugo Meiiner von Zweien'tamm 
(10th); 4. Lieut.-General Otto Meixner von Zweienstamm (7th) ; 5. Major-General the Archduke Joseph of Austria (4th); 6. Lieut.. 
General Edler von Hortstein (9th) ; 7 Lieut. -General Khemen zu Barensfeld (13th) ; 8. Lieut.-General D. Kolozsvary de Kolozsvar 
(llth); 9. Major-General Giesl von Gieslingen (8th); 10. Lieut.-General Wenzel Wurm (16(b) ; 11. Major-General the Archduke 

Ferdinand Karl Ludwig (12th). 



224 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP. 




VARIOUS TYPES OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY. 



that a future Tegetthoff could win a naval 
victory and be immediately removed from his 
command. A better and more rational govern- 
ment existed in Austria-Hungary, but still the 
bureaucracy remained and prevented reform 
w ich would cheapen administration and make 
tor reason in the non-combatant branches. 

It has been said that the discipline of the 
regular army fonned a common tie which 
bound the various races together. This was 
absolutely the case a hundred years ago, before 
the influence of racial feeling had gained the 
i nportance it attained in late years. But even 
in 186f> the Italian regiments had to be largely 
employed against the Prussians while those 
of other races were used in Italy against Victor 
Emmanuel's troops. Since then the indivi- 
dualist feelings of some of the races had grown 
stronger and shown far greater tendency for 
segregation under an ethnographical arrange- 
ment. Pan-Slavism is a force which must 
now be recognised. There is no doubt that 
some of the Slav regiments during the present 
war expressed their discontent at being led 
against the Russians. Round Trieste there 
existed the undoubted desire to see " Italia 
irredenta " united to the Kingdom of Italy. 
Transylvania had aspirations, or at least the 
Rumanian speaking majority of its inhabitants 
had, towards a union with Rumania. Whether 
these particularist ideas had much effect on 
the actual conduct of the troops in the war of 
1914 it is difficult to say. though rumour seems 
to point to the conclusion that they had. 

Doubtless the comparatively small thinking 
portion of the Monarchy felt that by entering 
on the war the Government had deliberately 
thrown the affairs of the Dual Monarchv into 



the melting-pot, and had some misgivings 
as to what would be the form the new kingdom 
would take when the Allies began to remould 
it. As the struggle progressed, such a feeling 
assuredly had some effect on the various 
peoples involved. The Hungarians were not 
long in showing that they resented the way in 
which they were sacrificed during the war to 
Prussian ambition. That the Slavs disliked 
the war against the great Slav Power was 
only natural. .Certainly, too, some Czech 
regiments, when they marched out of Prague, 
openly showed this feeling. In these days of 
education and the universal spread of news 
by the papers, soldiers are all more or less 
thinking bayonets. In Austria-Hungary, as 
elsewhere, this would be the case, and seeing 
the nature and origin of the war, sentiment 
in the ranks, at any rate among the non- 
German races, was scarcely likely to be favour- 
able to the Government which brought it about. 
The percentage of the different nationalities 
in the army are given below : 

Germans 

Slav races : 

Czechs ... ... ... ... 15 

Poles !> 

Ruthenes ... ... ... 8 

Slovenes ... ... ... 3 

Slovaks ... ... ... ... 5 

Serbo-Croatians 

Magyars 

Runianes 

Italians 



47 

18 



1 

100 

The words of command for the whole army 
were given in German, but the instructional 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



225 



language varied according to the racial com- 
position of the various regiments. The purelv 
Magyar, Polish, Czech, Ruthene and Serbo- 
, Croatian regiments are taught in their own lan- 
guages, and in the mixed regiments any per- 
centage above twenty per cent, of the total 
strength had the right to be instructed in its 
own language. 

In the Honv^d regiments of Hungary 
proper, Magyar is the official language and the 
language of command and, as far as possible, 
the language of instruction. In the Honved 
regiments recruited from Croatia and Slavonia 
the language is Serbo-Croatian. 

There could be no doubt that the use of the 
German language for command was a powerful 
instrument acting for unification in addition to 
the sentiments of loyalty to the cause of the 
Emperor and the Empire, so sedulously incul- 
cated by the officers. So much was this recog- 
nized that the particularists constantly brought 
the accusation that it was being used for the 
Germanization of the various races. But 
although from tho force of circumstances 
German acted as a lingua franca for all the 
different races, it was by no means enforced on 
them, and it was merely the plain utility of its 
acquisition which appealed to a recruit who 
was desirous of acquiring another language in 
addition to his own. He naturally chose one 
which not only enabled him to understand his 
orders better, but which also facilitated his 
intercourse with those of his countrymen who 
talked it, and with a large proportion of the 
inhabitants of Central Europe. Hungarians 
were permitted to have some slight variations 
in their uniform,* but these were mere con- 
cessions to Magyar national feeling, and the 
Emperor himself frequently declared he would 
never allow anything which could interfere 
with the complete unity of the whole force or 
sanction a separate Hungarian Army. During 
the constitutional crisis of 1903 he issued an 
Army Order, on September 16, which clearly 
expressed his views : 

" The better founded my favourable judg- 
ment of the military value, the self-sacrificing 
delight in service, and the single-minded 
cooperation of all parts of my whole Defensive 
Forces, the more I must and will hold fast to 
their existing and well-tried organization. My 
Army in particular must know that I will never 
relinquish the rights and privileges guaranteed 

* For instance, the infantry wore their trousers cut 
tight after Hungarian pattern. 



to its supreme War-Lord my Army whose 
stout bonds of union are threatened by one- 
sided aspirations proceeding from misappre- 
hension of the exalted mission the Army has 
to fulfil for the weal of both States of the 
Monarchy. Joint and unitary as it is, shall 
my Army remain, the strong power to defend 
the Austro-Hungariaii Monarchy against every 
foe. True to its oath, my whole Defensive 
Force will continue to tread the path of earnest 
fulfilment of duty, permeated by that spirit 
of union and harmony which respects every 
natural characteristic and solves all antagon- 
isms by utilizing the special qualities of each 
race for the welfare of the whole." Hungary 
had constantly endeavoured to obtain greater 
independence for her army, and had at the 
same time tried by every means to oppress the 
various non-Magyar elements which were under 
her rule. The result had been to intensify the 
latter in their dislike to the bullying rule of 
Hungary, and make them look for help outside 
the Empire. 

The high spirit breathed forth in the Emperor- 
King's pronouncement aimed at an ideal, 
perhaps difficult to obtain, but which never- 
theless had been reached in great measure. 
Of course, the bureaucratic element previously 
alluded to was not without its bad influence on 
the military machinery. But the personal 
supervision of the Emperor-King, or of one of 
the Archdukes to whom he delegated some- 
times this duty, tended to keep this influence 
within bounds. One typical case of the 
working of the bureaucratic mind was shown 
during the occupation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina. General Galgotzy, who was in com- 
mand, undertook the construction of a road. 
Time was pressing, money was short, but 
urged on by the General, the troops, who 
loved him, soon finished the road. He re- 
ported : " Road built. Twenty thousand 
florins received, twenty thousand spent, 
nothing remains. Galgotzy." This laconic 
message was a bad shock to the military 
auditors, who demanded an exact account 
with vouchers in continued applications, which 
grew more and more peremptory in tone. At 
last Galgotzy replied : " Twenty thousand 
florins received, twenty thousand expended. 
Whoever doubts it is an ass." This was too 
much for the Chief of the Audit Department, 
who saw the Emperor and drew attention to 
Galgotzy's want of respect to his high functions 
and suggested a reprimand. The Emperor 



220 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




RESERVISTS ON THE MARCH. 



blandly inquired : " Do you, then, doubt it ? " 
The incident closed, not to the discomfiture of 
the General. 

The political organization of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy was based on the funda- 
mental law of 1867. By taking advantage of 
the disorganization brought about by the war 
of 1866, Hungary gained a position of quasi - 
independence. The difference between the two 
States was maintained in the armies with this 
distinction, that the regular, known as the 
Joint Army, was, as its name implied, common 
to both States, and was paid and kept on foot 
by a common fund. But beyond this force 
two others existed the one the Austrian 
Landwehr, with its Lar.dsturm, the other the 
Hungarian Landwehr (known as the Honved), 
with its Landsturm. These forces in all 
might be described as Territorial forces in the 
sense in which these words were used in our 
country i.e., forces which had some training 
but not as much as the regular army, of which 
they formed no part. 

As the armies were divided so were the 
budgets which keep them on foot. There was 
the budget for the regular army provided by 
both Austria and Hungary ; that for the 
Austrian Landwehr and Landsturm furnished 
by the State concerned ; that for the Hun- 
garian Honv6d obtained from Hungary and 
the portions of the Monarchy associated with 
her. There were also three administrations 
viz., that for the Joint Army, that for the 
Austrian, and that for the Hungarian Landwehr 
(Honv6d) or National Defence forces. 



In Austria-Hungary, as in all countries which 
felt the necessity for proper military organiza- 
tion, universal service was the law of the land. 
Only the physically unfit were in theory 
exempted from this obligation, although in 
certain cases this rule was, in fact, considerably 
mocfified, as will be seen later on. Those excused 
had to pay a tax in lieu of service. The 
liability extended from the completed nineteenth 
to the completed forty-second year i.e., for 
twenty-four years altogether. The actual ser- 
vice in the ranks and reserve was twelve years 
in the Joint Army, but varied slightly with 
the arm. Thus in the Infantry the time was 
two years with the colours, eight years in the 
Reserve, and then two in the Landwehr 
Reserve. In the Cavalry and Artillery the 
time was three years in the army and seven in 
the Reserve. The Reservists who had served 
two years in the army were liable to trainings 
not exceeding fourteen weeks in all, each of not 
more than four weeks during their time in the 
Reserve, those of three years' army service to 
three, not exceeding eleven weeks in all. These 
liabilities were rarely exacted to their full 
extent, a training period rarely exceeding 
thirteen days. Those who had served four 
years in the army were not liable to be recalled 
during their Reserve service. 

After the men had served ten years in the 
army and its Reserve they were included in the 
Reserve of the Landwehr (Honved) for another 
two years. 

It has been already said that the troops of 
the Landwehr and Honved category resembled, 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. 



227 



in principle, our Territorial force, for they received 
only a comparatively short training. Like 
our Territorial force, the Landwehr is a per- 
manent institution and trains its own men ; 
but before explaining how this was done it is 
necessary to describe how the allotment of 
the young men. who come up for service was 
made. 

When they presented themselves for enrol- 
ment the unfit were eliminated and the rest 
between the ages of 21 and 24 were divided into 
various categories by lot.* Those who drew the 
lowest numbers were told off for the Joint Army 
until the required contingent had been reached 
for which the vote of the Delegations had 
provided. The next highest went to the Land- 
wehr (Honved) till its quota was obtained, and 
the remainder was handed over to the Ersatz 
Reserve. f The period of service in the Land- 
wehr (Honved) was the same as in the common 
army ; but the training (which was conducted 
by its own regimental cadres) was much more 
restricted, being only a total of twenty weeks in 
the Landwehr or twenty-five in the Honved, 
no one period exceeding more than four weeks. 

The men of the Ersatz Reserve were trained 



* The men up to twenty-four are those who have been 
put back for some reason. 

t " Ersatz " is derived from the word " Ersetzen." 
to rfplace, and the Ersatz Reserve is intended to replace 
uucl lill up vacancies which occur in the other forces. 



for ten weeks, and were thereafter liable to 
three trainings, no one of more than four weeks 
i.e., like the Reserve. The total liability 
of the man, whether for the common army, 
the Landwehr (Honved), or Ersatz Resei \ . , 
was therefore twelve years, after which he 
passed into the Landsturm. In this he served 
in the first levy up to the end of his thirty - 
seventh year : in the second levy up to the end 
of his forty-second year. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the same law 
held good, but the Reserve and the first and 
second levies of the Landsturm were called 
respectively the first, second, and third Re- 
serve. 

The total number of inhabitants of the 
entire Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was roughly 
51,340,000, of whom about 500,000 were avail- 
able each year, to which must be added those 
whose entry into military life was adjourned for 
one cause or another, but the whole of them 
were not taken. In the first place there were 
the unfit ; secondly, the exempt who were 
turned over to the Ersatz Reserve. These 
included priests, those in training for priestly 
office (both these classes were practically entirely 
exempt), then those who fulfilled certain con- 
ditions, such as sole supporters of a family. 
In addition to these, conscripts who had been 
for a definite period at certain schools, or who 
had passed certain examinations, served only 




HUNGARIAN INFANTRY. 



228 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




Austria-Hungary would put into the field : 

Joint Army l,:it>0,000 

240,000 



COMPARTMENT OF A RED CROSS 
TRAIN. 

one year with the Army and eleven in the 
Reserve. These furnished the greater part of 
the medical, veterinary officers and apothe- 
caries, and officers of the Reserve. Men who 
came under these provisions might adjourn 
their military service up to their twenty-third 
year. Any who volunteered for three years' 
service could choose their regiments. 

By the working of the Act of 1912 the follow- 
ing numbers of recruits were embodied in 1913 : 

Joint Army 153,500 

Austrian Landwehr ... ..I 27,000 

Tirol 1,000 

Honved 25,000 

Bosnia and Herzegovina ... 7,800 



214,300 
(The number of Ersatz Reserve cannot be 

given.) 

When the new law (July .5, 1912) would 

cony into full force it was calculated that 



Austrian Landwehr 
Hungarian Honved 
Ersatz Reserve 
Landsturm 



... 220.000 
... 500,000 
...2,000,000 



4.320,000 

It seems improbable that anything like these 
numbers were embodied, at any rate at the 
commencement of the war. In the first place 
the entire available force of the Landsturm was 
not called out though within a few months 
all was probably ordered up. Secondly, there 
were certainly not enough arms in the country, 
at any rate of a modern class, to equip them 
with. It was hardly likely that Austria had 
at the commencement of hostilities more than 
1,200,000 to 1,300,000 at her disposition for war. 

Austria-Hungary had in the last three years 
increased her military establishment very con- 
siderably and spent large sums on re-armament. 

The organization of the army was based for 
the Joint Army of Austria and Hungary, 
the Landwehr and the Honved. on the law of 
July 6, 1912 ; for the Landsturm on that of 
1886. It was regional, regiments being allo- 
cated to specific areas. But the requirements 
of certain special corps prevented this in their 
case being strictly adhered to. It is impossible 
to give an exact account of the territorial 
divisions which furnished the various contin- 
gents, because the new arrangements were not 
completely carried out when the war broke out. 
But the accompanying map shows generally 
the divisions into which the country is divided. 

The 241,333 sq. miles which compose the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were divided into 
sixteen Army Corps Districts, as shown in the 
following table : 





No. of Divns. 


No. of Batteries. 


Battalion. 


Train. 




Army Corps and 










Corps 


JK';\<!quarters. 


In- 








Moun- 


How- 


Pion- 


Sap- 


Divi- 


Squad- 


Cavalry. 




fantry. 


Cav. 


Field. 


Horse. 


tain. 


itzer. 


eers. 


pers. 


sions. 


rons. 




1st Cracow 


2 


1 


18 


3 





2 





1 


1 


6 





2nd Vienna '... 


3 


1 


18 


3 





2 


2 


1 


1 


11 


3rd Gratz 


2 





18 








2 


1 


I 


1 


j 


4th BudapeM 


2 


1 


IB 


:{ 





2 


1 





1 


8 





5th Pressburg 


2 


1 


19 


.-! 





2 


1 


i 


1 


9 


6t h K asrhau 


2 





111 


:t 





2 





. 




4 





7th Tcmesvar... 


2 


1 


J'.i 


:i 





2 


1 







a 





8th Prague 


2 





18 








2 










5 


. 


9th Leitmeritz 


2 





18 








2 










5 


. 


HMli Przemysl 


2 


1 


18 


3. 





2 


1 


I 




7 





llth Lwow 


2 


2 


18 


3 





n 





1 




7 





Uili Hormannstadt .. 


2 





HI 





. 


2 





1 




5 


13th Agram ... 


> 





19 





_ 


2 





1 




5 - 


1 4th Innsbruck 


2 





18 





12 


2 


| 


I 




10 


15th Sarajero... 


2 











24 





1 


1 




9 





16th Kagusa ... 


2 










20 







.1 




11 






THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



229 



There were in addition to the Joint Army 
eight divisions of Austrian Landvvehr and eight 
of the Honved. These, too, were organized 
on the territorial divisions of the country and 
were analogous in formation to the regular 
divisions. Altogether Austria-Hungary had 
forty-nine divisions with which to form the First 
Line Active Army viz., thirty-three belonging 
to the Joint Army and the sixteen furnished 
by the Landwehr or Honved. It was the 
intention considerably to augment the Land- 
wehr Divisions, but no more were ready 
when war broke out. As given above, these 
were enough to furnish one to each army 
corps. Eventually the intention of the Govern- 
ment was to double the number so that there 
would be thirty-two divisions, i.e., two to each 
army corps. 

There were also eight Cavalry Divisions of 
Regular Cavalry for the Joint Army and 
two of Honved Cavalry. 

It is now necessary to describe in detail the 
various units which went to make up the Army 
of the Dual Monarchy. 

The Infantry of the Joint Army comprised 
one hundred and two infantry regiments 
besides twenty-seven battalions of Jaegers, 
four regiments of Tirolese Jaegers, and 
four of Bosnia-Herzegovina Infantry.* Each 



* The name *' Jaeger," literally hunter, has no moaning 
at the present day, as all infantry has the same arma- 
ment. Formerly the Tyrolese were armed with rifles 
when the ordinary infantry had smooth bores. 



infantry regiment had four field battalions 
and a depot battalion. The regiments were 
numbered, and in addition had some per- 
manent title or bore the name of the honorary 
colonel e.g., " The 1st Kaiser Franz Infantry 
Regiment." The companies of the field bat- 
talions were numbered tliroughout, as in 
Germany, one to sixteen. When mobilized 
the Depot Battalion, which was only a skeleton 
in peace, was expanded into two, one of which 
was called a Reserve Battalion, the other the 
Depot. The duty of these was to furnish 
reserves to fill up casualties in the others. The 
former might also be sent into the field. 

The strength of a company on war footing 
was much the same as in Germany or France, 
viz., four officers and 200 non-commissioned 
officers and men. The strength of a battalion 
was 1,064 of all ranks, and of a regiment 4,356. 
The effective fighting strength of the latter 
i.e., rifles in the ranks was roughly 4,100. 

The Jaeger battalions had a similar organiza- 
tion to a battalion of the line. For reserve 
purposes in war they had a Reserve Company 
only. Some of the Jaeger battalions had 
cyclist companies.* The bicycle was of the 
folding pattern, and in each company there 
were also two motor-cycles and one motor 
car. 

Every infantry regiment had at least two 
machine-gun detachments each of two guns, 

* There were four in 1913, possibly more in 1914. 




AUSTRIAN MOUNTED BATTERY. 



230 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



281 



and probably by the time war broke out 
there were two guns per battalion. Every 
battalion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and every 
Jaeger battalion had four. 

The new war uniform of the infantry, as 
indeed for the rest of the army except the 
cavalry, was a bluish-grey. Every private 
in the front ranks carried a Linnemann spade, 
1 ft. 8 in. long, weighing 2 Ibs. Sixteen men 
in the rear rank had a small pick. The four 
. pioneers of the company carried certain special 
tools. These men were usually united into 
a regimental detachment under a junior officer. 
The small-bore magazine rifle had been 
some years (since 1895) in use in the Austrian 
Army. It was known, after the name of 
its inventor, as the Mannlicher. It had a 
calibre of '315 in. and had a straight-pull 
bolt. It fired a pointed bullet with a muzzle 
velocity of 2,850 ft. It was sighted up to 
about 2,460 yards and weighed 8 Ib. 5 oz. 
The total length of the weapon with bayonet 
fixed was 5 ft. The magazine was loaded 
by means of a charger which held five cart- 
ridges. The cavalry carbine was much shorter, 
only 3 ft. 4 in., and weighed only 6 Ib. 12 oz., 
but it took the same cartridge. 

The number of rounds carried by the infantry 
soldier was 120. In addition there were forty 
rounds in the company ammunition wagon 
and 160 in the infantry ammunition columns. 

The machine gun was that known as the 
Schwarzlose and was of the same calibre and 
used the same ammunition as the infantry 
rule. It was an extremely simple and efficient 
weapon, being composed of very few parts. 

The Austrian Cavalry, although it still 
retained various designations Dragoons, 
Uhlans, Hussars was really all of one type, 
practically light cavalry, uniformly armed 
with sabre and carbine. Non-commissioned 
officers and others who did not carry the 
carbine had an automatic pistol. 

There were forty-two regiments, fifteen of 
which were called Dragoons, eleven Uhlans, 
sixteen Hussars ; the regiments of each class 
being numbered among themselves. The last 
named were recruited in Hungary and Tran- 
sylvania, ai the Hussars originated from the 
former country.* The dragoon regiments were 
rai--cd in Austria, eight of the uhlans in Galicia, 

* The name Hussar is derived from the Magyar word 
hus,z = (a squadron of) twenty. The uniform is modelled 
on the Magyar national costume. Similarly the Uhlan 
uniform is a reproduction of the Polish peasant costume. 



two from Croatia and Slavonia, and on? from 
Bohemia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there 
were two independent cavalry squadrons. As 
in the Infantry so in the Cavalry, the regiment 
bore the name of the honorary colonel or had 
some other permanent title. A regiment 
consisted of six squadrons, each of which had 
a combatant strength of 150 sabres, exclusive 
of the pioneer troop. Each cavalry regiment 
had four machine guns, with forty thousand 
rounds of ammunition. Unlike that of the 
infantry regiments the gun had no shield. 

On mobilization each regiment formed from 
the Depot Squadron which it had in peace 
time, a Reserve Squadron and Depot Squadron, 
which fulfilled the same duties as the battalions 
bearing these names in the Infantry. 

The pioneer troops of the Cavalry, to which 
allusion has been made above, were particularly 
well organized indeed, it was in Austria that 
they were first introduced. Each consisted of 
one officer and twenty-five men, who carried 
the various tools, explosives, etc., which 
are required by a force like cavalry so constantly 
used in advance of an army, a position where 
obstacles have to be removed and where 
special duties fall on it, such as the destruction 
of railways, etc. In addition to the pioneer 
troop eight men per squadron were equipped 
with tools. Thus, an Austrian cavalry regiment 
had available seventy-tliree men trained for 
pioneer duties, forming a highly efficient body 
for the purposes required of it. The telegraph 
section (eight men) carried about seven miles 
of light wire. 

Every squadron had also ten waterproof 
bags which could be inflated. One sufficed 
to support two men, and they could be used 
to construct rafts for crossing water. 

The curse of Cavalry on active service is 
the practice of constantly frittering it away 
by detailing it for escort and staff duties, such 
as orderlies to general officers, etc. Wellington 
found this in the Peninsula, and frequently 
issued orders to prevent it. The Austrian 
Cavalry was not allowed to be used for any 
such minor, and often quite unnecessary, 
purposes. To provide for them as far as they 
were really needed, so-called troops of " Stall 
Cavalry " were employed. Each regiment 
furnished two sections of these on mobilization 
(principally from the Reservists), which con- 
sisted of one officer and fifty men. A similar 
organization existed in the Infantry. Every 
regiment provided a " Staff Company " of 



232 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



two officers and 120 men, who were all attached 
to the higher tactical units, such as brigades, 
divisions, army corps, for escort and guard 
duties connected with these. The sections 
of both cavalry and infantry were united in 
pairs and called Staff Squadrons or Staff 
Companies. 

The Austrian Cavalry wore much the same 
uniform in peace as in war, except that the 
head-dress had a cover of the same colours as 
the Infantry uniform.* 

The Austro -Hungarian Artillery had under- 
gone great transformations in recent years. In 
1866 the cannon employed were brass muzzle- 
loaders, and they were on the whole superior 
to the mixed mass of early breech-loading 
Krupp guns and old smooth-bores that Prussia 
brought against them. But the Austrian 
military authorities soon saw that the future 
lay with the breech-loader. It was considered 
desirable that the guns should be made in the 
country, as Austria then had but few and 
indifferent steel factories. It was decided to 
construct them on the system proposed by 
General Uchatius, of his " steel bronze," as these 
could be turned out from the Royal Arsenal 
The material was bronze cast under pressure, 
and with the interior of the barrel hardened by 
passing a succession of steel cones through it. 
The method was found to be successful, and 
is still used for field guns. 

The original gun was only a nine-pounder, 
firing common shell of nine and a half pounds. 
But as other Powers introduced more power- 
ful weapons Austria-Hungary was obliged to 
follow suit. The gun used for horse and field 
batteries was known as M/5 i.e., pattern of 
1905. It was a 3-inch calibre gun, a quick firer, 
throwing a shrapnel shell weighing 14-7 lb., 
containing 332 bullets of 50 to the lb. The 
fuse was constructed for use both for time and 
percussion. High explosive shells were also 
carried in proportion of two to five shrapnel. 
The gun had a long recoil on its carriage so that 
the shock of explosion was absorbed and the 
gun returned to its place. This rendered rapid 
fire possible. It had a panoramic sight gradu- 
ated up to 6,600 yards, and an independent line 
of sight. It had a shield of chronic steel, 
affording protection against shrapnel at all 
ranges, and against pointed rifle bullets beyond 
100 yards range. On the whole it was an 

* There serins fairly good reason to believe that just 
before the war some part received a dress not very 
different in colour from that of the Infantry. 



efficient gun, but nothing like so powerful as 
our own 18-pounder or as the French 75 mm. 
Both the horse and field artillery were armed 
with it. 

There were six guns in a field battery, only 
four in a horse battery or in a heavy battery. 
The number of roxmds carried was 126 per gun 
with the battery and 372 per gun with the 
d visional ammunition columns. The same 
amount was carried for the horse battery. 
Each battery had two miles of wire and four 
telephonists. It had also a range-finder. 

Austria-Hungary, like other Powers, had 
adopted a howitzer for the heavy batteries. 
This fired a shell of 38| lb. There were 123 
rounds per gun with the battery, and 204 in 
ammunition columns. A heavy gun was also 
in use viz., a 10'5 cm., equivalent to 4'1 in. 
The ammunition was similar to that of a howit - 
zer viz., a shell weighing 38J lb., containing a 
high explosive bursting charge, and a shrapnel 
with 700 bullets, 50 to the lb. When marching 
the carriage was separated from the gun, and 
each was drawn by six horses. 

Special stress was laid on mountain artillery, 
as on all the frontiers of the Monarchy moun- 
tainous regions are found. There were two 
varieties of weapon employed, the one a 7 cm. 
gun, firing a shell of 6 lb. 7 oz., the other a 
howitzer. The latest idea was to replace these 
comparatively inefficient weapons by a 10-5 cm., 
i.e., 4-1 inch quick-firing howitzer throwing a 
shell of 32 lb. It had a range of over 6,000 yards 
and was altogether a very powerful weapon for 
its class. 

It may be well here to mention a speciality 
of the Austrian artillery. In every army corps 
there were a few 8 cm. guns especially adapted 
for use on hilly ground when the ordinary gun 
carriage could not pass. The carriages were so 
constructed that it was possible to use shorter 
axle-trees to replace the long ones of the 
ordinary carriage. The gun carriage and the 
shield with sighting apparatus was formed 
into three separate bodies on wheels with a 
track of only one yard. It took ten minutes 
to make the alteration and ten to put it back 
into the ordinary form. 

Reference may here be made to the heavy 
I ii >\\ it /.cr used by the (itrmans against Xanuir 
and other places. It i.s quite certain that 
the majority of these were what is knouu as 
the 30'5 em. (equivalent to 12 in.) Austrian 
mortar, firing a shell of 858 lb., with bursting 
charge of 56 lb. of ecrasite. Austria was 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



283 




PLACING FIELD GUNS IN POSITION. 



credited with thirty-four of these, and that some 
were used in Belgium is proved by the fact that 
photographs of the weapons used show this 
piece with Austrian soldiers seated on it. Its 
extreme range was about 10,500 yards, i.e., 
roughly six miles. The rate of fire was ten rounds 
per hour, and it took an hour to get the gun 
ready for action. Three powerful tractors were 
required for two guns and their ammunition 
lorries. 

The organization of the engineers in the 
Austro-Hungarian Army differed considerably 
from that employed by us, or indeed any other 
country. In most European forces there were 
what we call field companies, specially intended 
for use with the field armies, and fortress com- 
panies not associated with the divisions and 
army corps, but only brought up when required 
for siege purposes. In Austria a different 
practice was pursued. Each army corps would 
eventually have a pioneer and also a sapper 
battalion. Both were to be equipped for the 
construction of field defences, road making and 
field mining, but the pioneers had as their 
province bridging, with which the sappers 
had nothing to do. Their special work was 
fortress warfare. The former had four com- 
panies to the battalion, the latter only three. 

Experiments were made with bridge trains 
drawn by motor-wagons, and possibly some 
of these were employed with the armies in the 
field. Each army corps had four pontoon 



troops, each of which could furnish 58 yards 
of ordinary bridge. 

There was to each infantry division a search- 
light section, the searchlights being one with 
a 32-in. and one with a 21-in. reflector. The 
larger nature was carried on a -motor-wagon, 
which furnished the power to work the dynamo. 

In addition to the field organizations already 
described, there were two other bodies which 
need notice. These were the Engineer Staff, 
who constructed fortresses and besieged them, 
the other a Military Works Department, which 
constructed and maintained buildings not 
immediately connected with fortifications. 

In aeronautics Austria-Hungary was not so 
forward as other nations when war broke out. 
The first beginnings of a service of dirigibles 
and aeroplanes date from 1909. At Fischa- 
mend, about eleven miles south-east of Vienna, 
a depot for dirigibles existed, and experiments 
were made with various types, though there is 
no reason to suppose that Austria had more 
than a few of these instruments of war available 
at first. They were chiefly of the Parseval 
type. In addition there were a number of 
captive balloons. 

The same was the case with aeroplanes. The 
organization was not fnr advanced nor the 
number very large. The school for teaching 
aviation was established at Vienna-Neustadt. 

Under the name of Communication Troops, 
especially under the Ministry of War, a number 



284 



THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. 




AUSTRIAN FIELD ARTILLERY. 



of troops for miscellaneous purposes were 
united. These included the Railway Regiment, 
of three battalions, with a total war strength of 
4,383 non-commissioned officers and men with 
92 officers. There was also a regiment of 
Engineer Telegraphists, from which a section 
was furnished to each army corps ; others went 
to the fortresses. The wireless telegraphy 
organization also formed part of this regiment, 
which further included a detachment of auto- 
mobilists consisting of 176 officers and men. 
The school for instructing infantry and cavalry 
in telegraphy was also under its administration. * 

The Train i.e., the equivalent of the British 
Army Service Corps was organized in " divi- 
sions," one for each army corps. A division 
consisted of a variable number of squadrons 
and had also a skeleton squadron to act as 
Depdt, and another to furnish the Tool Park. 
The composition of the squadrons varied 
with the corps to which they were attached. 
There were altogether one hundred and fifteen 
squadrons, of which eighty-nine were field 
squadrons and twenty mountain squadrons. 
The larger ' part of the latter were in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and their transport was done 
by pack animals. 

There was also a division to supply the 
vehicles necessary for the flying corps. 

The Automobile Service i.e., the corps in 

* Every infantry and pioneer company, squadron of 
cuvalry and battery of artillery had a small number of 
trained signallers, usually three. They used flags by day 
and lamps by night. The infantry pioneers also carried 
telephone equipment to be used for various purposes of 
communication. 



charge of mechanical transport was divided 
up among the various army corps. In each 
of these there was an officer whose special duty 
it was to look after the motors and all matters 
connected with them. Thus he registered all 
qualified men within the command and assisted 
in the mobilization, both of the machines avail- 
able and the men necessary to work them. 
Reserve officers and others who had expert 
knowledge were posted to the mechanical trans- 
port. They were required to attend a four-weeks' 
course annually with the motor cadre of the 
army corps to which they were posted. 

Here it may be remarked as coming under the 
head of supply duties, which we in England 
unite with transport in the Army Service Corps, 
that Austria had gone far in the provision of 
travelling kitchens. It had been intended to 
provide one for every company, squadron and 
battery, other than those specially equipped for 
mountain warfare. In the latter ease and for- 
the smaller units, such as machine gun sections, 
a cooking chest was allowed. This was of well- 
known Norwegian cooking-stove construction 
i.e., it was a tin box carried in a case sur- 
rounded with a thick layer of felt. This kept 
the food hot for twenty-four hours and, indeed, 
completed the cooking. 

Austria-Hungary, like other properly or- 
ganized nations, had arranged her troops in 
higher units instantly available for service on 
mobilization for war. 

To begin witli the infantry, two regiments 
made a brigade of eight battalions. Two of these 
a division, so that the latter body should have 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



285 



had normally sixteen battalions, or, roughly, 
16,000 men ; but in some cases rifle battalions 
were added, and all the regiments had not got 
four battalions : thus the numbers might be 
more and sometimes were less. In the case of 
the 3rd Corps, which had three infantry divi- 
sions, this would have given, if the formation of 
all were normal, six brigades, each of eight bat- 
talions forty-eight battalions ; but .there were 
only forty-five, because some of the regiments 
had not the complete number of battalions. 
On the whole the sixteen army corps had 
thirty-three infantry divisions with four hun- 
dred and sixty-seven battalions, which worked 
out at an average of fourteen to the division 
instead of sixteen. The army before the war 
was in a state of transition owing to the intro- 
duction of the new law of 1912, and in speaking, 
therefore, of the division as having sixteen 
battalions it must be looked on as what was 
aimed at rather than what was really attained. 
The division, therefore, was properly two 
brigades, though in a few cases there were more 
e.g., in the 3rd Corps, where there were five 
brigades instead of four for the two divisions 
which composed it. The 14th had seven 
brigades to its two divisions, the 15th six, the 
16th eight. But in all the other corps the divi- 
sions were normal so far as the brigades were 
concerned, though the number of regiments 
and battalions varied. 



The distribution of field artillery to the divi- 
sions was more regular ; the majority had eight 
field batteries to the division i.e., forty-eight 
guns. Only one corps had a horse battery 
(four guns). 

As to the cavalry, the regular proportion 
was half a regiment to a division i.e., three 
squadrons. In some it was more, but in the 
case of the corps which were stationed iu 
mountainous countries, less. 

The division, therefore, theoretically was : 

Two brigades of infantry (fifteen to sixteen 
battalions) ; 

Half regiment of cavalry ; 

Forty-eight field guns. 

It also had one Staff Infantry Company and 
one Staff Cavalry Troop, and further one Train 
squadron for transport, besides an Ammunition 
Park, a Telegraph Detachment, and an Ambu- 
lance. 

The Army Corps consisted generally of two 
divisions (three in the case of the 3rd Corps) of 
regular troops, but in most cases a division of 
Landwehr (or Honved) had been added to it. 
It had, besides, the Corps Artillery, consisting of 
three batteries of field artillery and two of heavy 
howitzers, twenty-six guns in all.* There were, 
besides, one battalion of Pioneers, in some cases 

* There is reason to believe that the artillery of the 
army corps has been increased by another ten batteries 
but this is not quite certain. 




PONTOON BRIDGE OVER THE DANUBE. 



266 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



one of Sappers, a Bridging train, and a Tool 
Park, an Ammunition Park, a Telegraph and 
Telephone Detachment, a Field Hospital, and a 
Supply Column. 

There were actually available besides the 
common army, eight active Austrian Landwehr 
Divisions, and the same number of Honved. 
Their organization was similar to that of the 
common army. 

Of cavalry besides the regiments attached 
to the Infantry Divisions, there were eight . 
Cavalry Divisions of the Joint Army and 
two of .the Honved Cavalry. These had all a 
similar organization, viz. : 

Two brigades of cavalry of two regiments 
each i.e., twenty-four squadrons ; 

Three batteries horse artillery, twelve guns ; 

Sixteen machine guns with four cavalry 
regiments ; 

Besides an Ammunition Column, a Supply 
Column, a Field Hospital and Ambulance, and 
a troop of Staff Cavalry. 

As so much of the frontier line of Austria- 
Hungary is mountainous, there was a special 
organization to meet the case. Mountain 
Brigades were formed. These consisted of a 
variable number of battalions, mostly Jaegers, 
or in Tirol the Imperial Jaeger Regiment, 
one or two squadrons of Mounted Rifles, who 
rode ponies, and the Artillery in the shape of 
Mountain Batteries i.e., with the guns carried 
on packs, as also were the supply and hospital 
arrangements. These brigades were grouped 
together in divisions and provided with pioneers 
and signalling detachments, but from the nature 
of the country in which they operated their action 



was always more or less independent and the 
brigade therefore was a complete tactical unit. 

Austria-Hungary had but few fortresses of 
modern construction, and it is doubtful if 
even these were up to the requirements of the 
present day. In Galieia, Cracow and Przemysl 
were entrenched camps, while in between them 
was Jaroslav, a fortress of a similar character 
to Huy, between Liege and Namur i.e., of 
no value. In Tirol there was Trient, an 
up-to-date entrenched camp, and certain 
barrier forts which blocked the roads from 
Italy and Switzerland. On the Adriatic, Pola 
was a powerful maritime fortress with sea and 
land defences. Cattaro and Sebenico were 
defended harbours, the latter being especially 
intended for torpedo craft. 

Austria-Hungary was under one great dis- 
advantage when war broke out : she had not 
completed the reforms which had been begun in 
1912, but nevertheless she chose to place herself 
in the power of Germany to use her forces as 
the Northern Power willed. She reaped the 
consequences of her act. Employed by Germany 
for purely selfish ends she suffered defeat after 
defeat. On her southern frontier the Serbians 
drove back her invading troops. Her ultimate 
aim of reaching Salonika became a vain dream, 
and she ran the risk of emerging from the war 
so wantonly entered on poorer by many 
millions of money, with the loss of hundreds 
of thousands of her subjects, and some of her 
fairest provinces. 

[For much of the information contained in Chapter* 
XXXVI and XXXVII we are indebted to Mr. H. W. 
Steed's valuable work, " The Hapaburg Monarchy." Ed.) 




CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

THE RESPONSE OF THE 

DOMINIONS. * 

DOMINIONS ILL-PREPARED FOR WAR LACK OP COMMON MILITARY POLICY BUT COMPLETE UNITY 
OF SPIRIT AND RESOLVE VOLUNTARY OFFER OF ALL RESOURCES AN UNITED EMPIRE THE 
KING'S MESSAGES FEELING IN CANADA PARTY DIFFERENCES SUNK DECLARATIONS OF CANA- 
DIAN STATESMEN POPULAR ENTHUSIASM ENROLMENT OF VOLUNTEERS GIFTS TO ENGLAND 
AND TO BELGIUM ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CANADA ACTION OF DOMINION PARLIAMENT THE 
FRENCH CANADIANS GERMAN COLONISTS AMERICANS IN CANADA THE IRISH THE INDIANS 
THE CANADIAN CONTINGENTS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE INCREASED THE VOYAGE TO ENGLAND 
ARRIVAL AT PLYMOUTH TRAINING ON SALISBURY PLAIN AUSTRALIA UNHESITATING LOYALTY 
FEARS ABOUT BRITISH POLICY DEFEAT OF THE COOK MINISTRY THE FISHER MINISTRY AUS- 
TRALIAN DEFENCE AND THE JAPANESE QUESTION THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TRADE ORGANI- 
ZATION LOYALTY OF GERMAN SETTLERS COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES THE COMMANDERS 
TRAINING IN EGYPT NEW ZEALAND READY FOR ANY CRISIS IMMEDIATE DECLARATIONS OF 
SUPPORT THE CITIZEN ARMY VOLUNTEERS THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE THE MAORIS 
SAMOA TROOPS IN ENGLAND AND IN EGYPT OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC MR. SEDDON'S 
POLICY THE AUSTRALIAN FLEET SEIZURE OF GERMAN POSSESSIONS DESTRUCTION or THE 
" EMDEN " PURSUIT OF GERMAN PACIFIC SQUADRON DOMINION GIFTS TO THE EMPIRE. 



THE opening of hostilities found the 
Dominions ill -prepared for war. 
They were without a common scheme 
for military or naval defence, and 
the fundamental principles on which any such 
scheme must rest were still a matter of acute 
dispute. There was no central authority that 
could enforce its directions and demands, for 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, which 
sought to unify Imperial military preparations, 
was an advisory, not an executive body. There 
was no common naval policy. The Dominions 
were sharply divided between the principles of 
local navies and centralized Imperial control. 
Australia had with great energy adopted the 
policy of a local navy. New Zealand, after 
wtalwartly upholding centralization, had turned 
tti face towards local development. In Canada 
a deadlock between the two parties brought 
about the unfortunate result that nothing 
was done. Military affairs revealed the 
same seeming chaos. Canada had a small 
and totally inadequate permanent force of 
Vol. II. Part 20. 237 



about 3,000 men, and a loosely organized 
and greatly under-manned voluntary militia. 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa had 
accepted the principle of citizen armies, but 
in Australia the system had been established 
too recently for its effects to be fully felt 
on the fighting strength of the Commonwealth. 
Nothing could be done in any of the Dominions 
without the voluntary consent of their Govern- 
ments and of their peoples. Any outside 
observer, unacquainted with the essential 
spirit of the two races, who compared in the 
summer of 1914 the elaborate organization, 
the centralized control, the automatic pre- 
cision and uniformity of the German fighting 
machine with the diversity, the divided 
councils, and the conflicting methods of the 
five sister nations of the British Empire, might 
well have thought the outlook for the latter 
dark indeed. 

Such an estimate would have been a pro- 
found miscalculation. At the first sign of 
danger it was instantly shown that underneath 



288 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




[EUioU and Fry. 

MAJOR-GEN. E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B., 
Commanding Canadian Expeditionary Force. 

the differences of method in the King's 
Dominions there lay a fundamental unity of 
spirit and resolve. When it was realized that 
there was a possibility of war. even before war 
was declared, the Governments of Canada, 
Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Africa, without waiting to be risked, 
placed themselves and their entire resources at 
the service of the Crown. At the earliest 
possible moment the Government of the 
Dominion of Canada offered the cruisers 
Niobe and Rainbow to the Admiralty, and 
informed the British Government that it 
would raise an Expeditionary Force of over 
twenty thousand men to be sent to the United 
Kingdom, and would supply such further 
numbers of men as might be required. The 
Government of the Commonwealth of Australia 
placed the Royal Australian Navy under the 
control of the Admiralty, and offered to 
dispatch an Expeditionary Force of twenty 
thousand men. The Government of New 
Zealand placed the New Zealand Naval force 
under the control of the Admiralty, and pro- 
mised a force of all arms of eight thousand 
officers and men. with further drafts to secure 
the maintenance of the force at strength. The 
Government of South Africa could not dispatch 
any considerable Expeditionary Force, for 
there was every possibility that all its available 
men would be wanted in its own territories. 
But it informed the Imperial Government that 
it was prepared to take all necessary measures 



t'or the defence of the Union and thus to release 
the Imperial troops in South Africa for work 
elsewhere. Even Newfoundland, with its sparse 
population, raised a small Expeditionary Force, 
and increased the troops in its own territory. 

The people of the Dominions, with sure and 
wide vision, realised the vital import of the 
struggle ahead. From Toronto and Capetown, 
from Winnipeg and Johannesburg, from Sydney 
and Hobart, from Melbourne and Vancouver, 
there came accounts of one unanimous and 
spontaneous outburst of public enthusiasm and 
Imperial devotion, which swept away all party 
differences and minor disputes, and even made 
racial issues grow dim. The problems which 
had seemed to threaten the permanency of our 
institutions were laid to rest in an hour. The 
differing nationalities, whose conflicting points 
of view had time after time caused lesser 
conflicts, were suddenly fused in the heat of 
their great emotion into a united Empire. It 
was not only the men of English descent who 
rallied to the flag when they heard that the 
flag was threatened. The French Canadians 
in Quebec and the newly naturalised American 
settlers in Alberta and Saskatchewan rivalled 
in their enthnsiamn the Englishmen in Toronto 
and in Victoria. The Boers in Pretoria and in 
Bloemfontein were at one with the English in 
Capetown and Buluwayo. Japanese and Hin- 
dus on the Pacific Coast showed that they 
shared the common spirit. Behind the white 
men of the five nations of the Empire others 
stood, less maybe in numbers, but certainly 
not less in whole-hearted devotion, from the 
Maori races of New Zealand, who strove, and 
strove in the end successfully, to put their 
fighting men alongside of our own against 
the common foe, to the chiefs of a hundred 
tribes in Africa and in the Pacific tribes 
whose very names were unknown to most 
Englishmen who offered their men, their 
money, their live stock, and themselves to 
the King. The message of the Basuto chief 
who indignantly asked why he, the King's 
servant, should stand idle when his King was 
fighting his enemies, typified the spirit of all. 

It would be incorrect to say that the response 
of the Empire astonished the people of England. 
For SOUK; years England had been learning 
more and more of the settled loyalty of the 
Dominions. But if the response caused no 
surprise it gave the greatest satisfaction and 
renewed courage to the Motherland. The 
King's thanks, in words which we have already 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



289 



quoted,* to the people of Greater Britain, 
circulated a few days after the war broke out, 
well said what all felt : " I desire to express 
to my people of the Oversea Dominions with 
what appreciation and pride I have received 
the messages from their respective Govern- 
ments during the last few days. These spon- 
taneous assurances of their fullest support 
recall to Me the generous, self-sacrificing help 
given by them in the past to the Mother 
Country. I shall be strengthened in the dis- 
charge of the great responsibility which rests 
upon Me by the confident belief that in this 
time of trial My Empire will stand united, 
calm, resolute, trusting in God. GEORGE R.I." 
The King shortly afterwards addressed a 
message to the Governments and peoples of 
his self-governing Dominions, emphasizing the 
unity of the Empire in face of this unparalleled 
assault upon the continuity of civilization and 
the peace of mankind. The war was not of 
his seeking. " Had I stood aside when, in 
defiance of pledges to which my Kingdom was 
a party, the soil of Belgium was violated and 
her cities laid desolate, when the very life of 
the French nation was threatened with extinc- 
tion, I should have sacrificed My honour and 

Vol. I., p. 161. 



given to destruction the libartiee of My Empire 
and of mankind." 

The King's personal knowledge of the loyalty 
and devotion of his Oversea Dominions had 
led him to expect that they would cheerfully 
bear the great efforts which the conflict en- 
tailed. The full measure in which they had 
placed their services and resources' at his 
disposal filled him with gratitude. " I am 
proud to be able to show to the world that My 
Peoples Oversea are as determined as the People 
of the United Kingdom to prosecute a just 
cause to a successful end." 

CANADA. 

On August 1 , the day when war was declared 
vipon Russia by Germany, and when Germany 
invaded the Duchy of Luxemburg, the Canadian 
Government showed that it was awako to the 
dangers of the situation. The Duke of Con- 
naught, who was in the midst of a tour in the 
West, returned direct from Banff by special 
train to Ottawa. Sir Robert Borden, the Prime 
Minister, who had arrived in the Dominion 
capital that morning, summoned a Cabinet 
Council, which sat for hours deciding on the 
lines of national policy. The whole machinery 
of Canadian defence was quickly set in motion. 
Steps were taken to guard vulnerable points 




H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT AT VALGARTIER CAMP. 
Princess Patricia talking to Sir Robert Bordeo. 



240 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts from sur- 
prise attacks. The Militia Department was 
already preparing for mobilization, and it was 
understood that the different Canadian regi- 
ments, small" in numbers, would form the 
nucleus of larger forces to be immediately 
raised. Within a few hours fifteen Militia 
regiments volunteered for active service, and 
many thousands of men flocked around their 
headquarters, seeking to join them. 

The Dominion Prime Minister was debarred for 
the moment from public speech. Others were not. 
From political leaders of all parties, and from 
newspapers of every shade of opinion, came the 
one expression of sentiment. Party controversy 
ceased. " Danger unites us," declared one 
leading Opposition newspaper. 

Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the earliest possible 
moment was able to assure Sir Robert Borden, 
after conference with his leading adherents, 
that the Liberal Party would give its support 
without reserve to all measures doemed neces- 
sary by the Government. There was no 
thought or suggestion of Canada adopting a 
passive or neutral attitude. The politicians 
who had talked most in days of peace of 
Canada taking up a position of conditional 
neutrality in the event of a European war were 
now among the first to urge that Canada should 
throw, if need be, every man and every dollar 
into the struggle. " I have often declared," said 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier in a public message, " that 
if the Mother Country is ever in danger, ever 
threatened, Canada will render assistance to 
the full extent of her power. In view of the 
critical nature of the situation I have cancelled 
all my meetings. Pending such great questions, 
there should be a truce to party strife." 

Sir Richard McBride, the Premier of British 
Columbia, voiced the general sentiment : 
" Should it unfortunately develop that Great 
Britain is compelled to engage in hostilities," 
said he, " Canada will automatically be at war 
also. That Canada will do her full duty goes 
without saying ; but if we can now, by a 
demonstration of our loyal determination to 
stand by her side, strengthen the position of 
Great Britain I am sure there will be a universal 
desire to adopt that course. With Britain 
supreme in command of the seas the Imperial 
Government can conceivably in less than a 
month land in England upwards of 100,000 
fresh troops from her far-flung Colonial pos- 
sessions. These troops might easily be of vital 
service to the Motherland ; and that they 



will be offered from all parts of the Empire if 
the need be as great as our information would 
lead us to believe hardly requires to be stated." 

The first Monday in August saw the cities of 
Canada in a white heat of enthusiasm. All 
day long, crowds gathered around the bulletin 
boards of the newspapers, waiting for the latest 
information. Naval reservists, in response to 
a proclamation, were reporting themselves and 
leaving for their depots, and the departure of 
every man was made the occasion for a great 
demonstration. The staffs of the Militia were 
almost overwhelmed by the numbers of volun- 
teers for service. 

From every district promises of help and 
support poured into Ottawa. The Premier of 
Manitoba, the Hon. R. P. Roblin, offered to 
raise ten thousand men. The Premier of 
Ontario declared Canada's plain course was 
" to exert our whole strength and power at 
once on behalf of the Empire." Local organiza- 
tions and individuals proffered men, money 
and material. The one fear was lest Britain 
should shrink from her duty and preserve an 
ignoble peace. The Duke of Connaught 
crystallized the general sentiment in a sen- 
tence : " Canada stands united from the 

i 

Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to 
uphold the honour and traditions of our 
Empire." 

The demonstrations in the streets, the 
general enthusiasm, and the spontaneous offers 
of service did not mean that the Canadian 
people regarded the situation lightly. Below 
the surface-current of enthusiasm there ran a 
quiet, sober, solemn determination. The nation 
had reckoned the cost, and was willing to pay 
it. The deeper note of the public temper was 
most markedly seen when, on the Tuesday, 
the definite announcement was posted on the 
newspaper bulletin boards that Britain had 
declared war. A sudden silence fell on the 
crowds. Men and women stood gravely still. 
Then, after a pause, they turned to go. The 
hour of shouting was over ; the days of work 
and sacrifice had come. 

Within three hours of the declaration of 
war, the Canadian Government summoned u, 
meeting of Parliament for August 18, and the 
Militia Department gave instructions for the 
enrolment of twenty thousand volunteers for 
service at the front. Before the instructions 
were issued a hundred thousand men hail 
offered themselves. Canada arranged to take: 
over the garrisoning of Bermuda, to set the 



.'I / '.:' ' : I 

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



241 




FRENCH CANADIANS. 
No. 1 Company of " Le Regiment Royal Canadien." 



[By courtesy of " Canada." 



Imperial troops there free. The Government 
urged farmers to grow more grain in order to 
safeguard the Empire food supply. Effective 
steps were taken to guard the financial and 
commercial interests of the people. 

The public attitude was displayed in a 
number of gifts to Britain, gifts of a variety 
and kind unequalled before. One Montreal 
millionaire provided the entire cost of the 
raising, equipment, and maintenance of a 
special regiment, Princess Patricia's Light 
Infantry, or, as they were soon known from 
end to end of the Dominion, the " Princess 
Pat's." A prominent Calgary cattle-dealer 
offered fifty thousand dollars to equip a Legion 
of Frontiersmen, and a leading resident in 
Vancouver expressed his willingness to raise a 
corps of 500 British Columbians at his own 



expense. Word came from England that there 
was likely to be severe suffering there, owing 
to lack of employment caused by the war. 
Within a few days the Dominion Government 
sent an offer on behalf of the Canadian people 
of a million bags of flour of 98 Ib. each as a 
gift to the people of the United Kingdom. 
Following this, the Alberta Government offered 
England 500,000 bushels of Alberta oats ; the 
Nova Scotia Government sent 100,000 dollars 
for relief ; the Quebec Government asked 
instruction for shipment of 4,000,000 Ib. of 
cheese ; Prince Edward Island gave 100,000 
bushels of oats, and the Ontario Government 
placed a quarter of a million bags of flour at 
the disposal of the Imperial Government. The 
Premier of Prince Edward Island asked whether 
England would like any cheese and hay ; 




NEWFOUNDLAND CONTINGENT. 
Regimental Drilling at St. John's. 



' Canada." 

202 



242 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




Saskatchewan wanted to know if a gift of 
1,500 horses would be acceptable ; Manitoba 
sent 50,000 bags of flour of 98 Ib. each, and 
British Columbia offered 25,000 cases of canned 
salmon. The women of Canada raised a fund 
to provide a naval hospital ship, and on it being 
suggested that a naval hospital would be more 
acceptable they sent 57,192, of which 20,000 
was to be handed to the War Office for hospital 
purposes and the balance to the Admiralty for 
a Canadian Women's Hospital at Haslar. The 
Canadian Red Cross sent a fully equipped 
Field Hospital and 10,000 to the British Red 
Cross Society. The Dominion Government 
provided 20,000 for a Canadian hospital in 
France under the French Government. Farmers 
in different districts gathered vast stocks of 
flour and of fanning produce of many kinds 
and sent them to England. When stories came 
through of Belgian distress, Canada, without 
staying its hand for England, raised further 
great sums for the Belgian people. To record 
all the public and private gifts of magnitude 
to the Imperial cause in the early weeks of 
the war would be impossible. They ranged 
from a present of half a million dollars to 
machine guns. Everyone gave what he could. 
One Toronto newsboy, having nothing else, 
gave a street -car ticket costing just over two- 
pence. The ticket was afterwards sold for a 
thousand dollars. 

In addition to the funds for England, the 
Canadians had their own Patriotic Relief Fund 
They took as their first duty the obligation to 



VALCARTIEK 
Canadian Expeditionary Force 

see that no one dependent on any man from 
the Dominion who was fighting at the front 
should suffer want in future. Eighteen cities 
raised considerably over a million pounds for 
the Patriotic Fund within ten weeks of the 
outbreak of the war. Montreal heading the list 
with 400,000 and Toronto coming second with 
nearly half as much. In addition, most 
municipalities made provision for the families 
of volunteers from their localities, and usually 
insured the lives of the men for $1,000 each. 

All this aid and provision was the more 
remarkable since Canada in the opening days 
of the war was in the midst of a period of great 
financial and industrial difficulty. The long 
era of prosperity which had been the marvil 
and envy of the world had apparently drawn 
to a temporary close. Canada had had her ten 
years of plenty, with splendid harvests, rapid 
developi nent, and fast-growing population. 
Immigrants had arrived by the hundred 
thousand yearly ; villages had grown to citic; , 
and vast areas of Saskatchewan and Alberta, 
not long since desolate prairie, were now the 
centres of active and populous communities. 
A new industrial system had been built up. 
Canadian-owned ships yearly spread over wider 
seas: Canadian investments were a leading 
feature of the world's stock exchanges; Cana- 
dian millionaires were beginning to take the 
place in London occupied previously by South 
African gold kings and diamond kings ; Canada 
spelled prosperity. The difficulty of the 
Dominion had been for some years to obtain 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. 



243 




CAMP. 

Before Leaving for Europe. 

enough men to do the work waiting to be done ; 
to find sufficient farmers to cultivate the fertile 
lands freely offered to them ; to bring in enough 
people willing to step from the struggles and 
sufferings of the Old World to the prosperity 
-and abundance of the New. 

Some months before war broke out this con- 
dition of general prosperity had received a 
decided check. It is hardly within the scope 
of this history to detail the economic con- 
ditions which brought this about. Some of the 
growth had been too rapid. Capital for Cana- 
dian enterprises had been so easily raised that 
part of it was used without sufficient care. 
Land values in many districts in the West had 
been inflated artificially, often at the cost of 
the . foreign investor. A comparatively small 
amount of unsound business had produced sus- 
picion abroad concerning everything Canadian, 
and hence outside capital became more and 
more difficult to obtain. Some foreign monies 
were withdrawn. At the first suspicion of a 
bad harvest enterprise began to slacken, and 
even in the weeks before the war broke out the 
Canadian people were reckoning on a bad 
winter. They knew for the first time for years 
the problem of the unemployed. The war 
brought the industrial crisis to an acute point. 
Canada, largely dependent upon England for 
capital, "found that England had now no funds 
available. Men responsible for great develop- 
ment enterprises enterprises of necessity 
largely dependent on borrowed money learned 
.that borrowing was no\\' impossible. 



" Canada." 

In the hours when the men of Canada were 
working most -freely and giving most abundantly 
for Empire they well knew that many of their 
enterprises were face to face with ruin. The 
Stock Exchanges were closed. Shares in some 
of the soundest industrial enterprises were 
almost unsaleable ; others were offered for 
little more than half of their market price of a 
few months before. Thus the shares of the 
premier railway of the Dominion, the Canadian 
Pacific, which a little over a year before had 
reached $254, were now sold for S157J. Many 
other enterprises showed a 7iuich more marked 
difference. Government and municipal under- 
takings found it difficult to secure funds for the 
carrying on of publis works, and in con- 
sequence had to discharge hundreds of 
men. A number of establishments closed 
down altogether, while others ran short 
time and with reduced staffs. There was a 
great curtailment of lumbering operations in 
the woods ; manufacturing was exceedingly 
quiet, and in a few parts of Saskatchewan and 
Alberta the crops were a failure. 

Some extracts from the official returns from 
the leading cities in the Dominion for the 
month of August will show how acute the 
situation was : 

MOXTBEAL. The war embroiling Europe in its first 
effect on employment and industrial conditions in 
Montreal and district has had a distinctly depressing 
tendency. 

TORONTO. Owing to the outbreak of the European 
war, and the resulting financial stringency, the labour 
situation during August entered upon a more serious 
phase than at any previous time in the history of Toronto. 



214 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



All lines of industry wore nMVr-trd ami many thousands 
ul mm and \\oinrn paid oil" on account of the during of 
plants or reduetion of staffs. The effect of the enlist- 
ment of -;everal thousand men in the Canadian contingent 
in relieving tle congestion of the labour market \\as 
inappreciable. The building trade was suddenly 
paralysed owing to the inability of contractors to obtain 
advances from the banks and loan companies, anil 
house- huilt for sale find no market. .Some important 
public works, employing large numbers, have been 
temporal ily discontinued- 

PORT ARTHUR AND FORT WILLIAM. With tho begin- 
ning of August and news of the commencement of the 
European war ft decided check was felt in all business 
and commercial affair-*, with the result that no new 
worlc was started, and as Great Britain became involved 
matters in the district in the labour market became still 
worse. 

SAULT STE. MARIE. The inability to get money for 
public works, such as street and road building, steel mill 
extensions, and dry dock construction, and a serious 
falling off in house and public buildings' construction 
has thrown a great many men out of expected employ- 
ment, and threatened many hardships during the 
coming winter, the more especially because of the 
advancing cost of living in nearly every department 
excepting rental?. 

WINNIPEG. Industrial conditions were worse than in 
the month of July. Money was scarce, particularly 
toward- the end of the month. The Provincial Govern- 
ment ordered the stoppage of work on the new law 
courts and Parliament buildings, owing to financial 
stringency. Similar action was taken in regard to a 
goodly number of larger private buildings in the course 
of erection, thus causing a large number to be added to 
the unemployed. 

REGINA. August saw an increase of the already 
large number of unemployed, this being more noticeable 
among the building trades. Almost simultaneously with 
the declaration of war nil the large contracts in the 



city were closed down, and the - i; y d'-ci'ilnl to curtail 
its programme of improvements. A general depression 
prevails in all lines of businBU, and many establish- 
ments have found it necessary to reduce t!n-ir ^ faffs. 

CALGARY. Tho unemployed situation w;i> more .-.crious 
than it has been for several years, a large surplus of men 
of all branches of trades vainly looking for employment. 
Sim.-i) war was declared work has closed down on all 
sides, throwing thousands out of employment. Very 
few building \\erc carrying on operations. 

EDMONTON. Owing to the business depression cau-t-d 
by the European war, the labour market was in MH h a 
deplorable state that any comparison with the previous 
month or the corresponding period a year ago would be 
unfair. Hundreds of men were thrown out of employ- 
ment by the stoppage or curtailment of work in all Jin<;<. 

PRINCE RUPERT. The outlook from a labour stand- 
point was very grave- There has been a gradual eIo>iiiL r 
down of all development work since the d"< l.in'tion of 
war. 

VICTORIA. Owinu to tho outl)ri"ik ot' war in Kunipf. 
labour and business conditions have been very dull and 
unsettled during the month, with the result that labour 
of all classes has been very irregularly employ v- 1. 

The industrial situation was tackled man- 
fully. Distress was relieved ; fresh uiilrrprises 
were begun ; wholesale economies were insti- 
tuted ; and vigorous efforts were made to 
restore financial stability. Soon the result of all 
these steps began to be markedly felt. Mean- 
while, military preparations were carried on 
without pause. 

i When the Dominion Parliament met on 
August 18, two notices of motion were given, 
one to raise fifty million dollars for the defence 




ROYAL GRENADIERS ENTRAINING AT MONTREAL. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



245 




TROOPS EMBARKING AT MONTREAL. 



and security of Canada, and the other safe- 
guarding finance. The speeches made in Par- 
liament quickly proved the reality of the 
political truce. Not much was said, but what 
was said was to the point. " The occasion is 
too great for words," declared one lending 
Toronto paper. The two parties, recently 
engaged in prolonged and bitter political con- 
flict, now joined in a message of loyal devotion 
to the Motherland, of confidence in the justice 
of her caiisp, and of determination to aid in the 
Empire's war with every resource and to the 
limit of every sacrifice. "As to our duty," 
said the Prime Minister, " we are in accord. 
We stand shoulder to shoulder with Britain 
and the other British Dominions. With firm 
hearts we abide the issue." Sir Wilfrid 
Liiuricr supported him. " We are British sub- 
jects," he said, " and to-day we are face to 
face with the consequences which are involved 
in that proud fact. Long we have enjoyed the 
benefits of our British citizenship ; to-day it is 
our duty and our privilege to accept the 
responsibility, yes, and the sacrifices. Our 
answer is ' Beady, aye ready ! ' ' Canada, he 
declared, had one mind and one heart, to main- 
tain untarnished the honour and dignity of her 
name and to save civilization from the un- 
bridled licence of conquest and power. 

Day by day evidence of national unity grew. 
On one occasion complaints wore made that 



French-Canadians were backward in recruiting, 
and that only four hundred of them had joined 
the first contingent. The defence of the 
French-Canadians came from the English Press 
of the Dominion. " There are fifteen hundred 
of them at Valcartier who have been accepted, 
and many more volunteered," stated the 
Toronto Daily Star. " Moreover, there are 
now at the front the first of ajl Canadians to 
get there a body of 750 French-Canadians, 
who, being reservists of France, sailed there 
direct from Montreal, and are probably by now 
on the firing line. There is no room for dis- 
sension and fault-finding. The people of this 
country will do their duty as they perceive 
what it is, and will do it as resolutely as any- 
body could wish." 

It was thought that trouble might arise from 
the large German colonies. The settlers in 
some of these quickly proved that they shared 
the common aspirations of the Dominions. 
The citizens of Berlin, Ontario, for example, 
sent a cable to Lord Kitchener: "Berlin, 
Ontario, a city of 18,000 population, of which 
12,000 are Germans or of German descent, 
purposes raising 15,000 or more for the 
National (Canadian) Patriotic Fund. The 
German people want to see militarism in Ger- 
many smashed for good, and the people set 
free to shape a greater and better Germany. 
We feel confident that England hag appointed 



240 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



the ri<:ht men in Mr. Churchill and Lord 
Kitchener to boss the job." 

Americans in Canada showed their sym- 
pathy in unmistakable fashion. Many of 
their young men demanded to be enrolled in 
the ranks of the new Army, and when the first 
Cimadian contingent arrived in England, men 
of American birth were found in almost every 
regiment. Some officials who had most to do 
with the recruiting were emphatic in assorting 
that, were it necessary, whole regiments could 
be raised solely composed of volunteers from 
the United States. The American volunteers 
proved in many ways that they came not 
merely for love of excitement and adventure, 
but from conviction of the justice of the cause 
of the Allies. One man from Texas wanted to 
bring 5,000 Texans to Canada to enlist, all of 
whom, he declared, were of British descent. 
A major in the American Army offered to 
resign provided he was given a commission in 
the Canadian Army, and said he would bring 
500 recruits with him. These were typical 
cases. 

The one anxiety of Irish-Canadians was not 
lest their fellow countrymen in the Dominions 
should show any weakening, but lest develop- 
ments in Ireland itself should give encourage- 
ment to the foe. They heard with the greatest 



satisfaction of Mr. Redmond's speeches, and 
they urged on their compatriots at home by 
letter and cable the need of prompt aid for tlio 
Empire. In Montreal alone one regiment of 
Irish-Canadians was raised, and the Irish 
flocked-everywhere to the colours. 

The attitude of the Red Indians must not 
be passed over. The Red Indian population of 
Canada numbers to-day over one hundred 
thousand. Many of the Indians applied to be 
allowed to join the Expeditionary Force, and 
a few were enlisted. One tribe offered to form 
a corps of guides. Another volunteered the 
services of their band. Tribes that had fought 
by the side of England in former struggles now 
recalled their former exploits how they had 
aided us in 1812 or had served as trackers in 
the Red River Expedition. Eighteen tribes 
scattered between the Yukon River and Nova 
Scotia raised among them close on 3,000 as. 
contributions to the different war funds. 

The Blood Indians of Alberta passed a reso- 
lution in the early days of the war : " The first 
citizens of Canada, the old allies of warring 
French and British, the redskins, the devoted 
wards of Victoria the Good and of her grandson, 
King George, are no whit behind the Sikhs of 
India, the men from South Africa, or the 
British Regulars in testifying to their loyalty 




[Chesterfield and McLaren, Montreal. 



EMBARKING HORSES AT QUEBEC. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



247 




TRANSPORTS WITH CANADIAN TROOPS, ESCORTED BY A BATTLESHIP. 



to the Crown or to the unity of the British 
Kmpire." Chiefs "Shot Both Sides" and 
" Ermine Horses," of the Blood Indians, sent 
200 from the tribal funds "as a tangible 
expression of their desire that Great Britain 
may ever remain the guardian of the weak and 
the arbiter of the world's peace." The Mani- 
toulin Island Indians sent 400 " toward 
defraying the enormous expenses of the war 
in which our great father the King is at present 
engaged." The Six Nations desired their gift 
of money to speak for " the alliance existing 
between the Six Nations Indians and the 
British Crown." 

It was at first intended to raise an Expe- 
ditionary Force of 22,000 men, with another 
10,000 men in garrison duty or doing patrol 
work in the Dominion, but it was soon found 
impossible to keep the forces within these 
limits. Miners and trappers and pioneers in 
distant fields abandoned their work at the first 
word of war and travelled up rivers, over 
mountains, and through back-wood swamps 
to the nearest recruiting points. Old members 
of the Canadian contingent in the South African 
War demanded as a right that they should 
again be allowed to serve. Cowboys formed 
themselves up into regiments in Albertan 
townships under the shadow of the Rockies, 



and asked nothing but to be led in the shortest 
time to the heart of the fight. " Among the 
troops from the West just arrived are 200 
frontiersmen from Moosejaw," wrote the 
Ottawa correspondent of The Times. " They 
were refused permission to enlist as they wanted 
to go as cavalrymen. Notliing daunted, they 
hired two cars themselves and came to Ottawa 
at their own expense. They also purchased 
their own outfits. Nearly all are old Strathcona 
horsemen who saw service in South Africa. If 
not accepted for service by the Government 
they threaten to hire a cattle ship and sail for 
Europe." 

Canada was fortunate in having at this time 
men of the right type at the head of her military 
forces. The Duke of Connaught, the Governor- 
General, himself a trained, experienced, and 
hard-working Army officer, was able, because 
of his knowledge of military affairs and his 
skill in handling men, to stimulate and direct 
national enthusiasm. The Canadian people, 
apart from some limited circles in two or three 
of the great cities of the East, are not over- 
given to courtly flattery, but the most inde- 
pendent of Canadians would be the first to 
admit that in the Duke of Connaught th 
Dominion had in these hours of crisis the right 
man in the right place. Colonel, afterwards* 



248 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAti. 



Major-General, Sain Hughes, the Dominion 
Minister of Militia, on whose should r.- 
the main work of organizing the Expe- 
ditionnry Force fell, had proved before the 
jr&r broke out that he knew his work and 
that his heart was in it. A man of great deter- 
mination, energy and force of character, quirk 
of speech and ready in caustic criticism, he at 
times aroused by his intensity some enmity. 
But his hardest opponents did not deny his 
strenuous enthusiasm. He took part in the 
South African War. where he won some dis- 
tinction as a practical fighter. Succeeding Sir 
Frederick Borden as head of the Department 
of Militia, he undertook with zeal the task of 
awakening the Canadian people to the necessity 
of national defence. He urged in public 
speeches, in private conferences, and in every 
way possible, the need for national preparation. 
He fostered the Cadet Corps movement. He 
strove for efficiency in the ranks of the very 
limited battalions which before the war repre- 
sented Canada's military force. 

The first Canadian contingent as finally 
formed represented the Dominion from end to 
end. It was built up on the small defence 



army, with its permanent foree of three 
thousand men. and its militia. The old 
Canadian Army had been exposed in former 
times to scathing criticism, and not without 
cause, but it gave a skeleton organization, staff 
machinery, and military traditions which U.TC 
now found to be of the greatest value. Corps 
of regulars, such as Lord Strathcona's Horse 
and the Royal Canadian Dragoons, active 
militia units such as the different Highland 
brigades, the Queen's Own Rifles, the Grena- 
diers, and the artillery, afforded a substantial 
foundation on which to build. Much benefit was 
found from improvements in staff organization 
introduced three years before in consequence of 
u caustic report on Canadian military unpre- 
paredness from Sir John French. 

A selection was made from the vast hosts of 
volunteers, and the numbers to hand enabli d 
the sifting process to be thorough. .Men wer, 
mercilessly weeded out for minor physical 
defects. Sobriety was particularly insisted 
upon, and while the Expeditionary Force 
remained in Canada any man who, after enlist- 
ment, was found under the influence of drink 
was dismissed. No inarried man was taken 




PRINCESS PATRICIA'S CANADIAN LIGHT INFANTRY, iumni /'.. 
At Bustard Camp, Salisbury Plain. The Colours of the Regiment were worked by Princess Patricia. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



249 



unless he first obtained the written consent of 
his wife. The pay of the private soldier was, 
with allowances, between 4s. Od. and 5s. a day. 
A very large proportion of the men of the 
first contingent, about 60 per cent., were 
British or Irish born. There was a strong 
Scottish element, and the kilted Highland 
regiments, with their piper bands, were a 
prominent feature of the contingent. This 
proportion was not maintained in the con- 
tingents formed later. Among the new 
soldiers were men of every rank of life under- 
graduates from McOill, Toronto or Queen's, 
business nien, miners, trappers, cowboys, 
journalists, railway hands to name them- 
all would be to name practically every 
class of Canadian employment. There was 
an appreciable proportion of townsmen. 
The common notion in England at the time 
that the Canadian contingent was made up of 
cowboys and hunters had only a slender basis 
in fact. But it must be remembered that the 
Canadian townsman, or the young English 
immigrant who has lived for a few years in a 
Canadian town, is much more self-reliant and 
more accustomed to open-air life than the 
average Englishman of the same class. He 
has learnt to do things for himself, to take 
greater risks, and to adapt himself to strange 
surroundings more than the average man 
accustomed to the set routine of English 
cities. The atmosphere of New Canada 
encourages initiative, venturesomeness, and 
self-reliance all good qualities in the fighting 
man. 

A monster camp was hastily formed at 
Valcartier, outside Quebec, and here the 
regiments were assembled from every part of 
the Dominion. The original 22,000 grew 
until the strength of the first Expeditionary 
Force including a regiment for Bermuda 
was close on 33,000. The avowed aim of the 
authorities was to make the new army com- 
plete in every detail. The personal equipment 
of the men was as good as money could buy, 
from the thick under-garrnents and extra-stout 
bootlaces to the overcoats. The mounted men 
were specially proud of their horses. An 
adequate motor transport ambulance and 
ammunition train were secured ; 105 fully- 
trained nurses from the leading Canadian 
hospitals were sent by the Canadian Red Cross 
Society to accompany the Army. The 
generosity of private donors had placed more 
machine guns at the service of the contingent 




FIELD GUN, 
Being hoisted on board a transport. 

than were needed. The contingent had its own 
aviators, its own medical service, its own 
intelligence staff. The moral needs of the men 
were not overlooked, and besides Chaplains, 
several Y.M.C.A. officials were given military 
rank that they might accompany the troops. 
By the end of September all was ready, and 
31,250 men, with 7,500 horses and the complete 
equipment of a fighting army set sail in thirty- 
two transports for England. 

A veil of silence had been thrown over the 
movements of the new Army. No word was 
allowed to appear in the Canadian or the 
British Press concerning their journey until 
they were safely landed. The troopships, 
mostly liners of the great Atlantic fleets, 
were silently assembled in the St. Lawrence, 
where protecting warships met them. At a 
given signal the various battalions of Val- 
cartier were summoned to the ranks. The 
order was given to pack kits, and the men set 
out. A description of the scene by a western 
journalist is well worth preserving: 

No one who witnessed the departure of the Canadian 
troops from Valcartier camp, and ultimately from 

20 3 



250 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN ENGLAND, 
Canadian Highlanders Marching to Field Church Service. 



Quebec on board the transports, will ever forget the 
sight. The march, for those who did not take the train, 
uas some 18 miles by road to Quebec, and it was mostly 
made in a drizzling rain, with exceedingly heavy going 
under foot. As the various battalions at various hours 
of the day were summoned by the trumpeter to prepare 
for departure the scene in their lines was one of boisterous 
activity. Kits were packed, equipment was affixed. 
and every preparation made to leave the tents behind. 
On the order to start, the long khaki-coloured lines 
debouched into the road. As they passed the other 
battalion lines they were cheered by friends who lined 
the roadway, and who in many cases provided bands 
to play the men from camp. " It's a Long Way to Tip- 
perary " was the inevitable song of the soldiers.- and the 
inevitable air played by the bands. The familiar tune 
could be heard until the last man of the leaving battalion 
had disappeared from view slog-logging it through the 
heavy sand. 

The greater part of the artillery made the march late 
in the afternoon and at night, arriving in Quebec rain- 
soaked, mud-bespattered, horses reeking in the rain, 
but everyone cheerful and content. Even in the driz- 
zling rain the sight of the long lines of guns, ammunition 
wagons, transports, and horses filing along on the narrow 1 
roads, flanked by autumn-tinted trees, fringed by quaint 
French-Canadian villages and farm-steadings was an 
inspiring one. Women and children came to the doors 
to cheer them as they passed. At one point a white- 
haired old cure of a French village stood for nearly half 
an hour to his knees in the wet grass of his orchard, 
plucking apples from the trees and throwing them to 
the men as they swung along. They cheered him, and 
a French-Canadian battery which passed sang the 
Marseillaise. 

The scene at Quebec was no less interesting and 
striking than that on the road from Valcartier. Not 
since the days of Wolfe in Quebec has the military 
atmosphere so predominated in the old city. In the 
Chateau Frontenac mothers and wives gathered to bid 
good-bye to sons and husbands. Officers, mud bespat- 
tered, were seized upon their arrival from the camp, and 
openly embraced by wives or sisters, before all the guests 
in the rotunda of the big hotel. In the cafe the music 
played and the last evenings were devoted to an attempt 
to forget the present, and not to anticipate the future. 
But all the merriment was hectic in nature, and the 
underlying minor chords of the violins predominated in 
the hearts of the majority of the dancers. On the days 



of departure hasty farewells were said ; men went away 
to the transports which were to carry them to England 
" for the duration of the war." Women went back to 
their rooms to weep, or prepared to return home to bear 
the weary waiting of the future with what fortitude they 
might. 

The afternoon the transports sailed to meet their grim 
convoy at the rendezvous was clear and bright. The 
Dufferin Terrace overlooking the harbour was black with 
the 1 thousands which watched them go. From the liners 
as they passed one by one slowly down the river and 
past Point Levis came the music of bands, and the 
singing of the soldiers. Waving handkerchiefs and 
cheers answered them until the last of the big transports 
carrying the pride of Canada's soldiery disappeared 
from view between the Isle of Orleans and the main- 
land.* 

The voyage across the Atlantic took nineteen 
days, the ships moving in triple line and their 
pace being regulated by the speed of the slowest. 
The uneventful journey may well in future form 
the theme of an imperial epic. Even the least 
imaginative of the voyagers could not fail to be 
impressed as he gazed from the decks day after 
day at the long lines of giant vessels all around, 
and at the warships convoying them with 
unceasing vigilance, the gunboats now darting 
off towards the horizon to hold up some sus- 
picious passing stranger, the cruisers keeping 
pace front and rear ready for battle. 

In England there were days of anxious 
expectation. The Press had been directed to 
make no mention of the voyage across the 
Atlantic, and the authorities even kept back 
the delivery of every Canadian newspaper in 
England for some weeks lest anything should 
become known nf it. The absence of informa- 
tion only whetted curiosity. There was a. 

* Manitoba Free Press. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



251 



widespread desire among all classes to give the 
Canadians a great public reception in order to 
show the Dominions how England valued the 
aid of her sister nations. This, for obvious 
military reasons, was impossible. People of 
every rank, from Cabinet Ministers to the 
humblest private citizen, begged permission 
from the War Office to be on the quay side when 
the troops arrived. These applications were so 
numerous that the military authorities were 
obliged to make a rule that only one outsider 
should be present at the landing of the men 
Lord Roberts. It was expected that 
Southampton would be the place of arrival, 
and the municipal authorities there made every 
preparation to give the Canadians a hearty 
greeting as they passed out of the dock gates. 
A false rumour was published one day that the 
Canadians had arrived in the Solent on the 
previous night, and people rushed to Southamp- 
ton to welcome them. The rumour, it after- 
wards transpired, arose because of the arrival 
of a limited number of army reservists from 
Canada. 

While the eyes of the country were directed 
to Southampton, the people of Plymouth were 
astonished, on the morning of October 15, to 
find transport after transport arriving in the 
Sound, forming in line across the harbour, and 
dropping anchor there. Word went around 
that the transports had brought the Canadian 
contingent, and Plymouth and Devonport 



rose to the occasion. The demonstration that 
followed, with its spontaneous enthusiasm, will 
live long in the memories of all who shared it. 

The people flocked to the waterside and moved 
out in row-boats and small steamers to the 
transports. The Canadians lined the sides of . 
their boats and mounted the riggings. Their 
bands formed up on the poops and played 
national airs. The skirl of the Highlanders' 
pipes, the harsh notes of sirens and hooters 
from all the British ships in the bay, the cheers, 
the shouts and the songs of the men of Devon 
and the men of the Far West filled the air. 

The troops were not allowed on shore that 
day, and the people of the twin towns were not 
permitted on shipboard. But when in the 
days that followed the Canadian regiments 
landed and marched through the streets to the 
railway en route to Salisbury Plain, people of 
every rank and class showed that they could 
not do enough for them. " We were snowed 
under with good things," said one soldier 
expressively. Workgirls pressed apples and 
bananas on them ; clerks rushed from their 
offices with packets of cigarettes ; ladies stood 
at the stations with great dishes of coffee and 
piles of sandwiches, offering them to the men 
as they came in. 

Devon has seen many memorable sights in its 
time, and from the days of Raleigh and before 
has served as an arena for spectacles of imperial 
history. It was fitting that the arrival of the 




" Canadi." 



FIRST ROYAL CANADIAN REGIMENT AT SALISBURY PLAIN. 



25-2 



THE TIMES HltiTOHY OF THE W.IH. 



Canadians should bo here. The long linos of 
transports, stretching into the Sound until 
they vanished in the distant mist, opened up a 
fresh vision of the union of the sister nations of 
the Empire. 

It had been decided that the Canadian ron- 
t ingent should not proceed at once to the front, 
but should first go through a course of military 
training on Salisbury Plain. Four camps were 
prepared there the Bustards, West Down 
North, West Down South, and Pond Farm. 
It was at first intended that the men should 
remain for a short space under canvas and then 
be transferred before winter came on into 
huts around Larkshill. The transfer to the 
huts was delayed for some time, however, owing 
to the difficulty of finding sufficient labour to 
build them. Hence the majority of the troops 
remained under canvas until after Christmas. 

If it was the intention of the military 
authorities to put the Canadians through a 
severe physical test before sending them to the 
front, they certainly succeeded. The Salisbury 
Plain camps were placed in very exposed places. 
Autumn rains came on a few days after the 
arrival of the contingent, and continued almost 
daily for many weeks. Soon the countryside 
was a quagmire. The roads were torn into great 
holes with the constant traffic of the heavy 



Canadian motor transports, nnd the fields around 
the tents were some of them little more than seas 
of mud. The Canadians took their experiences 
good-humouredly. Chance visitors were in- 
clined to pity them. The men themselves made 
a jest of the mud. Tent life in the winter days 
was hard without doubt, but it was soon found 
that it was exceedingly healthy. A small 
number broke down under the strain, but the 
others became hardened. It would be difficult 
to find a body of men more fit physically than 
the Canadians at the end of their first two 
months on Salisbury Plain. 

Major-General Alderson took command of the 
contingent shortly after its arrival on Salisbury 
Plain, and it was soon evident that the Imperial 
Government had been happily inspired in 
choosing him. General Alderson had some of 
the Canadian troops under his command in the 
South African War, and gained knowledge of 
the ways of the men from overseas in Mashona- 
land and elsewhere. In his first visit to Salis- 
bury Plain he succeeded in capturing the con- 
fidence of the Canadians. Meeting some of 
the battalions on the road, out on a route 
march, he called the men informally around 
h^m and made an impromptu speech, which 
struck the right note. 

The Canadian camps had up to now been 




CANADIAN HIGHLANDERS IN LONDON. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAU. 



258 




CANADIAN AUTOMOBILE MACHINE GUN BATTERY. 
Inspection by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught. 



administered on a strict teetotal principle. 
At Valcartier, on shipboard, and at Salisbury 
Plain, the troops had been allowed no 
intoxicants, no alcoholic drinks of any 
kind being sold in the canteens. The 
result of this regulation, on Salisbury Plain at 
least, had not been wholly good. General 
Alderson told the troops from henceforth they 
were to be treated as men, not as children. 
They would be able to purchase beer in the 
camps, and he placed them on their honour to 
see that the privilege was not abused. It was 
the duty of the older and the more responsible 
men to ensure that the younger and the less- 
easily controlled observed discipline and kept 
within bounds of moderation. Ho trusted them 
to see that this would be done. Going on from 
this point General Alderson gave the soldiers a 
frank and straightforward speech about his 
plans for their training on Salisbury Plain, and 
the ideals of military efficiency he was striving 
for. The speech appealed to the men. It was 
repeated and emphasized in every tent in the 
four camps that night, and it infused a new 
vigour, enthusiasm, and devotion throughout 
the force. 

The main difficulties of the Canadian con- 
tingent at the beginning were caused by the 
isolation of the camps and the difficulty in 
some of the sections of the men learning the 
necessity of strict military discipline. The 
nearest villages were several miles away, and 
the nearest town of any kind was from 14 to 16 
miles, over difficult roads. The troops were 
consequently largely thrown on their own 



resources for recreation and entertainment. 
Some of the lads from the West found it hard 
at first to realize that, even in the army of a 
democracy, rigid obedience is an absolute 
necessity. Some trouble was experienced in a 
few regiments over the question of outstaying 
leave. This quickly righted itself. The great 
virtues of the Canadian force, physical strength, 
intelligence, ingenuity, daring and manual skill, 
became more and more evident, and by the 
end of December it was clear to all observers 
that in the first Canadian contingent the 
Empire had a valuable fighting asset. 

While the First contingent was training at 
Salisbury Plain steps were being taken to raise 
a Second and a Third Canadian contingent. 
On October 18 Sir Robert Borden announced 
that the Government would proceed at once 
with the organization of the Second Expe- 
ditionary Force ; 16,000 to 20,000 men were 
to be immediately enlisted, and as soon as the 
necessary arms and equipment were available 
the Government intended to train a total 
force of 40,000 men, including some 10,000 
needed for garrison and outpost duty in 
Canada. The response of Canada to this was 
expressed in the words of a message by the 
Hon. Walter Scott, the Premier of Saskatche- 
wan : ' ' So long as we are able to raise a man 
to stand by the guns or a dollar to carry on the 
fight we shall go on until the oppressor is 
subdued." In many parts of the country men 
offered themselves in greater numbers than 
could be accepted. The Second Expeditionary 
Force consisted ot about 17,000 officers and 



254 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



men, 4,765 horses, 58 field and heavy guns, and 
16 machine guns. It included infantry, artil- 
lery, engineers, signal and cyclist companies, 
Army Service Corps, and field ambulances, with 
ammunition park, a supply column, reserve 
park, and other line-of-communication units. 
By early in December the total number of 
Canadians under arms was 91,000, made up as 
follows : 

Forces already despatched (including 
regiment garrisoning Bermuda) 
nearly 33,000 

Forces engaged in garrison and outpost 

duty in Canada, about 8,000 

Forces under training in Canada ... 50,000 



91,000 

It was officially announced that as soon as 
the Second contingent went forward, which 
would be as early as possible, a further enlist- 
ment of 17,000 men would be made, bringing 
up the total to 108,000. Thereafter the 
forwarding of further Expeditionary Forces 
would be followed by the enlistment of men to 
take their place. 

The main difficulty in enrolling the volun- 
teers in Canada was the provision of arms and 
equipment. Every available factory and mill 
and arsenal throughout the Empire was work- 
ing to its utmost capacity. Cooperative 
arrangements were made by the Imperial 
Government and the Dominion Governments, 
so that the resources of all possible parts of the 



Empire should be utilized in the most efficient 
manner for the common purpose. " In the 
western provinces," said an official notice issued 
in mid-December, " large numbers of men 
anxious to serve as mounted troops are available. 
They are excellent riders and good shots ; the 
Government has made special efforts to arrange 
that their services can be utilized." 

Within a little over four months from the 
outbreak of the war Canada had provided at 
its own charge over 90,000 men for the 
Imperial forces. This response, splendid as it 
was, did not satisfy the people. Apart from 
the small local personal following of one 
politician in the Province of Quebec, the 
Dominion grew the more determined the more 
its people knew of the realities and the neces- 
sities of the war. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, speaking 
on the issue in mid-December, when early 
enthusiasm had had time to cool, voiced the 
considered judgment of French Canada and of 
English Canada, of Opposition and of Govern- 
ment alike : 

"English Canadians, Irish-Canadians, French- 
Canadians, Could we contemplate the possi 
bility of remaining quiescent when the French 
Armies and the British Army are fighting against 
the powerful German hosts for the freedom of 
France, for the freedom of Belgium, and for 
the civilization of the world ? I do not hesitate 
to apply to Canada the words of Mr. Asquith. 
and say that if Canada had remained passive 




BUILDING HUTS ON SALISBURY PLAIN. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



255 




THE KING AND QUEEN AT SALISBURY PLAIN. 
Inspection of Canadian troops. 



and quiescent we should have covered ourselves 
with dishonour." 

Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister, 
speaking at the Canadian Club at Montreal in 
December, predicted that before the war closed, 
unless the end came sooner than could be 
reasonably expected, the German armies would 
Ond confronting them 250,000 men from the 
self-governing Dominions. He hinted then at 
the ultimate effects of this material aid on the 
future development of the Empire. " Step by 
step during the past hundred years," said he, 
" the development of self-government has 
proceeded ^in the Overseas Dominions. The 
enjoyment of these powers -is not weakened, 
but rather strengthened, by the bonds which 
hold together the Empire. In one respect only 
has the evolution not attained its full develop- 
ment. The citizens of the self-governing 
Dominions do not directly participate, through 
their Ministers or Parliament, in the councils 
of the Empire which determine the issues of 
peace and war. It would be rash to predict 
the method by which the great problem will be 
solved, but of this I am convinced that the 
events of this war will powerfully assist the 



hastening of its wise solution. In this great 
testing time Canada has made known to the 
Empire and the world her true spirit. It has 
animated the men who are nocking in thousands 
to do their part and has equally inspired the 
women, who in every city, village, and hamlet 
are busy in manifest activities for the aid and 
solace of our countrymen wherever needed." 

The political truce did not soon die down. 
The Opposition took up the attitude that its 
business was not merely to cease to oppose, but 
actively to help the Premier and the Cabinet. 
This attitude was clearly stated by the great 
Liberal newspaper of the East, the Toronto 
Daily Star, in December, on the occasion of a 
visit from the Premier. " Sir Robert Borden 
will have a warm welcome in Toronto, as he 
deserves. In these strenuous days everyone who 
holds a public position bears a heavy burden of 
responsibility and anxiety, and should receive 
all the comfort and support that the people can 
give. It is said that there is now a truce between 
the political parties ; but there should be more 
than a truce. There should be an alliance of all 
who stand for the common cause." 

The people of Canada found that the out- 



266 



777 /: V MKS HISTORY <>!<' THK WAR. 




CAMP KITCHEN ON SALISBURY PLAIN. 



[/'. A. li 



burst of national enthusiasm over the country 
lielped very materially to overcome the depres- 
sion which threatened the Dominion so seriously 
in the early days of August. Trade began to 
revive ; manufacturers, determined not to give 
way before threatening ruin, re-doubled their 
energies and in very many cases secured their 
own prosperity in doing so ; fresh enterprises 
were launched ; some firms began to manufac- 
ture goods formerly imported from Germany, 
and found a ready market ; others set out to 
provide material for the new armies. Enter- 
prise, in August at a standstill- by December 
had been re-born. 

AUSTBALIA. 

To Australia, as to Canada, the war came at 
an unfavourable moment. The country was 
suffering from a bad drought, and a drought 
makes its evil effects felt on every section of 
Australian life. Germany had for sonic years 
cultivated Australian trade with special care 
and success, and the immediate cessation of 
German demand and the paralysis of German 
shipping meant much loss in business. Hut 
there was no hesitation about the attitude of the 
people of the Commonwealth, any more than 



there was hesitation about the attitude of the 
people of Kent. The responsible men of 
Australia prepared quietly and systematically 
to conserve their means, to strengthen their 
armies, and to place their entire strength at the 
service of the Crown. " We must sit tifilit now 
and see the thing through at whatever difficulty 
and whatever cost," said Mr. Cook, the then 
Federal Prime Minister. " We must be stedl'usf 
in our determination. Our resources are great, 
and British spirit is not dead. We owe it to 
those who have gone before to preserve the great 
fabric of British freedom and hand it on to our 
children. Our duty is quite clear. Remember 
we are Britons." 

Australia understood the vital issues of the 
war. The national feeling was well expressed 
by Sir George Reid : " The real inwardness of 
the struggle between Germany and Great 
Britain is between two opposite ideals of 
Imperial power. Are the eyes and ears of 
humanity to be terrified by ' mailed fists ' 
and ' shining armour ' and the ' rattle ' of the 
sabre of Prussian sires, or are they to be 
attracted by triumphs of peacef u! enterprise and 
political development that leave unlimited seope 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



257 



for the elevation of all the races of mankind ? 
The answer has already, I think, been given. 
In every quarter of the globe, in the hands of 
men of every race, creed and colour, loyal arms 
have flashed in the sun, saluting the war signal 
of our Sovereign." 

The only fear before war was declared was 
lest the British Government, in its desire for 
peace, should shrink from the great sacrifices 
demanded. The first cabled reports of Sir 
Edward Grey's great speech in the House of 
Commons immediately before the declaration of 
war conveyed the impression that England had 
decided to stand on one side. A feeling of 
disappointment and humiliation swept through 
the country. " A prominent Labour ex- 
Minister declared that if Great Britain deserted 
her friends and allowed Belgium to be invaded 
in spite of her guarantee, he would never call 
himself an Englishman again," wrote one man 
from Sydney at the time. " But the telegrams 
were very disheartening, and when our declara- 
tion of war was announced it was received with 
H universal feeling of relief England had not 
caved in, after all ! Since then Australia has 
been splendid. No tub-thumping or flag- 
wagging, but a quiet resolve to do everything 
and to put up with everything to help the 
national cause, and, for the rest, to keep cool, 
and to await the issue as patiently as possible." 

The truce in party politics which prevailed 
over most parts of the Empire did not remain 
unbroken in Australia. At the beginning of the 
war the leaders of the Labour Party expressed 
their willingness to sink all party controversy 
for the time and to avoid contests in the forth- 
coming General Election by an arrangement 
under which old members would be returned 
unopposed. They suggested that Mr. Pearce, 
who had largely created the naval and military 
policy of Australia in recent years, should 
co-operate with the then Ministry of Defence. 
The Government, while welcoming the sugges- 
tion that party controversy should cease, 
declined to accept the definite proposals of the 
Labour Party. The Prime Minister, at a 
banquet at Melbourne on August 10, in an 
important speech on the war, welcomed 
Mr. Fisher, the Labour leader, who was present, 
and declared that : "So far as this trouble is 
concerned all party divisions have been done 
away with." 

Some of the supporters of the Cook Ministry 
were unable, however, to live up to this declara- 
tion, and they attempted, with singular un- 



wisdom, to represent the General Election as a 
contest between patriotic Conservatives and a 
disloyal, anti-war and anti-British Labourite 
Party. The Cook Ministry was soundly 
defeated, and, in the opinion of many non- 
partisan observers, the main cause of its defeat 
was the attempt to tag the label of disloyalty 
to the Labour group. Mr. Andrew Fisher, the 
new Premier, who succeeded to office in 
September, demonstrated by his actions how 
baseless the charge was. He sent a message to 
England on the day of his accession : " At the 
beginning of the war I said that Australia 
should support Great Britain with her last man 
and her last shilling. I am glad to have the 
opportunity of giving effect if necessary to 
that declaration." Mr. Pearce now succeeded 
once more to the Ministry of Defence and his 
appointment was generally welcomed. 

It was difficult for those who knew Australia 
at the end of the nineteenth century to realize 
the change that had come over the working 




THE MUD OF SALISBURY PLAIN 



258 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




THE KING LEAVING BUSTARD CAMP, SALISBURY PLAIN. 



classes there on the question of national 
defence. Even up to the days of the. Russo- 
Japanese War the Australian working man 
regarded militarism as a form of plutocratic 
oppression and as an attempt to fleece the 
workers by making them support an idle and 
unproductive class. The soldier was the subject 
of good-natured but contemptuous ridicule. 
Proposals that Australia should have a fleet of 
her own or should lend adequate support to 
the British Admiralty were exceedingly un- 
popular. The Russo-Japanese War changed the 
temper of the people. The Commonwealth had 
already given offence to the Chinese and 
Japanese Governments by its attitude towards 
Oriental immigration. The defeat of Russia 
brought home to the -nation the fact that 
Australia, apart from her Imperial connexion, 
lay at the mercy of one of the strongest, most 
daring, and most proud of world Powers. The 
Sydney Bulletin, whose influence as a maker of 
popular opinion will be denied by none who 
knows Australia to-day, drove home week by 
week, by pictures, editorials, comments and 
verse, the meaning of Great Japan. The visits 
of some English military leaders, including 
Lord Kitchener, helped to emphasize in the 
public mind the need for Australian defence 



and the shortcomings of the old military 
provisions. 

The outcome of this was the definite com- 
mencement of an Australian Navy and the 
passing of Defence Acts enforcing compulsory 
service on all able-bodied males, starting with 
cadet training from twelve until eighteen years 
old, and thence onward to service during man- 
hood in the Citizen Defence Force. It necessarily 
takes time to establish a system of universal 
service, but at the outbreak of the war the 
Commonwealth of Australia had 85,000 cadets 
under training and 50,000 men in the Citizen 
Forces, well equipped and organized. There 
were 24 batteries of field artillery of the latest 
type of 18-pounder guns, artillery of which 
Sir Ian Hamilton had said when on his visit of 
inspection to the Commonwealth : " I would 
not be afraid to take them into action against 
European troops to-morrow." 

The Commonwealth Government at once 
volunteered to send an Expeditionary Force ol 
20,000 men to Europe, and the leading news- 
papers voiced the public decision that this 
would be followed, if necessary, by five times 
the number : " Our one anxiety will be to have 
them placed where they can be of the most 
service to the Empire as a whole." The call 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



259 



wont out for volunteers, and the immediate 
rush was so great as to cause some embarrass- 
ment, for it was difficult to know what men to 
reject when so much fine material offered. 
Queensland Bushmen offered to provide a 
regiment and bring their own horses. The 
amateur yachtsmen of Australia offered their 
services for the Royal Naval Reserve. No 
attempt was made to use compulsion to obtain 
recruits. This was not necessary and would 
not have been possible. The Defence Acts made 
no provision for compulsory service abroad, 
and even had they done so it would have been 
needless, for there were twice as many good 
volunteers as were required, and in many dis- 
tricts the competition to enlist was exceedingly 
keen. 

While recruiting was proceeding, the business 
men looked to their side of the national struggle. 
They understood well enough what they had 
to do. It was to keep Australia going with as 
little hindrance as possible to sound industry 
and local development, so that the whole 
attention of their administrators could be 
devoted to providing the Mother Country with 
whatever men or resources she required. 
Meetings of the Chambers of Manufacturers 
and other commercial bodies were held, and 
unanimous resolutions were passed to keep 
factories open and as far as possible to prevent 





HON. JOSEPH COOK, 
Late Prime Minister of Australia. 



(EUioU & fry. 

RT. HON. ANDREW FISHER, 
Prime Minister of Australia. 

unemployment. Much trade had been dis- 
located by a series of proclamations prohibiting 
the export to foreign lands of vital articles 
of food supply likely to be wanted for the 
Imperial armies. One secondary result of the 
war in Australia, as in Canada, was to quicken 
the commercial enterprise of the nation, and 
before many weeks it became evident that the 
arrest of German trade would mean, after the 
temporary dislocation had been overcome, a 
gain rather than a loss to the Commonwealth 
generally. 

The German settlers in Australia decided to 
stand by the country of their adoption. The 
German Lutheran congregations at Rella, 
Roseberg and Curzo, German-speaking but 
mostly Australian born, unanimously adopted 
a resolution soon after the outbreak of the war : 
" That we, as German-speaking citizens, being 
British subjects either by birth or naturaliza- 
tion, desire publicly to express our unswerving 
loyalty and fidelity to His Majesty King 
George V., and that as citizens of the British 
Kmpire, enjoying full civil and religious 
freedom, we are prepared, if the necessity arises, 
to sacrifice our property and our lives for the 
welfare of the British Empire." Australia was 
one. 

The different States of the Commonwealth 
and the Dominion of New Zealand entered into 



77//-: T1MKX HISTORY OF THE WAK. 




HON. GEORGE F. PEARCE, 
Australian Minister for Defence. 

a friendly rivalry in philanthropic war work. 
By early in November the various war funds in 
Australia amounted to about half a million 
pounds, and week after week they rose rapidly. 
The Commonwealth Government granted 
100,000 to the Belgian Relief Fund, the New 
Zealand Government 20,000, and the Queens- 
land Government 10,000. Other States raised 
scores of thousands of pounds in money and in 
food for Belgium. Australia contributed 
50,000 before Christmas to the British Red 
Cross Society. The Pastoralists' Union of New 
South Wales gave gifts in aid of the war on a 
princely scale. Up to the end of October 
these gifts included 40,000 carcases of mutton, 
1,500 sheep, a million cartridges, 20 tons of 
dried fruit, and 1,500 horses. In November it 
gave a further 7,600 carcases of mutton. The 
Brisbane Newspaper Co. made itself specially 
prominent among the many newspapers which 
raised large war funds. Gifts of tons of flour 
and of biscuits, of thousands of sheep and of 
consignments of fruit and clothing were sent 
from all parts of Australia One unusual 
contribution was from the Ministers of Western 
Australia, who set aside 10 per cent, of their 
salaries for the National Relief Fund. 

It was decided that the First Expeditionary 
Force of 20,000 men should be drawn from 
every part of the Commonwealth in proportion 
to population. The contributions of the 



different States were : Victoria 7.430, Xe\v 
South Wales 6,420, Queensland 2,380, South 
Australia 1.770. Tasmania 1.070, West Aus- 
tralia 840. The Force consisted at. first of a 
Light Horse brigade with its own artillery and 
field train and a division of three infantry 
biiuades, two Light Horse squadrons, heavy 
artillery, three field artillery brigades, engineers, 
signal companies, ammunition and transport 
train, and field ambulances. Apart from the 
Light Horse brigade of 2,226 officers and men 
and 10 guns, the Australian Division included 
I7..~>f>3 troops of all ranks, 5,162 horses and 
70 guns. The infantry numbered 12,350. The 
force was dressed in the ordinary Australian 
khaki uniform, the several branches being 
distinguished by coloured ribbon on the hat 
green for infantry, scarlet for artillery, white 
for light horse, dark blue for engineers, Royal 
blue for signalists, blue and white for Army 
Service, and chocolate for the Army Medical 
Corps. The actual number of troops sent out 
with the First Expeditionary Force was slightly 
in excess of the detailed figures 20,338 men. 
together with 1,200 Army Reserve. This, 
however, was only a beginning. By the third 




[By courtesy of " The Australasian " 

COLONEL F. G. HUGHES, 
Commanding the Third Australian Contingent. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. 



week in November over 10,000 more men were 
being prepared for the front, and three rein- 
forcements, numbering in all about 9,000, 
were completing their training to be ready to 
fill up the ranks. Plans were completed to 
send regularly approximately 2,000 men a 
month to the front to compensate for the 
attrition from casualties and sickness 

Late in November Mr. Pearce, the Minister 
for Defence, was able to announce that on the 
military side 39,416 troops had been raised for 
service in Europe and 1,764 naval reservists 
and infantry had taken part in operations in 
the Pacific, making a total of 41,180 men. In 
addition, 56,289 men of the Citizen Forces 
wera armed and equipped, the bulk of them 
being mobilized under active service conditions 
for the defence of various parts of the Common- 
wealth. To these there had to be added 
51,153 members of rifle clubs, and 16,000 
recruits who had passed from the senior cadets, 
making a total of 67,153 reservists available 
for war, or a grand total of 164,631 men under 
arms. Australia was proud of her record, and 
with reason. The Government and Opposition 
were at one in their determination. " We 
must," said Sir William Irvine, late Attorney- 
General of the Commonwealth, " send 100,000 
or 150,000 men to join shoulders with those 
fighting in the old land." 

The pay of the troops was on the most 
liberal scale, ranging from 6s. and Is. a day for 
a private to 12s. and 2s. for a staff sergeant, 
17s. 6d. and 3s. for lieutenant and second 
lieutenant, and 45s. and 8s. for a colonel and 
brigadier. Brigadier-General Bridges was in 
command of the Australian troops at the time 
of their formation. He was appointed a 
Major-General in the British Army, and early 
in December General Birdwood, who served as 
military secretary to Lord Kitchener in South 
Africa and in India and who had won distinction 
in many fields, was appointed to the command 
of the united Australian and New Zealand 
troops. Everyone who had opportunity to 
examine the Australian soldiers while in 
training was agreed that they were men of 
magnificent physique, admirably equipped, 
and that they gave evidence in their conduct 
and in the details of their organization of good 
training, high discipline, and real efficiency. 

General Bridges, after having inspected the 
various camps, said : " Physically the troops 
are very fine indeed, and from what I have 
observed they are showing a wholly admirable 



and commendable spirit. They are in the 
utmost good heart, keen, eager and zealous in 
all their work. What they lack in technical 
knowledge and training there is no doubt they 
make up in adaptability. So far as the per- 
sonnel of the force is concerned, we have practic- 
ally all the men we require, or we know where 
we can obtain the troops for a few units." 

It was at first intended that the Australian 
contingent should come to England and com- 
plete their training here before proceeding to 
the front. 

No word was allowed to be published about 
the departure of the Australian contingent for 
Europe, as the German Fleet in the Pacific 
under Admiral von Spee was at this time at 
large, and it was realized that it might attempt 
to attack the transports. When the Australians 
were passing the Keeling Cocos Islands a warn- 
ing was received from the Japanese that the 
Germans were near, and that they had mined a 
part of the route. Everything was made ready 
for any eventualities. One volunteer in the 
Australian contingent described the scene : 

" That night as we were steaming some ten 




[\V . <j re gory & Co 

SERGEANT-MAJOR, 
VICTORIA MOUNTED RIFLES. 



262 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




ENROLLING THE AUSTRALIAN EXPEDITIONARY 
Victoria Barracks, Melbourne. 



["The Australasian." 

FORCE, 



miles to leeward of the Cocos the orders were 
given to don lifebelts and fall in at our messes. 
At 8 o'clock we were all marched up in single 
file and lined up on deck ready for anything. 
It was a pitch dark night and lightning playing 
away in the distance, and as all lights on the 
ships had disappeared we could not see an inch 
ahead. The colonel, majors, &c., were all 
dressed alike that is, bare to the waist, with 
trousers rolled up to the knees and lifebelts 
donned. Not a word was to be spoken except 
by officers, and there we stood for over an 
hour until the silence was rudely broken by 
the muffled roar of a gun some distance astern. 
Immediately afterwards we saw the dark form 
of a cruiser jump across our bows and make 
straight for the starboard horizon, followed by 
two others. I tell you we held our breaths. 
We did not get blown up that night after all, 
and next morning we heard the account of the 
noise. I'm beggared if it wasn't the Emdon, 
which had evaded the British for so long and 
tried to get one in on us. She was chased by 
the Sydney, which easily outstripped all the 
other boats. Two days afterwards the Sydney 
passed down our lines, and you bet we gave her 
a rousing reception." 

The rest of the voyage was without incidents 
of note, until the fleet arrived at the Suez Canal. 



There it was learned that owing to the situation 
in 'Egypt, due to the attitude of Turkey and the 
adhesion of the Khedive to the Turkish side, 
the Australians were to remain for the time in 
Egypt itself to complete their training there, 
strengthen the British garrison on the spot, 
and help to defend the Suez Canal against any 
possible land attacks. 

NEW ZEALAND. 

At the end of July, when news came through 
to New Zealand of the growing seriousness of the 
situation in Europe, the Government declared 
its attitude. New Zealand was ready for any 
crisis. The careful attention that had been paid 
in recent years to military training was now to 
bear fruit. Everything was ready for the raising, 
equipment, and dispatch of an Expeditionary 
Force on the shortest possible notice. On 
July 31 the Prime Minister, Mr. Massey, was 
able to inform the House of Representatives 
that while, so far as it was possible to judge, 
there was no occasion for serious alarm, the 
Government had prepared for possibilities and 
would ask the Parliament and people of New 
Zealand, if the occasion arose, to do their duty 
by offering the services of an Expeditionary 
Force to the Imperial Government. An under- 
standing had been arrived at with regard to 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



263 



the number and constitution of such a force. 
" I have no fear," said he, " of volunteers 
not being forthcoming." The announcement 
met with a thrilling response. For once the 
rules and forms of the House were forgotten, 
and the whole assembly, members and visitors 
alike, rose to its feet, cheered, and sang the 
National Anthem. When silence was secured, 
Sir Joseph Ward, the Leader of the Opposition, 
rose to support the Premier. " Speaking for 
the entire Opposition," he said, " we will 
heartily cooperate with the Government of the 
day in assisting to defend the interests of this 
portion of the Empire, and of the Empire as a 
whole." 

On the afternoon of August 5 the Governor 
appeared on the steps of Parliament House and 
read to a vast crowd of ten thousand people 
the cablegram from the King, printed earlier 
in this chapter, thanking the Dominions for 
their loyal messages. When he had finished 
reading the Royal message the Governor 
added : -" I have yet another message 
England and Germany are now at war." The 
people .of New Zealand pent back through the 
Governor a message to the King : " New 
Zealand desires me to acknowledge your 
Majesty's gracious message and to say that, 



come good or ill, she, in company with the 
Dominions and other dependencies of the 
Crown, is prepared to make any sacrifice to 
maintain her heritage and her birthright." 

The nation took the news of the declaration 
of war quietly. It was unanimously felt that 
England, under the circumstances, could do 
nothing else, and that New Zealand must of 
course support England to the utmost of her 
power. The Dominion was ready financially 
as well as from a military point of view. The 
country was prosperous. There were ample 
funds available, and the temporary unrest 
of overseas commerce and of finance caused 
throughout the world by the war soon righted 
itself. The astonishing feature to every visitor 
from England at the time was that the war 
made such seeming small difference to the 
nation at large. Parliament went on as usual 
with its customary domestic controversies. 
The suggestion that party warfare should be 
suspended and a General Election due in 
December postponed was not entertained. A 
chance visitor to New Zealand might well have 
thought, late in November, that the country 
was more interested in the electoral fight over 
the Prohibition question than in the war. This 
absence of excitement was due, however, not 




AUSTRALIANS EMBARKING AT MELBOURNE. 



204 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE TTMZ?. 




VICTORIA CONTINGENT IN CAMP NEAR MELBOURNE. 



to lack of interest, but to the general assurance 
of victory, and to knowledge that the country 
was ready for a time such as this. The Prime 
Minister, speaking at the time of the declaration 
of war, voiced the national attitude : " We 
must stand together, calm, united, resolute, 
trusting in God, and I am glad to say that not 
only in New Zealand does this feeling of confi- 
dence exist, but it obtains throughout every part 
of the Empire. My advice at this most trying 
moment is to keep cool, stand fast, and do your 
duty to New Zealand and the Empire." The 
Prime Minister was interrupted by a voice 
from one of the crowd : " We will do that." 
" I am sure you will," he responded. 

The New Zealand Citizen Army, like the 
Australian Defence Force, is raised for home 
defence only, but it supplied a considerable 
force of trained men from which volunteers 
could be drawn. Long before it was announced 
that volunteers were required, the Minister 
for Defence received letters and telegrams from 
every part from men anxious to serve anywhere. 
By eleven o'clock in the morning of August (i 
1 ,000 volunteers had applied in Auckland 
alone. By evening the number of volunteers 
was so great that count had been lost. Not 
only did men offer themselves, but motor cars, 
horses, and money were placed at the service 
of the Government from all districts. 

On Monday, August 10, six days after the 



declaration of war, the first part of Auckland's 
section left for Wellington, ready to the last 

button. Within three weeks of the declaration 

i 
of war the contingent was completed, and a 

message was cabled to the War Office that tin- 
Expeditionary Army of 8,000 men could embark 
at a moment's notice to any part of the world. 
A few days later a force was despatched to 
Samoa to capture the German colony there. 

The Maori people responded as heartily as 
the white, and insisted on their right to share 
in the defence of the Empire against the King's 
enemies. On behalf of the Maoris in the North, 
N. P. Kawiti sent a message to the Prime 
Minister : " We, the Ngaputi people, wish to 
convey through you to His Majesty the King; 
in this most trying epoch in the history of the 
Empire, an assurance of our loyalty and 
devotion, and that we are ever ready and willing 
to assist in any way in the defence of this 
Dominion against his enemies." The Maoris 
offered to raise a force of some thousand 
men, and Kawiti appealed to all his race to be 
prepared so that they might be able and willing 
to take their share of the heavy burden that 
had fallen on the Empire's shoulders. Tho 
fact that the British Government had decided 
to employ Indian troops in the war was at once 
used as a lever for inducing the New Zealand 
Government to accept the military service of 
the Maoris. The argument prevailed, and a 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAU. 



265 



camp of 500 Maoris was formed, one half to 
go off to train in Egypt and the other half 
to Samoa. It was anticipated that the main 
services of the Maoris would be as scouts. 

The main Expeditionary Force represented 
the very pick of the young manhood of the 
Dominion. Plans were made to keep the force 
up to full strength by the further dispatch of 
20 per cent, more men six weeks afterwards and 
5 per cent, each subsequent month. "The 
average young New Zealander," said the New 
Zealand Herald at the time, " is half a soldier 
before he is enrolled. He is physically strong, 
intellectually keen, anxious to be led (though 
being what he is he will not brook being driven 
a single inch), quick to learn his drill, easily 
adapting himself to the conditions of living in 
camp since camping usually is his pastime, 
and very loyal to his leaders when his leaders 
know their job. He is an excellent comrade, 
and anticipates his leader's wish almost before 
the order is given. He is extraordinarily sensi- 
tive to reproof. Where a curse is necessary in 
some armies to enforce a command, with 'the 
New Zealander the slightest stricture is all that 
is necessary. The organization and equipment 
of our army are good. Its numbers are in- 
creasing every year, its training is proceeding 
on good lines." This description is not perhaps 
unbiased, but those who know the character of 
New Zealand best would generally support it. 



The visitor who came to the conclusion in the 
early days of the war that because of the quiet 
attitude of the people there was any lack of 
determination would have wholly misjudged 
the situation. Whenever anything had to be 
done it was done promptly. The troops who 
were required were raised almost without an 
effort. Necessary supplies wore given in a day. 
The young soldiers were largely drawn from tho 
best professional, business, and farming class. 
One correspondent who visited the camp of the 
Canterbury contingent, near Christchurch, gave 
1 an example of the class of men in the force, 
taking at random a single tent containing eight 
troopers : " Of these seven were public school 
men and all were gentlemen. Two were grand- 
sons of a pioneer colonial bishop, another was 
the son of our most honoured statesmen, five of 
the eight were farmers of some means ; the others 
were business men in responsible positions. All 
of them had played in the fifteen or the eleven 
of their schools, and five of them had been school 
prefects. Any one of them, had he chosen the 
army as a profession, would have made an 
efficient and probably a distinguished officer. 
They were men of splendid physique. But all 
eight were just plain ' Tommies ' with not even a 
corporal's stripe among them. ' Men of similar 
type were common throughout the contingent." 
The high quality of the men was specially 
emphasized by a correspondent of The Timef, 




-..335K*..- -M : 






' 



- 



DRILL IN THE CAMP OF THE VICTORIA CONTINGENT NEAR MELBOURNE. 



Till- TIMES HISTORY OF TUP, 




AUSTRALIAN TROOPS EMBARKING AT MELBOURNE. 



who examined the small advance guard of the 
contingent at Salisbury Plain. The small de- 
tachment, he noted, included five members cf 
the " All Black " team, besides one English 
international player. It could put a team in 
tin- Held that would do credit to any first clas-t 
club. " In many ways," he continued, " the 
little New Zealand contingent is an extraordi- 
nary body of men. It contains three Rhodes 
scholars, besides a regimental poet and an artist 
of established reputation. The artist has 
turned his talent to account as scene painter in 
the regimental theatre ; for the force has no 
Y.M.C.A. tent at its present camp, and has 
arranged its own amusement hall. The pro- 
scenium is painted in imitation of the entrance 
to a Maori dwelling, the central ornament being 
a large and capable Maori god chewing up, wit h 
evident relish, a German eagle." 

The first intention was to complete the 
training of the New Zealand contingent in a 
camp on Salisbury Plain, and a small advance 
party WHS sent off to Knglnnd to undertake the 
preliminary work of preparation. The date of 
(lie departure of the troops \va-i. as with other 
contingents, kept a profound secret outside the 
Dominion. The New Xt ilanders were, like the 
Australians, stopped at Egypt and landed there 



to hel[^ for the time, if necessary, in the defence 
of the Suez Canal route. 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC. 

Before the departure of the main New Zealand 
contingent a small force set out under the 
direction of the Australian Navy and annexed 
German Samoa without opposition. This 
annexation was specially welcome in New 
Zealand, for the people there had for many years 
regarded the British consent to the German 
occupation of Samoa as one of the most serious 
flaws in our foreign policy. In 1899 the British 
Government signed an agreement abrogating 
an older treaty guaranteeing the independence 
and autonomy of the Samoan group under a 
native king, withdrew her own claims to the 
islands and recognized German ownership. 
The treaty was bitterly resented by Mr. Seddon, 
the Premier of New Zealand, for it seemed to- 
place an irreparable barrier in the way of the 
creation of a federation of Pacific islands, 
under the British flag, with New Zealai.d as 
chief, uhieh the then New Zealand Premier 
advocated. 

Mr. Seddon denounced the .surrender to- 
Germany with the utmost emphasis, and 
although it was impossible then to retract 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



2(57 



it, he induced the British Government to 
regularize and ensure her position on some 
other Pacific groups. Seddon's anger and 
disappointment was shared by many New 
Zealanders at the time and afterwards, and the 
occupation of the Islands by the Expeditionary 
Force caused the greatest satisfaction through- 
out the Dominion. By this capture, which has 
been described at length in a previous chapter, * 
the British Empire gained possession of a 
group of islands of considerable size and 
great fertility. The two loading islands are 
Savaii, with an area of about 660 sq. miles, and 
Upolu, of 340 sq. miles. The Australian ships 
which accompanied the expedition were the 
Australia and the Melbourne, [n addition to 
helping to capture German Samoa, they 
destroyed wireless stations in a number of 
places. 

The fact that the New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force to Samoa had to advance under the pro- 
tection of the Australian Navy was held by the 
Australian people to be a justification of their 
policy in maintaining a local navy rather than 
in supporting the plan of centralized naval 
control. The Australian vessels were of un- 
doubted service. The large vessels of the 
British Fleet were employed in major operations 

* Vol. I., p. 37. 



in other seas, and t lie China Squadron was largely 
engaged in convoying troops. A small fleet 
ot German cruisers was ravaging the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans. The people of Xew 
Zealand had given a battle cruiser, the Xew 
Zealand, to the Admiralty with the under- 
standing that this vessel was to be stationed 
in the Far East. The Admiralty, however, 
to the great disappointment of the people of 
the Dominion, determined to use the ship 
in the general service of the British Navy. 
The Australian Fleet was 011 the spot 
in the Southern Pacific when the war broke 
out. It was splendidly ready. When the 
German ships started their raids our naval 
forces in the Pacific were very small. Had an 
agreement entered into by the Admiralty with 
some of the Dominions in 1909 been carried out, 
we would have had in the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans in 1914 three Dreadnought cruisers, 
several ocean destroyers and 10 light cruisers 
of 25 knot speed. The naval agreement of 
1909 fell through, and on Australia lay for a time 
a large part of the defence of our interests in 
the southern seas. It was fortunate for England 
that, as events proved, the Australian Navy 
had been prepared with a thoroughness that 
left nothing to be dedred, and was well-manned 
and well -equipped. 

Following the advance on Samoa, the 




VICTORIA CONTINGENT MARCHING THROUGH MELBOURNE. 



268 



Till-: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP. 




TRANSPORTS WITH CANADIANS ARRIVING AT PLYMOUTH. 



Australian Fleet, working under the direction 
of the British Admiralty, co-operated with the 
China Squadron in searching the Pacific for 
German cruisers, and took possession of further 
German colonies. These naval operations have 
been already outlined in the chapter on the 
Navy's work in the outer seas.* Early in 
September the Australian Squadron, carry- 
ing with it 1,200 men, advanced on the 
Bismarck Archipelago. On the morning of 
September 11 the Squadron arrived at 
1 1 ' rbertshohe Harbour and a party of 
25 men was landed to take possession of 
a wireless station some four miles inland. 
Apparently 110 opposition was expected, but 
a force of < ioniums and armed natives concealed 
themselves in cocoamit palm trees and opened 
fire, killing Captain Pockley, of the Army 
.Medical Corps, and a naval petty officer, and 
driving the remainder of the party back. Later 
in the morning Commander Beresford of the 
. \ii.-tralian Navy landed at a point about a mile 
from Herbert shohe with 150 men, and advam-M 
(in tin 1 uircless station. Snipers impeded 
their advanee, and when they got within a 
hundred yards of the station they found 40 
native* and six Germans entrenched there, 

ai.d the gr id mined and well prepared 

for resistanee. Lieutenant-Commander Klwell 



* Vol. I., p. _'.>. 



advanced fearlessly to within 20 yards of the 
trench, gave his men the order to fix bayonets 
and charge, and immediately fell with two 
bullets through the head. Towards the end 
of the -afternoon the defenders of the station 
came out with a white flag and surrendered. 
While their anus and ammunition were being 
collected one of the Germans, bolted into the 
bush and firing broke out again from the 
trees, where more natives were concealed. 
Three of the Australians were killed. The 
natives were promptly dislodged and the wireless 
station occupied. 

While this was going on another party 
occupied Herbertshohe without resistance, and 
a third group took possession of Rabaul, the 
seat of German Government in the island. 
The Gorman group WHS two days later declared 
a' British possession, and after the formal 
proclamation had been publicly read an address 
was delivered to the natives by Major Heritage 
in "pidgin" Knglish and the Union Jack uas 
raised. The address in " pidgin " English 
was a curiosity well worth recording : - 

All boys belongimi all place, you savvy. Big foller 
master, he come now. Ho new feller master. He strong 
feller. All ship Mop place. He small feller ship 
belongina him ; plenty more big feller. He stop place 
belongina him now. He come here. He take him all 
pine*'. He look out good you feller. He like you feller. 
Look out gooi 1 ii!onga him. Supposing other feller 
master, ho horn .speak you, " you no work alonga new 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. 



269 



feller master." He gammon. Supposing you work 
good with this new feller muster, he look out good alonga 
with you. He look out you get plenty good feller 
kuikai food. He no fighting black feller boy along 
nothing. You look him new feller flag. You savvy him, 
he belong British English. He moVe better than other 
feller. Supposing you been making paper before this 
new feller master come, you finish time belongina him 
first. You like make him new feller paper. Long man 
belongina new feller master he look out good along with 
you. He give you more money, and more good foller 
kaikai. You no fight other feller black man other feller 
place. You no kaikai man. You no steal Mary 
belongina other feller man. Me finish talk along with 
you now. By and by ship belonging new feller master 
he come and look out place along with you. Xow you 
give three feller cheers belonging new feller master. 

The cheers, it is reported, were given with 
surprising vigour. 

A considerable force of trained Germans, 
with armed natives, had retired upon Toma, a 
mountainous district six to eight miles from the 
coast, and had entrenched themselves there, 
their trenches extending along the only possible 
roadway, a road hedged in on either side by 
impenetrable jungle. A formal attack had to 
be made upon the place. First the hills beyond 
Herbertshohe were shelled by a warship, to 
drive out the natives. Then the troops under 
Colonel Watson advanced on Toma itself. The 
position was shelled with shrapnel and lyddite, 
and then the troops, after marching some hours 
under a tropical sun, stormed the trenches. 
The enemy had, however, already abandoned 



the position. It was obviously impossible for 
them to remain long in the tropical forest, and 
soon afterwards a representative of the Acting- 
Governor came in under a flag of truce to 
negotiate. After consideration the Germans 
surrendered. The Acting- Governor was placed 
on parole, it being agreed that he should be 
allowed to return to Germany on the first 
opportunity. The German officers were de- 
ported, and the remainder of the force were 
allowed to go free, on taking the oath of 
neutrality.* 

Later in September the Australian Squadron 
advanced on the town of Friedrich Wilhelm, 
the seat of government of Kaiser Wilhelm'a 
Land, German New Guinea, and occupied it 
without opposition. 

A new task now fell to the Australian 
Squadron. They aided in the search for the 
six German cruisers which were ravaging the 
Pacific, capturing our ships and holding up 
our trade. It is one of the ironies of history . 
that the Australian Squadron, in its first 
important naval operations, should find itself 
working in co-operation with the Japanese 
Fleet the Fleet whose supposed menace had 



* This account is based on the dispatch of the special 
correspondent of The Sydney Sun, who accompanied, the 
Squadron. 




AUSTRALIAN RESERVISTS DISEMBARKING AT PLYMOUIH. 



270 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




iBy courtesy o/ " The Graphic ** 

A SQUADRON OF LIGHT HORSE RECRUITS, AUSTRALIA. 



been the main factor in bringing the Australian 
Squadron into being. Yet so it was. 

A large force of British, Australian, Japanese, 
Russian and French cruisers set out to search 
the seas for the Germans. The story of the 
steps taken by the Allied Navies to deal with 
these German cruisers will be told in a sub- 
sequent chapter. It is enough to say here that 
in the anxious and arduous weeks that followed 
the Australian Squadron played a splendid part. 
It was an Australian ship the cruiser Sydney 
that ran the Emden, the most active and 
destructive of the German Pacific Fleet, to 
earth in the Keeling Cocos Islands, and, after 
a short fight, drove her ashore and captured 
her officers and crew. The warm congratula- 
tions sent by Mr. Winston Churchill, as First 
Lord of the Admiralty, to the Commonwealth 
Naval Board on the brilliant entry of the 
Australian Navy into the war, and the signal 
services rendered to the Allied cause in this 
litfht, were echoed tliroughout the Empire. It 
was hoped by the Australians that, working in 
conjunction with the Japanese Fleet, they 
illicit have an opportunity to deal with the 
remainder of the German Squadron in the 
I'aeilie. This was not to be, but the Australians 
did valuable work in shepherding those vessels 
south of the Horn, and helping to drive them 
in the direction where the British Fleet under 



Admiral Sturdee was waiting for thsm and 
destroyed them. In the operations in th 
Pacific, the Australian Squadron could claim 
with justice a long, honourable, prominent and 
distinguished part. 



The following is a list of the principal gifts to 
the Imperial Government from different parts 
of the Empire : 

CANADA. 
Date of offer. 

Any. 1. The Dominion Government, 1,000,000 
bags of flour of 98 Ib. each, as a 
gift to the paople of the United 
Kingdom. 

Aug. 1. Alberta, 500,003 bushels of Alberta 
oats. 

Aug. 19. 57,192 13s. 3d., gift from tha 
women of Canada, through the 
Duchess of Connaught ; 20,000 
to be handed to the War Ollicc 
for hospital purposes, and the 
balance to the Admiralty to 
build, equip and maintain a 
Canadian Women's Hospital at 
Haslar. 

Aug. 24. Quebec, 4,000,000 Ib. of cheese. 

. 1 tig. 25. Prince Edward Island, 100,000 
bushels of oats, with, on August 
28, f urther off., rs of chefee a ad hay. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



271 



Aug. 27 Ontario, 250,000 bags of flour. Nov. 12. 

Sept. 1. Saskatchewan, 1,500 horses, costing 
approximately $250.000. 

Sept. 4. New Brunswick, 100,000 bushels of 

potatoes. Any. 28 

Sept. ti. Manitoba, 50,000 bags of flour of 
98 Ib. each. 

Sept. 6. British Columbia, 25,000 cases 

British Columbia canned salmon. Sept. 2 

Sept. 15. 20,000 from the Dominion Govern- 
ment to organize, equip and main- 
tain a hospital in France, to be 
known as the " Hospice Cana- 
dien." 

Oct. 3. A gift of provisions and clothing Sept. 9. 
from the people of Nova Scotia 
for the Belgians. 

Oct. 21. Agricultural produce viz., oats, 

potatoes, apples, peas,, beans, Sept. 14. 

chouse and flour from the 

farmers of various counties of 

Ontario to the British Govern- Sept. 21. 

mcnt. 

Oct. 24. $100000 in cash from the Govern- 
ment of Nova Scotia to the Local Sept. 28. 
Government Board for the relief 
of distress, in lieu of 100,000 tons 
of coal offered previously to His Oct. 1. 
Majesty's Government. 



A car of flour from the farmers of 
the Oaklake District, Manitoba, 
to the National Relief Fund. 

AUSTRALIA. 

1,000 gallons of port wine from 
Messrs. Cullen & Wallace, of 
Rutherglen, Victoria, for sick and 
wounded soldiers in hospitals. 

Butter, bacon, beef, condensed milk, 
and arrowroot suitable for army 
purposes, together with 50 cases 
of condensed milk for the benefit 
of children of the Empire, col- 
lected by the Brisbane Courier. 

Frozen meat to the value of 10,000 
from the Patriotic Committee, 
Brisbane, with intimation of 
further gifts. 

One ton of butter from Mrs. Hindson 
and family for use of British 
soldiers. 

Second shipment of goods collected 
by Brisbane Courier, foodstuffs 
valued at 6,200. 

Third shipment of foodstuffs col- 
lected by Brisbane Courier valued 
at 1,950. 

Gift of sheep for British troops from 
the Pastoralists' Union of New 




H M.A.S. "SYDNEY." 



27-2 



HIE TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WALL 




"GOOD-BYE." 

South Wales, a part of the gift to 
be devoted to relief in Belgium. 

Oct. 5. 6,000 from Victoria for Belgian 
relief. 

Oct. 27. Grant by the Commonwealth Parlia- 
ment in aid to Belgium of 
100,000. 

Nov. 11. Further shipments of frozen mutton 
from the Pastoralists' Union. 

Nov. 12. 20,000 raised in Sydney for the 
Belgian Relief Fund, and further 



sums fur tin: same fund from New 
South Wales. Queensland, and 

in. in ( 'liristehui-ch and Auckland, 
New /ral.md. 

\i:\v XKALAND. 

Anrj. 15. T\vo complete military X-ray ap- 
paratus for New Xealand con- 
tingent. 

Sept. 23. Bleriot monoplane, Britannia. 

Oct. 16. A quantity of socks and cholera 
belts in response to Queen's 
appeal. 

A ot>. 0. 20,000 divided between the National 
Relief Fund and the Belgian 
Relief Fund. 

UNION or SOUTH AFRICA. 

Sepl. 24. Consignment of invalid port for sick 
and wounded soldiers from Paarl 
Wine and Brandy Company. 

Oct. 8. The offer of the services of the South 
African Field Ambulance to the 
French Government as a Red 
Cross unit. 

Oct. 16. A quantity of fruit and eggs from 
the Bathurst Farmers' Union for 
, distribution among the Red Cross 

Society and hospitals. 

SOUTH AFRICA HIGH COMMISSION. 
Sept. 15. Tobacco and cigarettes from the 
people of Rhodesia for the Expe 
ditionary Force and the Fleet. 




ALEXANDRA PARK, 
Section of New Zealand Expeditionary Force 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



278 



^r/il. 16. Gift from the European inhabitants 
of Bechuanaland Protectorate of 
255 Us. to the National Relief 
Fund and 54 6s. 6d. to the Red 
Cross. 

Sept. 1. Offer of maize from the Agricultural 
Union of Southern Rhodesia. 

Oct. 1. Offer from Griffith, paramount chief 
of the Basuto, to raise funds for 
the relief of sufferers in connexion 
with the war. 

Oct. 15. 1,000 divided between the National 
Relief Fund and the British Red 
Cross Society from the Matabele- 
land Central War Fund Com- 
mittee, Buluwayo. 

Nov. 4. 200 from Lewanika as war contri- 
bution ; this sum given to the 
National Relief Fund. 

CEYLON. 

Oct. 14 to Nov. 18. 20,500 to the National 
Relief Fund. 

HONG KONG. 

Nov. 2. Donation of 8100,000 by Legisla- 
tive Council to the National Relief 
Fund, and public subscriptions 
to same fund, amounting to date 
to $135,000 donations and 86,000 
monthly subscriptions. 

MAURITIUS. 

Sept. 3. Offer from planters of 1,000,000 Ib. 
of sugar for the Navy and 
1.000,000 Ih. for the Armv. 



Sept. 3. An increase by 150,000 rupees, 
voted by the Council of Govern- 
ment, to meet in part the cost 
of special measures taken for 
the defence of the island since 
the outbreak of war. 

BARBADOS. 

Aug. 25. Government contribution of 20,000 
to His Majesty's Government. 

Oct. 14. Contribution to National Relief 
Fund. 
WINDWARD ISLANDS. 

Sept. 11. 6,000 voted by Legislative Council 
of Grenada to purchase Grenada 
cocoa for the use of the Forces, 
and 4,000 for the National 
Relief Fund. 

Sept. 14. 2,000 voted by Legislative Council 
of St. Vincent for purchase of 
St. Vincent arrowroot for the 
Forces and contribution to the 
National Relief Fund ; planters 
also adding 250 barrels of arrow- 
root with other aid to the National 
Relief Fund. 

Sept. 25. 2,000 from St. Lucia for the 
purchase of St. Lucia cocoa for 
the use of the Forces, and 1,000 
to the National Relief Fund. 

LEEWARD ISLANDS. 

Sept. 4. Offer from the Legislative Council, 
St. Kitts, and Nevis, of 5,000 
for the National Relief Fund. 




NEW ZEALAND, 
on review at the Camp. 



{fly cotir.'esy oj "Brett's Christmas Annual.' 



274 



Till-: TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAti. 




Oct. 



Sept. 



Oct. 
Sept. 

Oct. 
Oct. 

Sept. 



("Brett's Chnsttnxs Annual" 

NEW ZEALAiND EXPEDITIONARY FOKCE 
Marching through Palmerston North. 

Sept. 26. 4,000 from Dominica for war 
expenses, and 1,000 for Belgian 
Relief Fund ; 1,000 from Mont- 
serrat for the National Relief 
Fund. 



27. 250 from Montserrat for- the pur- 
chase of guava jelly for the 
Forces. 

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. 
17. Offer of raw cocoa to the value of 
-10.000 for the u.e of the Forces. 

JAMAICA. 

111. Offer of 300,0(10 Jamaica cigarettes 
by a local firm for the use of the 
British troops at the Front. 
31. Offer from Jamaica Agricultural 
Society of oranges for wounded 
soldiers in hospitals. 

1. Offer from the ] eople of Jamaica 
of a gift of sugar. 

BAHAMAS. 

8.- 10,000 voted by the Legislature a> 
a contribution to the war expenses. 
8. First instalment of 2,000 to the 
National Relief Fund. 

BRITISH GUIANA. 

8. Offer of 1,000 tons of British Guiana 
sugar to His Majesty's Govern- 
ment. 

10. Contribution of $12,810 to the 
National Relief Fund, and gifts 
of clothing. 

17. Offer of 500,000 Ib. of rice for use of 
the British Indian Forces at the 
Front. 




HIRST TASMANIAN CONTINGENT LEAVING HOBART. 



[" The lirapl'ic. 



THE TIMES HISTOKY OF THE WAR. 



275 




NEW ZEALAND CONTINGENT IN LONDON. 



WEST INDIES. 

Nov. 13. Offer from Messrs. S. Davson and 
Company, of Demerara sugar, 
Demerara rum, and molascnit. 

BERMUDA. 

Oct. 3. 40,000 voted by the Colonial Par- 
liament as a contribution towards 
the cost of the war. 

FALKLAND ISLANDS. 

Sept. 9. 2,250 voted by the Legislative 
Council to the National Belief 
Fund, and private subscriptions 
of 750 for samo fund. 

Oct. 3. Further instalment of 500 to the 
National Relief Fund. 

GAMBIA. 

Sept. 19. 10,000 voted by Legislative Council 
as contribution to the National 
Relief Fund. 

SIKRRA LEONE. 

Oct. 21. 5,000 voted by the Legislative 
Council as a contribution to 
Imperial funds. 

NIGERIA. 

Nov. 4. 38,000 from the Emirs of the 
Northern Provinces as a con- 
tribution to expenses of, and 
losses caused by, the war. 



Nov. 14. Contribution of 1,000 from Sarikin 
Muslimin to the National Relief 
Fund. 

GOLD COAST. 

Nov. 17. 60,000 voted by the Legislative 
Council for the expenses of the 
Togoland Expedition. 




i_" /-'firff's Ch tsttnas Annual." 

NEW ZEALAND TROOPS 
Embarking at Wellington. 



27(5 



27/7-; T1MKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




NEW ZEALAND 
Expeditionary Force disembarking at Wellington. 



" Cantf rbur , Times." 



EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE. 
Sept. 28. Offer from the Government of 100 

tons of local coffee for the use of 

the British troops at the Front. 
Sept. 28. Gift from the Kavirondo chiefs of 

the Kisumu District of 3.000 

goats for the troops. 
.\or. 14. Gift from the Masai Moran of the 

Matapatu clan of thirty bullocks 

for the use of the troops. 

NYASALAND. 
Oct. 15 to Nov. 18. Contribution of 450 to the 

National Relief Fund. 



FIJI 

Sepl. 21 to Xor. 7. 0.700 from the people 
of Fiji to the National Relief 
Fund. 

.Yor. 12. 110,000 voted by the Legislative 
Council to the National Relief 
Fund. 



Portraits will be found in Volume I., Part 4, r.f the 
following: The Hou. Samuel Hughes, p. 143; Sir 
Robert Borden, p. 145; The Hon. T. Allen, p. 146; 
Tihe Hon. E. D. Millen, p. 147 ; The Right Hon. Sir 
Edward Morris, p. 148. 




CHAPTER XXXIX. 



THE SERBIAN ARMY. 



THE VALUE OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE SERBIA IN THE BALKAN WARS -EARLIER MILITARY 
HISTORY DEPENDENCE UPON AUSTRIA THE NEW ERA KING PETER AND M. PASHITCH 
RUSSOPHIL POLICY AUSTRO-RUSSIAN TENSION THE FIRST BALKAN WAR THE MARCH TO 
DURAZZO THE SECOND BALKAN WAR BATTLE OF THE BREGALNITSA MILITARY ORGANIZATION 
TRAINING FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD BANS DISTRIBUTION NUMBERS ARMAMENTS SPIRIT 
OF THE SERBIAN ARMY THE MONTENEGRIN ARMY. 



IN his chapter on " the military virtue of 
an army," Clausewitz, the greatest of all 
modern writers on the theory of war, 
laid down the maxim that an unconquer- 
able military spirit, which makes of courage 
and endurance a settled habit, can be acquired 
only by success in war. " This spirit," he 
wrote, " can be generated only from two 
sources, and only by these two conjointly : 
the first is a succession of wars and great 
victories ; the other is an activity of the 
army carried sometimes to the highest pitch." 
History is certainly with Clausewitz. This 
sentence of his epitomizes the secret of the 
conquests of Alexander and Napoleon, and it 
explains the preparation of the Prussian 
victories over France in 1870, by the earlier 
successes of the Danish and Austrian cam- 
paigns. An unconquerable army must have 
faith in itself, and that faith is commonly a 
deduction from its own glorious past. 

Austria had some considerable advantages 
on her side. She had the numbers ; she had 
the financial resources ; she had the more 
elaborate organization of roads, railways, and 
industries behind her, and she had also both 
in officers and men the more educated human 
material. She was, in short, a civilized 
modern Power facing a primitive peasant 
State. But the " military virtue," if Clause 
wiiz reasoned soundly, ' was on the side of 
Vol. II. Part 21. 277 



Serbia. The Austrian armies went into the 
field with a secular tradition 01 defeat to 
depress them. The Serbians came fresh from 
their victories over Turkey and Bulgaria. 
They had the habit of victory. They had 
confidence in themselves, their comrades, 
their commanders. What they achieved at 
Kumanovo and the Bregalnitsa they expected 
to achieve again. They had behind them 
not only victory, but a succession of victories. 
Some of their exploits moreover the terrific 
march through the Albanian snows to Durazzo, 
and the stubborn contest with the Bulgarians 
deserved to be counted as " activity carried to 
the highest pitch." They knew that they 
could do and dare whatever human flesh is 
capable of doing and daring. It was much 
that they were beyond question the' most 
experienced of all the armies in the field. A 
very few of the senior generals in the French 
and German armies, who were subalterns in 
1 870, had seen active service against a civilized 
enemy, and a considerable proportion of the 
British and Russian armies were in South 
Africa and Manchuria. The Serbian Army 
alone had been through the ordeal as a whole. 
It had learned how to feed itself over Turkish 
roads and single-line railways. It "nad had to 
improvise substitutes for all the conveniences 
which wealth and invention lavished on the other 
armies. It had grown familiar under fire with 



////; TLMK* 



or mi': \\'.ut. 




COMMANDANTS OF THE SERBIAN REGIMENTS. 



all the tactical operations which others had seen 
only at manoeuvres. It had had the oppor- 
tunity, after the roughest of tests, of weeding 
out its inferior and promoting its more capable 
officers. Every man in its ranks had acquired 
that " second-wind " of courage, which makes 
even men of a nervous temperament go coolly 
into their second battle. It started with 
experience, and that alone is an element of 
superiority. But it meant even more that its 
experience was a record of unbroken, but by 
no means facile, victories. 

The military history of the little kingdom 
was until the last wars uniformly unlucky. King 
Milan Obrenovitch declared war on Turkey 
in 1876, as a sequel to the Bosnian popular 
insurrection, but the campaign was -disastrous. 
Eleven years later, when Eastern Roumelia 
suddenly threw off its allegiance to Turkey 
and united itself to the new principality of 
Bulgaria, the Serbs, by an unlucky impulse 
of jealousy, sought to prevent the aggrandize- 
ment of the neighbouring Slav State. They 
marched rapidly on Sofia ; but though the 
raw Bulgarian army had been weakened by 
the withdrawal of its Russian instructors, 
it inflicted a crushing defeat on the Serbian 
army at Slivnitsa, and Serbia was saved from 
invasion only by the veto of Austria. This 
double defeat at the hands first of the Turks, 
and then of the Bulgarians, had the natural 
effect of depressing the nation's self-confidence. 
It was inevitable, in Serbia's situation, that 
she should desire to expand. The little 



kingdom included the merest fraction of the 
Serbian race. It was, moreover, land-locked, 
and, until it could acquire a port, its economic 
existence depended on the goodwill of Austria. 
King Milan, a clever but frivolous and dissolute 
prince, had become the pensioner of the 
Austrian court. Russia, moreover, had re- 
nounced her traditional position of patron and 
protector, and officially recognized the fact 
that Serbia belonged to the Austrian sphere of 
influence. So long as Serbia stood in this 
dependent relation to Austria, it was futile for 
her to cherish the dream of reuniting under 
her crown the vast majority of the Serbian 
race who were under Austro- Hungarian rule. 
Nor was it, to all appearances, much more 
hopeful to pursue political ambitions in Mace- 
donia. Save in " Old Serbia," the historic 
region of Kossovo along her southern border, 
the Slavs of Macedonia looked rather to Bul- 
garia than to Serbia for their eventual libera- 
tion. Bulgaria was shepherding them within 
her schismatic national church. The Serbs, 
unlike the Bulgarians, had never followed the 
bold policy of breaking away from the Ortho- 
dox Patriarchate, and the result was that 
they had no recognized national organization 
in Turkey. Apart from the fact that the 
Slavs of Macedonia are by race and language 
more nearly akin to the Bulgarians than to 
the Serbians, they naturally turned for aid to 
the more martial and energetic State. Serbia 
never renounced her ambitions in Macedonia. 
She subsidized schools and maintained guerilla 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



279 



bands of Serbian comiladjw (guerillas) to hold 
Bulgarian activities, in check. But it was 
hard for any sober-minded Serbian to see his 
way in the vista of the future With a dis- 
reputable king, wholly subject to Austrian 
influence, without wealth, without allies, and 
with a military past that presaged nothing 
but defeat, it was hard to feel confidence in 
Serbia's national mission. The little kingdom 
was condemned to live in a stagnant backwater, 
and it seemed as probable that it would one day 
be absorbed by Austria as that it would live 
to unite the Austrian Serbs or to liberate the 
Macedonian Slavs. The consequences of this 
depression were serious for the whole life of the 
nation. Little was done or attempted to build 
up a, powerful military organization, and educa- 
tion was deplorably neglected. In the latter 
years of King Milan's son, Alexander, the 
country lived, moreover, under a reign of terror 
which stifled its whole public life and terrorized 
its ablest men. 

The new era dated from the return of the 
Karageorgevitch dynasty in 1903. King Peter 

showed himself a correct constitutional sove- 



reign, and under the guidance of M. Pashitch 
and the Radical or Russophil party the country 
followed both in its internal and in its foreign 
policy a normal line of development. It re- 



covered its hope. It saw its future clearly. It 
won from the ambition to expand a stimulus 
which transformed the whole fabric of its public 
life. It is necessary to dwell on these political 
changes, for in Serbia, as in all the Balkan 
States, the army, in an even more literal sense 
than in the older countries of Europe, is the 
nation in arms. There is no' professional 
military caste, for there is no class of landed 
gentry among whom the army is an hereditary 
profession, with a tradition handed down 
in families from father to son. The Serbian 
officer is commonly the son of a farmer, a 
tradesman, or a lawyer, and he is nearer 
to the people than the officer in any of the 
armies of the Great Powers. It was when 
the whole people began to will a brilliant future 
that the army transformed itself. The sharp 
goad of an imminent danger came six years 
later, during the Bosnian crisis. When Austria 
definitely annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Serbs were in no temper to acquiesce quietly in 
the inevitable. They protested and brought 
on themselves the anger of Austria, and for 
many weeks war seemed to be probable. The 
army was Hurriedly prepared for -the worst ; 
munitions were accumulated, and the whole 
nation steeled itself for what would have been, 
if it had come then, a life and death struggle. 







KING PETER PRESENTING COLOURS TO AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 



28'J 



Till-: TI.MI-:s HISTORY OF THE WAH. 




GENERAL RADOMIR PUTNIK. 
Chief of the General Staff. 

In this hour of peril the modern Serbian army 
was created, and peace, when it was at length 
assured, was so manifestly provisional that the 
stimulus continued to work. It was from this 
crisis onward that the Serbs began to compare 
their own case to that of Piedmont. That 
little kingdom had defied Austria, and had in 
the end become the nucleus of a united Italy. 
The Serbs resolved that history should repeat 
itself, and the younger generation frankly 
described itself as the Piedmontese party. The 
first essential was to create an army, and the 
test of 1912 proved how well these young men 
had worked. There grew up a military party, 
with the Crown Prince at its head, and the 
regicide officers as its leading members, which 
was able to exert a powerful influence on national 
policy. Piedmont succeeded in the last round 
of her struggle because she had Louis Napoleon 
behind her. Serbia saw in the continual tension 
between Austria and Russia the guarantee that 
she would one day be able to reckon on Russian 
aid. When in the spring of 1912, under the 
guidance of M. de Hart wig, the Russian Minister 
in Belgrade, she entered the Balkan League, it 
is probable that her statesmen saw in the cam- 
paign against Turkey only a preliminary to the 
real st ruggle with Austria. That , perhaps, is one 
reason why in the secret treaty of partition she 
claimed so modest a share in the eventual fruits 
of victory. Another reason was that she hardly 



trusted her own strength. She was far from 
entering the Balkan War in a mood of over- 
ennlklence. The event was to show how pro- 
found a change a few short years of peril and 
ambition had wrought in the moral of the army 
which had been beaten by the same antagonists 
in 1876 and 1885. 

In the first of the two Balkan Wars the Serbia n 
army was not subjected to any particularly 
severe test. The Turks had disposed their great 
masses to face the Bulgarian invasion of Thrace. 
It was, moreover, only to Thrace that Turkish 
reinforcements could be directed, for the Greek 
flee.t commanded the -Egean and isolated the 
Turkish armies in Macedonia. The Serbians, 
after the first battle, had the numerical pre- 
ponderance, and were dealing with an enemy 
who could not be reinforced. But the cam- 
paign none the less showed their powers of 
organization and their rapidity of movement. 
On the material side their work was a triumph 
of goodwill and intelligence over poverty and 
inadequate resources. The railways of Serbia 
were all single lines, and there was only one 
trunk line, which followed the valley of the 
Morava from Belgrade to Nish, and thence 
crossed the old Turkish frontier and entered 
the valley of the Vardar at Uskub. One of the 
five divisions of the Serbian army had to mobilize 
in a region (Zaitchar) which possessed an 
unfinished railroad serviceable only for local 
traffic. Over these single lines, most of them 
built with difficult gradients through moun- 
tainous country, the military trains had to 
crawl at an average of ten miles an hour. The 
road transport depended partly on pack-horses, 
but mainly on the light ox-wagons of the 
country, drawn by patient and indefatigable 
teams, which travelled at an average of barely 
two miles an hour. The mobilization was 
effected within ten days, more rapidly than 
good observers had thought to be possible, and 
Serbia placed in the field a much more formid- 
able army than her treaty obligations required 
from her. The first serious engagement of the 
war was fought within a week of the establish- 
ment of the general headquarters at Nish. It 
took place on October 23 and 24 at Kumanovo. 
The Turks, to the number of about 40,000 men, 
had moved up to strong positions from Uskub, 
and ought to have been able to bar the Serbian 
advance for many days. By some incredible 
piece of muddling, blank cartridge was served 
out to them, or at least to some of them. 
A determined bayonet charge was none the lesn 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



281 



required to dislodge the Turks from their main 
positions. Though the Serbs captured only 
twelve guns, the retreat became a rout. The 
Turkish commander abandoned his men ; many 
of the officers changed into civilian attire and 
fled. This one battle gave all the north and 
centre of Macedonia to the Serbians, and put 
them in possession of its main railway and of 
the junction and depot of Uskub. As famous 
was the fight for Monastir, not so much be- 
cause the Turks defended this very important 
town with much obstinacy or skill (it is not 
a fortified place), but rather because the 
Serbs had to take it amid the rains and floods 
of an early winter, wading over plains in which 
the water stood knee-deep, and fording torrents 
which swirled breast-high. 

Even more remarkable as a test of the moral 
and stamina of the Serbian army was its winter 
march across Albania to Durazzo. The Serbian 
march was a triumph over distance and moun- 
tains and the winter. The paths which this army 
traversed were in places mere ledges on the edge 
of precipices, so narrow that the packs of the 
baggage ponies could be loaded only on one 
side. The lower road was so rough that the 
men had often to pile their greatcoats to nil 
the ruts for the passage of the guns. Much of 
the country which the army traversed is 
practically uninhabited, and all its food was 
the bread which it carried with it. 

The real test on a great scale came only 
with the ill-omened second war. The Bul- 
garians were successful in the first stroke 
which they delivered. They managed to cross 
the Vardar in superior numbers, and heavily 
defeated a Serbian force at the bridge of 
Krivolak, on the Vardar. That first success 
was, however, retrieved, and the Serbs, return- 
ing with reinforcements, recovered this vital 
position. The real struggle was a prolonged 
battle of many days for the possession of the 
lofty plateau of Ovtche Polie, which is the key 
to Northern Macedonia. This battle of the 
Bregnlnitsa, as it is called, must have been one 
of the most stubborn in military history. 
There was probably no serious disparity in 
numbers, but the Bulgarians were wearied after 
a nine months' campaign in which they had 
had to face not only the Turks but cholera. 
The Serbs had been less heavily engaged, and 
large contingents had been released from time 
to time on furlough. The Bulgarian plans were, 
moreover, disorganized by the conflict between 
the military chiefs and the civil government, 



which at one moment checked the fighting and 
ordered the evacuation of the positions already 
won. Their artillery, moreover, was short of 
ammunition. It was a battle among moun- 
tains in a nearly roadless country, which gave 
little opportunity for any subtle tactics. No 
authoritative description of the fighting is 
available from the pen of any neutral eye- 
witness. The accounts which the writer has 
received from officers on either side conveyed 
the impression that the battle consisted of an 
interminable series of struggles for the posses- 
sion of obstinately defended positions, which 
were taken and retaken again and again by 
bloody bayonet charges. The two armies were 
well matched and showed the same qualities 
of dogged endurance and prowess in hand-to- 
hand fighting. One moral result this fratricidal 
war had. It may have deepened the hatred 
of the two kindred but rival races, but at least 




[" The Times "Photograph. 

GENERAL RASHITCH, 

Con mantling a Serbian Division in the 

Battle of the Jadar. 

21 -2 



2S2 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




I" The Times " Photograph. 

COLONEL VASHITCH, 
Commanding a Serbian Division. 

it implanted mutual respect. Neither of them 
showed much regard for the modern rules of 
civilized warfare, and the Carnegie Commission 
concluded of Serbs and Bulgars as of Creeks 
and Turks, that each of them broke every one 
of the rules of The Hague Convention. But 
Serbs and Bulgars at least ended by recognizing 
one another's courage and " military virtue." 
The writer heard again and again from both 
Serbs and Bulgars the confession that the war 
had proved the equality of the two armies. 
The Bregalnitsa was certainly a Serbian vic- 
tory. It ended in the conquest of the coveted 
plateau by the Serbian Army. But it was very 
far from being a decisive and conclusive 
victory. The Bulgarians lost only about fifteen 
miles of ground ; and it was the intervention 
of Rumania which compelled them to make 
peace. The other operations of the war were 
unimportant. The Serbs repelled a weak 
Bulgarian raid on their own territory, and in 
their turn failed in an excursion against the 
Bulgarian town of Widin. The Serbian casualty 
list gives 5,000 killed and 18,000 wounded in 
the campaign against the Turks, and 7,000 



killed and 30,000 wounded in the much shorter 
and more concentrated struggle with the Bui 
garians. Most of these latter casualties occurred 
at the Bregalnitsa. These figures represent a 
terribly high proportion of the men engaged. 
The active army of Serbia, exclusive of the 
" Third Ban " or Territorial Army, which was 
seldom under fire, hardly numbers more than 
180,000 men. The casualties account for 
60,000. Allowing for the men who died of 
wounds and cholera, the permanent loss was 
about 19,000 men a veritable decimation. 

This second war did even more than the first 
to raise the prestige of the Serbian Armies. It 
displayed their qualities in a struggle with that 
Bulgarian Army whose victories in Thrace had 
led qualified observers to rank it as the equal, 
at least in the primitive soldierly virtues, of 
good West-European troops. The doubt of 
themselves which their unlucky military past 
had left in the minds of the Serbs was dissipated 
for all time. They had conquered the Turks 
and defeated the Bulgarians. It was a proud 
record, and with a new self-confidence and 
whetted ambitions they thought of themselves 




THE CROWN PRINCE OF SERBIA, 

With General Youritchitch (commanding the 

19th Army) and General Rashitch. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



283 




BELGRADE. 
As seen from Austrian territory. 



as the Piedmontese of the. Balkans, destined by 
their energy and their military qualities to 
achieve the still greater feat of liberating their 
Bosnian and Croatian kinsmen from Austrian 
rule. Such a record makes, in the phrase of 
Clausewitz, for " military virtue." 

ORGANIZATION. 

The military system of Serbia was always 
based upon universal compulsory service. 
All able-bodied men were liable from 21 to 45 
years of age. There was also a liability, which 
may be regarded as nominal, for service in the 
militia on youths from 17 to 21 years, and on 
men from 45 to 50 years. The sacrifices 
required from a young conscript were much 
less onerous than in the wealthier countries of 
the Continent. Serbia was obliged to study 
economy, and her policy had always been to 
keep the recruits with the colours only for the 
minimum period required for training. Before 
the annexation of Macedonia, in 1913, the num- 
ber of young men who reached the age of 21 
every year was about 25,000. The weeding out 
of those medically unfit, and the exemption, on 
a liberal scale, of those excused service on 
various grounds, used to result, however, in a 
considerable diminution of this number, so that 
only about 18,000 recruits went into training 
each year. The normal period of service with the 
infantry was eighteen months. But it was 
thought that at least the better-educated 



conscripts could become efficient in six months, 
and only from one-half to one-third of each year's 
contingent was ever retained with the colours 
for the full period. The service in the cavalry 
and artillery was for two years. For eleven 
years (21 to 31) young men were liable to service 
in the first line of the active army, known as the 
First Ban. As reservists they might be called 
up for twenty days' training in each year, but 
this obligation was very rarely imposed. 

The Second Ban was a reserve composed of 
men between 31 and 38 years of age. No 
permanent cadres existed for the formation of 
independent units out of this class. It was 
primarily intended to replace the wastage of 
war, by reinforcing the First Ban as casualties, 
occurred. But much had been done in recent 
years to fit it for independent service. Its 
officers, who were in civil life mainly farmers- 
or professional men, had been encouraged to 
follow courses of instruction. The men had 
also been called up occasionally for ten days' 
training. A largo number of battalions were 
organized from this Second Ban during the 
Balkan Wars, and did good service in spite of 
the fact that their officers, including in some 
cases even the commandants, were not pro- 
fessional soldiers. 

The Third Ban was composed of men from 
38 to 45 years of age, who corresponded to the 
French territorial army. They were supposed 1 
to be liable only for home defence within the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




HEAVY GUNS IN THE TRENCHES. 



[Undtrwood & Underwood. 



Serbian kingdom. They were, however, used 
to guard communications in Macedonia during 
the Balkan Wars. One saw them quartered in 
little huts of turf and boughs all along the 
Vardar railway line. They were also used as 
combatants to meet the Bulgarian rajd on 
Serbian territory, and they even took part in 
the unsuccessful attempt to besiege and take 
the Bulgarian town of Widin. They showed, 
as one would expect, little enterprise in this 
latter undertaking, but they were invaluable 
for the tedious but necessary work of securing 
communications. Peasants age rather rapidly 
in the Balkans, and these men often looked 
older than a similar force in Western Europe 
would do. They wore no uniform, and were 
clad in their national peasant costumes of 
brown homespun, with the untidy but service- 
able Balkan sandals, tied to the feet with thongs 
or strings. 

The organization of the Serbian Army had 
the merit of simplicity. The former kingdom 
(excluding Macedonia) was divided into five 
territorial divisional districts. The districts 
were: (1) Nish, (2) Valievo, (3) Belgrade, 
(4) Kragujevatz, (5) Zaitchar. The names are 
in each case those of the town in which the 
divisional headquarters were situated. Nish 



had a large but altogether obsolete fortress, 
and Belgrade a picturesque old Turkish citadel, 
neither of any military value whatever. Kragu- 
jevatz possessed an arsenal of very limited, 
productive capacity. Of these five towns only 
two, Nish and Belgrade, were situated on the 
one trunk railway line which Serbia possesses, 
and even this railway was only a single line. 
There was, however, a circuitous, narrow- 
gauge line connecting Belgrade with Valievo, 
and another running up from Valievo to the 
river Save. Kragujevatz had also a branch 
line, which was continued to a point (Ushitza) 
not far from the Drina and the Bosnian frontier. 
Zaitchar was almost isolated, and possessed 
only a line running up to the Danube. Tho 
inadequacy of the Serbian railway system 
was bound to be a serious handicap in time of 
war. The internal communications were poor, 
and the two isolated lines which had their 
termini on the Save and the Danube could be 
of little use if the Austrian monitors retained 
command of these rivers. It must also be 
remembered that the Serbian railway system 
nowhere gave access to an open port through 
which munitions and supplies could be intro^ 
duced. Salonica became by arrangement with 
Greece a free port for Serbian merchandise, but 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. 



285 



it could not be used to import munitions with- 
out a breach of Greek neutrality. The only 
available road for this purpose was the long 
mountain path, practicable only for pack- 
animals, which led from the Montenegrin port 
of Antivari through Alpine country to Xovi 
Bazar. 

Each territorial division was subdivided into 
two brigade districts, and each district pro- 
vided two regiments of four battalions each. 
The battalion numbered about a thousand 
men, so that the war-strength of the divi- 
sional infantry totalled 16,000 men. Of the 
battalions in each regiment three existed in 
time of peace, and the fourth was organized 
only on mobilization. Attached to eacli divi- 
sion was a regiment of artillery, consisting of 
three groups of three six-gun batteries (in 
all 54 guns). The divisional cavalry was a weak 
force, non-existent in peace, but raised on 
mobilization as a regiment of four squadrons 
(400 sabres), from men and horses previously 
registered. Each division had also its own 
technical and administrative units, engineers, 
and supply column, and its total strength 
amounted to 23,000 officers and men of First 
Ban troops. 

In addition to these five divisions of the 
first line, there was also a regiment of mountain 
artillery, consisting of six batteries, six howitzer 
batteries, and two battalions of fortress artillery. 
There was, further, a separate cavalry division 
composed of two brigades, each of two regi- 
ments. Of these a nucleus existed in time of 
peace, one brigade being quartered at Belgrade 
and the other at Nish. Its war strength 



amounted to 80 officers and 3,200 men. 
Attached to the cavalry division were two horse 
artillery batteries (8 guns). This first line army 
numbered, all told, on a conservative estimate 
about 125,000 officers and men, with 5,200 
sabres and 330 guns. 

The Second Ban had a similar organization 
in five divisions. Each division included, how- 
ever, only three regiments (instead of four), and 
the four battalions of each regiment had 800 
men apiece (instead of one thousand). There 
was also with each division a regiment of 
cavalry, three batteries of artillery, and a com- 
pany of pioneers. The worth of this Second 
Ban seemed problematical before the Balkan 
Wars, and experts who wrote on the Serbian 
Army were disposed to ignore its existence. 
It was, indeed, only a militia, but it was a 
militia of trained men, who had seen much 
service, and that experience should give it a 
fighting value superior to that of the corre- 
sponding reserve formations of other Continental 
armies. Its armament, however, was much 
inferior to that of the First Ban, and only its 
infantry (say 48,000 men) had to be reckoned 
as a considerable addition to the strength of the 
first line. The effective strength of the active 
army (first two Bans) could not be less than about 
180,000, but this would certainly be swollen by 
large numbers of volunteers gradually incor- 
porated. 

It is not easy to estimate the numbers of the 
Serbian Army with any confidence. The figures 
given above are an extremely conservative 
estimate, based mainly on the calculations of 
experts who had studied its organization before 




TROOPS ON PARADE. 



286 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



the Balkan Wars. It was in those days 
gravely underestimated ; the tendency to-day 
is perhaps to rate it rather too high. It is 
certain, however, that Serbia put into the field 
a much larger number of men than either her 
critics or her allies expected her to produce. 
The Second Ban turned out to be useful 
material. Volunteers were incorporated in 
immense numbers. Some of them were Serbians 
of the kingdom who had been exempted from 
conscription. Others were men of Serbian race 
from Austria or from Macedonia. Emigrants 
came back to fight in their thousands from the 
United States. The figure of 180,000 as the 
total of the active army is therefore an under- 
statement. It is probable that the real total 
did not fall short of 200,000, and might even 
have exceeded it considerably. These figures take 
no account at all of the new population of Mace- 
donia. It was numerous, and there was no 
better military material in the Balkans. But 
it was composed mainly of Bulgarians and 
Albanians, both hostile elements. There was, 
indeed, a peasantry of Serbian race and sym- 
pathies in Kogsovo and Novi Bazar, and else- 
where there was a Serbian party. A con- 
scription had been held, and the foundations of 
a permanent territorial military organization 
had been laid. Some troops of Macedonian 
origin were used in the Great War, but it 
might be doubted whether Serbia would ven- 
ture to employ this Macedonian material 
without drastic selection in the fighting line. 
Some addition, perhaps a considerable addition, 
ought to be made from this source to our 



estimate of the strength of the Serbian 
Army. A high but not impossible figure for 
its active first line would be 250,000 men. 
To these must be added about 45,000 
Montenegrins. The Third Ban, which would 
be used in the fighting line only on the 
gravest emergency, amounted to another 
50,000. 

The infantry of the First Ban was armed 
in part with the Mannlicher rifle, but chiefly 
with a good Mauser rifle (M. 99, calibre 
276 in., weight 9 Ibs. 4 oz., with a magazine 
for five cartridges, a maximum elevation of 
2,000 m. about 2,187 yards and an initial 
velocity of about 2,400ft). The Second Ban 
carried the much inferior Mauser, M. 80, an 
old rifle to which a magazine was clumsily fitted 
in the Serbian arsenals ; while the Third Ban 
had the old single-loader Berdan rifle. The 
machine gun was the Maxim of the same 
calibre as the new Mauser carried on pack 
animals. 

The artillery had a French armament, not, 
however, of the most recent pattern, and it is 
uncertain how far Serbia had been able to replace 
the pieces worn out during the two Balkan 
carppaigns. The field gun was the French piece 
of 1897. It was a quick firer, calibre 7'5 cm., 
with panoramic independent sight. Its 

maximum range for shrapnel was 5,500 m. 
(0,015 yards). The mountain gun was a 
Creuzot piece of 7 cm. The Second Ban was 
armed with old De Bange guns of 8 cm. The 
heavy guns, which did good service at the siege 
of Adrianople, came also from Creuzot, and 




BLESSING THE COLOURS. 



THE TIMES H1STOEY OF THE WAR. 



287 



include 24 howitzers of 15 cm. (5'9 inches), 
and mortar-s of 24 cm. (9'6 inches). Aviation 
had not been studied to any useful extent. The 
cavalry carried swords and carbines, but no 
lances. 

A statistical outline tells in reality compara- 
tively little about any army, and even the con- 
clusions based on its history must be examined in 
a critical spirit. There are, however, certain 
general remarks which one may make with con- 
fidence about the Serbian Army. It was in- 
spired by a patriotism, a nationalism, which it 
would be hard to parallel in Western armies. 
In more advanced countries men dissipate their 
idealism. They give to countless " move- 
ments," social, political, philanthropic, religious, 
some part of the enthusiasm which the Serbians 
(and, indeed, all the Balkan peoples) concentrate 
on their country. A Serbian, in consequence, 
is much prompter to believe that the interests 
of his race will best be forwarded by the primi- 
tive struggles of war than are the more sophis- 
ticated peoples of the West. His mind is 
seldom embarrassed by any doubt about the 
moral or political value of war. There are few 
Socialists in Serbia, and (roughly speaking) no 
pacifists. If a nation with this old-world 
mentality had done less than some of its 
neighbours to prepare for war, the reason was 
partly that, unlike the Bulgarians, the Serbians 
were not by temperament a nation of systematic 
organizers, and partly that their economic 
resources were limited. The army was emphati- 
cally the army of a poor State. It was weak in 
cavalry, and to a less degree in artillery. It 
was strong in an infantry, which had both dash 
and endurance. Its deficiency lay chiefly in 
all the material adjuncts to warfare heavy 
guns, automobiles, flying machines, ambu- 
lances and, above all, railways. Its sanitary 
service in particular was painfully inadequate. 
Serbia is a simple agricultural community, and 
she goes into war almost destitute of the 
mechanical means and the mechanical training 
which are among the chief assets of Western 
armies. Another consequence of her poverty 
was that her supply of professional officers was 
inadequate even for the First Ban, and alto- 
gether wanting for the Second. The training of 
her officers was undoubtedly less exacting than 
that of most European armies. A fair propor- 
tion of them had, however, studied abroad, 
chiefly in Russia and in France. About one- 
third of them had risen from the ranks. Before 
the two Balkan Wars their education must have 



suffered severely from the lack of practical 
opportunities. Grand manoeuvres were, for 
reasons of economy, unknown in Serbia, and 
it was only in the years immediately before the 
war that divisional manoeuvres were attempted. 
The training of the men hardly went beyond 
drill on the parade ground, and little had been 
done to prepare them for field-work. Tho 
drill, however, was surprisingly smart, and 
the discipline was good, for the brotherly and 
democratic relations which prevailed between 
officers and men seemed in no way to interfere 
with the elementary duties of respect and 
obedience. It must be said of the Serbian 
officers, as of the Young Turks, that they are 
politicians as well as soldiers. It was the 
younger officers who carried out the revolution 
which restored the Obrenovitch dynasty, and 
the motive which inspired them was primarily 
the desire to escape from Austrian tutelage. 
Their thoughts reverted after the Balkan 
Wars to the much more important question of 
the predestined struggle with Austria. It 
is doubtful, however, whether this pre- 
occupation with politics seriously interfered with 
the efficiency of the army. Feeling within the 
corps of officers was singularly unanimous, and 
their interventions in politics were in reality the 
inevitable consequence of their intense will to 
carry out the national mission of the army 
the achievement of the unity of the Serb race 
by a successful war against Austria. If they 
worked for this by agitation and in the Press 
they worked for it also in the barrack -room 
and on the parade-ground. They were 
thoroughly devoted to their chiefs, and believed 
as implicitly in the handsome white -bearded 
old veteran, the Voivoda Putnik, as in the 
young and dashing Crown Prince. 

It would not be easy to attempt a serious 
estimate of the work of the Serbian General 
Staff during the two Balkan Wars. The Turkish 
army, demoralized from the very outset of the 
struggle, hardly put their capacity to a test. 
Their one big battle against the Bulgarians, on 
the Bregalnitsa, was in the main a soldiers' 
victory. It was fought oa mountainous ground, 
and won mainly by bloody and obstinate frontal 
attacks. But certain conclusions may be drawn 
with confidence. The mobilization was carried 
out rapidly and smoothly. The work of the 
several divisions which operated independently 
in Macedonia was well planned and well timed, 
so that the fruits of successes, gained in widely- 
separated portions of the Macedonian theatre, 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



were promptly and fully gathered. The Serbian 
Staff reacted with skill and spirit against the 
disconcertingly sudden Bulgarian attack, pre- 
pared its own reply with an undeniable talent 
for improvisation, and showed itself in the 
end better prepared and better informed than 
the aggressors. Fuller knowledge than any 
foreigners were allowed to acquire of that 
secret fratricidal war might reveal high strategi- 
cal talent in the Serbian Staff. Of that we 
cannot decide with assurance. We know only 
the result, and the result, whatever the explana- 
tion, was a victory over very formidable adver- 
saries. 

The reader may visualize this Serbian Army 
as a body of men which was on the whole rather 
ubove the physical average of Europe. It 
marched well. It was clad in serviceable 
uniforms, tasteful hi colour and design. Its 
equipment was the best in the Balkans. Its 
carriage was alert, and its smartness in drill 
pleased the eye. Its professional officers had 
an elegance and a grace of manner which one 
would not expect from a peasant race. Its 
chief handicap was poverty. Its great asset 
was its passionate sense of a national mission. 
If it met the Austrians weak in all the resources 



of modern science and industrial civilization, it 
confronted their age-long tradition of defeat 
with that habit of "military virtue" which is 
based on a record of victory. It entered the 
war an army of veterans, and it fought for a 
bigger stake than any other people in the field. 
Disaster might mean for it the extinction of 
the Serbian nation. Victory might so expand 
its territories and add to its population as to 
make of Serbia a State' which would dominate 
the Balkans, and aspire in time to play a far 
from negligible part in European affairs. 



THE MONTENEGRIN ABMY. 

The prowess of the Montenegrins is legen- 
dary, and if military history has little to say 
of fcheir achievements, the poets have done them 
more than justice. They led for centuries the 
typical life of wild frontier tribes, on a level f 
civilization not much above the standard of 
the Afridis and Pathans. One may doubt, 
however, whether any tradition unfits a people 
so hopelessly for modern warfare as this preda- 
tory raiding habit. The patient, laborious 
Bulgarian peasant, and the keen, commercial 
Greek townsman, each in his own way came 




INFANTRY GOING TO THE FRONT. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



289 




MONTENEGRIN FORTRESS BATTERY. 



out of the Balkan Wars with a better record 
than these truculent mountaineer?. They were 
brought up to despise the arts and toils of 
peace. They tended to leave much of the hard 
work of agriculture to the women, on the plea 
that they were warriors. Their hard life, the 
mountain air, and the ruthless process of the 
weeding out of the unfit made them easily the 
finest race in Europe from a physical standpoint. 
The average of height could hardly be less than 
six feetv the carriage of the men was superb, 
and their features were regular and handsome. 
They were bred to arms from boyhood, and no 
man left his hut without at least a revolver, a 
dagger, and a belt of cartridges. Along the 
frontier the ploughmen and the shepherds 
carried a rifle as an indispensable part of their 
daily dross. Their mental life was formed by 
warlike ballads and tales of individual valour. 
But precisely because they had all been taught 
to think of war as an occasion for personal 
prowess, they proved themselves as little fitted 
for a modern campaign as a legion of medieval 
Unights. 

The Montenegrin Army was detained outside 
Scutari throughout the first Balkan War by a 
Turco-Albanian force of very modest efficiency, 
and they entered it at last only with the consent 
(how won is still a mystery) of the adventurer 
Essad Pasha. In the second Balkan War they 
acted as auxiliary troops to the Serbians, who 
formed a poor opinion of their reliability. The 
fact is that their traditional mode of warfare 



was endless skirmishing behind the cover of 
rocks on the mountain-side. They were not 
accustomed to fighting in regular formations, 
nor had their officers any experience in the 
handling of large bodies of men. They were, 
however, aware of their own deficiencies, and 
accepted before the war was over a certain 
number of Serbian officers, who may have been 
able to effect some improvement. But the 
poverty of this little kingdom was a handicap 
to its military efficiency which no Serbian aid 
could remedy. Its armament had been mainly 
a gift from Russia. The artillery was weak. 
Cavalry (save for a few mounted scouts) was 
non-existent. There was no medical service. 
There was no regular organization of transport 
and supply. During the campaign before 
Scutari the transport was mainly effected by 
the women, who carried out food on their backs, 
and returned laden with loot. The medical 
service was left wholly to the charge of kindly 
foreigners. The Montenegrin Army, in short, 
was an old-world peasant militia. 

It would be a mistake to attempt any elabo 
rate account of the structure of this primitive 
force. Its one asset was the indisputable 
gallantry of its individual soldiers. It was 
organized in local units, composed of the whole 
manhood of a district. Youths and old men 
alike shared in it in some degree. The officers 
were elected locally, and were typical village 
captains. In theory a youth became liable for 
service at eighteen years, and was expected to 

213 



290 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




SERBIAN OUTPOST ON THE DANUBE. 



undergo forty-eight days' training as a recruit, 
with two weeks further of what is called on 
paper " manoeuvres." There were usually in 
training two bodies, each about 250 strong. 
The active army was composed of the whole 
manhood of the nation from nineteen to fifty - 
two years of age. Behind this was a reserve of 
the older men, from fifty-three to sixty-two 
years of age, who should be employed in non- 
combatant work and in guarding the frontiers. 
The active army underwent in theory an annual 
training of ten to fifteen days, which did not 
always amount to much more than a muster and 
a review. Each man had charge of his own 
arms, ammunition and equipment. 

On a war footing the Montenegrin Army was 
composed of four divisions, each with its own 
territorial region, each subdivided into two or 
three brigades, with a number of battalions 
varying from twelve to fifteen. The battalion 
varied from 400 to 800 men. Each division 
had attached to it a few mounted scouts, a field 



battery, and a battery of heavy guns. The 
total strength of the army might be put at 
from 40)000 to 45,000 men, with 104 guns and 
44 mitrailleuses. The infantry carried the 
Russian rifle. The reserve had the single - 
loader Berdan rifle. The mitrailleuses were 
Maxims and were carried on pack-animals. 
The artillery had. a Krupp field gun and some 
howitzers and mortars purchased from Italy. 

It would be a mistake to think of this. 
Montenegrin Militia as in any sense a regular 
army. On the other hand it is well to remember 
that in many respects it was well adapted to the 
work which it had to do, and to the country in 
which it was to operate. If it had no modern 
organized transport, the men were bred to 
endure privations which no Western army 
would face. If it had no medical service, the 
men were not accustomed to depend on doctors 
in time of peace. If its tradition was the 
guerilla warfare of the mountains, it was in the 
mountains of Bosnia that it must fight. 



CHAPTER XL. 



THE AUSTRIAN INVASION 
BATTLE OF THE JADAR. 



THE OUTBREAK or WAR TEXT OF THE AUSTRIAN DECLARATION AUSTRIAN STRATEGY AND THE 
PROBLEM or INVASION DECISION TO CROSS THE DRINA NATURE OF THE COUNTRY SERBIAN 
STRATEGY AND THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE^THB SERBIAN CONCENTRATION DISPOSITION OF 
THE FORCES THE PASSAGE OF THE DRINA BATTLE OF THE JADAR FIELD-MAESHAL PUTNIK 
His STRATEGY DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATIONS, AUGUST 16-19 SHABATZ TZER THE AUSTRIAN 
DEFEAT END OF THE FIRST AUSTRIAN INVASION OF SERBIA EFFECT OF THE SERBIAN VICTORY. 



IF there had existed, in the month of July, 
1914, any Serbian in touch with Govern- 
ment circles whose ignorance of the 
economic and military situation of his 
country had led him to contemplate any act 
which might conceivably precipitate a crisis 
with Austria, he would surely have received a 
check to his ambitions from the national War 
Office. Serbia was in the greatest degree un- 
prepared for war : in a state of utter inability 
to profit from any complication of the ever- 
threatening situation in Bosnia. 

The brief period of peace which followed the 
signature of the Treaty of Bukarest was all 
insufficient to permit the Serbians to repair 
the wastage of war. Orders for cannon, rifles, 
ammunition, stores, military impedimenta, 
horses, and clothing were placed with European 
factories ; but, with the exception of an insignifi- 
cant proportion of the latter, nothing had yet 
been delivered. Many of the damaged rifles 
were repaired in the national arsenal at 
Kragujevatz. There, also, cartridges were 
manufactured in abundance ; but, for the rest, 
the Serbian army was found in a state of 
lamentable, if inevitable, unreadiness. 

291 



Such, then, was the material condition of 
the Serbian army upon the declaration of war. 
One example may be quoted to illustrate the 
ultimate effect. During the battle on the Tzer 
mountains many of the regiments, at an 
effective strength of over 4,000 men, possessed 
but 2,600 rifles. The armed soldiers went into 
action, while the unarmed waited in reserve, 
springing forward as their comrades fell, and 
taking up the weapons of the fallen to continue 
the fight. 

In the country the brief respite accorded 
little more than six months had been all 
insufficient. The men had scarce time to rest 
and repair the wastage to their own homes ; 
the more serious work of restoring the national 
resources had not yet been commenced. Yet, 
despite these almost overpowering difficulties, 
this young, virile nation was able to enter a 
new war, cruelly thrust upon it by a Great 
Power, with tremendous energy. All, from 
young to old, took up the call with enthusiasm, 
and as the soldiers left their homes once more 
the women cried, " Strike ! and may God 
strengthen your arm." 

Simultaneously with the departure of Baron 



292 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



K.*IUEN $:*/ y U MT TZ >Q* 
V9 u k 




THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN FRONTIER. 



Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, from 
Belgrade, the Prince Regent Alexander signed 
a decree ordering the general mobilization of the 
Serbian army. The operation commenced the 
following day (July 26). 

The Serbian soldiers lacked many important 
items from their equipment ; but, donning the 
bat tie -stained uniforms which had already 
served through two wars, they abandoned 
homes, fields and flocks and responded to the 
new call to arms with an enthusiasm as great as 
that demonstrated in 1912. Many of them 
travelled at the risk of their lives, for, finding 
no place inside the wagons, they clambered 
on top. To the remonstrances of their officers, 
they replied only that it was necessary to 
reach the centre of concentration without 
delay. 

The experience already gained served the 
military authorities well. The routine followed 
was precisely similar to that previously adopted, 
with the consequence that the machine, despite 
the enormous difficulties by which it was beset, 
worked with remarkable smoothness. 

Two days after the commencement of the 
general mobilization Austria declared war upon 
Serbia. The notification was conveyed by a 



telegraphic communication remarkable in that 
Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, addressed himself on this occasion not 
to the Serbian Government, but direct to the 
General Staff. The historic document read as 
follows : 

Eventuellement, Le Grand Quartier General, 

Kragu6vatz. 

No. 3523. Handed in at Vienna July 28, 11.10a.m., 
received at Kraguovatz 12.50 p.m. 

Le gouverneraent royal de Serbie n'ayant pas repondu 
d'une maniere satisfaisante a la note qui lui avait et6 
remise par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade 
a la date du 23 juillet 1914, le gouvernement Imperial et 
royal se trouve dans la n6cessit6 de pourvoir lui meme 
a la sauvegarde de ses droits et int6rets et de recourir 
a cet effet a la force des armes. L'Autriche-Hongrie so 
considere done de ce moment en etat de guerre avec la 
Serbie. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 
d'Autriche-Hongrie, 

COMTE BERCHTOLD.* 

* Translation. 

The Royal Government of Serbia not having replied 
in a satisfactory manner to the Note which was sent 
to them by the Minister of Austria -Hungary at Belgrade 
under date July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment finds itself obliged to provide for the safeguarding 
of its rights and interests, and for this purpose to have 
recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary therefore 
regards herself from this moment as in a state of war with 
Serbia. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Austria-Hungary, 

COUNT BERCBTOLD. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



293 



The declaration of war found Serbia in the 
midst of her mobilization, and the fact that the 
Austrians, who had carefully chosen their own 
time for the opening of hostilities, did not 
immediately profit by the advantage they thus 
possessed, seize Belgrade, and penetrate into 
Serbia was, at the time, the subject of con- 
siderable comment. Certain is it that, at the 
moment of the declaration, the Austrians, with 
the facilities for transport then at their disposal, 
should have been in a position to land on 
Serbian soil and enter the capital with a small 
force say, one battalion. But their stay 
would have been relatively short, for the terri- 
torial troops of the Third Ban had been speedily 
mobilized, the gendarmerie were ready for 
combat, and a regiment on a peace footing of 
about 2,000 bayonets, together with a con- 
siderable number of volunteers, was concen- 
trated an hour's march from the city. 

The difficulties of invasion increased almost 
hourly. Immediate measures had been taken 
to prepare a group of 20,000 combatants for the 
defence of the capital, with the result that, on 
the evening of the third day of the mobilization 
the date of the declaration of war a force of 
10,000 men and 24 cannon was concentrated 
within striking distance. 



According to the information at the disposal 
of the Serbian Staff, the Austrians had, on 
July 28, only one division concentrated between 
Semlin and Pancsova a force necessarily in- 
sufficient for such an operation as the occupa- 
tion and retention of Belgrade would have 
entailed. A few days later, thanks to the 
rapidity with which the Serbian concentra- 
tion was effected, the enterprise would have 
necessitated the employment of at least 
one Army Corps. Even had this ben forth- 
coming, however, the adventure would have 
been attended with considerable risk to the 
invaders, in view of the presence, within 
a two-days' march of Belgrade, of a 
considerable and ever -augmenting hostile 
force. 

The project would have taken on a different 
aspect had the Austrians decided to direct their 
principal offensive against Belgrade. But, in 
view of the fact that their own concentration 
was at the time incomplete, and of the increasing 
tension of Austro-Russian relations, reasons of 
strategy, which will become clearly evident 
when the importance of the battle in the Jadar 
Valley is explained, caused the Austrian Staff to 
centre their attention upon an invasion across 
the Drina river culminating, as they hoped, 




SERBIAN OFFICERS ON THE DANUBE. 



294 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



in the capture of Valievo and Kragujevatz, niul 
the dispersion of the Serbian army. 

The Austro-Serbian frontier extends over a 
length of almost 340 miles, and is formed 
on the north by the Danube and Save rivers, 
and on the south by the Drina river. This 
water barrier is, however, an easily sur- 
mounted obstacle, for both the Save and 
Drina are often of shallow depth and abound 
with convenient places for the passage of a 
military expedition. To many of these points 
of vantage on tne northern frontier Austria has 
constructed strategic railways thus permitting 
her army to threaten the Serbs along the whole 
front viz., at Bosut, Mitrovitz, Jarak, Klenak, 
Semlin, Krevevara (facing Semendria) and Divic 
(facing Gradishte). Obrenovatz, though in 
Serbian territory, is at once within a few hours' 
march of Semlin and the terminus of a Serbian 
railway, and doubtless also attracted the 
attention of the prospective invader. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina are yet only 
sparsely served by railway communications, 
but, for the purposes of an invasion of Serbian 
territory, the lines running to Tuzla in the north 
and to Vishegrad and Uvatz in the south are 
of great strategic importance. Moreover, unlike 
Hungary and Slavonia, the country is of so 
mountainous and well-wooded a nature that it 
can be used effectively to mask the concentra- 
tion of large bodies of men in close proximity 
to the frontier. 

The problem before the Serbian General 
Staff was more complicated. A hostile raid 
was to be feared at one or more of a score of 
points. To have sprinkled their forces along 
the whole frontier would have played into the 
hands of the enemy ; to ha've presumed the 
probable direction of the chief offensive and 
massed the armies either at Valievo, Obrenovatz 
or Pojarevtz, would have disclosed the Serbian 
concentration and permitted the Austrians, with 
their superior reseau of railways, to pass, 
almost unchallenged, in another direction. 

The Serbians did not, therefore, reckon on 
opposing any and every attempt of a hostile 
force to enter their country. On the contrary, 
strategical considerations led them to the con- 
clusion that a decisive defeat could only be 
inflicted upon the Austrians after their penetra- 
tion into Serbian territory. In pursuance of 
this idea, it was decided to place fairly strong 
advance guards at all probable points of 
Austrian penetration, with orders to oppose any 
invasion as long as possible until, in fact, the 



tactics of the enemy could be defined and the 
army moved up to offer battle. 

The Serbians, at the outset, did not know 
where the bulk of the Austrian troops was 
concentrated. On broad lines, two alternatives 
presented themselves. The first of these pro- 
vided for an invasion in force on the line 
Obrenovatz-Belgrade-Semeiidria. This line 
offered the shortest route to the centre of the 
country the avowed objective of the enemy 
but it would have necessitated a crossing of 
the Danube, while the Serbs could have moved 
up their troops by road and rail. The second 
alternative an offensive on the front Obreno- 
vatz - Ratza - Loznitza - Liubovia entailed a 
longer journey, but was strategically sounder 
in that it furnished several bases, all converging 
on Valievo. 

The Serbian concentration was, accordingly, 
dictated by the necessity of countering either 
of these projects, and the principal armies 
were therefore centrally grouped on the line 
Palanka - Arangelovatz - Lazarevatz. Weaker, 
though important, forces were massed at 
Valievo and Uzitze, while the advanced units, 
to which reference has already been made, were 
posted in the vicinity of Loznitza, Shabatz, 
Obrenovatz, Belgrade, Semendria, Pozarevatz 
and Gradishte. 

The choice of positions so central in situation 
greatly facilitated the operations, and it was 
found possible to march most of the troops 
to their allotted posts. The railways were 
reserved for the transport of material and 
the conveyance of the advanced units to the 
frontiers. 

On August 6 the Serbian Staff received 
information to the effect that important Austrian 
forces were massed in Syrmia, and in North- 
eastern Bosnia. Simultaneously, considerable 
military activity was manifested on the Danube. 
At Belgrade, Semendria, Gradishte, etc., the 
enemy maintained a vigorous bombardment, 
elaborately prepared to effect a crossing at 
many points, and picturesquely played at 
invasion.* The reports from the outposts, 

* During a period dating from July 29 to August 11 
the Austrians made eighteen attempts to cross the 
frontier, their object doubtless being to divert the 
attention of the Serbians from those points whore the 
serious invasion was to be effected. In some oases 
pontoon bridges were thrown across to small Islands 
situate between the two shores ; in others, detachments 
of infantry were embarked in barges, and an effort made 
to tow them across the river. On all occasions the 
attacks were easily repulsed by the troops of the Third 
Ban, often with serious losses to the invaders. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



295 



however, convinced the Serbian Staff that the 
real danger must be awaited elsewhere. Hostile 
attempts to cross the Drina at Liubovia and 
Ratza, and the Save at Shabatz, quickly 
followed and were repulsed. Nevertheless, the 
earnestness of these efforts, as compared with 
the theatrical display on the Danube, suggested 
that the serious invasion was to be operated 
from the north-west, and when, on August 8 
and 9, Austrian aeroplanes whirred over 
Krupani, Shabatz and Valievo, the last rays of 
Serbian doubt and irraecision were dispelled. 

As was subsequently ascertained, the dis- 
tribution of the Austrian Army Corps exactly 
coincided with the conclusions which had been 
reached by the Serbian General Staff. Retain- 
ing but two divisions between Weisskirchen 
and Semlin, they had flung an imposing 
military cordon around the fertile Matchva 
district (north of the line drawn from Shabatz 
to Leshnitza) and extended other important 
forces along the left bank of the Drina as far 
south as Vishegrad. 

One and a half divisions of the VII. corps 
were between Weisskirchen and Pancsova ; 
1 brigade of the XIII. corps was at Semlin ; 
the IV. corps of 3 divisions spread from Kupi- 



navo to Klenak ; 1 division of the IX. corps 
was at Ruma ; 2 divisions of the VIII. corps 
occupied the front Bielina-Janja ; 1 division 
of the XIII. corps was opposite Loznitza ; 
1J divisions of the XIII. corps held the line 
Drinjacha-Zvornik ; 2 brigades of the XV. 
corps were at Srebrenitza ; 4 brigades of the 
XV. corps were between Focha and Vishegrad ; 
3 brigades of the XVI. corps were at Serajevc . 
The Landsturm were distributed along the 
frontier, the 104th brigade of four regiments 
(25th, 26th, 27th, 28th) being concentrated 
before Loznitza. Against Montenegro the 
Austrians sent 3 brigades of the XVI. corps. 

The first penetration of Austrian troops into 
Serbia was signalled from Loznitza on the 
morning of August 12. Near that town, in 
fact along the whole length of its lower course, 
the swift-running Drina river has frequently 
changed its channel, thus cutting out numerous 
small islands which serve to facilitate the task 
of an invading army. It was one of the largest 
of these islands that of Kuriachista, between 
Loznitza and Leshnitza that the Austrians 
chose as a base for their enterprise. 

The passage was commenced in boats and 
pontoons. The small Serbian frontier guard of 




[" The Times" Photograph. 

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR IN DIFFICULTIES. 

The motor car of " The Times " Correspondent with the Serbian Army being dug out 

of the mud by Austrian prisoners. 



296 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



REFERENCE 



Serb disposition Aug. IB ^f 1 



i movements & combats Aug 
Austrian movements Aiy./fft? 
Austrian movements Aug 



Bielina 



Scale oF Miles. 
9 i i 3 s 




Scale of Kilometres 

01 Z 3 t S 10 15 



BATTLE OF 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



297 



REFERENCE . 



Sero disposition Aug./S^ . - 
Serb movements & combats Aug. 13^ 
Austrian movements Aug.lS'-P > " f 
Austrian retreat Aug. /Si* 



Bielina 



piizA ;s, T^.~ ? ^ 

t^~^..^&^ 

'wx^aiff -- 1 "^"^ ' :; '^ '.& '"'?'' 



. ,.. 




toVa/ievo 



Scale of Kilometres 

I I 3 t 5 10 15 



THE JADAR 



298 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




SERBIAN PEASANT WOMEN HELPING TO HAUL THE GUNS. 



two battalions of the Third Ban, with two 
batteries of obsolete " De Bange " artillery, 
offered what little resistance lay in their power, 
after which, conforming to their orders, they 
retired on to the heights of Loznitza. The 
Austrians then fortified a bridge-head, threw a 
pontoon bridge over the river, and continued 
the passage of their troops, representing the 
entire 13th Army Corps and two divisions of 
the 8th Army Corps. 

The same day an Austrian force crossed the 
river Save north Qf Shabatz. Preceding the 
operation by a heavy bombardment, they first 
sent detachments across by the south of the 
island of Drenovatz, and then, fortifying them- 
selves on the Serbian shore, experienced no 
difficulty in driving back the fraction of the 
Third Ban there stationed. This feeble 
defending force retired to the hills lying to the 
south-east of Shabatz, and the advance guard 
of the Austrian 4th Army occupied the town, 
and constructed a pontoon bridge across the 
river from their railway terminus at Klenak. 

Further passages of the Drina were executed 
by the 42nd division of the 13th Corps and 
I\MI brigades of the 15th Corps at Zvornik 
and Liubovia respectively. In addition, the 
Austrians threw bridges across the river near 
Amajlia and Branjevo. 

It will be observed that the invasion had 
been carried out in a very thorough and 
.systematic manner. Over a frontier of some 



100 to 120 miles in length the Austrians had 
thrown their troops in at least six great columns, 
all converging on the military centre of Valievo. 

Before proceeding to a description of what, 
for want of a better name, is known as the 
" Battle of the Jadar," it will be necessary 
to sketch briefly the country over which this 
important engagement the first great victory 
registered by the Allies was fought and won 
by Serbia. 

Shabatz, the north-easterly point of invasion, 
was a prosperous riverside town of some 15,000 
inhabitants. From time immemorial it had 
been recognized as a centre of great strategical 
importance. In its vicinity there were many 
islands to facilitate the passage of the river, 
and from it many roads leading to the heart 
of Serbia. On its site the Romans had built 
a citadel ; through it the Huns had passed on 
their journeyings north and south and south 
and north ; in their day, too, the Turks had 
not only erected a powerful fortress but, at a 
later date, laid the foundations of a flourishing 
township. Modern, long-range artillery, how- 
ever, rendered the town itself indefensible, both 
from the northern shore of the Save and from 
the hills lying to the south-east. 

North and west of Shabatz lay the great plain 
of Matchva, bounded on its east and north by 
the Save and on its west by the river Drina. 
It was a rich, fertile country, absolutely flat, 
but much broken up by maize fields and wood- 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



299 



land, in such a manner that a good field of 
fire could nowhere be obtained. 

To the south-east, undulating terrain is 
bisected by the river Dobrava, wHere excellent 
defensive positions were available, while due 
south the great mountain barrier of Tzer 
rises like a camel's back out of the plain and, 
if its western extremity of V'idoievitza be 
included, stretches right across from the Drina 
to the Dobrava rivers. Even the southbound 
road, which cuts the range, climbs up and down 
like some mammoth switchback. 

The southern slopes of Tzer are less abrupt 
than those of the north and descend slowly 
into the valley of the Leshnitza river, from 
whence rise the lesser heights of the Iverak 
mountains. Both Tzer and Iverak are well 
covered with plantations of maize and prune 
trees, intersected with patches of woodland. 

Descending southward again, the foothills 
of Iverak are lost in a series of fairly important 
summits which flank the right bank of the 
Jadar river the tributary of the Drina river 
from which the battle under consideration 
derived its name. 

From the left bank of the Jadar, from its 
junction with the Drina to Jarebitze, a great 
rolling plain stretches south until the giant 



Guchevo mountains, running in a south- 
easterly direction, rise abruptly and hide 
the Bosnian hills from view. 

Continuing southward, the country is 
extremely mountainous, even the main roads 
being cut out of the hill sides along the in- 
numerable valleys through which run water- 
courses which, almost dry in summer, are 
converted into torrential streams by the 
melted snow of spring. 

Of the few existent roads, those which were 
maintained by the State such as that from 
Shabatz to Loznitza were metalled, of excel- 
lent quality and practicable in all weathers. 
Others, from Shabatz to Jarebitze, Zavlaka, 
Oseshina and Valievo respectively, and from 
Loznitza to Valievo, Loznitza to Krupani,- 
Krupani to Zavlaka, and Liubovia to Oseshina, 
were merely well -levelled highways of mud, 
which inevitably became impassable in wet 
weather for anything other than oxen transport. 
For the rest, communications consisted of 
traffic-beaten tracks across the fields or bridle 
paths over the mountains. 

Offensive military operations against Valievo, 
therefore, called for the possession both of the 
mountain heights and of the few available 
roads. 




HEAVY GANNON BEING BROUGHT UP BY OXEN. 



300 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



The Austrians suffered from none of the 
difficulties which normally confront the invader 
by reason of his comparative ignorance of the 
terrain over which he is operating. Serbia 
had not only been explored time and again by 
the Austrian surveyors who were responsible 
for the production of most of the existing maps, 
but, during that epoch of Serbian history when 
a King's treaty had reduced her to military 
dependence upon Austria, the country had been 
overrun by agents of the Habsburg Govern- 
ment. A highly organised spy-system had 
doubtless kept the records up to date. 

The Austrians planned their chief advance 
by the valley running down the Jadar to 
Valievo, and, for the satisfactory fulfilment 
of this intention, the possession of the heights 
of Tzer and Iverak was of great strategical 
importance. The fact that the Serbian Army 
was thinned down and worn out by two previous 
wars and, materially speaking, was not in a 
condition to fight, was well known to them, 
and they doubtless calculated that the mass of 
the forces opposed to them, concentrated as 
they were at Lazarevatz Arangelovatz 
Palanka, would be unable to enter the firing 
line until the penetration had reached the heart 
of the country. Here they sadly misjudged 
the possibilities, for, as we shall afterwards see, 
the Serbians arrived on the scene of action with 
truly astonishing rapidity, as the result of a 
series of long and arduous forced marches. 

They wished, no doubt, to finish quickly with 
Serbia in order to turn their attention to the, for 
them, more important issues of the great war, 
and they placed in the field an army which, 
numerically, vastly outnumbered the forces at 
the disposal of their antagonist. For the Serbs 
did not dare to detach their entire military 
strength towards Shabatz and the Drina. They 
had need to guard other vulnerable points of 
their frontier against invasion, and the ambiguous 
attitude of Bulgaria and the attempts which 
were being made by Bulgarian bands to destroy 
the railway line to Salonika, necessitated the 
retention of fairly important units in Macedonia. 
Thus, in the vital stages of the battle of the 
Jadar, Serbia was able to engage only about 
half her available strength. 

Immediately the news of the offensive 
reached Serbian Headquarters at Kragujeyatz, 
and it was seen that the main operations were 
being directed against Valievo and not down 
the Morava valley, the Serbian armies began 
a general movement westward. 



The Serbian strategy was under the direction 
of the Chief of the General Staff, Voivode 
(Field Marshal) Putnik. 

General Putnik differed from most of his 
Balkan contemporaries in that he was a purely 
home-bred soldier, no part of his military educa- 
tion having been received abroad. He sprang, 
curiously enough, from a Serbo-Austrian stock, 
for his father was a native of Banat, in Hungary, 
and emigrated to Serbia in the 'forties. Settling 
in Kragujevatz, Putnik pre there followed his 
vocation of teacher in an elementary school, 
and in the year 1847 the future generalissimo 
was born. From early youth the young Putnik 
was attracted to a martial career, and, having 
passed through the academy at Belgrade, the 
war with Turkey in 1876 found him already in 
commission. In the subsequent campaign 
against the Ottoman Empire in 1877-8 he served 
his country as a captain of infantry, and was 
one of the first officers to penetrate into the 
historic plain of Kossovo. Throughout the 
ill-starred Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 he held 
the rank of lieut. -colonel, and was Chief of 
Staff of the Danube Division First Ban. 

On his promotion to colonel, Putnik became 
at first Chief of the General Staff and then 
Cimmander of the Choumadia Division. A 
reported sympathy with the Radical Party, 
however, now brought about his downfall, for 
King Milan was stoutly opposed to his officers 
mixing in politics. From that time until the 
accession of King Peter, in 1903, Putnik devoted 
himself to military studies and writings, and his 
literary efforts did more, perhaps, to establish 
his reputation than had his previous work in 
field or barracks. The restoration of the 
Karageorgevitch dynasty saw him promoted to 
the rank of general, and he speedily became the 
outstanding military figure in the kingdom. 
When not in command of a division he occupied 
the portfolio of Minister of War. In this 
capacity he presided over the re-organization 
of the army, including the choice and purchase 
of war material. 

At the outbreak of hostilities with Turkey 
in 1912, Putnik naturally took his place at the 
head of the army and received the grade of 
Voivode, being the first Serbian to enjoy that 
distinction. His confirmation in that position 
for the Bulgarian War of 1913 followed as a 
matter of course. 

In appearance General Putnik is small of 
stature, slight of build, and grey-bearded as 
becomes his years. He enjoys but indifferent 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



301 




SERBIAN TROOPS GROSSING THE RIVER SAVE, NEAR BELGRADE. 



health, is asthmatic, seldom leaves the over- 
heated room in which he lives, and it has been 
said of him that he went through the Turkish 
campaign in his slippers. In character he is 
inclined to be brusque and painfully outspoken ; 
he excels in the selection of nicknames usually 
uncomplimentary for those about him, but is 
known as a sound judge of character, and 
choses his lieutenants with great discretion. 
A remarkable topographical memory greatly 
facilitates his task of directing the movements 
of the armies which he commands. Politics 
and journalists are his b&tes noires. As Minister 
of War he was most intolerant of criticism, and 
usually replied to his questioners by asking them 
what they knew about military matters. He 
has also remarked that no people with any 
self-respect write for newspapers or dabble in 
politics. 

The arrest of General Putnik by the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities before the declaration of 
war was, at the time, the subject of considerable 
European comment. He was then returning 
to Serbia, 'and had been subjected to several 
hostile demonstrations en route. At length, 
on nearing Budapest, a number of persons 
invaded the compartment where he was 
resting, and, fearing that an attempt was about 
to be made to lynch him, he attempted to draw 
his revolver. He was quickly informed, how- 



ever, that his disturbers were detectives, and 
that he was under arrest. He was detained at 
Budapest under a double guard with fixed 
bayonets, but was at length informed that he 
was at liberty and conducted with a great show 
of respect to the Rumanian frontier, whence 
he re-entered his own country. 

It had already been ascertained that the 
principal Austrian force had entered by the 
Jadar valley, and General Putnik therefore 
despatched the 3rd Army, together with the 
bulk of the 2nd Army, in that direction ; the 
rest of the 2nd Army being ordered to block 
the advance of the invaders from Shabatz. 

The Austrians proceeded with the work of 
fortifying their bridge-head, and it was only on 
August 14 that they delivered an attack upon 
the Serbian force which had retreated to the 
heights of Loznitza. It was the first engage- 
ment of the campaign, and both sides strove 
hard for victory. The Austrians, full of yet 
undamped enthusiasm, attacked vigorously ; 
but the Serbian veterans defended stoutly, and 
many bayonet charges were driven off with 
heavy loss. Often enough the defenders were 
in a critical position, but they held their ground 
successfully, awaiting the promised reinforce- 
ments. These, however, were unable to get up 
in time, and, having served a useful turn in 
delaying the enemy for a whole day, the old 



80-2 



77/7-; T1UKS HISTORY OF THE WAP. 




ADVANCING UNDER FIRE. 



men fell back. Near Jarebitze they were 
joined by the tardy reinforcements, and the 
united forces proceeded to dig themselves in 
on a front of ten miles, extending from north 
to south through the town and right across 
the Jadar valley. The Austrians, it is in- 
teresting to note, did not follow up their 
attack, and the Serbs were thus able to retire 
and entrench themselves in perfect tranquillity. 
The next day they were joined by the balance 
of the 3rd Army. 

Having from the outset of hostilities dis- 
cerned the importance of driving in a wedge 
between Shabatz and Loznitza, General Putnik 
had sent his cavalry hot haste towards Matchva 
to investigate the situation there. The infor- 
mation which they obtained was of a somewhat 
startling nature, for they reported that hostile 
forces, coming across the plain, had been seen 
at points as far apart as Slepchevitch and 
Belareka. Any idea of attacking Shabatz was, 
therefore, temporarily abandoned, and the 
Serbian extreme right, with the Cavalry 
Division, received orders that, at whatever cost, 
the Austrians in the north must be prevented 
from effecting a junction with those in the 
Jadar valley. 

In addition it was now, for the first time, 
learned that an Austrian column was marching 
northwards on Krupani. This was, however, 



according to the initial reports, but a small 
force, and, in consequence, a company of the 
Third Ban, together with a detachment of 
" Komitadji," were deemed amply sufficient 
to hold it in check. 

The designation " Komitadji " as applied to 
the Serbian fighting man, stands hi need of a 
little explanation, for he should in no sense be 
confounded with his throat-cutting namesake 
of Turkish-Macedonian days. The Serbian 
" Komitadji " were bands of dare-devils under 
the command of officers of the regular army and 
were distinguished by their reckless daring on 
the field of battle. 

With the exception of a successful attack on 
the position of Poporparlok, north of Jarebitze, 
and a Serbian movement towards Shabatz, the 
two armies now occupied themselves with their 
concentration for the forthcoming struggle. 
It will have been observed that, up to this 
point, the Austrian march on Valievo had been 
practically unopposed ; but, while they were 
promenading along the Tzer and Iverak moun- 
tains, the Serbian Armies, behind the fan-like 
screen which had been thrown out, were 
hastening westward by a series of remarkable 
forced marches. 

Into Shabatz the Austrians were pouring thoir 
4th Army Corps of two divisions and the 
29th division of the 9th Corps ; a flanking 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



303 



column, coming from the Drina, had arrived at 
Slepchevitch. Their 8th Corps was marching 
with its left towards Belareka, centre along the 
crests of Tzer, and right down the Leshnitza 
valley. The 36th division of the 13th Corps 
had its left on Iverak and its right in the Jadar 
valley. The 42nd division of the same Corps 
directed its left and centre on Krupani, while 
its right, with two brigades of the 15th Corps, 
was moving north from Liubovia. 

On the Serbian side the Independent Cavalry 
Division, with the right wing of the 2nd Army, 
were developing their mission of cutting off 
the Austrian forces in the north from a junction 
with those advancing on Tzer. The centre and 
left of the 2nd Army were marching to attack 
the hostile columns on Tzer and Iverak, in 
Jiaison with the right of the 3rd Army then 
north of Jarebitze. The centre of the 3rd Army 
held the positions south of Jarebitze, while its 
left, now split into several detachments, had 
been detailed off to deal with the invasion to- 
wards Krupani and the advance from Liubovia. 

The first real shock of the battle occurred on 
the morning of August 16. The division on the 
extreme right of the Serbian armies was working 
northward in an endeavour to invest Shabatz, 
when its left flank guard discovered the presence 
of a strong Austrian column marching across 
the foothills of Tzer, and presumably des- 
tined to clear the ground preparatory to a 



descent of the 4th Army Corps. This develop- 
ment might well have involved an interference 
with the plans of the Serbian General Staff but 
for the initiative and daring of Major Djukitch, 
of the 4th Artillery regiment. This adventur- 
ous spirit asked permission to go out and meet 
the Austrians with but a single cannon. He 
might, he submitted, lose his life, and the gun, 
but he promised meanwhile to inflict con- 
siderable damage on the enemy. He was 
therefore allowed to take one cannon on to the 
position of Gusingrob. The spectacle which 
there met his eyes was disconcerting. Austrian 
columns appeared to be overrunning the coun- 
try, and he was at a loss to know in which 
direction to open fire. Then, throwing gunnery 
etiquette to the winds, he commenced to shell 
first one section and then another. The effect 
of this unexpected bombardment upon the 
Austrians was magical. The troops were 
thrown into panic and the greatest confusion 
prevailed. 

The first shot had been fired at 8.55 a.m., 
and half an hour later a messenger arrived 
ordering Djukitch to return to Slatina. In 
reply, he sent his Colonel an account of the 
situation and asked for reinforcements, fol- 
lowing upon which he received the balance of 
his own battery, and a detachment of infantry 
together with the cavalry division were also 
sent forward. 




CONTINGENT OF RESERVISTS. 



804 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



The Austrians now hastily reformed and 
massed on the line Belikamen-Radlovatz, and 
the Serbs deployed on Slatina-Metkovitch- 
Gusingrob. From these positions a battle- 
royal commenced at 11 a.m. on Belikamen and 
continued, with ever-increasing vigour, through- 
out the day. Towards 6 p.m. the position of 
the Serbs, sensibly inferior in point of numbers, 
was critical in the extreme ; but, upon the 
timely arrival of assistance, they were able to 
resume the offensive. This counter-attack 
resulted in the complete rout of the Austrians, 
who fled the field, leaving behind them a great 
quantity of impedimenta, including two field 
batteries. According to the statements of 
prisoners, their 102nd regiment was almost 
destroyed, and the 94th regiment had practically 
ceased to exist as a fighting unit. 

More important than the mere defeat of the 
enemy or the capture of a certain amount of 
material was the effect of this first success upon 
the ultimate result of the great battle, for it 
immediately and finally cut off the Austrians 
in Matchva from the chief theatre of operations, 
definitely freed the right wing of the Serbian 
army for action against Shabatz and the 
cavalry for service in any direction which 
might be dictated by the march of events. 

The centre of the Serbian 2nd Army 
that directed against Tzer had arrived before 
Tekerish towards midnight on August 15. 



The country thereabouts is very undulating 
and richly interspersed with woodland, and it 
was not until the advance guard had actually 
arrived on the position that they perceived a 
strong Austrian column descending from the 
mountains in the same direction. The two 
armies, so to speak, fell on top of one another, 
the Serbs finding themselves in an exposed 
position on the rolling foothills with tho 
Austrians towering above them, effectively 
sheltered by the woods. The Serbs deployed 
on the positions Bornopolye-Parlok-Lisena, 
with their artillery on Kik, while the Austrians 
developed an attack from the superior ground 
then in their possession. Fierce fighting con- 
tinued without any distinct advantage to 
one side or the other until 8 a.m. on August 16, 
when the Austrian artillery got the range 
of the Serbian left flank and forced the divi- 
sion back on to the line Krivaiska Kosa 
Ragonicabrdo-Kik. Here the timely arrival 
of reserves averted further catastrophe, and 
the troops were able to dig themselves in.. 
The casualties to both armies were severe. 
The Serbs had over 1,000 placed hors de combat, 
while the losses suffered by the Austrians 
included the capture of 300 prisoners and. 
several machine guns. 

The left wing of the 2nd Army had, in 
the meantime, arrived against Iverak. The 
prompt and, we may assume, unexpected 




MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



305 



entrance of this division into action was due 
to its having executed a forced march of 
fifty-two miles over mountainous country and 
in a tropical heat during the preceding twenty- 
four hours. Yet it was ready, at 3 a.m. on the 
morning of August 16, to continue its route 
to Poporparlok. At that hour, however, the 
unfavourable news was received that the 
Austrians had driven the left wing of the 3rd 
Army from that position on the previous 
evening, and the objective was, therefore, in 
the hands of the enemy. 

The situation before this division was, it 
must be admitted, by no means clear. No news 
was available from the direction of Shabatz ; 
the division before Tzer had received a severe 
mauling during the night ; the 3rd Army had 
lost Poporparlok ; and the reports of the 
Austrian advance were of a disquieting nature. 
A consideration of these facts led the Com- 
mander to abandon his projected advance and 
to devote himself to the task of checking any 
attempt of the Austrians to push forward from 
Iverak. The division was accordingly en- 
trenched on the line Begluk-Kik (1,161 ft.), 
and a strong advance was thrown out towards 
Kugovitchi. During the morning the advance 
guard attacked Kugovitchi, carried the positions, 
and established themselves there. 

At 3 p.m. the left flank of the position at 
Beglok was shelled by the Austrian artillery 
in preparation for an attack in force, which, 
commencing about 7.30 p.m., was successfully 
repulsed after one and a half hours' fighting. 
The enemy then flung fresh forces into the 
fray, and came on again at midnight. On this 
occasion the Serbians calmly allowed them to 
advance in a compact mass close up to their 
lines and then, after emptying their magazines 
at them, they charged with bombs and bayonet 
and hurled them back with heavy loss. 

Less encouraging to Serbian arms was the 
experience of their 3rd Army, charged with 
the defence of the territory south of Iverak, 
and the whole line was subjected to a persistent 
Austrian attack. Poporparlok, as has already 
been observed, had been lost the night before, 
and the Austrians now developed a vigorous 
offensive in an attempt to turn the Serbian 
left and capture the road to Valievo. The 
attack on the positions of Jarebitze commenced 
at daybreak. Though the hills held by the 
Serbians were in every way well suited t* 
defensive operations, the approaches almost 
equally favoured a. skilful offensive, for the 



summits were restricted and incapable of pro- 
viding entrenched positions for more than a 
company or so of infantry, while the inter- 
lacing hollows afforded excellent cover under 
which to develop outflanking movements in 
comparative security. The field of fire was, 
further, greatly reduced by the maize and 
prune trees, which are an ever-present feature 
of north-western Serbia. It was by deploying 
around the aforementioned hollows that the 
Austrians attempted to force the Serbs to with- 
draw from the coveted position of Jarebitze. 

A frontal attack on the centre and left of the 
stronghold was simultaneously undertaken by 
a further hostile column which had advanced 
across the plain south of the Jadar valley, 
where the depressions, sunken roads and maize 
again provided adequate protection. Through- 
out the day the Austrians made a determined 
struggle for supremacy in this quarter of the 
theatre of war. The Serbian positions were, 
however, exceedingly strong, and the repeated 
attacks to which they were subjected were all 
successfully repulsed. The Serbs would, in 
fact, have been able to make a protracted 
stand at Jarebitz6 but for a disconcerting 
development farther south, where the Austrian 
forces moving on Krupani, so far from being 
limited to the feeble detachments that had at 
first been imagined, proved to be composed of 
no less than three brigades of mountaineers. 
Reinforcements of infantry and mountain 
artillery were tardily hurried south, but the 
Austrians were able to continue their advance 
towards Zavlaka, and the Serbs, seeing Valievo 
thus threatened, deemed retreat the wiser 
course, evacuated Jarebitze and retired on to 
the line Marianovitche vis-Ravnajaski vis- 
Groblje-Racievskikamen-Schumer, where a 
front could be offered to both the hostile 
columns. 

This withdrawal was executed in perfect 
order and, strangely enough, without inter- 
ference. That some movement was being 
effected must have been obvious to the invaders, 
for the Serbian artillery which had been in 
position on the right bank of the Jadar was 
obliged to defile before the Austrian front in 
order to gain the main road. Yet, fortunately 
for the Serbians, they were allowed to pursue 
their retreat unmolested. By 8 a.m. the 
following morning (August 17) the new line 
had been occupied and extended to Soldato- 
vitcha gaive, whence the detachment frm 
Krupani had retreated. 



806 



TIMES HISTORY OF THK WAE. 




{" The Times " 



HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF OF A DIVISION. 



On the day's showing, therefore, we see that 
although the Austrians had encountered their 
enemy much sooner than they had probably 
expected, they had nevertheless temporarily 
checked the Serbian counter-attack. On the 
ther hand, the attempt to effect a junction of 
their forces at Shabatz with those on Tzer had 
been baulked at the outset. 

After the engagement on Belikamen on 
August 16, the Independent Cavalry Division 
was strengthened by detachments of infantry 
and artillery, and ordered to pursue its im- 
portant but perilous mission of penetrating 
between the Austrian forces at Shabatz and on 
the Drina. Proceeding in very extended 
formation, so that its left flank was based on 
Tzer and its right on the division operating 
towards Shabatz, it was able not only to pene- 
trate as far as Dublje and Prnjavor in the 
north, but to assist the column attacking Tzer 
by a vigorous bombardment of the Austrian 
position on that mountain at Troyan. In fact, 
throughout the great battle, the cavalry 
rendered most noteworthy service by the 
manner in which, in dismounted action, it 
co-ordinated its movements with those of the 
Serbian forces acting on its wings. 

The extreme right of the Serbian Armies, 
having passed the night of August 16-17 at 



Slatina, n<nv felt the way clear for a resumption 
of its movement towards Shabatz. The fact 
that they were proceeding against Austrian 
forces more than double their own strength 
served rather to encourage than to damp the 
ardour of the men, and, deploying in three 
columns, they set their course northward and 
pressed lightheartedly on until, on approach- 
ing the line of hills Jevremovatz-Prichinovitz- 
Jelentza, they were suddenly brought up by a 
heavy musketry and artillery fire coming from 
well-prepared earthworks. 

An investigation of the situation disclosed 
that Shabatz had been prepared for defence 
d I'outrance. The outskirts of the town 
had been strongly fortified by solid fieldworks 
and obstacles blind trenches, barbed wire, 
spiked pits and all the artifices of modern 
warfare joined hands with heavy artillery to 
render attack by such a small force as that 
at the disposal of the Serbian commander a 
somewhat risky proceeding. It was, therefore, 
decided to invest the town in such a manner 
as to counter any attempt to leave it, and 
await the arrival of reinforcements. 

The centre and left of the 2nd Army, now 
recovered from the gruelling which they had 
received the previous day, decided to under- 
take a combined movement against the iiioun- 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



307 



tains of Tzer and Iverak respectively. The 
defeat administered to the Austrians on 
Belikamen had exercised a salutary influence 
on the column which had driven back the 
Serbian centre on the previous day, with the 
result that, on the morning of August 17 we 
find them hardly pressed at Troyan, the most 
easterly and, after Kosaningrad, the most 
important of the peaks of the Tzer mountain. 
The Serbians prepared their attack by a well- 
nourished artillery fire from the south-east and, 
as lias already been noted, from the north, 
and then, as is their wont, reposing their con- 
fidence in bombs and bayonets, they scaled 
the grassy slopes and rushed the position. 
This operation was effected by two regiments ; 
the while a third, advancing along the southern 
slopes, took the more westerly point of Parlog. 
The columns made no further progress this 
day, the time being spent in bringing up cannon 
and preparing for the attack on the culminating 
height of Kosaningrad, where the Austrians 
were found to be concentrating in force. 

Although the victories at Troyan and Parlog, 
coming hot upon the routing of the Austrians 
at Belikamen, may almost be said to have 
decided the fate of the first invasion, the enemy, 
probably hoping to retrieve their position at 
Kosaningrad, continued to drive home their 
advance from Iverak. The situation of the 
Serbian troops in that sector the left wing of 
the 2nd Army was difficult in the extreme. 



for their left flank was increasingly exposed 
by the enforced retirement of the 3rd Army. 
In point of fact, the only favourable artillery 
omen for them was the knowledge that the 
flank of their enemy was, in its turn, being 
threatened by the advance of the neighbouring 
Serbian column on Tzer. It was conceivable 
that the moment Tzer and the Leshnitza valley 
fell into Serbian hands the pressure on their 
front would be relieved, but in the meantime 
the Austrians probably realized that the only 
strategy now open to them was to drive the 
forces opposed to them on Iverak rapidly 
eastward, and by the persistence of their 
progress towards Zavlaka and Valievo render 
the possession of Tzer a matter of secondary 
interest. 

Thus from early morning the Swaba by 
which name the Austrians were known to the 
Serbian rank and file undertook a vigorous 
onslaught on the line Beglok-Kugovitchi. Half 
an hour later they had been driven off. The 
fighting, nevertheless, continued. The Aus- 
trians came on in swarms, and by 11 o'clock 
the engagement had spread to the right wing. 
Towards noon the 3rd Army again reported 
its position as critical, and this hardly-pressed 
division was obliged to send reinforcements 
to its aid. Thus weakened, and finding its 
advance guard at Kugovitchi threatened by a 
cleverly executed turning movement, the 
division began a strategic withdrawal to the 




[" The Times " P/toltgrapk. 

ROADSIDE SCENE DURING THE BATTLE OF THE JADAR. 



308 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



Majur : 

SHABATZ 




MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS 
ROUND SHABATZ. 



heights of Kalem. The retirement was exe- 
cuted in good order, the Austrians contenting 
themselves with the occupation of Kugovitchi 
and the hill lying to the south-west. The 
Serbs entrenched in strong positions and 
awaited the renewal of the Austrian attack 
with confidence. Nothing more serious than 
artillery fire was sustained, however, and the 
good news of the successful advance on Tzer 
having been received, preparations were at 
once undertaken for a forward movement on 
the morrow. 

We have already seen that the strength of 
the Austrian attack had thrown the Serbian 
3rd Army on the defensive and that, in the 
early morning of this day (August 17), this 
force had retired on to the line Marianovitche 
vis Ravnajaski vis-Groblje-Ragievskikamen- 
Schumer Soldatovitcha gaive, where it could 
present a front to the Austrians advancing on 
Valiovo via Jarebitze and Krupani respectively. 
It might have been expected that the Austrians 
would have taken Jarebitze, and then continued 
down the main road to Zavlaka, but the dis- 
position of the armies and the stubborn 
resistance offered by the division against 
Iverak were probably the causes which led the 
invaders to concentrate their energies upon 
the extreme south of the Serbian line, attempt 
to pierce it and come out at Oseshina. The 
Austrians therefore remained before Jarebitze 



and hurled their 4 2nd division of mountain 
troops against the Serbian left, doubtless in an 
endeavour to turn it up and strike the Petska- 
Oseshina road. The defenders were, of course, 
greatly outnumbered and, as far as military 
equipment went, outmatched, but despite a 
decisive hostile effort, they held their ground 
all day, and it was only towards evening that 
any weakening was observable. The onslaught, 
however, had been sufficiently severe to render 
a demand for assistance both logical and neces- 
sary, and the troops stood their ground the 
better for knowing that reinforcements were 
hurrying to their aid. 

August 17, therefore, had seen both General 
Staffs employing the same strategy at different 
points. On the extreme north and extreme 
south of their line and over a part of their 
centre the Serbians were stonewalling, while 
prosecuting an exceedingly vigorous advance 
on Tzer. The Austrians, for their part, sought 
to overwhelm their enemy in the south and to 
maintain their positions in other quarters of the 
theatre of war. To the military student, as he 
looked that night at the respective positions 
of the two armies, at the difference in their 
strength and equipment, the chances would 
inevitably have appeared to favour the triumph 
of Austrian arms, but the stamina, courage 
and moral of the Serbian soldier were about 
to claim a striking and vital victory for the 
allied armies. 

Just as the dislocation of their plans on 
Tzer had caused the Austrians to undertake a 
furious onslaught on the 3rd Army and had 
almost diverted the projected advance down 
the Jadar valley, so it became essential that the 
mass of invaders penned up in Shabatz should 
break through and endeavour to re-establish 
the original situation. It was quite obvious 
to the Serbian Staff, however, that, once the 
penetration by the centre had failed, the 
Austrians would attempt to get home with the 
wings. This at once explains a dispatch of 
additional reinforcements to the extreme left 
and the instructions given to the extreme right 
to solidly entrench and prepare to resist any 
endeavour of the Shabatz army to descend. 

The right had not long to wait, for at 7 a.m. 
on August 18 the morning following their 
unsuccessful assault on the town they were 
attacked by the Austrians, who doubtless 
reckoned on their superior strength to crown 
the enterprise with success. An engagement 
of a most sanguinary nature at once commenced 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



309 



with the employment by the Austrians of 
tactics which are not commonly associated with 
civilized warfare. Having rounded up some 
2,680 of the female inhabitants of Shabatz, 
including many women dragged from beds of 
sickness, they forced them to march in advance 
of the troops as cover against Serbian fire. 
Two Hungarian regiments were sent ahead in 
this manner, a Madame Gashitch (wife of a 
local druggist and a student of the Magyar 
tongue) being obliged to act as interpreter. 
Once their opponents came into the open, 
the Serbs doggedly resisted the effort to pierce 
their line, but were, nevertheless, forced back 
step by step, contesting every foot of the way. 
Finally they succeeded in wearing down the 
ffensive, and the attacks gradually ceased. 
The division passed the night on the line 
Leskovitz-Mihana, towards Slatina. 

The Independent Cavalry Division, which had 
intended to continue its pursuit of the Austrians 
towards Leshnitza, found itself obliged to 
retire to the line Metkovitch-Brestovatz. 
The withdrawal from before Shabatz had 
necessarily affected its plans, but, in addition, 
the fraction of the enemy which had retreated 
to Lipolist had been there joined by incoming 
reinforcements a brigade strong, and was thus 
able to undertake a counter-offensive. The 
force then opposed to the Cavalry consisted 



of the 28th Landwehr division, with two groups 
of artillery and two howitzer batteries. 

The Austrians, however, did not press their 
advance. Having by this time cultivated a 
wholesome respect for the Serbian cavalry, 
and apparently fearing that the retirement 
was but a ruse to lull them on to destruction, 
they threw out a strong advance guard and 
progressed cautiously, showing no disposition 
to attack. They pushed ahead a little and then 
retired, and this going and coming continued 
throughout the day. 

Simultaneously witli the unsuccessful en- 
deavour to throw troops from Shabatz on to 
Tzer, the Austrians directed heavy reinforce- 
ments to the summit of Kosaningrad in readiness 
for the Serbian attack on that position. They 
had, in addition, heavily fortified the height 
of Rashulatcha, which lay between the crests 
of Tzer and Iverak, and from whence they could 
direct their artillery in either direction. 

At this stage of the battle the check which the 
division operating against Iverak had received 
exercised a delaying influence upon the vie- 
torious columns on Tzer, for in marching ahead 
they not only exposed their left flank, but the 
assistance which they anticipated would be 
rendered from the south in the attack on 
Rashulatcha was not forthcoming. If the 
division moved more slowly on this account, 




THE MARKET PLACE AT KRAGUJEVATZ. 



L" The Times " Photograph. 



810 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



it, nevertheless, progressed surely. The aid 
of oxen was invoked to drag the guns along the 
crest of the mountain, and after a preliminary 
shelling a rush was made for the position of 
Kosaningrad. The Serbians again put their 
faith in bombs and bayonets, and attacked 
with their customary vigour, but they failed 
to get home, and ultimately retired. A second 
attack was carried out under the same conditions, 
and although the Austrians flung fresh troops 
into the fray, the Serbs pressed on and a violent 
combat developed. Ultimately the blue-grey 
line wavered, then broke, and the Austrians 
scattered in all directions, followed by the 
pursuing Serbians. 

The possession of the coveted Kosaningrad 
paved the way for an offensive against Rashu- 
latcha, for the position could now be both 
outflanked and covered by enfilade fire as well 
as assaulted. This was precisely the tactics 
adopted by the Serbian commander. He had 
left a strong reserve on Troyan, and ordering 
this to join up with a column which had marched 
along the southern slopes to cover his left 
wing, he directed the united detachments to 
storm the height the while he manoeuvred on 
the flank. The movement was not vigorously 
pressed, for the probabilities were that on the 
morrow the division on Iverak would be able 
to threaten the stronghold from the south. 

The advance of this latter force had, in 
fact, already commenced. Forming into two 
columns, they marched out and attacked the 
Austrians at Kugovitchi, and after a pro- 
longed and stubbornly contested engagement, 
drove them from the trenches. Here they were 
subjected to an intense bombardment from 
batteries posted on Reingrob and had to dig 
themselves in under fire. It was not to be 
expected that the Austrians would tamely 
acquiesce in this disconcerting upsetting of 
their plans, and towards midnight they executed 
a determined counter-offensive. The Swaba 
were not, however, adepts at night attack. 
The Serbs allowed them to come within short 
range and then, after meeting them with point 
blank magazine fire, drove them off in some 
confusion. The division continued to be sub- 
jected to a more or less desultory rifle fire and 
accordingly passed the night in battle order. 

The same day (August 18) the Austrians 
renewed the pressure on the 3rd Army, direct- 
ing their attention also to the line Proslop- 
Rozani, where the detachment of the Third 
Ban from Liubovia was concentrated. Soldato- 



vicha gaive was the object of the initial attack 
of the day, and the detachment of divisional 
cavalry which, following a rearrangement of 
the defence, had been left in charge of the 
position, finding themselves overpowered, 
retired towards the neighbouring summit of 
1,227 ft., where they strengthened the troops 
holding the line between that height and 
1,056 ft. Against this line the Austrians 
massed their entire 42nd division. 

The combats over the centre of the front 
held by the 3rd Army continued without any 
change in the situation being thereby occasioned, 
but after a slight transfer of strength the 
Austrians struck hard at the Serbian right, 
forced it back, and occupied Marianovitche vis. 

During the day the reinforcements to which 
reference has already been made arrived from 
the north and, having directed them princi- 
pally southward, the General Commanding the 
army ordered his left to undertake a counter- 
offensive with such decided effect that towards 
nightfall Soldatovitcha gaive had been 
recaptured. All ranks then felt that the 
moment for the forward movement had at 
length arrived. 

From early morn on August 19 the Austrians 
at Shabatz, no doubt realizing that the centre 
of their army had been thrown into retreat and 
that progress on their left had been effectively 
barred, renewed their attempt to penetrate 
southward. The attack was pressed with 
redoubled energy, so much so that; despite the 
stubborn resistance offered by the Serbs, they 
were finally driven over on to the right bank of 
the Dobrava river. There was strategy in this 
retreat also, for the Dobrava positions were of 
acknowledged strength. If the Austrians ad- 
vanced against them they could, even if in 
greatly superior force as they were be dealt 
with to the certain advantage of the defenders ; 
whereas had they continued southward towards 
Tzer, with the object of threatening the Serbian 
rear on that mountain, the division could have 
fallen on their flank. The possibility of this 
last diversion was not lost upon the Austrians, 
and presumably deeming it prudent com- 
pletely to wipe out the opposition before pro- 
ceeding on their way, they advanced against 
the Dobrava, where the engagement continued 
until nightfall. 

The Austrian success continued, moreover, 
to act as a brake upon the movements of the 
Cavalry Division, which had necessarily to lie 
back in order to guard against any unforeseen 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



311 




SERBIAN BLERIOT MONOPLANE AT SHABATZ. 



[" The Times " Photograph. 



movement on Tzer from the north. They were 
also, for their part, threatened by the afore- 
mentioned enemy force at Lipolist which, 
fortunately, continued its hesitating tactics of 
the previous day and made nothing in the 
nature of a definite advance and, later on, 
they received fire from the left flank of the 
Austrians on Tzer, who were probably rein- 
forced by a part of the troops who had been 
driven out of Kosaningrad. Although urged to 
continue the pursuit towards Leshnitza, the 
division was obliged, therefore, to remain on 
the line Belega-Suwatcha- Vitingrob. A further 
request for reinforcements met with a ready 
response from headquarters, and the division 
was so strengthened that it became a combined 
but nevertheless very mobile unit. 

To the south of the Cavalry Division the 
Serbians continued their victorious career along 
the crests of Tzer. Towards midday Rashu- 
lacha fell after a series of spirited attacks, and 
the possibility of danger from the flank having 
been removed, a strong advance guard was 
thrown out and ordered to pursue the enemy 
with all speed. 

During the day an Austrian column was 
observed to be retreating in the Leshnit/.a 
valley. They were shelled from the heights 
above, thrown into disorder, and badly mauled. 
In the evening the advance guard of the 
division had arrived near Jadranska Leshnitza. 

In the early morning of this day the attack 
against Iverak commenced in earnest, and a 



furious battle raged in which the Serbians 
drove their enemy before them over the 
mountain with astonishing speed. Hostilities 
had opened with an ineffectual counter-attack 
by the Austrians on Kugovitchi at 2 a.m. ; 
three hours later the Serbian forward move- 
ment was inaugurated. The thoroughness of 
the victories registered by the neighbouring 
division on Tzer of course facilitated the 
advance, but the Austrians, realizing that 
their position in the north was hopeless, made 
a last supreme effort to register some success 
in the centre. The Serbians stormed and took 
Velika.Glava at 11 a.m., but their progress was 
there stayed by a nourished gun-fire from the 
heights on Iverak to the west of Rashulacha. 
A hotly contested artillery duel raged, then a 
fusillade spread along the whole line from 
Velika Glava to Kik (north of Zavlaka), and by 
midday the battle was in full swing. At this 
juncture the Serbian left reported that the 
Austrians were massing in force near Kik with 
intention to outflank, and that the right wing 
of the 3rd Army was being hemmed in by a 
hostile turning movement. This somewhat 
untoward development bade fair to hinder the 
general advance, but headquarters came to 
the rescue with a reserve division, which was 
dispatched in that direction and charged with 
the double task of relieving the pressure on the 
left of Iverak and the right of the 3rd Army. 

The menace from Kik was accordingly 
ignored and the right and centre columns 



812 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




FIELD ARTILLERY. 



continued their attack on Iverak. For some 
time the Austrians defended with partial 
success. At some points they retired, at others 
they pushed ahead, but by 4.20 p.m., when 
Reingrob was captured, the Serbians were 
masters of the situation. The Austrians, now 
fighting rearguard actions, delayed the pursuit 
a little at Poporparlok and again at Vutchiplast, 
but their defeat was complete and the division 
passed the night in four groups stretching from 
Vutchiplast to Kik. 

The 3rd Army was again hotly engaged. Its 
left flank continued its advance from Soldato- 
vicha gaive ; but the Austrians continued to 
drive home their success at Marianovitche vis, 
strove to pierce the centre of the army, and 
carried out an assault on the Proslop-Rozani 
line. Both sides exerted themselves on this 
the critical day of the battle, and the fighting 
was continuous and intense. As the day wore 
on and the reinforcements which had been 
announced failed to arrive (they were delayed 
by roads so bad that the transport of impedi- 
menta was rendered almost impossible), a strong 
detachment was transferred from the left to 
the right wing, and by a vigorous assault 
Murianovitche vis was retaken towards evening. 
The Austrians were driven from the position 
in great disorder and left a great deal of material, 
including three hospitals filled with wounded, 



on the field. In addition, the Serbs captured a 
commandant and 500 prisoners. 

August 19, therefore, may be set down as the 
decisive day of the struggle. Though the 
Austrians had made considerable headway 
from Shabatz and had checked the advance of 
the cavalry division, the fact that the Serbians 
were the undoubted masters of Tzer and Iverak 
and that the 3rd Army had definitely under- 
taken the offensive, robbed the invaders of their 
last hopes of success. 

So persistent had been the Austrian attack 
on the Dobrava river positions that the Serbian 
force .stationed there not unnaturally presumed 
that it would be resumed with undiminished 
energy on August 20. The Austrians appeared, 
however, to have abandoned all thoughts of 
retrieving the situation on Tzer and Iverak, 
and even in the Shabatz theatre the idea of a 
further advance seemed to have been given up. 
The attack was consequently feeble, and thu 
Serbs were able to cross the Dobrava and 
establish themselves on the left bank. 

The Austrians were certainly in a most 
unfavourable position. The great battle had, 
so far as the omens went, been already lost and 
won. The Serbian advance along Tzer had at 
length freed the left flank of the cavalry, and 
that force undertook the pursuit and fell on 
the rear of a retreating column. Mobile, yet 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



313 



strong in all arms, they threw the enemy troops 
into disorder, shelled them, charged them, and 
drove those who escaped slaughter into panic- 
stricken flight. " This war is a grim business 
for us," said a Serbian officer who witnessed 
the spectacle, " but I shook with laughter to 
see those fellows run." The fugitives retired 
via Belareka and Prnjavor, hurrying through 
the villages in detached groups and crying out 
to the peasants as they went, " Where is the 
Drina ? Where is the Drina ? " They stayed 
to destroy Prnjavor and to commit sundry 
atrocities (which will be more fully dealt with 
in a subsequent chapter) en route, but by night- 
fall there were few of them left in the Matchva 
district. 

The Serbian troops on Tzer continued to 
drive the Austrians off the top of the mountain, 
and towards noon pushed their advance on to 
the adjacent summit of Vidieovitza, where they 
placed a battery in position and shelled another 
mass of Austrians retreating in the Leshnitza 
valley and a further contingent going towards 
Janja, causing great destruction. Some detach- 
ments did, indeed, endeavour to make a stand, 
but they were soon overrun by their own 
compatriots, who crowded upon them in dis- 
ordered flight. 

Only once did any danger threaten the Serbs, 
and that was when a hostile column, yet 
unaffected by the general panic, came up a 
ravine from the direction of Chokeshina and 



temporarily isolated the advance guard on 
Vidoievitza. Though the Austrians proceeded 
manfully to the attack they were soon over- 
come, and joined their comrades in the rush for 
the security of the river. 

From early morning the division operating 
on Iverak had been ordered to direct its atten- 
tion to the Austrians retreating via the Jadar 
valley, and to act on their flank. The force 
accordingly split into three sections and 
advanced westward, sending detachments into 
the valley and consistently reinforcing them as 
they descended. The principal masses of 
Austrians were retreating along the road to 
Loznitza, and the better to cover their with- 
drawal, they opened fire with their guns 
against the pursuing Serbians. This had no 
other result than to bring the Serbian batteries 
into action, under protection of which the 
infantry continued the pursuit. Advance 
parties of volunteers were sent out to harass the 
Austrian rear, and the columns followed up 
what was, in point of fact, nothing but a pre- 
cipitous flight for safety. 

. Thanks to the re-occupation of Mariano- 
vitche vis the previous evening, the 3rd Army 
was also able to join in the common chase of the 
enemy ; the advance continued along the whole 
line, the Austrians retiring towards the frontier 
by all available roads with the Serbs hard on 
their heels. 

There remained to be dealt with but the 




ARMY TARGET. 
Shooting with Quick-Hiring Guns. 



314 



THE T1MI-:* HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



Austrian forces on Kik, to the north-west of 
/.ivlaka. The Serbian reinforcements which, 
it will be remembered, had been originally 
directed towards Marianovitche vis had been 
afterwards diverted westward, and at dawn on 
August 20 they approached Kik in two columns. 
The cross-country going was exceedingly diffi- 
cult, hills and forests interspersed the land, and 
even cattle transport proving impracticable, 
the guns were unyoked and dragged along by the 
infantry. Osoye was occupied by the left 
column without combat, but in descending 
from that position, the Serbs received fire from 
Austrian artillery. The greatest difficulty was 
experienced in bringing their own batteries 
into action. Indeed, by 8.0 a.m. only one gun 
was in position, but at this moment the enemy 
ceased fire. 

An hour later two batteries belonging to the 
right column, which had followed a more 
northerly route, opened fire, and under cover of 
the bombardment a Serbian battalion reached 
the foot of the mountain. The infantry attack 
which then followed was received exclusively 
by rifle fire, for the Austrian artillery had 
already been retired, and, as was subsequently 
discovered, their maxims had been destroyed 
by the Serbian guns. In the height of the 
combat which accompanied the assault the 
extreme left of the division on Iverak, which 
had remained to guard against possible attack 



from this quarter, moved against the right 
Hank of the Austrians. Seeing this, they did 
not wait for the bayonet attack which was then 
in preparation, but at 10.0 a.m. abandoned 
the position and fled under a cross fire from 
the two attacking parties. Losses under such 
conditions are necessarily great. The Serbs 
buried over 600 Austrian dead on the position. 
They took 50 prisoners, a field hospital and a 
mass of impedimenta and rifles. Their own 
losses were astonishingly low 7 killed and 
16 wounded. 

The Serbian forces now proceeded to occupy 
Jarebitze, after which they joined the Iverak 
division in its pursuit of the enemy. 

Of the events of August on the Drina frontier 
little need be recorded. The last remnants of 
the Austrian hosts were chased over the river 
or captured. Many lost themselves among the 
mealies or in the forests, whence they from time 
to time came in to surrender. The Serbian 
divisions ranged themselves along the banks of 
the Drina from north to south, and it remained 
only to drive the Austrian Corps from Shabatz 
to free Serbian soil from the invader. 

After having recrossed the Dobrava river 
on 'August 20, the Serbs followed up their 
advantage and pressed on towards Shabatz. 
The Austrians had again occupied their old 
positions before the town, and a fierce engage- 
ment at once commenced. All the day of 




RESERVISTS PREPARING THEIR MEALS. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



315 




ARTILLERY IN ACTION. 



August 21 the combat raged with ever- 
increasing severity, and a part of the long- 
promised reinforcements arrived and took up a 
position on the Serbian left. On August 22 
a forward movement was undertaken over the 
whole line. The Austrians, well entrenched on 
their left and centre and aided by a mass of 
artillery, resisted stoutly, but they had 
neglected the western approaches to the town, 
with the result that the Serb left was able to 
arrive before the walls before it was stopped. 
About mid-day the defenders counter-attacked 
in the direction of the road to Varna, but were 
well repulsed, and the day's fighting, on the 
whole, left the situation unchanged. 

The next day (August 23) the Austrians 
returned to the attack with increased energy. 
As the result of a persistent onslaught they had 
begun to pierce the Serbian lines between 
Majur and Jevremovatz, when at a critical 
moment in the engagement reinforcements in 
the shape of fresh troops were brought up and 
thrown into the fray. These men turned the 
balance, the line was reformed and an advance 
towards the town at once commenced. Simi- 
larly, the violence of the Austrian attack on 
the front Jevremovatz-Mishar had inflicted 
very heavy losses on one of the Serbian regi- 
ments, and the position there was somewhat 
until, either by good luck or good 



management, reinforcements turned up in that 
direction also. These units were immediately 
ordered to counter-attack, which they did to 
such effect that the Austrians were obliged to 
retire along the whole line, and henceforth to 
adopt defensive tactics. For the remainder of 
the day and far into the night a heavy fusilade, 
combined with machine gun and artillery fire, 
continued without interruption. The Serbians 
succeeded in tightening the cordon round the 
town, and little but the final stroke of victory 
was left over for the morrow. 

During the night a number of siege guns 
arrived and were placed in position. The 
following morning (August 24) 98 guns of 
various calibres simultaneously bombarded 
the Austrian trenches. The noise and effect of 
the cannonade was terrific, but, as it so hap- 
pened, superfluous, for under cover of night 
the Austrians, deeming further resistance 
useless, had evacuated Shabatz, leaving only 
a small covering detachment in the town. 
The general assault which had been ordered 
for mid-day was therefore abandoned, and at 
that hour a detachment of the besieging troops 
commenced a march towards the walls. At 
4 p.m. they arrived on the banks of the Save, 
and the first Austrian invasion of Serbia had 
oome to its inglorious end. 

Following the debacle the Vienna Press 



316 



THIS TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



Bureau, with a courage which would have 
proved invaluable upon the field of battle, 
issued the following official communique to an 
astonished world : 

Since, owin^' to the intervention of Russia into our 
dispute with Serbia, we find it necessary to concentrate 
our entire force for the great combat in the north, the 
war against Serbia must be considered only as a " Straf- 
expedition " (punitive expedition) which, for the 'same 
reason, has become a matter of secondary, interest. In 
spite of that, and both in view of the general situation 
and of the false news which has been circulated by tl.e 
enemy, an offensive action had been judged opportune. 
Yet, also for the above-mentioned reason, this operation 
was limited to a short incursion into the enemy's terri- 
tory, after the successful accomplishment of which it 
was necessary to return to an attitude of expectancy, 
in adjourning the offensive to a more favourable occasion. 

The offensive executed by part of our troops was an 
action replete with bravery and heroism. Its effect 
was to draw upon us the entire Serbian army, the 
attacks of which, despite a great numerical superiority, 
had no result, thanks to the heroism of our troops. 
The fact that our troops in part suffered heavy losses 
should not astonish us, for our enemy possessed a numeri- 
cal superiority and was, in addition, fighting for his 
existence. Thus when our troops, who had penetrated 
a long way into Serbian territory, received the order to 
regain their positions on the Drina and on the Save, 
they left an enemy completely enfeebled on the field 
of battle. 

In addition to inflicting a tremendous blow 
upon the military prestige of the Monarchy, 
the " Strafexpedition " proved to be one of 
the most expensive punitive campaigns ever 
undertaken. The estimation of Austrian 
losses is somewhat difficult as many of the 
fallen were not discovered until the pene- 



trating odour of decomposed humanity dis- 
closed the presence of bodies in wood or unhar- 
vested field. Hundreds of unnamed and un- 
counted warriors were thus buried where they 
lay. The Austrian casualties were, however, 
necessarily heavy. In attack they had made 
free use of their artillery and then, depending 
on mass formations to carry the positions, had 
flung their troops forward in compact masses, 
only to be mown down like ripened corn by 
the Serbian infantry. In their disordered 
retreat they time and again wandered into the 
valleys, and were there decimated by the 
Serbian artillery. Their dead numbered not 
less than six to eight thousand and their 
wounded 30.000. The Serbs took 4,000 
prisoners, 46 cannon, 30 machine guns and 1,4.0 
ammunition wagons, plus a mass of rifles, field 
hospitals, transport, engineers' trains, stores, 
and other impedimenta. 

The Serbian losses were inferior, but never- 
theless heavy. The victorv of the Jadar cost 
them 3,000 dead and 15,000 wounded, but it 
stemmed the tide of invasion for three precious 
months, and necessitated the continued con- 
centration in the southern theatre of the war 
of five Austrian army corps which the Teutons 
would fain have transferred to the battlefields 
of France or Galicia. 

In Vol. I. will be found portraits of King Peter, p. 39 ; 
the Crown Prince, p. 78; M. Pashitch, p. 19. 




CHAPTER XLI. 

THE INDIAN ARMY IN FRANCE. 

THE UNITY OP INDIA EMPLOYMENT OF " COLOURED TROOPS " PRECEDENTS ENTHUSIASTIC 
OFFERS PATHOS OF THE RUSTING SWORD SIR PERTAB SINGH'S SPEECH ORGANIZATION OF- 
IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS RESPONSE OF THE CHIEFS THE KING-EMPEROR'S MESSAGE 

ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS FRESH LIGHT UPON "INDIAN UNREST " 

THE LANDING AT MARSEILLES WELCOME TO FRANCE LEGENDS OF INDIAN WARFARE QUALITIES. 
OF THE TROOPS THEIR COURAGE -NEW LESSONS IN SCIENTIFIC WAR FAILURE OF THE GERMAN 
'' HOLY WAR " RALLY OF MOSLEM INDIA WIDE SPHERE OF THE INDIAN ARMY'S OPERATIONS. 



INDIA, the nursery of soldiers, supplied the 
first Imperial contribution to the Empire 
in the field. The phenomenon of political 
unity in the British Isles was repeated in 
the Dependency. 

For the first time in the history of that great 
continent every class, creed, and community 
became articulate, and the voice of the three 
hundred millions was lifted as one. Discontent, 
it seemed, had only been a phase of " His 
Majesty's Opposition " there as here. In the 
face of stern reality doctrinaire politics went to 
the wall. The loyal Indian became more loyal ; 
unsought he showed his loyalty and devotion 
without stint. The discontented Indian took 
thought. The unthinking masses stood by 
the order of things. The military races were 
filled with a great hope. It seemed that the 
time had come at last when half the manhood 
of India might be called upon to unsheathe the 
sword. 

Only for a little while there was great sus- 
pense. Indian troops had never before been em- 
ployed on European soil in a war against white 
men, and there was fear that the precedent might 
still hold. The ignorance which prompted 
the scruple was one of the first illusions 
Vol. II. Part 22. 317 



which the war swept away. In bringing 
" coloured troops " to France we opposed to- 
the modern apostlesof Culture the descendantsof 
Poms, to whose chivalry Alexander bore witness, 
sons of an ancient civilization admired of 
Megasthenes close on twenty centuries ago. 
To a race guilty of the blood of women and 
children we opposed the descendants of Jeimul 
and Putta. It would be difficult to conceive 
in what terms the bards of Rajput chivalry 
would celebrate a foe who drove women into 
the field before his legions to protect them 
from the fire of the enemy. 

Of India's services in Egypt, China, Somali- 
land, and the Sudan little need be said. As 
long ago as 1801 in a similar European crisis the 
mobility of our Indian army served us in good 
stead when we dispatched troops to Egypt. 
In Manila, Macao, Java, and Bourbon Indian 
soldiers have served the purposes of the Empire 
in conflict with European foes. 

South Africa, according to the fiat, was a 
" white man's war," but we must not forget that 
the Indian bearers' corps went with the per- 
sonnel of the Indian hospitals and were supple- 
mented by Indian settlers in Natal. These 
brave men, who were unarmed under fire, were 



818 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



commended for their coolness, as were the 
drivers of Danjhibhoy, the Parsee mail con- 
tractor's ambulance tonga corps. In a chapter 
of history the theme of which is the comrade- 
ship under arms of East and West these humble 
camp followers deserve an honoured place. 

In 1885, at the time of the Penjdeh incident, 
India passed through a crisis similar, though in 
a less degree, to that with which the country 
was faced in the first week of August, 1914. 
Then, as now, the Ruling Chiefs and Feudatory 
Princes came forward with offers of aid. It 
was the Nizam of Hyderabad who first offered a 
large sum out of his revenues to Government to 
swell the war chest. Financial aid naturally 
suggested a contribution of troops ; but in those 
days the local corps of the Ruling Chiefs were 
not trained and equipped on the same lines as 
the Indian Army. That they should be service- 
able on the field this was necessary, and out of 
the recognition of the need the Imperial Service 
C'orps had its origin. 

The suggestion that the States should provide 
troops rather than gold as their contribution to 
the maintenance of peace commended itself to 
the Ruling Chiefs as well as to Government. 
Not only would these new corps lend added 
security to our frontiers ; they would also pro- 
vide an honourable and useful career to men of 
good family and military antecedents, a class 
who during long periods of peace and inaction 
might well deteriorate. 

There are races who suffer through suppressed 
chivalry, who feel the burden of peace. There 
was tragic pathos in the rust of the sword in 
States like Hyderabad, Gwalior, Jodhpur, and 
lammu. The old military caste had lost its 
occupation. 

At the beginning of the great war the veteran 
Sir Pertab Singh, Maharaja Regent of Jodhpur, 
made an affecting speech to his subjects on 
the eve of his departure for the front. He told 
them that Englishmen were shedding their blood 
like water for a great cause. Englishmen had 
always been ready to do so, and had done so 
many years ago for the Rajput States, and were 
ready to do so again. Now was the time for the 
Rajputs to show their gratitude, and, in turn, 
be prepared to shed their blood for the King- 
Emperor. That is the spirit in which the 
Rajput Chiefs regard the British connexion ; 
and the same ties unite us and the Sikh and 
Mahomedan Rulers. More than a century 
ago we saved the Nizam's dominion from the 
Mahrattas and other encroaching neighbours. 



The Cis-Sutlej Sikh States of Patiala, Nabha, 
and Jind would have been swallowed up by 
Ranjit Singh but for the protection of the 
British Raj. A few years later these same 
States performed signal service for us during 
the Mutiny in keeping the road open from the 
North to Delhi. Mutual services, fidelity to the 
pledged word, splendid military traditions, bind 
the British Government and their trusted allies 
by an indissoluble tie. 

The Imperial Service Troops* were organized 
on the same lines as the Class-Company regi- 
ments of the Indian Army, and as far as possible 
are recruited from the subjects of their respec- 
tive Rulers, and not as in former days from 
outside the States. They are trained and 
inspected by picked British Officers of the 
Indian Army and commanded when possible 
by their Chief himself or one of his kin. In war 
time they are attached to the Regular Army 
under much the same status as the troops of 
allies. When the European War broke out 
they had already seen service in China, Somali- 
land, in the Relief of Chitral, Tirah, and the 
Swat and Mohmund Expeditions. Whenever 
there was trouble on the Frontier the Ruling 
Princes came forward with offers of military 
service ; but these were often necessarily 
disappointed, and the Chiefs might well begin 
to feel that their soldierly occupation was gone, 
that their fine troops were to play a spectacular 
part merely in the Imperial Army. 

When war was declared they came forward 
to a man and put all their troops and the 
resources of their States at the service of the 
King-Emperor, f They offered their swords, 

* Twenty-seven of the larger States in India maintain 
Imperial Service Troops. The total strength of these 
forces is : Cavalry ; ten regiments of four squadrons 
each, and one of three squadrons, with eight squadrons 
in corps of lesser strength than three squadrons. 
Infantry, six eight-company battalions and six six- 
company battalions. Artillery, the two Kashmir 
mountain batteries ; four companies of sappers, five 
mule or pony transport corps, aggregating 1,650 army 
carts, two camel transport corps aggregating 1,200 
camels, a fighting camel corps of 500 rifles, and three 
transport escorts for the protection of transport corps, 
provided by the State. 

The services of every corps were immediately placed 
at the disposal of the Government of India on the 
mi) break of war. The Viceroy accepted from twelve 
States contingents of cavalry, infantry, sappers, and 
transport, besides a camel corps from Bikanir. These 
troops did not all land in France, details being detached 
to East Africa, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf. 

t From among the many I'rinces and Nobles who 
volunteered for active service, the Viceroy selected the 
Chiefs of Jodhpur, Bikanir, Kishengarh, Rutlam, Sachin, 
I'atiala, Sir 1'ertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, the Heir- 
Apparent of Bhopal, and a brother of the Maharaja of Cooch 
Behar, together with other Cadets of noble families. 



THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. 



319 




[Elliott 6- Fry. 

LIEUT-GEN. SIR JAMES WILLCOCKS, 
K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., D.S.O. 

Commanding Indian Army Corps. 



their jewelry, their horses, their troops, their 
lives. The Nizam of Hyderabad, as in 1885, 
came forward with a gift of all his horses- and 
sixty lakhs of rupees (400,000) to meet the 
expenses of the 1st Hyderabad Imperial Ser- 
vice Lancers, maintained by the State, and the 
20th Deccan Horse, of which he is Colonel. 
The Maharaja of Mysore offered the princely 
gift of fifty lakhs of rupees. The Maharaja 
Scindia contributed a Bed Cross motor ambu- 
lance fleet and, in combination with the Begum 
of Bhopal and other Chiefs, a ho tpital ship. All 
this was in addition to large contributions to 
patriotic funds. Every Prince gave according to 
his resources. In the Legislative Council an 
Indian member stated the desire of the people 
of India, in addition to the military assistance 
afforded, to share in the heavy financial bur- 
dens imposed by the war. The resolution was 
supported by representatives of various races 
and creeds, and was carried without a single 
dissentient. The people of India, the innumer- 
able millions under the sole control of the 
Government, were equally lavish in their out- 
pourings and their demonstrations of loyalty. 



Hundreds of telegrams were received by the 
Viceroy every day from communities and 
associations, religious, social and political, of 
all classes, castes and creeds, and also from 
individuals, offering their resources or asking 
for opportunities to prove their loyalty by 
personal service. 

And from beyond the borders the response 
was the same. From the grim Khyber, from 
Las Bela and Kelat in Beluchistan, from the 
mountain heights of Chitral, promises of assist- 
ance and appeals for enrolment were pressed 1 
upon the Government of India. The Prime 
Minister of Nepal, the great Gurkha State, 
offered the army he controls. The Dalai 
Lama of Tibet offered a thousand of 
those brave and kindly men who, in 1904, 
opposed our advance to Lhasa with their 
matchloc^. and jingalls and bore us no ill-will 
for the toll they had to pay. The incarnation 
of Avalokites\ ara, who was himself a fugitive 
at Urga in Mongolia, had since sought asylum 
with us 'from a less merciful foe. And now 
in every gompa in Tibet, from holy Kailas by 
the Mansarowar Lake to the " precipice- 
encircled " monasteries of the Eastern Tsang- 
Po, prayers were chanted for the success of 
our arms and for the happiness of the souls of all 
victims of war. The monks droned them in 
litanies to the sound of drums and cymbals 
and conch shells in the dark halls, dimly lit 
with butter-lamps, under the images of the 
impassive Buddha. 




[Elliott & Fry. 

LT.-GENERAL H. B. B. WATKIS, C.B. 
Commanding Lahore Division, Indian Army. 



320 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



The King-Emperor'l message* of September 9 
to the 1'rinees and Peoples of his Indian 
Kmpire, in response to their devoted offers of 
service, sent a thrill of enthusiastic loyalty 
throughout the country. 

* Tin- King-Emperor's Message was as follows : 
To THK PRINCES AND PEOPLES op My INDIAN EMPIRE : 

During the past few weeks the peoples of ray whole 
Empire at home and Overseas have moved with one 
mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparal- 
leled assault upon the continuity of civilization and the 
peace of mankind. 

The calamitous conflict is not of my seeking. -My 
voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. 
My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes o 
strife and to appease differences with which my Empire 
was not concerned. Had I stood aside when in defiance 
-of pledges to which my Kingdom was a party the soil 
of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, 
when the very life of the French nation was threatened 
with extinction, I should have sacrificed my honour and 
given to destruction the liberties of my Empire and of 
mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is 
with me in this decision. 

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged 
word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of 
England and of India. 

Among the many incidents that have marked the 
unanimous uprising of the populations of my Empire 
in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved 
me more than the passionate devotion to my Throne 
expressed both by my Indian subjects and by the 
Keudatory Princes and the Ruling Chiefs of India, and 
their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources 



In the great wave of sentiment that swept 
over the country there is no doubt that many 
who had long imagined themselves hostile 
to the British connexion were carried off their 
feet. The loyalty of the Indian Princes had 
never been questioned ; it was taken for 
granted that the army would be true to their 
salt ; the agricultural and industrial classes, 
the real bone and marrow of the country, it 
was rightly presumed, would remain stanch 
to the British cause. But there was another 
class, whose sympathies had long seemed 
estranged, a class from which the Government 
of India might naturally expect embarrassment 
when the Empire was engaged in a life or death 
struggle with a foreign Power. 

The most extraordinary thing about the 

in the cause of the Realm. Their one-voiced demand 
to be foremost in the conflict has touched my heart, 
and has inspired to the highest issues the love and 
devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked my 
Indian subjects and myself. I recall to mind India's 
gracious message to the British nation of good-will 
and fellowship, which greeted my return in February, 
1912, after the solemn ceremony of my Coronation 
Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full 
harvest and a noble fulfilment of the assurance given by 
you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are 
indissolubly linked. 




MOTOR AMBULANCES PRESENTED TO THE BRITISH ARMY BY 
HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA SCINDIA OF GWALIOR. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



321 



attitude of the Indian people during the war 
was the suspension of political agitation. In 
Europe the extreme radicals, anti-militarists, 
syndicalists, became patriots in their country's 
hour of need. In India, too, many of thoso 
whose whole business had been the fomenting 
of discontent rallied to the defence of the 
Empire. But in our Indian Dependency the 
phenomenon was the more remarkable as 
the antagonism to the British Government 
had its seeds in racial animosity. 

The prophecies of trouble in India during a 
European war were not fulfilled. Germany 
had miscalculated. But it was not Germany 
alone that was at fault in her reading of the 
temper of the Indian people. There was sur- 
prise in England that the clamour of sedition 
should be stilled at the moment when the 
British Empire seemed most vulnerable. 

The truth is the disaffected class had made 
itself articulate out of all proportion to its 
numerical strength and social influence in the 
country. When the call to arms came, the 
millions responded, and the voice of discontent 
was no longer audible in the outburst of 
enthusiastic loyalty. The carping critic of 
Government, the radical Indian doctrinaire, 
the " political missionary," were silenced, dis- 
countenanced or converted. Volunteers from 
the non-military classes asked to be enrolled in 
ambulance corps and sent to the front. The 
twice-deported Tilak, addressing a meeting at 
Poona, urged them to sink differences and to 
support Government in every possible way. 
" The presence of English rulers," he said, " was 
desirable, even from the point of view of 
Indian self-interest." 

It would, of course, be absurd to pretend 
that the ghost of political agitation had been 
laid by the maladroit exorcism of the Kaiser, 
or that the uncompromising nationalist poli- 
tician will rest content with the prestige that 
military achievement has won for his country- 
men. Greater claims will be advanced. India, 
like Ireland, will always present a difficult and 
thorny problem of administration, and just as 
Ireland still has her Sinn Fein extremists, so 
has India still her anarchists and her fanatical 
bomb-throwers. 

At the beginning of the war the German 
can have been nothing more to the masses of 
India than a different kind of white man, a 
sahib of an unknown quantity. No fear of 
menace to their comfort or liberties, no evil 
dream of a universal Kultur, could have 




[Elliott & Fry. 

HIS HIGHNESS THE AGA KHAN. 

inspired their loyalty, which was quite spon- 
taneous and genuine. But in distilling the 
soul of goodness out of things evil we must 
recognize our debt to the Kaiser in the rallying 
of numbers of the disaffected class to the Throne. 
His officials have carried on the work of recon- 
ciliation. On the deeply religious and sensitive 
soul of India the barbarities of Louvain 
left an indelible impression. The profaning 
of sacred places is the unforgivable sin. The 
Huns who shelled the cathedral of Reims 
and dropped bombs on Notre Dame would 
not be likely to spare the mosque of Delhi or 
the temples of Benares or Trivandrum. 

Also it should be remembered that nearly 
every educated Indian of the middle-class is, 
through the nature of his circumstances and 
education, a liberal. Militarism and bureau- 
cracy are his bugbears ; the mailed fist and 
the Prussian heel symbols of Gehenna. A 
distinguished Bengali politician expressed the 
feelings of his countrymen when he said : 
" We cannot expect the same privileges from 
Prussian militarism or look for political con- 
cession at the hands of the hooligans of Pots- 
dam. Hence our abhorrence of any procedure 
which, by embarrassing the ' Government as 
by law established,' may weaken the links that 
bind us to the Empire." The attitude of India 
at the beginning of the war was even more 
eloquently expressed by Mr. .Malaviya, in his 
speech in the Viceroy's Legislative Council. 

" India recognises her duty at this present 
moment," he said, " and, God willing, will 

222 



322 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




\Vandyk. 

HIS HIGHNESS 
THE YUVARAJA OF MYSORE. 

manfully discharge that duty, that no sacrifice 
of men or money will be grudged in order that 
the British arms should triumph, in order that 
the success of the British arms should establish 
the triumph of right over might, of civilization 
over the military barbarism of Germany, of 
ordered freedom over military slavery." 

The arrival of the Indian Corps at Marseilles 
was a landmark in history. No episode in 
this extraordinary war was more remarkable 
or, for Britons, more inspiring than the presence 
of Indian troops on the Continent of Europe. 
To India, the event was, if possible, of even 
greater significance. The march of her sons 
through the streets of Marseilles was a kind 
of initiation. A phantom had been laid that 
shadowed her prestige. Invisible barriers had 
been broken down. New virtus of honour were 
opened out before her. 

That hot September morning when the 
interminable line of transports was seen through 
telescopes at dawn creeping along by the 
Chateau d'lf and the Islands of Pomique and 
Ratonneau, will long be remembered in Mar- 
seilles. No more romantic landing can have 
been witnessed by the old sea-city in all its 
varied past. Daily for a couple of months the 
streets had echoed to the tread of a medley of 
races Zouaves and Turcos from Algeria, white- 
turbanned swarthy Moors from Morocco, coal- 
black negroes from Senegal, and a score of 
different units from the South of France, but 
Hie urlromr Hie Miirseillais gave the Indians 
transcended all other demonstrations in spon- 
taneity and warmth. 



Throughout the forenoon while the troops 
wen- landing excitement had been steadily 
rising in the city, and the dispatching of the 
British and Indian soldiers through the streets 
in the afternoon en route to their camps was a 
signal for the whole of Marseilles to turn out 
en fete. From the Cannebiere to the Prado the 
gaily-dressed streets were packed with a seething 
mass of humanity. 

First came a detachment of Sikhs, for the 
greater part head and shoulders above the 
spectators. They received the plaudits of the 
crowd with the imperturbable smiling com- 
posure of the Oriental. The police guarding the 
road were swept aside, the ranks were rushed, 
men and women shook tho sepoys by the hand, 
and young girls showered flowers upon them, 
pinning roses in their tunics and in their turbans. 
Tricolours were distributed with prodigal 
favour, old ladies with bitter memories of '70 
pressed forward the better to admire these 
handsome, bearded men, and it would be diffi- 
cult to conjure up anything more touching than 
the sight of those frail women patting the 
bronzed giants on the back and calling down 
blessings on their heads. 

So it proceeded for hours. The troops filed 
past to the cries of "Vivel'Angleterre/" "Vivenl 
les H indents ! " When the Gurkhas came along 
marching to the time of the " Marseillaise " 
played on the pipes, the crowd gave the troops 




\Vandyk. 

HIS HIGHNESS 
THE MAHARAJA OF GWALIOR. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



the pavement and stood in the cobbled streets, 
cheering. Men, mountain battery mules, 
officers on their chargers, marched along under 
the very awnings of the cafe lerrasses, while the 
spectators stood on chairs and tables waving 
hats, sticks and handkerchiefs, and crying 
"Vive F Angleterre ! " " Vivent lea Indiens!" 
" Vivent les Hindoua ! " 

When it was dusk and the last troops had 
gone by, the crowd followed them to their 
eaniDS at St. Marcel and La Barrasse and 
Borely, and watched them cook their evening 
meal while the camp fires twinkled in the dark, 
and the smell of wood smoke rose in the air. 
It was a historic camp this, pitched by the men 
of Ind on the soil of France between the land- 
locked harbour and the stately garden of the 
Borely. 

A month later the Indian Cavalry Division 
arrived. The increasing volume of support 
was more than physical ; every strange 
unit was a separate refutation of Bernhardi's 
" biologically just " war. If the war we were 
waging had not been as just as the constitution 
of our Empire, Sikhs, Gurkhas, Rajputs, 
Jats, Pathans and Punjabi Musulmans would 
not have been fighting our battles in France. 
No wonder the Berlin professors counted on 
disharmony in so complex an organism as 
ours, of such subtly individualized parts. Our 
Empire in the East is a piece of creative work of 
which Kullur has not the secret. 





HIS HIGHNESS 
THE MAHARAJA OF BIKANIR. 



[Vandytt. 

HIS HIGHNESS 
THE MAHARAJA HOLKAR OF INDORE. 



The sight of the troopships in the Quai 
d'Areng, some of them prizes of war converted 
to our purposes of transport, brought home to 
us once more the significance of our command 
of the sea. For over a century India has been 
to us another base from which we have been 
able to pour troops on distant shores when 
emergency dictated. Earlier European up- 
heavals had entailed the sending out of expedi- 
tionary forces from our Indian Army, though 
this was the first occasion on which they landed 
on European soil. 

After the disembarcation of the first two 
Divisions at Marseilles little was heard of the 
Indian contingent during the next month. 
The need of acclimatization, the delay in the 
provision of suitably-warm clothing, the sorry 
condition of their horses after the sea voyage, 
held them long in reserve. The continued 
silence and mystery about their movements 
may well have led the Germans in the firing 
line to believe them a myth, or to think that 
they had been sent over, as one of their journals 
suggested, for merely spectacular uses an 
illusion which was afterwards rudely dispelled. 
In England the mystification was increased in 
the last week of October by the appearance 
of the Indian Mountain Batteries in the New 
Forest, which drew crowds of motorists and 



824 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




\Vattayk. 

HIS HIGHNESS 
THE MAHARAJA OF PATIALA. 

pedestrians to their camp. The throng of 
sightseers disgorged from the cars and cabs 
gave the scene the appearance of Derby Day. 
The impression they took away with them was 
of a fine and wiry -looking crowd, lean and hard, 
and having a noticeably older air than the men 
of an ordinary British regiment. The tales of 
prowess that began to pour in from France did 
not surprise anyone. 

The reader who wishes to sift fact from 
fiction will do well to remember that no story 
that was current before the end of October, 
when the Indian troops were first engaged, lias 
any foundation. The story of the Gurkhas who 
stole through the enemy's lines and blew up the 
powder magazine is a fabrication. The eight 
<!erman sentries whe gave up the ghost on a 
still night to eight stealthy Gurkhas with no 
more protest than a rattle in the throat ; that 



wave of Prussian Guards which was only 
checked by Nepalese knives and Sikh bayonets 
may live in romance, but not in history. 
" Bengali " Lancers do not dismount in hordes 
of twenty thousand strong and charge the 
enemy with their spears. The Gurkha does not 
fling his knife like a boomerang. And there 
is no inhibition against his drawing it for 
peaceful purposes. It will cut wood at a pincli 
and potatoes, and may be honourably un- 
sheathed without drawing blood. So the story 
of the ladies of Marseilles who offered their 
finger tips with Roman fortitude to make good 
this sacrificial rite must go with the rest. 

The tale of the Gurkhas' murderous knives, 
which whistled through the air as the Germans 
rose from their cover, seemed at first a palpable 
" invention," but the story may have its origin 
in honest misconception. The Sikh wears an 
iron quoit on his turban it is one of the five 
badges presented by his Guru and though 
now only a symbol it was once a formidable 
weapon. The significance of the quoit may 
h ive been explained with other strange Eastern 
lore, and the story evolved in some tired brain 
in which images of quoit and kukri, Sikhs and 
Gurkhas, past and present, danced confusedly 
together. 

Most of the tales of Sikh and Gurkha prowess 
were abroad before the Indian troops were 
engaged at all, but the true soldierly qualities 
of these men are too well known to suffer 
through such fantastic advertisement. 

The tall, bearded Sikhs, the sturdy, compact, 
little Gurkha, with his Mongol face and his 
look of terrier-like tenacity, seem to have 
captured the public imagination. One heard 
little of the other Indian troops, amongst whom 
were to be found the same high qualities. The 
Pathan in particular is a fine figure-head. Take 
the trans -frontier tribesman. Man to man in 
open country, on the hillside or in forest the 
German with his two or three years' training 
on parade grounds or in manoeuvres can be no 
match for him. These men are cradled in war. 
Tribal vendettas are the breath of life to them. 
The young Afridi has been the mark for a 
bullet from liis infancy. He will glide through 
the enemy's lines on a dark night, without a 
quickening of the pulse, and lie up like a hare 
in its form while the lead splashes against the 
rock by his side. He knows nothing of mass 
tactics. His every move is instinctive, in- 
dividual. The Cis-frontier Pathan, who suffers 
from protection, being answerable to the penal 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. 



325 



code, is almost as good a man. Security, the 
magistrate, and the police may have taken 
something off the fine edge of his daring. Still, 
a fat Prussian the other side of a nullah would 
have small chance against him. 

Then there is the Rajput, who with his straw- 
fire elan and unexampled traditions of chivalry 
is probably as good a man on a horse as any in 
the world, and whose courage glows in the 
pages of Indian history. 

The Dogra, the Baluchi, the Mahratta, the 
Jat, the Punjabi Musulman all come of a 
hard-bitten fighting stock ; nerves are not in 
their compositions. A British trooper, who had 
seen the Indians in the trenches during their 
baptism of shrapnel fire, said : 

" They did not seem to mind. They poked 
their heads out when a shell went by and stared 
at the hole it made as if it had been a firework. ' 

That is exactly what one might expect. 
Indians love a tomasha, a museum, a little magic, 
an entertainment. But it must be remembered 
that until this war the artillery had always 
been on our side. Those strange supernatural 
forces which the Sahibs could command had 
been their allies. They could count on the 
Olympians. 



No one has ever questioned the courage of 
the Indian troops. In fighting with naked 
steel and lead they are " lords of themselves." 
One has always counted on them in a cavalry 
charge, or a bayonet rush on foot, or in holding 
a position against rifle fire. But where the 
infernal machinery comes in it might well be 
another matter. To lie up in a trench all day 
under heavy shrapnel fire directed by an 
asroplane with a sixth sense is no part of their 
tradition. They like to stalk their man and 
shoot him. But in this war, mines, barbed- 
wire entanglements, shells, siege guns, mitrail- 
leuses, all the machinery of the " higher civiliza- 
tion," were most palpable phenomena on the 
other side. The miracles might seem to be 
against them. 

" Sahib, why did you not teach us these 
things ? " a sepoy said reproachfully to his 
British officer, unconscious that the same 
wizardry was being brought into play by his 
own Sahibs against the enemy. 

Yet, with British officers whom they knew 
and who know them to lead them and to hearten 
them, they did not flinch when the parachute 
flares came rocketing over their trenches and 
the air was rent with the voice of a thousand 




INDIAN LANCER OUTPOST. 



826 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



devils, and the mitrailleuses poured in their 
deadly fire as if it were day. The Indians 
who gave themselves to our cause did so at a 
greater sacrifice than our own, for tho meaning 
of the struggle did not touch them as nearly as 
it did us. To them the German was merely a 
savage with diabolical inspirations, a merely 
physical menace. The gospel of Treitsclike did 
not trouble their philosophy. Honour per- 
sonal, communal and national was the only 
reward they looked for. The first advance of 
the Indians under machine-gun fire was a new 
spiritual triumph for the East. 

From Marseilles the Indian contingent went 
to Orleans. There was a long period of waiting 
between their arrival there and their cntrain- 
ment for the front. The delay must have been 
especially trying to troops who were anxious bo 
prove themselves in such entirely new condi- 




tions of warfare. India knew that her ancient 
chivalry was a household word in Kurope, but 
there were still untried fields to conquer ; other 
kinds of nerve, resource, and coolness were 
called for if she were to carry on unbroken her 
military traditions into the scientific battle- 
fields of the twentieth century No one knew 
the temper of his troops better than their 
General, and it was a stirring appeal that he 
issued to them in the order of the day, 
October 10.* 

There was still another fortnight to pns 
before tho Indians were to hear the sound of 
the guns. In the meantime the ancient city 
of Orleans was invested with a new romance. 
The ancestors of the Rajputs who filed under 
the statue of Joan of Arc held the same tradi- 
tions of chivalrous womanhood as the Maid of 
Orleans. The women of Chitore fought beside 
their husbands, or, when all was lost, passed 
into an underground sepulchre of flame pre- 
pared for their ashes. The Jodhpur Lancers 
rode through the Place du Martroi like men 
conscious of a past. More than any race the 
Rajput loves distinction. And they cling to 



ONE OF GARDNER'S HORSE: 

A man of the 2nd Lancers (late 2nd Bengal 
I.ancers.) 



* Soldiers of the Indian Army Corps, 

We have all read with pride the gracious message of 
his Majesty the King-Emperor to his troops from India. 

On the eve of going into the field to join our British 
comrades, who have covered themselves with glory in 
this great war, it is our firm resolve to prove ourselves 
worthy of the honour which has been conferred on us as 
representatives of the Army of India. 

In a few days we shall be fighting as has never been 
our good fortune to fight before and against enemies 
who have a long history. 

But is their history as long as yours ! You are the 
descendants of men who have b'een mighty rulers and 
great warriors for many centuries. You will never 
forget this. You will recall the glories of your race. 
Hindu and Mahomedan will be fighting sido by side with 
liritish soldier? and our gallant French Allies. You will 
bo helping to make history. You will be the first Indian 
soldiers of the King-Emperor who will have the honour 
of showing in Europe that the sons of India have lost 
none of their ancient martial instincts and aro worthy of 
the confidence reposed in them. 

In battle you will remember that your religions enjoin 
on you that to give your life doing your- duty is your 
highest reward. 

The eyes of your co-religionists and your fellow- 
countrymen are on you. From the Himalayan Moun- 
tain*, the hanks of the Ganges and Indus, and the plains 
of Hindustan, they are eagerly waiting for the news of 
how their brethren conduct themselves when they meet 
the foe. From mosques and temples their prayers are 
ascending to the God of all. and you will answer their 
ho|><-< by the proofs of your valour. 

You will fight for your King-Kmperor and your faith, 
so that history will record the doings of India's sons and 
yonr children will proudly tell of the deeds of their 
fathers. 

JAMES WILLCOCKS, 

Lieut. -General 
Coming. Indian Army Corps. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



327 



a boast of heraldry that ennobles the poorest ; 
for every true Rajput is in some distant col- 
lateral way the kin of the Maharana and can 
lay claim to unmixed blood for close on two 
thousand years. Tod, their devoted chronicler, 
traces their armorial bearings to a date before 
Troy, and believes that the ancestors of 
Udaipur carried their Palladium into the field 
against Alexander. " There is not a village," 
he says, " that has not had its Thermopylae, 
and scarcely a city that has not produced its 
Leonidas." 

The first four Indian Princes to land on the 
soil of France were Rajputs, all.curiously enough, 
of the Rathore stock, of the bluest blood in 
India. These were the Maharajas of Jodhpur, 
Bikanir, Kishengarh and Sir Pertab Singh of 
Idar. Next came the young Maharaja of Idar, 
the adopted son of Sir Pertab Singh, who 
abdicated to become Regent of Jodhpur. Sir 
Pertab is one of the most famous of living 
Indian soldiers, and has rendered conspicuous 
service to the British Crown. He served on 
the staff of the Generals commanding both in 
the Mohmund Expedition of 1897 and in the 
Tirah Campaign of 1898. In 1900 he went 
with the British force to China in command 
of the Jodhpur Lancers. Few would have 
recognized in that short, well-built soldierly 
veteran in khaki -'the brilliant and spectacular 
figure who led the Imperial Service Corps at 
Delhi and rode in the Jubilee procession of 
Queen Victoria, and in the Coronation proces- 
sions of King Edward and King George. Sir 
Pertab was over, seventy, probably the oldest 
man in the field, and he came to Europe with 
the avowed intention of dying a soldier's death. 
" To die in battle is not to die," he said, and 
the old Rajput spirit would not be denied 
the spirit in which his ancestors put on their 
saffron robes, the national sign of combat d 
Foutrance, and charged into Ala-ud-Din's host 
and fell as they clove a path through the foe. 
His brother's grandson, the Maharaja Soomair 
Singh of Jodhpur, and his daughter's son, 
Kanwar Prithi Singh of Bera, came with him, 
and three of his nephews and several noblemen 
in his regiment. The Maharaja of Kishengarh 
also joined his kinsman, and many officers 
had Indians of high birth in the ranks, as 
syces, or grooms, and personal servants, as it 
was impossible for them to go in any other 
capacity. 

The young Maharaja of Jodhpur ; a boy of 
seventeen, brought with him his Lancers, the 




INDIAN 2nd LANCERS. 

famous Sardar Rissala, lithe men and keen, 
great horsemen, equally efficient with sword 
and lance. These were the first Imperial Ser- 
vice Corps 'to lind in Europe. The Patiala 
Lancers and Jind Infantry were detached for 
East Africa ; the Bikanir Camel Corps for 
Egypt, where their high mettle was soon put to 
the test in an engagement in which they were 
attacked by superior forces and drove the 
enemy off. 

The Jodhpur. contingent were billeted in a 
S3igneurial chateau on the banks of the Loire. 
It may be imagined how the Lancers exercising 
in the park attracted the bourgeois from the 
city. Through all '.these weeks Orleans was a 
strange mixture of East and West., The 
country people, dressed in black, would be 
making their way to the Cathedral, there to 
pray for the safety of their kinsmen at the front, 
or loitering at the street corners talking over the 
latest news, when suddenly into the midst of all 
these would emerge from a side street with all 
the sudden Indian irrelevancy of a dream, an 
Indian forage cart, driven by an imperturbably 
smiling Asiatic, his little mules, all befringed 



328 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




GROUP OF INDIAN OFFICERS. 



and iron-yoked, leaning heavily against each 
other as if for comfort or support in this strange 
land. Next a flock of sheep and bearded blunt- 
faced goats passes down the boulevard, driven 
by Punjabi Musulmans, who to ring them 
round safely are almost as numerous as their 
charge. One of them carries a lamb born in 
the train. Another calls out uistinctively in his 
own language to an old market woman, who is 
in danger of being run over by an Indore trans- 
port wagon, " Buddhi, Buddhi, nikal jao" 
(old woman ! old woman ! get out of the way). 
Next a Pathan sowar canters by on a country- 
bred, and the traffickers look up and admire his 
loose and easy seat, wonderinj; perhaps what is 
the significance of the smart kida on his turban 
and thinking him a prince. A regiment of 
Dogras comes along, fine upstanding men, not 
unlike the I'athan in feature. They, too, pass 
on, while the Pluoe continues its business of 
buying and selling but always with apprecia- 



tive comments, " En voild qui feront danser le 
Kaiser," or " lie sent joliment solides tout de 
meme." 

Through a gateway visible from the next 
street there is an Indian bakery, two long rows 
of domed mud kilns lepai-ed, as they call it in 
the East, or plastered with mud, but without 
the concomitant of cowdung, which to the 
Indian mind is needful for -cleanliness. There 
are a score of them on either side, each with its 
turbaned cook tending the ash fire. These men 
carry their atmosphere with them. There is 
nothing in that yard hooded with fog to remind 
one that one is not at Jullundur still on a thick 
November morning. The native soldiers did 
not frequent the city as a rule unless they 
were marching through, so the citoyenne had to 
bestow her offerings on the humbler camp- 
followers. The daughter of the concierge 
would run out into the street and pin her tri- 
colour to the coat of a Musulman driver. The 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



329 



blanchisseuse would hold out a cigarette bash- 
fully to a Sikh farrier, who is forbidden by all 
the laws of his Gurus to smoke. Her child, 
perhaps, would be honoured by a joy ride in the 
mule transport wagon as far as the corner of 
the street. 

By no means all the Indian troops which left 
Karachi and Bombay landed in France. Many- 
were sent to East Africa. Then Turkey's 
appearance in the struggle, as the vacillating 
dupe of Germany in her efforts to cut off our 
communication with the East, made it neces- 
sary to divert others to the Suez Canal, the 
Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. 

Nothing during the war illustrated the 
devotion of our Indian subjects to the Crown 
more than the detachment of the Moslem 
element from German intrigue. When Turkey 
entered on the scene our enemies expected a 
pan-Islamic upheaval and a demonstration in 
force against the Allies. They pictured a 
Mahomedan rising in Northern India in 
which the Jehad would be preached in all the 
mosques from Cawnpore to Peshawur, and a 
fanatical army of the faithful would press over 
the frontier carrying the torch through the 
tribal countries into Persia and Afghanistan. 
Emissaries from Turkey, they believed, had 



already prepared the field for the conflagration, 
and lying notices about the Holy War were 
hoisted on placards in front of the Indians' 
trenches or dropped harmlessly from aeroplanes 
among the British troops. The response of 
Islam must have been a bitter draught for 
German aspirations. In every mosque in 
India prayers were offered for the success of 
British arms, The King of Afghanistan pro- 
claimed his neutrality. The frontier tribes 
remained quiet. The Moslem political associa- 
tions denounced Turkey's unholy alliance. 
Mahornedan journals, which in times of peace 
had been most bitter in their attacks upon the 
administration, urged their communities to 
remain loyal to the Crown. The Sheikh-ul- 
Islam of Egypt and the leading Ulema appealed 
to all Egyptian Moslems to be calm and peaceful. 

In Egypt, too, our Moslem soldiers were 
greeted by their co-religionists, and sat chatting 
with the white-bearded mullahs on the steps 
of the mosques as if it were the most natural 
thing in the world that they should be called 
out of the East to fight against the Turk. 

Two years before the most sanguine prophet 
of our Imperial unity could not have believed 
these things possible. When Italy's suzerainty 
was recognized in Tripoli, when the seat of 




DISEMBARKING FROM TRANSPORTS AT PLYMOUTH. 



223 



830 



'////; TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




INDIAN TROOPS MARCHING TO GAMP. 



the Caliphate was threatened by the Balkan 
States, a flame of resentment at the invasion of 
Turkey and at the supposed sympathy of 
England with the aggressors spread over Mosli < \ i 
India. The wiseheads understood the necessity 
of England's detachment in the struggles of the 
Turkish Empire, but young blood was not so 
cool, and our non-interference was resented 
as if it had been an expression of active hos- 
tility. Though the movement was anti- 
British, and illogically so, we cannot altogether 
withhold pur sympathy, as the human nature 
that prompted it is clear and intelligible 
tin- instinct of the man who is struck wantonly 
to hit buck, if not at the actual aggressor, at the 
man nearest him. 

The rally of Moslem India to the British 
Throne when we actually engaged in hostilities 
against the Turks only two years after this 
crisis might well surprise the wire-pullers in 
Berlin. The sanir Meld hospital which \\as 



sent to Turkey during the Balkan \Var was 
offered by the Moslems of Delhi for the Indian 
Expeditionary Force in France. Politicians 
who bitterly attacked the Raj when it was in 
no danger hurried to its support when it w as 
assailed and in the throes of a life and death 
struggle. There is health in such champion- 
ship and seeds of great hope of a generous 
understanding in the future. 

The best Indian Moslem opinion lost no time 
in ranging itself. The Nizam of Hyderabad 
issued a manifesto in which he impressed upon 
all Mahomedans that it was their bounden duty 
to adhere lirmly to their old and tried loyalty 
to the British Government. 

" 1 repent and reiterate," he said. " that in 
the crisis liet'ore iis Muhomedan inhabitants of 
India, especially subjects of this State, should, 
if they care for their own welfare and prosperity, 
remain firm and wholehearted in their loyalty 
and obedience, and swerve not a hair's breadth 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



381 



from their devotion to the British Government, 
whose cause I am convinced is just and right. 
They should keep the sacred tie which binds a 
subject people to their rulers and in no case 
allow themselves to be beguiled by the wiles of 
anyone into a course of open or secret sedition 
against the British Government." 

The Begum of Bhopal struck the true note 
of Mahomedan loyalty when she declared in 
open durbar before her people that she would 
always remain loyal to the traditions which 
exist between the Bhopal State and the British 
Government, seeing that these traditions were 
binding on her not only as a ruling chief under 
the protection of the British Government, but 
also as a disciple of Islam, which enjoins upon 
all its followers the sanctity of a promise. 

Two resolutions passed by the All-India 
Moslem League voiced the general feeling of 
Mahomedans in India : 

Firstly, " that the Council of the All-India 
Moslem League gives expression once more to 
the deep-rooted loyalty and sincere devotion of 
Musulmans of India to the British Crown and 
assures his Excellency the Viceroy that partici- 
pation of Turkey in the present war does not 
and cannot affect that loyalty in the least 
degree, and the Council is confident that no 
Musulman in India will swerve a hair's breadth 
from his paramount duty to his Sovereign." 

Secondly, " that the Council of the All-India 
Moslem League expresses its deep gratitude to 
the British Government for the assurances 
given to its Muslim subjects as to the immunity 
of the Holy Places of Islam in Arabia and other 
places from attack or molestation and for obtain- 
ing similar assurances from its Allies." 

Responsible Indian Mosleii s realized as a 
rule the nature of the intrigue into which 
the Young Turks had been drawn. They 
also recognized that Turkey was divided. 
The specious call of a " Holy War " waged 
under an infidel standard did not deceive 
them, and they had no mind to be dragged into 
the arena on the heels of Germany. The Aga 
Khan sent messages to his millions of adherents 
spread over India, the Persian Gulf, the Indian 
Borderland, Burma, the Straits Settlements, 
and throughout Africa directing them to place 
themselves and their resources at the disposal 
of the local British authorities, and to be 
prepared for any duty that might be assigned 
to them. In a speech delivered in London, he 
expressed his conviction that Germany was the 
most dangerous enemy of Turkey and other 



Moslem countries, as she was the Power most 
anxious to enter by " peaceful penetration " 
Asia Minor and Southern Persia. She had been 
passing for years, he said, as a sort of protector 
of Islam though Heaven forbid that they 
should have such an immoral protector. 
Happily, so far as the Moslem subjects of the 
King were concerned, these efforts were abso- 
lutely futile. They would never break down 
the strong wall of their loyalty, which was 
based on the consciousness that their dearest 
interests, religious as well as civil, were guaran- 
teed to them by British rule more securely than 
they could be by any other dominion. " All 
Indians knew," he concluded, " that if Britain 
was ever weakened, India's aspirations, India's 
whole future, would go to pieces." 

When the last day of the Moharram had 
passed quietly in the bazaars of India Moslem 
troops had been engaged against Turks and 
Beduins in Egypt and the Persian Gulf. 

The first Indian troops to be engaged through 
Turkey's adventure in the war were the 
Bikanir Camel Corps, Imperial Service troops, 
who had already seen service in China and 
Somaliland. On November 20 Captain Chope 
and Lieutenant Mohammed Anis with twenty 
of the corps were patrolling between Bir-el-Nuss 
and Katia to the east of the Canal. They were 




INFANTRY CARRYING MAXIM INTO 
ACTION. 



33-2 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




INDIAN MULE CART IN FRANCE. 



attacked three times. The first two attacks 
were repulsed easily. On the third occasion 
they were attacked heavily on both flanks 
by a large body of horsemen. Captain Chope 
retired, dismounting his men, who fired as 
opportunity offered, while the enemy were 
firing from horseback. Lieutenant Mohammed 
Anis was shot during this period, but one of the 
Bikanir men took him up and carried him 
behind him on his camel. Unhappily, both were 
shot. Captain Chope succeeded in getting back 
to his supports, after beating off the enemy, 
with the loss of Lieutenant Anis, Subadar 
Abdu Khan, twelve men killed, and three men 
wounded. 



The wide sphere over which forces of the 
Indian Army were operating at this time 
is realizable by the fact that an engagement 
was fought in Somaliland on the same day 
as the action of the Bikanir Camel Corps on 
the east of the Suez Canal, and this was to be 
followed up almost immediately by the news 
of a success in Turkish Arabia. At the si 
time Indian troops were garrisoning 
Africa and ports on the Red Sea. 

The full narrative of the subsidiary cam- 
paigns fought by the Indian Army in the 
neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf, the Suez 
Canal, the Red Sea, and in East Africa will 
provide material for other chapters. 



CHAPTER XLII. 

THE INDIAN ARMY IN THE 
TRENCHES. 



INDIANS ARRIVE AT THE FRONT FIRST ACTION AT NEUVE CHAPELLE SUCCESS AND CONGRATU- 
LATIONS HIGHLANDERS AND GURKHAS THE FIRST INDIAN V.C. FUTILE GERMAN EFFORTS TO 
Sow SEDITION LORD ROBERTS IN FRANCE His VISIT TO THE INDIANS His DEATH COLD 
WEATHER HARDSHIPS OF THE INDIANS FOOD PROBLEMS HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION HEAVY 
FIGHTING AT FESTUBERT CAVALRY IN THE TRENCHES SAPPERS AND MINERS GERMAN RECOG- 
NITION OF INDIAN PROWESS THE GARHWALIS THE KING AT BOULOGNE VISIT TO THE INDIAN 
HOSPITAL INSPECTION OF THE TROOPS EAST AND WEST : A NEW PHASE. 



THE Lahore Division arrived in its 
concentration area in rear of the 
2nd Corps on October 19 and 20. 
On the 22nd two battalions were 
ordered to proceed to Wulverghem in support 
of the Cavalry Corps. 

The Meerut Division arrived shortly after- 
wards and took up the line of the 2nd Army 
Corps, operating on the front from Givenchy, 
west o Neuve Chapelle, to Champigny. The 
Lahore Division on the left stretched from 
Champigny northward to a point east of 
Kstaires. 

Two and a half battalions of these brigades 
were returned to the 2nd Corps when the 
Ferozepore Brigade joined the Indian Corps 
after its support of the Cavalry further north. 

The Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade arrived 
in the area during November 1 and 2, and the 
.lodhpur Lancers came about the same time. 
Tlios \\-ere all temporarily attached to the 
Indian Corps. 

The Indian contingent was commanded by 
General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., 
D.S.O., whose knowledge of the Indian Army 
and distinguished record in frontier campaigns 



rendered him signally fit for the command. 
Few living soldiers understood the sepoy 
better ; and it is perhaps no exaggeration to 
say. that every Indian officer serving in the 
Force was known to him personally. 

From October 25 the Lahore Division, 
omitting the two battalions which were support- 
ing the Cavalry, were heavily engaged in 
assisting the 7th Brigade of the 2nd Corps 
in fighting round Neuve Chapelle. Tho line 
held by the Indian Corps was subjected to 
constant bombardment by the enemy's heavy 
artillery, followed up by infantry attacks. 

October 28 will be a day memorable in the 
annals of the Indian Army. It was the first 
occasion on which the Indian troops were called 
upon to show their mettle on European soil. 
They were required to take part in an offensive 
against a strong position held by a force of the 
regular army of the greatest military Power 
in Europe. They responded splendidly. The 
objective was the village of Neuve Chapelle, a 
position of great tactical importance. Our 
trenches here presented something of a salient 
and could be enfiladed. The Seaforths had 
been particularly exposed and had lost heavily. 



333 



834 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




[Vandyk, 



HIS HIGHNESS 
THE GAEKWAR OF BARODA. 



It was necessary to take the village and 
straighten up the line. The task of storming 
it was assigned to the 47th Sikhs, the 9th 
Bhopal Infantry, two companies of the 3rd 
Bombay Sappers and Miners, in conjunction 
with the 7th British Brigade. These troops 



stormed the village, advancing under heavy 
rifle and machine-gun fire ; cleared it and 
occupied it. Sir John French, in his dispiiirl) 
of November 20, made special mention of this 
action and the gallant conduct of the Indian 
troops, who distinguished themselves in the 
attack. 

It will be remembered that on November 4 
the Press Bureau issued a communique, stating 
that the Indian troops had commenced to tako 
their part in the operations of the British 
Expeditionary Force. This was the first 
official reference to the contingent since the 
landing at Marseilles. The village referred to 
was Neuve Chapelle. The Indians were de- 
scribed as advancing with a dash and resolution 
worthy of the highest traditions of the Army. 
They were also praised for their coolness under 
artillery fire. One of the first regiments to go 
into action was heavily shelled while entrench- 
ing. An officer who was present particularly 
observed the indifference of the men through- 
out this to them novel experience. It \vas 
noticed that after the first few shells they hardly 
troubled to look round. 

After the action Sir James Willcocks received 
the following message from the Commander- 
in-Chief : " Please congratulate your Indian 
troops on their gallant conduct and express my 
gratitude to them." 




ARRIVING AT CAMP IN FRANCE. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




[Vandyk. 

HIS HIGHNESS 
THE NAWAB OF BAHAWALPUR. 



The Corps Commander under whose orders 
the first units to be engaged had been tem- 
porarily placed also sent a warm message of 
congratulation and thanks. 

The 47th Sikhs mentioned by Sir John 
French in his dispatch are one of the six Sikh 
class battalions in the Indian Army. The 
14th, loth, 16th, 35th and 36th make up the 
complement. In addition to these there are the 
three Pioneer Battalions, chiefly recruited from 
the Mazbi Sikhs. In this war the 36th took 
part in the capture of Tsing-Tau. The 14th 
Sikhs were one of the regiments that came 
within the observation of the German Head- 
quarters Staff in China in 1900. Field-Marshal 
von Waldersee reviewed them on the race- 
course at Shanghai and expressed his unbounded 
admiration for their splendid physique and 
soldierly bearing. In 1914 the Sikh class 
regiments were able to persuade the Germans 
more feelingly of their worth. 

The 9th Bhopal Infantry, who also took 
part in the assault, are not, as is sometimes 
believed, Imperial Service Corps or local levies 
of the Bhopal State, but a battalion of the 
regular Indian Army. When the 9th Bengal 
Infiintry were removed from the general line 
and included in the separate Gurkha line as 
the 9th Gurkhas, this battalion, which was 
originally a local 'battalion of the Bhopal 
Durbar, fell into its place. They were one of 



the first Indian regiments engaged in the war 
and lost heavily in officers and men. 

In the last week of October the 2nd Battalion 
of the 8th Gurkha Rifles, of the Bareilly 
Brigade, arrived in their trenches. They were 
immediately subjected to a terrific shell fire 
and found the position untenable. Their 
initial difficulties were increased by the depth 
of the trenches, which had been built for taller 
men. They were enfiladed by machine-gun 
fire and lost nearly all their British officers. In 
one of the trenches a havildar got his men 
together and led them back in the dark to the 
lines behind. After this heavy pounding the 
men felt a little lost and uncertain where they 
would find themselves. By a piece of good 
fortune they hit on the trenches of a Highland 
regiment. The Highlanders and Gurkhas are 
old comrades in arms. The Seaforths, in 
particular, have a tradition of good fellowship 1 
with these Nepalese hill-men which dates back 
to Mutiny days ; they have fought side by side 
in many a North-West Frontier campaign. In 
India one often hears picturesque incidents of 
the entente. The Gurkhas felt themselves 
at home among their old friends. 

No wonder the Indians felt lost at first in 
these strange conditions of warfare in a far 
country. Their training and their instincts 
had accustomed them to quite a different kind 
of fighting. They must have been in constant 
doubt. Even to distinguish German soldiers 
from French was not easy for them in the dark. 
When their English leaders were killed they had 




[Lafayette. 

HIS HIGHNESS 
THE MAHARAJA OF COOCH BEHAR. 



; TIMI<:S 



or THI-: 




INFANTRY ADVANCING ACROSS A FIELD. 



n o language in which they could make them- 
selves understood. Their stragglers were 
exposed to difficulties in the way of rejoining 
their units which it is almost impossible to 
exaggerate, and the Germans were quick 
to turn their bewilderment to account. 

For three days October 31, November 1 
and 2 our lines were subjected to a terrific 
bombardment and continual infantry attacks. 
On November 2 a serious attack was 
developed against a portion of the line west of 
Xeuve Chapelle. In one place the enemy broke 
through and the line was slightly bent back. 
The 2nd Gurkhas under Colonel Norie saved 
the situation in a gallant charge. The losses 
among officers and men in this affair were 
distressing. The 2nd Gurkhas are the famous 
Sirmoor battalion enlisted after the Nepal War. 
They, with the 60th Rifles, held the exposed 
flank of the ridge before Delhi from the first 
day to the last of the siege. 

It was on October 31 at Hollebeke that 
Khudadad, a sepoy of the 129th Duke of 
Connaught's Own Beluchis, won the Victoria 
1 KMfe When the British officer in charge of 
the detachment had been wounded and the 
other guns put out of action by a shell, Ivhuda- 
dad, though himself severely wounded, remained 
working his gun until all the other five men of 
the machine gun detachment had been killed. 



Khudadad was the first Indian to be awarded 
the Victoria Cross, though not actually the 
finst to receive it. When the King, a month 
afterwards, presented the decoration on the 
field of battle the gallant sepoy was lying ill 
in hospital. 

To the uninitiated the titles of Indian regi- 
ments are the cause of considerable confusion. 
It should be explained that Khudadad, though 
a sepoy in a Beluchi regiment, is not liimself a 
Beluchi. Very few of the tribesmen of Beluchi- 
stan, a Mahomedan hill-race of Arab descent, 
serve in the Indian Army. The pure Beluchis, 
though a fine fighting stock, do not as a rule 
accept military service except under the tribal 
chiefs in their own local levies. The 127th, 
129th and 130th Infantry, known as the Beluchi 
regiments, are recruited from Mahomcdans 
of varibus tribes within the Indian frontier. 
They contain few genuine Beluchis. 

A similar misconception is prevalent with 
regard to some of the so-called Sikli regiments. 
The 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th Sikhs are not, as 
their designation implies, class regiments of 
Sikhs, but mixed-company regiments composed 
of Sikhs, Dogras and Punjabi Musulmaiis. 

They derive the title " Sikh " from the fact 
that they were taken over from the Sikh 
Durbar and drafted into the Icdian Army after 
the conclusion of the Sikh War. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAX. 



337 



After the affair of Xeuve Chapelle there was 
a comparative lull in the German offensive 
along the front held by the Indian contingent. 
The troops were exposed to a continual bom- 
bardment and to isolated night attacks all 
along the line, which were repulsed without 
heavy loss to our side ; but for nearly three 
weeks there was no fighting of the same severe 
character as the actions in which the 47th 
Sikhs, the 20th and 21st companies of the 
3rd Bombay Sappers and Miners, and the 2nd 
and 8th Gurkhas lost so heavily. 

In his dispatch covering this period Sir John 
French drew special attention to the initiative 
and resource of the Indian troops. One story 
told by the " Observer serving with the Indian 
Army Contingent in France " offers an unforget- 
table picture : 

Two sepoys were on reconnaissance work over the 
ground separating our trenches from the Germans when 
a searchlight was turned on, and exposed one of them to 
the enemy's fire at short range. Concealment was hope- 
less, and the Indian was quick-witted enough to realize 
that no ordinary resource could save him. He imme- 
diately rose to his feet, and, in view of our trench, 
advanced, salaaming to the German trench. Its occu- 
pants, disconcerted by so unusual an advance, ceased 
fire. He still advanced, and approaching quite close to 





INDIANS AND BRITISH AT A 
FRENCH COFFEE STALL. 



[Vandyk. 

HIS HIGHNESS 
THE JAM SAHIB OF NAWANAGAR 



the trench, was allowed after some dumb show to enter. 
A dialogue then followed, which can be imagined more 
easily than it can be reproduced. The Germans, anxious 
to define his status, mentioned several Indian nationali- 
ties. He shook his head until the word Musulman 
occurred in the list. Then he nodded most vigorously. 
A moment later his questioners mentioned the British. 
He drew his hand across his throat with a lively gesture 
ot disgust, adding, as he re-enacted the scene, a snarl. 
The Germans, very favourably encouraged by this 
indication, gave him some rations and a blanket. 

He spent the night with them, and the next morning, 
by the use of his fingers, indicated to a superior officer 
who had been sent for to deal with so novel a case that 
there were twenty-five other Musulmans in his trench, 
whom, if released, he could certainly bring in. The 
Germans, completely deceived, gave him a final cup of 
coffee, and sent him on this promising errand. He 
rejoined his friends, who had long since given him up, 
with a report of far more than purely local interest, and 
he has deservedly gained both his promotion and a 
reputation for wit and presence of mind. 

This story, though true, has the appearance 
of fable, and so is likely to become historical. It 
embodies as aptly as ^Esop the German's psy- 
chological limitation, the Indian's subtlety of 
mind. The German is an adept contriver of 
wiles, but liis sphere is the mechanical world. 
The Asiatic is a keen reader of men ; he pos- 
sesses that insight into character and motive 
which the German lacks. He has also a sense 
of humour, in which the German is deficient. 
His diplomacy is as subtle as the Teuton's is 
crude. The clumsy efforts of the enemy to seduce 
him from his loyalty to the British Raj must 
have moved his laughter. Aeroplanes dropped 
seditious leaflets over the troops ; in these the 
patient German Professors sought to turn to 
material account their Oriental research and 
moral philosophy. Some fell among the British : 



338 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



others addressed to Mahomedans, urging them 
to revolt, were written in Hindi, a character 
uliicli few of them understand. They were 
told that the Sheikh-ul -Islam had on the occa- 
sion of the Am Id (a festival which does not 
exist ) at .Mecca (where he has not been and does 
not live) declared a Holy War on the Allies and 
that he had been joined by the Afghans. 

The Indians replied by aeroplane in a proper 
spirit of defiance. 

Another hail of sheets marked the descent 
from heaven of the Ghadar, an inflammatory 
journal published By an Indian revolutionary 
society in San Francisco. The authors of this 
poisonous leaflet had long been trying to sow 
the seeds of sedition in the army in the Punjab. 
Its arrival in Flanders was sufficient proof of 
Germany's intrigue with the disaffected Indian 
community in America, and lent support to 
the charge that the Kaiser's political mis- 
sionaries were at the bottom of the Komagata 
Maru incident. " Ghadar " in Urdu means 
" Rebellion." The copies that were rained upon 
our troops urged them to kill their British 
officers and raise the standard of revolt in 
Hindustan. The incitement was more subtle 
and insidious than the appeals sounded in our 



enemy's ordinary vehicles for the dissemination 
of " correct news," since it proceeded from men 
who understand the nature of the soil in whicli 
the\ are sowing. 

One morning from a trench facing the Indians 
they hoisted up a huge placard on a pole witli 
an inscription in large letters : 

HOLY WAR. 

INDIANS FIGHT ON OUR SIDE. 
WOE TO THE BRITISH. 

It at once became a target. The clumsy 
banner was an expression of the Teuton's 
political philosophy, concrete enough for the 
Indians to understand. The shots that riddled 
it symbolized their contempt. 

If the German sedition-mongers could hn\e 
seen the reception of Lord Roberts on Novem- 
ber 12 by the Indians, or afterwards of the 
King, they might well have been disheartened. 
The visit of the veteran Field-Marshal to the 
Indian sepoys was one of the most dra- 
matic incidents of the war. He arrived in 
Boulogne on November 11, and inspected the 
Indian Hospital Ship. The effect of his pre- 
sence in the wards is graphically described in a 
letter received by the wife of one of the medical 




INDIAN CAVALRY IN FRANCE. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



839 




THE LATE LORD ROBERTS AND INDIAN OFFICERS. 



officers, and published in The Times of 
Xovember 17 : 

Lord Roberts came yesterday to inspect the ship and 
see the wounded. It was wonderful to see them directly 
he was recognized they were all trying to get up and 
salute him. He was very kind to them all and heard all 
about their wounds, patting their heads and saying, 
" Poor chap, poor chap ! " 

When he left the ward there was a general murmur 
from them all, blessing him. I have never *een such an 
affecting sight. The tears ran down the old man's face, 
but he turned round on me very sharp and said, " Your 
hospital is as near perfection as any I have seen. I 
congratulate you, sir." He then saw two native officers, 
both of whom knew him, wrote his name in my book, 
shook hands, and went. 

He is simply worshipped by those men. Other 
generals have been round often, but there is never a 
Bound. Yesterday was like a whole church full of men 
praying. Such is my first official experience of " Bobs," 
and it brings the water to my eyes. . . . His face i old 
but his back is as straight as a line, and his signature the 
largo firm writing of a young man. 

The next morning Lord Roberts arrived at 
the headquarters of the Corps, where he was 
welcomed by the General and inspected a 
guard of honour of mixed British and Indian 
troops which was drawn up to receive him. A 



thousand feet above a British aeroplane aimost 
stationary, battling against a fifty-mile wind, 
kept guard over the greatest soldier of our 
Empire, and the continuous roll of guns came 
from the long line of battle but a few miles 
away. The Field-Marshal then visited the 
headquarters of the divisions and of the cavalry 
behind our lines, pausing here and there and 
speaking to men from every unit, British and 
Indian. They came straight up from the 
trenches to see him, looking hard, keen and 
soldierly. It was an inspiring moment for the 
Colonel-in-Chief as well as for the men. If any 
spirit had been dulled by the hardships of the 
trenches and the rude weather he must have 
gone back newly inspired. To the Indians he 
spoke in Hindustani with an encouraging 
sympathy that will never be forgotten. No 
other Englishman has attained to anything 
near the place which Lord Roberts has won 
in the heart of the Indian soldier unless it bo 
John Nicholson '' Nikolsain Sahib," who has 
his niche in the Hindu Pantheon. 



340 



THIS TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.I I,'. 




LONDON SCOTTISH AND INDIAN SOLDIERS IN CAMP. 



It was during this inspection that Lord 
Roberts greeted for the last time his old friend 
Sir Pertab Singh, whose guest he had been in 
the East. No doubt the two veterans spoke of 
old days when they pursued " the image of 
war " together, pigsticking in Rajputana 
perhaps of that identical boar which Sir 
Pertab held with his bare hands until Lord 
Roberts rode up and dispatched it. 

On Friday the tour of inspection was con- 
tinued, but Lord Roberts had overtaxed his 
strength. His devotion to the Indian Army 
cost him his life. 

On Sunday morning the wounded Indian 
soldiers awaited him at the hospital of the 
College of Jesuits, at Boulogne. Word had 
gone round that the " Lat Sahib " had crossed 
" the black water " to see them. It was the 
most moving incident that could befall these 
loyal and patient men who had left their country 
to play their part in the great Sahib's war an 
honour greater even than the hour of victory, 
which is common to many. For though Lord 
Koberts "its not known personally to the 
younger generation of sepoys, he had become a 
name familiar in the remotest villages. 

The day was gloomy black clouds and 
drifting rain, \>. did not seem that a ray of 
sunshine could enter the long, dark wards. 
And yet some brightness was due to the fine 



men who had left their clear, warm, Indian 
sky, and with it so many of those simple ties 
and observances which, with the shock of 
battle, make up the only happiness thej 
know. 

The dark, bandaged figures squatted on their 
beds, some with their arms in slings, others 
with their heads wrapped in lint. The most 
w:-ary of them lay motionless, rolled up from 
head to foot in their red blankets, which entin 1\ 
covered then- faces. Soon it became known that 
the Lat Sahib would not come ; he had caught 
a chill. The depression deepened. Then that 
he was seriously ill. The weather was too rough 
for so old a soldier. Then it was whispered that 
the great leader was dead. He had died in his 
effort to come to them. 

Exposure to the severe weather had brought 
on a chill. Congestion of one lung and pleurisy 
set in very quickly. This proved too great a 
strain on the heart and he gradually grew 
weaker, relapsed into unconsciousness and 
succumbed at 8 p.m. on the night of the 14th. 
He died as he himself would have chosen, in 
the midst of his old army, within sound of the 
guns. 

It was a thrilling message to India that the 
la-t earthly engagement of her old Commandec- 
in-Chief was to have spent an hour comforting 
the soldiers whom he loved. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



341 



Lord Roberts knew well the devotion he had 
inspired in the Indian Army. " I must go and 
see the Indian soldiers," he said t9 a friend a 
few days before starting. "It is the most 
useful thing I can do." To realize how useful, 
one must understand the Indian, his capacity 
for hero-worship, his quick recognition of an 
ideal, his responsiveness to sympathy, his 
fidelity to a cause. An Indian officer in 
C'ureton's Multanis expressed the general 
feeling of the troops when he said : 

"He was truly not only the Colonel -in-Ohief 
of our Army ; he was our father. He was a 
pattern of the British officer under whom we 
gladly serve brave, wise, and above all full 
of sympathy. It is sad what parting with one 
like him is not ? but, thank God, we saw 
him here at the last, and I, if I live, will be able 
to tell my cluldren in the Punjab that he shook 
hands with me and spoke to me in my own 
language." " And Sahib," he added, " what 
death could have been more to the choosing of 
a man like our Colonel-in-Chief than to die amid 
us the Army that he loved so well ? " 

That is just the epitaph the Happy Warrior 
would have chosen. 

For the next week cold weather worked more 



havoc than the enemy. On November 12 
severe weather set in, rain and hail and a bitterly 
cold wind, and on the 18th severe frost ; on 
the 20th there was a heavy snowfall. The 
Indians suffered considerably. There were a 
great many cases of frostbite. It was not 
that the cold was intense ; in Afghanistan and 
Tibet our Indian troops had endured much 
harder weather. In January, 1904, when they 
were encamped on the Tuna plain under 
Chumalari, the thermometer fell to 25 degrees 
below zero. The beards of the Sikhs were 
frozen ; their tent ropes stiff as iron ; digging 
trenches would have been impossible. Yet 
there were not more than two or three cases 
of frostbite during the whole expedition. In 
France there were sometimes