[[ Mirrored from archive.org, with more info at http://www.314th.org/times-history-of-the-war/times-history-of-the-war.html ]] The Times HISTORY OF THE WAR Vol. III PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE. PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES" PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON. 1915 CONTENTS OF VOL. III. CHAPTER XLVIII. The Advance on Ypres PAGE CHAPTER XLVII. Fbom the Fall of Antwerp to the Battle op the Yser 1 15 CHAPTER XLIX. The Intervention of Turkey... ... ... ... 41 CHAPTER L. The Turkish Army ... ... ... 55 CHAPTER LI. The Outbreak of War and the Campaign in the Caucasus ... ... ... C7 CHAPTER Lll. The Invasion of Chaldea ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... SI CHAPTER LJII. The Second Three ^Ionths of Naval War ... ... ... ... ... 121 CHAPTER Ll\'. The German Counter-Offensive and the Belgian Battle of the Yser ... 161 CHAPTER L\'. Russia's Problem... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 201 CHAPTER L\'I. The First Invasion of East Prussia ... ... ... ... ... ... 223 CHAPTER LVII. The Russian Conquest of IUlria ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 241 CHAPTER lATII. The Problem of Egypt: A New Regime ... ... ... ... ... ... 281 CHAPTER LIX. The German Failure in Poland ... ... ... ... ... •■• ... 321 CHAPTER 1^. Second and Third Austrian Invasions of Serbia : Fall and Pecapture of Belgrade ... ... ... ••• •■• ••• ■•• ••• ••• ••• -^^'l CHAPTER LXI.^ The Autumn and Winter Campaign in Eastern Fr.\nce 401 CHAPTER J.Xll. The Battle of Ypres (First I'hase) -l-'l CHAPTER J.XIll. The Franco-Belgian Battle of the Yser -^^'^ CHAPTER LXIV. The South African Rebellion '^^ CHAPTER XLVII. FROM THE FALL OF ANTWERP TO THE BATTLE OF THE YSER. The SiTiTATiON October 9 — The Retreat of the Belgians from Antwerp — The Advance of THE English — The Belgian Retreat to Ostend and the French Frontier — German Occupation of Ghent, Bruges, Ostend— The Flight to England and France — German Mistakes — Their Possible Explanation — Want of Accurate Information — Failure oh THE German Cavalry — Their Aeroplane Service — The German Gains. BY October 9, the date of tlie fall of Antwerp and the day before the bombardment of Lille, the anny of General de Castelnau, with General Brugere's Territorial Divisions, stretched across the Plain of the Somme from the region of Compiegne to the heights north of that river. Castelnau's left wing rested on the Ancre west of Bapaume. Upon the hills northward between the Ancre and the Plain of the Scheldt, as far as the region of Bethune, were disposed the troops forming the army of General de Maud'huy, a detachment of wliich in the centre held Arras at the edge of the plain. Since October 6 that city had been bombarded by the enemy. Facing Maud'hiiy's Army (the 10th) extended a lino of Germans forming a continu- ous crescent from the region of Bapaume to La Bassee. The left wing of this body held high groimd between the Plains of the Somme and the Scheldt. The centre was in the Plain of the Scheldt west of Douai ; the right wing passed east of Lens through Loison to La Bassee on the Canal St. Omer-Aire-La Bassee-Lille. This canal enters the canalised river Aa a little to the south of St. Omer. At Wat ten, five miles Vol. ill.— Part 27. to the north of St. Omer, it meets a canal which runs eastward — througli Furnes — to Nieuport and thence into the Canal de Ghent between Ostend and Bruges. From Watten the Aa flows past Gravelines to the North Sea. It meets the Canal de Calais going west, and next, from the east, another canal, which enters the sea at Dunkirk, The Canal de Calais, the canalised Aa. and the portion of the Canal St. Oraer-Airc-Betluino- La Bassee-Lille which lies between St. Omer and Bethune skirt the liilly district extending from the south of Calais to the south of Arras. Together these waterways formed a deep ditch in front of the low ramjiart of hills which from Calais to Peronno barred the advance of the Germans to the English Channel. The army of General d'Urbal, to whose support the Cavalry Corps, the TIL and the II. Corps of the British Expeditionary Force* were being rai)idly transported, held both banks of the ditch and also the line of the canal which from Wattcii runs south of Dunkirk through Furnes and * To fncilitato refeionce tlio British Army Corps are iiuinberod tlius : I., II.. HI-, IV., &e. ; tlio divisions niid brigades 1st, 2nd, 3rd, iXi-. THE TIMES HlhTORY 01 THE WAR. MAJ.-GEN. THE HON. JULIAN BYNG. Nieuport to the Canal de Ghent. But d'Urbal's Army, on October 9, was only in process of formation. Further to the east was Lieut. -General Sir Henry Rawlinson \\ith the 7th Infantry Divi- sion and 3rd Cavalry Division. They had disembarked between October 6 and 8 at Ostend and Zeebrugge. On the 10th the 3rd Cavalry Division under Major-General the Hon. JuUan Byng was south of Bruges, round Thourout and Ruddervoorde. The task of Sir Henry Rawlin- son was to prevent the Germans, who had crossed the Lys west of Ghent, seizing Bruges and Ostend and cutting the retreat of the Belgian Ai'my and its British auxiliaries retiring from Antwerp on Bruges, Ostend and Nieuport. One by one the national defences of Belgium against an invasion from the east had fallen into the possession of the Germans. First had been lost the Meuse and the Ardennes, then the Dyle and the Senne, next the Dendre and the Scheldt, and now the Lys. In the oblong plain, roughly 60 miles by 30 miles, wliich is bounded by the Lys from Aire to Ghent, by the canal from Ghent to Zeebrugge, by the sea from Zeebrugge to Calais, and by the canal and the canalised Aa from Calais to Aire, the Germans had occupied Ypres, the long, narrow ridge of hills to the south-west of it, and Baillevil. Their outposts were close to Hazebrouck and Cassel, and they were advancing up both banks of the Lys from Armentieres towards Aire ; they held the bridges and fords of the river between Courtrai and .Merviile and even fiu"thor west. South of the Lys and between it and the Scheldt the Germans were surrounding and about to bombard Lille, sternly defended by French Territorials. This and the next chapter deal chiefly with the important movements between October 9 and 20. During this period the Germans pur- sued the Belgian Army through Ghent, Bruges and Ostend to the Une of the Yser from Nieuport to Dixmude, and they succeeded in capturing Lille. But, at the same time. General d'Urbal's Army (the 8th), wliich was daily growing in mmibers, and the British Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps, with the assistance of the I\'. Corps — i.e., the forces vmder Sir Henry Rawlin- son — drove the Germans east of Y^pres. The oblong Aire-Ghent-Zeebrugge-Calais is divided into two more or less equal sections by the canal from Comines on the Lys to Ypres, by the canal from Ypres to the Yser, and by the canalised Y'ser through Dixmude to its mouth at Nieuport Bains. The Germans were ex- pelled from the western section of this oblong and from a part of the eastern section. South of the oblong, in the " Black Coimtry " of France, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, with the II. Corps, and General Conneau's Cavalry Corps pushed the Germans some distance back towards Lille between the Lys and the Aire- Bethiine-La Bassee-Lille Canal, and the armies of Maud'huy and Castelnau continued their struggle with the Germans from Bethune to Compiegne. Meanwhile Hindenburg in the Easterii Theatre of War, after his defeat on the Niemen at the battle of Augustovo (September 25 to Octo- ber 3), had advanced on Warsaw, and in South Africa, on Octol:)er 13, Maritz raised the stan- dard of revolt. Of the above events in the Western Theatre of War, the first to be described will be the retirement of the Belgian Army from Antwerp to Nieuport and the hue of the Yser. Antwerp, " the pistol aimed at the heart of England," as Napoleon had called it, was in the grasp of the mailed fist, but so long as the Kaiser respected the neutrality of Holland he could not load and fire the weapon he had filched. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. CO CD E o o O '^ «0 § I I 1 I I ^ .o cu GENERAL MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS FROM OCTOBER 9 TO OCTOBER 20. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LILLE. Nevertheless, the capture of Antwerp — held by tlie ignorant to bo iin]3regnable — was not without influence, especiallj- in Germany, where even the bombardment of an open sea- side town in England is regarded as a notable military operation. Antwerp had long been coveted by German captains of indvistry, like Herr Ballin : German capital had been largely invested there and, before the Great War, it w as fast assuming the appearance of a German port. Whether it was the fall of Antwerp that decided Beyers and Do Wet to f^tart their abortive rebellion in South Africa may be a moot point ; but it is certain that this success put fresh life into the German forces in Europe. It was an excellent augurj'^ for the impending marches on Warsaw and Calais. Also, it again enabled the German commanders on the Oise and Aisne to look forward to the resumption of the march on Paris. So long as Antwerp was in Belgian hands, the German commixnications back through Liege were perpetually menaced. For the two towns were only sixty miles apart — i.e., roughly fom- days' march — so that if the Allied force at the former place was materially strengthened it would need no great effort to thrust Beseler back on Liege or be\'ond. Then not only would the whole of the German communications through Liege have been cut, Init tliose south of Liege through the Ardeniies would have been rendered precarious. While Ostend and Zeebrugge were Belgian ports, and the line of the canal from Ostend through Bruges to Ghent and the line of the Scheldt from Ghent to Antwerp were held l>y the Allies, the Belgian Army in Antwerp miglit be rapidly reinforced either from Great Britai-a or from France by the railways and roads along the French coast to Dunkirk. From Dimkirlc a single-line railroad ran through Furnes and Dixmude to Thom*out : through Thourout passed the double-line railroad* from Courtrai to Ostend and the single-line railway from Ypres to Bruges, Steam tramwaj^s joined Furnes and Dixmude to Ostend, and, until the Germans occupied Hazebrouck and Ypres, troops could be transported from St. Omer, wdthout going north to Dunkirk, through Ypres and Thourout to Bruges. There were also, of course, plenty of highways on \^'hich men and material could be carried by auto- omnibvis, that new and useful military vehicle, from France to Ostend or Bruges. The German Staff had, therefore, to face the possibility, or rather probability, of the areas between the Dutch frontier and the Canal de Ghent and the Scheldt, between * The line between Courtrai and Thourout was single THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. the Lys and the North Sea, being suddenly filled with armies from England or France. From Antwerp those armies could be directed on Liege, Brussels, Namur. Lastly, as a springing- off point for air-raids on Aix-la- Chapelle, Cologne, Diisseldorf, Essen and the cities of Westphalia the country round Antwerp woxild be invaluable to the Allies. By the capture of Antwerp and by holding Brussels and Liege the Germans opposed a strong bai'rier across the road to the Rhine. But, though the Germans had taken Antwerp, crossed the Scheldt between Ghent and Ant- werp, and forced a portion of the Belgian and British troops on to Dutch soil, the remainder of the Allied forces had reached the line Ghent-Selzaete in good order. There was a chance that the German forces which had occupied Ypres on October 3 and had spread out towards Hazebrouck might move froixi Ypres to Bruges and Ostend and cut off the retreating Belgians and British at those points. To provide for this contingency. Lord Kitchener, as mentioned, had dispatched Sir Henry Rawlin- son with the 7th Infantry Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division to Ostend and Bruges. Between Ypres and the canal connecting Ostend with Bruges was no serious natural obstacle to delay the German movements, and oops alone could stop a German advance in force. On the 9th — the day after Sir John French's interview with General Foch at DouUens — the Cavalry Division, under Mcxjor- General the Hon. Julian Byng, concentrated at Bruges, where it was joined by a detaclunent of armoured motor-cars. The next day, the 10th, it moved towards Ypres, the 6th Cavalry Brigade to Thourout, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade to Ruddervoorde. The day after. t!.o armoured motor-cars " di-ew first blood," capturing two officers and five men in tlic direction of Ypres. On the 12th the Division held a line stretching through Roulers from Oostnieuwkerke on the west to Iseghem on the east. From Roulers a canal runs to the Lys. During the next day the Cavalry reconnoitred towards Ypres and Menin, wliilo the 7th Infantry Division reached Roulers. At 9 a.m. on the l-lth Byng's Cavalry entered Ypres, which had already been occupied by Franco- British troops on the 13th ; Byng was followed by the Infantry of the 7th Division. Three days before (October 11), as will bo related elsewhere, the II. Corps (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's)had coiuinenced its luoi'chsouth of the Lys from the Aire-Bethune Canal to turn the position of the Germans at La Bassee. The French Cavalry Corps of General Cormeau was to his left ; on Conneau's left — round Haze- brouck — was the III. Corps (General Pulteneys), and beyond them, to the north, the Cavalry Corps (General Allenby's). The Cavah-y Corjjs had captured the western end of the ridge to the south-west of Ypres. On Ypres itself the 87th and 89th French Territorial Divisions, coirunanded by General Bidon, had been directed by General d'Urbal.* Thus any German intention of marching from Ypres on Bruges had been frustrated by the advance of Rawlinson from Bruges on Ypres, combined as it was with the movement eastward of d'Urbal's and Sir John French's Armies from the line Dunkirk-Bethune. In the next chapter that movement \\ ill be narrated in detail. In the meantime the Belgian and British troops who evacuated Antwerp had halted round Ghent. They were threatened by the German forces at Lokeren, north of the Scheldt, and at * " When I arrived in the Nord I found in all two divisions of Territorials and some Cavalry." — General d'Urbal. THE BELGIAN WAR OlFIGK. Villa Louis XIV. at St. Adnsse, near Ilnvre. 27—2 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL Alost, on the Dendre.which flows into the Scheldt east of Ghent from the south. A Taube had flown over Ghent and dropped — for a wonder — not a bomb but a proclamation. On the morning of the 9th Uhlans were repulsed by some Belgian cyclists at Quatrecht, but, later in the day, German field artillery opened on what remained of the village of Melle, which three weeks before had been visited by the Kaiser's professional mcendiaries. Quatrecht and Melle were south of the Scheldt and east of the Lys. Bj' 5 p.m. the Belgian artillery was over- powered and withdrawn, and a column of German infantry pushed forward. Passing under a long railway bridge they were mown down by some Belgians in ambush. Nor was that the end of the Belgian successes. Batteries of quick-firing guns had been quietly brought up into positions from wliich they could enfilade the German guns. Suddenly they opened fire and the hostile batteries were put out of action. More guns were moved forward by the enemy, and at midnight the Germans renewed the battle. Fmally, in the early hours of the morning of October 10 the Belgians marched tlu'ough Melle, fired on the Landsturm troops entrenched in the fields to the east of the village, and charged them with the bayonet. The Germans fled, losing heavily in dead, wounded and prisoners. The next day (Sunday) the people of Ghent s[)ent in peace and at liberty. The streets were filled with refugees. As Ghent and Bruges were to Belgium what Verona and Venice were to Italy, it had been decided to give the demolishers of Louvain and Mahnes and the bombarders of Antwerp, Reims, Arras, Lille no excuse for the exercise of theu* pecuUar talents for destruction. Ghent and Bruges were to be left open cities ; the town m which ]\Iaeterlinck had been born was to be surrendered on the morrow to the followers of the Kaiser. On Monday, October 12, three German officers m a motor-car drove up to the Hotel de Ville, and arranged with the Burgomaster for the " peaceful occupation." After the motor-car came some cyclist soldiers, next troops of cavalry. An hour later the German flag was hoisted over the Hotel de Ville. From Ghent one body of Germans proceeded to Bruges. Half way between the two cities — at Ursel, to the north of the Canal de Ghent — there was a brief engagement. Another force marched by Thielt towards Thourout and Roulers. At 2 p.m. on October 14, forty cyclist soldiers rode into Bruges, and some of them tore down the British and French flags from the Hotel de Ville. Out of derision they left the Belgian flag flying. The "All-highest" had A BELGIAN FIRING LINE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. FRENCH CITIZENS TAKEN PRISONERS BY THE BAVARIANS. not proclaimed himself King of Belgium ! The day before, at 8.30 a.m., the Belgian Govern- ment, the personnel and families of the Ministers, had sailed for Havre ; the King and the Minister of War remained behind. To receive the exiled Goverimient the French Minister of Marine had left Bordeaux for Havre. The official announcement was made in the following terms : The Belgian Government, finding no longer in Belgium the necessary freedom for the full exercise of its authority, asked for the hospitality of France, and indicated a wish to transfer its residence to Havre. The Government of the Republic replied at once that, even as it made no distinction in its solicitude for the Belgian and French Armies, so it would heartily receive the Belgian Govern- ment and would assure it full sovereign rights and the complete exercise of its authority and governmental duties. It had been arranged that the Belgian Govermnent should have the same rights at Havre as were accorded by Italy to the Pope under the Law of Guarantees. The King of the Belgians thanked M. Poincar6 : " We await," he telegraphed, " the hour of mutual victory with unshakable confidence. Fighting side by side for a just goal, our courage will never fail." The Belgian Prime Minister, M. de Broque- ville, at the same time assured M. Viviani that Belgium, who sacrificed everything for the defence of honesty, honour, and liberty, regretted nothing. Bruges seized, the Germans rushed on the sea- side resorts of Belgium from Ostend, the Monte Carlo of the North Sea, to the picturesque httle village of Knocke, with its golf greens. Ostend and Zeebrugge (connected with Bruges by a ship caiial) were the termini of the Belgians escaping to England ; those flying to France were pouring either along the coast from Ostend through Nieuport and Fumes to Dunkirk, or by the more inland roads. Never before this war had such sights been seen. Ever since 1870-1 the French, who had then learnt the real nature of those Prussians idolLsed by Carlyle and his school, had been expecting the Prussians to commit atrocities. But living Belgians as yet had had no experience of Prussian Kullur in war-time. Remembering this fact, picture the scene at Ostend. Of those unable to bear arms, some with stoical resignation were awaiting an in- vader who at any moment might behave as he had behaved at Louvain, Malines, or Termondo. The remainder, abandoning businesses whicli they had built up, Icavijig the posts which asstu-ed their livelihoods, snatched up a few clothes and portable objects of \altu>. escaped with their womenfolk and childnn 8 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. A SUSPECTED SPY STOPPED BY GERMANS OUTSIDE BRUSSELS. from the houses which had sheltered them, leaving their furniture, objects of art, trinkets, books, letters, pictures, portraits, photographs, which meant so much to them, to be stolen, destroyed, or defiled by the German house- breakers. The rich, who had no money invested out of reach of the Germans and their Allies were, unless they had had the prescience to convert their wealth into gold and silver or jewels, reduced to the level of the poor. On the quays at Ostend, and in the Square fronting the Gare Maritune, were collected old men, women, children, infants in arms, town- folk, farmers, peasants, waiting under the drizzling rain to be shipped in the chilly month of October to an island of whose inhabitants but few spoke French, and hardly any Flemish. They embarked on trawlers, fishing smacks, even row boats, as well as on steamers. Between dawn and 9 a.m. of October 13 a vast crowd awaited the mail boats. The arrival of the ships Avas the signal for a frantic rush to board them. Hundreds jmnped from the landing stages on to the decks. Cliildren were separated from their inotliers ; wi\-es from their husbands ; the old were trampled on. It was like the stampede which takes place in a theatre on the cry of " fire." Overhead flew a German biplane, whose occupants coolly inspected the horrible scene below. After gratifying their curiosity they departed to observe what was happening at Zeebrugge. When the last boat put off (October 14), the scene was indescribable. Nearly 4,000 parsons, mostly women and children, were gathered in and round the boat station. Many of them had tasted neither food nor drink for twentj^- foor hoLU-s. As the boat pushed off there was a wild rush, and several persons were flung forward into the water between the pier and the ship's side and were drowned. A Times correspondent witnessed the heart- breaking spectacle on October 14 : Ostend had a great alarm this morning, and the panic at the time I write is much worse than yesterday. This morning two mail boats had cleared loaded to the gunwales with a varied human freight, when certai i persons among the crowds on the quays forced thoir way through the struggling mass shouting out that all the remaining vessels in the port had been requisitioned to carry oS the wounded soldiers, hundreds of whom had been hurried in from Knocke, Blankenberghe. Coq, and other coast villages between Ostend and the Dutch border, and so save them from falling into the clutchss THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. of the Germans. The alarmists — they were both men and women — added that the enemy had already occupied Bruges, and was marching on Ostend in force. Women fainted, children shrieked, and men ran hither and thither as if possessed. Only when three more steamers drew alongside and the people were permitted to board them without any such formalities as ticket examina- tion and production of passports did the terror abate. To make matters worse, the familiar Taube made its morninc; call, and dropped a bomb. This fell in the Rue Peter Bsnoit, close to a group of refut^ees, who scattered in all directions. LuckUy no one was injured. To-day practically nobody remains in the hotels, and the shopkeepers are putting up their shutters. Hun- dreds of woimded — those on the way to recovery — have crossed to England to-day, but a large number remain with few Red Cross people to care for them, and to add to their misery and that of the town in general food has become very scarce. One of the War Correspondents left for England in a paddle-wheel steam-tug. Nomially it took 50 ; that night it had to accommodate 200 or 300 persons. At 9 p.m. the passengers went on board. There was neither light nor food nor shelter ; rain swept in from the sea ; a heavy mist penetrated everywhere. Not till 7 a.m. was a start made. Then the pilot remembered that he had left behind him his wife and children. The tug returned and was made fast to a large mud barge. At last, with the pilot's wife and her belongings, which included a pet dog and a canary, they put out again, and it was then discovered that the compass was out of order. Fortunately the sea was calm, and by following another vessel the tug reached Folkestone in safety. But all could not obtain passages for England. AVlien day broke (October 15) men and women sat shivering on the Digue, some reading the fol- lowing proclamation : Fellow citizens, countrymen ! For two months ai.d a half, at an heroic price, the Belgian soldiers have defended inch by inch their homeland. The enemy counted on the annihilation of our Army, but a retreat cariied out in admirable order has, at the same time, wrecked his hopes and assured to us the conservation of our military forces, who will continue to fight to the bitter end for the highest and most just of causes. From now onwards our Army in conjunction with the Allies will operate on the southern frontier. Thanks to this valorous cooperation the triumph of right is certain. To the sacrifices already made and accepted by the Belgian nation is added another. So as better to bring to nauglit the designs of the invader the Belgian Govern- ment has provisionally established itself in a place where on the one hand it may rest in contact with the Army, and on the other, with the help of France and England, it may better exercise and continue the national sovereignty. That is why it has left Ostend, carrying with it the memory of the warm reception that town extended to it. The Belgian Government goes to Havre, where the noble friendship of the French Republic willpermitit at the same time the fullness of its sovereign rights and the complete exercise of its authority and its duty. This momentary tribulation to which our patriotism ought to yield will have, we are convinced, a prompt revenge. The public services in Belgium will continue in such measure as the local circumstances may permit. The King and the Government count on the wisdom of your patriotism. On your side count on the ardent devotion, on the valour of our Army, ami the help of the Allies to hasten the hour of the common deliverance. Our dear country, so odiously treated by one of the Powers which had sworn to guarantee our neutrality, has excited an astonished admiration throughout the entire world. Thanks to the unanimity, the courage, and the clear-sightedness of all our children, she will remain worthy of that admiration which comforts her to-day. To-morrow she will emerge from her tribula- tion greater and more beautiful, having suffered for the justice and for the honour of civilization itself. Long live Belgium. Free and Independent. A Belgian galloped up shouting : " The Ger- mans are coming. The Germans are coming."' A lieutenant and six Uhlans trotted into the central square ; behind them was a detachment of twenty cyclists. Half-an-hoiu- later General von der Goltz, the ex-trainer of the Turkish Army, author of " The Nation in Arms," and Governor of Belgium, motored in, and soon after left with the Burgomaster for Bruges. The day afterwards Ostend was filled with German officers and soldiers. The 3rd German Reserve Corps was quartered in or around it, and forty officers of the Staff were feasting at the Hotel Royal du Phare. Magnums of looted champagne and quarts of stolen Burgundy " lined the centre of the two long tables." GENERAL MAUD'IIUY (right) Talking to a French officer. 10 THF TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BRITISH TROOPS AT OSTEND. Simultaneously with the exodus to England by boat, there had been an exodus on foot or on wheels to France. Vehicles of all sorts, crowded with hmnan beings or piled high with their belongings, had been rolling along the muddy, cobbled roads to the French frontier. An endless stream of men, women, and childi-en, sopked to the skin by the incessant rain, some with their clothes reduced to rags, sleeping for the most part in the fields, unfed, unwashed, their feet lacerated by their unwonted exertions, straggled slowly across the border. How many died, how many were crippled for life, how many lost their reason will probably never be known. Behind, or among the fugitives, marched or rode what remained of the heroic Belgian Army. As early as October 12 the vanguard passed through Fiu-nes. A Times correspondent on that day saw it defiling through the streets of the little town. I have just returned from Fumes, the first town across the Belgian frontier on the road to Ostend. There I met the head of the army. They began to arrive yesterday between 5 and 6 in trains, in trams, and by road, and completely upset the Sunday evening calm of the little town. The people were just trickling out of church, and the priest and his surpliced choir boys were slowly walking in procession across the square when the first transport motor-cars arrived. Then came a Red Cross detachment, a mixed bodj' of soldiers, civilians, and priests, who had come by tram from Ostend ; they were followed by the troops themselves, and an hour later the little square with its high crow-stepped gables was crammed with parked autonmobiles, and a steady stream of infantry, wagons, and guns was moving by in the lamplight. Most of the troops had marched out of Antwerp three days ago. The town wa^ becoming untenable and a field army could do nothing. " We have done our best," the soldiers kept saying. There was little sign of demoraliza- tion among them. The infantry in particular seemed glad to be out of Antwerp, where they were at the mercy of the Germans' big guns, and to have a chance of meeting them again in the open. Fighting is all very well, but sitting in a trench without firing a shot, while 100 lb. shells come shrieking over six or seven miles of country to kill and bury you at the same time, is a depressing occupation. Such, at least, was what the infantry felt, and they were glad to have done with it. All the coast district from here to Ostend is crowded with refugees who have fled from Antwerj) to Ghent, from Ghent to Ostend, and are now making their way into France. The French Consulate at Furnes was besieged by hvmdreds of people waiting to get their passports vi/id. As the railway is now entirely reserved for military purposes, the roads are black with travellers in every sort of vehicle. Many of them have no fixed idea of where they are going, and move on from place to place wherever they can find beds. Several thousand are stranded at Panne, a little village on the dunes near Furnes. for the sole reason that it is the terminus of a THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 11 local tramway, and once thcro they can get no further without going back the way they came. Others are going to Calais in order to take the boat to England. Again and again I have been anxiously questioned by poor people about the price of living in England, and as to where it would be best to go. I have es.sured them that everything would be done to help them in England, and that those who had not frienda there already to go to would speedily find them. A portion of the Belgian Army halted on the Yser and faced the hated foe ; the rest retired into France. " You can imagine," wrote a Belgian officer to a friend, " with what grief I crossed the frontier, followed by my squadrons, and left our native soU. I do not even hide from you the fact that I rode ahead of my Staff so that they might not witness my emotion. But let us hope," he added, " that God may give us the happiness to recross it, driving before us these slave-merchants of the twentieth century." Though the uniforms of the Belgian soldiers were caked with mud or soddened with rain, and their boots and gaiters were adliering to their swollen feet, though the plight of Belgian civilians was a miserable one, all alike, from their King downwards to the boy of eleven who was observed riding on a tall horse and smiling to the passers-by, were resolved to assist the French and British now hurrying up to avenge the outrages committed by the " slave- merchants " from beyond the Rhine. But for a time nine-tenths of Belgium was left to the mercy of her enemies. Here one criticism may be safely ventured on the German strategy. Before Sir Henry Ra\\ lin- son's force landed at Ostend and Zeebrugge there appears to have been nothing but the two French Territorial Divisions and some cavalry roimd Dunkirk to prevent a Gennan Army crossing the Lys between Ghent and Courtrai and advancing tlirough Roulers and Thourout on Bruges and Ostend. Even after the British IV. Corps (minus the 8th Division which was not yet mobilised) had issued from Bruges, the German leaders, considering the railway and road facilities and the motor traction at their disposal, ought to have been able to concentrate between the Lys and the Belgian coast overwhelming forces. Had they done so and the movement been properly timed, they might have occupied Ostend and Bruges before, or inmaediately after, the fall of Antwerp. In that case it is difficult to see how the Belgian Army and its British auxiliaries could have escaped destruction or capture. To have permitted the mass of the Army defending Antwerp to retire to the line Ghent- Selzaete may have been pardonable. Until Antwerp was actually taken the garrison could not be pursued through the city, and to cut A BELGIAN ARMOURED TRAIN. 12 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. thoir retreat by crossing the Scheldt between Antwerp and Ghent in face of desperate troops well supplied with artillerj^ was no light under- taking. But it was a different matter to traverse the undefended Lys and move over the easy country from that river to the environs of Bruges and Ostend. Two explanations for the strange behaviour of the German General or Generals may be hazarded. They undoubtedly overestimated the numbers of the French troops spread out from Dunkirk to Lens ; they may have imagined that Lord Kitchener would pour a much larger force than he actually did into Ostend and Zeebrugge. The overestimate of the French forces resulted from a variety of causes. One of the chief advantages with which the Germans had started the war had been that the countries invaded by them were swarnaing with the Kaiser's spies — often in the possession of wireless installations. By October, however, the nmnber of spies and traitors within the Allied lines could have been but small. The Belgian and French officers and officials had not played with espionage ; among German spies the mortality had been very high ; and shot or hanged spies could not quickly be replaced. From Belgians and Frenchmen no reliable information could be obtained by the Germa;ns. The latter's ferocity, greed, and insolence had united their neighbours against them to an extent wliich would never have been credited before the war. Cosmopolitan Socialists and Republicans had become the bitterest ojjpo- nents of the Germans. A rigid censorshijj of letters, postcards, and telegrams had, too, minimized the chances of useful information with regard to the Allied Forces reaching Berlin through Great Britain or neutral countries. The German leaders had now to rely for their knowledge of the Allied movements mainly on the reports of their cavalry, auto- mobolists, cyclists, and airmen. Unfortunately for them the German cavalry woiild seldom in equal nmnbers face the British or French, and the Allies, although badly provided with armoured motor-cars at the outset of the war, had in October a sufficiencj'^ of land cruisers to render the expeditions of German automobilists in advance of the main bodies very dangerous. * We have seen that the British IV. Corps was * See an interesting article, " La Guerre en Auto- mobiles," in the Lectures pour Tous of January 15, 1915. accompanied by several armoured cars, which rendered an excellent account of themselves. As for aeroplane reconnaissance : the French and British aviators were more than a matcli for the Germans, and the scouts on " Taubes," when reconnoitring, found it more and more difficult to survey at their leisure the country beneath them. Even when undisturbed by enemy air-craft or fire from below the aerial observer, however skilled, was liable to make bad mistakes. In August, when the days were long, the weather fine, and the air clear, watching from the skies had been comparatively easy. But the nights were lengthening, rain coming down, and mists and fogs covered the surface of the ground. The leaves had not j'et fallen, and were turning the colour of khaki, and so the woods afforded considerable cover. For all these reasons the German Staff could not see clearly the forces opposed to them on the huge chessboard. Taken prisoner in the fighting round Dixmude, which will be described in a subsequent chapter, a Prussian Major asked his captors the number of the forces opposed to the Germans at that point. " Forty thousand, I suppose ? " he queried. " Yes, yes," answered a French officer, indicating by his manner that he was not answering the question. "But tell me how many," pleaded the German. " Six thousand," was the suave reply. The other burst into tears. " Ah ! if we had known ! " he cried.* The strategy of Joffre and his Ueutenants also mj'^stified the Germans. " I have attacked the Germans to make them believe that I was in force," said General d'Urbal, referring to the fighting in the first fortnight of October. " T have multipUed the actions, I have harassed them day and night without giving them a moment's rest. Mean- while, my army was being formed ; each day reinforcements were reacliing me." The other explanation why the Germans pro- ceeded with so much caution and by the wrong route to Ostend and Bruges is that they could not read into Lord Kitchener's mind and know what forces he was sending to Ostend and Zee- brugge. Mr. Winston Churchill's presence at Antwerp must have suggested to them that the British set immense importance on the retention by the Allies of that city and a fortiori on the * Lectures pour Tous, January 15, 1915, p. 426. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. 13 A BRITISH HEAVY GUN. The markings are daubs of paint which help to render the gun invisible. holding of Ostend and Zeebrugge, from wliicii submarines and aircraft could operate in the Straits of Dover and the estuaries of the Thames and Medway. That the First Lord of the Admiralty should have rushed away from tlie most responsible duties to lead Marines iu Antwerp must, it may be surmised, have made the Staff officers round the Kaiser pause. Since 1807 the military policy of Prvissia had been always to run no excessive, no avoidable risks. The Prui-:sian Ai"my did not desert Xapoleon I. until they were aware that nearly the whole of the Grande .\rmee had jierishecl in Russia. Even then they waited for t)ie advancing legions of the Czar to arrive. The Prussians had attacked Denmark in 18(>4, but they had the Austrian Army supporting them ; they attacked Austria in 18(>6, after Bismarck had induced Italy to help thorn and Napoleon III. to remaiii neutral. In 1870 IJismarck had Moltke's and Roon's assurance that the German Armies were immeasurably supei'ior to the {""rcnch, and the Czar's promise that Russia would not permit Francis .losepli to assist Napoleon 111. In the light of subsequent events it may seem strange, but there can V)e no doubt that the Kaiser and his oilicers had entered on the Great War in the fiiiu belief that they would break up the French in the first three weeks of the struggle. To calculating schemers of the Prussian type unexpected moves were most distiu-binir. The regret felt by the Germans that a civilian was not British Minister of War must at this moment have been intepj5e. Unable to surmise their astute and experienced adversary's hand, unable to look over his or Jof^re's shoulder, they hesitated, played for safety, and the oppor- tunity of capturing or annihilating tlie Belgian army and the British IV. Corps was lost for ever. They had to content themselves with having obtained an unfortilied post, Ostend. 70 miles distant from Doxcr. which foruicd the first milestone on the road to London. But though the enemy's army had escapnl, the conquest of the Belgian coast line between Ostend andliie Dutch frontier, the ncqui.sitioi. of Ostend, of Zeebrugge, and th(> ship canal from Zeebrugge to Bruges, of the Canal div Ghent, of the Scheldt from (ihent to Antwerp, and of the railways from .Antwerp to the coast. were from th(> i'an-German jjoint of view i\<> mean achicxcmcnts. Tin- Kai-cr liad perfDrnu-d part of hi< coMtr.ict. 'I'iic Gi-rmans liad l>e<-u 14 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAE. ON THE GERMAN LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. content to leave their liberties in liis hands on the understanding that he would deprive the British of the command of the sea. From Eniden, Wilhelmshaven, Bremerhaven, Heligo- land, Cuxhaven, and the mouths of the Elbe and Kiel Canal to strike at the British Fleet, to raid the British naval bases, to invade the British coast, l\ad hitherto been proved to be imprac- ticable. Ostend and Zeebrugge once gained, all attempts of this kind might be feasible. The German " High Seas Fleet " being intact sub- marines could be transported to Zeebrugge, or built there ; boats and barges for the transport of troops to Kent or Essex might be accumulated in the watervvay.s between Aj\\- ^^'erp and the coast, as Napoleon had done a hundred and ten years before. Abo\-e all, a convenient base for aeroplanes. Zeppelins, and Par.sevals, which might bombard Portsmouth, Dover, Chatham, Harwich and London, had been annexed. CHAPTER XLVIII. THE ADVANCE ON YPRES The Plan of the Allied Advance — The French Cavalry Cross the i-,Ys— The Attack ON the German Line between Kstaires and La Bassee — The Field of Battle — The Batti.I'; OF La Bassee — The Fall of Lille — The Movement osi Ypres — Actions of Meteren and Mont-des-Cats — Occupation of Ypres, Bailletjl. and Armentieres — Attempt to Cross the Lys near Menin — End of the Allied Offensive. WHILE the Belgian Army was with- drawing to the banks of the Yser and the British IV. Corps (Sir Henry Rawhnson's) was protect- ing the flank of the retiring divisions by occu- pying the country between Bruges and Ypres, the third attempt of General Joi^re to turn the right wing of the main German army was in progress. Lille, the importance of which to the French was explained in Chapter XLVL, p. 479, had been bombarded on October 10. As detachments of Germans had passed west- ward between this town and the Lys and were to the north of the St. Omer-Aire-Bethune-La Bassee-I.iille Canal in the vicinity of Merville, and as the right wing of the army opposing Maud'huy extended to La Bassee, Ijille ran the risic of being completely isolated and its garrison of French Territorials captured. To obviate this disaster the offensive had pronijjtly to be resumed. It had been brought to a standstill after Maud'hiiy's unsuccessful advance through Arras. For a renewed offensive there were available on the 9th the skeleton army of General d'Urbal based on Dunkirk and the British 7th Infantry Division and IJrd Cavalry Division round Bruges. Ypres was in the hands of the Ger- mans and the latter were operating on both banks of the Upper Lys. The comparatively small Allied forces north of the Lys were, therefore, fully employed, and the only hope for Lille lay in the now rapidly- approaching II., III. and Cavalry Corps of the British Expeditionary Force coming from tlie Aisne. It will be remembered that on tlie 8tli General Foch had arranged at Doullens with Sir John French that Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien with the II. Corps should arrive on the line Aire- Bethune by the 11th. This corps was to prolong Maud'huy's Army to the north and, pivoting on the French position to the west of La Bassee, attack in flank the German troops stationed there. The Cavalry Corps under General Allenby, of which the 2nd Division (General Gough's) had marched from Com- piegne on October 3, was, with (Jeneial Conneau's Cavalry Corps, to protect Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's left flank from the attack of the Germans north and south of the l.,ys. When the III. Corps (GeJieral Pulteney's) \uni detrained at St. Omer, north of the Lys, wliich would not be till the 12th, Allenby — but not Conneau — was to move to rulteney's U-ft wing. General d'Urbal's 87th and 8!)t li 'l\ii i- torial Divisions under GenerrJ Bidon, to l)t' supported later by foiu* French Cavaln 1 )ivi.sn)ns 16 16 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. under General de Mitry, the British Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps were to sweep the Germans east of the line Dixmude-Ypres- Comines and effect a junction with the British IV. Corps (Sir Homy RawHnson's) and the Belgian Army. Into JJixmude wore to be thrown a ))ody of French ^Marines under Rear- Admiral Rornarc'h ; into Nieuport, at the mouth of the Yser. a division of French troops commanded by General Grossetti. Obviously, this ])lan for the employment of the British Expeditionary Force — 7ni)ius the I. Corps (Sir Douglas Haig's), which it was calculated \\ ould not reach St. Onier till about October 19 — contemplated, besides the saving of Lille, the probability that the Germans north of the Lys might make a rush for Calais and Dunkirk or endeavour to envelop and destroy the British IV. Corps and the Belgian Army retiring behind it. Otherwise the Corps of AUenby and Pulteney would have remained south of the Lys, and supported Smith-Dorrien in his advance on Lille. Foch's decision to leave Smith-Dorrien with Maud'huy to save, if they could, Lille, was a wise one. The misty weather had hampered aerial reconnaissance, and the numbers of the Germans north of the Lys could only be guessed. Weighed against the preservation of the Belgian Army, of RawHnson's Corps, the forces of d'Urbal, of Calais and Dunkirk, the safety of Lille and its garrison had to be subordinated to the major interests of France and the Allies. The stakes were too tremendous for senti- mental reasons connected with Lille to affect Joffre and Foch. Nearly the whole of Belgium had been overrun by the Germans and, accord- ing to M. Clemenceau, Count Bernstorff, the Cierman Ambassador at Washington, had de- clared that the only conditions of peace whieli the Kaiser would grant to France were : 1. The cession to Germany of all the territory north and east of a straight line drawn from the mouth of the Sonime to Lyons — in other words, the redviction of millions of French men and women to a worse position than that of the Alsatians before the war ; the loss of some of the most venerated places and monuments in France — e.fjr., the battlefields of Valmy and Montmirai!, the Cathedral of Reims and the cottage of Joan of Are ; the acquisition by the Germans of the rich coal coimtry round Lille, of the vineyards of Champagne and Bur- gundy, and the extension of the German frontier to the outskirts of Paris and Lyons. 2. The surrender to Gennany of Algiers, Timis, and all other French Colonies, and also the French Pro- tectorate of Morocco. S. The payment to Germany of a War Indemnitv of £400,000,000. 4. The transfer to Germany of ."J.OOO.OOO rifles, .3,000 guns, and 40.000 horses ; the dismantling of all French fortresses, and the suppression of recruiting in France for twenty-five years. 5. .A.n alliance with {jcrmany against Great Britain and Russia, and a cominereial treaty with Germany for twenty-five years. Under the commercial treaty, (Jennan merchandise was to enter France free of duty, and Kronch patent fees were not to be payable by (iermans. Wlu'ther M. CU-menceau were ill-inlormed or not as to Coimt B(?rnstorff's statements, there could be little doubt that if the Allies were defeated and France conquered, a treat\- on some such lines as the above would be imjjosed on the French. " France," had written General Bernhardi, " nuist be so completely crushed that she can never again cross our path.' On October 9, 2,000 French Dragoons from Aire were ordered by General Conneau to dis- lodge the German cavalry lining the south bank of the Lys from Mer\'ille to Estaires, The crossings at those places were covered by machine guns, and after sunset they were illuminated by searchlights. The French com- mander assembled his men on the north bank at a point west of Merville where the current was very swift and the water deep. The Ger- mans had regarded the river as unfordable at this point, but a trooper who was a good swimmer stripped and. pulling after him a light line, swam to the right bank. The line at the other end was tied to a heavy rope and when the diipping soldier stepped out of the water he hauled the rope across and fastened it securely to the trunk of a tree. The other end was similarly secured and, assisted by the rope, the men on horseback filed one by one across the river during the night. At daybreak (October 10) the w^hole force had passed safely and the hostile horsemen retired in the direction of Estaires.* The character of the fighting in ^\hich Conneau' s Cavalry was engaged was ^\ell * It was east of Estaires, at Sailly, that Lieutenant Wallon the well-known rider, fell a victim to German perfidy. He was advancing with .some Dragoons ta seize the crossing of the Lys at that point. Some distance from the village which was held by the Germans the party entrenched itself. They beat off an attack and shot several German scouts. Soon eleven "' pea.- sants " with picks and spades over their shoulders were -een moving towards the French. When these " peasants " were within 40 yards or so of the trenches, they suddenly dropped their stolen implements and drawing concealed revolvers emptied them into the French, while their comrades in front of the \illage opened a general fusilade. A ball struck Lieutenant Wallon in the chest. He dropped to the ground. Sergeant Rossa, in spite of the woimded man's protests, dragged him to the rear and placed him on a cart. Shortly after he expired. The eleven " peasants " were shot and the village taken. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 17 FRENCH INFANTRY GUARDING THE RAILWAY LINES SOUTH OF LA BASSEE. described in the Standard on the authority of a ^\ ounded French ofHicer. " There are no longer," he said, "massed charges in \vhicli tlioiisands of men collide in formidable shock, hut cngagonients of detail, in which ruse and decision play the greatest part. The side which succeeds in surprising the other, in filtering through its lines, in gaining ground without arousing the attention of the enemy, obtain^ an indisputable advantage." He illustrated the point by two examples. A regiiucTit of Fren<h Cavalry wius deputeil to cross from the south to the north bank of the Lys. The Gennan.s had here broken down tlie IS THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMAN PRISONERS IN CHARGE OF SPAHIS. bridges and their giuxs commanded all the fords. In the middle of the night a reservist, and four troo}:er-;. like the Dragoon who swana across the Lys between Aire and ]\Ierville, plunged into the river at a spot where it was \mfordable. They reached tlie left bank and installed cables which permitted a bridge to be rapidly constructed. An hovir later the whole regiment was north of the Lys. The other incident occurred between La Bassce and Estaires. At dawn some 600 l^lilajis, taking advantage of a thick fog, occupied one among the numerous villages tliat stretch like a chain from the La Bassee- Lille Canal to the Lys. A captain, with the officer who told the storj', was sent with 80 Cuirassiers to reconnoitre. In half an hour they were tliree hundred yards from the village, and halted. Dismounting, a sergeant and four men crept forward through the dense fog. They found the Uhlans camped in the streets or resting m the houses. On hearing this the Cuirassiers resumed their march. Suddenly a (jlerman patrol appeared through the fog. It was immediately captured, and the French rode on. Close up to the village church the French captain gave the order to charge. The Germans offered little resistance ; many were killed and \\ ounded ; 2.50 were made prisoners ; the rest fled. This example shows the repeatedly-proved inferiority of the German Cavalry to that of the Allies, which was, indeed, one of the most marked features of the war. The French and British Cavalry habitually routed the vaunted German horsemen. Re- membering the past history of the Prussian Cavalry, an explanation is not diflficult. Cavalry is an arm particularly liable to impressions. On the results of the fu'st collisions largely depend the futiu-e conduct of the arm. Thus it was that Frederick's cavalry won for him the battles of the Soor, Hohenfriedberg and Rosbach. For the above reason forty years later it \\ent down before the French horse at Auerstadt and Jena like corn before the sickle, and made no further effort during the war. It cut but a sorry figure in 186G, but in 1870 did good service. In this war the encounters of the German with the British Cavalry were a revelation to the former. Their previous training led them to think themselves invincible. The belief was as erroneous as it was in 180(), and, after the first few shocks, they seldom tried to meet the British cavalry, and nearly always tied before them. The same was true when they were opposed to the French. The moral of their opponents was superior to theirs, and this was because the individual men were more rationally trained, better led and better manaPu\Ted. Conneau's Dragoons were south of the Lys on the 10th. The next day (October 11) THE TIMEIS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 19 General Gough with the 2nd C'a\iilry Division cleared the German cavalry from some woods north of the Bethune-Airo ('anal. The Division i^laced itself astride the Lys, its right wing in touch with the left of the II. Corps, which had crossed the canal and was moving in a north-easterly direction. Goiigh's left joined hands with the Divisional Cavalry of the (itli Infantry Division (III. Corps) near Haze- brouck. The right of the German front rested on I\[ont-des-Cats, a hill some 500 feet high " from which radiate spurs like fingers from the jjalm of the hand " * at the western end of the long ride south-west of Ypres. Mont-des-Cats is opposite the little hill on which stands Cassel, and is eight miles or so north-east of Haze- brouck and a little to the south of a straight line drawn from Cassel to Yj)res. From Mont- des-Cats the German line ran south through Meteren to Estaires on the Lys and from Es- taires due south for three miles tlu-ough very intricate country. It then tiu-ned slightly to the south-east, " passing about three miles east of Bethune " tlirough La Bassee to Ver- melles. West of the German front were de- tached bodies of cavalry and infantry. It was * The Eve-witness, October 17. with some of these that the French dragf)ons who had crossed the Lys above Merville and General Gough's cavah-y had come in contact. The task allotted to Sir Horace Smith - Dorrien with the 11. Corps was to pierce through the German line between Estaires on the Lys and La Bassee ; he would be aided by Conneau's Cavah-y Corps on his left. The -Vllied troops were then to wheel to the right against the right flank of the Germans en- trenched round La Bassee, which would thus be exposed, while, to hold the latter fast. Maud'huy was to attack them in front. The locality in which Sir Horace was to operate was the " Black Country " of France, " similar," as Sir John French observes, " to tliat usually fomid in manufacturing districts and covered with mining works, factories, buildings, &c." The desperate and bloody Battle of Charleroi (August 21-2) had been fought under analogous circumstances. Like the rest of the plain of the Scheldt, the country was very flat. The word " plain," however, which is associated with long and uninterrupted views, does not convey an ade- quate idea of the district between the Lys and the Bethune-La Bassee-Lille Canal. The military Eye-witness at the British Headquartei-s sketched the landscape in graphic language. MACHINE GUN SECTION GUARDING A ROAD. 20 22 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BRITISH INFANTRY: EXAMINING ARMS. " It is mainly," he says, " an industrial region, and, with its combination of mining and agri- culture, might be compared to our Black Country, \vith Fen lands interspersed between the coal mines and factories. In some direc- tions the villages are so close together that this district has been described as one inunense town, of which the various parts are in some places separated by cultivation, and in others by groups of factories bristling with chimneys. The cultivated portions are very much enclosed, and are cut up by high, unkempt hedges and ditches." Such was the new field of battle as it appeared to Sir John French and the officer on his Staf¥ who supplied the descriptive accounts of the movements of the British Expeditionary Force. The enemy had barricaded themselves in many of the villages. Nearly all these villages were defended by a series of narrow, inconspicuous trenches. Driven from these trenches the Germans retired into the village itself, the streets of which were commanded by machine guns. To hide them from observation these were often placed in the centre of roo as. ^Vhen the village was in danger of being taken incendiaries set fire to the houses on the out- skirts and. under cover of the flames, the defenders retired to the trenches behind t'.ie village. If the British or French put the fires out and themselves occupied the village it \\ as heavily shelled. Another difficulty encoimtered was this. Some of the villages on the line of march were held, others were left undefended. It was not imtil the cavalry, cyclists and advance guards had thoroughly recormoitered a village and, if it was held, drawn the enemy's fire, that the troops behind could be brought through it. The danger of ambushes in this network of buildings and mounds was very great, and the ambushes of the past were by no means as dangerous or as difficult to detect as those of modern warfare. In 1914: two or three men THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •23 liidden with a machine giin might destroy a cohimn of soldiers. The soldier of 1914 had, in fact, to be as meticulously vigilant as the n:iodern surgeon. Behind every embankment, spoil heap, hedge, in thickets, in houses, cottages, factories, as well as in villages, might be lurking Germans with rifles and mitrailleuses. Broad and deep dykes traversed the fields and meadows betw een the villages, and, if the troops had to deploy on either side of a village, farm, or factory, they were likely to be met by these obstacles, for the crossing of which planks or ladders had to be carried. Sir Jolin French and Sir Horace Smith- Dorrien were not Hindenburgs and Kluclis. They regarded the soldiers entrusted to them as their comrades, and not as " cannon-fodder "; to attempt to surprise the villages by clothing their men in the dress of German soldiers or French peasants or workmen was in the eyes of British officers dishonourable ; to place prisoners, much less civilians, in front of a column of attack was to the Allied leaders as an abominable crime. The appropriate tactics from the British and French standpoints was to deluge the villages and buildings occupied by the enemy with common shell and shrapnel, and when the enemy's nerves were shaken and their machine guns destroyed or buried in the ruins, to order an attack with the bayonet, which the Germans seldom faced. Unfor- tunately, as mentioned, the weather was misty, and the flatness of the country and its enclosed nature rendered it very difficult even for howitzers to find and get the range of a village unless, indeed, its presence was indicated by a church or a factory chimney rising above the trees surrounding it. Met with such difficulties it might have been expected that the III. Corps would have halted on the edge of the " Black Country " or joined the TI. Corps and the Cavalry Corps to the north of the Lys ; and, as Lille fell on Octo- ber 13, it may be plausibly argued that either course would have been preferable to that which was actually adopted. Had, however. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien not attacked, the Germans might have poured most of the troops contained by him across the Lys, employed them against Sir Heru-y Rawlinson's and General d'Urbal's forces, and turned the line of the Yser. Indeed, if the British II. Corps had followed the III., the Germans between the Lys and the La Bassee-Lille Canal would have certainlj been sent to strengthen the front between Mont-des-CatsandEstaires. Had then, d'Urbal's Divisions, with the II. and III. Corps and the Cavalry Corps, been imable to pierce or turn the German line the lY. Corps (Sir Hem-y Rawlinson's) might have been caught between the Germans advancing through Ghent to Ostend and the army facing d'Urbal and Sir John French. By thrusting the II. Corps against the flank of the army engaged in a desperate struggle with Maud'huy's force Sir John French destroyed the last chance the Germans had of oxerw helming Sir Henry Raw- linson's Corps and the Belgian Army. The vanguard of the Belgians reached Fumes on October 12, the day Sir Horace commenced his attack. Other points had their weight. If Sir Horace and General ^Nlaud'huy had cleared the enemy from La Bassee, Lille would have still svurendered, but the effect of a vict£)ry at La Bassee might have been decisive on the long-drawn Battle of Arras. The tenacity with which the Germans coritinued to hold on io La Bassee shows tlie importance they attached to it in their scheme for crushing 3Iaud'huy. On the other hand, if ^laud'huy had been driven to the Somme, the main communications MAJOR-GENERAL H. de la P. COUGH. •24 THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. NEWS FROM THE FRONT. Germans in the trenches writing hurried letters home. of d'Urbal's, Sir John French's and now King Albert's Army would have been cut, and the whole of the Allied Forces north of Bethune would have had to be based on Etaples, Boulogne, Calais and Dimkirk. Needless to say, their position would have been most pre- carious : most, if not all, of the gigantic army hurled a week or so later by the Kaiser into the battle which goes by the name of Ypres would have been directed against them, and, in the event of defeat, they would have had to embark at three small ports, an undertaking M'hich, in the days of guns and howitzers with a range of from five to ten miles and of sub- marines and bomb-dropping airships and aero- planes, might have led to a frightful catas- trophe. To add Smith-Dorrien's Corps to Maud'huy's Army and to help Maud'huy to achieve a victory or to avoid a defeat was, therefore, the wisest course open to Joffre, Foch and French. But it led to a terrible strain being put on the heroic body of troops who at the Battle of Le Cateau had saved the British Expeditionary Force from annihilation. Happily the II. Corps was no longer opposed by troops of the same quality as those they had .net in August, nor were the conditions under which they opposed them so unfavourable. Judged by the following Order of October 7 to the German 14th Reserve Corps, the directors of that vast organisation, the German Army, -were already experiencing difficulties in feeding and munitioning the soldiers : It is notified that the troops must no longer count on the regular arrival of supplies. They must, there- fore, utilize the resources of the covintry as much and as carefully as possible. 'J'he regulation for the use of the iron rations must be strictly observed. In spite of all precautions complaints are conlinually being received that supply and ammunition columns constantly fail to arrive becaiise they are stopped and unloaded by unauthorised persons. It is again notified that only the avithorities to whom the supplies, &p., are eon--igned have the right to take dehvery of them. To terrorise the Belgians and the French the disciples of Bernliardi had relaxed the bonds of discipline ; they had encouraged the men to murder, rape, burn, get drunk and loot. It was not to be expected that, after their de- baucheries and crimes, the soldiers would rigidly obey the call of duty and behave with the carefulness of ordinary men. The TI. Corps had reached the Aire- Bethune Canal on October 11. As related, it crossed the Canal the same day, its left wing moving in a north-easterly direction. Sir John French decided that on the 12th this wing was to be brought up in the direction of JVIerville, from which the Uhlans had been driven by the French Dragoons of Conneau's Cavalry Corps, who had crossed the Lys east of Aire. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was then to move to the line Laventie-Lorgies. The former place is a little to the south-east of Estaires, the latter a few miles to the north of La Bassee. He would then be threatening the flank of the army strtiggling with Maud'huy's. On THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. '25 October 12 the 5th Division (Sir Charles Ferguson's) " connected up " with Maud'huy's left, north of Annequin, which is south of the canal and to the west of La Bassee. To counter this manoeuvre the Grermans extended their right. The 3rd Division (Sir Hubert Hamilton's) now d ployed on the left of the 5th Division and the whole of the II. Corps advanced to the attack, but, owing to the obstacles already described, they could make little headway. Several counter-attacks, how- ever, were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy, who abandoned a number of machine guns. Conneau's Cavalry Corps joined in the battle, following the roads between Estaires tuid Fle.urbaix, Laventie, Vieille Chapelle, Lacouture and Richeboiu"g. The Germans were defeated in almost every encovmter. At Vieille Chapelle the church was bombarded and left in ruins, and in the kitchen of a house a French Chassem" engaged in an Homeric contest with a Uhlan. Thrusting and cutting at the German, the Frenchman drove him into the backyard, where both fell mortally wounded. Thej' were biu-ied in a neighbouring field. Richebom*g was set on fire by the Germans as they re- treated. The first bviilding bvuiied was a factory which gave employment to the village. On October 13 Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, pivoting on Givenchy — a village two miles due west of La Bassee — wheeled to the south and endeavoiu-ed to get astride the La Bassee-Lille road in the neighbourhood of Fournes. Thence he would menace the enemy's position on the high ground south of La Bassee. In the course of the advance, near Pont Fixe, the Dorsets and other regiments of the 7th Brigade es- pecially distinguished themselves. They, like the enemy, were entrenched. During the night the Germans sapped towards them, and they towai-ds the Germans. At daybreak a British shell dropped into and burst in one of the advance trendies of the enemy. Five Germans were taken ])risoners. " I saw the fellows," wrote a war c orrespondent of the Daily Chronicle, some days later, " and they undoubtedly belonged to the last line of the German Reserve. One felt sorry for them, they looked starved, dirty and weary to death." The British guns shelled, and the infantry fired at the (Germans till 5 p.m., when the latter abandoned ail but the last trench. By this time only a ploughed field and a couple of ditches divided the two infantries, and the soldiers on cither side could be heard cursing each other. At last the order was given to the British to fix bayonets and charge. ^^'ith a yell they rushed forward and, in the expressive language of a corporal, " dug 'em out same as you'd dig bully beef out of a can." Then they rushed for the Aillages behind tiie trenches, clearing the enemy out and capturing a mitrailleuse. For two miles the chase con- tinued. In the morning of October 14 the battle was continued, the advance being in the same direction. It was on this day that the 3rd Division and the nation suffered a heavy loss. WTiile riding along the lines the Commander of that Division, Sir Hubert Hamilton, was struck by a shrapnel bullet. He fell from his hor.se and died im- mediately afterwards. At night he was buried in the churchyard of the little village of Lacou- ture, three French Chasseurs being interred near him. An eye-witness described the scene to a Times Correspondent : The darkness of the night was profound and the mourners had a difficulty in distinguishing the features of their neit;hl)ours. The group which gathered round the grave at the entrance of the httle village of Lacouture included the General Staff of the 3rd British Division, delegates of the Headquarters Staff, the oiticers of the II. Army Corps, led by Genera! Smith-Dorrien in person, and some French officers attached to the British General Stnff. GRAVE OF GEN. HUBERT HAMILTON At Lacouture. 26 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. INDIANS NEAR LA BASSEE. Owing to the proximity of the enemy absolute silence was observed, except for the low voice of tho priest, advantage being taken of a lull in the attack. Just at the moment when the priest was saying the last pra3'ers the guns began to roar agam, and projectiles whistled over the heads of the nnourners. The German attack was directed from a distance of a few hundred yards. The moment was well chosen, for the volle\s fired by tl;e troops of the Allies in honour of the dead, gloriously fallen for the common cause, were at the same time volleys of vengeance. Crackling reports of rifles con- tinued round the ruined church, but the \'oice of the priest, reciting the last words of the Requiem, lost nothing of its calm and clearness. Soldiers in single file acted as an escort to the cemetery beside the little church, which is now a Tnass of ruins in consequence of the bombardment. Afterwards Sir Hubert Hamilton's body was removed and reburied in his native land. Among the wreaths on his tomb was one from Lord Ivitchener. Hamilton had been among the ablest of Kitchener's pupils ; he had been liis ^Military Secretary in India, and had shown marked ability in the retreat from ^lons and at the battles of the Marne and Aisne. The death of their leader was avenged by the 3rd Division on tlie 15th when, as Sir John French wrote, " they fought splendidly." The dykes in their way were crossed with planks, and they " drove the enemy from one en- trenched position to another in loop-holed villages.'" By nightfall they had tlirust the Oennans off the Estaires-La Bassee Road, and they were established on the line Pont de Ham- Croix Barbee. On the 16th the left of the II. Corps was in front of Aubers, wliich was strongly held. The next day this village was captured by the 9th Infantrj- Brigade^ and at dark the village of HerUes, south-east of Aubers, was carried at the point of the bayonet after a fine charge. " The Brigade," remarks Sir Jolin French, " was handled with great dash by Brigadier-General Shaw." At this time the beUef was that the II. Corps was being opposed by a portion of the 14th German Corps, by several battaUons of Jaegers, and by the 2nd, 4th, 7th and 9th German Cavalry Divisions. With the capture of Herlies the offensive of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien came to an end. The Kaiser was about to begin the counter- offensive, whicli is known to the public imder the name of the Battle of Ypres. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrion had not been able to drive the Germans out of their position at La Bassee nor to save Lille. Before describing the bombardment and surrender of Lille let us look at some details of the fighting between the Lys and the canal, \\liich have some value in completing the pictvire of the war. The British " Eyewitness " states : Parts of the legion where fighting has been in progress now present, a melancholy aspect. Many of the once prosperous homesteads and hamlets are literally torn to pieces, the walls still standing pitted by shrapnel balls, and in some of the villages the churches are smouldering ruins. Dead horses, cows, and pigs which have been caught in tlie hail of shrapnel litter the village sti-eets;. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 27 iind among the carcases and (M'lris wander the wretched inhabitants, who have returned to see what they can save from the wreckage. Here, blocking up a narrow side street is a dead horse still harnessed to a trap and beside it is stretched the corpse of a Jiiger ; close by, in an enclosure where a shell has found them, lie some thirty cavalry horses ; a little farther on is laid out a row of German dead, for whom graves are being dug by the peasants. The work of buriul falls to a great extent on the inhabitants, who, with our soldiers, take no little care in marking the last resting-places of their countrymen and their Allies, either by little wooden crosses or else by flowers. Amidst tVie graves scattered all over the countryside are the rifle pits, trenches and gun emplace- ments, which those now resting below the sod helped to defend or to attack. From these the progress of the fighting can be traced, and even its nature, for they v'ary from carefully constructed and cimningly jilaced works to the hastily sliapeil lair of a German sniper, or the roadside ditch, with its sides scooped out by the eutronch- ing implements of our infantry. The unfortunate inliabitants, too, had to suffer from friends and foe alike. For the British had liad to destroy the farms and cottages which had sheltered a large number of industrious families. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, we have seen, began his advance towards Lille on October 11. But on the 10th the Germans, unable to break their way into the city, had resorted to their favourite procedure. They bombarded Lille with their heavy artillery. The city had been seized by them in August and a war indemnity levied on it. It was a flourishing town of over 200,000 inhabitants ; the fine public buildings and the splendid Art INIuseum bore witness to its prosperity, and to the innate culture of the French which distinguishes them from most industrial races. The Germans affected to treat the French as decadent. A A^alk through Lille should have dispelled that illusion. In 1792, when the I'rusiians and Austrians endeavoured to reimpose the yoke of the Bourbon despotism on France, Lille had been .vainly bombarded by the Austrians. A bom- bardment in 1914 was not so likely to be ineffec- tual, for the weapons employed had fifty times «.<. ■ AN INTERRUPTED GAME OF CARDS. 28 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LILLE DURING THE BOMBARDMENT. the power of those brought to bear on the town a hundred and twenty-two years before. On October 10 a small body of German cavalry rode up to the Town Hall and inquired for the ]\layor. AMiile they were demanding hostages, French horsemen arrived, and the Germans, after a brief encounter, fled. At 5 p.m. the bombardment began, a shell bvirsting above the Town Hall. It was the furst of several. A panic started and the streets were soon a seething mass of excited men and women flying for refuge to their cellars. A Taube hovered and dropped a bomb, which killed a boy and a horse, and injured a woman. At 7 p.m. the bombardment increased in violence and several houses in the Rue Nationale were destroyed. The night was comparatively calm. On October 11, from 8 a.m. to nightfall shells fell incessantly. Numerous public buildmgs, houses and factories were on fire, and the jDeople were flying in all directions. The next day, at 6 a.m., the Germans resumed their work of destruction. Far off could be hetird the French artillery replying to the German heavy guns. On the 13th, as there was no hope of succour, to save the city from total destruction it was surrendered. Five or six thovisand shells had been fired into it, the Art ]\Iuseum was damaged, some quarters of the city were in flames. The Germans, who after- wards systematically pillaged the to\\"n — packing up and dispatching to Germany furnitLU-e, Imen, and even clothing — sent for the fire engines of the neighbom"ing places and the flames were finally subdued. According to the official report 882 buildings, amongst them some of the finest, had been destroyed and Ij.jOO damaged, but the loss of life had been small. The Mayor, Bishop and Prefect and several coimcillors were taken as^ hostages. A gentleman who was in Lille during the bombardment and for a week after the Gennan occupation ^^Tites as follows : The two most prominent buildings in Lille were untouched by the shells, but the splendid art gallery had suffered. There were holes through the roof, but I do not know what damage was done to the pictures. In the Rue de la Gare two solid blocks of buildings were destroyed, and from the Place de la Republique to the Gare du Nord the buildings were terribly damaged. The Cafe Joan, known to every Englishman and American who has visited Lille, was in ruins. The Germaiis on the entry behaved well. Tliey were apparently mider strong and admirable discipline. They set themselves at once to put out the fires. Buildings were dynamited to prevent the flames from spreading. The ordinary police were left in charge of the town, although there were German soldiers stationed in all the streets. The people were told to remain witliin their liouses with the blinds down. Civilians with arms in their possession were told that thev were liable to be THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 29 shot at once. Owners of motor-cars were bidden to report the- fact to the authorities. The Germans com- mandeered all the horses, motor-cars, and bicycles — in fact, every means of transport. During the bombardment few civilians suffered. I saw one civilian dead in the street. Among the defenders was a small party of Algerian troops. While they were defending the gates one man was left in charge of the horses, just off the Rue de la Gare. A shell burst just by him, and I saw the man and thirteen horses lying dead in a heap. For a week after the German occupation I remained in the town. No attempt was made by the Germans to dig trenches. I saw twenty-five big guns brought into the city. My papers were inspected by, the German military authorities, who were satisfied of my neutrality, and I left Lille and came to England through Belgium. As we passed through we saw entrenchments and barbed wire defences being constructed around the towns. The German soldiers entered Lille accom- panied by bands playing their favourite music. They were singing and smoking, but many were in a state of complete exhaustion. A prominent resident who escaped from the city stated that several soldiers lay down on the pavements and slept for hours and that some of the cavalrymen could scarcely sit their horses. Later, regiments of white-haired old men, and boys between the age of 16 and 18, in brand new uniforms arrived. They had been told that France was conquered and that they were to be reviewed by the Kaiser in Paris ! The feelings of some of the Germans may be surmised from the letter below found on the body of a dead soldier : Perenchies, near Lille, 16th October 1914. Dear Brother, — Taking the opportimity of a five hours' pause, which is the first chance of writing I have had, I hasten to inform you of my present position. On the 5th October came the order that the XlXth Corps should leave the Third Army and form part of the First Army under General Kluck. The march from St. Hillegras to Lille, 180 kilometres (108 miles) in five days was very exhausting. In Lille hostile infantry was reported, and we were engaged in street and house fighting on the 13th and 14th, and it was only by t'.ie 19th Heavy Artillery that the town was compelled to surrender. Lille has already been taken by us three times, and if troops or supply columns are attacked again the place will be razed to the ground. The shell fire, although it only lasted an hour, has cost the town at least a hundred buildings. Here, also, in Lille the 77th Field Artillery has manj' of our comrades on its con- science. Of prisoners we have absolutely none at present, since the wretches put on civilian clothes, and then one can look in vain for soldiers. We lie five miles from Lille and are to hold up the English who have landed. This will be no light task, since we are not fully informed as to their strength. It gives one the impression that the war will last a long time. Well, I shall hold out even if it goes on for another year. In front of us we can hear heavy guns, so we may easily have more fighting to-day. W^e have had no post for fourteen days, for the country here is very unsafe. Thus Lille — like Liege, Namur, Charleroi, Louvain, Malines, Brussels, Antwerp, Mons, Tournai, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Cambrai, Douai, Rethel, Mezieres, Sedan, Montmedy, St. Quentin, Laon — was in the possession of the Germans. The day before (October 12) they had seized Ghent ; the day after they were to occupy Brixges, and, on October 15, Ostend. North of the Lys, however, the tide of invasion had tiu'ned. The British IIT. Corps and Cavalry Corps with d'Urbars Territorial Divi- sions and Cavalry were driving the enemy from Ypres and its vicinity at the very moment Mhen the Germans entered Lille. FRENCH SEARCHLKJHT Thrown on attacking (jermans. 30 THE TIMES IllSTUliY OF THE WAR. The tuminGT movement prepared by Joffre and French, north and east of the Aire-Lillo Canal, had on the centre and left been more successful than on the right. This was due to two causes. The obstacles had been fewer, and less serious than those encountered by Sniith-Dorrien's and Conneau's Corps ; the enemy had been less numerous. From the Lys to the sea is a distance on an average of tMrty miles. Wliile the population of Lille was over 200,000, that of Ypres, one of the largest towns in the inland portion of the oblong Aire-Ghent-Zeebrugge-Calais was under 20,000 — 10,000 less than that of Armentieres, on the south bank of the Lys to the north-west of Lille. Crossing the Lys one passed from an industrial to a rvu-al neighboiu"hood, to villages instead of towns, to farnxliouses instead of villages. Except for the liill on which Cassel stands and for the INIont-des-Cats, and the long ridge which stretches from it eastward, the whole district was either fiat or gently imdu- lating. Next to the coast were reclaimed marshes drained by canals and dykes. On the edge of the sea were dunes. Hedges and belts of trees restricted the view ; the main roads, though straight, were badly paved ; the by-roads were winding. On October 11 the whole of the coast and reclaimed marshland was in the hands of the Allies, and the German line, as already men- tioned, stretched from Mont-des-Cats (south of the road from Cassel through Poperinghe to Ypres) to Meteren (on the road from Cassel via Bailleul to Armentieres) and thence to Estaires on the Lys. This position could be turned froin the nortli by an advance of d'Urbal's troops from Dunkirk through Bergues and Poperinghe to Ypres or on the south by Con- neau's cavalry crossing the Lys east of Estaires. To the rear it was threatened by the move- ment of Rawlinson's Corps from Bruges. By the 10th the head of Byng's Cavalry Division was at Thourout ; and on the 12th the 6th Cavalry Brigade held the line Oostnieuwkerke- Roulers, the 7th that of Rumbeke-Iseghem. The aim of the Germans was to remain on the defensive vmti] the army released from A BELGIAN LOOK OUT IN FLANDERS. Finding Ranges. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 31 WOUNDED BRITISH IN THE STATION AT BOULOGNE. Antwerp, and the reinforcements which had crossed the Scheldt and were now hurrying to the Lys, joined hands with them. They took every advantage of the ground, concealing themselves in ditches, woods, and villages, and behind hedges, and a network of telephone wires warned them of the Allied movements. The line, however, they had to defend was longer than that from Estaires to La Bassee, and, while the commander opposing Smith- Dorrien and Conneau had one wing resting on the Lys and the forces from Estaires to Mont- des-Cats, the other on the Canal La Bassee- Lille, the right wing of the Germans north of the Lys was in the air, while their left wing was threatened by the movements of Conneau and Smith-Dorrien south of the Lys. The resistance of Lille was another important factor in the situation. Troops badly needed between Estaires and Mont-des-Cats had to be held back till Lille surrendered. The inhabi- tants of Lille and the French Territorials there have the gratification of Icnowing that, like the Belgians in Liege, they largely contributed to the coming success of the Allies. If LUle had surrendered on the 9th, and not on the 13th, it may be doubted whether d'Urbal and the British would have reached the canal from Comines to Ypres, and from Ypres to the Yser. The misty and, occasionally, rainy weather and the hostility of the civilian pop\ilation were also to the disadvantage of the Germans. There can be no question that they believed they were being attacked by a much larger force than was actually the case. The reports of their air-scouts were defective, and the Allied Cavalry, assisted by armoured motor- cars, screened the advance of the infantry. From now onward the armoured motor-car began to play an important part in the schemes of Joffre and French for defeating the invaders. One of the many examples of their use is given by the British Eye-witness : On the 16th the crew of one of our armoured motor- cars obtained information that a party of hostile cavalry was in a farm. They enlisted help from ten men of the nearest battalion, who stationed themselves on one side of the farm while the motor-car waited on the other. Being unable to bolt their quarry, our men carried fire to the farm, which had the desired effect and resulted in two Uhlans being killed and eight captured, no cosualtiea being sustained by the attacking party. The Belgians showed special aptitude for this kind of warfare. They " appeared to regard Uhlan-himting as a form of sport," and often ventured miles ahead of their own troops, and seldom failed to return with spoils in the shape of helmets, lances, and rifles. At the opening of the war the Germans had scored heavily with their miniature forts on wheels, but with every day their superiority in the mere machinery of war was diminishing. It will be recollected tliat on October 11 General Gough with the 2nd Cavalry Division a2 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMANS ON THE DUNES Watching the Allied Fleets. had driven the German Cavalry from woods to the north of the Bethune-Aire Canal, and Unked up with the Divisional Cavalry of the 6th Division (part of the III. Corps) in the neighbourhood of Hazebrouck. On the 11th General Pulteney had practically completed the detrainment of that corps at St. Omer, and moved it east to Hazebrouck, in and aroimd which town it remained during the 12th. The same day a Taube ventvu-ed over St. Omer and dropped three bombs on the Rue Carnot, killing a laundress and a small child in her arms and woimding a man. It was imme- diately pursued by five French aeroplanes. The " passenger " \\ as shot by the pursuers in the head. The Taube swerved, but the pilot managed to right it and flew away at full speed. Another shot struck the pilot and the machine " fell like a stone to the ground." At Pradelles, on the road from Hazebrouck to Bailleul, a German officer wished on the 12th to make some observations from the tower of the church. He applied to the Abbe Bogaert for the key. The Abbe could not find it. He was taken to Strazeele, where he was murdered. Extra- ordinary and horrible as such incidents as the above would have seemed in July, in October they attracted little attention. On Tuesday, the 13th, the advanced guard of the III. Corps, consisting of the 19th Infantry Brigade and a Brigade of Field Artillery, moved eastward to the line St. Sylvestre-Caestre-Strazeele Station. Three miles out of Hazebrouck the 1st North Stafford- shire Regiment came under shell fire at 7. 30 a.m. " Lost Private Ward," notes a non-com- missioned officer, " about two yards in front of me — ^struck dead by a shell. He had just lighted a cigarette, and said it might be his last." Through Strazeele the Staff ordshires advanced to Merris, south of Meteren, " where we reniamed in position under sheU-fire for Ih hours, holding up the Bosches." Merris a few days before had been the scene of an act of atrocious cruelty. Uhlans had pursued an old man to the " Bon Bovu-geois " Inn. He had hidden in an oak chest. Discovered, he was at once shot with a revolver. At St. Sylvestre and Caestre the British were on the main road between Cassel and Bailleul ; at Caestre they were across the single line railway from Hazebrouck tlirough Poperingh© to Ypres ; at Strazeele Station they were on the double-line railway from Hazebrouck through Bailleul to Armentieres and LUle. The Germans held the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats between Godewaersvelde (on the railway from Caestre to Poperinghe) and Bailleul. They THE TIMES HlSTOliY OF THE WAR. 33 were in force at Meteren foui* miles or so to the east of Caestre and two miles west of Bailleul. The Fourth German Cavalry Corps and some Jaeger Battalions were known to be occupying the neighbourhood of Meteren and were believed to be supported by the advanced guard of another German Army Corps. The high ridge of the Mont -des -Cats extends eastward to the road from Armentieres to Ypres. It ends round Wytschaete and, south of Wytschaete, round Messines. Sir John French now ordered General Pul- teney to push toward the road between Armen- tieres and Wytschaete. The latter village is four miles south of Ypres, seven from Armentieres. In heavy rain and fog and through very en- closed country the III. Corps marched for- ward. The artillery gave little assistance because objects could not be seen distinctly ; the roads and fields were bad going. By night- fall, however, the British had routed the enemy in all directions and captured Meteren, and Oultersteene to the east of Merris. " We lost," says the non-commissioned officer, " another seventeen men in taking Oultersteene. . . . Were not the villagers pleased to see us ! But what a toll ! I do not take into account the battalion or brigade — only my company. We got two machine guns, a dead German officer, with the Iron Cross ; cycles. Repaid our losses," he adds, "With interest." On account of their deeds at ileteren the Medal for Distinguished Conduct was awarded to Sergeant E. Howard of the 1st Royal Lancaster Regiment, to Sergeant H. Duckers of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, to Sergeant G. A. Hodges of the 2nd Essex Regiment, and to Private C. Rowley of the 1st Royal Warwick- shire Regiment. Howard, at very great risk to himself, had crawled to 12 men of his platoon who had ceased firing. He found they were all dead. Duckers had handled his platoon with remarkable skill, both at Meteren and on other occasions. Hodges, shot througii the shoulder, continued in command of his platoon and led it forward to the firing line. Rowley had volunteered under a heavy rifle fire to go back from the firing line to the support trench, a distance of some 300 yards, for ammunition. He reached it and, later, recrossed the same piece of ground under similar conditions. Meanwhile General Gough, to the left of the III. Corps, had not been inactive. As had been arranged, the Cavah-y Corps, after the arrival of the III. Corps, had moved to the north of it. On tlio 1 2th Cough's Division had ridden through Fletre (between Caestre and Meteren) and on the 12th-13th engaged the right of the enemy at Mont -des -Cats. In this action Prince Max of Hesse was mortally wounded. He lies buried in the grounds of the monastery wliich crowns the hill, together with three British officers and some German soldiers. This day a cavalry patrol came sud- denly upon a German machine gun detachment. The subaltern gave the order to charge ; the Germans were killed and scattered and the gim captured. For his gallantry and deter- mination at Mont-des-Cats Lieutenant C. J. Aris of the 16th Lancers obtained a D.S.O. He had charged and driven off a German patrol, and although twice wounded, persisted in sending in his report to liis squadron leader. It was on the 13th-14th that French and British troops marched into Ypres. On the 14th tiie 1st Cavalry Division joined up with the 2nd, and the whole Cavalry Corps under General Allenby moved north, and in face of considerable opposition seciued the »» MORTAR CAPTURHD IN A GERM.\N TRKNCH. 34 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. high ground above Berthen round Westoutre, whoso Mayor, it will be remembered, had been lashed across the face by a German cavalryman. Further to the north the 87th and 89th French Territorial Divisions were marcliing from the direction of Dunkirk on Poperinghe, Vlamer- tinghe and Ypres. The 3rd Cavalry Division (Byng's) on the 13th had reconnoitred towards Ypres and JNIenin.* Patrols had been sent forward towards Comines and Wervicq. At Comines — the birthplace of the historian Philip de Comines, who deserted Charles the Bold for Louis XI. — the canal from Ypres enters the Lys. Both places are on the Lys between Menin and Armentieres. The 7th Infantry Division (Major-General Capper's) had occupied Roulers, menaced by the Germans from Thielt, and Sir Henry Rawlinson ordered B^mg to hold the line Dadizeele-Iseghem.t * The latter town is on the Lys a few miles west of Courtrai. It was at Menin that Scharnhorst, the Hano- verian who reformed the Prussian Army after the Jena catastrophe, had first distinguished himself in war. t Roulers had a population of over 25,000 ; on June 13, 1794, the French under Pichegru and Macdonald he. I Jiere defeated the Austrians under Clerfait. The Battle of Roulers had been the prelude to that of Fleurus, the first battle in wliich a captive balloon was used — by the French — for military purooses. The next day (October 14) considerable bodies of Germans, believed to belong to ti e 12th Corps, were reported to be moving from the vicinity of Balleul towards Wervicq and Menin. Consequently Byng, followed b\- Capper, was directed on Ypres with orders to reconnoitre to the south-west. At 9 a.m. Byng's Division v,as at Ypres and the 6th Cavalry Brigade proceeded to the line La Clytte-Lindenhock. Near Ypres the Brigade with rifle and revolver fire brought down a Taube. The pilot and observer fled to the woods, but were capttired. Accompanied by armoured motor-cars, the advance guard pushed on towards Xeuve Eglise, killing and capturing numbers of the retreating enemy, No " formed bodies " were, however, met with. From the direction of Bailleul heavy firing was heard. At dusk the 7th Cavalry Brigade moved into billets at Kemmel, west of the Ypres -Armentieres road ; the 6th were at Wytschaete in touch with Cough's Cavalry Division, with which they had established con- tact during the day. On the 15th, the day of the German entry into Ostend, Byng's divisionrested. As the Germans, issuing from Ostend, Bruges, and Ghent, might be expected to advance on MOTOR FOR HEAVY TRANSPORT WORK. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 35 GERMAN CAMP OUTSIDE OSTEND. Ypres, Sir John French on the 16th placed the 3rd Cavalry Division round Langemarck and Poelcapelle north-north-east of Ypres and south of the Foret d'Houthulst. The Division, with the 7th Cavalry Brigade leading, moved via Ypres and Wieltje to the line Bixschoote- Poelcapelle. It was reported that the enemy in large nmnbers were in the Foret d'Houthulst and Oosfehieuwkerke, and a patrol of the 2nd Life Guards was obliged to withdraw from Staden. There was intermittent figliting diu-ing the afternoon, and at dusk French troops relieved the 7tli Cavalry Brigade, which was then billeted at Passchendaele, south-east of Poelcapelle. The 6th Cavalry Brigade w^as south of it at Nieuwemolen. The 7th Infantry Division extended east of Ypres in the wooded district from Zandvoorde through Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke, south of Xieuwemolen. SujDport- ing Sir Henry Rawlinson's Corps was General Bidon W'ith the 87th French Territorial Division in Ypres and 'N'^lamertinghe, and behind it, on the road to Dunldrk, the 89th French Territorial Division in Poperinghe. Sir Henry Rawlinson was to support the Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps on the Lys if he was not attacked by the Germans advancing from Ghent, Courtrai, Bruges, and Ostend. The next day (October 17) four French Cavalry Divisions under General do Mitry deployed on Byng's left and drove the vanguard of the Germans from Ostend and Bruges out of the Forot d'Houthulst. The day before the German Army coming from Ostend had commenced its attack on the Allies defending the Yser. A glance at the map will show that on October 14 the Germans, who were originally on the line Mont-des-Cats-Meteren-Estaires, were in imjiiinent danger of being enveloped and their retreat cut. The operation orders of the 6th Bavarian Cavalry Division which were captured stated that, the right of the line having been forced to withdraw, the left was compelled to follow the movement. While Rawlinson's Corps moved against the German rear, and while the French Territorial Divisions and the Cavalry Corps crumpled up the German right, the III. Corps moved on towards Bailleul, which was entered at 10 a.m. on October 14, and where many \\ounded Germans were captured. The town had been pillaged ; a war-tax of £2,000 — paid by the farmers of the neighbourhood — imposed, and several houses burned. Fourteen men of military age had been shot. There was a lunatic asylmn in the town. With Teutonic liLunour, the Germans turned the hundi'ed imnates out of doors. These poor creatures wandered about the country and many were afterwards found dead by the roadside or in the woods.* That night the III. Corps occupied the line St. Jans Cappel-BaUleul. * See the account givoa by a imtivo of Biiilloul in tho Daily Chronicle of October 20 : " Tho Oormims." he says, "arc not soldiers so much as brigands and assassins.' 3G THE TIMES HISTORY UF THE WAR. The advance was resumed on the loth in very foggy weather. The enemy offered a stubborn defence. As Ypres and Wytschaete Mere now in the hands of the Alhes Sir John French had altered the direction of the III. Corijs. He pushed it to the north bank of the Lys between Sailly and Armentiercs. It will not be forgotten that Conneau's Cavalry Corps Avas on the south side of the river in the region of Estaires. By nightfall the 6th Infantry Division was at Sailly-Bac St. Maur, tiie 4th at Nieppe on the road from Bailleul to Armentieres. On the 15th the Cavalry Corps had been ordered to make for the Lys below Armentieres. There had been an en- counter near Messines on the 14th, and Sergeant C. Graham, of the 5th Lancers, for engaging with his revolver the enemy behind a barricade and, although badly wounded in the hand, giving a clear account of liis reconnaissance whilst his hand was being dressed, subseqiiently !S.-' received the Medal for Distinguished Conduct. At sunset all the country on the north bank to some six or seven miles below Armentieres (on the south bank) and all the bridges above it from Aire eastward were held by the Allied troops, ^^'arneton, six miles or so east of Armentieres^ was taken in the following circumstances : At tne entrance to the town the Germans had constructed a high barricade loopholed at the l)ottom so that men could fire through it from a lying position. A squadron of British Cavalry rode up in the dark (October IG), but, nothing daunted, obtained help from the artillery, who man-handled a gun into position and blew the barricade to pieces. The cavalry then rode into the middle of the town. Hardly liad they reached the further end of the large Place, when " one of the buildings appeared to leap skj'wards in a sheet of flame, a shower of star shells at the same time making the Place liglit as day." The enemy from the houses round the Place fired on the horsemen from rifles and macliine-guns. The squadron retired with the loss of an officer wounded and nine men killed and wounded. Determined not to leave the wounded to the mercy of the dervishes of Central Eiurope, some troopers took off their boots, went back into the Place and succeeded in carrying away their bleeding comrades. W'arneton was captui-ed, but the bridge had been destroved. AN ADVANCED POST. THE TIMES HISTORY • OF THE WAR. 37 Armciitieres lies to the south of the Lys. A bridge connects it with Nieppe. After a few shells had been fired at the barricade on the bridge the Germans evacuated Armentieres (October 16), leaving behind them fifty wounded, rifles, ammunition, and a motor-car. The river- line, almost as far east as Frelinghien, was in British or French hands. Ai'mentieres had been systematically plundered. The members of the INIvmicipal Council and prominent factory owners had been arrested and held as hostages. The inhabitants, it need scarcely be said, welcomed with joy the British troops. From the condition of the bridges over the Lys it is clear that the Germans had been completely surprised by tlie rapid offensive of the Allies. At Warneton the damaged bridge was being repaired ; at Frelinghien the bridge had not been demolished and was defended ; further west, at Houplines, the bridge was destroyed, but at Nieppe both the rocid bridge and railway bridge leading to Annentieres were only barricaded, and the bridge at Erquinghem, west of Armentieres, was neither defended nor broken. The Lys in this part of its course flows through a slight depression in the plain. It is from 45 ft. to 7.5 ft. wide, and only 6 ft. deep. At places it had been canalized. Many of the bridges were of the draw or swing type. Accordingly, on the 17th, when Smith- Dorrien's Corps — the right wing of the Allied Forces engaged in the battle between La Bassee and Nieuport — had ended its offensive and the Germans from Ostend and Bruges had already* begun their attempt to break through the left wing on the Yser between the sea and Di.xmude, the 3rd Corps (General Pulteney's) had crossed the Lys and occupied Arinentieres. " Took up outposts," writes a non-com- missioned officer of the 1st North Staffordshires, " near Armentieres at Wez Macquart and dug ourselves in." Both banks of the Lys up to Frelinghien were held by the Allies. To the north of the Lys the Cavalry Corps had taken Warneton and were reconnoitring towards Alenin. " With a view to a further advance east," wrote Sir John French in his dispatch of November 20, 1914, " I ordered General Allenby, on the 15th, to reconnoitre the line of the River Lys, and endeavour to secure the passages on the opposite bank, pending the arrival of the III. and IV. Corps." From the 15th to the I'Jth this reconnaissance was * The Battle of the Yser bogau on Octol)cr 16. LOADING AN 18-pr. GUN. most skilfully and energetically carried out, but, although valuable information was gained and strong forces of the enemy held in check, the Cavalry Corps was unable to secure pas- sages or to establish a permanent footing on the southern bank of the river. On the 17th the III. Corps (Pulteney's) was on the line Bois Grenier-Le Gheir. The enemy were holding a line from Radinghem through Perenchies to Frelinghien and thence along the south bank of the Lys as far as the crossing at Wervicq. On the 18th Sir John, trusting to the Belgians and French to maintain the line of the Yser, and to the Cavalry of de Mitry and the Terri- torials of Bidon to stop any German advance on Ypres through or past the Foret d'Houthulst, ordered up Sir Henry Rawlinson's Corps — i.e.. Capper's Infantry and Byng's Cavalry Divi- sions — to the support of the Cavalry Corps. The 7th Infantry Division (Capper's) was to drive the Germans from Menin on the north bank of the Lys between Warneton and Courtrai. " I considered," says Sir John, " that the pos- session of Menin constituted a very important point of passage, and would much facilitate the advance of the rest of the Ai-my." Sir John still hoped that the offensive of the Allies might be continued. The left of Capper's Division was to be supported by Byng's Cavalry and by the French Cavalry operating on the ea,st of the Foret d'Houthulst in the neighbourliood of Roulers. Sii' Hemy Rawlinson reprosentod :i8 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAU. A GERMAN RANGE FINDER. to Sir John French that large hostile forces were advancing upon him from the east and north- east and that his left flank was severely threatened, but Sir John, now that the I. Corps (Sir Douglas Haig's) was detraining at St. Omer, decided that Rawlinson's Corps should run the risk of an attack of the Germans on his flank. The following account by a Flemish gentle- man of the fighting roimd Roulers to the North- east of Ypres on October 18 and 19 will help to explain Sir H. Rawlinson's objections to Sir John French's plan : — About the middle of this month thousands of German soldiers appeared in Roulers. On the doors of the houses they chalked the nimiber of men to be billeted under each roof. The requisitions were numerous^-carriages, barrows, horses, cycles, hay, oats, etc. Everything had to be supplied so quickly that the invaders had no time to give coupons. But as a reward they chalked here and there on a house the words " Good people." On October 17 the German troops marched ofi in the direction of Dixmude, towards the coast, to strengthen the (Jerman forces between Ostend and Nieuport. A hundred men remained in occupation of Roulers. Early next morning, Sunday, the cry was heard along the road to Dixmude, " The French are here ! " Seventeen French- men appeared from the direction of Ypres and two hours later 200 French dragoons followed them. They con- cealed themselves in a little wood. The hundi'ed Ger- mans in the town got to know their whereabouts, perhaps through spies. A skirmish occurred in the little wood, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon only 40 survivors of the German troops went back to the town. The same evening many French troops marched into the town, and more arrived during the night. They built in the market-place and the streets barricades of mattresses, sacks, and barrels. Mitrailleuses were stationed behind pillar-boxes and in the porches of corner houses. Guns were placed in position at one of the approaches to the town. The next morning, Monday, many Genm n tro ip- appeared from the direction of Bruges and Ghent, i'hey placed I heir guns in three villages, Hooglede, Ardoye, and Iseghem. At Hooglede they had a .specially good position, on the ridge of a hill, which runs straight through West Flanders. The Flemish people say that the threshold of the church of Hooglede lies as high as the top of the tower of Roulers, which is about 245 feet high. The Germans placed their guns in front of the church of Hooglede, whence they saw Roulers lying below them. The French artillery began the action, but the Germans for a time did not answer. The clock of Roulers had struck 12 before they opened lire, and it rained ;-hells on the town. Its population escaped into the cellar-^, anxiously awaiting the fate of their beloved town. The bombardment went on. Roofs fell in, walls reeled. The tower of the church of Notre Dame leaned over. A shell fell through the roof of St. Michael's Church and did much damage. Flames went up on several sides. In the meantime German infantry tried to approach the town. Their advanced troops fortified themselves in railway carriages at the shunting station on the line Beveren-Roulers, but the French artillery on the Dix- mude road shelled and destroyed the carriages. More troops were brought up and, towards evening, the Germans succeeded in forcing their way into the town. The fight was continued in the streets, but the French were obliged to retire. They fell back in good order, with all their guns, and took up new positions at East Nieu- kerke, about three miles to the south-west. Night came, and from afar one could see the fierce glow of burning Roulers. That night, however, the British advanced from Ypres and camped near Moors- lede, with the French lying near the old battlefield of Roozeheke. At the same time as Rawlinson's movement on Menin the III. Corps was to move down the south bank of the Lys from Armentieres to assist the Cavalry Corps to cross to the right bank. To do this, the enomy between the III. Corps and Lille had first to be vigorously pushed back. On the night of the 17th the III. Corps and Cavalry Corps were being opposed by the 19th Saxon Corps, released from Lille after its capture, by at least one division of the 7th Corps, and by tliree or four divisions of cavalry. Reinforcements for the enemy were known to be coming up from the direction of Lille. Despite the odds against hun, Pultenej'^ attacked on the 18th, but he made little pro- gress. At nightfall his 6th Division had taken Radinghem and was holding Radinghem, La Valine, Ennetieres, Capinghem, and a point 300 yards east of Halte. A wounded soldier described the attack of Ennetieres to a Times correspondent : The advance began early yesterday morning. The enemy was driven out by shell fire. They retired towards Lille and shelled the village in their turn. Not a habit- able house was left standing. The Allied troops advanced round the village under a terrible fire, talcing cover under the walls of factory buildings. The enemy had taken the range of the buildings. Their fire was accurate. An officer with two companions mounted to the roof of a factory to make observations. A shrapnel shell burst on them at once, and all three were killed. In the village 500 German dead were found. The cart- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 39 lidges foiuid upon them wero of the old Snider type \<nt]i large lead bullets, some flattened at the top. I have seen two of them. Infantry succeeded in entrench- ing themselves on the farther side of the village. But their trenches were not more than two feet deep, and they had to lie full length in them. It was here in the trenches that my informant was wounded. A shrapnel struck the pile of earth in front of him, and a bullet from the bur-ting ghell hit liim on the head It was a glancing shot, which inflicted a severe scalp wound. Just previously he had seen a shrapnel shell burst immediately over the heads of six men. " They arc gone," he thought. But when the smoke had cleared away all six rose from the ground, luiscathed. It is clear that in the operations of the past week our troops have gained much ground. They are now, how- ever, coming into touch with the main German position at Lille. Our men are now " digging themselves in " to hold their ground until the necessary reinforcements can reach them. The 1st North Staff ordsliires were engaged roiind Wez Macquart. A non-commissioned officer mentions that a Roman CathoUc Father gave his chiim and him a bottle of wine at J 0.30 p.m., which gave them sleep. " iNIay God bless him for it," he observes. The 4th Division held the line from L'Epinette to the Lys at a point 400 yards south of Frehnghien and thence to a point on the Lys half a mile south-east of Le Gheir. The Corps Reserve was at Armentieres station, with its right flank in touch with Conneau's Cavalry Corps. South-west, at Aubers, began the left wing of Smith-Dorrien's force, which dui'ing the 18th was violently but unsuccess- fully attacked by the Germarus between Lille and La Bassee. Tlie left of Pulteney's Reserve joined hands with the Cavalry Corps, and, beyond the Cavalry Corps on the north bank of the Lys, the 7th Infantry Division was advanc- ing on Meuin. On October 19 Sir H. Rawlinson — with Byng's Cavalry Division on his left — tried to carry out Sir John French's orders to drive the enemy through Menin, but the task was beyond his power. His Corps (the IV.) was worn out by constant marching and fighting, and the Ger- mans were in overwhelming force. By 10 a.m. the 7th Cavalry Brigade, attacked by bodies of the enemy from Roulers, which had been occupied by the Germans, fell back three- quarters ot a mile to a strong position. " K " Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery, which had been attached to the Brigade, came into action north of IMoorslede and rendered great assist- ance. The 6tli Cavalry Brigade, with " C " Battery, advanced from So. Pieter and, after a brisk little action captured Ledegehem and RoUeghemcappelle. But the enemy from Roulers continued to press on, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade was withdrawTi to the high BRITISH MOTOR-AMBULANCE WRECKED BY GERMAN FIRE. 40 THl-: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ground east of Moorslede. This exposed the ihnik of the (itli Cavalry Brigade and, as large hostile forces were reported advancing from Courtrai, it was ordered to fall back gratlually on ^loorslede and thence to withdraw to billots at Poelcapelle. Its retirement was covered by the 7th Brigade, which, under heavy shell fire, retreated to Zonnebeke. The French took over Passchendaele, north of Zonnebeke. The pressm-e of the Germans on BjTig had decided Sir Henry RawlLnson not to attack Menin. " He probably exercised a wise judg- ment," says Sir Jolm French, " in not com- mittmg his troops to tliis attack in their some- what weakened condition ; but the result w a^ that the enemy's continued possession of the passage at Menin certainly facilitated liis rapid reinforcement of liis troops, and thu?' rendered any further advance impracticable." Tlu-ough Menin ran the railway from Lille to Roulers, and one from Courtrai. The 1. Corps (Sir Douglas Haig's) had com- pleted its detrainment on the 19th and was con- centrated between St. Omer and Hazebrouck. " A question of vital importance," writes Sir John French, "now arose for decision." To which point of the line of battle should the I. Corps be dispatched "? The enemy on the Lys, it was apparent, were in very superior nmnbers, and the II., III., IV. and the Cavalry Corps were holding a much A\ider front than their strength w arranted. Should the I. Corps his sent to the line of the Lys ? The objection was that the German 3rd Reserve Corps and at least one Landwehr Division were Icno^v^^ to be operating in the region north and east of Ypres, and that the enemy were bringing up large reinforcements from the east, which for several days could only be opposed by two or three French Cavalry Divisions, the two Territorial Divisions and the Belgian Army, which was badly in need of a rest after its heroic exertions. Unless some substantial resistance could be offered on the Yser and between the Yser and Ypres the Allied flank would be turned and the Channel Ports laid bare to the enemy. " I judged," says Sir John, " that a successful movement of this kind fon the part of the Germans] would be fraught with such disastrous consequences that the risk of [the II., III., IV. and Cavalry Corps] operating on so extended a front must be undertaken." On the evening of the 19th Sir Jolm had a personal interview with Sir Douglas Haig, and the latter was instructed to advance with the I. Corps through Ypres to Thourout. His immediate objective was to be the capture of Bruges. If Bruges were taken the communi- cations of the Germans attacking the line of the Yser would be cut. When Bruges was cajitured Sir Douglas was, if possible, to drive the enem\- towai'ds Ghent. But it was left to him to decide after he had traversed Ypres whether he would move on Bruges or towards the Lys. Sir John had arranged for de ilitry's Cavalr_\- to operate on the left, and Bj-ng's Cavalry Division on the right of the 1st Corps. The 7th Infantry Division (Capper's) was to " con- form generally " to the movements of the 1. Corps, iis for the Cavalry Corps and the III. and II. Corps on the north and south bank'^ of the Lys, they were to remain on the defensive. The forces which the enemy had accumulated on their front precluded ai^}' other course. The Lahore Division of the Indian Expeditionary Force was arrivmg in its concentration area in rear of the II. Corps on October 19 and 20. The I. Corps on October 20 reached a line from Elverdinghe to the cross-roads one-and-a- half miles north-west of Zonnebeke. Why Sir Douglas Haig w as unable to carry out Sii- John's plan for the capture of Bruges will be described in a subsequent number. The Battle of Ypres was about to begin ; the Battle of the Yser had been in progress for foxir days. The reader must not forget that during the fighting from La Ba.ssee to Nieuport the Battles of Arras and Roye-Peronne continued to the south along a Une of about 100 miles CHAPTER XLIX. THE INTERVENTION OF TURKEY, Turkey and Greece — The Crtsts in 1914 — German Policy at Constantinoplk — Great Britain and Turkish Ships — Goeben and Breslau in the Dardanelles — Grand Vizier's Promises of Neutrality — Diplomatic Negotiations — Abolition of the Capitulations — Germany Forces War — Entente Ambassadors Leave Turkey. WHEN the European crisis gi-ew to a head in the closing days of July, 1914, it obscured a minor, but very acute, crisis between Turkey and Greece, which seemed to mean that we were on the eve of a war between those two countries. There had been a series of shameless persecutions of Greek Christians in Asia Minor, and there still remained as a legacy from the war of the Balkan Allies against Turkey the question of the future ownership of the islands of the Dode- canese. The dispute was further aggravated by a contest for naval supremacy. Turkey had ordered two battleships in England, which were expected to be ready for delivery in the autumn, but Greece had retaliated, and fore- stalled her rival, by the purchase of two cruisers from the United States Government, which were expected to reach Greek waters at the end of July. Both countries had British naval missions hard at work, increasing the efficiency of their fleets, and it was obvious that if war were declared in the summer the arrival of the American cruisers would give the advantage in the Aegean Sea to Greece, while if Turkey protracted the crisis until the delivery of the British-built Dreadnoughts a superiority, at least in tonnage and in guns, woukl rest with Vol. JIT.— Part 28. Turkey. M. Venezelos, who always showed high qualities of moderation and statesmanship, made a final and, as it was then believed, despairing attempt to compose the quarrel. A meeting was arranged to take place at Brussels between M. Venezelos and Prince Said Halim Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizier. M. Venezelos duly left Athens for Brussels, and proceeding up the Adriatic to Trieste reached Munich. The Grand Vizier, however, who was to have left Constantinople at the same time, \\ as so much impressed by the growing gravity of the crisis that he failed to keep his engagement, and did not leave Constantinople. By the time M. Venezelos had reached IMunich the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia had been launched. Europe was on the eve of wai-. and the railways in Austria and Serbia were already in the hands of the military authorities. Greater evils drive out loss, and not the least astounding result of the outbreak of the groat war in Europe was the fact that the minor danger of war between Greece and Turk(\\- disappeared for a time. Yet neither country could be indifferent to the great conflagration, and here, too, as might have been ex]jfcted, their sympathies were on opposite sides, Turkey had for years past been to all intents and pur- 41 42 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE SULTAN Leaving the Mosque after the declaration of war. poses a member of the Triple Alliance, and if not a very effective partner she had in hei' sjTnpathies been a much more real ally of Germany and Austria than had Italy — the nominal third member of the Triple Alliance. It IS true that there was somewhat of a diplo- matic tangle. With Italy Turkey was at war from 1911 to 1912, and with Austrian diplomacy also she had had stormy passages in recent years, notably after the Young Turk Revolution when the Dual Monarchy in October, 1908, suddenly declared the annexation of the already occupied provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with Germany, since the advent of William II. to the throne, she had increasingly intimate relations. Bismarck may have declared that the Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, but in this domain as in others Bismarck's politics were entirely discarded in modern Prussia. It had been long decided that Ger- many was to be Turkey's patron. In the days of Abdul Hamid's tj-ranny it was a simple matter to buy the Palace clique at Yildiz Kiosk, and by this means she had begun the policy of securing political and commercial ascendancy, of advancing her trade interests, and of exploit- ing the great mineral wealth of the Empire. The Kaiser himself went to Constantinople and visited Palestine, for it was to Asiatic Turkey that Germany's longing eyes were turned. " Peaceful penetration " was her method, and with the ever pecuniarily embarrassed Turk she found many oppor- tunities of strengthening her hold in his country. To build and own his railways, to be his banker, to teach his soldiers drill, to sell him Kriipj) guns, and to dominate his dii)lomacy, wore the objects which she pursued, in the hope that one day, either by some dramatic turn of events or gradually and almost imperceptibly, the Sultan's sceptre in Asia would pass from the feeble Oriental grasp into her own firm hands. The advent to po%%er of the Young Turks in 1908 temporarily checked the march of German influence at Constantinople, and the friends of Abdul Hamid were out of comt. But Germany had the good fortune to be represented at Constantinople by Baron IMarschall von Bieber- stein, a singularly able diplomatist, who rapidly gained the confidence of the new party, and cleverly represented to it that whether Old Turks or Young Turks were in power the interests of the Empire in its relations with foreign Powers remained precisely the same, and that, whatever might have been the defects of Abdul Hamid's internal adminLstration, his foreign policy had been conducted with real regard to the safety of his country. Yet it THE GROWN PRINCE OF TURKEY (centre). THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 43 CONSTANTINOPLE, Showing the Golden Horn and Stambul. might have been apparent that this was pre- cisely the reverse of the truth. For Abdul Hamid, in his long years of feeble tyrannj', had not only brought Turkey to the direst straits internally but had greatly imperilled her international position, exposed her to a long series of humiliations and severely tried and chilled the once wann and well tried friendship of Great Britain and France, the two naval Mediterranean Powers which held Turkey in the hollow of their hands. The Aiistrian annexation of Bosnia and the Italian declaration of war against Turkey placed Germany in an exceedingly difficult position, but she managed to maintain her influence at Constantinople through these trying periods. Then came Turkey's disastrous war with the Balkan Allies, in which Germany's sympathies were on the side of Turkey, though German friendship was confined entirely to good wishes and Turkey was left to stomach her defeats as best she iniglit. There follo\M'd the war between Bulgaria and her former Allies, Serbia and Greece, and when^ at its conclusion, the Treaty of Bukarest was made, the German Emperor busied himself to secure the retention of Adrianople by Turkey. Doubt - less he and the German General Staff had been sadly disillusioned as to the military capabilities of their friends, but they were still determined to continue their old programme of exploiting Turkey, and they had a definite plan for dragging her into the European conflict whicli was not far distant. When at last the Great War broke out it became evident that Turkish neutrality was not likely to endure for long. Complications, also, very soon sprang up. On August 3 Sir Edward Grey instructed I\Ir. Beaumont, the British charg6 d'affaires, to inform the Turkish Goveriunent that Great Britain do- sired to take over the Tiu-kish battlecship, 44 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE bHElJvH-LL.lSLAM PROCLAIMING A HOLY WAR. Sultan Osman, then under construction by Messrs. Armstrong, Wliitworth, and Co. The . Grand Vizier gave an assiu-ance that Turkey intended to observe .a strict neutrality, and explained that the Turkish mobilization, already begun, had been ordered only because it would take months to complete, and because the Government wished not to be taken by surprise in case of any aggression. Sir Edward Grey replied by expressing his conviction that the Turkish Government would understand the necessity for Great Britain to keep in England all warships available for England's own use, and gave an assiu-ance that all financial and other loss to Turkey would receive due consideration. Fiu-ther, he added that if Tiu-kex- remained neutral no alteration would be made in the status of Egypt. Germany, however, rapidly thickened the plot. At 8.30 p.m. on August 10 the German warships Goeben and Breslau reached the Dardanelles. It was the duty of Tiu-key. as a neutral Power, to see that they did not pa.ss through, and that they should either leave before twenty-four hoiu^, or be disarmed and laid up. The next day the world was astonished by the news that the Ottoman Government had bought the Goeben and Breslau. The Grand Vizier informed the British charge d'affaires that the piurchase was due to Great Britain's detention of the battleship Sultan Osman. Turkey, he said, must have a shjp to bargain with in regard to the question of the Islands on equal terms with Greece, and he declared that the purchase was not due to any intention to make war upon Russia. At the same time he asked that the British Naval Mission might be allowed to remain. To tlus request Sir Edward Grey replied that if the crews of the Goeben and Breslau were returned at once to Germany there would be no need to withdraw the Naval Mission. Thereupon Admiral Limpus received a message that crews would be made up for the Goeben and Breslau, and that there was no mtention of sending the two slups outside the Sea of INIarmora until the end of the war. This was on August 14, but on the very next day Admiral Limpus and all the officers of the British Naval Mission were suddenly replaced m theu" executive command by Turkish officers and were ordered, if they remained, to work at the ^Ministry of Marine. A dehghtful Turkish explanation of this volte face was given by the Grand Vizier, who, on the following day, solemnly assured Great Britain that Turkish neutrality would be THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 45 maintained. A certain number of German experts would be left on tlie Goeben and Breslau, owing to the inability of the Turks to liandlo tliese ships themselves. " It would,"' fie declared, " have been an impossible position for Admiral Limpus if he had had under his direct orders a mixed crew of Turks and Germans, and perhaps the reason of his with- drawal fj-oiu executive command may lie in this consideration." The Grand Vizier, who daily distributed smooth assurances to the Ambassadors of the I']ntente Powers, may have been weakly anxious to preserve neutrality, wliile the \Var IMinister, Enver Pasha, carried on a strong propaganda in favour of immediate adhesion to the Triple Alliance. Not only was the army mobilized, but a new field of mines was laid in tiie Dar- danelles in the first week of August, ajid warlike preparations were daily more and more in evidence. The attitude of England was one of marked forbearance. On Avigust Iti the British charge d'affaires was instructed, as were his colleagues of the Entente, to declare to the Turkish Government that if Turkey would observe strict neutrality during the war, England, France, and Russia would uphold her independence and integrity against any enemies that might wish to use the European conflict in order to attack her. When the British Ambassador, Sir Louis ]\Tallet, wlio TALAAT BEY, Minister of Interior. had been on leave at the outbreak of the European War, returned to his post he tele- graphed to Sir Edward Grey, on August 18, that he had been aacorded a moHt cordial reception by the Gi'and Vizier, and that though the situation was delicate he had CROWD LISTENING TO THE READING OF THE PROCLAMATION. :s - 2 46 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A VIEW OF THE BOSPHORUS. great hopes that if His Majesty's Govern- ment would exercise patience it might yet be saved. In reply to his inquiry as to whether the German crews would be removed soon, and what guarantee the Grand Vizier would give that the Goeben and Breslau would be used neither against Great Britain nor Russia, the Minister replied that neither -would go into the Black Sea or the Mediterranean. Sir Louis Mallet added, " His Higlxness was much impressed and relieved when I informed him of the declaration authorized in your telegrams of August 16. He said that this wovUd be of enormous assistance to him, and he assured me that I need not be anxious lest Turkey should be drawn into war with Great Britain or with Russia. The present crisis would pas;^. I am convinced of the absolute personal sincerity of the Grand Vizier in these utterances." Nevertlieless, the fissure between the two parties was so great that on August 19 Sir Louis Mallet telegraphed : '"In view of the possibility of a coup d'etat being attempted with the assistance of the Goeben in cooperation with the military authorities under German influence, who exercise complete control, I wish to inake it clear that in my opinion the presence of the British Fleet at the Dardanelles is wise. I am anxious to avoid any misunderstanding as to the gravity of the situation notuith- ptanding the assurances received from the Grand Vizier." In order to avoid a conflict Sir Edward Grey was prejiarcd to go so far as to recogiuzo the sale of the Goeben and Breslau provided it were a genuine one. He informed the Turkish Ambassador in London tliat Turkey would have nothing to fear f roin , Great Britain, and tint her integrity would be preserved in any THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 47 conditions of peace which affected the Near East, provided that she preserved a real neutraUty during the war, made the Goeben and Breslau entirely Tiu'kish by sending away the German crews of those vessels, and gave all ordinary facilities to British merchant vessels. Turkey, however, greeted tills striking conces- sion in a most remarkable manner, and on August 20 Djemal Pasha, the Minister of Marine, called on Sir Louis Mallet and made the astonishing proposal that the Capitulations should be abolished immediately, that the two Turkish battleships acquired by Great Britain at the outbreak of war should l^e returned immediately ; that interference in the internal affairs of Turkey should be re- nounced ; that Western Thrace should be restored to Turkey if Bulgaria were to join the Triple Alliance, and that the Greek Islands should be restored. Even in the face of these extraordinary demands Sir Edward Grey replied that he did not wish to refuse all dis- cussion, and the English, French and Russian Ambassadors addressed the following communi- cation to the Porte : " If the Turkish Govern- ment will repatriate immediately the German officers and crews of the Goeben and Breslau, will give a written assvirance that all facilities shall b3 furnished for the peaceful and uninterrupted passage of merchant vessels, and that all the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by Turkey during the present war, the three' allied Powers will in return agree, with regard to the Capitulations, to withdraw their extra- territorial jurisdiction as soon as a scheme of judicial administration which will satisfy modern conditions is set up. They will, fiu"ther, give a joint guarantee in writing that they will respect the independence and integrity of Tiu-key, and will engage that no conditions in the terms of peace at the end of the war shall prejudice this independence and integrity." This remarkable pronouncement was made in vain. The war party in the Cabinet, although in a minority, relied on the guns oi the Goeben to overawe the Sultan himself, if necessary, and continued to drive their im- willing colleagues. On September 9 the Porte sent a Note to the Powers, in which it announced the abolition of the Capitulations, as from October 1. Even the German and Austrian Ambassadors made a show of resenting this unwarrantable act, and on the following day identical Notes were addressed by the six Great Powers to the Sublime Porte, in which it was pointed out that the capitulatory regime was not an autonomous institution of the Empire, but the resultant of inter- national treaties, diplomatic agreements and contractual acts of different kinds. It could not, therefore, be abolished without the con- sent of the contracting parties, and, in the RECRUITS AND RESERVISTS FROM PALESTINE, on the lett ; Regulars oa the right. 43 THi: TIMES HISTORY OF IHE WAIL SIR LOUIS MALLET, British Ambassador at Constantinople. absence of any understanding between the Ottoman Clovernnient and their respective Governments, the Ambassadors refiLsed to recognize the executive force of a vuiilateral decision of the SubUme Porte. The whole area of the Dardanelles, Con- stantinople, and the Bosphorus w«u» rapidly becoming neither more nor less than a German enclave. Special trains full of Ciennan sailors with officers were run through Bulgaria, and by tiic end of August the total passed tlirough, over and above the original crews of the Goeben and the Breslau, was over six hundred. In addition to these, many German military reservists arrived, and were posted to garrison the Dardanelles forts. The German admiral on board the Goeben and the German Govern- ment were the absolute masters of the situation and were in a position to force the hand of the Turks at anj^ moment which might suit them, and steady pressure was exerted to prepare public opinion for hoslihties. Sir Louis Mallet, m the dispatch wherein on his return to London he summarized the events which led up to the final rupture of diplomatic relations, showed clearly enough the methods employed. German success in the Eiu'opean war was said to be assured. The perpetual menace to Tvirkey from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely alliance \\ ith Germany and Austria. Egj'pt might be re- covered for the Empire. India and other ^Moslem countries, rejaiesented as groaning under Christian rule, might be kindled mto a iiame of infinite possibilities for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey would emerge from the war the one Great Power of the East, even TURKISH TROOPS LEA\ING FOR THE FRONT. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 49 as Germany would be the one Great Power of the West. Every agency which could be used to stimulate public opinion and to inflame it against the Allies was set at work, with the connivance, and often with the cooperation, of the Turkish authorities. All the Turkish newspapers in C'onstantinople became German organs ; they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany or Austria and minimized every disaster or reverse. The semi'official telegra^jhi.? agency, which was practically p. department of tlie Ministry of the Interior, was placed at the disposal of the German propa- ganda. Through all these channels unhmited vise was made of Tiu-key's one concrete grievance against Great Britain as distinguished from other European Powers, the detention of tlie two Dreadnoughts, the Sultan Osman and the Reshadie. The populace had contributed freely to the fund raised by voluntary subscription to defray the cost of these much-desired vessels, and there is no doubt that bi1t(>r disappointment was felt when the turn of events prevented or postponed their acquisition. The "Committee of Union and Progress," the chief organization of the Young Turk Movement, which had its origin in Salonika, had been torn by many intrigues and feuds since its first great public triumph in 1908. But a rump remained of which the most powerful members were Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, Djemal Pasha, the ^linister of Marine, Talaat Bey, the Minister of the Interior, and Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance. Of these Djavid Bey alone was a champion of neutrality, and Berlin, finding his opposition uncompromising, in the end forced his resignation. Enver Pasha was an open and whole -liearted partisan of Germany. Talaat Bey, described by Sir Louis Mallet as " the most powerful civiUan m the Cabinet and the most conspicuous of the Committee leaders," was no less real an adherent, though it was not till early in October that he was openly reckoned as a member of the war party.. Djemal Pasha, likewise, wore the mask of neutrality for long, but only in order to attempt to conceal the pre]iarations which were being made. Against these, at least apparently, were ranged the Sultan, the Heir Apparent, the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, and the remaining members of the Ministry — enough to constitute a clear majority against a desperat(> \'enture, but unfortunately the majority' had no means of asserting itself against the folly of the TEWFIK PASHA, Turkish Ambassador !n London, leaving the Embassy. fire-eaters, who in the last resort were prepared to train the guns of the Goeben upon Con- stantinople itself. Both the j)ro-Germans and the Germans themselves, however, were anxious to retain the Grand \'izier in office if possible, and to avoid a coup d'etat. As Sir Louis Mallet later pointed out, it was clearly only as an extreme step that the Monarch whom Pan-Islamic pro-C!ermans acclaimed as the hope of Islam, and whom the devout in some places had been taught to regard a-s hardly distinguishable from a true belie\'er, would run the risk of scandalizing the Moslem world, whom he hoped to s(!t ablaze to the undoing of J'^ngland, Russia, and France, by using the guns of the Goeben to force the hands of the Sultan-Calij)li. On September :21 I lie I'ritish Ambassador saw the Sultan for the last lime, au'l read to him a personal message from King Ccorge, who ex]iress(>d his profound r(>gret that "' the exigencies of unforeseen circumstances " had compelled (Jreat IJritain to detain tlu> two 50 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. MOBILIZATION. Marching into Constantinople to join the Colours. warships intended for the Turkish Navy, and expressed the hope that the decision to return these vessels to Turkey at the end of the European War would suffice to prove that their detention was dvie to " no unfriendly intention towards an Empire bound to vis by a friendship of more than a century." " My Sovereign," said the Ambassador, " trusts that Turkey will do nothing to prevent his Government from acting up to this decision, that she will maintain strict and absolute neutrality during the present war, and tliat there will be no delay in putting an end to certain facts contrary to neutrality which have caused some anxiety as to the attitude of the Turkish GoN^ernment." Tlie Sultan listened to his communication in silence until the Master of the Ceremonies translated the clause containing the words " certain facts contrary to neutrality." He then broke in with an eager disclaimer of any unneutral conduct on the part of Turkey. The rest of this interesting interview is best recorded in the Ambassador's o\\ n ^vords : On my mentioning, as a specific instance, the retention of German officer's and crews on board the Goeben and Breslau, His Majesty explained with some lucidity that they had been kept for a short time to train the Turkish crews. Tlie " captains " available in the Turkish Navy were unequal to the task, and it was necessary for that reason to do what had been done. The German crews would be sent away in " five or ten days," and the officers also. Only one or two of the latter would be retained. He would speak franklj', he said. Great Britain was a great Power with a great navy, and had no need of the two ships of the Ottoman fleet. Great Britain had taken them, but he knew they would be given back at the end of the war. On my remarking that Great Britain wished to make absolutely sure of the position at sea, the Sultan again said that she was too great a maritime Power to need these ships, but he once more stated his conviction that they would be given back. Anyhow, he and hia Government were not going to depart from their neutrality. His Majesty repeated this more than once, saying that they knew that that was the only path of safety, and that his great desire was to keep the peace. He laid stress on the friendship between Great Britain and Turkey. This was the more striking, because the words were not put into his mouth, as might be sup- posed, by myself, the Master of Ceremonies having quite failed to render the parts of my communication in which I dwelt on past relations between England and Turkey. When referring to what the Sultan had said about the need for training his navy, 1 expressed regret that the British naval mission had not been allowed to complete that task. His Majesty did not seem to grasp the main point, but on mj' referring to the circum- stances of Admiral Limpus's departure, he broke in with some emotion, and said twice over that it was not by his wish that the admiral had left Constantinople with- out an audience. The admiral had not asked for one or come to the Palace. Had he done so he, tho Sultan, would have postponed all other business in order to see him. I said I would convey this to Admiral Limpus. I also promised to communicate the Sultan's assurances, which I said I sincerely believed, to the King, who would be gratified at receiving them. Just before I took my leave. His Majesty was good enough to express his warm personal regard, and made some further kind remarks about the value which he attached to his personal relations with me. The Sultan spoke throughout in the most homely language, but with great liveliness and point, and with obvious sincerity. His assurances about his desire to observe neutrality and remain at peace rather lost than gained in force by the way in which tho Master of Ceremonies (whose mind is slow and whose French is defective) translated them. His remarks on the embargo on the two ships were plainly, but not discourteously or resent- fully, worded. Amongst the " facts contrary to neutrality " there was much more than the case of the THE TIMES HIS'J^OEY OF THE WAR. 51 Goeben and tlie Breslau. British merchant vessels carrying cargoes from Russia to the Mediterranean liad throughout August been subjected to delays and searches at the Dar- danelles, and for one incident at the harbour of Chanak the Turldsh Government had been oompelled to tender an apology. On the other hand, the case of the Goeben and Breslau had compelled the British Navy to keep a close watch at the entrance of the Straits, which greatly perturbed the Turks. On September 26 a Turkish destroyer was stopped outside the Dardanelles and turned back. Thereupon the Commandant of the Dardanelles closed the Straits, and in spite of assurances given by the Grand Vizier they were not re-opened. The Goeben and the Breslavi made cruises in the Black Sea, and niimerous German vessels, of which the most important were the Corco- vado and the General, served as auxiliaries to tliis German Black Sea Fleet. Secret com- munications with the German General Staff were established early in August by means of the wireless apparatus of the Corcovado, which was anchored opposite the German Embassy at Therapia. Other German ships played with the Turkish flag as they pleased, in order to facilitate their voyages, or cloak their real character while in port, and a department was constituted at the German Embassy for the purpose of requisitioning supplies for the use of the German Govermnent and their ships. By the middle of September it was calculated that there wei-e over 4,000 German soldiers and sailors in Constantinople alone. The oflficers of the German military mission, under General Liman von Sanders, displayed " a ubiquitous activity," and were the main organizers of preparations in S^Tia which directly menaced Egypt, and became a source of pre-occupation and a theme of remonstrance to the British Government. In October a new weight was cast into the scale by the importation of large quantities of bulUon consigned to the German Ambassador, and delivered under military guard at the Deutsche Bank. The total amount was esti- mated at £4,000,000. A definite arrangement was arrived at with the war group of ^Ministers that as soon as the financial provision reached a certain figure Turkey could be called upon to declare war. The attempt to win over the Grand Vizier and induce him to make the declaration was finally abandoned, and by the last week in October it was decided that drastic steps to provoke the outbreak must be taken. On October 29 it was reported from Cairo that an armed body of 2,000 Bedouins had made an incursion into the Sinai peninsula, and occupied the wells of Magdala, and that their objective was an attack on the Suez BEDOUIN INFANTRY 62 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Barrat!. PRINCE SAID HALIM PASHA, Grand Vizier, and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Canal. On the uiorning of the same daj' three Turkish tori)edo-boats raided Odessa harbour, sank the Russian guardship Donetz, damaged the French ship Portugal, killing two of the crew, and also damaged three Russian steamers. Some loss of life was caused m tlie town itscUf hy sliell-fire. Tlieodosia was likewise bom- barded. The British Ambas.sador records that it was certain that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the German admiral on the evening of October 27. Tlie grave new.s reached Constantinople on the after- noon of October 2!». .M. Bompard, the French Ambassador, and Sir i^ouis Mallet immediately called on M. de Giers, their Russian colleague, and decided to ask for authority from their Governments to confront the Porte with the alternative of the rupture of diplomatic rela- 1 ions or the dismissal of the German naval and military missions. In the following words the British Ambassador describes the end of that friendship of more than a century, of which Eong George had so lately and so vainly reminded the unhappy Sultan Mohammed V. : On tb.p morning of the 30th, liowevor. I learnt from my Russian colleague that he had recived instructions from his Government immediately to ask for his pass- ))orts. He had written to the Grand \'izier to ask for an interview, which his Highnt^ss had begged him to postpone until the following day owing to indisposition. The instructions of my Russian colleague being in a categorical form, he had therefore been constrained to address a note to the Grand Vizier demanding his passports ; and I and my F'rench colleague, acting on the instructions, with which the Ambassadors of the allied Power.-; had at my suggestion already been fiimLshed, to leave Constantinople simultaneously should any one of them be coinpelled to ask for his passports, owing either to a Turkish declaration of war or to some intoler- able act of hostility, decided without further delay to GENERAL LIMAN VON SANDERS (centre) AND HIS STAFF. THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. 53 IHE "BRESLAU" ("MIDILLU") Flying the Turkish flag. write to the Grand Vizier and ask in ovu- turn for inter- views to enable us to carry out these instructions. In view of his Highness'* indisposition we had not expected to be received that day, but a few hours later the Grand Vizier sent us word that he would, nevertheless, be glad to see us, and notwithstanding the excuse which he had made earlier in the day he received the Russian Ambas- sador also in the course of the afternoon. My interview with the Grand Vizier partly coincided with that of M. de Gicrs, and preceded that of JI. Bompard. It was of a painful description. His Highness convmced nie of his sincerity in disclr.iming all knowledge of oi partici- pation in the events which had led to the rupture, and entreated me to believe that the situation was even now not irretrievable. I replied that the time had passed for assurances. The crisis which I had predicted to his Highness at almost every interview which I had had with him since my return had actually occurred, and unless some adequate satisfaction were immediately given by the dismissal of the (Jerman missions, which could alone prevent the recurrence of attempts upon Egyptian territory and attacks on Russia, war with the Allies was inevitable. My Russian colleague had already demanded his passports, and I must, in pursuance of tlie instructions I had received, follow the same course. The Grand Vizier again protested that even now he could undo what the War party had done without his knowledge or consent. In reply to the doubt which I expressed as to the means at his disposal, he said that he had on his side moral forces which could not but triumph, and that he meant to fight on to the end. He did not, indeed, hint at a possibility of immediately dismissing the German mission, but he informed me tliat there wa^ to be a meeting of the Council at his hou.se that evening, when he would call upon his col- leagues to support him in his determination to avert war with the allied Towers. The Council was duly held, and, as ho had predicted, the majority of the Ministers supported the Grand Vizier, who made a strong appeal in favour of peace, and was seconded by Djavid Bey. But the powerless- ness of the Sultan's Ministers to do more than vote in the Council Chamber was evident. The question of dLsmissing the German naval oificers was discu.ssed, but no decision to do so was taken, and no Minister ventured even to propose the e.xpulsion of the military mission. In the interval the War party had sealed their resohi- tion to go forward, by publishing a conununiqu6 in which it was stated that the first acts of hostility in the Black Sea had come from the Russian side. Untrue and grotesque as it was, this invention succeeded in deceiving many of the public. It is not possible to establish by proof which of the Ministers had pre-knowledge of the German admiral's coup, but it may be regarded as certain that Enver Pasha was aware of it, and highly probable that Talaat Bey was also an accomplice. The story of a Russian provocation was plainly an afterthought, and if the oHicial report of the R\issian Government were not suiTicient to disprove it. I could produce independent evidence to show that the orders to begin hostilities wei-e given at the mouth of the Bosphorus on the evening of October 27 as the result of a conspiracy hatched between the German representatives in Constantinople and a small luid un- scrupulous Turkish faction. My Russian colleague loft C-instantinoplo without incident on the evening of October ,"{]. Jly own departure was eventually arranged for the following; evening, when I loft for Dcdcagatch, accompanied by my stall of sixty ollicials and their families ; the Britislj advisers in the service of the Turkish Government and some other British subjpct.s also travelled with me. My French colleague and his staff left by tlio same train. Owing to the wanton refusal of the niiliiary authorities, at the last moment to allow the depart uro of a grcvit number of British and Frencli subjects who were to- ha\(' left by an earlier train than that which liail been 28 3 54 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. DJEMAL PASHA, MINISTER OF MARINE (fifth from the right), with Turkish and German Officers on board the (" Sultan Yawuz Selim "). Goeben" placed at my disposal, the station was for some hours the scene of indescribable confusion and turmoil. My protests and those of the French Ambassador were disregarded, and after protracted discussion, we agreed to leave matters in the hands of the United States Ambassador, who undertook to use all his influence to procure the departiu-e of our fellow subjects on the following day. The " sous-chef de protocole " of the Sublime Porte and the " chef de cabinet particulier " of the Slinistry of Foreign Affairs were sent to bid farewell to M. Bompard and myself at the railway station, and two Secretaries of the Political Department of the Ministry accompanied us to the frontier. ^Ir. ^Nlorgenthau, the United States Ambas- sador, was left in charge of both French and British interests at Constantinople. The Italian Ambassador fulfilled a like function for Russia. CHAPTER L. THE TURKISH ARMY. Turkish Military System — German Reforms — Difficulties of Conscription — The Balkan Wars — The Macedonian Problem — Enver Pasha and the Revolution — Sketch of the Young Turk Movement — Enver's Career — German Intrigues — The Liman Military IVIission — Its Difficulties — Peace Strength of the Army — Distribution of Army Corps. OF all military forces in Eiirope the Turkish Army is the most difficult to estimate with any approach to accuracy. No Government by skilful artifice could be inore successful in baffling the curiosity of the outsider than is the Turk by the simpler means of statistical incompetence and a natural disinclination to make practice march with theory. In the years immediately preceding the war the army had been subjected to a series of successive reforms, carried out under the guidance of German officers, and no exact accounts were ever published of the extent or nature of these reforms. Indeed, it may be said with confidence that so great was the tangle of Turkish military administration, so incompetent and weak the central control over provincial commands, contractors, and remote officials, that the German reorganizers of the Tiu-kish Army must themselves have had but an inaccurate knowledge of the reserves in men and material at their disposal. There are many signs that, over a long period of years, both before and after the l^alkan Wars, and into the present campaigns, they had con- sistently overestimated the military possi- bilities of modern Turkey. Theoretically the Turkish system bore a general resemblance to that of the rest of Europe. The principle of conscription had long been recognized, but during the reign of Abdul Hamid the Christian population of the Empire was not allowed to serve in the army and was forced to pay a heavy tax instead. ^Vith the advent of the Young Turks to power there came a supposed change, and under the Constitution Christians were liable for military service. The Balkan Christian, as might have been expected, did not prove a very enthu- siastic defender of the Sultan's power, and the Turks complained bitterly that in the battles of Kirk ICilisse and Lule Burgas, fought in the Tliracian campaign of 1912, the Christian soldiers deserted in large numbers to the Bulgarian standard. The Balkan War and the treaties of London and Bukarest deprived Turkey of the most w arlike Christian population of the p]mpire. The Ainnenian and the Syrian added little strength, and since the disasters of 1912 and 1913 the Yoimg Turldsh experiment of using Christian material had been discredited. 3i> 56 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Jews figured in the army, but they were not a very important element, and in the main it may be said that the Turkish Government had to rely tor its defence upon a system of conscription applied only to the Musulmans of the Empire. This statement, unfortunately for the Turk, requires another important qualification, for the Turlcish writ ran but lamely amongst the Arab provinces. The Yemen had for many years been in a state either of active or simmer- ing rebellion, and instead of being a source of supply had been a grave for fine battalions of the Tiu-kish Army. It may be calculated that out of an Empire which may be estimated as containing 20,000,000 inhabitants the Turkish Anpy could only draw soldiers from a population of some 8,000,000 — men, women, and children. Men were liable for service from twenty to forty years of age. Nine years were spent with the First Line or Active Service Army, of which in the case of infantry three were with the colours, in the case of cavalry and artillery foiu- ; six and five years respectively were spent in the reserve. Nine years were spent in the Redif, or reserve of the active troops (Nizam). There was, properly speaking, no second line, and the Redif corresponded to the German Landwehr. The last two years were spent in the Territorial Militia (Mustafiz). This line is sometimes referred to as the Landstuim, but it possessed no cadres in peace time, and was most generally found without arms in war time. In principle a Turkish Army Corps con- sisted of three divisions or thirty battalion.s. It had thirty batteries of field, three of horse, and three of mountain artillery. A battery had six guns, and each corps had 216 guns. A field battery had four officers, and 120 non- commissioned officers and men ; a mountain battery had three officers and 100 non-com- missioned officers and men, and a howitzer battery had four officers and 120 non-com- missioned officers and men. There were eleven battalions in all of jDioneers, railway troops, telegraph troops, sappers and miners, etc. There were in 1912 140 quick-firing Krupp mountain guns of 7'5 cm., the majority of which fell into the hands of Bulgars, Serbs, and Greeks. Since then, however, 108 Schneider quick-firing mountain gvms were received from France, and the Austrian Skoda Works had doubtless by the date when Turkey entered the war delivered the large order given them for 10' 5 cm. quick- tiring howitzers. Many batteries had, instead of the regulation T'f) cm. quick-firing Krupp field gim, the old pattern field gun of 8-7 cm. In October, 1912, only eight army coqjs took the field, and these lost the greater part of their field artillery. Under German reorganization most of the batteries seemed to have fovir guns, but some had six ; a four - company organization appeared -iPt 4 % TUKKISH CAMEL TRANSPOKT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 57 TURKISH AHivOi'LANIi ABoUT TO tL\ FKOai Si. STEFAiNO TO CONSl AN TiNOPLE. to have replaced the old five-company battalion. The infantry of the first line was armed with a 7*65 mm. Manser magazine rifle. The Redifs were supjjosed to have the same, but many had the 9*5 mm. Mauser, and the supply was eked out with Martini-Henrys. The cavalry consisted in 1912 of 40 regiments, or 200 squadrons, of 70 men, arn:\ed with a sabre and a Mauser carbine. One of the peculiar institutions created and fostered by Abdul Hamid was the Hamidian cavalry. They con- sisted of bands of Asiatic tribesmen, chiefly Kurds, whose official business was to protect the frontiers that look towards Russia and Persia, but whose actual duty, carried out with great zest, was to make life a burden to the Christian inhabitants of the Armenian vilayets, where they slaughtered, pillaged and ravaged to their hearts' content. Under the Turco- German reform scheme the Hamidian cavalry were abolished, and 24 regiments of tribal cavalry, organized on a militia system from the Kurdish and Arab tribes in Asia Minor, were substituted for it. The leopard, however, does not change its spots, and the Kurdish tribal cavalryman, whether styled Hamidian or not, probably remained very much as he was. The Minister of War was entirely responsible for the army, but he was assisted by the Chief of the General Staff, and by an Under-Secretary, or Musteshar, who was always a general officer. The General Staff department consisted of four sections, and outside these there was a director- general of military factories, a sort of master- general of ordnance, who was formerly coin- pletely independent, but was made by the Young Turks subordinate to the Minister of War. He still had his own independent budget, which was presented separately to Parliament. For the last two years, however, before the war tlio authority of the ]Ministor of War had been daily abdicated in favour of General Liman von Sandars, otlierwise known as Liman Pasha, who was the chief of a very numerous German military mission to Turkey. The history of European reform in the Turkish Army is a long record of failure. During the Crimean W^ar, when Turkey and Great Britain were allies, British officers in considerable numbers were accredited to the Turkisli Army, and succeeded, temporarily, in the face of intrigue, corruption, jealousy, and heart-breaking obstacles of every kind, in working considerable improvement and in nuvlving good use ox the always magnificent material which the Turkish Army provided. The story of General Fenwick \\'illiams' heroic defence of Kars is a typica\ example of the work which Englishmen were called upon to do and of the tremendous obstacles which they had to fight, but there have been many minor parallels to this striking and well-known case. Williams was sent to Kars as a British Commis- 58 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. TURKISH INFANTRY. sioner, and, strictly speaking, his only duties uere to transmit to his own Government a report of the state of affairs in the Turkish camp. He arrived in the autumn of 1854, and it is more than probable that, if he had confined himself to his duties, there would have been no Turlcish Army in the following year. But this remarkable man, who had spent the greater part of his life in the East and had been many years in Turkey, was not content to be an observer in such critical hours. He saw the key of Turkey in Asia defended by an armed rabble, which had already been ruined by its own officers and was rapidly dissolving owing to plunder and peculation. The position which he found was " an innovation in all military science." The artillery was nearest the enemy, the infantry close to the city, and the cavalry far away southwards on the road to Erzrum. The Commander-in-Chief was supposed to have a Staff, but the only plan of operations in his mind was the vague one that he had to fight the Giaours. When the news was spread that a British Commissioner was arriving there were frantic efforts made to burnish up accoutrements and introduce a little order into the camp, but ^Villiams was not to be deceived. He at once interfered, and, as has been well said, he thereby committed a breach of etiquette, but saved Asia Minor. Instead of accepting the muster- rolls of the troops which were handed to him, he had the men counted, and, suramoning to his presence all the gang of corrupt officers and contractors, he called them sternly to account and immediately establislied a strong personal ascendancy which he never afterwards lost. In all the history of Turkish official corrup- tion there has been no more disgraceful instance than that of Kars in the Crimean War. The Englishmen in the town came to the conclusion that, dishonesty was the only system which appeared to be well organized. They were, in fact, thoroughly disgusted with their allies and acquired a great respect for their enemies, the Russians. Then, as now, the Armenians were strongly on the side of Russia, and one of Williams' officers records that the Tsar, throughout all his vast dominions, did not possess more staunch and zealous partisans than these Ottoman subjects. But, he added, *' our indignation at their open and industrious partisanship in favour of the enemy was somewhat modified when we heard of the wrongs and oppressions which had been abundantly heaped on them." In spite of lies, treachery, and cholera within, and of the complete failure of Omar Pasha to relieve him from the coast or Selim Pasha 'from Erzrum, Wilhams held the fortress till the end of November, 1855, when at last he was compelled to surrender. Later on another Englishman, General Valentine Baker, known as Baker Pasha, established, like Williams, a strong personal influence over the Turks, and during the Russo -Turkish War of 1877-8 achieved a great military position. Yet so great was the Turks' distrust of foreigners that Baker complained THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 59 that up to the end liis authority could only be exercised in an indirect manner, and that he was never actually allowed to command troops or to give a direct order. A similar bitter experience befell the officers who at various times were the instruments of the refonn schemes of the great Powers in Tiu-key. Their work, it is true, was not in the army, but in the gendarmerie, but what is true for one is true for the other. Owing to the turbulent state of the Empire and its lack of cohesion, it was necessary to maintain a large gendarmerie, and the force consisted actually of some 42,000 men, of whom 16,000 were mounted. After the BerUn Treaty in 1878, British officers under Baker Pasha for a short time attempted to reorganize the gen- darmerie in the Armenian vilayets. They did extremely good w'ork, and their presence afforded a measure of protection to the op- pressed Armenians, but their successes were rather those of military Consuls than of com- manding officers, for they were unable to get the reins of power into their own hands, and shortly after INIr. Gladstone's return to office in 1880 they were withdrawn for some reason which has never been sufficiently set forth. In 1903 the Emperors of Russia and Austria met at Miirsteg, at a shooting box of the latter, and devised a programme for reform in Mace- donia. As a result of this, the Macedonian vilayets were divided into sectors, and Austrian, British, French, Italian and Russian officers were sent to undertake the reform of the gen- darmerie. Germany refused to participate in this scheme, in order to avoid giving offence to Abdul Hamid, to whom all attempts at reform were thoroughly distasteful. The officers of the foreign Powers, in spite of stupendous difficulties, succeeded in effecting a certain measure of reform, and the British in their sector at least managed to turn the gendarmerie into a smart, well-dressed and well-drilled force, for which the insistence of the Powers seciored regular pay. Nevertheless, the Sultan obsti- nately refused to allow any foreign officer to have any executive authority whatever, or to issue a single order. But the British took charge of the gendarmerie training school at Salonika, and in this manner succeeded in working wonders with the recruits, and thereby benefiting the gendarmerie throughout the sectors. This gendarmerie reform scheme had tre- mendous political and military consequences, and was, indeed, the spark which kindled the amazing Young Ttu-k Revolution of 1908. The presence of European officers and the forcible imposition of reform from without were in- supportable mortifications to the Turks and established in the army a bitter hatred of the corrupt Hamidian rule at Yildiz Kiosk, which by its feeble tjTanny was exposing the Empire to a long series of humiliations. The smartness A TURKISH OFFICER WITH BEDOUIN SOLDIERS. »;(i THH TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. TURKISH SOLDIERS GROSSING THE EUPHRATES. of the gen»larmerie force under foreign officers, although their authority was hampered at every turn, was the most striking demonstration of the Turkish Government's ineptitude. The contrast between the condition of the gen- darmerie luider foreign officers and of the unpaid, ragged army under their own shiftless rulers was a very unpalatable one for both officers and men. There was also a conviction among the Turks in INIacedonia, more parti- cularly at Salonika, that the Sultan's handling of the Macedonian question would inevitably end in the loss of the whole of European Turkey. The meeting between King Edward and the Tsar at Reval, in June, 1908, when Macedonia \Aas the subject of discussion and Russia and Great Britain agreed upon the necessity of imposing a much more drastic reform scheme, brought to a climax the anxieties of the Young Turks for the future, and in the following July they struck their blow. It was in this Revolution that the much-discussed Enver Pasha, later to become Minister of War, made his first public appear- ance. It is commonly but inaccurately .supposed that he received his education abroad, and he is often referred to as a product of German training. It is, however, a fact that until he took up his post as military attache in Berlin after the Yoimg Turk Revo- lution Enver hnd not been in Western Europe at all. He w!i.s bom and educated in Con- stantinople, and wa,s a product of the Con- stantinople military school. He later learnt to speak and write both (ierman and English, but in 1908 his only foreign language was French. When the Young Turks formed a secret committee at Salonika in 1905, Major Enver Bey, who was then stationed in Mace- donia and was an A.D.C. to Hilmi Pasha, the Inspector-General of the Macedonian vilayets, threw in his lot with the committee, which concentrated all its forces upon a projiaganda in t!ic arm}'. It saw plainly that a Constitution could be wrung from the Sultan only by force, and it conceived a plan for a general strike of the troops upon some very critical occasion. The Third Army Corps, which was stationed both in Macedonia and in the vilayet of Smyrna, was the special field of its operations, and the propaganda spread like wildfire among the officers. Small local committees were formed wherever there was a garrison of any kind. An infinity of trouble was lavished upon this secret society. Books could only be smuggled in with great difficulty, and officers sat up at night stud3dng these perilous works, ransacking the literature of secret societies and the history of the French and other revolu- tions. The Balkans themselves provided models, and Prince Ypsilanti's Greek Hetairia, formed during the Greek struggle for independence, and the modern Macedonian and Bulgarian internal organizations w^ere models fertile in suggestions. A ritual of signs and counter- signs was created and Freemasons' lodges were also formed. These mysterious activities natu- rally could not continue indefinitely without coming to the notice of Abdul Hamid's spies, and in March, 1908, a series of raids was made and a Commission was sent from Constanti- nople to procure evidence against suspected persons. vSo widespread, however, had the conspiracy become amongst army officers and Government officials that it continued imabated, and in the following Jvuie the Sultan sent another Commission to imearth the Young T\irk leaders at Salonika. One of the first to be denounced was Enver Bey. In the paradoxical fashion common in Tm-key he was promptly invited to Constantinople with a promise of high promotion upon his arrival there. He realized at once that this treacherous offer probably meant that his body, like that of many another conspirator before him, would be dropped to the bottom of the Bosphorus. He therefore THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAP I. 61 CO o u < O z o H I— H H (73 H O Z ? o C/D w l-H X CO l-H H X H PL, O < G2 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. saved himself by flight, and joined Niazi Bey, who raised the flag of revohition on JuJy 3 in the Resna hills. In the subsequent proceedings Enver appears to have had no leading part himself, but owing to his prominent position in the committee at Salonika and to his having had the honour of being denounced by Abdul Hamid he was universally acclaimed as a hero of the revo- lution, and his name was everywhere coupled with that of Niazi. In the middle of the night of July 3 Niazi, at the head of a small body of Turks from the 88th Regiment, seized the money in the battalion treasury, seventy- five Mauser rifles, and an ammunition chest. He distributed the rifles to his men and took to the hills. The same night, at Presba, Lieu- tenant Osman with the rifles and cartridges of his own detachment reached Asiunativ, where be armed the villagers and proceeded to join Niazi. Next day 200 Musulmans from Ochrida and Monastir joined the little army and swelled Niazi's force to the number of 700. On the night of the 5th the committee placarded the town of Monastir with its constitutional mam'- festo, and on the 6th the officers of the garrison deserted to Niazi with their ammunition. Bands with officers at their head visited both the Christian and Musulman villages and quickly won over the population. Niazi met with no opponents, and consequently there were no casualities except some a.ssa.ssinations at Monastir and the shooting of spies. Deser- tions of both officers and men in the gendarmerie increased daily and the Albanian bands came pouring in. Soon the officials who had remained faithful to the Government had no forces at their disposal. The Young Turk Committee decided to make a demonstration at Ochrida, and thence march on Monastir. On July 19^ the Monastir garrison, previously reinforced by two battalions from Salonika, was further inert ased by 2,500 men from Smyrna, but these soon showed themselves partisans of the revo- lution. At midnight on the 22nd Niazi entered Monastir at the head of 2,000 men, captured tlie commandant, and returned with him to Ochrida. At noon on the 23rd a vast cro« d of Musulmans and Christians, the troops, the gendarmerie, the local officials, the clergj', and 1,000 insurgents assembled on the parade ground at Monastir, and the Constitution was proclaimed with a salvo of guns. An hour after midnight, after many telegraphic messages, and in the face of Niazi's tlireat to march on Constantinople, the Sultan sent an ofticial telegram according the Constitution. At noon on Friday, July 24, Hilmi Pasha proclaimed tliis somewhat sorry concession from the steps of the Konak at Salonika. This is not the place to write the chequered history of Turkey since that eventful day, but INSTRUCTION IN THE USE OF THE GERMAN SERVICE RIFLE. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 63 it is important to notice that from that tiine forth the army, by means of which the Young Turks came to power, remained the dominating factor in Turkish politics, and it never escaped from the mastership of the small Salonika group. Within the conamittee itself there arose many feuds and factions, but a rump ever remained, the principal members of which were Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, Djemal Pasha, and, for a long time, Djavid Bey. At first it was the role of the committee to play the part of the power behind the throne, and to put forward elder statesmen as their puppets. None of the members took office, and Enver Bey disappeared to Berlin as MiUtary Attache. When the counter-revolution came, in March, 1909, he hurried back to Salonika and once more figm-ed in the Umelight beside Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, when the latter made his triumphal march to Constantinople, suppressed the counter-revolution, deposed Abdul Hamid, and put the present Sultan on the throne. After this success the Young Turks to a certain extent modified their policy, and a few of their own members accepted the responsibility of office, but in a large measure they followed their previovis procedure of acting as an irresponsible and secret jiinta, outside of the Government which they con- trolled. Enver, despite ambition, declared by many to be his principal failing, still re- frained from pressing his claims, and returned to his post at Berlin, from which in the spring of 1910 he paid a visit to London. In the autiunn of 1911 Italy suddenly declared war and Enver Bey hurried to Tripoli, where, during the later stages of the campaign, he endeavoured to organize the Arab resistance to the Italian arms. A year later Turkey, menaced by the Balkan League, patched up a hasty peace with Italy at Ouchy, just before the outbreak of the Balkan war. Enver was still in Tripoli, and so swift were the blows of the Balkan Allies and so difficult did he find his return to Constantinople — he is stated to have crossed Egypt in disguise — that he was unable to take any part in the autumn fighting, thereby escaping the odiiun of any share in a disastrous campaign. When the first Balkan Conference met in London in 1913 Enver, who was then at Constantinople, directed all his energy to preventing any peace which should involve the cession of the beleaguered city of Adrianople to the Bulgars. When the Turkish Government finally made up its mind to this tNVER PASHA, Minister of War. sacrifice he appeared at the Ministry of War at the head of a crowd of demonstrators, and in the tumult that followed Nazim Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief, was shot, apparently by Enver's own hand. The generally-accepted version is that Enver was fired upon by some- one standing directly beliind Nazim, and that drawing his revolver vipon his assailant, he shot the former by mistake. The E n per or William, at the time, spoke openly of Enver as an " assassin." In any case the immediate object of Enver was achieved. Tlie Ministry of Kiamil Pasha was ejected from oflice and Mahmovid Shevket Pasha became Grand Vizier and Minister of War. This coup d'etat took place on January 24, 1913. Mahmoud and Enver gave Nazim a military funeral, at which they appeared as principal moiu-ners. The Turkisii Government refused to cede Adrianople, negotiations in London broke down, and the second campaign began. This brought no credit to the Die- Hard Party, for Adrianople fell, and when peace was signed in London the Turks had to agree to the loss of the fortress and to accept <>4 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. PIGKHT OF TURKISH MARINES. the Enos-Midia frontier line. When; how- ever, the Balkan League broke up and Bul- garia came to blows with her former allies, Servia and Greece, while Roumania marched almost to the gates of Sofia, Enver seized the chance presented to him, and at the head of a Turkish army recaptured Adrianople. There was no one to eject them, and by the treaty of Bukarost Turkey was allowed to retain Adrian- ople. In June, 1913, just before these events, Mahmoud Shevket Pasha was assassinated as an act of vengeance for the murder of Nazim. and Enver became Minister of War, with the rank of Pasha. Prince Said Halim, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was made Grand Vizier, and still retained both posts at the outbreak of the war. As has already been said, the Young Turks' was essentially a military revolution, and it was natiu"al that the new party in power should concern itself with the question of army reform. Abdul Hamid first brought Von der Goltz Pasha to Turkey, and under the old reghne Germany was already the model for the army. The Young Turks applied to Great Britain for naval reorganizers and to Germany for their army reformers. A military mission, consisting of some twenty German officers, arrived in 1909 and set to work, but their efforts were severely hindered by the political unrest, by successive rebellions in Albania, and finally by the Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars. The culminating disaster of the Balkan War did not, however, diminish the determination of the Young Turks to proceed with army reform on German lines. Enver Pasha redoubled his efforts, and in the autumn of 1913 the German military mission was very much increased and further powers were conferred upon its new head, General Liman von Sanders. Germany accepted the invitation to undertake this new responsibility without any reference to the other Powers, and when the facts became known considerable dissatisfaction was ex- pressed. M. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, was particularly indignant, because he had liimself paid a visit to Berlin and discussed the field of international relations with the German Chancellor at the very moment when Germany had accepted the Tiu-kish invitation, yet Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg had never mentioned the matter to him. Russia accord- ingly made a formal protest, which was met by German assurances of the irmocuous chtu-acter of the German mission, but in reality Liman Pasha became mihtary dictator of Constanti- nople, a city where martial law had reigned constantly for six years. The 42 officers with which he began his mission grew to an inxmensely greater number. The Turkish War Office was entirely under their control, and no important interview could take place without the presence of a German officer, nor could any contract be signed without his approval. Scores of Germans were distributed amongst the various com- mands, and the Turkish Minister of War was apparently the willing instrument of a definite THE T1ME>^ Hl;STURY OF THE WAR, 65- attempt to make the Turkish Army simply and solely a weapon at the disposal of the Kaiser's Great General Staff. For the first time in history we had the spectacle of the Turk yielding up authority fully and freely to a foreigner. In face of all the past experience of many able soldiers — English, J^^rench, and others — it would, in any case, have been safe to predict that no such experiment could work duccessfully, that however wholehearted in his German allegiance Enver Pasha might be, the Turkish Army and the Turkish people could not be counted upon to follow his example, and that the German exercise of authority could only work with tremendous friction and with poor success. But there is no longer any need to make predictions in the matter, for much testimony has been forthcoming that the German officers were regarded with jealousy and suspicion by those in high places, were detested and despised by the rank and file of the army and the mass of the Turkish people, and had to contend against all the obstacles which Oriental apathy, ill-will, and capacity for deliberate obstruction could contrive to put in their way. They had, on the other hand, a thorough knowledge of their work, and strong determination, but they were utterly lacking in that experience of Musulman countries and that talent for the handling of native troops and tor colonial soldiering which stood Englishmen and Frenchmen in s-uch good stead in the past. It is not unconomon to hear the suggestion made that the Turkish Army had greatly decreased in efficiency since the advent of the Yoting Turks to power, and many people supposed that in Abdul Hamid's time it would have proved superior to the armies of the Balkan League. But this assiunption must not be made too lightly. The Turks were once a great conquering race, of whom all Europe stood in awe, and we cannot forget that in the seventeenth century they were at the gates of Vienna. But the qualities of generalship and leadership on land and of seamanship on sea deserted them, and the nineteenth century witnessed a progressive and obvious decay. The fighting qualities of the Turk remained and appeared to suffer no eclipse, but he was no longer led or cared for, and though we foimd the Turks brave allies in the Crimean War, courage and patience were the only military virtues they possessed. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 it was the same story. The Russians had to cross two tremendous obstacles — the Danube River and the Balkan Moiuitains — and it was in stubborn defence, assisted bj- these great barriers, and in the trenches at Plevna, that the qualities of the Turkish soldier were displayed ; but there were no signs of generalship and there was nothing worthy of TURKISH ARllLLEKY. 66 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the name of organization. Even in the Greek War of 1897, although for the most part the Turks had no enemy in front of them, they advanced with extraordinary slowness. After this, year by year, the condition of the army grew worse. It had neither pay, uniform, nor commissariat. The infantry got no musketry training and the artillery had no ammunition for their guns. When the Revolution of 1908 came, an attempt was made to reform the army, hut there was no time before the crisis arose. There were two rebellions in Albania to be suppressed, as well as an Arab revolt ; then came the war with Italy, and lastly the life-and- death struggle against the Balkan League. No country had ever been in a strategic position at all comparable to that of Bulgaria for striking a quick blow at Turkey, and in a war with Turkey time is the essence of the matter. Unlike the Russians in 1878, the Bulgarians had to cross neither the Danube nor the Balkaas. The Bulgarian Army was universally admitted to be a most efficient fighting instrument. It had been trained and disciplined for one object and one object only — to fight the Turk ; and every Bulgarian soldier believed in his heart that the day of that fight would come. The Turks had an excellent plan of campaign ready, which had been prepared for them by the Germans ; but it is one thing to have a good plan of campaign provided by someone else and another thing to have the generalship to carry it out. Abdulla Pasha, the Commander-in- Cliief, failed in 1912 against the Bulgars in Thrace precisely as Enver Pasha failed in 1915 against the Russians in the Caucasus. The plan which had been the inadequately concealed [purpose of the Turkish army manoeuvres of 1909 and 1910 was fathomed by the Bulgars, and miscarried hopelessly, being in any case put out of court by the slowness with which Abdulla developed his offensive towards Kirk Kilisse. But it is probably true, as General Savoff and the Bulgarian Staff themselves stated, that the Turldsh officers were superior, the men better fed, better clad and better trained, and their war stores and equipment of every kind more complete at the outbreak of the Balkan War than they had been for some years. It is, however, possible, although in 1912 the Turkish soldier showed liimself by no means devoid of his old qualities, that the Young Turk Revolution, the deposition of Abdul Hamid, and the spread of hberal ideas and " free thought," had lessened his simple faith in, and self-sacrificing subordination to, the powers above him, more especially the officers who led him. From the Balkan War the Turkish Army emerged manifestly weakened, but, as has been indicated, much energy was afterwards spent upon it. We may take it that General Liman von Sanders and his Staff had, at any rate, given most excellent advice as far as organization goes, and had taught strategy on sovmd principles. But possibly thej-- mada too little allowance for local conditions and for Turkish characteristics, and in any caso. however admirable their efforts, we may take it that they were hampered at every turn by a personnel none too honest, none too efficient, and none too earnest. It would be a inistake, however, not to assmne that the Turkish infantry would, as always, fight well, and in particular it could be relied upon for a stubborn defence. The Turks had always sho^vn great skill in entrenching quickly and ingeniously, and the tactics employed in 1914-15 on both sides in Flanders, for instance, were eminently suited to the Turkish miUtary genius. The Turkish gunners, on the other hand, were not remarkable for their skill, since they got no special practice, and the Turkish cavalry had few modem triumphs to its credit. The latest estimate of the total peace strength of the army in 1915 was 17,000 officers, 250,000 men, 45,000 horses, 1,500 guns, and 400 machine guns. Under the army scheme in operation since the Balkan War there were nominally four army inspections. The first had the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th army corps, with headquarters at Constantinople, Rodosto, Kirk Kilisse and Adrianople ; the second army inspection con- tained the 8th corps at Damascus and the 5th and 6th corps at centres undetermined. All the above had their complement of three divisions. The third army inspection was at Erzingliian, and included the 9th, 10th and 11th army corps at Erzrlim, Erzingliian and Van respectively. Of these the 10th corps had three divisions, but the 9th and 11th two only. The 4th army inspection was at Bagdad, and included the 12th army corps at Mosul and the 13th at Bagdad. They had two divisions. Lastly, there were the independent 14th corps, with three divisions at Sanaa, Hodeida and Ebka, and the Hedjaz division. CHAPTER LI. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS. War Strength of the Army — Fields of Operations — The Caucasus Frontier — Tims — Difficulties of a Winter Campaign — The Turkish Advance — Concentration — German Strategy — Nature of the Offensive— Envelopment Foiled — The Russian Victory — Sarikamish — Russian Naval Success — The Persian Frontier — Turks Occupy Tabriz — Russians Relieve Tabriz. WHEX the European crisis developed cat the end of July, 1914, the Turks immediately began mobili- zation. This proceeded with ex- treme slowness, but by the end of October, when Turkey herself joined in the European conflict, it was estimated by The Times Military Correspondent that there were some 500,000 more or less trained men in the Army, and another 250,000 trained men at the depots. The army corps were distributed as follows. At and near Constantinople were the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Army Corps, and a portion of the 6th. There were also the Bosphorus Defence Troops, three or four cavalry brigades, some Kurdish levies, and a few depot troops. In all some 200,000 men may have been in the Constantinople district. In Thrace there were the 2nd and most of the 6th Corps, with three cavalry brigades and frontier guards ; these were distributed between Adrianoplc, Dimotika, and Kirk Kilisse. At Smyrna part of the 4th Army Corps remained, but the bulk of it was concentrated at Panderma. In Palestine the 8th Corps was at its full strength of some 40,000, plus numerous Arab irregular corps and cavalry. It is worth while to pause here and examine the object of this military distribution. In Europe the Tui'ks still retained territory in Tlirace as far as the Balkans in the north, and the towns of Adrianople, Dimotika, and Rodosto in the north and west. Tliis was but a remnant of the former Tiu-key in Europe, and in a military sense it was, as has been said, little more than a elacis to the famous lines of Tchataldja, which defend Constantinople on the landward side. Both before and after the Balkan War the main mass of the Turkish troops had been kept in Eiu-ope with the object of defending the capital, and also because it was the bvirning desire of the Young Turks to regain the territory' which Turkey lost m the last war. The second group of troops was in the Caucasus, directed against Russia, while the third group was concentrated in Sj-ria and on the borders of Egj-pt. So long as Bulgarian neutrality could bo counted upon the immediate task of the Turkish Army was in the Caucasus. The Oth, 10th, and 11th Corps were, by the begimiing of November, brought up to tliree divisions, and each division to a strength of ten l)at tnlions There were also three brigades of cavalry, and, in addition, the 67 68 Till': TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. DJAVID BEY, Turkish Minister of Finance. tribal horse was called out and partisans raised on the Persian frontier for a raid into Persia. As Turkey entered the fray at the beginning of November it was generally believed that no exterusive military operations could be under- taken immediately in the Caucasus, and that the real campaign must be postponed tintil the spring of 1915. With a long and arduous desert march before her towards Egypt; where the Suez Canal and all the other conditions piled difficulty upon difficulty, with Bulgaria and Greece still neutral, with the Russian frontier buried in snow, with the navy unable to take the open sea and incapable of more than Black Sea raids, it looked as if Turkey's participation in the war would be for months to come of little more than a nominal kind. In all of the numerous previous campaigns against Russia winter had checked the opera- tions in the Caucasus. It must be set down a-s a testimony to the energy and determination of the Turks under their German leaders that, contrary to general expectation, they refused to let winter pass without putting forth all their strength and did not fear to face the unspeakable horrors of a mid-winter campaign in those frozen snow-bound heights. The Caucasian frontier is, indeed, of vast importance to Turkey. Between herself and Egypt she has a desert barrier and far to the south-east, in Mesopotamia, she was probably unprepared for the swiftness with wliich the British sent an expedition from the Persian Gulf to the Tigris. But in the Caucasus she is for ever face to face with her ancient enemy, and when the fatal decision to make war was taken in Constantinople, evei-y Turk knew well that, whether in the winter or the spring, a desjwrate struggle must come between the Sultan's ho.sts and the might of Russia. Doubtless Germany hoped and believed that by an imrnerliate vigorous Turkish offensive in the (Auicasus Russia could be forced to detach considerable bodies of troop'^ from the Polish theatre of war, and thus relieve the ))ressure upon herself or Austria, but the Russians were fully prepared for Turkey, whose hand had been only too plainly shown from the very development of the European crisis. The Russian Army in the Caucasus stood fast at its post, and when Turkey declared war it was not thought neces- sary to transfer a single man from the Polisli front. There had been many alterations in the Russo-Turkish frontier in the Caucasus, but the wide isthmus between the Black Sea and the Caspian was still the inevitable theatre of war. Here Russia's southern frontier marched successively with Turkey and with Persia along a line that moved in a south-easterly direction from the Black Sea to the Caspian. The Russo- Turkish frontier was a mountain wall runninir from the Black Sea on the west to the great bulwark of Ararat on the east. At its western end there is a passage by the sea that may be compared to the road on the Franco-Spanish frontier which lies between the Western Pyrenees and the angle of the Bay of Biscay. The rest is a confused mountain wall dropping down through great ravines and climbing up again to ^Ararat. The Russo - Persian frontier, which followed on, ran through very level country along the course of the great riv er Araxes to the Caspian. The great Russian town of the Caucasus is the beautiful city of Tiflis, the old Georgian capital. Here was the half-way house between Batouin on the Black Sea and Baku on the Caspian, while north- wards from Tiflis ran a road and the new rail- way over the Vladikafkas Pass into Russia proper. Southward runs another railway, through the great fortress of Kars to a railhead at Sarikamish, close to the Turkish frontier. At Alexandropol there is a bifurcation and a railway ■THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 69 runs eastward through Erivan to ,hilt'a on the Persian Frontier. The Kars raihvay runs through high mountain ridges, and south of it there is a succession of peaks chniljing up to the Armenian plateau on the Turkish .side. Sarikamish itself is 6,000 ft. vip, and beyond.it are heights 10,000 and 11,000 ft. above the sea. There are no roads anywhere except across great heights, which in tlie winter are buried in snow. A few days after the first Turkish raid on the Black Sea coast the Russian troops crossed the Turkish frontier and, after various skir- mishes with advance bodies of Turkish troops, captiu"ed a position close to Kojirukeui. on the road to Erzrum ; but on November 1 3 they were compelled to fall back before superior forces ; reinforcements, however, came up, and after three days' fighting the Russians were once inore in possession of Koprukeui by Xovenn- ber 20. This initial Russian success, however, was but a demonstration, and not an advance in force. Transcaucasia was to Russia but a secondary theatre of war, and her general policy was to act upon the defensive during the winter months. The Turks, however, had no intention of remaining on the defensive, and at the end of November thej^ began to develop an advance. As has already been said, the 9th, 10th and 11th Army Corps had a month previously been concentrated at Erzrum. SHUKRI PASHA, one of the Turkish Commanders in the Caucasus. Erzrum was Turkey's most important fortified place in Asia, and corresponded to Atlrianople on her European frontier. The Russian concentration had taken place at Kars, and it is important to note well these two frontier strongholds, as it is between them TURKISH CAVALRY. 70 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. that tlio hulk of tlie rarly fighting took i)lace. The intervening distance is over 100 miles. Hotii are situated some 6,000 feet above the ^sea, and tiio mountain road between them rises considerably liiglier. The whole inter- vening co'uitry is a tangle of mountain ridges and high snow-swept valleys. The plan pre- pared by the Germans for the Turks was the plan which is dearest of all to the heart of the German General Staff, Here they proposed to repeat \\ith the Turks the procedure which von Kluck had followed against the French and English armies in France, and von Hindor- biu-g against tiie Russians before Warsaw, and attempt the envelopment of the enemy. The Germans assumed, and rightly assumed, that the Russians would move forward their main army by the road from Kars to Erzrum, for, except on the Persian side, it is the only avenue for large masses of troops, and, moreover, the railhead at Sarikamish vipon this road was not more than 15 miles from the Turkish frontier. To engage and hold the Russians on the Erzrum road with the 11th Turkish Army Corps, and at the same time to send round columns on the left for an enveloping attack against Kars and the Russian right flank, was the essence of tlie German plan. In order to carry it out successfully it was clearly necessary that Enver Pasha i-hould dispose of more troops than the enemy. The 37th Division of the 13th Bagdad Corps was brought up to strengthen the 11th against the Russian front, and a portion of the Iht Army Corjis was brought by sea f i om Constantinople to Trebizond, to advance from the coast again.=t Ardahan and complete the extreme Turkish left in the enveloping movement upon the Russians. It may be estimated, therefore, that Enver Pasha disposed of more than 150,000 men, while the Russian forces were probably at most 100,000. The 11th Corps, as^sisted by a division of Arab soldiers from the 13th Corps, was to contain the Russians from Koprukeui, while the 1 0th and 9th wheeled on its left to the line from Olty and Id to Koprukeui. The 10th concentrated at Id, and the 9th fell into place in the centre. Meanwhile far to the n( rth anotheu force, a portion of the 1st Corps, moved on Ardahan, with Kars and the cutting of the railway t ehind the Russians as its ultimate objective. When the Turkish offensive began the 11th Corps pushed the Russians back towards Khorosan, which is about 30 miles south of TURKISH EMISSARIES IN BERLIN. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAF. 7J TURKISH CAVALRY. Sarikamish and held it tlirough heavy fighting in Christmas week. Meantime the 9th and 10th Corps were struggUng through icy winds and deep snow at tremendous altitudes through the moimtains, and reached but did not enter Sarikamish on Christmas Day. The 1st Corps, coming from the valley of the Chorok river, crossed a mountain pass 8,000 feet up and bear- ing down upon Ardahan drove out a small Russian force of some 4,000 strong on January 1 . It will thus be seen that with the Russian front checked at Khorosan, with the Saganuk heights at Sarikamish occupied by the 9th Turkish Corps, the 10th fiercely attacking the railway just beyond it, and the Ist in occupation of Ardahan, this extraordinarily ambitious scheme of envelopment came comparatively near success, in spite of the difficulties of carrying out a concerted occupation amongst the mass of mountains deep in snow, without roads or railways, and with little possibility of inter- conununication between the columns or of synchronizing action. In the end, as might have been expected, these difficulties proved too much. The 10th Army Corps was the first to suffer. About the afternoon of Decem- ber 29 it began to give way, and on New Year's Day it was driven right back. On January 3 the Russians came up in force and drove the 1st Corps out of Ardahan. With the 10th and the 1st Corps in retreat the 9th Corps, which was still fighting desperately at SarikainLsh, was completely surrounded and absolutely wiped out. The only unbeaten corps, the 11th, could as yet do nothing to aid it, for it was fully engaged by the head of the Russian column at Khorosan, and it made no progress for over a week. Iskan Pasha, with the whole of his Staff, including the German officers attached, and the 11th Corps which he com- manded, or such portion of it as had succeeded in reaching Sarikamish, surrendered. The best resumes of these operations are the two following official communiques dated January 6. The first is froui the General Staff of the Army in the Caucasus : At the end of November the main body of the Third Turkish Army was moved in the direction of the region to the east of Erzrum. The army was preceded by two army corps, witli a reserve corps near Hassan Kala. In accordance with the plan of Enver Pasha, the Third Army was to operate as follows: The 9th and 10th Corps wero to advance iu the direction of Olty in order to form tho wing of (ho Tmkish defensive, while the llth Corps was ordered to maintain its pos^ition, which was strongly organized, and to draw upon itself, by a strategic demonstration, our troops. In caso the Russian troops imdcrtook an energetic offensive, the llth Corps was ordered to fall back on tho fortress of Erzrum, drawing our forces with it. Tlie 10th Turkish Corps was to advance in two coKnnns, the first, one division strong, marching towards Id, through tlie valley of tho Olty Chai, while the second, two divisions strong, was to march on Ardost, through tlio valley of S<>rvy Chai. The Hth Turkish Army Corps wa-^ to assume the offensive in the gap between tho 10th and llth Corps. 72 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WATL in. * — . < u < U DC o l-H u THE times; history of the war. 73 FORT CHANAK, DARDANELLES. Our troops in the region of Olty, in spite of the enemy's numerical superiority, courageously hindered a Turkish advance, and, by means of counter attacks, inflicted lieavy losses on the enemy. In the meanwhile, we ascertained that a strong Ottoman column, reinforced by the rebel Musulman population, was advancing over the Panjouretsk and Yalanuz-Djamsh passes towards Ardahan. Our garri- son, which was occupying this point, fell back slightly after fighting 17 days. The second communique of .January is from the Russian Headquarters' Staff : In the Caucasus, having received reinforcements, we attacked, on Sunday, the Turkish troops concentrated at Ardahan and inflicted a complete defeat on the enemy, taking from him the colours of the 8th Regiment, wliich formed part of the garrison of Constantinople. During the later development of the action we dis- covered that the bulk of the Turkish forces — namely, the 9th and 10th Army Corps — had taken the offensive against Sarikamish. This movement, undertaken by mountainous roads covered by snow, across extremely steep ridges, was carried out almost without supply con- voys or field artillery, although the Turkish troops were abundantly supplied with war supplies. The enemy planned this operation counting chiefly upon the sympathy and liberal help of the native Musulmans who had previously been approached by Turkish emissaries. The task of our troops was to check the largo forces of the enemy on this front and to create a barrier suffici- ently strong to defeat the 9th and lotli Turkish Army Corps. In spilo of the extraordinary dilliculty of this task, the rigorous winter weather, and the necessity of lighting in mountainous passes covered with snow anil at an altitude of 10,000 feet, our gallant troops of the Caucasus, after <lesporafe fighting, which lasted over 10 days, brilliantly fullillod the exceptional task which had fallen to them. Having repulsed the frenv.ied attacks of the Turks on the front and at Sarikamish, they enveloped and annihilated almost the whole of two Turkish Army Corps, taking the remainder of one of these corps prisoners, together with its ("oininandcr-in-(-hicf, thre(! Divisional Generals, the Staff, ninnerous officers, thousands oi soldiers, artillery, machine-guns, and baggage animals. Tho intense struggle on the principal front naturally necessitated a change in the formation of our forces in the districts of secondary importance, and the approach of certain of our detachments to the frontier. Our trophies cannot yet be precisely stated. The pursuit of the enemy continues. Iskan Pasha himself stated that he considered his defeat mainly due to the cold weather and the ahnost impassable condition of the roads. Out of the 9th Corps only 6,000 reached Sarikamisli. Here the Russians engaged him, and after six night attacks he svirrendered. The prisoners, when captured, were scarcely able to stand from exhaustion and hunger. The officers were distracted by the insubordi- nation of the men, who threw down their rifles and hurried to the Russians in order to surrender. Several times the Russians moved their kitchens up to the front line, and the Turks, smelling the food, instantly stopped fighting and surrendered. When they were fed they kissed the hands of their captors. Des- criptions of scenes on the battle-field by eye- witnesses inake the blood run cold. Tlu> slaughter was particularly great on two heights with a slight dip between them. Here the battle had swept with sucli fury that it was literally impossible to move vvitlioiit treading on bodies, and I,.")00 dead were left in this small space alone. It would appear that during tlie wonderful defence of Sarikamish from December 2.") to December 28, a liaiidful of Russians assumed the offensive against an entire Turkisli division until reinforcements arrived. This heroic action alone saved the town. The Ru.ssians advanced by a forced march tliroiigli deei) snow, engaging 74 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ADMIRAL SAGHAN (centre) WITH HIS STAFF. the enemy in the evening about thirteen miles from the town. The ragged, hungry, half -frozen Turks rolled on in dense columns. The maclaine-gun detach- ments allowed them to approach within 3t30 paces, and then literally mowed them down ; but ever new columns sprang up in their place. The Russians slowly retired eastward step by step. The enemy, realizing that every hour and minute was precious if Sarikamish was to be taken, came on with the madness of des- pair, fighting always in the darliness. The Turkish columns hurled themselves on the slender Russian line, which, coolly falling back, sold every inch of ground dearly. The Turks, drunk with fanaticism, fired standing. Thereupon tlie Russians resorted to the bayonet, and with ringing cheers charged home upon the enemy's masses, inflicting frightful slaughter. The enemy broke on several occasions, but German officers with loaded re- volvers drove back defaulters till the Russians, under the pressure of sheer weight of numbers, were forced to retreat two or three miles from Sarikamish. More Turkish artillery arrived at this juncture, but too late to claim the victory as the Russian guns were covering their own infantry, and roared forth an effective reply. Reinforcements poured in steadily, and the protracted engagement culminated in a brilliant victory. Russian valour thus vipset the grandiose plan of the German strategists to inflict a sudden stunning blow on inferior Russian forces, envelop the vanguards, rear, and flanks, emerge by a forced march on Sarikamish, cut off the Russians, overwhelm Ardahan, and advance far northward from a direction where they were least expected. The surrender of the 9th Corps at Sarika- mish, however, by no means exhausted the effort of the Turks. Although the 11th Corps had been unable to move in time to save the 9th, it made a gallant effort to relieve the pressure upon the retreating 10th. It pressed on beyond Khorosan and forced its way to Kara-Urgan, some twenty miles from Sarika- THE "MESSUDIEH," SU.SK IN THE l^ARDANELLES BY SUBMARINE Bll. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 75 TABRIZ. inish By tiiis means the Russians were compslled to check in their pursuit of the 10th Corps, and instead of dispatching the troops which had wiped out the 9th on the heels of the 10th, they had to hiu-ry them up to Kara- Urgan, where a long fierce struggle began. Desperate fighting took place throughout the whole of the second week in January, but it seems early to liave turned to the advantage of the Russian troops, who on the lith amiihilated with the baj'onet the whole of the 52nd Regi- ment, with the exception of the commander, staff officers, and some men, all of whom were made prisoners. At Yenikoi a battle which was fought with great fierceness for two days ended in the defeat of a portion of the 32nd Turkish Division, wliich fled precipitately, after losing severely and abandoning two machine guns and its baggage train. In one cavalry charge alone, it is recorded that the Turks lost 300 killed and woimded by the sabres of a regiment of Siberian Cossacks. On January 17 a dispatch from the Army in the Caucasus announced that the battle of Kara-Urgan, which had been fought for three days in a ceaseless snowstorm, hail ended in a victory for Russia. Thanks to the \alour of the regiments of the Caucasus and Turkestan and the Siberian Cossacks tlie resistance of the enemy was shattered. His rearguards, which were covering his retreat, were amiihilated, the remnants of tlic Turkish army harried, and the flanks and front put to flight towardsErzrum. The puisuit was pressed vigorously, but the tremendous snow (h-ilt proved a giant obstacle, and the 11th Corps succeeded in making good its escape towards Erzrum. The Russians, however, harried it not only from the rear but from the right flank, thus depri\ing it of the opportmiity of proceed- ing along the Kara-Urgan-Koprukeui road. This accoimted for the heavy fighting west- ward, at Yenikoi, which represented the last stand of the 11th Corps. ^Meantime in the north tlie Russians had A TURKISH SCRIBE READING IHE WAR NEWi IN THE BAZAAR. 76 THE TIMES HISTOm' OF THE WAB. ARABIAN INFANTRY DIVISION. cfjiitinued their successes against tlie 1st Corps, which had been driven from Ardalian, and cleared the whole of the Chorok valley of the enemy. The difficulties of the Turks were greatly increased by the action of the Russians in cutting their communications by sea. In the first week of January, almost simultaneously with the signal defeat of the Tm-kish land forces, the Russians obtained a \-ictory on the water. At Sinope a Russian cruiser engaged the Turkish cruiser Medjidieh, which was con- voying a Turkish transport. The transport was sunk and the Medjidieh fled. On January G the Black Sea Fleet engaged the Breslau and the Hamidieh and severely damaged them both, while along the coast a number of small Tiu-kish vessels were sunlc. The Ooeben was all this time out of action ; she w-as reported to have struck a mine at the entrance to the Bosphorus in December and was still under repair at Constantinople. On Sunday, January 1.5, Russian torpedo boats sunk the large steamer Georgios, near Sinope, and several sailing vessels which were supplying the Tm-kish army and fle<3t witli war stores, provisions, and coal. Before the destruction of these boats the crews were given the opportunity to go ashore, and those who remained were removed and conveyed to Sebastopol. Such is the record of the main fighting in the Caucasian area up to the end of the month of January, 1915. It left the Russians far on the road to Erzrum, where the Turks were hastily attempting a new concentration, while in the north-west the fragments of the beaten 1st and 10th Corps had effected a junction and were attempting a fresh offensive. In the country round the Chorok ri^•er and in the region of Sultan Selim the Turks on the morning of the 20th developed vigorous attacks, which were repulsed. At Olty they also re>mned the offensive, pusliing forward a colun^n which, how- ever, was thrown back w ith very heavy losses. We have now to turn our eyes farther east. When the Russian main column crossed the Tiu'kish frontier in November and pressed for- ward to Koprukeui, a second cohnnn entered Tiu-key 50 miles farther east, midway between Khorosan and Bayazid, and on November 8 seized Kara Kilissa. A week later it met the enemy 10 miles to the north of Dutukht, and, driving him back, seized the town. In this district the Tiu'ks employed the Arab regiments of the 13th Corps, and, taking the offensive, delivered a fierce blow on November 22. The result was indecisive, and for the next montli desultory fighting took place in the Alusligird valley. Arab reinforcements kept coming in from Baghdad via Bitlis and Erzrum. Under the command of Ha-^san ed Din Pasha they THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 77 developed a vigorous offensive in the middle of December, and an engagement took place at Dutukht in which an attempt was made to envelop the Russians. The latter, however, were on their guard, and withdrew in time after infiictuig heavy losses on the Arabs. During the month of January there was no news of any fiu-ther fighting in this direction, and it is very probable that the Turkish forces had to fall back towards Erzrum. A third Russian column advanced from the angle of the Russo-Turco-Persian frontiers, where the Makuli tribesmen are friendly to the Russian Army, and on November 3 occupied the famous, but now forlorn, town of Bayazid at the foot of Mount Ararat, and thence moved forward in the direction of Van. There is no further record of its achievements, and pre- sumably it cooperated with two Russian columns which crossed the Turco-Persian frontier. The operations in this last and most easterly frontier must now claim oiu- attention. The fact that, though Persia was neutral, Turkey and Russia carried on war on Persian soil requires explanation. It is not a little curious, but on examination the cause of it can be easily seen, and the inwardness of che situation will be most easily grasped if we represent the Russo-T;irco-Persian frontier in the form of a T thus : Russia Turkey Persia (Azurbeijan) In this simple diagram the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian frontiers form the top ot the T, and, if we neglect the niceties of geo- graphical position, maybe said to run from west to east. The Turco-Persian frontier is the leg of the T. Were Persia a covmtry with a settled frontier, were it able to defend itself, and were it secure in its inviolability, then Russia and Turkey would only fight in the left section of the leg of the T, where the rival strongholds of Erzrum and Kars on either side are set to guard the frontier. But Persia was not Ln\iolate, was incapable of defending herself, had a frontier the line of which had been the subject of dispute between herself and Turkey from time immemorial, and had suffered for years past from continued Tiu-kish encro^ichments. Numerous JMixed Commissions to decide the question of the Turco-Persian frontier had sat in the last 50 years. Great Britain and Russia, as mediating Powers, had always beeen represented on these Commissions, and it has been calculated tliat during this period tliis miserable dispute, in WOUNDED TURKS IN HOSPITAL. 78 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. TURKISH ARTILLERY. which we had no direct concern, cost the British taxpayer £150,000 in expenses. In the year 1913 it really seemed as if the question was at last entering its final stage. An agree- ment was signed at Constantinople between the Turkish and Persian Governments, and still another Mixed Commission of the usual kind was formed to carry out the actual delimitation of the frontier on the basis of this agreement. The four nations, Russia, England, Turkey and Persia, were represented, and ]\Ir. A. C. Wratislaw, formerly Consul-General at Tabriz, was the principal English member. It began its operations from the Persian Gulf, taking the southern sections first, and was still at its labours when war broke out. The Turks for the previous ten years had been particularly shameless in their aggressions on the northern sections of the frontier, and had steadily moved forward the frontier stones and their own Customs' Houses until they had made themselves masters of all the strategic points on the western side of Lake L'rmia. The rich Persian province of Azurbeijan had sunk into a state of anarchy and weakness, and the authority of the Persian Govermnent counted for nothing. From a military point of view, therefore, the eartern section of the T TIFLIS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 79 RECRUITS FROM ANATOLIA. became of vital importance both to Turkey and Russia. With the Turks in occupation of all the strategic points, and well across the frontier, it was clear that in the event of a Russo-Turkish war Turkey could attack not only along the western section of the top of the T where the frontier is mountainous and diffi- cult, but also through Persia on the eastern section where the lie of the land is very much simpler. The Russians, therefore, had been forced to assert their influence and authority in Azurbeijan. An opportimity was offered in 1909 at a period of civil war in Persia, when the constitutional party in Tabriz was besieged by the forces of Mohammed Ali Shah. In April, 1909, the British and Russian Govern- ments were exercising strong pressiu^e at Teheran to force the Shah to grant a Con- stitution, but meantime Tabriz, which had stood a siege of three months, was reduced to the last extremities of starvation. The Shah ]irocrastinated in his dealings with the two Powers, hoping for the fall of Tabriz, which would have immensely strengthened his position. In the city itself an attack upon the foreign consulates by the starving mob was feared, and both the British and Russian colonies made an urgent appeal to their Govern- ments to secure them military protection. Great Britain and Russia, therefore, decided that Tabriz must be relieved by the dispatch of Russian troops, and a military expedition was sent from Julfa to open the road and revictual the town. From that time onwards detachments of Russian troops were main- tained in Tabriz, and later it was found neces- sary to send a strong military guard to the Consulate at Khoi, the Turks retorting by a similar step at Suj Bulak. Both Russia and Turkey were, therefore, in military occupation of parts of this Persian province when war broke out, and both were forced to treat it as part of the theatre of war. Just as it was important for Russia that she should not be attacked along the whole of the top of the T, instead of on its western section, so it was equally vital to Turkey that she should not have her whole flank turned by finding Russia not merely at the top, but also along the leg of the T. Two Russian columns, therefore, were sent across the Persian frontier into Tiu-key by the Kotur and Khanesur passes, which are about 30 miles apart, and are between the north end of Lake Urmia and Van. These drove the Turks back in November and engaged them between Oilman and Kotur. On Decem- ber 1 they again defeated the enemy at Serai and Bashkola. The Turlcs retreated towards Van. lint were reinforetMl and again 80 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A BEDOUIN. assumed the offensive, only to receive another check. Farther to the south a mass of Kurdish levies from both sides of the frontier advanced upon Tabriz from the direction of Suj Bulak, Apparently the Russians did not expect that the Tiu-ks would show such a total disregard of the neutrality of Persia as to make a wide movement through Azurbeijan, and they had, therefore, withdrawn their small detachment of troops from Tabriz for use elsewhere, relying on Shuja-ed-Dowleh, the Persian acting Governor of Azm-beijan, to ofTer any necessary resistance to Kurdish forays. The Governor, however, was capable of no great effort, and after a skirmish at ZSIaragha the Tiu-ks occu- pied Tabriz in the early part of January and proceeded to Sufian and Maraud on the Julfa road. Their success was, however, a brtef one. A Russian detachment routed them at Sufian, and re-entered Tabriz on January 30. CHAPTER LII. THE INVASION OF CHALDEA. The Character of the Persian Gulf, Where the History of the World Began — How the Turks First Came to the Gulf — The Rise op the Wahabis in Arabia — Midhat Pasha's Annexations of Gulf Territory — The Dawn of German Influence in the IMiddle East — The K-aiser's Pilgrimages and the Baghdad Railway — The First Germans in the Gulf — Attempts to Seize Koweit and Various Islands — The Lure of the Gulf Pearls— The Diplomatic Negotiations in London — A Picture of German World -Politics in Miniature — Why Great Britain Claims Pabamountcy in the Gulf — Admiral Mahan's Grave Warning — - The Outbreak of War, and the Seizure of Fao — The Admiralty Oil- works on the Shatt- al-Arab — The First Turkish Attack — Arrival of General Barrett with British Rein- forcements — The Action at Sahain — The Battle of Sahil, which Decided the Fate of Basra — The Fall of Basra — The Advance up the River to Kurna — The First Action at Kurna and the Call for Reinforcements — The Fall of Kurna and Surrender of the Turkish Garrison. ONE of the immediate effects of the appearance of Turlcey as a com- batant was to extend tlie area of tlie war to the Persian Gulf. HostiUties quickly began between the Turks and a force of British and Indian troops at the head of the Gulf. In a very short time the British had defeated the Turks, captured the important port of Basra, gained possession of the delta of the Tigris and Euphrates, and driven the rem- nants of the Turkish forces a long way north- ward towards Baghdad. The operations thus initiated formed an entirely separate campaign. They were of great political importance, for they shattered at a blow Germany's dream of a dominion extending to the Middle East. Basra was to have been the terminus of the Baghdad Railway, which represented Ger- many's greatest enterprise in the domain of world politics. Its fall deprived the (Germans of that access to the seas of Southern Asia which they craved. The campaign, even in its early stages, further brought to a head and finally disposed of various important issues which had produced differences between Great Britain and Turkey for more than three de- Vol. III.— Part 2<J. SI cades. Its political consequences are likely im- measiu"ab)y to surpass its military significance. The recorded history of the world probably began in the Persian Gulf. All through the ages the destinies of empires have been swayed from its lonely shores, to a degree far too Uttle understood in the West. The Power that possesses maritime control of the Gulf can, if she chooses, exert a dominating influence upon the affairs of the Middle East. Germany per- ceived the value of the Gvilf long ago, and for ten years before the war had ;-t riven with limited success to establish her influence there. During the twentieth century the political and economic problems associated with the Gulf are bound to attract increasing attention. The war did not finally dispose of them, but a bettor conception of the character of the Gulf and of past events in its vicinity is essential to a right understanding of the larger issues which lay behind the war. No other inland sea is quite like the Persian (!ulf, none possesses so ancient and so strange a history, and none is so little known or visited. Its narrow entrance lies in a fur corner of the Arabian Sea, where the lees of the southern 82 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. oceans collect and strange marine monsters disport themselves. Approaching the entrance from the Gulf of Oman, a ship may shape its course past the land-lT)cked harbour of Muscat, set like a sapphire in the midst of grim volcanic heights ; or it may coast along the desolate shores of British and Persian Mokran, where dwell the Icthyophagi, the fish-eaters, exactly as they did in the days of Alexander's retreat from Sind. Mark well the low, bare hills that fringe the beaches of Mekran. Beliind thena lie the long lateral valleys through which vast hordes migrated into India. They are perhaps the oldest of routes between East and West, a highway of trade along wMch were carried 'the silks and spices that delighted the nobles of Rome, although they Icnew not whence they came. The entrance to the Gulf is guarded on the Arabian side by the bastioned steeps of Ras Musendam, the head of the massive deserted peninsula wliich constitutes, says Mr. Hogarth, one of the few bits of compact exploration still left to the adventuroiis. The mighty headland looks across the straits to the Persian island of Hormuz, whose vivid rocks glow lilce jewels in the setting sun, save where a dark and niassi\-e keep that seems built for eternity recalls how tiny Portugal once held the East in fee until the effort drained her of her manhood. Behind the Masendam Penin- sula winds the wonderful tropical fiord called the Elphinstone Inlet, cleaving the barren mountains for nineteen miles, a sheet of water of unknown depth, where a whole fleet might lie concealed were it not the hottest place in the world. Across a narrow neck of land lies the huge landlocked expanse of Malcolm Inlet, less often furrowed by tlie keels of ships than the Antarctic Seas. The eastern shores of the Gulf begin with the flat and sweltering sands of Bunder Abbas, which has sometimes been called the Gulf's southern key. It is not so in fact, for it is merely an open roadstead. The real key is formed by the islands of Ivishm, Henjam, and Larak, and still more by the Clarence Straits which divide Kishm from the mainland. Great Britain holds on lease a patch of Ivishm, known as Basidu, and also holds a square mile of Henjam, on which stands a telegraph station. From Basidu to the head of the Gulf the Persian coast is one sheer wall, fronted by a narrow strip of low -lying land. The great plateau of Persia ends abruptly and precipitously near the sea, and only the shallow open roadstead of Bushire partially redeems the Shah's dominions from the reproach of being without a harboiu-. Yet the low and scanty foreshores once bred a race of mariners, and long ago men of Arab blood sailed from these beaches and sacked Canton. One can still trace the ruins of the cities of Keis and Siraf, where swarms of Chinese junks once lay at anchor, as they used to lie in Bombay in the days before China partly lost the secret of the sea. THE LAGOON AT SHARGAH, PIRATE COAST. In the days of piracy the town was well sheltered. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 83 THE ASSHAR CREEK AT BASRA. The western side of the Gulf begins with the Pirate Coast, and though the pirates have been turned from their e\'il ways by the maritime truce imposed by the British Government, their strongholds reinain unclianged in appearance. At Shargah, whicli is a typical example, there is a blue lagoon amid the sandhills, behind which lies the tov\n, dominated by an old battlemented castle. A century ago British troops subdued these nests "of wild corsairs, who were on one occasion strong enough to capture and destroy one of the King's warships. Even in these lonely seas, where travellers are rarely seen, German influence had been subtly at work in the ten yeai's before the war. Off the Pii'ate Coast lies the islet of Abu Musa, of which a German firm secured a lease through bribed intermediaries, on the pretence of working deposits of red oxide. Next to the haunts of the pirates comes the peninsula of El Katar, where the Turks vainly tried to establish themselves. In the bight behind lie the Pearl Islands, the domain of the Sheikh of Balu-ein, and the mart for all the treasures of the Great Pearl Bank, which stretches nearly the whole length of the Gulf. In the middle of Bahrein are liundreds of thousands of still inexplicable mound tombs, and on the mainland opposite lie? the dead city of Gerrha, never yet visited by European archaeologists, although it was the earliest home of the Phoenicians. Northward runs the long coast-line of El Hasa, hitherto claimed by the Turks, and at length there comes into view the splendid bay of Koweit, the finest harbour in the Gulf, long and actively coveted by both Turks and Germans. Finally, at the head of the Gulf sand and movmtains are replaced by the green and smiling fields and palm groves which, with the desert and swampy lands beyond, form the delta of the Tigris and Euphrates. From the point where the two rivers unite the stream is known as the Shatt-al-Arab, and it flows through an alluvial land as flat as Holland. About 67 iniles from its mouth stands the ancient city and seaport of Basra, the centre of Turkish influence in the Gulf. The country round Basra was the scene of the first operations of the Mesopotamian and Gulf campaign, but the local issues which lay at its back affected the whole Persian Gulf. The Turks had long tried to dispute in various stealthy ways the predominant and pacific influence which the British had exercised in Gulf waters for three hundred years. After they entered into a thinly veiled partnership \\ith the Germans the pressure against British interests steadily increased. When Turks and Britons fovight before Basra, they were con- tending for domination in the (!uh', and the hu-e which lay behind was that of the short road to India. That is why a study of conditions 84 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE RIVER BANK AT FAO. Much of the earlier fighting was in date gnves oi this character. and events in the Gulf is an imperative prelude to a full comprehension of tliis particular campaign. Let us first see how it was that the Turks came to emerge upon the Gulf at all; The Turkish course of empire long lay westward. From the time when Ertoglu-ul and his band of four hundred horsemen charged the Mongol army near Angora in the thirteenth century, and thus took the first step which led to the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, the Otto- man T\irks always looked towards the setting rather than the rising sun. Their roots were planted deep in Asia, bvit it was the lure of European conquest which constantly led theuT onward until the tide was stayed at the very gates of Vienna. Nevertheless, they did not neglect to extend their dominions in Asia and Africa. They conquered Egypt early in the sixteenth century, and in the same century Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent effected the first Turldsh captvire of Baghdad. He was ousted from the city by the Persians, and it was not mitil 1638 that Sultan Murad IV. appeared before Baghdad with an immense army, recovered it, and hoisted the Tirrkish flag. Thirty years later, in 1668, the Turks marched down to Basra, captured it, and came for the first time to the shores of the Persian Gulf. It is not at all generally realised that the British were in the Gulf before the Turks. The first time British arms were carried to victory in the Persian Gulf was on January 19, 1622, when a British force laid siege to a Portuguese fort on the island of Kishm, opposite Hormuz, and captured it a fortnight later. Two nionths afterwards the British, fighting in alliance with a Persian army, seized and sacked the Portu- guese city and island of Hormuz, and laid its almost fabulous glories low. It wan at this time that the British made a treaty with Persia by which they imdertook " to keep two men-of-war constantly to defend the Gulf." The number of warships was afterwards in- creased to five and, from that time onward, British seamen policed and protected the Gulf, and their power and influence were ne\'er seriously disputed. The Turks made little use of Mesopotamia and the deltaic lands. As in other parts of their Empire, their influence always lay like a bligiat upon the country and stifled progress. Nor did they do anything effective to extend their rvile beyond the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates in the direction of Arabia. The Turk has never been in any true sense the over- lord of Arabia, and he never will be. Early in t!ie eighteenth centm-y the then Turkish Vali of Baghdad actually rei:)udiated the control of THE. TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 85' Staniboul. and made the city and all the lands southward to the Gulf a practically inde- pendent State. His successor appealed to the British in India to take him under their pro- tection, and asked for British officers to train his armies. Some officers were sent, but when the British Govemnaent heard of the arrange- ment months afterwards it was severely con- demned. London preferred to remain on good terms with the Porte, and cared nothing about the future of Mesopotamia. The officers were recalled, and by the beginning of the nineteenth centvu"y the Sultan had gradually recovered his old authority. Had it not been for the action of the Home Government, Mesopotamia would have been a British protectorate for the last hundred years. The rise of the Wahabis in .Arabia had a lasting effect upon the fortvmes of the people on the Arabian shores of the Gulf and upon the Turkish position in these regions. The Wahabi movement was essentially an attempt to revert to the early sunplicity of the Islamic faith, and in course of time it shook the world of Islam to its foundations. The Wahabis began to grow strong in the latter half of the eighteenth century. They propagated their doctrines by the sword, and when the nineteenth centvury dawned they had very nearly conquered all Arabia. They reached the Persian Gulf very early in their progress, and only dread of the growing power of the British kept them out of Muscat, the capital of Oman. They entered Mesopotamia in 1801, and sacked the sacred shrines of the Shiahs at Kerbela. They took LANDING AT BAHREIN. The officer is Captain W. H. Shakespear, C.I.E., who was killed in Central Arabia. ilecca and Medina, and desecrated the tomb of Mahomet, and at length they became so for- midable that the Sultan of Tiu-key saw that his claims to the Caliphate were in danger. He persuaded Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Eg;ypt, to send Egyptian armies against the Wahabis. The Egyptian forces slowly overran Arabia, but it took them seven years to over- thro\\^ the Wahabi movement. They won their 104ih WELLESLEY'S RULES MAUCHING AGKOSS IHE DESERT. 29- 2 8G THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. '•^■.<5S^*>- -?^^^«i"^ *•> -7X. -*-^*-fe.--.,, ^,^ ^^=^Alr» ''■-'*'*^Cw«-- ' ^'" >^- -'•.^*=^ ^t£^ •■'^" ■ a:-^- • ^ -^ • AN ARAB COUNCIL ON THE BEACH AT HENJAM ISLAND. The post is the British cable mark. final victory in 1818, but neither Turks nor Egyptians were able to garrison Central Arabia permanently. In five years the Wahabi power was partially re-established, and for the remainder of the century the history of Central Arabia turned upon the rivalry between the great ruling Wahabi houses of Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. Their quarrels have continued to the present day, though at present the family of Ibn Saud is almost completely in the ascendant. Yet little more than a decade before the war three British cruisers had to land a force with guns at Koweit, and trenches had to be dug round the town, to save it from an attack by an army under the then head of the Ibn Rashids. These memories may seem remote and unim- portant, but they are of very present urgency. The Wahabi movement did not die, but smouldered with modem modifications. The disputes between the houses of Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud remained a dominating factor in Arabian politics. One of the many issues which must be settled as a resxilt of the war was that of the future of Arabia. It was not a local issue, as it seemed. It affected the whole of Islam, for it involved the future guardianship of the Sacred Cities and the control of the pilgrimage to Mecca. In any settlement that was reached, the great chief- tains of Arabia would have to be reckoned with. One of the desires of Ibn Saud was an outlet to the Persian Gulf, and he more than once sought British protection. though it was never accorded to him. He would long ago have taken the Turkish ports of Bida and Ojeir, in the peninsula of El Katar, but he feared Turkish reprisals from the sea. Until 1913 the venerable and mildewed corvette which the Turks stationed at Basra was enough to keep liim in his inland cities and oases. There was never a case where sea power of the most insignificant kind was so cheaply and successfully exercised. The Turks, then, were never masters of any portion of the western shores of the Gulf until the 'seventies of last century. They held Basra. They held the little town of Fao, at the entrance to the Shatt-al-Arab, where they maintained a mud structure which by courtesy was called a fort. Beyond lay the sands of Arabia, where the irades of the Sultan had no validity. The Sheikhs of Koweit preserved their independence, though prudence prompted them to keep on friendly terms with their neighbours. South of their town lay the region of El Hasa, with one or two fertile oases in which towns existed. South again of El Hasa came the peninsula of El Katar. In both El Hasa and El Katar the Arab tribes lived munolested. Beyond El Katar came the territories of the cliiefs of the Pirate Coast, with whom Great Britain held treaties under which they agreed to keep the peace at sea and to abstain from piracy. The Turks maintained intermittent relations with the Wahabi chiefs of Central Arabia, who took the advice tendered them by the distant Sultan, or disregarded it, precisely as it suited them. 4 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 87 88 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Into this scene of comparative passivity came the late Midhat Pasha, and it was with his advent that modern Turkish aggression in the Persian Gulf really began. Midhat Pasha was an extremely able and energetic man, and in after years he incurred the inexorable hatred of the Sultan Abdul Hamid because he was the author of the first Turkish Constitution. He paid for his liberal ideas with his life, being imprisoned and eventually assassinated at Taifj in Arabia, in 1883. He was made Vali of Baghdad in 1869, and in the early 'seventies he set about extending Tiirkish rule in the Persian Gulf. He began by establishing closer relations with Koweit. Next he sailed down the Gulf, landed a force on the coast of El Hasa, con- quered the Arabian tribes, and converted the region into a Tiirkish sandjak. Then he appeared with Ms flotilla off tlie island of Bahrein, which he " annexed," a proceeding wliich was very soon upset by the British Government. He laid claim to the peninsula of El Katar, but Great Britain declined to recognize his pretensions. The Government of the day did, however, most foolishly and unwisely accept his conquest of El Hasa, a decision wliich in later years there was every reason to deplore. We had never retained any territory in the Gulf ourselves. We had every right to object to any other Power filching great tracts of country in this region. But 1873 was a period when Britain was unmindful of her larger responsibilities and duties, and temporarily forgetful of her own glorious past. Midhat Pasha was summoned back to Con- stantinople in 1873, and was made Grand Vizier. The activity he generated in all the lands south of Baghdad quickly died away, and the Turks gave comparatively little trouble until the rise of German influence on the Golden Horn stimulated them to fresh aggression- They kept a battalion or two and some guns at El Hofuf, the town in the oasis of that name, ■which is regarded as the capital of El Hasa. They had a small garrison at their port of El Katif, and another at Ojeir, at the head of the Bight of Bahrein. These troops maintained Turkish sovereignty as far as the range of their weapons, and no farther. They collected taxes spasmodically and without much oppres- sion, owing to the fewness of their numbers. In El Katar the sole evidence of Turkish claims consisted of a very small force in the town and port of Bida. It never went beyond the walls of the town. Had it done so, it would have been destroyed by the tribesmen, who fiercely re- sented the Turkish intrusion. To the Gulf peoples the Turks were a nuisance, but on the whole not a very troublesome nmsance. The whole situation was gradually changed when, after the accession of the Emperor William II., Germany formulated her new world policies, and induced Turkey to enter into a veiled and subordinate alliance with her. By Permission oj" Times of Indiu lllusti.,LJ Weekly."] THE BAZAAR AT KOWEIT. iCtcil Burns, R.B.A. THE TIMES mSTOBY OF THE WAR. 89 THE FORESHORE AT BAHREIN ISLAND. From roof of British Consulate. The Emperor's first visit to Constantinople in 1889 saw the dawn of the mighty Pan-Germanic scheme which was compendiously known in Berlin as the B.B.B. (Berlin-Byzantiimi- Baghdad). After the war began a professor lecturing at BerUn said that Germany's aims might be siminied up in four geographical catch- words : " North Sea, Constantinople, Baghdad. Indian Ocean." Another favourite definition, attributed to the Emperor himself, was " a Germanic wedge reacliing from Ham- burg to the Persian Gulf." The Deutsche Bank group had already acquired control of the rail- ways of European Turkey, and the locomotive was to be the principal means of extending Germanic influence in the Middle East. The scheme was grandiose. It was also in some respects exceedingly vague. Perhaps it owed its origin in part to chance seed dropped by von Moltke, who in his early days, when attached to the Turldsh Army, had ridden through Anatolia, traversed the Gates of Cilicia, looked forth upon the Upper Euphrates Valley, and dreamed dreams of a day when these fertile but fallow lands might be won back to a pro- gressive civilization. Marshal von der Goltz Pasha, who in 1883 had already begun Iiis re- organization of the Turkish military forces, may have contributed to the growth of the conception. The idea that the Turkish soldiery might be utilised as a weapon in the hands of Germany was certainly destined to bear remarkable fruit. On the financial side there were big profits to be made, for Germany sup- plied nothing to Turkey without exacting big and even excessive prices. The talk of founding German agricultural colonies in Asia Minor from the overspill of Germany's population was not very practical, and was always doomed to come to naught. A highly civilised European race, seeking to win subsistence from the soil of Asia, would be " iinderlived " by the in- digenous popvilation. Far more attractive were the dreams of controlling as administrators the fertile plains of the Lower Euplu^ates and Tigris, and making them once more-the granary of the world. In the beginnings of recorded history man fovmd wheat growing wild in this rich countrj^ evolved the arts of cultivation, and made the wilderness a smiling garden. Herr Paul Rohrbach, whose eyes were always fixed upon Mesopotamia, was fond of telling the people of BerUn that so recently as the eighth century the land between the two rivers produced annually ten million tons of wheat, and supported a popiilation of six millions. Now, he would add, it maintains only a million people. The objects of the Germans were, therefore, to a certain extent economic, but they were above all political. They wanted to build a great trunk railway from the Bosphorvxs to th.' Persian Gulf, with a port in Gulf waters as its terminus. Whatever flag the port might fly, it was meant to be an essentially German strong- hold. It would have at its back an army under 90 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. MALCOLM INLET, OMAN. A huge unfrequented harbour. The distant shores are some miles away. German influence, and in future years it would serve as a stepping-off place for India. The outward movement across the Indian Ocean was very rarely talked about. It was a develop- ment which lay beyond, and was perhaps never more than dimly conceived. The vital thing was to reach the Persian Gulf. Yet the Baghdad Railway at first took shape very slowly. The year before the Emperor's first visit to the Sultan Abdul Hamid, a German company, backed by the Deutsche Bank, had obtained a concession for making a short rail- way along the Asiatic shores of the Sea of Marmora. As a result of the Emperor's activi- ties, this concession was developed into the scheme for the construction of a line to Angora and Konia, which was known as the Anatolian Railway. The Emperor paid his second visit to Constantinople in 1898, and afterwards proceeded on his famous pilgrimage through Syria and the Holy Land, in the course of which lie won Turkish support for ever by proclaiming himself to be the protector of Islam. In 1899 came the sequel. The Sultan granted a con- cession for the continuation of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, to a German corporation which styled itself " The Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company." The concession was signed on behalf of Germany by Herr von Siemens, of the Deutsche Bank. By a further and more definite concession gi-anted on March 5, 1903, to Herr von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, Turkey guaranteed interest on the cost of construction of the line at the rate of £700 per j^ear per kilometre. The principle of kilometric guaran- tees, which Germany invariably exacted from Tiu"key, was iniqmtous, and has always been strongly denounced. It should in justice be said, however, that the promoters of the railway were able to forego the guarantee on some of the earlier sections of the line within a few years of their being open to traffic. Whether the later sections would ever have made enough profit to free themselves from the guarantee is very much open to doubt. It should also be acknowledged that in Anatolia tlie line had beneficent resiilts. No reasonable man ever doubted that, whether it paid or not, the Baghdad Railway was on its economic side a most praiseworthy enterprise. Asia needs railways, and no part of the Asiatic continent is more in need of good railways than Asiatic Turkey. The British opposition to the Baghdad Railway scheme was based partly on its improper methods of finance, but far more on the imdoubted fact that Germany's motive in promoting it was primarily political, and that it was meant to tmdermine British influence in the Middle East, and British para- moimtcy in the Persian Gulf. The effects of the new German policy quietly THE TIMEIS HllSTORY OF THE WAR. 91 began to make themselves manifest in Gulf waters. The method adopted was to protest on every occasion that German aims in the Gulf were exclusively commercial, but British vigilance soon discovered another side to the occupations of German agents. They talked of coromerce, but they surreptitiously sought at various points to obtain a territorial footing. It is most interesting and instructive to trace the germination and the growth of German influence around the shores of this inland sea. The details may seem trifling, but they reveal German methods in a compact and illuminating manner. The very first Germans who seem to have traded in the Gulf opened business under the name of Messrs. Wonckhaus & Co., and were understood to represent a Hamburg firm. Their proceedings were characteristic. They went in 1896 to Lingah, a little town on the Persian coast where no other European resided. Even the British Vice-Consul was, according to Lord Curzon's book on Persia, a " jolly old Arab." The Wonckhaus firm modestly began by dealing in shells and mother-of-pearl, said very little about itself, avoided all Eiu-opeans, but cultivated a large acquaintance among the roving Gulf population. The next year the German Govermnent quietly established a Vice-Consulate at Bushire. At that time there were exactly six German subjects in the whole of the Gulf. In 1899, after the Baghdad Railway con- cession was first signed, things grew busier. The old German cruiser Arcona, not the warship of that name, came to the Gulf on her way home from China. It was understood that she was looking for a suitable terminus for the railway. She spent some time in various secluded bays, but was imable to get up the Shatt-al-Arab to Basra, as she could not cross the bar at the mouth of the river. A little later in the same year a party of Germans appeared at Bunder Abbas. They said they were " scientists," but they were certainly not astronomers. They disappeared as mysteriously as they came. In 1900 Herr Stemrich, who was then German Consul-General at Constantinople, came over- land through Asiatic Turkey at the head of a mission which was making the first rough in- spection of the route of the proposed railway. The members of the mission included the German Military Attache at Constantinople. Herr Stemrich went to Koweit, where he was courteously received by Sheikli Mubarak. He explained that the Baghdad Railway Company desired to establish its terminus on the shores of the Bay of Koweit. He wanted to buy a site at Ras Kathama, at the head of the bay, and to lease twenty square miles of territory around it. Sheikh INIubarak refused, for he mistrusted his plausible visitors. He knew, as all Maho- medans knew, that Germany had contracted some sort of mysterious alliance with the MATRA. THE CENTRE OF THE MUSCAT DATE TRADE. 92 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. THE SHEIKH'S CASTLE AT SHARGAH, ON THE PIRATE COAST. The ancient cannon is the Sheikh's sole piece of artillery. Turks. He wished to have nothing to do with any friends of Turkey, because the Tui"ks were constantly trying to undermine his position. Herr Steinrich was politely bowed out of the high council chamber, where the Sheikli was constantly wont to sit, with his gaze wandering over the wide expanse of his precious bay. There was another and far more definite reason for Sheikh Mubarak's refusal. On January 23, 1899, he had signed a secret agree- ment with Great Britain, in which, in return for certain undertakings, he agreed, among other things, not to lease or dispose of any portion of lais territory to the Government or subjects of any foreign Power without the previous consent of Great Britain. The agree- ment was part of the British response to the Kaiser's visit to the Sultan in the previous year, the results of which were not unknown in London and Simla. It was made within a month of Lord Curzon's arrival in India as Viceroy, and was ahuost the first matter he took in hand after assuming office. The Germans were undefeated. If they could not get their terminus by purchase, they pro- posed to obtain it by force tlu-ough the agency of their puppets the Turks. Towards the end of the year 1900 Sheikh Mubarak decided to take a hand in the warfare in Central Arabia between the houses of Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. He led a small army into the interior in support of Ibn Saud, was ambushed in a deep defile whUe returning from the city of Hail, and suffered a severe reverse. His temporary weakness made a German opportunity. Early in 1901 a Turkish corvette packed with troops sailed into Koweit Harboiu", and its commander announced that he proposed to take possession of the town. Great Britairi had been warned of the plot, and had madt; preparations. A British cruiser was Ijdng in the harbour, and the Turks were told that their corvette would be sunk if a single soldier was landed. They sailed away. Later in the year the corvette returned, bearing a high Turkish dignitary who was carrying a menacing letter addressed by the Sultan to Mubarak. Again a British cruiser intervened, and as a result of its support Mubarak ordered the envoy to depart. Then the Turks mcited Ibn Rashid to attack Koweit, and only the assistance of thre« British cruisers, as already related, saved the town from being sacked. The next move \\ as to make use of Mubarak's nephews, who were in exile in Turkish territory. They sailed from the Shatt-al-Arab with a fleet of native craft to take Koweit, but the whole flotUla was dis- persed by a single British gunboat. Thereafter, the German plots for seizing Koweit by force were abandoned. A new method of obtaining access to Koweit territory was then instigated by the Germans. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 93 They had, meanwhile, discovered a possible alternative terminus. The north side of the Bay of Koweit is bounded by the large and m,arshy island of Bubian. Behind Bubian are the long and deep inlets known as the Khor Abdullah and the Kiior Zobeir, which penetrate a good deal of the way to Basra. The Germans seem to have thought that if they made their terminus somewhere on the Khor Abdullah they would have it in a place fairly safe against attack. Unfortunately for them, there were difficulties. Mubarak claimed jurisdiction to a point tw^enty miles north-west of the Klior Abdullah. He was also the indisputable owner of Bubian, which completely commanded the passage to the sea. His rights were vio- lated, and Turkish posts were estabhshed at various points within his territory, including the island of Bubian. The British Embassy at Constantinople was at that period exceedingly inactive, and the Home Government had passed from the " hot " fit to the " cold " fit. An incident which happened at a meeting between King Edward and the German Emperor is understood to have contributed to this change. The Emperor was eager to talk about Koweit, in wliich he took a deep and direct interest. King Edward was armed with certain notes on a sheet of paper. The Emperor asked if he niight have the notes, and then promptly, but most improperly, recorded them as an official communication. The notes contained a questionable admission. It was thought best to condone the Emperor's sharp practice, but British policy at Koweit suffered in consequence. The posts on Bubian were allowed to remain after a formal protest, much to the chagrin of Mubarak, who had faithfully stuck to us, but had been imper- fectly supported. They were there almost \intil the war began, although, meanwhile, Germany had announced her intention of rnaldng her terminus at Basra. She never really abandoned her desire to reach Koweit. One of the provisions of the Anglo-Turkish Agree- ment about the Baghdad Railway, which was never signed owing to the outbreak of the war, provided for the residence of a Turkish official at Koweit. He would have been as constant a centre of intrigue as was the Ottoman High Commissioner in Cairo. Elsewhere in the Gulf the Germans grew more active. The firm of Wonckhaus, which had begun so humbly by buying shells on the beach at Lingah, rapidly blossomed into a large and widespread enterprise. In 1901 the head- quarters were removed to the island of Bahrein. A new " branch " was opened at Basra, and a big house was taken for it. The whole Gulf wondered where the money came from. It certainly was never obtained from profits. Another branch was opened at Bunder Abbas. The Bahrein branch very nearly became the scene of an " international incident." Sheikh Isa, of Bahrein, was having much trouble with a turbulent nephew, who had a following of truculent retainers. One of these followers violently assaulted one of the Wonckhaus coolies, and directly afterwards one Bahnsen, an assistant to Wonckhaus, was badly ham- mered. The incident sounds paltry, but it was just one of the pretexts for interference for A DESERTED BRITISH NAVAL STATION AT BASIDU, ON KISHM ISLAND. The RI.M.S. "Lawrence" is lying beyond, in the Clarence Straits. 29—3 94 THE TIMES HISTOIiY OF THE WAI!. which Germany was eagerly watching. She was given no chance. Within three days a British gunboat arrived, bearing the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. A sum of £60 was instantly paid as compensation to the bruised Bahnsen, and the ringleaders in the disturbance were publicly flogged and then banished. In 1905 Germany showed signs of desiring to open direct relations with the Sheikh of Bahrein, but it was at once pointed out that the Sheikh's external relations were, with his consent, imder British control. The Persian Gulf was almost certainly the earliest home of the primitive civilization of the world. Sonae among the very few peoj^le who have really tried to study Bahrein believe that it was probably the real cradle of the higher development of the hiunan race. Its extra- ordinary collection of mound tombs, stretching as far as the eye can see across its desert interior, puzzle the chance travellers who have examined them. All through the ages its rough tracks have drawn adventurers from many lands — British and Arabs and Persians, Portuguese and Greeks and Phoenicians, Baby- lonians and Chaldeans and Sumeriahs, and those " black-heads " who were perhaps the first progenitors of civilized humanity. Their footsteps ring down the ages, and yet they have left very few records. From the time when Alexander's famous admiral Nearchus, who commanded the Greek fleet in its navi- gation of the Persian Gulf, visited Bahrein, the island figures hardly at all in history. What brought the later comers to Bahrein ? The answer is — pearls. Even to-day Balirein has a world-wide interest as the centre of the Gulf pearl trade. In good years it sends to Paris and New York and London, by way of Bombay and Siu-at, a million pounds' worth of pearls. The Great Pearl Bank practically extends for more than half the length of the western side of the Gulf, commencing near Abu Musa, opposite Shargah, curving round to the island of Halul, then pasing near El Katar, and finally terminating at a point near Musa- lamiya, where the territories of the Sheikh of Koweit begin. Very little of the Bank lies in territorial waters, and therefore the right to fish upon it raises a rather nice question of international law. The pearl fisheries had been worked for many centuries by the various Arab communities on the western shores of the Gulf, who may be said to have acquired a pre- scriptive right in them. A British gunboat poUced tlie Bank during the fishery season, and preserNJ-ed order among the pearling dhows. Various enterprising persons of British, Indian, and other nationalities, who sought to particiiiate, were all warned off by the British Government. One writer observes : " The question really settles itself. I should be ^ , -^^jT.^.-^-^,^^^^ ^^. MESSRS. WONCKHAUS AND GO.'S HEAP OF PEARL OYSTER SHELLS AT BAHREIN. THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. H.M. SHIPS "ESPIEGLE" AND "ODIN" LYING OFF BASRA. sorry to go pearling amid a horde of retired pirates unless I had an escort of a squadron of cruisers." Germany thought differently. When the Wonckhaus firm transferred itself to Bahrein, its heaps of mother-of-pearl shells, bought from the fishermen and piled high outside the dilapidated building which served as an oftice, seemed innocent enough. But German minds a long way ofi had been thinking very ardently about the Pearl Bank. Searching amid the records of Constantinople, Germans had come upon the story of Midhat Pasha's great cruise in the Gulf in the early 'seventies, when he pro- fessed to annex Balirein to the Sultan's dominions. The hint was enough. A shadowy structure of Turkish claims was speedily reared. The enterprising Wonckhaus had not been settled for a year in Balirein before the Sultan was formally asked to grant to a German syndicate a monopoly of the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf. The Germans explained that they proposed to work the Pearl Bank by " scientific " methods, and the Sultan was to have his share of the proceeds. The Sultan had not the slightest territorial or financial interest in the pearl fisheries. He had no more right to grant a monopoly of pearl fishing in the Gulf than he had to confer whaling privileges in South Georgia. Yet he was solemnly pro- ceeding to accede to the German request when one sharp word from Great Britain quashed the whole scheme. But the Teuton is not easily rebuffed. The next that was heard of the German agents at Constantinople was that they were trying to persuade the Siiltan to give them a lease of the island of Halul, in the centre of the Gulf, sixty miles east of Bida, the port of the El Katar peninsula. Halul is an island two or three miles in circuniference, with plenty of flat grovmd. It has a useful boat -landing place, and a good anchorage well sheltered from the " shamal " winds, the terror of Gulf mariners. It has no water, but, as at Bunder Abbas and elsewhere in the Gulf, condensers could be used. Halul is right on the Pearl Banlc, a.nd within the 20-fathom line. It is really a ren- dezvous for the pearling fleet, and by long prescription is regarded as the joint property of all the Sheikhs sending dhows to the fisheries. It was no more Turkish than the island of Bombay, but the Power that held it would certainly control the pearl fisheries. It was, moreover, qmte good enough for a coaling station, and might have been made into an Oriental Heligoland. Again a British word in season stopped this little enterprise, but still the Germans per- sisted. Their next attempt was more definite, and for a time almost succeeded. They sought to establish rights on the island of Abu .Musa, fifty miles north-west of the town of Shargali. on the Pirate Coast. Abu Musa is rather bigger than Halul, and there is ample evidence that it has been continuously in the possession of the Sheikhs of Shargah. It is at Abu Musa that the Great Pearl Bank begins. It was over Abu 96 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Lovat Fras;r: THE HOTTEST PLACE IN THE WORLD : ELPHINSTONE INLET, OMAN. A wonderful tropical fiord nineteen miles long, but human beings can only live there for four months in the year. The R.I.M.S "Lawrence " in distance. Musa that Germany fii-st showed signs of openly questioning the predoniinance of British influence in the Persian Gulf. In ten years she had travelled very feu* from the " inno- cent " German traders buying shells on Lingah Beach. There are red oxide deposits on Abu Musa, and the Sheikh of Shargah granted a concession for working them to three Arabs, who formed a partnership. Two of the men, father and son, resided at Lingah, and it is supposed that they apphed for the concession on German instiga- tion. The third partner was a Shargah man. In 190G the inevitable firm of Wonckhaus appeared on the scene and openly acquired the concession. The Wonckliaus firm was believed to be acting for the Hamburg-Amerika Com- pany, which had all the time been at the back of these pertinacious German activities in the troubled waters of the Gulf. The Sheikh of Shargah protested against the transfer, and requested the British Govermnent, as his protector, to intervene. He was one of the Trucial Chiefs, and by a treaty concluded in 1892 all the chiefs had bound themselves '" not to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any other Power, nor admit the agent of any other Government, nor to part with any portion of their territories save to Great Britain." Xo notice was taken by ]\Iessrs. Wonckliaus & Co. of the Sheikh's stoppage of the concession. In October, 1907, therefore, H.^l.S. Lapwing towed to Abu ]Musa a number of sailing boats containing 300 of the Sheikh's armed followers. The men working the oxide deposits were removed and conveyed to Lingah- According to the German account, a repre- sentative of Wonckhaus arrived at the island a few hours later in a boat flying the German flag, which was fired on by the men from Shargah. Here, at last, was the "international inci- dent " for which Germany had been working. The German Government called for explana- tions. The German Foreign Office quickly mobilised its Press, and a small rock in the I'ersian Gulf, of which hardly anyone in or out of Germany had ever heard, was -made the subject of many cohmins of portentous articles. The Cologne Gazette was mild, and said that the German purpose was coimnercied. The Neueste THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 97 Nachrichten, rather more severe, spoke of " the incomprehensible violation of German rights." The Berliner Tagcblatt grew a little violent, and announced that Great Britain was trying to undermine German prestige and to demonstrate her own supremacy. It said that the English " seem to have had the intention of showing Germany that she can do nothing in the Middle East without Great Britain's consent." It cryptically declared that " commerce and politics can no longer be divided," and that Germany could only attain comniercial success by " energetic political action." The hubbub was reflected in the London Press, but it soon ceased. The German ca,se had not a leg to stand on. The island had clearly been in the possession and the continuous occupation of the Sheikhs of Shargah for many generations. The Sheikh had an equal right to make the concession and to object to its transfer without his consent. In one respect the incident still served the German purpose. It had enabled Germany publicly to question for the first time the British claims to para- mountcy in the Gulf. She made a formal protest, but did not then pursue the matter. About the time that Germany became interested in the Pearl Bank her hand also became visible on the Karun River, in Persian territory, at the head of the Giilf, in the region where the British Admiralty afterwards acquired extensive oil interests. The Karun River is in the territory of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, a semi-independent chieftain who has special relations with Great Britain, though he nomi- nally acknowledges the overlordship of Persia. The German Legation in Teheran was biisily engaged in endeavouring to extend German influence in Persia, more particularly in the south. A Dutchman named Van Roggen, who was understood to be a German agent, iirrived on the Karim River, and worked out a scheme TRIBESMEN IN ELPHINSTONE INLET, OMAN. They are Shihiyins, the most primitive people in Arabia. iLovai l-rjicr. Da THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. for irrigating the river valley at a cost ot" two millions sterling. The episode was again typieal of German arbitrary methods. Germany applied to tlie Persian Government for a concession for the irrigation scheme. It was not in the gift of Persia at all. The Sheikh ot Mohammerah said that if he wanted his territory irrigated he would do it himself, with the aid of British financiers. At his request one of the Punjab irrigation engineers spent eighteen months on the Karun working out a separate scheme. Germany still pressed Persia for the concession. The Sheikh made it quite clear to the Teheran authorities that if they tried to alienate his rights in favoiu" of Germany he would offer active resistance, which he was well able to do. The German position was seen to be quite untenable, and after a time the Van Roggen scheme was withdrawn. The time came, after ten years of spade- work, when the Hamburg -Ainerika Coinpany publicly entered into the Gulf trade. In Sep- tember, 1906, a line of steamers was started, plying between Hamburg, Aden, Muscat, and all the principal Gulf ports. The ubiquitous Wonckhaus, his hiunble beginnings in a native V house at Lingah entirely obscured, blossomed forth as the accredited agent of the famous Hambiu-g-Amerika Company, with the benedic- tions of the mighty Herr Ballin himself. The arrival of the first German steamer was long remembered in the Gulf. It entered eacfi port with a band playing " Deutschland iiber Alles," and an air which the listening Britons fondly supposed to be " God Save the King." Its cargo appeared to consist chiefly of unlimited quantities of ropy German champagne, which was lavishly dispensed to all and sundry. A dinner of innumerable courses was served at every stopping-place. All were welcome. It was a wonderful time for the satellites of the patient Wonckliaus. The Hamburg-Amerika cargoes were not long confined to chainpagne. The service was soon reduced to a monthly one, but the German trade grew, although the disturbed internal condition of Southern Persia greatly affected business at all Persian ports. In the year 1911-12 German imports at Bushire were valued at £39,000 ; those of the United King- dom and India at £707,000. Exports from Bushire to Germany were valued at £67,000 ; those to the United Ivingdom and India at £394,000. At Bunder Abbas in the same year German imports amounted to £20,000, and British and Indian £322,000 ; exports to Ger- many £14, to Great Britain and India, £147,000. On the other hand, German trade with Basra and Mesopotamia- increased very rapidly, showing in 1912 a growth of 33 per cent, in imports and of 28 per cent, in exports. The figures were : imports, £528,415 ; exports, £375,760. The British figures were vastly larger, but German trade made steady pro- gress at Basra until the war stopped it. BRITISH TELEGRAPH STATION ON HENJAM ISLAND. The island of Kishm lies across the chanael. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 99 CROWD AT BASRA WATCHING THE BRITISH ENTRY. The Hambxirg-Amerika steamer?, are believed to have been heavily subsidized. When the negotiations between Great Britain, Germany, Turkey and other countries, with regard to the Baghdad Railway, gradually took shape in London, Germany for the time being abandoned her clumsy attempts to obtain a foothold in the Gulf by surreptitious means. It will be seen that by the vigilance of the British representatives on the spot she was invariably foiled at every ]>oint. She saw, however, that the advantages she had failed to gain by direct action might probably be stealthily obtained in course of time by diplo- matic action. British interests in the Persian Gulf Were less understood and less rigidly guarded in London. During the three years before the war an agreement between Great Britain and Turkey was drafted after very long discussion. It provided that the terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, its natural outlet, and that no extension to Koweit was to be built tmless the consent of Great Britain was first obtained. Turlcey further agreed to abandon her entirely mythical pretensions to suzerainty over the Bahrein Islands, Muscat, and the territory of the Trucial Chiefs, a valueless concession, because her suzerainty had never existed, the claim was quite modern, and it had never been acknowledged by the rulers directly concerned. She also undertook to evacuate the peninsula of El Katar, an almost equally empty offer, because she had never held more than a couple of tiny ports. On the other hand. Great Britain agreed to recog- nize the suz.erainty of Turkey over Koweit, while Turkey promised not to interfere with the internal affairs of Koweit, and said she would recognize' the conventions Cthere is believed to be one later than that of 1899) between Great Britain and Koweit. The expediency of the British admission was strongly questioned by those who hold that Turkish pretensions to suzerainty over Koweit are vague and indefensible. The agreement further provided that a representative of the Turkish Government should in future reside at Koweit. It has been objected to this pro- vision that it would have opened the door to intrigue, and that it was at variance with the spirit of the convention of 1899. A British naval officer in 1901 ordered off the Sultan's representative. Ten years later the British Government were ]3roposing to admit him, although in the Gulf every Turkish official had become a German agent. The agreement with Turkey, which had been drafted with the full cognizance and practi- cally in consultation with the German Govern- ment, was never signed, although the negoti- ations were intermittently continued almost until the outbreak of war. At the same time an agreement between Great Britain and 100 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. < U < o z z O si THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 101 Germany with regard to the Baghdad Railway, ^Mesopotamia, and other matters, was also drafted. A telegram from Berlin stated that it was initialled in London by Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky in the middle of June, six weeks before the war. It was not signed, and the precise character of its contents was not disclosed. During the two or three years before the war the construction of the Baghdad Railway was steadily continued, and work was begim. on the section between Baghdad and Basra. The full story of the Baghdad Railway, which has far wider ramifications than have here been touched upon, does not require recital in connexion with the campaign in the delta. It is interesting to note that while Turkey was demonstrating in London her inalienable claims to the Arabian region of El Hasa and to the western shores of the Gulf south of Koweit territory, she was rudely evicted from these areas. In the summer of 1913 the redoubtable Ibn Saud crowned his victorious career by sweeping the Turks, lock, stock and barrel, out of El Hasa and all Eastern Arabia, probably never to return. The remnants of their troops arrived on the Gulf coast in a sorry plight, and were rescued by a British steamer. Their disappearance did not prevent the British Goverrmaent from solemnly assenting to tiie demarcation of the Turkish " possessions " in Eastern Arabia, and from continuing to discuss at inordinate length the Turkish " right " to a long section of the Gulf coast which the Turks had filched less than forty years before, and from which they had been ingloriously expelled. The story of the advent of Germany into the Persian Gulf, and of the results which followed therefrom, has been told at some length and in considerable detail for a special reason. It is probably the only instance on record — except perhaps Morocco — in which German methods of "world-expansion" can be traced from the very earliest beginnings down to the latest phase. We see the v^iole process at work, from the modest arrival of an obscure gentleman from Hamburg upon the sun-steeped shoi'es of the Clarence Straits, down to the noisy appearance of the big steamer with its stewards' band, and the cargoes of railway material which were meant to make Basra and its river the Hamburg of the East. We see the first crude attempts to seize unconsidered islets ; the schemes for obtaining concessions by illicit means ; the quiet manufactiu-e of " international incidents " ; the initial half-hearted attempts to question the validity of the British position ; the tentative unleashing of the German Press ; the entry of the great financiers, with their web of intrigue ; the transference of issues which seem unimportant, but are really vital, to the European Chancelleries ; and, finally, the dangerous stage of agreements, by which Great Britain is to be tempted by smooth words to open the door for the destruction of interests patiently won by centuries of effort. It is all there — a picture of German world-politics in miniature. Each isolated incident is trivial in itself ; collectively they mean much. It may be argued that Germany had an entire right to establish and extend her trade around the shores of this inland sea. Of course she had. No one has ever dreamed of questioning her right to trade or to build railways. What was questioned was her motives and some of her acts. It was the combination of commercial effort with political action, so lucidly explained by the Berliner Tagehlatt, which roused British hostility to the doings of Germany in the Persian Gulf. On innumerable Gorman plat- forms the ultimate aims of Germany in the ]\Iiddle East were expounded with arrogance and without reserve. Countless German books dealt with the same theme. The intention \\'as to supplant and replace British influence in these regions, and not to supplement it. To that great end all the German efforts were in reality directed. By what right, it may further be aslced, did Great Britain endeavour to resist German expansion in these waters ? Had she any real authority for her claims to paramountcy beyond self-interest and the need for guarding India ? It remains to answer these natural questions and to define the solid grounds upon which the British position in the Persian Gulf is based. Great Britain had taken nothing for herself in the Gulf; had pi'eserved peace aroimd its shores, and had given equal opportunities to all. That is the sum of her case. She kept tlie peace of the Gulf vmaided and unsupported. She sought no peculiar privileges. Sho ae- (iuircd no territory. She held point aftrr point in the Gulf, and gave them all back, save only a patch of land at Basidu, on tlie island of Kishm, and her telegraph station on the island of Hen jam. Every nation was able to benefit by her efforts, and trade was unrestricted. But if she imposed a self-denying ordinance 102 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. <^^mJ^\ [By Permission of " lUuslrated Loidon Xews." JUNCTION OF TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES AT KURNA. Union Jack floating on Governor's House, afterwards occupied by British General and Staff. All the houses were loopholed, and much damaged by British fire. Two Krupp guns among the palm trees; mountain gun near Governor's House. upon herself, slie imposed it equallj' on otJiers. She could brook no rivalry in the Gulf, and, above all, she could not contemplate the creation of territorial interests by any other Power. The first Englishman who ever visited the Gulf was Ralph Fitch, who traversed it from end to end in 1583, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, in the company of three other Englishmen. They were captured by the Portuguese and sent to Goa, being the first of the English to set foot in India. Thus they made the acquaintance of the country from the inside of a Portuguese gaol. The object of Fitch was the development of trade, and his journey was one of the occurrences which led to the formation of the organization which ultiinately became the East India Company. It was not, however, until 1618 that the British flag was first flown in the vicinity of the Gulf. In that year one of the Company's trading vessels was sent from Surat to Jask, near the entrance to the Gulf, where nowadays Great Britain maintains a telegraph station. Trade with Jask continued for tliree or four years, but the obstruction of the Portuguese, who held the city and island of Hormuz, became so pronounced that it was resolved to attack them. An arrangejnent was made with the Shah of Persia, who had already sent an army to besiege Hormuz. Part of this arrangement, duly embodied in a treaty, was that the Company were " constantly to defend the Gulf " with warships, as already noted. After the sack of Hormuz, a British factory was established at Bimder Abbas. Subse- quently there were frequent encounters between I?0O|>t Cxn.tLMJ J-^^iB^ IBv Permissjon of " lUiistraieJ LonJon News,' SCENE OF ACTIONS ON THE SHATT-AL-ARAB ON NOV. 15 AND 17 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 103 thp British squadron and the Dutch and I'ortuguese, as well as the Arabs, although it was with British aid that the Arabs expelled the Portuguese from Muscat. British prestige steadily increased in the Gulf during the next century and a half, and the British flag \vas both respected and feared. Frequent help was given to the Persians, who owed it to the British that they did not become a nation without a seaboard. The survey of the Gulf was begun by the Indian Navy in 1785 and thus was set on foot an undertaking which continued to the time of the great war. Both the charts and the lights of the Gulf were solely the outcome of British enterprise. The greatest work Great Britain tmdertook in the Gulf was the suppression of piracy. The Arab tribes seem to have always fought one another on sea and land, and to have occasionally united to attack the passing stranger ; but they never really entered upon organized and persistent piracy till they were, at the beginning of last century, welded together by the great Wahabi movement in Arabia. All along the Pirate Coast there are lagoons and , backwaters, in which the pirates sheltered their vessels, and behind which their towns were built. The boldest of the pirates were the Joasmi tribe, whose headquarters were at Ras-ul-Ivheima. By 1806 the pirates had become so aggressive that the British cornered a Joasmi fleet off the island of Kishm, and a treaty was signed at Bunder Abbas. The pirates, however, cared little for treaties, and soon recommenced their work of depredation. At times they even attacked the Company's cruisers, and when they boarded and captured the small British warship Sylph, part of a squadron carrying Sir Harford Jones's Mission to Persia, it was felt that strong reprisals were necessary. A military expedition, which included the York and Lancaster Regiment and the Loyal North Lancashires, was dispatched to Ras-ul-Kheima, and bm-ned the town and the pirate fleet. The expedition then crossed the Gulf, and the town of Lingah was destroyed. The fortress of Laft, on the island of Kishm, was captiu-ed in an extraordinary manner. The force attack- ing the fortress was beaten off, but next morn- ing the British were astonished to see the Union Jack waving from its walls. An ofiicer had gone ashore in the night, found that most of the defenders had fled, obtained admission, and hoisted the flag. THE PALM GROVE AT SAHIL GAMP. Afterwards the piratical craft at Shargah and other towns on the Pirate Coast were destroyed, and finally at Shinas, on the coast of Oman, a thousand Wahabis were killed. It was on this occasion that the Wahabi leader, the then Ibn Saud, wrote to the British authori- ties : "In truth, then, war is bitter ; and only a fool engages in it, as the poet has said." Even this lesson did not suffice for the Joasmis. By 1812 they were sweeping the seas once more, and in 1815 they had even captured a vessel so far away as the coast of Kathiawar, Western India. In 1816 a British squadron menaced Ras-ul-Kheima again, but made no impression. In 1817 the .Toasmis built a fort at Basidu, on the island of Ivisluu. In 1818 they were ravaging the west coast of India, and in 181!) a fleet of sixty-four pirate vessels, manned by seven thousand men, was off the coasts of Cutch and Kathiawar But the cup of the iniquities of the Joasmis was full to overflowing. A powerful force was assembled at Bombay under Sir William (U-ant Keir, including the two British regiments which had fought in the Gulf seven years before. Ras-ul-Kheima was cannonaded and finally carried by assault, 300 of the ^Vrabs being killed and 700 wounded. The other Joasmi ports were visited in turn and their fortifications blown up. At Sohar, on the Oman coast, there w£is considerable fighting. Finally, in 1820. a 104 THE TIMES HISTOliY OF THE WAR. [Elliott and Fry LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ARTHUR BARRETT, K.C.B. general treaty of peace was concluded with the pirate chiefs. The York and Lancaster Regi- ment still bears the word " Arabia " on its colours in commemoration of these forgotten campaigns. Sir William Grant Keir's expedition dealt piracy in the Guh its death-blow. The Beni Yas at Abu Dhabi made a desperate attempt to hoist the blood-red flag again in 1834. Anticipating a suggestion afterwards heard in comic opera, they even prepared boiling oil in which to place the Christians they captured. They were promptly suppressed, however, and an episode which began with cauldrons of boiling oil ended in a trial in the Bombay High Court. The various treaties entered into with the leaders of the tribes on the Pirate Coast, known as the Trucial Chiefs, were con- solidated in the general treaty of 1853. To this was added the treaty of 1892, by which the chiefs agreed to place their external relations in British hands, and not to alienate any portion of their territories to foreign Powers. It would be too much to say that piracy entirely disappeared from the Gulf. Isolated acts of piracy occurred almost every year, and they generally emanated from the territory which was alleged to be imder Turkish control. They were usually swiftly pimished, but there could be little doubt that if the strong hand of the British was withdra^-n, Arab fleets would again commence their depredations. In suppressing piracy in the Gulf, Great Britain was not only seeking the protection of her own trade, but was " soUcitous for the common good, and was serving other nations as well as herself." An almost equally long story might be told concerning the strenuous British efforts for the suppression of the slave trade, extending over many years and still imfinished. The British control of the arms traffic involved heavy expenditure and most laborious patrols. Sometin"ies the whole East Indies Squadron was occupied in tliis work, and in 1911 Admiral Sir Edmond Slade led a FAO, THE FIRST POINT CAPTURED BY THE BRITISH. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 105 THE DELTA OF THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES. combined naval and military expedition into Persian Mekran to punish gun-runners. The British sanitary organization did much for the health of the Gulf, and for ten years kept at bay the repeated appearances of plague. The duties of the British Resident in the Gulf, whose headquarters were at Bushire, were niany and varied. He was by general consent the arbiter in the quarrels between the different local rulers, and was alike their counsellor and their friend. His influence was always directed towards the preservation of peace and order. He composed the occasional di^erences between the Trucial Chiefs, protected the coasts of Arabia and Persia from external aggression, saved the native dhows from being plundered in the date season, and, as has already been said, maintained order at the annual pearl fisheries. The British claim to paramountcy in the Gulf thus rests on a long sequence of events by which, at a heavy expenditiu-e of blood and treasure, we made it a haven of peace. Our flag was flying in the Straits of Oman when the Germans plunged into the Thirty Years' War. We had shouldered our burden there before the Mayflower sailed from Plymouth. If we were to lose our grip, piracy, slave-dealing, raids and counter-raids, all the characteristics of the days of barbarism, would at once reappear. The flare of burning coast -towns, scenes of rapine and bloodshed, would instantly remind us of oiu" abandoned obligation. Having taken up the burden, we ow^d it to the peoples of the Gulf, living in security imder our guardianshiji, not to abandon it. There is no part of our work in the world that can be contemplated with greater satisfaction. After we had per- formed it for tlu-ee hundred years, Gerniany deliberately prepared to challenge our presence and our piu-pose there. The Gulf was her goal, and she was not satisfied with the opportunities for trade which were open to all nations alike. The resistance we offered to her plans \\as no more than oiu" bounden duty. There is no need to contend that Groat Britain exercised peculiar unselfishness irk lor, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE DAMAGED CUSTOMS HOUSE AT KURNA. How the Royal Navy left it. this self-imposed task. We were unselfish in our manner of performing it, but the fact need not be disgviised that we were driven to assume responsibilities in the Gulf mainly by considera- tions of self-interest. The maintenance of British predominance in the Gulf is an essential part of the defence of India. The mere presence of another Power in the Persian Gulf, whether its post be fortified or unfortified, would have a gravely unsettling effect upon India. The people of India would not stop to think whether, from such a post, their country could be really threatened. The fact that another flag was flying in a region where the British had been dominant for three hundred years, and supreme for more than a century, would suffice to per- suade them that our strength was declining, and such confidence as we now inspire would instantly be diminished. It is not from strategic reasons alone that we are compelled to maintain our special position in tlie Gulf. We have to think also of the moral effect which the intrusion of another Power would produce upon India. The truth of these contentions has been demonstrated by a dispassionate and entirely impartial observer. So long ago as 1902 the late Admiral INIahan declared that he saw " the question of the Persian Gulf, and of South Pei"sia in connexion with it, clearly visible upon the horizon." He warned us that " concession in the Persian Gulf, whether by formal arrange- ment [with other Powers], or by neglect of the local commercial interests which now underlie poUtical and military control, will imperil Great Britain's naval situation in the Farther East, her political position in India, her com- mercial interests in both, and the Imperial tie between herself and Australasia." Unfor- tunately his warning, and all warnings, were disregarded when the British Government began to dabble in Anglo-Turkish and Anglo-German agreements. In a striking passage he defined the question thus : Great Britain, in the clear failure of Turkey and Persia, is the nation first — that is, most — concerned. She is not so only in her own right, and that of her own people, but in the yet more binding one of Imperial obligation to a great and politically helpless ward of the Empire — to India and her teeming population. In her own right and duty she Ls, as regards the maintenance of order, in nctual possession, having discharged this office to the Gulf for several generations. Doiibtless, here as in Egypt, now that the constructive work has been done, she might find others who would willinglj' relieve her of the burden of maintenance ; but as regards such transfer, the decision of acceptance would rest by general custom with the present possessor, and to her the question is not one merely of convenience, but of duty, arising from, and closely involved with existing conditions, which are the more imperative because they are plants of mature growth, with roots deep struck and closely intertwined in the soil of a past history. These conditions are doubtless manifold, but m last analysis they are sub- stantiallv three. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAU. 107 First, her security in India, which would be materially nfiected by an adverse change in the political control of the Gulf. Secondly, the safety of tl:e great sea route, com- uiercial and military, to India and the Farther East, on which British shippnig is still actually the chief traveller, though with a notable dinnnnlion that demands national attention. Thirdly, the economic and commercial welfare of India, which can act politically only through the Empire, a dependence which greatly enhances obligation. The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of considerable naval potentiality, a fleet in being there based upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the Mediter- ranean. It would flank all the routes to the Farther East, to India, and to .Australia, the last two actually internal to the Empire regarded as a political system ; and although Great Britain iniquestionably would check such a fleet, so placed, by a division of her own, it might well require a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position. Such a weighty pronouncement needs no further emphasis. It only remains to add that among the numerous declarations made by Great Britain on this subject, the chief is that spoken by Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary, in the House of I^ords on May 5, 1903. He said : "I say it without hesitation, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." That is our Monroe Doctrine in the Middle East, and from it we cannot depart. It may fitly close this preliminary examination of the problems of the Persian Gulf and the countries around it. On October 29, 1914, the German warships had bombarded Russian towns on the Black Sea coast, and on October 30 Sir Louis Mallet asked at Constantinople for his passports. The rupture of relations between Great Britain and Turkey had been fully expected by the small British community at Basra, and many of the British subjects there left for Mohammerah, in Persian territory, on October 27. H.M.S. Espiegle had been lying in the Karun River off IMohammerah for some weeks. She is a gunboat of 1,070 tons, with a speed of 13 J knots, and is armed with six 4-inch guns. When the people at Mohammerah noticed the little Espiegle clearing for action on October 31, they knew that a conflict was near. Late that afternoon several more Englishmen arrived at Mohammerah from Basra, but when others tried to leave Basra still later in the day they were detained.* On Monday, November 2, the British Consul, Mr. BuUard, and the remaining juembers of the British colony, embarked on a Turkish steamer. All save the Consul were compelled to disembark again, as the Governor of Basra announced that he had received telegraphic instructions from Constantinople to detain everybody except Mr. Bullard. It is satisfactory to be able to add that all the persons detained were found safe when Basra was afterwards captured. The same thing was reported to have hap- pened at Baghdad. Only the British Consul and his family, and the French Consul, were allowed to leave. They made the voyage down the Tigris in one of the laimches of Messrs. Lynch, the Ishtar. The laimcn was com- mandeered on arrival at Basra, and the party continued their journey in a Turldsh steamer. The ' detained Etu-opeans were afterwards reported safe, but it was subsequently said that they had been removed to a city in Asia Minor. The Government of India, which had charge of the Gulf operations, had been equally fore;- warned. Some time before the outbreak of hostilities they had deemed it prudent to strengthen their forces in the Gulf. The Poena Brigade, under Brigadier - General W. S. Delamain, had been sent to the island of Bahrein. It included the 2nd Dorsets, the 20th Infantry (Brownlow's Punjabis), the 117th Mahrattas, and the 104th Welle.sley's Rifles. It was accompanied by the 23rd (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, and the .30th Mountain Battery. [I-Hiof :nui I-'rv. BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. S. DELAMAIN. 108 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Elliott and Fry. COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, Britiih Resident and Consul-General In the Persian Gulf. In due course the Brigade re-embarked, and reached the bar at the niouth of the Shatt-al- Arab on November 7. The bar is an immense and increasing obstruction of extremely soft mud, through which there is only one good navigable channel. The Turks have often bi.-n rightly blamed for not dredging it, but on the other hand it must be admitted that the mud is so liquid that dredging operations will not be easy. At the outer edge of the bar no land was visible, nothing but an expaiLse of brown silt-laden waters. The aspect was very like that of the Taku bar, outside the Peiho river which leads to Tientsin. As the sliips drew nearer the shore low green banks were revealed, and a fiat country which might have been mistaken for the shores of the Scheldt were it not for the green date groves. About three miles along the bank the village of Fao came into view. It is a small place with about 400 inhabitants, chiefly herdsmen and cultivators. The Turkish mud fort was almost hidden. The cable station consisted of a couple of two-storied buildings, occupied respectively by the Turkish operators and the officials of the Indo-Eiu-opean Telegraph Companj^ Persia lay on the. other side of the broad and muddy stream. Its defences were represented by a square fort with bastioned corners, nearly opposite the cable station. The taking of Fao was a verj' brief epi- sode. H.M.S. Odin (Commander Cathca'-t R. \\'ason), a sister gunboat to the Eipiegle, together with the armed launch Sirdar, bombarded the Turkish fort and reduced it to silence in about an hour. A portion of the brigade together with a force of marines from the battleship Ocean, which lay outside, was landed, and the town was occupied. The invasion of Chaldea had begun. It was not the flrst time that a British force had sailed into the Shatt-al-Arab. During the war with Persia early in 1857 Sir Henry Havelock entered the river with 4,000 men and took ^Mohammerah. On that occasion the Seaforth Highlanders and the Staffordshire Regiment participated. The Seaforths afterwards actually ascended the Karrni River and captiu-ed the city of Ahwaz, an exploit which was almost mamediately forgotten owing to the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. Having made good his position at Fao, where he left a detachment of native infantry, General Delamain proceeded more than thirty miles up the river with the bulk of his brigade. The voyage cannot at any time be called picturesque. The Turkish bank is clothed with trees, largely date groves, behind which stretch swamps and desert. The Persian bank is less wooded, but rather dreary, though the iand is green enough. These lower areas of the delta pro%ide excellent snipe shooting, as many an exiled naval officer has f oimd. The edges of the banks are soft and muddy, and rather steep. Landing is ex- ceedingly difficult, as General Delamain discovered when the time came for hun to disembark his force. The reason he had hurried on became plain to all after the expedition had steamed onward for tliree or four hours. There on the bank of the island of Abadan, on the Persian side, stood the new and spacious refinerj- of tlie Anglo- Persian Oil Comjjanj', which is destined to supply oil for the ships of the Royal Xa\'y. Its large electric power station, and thf installation for making tins and cans for kerosene and benzine, offered the enemy tempting opportiuiities for destruction. H.^l.S. Espiegle was guarding the works when the expedition arrived. The night before, two small Turkish motor gunboats, built by Thornycroft, had come down the river after siuiset. The Espiegle was waiting for them, and after an exchange of shots drove them off. Tliat morning the Espiegle had gone up stream and round the bend and shelled a small Turkish THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 109 post, and also a custom -hovise. The Turks had some guns concealed, and replied with vigour. The oU refinery at Abadan is the outcome of a concession granted in 1901 to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy, a British subject, to exploit petroli- fisroios areas throughout the Persian Empire. Mr. D'Arcy commenced the work himself, but the concession was acquired in 1909 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a purely British organization. The late Lord Strathcona was largely instrumental in forming the company, and remained its chairman untU liis death. When the project was placed before him his characteristic question was, " Will it help the Empire ? " On being assured that the project had Imperial importance, he supported it with enthusiasm. When the Board of Admiralty sought to adopt oil fuel on a large scale for British warships, it became desirable for the Government to acquire direct access to some source of oil supply which would save them from the danger of being at the mercy of oil mono- polists. At the instanec of Lord Fisher, an Admiralty Commission, of wliich Vice-Admiral Sir Edmond Slade was the head, was sent out very quietly in October, 1913, to report upon the Anglo -Persian oilfields. Their report was so favourable that in June, 1911, the House of ■Commons, at the request of Mr. Winston Churchill, decided that the Government should acqviire share or loan capital in the Anglo - Persian Oil Company to the extent of £2,200,000. Though the company " proved " oil at various points in Southern and Western Persia, its first large soiu-ce of supply was at Maidan-i-Naphtun (the Plain of Naphtha), about 150 miles north-east of the refinery at Abadan. A pipe-line was constructed between Abadan and Maidan-i-Naphtun, but tJie sujjply was so enormous that only a very few wells had been tapped. The oil flows from the wells to large storage tanks on the field, whence it is pumped into the pipe -line from a pumping station at Tembi, four miles away. The capacity of the line is about 350,000 tons per annum, and the oil available seems illimit- able. The Abadan refinery is able to deal with about 1,000 tons of crude oil daily. The chief offices of the company are at Mohammerah, and there is a large British staff at Abadan. After the Government acquired an interest in the company, preparations were begun for the construction of a second pipe-line which would increase production by about a million tons a year. It was always recognized that the pipe-line and the Abadan works would be to a certain extent vulnerable in the event of a sudden outbreak of war with Tvu-key. The subsequent invasion of Persia and the temporary capture ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY'S REFINERIES ON ABAUAN INLAND. 110 THK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. of Tabriz, showed that, as was anticipated, Turkey had no more intention of respecting the netitrality of Persia than Germany was willing to refrain from molesting Belgium. The Government, however, felt reasonably confident that they could protect their own property, and they were instantly successful on this occasion at Abadan. As a matter of fact, the Royal Navy was not in the least degree dependent upon Persian oil when the war broke out. Great Britain entered the war with immense reserves of fuel oil stored in the United Ivingdom, which was an essential feature of Admiralty policy. General Delamain proceeded past the Abadan oil .works and round the bend of the river, anchoring half an hour later at Saniyeh, about 35 miles from the sea. Here he disembarked his brigade on the Turkish banlc without opposition, but with some difficulty, the bank being about ten feet high, and very mnddy and slippery. The brigade at once proceeded to make a strong entrenched camp close to the river, while awaiting the arrival of reinforce- ments. It was not left long in peace. At dawn on November 11 the outposts were attacked by a considerable Turkish force, which had evidently hurried down from i>asra. The Turks were quickly checked by the 117th Malu-attas, but they had estab- lished themselves in a village from which they could only be dislodged by a considerable effort. The 20th Punjabis made a counter-attack, supported by fire from a mountain battery. Major Ducat was mortally wounded at close quarters while gallantly leading a company of the Punjabis against the village. The enemy were finally routed, and as they with- drew the maxims got in on their flank. The Turkish casualties were believed to amount to about 80. The British casualties were very few, but Captain Franlcs, of the Mahrattas, was seriously wovuided. On November 13, soon after daybreak, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett, who had been placed in command of the operations against Basra, arrived with several transports off the bar at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab. The reinforcements included the Ahmednagar Brigade, vmder Brigadier -General W. H. Dobbie, C.B., consisting of the 1st Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, the 119th Infantry (the Mooltan Regiment), and the 103rd Mahrattas ; and the Belgaum Brigade, under Brigadier- General C. I. Fry, consisting of the 2nd Nor- folks, the 110th Mahrattas, the 120th Raj- putana Infantry, and the 7th Rajputs. There were also tliree batteries of the Royal Field Artillerj^ the 48th Pioneers, the 3rd Sappers and Miners, and the 33rd Light Cavalry, the PREPARING RIVER STEAMERS FOR THE KURNA ADVANCE. Two field guns on S.S. "Medjidieh" in foreground. Two other guns on S.S. " Blosse Lynch" beyond. Vessels protected with grain bags and bales. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR: 111 1 " \ g J . 1 "^ E ^ 1 ^^ Hi !■ ■ y.^^f -I« '" ^ Mpi^^ '^^^^^Sl^M 1 •■ . . 1 ■ THE HAMBURG-AMERIKA S.S. ' ECKBATANA,' SUNK BY THE TURKS IN THE SHATT-AL-ARAB. Three vessels were sunk here, but the obstruction proved inadequate. last-named regiment being xinder the command of Lieut. -Col. Wogan Browne. The 33rd Cavalry won distinction in the Gulf in 1857, and their charges at the battle of Khooshaub have a very special place in Indian cavalry annals. The troops named by no means represent the total force employed in Mesopotamia, but they were ihe first reinforcements to arrive. On the 14th the transports crossed the bar at 6 a.m., and accompanied by various warships steamed up the river. A cold breeze was blow- ing, and the troops began to notice the change from the climate of India, and to put on thicker clothing. It can be very cold in the Shatt-al- Arab in the winter months, and from the tropics the expedition had passed to a region where fires are almost a necessity at such a season. Saniyeh was reached at 10.30 a.m., and Colonel Sir Percy Cox at once camie off to see Sir Arthur Barrett. Sir Percy Cox had long been British Resident and Consxil- General in the Persian Gulf, and had a knowledge of Persian, Arabian, Meso- potamian, and Gulf problems to which no other living Englishman could lay claim. Though perhaps little known outside India, he had filled a distinguished and honourable place in the more recent chapters of the story of Great Britain in the Middle East. He was at once soldier and diplomatist, but peacemaker most of all. For years he had held the Persian Gulf in the hollow of his hand. There was not a sheikh upon its shores who did not both fear and respect him, and, above all, repose entire confidence in his justice and impartiality. He had been a court of appeal in all their quarrels, and composed their differences with firmness and fairness. His responsibilities ever since 1899, when he first went to Muscat to establish a better under- standing with the ruler of Oman, were heavy and varied. Often he was in most critical situations, for Germany was not the only Power which during that period sought to practise an aggressive policy in the Gulf. He emerged from every trial successfully, and overcame difficulties which in the hands of a weaker or less prudent man might have caused an international explosion. Patience, tact, vigilance, and an infinite capacity for laborious work were the secrets of his years of toil. Silent and modest, fearless in emergency, never afraid of responsibility but endowed with unfailing restraint and caution, he was a striking figure in the long line of India's soldier- politicals, and served Great Britain in the Gulf and Southern Persia better than she knew. After a consultation with Sir Percy Cox, on November 14, General Barrett decided to postpone the disembarcation of his forces until next day. The camp of the Poona Brigade was wet and muddy, having suffered two days' heavy rain. On th(> 15th the troops began to go ashore, but were not all landed mitil 2 p.m. 112 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. TURKISH OFFICERS AT KURNA. In the meantime, General Barrett, on hearing that the enemy were occupying a post about four miles northward at the village of Sahain, ordered General Delamain to move out against them with the Poona Brigade. General Dela- main marched after breakfast, taldng with liim his two mountain batteries, the Dorsets, 117th Mahrattas, and the 104th Wellesley's Rifles. The 20th Pimjabis followed later in reserve. The Tiu"ks were found to be about 2,000 strong, about one-third of their force being Arab auxiliaries. They were holding a position on the outer edge of the date planta- tions, which extend back from the river at this point for about two miles, beyond which' the country is open desert. The Dorsets advanced against the Turkish right, half the 104th attacked their centre, and the rest of the 104th, with the 117th, moved against the enemy's left through the date groves, which were full of riflemen. The Espiegle and the Odin joined in the action from the river. The Turks did not hold their fire, but opened with rifles on the Dorsets at 1,000 yards, while the latter were skirmishing across the plain in open order. The enemy's gims fired shrapnel, though not with any marked success, although their general resistance was quite stubborn enough. The 117th, who were eventually reinforced by the 20th, reached the village of Sahain, but did not succeed in entirely clearing it, though it was set on fire. Along the rest of the front the Turks fell back, but as the action was only meant to be a reconnaissance in force the brigade then marched back to camp. The British casualties were two officers wounded ; rank and file, eight killed and 51 wounded. Of these the Dorsets lost five killed and 35 wounded. November 16 was a day of rest, but news came down the river which appeared to make an early movement imperative. The bulk of the Basra garrison was advancing, and tiiere were fears about the fate of the Eui'opeans detained in the city. On November 17 the whole force started northward at 5.30 a.m., and the action was fought which decided the fate of Basra and the delta. The position at Sahain, which had been attacked on the loth, was found to be completely evacuated. After a march of about nine miles contact was established with the Turks at SaJiil, near the river. They were in a strongly entrenched position, and had with them twelve guns, chiefly Krupps. Two of their guns were near the trenches, but the rest were in a date-groxe about 2,000 yards in the rear. General Fry and a portion of the Belgaum Brigade led the advance, much of wliich had to be made over the open plain. The ground was heavy, and just as the action began a heavy rain and hail storm, lasting half an hoiu-, turned it into a quagmire. The Turks opened fire between 9 and 10 a.m. with shrapnel. It was noticed that the shrapnel burst far too high, and when common shell was used much of it failed to burst at all. The British batteries covered the advance, the mountain guns paying attention to the Turkish trenches, whfle the field guns were turned on the Turkish bat- tery in the date grove. The two gunboats had moved up the river and enfiladed the Turkish left flank. The Turkish rifle fire, which presently began, was on the whole also bad. An onlooker afterwards wrote : " The coim- try over which our infantry advanced was flat as a table, and would not have given cover to a mouse, much less a man. It was just grand to watch them move forward. It might have been a field day." It was during this advance in open order, without a chance of cover, that most of the British casualties occurred. It was like moving through a snipe marsh, and it took hours to get near the almost invisible Turldsh trenches. The guns stuck, and men tugged at their wheels. The Turks at length were pouring in a heavier THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 113 and more accurate fire. They had some sharp- shooters in their trenches, who began to do a good deal of execution. The attacking infantry, both British and Indian, advanced steadily and indomitably, and were quite unperturbed. General Barrett afterwards telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India that " the troops behaved splendidly." The gallant Dor- sets, who learned at Dargai, on the Indian frontier, what it means to face heavy fire with- out cover, were the principal sufferers. An officer in an Indian regiment, who took part in the action, wrote : " The Dorse ts were simply wonderful." Nearer and nearer drew the British skirmishers. The Turkish trenches were being heavily bombarded. All the guns from the batteries and the ships were now concentrated on them, as well as a heavy rifle fire. A British battery got round on their right. The British infantry were within four hundred yards. They were ready with their bayonets, but the Turks would not face the cold steel. Just as our troops expected to charge, the enemy broke from their trenches and fled. The fight was won, and though none present then realiiied it, at that moment Basra was won too. From the time the Turks broke at Sahil they never really stood fast again. When the enemy fled they ran at first, but Boon slackened into a walk, for it was impossible to run far over such heavy ground. The British troops rose and poured a withering fire into them, while the batteries sprayed them with shrapnel. Effective pursuit was out of the question, though the enemy were followed for about a mile. The 33rd Cavalry were eager, but horse- men cannot charge through a sticky swamp. Presently even the British batteries ceased firing, for the oddest but most imperative of reasons. The fugitive Turks had passed from their view, and were lost in a mirage. To the gumiers it seemed as though there were trees and shining water where shortly before there had been nothing but the bare plain and the scattered and retreating enemy. Every traveller in these regions knows how curiously deceptive the mirages are, and how they often obliterate the real view. The curious thing was that the watchers perched high on the distant transports saw no mirage at all, and wondered why the guns had stopped firing on the routed enemy, who were quite visible from the ships. This also is a common and quite understand- able experience. The action at Sahil was over by 4 p.m. The British losses were : killed, officers, three ; rank and file, about 35 ; wounded, officers, about 15 ; rank and file, about 300. General Barrett had a narrow escape, a shrapnel shell burying itself in the ground at liis feet, at a MATERIAL FOR HACJHUAD RAILWAY AT MAGIL. NRAR HASKA. The Germans brought these rails, etc., for the Baghdad-Basra scciiou. 114 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. range of about 3,500 yards. The casualties among the Dorsets were about 130. Three Dorset officers were killed, including Major Mercer, who was present at the storming of Dargai, on the Indian frontier, and Captain Frank Middleton, who saw much service in South Africa. Most of the losses were in General Delamain's Brigade, but General Fry's Brigade also suffered considerably. The 104th Wellesley's Rifles reached the Turkish camp and got about 80 tents and large quanti- ties of stores, some rifles, 20 camels and 40 mules. Two mountain guns were captured. The Turkish losses can only be guessed, but their dead numbered hundreds, and the Euro- peans at Basra afterwards said they brought back large numbers of woimded, estimated at 2,000, though the figure seems excessive. About 150 prisoners were taken, including three officers. A portion of the expedition camped near the battlefield, and the rest marched back to Saniyeh. A heavy storm that evening sank a nmnber of boats in the river. Ten men were drowned, and a considerable quantity of stores and kit was lost. The next three days passed quietly, for the men needed rest. Some amount of reconnaissance was done, and the force was troubled a little by stray Turkish snipers. On the morning of November 21 came the unexpected news that the Turks had evacuated Basra in a panic, and that Arabs were looting the city. General Barrett decided to push on at once. He had at his disposal two river paddle steamers belonging to Messrs. Lynch, the Medjidieh and the Blosse Lynch. He embarked the Norfolks, with General Fry and the staf? of the Belgaum Brigade, and a couple of mountain guns, on the Medjidieh, and the 1 10th Mahrattas on the other vessel. The rest of the expedition was ordered to cross the desert to Basra, marching all night. The Turlcs had made an awkward obstruction in the river at Baliyahiyeh, about eight miles beyond Sahil. They had sunk the Hamburg- Amerika s.s. Eckbatana, 5,000 tons ; the John O'Scott, Turkish-owned ; and an old lightship from Fao. On the bank at this point they had a battery of Ivrupp guns in position. Like all things Turkish, the obstruction was imperfectly made. The Espiegle and the Odin managed to get past it and disposed of the battery. The river steamers left Saniyeh at 9.30 p.m., and reached the obstruction at 1 a.m., where they were met by the Royal Indian Marine paddle giuiboat Lawrence. They waited for daylight, and at 7 a.m. passed the obstruction. At 8.15 they were met by a boat bearing an urgent message from the American Consul, who said that the Arabs were still looting and that lives TURKISH PRISONERS AT KURNA. 'Some are probably Arab irregulars. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 115 RIFLES TAKEN AT KURNA. On the left is one of Messrs. Lynch's river st3arrers. were imperiUed. At 9 a.m. they came in sight of Basra, and saw black clouds of smoke rising from the Tiorkish Custom House, which had been fired ; but the Odin, Espiegle, and LawTence had already arrived, and the city was saved. A quarter of an hour afterwards the "German flag flying over the imposing German Consulate was lowered, and the British naval ensign hoisted in its stead. The desert column reached Basra at noon, and camped outside the city that day, being somewhat exhausted after a forced march of 30 miles. The Europeans in the city were all safe, having been detained in their houses under a guard. The city and port of Basra have been famous in the East for centuries. The port was originally created by the Caliph Omar in 638, on a site some miles from its present position. In the days of the Baghdad Caliphate it was a great emporiiun of trade and commerce, and from Basra Sindbad the Sailor, who was no mythical personage, sailed on his memorable and highly coloiu-ed voyages. The Turks soon brought about the decay of the port after they captured it in 1668. In modern times its prosperity has greatly revived, largely through the date trade, of which it is the central mart. Visitors have often said that the European community of Basra talk dates and notliing else. The export trade of Basra reached a total volume of £3,246,000 in 1912, of which barley represented £1,118,000. The imports in the same year amounted to a total of £2,653,000. The conquest of a city with a total annual trade of six million sterling was therefore a substantial achieve- ment. Basra has been called the Venice of the East, but the title is far too flattering. It has no fine bmldings, and the flat -roofed houses are unimpressive. It derives such beauty as it possesses from its setting of palm-trees, its gardens, and its numerous intersecting canals ; though these same canals are a constant source of fever. The main portion of the city, a quarter with narrow, unpaved streets, lies up the contracted Asshar creek, two miles from the river. The suburbs, bowered in palms, are more attractive. The population is probably about 60,000, but there are many more people in the suburbs. It is a curiously mixed com- munitj% including many Jews and Armeniarus. The Turks were always few and exclusive, and consisted mainly of Government oflicials and the garrison. The Turk had long been overlord of the Euphrates delta, but his race never sought to settle there. The Germans were perfectly right in tlieir dreams of the futiu'c of Basra, and had tlieir purpose not been primarily political, thoy need 116 THE TIMES HISTOnY OF THE WAR. PROCLAIMING THE BRITISH OCCUPATION AT BASRA. Troops lined up on Asshar Creek. The Union Jack was hoisted on building on left. never have sought to emerge upon the shores of the Giilf at all. They could have made Basra an Oriental Hamburg, as they often declared. In situation it closely resembles the city on the Elbe. The bar needs dredging, as does also the channel of the Shatt-al-Arab, but miles of n:iagnificent quays might be constructed on both sides of the river frontage of Basra, where the river is half a mile wide. When the fertile valleys of the Tigris and Euplu-ates are won back to cultivation by irrigation, Basra will have a great and prosperous future. The work will still be done, though not by German hands. The British expedition made a formal entry into the city on November 23, after which the troops were billeted, some occupying the deserted Tiukish barracks and other public buildings. At the close of the entry half the force was lined up on the Asshar Canal bank, facing north, and the notables of the city were assembled, being greeted by General Barrett and Sir Percy Cox. A proclamation stating the reasons for occupation and the friendly intentions of the British Government was read aloud in Arabic. The Union Jack was hoisted in the presence of guards of honour furnished by the Royal Navy and the Norfolk Regiment. The troops presented arms, three cheers were given for the King-Emperor, and the warships fired a salute of 31 guns. The inliabitants took the change very calmly, and as there were no Turks left among them, they gave a cordial welcome to the British. Major Brownlow was appointed ^Military Governor, and took up his residence at the German Consulate. The Gerinan Consul and five German prisoners were removed to Bombay. The expedition started a little newspaper, the Basra Times, printed in English and Arabic, for the use of the troops and the populace. At the beginning of December a camp was formed for a portion of the force, and two mountain batteries, at Magil, about four miles farther up the river. Magil was a depot for material for the Baghdad-Basra Railway. The troops found there large quantities of railway stores, including thousands of rails and sleepers. The (Germans had made a wharf, and they had landing-cranes and other structiu-es. The staff had fled, and the two spacious and comfortable houses they had built were empty. Near Magil the new channel of the Euphrates enters the Tigris, and thenceforward to the sea the imited rivers are known as the Shatt-al-Arab. Intelligence was received at this time that the retreating Turks had reassembled at Kurna, a point 49 miles above Basra, where the old and now partially blocked channel of the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 117 "Euphrates joins the Tigris. The Arabs profess to beUeve that Kurna is the site of the Garden of Eden, though Sir WilUam Willcocks places it far above Hitt on tlie Euphrates, and con- siderably to the north-west of Baghdad. Just at Kurna the Tigris is about 300 yards wide. Above Kurna it narrows, but the difficult part . of the navigation only begins 30 miles farther on, and contmues for about 80 miles. The Tigi'is winds greatly between Kiu-na and Bagh- dad, and is said to cover 490 miles between the two places. The land route across the desert irom Kiuna to Baghdad is only 300 miles in length. The Tigris is at its lowest from Septem- ber to Xoveniber, and then gradually begiiis to rise. It is at its height in ]May and June. Sea- going steamers can ascend to Kurna, but higher up shallow-draught vessels are required. On December 2 it was decided to send up a ■column on the two river steamers to deal with the situation at Kurna. It embarked next day, and sailed at 8 p.m. The force consisted of a ■section of the Royal Field Artillery, a half- company of the 3rd Sappers and Miners, the 104th Wellesley's Rifles, the IlOth Maln-attas, and a detachment of the Norfolks, with an ambulance party. It was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, of the 110th Mah- rattas. The river steamers each had a couple of 18-pounder field guns on their upper dfecks, and were protected by parapets of gram and fodder bags and bales. The naval flotilla accompanying the column consisted of the Espiegle, Odin and Lawrence, the armed launches ]\Iiner (54 tons) and Shaitan, and the yacht Lewis Pelly (100 tons). The Lewis Pelly is the dispatch boat of the British Resident at Koweit, and on this occasion she carried two 3-pounders and a Maxitn, Xot much opposition was expected, but the expectations were wrong. The expedition reached a point about four miles below Kurna early next morning, and the troops were landed on the left (eastern) bank. While the military advanced, the Espiegle and the Lawrence steamed ahead, with the armed launches. The Odin was left behind to guard the landing-place. She had damaged her rudder, and it was not safe to take her roimd the sharp bend of the river. The navigable channel was at tliis point very narrow, and the ships were constantly touching the mud. They anchored at a suitable spot, and engaged the Turkish guns on the left bank, which were con- cealed in date-groves and extremely difficult to locate. They also shelled Kurna. The paddle-steamers could move more freely owing to their shallow draught, so they went closer inshore and used their guns in support. The launches were even more daruig, but the Miner was holed below the water-line and had to withdraw. The Lawrence was also hit by a ; shell. There was a village called Me/era some distance from the bank, on the left of the .; Turkish position. Colonel Frazer signalled to , the warshi2:)s to shell it, and it was saluted with lyddite and destroyed in half an hoiu-. " 1 have never seen such a bonfire," wrote one of the naval officers who was aloft "spotting." The troops meanwhile advanced across the plahi, and cleared the village and the Tiu-lcish trenches. The survivors of the enemy crossed the river to Kurna in boats. The colurrui was then opposite the town of Kurna, which lies amid thick trees at the point where the old channel of the Euphrates meets the Tigris. It was evident that Kiu-na was far more strongly held than was supposed. It was entrenched, and the houses, few of which could be seen, were loopholed. A t'^emendous fusillade came whistling across the stream. There was no means of crossing, and there was nothing for it but a withdrawal to the original landing-place. The camp was then entrenched, because the Tiu'ks were in superior numbers, and an attack wEis feared. They did not attack, but it was afterwards found that during that night they wert; strongly reinforced. Colonel Frazer's colmnn was not strong enough for the task. Nevertheless, it captured two of the Tiu-kish guns, which had been silenced by the ships. One was brought in, but the other had to be left. if~ii «|C iTurUiGh Our present Jri S %-\Position ,.,,./" on S'>< by means of 3 dhon Open desert plain: ^ith palm treu on either bank <0^^^ pl-.BankUie^grjj 'i '•aa?T\ * 1 - ^ ^ Village burnt 0/ US a^ a. "'_^". ^^ rcoccupied^by Turks ■i*-- i^^^^^^^^^"^ rat ^Ij on At* .'/C ''eoccupiea^by •etahen by js ,<#> British Attack ^^ct? on?''' onlyoccucieKpos" X-Y sn /Knijg/e ii"-iyer aasntino 'd Ifjardn^ent ^ Launcti Shaitan struck by ihells ana Oeached here Approximate Scale 1 MIUE '3 " -S^KPrrtisnCafTipi FLAN OF ACTIONS AT KURNA. From a Sketch Map by a British Officer. 118 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. WOUiNDED INDIAN SOLDIERS. and an attempt to obtain it next day failed owing to the heavy fire. A hasty message was sent down to Basra for reinforcements, and meanwhile casualties were examined. The Miner had a shell in her engine- room, and had settled on the mud, biit was patched up and floated the same night. The Lawrence had received a shell below, and her dynamo was wrecked. The launches were struck several times. The casualties among the troops were one British officer and three British rank and file wovmded, one Indian officer and 19 rank and file killed and about sixty woiuided. On December 5 (a Satiu-day) little happened, and on the 6th Brigadier- General Fry arrived from Basra with considerable reinforcements, including the 7th Rajputs, the remainder of the Norfolks, a field battery, and a mountain battery. By this time the Turks had crossed the river again and reoccupied Mezera. They made a half-hearted attempt to advance against the camp, but were dispersed by a few roimds of shrapnel. Kuma was not yet taken, and it took some stiff fighting to capture it. On the morning of the 7th the action of the 5th was fought all over again, exactly in the same way, though this time the British were in greater strength, while the Turlcs were somewhat handicapped by tlie loss of the two guns silenced in the previous engagements. Exactly the same result followed. Mezera was taken once more, the- Turkish trenches were cleared, and the survivors fled across the river ; but a terrific fire across the stream from the loopholed hou.ses of Kurna stopped any further operations for the day. On this occasion a portion of the Briti.sh forces bivouacked near Mezera and held the left bank opposite Kurna. Three guns were taken on this day, as well as 100 prisoners, including three officers. During the night the Turks fired a few shells, but otherwise remained i.iactive. The flotilla, which was again busily engaged during the action of the 7th, had plenty of excitement. ' The Espiegle was hit several time.=:. The Miner went aground, but got of? again. The Lewis Pelly had her share of damage. The launch Shaitan was struck on the bridge by a shell, which killed her commander Lieutenant- Commander J. G. M. Elkes, R.N.R. The man at the wheel was wounded, and part of the wheel was carried away. A later shot smashed the Shaitan's rudder, and she had to retire. The Odin joined in this day's action. It was clear that the only way to take Kiu-na was to cross the River Tigris higher up. Early on the morning of the 8th, two battalions, the 104th and 110th, were marched a long way up the river with two mountain guns. Some sappers then swam the swift stream, a feat in itself. They carried a line across, to which a steel hawser was attached. With the aid of a commandeered dhow a flying bridge was con- structed, and the two battalions, with the guns, were ferried across without opposition. They then inarched baf;k down the right (western) bank, tlireatened the Turkish position in flank and rear, and seized the approaches to Kurna. No attempt was made to carry the town that night, but the little force entrenched itself in the palm groves near the town. About midnight on the 8th the watchers on the warships below Kurna saw a small steamer coming do\vn ablaze with lights. She carried three Turkish officers bearing a message from Subhi Bey, the late Governor of Basra, then commanding the forces at Kurna. He offered to surrender the town, but wanted his troops to march out with their arms. General Fry insisted on an unconditional surrender, and after an hour's parley in the small hours on board the Espiegle this was agreed to. At 1 p.m. on the 9th the remnants of the Tiu-kish garrison appeared in front of their trenches on the river bank and laid down their- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 119 arms. A large proportion must have fled during the night into the surrounding country, and it was known that many barge-loads went upstream to Baghdad. The two Indian bat- talions on the Kurna side formed up round the garrison. General Fry, Sir Percy Cox, and the senior naval officer, then went on shore with their staffs. The Turkish officers came up and handed over their swords. General Fry returned Subhi Bey's sword in recogm'tion of his gallant defence. The compliment was deserved, for, as subalterns would say, the Turks " put up a good show " in their last resistance. The captives numbered 42 officers and 1,021 men. Several more guns wer>? taken. The Tiu-kish casualties in and around Kurna and Mezera are believed to have been at least a thousand, and were perhaps more. An officer wrote that he had charge of a party which litiried 200 dead found in one trench alone. Kurna was wrecked by the British fire. The prisoners were taken to India. The British casualties on the 7th and 8th nimibered one British officer killed and three wounded, and 40 Indian rank and file killed and 120 wounded. The operations at Kurna gave the British complete control of the deltaic region, but it was considered necessary to leave a strong column at Kurna, and another across the river at Ivlezera. They made big entrenched camps and prepared to settle down. The neigh- bourhood was on the whole not inviting. The camps were pitched beyond the date groves, and one officer wrote : " This is a most desolate spot. Sitting here, all I can see is miles and miles of perfectly level desert, absolutely unbroken." Many Canadian prairie farmers might have said the same thing in the early days. The country is not desert, but one of the most fertile regions in the world. The British troops liked the life as a welcome change from India, but the mosquitoes troubled them greatly. One verj'- still night, when the camp was asleep, a man was heard to say to his neighbour : " 'Ere, Bill, if this is the Garden of Eden, I wonder what Adam and Eve did with these 'ere mosquitoes a-buzzin' around them." In January a force of about 5,000 Turks, with six guns, estabhshed itself on the Ratta Canal, about seven miles north of the Mezera Cam[j. The British troops, aided by the three gunboats, made a reconnaissance in force from Mezera on January 20. The enemy's outposts were driven across the canal, and his camps and dhows were shelled. The British had about 50 casualties. His Excellency Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Viceroy and Governor -General of India, imder whose direction and supervision the invasion of Chaldea was begun, made a toiu? of the Persian Gulf and the conquered territory at the end of January. Lord Hardinge visited Muscat, GUN CAPTURED AT KURNA. The Officer seated on the Gun is Brigadier-General C. I. I'ly. 120 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. Balirein. Koweit, Mohammerah, and other plac(!.s, and eventually arrived at Basra on February 4. He was received by the native community with an address of welcome, in which the hope was expressed that the British occupation would be permanent. He said, in reply : The British occupation has raised problems which require prompt consideration and settlement. I have coiue heie to see local conditions for myself in order tb.e better to judge what measures are necessary. Yon are aware that we are not engaged single-handed in this groat struggle, and we cannot lay down plans for the future without a full exchange of views with the other Groat Towers. b\it I can liold out the assurance that tlie future will bring you a more benign rule. Lord Hardinge afterwards went up the river to Kurna and Mezera, so that he visited the most advanced outposts of the expedition. He also, while at Basra, rode across the desert to Shaiba and elsewhere. Attacks on Muscat on January 10 and 11, which were repulsed by detachments of the 95th Russell's Infantry and the 102nd Bombay Grenadiers, had only a remote connexion \\ ith the great war. They were the outcome of a local revolt against the Sultan of Oman which had begun nearly two years before, and was perhaps stimulated into renewed activity by the news that half the world was in arms. The town and district were perfectly quiet when Lord Hardinge arrived some time later. Cajjtain William Henry Shakespear, CLE., British Resident at Koweit, was killed in Central Arabia during February while on a special mission to Ibn Saud, who was at strife with soinc of liis neighbours. Captain Shakespear was a fine type of the young soldier-political, and his death was a great loss. There was much relief at the end of February when the Europeans who had been at Baghdad, about fifty in number, reached the shores of the Mediterranean. They were unexpectedly released from detention by order of Djemal Pasha, who was formerly Vali of Baghdad, and perhaps did not forget old friendships. Nine Englishwomen and some children were left in Baghdad in charge of Dr. Johnson, an elderly missionary. They were not allowed to depart,. but it w as believed that they were quite safe. THE BUSRA TIMES ao ;:a. ly^h January, lylb. REUTERS J&noiry 12Ul O«nnao offensive ia Poland la eon* ceotrated oo narrow xone 10 tnilM wide, 30 uulea west of WAfiSAW. 2 Anny Corps zn operstinf wtth heavy gons. aad the Oenoaa Uce practically foUows the Hue al tae S^AV/Kh. The Ocrinana arc s'ralnine every nerve to possess the BOUNOFF WOODS. Pnsocers state that the enemy are conlldent of thus piercing the Russian hoe. One mght 13 coniecntiTe a-tacis were repulsed, the Bnssiana inUiotiair siiormoncIoiBes ou tb: dense lormauoo* 0. the eceiny. Th» Ainentan papers say that- the Bntlih reply to their Rote was co^t cor.cilatorj aad fncodly The Gcnpaas are fonoUsly bomhardmg S0ISSOH& Snd UlA QahtiAa ^ KAvaze 'y'H, i_- j^;> *-*■ ,-^f J^ i -It *.* jj oAt» ^'Jy-'^ '^y^^ Portion of Title-Page of Newspaper Started by Expecition after the I all of Basra. CHAPTER LIII. THE SECOND THREE MONTHS OF NAVAL WAR. Lord Fisher at the Admiralty — Tsing-Tau and the Japanese Navy — The German Losses — Career and End of the Emden — The Cocos-Keeling Action — Action Off the Coast of Chile — Loss of Good Hope and Monmouth— Victory Off the F.\lkland Islands — End of von Spee's Squadron — Admiral Sturdee's Dispatch — Minor Operations — East Africa — Konigs- berg in Rufigi River — West Africa — Red Sea — Persian Gulf — The Goeben in the Black Sea — Torpedoing of Messudiyeh by B 11 in the Dardanelles — British Losses in Home Waters — Bulwark and Formidable — Raids and Countkr-raids — Yarmouth, Scarborough and Cuxhaven — Admiral Beatty's Action in the North Sea — Sinking of the Blucher. ON October 29, 1914, Prince Louis of Battenberg was succeeded in the otHce of First Sea Lord by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone. Of the reasons which caused the resignation of Prince Louis there is no occasion to write ; but that fine seaman and most able tactician carried with him in his retirement the good wishes and the admiration of the whole service, of which he had so long been an ornament. Lord Fisher was now called upon by his coiuitry to wield the weapons that he had had so large a share in bringing into being. During the second three months of the war events of great importance happened in the North Sea, but the main feature of this period was the practical completion of the task of destroying Germany's naval forces in the outer seas. To the taking of Tsing-Tau had to be added the destruction of the naval force which had been based upon that Eastern stronghold. Its ultimate fate was sure, but its existence constituted a menace to commerce and in- volved risks and responsibiUties which directly and indirectly affected the whole work of the British Navy. Tsing-Tau was from the begin- ning of German occupation administered by the Gei-man Admiralty, not by the Colonial Office, and the cost was a charge upon the Navy, not the Colonial, Estimates. It was, in fact, above all a naval base, and the home of the German " East Asiatic " squadron. This Vol. III.— Part 30. force consisted of the armoured cruisers Scham- horst and Gneisenau, the light cruisers Emden, Niimberg and Leipzig, four gim.boats and two destroyers. As will be seen, the cruisers did not remain. to be destroyed at Tsing-Tau, and their careers and fates are the central featiu-es of the ensuing narrative. The full story of the fate of Tsing-Tau has been told in Chapter XLIV. We must now describe briefly the work of the J apanese Navj-, which assisted the fleets of the Allies so materially by clearing the waters in the vicinity of its own shores, and which afterwards cooperated in the convoy of troops from the Dominions and in hauling dowTi the German flag in the islands of the Pacific. It was not until August 23, 1914, that Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and declared war ; but as soon as this happened our Far-Eastern Allies acted with the prompti- tude and startling efficiency tliat we have learned to expect from them when warlike operations have to be undertaken. The First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Baron Dewa, strung itself out on a line from the Shantung Promontorj' in the Yellow Sea to the Chusan Archipelago in the Eastern Sea ; while the Second Fleet, under the command of Admiral Kato, had bj' August 27 spread itself in front of the Bay of Kiao-Chau — in which Tsing-Tau is situated — and had establLshed tis close a blockade of that port as modern con- 121 122 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ditions of sea warfare permit. The objective of the Japanese was, naturally, the German Far-Eastern Squadron, but von Spee, the Admiral in command of this force, succeeded in hiding himself and his cruisers somewhere in the south of the Cliina Sea. The Japanese Fleets remained on their stations as described imtil the end of August, when the transportation of the army destined for the captiu-e of Tsing-Tau began. The First Fleet took up a position in Southern Korean waters, while a squadron of the Second Fleet, cruising in the Yellow Sea, rendered assistance to the men-of-war convoying the transports. Rear-Adnural Kamimura's Squad- ron, cooperating with the detachment from the Port Arthur naval station, assisted in the landing of troops at Lunldang. While these movements were in progress — they lasted till September 1 3 — a detachment under the direct command of Admiral Kato, Commander-in- Chief of the Second Squadron, with the Tochinai and Okada detachments and a ftu-ther con- tingent specially commissioned for this service, concentrated on Kiao-Chau Bay and the immediate vicinity. In spite of extremely bad i:rSuez. weather, gale succeeding to gale, the mine sweepers worked almost imintermittently to clear the sea in front of the point where the second detachment of the army was to be landed. Scouting was also kept up by means of aircraft, and eventually the enemy was cut off from all communication by way of the sea. When, in September, the transportation of the second portion of the army was begun, the First Fleet was employed again in convoying the transports ; the Kamimm-a and Port Arthur detachments assisted in the landing of troops at Laoshan Bay, wliile the main force of the Second Fleet, which was now able to operate inshore owing to the success of the mine sweep- ing, cooperated with the land forces in bom- barding the fortresses on the right wing of the line of the enemy. In this operation the Kamimura and Port Arthur detachments assisted. The Marine Batteries which were working with the besieging army opened fire on October 14 upon the eneray warships in the harbour, and having rendered them useless, turned their attention to the bombardment of Tsing-Tau fort. On October 31 a general cannonade was begun, and on November 7 the THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 123 LANDING PARTY ABOUT TO RETURN TO THE "EMDEN" AFTER DESTROYING THE WIRELESS STATION AT COGOS-KEELING ISLANDS. fortress surrendered. The British battleship Triumph and the destroyer Osk cooperated with the Second Fleet and took part in the blockade as well as in the bombardment. During these operations there were lost the old light cruiser Takachico, 3,700 tons, date 1885, the destroyer Shiratai, torpedo boat No. 33, and three specially commissioned steamers. On the enemy's side there were either svink or destroyed, the Austrian cruiser Kaiserin Elizabeth, five gunboats (the Cormo- ran, litis, Jaguar, Tiger and Luchs), and two destroyers. This satisfactory action was only a part of the activaty displayed by the Japanese. On the outbreak of hostilities Japan's Third Fleet was sent to protect the trade route from the Southern Seas, through Chinese waters, until one of its units came into touch with the guardship at the Makoh Naval Station in Korea. Although by the beginning of Novem- ber all enemy ships had been cleared out of Far- Eastern waters, as far as was known, still this surveillance was kept up. A detachment of this squadron detailed for operations in the Southern Seas proceeded to Singapore on August 26 and carried on operations in concert with the British Eastern Squadron. At first nothing was known of the movements of the enemy in these regions, and the work consisted of general sxu-veillance and supervision of important ports. When the Emden became active in the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean the detachment assisted in the hunt for that elusive cruiser, and on October 25 a reinforcement under Vice-Admiral Tochinai was dispatched to the scene, and on Novem- ber 9 the Emden was destroyed at the Cocos- Keeling Islands by H.M. Australian cruiser Sydney. When hostilities began certain ships of the enemy were at large in the Pacific in the neighbourhood of Hawaii ; but it was not known where they were, nor what was the position of the squadron that had escaped from Far- Eastern waters. A squadron of the First Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy was accordingly told off to hunt the enemy on the trade route between Japan and North America. No trace of German ships could be found, so the squadron occupied itself usefully by taking possession of those places in the sun which Germ an j'^ had seized in the Pacific in her efforts to foi-m a greater Germany beyond the sea. One of the ships of the German Far-Eastern Squadron that escaped the attentions of the Japanese in these waters was the light cruiser Emden. Allusion has already been made to her in a previous chapter, but it remains to tell the story of her destruction. The resoiu"ce- fulness of the captain of this ship has often been dwelt upon, but it was probably never displayed to greater advantage than when she left Kiao-Chau. There was every chance of 124 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Lalayclle. CAPTAIN JOHN C. T. GLOSSOP, of H.M.S. "Sydney." her being met by a Japanese vessel, with whom she could not hope to come to action with su(;cess. The expected happened, and shortly after leaving the anchorage she fell in .with a Japanese armoured cruiser. But it was not the three -funnelled Emden under the black, white and red German man-of-war ensign that passed the enemy warship ; but a vessel with four funnels, flying the British white ensign, whose crew, as she steamed by the Japanese, lined the rails and gave her three hearty British cheers. Much may be forgiven to seamen as clever as this. In the Bay of Bengal the Emden took and sank between September 10 and September 14 the Indus (3,413 tons), the Lovat (6,102 tons), the Killin (3,544 tons), the Diplomat (7,615 tons), and the Trabbooh (4,028 tons). On September 12 the Kabinga, of 4,657 tons, was taken and released. On September 14 the Clan Matheson, of 4,775 tons, was sunk. On September 30 there were taken and sunk the King Lud (3,650 tons), the Foyle (4,147 tons), the Ribera (3,500 tons), and the Tymeric (3,314 tons). On the same date the Buresk [4,350 tons) was captured, and the Gryfevale [4,437 tons) was taken and released. The Pontoporos, taken by the Emden, was released by H.M.S. Yarmouth on October 16. On October 20 were taken and sunk the Troilus (7,562 tons), the Clan Grant (3,948 tons), the Benmohr (4,806 tons), the Chilkana (5,220 tons), and the Ponrabbel (473 tons). On the same date the Exford (4,542 tons) and the Saint Egbert (5,r)96 tons) were captured but not sunk. Thas some 70,000 tons of British ship- ping were destroyed in seven weeks ; it is for- tunate indeed for the Empire that other com- merce raiders were not so successful. Some further exploits of the Emden are described in the following extracts from a log kt'pt by one of her petty ofificers : September 22. — This night off Madras. One of the crew had worked there, and he informed the captain of the oil tanks situated at entrance to harbour. At 9.30 p.m. Emden crept in, turned searchlights on to tanks, and fired two broadsides to find the range. Searchlights then shut off, and 125 shells fired in salvos, some hitting a ship. Tanks set on fire, and tremendous blaze arose. Emden retired at full .speed to north-east. Shore bat- teries opened fire, but shells fell short, and none hit the Emden. September 23. — This morning the glare of the fire at Madras could still be seen on the horizon, though about 100 miles away. Emden sailed north-east to give impression that she was going toward-s Calcutta, but when out of sight turned southwards round the east coast of Ceylon. October 10. — Visited island of Diego Garcia, in the middle of the Indian Ocean, about half-way between Africa and Sumatra. The few European families here had not yet heard of the war, as they only get a steamer in three months. Emden coaling all day. Some of the engineers repaired the local motor-boat, and were given baskets of coconuts and fish. October 28. — At 4 a.m., 10 miles outside Penang, extra funnel hoisted to make the Emden appear like British cruisers. From the entrance of the harbour at 5 a.m. could be seen in the distance several ships, and well in front of them an unknown cruiser. On steaming in to a I'ange of about 600 yards, this was found to be the Russian cruiser Jemtchug. The Emden fired two tor- pedoes, the first hitting the cruiser just under the after funnel, whereupon she was seen to sink about 4 feet. The second, fired at closer range, struck just vuider the bridge, when a terrible explosion occurred. During this time the Emden fired salvo after salvo — in all 100 shots. The Jemtchug fired a fev/ shots, some of which hit ships in the harbour behind the Emden, but none hit the Emden. The Emden had no idea that the Russian cruiser would be in Penang, but expected to find the French cruiser Dupleix and the French destroyer Mous- quet. Tlie Mousquet was on patrol duty outside the harbour, and was afterwards reported to have seen the Emden, but thought she was a British cruiser. The Emden had now tvirned, and was lea\-ing the harbour at full speed. Thirty miles out she met a steamer. On approaching it she hoisted the red flag, meaning that she was a powder steamer. The stranger, which was the British steamer Glenturret, had signalled the shore for a pilot, and the launch had just reached her. The Emden had got out her boats when a warship appeared on the horizon. The Emden immediately ordered her boats to return, and made off, as the warship appeared to be a large one. This was, however, only the effect of the early morning mirage. As the ships closed at about 3,800 yards the stranger was found to be the French destroyer Mousquet. The Emden opened fire. The first few shots hit the Mousquet's engine-room, and after several salvos the Emden ceased fire, expecting the Frenchman to be wrecked and to surrender. Instead, the Mousquet went on firing about 10 shots. None, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 125 THE LAST OF THE "EMDHN" Left top corner: Deck of the " Emden " after the battle: right top and centre: " Fmden's' removing stores at Cocos-Keeling Islands; bottom: the "Emden" aground. crew 30—^ 126 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. Re Fere n ee Course of HMS. SYDNEY '> » EMDEN Position oF HMS. SYDNEY. at 9.15 am. / 0J4I Scale oF Miles 2 3 4-5 6 DIRECTION I. (Cable Station) lOOq SKETCH ILLUSTRATING THE FIGHT BETWEEN H.M.S. "SYDNEY" AND THE "EMDEN." The numbers denote corresponding relative positions. however, hit the Emden, although some fell 150 yards in front of her. The Mousquet's crew afterwards said that they had fired two torpedoes, but the Emden did not see these. The Emden began firing again, and the Mousquet sank, bows first. The Emden ceased fire, and rescued 36 Frenchmen, three of whom died after- wards. This involved delay, and another destroyer was seen approaching from Penang. The Emden at once steamed for the Indian Ocean at full speed. After being chased for four hours by the destroyer the Emden entered a heavy rainstorm, and the destroyer was lost to sight. The Inst act in the drama of the Emden took place off the Cocos-Keeling Islands in the Indian Ocean. They are situated in latitude 12 South, some 500 miles south-west of Java Head and Sunda Straits. They were discovered bj^ the English, and consist of a group of coral islets where the coconut palm grows in abundance. They are in possession of Mr. Ross, a descendant of Captain J. C. Ross, who, in the good ship Borneo, belonging to Hare & Son of London, took possession of the islands and settled here in 1825. When the island of Krakatoa exploded like a bomb in the year 1883, and altered all the topography of Sunda Straits, ashes and pumice floated feet thick on the surface of the Indian Ocean. In spito of the remoteness of Cocos- Keeling from the scene of the explosion, 500 miles at least, the lagoons in Cocos were so choked with the floating pumice as actually to reclaim a portion of them. It was to this desolate spot in the Indian Ocean that Captain von Miiller brought his ship in the early days of November ; with liim was one of his captures, the Biu-esk^ which was full of coal. The object of this visit of the Emden was the destruction of the important wireless THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 127 station that is established on the islands, and on the morning of November 9 the officials in charge were unpleasantly surprised by the landing of an armed boat's crew from a cruiser which had come to an anchor, and which they first imagined to be H.M.S. Minotaiu-. They were quickly undeceived by the German officer in charge of the party, who informed them that their operations from the wireless station had greatly hampered the movements of the cruiser. One detachment of the Germans then rounded up all the officials and their servants, placing them under a strict guard, wliile a second party prepared to blow up the wireless installation and to .smash the instrument rooms of the cable office. This they did most thoroughly, but the officials seem to have kept their heads in the most praiseworthy manner, as, just a.s soon as they discovered that the eneiny was upon them, they sent out distress signals by wireless, and warned adjacent stations by cable that they were about to be smashed up. The landing party now blew vip tlie wireless mast and the store in which spare cable and cable gear was kept ; a third explosion wrecked the wireless hut and completed the destruction of the installation. The dynamo rooms and workshops were destroyed with flogging hammers and axes, everything breakable, including clocks, being smashed to atoms. Their next proceeding was to cut the shore ends of the submarine cables, and this was done in full view of the prisoners. There are three cables from the Cocos — to Perth, to Batavia, and to Rodriguez — and the pleasure of the prisoners can bo imagined when they saw the Germans spend much hard labour in destroying a dummy cable. Eventually the Perth cable and the dummy were cut, the others being left, presumably becau.se the Germans did not know that they existed. The party from the Emden had landed at 7.30 a.m., and by 9.20 their mission of destruc- tion was accompHshed. At this time a signal was blo^\•n on the siren from the ship ; the officer in comixiand collected his men, marched them down to the beach, and re-embarked. The telegraphists report that they were fairly and courteously treated. On arrival the Emden was still using her now famous fourth fiumel, a dummy, and this it was that caused the telegraphists to mistake her in the first instance for the IMinotaur, which is a four funnelled armoured cruiser. As she steamed away in the bright light of the tropic morning for what was so shortly to prove her last cruise, the Emden hauled down and stowed away her dummy. The action that ensued between the Sydney and the Emden is here given in the official dispatch of Captain Glossop, dated from Colombo on November 15 : I have the honour to report that whilst on escort duty witli the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, i " . THi • R n^ AC mm ^ OIL TANKS AT MADRAS. 128 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. EasterJ. Coqulmbo^ Talcahuanafj i^ Cqrone/fy t'^ P^ C I F I C <r-J^o_ Melbourne _ 6000 (Mercator) S V ^ Fall^land I? Cape Horn 760 THE GORONEL AND FALKLAND AGTIOiNS. H.M.A.S. jNIelbourne, at 6.30 a.m. on Monday, Novem- ber 9, a wireless message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was off the entrance. I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7.0 a.m. and proceeded thither. I worked up to 20 knots, and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship, which proved to be H.l.G.M.S. Emden, coming out towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot. I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the fore- mast, and she was badly on fire aft, then the second funnel went, and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action. 2. Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during the action I had not fired, and as she was making off fast I pursued and overtook her at 12.10, firing a gun across her bows, and hoisting International Code Signal to stop, which she did. I sent an armed boat, and foimd her to be the s.s. Buresk, a captured British collier, with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English steward, 1 Norwegian cook, and a German prize crew of 3 officers, 1 warrant officer and 12 men. The ship unfortunately was sinking, the Kingston knocked out and damaged to prevent repairing, so I took all on board, fired four shells into her, and returned to Emden, passing men VALPARAISO HARBOUR. The " Scharnhorst " and "Gneisenau" in the distance on the left. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 129 ewimming in the water, for whom I left two boats I was towing from Buresk. 3. On arriving again off Emden, she still had her colours up at mainmast head. I inquired by signal. International Code, " Will you surrender ? " and received a reply in Morse, " What signal ? No signal books." I then made in Morse, " Do you surrender ? " and sub- sequently, " Have you received my signal ? " to neither of which did I get an answer. The German officers on board gave me to understand that the captain would never surrender, and therefore, though very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m., ceasing at 4.35, as she showed white flags and hauled down her ensign by sending a man aloft. 4. I then left Emden and returned and picked up the Burcsk's two boats, rescuing two sailors (5.0 p.m.), who had been in the water all day. I returned and sent in one boat to Emden, manned by her own prize crew from Buresk and one officer, and stating I would return to their assistance next morning. 5. I lay on and off all night, and communicated with Direction Island at 8.0 a.m., November 10, to find that the Emden's party, consisting of three officers and 40 men, one launch and two cutters, had seized and provisioned a 70-tons schooner (the Ayesha), having four Maxinas with two belts to each. They left the previous night at six o'clock. The wireless station was entirely de- stroyed, one cable cut, one damaged and one intact. I borrowed a doctor and two assistants, and proceeded as fast as possible to Emden's assistance. 6. I sent an officer on board to see the captain, and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded and lack of accommodation, etc., in this ship, and the absolute impossibility of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I received his officers and men and all wounded, " then as for such time as they remained in Sydney they would cause no interference with ship or fittings, and would be amenable to the ship's discipline." I therefore set to work at once to tranship them— a most difiicult operation, the ship being on weather side of island and the send alongside very heavy. The con- ditions in the Emden were indescribable. I received tb.e last from her at 6.0 p.m., then had to go roiuid to the loe side to pick up 20 more men who had managed to get ashore from the ship. 7. Darkness came on before this could be accom- plished, and the ship again stood off and on ail night, resuming operations at 5.0 a.m. on November 11, a cutter's crew having to land with stretchers to bring wounded round to embarking point. A German officer, a doctor, died ashore the previous day. The ship in the meantime ran over to Direction Island to return their doctor and assistants, send cables, and was back again at lO.O a.m., embarked the remainder of woimded, and proceeded for Colombo by 10.35 a.m. Wednesday, November 11. 8. Total casualties in Sydney : Killed, 3 ; severely wounded (since dead), 1 ; severely wounded, 4 ; wounded, 4 ; slightly wounded, 4. In the Emden I can only approximately state the killed at 7 officers and 108 men from captain's statement. I had on board 11 officers, 9 warrant officers and 191 men, of whom 3 officers and 53 men were wounded, and of this number 1 officer and 3 men have since died of wounds. 9. The damage to Sydney's hull and fittings was surprisingly small ; in all about 10 hits seem to have been made. The engine and boiler rooms and funnels escaped entirely. 10. I have great pleasure in stating that the behaviour of the ship's company was excellent in every way, and with such a large proportion of young hands and people under training it is all the more gratifying. It will bo seen from Captain Glossop's dispatch that he was on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, of [Elliott & fry. THE LATE REAR-ADMIRAL SIR CHRISTOPHER CRADOCK, H.M A.S. Melbourne. This convoy was carrying Australian and New Zealand troops to the scene of the great conflict in Europe. The act of self- denial on the part of Captain Silver in sending the Sydney to engage the Emden instead of taking that duty upon himself certainly deserves to bo noted. This officer denied to liimself and to the officers and men under his command the privilege of dealing with the notorious raider, and in so doing ho was actuated solely by his high sense of duty and the responsibility that he owed to his country. In his judgment the Sydney was the more suitable ship, so she was sent, and the Melbourne renaained with her convoy tuitil the affair was concluded. Action off the Coast of Chile. On Friday, November 6, the Admiralty received " trustworthy information " that an action had been fought on the Chilean coast on Sunday, November I, between H.M.S. Good Hope, Momnouth, and Glasgow, in company with the armed liner Otranto, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, and the German vessels Scharnliorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Dresden. The following is a description of the vessels that took part in the affair : Good Hoi'E. — Armoured cruiser of 14,100 tons. Built at Govan and launched in 1901. Length, 515 ft.; 130 THE TIMES HISTORY. 0^ THE, WAR. beairi, 71 ft. ; draught of water, 28 ft. Her armament consisted of two 9-2-inch guns, sixteen C-inch, twelve 12-pounders, three 3-pounders, two machine guns, and she was also fitted with two torpedo tubes. The 9-2 gun throws a shell of 380 pounds weight, the 6-inch one of 100 pounds weight. Monmouth. — Armoured cruiser of 9,800 tons. Built in Glasgow and completed in 1903. Length, 440 ft. ; beam, 66 ft. ; draught of water, 24 J ft. Her armament consisted of fourteen 6-inch guns, eight 12-pounders, three 3-pounders, eight machine guns, and two torpedo tubes. Her best speed was 23' 9 knots. Glasgow. — Liglit cruiser of 4,800 tons. Built by Fairfield and completed January, 1911. Length, 430 ft.; beam, 47 ft. ; draught of water, 15J ft. Her armament consists of two 6-inch guns, ten 4-inch, four 3-pounders, and two torpedo tubes. Her speed is 25 knots. Otbanto. — Of the Orient Lino. Twin-screw steamer of 12,100 tons, launched from Workman & Clark's yard at Belfast in 1909. Commissioned August, 1914, as an auxiliary cruiser. The German armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, of 11,600 tons, were sister ships, and were completed in 1907. Their length was 449J ft. ; beam, 71 ft. ; draught of water, 25 ft. Their .irraament con- sisted of eight 8-2-inch guns (weight of projectile 275 pounds), six C-inch, twenty 24-pouiiders, four machine guns, and four torpedo tubes. Dresden. — Third-class cruiser, 3,600 tons. Sister ship to the Emden. Completed 1909. Length, 387 ft. ; beam, 43i ft. ; draught of water, 17| ft. She was armed with ten 4-1-inch guns, eight 5-pounders, four machine guns, and two torpedo tubes. NuRXBEBG. — Same type and armament as Dresden, but 3,450 tons displacement. Leipzig. — Third-class cruiser, 3,250 tons. Completed 1906. Length, 341 ft. ; beam, 43^ ft. ; maximum draught, 17^ ft. She was armed with ten 4-1 -inch guns, ten 1 -pounders, four machine guns, and two torpedo tubes. The first news that reached tliis country of tliis disastrous action was hardly credited in official circles, and in an official statement the Secretary of the Admiralty stated : The Admiralty cannot accept these facts as accurate at the present time, for the battleship Canopus, which had been specially sent to strengthen Admiral Cradock'a squadron, and would give him a decided superiority, is not mentioned in them, and further, although five German ships are concentrated in Chilean waters, only three have come into Valparaiso harbour. It is possible, therefore, that when full accounts of the action are received they may considerably modify the German version. Unfortunately for official optimism the obso- lescent Canopus* was not with the cruisers in the action. The moral of this battle was the same as that of those by which it was suc- ceeded — that, given reasonably good shooting and skill in the handling, the ship with the better artillery will win any action. The Good Hope represented one of the worst and most expensive types of ship ever built for the Navy in modern times. She was an immense target and much under-gunned for her displacement. The Monmouth, also of nearly 10,000 tons, carried no gun larger than a 6 -inch. * Canopus, battleship of 12,950 tons, built at Ports- mouth, and completed in 1900. Length, 400 ft. ; beam, 74 ft. ; draught of water, 26| ft. Her armament consists of four 12-inch guns (mark 8, 35 calibre, weight of projectile 850 pounds), twelve 6-inch, ton 12-poundera (12 cwt.), two 12-pounders (8 cwt.), six 3-pounders, two Maxims, four torpedo tubes. Speed (when new) 18-5 knots. 1. H.M.S. "MONMOUTH." II. H.M.S. "GOOD HOPE." THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 131 \ \ n/l \ V 4 Q OTRANTO \ 3 Q GLASGOW \ ZnMONMOUW I Q GOOD HOPE ^ c^ to' <5r.'' \ > ; I ' '' / I I I / I i 'fS Mil, es- Tumbes OTRANTO X 1 A = /I ^1 y <i / [/ MONMOUTH I \ / /I Outof Actioa |/>^ A i ^4 3D HOP£ ' GOOD Out of Action [7»50/;ArJ ^^1, 'Talcaliuano San Vicente COISCEPCION Coronel Loto ^ i> S*^ Arauco Bay Arauco :f0i7\ PLAN OF THE ACTION OFF CORONEL. The comparison of guns in the two squadrons runs thus : Germaa. 16 8-2-mch 12 6-inch 30 4-1-inch 40 24-pounder3 16 o-pounders British. 2 9-2-inch 32 6-inch 10 4-inch 20 12-poundors 10 3-Dounder3 The British ships were outclassed, as their 6-inch guns of an old mark were unlikely to inflict damage on the enemy at long ranges, no matter how well served ; while at the same time the comparatively modern 8*2's of the Germans would be finding their target, the gmuiers being unhampered by the disturbing factor of hits on their own ships. The Scharn- horst had won the gold medal for big-ship shooting presented by the Kaiser, and the Gneisenau was also extremely efficient in gunnery. On yunday, November 1, l'J14, tlu* Good 132 THE TIMES HlSTOIiY OF THE WAR. Hope, Monmouth and Glasgow came up with the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Dresden. There was a strong wind and a very considerable sea ; both squadrons were steaming to the southward, and the Germans kept out of range and declined action until sxinset, when the light gave them an important advantage. Early in the battle, which lasted about two hours, "both the Good Hope and Monmouth caught fire, but they continued fighting until nearly dark, when a serious explosion took place in the Good Hope and she foundered. It was stated that the Monmouth hauled off at dark, making water badly, and appeared vmable to steam . away. We now know, however, that she closed with the enemy with the greatest gallantry with the intention of ramming ; that she was sunk in the attempt quite close to the enemy ships ; and that although the sea was by no means too bad, no attempt was made to save the English sailors struggling in the water. On November 17 the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that the following report had been received from Captain John Luce, of H.M.S. Glasgow : Glasgow left Coronel 9 a.m. on November 1 to rejoin Good Hope (flagship). Monmouth and Otranto at ren- dezvous. At 2 p.m. flagship signalled that apparently from wireless calls there was an enemy ship to north- ward. Orders were given for squadron to spread N.E. by E. in the following order : Good Hope, Mon- mouth, Otranto, and Glasgow, speed to be worked up to 15 knots. 4.20 p.m.. saw smoke ; proved to be enemy ships, one small cruiser and two armoured cruisers. Gla.sgow reported to Admiral, ships in sight were warned, and all concentrated on Good Hope. At 5.0 p.m. Good Hope was sighted. 5.47 p.m., squadron formed in line-ahead in following order : Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto. Enemy, who had turned south, were now in .single hne- ahead 12 miles off, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau leading. 6. 18- p.m., speed ordered to 17 knots, and flagship sig- nalled Canopus, " I am going to attack enemy now." Enemy were now 15,000 yards away, and maintained this range, at the same time jambing wireless signals. By this tune sun was setting ijninediately hehind us from enemy position, and while it remained above horizon we had advantage in light, but range too great. C.55 p.m., sun set, and visibility conditions alt^ered. our ships being silhouetted against afterglow, and failing light made enemy difficult to see. 7.3 p.m., enemy opened tire 12,000 yards, followed in quick succession by Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow. Two squadrons were now converging, and each ship engaged opposite number in the line. Growing darkness and heavy spray of head sea made firing diflficult, par- ticularly for main deck guns of Good Hope and ilon- mouth. Enemy firing salvos got range quickly, and their third salvo caused fire to break out on fore part of both ships, which were constantly on fire till 7.45 p.m. 7.50 p.m., immense explosion occurred on Good Hope amidships, flames reaching 200 ft. hi ah. Total destrua- tion must have followed. It was now q lite dar'c. Both sides continued firing at flashes of opposin * guns Monmouth was badly down by the bow, and turned away to get stern to sea, signalling to Glasgow to that effect. 8.30 p.m.. Glasgow signalled to Monmouth : " Enemy following us," but received no reply. Under rising moon enemy's ships were now seen approaching, and as Glasgow could render Monmouth no assistance, she proceeded at full speed to avoid destruction. 8.50 p.m., lost sight of enemy. 9.20 p.m., observed 75 flashes of fire, which was no doubt final attack on Monmouth. Nothing could have been more admirable than con» duct of officers and men throughout. Though it was A DESTROYER'S TORPEDO TUBES. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 183 .S^anta Cru7 r I c c f ^^ '"Sffe. "^'^- Queen Cfyary ^^^^tr^Wh Bcave W ?»' ^^^ ^-'^^^'^^-..^., '^. ■^■^o. / Beauchenel. / FALKLAND ISLANDS. ( British ) ^ A. / r 1 ^jAWolIaston I? Cape Horn^-^'- o|^. ,r£>C?^ Sbaben I. ^<Ql>'" SCALE or MILES. ^^ ^ 50 100 I 1—1 i—i I— I I— I I— I 7SO 200 MAP SHOWING POSITION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. most trying to receive great volume of fire without chance of returning it adequately, all kept perfectly cool, there was no wild firing, and discipline was the same as at battle practice. When target ceased to be visible, gunlayers spontaneously ceased fire. The sorious reverse sustained has entirely failed to impair the spirit of officers and ship's company, and it is our unanimous wish to meet the eneniy again as soon as possible. The Admiral, the gallant and well-beloved Cradock, had gone to his long home with a guard accompanying him of himdreds of those seamen he had led in action. No end could have been more consonant with his own wishes than that he should die for the country he had served so well. The Glasgow, sorely battered, stood away out of action to the southward. It was a miracle that she lived to tell the tale ; but not only did she do so, but we see from the con- cluding paragraph of the report of Captain Luce in what manner the action had been viewed by those on board. We are told th.at owing to internal damage from the fire of the enemy a good deal of strutting with timber had to be resorted to. in order to shore up her decks and stiffen damaged bulkheads. An officer finding his way along the next morning discovered the following inscription chalked up on one of these struts : " Epping Forest, no Germans admitted on any pretence." It will be remembered that the cruisers Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue were sunlc in the North Sea by submarines on September 22 : and that this feat was received with delirious joy in Germany. The satisfaction on that occasion was nothing to the outburst when the news was received in Berlin of the destruction of Admiral Cradock's two ships. The hated English had once more been defeated on their own element, the sea, and loud were the boast- ings and the predictions of further disasters in store for the British Navy in the future. There was no minimising the fact that our arms had received a serious reverse, or that the enemy had legitimate cause for jubilation. Admiral von Spec had not been heard of for nearly six weeks before the battle ofT the Chilean coast, and his reappearance and success were a mortifying blow to British prestige. The German squadron, as we Icnow, had eluded the Japanese squadrons in the Far East, the Scharnliorst and the Gneisenau having left Kiao-Chau just before war broke out. ' 30— :j 134 THE TIMES UlSTOHY OF THE WAR. They were not heard of again until September 22, when they arrived off Papeete in the island of Tahiti, where they sank a small and unarmed French gunboat and bombarded the defenceless town. Later on it was discovered that the two vessels had visited Apia harbour on Septem- ber 14, but had remained only a short time. In October the Leipzig sank a steamer called the Bankfields off Peru, homeward bound from Eten with a cargo of six thousand tons of sugar. In September she sank the oil-tank steamer Elsinore, and in November the Vine Branch, off the Chilean coast, while that vessel was outward bound from England to Guayaquil. The Dresden sank the Hj^ades off Pernambuco on August 16, V. hile the vessel was bound from the River Plate for Holland with grain, and the Holmwood on August 2G near Santa Maria, on the voyage from Soutli Wales to Bahia Blanca with coals. The Niirnberg cut the cable between Bamfield, British Columbia, and Fanning Island early in September, but there is no record of her having captured anj^thing. The large cruisers do not seem to have gone in for commerce destruction. Thk Falkland Islands Victory. High speed in scouting vessels, wireless telegraphy, the aeroplane, the captive balloon, and the dirigible have rendered it increasingly difficult in the twentieth century to conduct warlike operations with anv-thing approaching to secrecy. Not only is the general on land no longer unaware of what is happening on the other side of the hill, but the admiral at sea is overlooked by aircraft when the weather is at all suitable for the purpose. Aircraft, how- ever, have distinct limitations. In ideal weather for the purpose a Zeppelin airship might scout with most satisfactory results in the North Sea, and might even pursue her researches until they included a peep at the harbours on the western shores of Scotland, But the open ocean remaiiis, and, at all events for the present, seems likely to remain, the province of the ship wh.ch sails upon its waters. Therefore the problem of coining up with and destroying the squadron of von Spee was a matter that had to be settled without adven- titious aid from the firmament of heaven. Very seldom had retribution followed so -i»^ THE KAISHR AMONGST HIS SAILORS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 135 PORT STANLEY, FALKLAND ISLANDS. [Mrs. Walter. •swiftly on the heels of action as it did on this occasion. The destruction of this German squadron, an imperative necessity from the first, had now to be accomplished in the shortest possible time. Von Spee had signed his own death warrant. First we will set down ■the bald Adiniralty announcement, which runs as follows : At 7.30 a.m. on December 8 the Scharnhorst, GneisennuJ Niirnberg, Leipzig and Dresden wore sighted near the Falkland Islands by a British squadron under Vice- Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee. An action •followed, in the course of which the Scharnhorst, flying the flag of Admiral Graf von Spee, the Gneisenau, and the Leipzig were sunk. The Dresden and the Numberg •made off during the action, and are being pursued. Two colliers were also captured. The Vice-Admiral •reports that the British casualties are very few in number. Some survivors have been rescued from the Gneisenau .and the Leipzig. Thirty-eight days only had elapsed between the action in the Pacific and that which took place in the South Atlantic. On November 1 the Monmouth and the Good Hope were sunk ■by the German squadron ; on December 8 they were followed by their destroyers. The Falkland Islands, where the battle between Sturdee and von Spee took place, are well over 7,000 miles from England ; yet in a little over five v/eeks from the time of the disaster to Cradock a sufficient force had been dispatched, had found the enemy, and had dealt with him to his entire discomfiture. During the war a policy of silence was 'maintained that sometimes proved irksome to the public. A more striking justification of this attitude on the part of the authorities •could hardly be found than in the success of the Falkland Islands action. Until it was over no •unauthorised person so much as knew that Vice-Admiral Stvirdee was on his way, or indeed that any squadron had been dispatched to deal with the situation. In the upshot the right force arrived at the right place at the right time, thus solving the strategical side of the problem, while its tactical outcome was all that could be desired. The Governor of the Falkland Islands had heard from the Admiralty that he might expect a raid on the Islands, and had done what he could to prepare for such an eventuality. Women and children by an order dated Octo- ber 19 were ordered to leave Port Stanley, and in the meantime the men in the island prepared Sea Miles. 2 3 I I L^ ADMIRAL STURDEE'S SQUADRON IN PORT STANLEY HARBOUR. L "Invincible." 2. " Inflexible." 3. "Carnarvon." 4. "Glasgow." 5. "Kent." 6. "Cornwall." 7. "Bristol." 8. "Macedonia." 9. " Canopus." 136 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST TORPEDOES. Putting out nets. to make the best fight that they could, supposing the enemy were to 'appear. A wireless message was received on November 3 acquainting the people on the island of the loss of the Good Ho2:)e and ^Monmouth, and this was followed by another from the Glasgow saying that that ship and the Canopus were on their way to the Falklands. The presumption was that these ships were being followed by the victorious Germans. A letter from a lady in the Falkland Islands gave the following description of the state of the Glasgow on arrival : The Glasgow was very badly damaged, one enormous hole in her side being 3 ft. by 9 ft. Another shell had gone through the side of the ship and through the captain's cabin, demolishing his roll-top desk, and giving off such fumes that several nien who rushed in to put out the fire were rendered unconscious. There were only four slight casualties, fortunately, and both men and officers said of each other that thoy were heroes. The Glasgow men said that after the Good Hope sank with Admiral Cradock on board their captain became senior officer. When he foiuid himself damaged, and noticed that the Monmouth was in a similar condition, he signalled to the latter ship to steer a certain course away from the enemy, but received a reply that as the jhip was not under control it was impossible to obey the order. He therefore steamed close to the Monmouth, which was in a sinking condition, her bows being under water, with the men assembled in the stem. There was a heavy sea running ; the enemy was still firing, and they had to leave the Monmouth to her fate. As the Glasgow left to seek safety in flight three cheers were raised by the Monmouth, and that was the last they knew of the ship. Impartial evidence that the British sailors were left to drown by the enemy is that of the German seamen themselves. On arrival at Valparaiso they were asked by a German pastor why none of the English had been saved, and whether it had not been possible to rescue any of them. To this they replied that it would have been qviite possible to do so, but that they were not permitted by their oflficers to hold out a helping hand. The force at the disposal of Admiral Sturdee comprised the battle cruisers Invincible and Inflexible, the battleship Canopus, the armoured cruisers Kent and Cornwall, sister ships to the ill- fated Monmouth, the armoured cruiser Carnar- von (10,850 tons, armed with four 7"5-inch. six G-inch, two 12-poiuiders, twenty 3-pounders, and two torpedo tubes), the sister light cruisers Glasgow and Bristol, and the armed liner Macedonia. The Invincible and Inflexible are two of the three battle-craisers (the Indomitable being the third) which were completed in 1908, and have a displacement of 17,250 tons. Their speed is over 28 knots, and the price of this THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 137 increase over the 21 knots of the battleship Dreadnought was the loss of two 12-inch guns and lighter armour— a 7 -inch belt amidships instead of an 11-inch, and a 4-in belt forward instead of a G-inch. Owing to the arrangement of their turrets all their eight 1 2-inch guns can be fired either to port or starboard. The details of the German squadron have already been given. It is interesting to note that the Scharnliorst and Gneisenau were almost contemporary with the Invincible class, having been completed in 1907, but at that time Germany had not been able to copy and adopt the all-big-gun ship, either as battleship or as battle cruiser. What information Admiral von Spee had been able to gather concerning enemy movements since the day on which he sank the Good Hope and the Monmouth has never become known, but what is quite certain is that he was unaware of the arrival of the squadron commanded by Admiral Sturdee. It is evident that the Ger- man commander was on his way to annex the Falkland Islands, and to use them as his much- needed base. Secrecy and silence were weapons as potent as the guns of Sturdee' s squadron, and the nation owes a debt of gratitude to those V ho succeeded, totally unknown to the enemy, in getting a powerful squadron away from home waters to the far-distant Falklands — a squadron which arrived exactly in time, and which was thus enabled to clear the southern seas of a menace to British trade and British supremacy. At the time of the battle between von Spee and Cradock, the Canopus was 200 miles to the southward, and after the action she was picked up by the Glasgow, both ships then proceeding in company to the Falklands, wliere they arrived on November 8. On the evening of that day a wireless message was received directing them to proceed to Monte Video, and tlie inhabitants of the colony were left with the pleasing prospect of awaiting the arrival of the victorious German squadron, to which they could offer only such resistance as might be raised locally. Before, however, the two ships arrived at Monte Video, they received a wireless message ordering them to return to the Falk- lands and help to defend the colony, which they accordingly did ; and then, on December 7, to the immense reUef of everyone, the Invincible and Inflexible arrived from England, and the other ships from Brazil. At 8 o'clock on Tuesday morning, Decem- ber 8, it was reported from the signal station on shore that the look-out on Sapper Hill had •%^' -*i--| ^f i ,Kj»i u i'notograph l)V <i .\itial Offuci frvsint. BOATS FROM THE "INFLEXIBLE" AND "INVINCIBLE" PICKING UP SURVIVORS FROM THE "GNEISENAU." The "Inflexible" standing by. 138 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. VICE-ADMIRAL SIR F. C. STURDEE. DOVETON observed a fovir-fiinnel and a two-funnel man- of-war steering northwards, and the Kent, which was acting as guard ship in Port William, was at once ordered to weigh anchor, and a few minutes later passed down the harbour to a station at the entrance, while a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed. It was most important to conceal, if possible, from the enemy the fact that two battle cruisers were present, and accordingly those two vessels raised steam with oil fuel. Those who have seen the volumes of black sn:ioke that pour out from the funnels of a ship raising steam with oil fuel wiU reahse how black was the cloud that soon enveloped the harbour. At 8.20 the signal station reported another colimin of smoke in sight to the southward, and still another column half an hoiu" later. The Canopus, which was lying in Port Stanley, with the Glasgow and Bristol, the other vessels being in Port William, with the Macedonia at anchor as look-out ship at the mouth of the bay, reported at 8.47 that the first two ships were about 8 miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8.20 appeared to be that of two ships about 20 miles off. The subsequent course of events may be given in the words of Admiral Sturdee'e dispatch : At 9.20 a.m. the two leading ships of the enemy (Gncisenau and Niirnberg), with guns trained on the \vireless station, camo within range of the Canopus, who opened fii-e at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the Invincible at a range of approximately 17 000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William. A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the Kent at the entrance to the harbour but about this time it seems that the Invincible and Inflexible were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts. The Glasgow weighed and proceeded at 0.40 a.m. with orders to join the Kent and observe the enemy's move- ments. At 9.45 a.m. the squadron — less the Bristol — weighed, and proceeded out of harbour in the following order : — Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the south-east, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a briglit sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the north-west. At 10.20 a.m. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the Car- narvon and overtook the Kent. The Glasgow was ordered to keep two miles from the Invincible, and the Inflexible was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to 20 knots at 11.15 a.m. to enable the other cruisers to get into station. At this time the enemy's fimnels and bridges showed just above the horizon. Information was received from the Bristol at 11.27 a.m. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably colliers or transports. The Bristol was therefore directed to take the Macedonia xinder his orders and destroy transports. The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12.20 p.m., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the Glasgow. At 12.47 p.m. the signal to " Open fire and engage the enemy " was made. The Inflexible opened fire at 12.55 p.m. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser ; a few minutes later the Invincible opened fire at the same ship. The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1.20 p.m. she (the Leipzig) turned away, with the Niimberg and Dresden to the south-west. These light cruisers were at once followed by the Kent, Glasgow, and Cornwall, in accordance with my instruc- tions. The action finally developed into three separate encoimters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing. Action with the armoured cruisers. — The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the Schamhorst and Gneisenau. ITie effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1.25 p.m., with the Schamhorst leading, they turned about 7 points to port in succession into line-ahead and opened fire at 1.30 p.m. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to 24 knots, and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line-ahead, with the Invincible leading. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR, 139 PART OF ADMIRAL STURDEE'S FLEET. Top: H.M.S. "Invincible"; centre left: H.M.S. "Canopus"; centre right: H.M.S. "Glasgow" bottom: H.M.S. "Inflexible." 140 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL [Russell Soutlisea REAR-ADMIRAL ARCHIBALD P. STODDART, (in the uniform of a Captain) who flew his flag on H.M.S. " Carnarvon." The range was about 13,500 yards at the final tiim^ and increased until, at 2 p.m.. it had reached 16,450 yards. The enemy then (2.10 p.m.) turned away about 10 points to starboard and a second chase ensued, until at 2.45 p.m.. the battle cruisers again opened fire ; thi* caused the enemy, at 2.53 p.m., to turn into line-ahead to port and open fire at 2.55 p.m. The Scharnhorst caught fire forward, but not seriously, a!id her fire slackened perceptibly ; the Gneisenau was badly hit by the Inflexible. At 3.30 p.m. the Scharnhorst led round about 10 points to starboard ; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel ; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the Scharnhorst became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires; and also escaping steam ; at times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4.4. p.m. the Scharnhorst, whose flag reinained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship ; for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 1.17 p.m. she disappeared. The Gneisenau passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effo»i; to fight the two battle cruisers. At 5.8 p.m. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in .serious straits, and her fire slackened very much. At 5.15 p.m. one of the Gnei.senau's shells struck the Invincible ; this was her last effective effort. At 5.30 p.m. she turned towards the flagship with n heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires rising everywlierc. About this time I ordered the signal " Cease tire," hut before it was hoisted ilie Gneisenau opened fire again, and continued to fire Crom time to time with a single gun. At 5.40 p.m. the three ships closed in on the Gneisenau, and, at this time, the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak con- tinued flying. At 5.50 p.m. " CeEise fire " was niaile. At 6 p.m. the Gneisenau heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her .side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking. The prisoners of war from the Gneisenau report that, by the time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves witli hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water. ^^'hen the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded survivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship. I'lvery effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships : life-buoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued. The Invincible alone rescued 108 men, 14 of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board ; these men were buried at sea the following day with full military lionours. Actii>n irith the Lir/ht CrtasiTn. — At about 1 p.ni.. when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to port to engage the Invincible and Inflexible, the enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape ; the Dresden was leading and the Niirnberg and Leipzig followed on each quarter. In accordance witli my instructions, the Glasgow, Kent, and Cornwall at once went in chase of these ships ; the Carnarvon, wiiose speed was insullicient to overtake them, closed the battle cruisers. The Glasgow drew well ahead of the Cornwall and Kent, and at 3 p.m. .shots were exchanged with the Leipzig at 12,000 yards. The Glasgow's object was to endeavour to outrange the Leipzig with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter course and give the Cornwall and Kent a chance of coming into action. At 4.17 p.m. the Cornwall opened lire, also on the Leipzig. .At 7.17 p.m. the Leipzig was on fire fore and aft, and the Cornwall and Glasgow ceased fire. The Leipzig turned over on her port side and disap- ])eared at 9 p.m. Seven ollicors and eleven men were saved. At 3.36 p.m. the Cornwall ordered the Kent to engage til? Xiirnberg, the nearest cruiser to her. Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine-room department, the Kent was able to get within range of the Niirnberg at 5 p.m. At 6.35 p.m. the Niirnberg was on fire forward and ceased firing. The Kent also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards ; as the colours were still observed to be flying in the Niirnberg, the Kent opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colours being haviled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The Niirnberg sank at 7.27 p.m., and, as she sank, a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived. The Kent had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by one shell. During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the NiirnberK and Leipzii.' the Dresden, who was beyond her consorts, effected lier escape owing to her superior speed. The Glasgow was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the Leipzig for over an THE TIMES EISTOBY OF THE WAB. 141 ADMIRAL GRAF VON SPEK AND HIS FLlilM. Top, "Scbarnhorst" : centre left, "Leipzig"; centre right, " Nurnbeni " ; bottom, " C^neisenau." 142 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. lionr hoforo either the Cornwall or Kent nould come up and got within range. During this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight. The weather changed after 4 p.m., and the visibility was much reduced ; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the Dresden to get away unob- served. Action u-ith the Eneniy^s Transports. — A report was received at 11.27 a.m. from H.M.S. Bristol that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The Bristol was ordered to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy the transports. H.M.S. Macedonia reports that only two ships, steam- ships Baden and Santa Isabel, were present ; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crew. I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the Engineer Officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed. In connexion with Admiral Sturdee's tribute to the work of the engineering staffs of the ships, reference may be made to the expedients to which the Kent was put in her chase of the Niirnberg. She was wofully short of fuel, and when it was reported to her captain that the supply of coal was beconung exhausted, he replied, " Very well, then, have a go at the boats." Tlie order was obeyed ; the boats were broken up, smeared with oil, and passed into the fvu-naces. After them went the wooden ladders, the doors, and the chests of drawers from the officers' cabins, and the Kent steamed at 24 knots. It was on the Kent, also, that Sergeant Charles Mayes performed an act that won him the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal. A shell burst and ignited some cordite charges in the casemate, and a flash of flame went down the hoist into the ammunition passage. Sergeant Mayes picked up a charge of cordite and threw it away. He then got hold of a firehose and flooded the compartment, extinguishing the fire in some empty shell bags which were burning. The extinction of this fire saved a disaster which might have led to the loss of the ship. The sinking of the Leipzig is described in the following extracts from a letter from H.M.S. Cornwall : At about 9 p.m. she loosed oil a rocket as a sign of surrender, and so we lowered what boats we could and sent them to her aid. I sliall never in all my life forget the sight of that ship going down. All the ship's company had gathered on the foc's'le, and one or two boats were still being lowered when the captain leant over the side of the bridge and said: ''It's no good, she's going." The men in the boat which was half lowered stood up and every face was turned towards the blazing ship. You can't imagine what she was like. It was nearly dark, about 9.25 p.m., and the red glare from the flames lit up the remains of what had been the home of .some 300 human beings a few hours before. As we saw her then she lay like an inferno on the sea. She had only the veriest stump of her second funnel left. The other two had been knocked completely away. Her main- mast was gone, and the upper half of her foremast. Aft she w.^s blazing like an oil factory, and forward she was also burning furiously. Her ports showed up like faint red circles, and occasional spurts of steam and sparks ascended from her waist. How any ship could have floated like it Heaven alone knows, and how anyone can have lived through it simply astounds me. Suddenly she heeled to port and her stump of a foremast slowly dipped into the water as she sank with scarcely a ripple by the head. There was no cheering or anything A BATTLESHIP'S GUNS IN ACTION. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 143 GERMAN WARSHIP IN KIEL CANAL. of that sort. We just stood there in absolute silenne, and, personally, I thought of the poor de\'ils who had been chased for five months only to end like that. There is no doubt whatsoever that they fought like heroes. As for ourselves they hit us fair and square eighteen times, and yet we had not one single casualty. The same writer makes the following general reflections on the engage aient : When one remembers that the action in the Pacific was fought on November 1, and that the German fleet did not appear off the Falklands until December 8, when they were free to have come any day previous to that, and that the British fleet had only arrived twenty-four hours earlier it does seem obvious that our luck was in. If we had arrived forty-eight hours later and they had arrived twenty-four hours sooner, the Falkland Isles would have been in German hands, and hundreds of lives would have been lost regaining them. Of course, we had every adva itage on our side both in weight of guns and speed and armour, but even so it argues good management on somebody's part to sink four German ships with a loss of over 2,000 Germans as against a British loss of seven or eight killed and four wounded. It cannot be denied that a satisfactory roundness would have been added to the victory had all the five German ships been sunk, and on this point the comments of the Naval Correspondent of The Times may aptly be quoted : It is not unfair, nor does it detract from the gallantry of Admiral Sturdee, or the skilful manner in which he fought the action, to describe the escape of the Dresden as a regrettable incident. It is explained as being partly due to the fact that the Glasgow, the only light cruiser with sufficient speed to have caught her, engaged the Leipzig before the Cornwall or Kent came up, and during this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight. Jloreover, the weather changed about 4 p.m., the visibility was much reduced, and the sky became overcast and cloudy. Her escape had two unfortunate results. It locked up several ships for her search which could have been otherwise employed, and indirectly led to the loss of a fine Japanese cruiser. We treasure two sayings in the Navy, one of Drake's, who said there was time to finish his game and beat the Spaniards too ; and the other of Nelson's — " Now, had we taken ten sail, and had allowed the eleventh to escape when it had been possible to have got at her, I couki never have called it well done." It seems quite likely that Admiral Sturdee has since regretted those brilliant hours in the forenoon when he slowed down to enable the other cruisers to get into station. But this matter apart, it was a well-fought action, giving every oppor- tunity for the display of the admirable qualities of all engaged in it. Some JNIinob Operations. One of the most interesting of the minor events of the war at sea was the bottling up and subsequent destruction of the German light cruiser Konigsberg in the Rufigi River on the East Coast of Africa in November. This vessel escaped from Dar-es-Salaam at the beginning of the war and did a good deal of mischief among shipping, including the shelling of H.M.S. Pegasus in Zanzibar, when that vessel was laid up repairing boilers and was unable to replj'^ to her fire. Chased by British cruisers she took refuge in the Rufigi River and managed to force her way up stream until she was out of range. As the depth of water was insufficient to permit of hor being followed, it was decided to prevent her escape by blocking the channel. A vessel named the Newbridge, with 1,500 tons of coal in her, was requisitioned for this service, and for the trip down from Zanzibar to the river Iut crew was replaced by naval officers and blue- ]44 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. SERGEANT CHARLES MAYES, H.M.S. "Kent." jackets, though her captain, Captain Willett, remained. Tlie operations were in charge of Lieutenant Lavington of the Pegasus. The preparations were made with secrecy, but the Germans received notice of what was intended and got ready accordingly. Tn order to reach the position where it w as proposed to sink her the Newbridge had to pass close to a small island in the mouth of the river, and on this a number of the crew of the Konigsberg entrenched themselves with Maxims and quick- firers landed from their ship. The Newbridge went in under her owti steam, and the Germans opened fire as soon as she got within range ; a seaman was badly peppered with coal dust owing to a shell exploding in a coal bag, but that was the only casualty. Coolly and dex- terously the ship was manoeuvred into position to block the charmel. Bow and stern anchors were let go, and water was admitted to her tanks so that she took a hst to port, the object being to sink her with her deck up stream, in such a way that sand might be carried against it by the four-knot tide and promote the rapid silting up of the channel. Then, when all was ready, her crew took to the boats and exploded three charges of guncotton that had been placed in her hold against the outer skin. She sank rapidly. Several casualties occurred in the boats as they passed out under a hot fire from the island, two bluejackets being killed and several wounded. The Duplex, a cable ship which accompanied the Newbridge, had five Lascars killed and a lieutenant R.N.R. severely HOISTING NAVAL AEROPLANE ON BOARD H.M.S. "HIBERNIA." THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 145 GERMAN BATTLESHIf SQUADRON. wounded. Almost immediately afterwards the Duplex ran on a reef ; she was got off, but as she was found to be badly damaged, she also was sunk in the fairway to complete the bottling up process. In the meanwhile the Konigsberg concealed herself by fastening palm branches to her masts and funnels. The difficulty that she thus became indistinguishable from the sea was overcome by an aeroplane brought down the coast in the Kinfaims Castle. Flying inland this machine marked the position of the German cruiser by smoke bombs, enabling her to be destroyed by bombardment overland from the coast by the British cruisers. On the other side of Africa, on October 26, a French force under Colonel Mayer, with the cooperation of a British naval and military force, occupied Edea, a town on the Sanaga River, West Africa, and an important station on the railway to Duala. On November 13 preparations were completed for extensive operations to the north and north-west of Duala. After a bombardment by the French cruiser Bruix and the Nigeria Government yacht Ivy, a force of Royal Marines seized and occupied Victoria, the seaport of Buea, the seat of the German Colonial Government. On the same day a colunm advancing along the Bonaberi railway from Susa drove the enemy north and occupied Mujuka, a station about 50 miles from Bonaberi. Meanwhile large allied naval and military forces, advancing from different points, proceeded to occupy Buea. The occupation was effected on Novem- ber 15, the enemy being scattered in all direc- tions. A German missionary attempted to blow up H.M.S. Dwarf with an infernal machine, and when asked how he found such an action compatible with his profession replied that lie was a soldier first and a missionary afterwards. About the same time two successful opera- tions were carried out in the Red Sea. In the first of these, against the Turkish garrison at Sheik Seyd, Indian troops were engaged, assisted by H.M.S. Duke of Edinburgh- According to the official accovmt issued by the Secretary of the Admiralty on November 16, the Turkish fort (Turba) is situated on the rocky heights to the eastward of Cape Bab-el- Mandeb, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and is close to the boundary line between Turkish territory and the Aden protectorate. The Sheik Seyd Peninsula consists of a group IF. N. BtrUeU. FLIGHT COMMANDER FRANCIS E. T. HEWLETT, R.N. 146 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BRITISH AEROPLANE RAID ON GUXHAVEN. of rocky heights joined to the mainland by a low sandy plain, the greater portion of which is covered at high water by a shallow lagoon. The guns of the fort command the isthmus connecting the peninsula A\ith the mainland. Three battalions of troops were landed in face of opposition, but under cover of fire from H.M.S. Duke of Edinburgh, which had pre- viously disabled Turba Fort, and which assisted during the operations. After landing, one and a half battalions of infantry attacked the enemy positions, and were opposed by well- concealed artillery and infantry fire. Wlien the hills commanding INIanlieli were occupied, opposition weakened, and about 200 of the enemy escaped on camels by the isthmus or in boats by sea. Six of the enemy were reported killed, and the majority of the remainder wounded and prisoners. The forts were occu- pied by the British forces, and large amounts of munitions of war and six field guns captured. The heavy guns were probably put out of action by the Duke of Edinburgh. The British casualties among the troops were one officer and fifteen men wounded, and four men killed. There were no naval casualties. In consequence of a report that mines had been sent to Akaba to be laid in the Gulf of Akaba, and possibly in the Red Sea, the cruiser Minerva was ordered to proceed to Akaba to investigate and stop any such action. According to an account published at Cairo on November 17, on arriving at Akaba the captain found it occupied by a small detach- ment of troops. Negotiations for a surrender were attempted, but were frustrated by German officers present. The Minerva was compelled to open fire, but confined her attack to the fort, the post office, and the Government buildings. Later a landing party reconnoitred in the direction of Wadi-el-Ithm, but encountered only a few armed men, who rapidly disappeared. The patrol returned to the tov\-n and re-embarked, after posting a proclamation inviting the inhabitants to return and assuring their safety. The town and wells were not damaged, and there were no British casualties. In the Persian Gulf, as already recorded, successful operations were carried out on November 8 against Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, by a mihtary force from India covered by H.M.S. Odin (Commander Cathcart P. Wason), the armed launch Sirdar, a force of marines with a ISIaxim gun party, and a boat from the Ocean. The gims of the enemy were silenced after an hour's resistance, and the town was occupied by the troops and the naval brigade. There were no naval casualties. At the end of October the Tiu-kish Fleet, at THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 147 the instigation of its German masters, started bombarding undefended coast towns in the Black Sea. The Goeben bombarded Sebas- topol and threw 116 shells into the town on November 1, and in answer a combined British and French squadron bombarded the Dardanelles forts at long range at daybreak on November 3. The forts rejjlied, but the Allies suffered no loss, only one pro- jectile falling alongside. A large explosion, accompanied by volvunes of black smoke, occurred at Helles fort, but the amount of material damage done could not be estimated. Probably the intention of the attack was not so much to cause damage as to ascertain the range of the guns in the forts. Nearly three weeks later the Goeben and the Breslau were engaged by the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea. According to the statement of the Naval General Staff at Petrograd, about noon on November 18, when the Russian battleship division was retiu"ning from a cruise along the Anatolian coast and was abrea.st of Sebastopol, it sighted, 25 miles off the Chersonese lightship, the Goeben and the Breslau. The ships immediately took battle formation, and holding a course which placed th« enemy to starboard, opened fire at a range of forty cables (i.e., 8,000 yards). The first salvo of the 12-inch guns of the flagship Evstaffi hit the Goeben, bursting on the centre of her freeboard and causing a fire on board. The other Russian ships then opened fu-e, and inade excellent practice, a whole series of explosions being noticeable on the Goeben's hull. After some delay the Goeben opened fire with salvos from her big gims, which she concentrated on the Russian flagship. The battle lasted 14 minutes and then the Goeben swiftly changed course, and, thanks to her superior speed. IRusseil, Southsea. LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER NORMAN D. HOLBRCOK, V.C., of Submarine B 11, disappeared in the fog. The Breslau, which had taken no part in the action, remained in the offing. Only slight damage was suffered by the Evstaffi. The Russian casualties were four officers and 24 men killed and wounded. The strength of the Russian squadron on this occasion is not stated, but in anj' case the Goeben was nearly twice the displacement of SUBMARINE B 11, Which torpedoed the Turkish Battleship " Messudiyeh " in fhe Dardanelles. 148 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. CLEARING FOR ACTION. All spare wood and furniture is thrown overboard or sent ashore. the Russian flagship. Also, she was apparently caught napping, as the Russian, who kept the better look-out, got in the first blow. At the range indicated the Goeben's guns should have made a smashing reply, but they evidently failed to do so, while the shells of her antagonists seem to have done her considerable damage. Subsequently she appeared off Batiun, but from the fact that she was quickly driven off by the shore batteries it may be inferred that her big guns had not all been repaired, or replaced, since the engagement near Sebastopol. On December 13 the British svibmarine Bll, Lieutenant-Commander Norman D. Holbrook, entered the Dardanelles, and, diving under five rows of mines, torpedoed the Turkish battleship Messudiyeh, which was guarding the minefield. Although pursued by gunfire and torpedo boats, Bll retvuTied safely, after being sub- merged on one occasion for nine hours. When last seen the Messudiyeh was sinking by the stem. What was not known at the time, and what is nevertheless the fact, is that during the operations the compass of Bll went wrong, and Lieutenant Holbrook had to find his way out of the Dardanelles without it ; at one time his frail vessel was actually bumping on the bottom. All his brother officers concur in regarding this as one of the finest individual feats performed during the war. The underwater navigation of the Dardanelles is most perilous and difficult at all times, owing to the swift currents which never cease racing through the Straits, and when, in addition to the whirl- pools and eddies caused by these currents striking projections and points, the presence of five rows of mines is considered, such a feat would seem quite impossible of accomplishment were it not for the hard and undeniable fact that it was accomplished. That the tor- pedoed battleship was " guarding the mine- field " adds a touch of comedy to the proceed- ings that must have been singularlj^ gratifying to Lieutenant Holbrook and his gallant com- panions who crept along the sea floor with him on that eventful day. The London Gazette of December 21 annoiuiced that the King had approved of the grant of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant Norman Douglas Holbrook ; his second in command, liieutenant Sydney Thorn- hill Winn, being made a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order for his shai'e in the achievement. British Losses in^ Home Waters. About this period several na\al losses in home waters have to be chronicled. On the last day of October the old cruiser Hermes, Captain C. R. Lambe, was sunk in the Straits of Dover by a German submarine as she was retvurning from Dunkirk. She was struck by two torpedoes and hmnediately began to settle down. The S.O.S. signal was made^ and two destroyers and the cross-Channel steamer Invicta came to the rescue. She remained afloat for about two hours after being struck and then foimdered, her captain being the last man to leave her. About 44 of her crew were lost, 400 being saved and landed at Dover On November 11 the torpedo -gunboat Niger,. Lieutenant -Commander A. P. Moore, was tor- pedoed by a submarine m the Downs and foimdered. There was no loss of life, and. curiously enough, the occivrrence was witnessed by thousands of people at Deal, who had assem- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 149 bled on the beach on hearing the sound of heavy firing out to sea. About noon the soiuid of an explosion was heard and volumes of black smoke wero seen rising from the Niger, which was lying two miles from the shore opposite to the pier iiead. A stiff breeze was blowing with a considerable sea. Instantly the Deal and Kingsdown lifeboats piit out. together with a swarm of boats from the shore, and by these the crew were rescued. The Niger sank about twenty minutes after the explosion. On November 24 the Secretary of the Admiralty reported the sinking of the German submarine U18 on the northern coast of Scot- land. At 12.20 on the morning of the pre- ceding day a British patrolling vessel reported having rammed her, but she was not sighted again \intil 1.20, when she was seen on the surface, crew on deck, and flying a white flag. Shortly afterwards she foundered just as the destroyer Garry came alongside and rescued tlu'ee officers and 23 of her crew, only one being drowned. The survivors were landed and interned in Edinburgh Castle. A terrible disaster occurred at Sheerness on November 26, the Bulwark, a battleship of 15,000 tons, being blown up and destroyed, with the loss of all her company of some 750 officers and men, save fourteen. Many theories were advanced to explain the blowing up of the magazines of the ship, but it remained after all an impenetrable mystery. Lieutenant Benjamin George Carroll, assistant GERMAN WARSHIP COALING AT SEA. coaling officer at Sheerness, in his evidence at the coroner's inquest, said that he was passing down the Med way at 7. 50 a.m. on the morning ol GUNS OF H.M.S. "NEW ZEALAND." 150 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ■2? f -■•«'- ^ ^ ^ M I i I iSE^ Pi a u a H O o z z THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 151 the 26th . The Bulwark was then lying in Rithole Reach, and there was nothing alongside her. Just as he was noticing a signal indicating the number of tons of coal on board her he saw a spurt of flame abaft the after barbette. Then the whole volume of flame seemed to rush towards the after funnel. The whole interior of the ship seemed to be blown into the air, and everything seemed alight. He observed no disturbance of the water. It was quite calm, and there was no tide. He at once turned his boat back to render assistance, and was able to pick up two men, including an officer. He * was convinced that there was an internal explosion. The 12-inch charges were in brass cases, and he did not see how possibly the throwing away of cigarette ends could have anything to do with the explosions. The Admiralty Court of Inquiry which made an exhaustive and scientific research into the causes of the disaster, could not account for it by any known theory ; one of their witnesses. Commander Wilton, said that they had been able to trace every cartridge on board, and there was no evidence of loose cordite. The only definite conclusion arrived at was that the ignition which had taken place was internal and not external. The first day of the New Year was marked by the loss of the Formidable, a battleship of 15,000 tons, which was torpedoed and sunk in the Channel. Completed in 1901, she was virtually a sister-ship to the Bulwark, and although pre -Dreadnought battleships are now obsolescent they have still a considerable fighting value, and it would be folly to under- estimate the loss that her destruction meant to the Fleet. She went down between 3 and 3.30 a.m., and of her complement of nearly 800 only 201 were saved. After she was struck everything was done that was possible in the circumstances, and that high standard of discipline which never fails in the Navy in the face of serious emergency was fully maintained. Captain Loxley was on the bridge directing operations to the last and went down with the ship. Of the four boats launched, one, a barge, capsized, and several men were thrown into the sea ; the second, also a barge, got away with about seventy men, who were picked up by a light cruiser ; the third, a pinnace with some sixty men, reached the shore at I^iymo Regis, and the fourth, a cutter with seventy men, after being in a rough sea for about eleven hours, was rescued off Berry Head by the [RusseU. REAR-ADMIRAL THE HON. H. L. HOOD. trawler Providence and brought into Brixham. The splendid behaviour of the master of this trawler, William Pillar, and his crew, was the one bright spot in the tragedy. They were some fifteen miles from Berry Head, and rvmning before a gale to shelter in Brixham when they were amazed to see an open boat adrift. This tvirned out to be the cutter of the Formidable. Only a seaman can apprcciato the difficulties with which Pillar was now confronted. He had, in heavy weather, to take in another reef in his mainsail and to hoist a storm jib ; otherwise he could not have brought his vessel to the wind and so manoeu- vred as to get into touch with the cutter. By superb handling and entire disregard of danger, he actually managed to gybe his vessel in his endeavour to establish communication with the cutter (this means passing stern to the wind from one tack to the other, and is most dan- gerous in heavy weather), and at last a rope was passed and made fast. One by one the mariners of the Formidable leapt from the open boat to the smack, and when the transfer was at last accomplished the boat was cast off and the Providence made for Brixham. The officer of the cutter commended the gallant seamanship of the Brixham fishermen, wliich ho describctl as being beyond all praise, and tlie King, when he pinned the silver medal for gallantry on the breast of the skippi-r, I'iiliu-, at Buckingham I'alace, addressed liini and his crew in the following words : " I congratulate 152 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE "BLUGHER." you most heartily upon youi" gallant and heroic conduct. It is indeed a gi'eat feat to have saved seventy-one lives. I realize how diffi- cult your task must have been because I know myself how arduous it is to gybe a vessel in a heavy gale." This was not only the King of England speaking to a Brixham fisherman, but also one seaman speaking to another ; and to have been thus addressed must have enhanced the value of their well-earned medals to the crew of the Providence. An Admiralty award of £250 was made to Pillar, £100 each to the mate and seaman, and £50 to the boy. There was at first some doubt whether the loss of the Formidable was due to a submarine or to a mine, but subsequently the Admiralty came to the definite opinion that she was sunk by two torpedoes fired from a submarine. In this connexion Lord Charles Beresf ord remarked in the House of Commons on February 15 that : the submarine was considerably overrated if proper precaution was taken against it, but if such precaution was not taken, it was a most fatal weapon in naval warfare. It was problematical whether a submarine would ever hit a ship going at speed ; certainly, it would never hit ships accompanied by their proper quota of destroyers and small craft. These were the two safe- guards. He wanted to know why the squadron, of which the Formidable formed part, disposed of them. It was common knowledge where she was going, and what she was going to do. She went out and then sent back the destroyers, which were her first defence. Afterwards, when she was farther out in the Channel, in an area known to be infested with submarines, she slackened speed. The Admiral would not have done that if the Admiralty had given definite orders after the loss of THE "BLUGHER" SINKING. [From an aaual photograph. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 153 the three cruisers (Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue) that no ship should proceed except at speed and with her screens. Raids and Cotjnter-Raids. We now come to the series of raids made on our East Coast by the German Navy. The first, on November 3, was directed against Yar- mouth. This place has been persistently described in the German Press as " the fortified port of Yarmouth " — in order, it is to be imagined, that the subjects of the Kaiser may think that special daring was necessary to attack so redoubtable a fortress. The story of this raid has already been dealt with (Vol. II., pp. 358-362) ; there is, therefore, no occasion to make more than passing reference to it here. In it eight ships were employed, including the three battle cruisers, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann, the armoured cruisers Bliicher and Yorck, and the cruisers Kolberg, Graudenz, and Strassburg. They bombarded Yarmouth at such long range that they did no damage ; they even failed to do any serious harm to the ancient torpedo gunboat Halcyon, though she should un- doubtedly have been sunk. They then turned and fled, dropping mines as they went. The submarine Dll which started in pursuit, struck on one of these and was lost with all her crew save two. Two fishing boats also struck on mines and were lost with fifteen hands. As the cruisers returned to their own waters the Yorck struck on a mine and was lost, carrying with her some 300 men. The second raid, on December 16, was made on Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepools. As thiS; too, has been exhaustively treated in the chapter above referred to, there is no need to do more than record it here, and to note the horror which this cowardly attack caused not only in England, but through- out the whole civilized world. Fog unfor- tunately prevented a British squadron from coming in contact with the marauders, but a reply was delivered on Christmas morning, when a combined attack was made on the German warships lying in Cuxhaven harbour by seven seaplanes piloted by Flight -Commanders Douglas A. Oliver, Francis E. T. Hewlett, Robert P. Ross, and Cecil F. Milner, Flight- lieutenants Arnold J. Miley, and Charles H. K. Edmonds, and Flight Sub -lieutenant Vivian Gaskell Blackbvu-n. The attack was delivered at daylight, starting from a point in the vicinity of Heligoland. The seaplanes were escorted by a light cruiser and destroyer force, together [Symonds, Portsmouth. CAPTAIN A. S. M. CHATFIELD, of H.M.S. "Lion." with submarines. As soon as these ships were seen by the Germans from Heligoland, two Zeppelins, three or four seaplanes and several submarines attacked them. It was necessary for the British ships to remain in the neigh- bourhood in order to pick up the returning airmen, and a novel combat ensued between the most modern cruisers on the one hand and the enemy aircraft and submarines on the other. By swift manoeuvring the enemy submarines were avoided, and the two Zeppelins were easily put to flight by the guns of the Un- daimted and Arethusa. The enemy seaplanes succeeded in dropping their bombs near our ships, though without hitting any. The Bi'ititjh ships remained for tliree hours off the enemy coast without being molested by any siu-face vessels, and safely re-embarked three out of the seven airmen. Three more pilots were picked up later, according to arrangement, by the British submarines which were standing by, their machines being sunl<. Flight-Commander Hewlett was missing at the end of the day's operations, but he eventually returned in safety, having been picked up by a Dutch fishing vessel. What damage was done is not known ; but the moral effect was great. Cux- haven, unlike Yarmouth and Scarborough, is very strongly fortified ; and shoals make it impossible for a ship to pass up the Elbe without coming within the range of the giuis 154 THE TIMES HISTOllY OF THE WAli. [Ritisell, Southsea. CAPTAIN LIONEL HALSEY, of H.M.S. " New Zealand." mounted there. It will be noticed that the much-vaunted Zeppelins were put to flight almost at once. In connexion with this counter-raid on Cuxhaven reference may be made to the sup- port that was lent by British warships at sea to the land forces of the Allies on the coast of Belgium. When, established on the coast, the Germans proceeded to make their plans for the capture of Calais, as a preliminary for the destruction of ova Fleet and the invasion of our country, thej^ did not reckon on the Britisli Navy taking a hand in the game. As was briefly recorded in a previous chapter, a naval flotilla, including the three monitors which at the outbreak of war were being built in British yards for Brazil, and mounting a large number of powerful long-range guns, was brought into action off the Belgian coast in October in support of the left flank of the Belgian Army. Observation was arranged from the shore by means of naval balloons, and the squadron under Rear-Admiral Hood was able to render the neighbourhood of Nieu- port and Westende a " perfect hell of fire and smoke," bombarding the German right and enfilading their lines. Although the enemy replied with heavy guns and sought to damage the attacking ships with submarines, destroyers, and mines, our vessels received only trifling structural injury, and our casualties throughout were sligiit. This bombardment was continued intermittently for weeks. On November 23 all points of military significance at Zeebrugge were bombarded, and though the official report stated that the amount of damage done was imknown, there was reason to believe that, at least for the time being, the port was rendered useless as a naval base. There is a curious resemblance between tlie work thus done by Admiral Hood in the twentieth century and that accomplished by Admiral Rodney in the (;ighteenth. On July 3, 1759, Rodney arrived off Havre which was full of stores, fodder, provisions, field guns, ammu- nition trains, horses, harness, and small arms, ready for embarcation in himdreds of trans- ports and flat-bottomed boats for the invasion of England by the army under the Due d'Aguil- lon. Rodney was provided with a niunber of " bomb vessels," which threw bombs guaranteed to set fire to anything inflammable with which they came into contact. Like om* modern Admiral, he was yoimg and full of energy ; under him the men worked so splendidly that in one night they had all their bomb vessels in position, and the next day the rain of bombs set fire to and consumed everything which would burn, including the transports and flat fRiissi!. Soiiilisra. REAR-ADMIRAL OSMOND DE B. BROCK (in the uniform of a Captain), of H.M.S. "Princess Royal." THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 155 ^ H.M.S. "LION," Flagship of Sir David Beatty. boats. It was said that it took Havre over a century to recover from Rodney's attack. The North Sea Action. The third German raid took place on January 24, or rather it should be said was attempted, for the attack was foiled by a British patrolling squadron under Vice- Admiral Sir David Beatty. Presumably the intention was to repeat the achievement of December 16, wliich caused so much delight in Germany, and it has been suggested that the objective was the Tyne, or even the Firth of Forth. In Germany it was spoken of as " an advance in the North Sea," as if it were nothing but a reconnoitring excursion. A British squadron of battle cruisers and light cruisers with destroyer flotillas was patrolling the North Sea on Sunday morning, January 24, 1915, when at 7.25 a.m. the flash of guns was observed to the south-south-east, and shortly afterwards the light cruiser Aurora reported to Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty that she was engaged with enemy ships. Ho at once altered the course of his ships to south- south-east, increased his speed to twenty-two knots, and ordered the light cruisers and destroyer flotillas to chase south-south-east in order to get into touch with the enemy and report theiij movements. Almost immediately reports followed from the Southampton, -Arethusa and Aurora, wliich had anticipated these instructions, that the enemy ships con- sisted of three battle cruisers, the Bliicher, six light cruisers, and a number of destroj'ers. The British fleet included the battleships Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable ; the light cruisers Southampton, Nottingham, Birmingham, Lowestoft, Arethusa, Aurora and Undaunted, and destroyer flotillas, the last being under Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt. The following are particulars of the large ships engaged on both sides : British. Lion. — Battle cruiser, launched at Devonport 1910, completed 1912. Displacement, 26,350 tons ; length, 660 ft. ; beam, 88J ft. ; draught, 28 ft. ; i.h.p., 75,685 ; CAPTAIN HENRY B. of H.M.S. "Tiger. PELLY, 15G THt: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 'J LlJ Q Z o C/D THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 157 speed, 28-5 knots. Artnament : Eight 13-5-inch sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounders, and five raaclnne guns, and two torpedo tubes. Con\plement, 980. Tiger. — Battle cruiser, launched at Clydebank 1913. Displacement. 28,000 tons ; length, 660 ft. ; beam, POJ ft.; draught, 28^ ft.; i.h.p., 100 000; speed, 28 knots. Armament : Eight 13-.5-inch and twelve 6-inch gims. These particulars are unoflficial. Princess Royal. — Battle cruiser, sister ship of the Lion, launched at Barrow 1911 completed 1912. Dis- placement, 26,3.')0 tons ; length. 660 ft. ; beam, 88| ft. ; draught, 28 ft.: i.h.p., 76,510; speed, 28-5 knots. Armament : eight 13-5-inch, sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounder, and five machine guns. Complement, 980. New Zeaxand. — Battle cruiser, bviilt at Govan at the charge of the New Zealand Government, launched 1911, completed 1912. Displacement, 18,800 tons ; length, 555 ft. ; beam, 80 ft. ; draught, 26| ft. ; i.h.p., 46,894 ; speed, 25 knots. Armament : Eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounder. and five machine guns and two torpedo tubes. Complement, 780. Indomitable. — Battle cruiser, sister ship of the In- vincible and Inflexible, which took part in the action offi the Falkland Islands. Launched at Govan 1907, completed 1908. Displacement, 17,250 ; length, 530 ft. ; beam, 78| ft.; draught, 26 ft.; i.h.p., 41,000; speed, 26 knots. Armament : Plight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch, and five machine gions and five torpedo tubes. Com plement, 780. German. Blucher. — Armouied cruiser, launched at Kiel 1908, completed 1910. Displacement, 15,550 tons; length, 4J9ft. ; beam, 80Jft. ; draught, 26-2 ft. ; i.h.p., 40,000 ; speed, 25-3 knots. Armament : Twelve 8-2-inch, eight 5-9-inch, and sixteen 3-4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. MoLTKE. — Battle cruiser, sister ship of the Goeben, launched at Hamburg 1910, completed 1911. Displace- ment, 22,640 tons ; length, 610J ft. ; beam, 96 ft. ; draught, 27 ft. ; i.h.p., 86,900 ; speed, 28-4 knots. Armament: Ten 11-inch, twelve 5-9-inch, and twelve 3-4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. Complement, 1,013. Seydlitz. — Battle cruiser, laimched at Hamburg 1912, completed 1913. Displacement, 24,640 tons ; length. 656 ft. ; beam. 93i ft. ; draught, 27 ft. ; i.h.p., 65,000 ; speed, 26-2 knots (best recent speed, 29 knots). Arma- ment : ten 11-inch, twelve 5-9-inch, and-twelve 3-4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. Complement, 1,108. DERFFLrN^GER. — Battle cruiser, launched at Hamburg 1913. Displacement, 28,000 tons; length, 700 ft.; beam. 96 ft. ; draught, 27 ft. ; i.h.p., 100,000 ; speed, 27 knots. Armament : Eight 12-inch, twelve 5-9-inch, and twelve 3-4-Lnch guns, and four torpedo tubes. All the turrets of the Derflfiinger are stated to be in the centre line, and not superimposed ; otherwise the vessel has much the same outline as the Seydlitz. When the enemy ships were first seen they were steering north-west, but they quickly changed their course to south-east. Tlie British battle cruisers, working up to their full speed, steered to the southward. At 7.30 they sighted the enemy on the port bow about 14 miles distant and steaming fast, and as the prompt reports thej' had received had enabled them to attain a position on the enemy's quarter, they altered their course to south-east parallel with that of their quarry, and settled down to a long stem chase. The speed was gradually increa.sed to 28'5 knots, and thanks to the efforts of the engineer staffs of the New INTERIOR OF A GERMAN SUBMARINE. The Commander looking through a periscope. Zealand and Indomitable, those two ships were able to attain a speed greatly in excess of their normal. The result was that the squadron gradually closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship (the Bliicher) of the enemy, who were in single line-ahead, with their light cruisers ahead and a large nimiber of destroyers on their starboard beam. The first shot was fired by the Lion at 8.52, but fell short, and from that time single shots were fixed at intervals to test the range, imtil at 9.9 the Lion hit the Bliicher for the first time. At 8.20 the Tiger, which was following the Lion, had drawn up sufficiently to be able to open fire on the Bliicher, and the Lion now turned her attention to the third ship in the German line, which was hit by several salvos at 18,000 yards. The Princess Royal, in turn getting within range, opened fire on the Bliicher, and as this latter ship now began to drop astern somewhat, she became exposed to the gims of the New Zealand, the Princess Royal then shifting her fire to the third ship in tlie Gennan line and inflicting considerable damage on her. Diu-ing these operations the British flotilla cruisers and destroyers gradually dropped back from a position broad on the beam of the battle cruisers to the port quarter, so that their smoko might not foul the range, but as the enemy destroyers threatened attack, the Meteor and M destroyer division passed ahead, skilfully handled by Captain the Hon. H. Meade. 158 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GROUP OF GERMAN SAILORS RESCUED FROM THE " BlUgHER. About 9.45 the Lion was engaging the leading German ship, which was on fire ; the Tiger had first fired at the same ship, but, when smoke interfered, at the Blvicher ; the Princess Royal was engaged with the third German ship, which also was on fire, while the Blvicher, alreadj^ showing signs of having suffered severelj% was also the mark of the Ne^\' Zealand. The enemy's destroyers were now emitting vast quantities of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, which appeared to alter their coiu'se to the northward, with the object of increasing their distance ; the rear ships, according to Sir David Beatty's dispatch, certainly hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, and thus increased their distance from the British line. To meet this manoeuvre our battle cruisers were ordered to form a line bearing north-north-west and to proceed at their utmost speed. The German destroyers then giving evidence of an attempted attack, the Lion and Tiger opened fire on them, causing them to retire and resimae their original course. The light cruisers, maintaining their position on the port quarter of the enemy line, were able to observe and keep touch, or to attack any vessel that fell out of line. The Bliicher, which by this time had dropped considerably astern of her companions, was seen to be on fire, to have a heavy list, and to be apparently in a defeated condition. As she hauled ovit to port and steered north the Indomitable was ordered to break to the north and attack. A few minutes later submarines were reported near the line, and Admiral Beattj', who liimself saw the wash of a periscope two points on the starboard bow, at once turned to port. Then the Lion suffered an injury \% hich at three minutes past 1 1 was reported as being incapable of immediate repair, and, in consequence, her course was shaped north-west. Admiral Beatty also found it necessary to transfer his flag to another vessel ; accordin;:;ly, at 1L20, he called the torpedo boat destroyer Attack alongside, and shifting his flag to her at about 11.35, proceeded at fvill speed to rejoin the squadron. He met them at noon retiring north-north-west. Boarding the Princess Roj^al at about 12.20 p.m., he learnt from her captain what had happened in his absence since the Lion fell out of the line. The Bliicher had been sunk, and on the vessels that went to rescue her sur^avors (of whom about 250 were saved) a Zeppelin and a sea-plane endeavoured to drop bombs. The three German battle cruisers had continued their course eastward, in a considerably damaged condition, the Derfflinger and the Sejdlitz, it is believed, suffering in particular. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 159 Undoubted Ij-, as Sir David Beatty remarked in his preliminary report, the Lion's mishap deprived our ships of a greater victory than that which they actually put to their credit. It cannot be said that our success was dearly bought. None of our ships was lost. The Lion and the Tiger were both hit, but although the former had to be towed to port by the Indomitable, the material injury to both ships was only such as could be repaired in a com- paratively short time. No member of the Lion's crew was killed, but 21 were wounded ; on the Tiger one officer, Engineer-Commander Charles G. Taylor, and nine men were killed, and three officers and eight men were injured. On the destroyer Meteor, which also was disabled, three men were killed and two wounded, one of whom died. Referring to the action in the House of Com- mons in February, ]\Ir. Churcliill said : ^ The action was not forced, because the enemj^, after abandoning their wounded consort, the Bliicher, made good their escape into waters infested by their submarines and mines. But this combat between the finest ships in both navies is of immense significance and value in the light which it throws upon rival systems of design and armament and upon relative gunnery efficiency. It is the first test we have ever had, and without depending too much upon it I think it is at once important and encouraging. First of all it vindicates, so far as it goes, the theories of design, and particularly of big- gun armament, always identified with Lord Fislier. The range of the British guns was found to exceed that of the German. Although the German shell is a most formidable instrument of destruction, the bursting- smashing power of the heavier British projectile is decidedly greater, and — this is the great thing — our shooting is at least as good as theirs. The Xavy, while always working very hard — no one except themselves knows how hard they have worked in these years — have credited the Germans with a sort of super-efficiency in gunnery, and we have always been prepared for some surprises in their system of control and accuracy of fire. But there is a feeling after the combat of January 24 that perhaps our na\"al officers were too diffident in regard to their own professional skill in gunnery. Then the guns. While the Germans were building 11-inch guns we built 12-inch and 13J-inch guns. Before they advanced to the 12 -inch gun we had large numbers of ships armed wdth the 13'5. It was said by the oppo- site school of naval force that a smaller gun fires faster and has a higher velocity, and therefore the greater destructive power. Krupp is the master gunmaker in the world, and it was very right and proper to take such a possibility into consideration. Everything that we have learnt, however, so far shows that we need not at all doubt the wisdom of our policy or the excellence of our material. In Germany the action caused a disappoint- ment even disproportionate to its real naval importance. For some weeks the Press Bureau of the German Admiralty noisily claimed that, at any rate, one British battle cruiser — to say nothing of two or more destroyers — had been sunk. In reality it was seen that, for the time at any rate, even brief and occasional excur- sions to British waters must be abandoned. It was no longer possible to pretend that the raids on Yarmouth and on Scarborough and the Hartlepools had been the prelude to greater things. Such enterprises, even while the German cruiser squadron was intact, involved great risk and little profit. Faced by a strength FUNERAL OF CAPTAIN ERDMANN OF THE " BLUCHER." 160 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. PAY DAY ON BOARD A MAN-OF-WAR. of even five to four in representative ships a German raiding force could not but retire, and in all the circumstances of January 24 — they would have been even less favourable if the squadron had advanced further — the Germans might think themselves fortunate to have escaped with no greater losses. The German naval authorities now recon- sidered the whole situation. They decided, as we shall see in another chapter, to abandon a few more of the rules of civilized warfare, and to threaten British and neutral commerce with indiscriminate extermination by submarines and mines. CHAPTER LIV. THE GERMAN COUNTER-OFFEN- SIVE AND THE BELGIAN BATTLE OF THE YSER. General von Moltke Superseded by General von Falkenhayn— The New Plan of the Kaiser — Advance on Calais — Position of the Allied Troops on October 16 — Retreat of French Marines from Ghent to the Yser — The Battle of the Yser Begins — Intervention OF British Flotilla — Ronarc'h's Defence op Dixmude — The Germans Force the Yser at Ti£Rvaete — Arrival of French Reinforcements — Considerations on the Fighting. DURING 1914 the greatest and most decisive battles in the Western Theatre of War were those of the Marne and Ypres, of which the former lias been described in Vol. II., Chapter XXXII. Under the titla of Battle of Ypres are included the fighting from October 16 onwards between the sea at Nieuport-Bains and Dixmude, popu- larly known as the Battle of the Yser, and the struggle which commenced on October 19 from Dixmude through Ypres to Armentieres on the l^ys, and thence to La Bassee. The Battle of the Yser may bo considered in two parts. In the first the Belgians, with the aid of a brigade of French Marines under Rear- Adniiral Ronarc'h, defended the lower course of the Yser and its canal from October 16 to 2.3. In the second, the bulk of the wearied but dauntless soldiers of King Albert were with- drawn and their places taken by a portion of the Army of General d'Urbal. It was not till November 17 that the Battle' of Ypres came to an end. Vol. 111.— Part 31. 1 The Battle of the Marne lasted a week ; the Battle of Ypres a month. The credit for the former victory rests with the French, though the British Army rendered them most valuable assistance. The Battle of Ypres, on the other hand, was won bj?^ the united efforts of the British, French, and Belgians, and each of the Allied nations may look back on it with tlie proudest feelings. It was — so Joffre is reported to have said — " the greatest battle of the world." During the month of October the Emperor William himself appeared on the western front to supervise the operations, and on the 25th it was aimounced that the Chief of the General Staff, (General von Moltke, had fallen ill, and that the Prussian Minister of War, General von Falkenhayn. had tak(>n over his duties. It soon appeared that Moltke had in reality been super- seded, and it was clear that sharp differences of opinion had arisen about tho [Ian of cani- ])aign. INloltke, it seemed, had insisted that the first and main strategic object should he to break the Allies' lines at Verdun, while the 01 162 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE CROWN PRINCE OF BAVARIA, Reviewing Troops. Kaiser, unable to reach Paris, was obsessed with the desire to gain possession of the Channel coast for the better prosecution of the war against England. Moltke disappeared, and until December, when he was definitely appointed Chief of the Staff, Falkenhayn .From a Skach by John S. Sargent, R.A BRIGADIER-GENERAL FOWKE, C.B., Chief Engineer British Expeditionary Force. nominally united the posts of Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff. Falkenliayn was fifty-three years old, and had only been in office about a year. He had at one time been Chief of the General Staff of the 16th Army Corps at INIetz, but he was best known for his work in China on the staff of Count Waldersee, in the expedition of 1900, when the German troops had been bidden b}^ the Kaiser to emulate the Huns of Attila. The strategy now adopted by the Kaiser and Falkenhayn has been severelj' and justly criticized. They struck simultaneously at Warsaw and Calais, and found that in neitlier theatre were they strong enough to achieve the desired success. Pitilessly, but in vain, they sacrificed troops of all sorts, including large numbers of old men and young boys who had volunteered for service at the outbreak of war. Although the success of the enterprise would undoubtedly have produced enormous results, its initiation must be ascribed largely to poUtical rather than military considerations. It was necessary to appease the Emperor's own im- patience, but it was no less necessary to provide the German people %vith some fresh promise of dazzling success. The preparations for ensuring success at the outset of the war, to impress the world with Germany's might, had been enormous and made regardless of expense. Though the Ger- man infantry tactics were obsolete, the German THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. 163 military machine was, on the whole, the most perfect that had ever been constructed. Men with the brains of captains of industry had toiled vmremittingly to provide the German Army with every advantage that foresight and experience could suggest — from the gigantic howitzers which were to batter down the per- manent fortifications of Belgium and France to the stick of liquorice which the sentry was to suck lest by a cough he should betray his pre- sence to the enemy. The coiuitries to be in- vaded had been examined with meticulous accuracy. They were honeycombed with -spies and traitors of both sexes, in all ranks of Society. Innumerable wireless installations and tele- phones had in peace-time been hidden on foreign soil to signal to the Germans the movements of their potential enemies. Soldiers had been even trained to utilize the arnis of windmills for the purpose of conveying information. The innumerable disguises — British, Belgian, French, Russian uniforms, women's dresses, priests' robes — in which the German soldiers often presented themselves during the War, show how thoroughly detail had been worked ovit. And now — in October, 1914 — what must have been the thoughts and sensations of those who had brought on this war ? They had intoxicated the German people, and its enthu- siasm, if not " irresistible," had been tremend- MAJOR-GEN. SIR THOMPSON CAPPER. ous. Treaties to which the Prussian Govern- ment had been a party had been torn up ; the rules of International Law treated as school- masters might treat the resolutions of a group of children. The horrors of the French Revolu- tion had been renewed by the Armies of the Sovereign who had up to August, 1914, posed as GERMAN PRISONERS AT FURNES. 164 TH1-: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. (/3 Ph o o si H O 2 > ■so 'u <u o .u 23 Q Q Z U O O z O THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 165 tho gnardian of European Law and Order. " When we left Belgium," wrote a Saxon oflficer in his diary, under August 26, " we left all the villages in flames. It is," he added, " like the Thirty Years' War — murder and fire everywhere." An airman who flew over the German lines at Charleroi during August said that the Germans " covered the plains like a moving sea." This sea of human beings — murdering, burning, burgling, raping — had flowed on towards Paris. " The measures," so the Ger- man General Staff had instructed the German soldiers, " which can be taken by one State against another in order to obtain the object of the War, to compel one's opponent to submit to one's will, may be summarised in the two ideas of Violence and Cunning." * And now it was that the eyes of the Kaiser began to be opened to the real proportion of the task he had undertaken. Despite the barbarous example made of Louvain, the easy-going Bel- gians (as they had been siu-Tiused to be before the War), had continued their heroic resistance. The British "rifle club " — to use a Prussian expression for the British Army — had taken a terrible toll of Kluck's masses. They had pur- sued it with slackening zeal as they began to discover the prowess of the British soldier. Inspired by the cool and resolute Joffre. the Armies of France had refused to know when they were beaten, Verdiin had remained un- taken, and the Germans under the Kaiser's eyes had failed to penetrate through the gap of Nancy. The desperate effort to pierce the French centre beyond the Mame had been foiled by Foch ; Manoury's stroke at Kluck's communications had forced the invaders to retire behind the Aisne. There they had held their own and battered Reims Cathedral. Meanwhile East Prussia had been invaded by the Russians and, though Hindenburg in the district of the Masurian Lakes had inflicted on them a serious defeat, no further successes had been gained by him or his Austrian colleagues in the Eastern Theatre of War. Far from it. The Russians in engagement after engagement had crushed the Austrians, overrvin Galicia, captiu-ed Lemberg, invested Przemysl, and approached Cracow. Their advance guards were on the Carpathians. If they crossed them they would harry Hungary ; if, masking Cracow., they entered Silesia they * " The German War Book," p. 64. ^^^^TBB BR9 '^ ^H^_ ^^^H ^ *-'^ ---■"" - Vv ■ - /^^^^^U ^^^^^ .4 '». -^j^^i^^^H 'Jifl ihshh ^^hmMMMMI^I r^^o^f WSSSSS^Sm -' ■^-^»_*i_^Hp^''^! l.^' ^^^^^^^j^^i^^H ."t^Jgrr •«-*^ , ;t||H^BIIW^|I^ ■>t^ ^^^^P JtH 1^ '^^fSsiH^' ' 'l^sB ' ^sl^H^ ^■FTJI " '-^-^''■fcai^^K^ ** \'j ^MMmKr-. . i ''^^k 'j^^^^^tm^^s l*^'- '-^^I^B^^I W-tM. ^^k ■%'"^3K ^^^^^^^BBI 9^^^Sl ,^ ^■■1^ ^^Ba T-Mr/'.^^f W--='\» ^^Wlf'' ' h^^^Bm ^^^v ■- -V" n HE^K^ ' ' ^v^VI^B ^j^-^ -1 ^^^H£^, .'3^L f ji^^l '^^Mj^^^^^S^ '"' -- 1 Mvh| Wmmim^ ^B • 'i^^^^^ft.X. fc, '.■"■•i'^"' ~fl ^^^^^^■AJJ ^^^^^^^^^^■■l^^flE ..IS^^^H ^^H|fl ^^^^^^^■^mmIS ^^^Cy^jMBSESkS IH^^Km bBMMRMP ^^n^^S -" _ - " i^^c^^^?^" ' ^^ ^^^^^^^^^n ^ ^ ^^Sh^^^^L 4 -: '--'*^^-.- ^■H K-'' ' '^£^ " ^ '^^iSii- Jl pwBE^ ^P ' ^viSBb ,v«»^^;^^^g^2 BSl^^^HH ^fil^ ''"4^^^^h5 ^■H^l H^^l ^Hll ^2 ^^ ^^^B^^^l ^^H ^^^^^BbivF^' '- ^^[^H| fe '"# <^"* hI« ^^^H ^^^B^^^jj^jjHJH "— _^H ^^^^^^^^H ^^^^^^Jjj^^PBa^^B^HH^^^BH M~^m ^^B ■PPTiij^^^^^H m.'^ wSm ■^ 3 ^^^EtT- '* _ki ^^^^n^^M^ m^ "^ 'MM^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H t" -* **'.*«*■*;.* I ■• ■ir.^ R^^l^ii^^^^^^^^^^^^^l »^:^v«eB MmHBBHHHHIH CONVENT OF THE LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR AT NIEUPORT, Damaged by a German Shell. would be in the midst of one of the two most important industrial districts of Germany. Not even fron^ the Serbian frontier had come good news. The mountaineers had repulsed the Austrian so-called punitive expedition with heavy loss. Turkey had not yet decided to throw in her lot with the Dual Alliance, and each day the anti-German feeling in Italy and Roumania was rising. If the War I^ord turned his eyes to the sea the outlook was still more unfavourable. Tho " Admiral of the Atlantic " saw the magnificent commercial fleet of Germany hiding, interned, sunk, or captured. The Emden and a few cruisers were still at large, but most of the German War Fleet wa-s lurking in the Iviel Canal or luider cover of the coa.st fortresses. It had not even obtained complete comimand of the Baltic ! To all intents and purposes, the British and French Navies were ruling the German Ocean, the Chaimel, and the Mediter- ranean. As a consequence the businesses of CJermany and Austria-Hungary began to suffer from a creeping paralysis. Cotton, tho basis of 166 ■THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BELGIAN TROOPS LANDING AT OSTEND. all modern explosives, without which the only useful propellant could not be manufactured, and copper, which was necessary for the driving bands of shells — to make them take the rifling — were daily becoming scarcer. Beyond the sea the German Colonies one by one were falling into the hands of the Allies. The Japanese had closed in on Tsing-Tau, and its capture could not long be delayed. The LTnited States had been shocked by the Belgian atrocities, and the Kaiser's old friend, the ex- Presidcnt Roosevelt, had denounced the authors of them in no measured language. India, loyal from Cape Comorin to Peshawur, was sending a contingent of warlike troops to the theatre of war ; her Princes were vieing with one another in placing their persons and their wealth at the disposal of the Empire. Egypt, far from throwing off the British yoke, was preparing to resist in^■asion, and in a brief two months Abbas was a refugee in Constantinople, and his uncle ruled in his place independently, and no longer the feudatory of the Caliph. Canada, Australia and New Zealand were send • ing their stalwart youths to the front. In a few months army after army would be poiu-ing across the Channel to join Sir John French's, General Joffre"s and King Albert's forces. Luxemburg, nine-tenths of Belgium, with Liege, Brussels, Antwerp, Ostend and a con- Jsiderable tract of France were, it is true, in the ■ possession of the Germans, but how long wxnild it be before the Germans and Austrians would be overwhelmed by nmnbers in both theatres of -war ? But there was no going back. At this critical monient the Kaiser may have remembered the words of M. de Faramond, the French Naval Attache at Berlin in 1913, "the German soldier is no longer natiu-ally what he had been 40 j'ears ago — a simple, religious ■ man, ready to die at the order of his King." Death he was still ready to meet, but chiefly for hope of the gain to be expected from victory. The modern Moltke, animated by the spirit of his illustrious rnicle, might point out that military considerations required that the main effort of the Germans should be directed by Verdiui; political exigencies demanded some- thing more spectacular. While Hindenburg was to capture \\'arsaw, the Kaiser himself would clear Belgium of the Allies and annex it, captiu-e Calais, and thence strike both at England and at Paris. Accordingly, from the beginning of October corps after corps was brought into the space between the Lys and the sea until fifteen were assembled, grouped in two armies, and with them four corps of cavalry. The army nearer the coast was under the Duke of Wiu-temberg, the other being commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria. The whole formed a force equal THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. IGl to, if not greater than, tlie liost which Napoleon led across the Nienien into Russia in 1812. Such were the conditions when the Battles of the Yser and Ypres commenced. As an example of the sort of hopes \\hich wt;re filling the German mind we will quote an article written towards the end of October in the ^dchsischer Staats-Anzeiyer by General Baron von Ardenne : If the English watch oia our naval position Boikuni- Wilhelmshaven-Heligoland-Brunsbiittel is almost im- possible in the present circumstances — np to now it has not been at all successful — it will become quite im- possible when Belgium and the north coast of France to the mouth of the Seine are in German hands. The somewhat improbable report that the French have retreated from Boulogne opens up a wide view over Germany's future position in the fight. In the course of time we shall be in possession of Calais, probably also of Dieppe and Havre. At Calais the Channel narrows down to a width of 35-40 kilometres (22-25 miles). Our 305 (12 in.) howitzers have a rangs of 14 miles (height of such a shot 4,370 yards). The range of our 42 cm. (17 in.) howitzers is still greater. England can expect ■utill further artillery surprises. Even if we cannot shoot from the French coast to the English, a safety zone can be made for German ships which will cover more than half the navigable water, [n the French harbours bases can be had for torpedo- boats and submarines, cruisers, scouts, etc., and — last but not least — bases for our Zeppelins. These bases on the French coast can be made absolutely impregnable from the sea by double or triple rows of mines, especially anchored mines. To anchor mines in these waters is comparatively easy. That this will be no joke for the British Isles can easily be seen from the fact that England is, so far as its food is concerned, dependent chiefly on foreign countries. Any disturbance in its supplies would be badly felt. Even now our comm?rce-;les.royers and the sinking of ships carrying contraijuiid, including food, are proving a thorn in Great Britain's side. When private property is no longer safe at sea there will be a severe collapse in the import of foodstuffs. In spite of all England's mine-laying, in spite of her great Fleet, she is always afraid of a German force landing in the United Kingdom. When the French north coast is in our hands, such an invasion — which is now considered a foolish romance — will be ea.sily possible, especialli/ when England continues to send troops au-ay from the island.* To stimtilate the enthusiasm and patriotism of the German ma.sses the most extrava- gant rumotirs were circtilated by the Imperial Government. For instance, some days before the appearance of Ardenne's article there was published in a Hamburg paper what purported to be a " Stockholm telegram." It was headed " The G3rman Sword of Damocles over Eng- land " : For nearly a week past enormous fleets of transports have formed almost a connected bridge over the Channel between Kamsgate, Dover and Folkestone on the l^nglish coast, and Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne on tlie French coast. The English Press declares that tl.Ls is for Great Britain a fight for life or death. * The Hamburger Nachrichten, on January 31. 1915, published a communication from Berlin which, among other things, stated that " an expression of expert opinion had been recently made regarding the range of German naval and coast guns, the chief point of which lies in the assertion that from Calais the harbour defences of Dover and the countrv 1o the North of Dover could be bcmbarded over n front of live and a half miles." BELGIAN CAVALRY ON THE MARCH. 1GB THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL THE WAR-WORN KAISER. But, extravagant as may have been the ideas of the Germans on the value to Germany of the coast line from Ostend to the Seine, it must be admitted that if their troops could have seized Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Staples, the mouth of the Somme, Dieppe and Havre, the chances of Germany succeeding in her scheme for the domination of the world would have been enormously increased. The chief naval bases of the British fleet were within reach of Calais and Boulogne, and once these won and used as German submarine and airship bases, the n^ain communications of the fleets guarding the east coast of England and Scotland would have been endangered. Harwich, Chatham, Dover and Portsmouth would certainly have been bombarded by aircraft, and the nerves of the vast population of London would have been constantly shaken by the visits of Taubes and Zeppelins, for the distance between Calais and the capital of the British Empire is under a hundred miles, little more than two hours' journey. There would have been more than a possibility that German aviators from Calais or Boulogne might have caused sensational, if not important, damage to London. Raids by sea on the coasts of Essex, Kent, and Sussex would, too, have been hazarded by men, careless of the lives of their troops, to strike terror into the British nation. If, in addition, the Germans had rejjeated their success of August and had forced their way down to Amiens, the communications of the British troops in France would once more have had to be shifted to St. Xazaire, at the mouth of the Loire. Maud'huy's Army would, it is likely, have had to evacuate Arras and join Castelnau's in the plain between the Somme and the Oise. The prestige of the German arms,, impaired at the Battle of the Marne and not improved by the Battles of the Aisne, Roye- Peronne and Arras, would have been rehabili- tated. The Battles of the Yser and Ypres brought all these by no means visionary plans to an untimely ending. The forces dispatched by the Kaiser to follow the Belgian Army, Rawlinson's Corps, and Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h's Marines, retiring from Antwerp or Ghent towards the Franco- Belgian frontier, necessarily collided with them and the other Allied troops moving forward to- the north of the Lys. These comprised General Bidon's two Territorial Infantry Divisions (the 87th and 89th), De ]\Iitry's four Cavahy Divisions, the British Cavalry Corps, and the III. Corps. Thus two long lines of men in mutual hostility were advancing towards one another, each endeavouring to act on and against his adversary's outer wing. A brief accomit of the events irmnediately preceding October 16 is needed to make the situation clear to the reader. On September 20 Joffre had commenced his turning movement between the English Channel and the Scheldt against the German communica tions. The enemy, after investing Antwerp, had replied by a counter-movement on Lille and Ypres, thus threatening Dunlcirk, Calais, and Boulogne. To ward off the German offen- sive Lord I^tehener had dispatched British INIarines imder General Paris and the 3rd Cavalry and the 7th Infantry Divisions under Sir Henry Rawlinson to Ostend and Zeebrugge. * * The 7th Infantry Division, under Major-General Sir T. Capper, C B., D.S.O., was constituted as follows : 20/A Infantry liric/ade (Brigadier-General H. J» Ruggles-Brise. M.V.O.) : THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 169 The 7th Division was outside the six regulax Divisions which formed the Expeditionary Force. It had been stated some years pre- viously in the House of Commons that it was intended to complete that Force by bringing home various luiits from foreign stations, and this was actually done. The 20th Brigade was, however, made up of battalions on home ser- vice, except the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, who came from Cairo. In the 21st Brigade two lat Grenadier Guards. 2rKl Scots Guards. 2nd Border Regiment. ^ 2nd Gordon Highlanders. 2lst Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General H. E. Watts, C.B.) : 2nd Bedfordshire Regiment. 2nd Yorks Regiment. 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. 2nd Wiltshire Regiment. 22nd Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General S. T. B. Lawford) : 2nd Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment. 2nd Royal Warwick Regiment. 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliei-s. 1st South Staffordshire Regiment. Northumberland Hussars Yeomanry. This appears to have been the first of the non-regular regiments to take the field. The Cyclist Corps. 14th Brigade Royal Horse Artillery. 22nd Brigade Royal Field Artillery. 35th Brigade Royal Field Artillery. .3rd Brigade (Heavy) Royal Garrison Artillery. 111th Brigade Royal Garrison Artillery 112th Brigade Royal Garri.son Artillery. A pom-pom detachment. 7th Divisional Ammunition Column. ^p<:^ —-"Tz- ' \ '.^^Hi^H ^^^^^^H ^^H Mlifl ^Hl v'"!!^^^^!' e '- jH^a <ISi^PI l]l ^gC^^iP^ mtSji Wm M flHB|^^K| ' f-* JjH .^^^^^^^LXi/^^KB^"^ « .i ^i^l ^H^^^^^H ^fcrs '^^■H ^^^^^^^^^^^^^T^^^^^^^^^^Hh ^9' ;^~' ^ ^^'H^H j^^^K My -^s^ ^^^^^^^^^^^K ' '^wf^^HttP^'^ .^^^ ^ ^hMJ^EMb'^^w^^ ^^^^^^^^^^1 '^^Ki^Kmm F^^^^^^^F^ ^^^^^^^H ^^^^^^nSeS^nX^BI L'^s^^^K' ^^^H IPi^^^^^^^^B^^^^^H^^^H^^^^^^K poj^^^E- . '^^^^1 H^^^^^Kd^^^^S^S^V RS^^R-*- --^^^^1 IHHMvT ^^fef^ H|^^M|/^ fc: • • ^^j_|£^yt*-^ ^^■'^^^t, ^^HHp?^ \^^^ M^^S^^^^BB^^^^ ^H^BBHpi^ --"^^^^Jg ■P"^ v^" ^^^<J^W^M ^•^^E^^^'^'i^B tm ^Lrf"-" M '■'^' ^^^SI ^^H^^S*' «! j^^^ip'''' ■ Sryf'^-'- - ■•'1»^**8 ^k ^99v ^31 ak^'^: .^ GURKHAS SHARPENING THEIR KNIVES. battalions were drawn from Gibraltar, one from the Transvaal, the fourth from Guernsey. The 22nd Brigade had two battalions from the Trans- vaal and two from Malta. The Artillery was made up from various sources, home and f oreigji. BRITISH INFANTRY ENTRENCHING, 170 Till': TIMES HI STORY OF THE WAR. A FRENCH MACHINE GUN SECTION IN ACTION. The Marines had assisted in the defence of Antwerp, l)ut, owing to the delay in sweeping the mines \\ hich the Germans had managed to lay in front of Ostend, Sir Henry Rawlinson could not operate lioldly against the enemy, but was obliged to confine himself to the minor alternati\e of protecting, with the French Marines of Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h, the retreat of the Belgian Army and British ^Marines. ,\ntwerp had succumbed on October 9, but, shortly before, the bulk of the Belgian Army had retired, and from this date Rawlinson and Ronarc'h were able to cover the further with- drawal of these troops to a jiosition on and behind the banks of the canalised Yser between Dixmude and the sea at Nieuport -Bains. (ihent, Bruges, Ostend were lost in succes- sion, and the Belgian coast from Ostend to the Dutch frontier fell into the hands of the foe. Already, on October 15, the advance guard of the German III. Corps was moving through Ostend on Xieuport and Dixmude. In the meantime, on the night of the 11th- 12th, Ghent was being evacuated by part of the 7th Division (Capper's) and Ronarc'h's Marines. The jNIarines led the way. To encourage their men the officers left their motor-cars and marched on foot. The moon was shining and the air chilly.' At daybreak tJiey reached Aeltre, where they halted for refreshment. At 4 p.m. the column touched Thielt, which was entered by Capper's troops two hours later. Hot-foot beliind them pressed some 50,000 Germans, but the night was passed without the enemy disturbing the French or British. A village 3Iayor had at the cost of his life put the enemy on a false scent. The next morning (the 13th) a Taube, whose observer was doubtless trying to locate the column of which the pvirsuers had lost contact, was shot down by the British. At 3 p.m. the ^Marines reached Thourout. The 7th Division, wliich had been preceded the day before by Byng's Cavalry Division, marched on Roulers. An extract from the official diary kept by Byng's Cavalry Division and another from IVIr. C. Underwood's narrative published in Blackwood's Magazine for March. 1915, bring clearly before us the movements of the Cavalry and Capper's Divisions. Mr. Underwood was an Interpreter appointed to the Headquarters Staff of the 2 1st Brigade. The diary below should be read in connexion with the map on pp. 180-1 :— Octoher 6. — After mobilizing at Ludgershall Camp the Dlvi-ioii was railed to Southampton, and >iailed on October 6 for Ostend and Zeebrugge. where it disem- barked early on the 8th, and came under the orders of the IV. Corps. October 9.- — On the 0th the Division concentrated at Bniges, marclung from there to Thonrout (6th Cavalry Brigade) and Ruddervoorde (7th Cavalry Brigade) on the following daj'. Ortober 11. — On the 11th Divisional Headquarters, which had stayed in Oostcamp on the previous night, mo\ed to Thourout. The armoured motors, which had THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 171 joined the Divii^ion on tlie previous day, succeeded in drawing first blood, capturing two oHieers and five men in tlie direction of Ypres. Ortobrr 12. — ()n tlie 12tli lieadf|narfers moved to Itoulors, the Cth Cavalry Brigade to tlie line Oost- nieuwkerke-Roulers, anil the 7th Cavalry Brigade to Kum beke-Iseghem , O'-tober 13. — 'i'he enemy were reported to have fought an action near Hazebroiick and to be retiring towards Bailleul, and our 2nd Cavalry Division to have capture<l a place some 10 miles south-west of Ypres. Accordingly on the 13th the Division reconnoitred towards Ypres and Monin with patrols towards Comines and Wervicq, but no signs of the enemy were found, and after a long day, during which many of the troops must have done at least 50 miles, the Division withdrew to the line Dadizeele-Iseghem, the 7th Infantry Division having in the meantime moved to Roulers. October 14. — Considerable hostile forces, believed to be in the XII. Corps, were reported to bo moving from tho vicinity of Bailleul towards Wervicq and Menin. In consequence of this the Division, followed by the 7th Infantry Di\ision, was ordered to move on Ypi'es and to reconnoitre to the south-west. This necessitated a very early start. The Division reached Ypres at •J a.m., and the 6th Cavalry Brigade, which formed the advanced guard, moved on toward the line La Clytte- Lindenhook. Shortly after leaving Ypres Ihi'^ brigade, assisted by lifle and revolver fire from everybody in Ypres, succeeded in bringing down a Taube aeroplane. Its pilot and observer escape:! into some woods, but were captured later on in the day. The advance guard, assisted by the armed motors, pushed on towards Neuve Kglise and succeeded in killing or capturini; a consider-, able number of the enemy dining the day, but no formed bodies were met with, though heavy tiring was heard from the direction of Bailleul. At dusk the Division moved into billets at Kemmel (7th Cavalry Brigade) and Wytschaete (remainder of the Division) in touch v.ith the 2nd Cavalry Division, with whom communication had been established during the 'lay. ()ciober 16. — No movement took place on the 15th, but on the following day the Division, with the 7th Cavalry Brigade as advance guard, moved via Ypres and Wieltje to the line Bixschoote-Poelcapelle. Tlie enemy were reported in considerable numbers in the Foret d'lTouthulst and Oostnieuwkerke, and a patrol of 1h3 2nd Life Guards was obliged to withdraw from Staden. Intermittent fighting took place during the afternoon, and at dusk French troops, having relieved the 7th Cavalry Brigade, the Division moveil into billets at Passchendaele (7th Cavalry Brigade), Nieuwemolen (6th Cavalry Brigade), and Zonnebeke (Divisional ROYAL ENGINEER LAYING TELEPHONE CABLE. Troops). The 7th Cavalry Brigade arc known to have accounted for some 10 or 12 killed during the day, and it is probable that considerably more were wounded. By the evening of the 16th Byng's Cavalry was disposed from Passchendaele through Nieuwemolen to Zonnebeke. From Zonne- beke to Gheluvelt and from (Iheluvelt to L t.-.Af FRENCH INFANTRY RUSHING FORWARD TO SUPPORT THE FIRING LINE. 172 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR ON THE DUNES. Belgian Cavalry. Zandvoordo extended Capper's Infantry Division, behind wliich were the woods to the east of Ypres. INIr. Underwood, who incidentally bears witness to the disgraceful conduct of the Germans in Ypres when it was temporarily in their possession, provides us with a glimpse of part of the complicated operation which was involved in the with- drawal of Capper's Division to the neighboui- hood of that city : Next morning, the 13th, it was reported that a Taube had been shot down at Divisional Headquarters at Thielt. » I saw the French Marines arrive on their retreat from Ghent, after which we left for Roulers, where the Divisional Headquarters were moving. It rained liard all the way, and we arrived and were billeted at 17 Rue du Xord. making this our headquarters for the night, Mr. Louis Maselis, a large corn merchant, being our host, who received us most cordially. We left for Ypres at 9.30 a.m., and four Taubes flew over us on the road, but too high to be shot at. We arrived at Ypres at 0.30^ and Headquarters were on the Railway Square. That evening I met Capitainc Bernaud, of the 79th Reserve Regiment, and saw our first lot of Allies, reserve draaoons, dismounted on the Square to receive us. The Germans had been through and stayed one night, the 7th, the day we landed at Zeebrvigge. They had taken up their quarters in the famous riding school, and the first thing they had done was to break open the mess-room and cellars and take out all the wine, after which they broke up everything and stole the mess-plate. When I saw it a week later, tha school maneges were strewn with broken bottles, champagne, claret, port, etc., and every drawer and cupboard door burst open and ransacked. They had cut all communications at the station, demanded an indemnity of 65,000 francs (£2,600), and stolen all the money they could lay hands on from the Banque Nationale. 6,000 loaves were requisitioned in the evening to be ready next morning, failing which there was a penalty of £800 (20,000 francs). At 10.30 a.m. a Taube, with pilot and observer, had been brought down, but they were not captured until 4.30, as they concealed theniselves in a wood. They were both brought in, furious with rage, as each weis seized by the collar and a revolver pointed at their heads by Belgian officers in the car, which was driven at the rate of 60 miles an hour at least ! Next day the whole brigade marched out to Halte, on the Menin-Ypres road, dug trenches, and remained in them all night. The Headquarters of the brigade I billeted in the Secretary of Ypres' Chateau, not 500 yards away. In the morning I had a good deal of trouble to re- . quisition oats, as it was pitch dark when we were ordered to advance to attack patrol of Germans towards Menin. About a quarter mile beyond Gheluveit we engaged advance party of Uhlans at 8.30 a.m. in a thick fog. jNIr. Underwood on the 13th had seen Ronarc'h's Marines passing through Thielt on Thourout. King Albert's idea was to fight a delaying action on a front roughly coinciding with the line Menin-Roulers-Thourout-Ghistelles, while the Belgian munitions and baggage were being withdrawn from Ostend and Bruges.* The village of Ghistelles lies on the main road from Bruges to Nieuport and on the railroad from Thoiu-out to Ostend. In this scheme Ronarc'h's Marines were to occupy a position behind Thom'out. resting on the Bois de \Vijnendaale to the north and Cortemarck station to the * See the first of the articles on Ronarc'h's movements, by M. Charles Le Goffic in the Revue des Deux Mondes for March 1st, 1915. M. Le Goffie's articles should be carefully studied by all who are interested in the minute details of the Battle of tlie Yser. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 173 south. At Cortemarck converge railwayo from Dunkirk and Ypres. Soaked to the skin by the pouring rain and pursued by overwhelming masses of Germans, the French Marines left Thourout on the 14tli to fill their place in the Une of battle., but at midnight the Admiral received an order to continue his retreat to the region of Dixmude. From Menin to Ghistelles is a distance of nearly thirty miles, and on the night of the 14th, when the Germans were in Bruges and approaching Ostend, the forces at the disposal of King Albert were too feeble to hold so extended a front. The marshes round Ghistelles could be turned from Ostend, and, as the Germans held some of the bridges across the Lys west of Menin, the right wing of Kng Albert, even allowing for the assistance which might be rendered it by the British Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps, would also be in imminent danger. It was resolved to bring the whole of the Belgian Army to the Yser and to leave General d'Urbal with such portions of the 8th French Army as were on the spot and the British Commander- in-Chief with Rawlinson's Corps, the Cavalry Corps, and the III. Corps to fill the sjDace between the Yser at Dixmude and the Lys. At 4 a.m., under heavy rain, the French Marines, with their rear protected by some Belgian Artillery, set out for Zarren and Wercken on the road to Dixmude. The route was encumbered by refugees. They fell aside to permit the passage of the column. As day dawned, groups of these poor SHELTER FROM THE RAIN AND FIHE. wretches could be seen gazing with lar'k-lustre eyes at the retreating defenders of their unhappy country. Leaving Ronarc'h on the 15th approaching THE OBSERVATION BALLOON. Used for watching the effect of the British naval guns against the German trenches. 31—3 171 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THK WAR. BRITISH MONITOR LEAVING A FRbNCH PORT. Dixmude, let us see what had been happening in the meanwhile in the district between Dix- mude and La Bassee. South-west of Dixmude the Yser is joined by a canal from Yj:)re8, and from Ypres another canal runs into the Lj^s at Comines. On the 1 2th, when the \anguard of the Belgian Army reached Furnes — nine miles west of Nieuport by the road to Dunkirk — and when Sir Hem\ Rawlinson's troops had proceeded from Bruges and Ghent to the neighbourhood of Roulers — thirteen miles north-east of Ypres — a con- siderable body of German troops was located west of the line Comines-Ypres. Its right rested on the high ridge, eleven miles long, to the south-west of Ypres ; its left \\as on the Lys at Estaires. From the Lys southward to the Aire-Bethune- La Bassee-Lille Canal another force of Germans was entrenched. The left of this force joined the host opposing General de Maud'huy, whose army was disposed from Bethune through Arras to Albert on the Ancre, where it made contact M'ith General de Castelnau's army operating between the Somme and the Oise. If the Gernians could have maintained them- selves on the ridge south-west of Ypres and between that ridge and the Lys, they would soon have been reinforced by portions of the army which had captured Antwerp and by the <*orps which were about to enter Lille. From the line Mont-des-Cats-Meteren-Estaires thev might have pushed their way between the Yser and the Ly.s on Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, isolated the Belgians on the Yser, and menaced the left wing of Maud'huy's armj-. Fortunately, as was narrated in Chapter XLVIIL, the right of the German position north of the Lys was on October 13 turned by Byng's Division from Roulers and by General d'L^rbal from Dimkirk, and was at the same time attacked by the British Cavalry Corps ; while the III. Corps from Hazebrouck moved against its centre and left. More- over, between the Lys and the Aire-Betluuie- La Bassee-Lille Canal, the Germans were thrust back by General Conneau's Cavalry Corps and the II. Corps. As Lille was surrendering, the French from Dimkirk entered Ypres, the British Cavalry Corps captured Mont-des-Cats. the western end of the ridge, and the III. Corps took Meteren, south of the ridge. Sir Henry Kawlinson's Cavalry (Byng's Division) pushed patrols towards Comines, and on the next day (October 14) passed through Ypres and occupied Kemmel and W'ytschaete at the eastern end of the ridge, from the remainder of which the Germans were dislodged by the Cavalry Corps. ^rhe same day Messines, south of Wytschaete, was taken and the III. Corps entered Bailleul. On the 15th, the day when the Germans seized Ostend, Sir John French directed thd Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps to the Lys, and the line of that river from Aire to Arrnentieres and THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 176 the north bank to a point five miles below Armentieres were by sunset in tlie possession of the Allies. On the 16th the Germans evacuated Armen- tieres, and on the same date, while the British and French north and south of the Lys were still continuing their offensive, the Germans attacked Dixmude and the Battle of the Yser began. The left wing of the Allies now stretched from Compiegne through Albert, Arras, Bethune, Armentieres, Ypres, Dixmude to the coast at Nieuport-Bains. As the Allies possessed the command of the sea the Germans could no longer indulge in their favourite manoeuvre of 4* outflanliing their enemy, and during the next month they were obliged to confine their efforts against the Allied line between the points Nieuport and Bethune, or between Bethune and Compiegne. The district in whic?i the Battles of the Yser and Ypres took place has been already described in broad outline. Between the Lys and the Scheldt the country is mostly industrial and agricultural, between the Lys and the sea agricultural and pastoral. Looking eastward from the Montague de Kemmel (512 ft. high) on the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats, to the riglit are seen in the distance the tall chimneys and factory buildings of Lille, south of the Lys. On the Lille side of the Lys the land is a flat, and in rainy weather, water-logged plain sloping gradually upwards to the low ridge on which are the villages of Givenchy, Aubers, Fromelles, and Radinghein. Close to Givenchy, which is two miles west of La Bassee, huge slag heaps rise black against the sky. Radinghem is five miles or so due west of Lille and the san\e dista^nce due south of Armentieres. The La Bassee-Lille Canal is beyond the ridge. Twenty miles away, in front of Kemmel, is Courtrai on the Lys, and, to its north, Roulers. South of the railway from Roulers to Ypres a wide belt of woods extends from Wytschaete to Zonnebeke. In the plain below to the left are seen, a little to the east, the towers and roofs of Ypres, once the capital of Western Flanders. Six miles to the north of Ypres and four miles east of the canal from Ypres to the Yser begins the forest of Houthulst. Far off the Yser winds through Dixmude to the sea, and twenty miles due west of Dix- mude, sixteen south-west of Nieuport-Bains, is Dunkirk. Apart from the innumerable windmills and the poplar-lined roads, the landscape north of WHEAT SEIZED BY THE GERMANS. 176 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A BRITISH LOOK-OUT POST. the Lys as far as the region of Dixmude has the aspect of the flat part of Essex. The ground is. however, broken and rolling and there are several slight elevations, for example the hill at Hooglede, north-west of Roulers. Round Dixmude commence the fen lands of Western Flanders, a network of dykes and ditches, few of which could be passed without bridging material. From the sea to Dixmude as the crow flies is some ten miles ; from Dixmude to Ypres thirteen ; from Ypres to Armentieres twelve ; and from the Lys at Armentieres to Bethune fifteen miles — making a total of about fifty miles. But the actual length held by the Allied troops on October 16 measm-ed nearly sixty miles, as it followed the northern bank of the winding Yser from Xieuport to Dixmude, and frojn this town round the eastern edge of rhe forest of Houthulst. From Nieuport to Dixmude the line was held by the Belgians, aided by the 6,000 French Marines of Ronarc'h, who occupied Dixmude and the neighbourhood with outposts thrown well out to the front. From this town it ran past Zonnebeke and dheluvelt, where were Rawlinson's troops, to VVarneton on the Lys. In between tlie French Marines and British were the French Territorial Divisions and a part of the available French Cavalry. From Warneton the British Cavalry Corps, tiie III. Corps, Conneau's Cavalry Corps and the JI. Corps held a curving line through the western outskirts of Aubers to Bethnne. On October 16 the actual po.sition of the Belgians was as follows : The 2nd Belgian Division was stationed round Nieuport ; to its riglit was the 1st Division ; beyond the 1st Division up to Dix- mude was placed the 4th. Then came the French Marines commanded by Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h, with the oth Belgian Division in support. The whole force could not have been much over 40,000 men. A patrol of tlie 2nd Lite Guards had been driven from Staden on the road from Roulers to Dixmude, and considerable numbers of the enemy were reported west of Staden in the forest of Houthulst and south-east of Staden at Oostnieuwkerke. The 7th British Cavalry Brigade on the 16th was, therefore, directed tlirough Ypres to the south of the forest of Houthulst, and till nightfall occupied the line Bixschoote-Poelcapelle. The movements of the French Tt>rritorials and Cavalry were to have an important bearing on the defence of Dixmude. As the sun was setting they relieved the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which was shifted in a south easterly direction to Passchendacle. At nightfall the front of the Yser from Nieuport to Dixmude was held by Belgian detachments, who occupied the villages of Lombartzyde, ^lannekensvere, Schoore, Leke, Keyem, and Beerst. From Thourout, connected by a single line railroad with Bruges and Roulers and by a double-line railway with Ostend, a main road runs to Ostend. Other main roads branch off this highway and proceed to the Yser. The villages of Beerst and Keyem are on the roads to the Yser at Dixmude. Between Schoore and Pervyse one of the main roads crosses the Yser. \^'est of Schoore still another passes through Mannekensvere to Nieuport, while Lombartzyde is a mile east oF Nieuport on the coast road to Ostend. So long as the Belgians retained Lombart- zyde (and the ground east of Nieuport), Manne- kensvere, Schoore, Leke, Keyem and Beerst, the Germans could not use the roads to the Yser which branch off from the Thoiu-out-Ostend highway, which rims south through Roulers to THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR, 177 RUINED CHURCHES IN BELGIUM. 1. Interior of a Church at Dixmude. 2. The Mins er at Nieuport. 3. Tomb in the Church of Ramscappelle, wonderfully preserved amongst the surrounding wreckage. 4. The Church at Pervysc. 178 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. ^lonin, being accompanied al! the \va,\- by a single-line raUroad. The Thoiirout-Ostend road is not, however, the only line from which the Yser may be approached from the east. At Rouler-s a main road goes north-west to Dixmude, and this w^ould naturally form the line of advance for the Germans coming from Ghent to attack Ronarc'h. Generally the German plan involved the capture of Dixmude, the crushing of the Belgians, and a further advance to turn the Allied left. To the south of the Roulers-Dixmude road lies the forest of Houthulst, which could not be left by the Germans on their flank, and whicli therefore became the scene of man}- a fierce encoimter between the opposing forces. The significance of the villages north of the Yser has been pointed out. Behind these from Dixmude to Nieuport -Bains was the canalised river Yser, which is from fifteen to twenty feet above the level of the land to the west of it. It has a broad towpath rimning all along it, which forms a fine rampart. Between the towpath and the rampart there is a bank about two feet high, which is enough to protect a man when he is firing. The canal moves in a slightly concave cur\'e from Dixmude to Nieuport. About half way between the two towns it i^ pressed out to the eastward. At each side of the ba.se of the loop thus formed there is a small village (Tervaete, Schoorbakke), clustered round a bridge. Westward of the canal lie fiat fields, broken up into farms and intersected by- minor water channels ; and then the embank- ment of the railway which connects Dixmude with Nieuport and is on the average about two miles distant froni the canal. The embank- ment is, as it were, the string of a drawn Vjow of which the stave is the canal and the tips Nieuport and Dixmude. The chief bridges over the Yser, so far as the fighting now to be described is concerned, are at Nieuport, ilannekensvere, Schoorbakke and Tervaete (near Keyem), and Dixmude. Off the roads the country leading to these crossings was liable to flood. The possession of the bridges was, therefore, of importance to the assailants for attack or to the defenders for an active defence. The situation was like that at the bridge of Areola in 1796. The railwaj^ formed a second line on which the Belgians could oppose the Germans if they crossed the canal. Behind the railway was the high-road, a tree-lined cliaussee, from Dixmude through Per\'yse and Ramscappelle to Nieuport. A GBRMAN MOTOR ALTAR. The Archbishop of Cologne on the left. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. IT'J LADLING MUD OUT OF THE TRENCHES. Nienport and Dixmude were places of con- siderable interest. Round the former had been fought the " Battle of the Dunes " in 1600 in which the Dutch under ]\Iaiu'ice of Orange had defeated the Spaniards. A Gothic Cloth Hall, a fine church with a massive tower, an Hotel de Ville, and the remains of a Templars' Castle were the architectural featiu-es of this quiet little town of some 3,500 inhabitants. Dixmude possessed a church with a magnificent rood-loft, and formed a centre for the dairy-farnis which carried on a brisk trade in butter with England. A mile or so beyond Nieuport was Nieuport- Bains, where the Yser entered the sea. It was a small watering-place with a broad Digue, a golf course, several hotels, and tastefully built villas. From Ostend to Dunkirk along the shore stretched the Dunes — great heaps of sand, some planted with trees. Skirting the Dunes on the south side ran the canal from Dunkirk through Fumes to Nieuport. Fumes, where the Belgian reserves were ultimately stationed, was a town of some 0,000 inhabitants, with a quaint old Place. This, a belfry, the choir of the church of St. Walbiu-ga, and the huge tower of the church of St. Nicholas formed its chief attractions. It was connected with the Yser by the Canal de Loo, which formed a third barrier to an encmv after he had crossed the Yser and the railway enibankineut between Dixmude and Nieuport. A steam tramway, a canal, and high-road joined Furnes to Nieuport, a high road Furnes to Pervyse, a railway and a high-road (through Pervyse) Furnes to Dixmude ; a high-road and light railway Furnes to Ypres. Most of the roads in this district were usually not wide enough to admit two vehicles to pass. If they left the roads, the Germans would liave to fight their waj- across hedges, dykes, lines of polder.s, willow thickets, orchards and gardens, and the marsh 3^ character of the soil would prevent them making {irtificial cover. Trenches speedily filled with water, and, a.s the land at high tide was below sea level, the Belgians by opening the s'.uices could let the sea in, while the space between the Yser and the railway embankment might hv- flooded b\- closing up the culverts under the railroad and bursting the channel of tlu^ raised canal. Further, the flank of cohunns moving between the sea and Schoore would be exposed to fire from the guns of the Allied men-of-war. The attacks on Dixnuide or its inunediate neighbourhood are comprehensible, but, remem- bering that Dunkirk was fortified, it is difficult to understand the reasons for the persistent German assaults on the Belgian position north of Dixnuide. One explanation that can be THE TIMES HIS'lORY OF THE WAR. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 181 n2 18-2 THI-: Tl.MHS HISTORY OF THE WAR. MAJOR-GENERAL F. [Swainc. C. SHAW. offered is that the Duke of ^^'llrtembel'g and his advisers imagined that the Belgians were demoralised. If that were the case, the German leaders were speedily to be undeceived. There was one point in the Allied position on the Yser which was of cardinal importance — viz., Dixmude, the possession of which was needed for any reallj"- decisive advance of the German right -flank forces. But mere posses- sion would not suffice, the power of debouching from it was necessary, and to acquire this the ground round it to the north, west and south had to be swept clear of the Allies so as to permit a German deployment in force. This wovild have given the Kaiser's leaders the initiative, and they woiild have been able to attack right, left, and centre, and the Allies, if they could not stem the current, must have retreated before them and thus have exposed the left wing of d'Urbal's force to flank attack. On the 15th it will be remembered that Rear- Admiral Ronarc'h and his 6,000 IMarmes were retreating from Thourout to Dixmude. Near Eessen a battalion imder Commandant de Karros was left to guard the roads which at that point debovich from Vladsloo to the north, from Roulers to the south-east, and from Poel- cappelle and the forest of Houthulst to the south. Commandant Mam-os with another battalion crossed to the Ypres -Dixmude road and occupied Woumen. The remaining four l);ii tdlions with 111'- machine gim company entered Dixmude about midday, and were posted behind the Yser. A detachment was placed near the village of Beer«t to the north of the town and east of the canal. South of the chapel of Notre-Daine-de-Bon-Secours natural cover for the artillery wa.s found. Scarcely had the men been billeted than they were called up to help a company of Belgian Engineers to put the outskirts of Dixmude in a state of defence. There was not a moment to be lost. xUready the (Germans were tlirowing a few shrapnel shells into tlic town, and in the evening a German armoured car, coming from Zarren, fired at the outposts in front of Ee.ssen. On reconsideration Ronarc'h thought the position which he had taken up too dangerous. Only forty-nine years old and the youngest of the French admirals, he had had experience of land warfare, having, U ce Falkenhayn, fought in China. He had accompanied the Seymour coliunn which had been sent to succour the European Legations besieged by the Boxers in Pekin. A taciturn, meditative man of the stamp of Joffre, he recognized to the full that his men were in insufficient numbers and that the majority of them were ill -trained. It wa.s not till the end of September that he had been ordered to form a Brigade of two regiments (six battalions and a company of mitrailleuses). OFFICERS OF THE FRENCH MARINES. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAll. 1S3 FRENCH iMARlNES WITH THEIR TROPHIES OF WAR. and Jie had had to recruit them chiefly among ladf! under age.* His Marines had fought bravely at the Battle of Melle, but he could scarcely have anticipate d they would display the amazing covu-age. skill and energy which they were about to exhibit. The Belgians supporting him were wearied with constant fighting. To hold a line so long with the forces at his disposal seemed bold almost to temerity. Ronarc'h represented his views to General Michel, who was conimanding the Allies on the Yser, and recei\'ed permission to shorten the line of defence round Dixmude. The last trains with the munitions of the Belgian Army had passed through to Fumes and there was no longer the need to keep any considerable body east of Dixmude along the railroad. Accordingly the Admiral withdrew his out- posts and divided the defence of Dixmude into two sectors. In the northern he placed Com- mandant Delage with the 1st Regiment, in the southern Commandant Varney with the 2nd. A battalion of the 2nd was retained by him at the station of Caeskerke, where the railways from Fumes and Nieuport meet. Of the two Belgian batteries one was placed south * One of the Marines, Yves Lebouc, was IG years old. The youth of France in this terrible war have behaved with extraordinary heroism. of tlie railroad to Furnes, the other north of Caeskerke. A telephone connected them with the great flour mill of Dixmude, the concrete platform of which had been constructed by a German firni before the war. It was an excel- lent point from which the whole valley of the Yser might be cannonaded by heav\' artillery, and the cost of building the floiu- mill was doubtless debited to the German \A"ar Office. For the moment, however, it afforded a capital post from which the fire of the Belgian gmis could be accurately directed. At the crossing of the roads from Dixmude to Pervyse and Oudecappelle was stationed the machine gun company. The canal of the Yser in the vicinity of Dixmude was guarded by the Belgian infantry of the 5th Division. To the south of Neucappelle French Cavalry held the road which at Loo crosses the canal from the Yser to Fumes and joins beyond Loo tlie Fumes-Ypres highway. Some of the Cavalry which (Jeneral d'Urbal had boldly thrown into the forest of Houthulst had pushed as far a.>< Clercken to the east of W'oumen. The efforts of the Gerinans against the Belgians and Ronarc'h's Marines on the Kith were at first confined to a reconnaissance and to entrenching themselves at Middlekerke on the Ostend Digue and at Westende, which faces Lombartzvde. A Taube had also flown o\cr 184 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. — " ~r ; ; ; : eEag^_ : DEVASTATION BY ARTILLERY FIRE IN BELGIUM AND FRANCE. 1. The Church of St. Jean, Dixmude. 2. Cottages in a street at Nieuport. 3. A street at Albert. 4. Wrecked house in the flooded area near Ramscappelle. 5. A street in Pervyse. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 185 Dunkirk the supply source of the Franco- Belgian Army. One bomb had been dropped by its navigator on the sand, another into the •^ea. Towards sunset from a fold in the groxind near Eessen the heavy German artillery (10 and 15 cm. guns) shelled the French and Belgians defending Dixnuide for some time. Sud- denly the guns ceased fire and masses of infantry could be perceived advancing to the attack. They were repulsed, but the fighting went on through the night of the 16th. About midnight a desperate charge of the Germans was successful. The approaches to the French trenches w^ere not protected by barbed wire, and sheer weight of numbers told. The defenders withdrew to the sviburbs of the town and awaited reinforcements. At dawn a counter-attack was delivered and the lost trenches re -won. No further assaults were that day made on Dixmude, and at 11 a.m. the German artillery ceased firing. " Afterwards," notes a Marine present at the action, " al! noise ceases ; Dix- mude has suffered little." In the com-se of the 17th five batteries of Belgian artillery under Colonel Wleschoumes were added to the few guns in position behind Dixmude. The Admiral had now at his disposal seventy-two pieces. But it must not be for- gotten that the Belgians had no heavy artUlery equivalent to the German, and so worn were their field-guns by constant use that the fire from them was inaccurate. Ronarc'h con- nected bj' telephone the new batteries with his headquartei's at Caeskerke. He proposed to keep them under his own immediate direction, but he generally authorized the gunners to fire whenever the fusillade, and particularly the mitrailleuse - discharges, indicated that an infantry attack was proceeding. ThLs day (the 17th) the advance posts of the Belgians in the villages to the east of the Yser were also shelled by the Germans. The afternoon of the 17th and the whole of the 18th were spent in quiet by the defenders of Dixmude, w-ho on the 18th were visited by King Albert. " He is a model King," writes a Marine, " I have seen him in the trenches. He's a real man." The respite given to Ronarc'h, which per- mitted him and his Belgian colleagues to put Dixmude in a comparatively complete state of defence, ^^■as due to the offensive taken on the 17th, 18th and 19th by General d'Urbal and. DR. HECTOR MUNRO. to his right, Sir Henry Bawlinson, and, west of Sir Henry, the British Cavalry Corps and III. Corps. The German troops ^^•ho were marching through Roulers on Dixmude, and some of whom had driven the patrol of Life Guards from Staden and entered the forest of Houthulst on the 16th, were the next day attacked by foiu* French Cavalry Divisions under General de Mitry. The French cleared the forest of the Germans and demonstrated towards Roulers and the road from Roulers to Dixmude. Do Mitry's left stretched to Clercken, north of the forest on the road from Poelcappelle to Dixmude, and on the 18th Ronarc'h v\as requested to assist in the advance on Thourout, at which town, as w-ell as at Roulers, Genertl d'Urbal was striking, while Rawlinson wns moving on Menin. Accordingly Ronarc'h .sent Commandant Mauros towards Eessen with a battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Marines and two Belgian cars equipped with luaohine guns. 186 THE Turn's HISTOliY UF THE WAR. A few corpses and dead horses on the road showed where the Germans had been. V\ Ix'n the-French entered Eessen they found that the enemy had decamped. Maiiros halted at Ev^ssen, but two regiments of mounted African ti-oops, temporarily placed under Ronarc'h's command, set out in extended order towards Bovekerke and the woods of Couckelaere. The Allies had almost recovered the position from Ghistelles to Menin which King Albert and his staff had at first chosen for defence and then abandoned, after the fall of Ghent. Dixmude had not been attacked on Sunday (the 18th), but while the French were marching against Thourout the Germans from the line Thoiu"out-Ostend attacked the Belgian advance posts from Lombartzyde to Keyem. The battle began in the morning. The Belgians fought with superb coui-age, but numbers told, and before sunset the Germans had secured Mannekensvere and Keyem. If they covikl cross the Yser west of the former place they would turn the centre of the Belgian position of Nieuport, while from Keyem they could either march on Dixmude or, crossing the southern side of the loop of the Yser, strike at Pervyse and break the Belgian line. If the east bank of the Yser was to be held, Keyem had to be retaken at all costs, and the Belgian 4th Division by a brilliant night attack drove the enemy from the village. This success and the repulse of the Germans before Keyem on the next day were psycho- logically of the highest value to the cau.se of the Allies. ISIany of the Belgians had come to believe that the Germans must win in the end and they could hardly believe their eyes when the enemy turned and ran. They stopped firing, and shouted out in amazement : " See, see, they're running ! " On IMonday the 19th, the Germans received the order to cross the Yser " at any cost," and, to facilitate the attack on Dixmude, columns from Bruges and Ghent were directed on Roulers. The town was attacked from three bides— from Hooglede on the north-west, from Ardoye on the north-east, and from Iseghem on the east. The artillery at these places commenced bombarding Roulers at noon, and towards evening the enemy entered the town. The French retired to Oostnieuwkerke, and the road from Roulers to Dixmude was again in the possession of the Germans, who had not been dislodged from Menin by Rawlinson. On the north and south banks of the Lys the Allies had made no further progress of a substantial nature. The enemy from the Thourout-Ostend front also achieved a considerable success against the Belgians. Beerst. between Keyem and Dix- BELGIAN INFAIViTRV ON THE MARCH. THE TIMES HISTOI-IY OE THE WAR. ]S7 FRENCH ENGINEERS REPAIRING A BRIDGE. iiiude, was captvired, and desperate efforts made to take Keyem and drive the Belgian 4th Division over the loop of the Yser. To save that division from destruction the French Marines and the Belgian 5tli Division were ordered to advance from Dixmude and recover Beerst, cross the road from that village to Thourout, and occupj' the Praet-Bosch woods to the north of the road. Supported by the Belgian 5th Division, the battalion of Commandant Mauros moved at 10 a.m. from Eessen on Vladsloo and Hoograde, and two battalions of Ronarc'h's reserve traversed Dixmude and marched on Beerst, where the Germans had barricaded themselves in the houses and chiirch. The ground in front of the village was quite fiat and intersected by dykes overflouing with water, and the only cover was here and there a leafless hedge ; so the Marines had to advance slowlj^ crouching, r.ieu tenant Maussion dc Cande, who incautiously .stood up, was struck down, and at every moment a Marine fell forward among the beetroots. Lieutenant Pertus had his leg blown to pieces as he was leading on his company ; and Lieutenant de Blois was liit a few minutes later. The losses of Jearmiot's battalion were so heavy that Pugliesi-Conti's was brought up into the fight. Tliirsting for vengeance and animated by the example of their officers, they were determined to perish rather than give ground. Following Commandant Varney, who A\as superintending the attack, the whole battalion pressed for- ward. House after house was taken, each after a terrible struggle. Still the fight proceeded. The Admiral sent up a fresh battalion from his reserves to replace Jeanniot's sorely tried battalion, which was brought back to Dixmude. On the right Mauros debouched from Vladsloo, whence, with the aid of Belgian mitrailleuses, he had dis- lodged the enemy. The Belgian 5th Division prolonged the fighting front to the right and kept part of its strength echeloned in rear. These happy dis portions soon produced good results, and by 5 p.m. Beerst was carried. Night was now falling, and the Admiral directed Commandant Varney to put the outskirts of Beerst in a state of defence to resist a possible counter-attack. But no sooner was work begun than the Belgian Conunander ordered Ronarc'h to recall his Marines to their original position roiuid Dixmude. The effect of the German victory at Roulers had become apparent. News had reached General Michel that a coliunn was moving from the east on Dixmude. At 1 1 p.m. the Brigade of Marines reached its cantonments at Caeskerke and St. .lacquos- CappelU'. Looking back, it was aeon that 188 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. /sender^/? \ 11 Hoogstaede ^boo les Kilometres 12 3 4b BATTLE OF THE YSER, Showing approximate position of the Allies October 16th (evening). THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 189 Vladsloo, which had fallen into the hands of the Germans, was burning fiercely.* The retirement of the Marines and the Belgian 5th Division rendered Keyem untenable. Diu"ing the night it was occupied by the enemy, and the 4th Belgian Division fell back behind the Yser. At the other end of the battlefield the Ger mans between Keyem and Nieuport had been heavily cannonading the Belgian 1st Division, while their columns from Ostend were assaulting Lombartzyde, defended by the 2nd Division. These attacks were repulsed. There can, however, be small doubt that both Lom- bartzyde and Nieuport would have fallen into German hands but for a new and, to the Germans, unexpected demonstration of the naval supremacy possessed by the Allies. On Sunday a naval flotilla, which included three Monitors, built for the Brazilian Govern- ment for river work, and taken over by the British Admiralty, had been dispatched under Rear -Admiral Hood to the Belgian coast. Consequently the Allied line on Monday had rested not only on the sea, but on a mmaber of movable forts armed with 6-inch guns equal to the heaviest which the Germans then possessed at this point. The Monitors being of light draught could approach close to the shore. Aeroplanes, seaplanes, and captive or dirigible balloons signalled to the naval gunners the positions of the German troops and artillery, f * For much of the account of the fighting round Dixmude we express our acknovvledgmenta to M. Le GofFic, whose lucid and interesting article in the Revue des Deux Mondes is based, not only on official reports, but on the written or oral evidence of Marines and others who took part in the Battle of the Yser. t The stationary observation balloon was very useful both on sea and land. A correspondent of The Times was SLibsequently allowed to ascend in one of the latter and gives a graphic description of the observations made on the occasion. " The officer whom I accompanied was engaged in making observations with a view to discovering the position of the German batteries. " At a height of about 200 feet we could follow all the phases of the battle which was in progress along the other bank of the Yser, between Nieuport and Dixmude. In particular we were able to note the effect of the fire of the British warships off the coast. , " With my glasses I could see Ostend and the ruins of several coast villages, including Westonde, JMiddel- kerke, and Lombartzyde. As far as I could see, not a single wall remained standing in the villages of West- kerke. Slype, and Novie. All this damage had been caused by the effective fire of the British ships, which ultimately succeeded in dislodging the German forces. " At 8 a.m. the engagement was in full swing, and as the air was clear I had a splendid view of what was going on. At 8.45 the observation-officer discosered the position of the German guns, and so we at once came down." The dead-flat country permitted those positions often to be seen from the masthead. To bafile the aim of the German coast batteries the ships moved on diagonal courses and, to escape- torpedoes launched by submarines, at a high rate of speed. So close in land did the M©nitors> and torpedo craft come, that their crews even fired with rifles at the enemy. How the British flotilla engaged the German forces ia graphically described by Petty-Officer Cooper, of H.M.S. Falcon. '* After patrolling the shores," he says, with reference to the flghting on October 27, but which applies equally to the earlier date, " the Falcon took up a position two miles off Nieu- port. A mile nearer the shore were the Monitors. They opened their attack, and we fired over them. We could see nothing of the batteries or the trenches, but we soon found the range, and were told by our officers that we were dropping our shells right into the trenches. On the first day we fired over 1 ,000 shells, and other guns were fired while their ships were proceeding at a^ high speed to and fro along the coasthne. The Germans brought to bear on us some of theii" heavier giins which they used at Antwerj), and they dropped their shells roimd us. Several struck us, but did little damage." Though the British flotilla opened fire at daybreak on the 19th, the Germans did not desist from their assaults on Lombartzyde and Nieuport. In the morning <>t' the 20th they rushed the farm of Bambuig. It was retfiken, but at night was abandoned by the Belgians. In the centre and on the right, the enemy, who now had gained Schoore as well as Mannekensvere, Keyem, and Beerst, .-helled the Belgians de- fending the raised (tanal of the Yser, and launched cohunns down the Keyem-Dixmude and Eoitlers-Dixmucle roads on Dixmude. Hitherto only field guns had been used by the Germans against Dixmude ; but at this junctm-e heavy howitzeis came up and rained shells on the town. General Meyser's Belgian Brigade had been attached to Ronarc'h's Marines, the trenches protected by barbed wire and pro- vided with head cover. Repeated attacks of the Germans were easily beaten off. In Furnes were posted the Belgian reserves. Before dusk Dr. Hector Munro's Field Hospital, which had already done such noble services for the Allies, had arrived. Dr. Munro, Dr. Bevis, and the rest of the party of twenty-fivo doctors and nurses, among them Lady Dorothie Feilding (a daughter of Lord Denbigh; were I'JO' THE TUIE^ HISTORY OF THE ]yAlL busy converting a large convent into a ba.««^ hospital. The gas in the town had been cut off, and the little shops were lit up by candles and oil lamps. Below, in the vaulted caves, scjldiers were drinking soup, coffee, or wine. The place was jjacked with armoured and other motor-cars, military cycles, artillery, and pro- vision wagons. The sound of the guns in tlic distance was terrific. Wednesday, the 21st, was one of the most critical days in the gigantic struggle between the Lys and the sea. General Joffre himself was on the spot to direct the operations of the Allies. French troops were hurrjang up to the assistance of t he Belgians, and King Albert and Joffre reviewed the -IGtli Chasseurs in tlie Place of Furnes. The same day he told Sir John French that he was bringing up the 9th French Army Corps to Ypres, and that other reinforcements would follow later. It was his intention with these and the Belgian and British troops to renew the offensive ar^d di'ive the Germans eastward, but he stated that he would be unable to com- hience the forward movement until the 24th. But the Germans had already thrust back the Allied line south of the Forest of Houthulst, and occupied Poelcappelle and Passchendaele. Partly to relieve the pressure on Dixmude, the four French Cavalry Divisions under General de Mitrv and the two Territorial Divisions under General Bidon. moved from the canal- between ^ixuiudu and Vpres on the Forest and to the north and south of it. Sir Uouglaa Haig from Ypres was on their right. He was to capture Poelcappelle and Passcheiidaele. Beyond Sir Douglas was Kawlinson, with the 7th Infantrj- and the 3rd Cavalrs^ Divisions. Up to 2 p.m. the ad\ance wa.s succe.ssful, bun then the French Cavalry were ordered to retire west of the canal from Ypres to tlie Yser, and, OM'ing to this and to the German attacks on Pvawlinson, Sir JJougias was brought to a stoj) on the line Bixschoote-Langemarck-St. Julien- Zonnebeke. Thenceforth the battle from Bethime to Xienport became an almost purely defensive one on the part of the Allies. To return to the operations on the Yser during the 21st. j'he German occupation of Roiilers and of the forest of Houthulst, coupled with the failure of Rawlinson to take Menin, had enabled Falkenhayn from the line Menin- Roulers-Thourout-Ostend to concentrate his enormous forces on any point between the Lys and Nieuport. The heavy howitzers which vomited high-explosive shells had arrived from Antwerp, but the presence of the British flotilla, which ^^•as provided with guns as powerful, rendered it advisable for the Germans to avoid the left and attack the centre and right of the Belgian Army. At daybreak (the 21st) the enemy hurled A FRENCH BICYCLE COMPANY, The bicycle folded for marching. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 191 THE SURPRISED GERMAN PATROL. themselves on the Frencli Marines and Belgians round Dixmude. Orders had been given to the gunners to level every house in the town.* An American with the Germans remarks that '■'from a church steeple in a village just back of the artillery trenches you could see a con- tinual flash of bursting shells in Dixmude — about fifty shells a minute." Dixmude was not the only spot bombarded. From the tower of the chiu'ch of Furnes that morning as far as the eye coiild i-each over the flat horizon nothing was to be seen except bursting shells and bui'ning villages^ and hamlets. Eight separate attacks were made on the trenches protecting Dixmude. The (Germans, most of whom had arrived from the Fatherland a few days before, and some of whom were mere lads of only seventeen or eighteen years, fought with magnificent courage, but the French Marines massed their machine guns in groups of four, and each column was in a few seconds reduced to a mass of corpses, writhing wovuided, and panic-stricken fugitives. Had it not been for the deluge of shells on the trenches and on Dixmude the struggle would have degenerated into a one-sided massacre. As it was the heroism displayed by Ronarc'h's Marines and the Belgian infantry who beat off the furious assaults of the Kaiser's troops cannot be overestimated. Under a sky which litei-ally rained shrapnel and fragments of common shell they continued to fight with unsurpassable gallantry. What they endured may be faintly understood from the narratives of two war- correspondents, ]\Ir. Ashmead-Bartlett and Mr. Philip Gibbs, who accompanied Dr. Hector 3Iimro on that day into Dixmude.* Quite early Belgian ambulances had come uj) to the improvised hospital in Furnes laden with wounded. In the courtyard of the con- vent two motor ambulances and fom* car.s wei'« getting ready to move towards the firing line. A start was made at noon. One of the cars was driven by Lieutenant de Broqueville, the son of the Belgian Minister of War. Lady Dorothie Feilding, Miss Chisholm, Dr. Hector Munro, and an American (Mr. Gleeson) were of the party. * These nnrrativcs appeared in tlie Daily Telegraph and the Daily Chronicle. 192 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. FRENCH SENEGALESE SOLDIERS. Two British chauffeiu's drove the motor ambu- lances. Winding their way through the streets of Furnes crowded with soldiers and wagons, the cars and ambulances passed into the open country. The sun was shining, and the long, straight lines of poplars between the low-lying fields indicated the roads that traversed the marshes and meadows. As they proceeded they met a squadron of Belgian cavalry. The men were haggard and dirty, but looked hard and resolute. Next they encountered groups of the cheerful Belgian infantry, columns of French troops, and ever-roiling, seemingly endless streams of motors of every make and design. Here and there the military gave way to tlie civilian element. Old women, young women with babies and children, and peasants trudged slowly away from the scenes of carnage. A column of German • prisoners escorted by mounted men marched past to the rear. " All of them had a wild, famished, terror-stricken look " in their faces. Four months before these unfortunate men had been peaceable citizens, members of a civilized community. Emerging from Oudecappelle, Dr. Munro's party came upon the battlefield. " Away across the fields," saj'^s Mr. Gibbs, " was a line of villages, with the town of Dix- mude a little to the right of us. . . . From each little town smoke was rising in separate columns, which met at the top in a great pall of smoke, as a heavy black cloud cresting above the light on the horizon line. At every moment this blaclcness was brightened by puffs of electric blue, extraordinarily vivid, as shells burst in the air. . . . From the mass of houses in each town came gusts of flame, following the ex plosions, which sounded with terrific thudding shocks. Upon a line of 15 kilometres there was an incessant cannonade, and in every town there was a hell. The farthest villages were already alight. I watched how the flames rose and Vjecame great glowing furnaces, terribly beautiful." Compared with such spectacles what were the greatest battles of the past ? From Dix- mude round the forest of Houthulst to the Lys, from the Lys to the slag heaps near La Bassee, from La Bassee through the battered Arras to the woods of Compiegne, from Compiegne to ihe Meuse, and from the Meuse to the Jura hundreds of thousands of men were killing and maiming each other under such earthquake conditions. The horrors on the plain of the Scheldt were being facsimiled on the Niemen, in the plains of Poland and Galicia, among the Carpathians, and on the Danube. At the eastern extremity oi Asia cannon as powerful as almost any in Europe were THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 193 belcliing explosives at Japanese, British or Germans. The Belgian artillery had been apparently silenced, and, on the Yser, the agents of lirupp had nothing to impede them in their diabolic work. Tlie road from Oudecappello to Dixmude was under the fire of the German howitzers. Every minute on or near the thoroughfare a great pall of black smoke rose up, leaving a dark cavity in which a couple of horses might have been buried side by side. One of the huge shells had burst on a Belgian battery. " All six horses of one of the guns," says Mr. Ashmead- Bartlett, " had been blown into mangled heaps. Their remains lay scattered about the road like badly cut joints suddenly thrown about by the overturn of a gigantic butcher's cart." A Belgian gunner had been cut in two, and amidst fragments of dead horses were biscuits, tinned meats, coffee, sugar. Until the debris had been cleared from the road it was impossible to proceed further. At last the way v/as open to the brave little partj^ and the ambulances and cars made a dash for Dixmude. They seemed to be rushing into a burning furnace. In the outskirts of the town were the French reserves. Then they entered Dixmude itself. JMr. Aslunead-Bartlett, who had been through the Russo-Japanese and Balkan Wars, has left his impressions of Dixmude as it appeared on the afternoon of October 21, 1914 : Well, I was all through the siege of Port Arthur, and I happened to be in Reiins when the Germans destroyed the Cathedral. At Port Arthur the bombard ments were terrible, but then the Japanese gradually worked their way towards the forts, and you had deep trenches which gave you some cover. At Reims you were fairly safo if you kept away from the immediate neighbourhood of the Cathedral, but at Dixmude it was Hell. The town is not very big, and what it looked like before the bombardment I cannot say. But the point is this : An infuriated German army corps were con- centrating the fire of all the held guns and heavy howitzers on it at the same time. There was not an inch which was not being swept by shells. There was not a house, as far as I could see, which had escaped destruction. The whole scene was so terrible, so ex- citing, and passed in such a dream, that it has left only a series of pictures on my mind. The ghastly, inhunaan character of modem warfare and the superhuman qualities displayed by the m^Tiads of soldiers and civilians who have been subjected by the Kaiser and the conspiring castes in Germany and Austria - Hungary to the ordeal by fire and explosion, should be brought home to the conscience of the civilized world. Says Mr. Gibbs : We came into Dixmude. It was a fair-sized town, with many beautiful buildings and fine old houses in the Flemish style — so I am told. When I saw it for the first and last time it was a place of death and horror. The streets through which we passed were utterly GERMANS IN A TRENCH ON THE YSER. 194 THK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. dosorted and wrecked from end to end n« tlioiigli by an eartliquako. Incessant explos-ions of sliel! fire crashed down upon the walLs wliicli still stood. Great ga.shes opened in the walls, which then toppled and fcli. A roof came tumbling down with an appalling clatter. Like a house of cards blown by a puH ol wind a little shop suddenly collapsed into a mass of ruins. Here and there, farther into the town, we :^aw living figures. They ran swiftly for a moment and then dis- appeared into dark caverns under toppling porticoes. They were Belgian soldiers. We were now in a side street leadiii;^ into the town hall .-quare. It seemed impossible to pass, owinj; to the wreckage strewn across the road. "Try to take it." said Dr. ^Iimro, who was sitting beside the chauffeur. We took if, bumping over the high debris, and then swept round into the square. It was a spacious place with the town'hall at one side of it, or what was left of the town hall. There was only the splendid .shell of it left, Butlieient for us to see the skeleton of a noble building which -had once been the pride of Flemish craftsmen. Kven as we turned towards it parts of it were falling upon the ruins already on the ground. [ .saw a great pillar tean forward and then topple down. A mass of masonry crashed down from the portico. Some stiff, dark forms lay among the fallen stone.s. They were dead soldiers. I liardlj' glanced at them, for we were in search of living now. The cars were brought to a halt outside the building anil we all climbed down. I lighted a cigarette and I noticed two of tlie otlier men fumble for matches for tho same purpose. We wanted something to steady us. 'J'here wa.s never a moment when shell fire was not bursting in that square about us. The .shrapnel bullets wiiijiped the stone>. The enemy was making a target of the Hotel de \ille, and dropping their sliells with dreaulful exactitude on either side of it. 1 glanced towards a flaring furpace to the right of the building. There was a wonderful glow at the heart of it. y\r. Ashinead-Bartlett shows us the interior of the Hotel de Viile of Dixniiide: In>ide the hall was a scene of horror and chaos. It was lulled with loaves of bread, bicv'clcs, and dead soldiers. 1 have never seen so many bicycles. I suppose .some cyclist troop had left them here on their way to the trenches. We rushed down to the cellars and dragged up the wounded, who were all lying down cases, and had to be placed on stretchers, which seemed, under the circumstances, to take an endless lime. All the while the shells were crashing overhead, and the bullets whistling through the square. Another officer ran up, and told De Broqueville tha: there were some more wounded in another building. De Broqueville ran off and disappeared down a side street. Loading the ambulances was slow work, but at length it was completed. We were all ready, and only loo anxious to depart, when we disco\ ered that De Broque- \ ille liad not returned. We waited several minutes. He did not come. Then there was a terrific crash, and a shell hit the Hotel de Villc just aboN c our heads, bringing down more bricks and mortar. ^I. Maeterlinck, the illu.strious Belgian author, who h;^s l\andled the French language %\ith the skill of an Anatole France, has drawn a. hopeful deduction fro)n scenes like these. " One of the consoling surprises of this \sar," he say?, " is the unlooked for, .and, so to speak, universal lieroisjn which it has revealed among all tiie ST. PIERRE RAILWAY STATION, GHENT. Arrival of the British. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 195 nations taking part in it." The Germans who had studied luunanit}- witii meticulous care, liad imagined that the Krupp inventions would paralyse the spirits of their adversaries. For forty years they had been accmnalating un- exampled stores of materials for the destruction of human bodies. They were prepared to use them in tlie same spirit that Nero had used his lions and his pitch against the Early Christians. They imagined that religion had lost its hold over Belgians, French, and British, and they confidently expected to terrorize the comfort- loving populations of Western Em-ope into submission. They were mistaken. As the sun was setting the Germans delivered a final attack. They atteinpted to carry Dixmude, and they crossed the Yser south of the town. The village of tSt. Jacques Cappelle became the centre of a violent combat. Such of the Belgian batteries as liad not been put out of action opened fire on the German inJantry. The German artillery redoubled its fire, and then (leased. Shouts which sounded like " Ja, Ja," and loud cheers were hePord. The Germans wei'e charging with the baj'onet. Over the advancing infantry the Belgian shells burst in groups of red flame. The " pat-pat - pat-pat-par " of the machine guns showed that streams of lead were being poiu"ed into the yelling masses, thiruied e\ery moment by the repeating rifles of the French and Belgian soldiers. The cheers were rej)laced by shrieks ; the attack came to a standstill, those Germans who had escaped death or wounds sullenly retired, and the shelling from the east of the canal recommenced. It was now seven p.ni and quite dark. The scene was majestic in tlie extreme. Di.xmude was a red furnace. The flames shot upwards, showing clouds of white stnoke above. St. Jacques, farther south, was a Waller furnace. All along the lino the shells were no longer bursting in clouds of white and black smoke. All had put on their blood-red mantles. Close at hand every- thing wa.s bathed in inky darkness; farther off the burning towns and buildings showed up clearer than they had done during the day. liehind Dixuuide infantry wore busily engaged con- structing fresh trenches. I looked back on this awful scene for the last time. As far as the eye could stretch the horizon was a purple red from the burning homes of thousands of haiinless and peaceful dwellers who are now poverty-stricken refugees in England and France. In thi-; district not a villaga or a hamlet has escaped.* Thus the frantic (>fiorts of the Germans to seize Dixmude had failed. Away to the left, at 5 p.m., a violent assault, preceded by hours of shelling, had been made from Schoor on Schoorbakke, a village a little to the north of * Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett. LADY DOROTHIE FEILDING. the loof) in the Yser Canal, l^his attack had been repiil.sed with frightful lo.sses to the enemy. By Wednesday night the Gennans were still on the east bank of the Yser between Dixmude and Nieuport- Bains: the canal, in places, and the dykes and ditches were choked with their dead or expiring wounded. So far, the sole assistance reccuved by the Belgian Army had been from Ronarc'h's Breton IMarines and the guns of the Allied flotilla. Joffre had kept the lUtli Chasseurs in reserve. For one more day the wearied Belgians and the French Marines wen; un- assisted to hold the line of the Yser. On Thursday, tlie 22nd, the Germans gave particular attention to the section of the battle- field north of Dixmude. The area in the looj) of the Yser between Tervaete and Schoorbaldie was swept by a hurricane of shells, and the canal crossed at Tervaeto. A coimter-attack bj' the Belgian 1st Division was tuisuccessful. The 196 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.iR. GROSSING A STREET UNDER FIRE, troops were rallied and ordered again to charge. This time the Germans were literallj' driven into the canal. At Sehoorbakke the Belgians re- pulsed the enemv and pursued them towards Schoor, while the -Allied flotilla continued steam- ing up and dowTi firing at the Gerntan trenches and batteries on the coast and some distance inland. British aviators circled over the flat country, which was partly flooded, to give the range. The windows of Sluis, on the Dutch frontier, were shaken, and the people there listened to what seemed a distant thunder- storm. Fresh troops were passing hour by hour through Bruger to reinforce the German front, and the hea^^iest ordnance was being transported to assist the German batteries at Middelkerke, where a German General and his staff had been killed b\' a British shell in the duel with the Allied flotilla. From Ostend all available soldiers had been jjushed westwards, and the hotels were being filled with wounded. On the evening of the 22nd the people of Furnes witnessed a sight which must have filled them with pride. Two battalions of the 1st Belgian Division — the 9th of the line and the 2nd Chasseurs— had, in view of the French reinforcements which were to arrive on the morrow, been relieved from the trenches. They were Brussels and Liege men who had held the gajjs between the forts at I-iege at the beginning of the war, and had won for themselves a fine reputation. At about 7 p.m. they mai'ched into Furnes, dead tired and covered with mud, but singing the Mar- seillaise at the top of their voices. The band of the Chasseurs played " Sambre et Me use." Everybody turned out to watch them, and they were given an ovation. A few hours later the absence of these brave men from the Yser must have been regretted. Reinforcements had reached the enemy, They were flung across the canal and, during the night, took Tervaete. They brought with them numerous machine guns to enfilade the Belgians in the loop of the Yser. Simul- tanopusly under cover of the night which, to some extent, protected them from the fire of the Allied warships, the Belgian 2nd Division before Nieuport and round Lombartzyde was subjected to a succession of desperate on- slaughts. The Belgians \\>^re, however, well provided with mitrailleuses, and the attackers were mowed down. Among these were poor youths from the German schools and univer- sities. One of them, a bright lad who was tended by the British nurses at Fumes, spoke bad French very politely. He had been wounded in the foot, and would be lame for life. Help for the sore-tried Belgians was at hand. Joffre had railed up from Reims one of the finest of the French Divisions, the 42n(i. Se\cral batteries of heavy howitzers were also THE TIMES HISTOFY OF THE WAR. 197 coming up. On Frid?.y the 23rd, General Grossetti with this Division was sent to reHe\<' the Belgian 2nd Division round Xieuport, which had lost Lombartzj-de and was to be brought back into reserve. Nieuport and the Belgian trenches behind St. Georges were being bom- barded, and Grossetti coald only pass his men in small groups across the Nieuport bridges. Not till evening did the P'rench occupy the trenches of the Belgian 2nd Division. Mean- while, south of Nieuport, the Germans were pressing the advantage gained by them during the night of the 22nd. They swarmed into the loop of the Yser, and the Belgian 1st and 4th Divisions were pushed back towards the railway embankment between Pervyse and Ramscap- pelle. During the day the heavy French howitzers, which were now in position, had been dropping their high explosive shells on the furthest gun emplacements of the Germans, and the enemy's commander perceived that there w-as no time to be lost if victory was to be achieved. A huge cigar-shaped captive balloon had been sent up to a great height, and its occupants vainly endeavoured to locate the French howitzers. Between the howitzers and the guns of the Flotilla the situation of the Germans was becoming every moment more dangerous. That day German officers in Ostend had been unpleasantly reminded of the precarious teniu-e on which they possessed the towTi. Fifty of them were lunching at the Hotel Majestic, one of those imposing structures which during the last quarter of a century had been erected wherever pleasure-seekers congregate. The restaurant was one of the most elegant in Europe. To the white and gold walls were attached delicately framed mirrors. Chandeliers with their glittering facets of cut glass hung from the ceiling. The floor was covered with rich red Brussels carpets, and over them waiters glided, serving their unwelcome visitors with commandeered delicacies and the most expensive wines. Here and there groups were standing about chatting. At a window in the eastern half of the room sat a naval doctor with the adjutant of the brigade to wliich both belonged. Meanwhile from the British squadron, four or five miles in the offing, a torpedo-boat destroyer was swiftly approaching the shore. Another followed in its wake. The pace at which they were going was shown by the masses of foam at their bows. At the end oT the Rue du Cerf, which slopes up to the great Digue, Admiral von Schroder, who had observed their approach, was directing men of the naval brigade to place two light guns, the only artillery available. With feverish haste the gims were pointed and fired at the first boat. Two shells fell close to it, and the vessels were promptly swung round. Their guns flamed out. The first British shells hit the water and struck the sea wall ; then two of them crashed throng) i the windows of the restaurant of the Hotel GERMANS AT TARGET PRACTICE. 198 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. \ / N K V.' GERMANS FILLING A BALLOON WITH GAS CONCEALED BENEATH A HAYSTACK. Majestic, and fell in the midst of the festive party. The second of these struck the doctor, who with his companion had risen from table to seek a safer spot, right in the middle of the back and blew him to pieces. Dr. Sven Hedin, the celebrated Swedish traveller, who later inspected the scene, .paints BRITISH SOLDIER PUMPING OUT WATER FROM A TRENCH. in " A People in Arms " a realistic picture of the havoc wrought by the two shells. " Splinters of them," ho says, " had rent gaping holes in walls and ceilings. The plaster ornaments had fallen and lay in ruins, and the carpet almost disappeared beneath their heaA'v white dust. The windows had been shivered to powder and the mirrors had been burst into all kind of curious star shapes whose fragments threatened to fall at the least touch. Tables and chairs were smashed to atoms, the table- cloths rent to ribbons." One of the killed doctor's legs had been blown under a table ; his head was in a pool of blood, and " the rest of him was spattered about the wnlls, ceiling, and tablecloths." With his base at Ostend liable to be reduced to the condition of Dixmude, with Grossetti's Division in Xieuport, with liis rear and flank imder the fire of the guns of the British and French warships and from the west by the heavy howitzers, the Duke of Wurtemberg during the night of the 23rd-24th directed no less tha.n fourteen assaults on Dixmude. If Dixmiide could be taken he mieht hope to turn the Belgians between PervyseandRaiuscappelle, to capture Fiumes and drive the Belgians and Grossetti's Division into the sea, and, crossing the Yser where it is an uneanalised stream of little breadth or depth, fall upon the left wing and rear of the Allied Ai'my deployed between Dixmude and La Bassoe. Fortunatelv Ronarc'h's Marines and the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 199 Belgian 5th Division held firm. Every assault was beaten off, and when day broke on the 24tli the trenches and ruins of Dixmude were still in the hands of the Allies. The Belgian Battle of the Yser had closed ; the French Battle of the Yser was opening. No account of this battle would be complete without an attempted appreciation of the debt which the Allies owe to the Belgian Army and Ronarc'h's Marines. They had held at bay a vastly superior body of German troops flushed with victory, animated by the highest patriotism and supported by artillery which produced the greatest physical and moral effects. Fen country in October is always unpleasant, cold mists had covered the land, and heavy rain had fallen at intervals. At places the men had fought in trenches half filled with water, and the straw on which those in the open slept was never dry. For days many of them had ta-sted no hot food or drink. At night they were forbidden under penalty of death to smoke, because a glimmer would have betrayed the position to the pointers of the German guns. The stench from the canal, into which the German dead were thrown, was almost unbearable. Often the Belgians were .separated from the enemy's sharpshooters by not more than fifty feet, and it was death to rise for a moment to stretch oneself. The men in the houses of Dixmude and Nieuport or in the villages were, if possible, worse off. With modern range-finders towns and villages are shell-traps, and the bursting of high-explosive shells among buildings is far more terrible than the explosion of a shell in the open, for if pieces of the shell miss the THE ARMOURED LOOK-OUT MAN. occupants of a room, the chances are that they Mill be killed by falling beams, girders, bricks and mortar. If they have taken refuge in cellars, they may find themselves buried alive. That in such surroundings the Belgians and the French Marines should have kept the line of the Yser for over a week was a feat which will always be remembered. BELGIAN SOLDIERS ON THE MARCH. 200 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GERMAN MACHINE GUN SECTION. On the Coast. The Belgians had most nobly answered to Joffre's call upon them to secure the line of the Yser and its bridge-heads for 48 hours. Since the night of the 16th they and Ronarc'h's Marines had struggled witli a force at least double, and probably treble, their numbers — a force provided with field and siege artillery 'vastly superior to anything which from the 16th to the morning of the 23rd could be opposed to them on the Yser — and they had held that force at bay not for 48, but for Ji^arly 200 hours. The Belgians had shown that neither the severe trials of successive battles nor the still greater stress of retreat had damped their ardour. They were still able and willing to meet the foe and put a stop to hi.'^ most ardent efforts. CHAPTER LV. RUSSIA'S PROBLEM. Russia's Numbers and the Wild Stories they Produced — The Difficulties of Russia — The Wonderful Frontier Railways of Germany — The Vulnerability of Poland — The Forest of Augustowo, and the Desolate Borders of the Niemen — East Prussia, the Idolized Province of the Junkers — The Effect of the Battle of Tannenberg — Poland AND Its Cities — Why the Russian Poles Hated the Prussians — How the Prussians Oppressed the Poles of Posen — German Risks of Invasion in Silesia — Austria's Position IN Galicia — The Struggle for the Carpathians — Germany's Eastern Line of Fortresses — Przemysl and Cracow — The German Plan of Campaign, and Why It Failed — The Real Problems to be Faced by Russia — Cracow the True Russian Objective — Rapidity of the Russian Mobilization — Russian Unity at the Outbreak of War — The Tsar's Decree against Liquor — The First Six Months' Fighting. WHEN the war began, the Allies in the West were for a brief space hypnotized by the thought of Russia's numbers. Little considera- tion was given by the public of London and Paris to her difficulties. The vast weight of the mighty Russian Empire fired the imagination of statesmen, combatants, and populace alike. Russia's trials and misfortunes in previous campaigns were instantly forgotten. When it was realized that the whole resources of a State nimibering 173,000,000 of people were being thrown into the scale against the Germanic League, it seemed to many as though the war was already won. The Tsar, it was said, was mobilizing millions on millions of men. Count- less hordes of Cossacks, so the wild stories ran, were to sweep across the Prussian plains and thunder against the gates of Berlin. Few paused to thinlv, few indeed seemed to know, that, though there were mj^riads of Russians, the Cossack forces were by no means unlimited, and in any case were not Russia's mainstay. The vision of the conquering Cossack was so luiiversal that fables about trainloads of Cos- Vol. HI.— Part 32. 201 sacks passing through England on their way to Northern France gained widespread currency, and had at last to be officially contradicted by the British Government. The conviction that Russia would instantly march from triumph to triumph was less easy to chasten. The Russian armies were likened to a steam-roller, and the phrase " the Russian steam-roller " obtained a great vogue in England and France. The popular impression was that the steam-roller would overcome all obstacles and ponderously pursue its course to the Prussian capital with- out a halt. It would be too much to say that these ideas ever produced any relaxation of effort in the West, but for some time they induced a rather mischievous belief that it was to Russia that the Allies must chiefly look for a final victory. Happily, as the war progressed and its relative asjiects were seen in a truer perspective, all the Allies came to realize that the war would only be won by the united sacrifices and labours of every nation alike. The difficulties of Rvissia soon proved to bo manifold. She had the men, and they canu> in masses from every part of her Empire. There 202 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THBJ WAR. THE TSAR AND THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS. were, however,, embarrassing shortages of equipment of every kind, from clothing to great guns. It was not that the Russian Army had not made immense progi'ess during the previous decade. Since the Russo-Japanese War it had been transformed out of recognition. Tlie trouble was that the material required for mobilization upon such an immense scale had not been accumulated in sufficient quantities ; and no better proof could be cited that Russia not only did not enter upon a premeditated war, but drew the sword with the utmost pos- sible reluctance. Next to difficulties of equip- ment came difficulties of transport. The German eastern frontier had been covered with a network of strategic railways. The Austrian province of Galicia was fairly well served by viseful lines. The Russian railway system was wofully scanty by comparison, which was yet another proof that the Russian Ooverrjment had not sought war. A railway map of Eastern Europe served by itself as con- vincing evidence of the relative intentions of Germany and Russia. The eastern provinces of Prussia wer^ gridironed with lines whose pur- poses were military rather than economic. On the Russian side the map was comparatively blank, the very roads were few and poor, and from end to end of the Russian westt^m frontier there was no railway following the course of the Empire's boundary, as was the case on German territory. There were reasons for the sparse- ness of Ru.ssia's railways. Her territories were so spacious that they included one-sixth of the land regions of the globe, welded into one cohesive whole. All the energies of Russian railway builders had been thrown into the con striiction of great trunk lines throughout tliese wide dominions. Had some of the money spent upon the Siberian and Transcaspian Railways been expended upon railway-building in Poland, and especially on lateral railways parallel to the course of the frontier, Russia would have been better able to confront the first formidable German advance tlu-ough Central and Southern Poland to the Vistula. She did not build strategic railways in her western provinces because her^oUcy was essen-' tially pacific. Her ultimate aim was internal development, and not war. In the end it was proved again and again that her abstention had unconsciously assisted her operations in the war. The German mihtary machine was de- signed for dependence upon railwaj^. When the Germans invaded Belgium and France they found read}' to hand an elaborate system of railways almost as complex and as efficient as their own. When they entered Poland and had to march painfully over an almost roadless land, their efficiency was speedily impaired. ^^Tien- ever the Germans were cut off from the loco- motive, their offensive gradually lost momen- tum. The Russian soldiers marched to war on their own feet, and bore the hardsliips of slow progression more successfully. Another difficulty wliich greatly hampered Russia was her isolation. She was everywhere cut off from the open sea save at distant Vladi- vostock, on the Pacific, where a passage was cut through the ice during the winter with very great difficulty. The Baltic was at once closed to her. After Turkey declared war, the Black Sea was hermetically sealed for the whole %vinter. Archangel was, ordinarily, shut in by ice from October to May, and was in any case inadequately served by rail, though steps were quickly taken to improve the railway Une, and, by means of icebreakers, to keep the port open a longer time than usual. Russia needed vast quantities of supplies from her Allies, and for a long time very few of her requirements could be met, save to a small extent through Vladivostock and Archangel. Her difficulties THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 203 did not end here. Tier crowning difficulty was t lie configuration and character of her frontier, to which attention must now be paid. The dominating feature of the western fron- tier of Russia was the position of the province of Poland, which was thrust like a great broad wedge far into the territory of the Germanic Powers. From the point where the River Warta crossed from Russian to Prussian ground, the distance to Berlin was only 180 miles. Small wonder that the uninstructed, knowing nothing -of Germany's means of defence, dreamed of Russian troops passing down Unter den Linden within a few weeks of the outbreak of war. The truth was that Russia was extremely vulnerable in Poland, as she realized with great poignancy very soon. On the north the provinces of West and East Prussia ciu-ved far over Poland. On the south the Austrian province of Galicia not only en- wrapped the M'hole Southern Polish border, but reached the Russian provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, and even touched Bessarabia. Poland was, in short, a dangerous salient for Russia. From three sides, well served by rail- ways, blows could be struck at the great city of Warsaw, which was the heart of Poland. Before Russia could think of a march to Berlin, she had to clear her flanks, and to make sure that she would not be assailed from either East Prussia or Galicia. As was to be expected, instead of marching on BerUn she fotind the greater part of the province of Poland overrun by the enemy. Her efforts to rid herself of the invaders not only constituted a great part of the first stages of the war ; they were, in fact, almost as effective as the process of invading Prussia which the ignorant expected, because in the long and fierce combats which ensued Russia was able slowly but persistently to wear down the strength of her foes. As a matter of convenience, it will be well to examine the frontiers of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary conjointly. The military and political problems they presented were so interdependent that a correct conception of the position can only be gained by passing in imagination at will across boundaries which were largely artificial. The Russian Baltic provinces of Kovno and Courland were flat plains with scarcely a ridge, and for the most part thinly populated. From a quarter to a third of their whole area was covered with forests, and the impression conveyed in a joiu-ney through them to Petrograd was of an almost empty thickly-wooded land. AMMUNITION TRANSPORTS FORDING A RIVER. 204 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. There was a considerable German population, especially in the towns, and a good deal of the territory was held by magnates of German descent. German influence had for centuries been very marked in West Russia, and the factor thus presented was not without its influence upon the war. The nattiral, though not the actual, frontier of Russia in this direction was formed by the River Niemen. The Niemen ran roughly parallel with the eastern frontier of East Prussia, for a distance of about 80 miles, between the cities of Grodno and Kovno. Along that stretch its average distance from the Prussian frontier was about 50 miles. It then turned due westward and eventually traversed about 70 miles of Prussian territory before entering the Baltic. At the point where it entered Prussia it was about 500 yards wide. In that long strip of territory 80 miles by 50, between the Niemen and East Prussia, there was much desperate fight- ing during the first few months of the war. It was a wild and desolate country, full of forests and small lakes and marshes. Its southern half was nearly fiUed by the great forest of Augustowo, in the midst of which stood the town of Suwalki. The whole strip was classified as part of Poland. Napoleon knew it well, for the bulk of the Grand Army traversed it, and crossed the Niemen at Kovno and Grodno in June, 1812. It was through the forest of Augustowo that Hindenburg ra.shly advanced to the Niemen in September, 1914, after his victory at Tannenberg. HLs main advance was by way of a causeway which ran through the marshes and woods from Suwalki. The opposing armies were actually firing at one another across the Niemen on September 25, but all the German attempts at a crossing failed, and in the end the enemy were pursued back through the forest to their own territory. The forest of Augustowo again came into promi- nence when von Hindenburg once more cleared East Prussia of Russian troops in the following February and March. On that occasion his operations included a march on Kovno along both sides of the Niemen from Prussian terri- tory, but he failed to reach Kovno because he was opposed on the line of two small tributary rivers, the Dubissa and the Niewissa, which feU into the main stream from a northerly direction. During this phase of the campaign important Russian units were cut off in the forest of Augustowo, though sections fought their way out from its recesses for days after- wards. Htndenburg's troops again reached the Niemen during February, and even crossed it, but failed to make good their position. It should be understood that the whole of th© fighting in this region turned upon the repeated German attempts to make good the passage of the Niemen. The statement that in this RUSSIANS DIGGING TRENCHES. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. •205 area the Niemen \\ as the natural frontier of Rus- sia was not an idle one. The river was of the utmost value to Russia, for among other things, it protected in part the vital main line of railway from Petrograd to Warsaw. Across the border lay East Prussia, the idolized province of the Prussian Jiuikers. Just as in the north the object of Germany was to make the passage of the Niemen, so the very first object of the Russians was to drive the German garrisons out of East Prussia, where they were believed to be weak. East Prussia was the mos't bleak and dreary of the (ierman provinces. It \Aas part of the great ]:)lain which sloped down to the sand dunes of the Baltic. On its open lands great quantities of rye and potatoes were gi-own, but its special characteristic, which played a great part in the war, was found in the tangle of lalces and w^oods and swamps in the south-eastern portion, all along the Russian frontier, which was collectively known as Masuria. This area was really a continuation of the Russian strip within the angle of the Niemen, but it constituted even more difficult country for military opera- tions, and was believed to form a more useful defence of German territory than many artillery positions. A scheme for draining and culti- vating it had been prudently rejected on mili- tary grounds. It was protected by a system of blockhouses, and there were garrisons in the various small towns in its recesses, while the Germans had not neglected to endow it with several of the railway lines upon which they so greatly leaned. When, however, the Russians swept into East Prussia in the fii'st month of tlie war, they carried all before them. They moved along the main railway line to Berlin. They menaced the fortress of Konigsberg. They drove in the frontier posts and overran th ' Masurian lake region. By the end of August they seemed masters of the gi'eater part of East Prussia, and were even thi'eatening ^^"est Prussia and the line of the Lower Vis- tula. Then came the sudden appearance of Hindenburg, and tlie series of movements which ended in the crushing defeat of the main Russian forces at Tannenberg. The result of the battle was that Germany recovered j)ossession of her province, though the ra\'ages of war had hit it sorely, and Berlin was filled with refugees from the East Prussian towns. Whether the Germans were geographically justified in giving the name of Tannenberg to this memorable cncoimter was an open ques- THE KAISER IN EAST PRUSSIA. General von Mackensen in the centre. tion. Historical reasons influenced them. East Prussia was the real cradle and stronghold of the Prussian race. From its chill plains and dense forests sprang the nobles and rulers who, under the leadership of the House of Hohenzollern, eventually welded the German Empire into an organic whole. When in the fourteenth century the German tribes were pressed back from the Rhone and the Meuse, the tide of migration swept eastward again. German colonists crossed the Elbe and the lower Vistula, and settled in the eastern forests and marshes, which- were already occupied in part by their own near kinsmen, though still more by Slavonic tribes. The powerful Teu- tonic Order of Knighthood, which controlled the w'ork of colonization, eventually came into coiiflict with Poland. The Knights were over- thrown by the Poles : in the great battle of Tannenberg on July 15, 1410. The conflict remains a landmark in the eternal struggle between Teuton and Slav. It finds a promi- nent though moitrnful place in German history. When Prmco Biilow, in his retirement, wrote his famotis book on " Imperial Germany," ho could still refer with regret to "(he black day of Tarmenberg." The rejoicings over Hindenburg's victory were far more than the joyful reception of the news of a triumph. .12 2 206 THE TIMEfi HISTOBY OF THE WAP. I" Tiiiu'^ " photographs. THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS. 1. Conversing with a Priest. 2. With his StaflF ofiRcers. 3. Arriving at Headquarters. 4. Planning an attack. 5. Reviewing Cossacks. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 207 The battle of Tannenberg seemed to Germanj^ to efface a bitter niemorj-, and to compensate for the grief of five hundred years. East I'russia had, nevertheless, not been so easily defended as the Germans expected. They had thought that the small fortress of Boyen, standing near Lotzen in the middle of the lake region, would serve to check the passage of an army. The Russians took Boyen with the greatest ease. It needed great forces of troops, and some serious Russian mistakes, to reco\er the province and to hold it safely even for a limited time. But as the effect of the invasion of East Prussia upon the spirits of the Germans wa-s very marked for political reasons, so the expulsion of the invaders had a correspondingly marked result in the retiurn of German confi- dence. On the other hand, the battle of Tan- nenberg gravely affected the liiissian plan of campaign. It meant a certain amount of confusion and postponement. It did not in the least depress the indomitable cheerfulness (jf the Russians, but it coixipelled their Com- mander-in-Chief to niodify his strategy. The next section of the frontier with which it is necessary to deal is the great wedge of Poland, at once the blessing and the bane of Russian strategy. Poland was advantageous because it stretched so far in the direction of the heart of the homeland of the foe. It was a perplexing problem because, as already explained, it was surrounded on three sides by enemy territory. Through its centre ran the great river Vistula, entering the province from Galicia, flowing north and nortli-west to Warsaw, and then passing westward until it entered Germany near Thorn. As the Niemen dominated strategy farther north, so the Vistula was the chief factor of .strategy in the centre of Poland. The Germans were astride its lower reaches, and thus could enter Poland along both its banks ; but where the river curved southward at Warsaw it pra- .sented an obstacle athwart the line of German advance which was to stand Russia in gootl stead. The Vistula had important tributaries. On the north the River Narew, which entered the \'istula below Warsaw, formed, with its feeder the Bobr, an important line extending almost to the Niemen at Grodno. West of Warsaw tlie small River Bzura, witli its lesser tributary the Rawa, made a valuable line on which the Russians held the Germans in check during the latter part of the winter. The Pilitza was another river in Southern Poland whose course w as the scene of ri.'i)eated conflicts. as was also the River Nida, which entered the Vistula on the Galician frontier. Poland north of the Vistula was an open wooded plain, containing in the neighbourhood of the Narew marshes of great importance in relation to military movements. Marshes had a considerable effect upon the Polish campaign. There were extensive marshes to the west of Warsaw which greatly hampered the Germans in their attempts to strike at the capital of the province. There were others before Lowicz and near Lodz which served to contract the German iuo\-ements when they were endeavouring to cross the Bzura in their second dash towards ^Varsaw■. youthern Poland was of greater altitude, with more forests, and occasional deep gorges — a very difficult country for military operations. The population of Poland w^as denser than in any other part of Russia, showing an av^erage of 200 to the square mile. Warsaw- had 800,000 inhabitants, and many flourishing manufactures. Its central position, its com- mand of road, rail and river, its bridge over the Vistula, and its great political importance, made it the goal of German ambitions in the eastern theatre of war. The capture of Warsaw w ould have implied a withdraw al of the Russian forces along the whole front in Poland, to a line resting on the River Bug and the huge Pripet marshes in its rear. When Htnden- burg made his first ad\'ance through Central Poland to the Vistula, iiis troops were confident that they would enter the city. They almost reached the outskirts. The roar of the gims could be heard by the alarmed inhabitants, and for a few hom-s it was thought that the capital was lost. Reinforcements arrived by rail in the nick of time, marched straight into the firing line, and drove the Germans back. The second city of Poland was Lodz, which had 400,000 inhabitants. Lodz was a " mushroom " town of modern gi-owth. with a great cotton industry. It was a straggling place, chiefly consisting of one w ide main thoroughfare several miles long. There was heavy fighting before Lodz when the Germans made their second advance in Central Poland to the line of the Bziu-a. The (Jernian bulletins alleged that fierce conflicts occurred in the streets of the city, but the truth was that the Russians designedly evacuated it, and thi enemy entered unopposed. For a long tune they treated Lodz with ptH'uliar tenderness, the reason being that it was more German than Polish. tJerman immigrants had gone to Loilz in great mmibers, attracted by its industrial 208 THE TIMES HISTOnr OF THE WAB. [A/Ur a painting by a German ariiU. GERMAN REFUGEES FROM EAST PRUSSIA IN BERLIN. possibilities. They welcomed the invaders, and the help given to the foe by German aliens tliroughout Poland was not the least of the Russian difficulties. Some of the smaller Polish towns had flourishing industries. Lublin and Plock possessed sugar refineries. Kalisz had a valuable trade in lace and embroideries. Radora, the centre of a ti'act of potato culti\a- tion, had huge distilleries. Piotrkow lay in a great mining district. Bendzin, near the Silesian frontier, was in the centre of a prosper- ous coalfield. Both in the eastern and the western theatres the invading Germans seized and wrecked great manufacturing antl mining districts. Just as they paralyzed the industries of Belgium and Northern France, so they devastated Western Poland. The scenes of desolation in Flanders and the Departments of the Nord and the Pas de Calais were surpassed by the misery wrought in Poland, where the countryside was left as bare as though it had been devoured by locusts. Much was said, and rightlj^ said, about the courage and devotion with wliich the people of Belgium flung themselves in the pathway of the invading German armies. They sufTeretl the ravaging of their countiy rather than make even a forced and involuntary league with the invaders. It was not so generally recognized that the equally gallant Poles found themselves called upon to make a similar decision. Ger- many counted upon a rising of the Poles in her own favour as soon as she crossed the I'olish frontier. The Austrians had precisely siniilar expectations. Both Powers were so lacking in political perception that they believed they would be welcomed by the Polish people as deliverers from the Russian yoke. Their anticipation of an immediate Polish rebellion \\as one of the factors in their planning of the war. It must be admitted that they were not so comijletely without justification as was manifest m their error about Belgium. Even experienced Russians had manj' misgivings regarding the Poles, and feai'ed either open <>r veiled hostilitj^ What both sides overlooked was that, though the Poles believed themselves to have great and manifold grie\ances against THE TIMES HmVRY OF THE WAR. 209 Rus.^ia^ these were of comparatively modern growth, and tlie bitterness they engendered was steadily diminishing. Their hatred of the Prussians, on the other hand, \\as ingrained in every fibre of their being. It had been nurtured during a thousand years. It was a,s old as Polish hi.story. If the Prussians never forgot Tannenberg, neither did the descendants of their Polish victors. When Russia marched to war, the hearts of all the Polish people flamed forth in lier support. The nearest counterpart to the outburst of Polish loyalty to the Tsar was the equally ardent upheaval of enthusiasm in India for the cause of the King-Emperor, a demonstration which upset yet another of the calculations of Berlin. The Poles and the Rus- sians found themselves at one, and they arnied in a common cause. The promise of Polish autonomy was the sequel to the declaration of the Pol&s, and not, as was at first supposed, its inspiration. The promise was a reward, and not a bribe. Meanwhile, the unfortunate Poles had to endure the wholesale wrecking of their towns and villages by the Germans as the result of their fidelity. The Germans had their Polish question too. Its heart lay in the province of Posen, on the westernmost frontier of Poland. There were 400,000 Protestant Poles in East Pru-ssia, but there were over a million Poles, chiefly Catholics, in Posen. For a centiuy attempts had been made, always without avail, to Prussianize tlie Poles of Posen. They were alternatch' cajoled and oppres.sed. On the one hand, measures were passed so recently as 1907 for exj)ro- priating their land in favour of German colon- ists, while they were also forbidden to use their own language at public meetings, and their children v\ere flogged at school for refusing to answer qviestions in Gennan. On the other hand, the En^peror William sought to conciliate them by building a flamboyant royal castle in the city of Po.sen at a cost of a quarter of a million sterling, and by other beguiling ex- pedients. On the whole, the Poles remained obdurate enough, and their resistance to Prus- sian methods was maintained with varying success right down to the outbreak of war. They were dragooned severely, but they re- fused obedience. Prince Biilow plainti\ ely de- clared that the Poles must be brought " to understand the German spirit," and he insisted that " German nationality " must prevail in the eastern provinces. If not, he said, they would have " a Polish danger," and he main- tained that the whole future of the German Em[)ire was bound up with the fate of the Eastern Marches. There was no great physical obstacle to a Russian invasion of Posen, when circumstances permitted. South of Thorn and the ^Vistula, the frontier was barred for some distance by the inevitable marshes. Then came the River Warta, south of which again the marsh lands recurred ; but the valley of the Warta (the river was 100 yards broad at the frontier) was practicable enough, and offered a natural means of ingress into Prussia. It may be added that Posen was a highly cultivated province, and from it Germany drew large supplies of rye. Russia, however, was perhaj^s even more interested, both for strategical and economic reasons, in the province of Silesia, which lay to the south of Posen, and was contiguous to the south-west corner of Poland. Silesia was half as large as Ireland, and was the biggest pro- vince in Prussia. It contained a million Poles, mostly settled near the frontier. It was also, and the fact was of infinite importance, the greatest mantifacturing and mining area of Eastern Germany. ]Mr. Hilaire Belloc acutely pointed out at an early stage of the war that the two main industrial districts of Germany were precisely those which the first shock of an invasion would strike. They were Westphalia in the west, and Silesia in the east. Of the two, Westphalia was the more important, because armaments were almost wholly manufactured in the western field. The ruin of Westphalia woiild mean a hundred times more than the occupation of Berlin. But the shutting down of the mills and manufactories and mines of Silesia w ould have an almost equally paralyzing effect upon Germany's capacity and desire for resist- ance. Silesia had tlie richest zinc deposits in the world, in the neighbourhood of Beuthen, quite close to the frontier. The greatest mining and smelting centres, at Zabrze, Konigs- hutte, and elsewhere, and the glass industries of Gleiwitz, were within a day's march of Rus- sian territory. The largest ironworks in Silesia, at Konig.shutte, could have been shelled from Russian soil, four miles away. There were flourishing textile industries of great magnitude in all tlu! \-alleys of Southern and (\'ntrr.l Silesia, worked chiefly by water power. The whole countryside was full of mills, and packed with a dense population. It was practically undefended, relied neither on fortresses nor on natural obstacles against invasion, and lay at 210 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL A GERMAN ENCAMPMENT NEAR THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER. the mercy of a succesfc'ful foe. The basin of the River Oder, which traversed the province in a north-westerly direction, led directly to Berlin, though it was guarded by certain forti- fied positions, of which more anon. Once firmly estabhshed in Silesia, the Russians could- strilce either north-westward at Berlin, or south- westward, through the Moravian Gate between the Carpathians and the Sudetic Mountains, at Vienna. Breslau, the capital, was the third city of Prussia, with half a million inhabitants and a huge trade. The province also contained many rich and powerful landowners with very great estates. It will have been gathered that the eastern frontier of Germany was not so vulnerable as it looked upon the map. Its curious shape even conferred some advantages, and in sections it had useful natural protection in the shape of marshes, dense woodlands, and rivers. The case of Austria-Hungary, which must next be dealt with, was far otherwise. The natural frontier of the Dual Monarchy on the north-east was the Carpathian Range, which bordered the territory of Hungary. Tliis barrier furnished by Nature \\as most unwisely passed at the time of the partition of Poland, towards the end of the eighteenth century, when the wide province of Galicia, on the northern side of the Carpathians, was acquired by Austria. By this change the Monarchy gave hostages to fortune. A portion of the northern frontier of Galicia was formed by the Upper \'istula, but much of the rest had no natural line of demarcation at all. The pro vince was traversed by several rivers rising in the Carpathians, and running from south to north mitil they fell into the Vistula. The chief of these were the San, the Wistoka, and the Dunajec. When the Russians poured into tl,e province from the east, these rivers formed a series of lines on which the defeated Austrian armies successively rallied, exactly as Sir Frederick Maurice had foretold many year.s before. As a whole the province necessarily had a downward slope from the Carpathians to the rivers Vistula and Dniester. The winter climate was very bitter, with heavy snowfalls, followed usually by excessive rain in tlie spring. It produced extensive crops, and was the most important potato-growing area in Austria, but its manufactures were backward. The (Jalician oil-field was very extensive, and of much im- portance to the Germanic Powers. The principal centres of oil production were near Drohobycz, Krosno, and Kolomea. All these tracts fell quite early into the possession of the Russians, and though in February, 1915, they were com- pelled to fall back from Kolomea for a time, very little Galician oil got into Austria or Ger- many after the first two months of the war. As Galicia was producing two million tons of oil annually in time of peace, the loss to the Ger- manic League was considerable. The means of communication in Galicia v\"ere THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 211 very good when compared with those of Poland. The principal railway route traversed the centre of the province from end to end, from Cracow tlirough Tarnow, Jaroslau, Przemysl, Lemberg, and Kolomea to the Rumanian frontier, with a branch from Lemberg bifurcating into Central and Southern Russia. There was another rail- way route roughly parallel to the principal one, but running along the lower slopes of the Car- pathians through Sandec, Sanok, Stryj, and Stanislau, all of which places were important junctions. Besides these long lines, there were a number of transverse sections, and no portion of the province was very far from railway com- munication. There were 11 points at which rail-heads approached the Russian frontier, with no communication beyond it, and the fact throws an instructive light upon the industry the Austrians had expended upon the Galician railway system. The two principal towns in Galicia were Lemberg, the capital, in the eastern area, with about 160,000 inhabitants ; and Cracow, in the western area, with about 90,000 inhabitants. The Russians took Lemberg at the beginning of September, and at once pushed on to the investment of the fortress of Przemysl, which lay one-third of the way towards Cracow. Lemberg was the fourth city of the Austro- Hungarian Empire, and 80 per cent, of its poptilation were Poles. Cracow was the corona- tion and burial place of the Kings of Poland, and was still " the intellectual centre of the Polish nation." Poles formed more than two-thirds of its population. Taking the people of Galicia as a whole, however, it may be said that the Poles numbered about 45 per cent., and the Ruthenes about 42 per cent. Although the Poles predominated in both the chief cities they were mostly concentrated in the western half of the province, while the Ruthenes dwelt Ln the eastern half. The Ruthenes were racially aldn to the Little Russians across the border. The relations betwreu Poles and Ruthenes are explained in Chapter XXXVI., Volume II. It is enough to say here that the Poles had been encoiu-aged by Austria at the expense of the Ruthenes, until a period shortly preceding the war. The Ruthenes welcomed the invading Russians, whose religion was the same as their own. The attitude of the Austrian Poles, who were Roman Catholics, was not so readily dis- closed. They had fewer grievances than their bretliren in Germany and Russia, and were not so restive under the yoke. In a corner between Galicia and Rumania lay the Austrian crowTi duchy of the Bukowina, " the land of beeches," a region of the thickly- wooded foot-hills of the Carpathians. The Bukowina was unquestionably more Russian than Austrian in sympathy and spirit. Over 40 per cent, of the population was Ruthene, about 35 per cent, was Rumanian, and the Jews numbered 13 per cent. The German element was very small indeed. Nearly 70 per cent, of the people belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church. Czernowitz, the capital of the duchy, was a bright and flourishing little city situated on a height above the Ri\er Pruth, and extensively girt by marshes. Its size had much developed iinder Austrian adminis- tration, and its industries imfiudcd the manu- RUSSIAN SERVICE O.N THE BATTLEFIELD. 212 THE IIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. factura of paper. During the fir.^t eight months of the war Czernowitz twice passed alternately into the hands of Russians and Austrians, and when they first recaptured it the Austrians took })itter vengeance on those of the inhabitants who had shown cordiality to the invaders. The whole of the struggle in Galicia and the Bukowina resolved itself, from the Russian point of view, into two main objects. The first was to reach Cracow, at the western ex- tremity of Galicia, for the possession of Cracow was an imperative prelude to the invasion of Silesia and Posen, or to a march southward through the Moravian Gate upon Vienna. The second was to secure the passes of the Carpathians, which gave access into Hungary. The Russians were very, anxious from the outset to bring pressvire to bear upon Hiuigary. Possibly they were influenced in part by a belief that the near approach of hostile arinies to Buda-Pesth would induce the Magyars to break away from Austria and conclude a separate peace on their own account. This belief was widely shared in England in quar- ters where the conceptions of the Magyar attitude were based upon romantic and quite misleading impressions deri\'ed from the records of the days of Kossuth. After the war had been in progress for some time it was more generally realized that the Magyars were largely responsible for the trend of Austro- Hungarian policy, and that their inclination probably was to stand or fall by the fate of Vienna. The steady growth^ of the influence of Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, who was soon seen to be the most powerful man in the Monarchy, confirmed this conclusion. Moreover, the Magj'ar oppression of the Slav races of the Monarchy had been one of the fac- tors which precipitated the war. The Magyars fought in politics for their own hand, but their bitter anti-Slav policy compelled them to range themselves Ijeside the Austro-Germans. Yet it was not really necessary for Russia to seek a political inotive of any sort for striking at Himgary. Military considerations sufficed to justify her plans. Hungary was the principal granary of the Monarchy. It was also the only large source of supply of horses left .to the Germanic Powers. In times of peace Germany annually imported large numbers of horses from Russia. The Hungarian horses were of lighter build, but they were better than nothing. Once the Carpathians were crossed, the wide plains of Hungary offered an easy path for a vigorous foe. By invading Hungary, too, the pressure on the gallant little army of Serbia could be relieved. Finally, once the Russians held the crest of the Carpathians they would fully protect their left flank against menace diu-ing a forward movement through Poland against Prussia. It was not surprising, there- fore, that throughout the long winter, the struggle for the Carpathian pa.sses continued PANORAMA OF LEMBHRG. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. 218 with unabated violence, no matter what conflicts were raging elsewhere. The Carpathians were part of the bac^kbone of Europe, and yet they were very httle known to travellers and tourists. They bore small resemblance to the Alps, and their scenery, though impressive, was not on the grand scale of Switzerland. No Carpathian height was covered with perpetual snow, and the whole range did not contain a single glacier. The highest peak, Mount Franz Josef, was in the ■J^atra group at the western end, and was 8,737 feet high. The passes were easy and low. The slopes of the naountains were thickly wooded, especially on the south. The winter in the Carpathians was always bitter, and if the passes were practicable enough from tlie jjoint of view of the mountaineer, they were choked with snow. Fighting occurred at inter- vals along a section of the Carpatliians nearly 300 miles in length, extending from a point -outh of the town of Tarnow in Galicia to the borders of Rumania. There were six principal passes the possession of which was at intervals contested, the Dukla, the Lupkow, the Uzsok, the Volocz or Vereczke, the Delatyn or Koroz- mezo, and the Borgo. To these may be added the n\inor Ivirlibaba Pass, at the south-western corner of the Bukowina. The Russians crossed every pass except the Borgo during the autumn and winter, some more than once, and though they were compelled to withdraw in every case, they rarely lost possession for any length of time of the northern approaches. Railways traversed the Lupkow, Uzsok, Volocz, and Delatyn Passes, and there was another raihvay crossing the range some distance to the west of the Dukla. By the Lupkow they reached Homonna and the verge of the Hungarian plain. By the Uzsok they came to Ung\ar and beyond. By the Volocz they raided down the valley of the Latorcza River to Munkacs and still farther. By the Delatyn, more popu- larly known as " the Magyar Way," because it was the historic route for invading Hungary, they marched in considerable force to the impor- tant town of Maramaros-Sziget, where they treated the alarmed inhabitants with a restraint which won their confidence. It was not until strong German forces were brigaded with the Austrian troops early in 1915 — it was believed on the direct representations of Count Tisza to the Kaiser — that the Russian pressure across the Carpathians was seriously checked. One reason for the movement of the Russians along NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS WITH THE RUSSIAN ARMY. Back, Mr. Stanley Washburn, The Times corres- pondent ; centre, Mr. Pares; left. Col. Asencheff; right, Mr. Soldatenkow. the Magyar Way and the Volocz Pass was that on the southern slopes of the range in these neighboiu-hoods there dwelt large numbers of Ruthenes, who received them with conspicuous pleasure. The whole of the terrain of the eastern theatre during the first months of the war has now been examined in detail. It is next necessary to explain concisely the fortified positions prepared in this area by each of the three Powers involved. The principal fortress in East Prussia was Konigsberg, the second capital of Prussia, situated on the River Pregel. It possessed an inner and outer line of works beyond which were 12 detached forts, six on each side of the Pregel. In addition, there were two other large and powerful forts, that of Friedrichsburg, on an island in the river, to the west of the city, and the Kaserne KJron- prinz, within the ramparts on the eastern side. Konigsberg ranked as a first-class fortress, and was the headquarters of the 1st Army Corjte. It lay far within the great Frische Lagoon, on a wooded peninsula, with a steep and forbidding coast. On the long spit of land forming the seaward side of the lagoon was the entrenched camp of Pillau, 29 miles from Konigsberg. 32—3 214 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. RUSSIAN TRENCHES (SHOWING TRAVERSES). The whole Koriigsberg area required to be treated with great respect, and when the Rvis- sians first entered East Prussia they only sought to mask the fortress. There were no other important protective works in East Prussia, although the difficult lake region of Masuria, with its blockliouses and the small fort of Boyen, formed a natural means of defence. On the line of the Lower Vistula, in the province of West Prussia, there were further powerful fortresses. Danzig, at the mouth of the river, was a first-class fortress and entrenched camp, and its approaches could be inundated on the eastern side. There were powerful works opposite Dirschau, 20 miles to the south, forming a bridge-head guarding the main line - to Konigsberg and Petrograd. About 45 miles farther south was the strong fortress of Grau- denz, on the right banlc of the Vistula, forming another valuable bridge-head. At a point 92 miles south of Danzig, and 12 miles from the Russian frontier at Alexandrowo, stood Thorn, a fortress which was one of the chief features of the defences of Eastern Germany. The town was on the right bank of the Vistula, but both banks were fortified. There was the usual circle of detached forts, eight on the right bank and five on the left. At Thorn the railway from Warsaw entered Prussian territory, and the place, which was really a formidable bridge-head, formed the pivot of Hinden- burg's railway strategy. Thorn and Danzig have been compared to Metz and Strasburg, and have been described as " bastions, as it were, commanding the curtain between them." The whole Lower Vistula was, in short, very strongly held. A subsidiary but very impor- tant strategic point was Bromberg, 32 miles west -north -west of Thorn, and the centre of a network of railways. It guarded the railway bridges across the River Netze. Below Thorn there was much marsh country on both sides of the frontier, but at the point where the valley of the Warta entered Prussian territory the need for artificial protection again began. Accordingly the great railway centre of Posen, which stood on an open sandy plain, was provided with an immense entrenched camp, which had to be reckoned with by any army marching due west from Warsaw on Berlin. South of Posen there were yet more marsh lands. An inner line of defence possessed by Eastern Germany was the line of the River Oder, which could, however, be very easily crossed b\' an invading iarmy in its upper reaches in Silesia. Strong garrisons were maintained at Oppeln and Breslau, but these places had few modern fortifications. There was a big entrenched camp at Xeisse, on the northern side of the Sudetic mountains. The principal obstacle to an advance down the Oder was the fortress of Glogau, to the north- west of Breslau. Glogau had been a fortress for centuries, and was built partly on an island and partly on the left bank of the Oder. Its I THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 215 foi'tifications were extensive, for it was an important railway junction. The remaining fortified positions on the line of the Oder were Kiistrin, 52 miles east of Berlin, the List sl)ield of the capital ; and Stettin, near the mouth of the river. It may be said that the true defences of the eastern frontier of Oerniany were provided by its incomparable system of strategic railways, which again and again enabled von Hindenburg to concentrate large forces quickly and secretly at varioiis points from which liis blows were launched like thimderbolts. Even Silesia, despite the scarcity of fortified positions, was astonishingly well served by railways. Seven lines of railway ran out of Breslau, and between that city and rVacow there was no point to which troops could not have been quickly hurried. The defences of Austria in Galicia were to a great extent of comparatively modern date. Until the last half-century Austria had not attempted to provide substantial defensi\ e positions in Galicia at all, and much of her works had been built since the twentieth century began. There was one fortified point in the Bukowina, at Zaleszczyski, on the Dniester, at the frontier, but it offered no more effective opposition to the Russians than Maubeuge did to the Germans. Lemberg was stated to possess certain defences, but when the Austrians were routed before the city in September the capital instantly fell. The principal Austrian fortress in Galicia was Przemysl, sitviated in hilly country 60 iniles east of Lemberg. The investment of Przemysl was begun directly after the fall of Lemberg, and though interrupted a'; times, and not made complete for a good many weeks, the fortress was never afterwards left alone for long. The real reason why Przemysl was able to offer such a prolonged resistance was that the Russians were at first short of heavy siege artillery, and still more of shells. The ultimate objective of the Russian struggles in Galicia was always Cracow. The city of Cracow was surrounded by a ring of six powerful forts on both sides of the Vistula, but the total length of the perimeter was comparatively small, and it was not believed that Cracow could withstand a prolonged siege. The Russians were drawing near to the city from the north early in December, and their cavalry were actually within five miles of it on the south, when von Hindenburgs second fierce rush on Warsaw compelled a hiu-ried shortening of the Russian line. When von Hkidenbnr? DANZIG. \ view of the Langenmarkt, showing the Town Hall. 21G THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR. fought his way to the Bzura River and dug himself in, he was aiming, among other things, at the salvation of Cracow, and, therefore, of Silesia also ; for with Cracow in their possession the Russians would probably have had Silesia at their mercy. Russia had two great fortified positions in Poland, Novo Georgievsk and Iwangorod. Warsaw, though not entirely without defences, was j^ractically an open town. Warsaw was the railway centre of Poland, but the fortified zone on which it relied was created 18 miles away at Novo Georgievsk, at the point where the Bug, swollen a few miles higher up by the waters of the Narew, flowed into the Vistula. It was the. usual circle of detached forts, and was exactly 120 miles from Thorn. The forts of Novo Georgievsk were on a plateau which com- manded the channels of the rivers for many miles. As it lay on the right (or north) bank of the Vistula, the Germans never came into contact with it dioring their repeated attempts upon Warsaw. It effectually blocked any prospect of advance on the north bank, and compelled them to select a line of advance to the south of the river, through Lodz and Lowicz. They were checked at the Bzura and the Rawa on their second advance in December, but had they made good the passage of these rivers they would still have had terrific obstacles to overcome. Marshes and woods extending for a long way from the left bank of the Vistula gave some protection to the capital, but the Russians had enormously strengthened these areas by an elaborate entrenched line midway between the Bzura and Warsaw. This series of entrenched positions, which came to be known as the Blonie line, from the village through -which it passed, was about 18 miles due west of Warsaw. It was believed that the Blonie line could be held for almost any length of time, owing to the support it would receive from Warsaw. Iwangorod was an entrenched camp 64 miles south-east of War- saw, at the jimction of the River Wieprz with the Vistula. It had nine forts on the right bank and tlu-ee on the left, and it was near Iwangorod that von Hindenburg's initial attempt to seize the line of the Vistula first broke down. About 150 irdles to the east of Warsaw, on the River Bug, was Brest-Litovsk, an immense supply depot ringed with forts, which was the real base of the Russian opera- tions in Poland. Warsaw, Novo Georgievsk, Iwangorod, and Brest-Litovsk were sometimes described as " the Polish Quadrilateral," but Warsaw had no pretensions to the strength of the other places. When in futiu-e years historians pronounce a final verdict upon the military and political strategy of the war, it will probably be declared that the greatest of the manv mistakes made WARSAW. A view of the Vistula. i THE TIMES HT STORY OF THE WAE 217 KONIGSBERG. by Germany was her decision to hack through Belgium. Frona that initial blunder most of her other mistakes followed in a natural sequence. Germany's plan of campaign, com- pendiously stated, was to overthrow France first, and to settle with Russia afterwards. She would probably have had better success if she had reversed her plan. It was the supposed need for crushing France first which led to the invasion of Belgium, with all the evil results (from the purely German point of view) which ensued. Germany did not crush France, she found herself committed in the west to an enormous front of dangerous length, and by her brutal treatment of Belgium she alienated the sympathy of neutral nations throughout the world. Had she delivered her first great attack in the east, she might conceivably have para- lyzed Russia and then turned westward with greater prospect of success ; but the whole .subject is only a matter of conjectiire. By the course Germany took she deprived herself of any chance of ever achieving her full purpose. Probably \n any case, she never had any chance of complete success from the time England entered the lists, a consideration which sufficiently accounts for the " Hymn of Hate." The German plans on the eastern frontier were largely based on the assumption that the Russian mobilization would be slow. The German Staff seem to have proposed to hold East Prussia and the frontier from Thorn to Galicia, but not to undertake at first any offensive operations on a large scale. The Austro -Hungarian armies in Galicia were instructed to push northward into Poland in the direction of Warsaw, and eastward into Volhynia, in the direction of Kieff. The main duty of the Austrians cleirly was to keep busy such Russian forces as were available. It was even hoped that the Austrian columns based on Lemberg might take Kieff, for the calculation was that the Russians would be to a great extent preoccupied by the Polish insurrection which Berlin and Vienna confidently expected. If the 1st Austrian Army, based on Przemysl, succeeded in marching tlirough Lublin and got near to Warsaw, then the Gernians would have made a supporting move from Thorn towards the Polish capital. But all these hopes were largely conditional, and the broad purpose of the Germanic Powt>rs was suuply to keep the Russian armies contained while the flower of the German Active Armv rushed 218 Till-: TIMES HlSTOliY of THE WAR. CRACOW. through Belgium and Xorthern France and took I'aris. Nothing happened on the hnes that the Gennan Staff presupposed. It is ti'ue that the Austrian advance from Przeniysl drew very near to Lubhn, but the Austrians were soon hurrying back to their own territory. The march on Ivieff remained nothing but a paper programme, for the invasion of Volhjniia ended as abruptly as it had begun, \^^lat completely upset the German calculations was the swiftness and steadiness of the Russian mobihzation, which astonished the whole ^\orld. Before the war had been in progress many days, powerful and impetuous Russian armies were pouring into East Prussia and Galicia, clearing the flanks of Poland. Until von Hindenburg won his signal victory at Tannenberg the Russians were carrying all before them. Tannenberg partly paralyzed Russian strategj" for a tune, but it never stopped the persistent Russian invasion of Galicia, nor did it prevent the Rvis- sSans from entering East Prussia again as soon as they were ready. The whole probleni which Russia had to solve was to clear both her flanks, and then to take Cracow. To that combined purpose she recurred again and again, and she never reallv nhnndoTied it for a moment, even when Central and Southern Poland were swarming with German troops and the people of Warsaw were preparing for flight. Through- out the whole of the first six months" cam- I^aigning, Cracow wa.s the lodestone that attracted the Russians. Cracow was the heart of the RiLSsian problem. ^Vhile Cracow le- mained untaken. no advance on the grand scale into either Prussia or Hungary was possible, while the chance of reaching Vienna was too remote to be even discu.ssed. With Cracow in Russian hands the whole situation would be changed. The roads through Silesia to Berlin^ or through the Moravian Gat« to Vienna, would become open. Hungary could be raided to the gates of Budapest. There could be an advance in force along the line of the Wart a to Posen and beyond, without fear of a flank attack. The difficulties of the invasion of East Prussia would largely be overcome, because it was reasonable to suppose that in such an event the German forces m East Prussia would soon be compelled to fall back, in order to avoid being cut off. The key to Russian strategy was Cracow, and to take that city was the prin- cipal problem for which a solution had to be foimd. This was the theoretical side of the Russian movements. In practice the Russian THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 219 task eventually resolved itself into the problem ol' clearing Poland of an exceedingly stubborn invader. Russia soon found that it was easier to mobilize her millions than to arm and equip them and place them in the battle-line. All the perplexities and obscurities of the early months of the Russian campaign turned upon the difficulty of converting mobilized men into efficient combatants, clothed in imiforms, fur- nished with rifles and aitununition, and ready to fight. The actual mobilization was a magni- ficent piece of organization. From the farthest confines of the Russian Empire came inter- minable train -loads of men eager to give their lives for the Tsar. Mr. Stephen Graham related how he was in a village in the Altai Mountains, in the very heart of Asia, when the mobilization order arrived. The men knew nothing of the troubles of Europe, and had not even been told against whom the Tsar had gone to war. They saddled their ponies and rode off cheerfully, never questioning the call. The cities in the rear of the line of conflict became choked with men, but it was long before they were all able to march forth as fighting units. The supply of clothing, of arms, and above all of ammunition, was insufficient for the count- less hosts which had been gathered. The factories of Russia worked without ceasing. The Allies did their best to supply deficiencies, so long as there was any chance of getting supplies into the country. Japan sent great quantities of warlike stores. Huge purchases were made from neutrals. Yet it was a very long time before Rvissia was able to overcome her manifold needs ; and the lack of material, and not the fighting qualities of her troops, was the chief explanation of such reverses as she occasionally encoimtered in the earlier stages of the campaign. She had to fight on an incredibly long front. Her actual fighting line was at some points dangerously thin. She was particularly short of big gun ammunition, a difficulty which soon hampered all the com- batants alike. A shortage of the means of waging war lay at the back of all her move- ments, and the knowledge gnawed at the hearts of her commanders. In course of time these obstacles were to a great degree overcome, and it was calculated that by April, 1915, she would be very near her maximum strength. The war brought a solidarity to the Russian nation such as it had never known before. Never had Russia been so vmited. There were strikes in progress at Petrograd and in other cities when the hour of conflict came. Civil discontent was rife, and anxious observers believed that the coimtry was on the verge of another internal upheaval. It was indeed, but not in the form which the vigilant watchers in Berlin had predicted. They had taken due note of the surface symptoms wliich were plainly visible, and believed that the war would find Russia rent asunder by disorder. They failed to iinderstand the psychology of the Russian people, just as they failed to under- stand ever^ other nation around them. The strikes at Petrograd vanished in a night, and the Cossacks who had been brought into the city to preserve order in the Nevsky Prospekt and the other main thoroughfares found them- selves acclaimed by the populace. One of them was heard to say to a comrade : " Is it possible that these people are cheering ns, or am I dreaming ? " The Germans and Austrians had imagined that the Russian crowds would demon- strate against the war, and clamour for peace THURN. KONIGSBERG*^ Allen§tein Ma sN iMW.'X^y'^' ^'^^^^'^ 220 THE EASTERPH Tilsii^ kernel.. RNieme?^' (ovnjo 7 Insterb <urg jGurnbinpeh KMariampol^ |.\ VSuwalki Bakalarimo fs^Se'iny , Q T-1-) i.-Tts^ A warggrabona^ XDrussenki til allays ^. — •^Osowie'c* ^eiiL -^1 '^x "^ 'en .Bialvstok WiJTia" '^olkovis^ Reference. Railways i ..- Fortified Places <> International Boundaries _*..i.««ii_ Marshes ^^ ^^ NoKogrodeIr Stolbzi iSlonir Vlinsk ''Slutskc Jobruisk '^. Ur/etchie W)Ro2han /schishew Jflesntchele o^isokie Utenski Liuschtsctia Liude nevit$hi^ , cGorodets Siedlce' ■^Brest Litovsk /?. / Lukon " .tV<K^ ,\u. -^ Kozienice 'ivanqorod/^ ^^^^!^^^l^3ngorod/^ "■""^ ^^yoAlexandna ^Skarischev ^~'^\^XMh I i n %3//,«yAnnopol Dhmbrovitza < II Wijzy S<ovel „^Mo^ iZamosc Vladimir S^ ^Luzk (f'^C/^ Sand6iTiir^'S'x^^''°*^ /^-r \ «:^*%- / ^ /7^'sk^ J. ;^ V /j>^ *';v.^./ ^Dubno Rovao wT^'-- {Rawaruska namionka ^Jaroslav j IjwOA " lGmbei*gl ^Kremenetz. Grpdek *N,r-».*-'vC {l/olotchisk yb' Jitomir, 1 '^■'^V Berd itched -^^ Zaleszczvskf^ *«Kaminietz '.«^- [753/; %^ Chotin W, :e/» Oorohot -\\\ Debreczen J»9" 76/ THEATRE OF WAR. 221 222 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. at any price. \^Tien the fateful day came immense throngs were kneeHng in front of tJie Winter Palace, and chanting the majestic and solemn strains of the Russian National Anthem. For the first time for a century a Tsar of Russia looked out upon a Russian Empire one and indivisible, animated by a common purpose, stung from indifference into an eager desire to face a common foe. In the Russo-Japanese War some of the Russian troops had to be driven into the troop trains at the point of the bayonet. In August, 1914, the Ru.ssian regi- ments marched forth gladly, fired by a burning desire to take up the biirden of a war which appealed more strongly to the people than any campaign in which Russia had ever engaged. One of the first fruits of the moral change which Russia underwent was the entire and ruthless prohibition of the liquor traffic. The Tsar's imperative order was accepted without a murmur, and was regarded as a sjmibol of the transformation which the country had under- gone. It cost the Russian Exchequer a revenue of £68,000,000, but Ministers were speedily heard declaring that it was worth the price because of the increased efficiency it pro- duced. Cheap vodka had been the bane of the populace. The ravages of drink in Russia cannot be compared with the consequences of Uquor consumption in the United Kingdom, because in Russia the effects went considerably deeper. Really good vodka, drunk in small quantities, was not a particularly pernicious beverage. A tiny glass or two, taken with a dish of fresh caviare of a delicacy unobtainable outside Russia, had been said to be "as accept- able as strawberries and cream." The cheap spirits more widely consumed in Russia were of very different quality, and the quantities drunk both unpoverished and debilitated masses of the people. At first the Tsar's decree only applied to the period of mobilization, but later it was extended for the duration of the war. The result was magical. From the Baltic to the Pacific not a public -house was open, and the order was rigidly enforced to the letter. It was accepted patiently and without complaint by the entire population. " The result was," wrote an observer, " that the army and the people were serious and sober when they faced the task imposed upon them. Rioting and dissipation were things of the past, both at the front and in the capital." Such wa.s the prave and earnest mood in which Russia braced her self for her tremendous task. The story of the first few months of fighting in the eastern theatre falls naturally into certain definite sections. There was first the Russian invasion of East Prussia, followed by von Hindenburg's retaliatory stroke, the battle of Tannenberg, and the unsuccessful attempt of the Germans to reach and to cross the River Xiemen. Then came, practically a.s a separate episode, the Riissian invasion of Galicia and the first defeats of the Austrian armies. This was preceded by the brief Austrian invasion of Poland, after which followed the swift Russian advance, the fall of Lemberg, the investment of Przemysl, and all the confused fighting which carried the Russians to the crest of the Carpathians, and even enabled them to make brief incxirsions into Hungary. These first operations of the Russians in Galicia were as remarkable and as complete as the swift Ger- man invasion of France in 1870. The next extremely definite movement was von Hinden- burg's first invasion of Central and Southern Poland, which very nearly reached Warsaw, and actually reached the Upper Vistula near Iwangorod. It was accompanied by fierce, simultaneous conflicts between Aiistrians and Russians on the line of the San. AH these movements collapsed, and the failure of the Austrian and German offensive had as its sequel a general withdrawal. The Russians in their turn then struck south-westward from Warsaw, and westward through Galicia, at Cracow. They had all but reached the city when von Hinden- burg, who had concentrated afresh, rushed once more at Warsaw, the movement constituting the second German invasion of Poland. It instantly compelled the Russians to fall back and straighten their line. They held the Ger- mans before Lodz and around Lowicz for many days, and at one moment ahnost succeeded in encircling two German army corps, a brilliant effort which raised unfounded expectations in the west. Eventually the Germans dug them- selves in on the line of the rivers Bziu-a and Rawa, south of the Vistula, and some distance west of Warsaw. The New Year found them still tenaciously entrenched in tliis position. All these operations will be related in detail, and in the order noted, in the chapters which follow. CHAPTER LVI. THE FIRST INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA. Motives of Russian Strategy — The Russo- Prussian Frontier — Possible Routes and Ter- rain — First Russian Successes — Their Effect in Germany — Von Hindenburg to the Rescue — Hindenburg's Career — German Victory of Tannenberg — Its Importance and Conse- quences—The Subsequent German Advance — Russia's Revenge on the Niemen — Battle. OF AuGusTowo — Results of First Five Months of War. EARLY in 1914 the reoganization of the Russian military system had already gone so far that the General Staff was able to announce that it would adopt an offensive strategy in the next European war. The Russian tradition that an aggressor is best defeated by luring him into the vast distances of the interior, there to be dealt with by Generals January and February, asserted itself again and again during the vicissitudes of the eventful struggle on the Eastern Front, but it was not the dominant idea in the early days of August. An invasion of East Prussia presented itself as a tempting and inevitable task. The Russians knew that the Germans had underestimated the rapidity of their mobilization. They knew that two factors had combined to induce the Germans to post inadequate forces in East Prussia — the im- perious need of securing an early triumph in France, and the habitual German tendency to undervalue Russian efficiency. A march into East Prussia was all but imposed upon them. It was natural to argue that before any advance through Poland itself could be contemplated, the northern flanlc must be cleared. Every army has its historical memo- ries which are apt to govern the thinking of its chiefs. By this route Russian armies had advanced when they occupied Berlin in the Seven Years' War, and again when they pursued Napoleon after Moscow. Strategists have always a maximum and a minimum object before them. Civilians and journalists talked gaily of marching through East Prussia to Berlin, and in the ranks of the Russian Army that ambition gave a naeaning to their advance. Scientific soldiers were more cautious, for they knew very well that the defensive lines of the Vistula, with the great fortresses of Danzig, Graudenz, and Thorn would not be carried without efforts and sacrifices inadvisable at this stage of the campaign. The lesser objects seemed none the less sufficient to justify the invasion. It was mucli to clear the northern flank of Poland and well worth while to occupy this thriving province, with its prosperous agricultui'e and its population of two million inliabitants. If no further u\ditary use were made of the invasion, a province securely held 223 224 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Keuit Schbnn / Postelaa \. Lau^czai'^ i >— I ' I 1 .J'jr •>zal" Krao i'(fc'_ "=- Lochstadi LP ilia I 7KDI Lab I a u' iIGSBERG ^T><Kov n ••apifq'izin Viff ' _ I n s Lerby r£ 5f j/W". '<;?<7 )JUv< ,_ oW'lUow>^s?l<i \.r--Bf'3u° mno IIG] Tscha lbm( \flartenst«/ii Puns!' ''I'O'mrfitt •scnau I, Q -c 'oMarienburg Ueb§udt\ I \ V, Mnhrnnnen ".«?; >uwalki > -iAIIenstein [S- S9)rte!st luro ^"""7 Br.? '<' Neur^ork rY,„„t, \Musch4ken ,W <^" 6 \ fNomou .-^ >Strasbijrq— ^Neidenburq oChorzele ^ tio^ogrc^^ .l,o'^. ./^^^^/ °P^pto»o ^Ostrol en ka Lorn •- sX,eVz,etn,e **>{MlaY^a o^'-^^^''^^ '-^W^ ■ S ^ V f t\ Zambrom jrn"' Ugoszczo maifo*/ ^" oVaigrod, ohanmsburg X^:con?.^''"'""^i' I ^_ lA/. — 1/^ o^\ Avassilkort Zamorowo o y^i 'iura^^h °^bludow Czyzer/o^^\i o ^^ K" ^^^ THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN FRONTIER. is always an article of barter when the moment of settlement arrives. East Prussia was, moreover, no ordinary German province. At Konigsberg was the seat of the Prussian dukes, and there the King of Prussia was -crowned. The gentry of the province, descended from the Knights of the Teutonic Order, were the flower and type of that stubborn, limited, but capable squirearchy which was the back- bone of the Prussian State and the Prussian Army. A blow at this outlying province ^vas in point of sentiment a direct thrust at the heart of Prussian confidence and Prussian pride. The routes which an invasion of East Prvissia >iust follow were dictated by the few main lines of communication of which the Russians disposed. Three railways only crossed the frontier. The first was the great trunk road from Petrograd to Berhn, which crossed the River Niemen at the fortress of Kovno, passed the frontier at Wirballen-Eydtkuhnen, and traversed the province tlirough Insterburg, Allenstein and Eylau to Thorn. The second, and least important of the three, left the main Vilna-Warsaw line at Bialystok, passed the minor fortress of Osowiec, crossed the frontier beyond Grajevo, and at Lyck entered the intricate lake country, and continued to Konigsberg. The third line ran from Warsaw to Mlawa, and continued through Eylau to Danzig. The frontier nowhere presented an appreciable obstacle, nor had the Germans been at pains to fortify it. It was a purely conventional line, which marked the political division of the area between the Niemen and the Vistula. Nature knew nothing of it, and on either side stretched the same flat expanses of heath and forest, of lake and swamp, varied by fertile fields in which rye and potatoes were grown. The intricate chains of lakes were a formidable obstacle to an invasion- Artificial obstacles existed only in the shape of two small forts (Boyen and Lyck) commanding defiles among the Masurian Lakes. Konigsberg, indeed, was a first-class ring fortress, but while an invader would be compelled to contain ifc and isolate it, it was so situated that it did not interfere with the occupation of the greater part of the province. The Russian plan of campaign provided for the invasion of East Priossia by two armies along the two main routes. The first, or Vilna Army concentrated behind the Niemen, and had its bases at the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno. The Second or Warsaw Army concentrated behind the river Narew. It detached a portion of its forces to penetrate the Masurian Lakes by Bialla and Lyck, but its main line of advance was by Mlawa-Soldau. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 22& Both armies were commanded by generals who had made a certain reputation amid the faihires of their colleagues in the Manchurian campaign. General Rennenkampf had commanded a division which included some famous Siberian regiments, which did good service at Mukden. To him fell the leadership of the Niemen Army in the direct march from the east on Konigsberg. The Narew Army, which invaded from the south, was under General Samsonoff, an officer who had won no small popularity and a considei'able professional reputation. Born in 1859, he had passed from the cavalry to the general staff. His service had been chiefly in Turkestan, and he had commanded Siberian Cossacks with distinction in Manchuria. The Niemen Army was the first to encounter a large force of the enemy, and it will be con- venient to consider its march separately bearing in mind that it was engaged in a con- certed and converging invasion, in which it was all important to seciire the proper timing of the move from the east with the move from the south. It was a complete army, and its composition was as follows : The 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 12th (active) Army Corps. The 3rd and 4th Reserve Divisions. Five Cavalry Divisions, including the Guard. Its numerical strength must have been from 225,000 to 250,000 men, and further reserves were busily collected behind the Niemen. The early days of the campaign, while mobili- zation continued, were employed in cavalry raids and reconnaissances. The Germans only once attempted an offensive ; in these small affairs the enterprise was on the Russian side. A Russian cavalry division (the 3rd) crossed the frontier, south of Eydtkulinen on August 6. Two days later (the 8th) a small force of Russian infantry with machine guns was skirmishing far to the north, almost up to the outskirts of the important town of Tilsit, memorable for an historic meeting between Napoleon and the Tsar Alexander. Its mission was to destroy the railway line. A cavah'y reconnaissance on a larger scale, in which three divisions took part,' on the 10th, helped to raise the spirits of the Russians, and gave con- fidence to its leaders. General Rennenkain{)f v/ith his Staff visited the fighting lines, and the impression was general that these skirmishes had dissipated the legend of German invinci- bility. In one of these early engagements the Russian Cavalry of the Guard covered itself with glory. A certain village in advance of the German lines was held by a strong body of sharpshooters with two field guns, which were doing terrible cxeciition at short range against the Riissian advance. To clear the village was infantry work, but the "Gardes a Cheval " and the " Chevaliers Gardes " were at hand and ready, and the infantry was far behind. Three squadrons were dismoimted. They fixed the bayonets, which the Russian cavalry carry, to their carbines, and under the fire of the two gims and of a distant battery, attacked the village in open order, and cleared it house by house. They lost two-thirds of their officers in the pro- cess, but still they advanced, charging over the open space upon the German lines. At the psychological moment a mounted squadron was latmched on the two guns. It sabred the men who served them, and then wheeling roimd, crashed into the flank of the Gterman infantry as the three dismounted squadrons reached their front. The exploit was costly, but it was one of many minor achievements which set Rennenkampf s Army marching forward with the confidence of victory. The general advance may be said to have begun on August 16, the seventeenth dav of GENERAL SAMSONOFF. Killed !n East Prussia. 22G THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the Russian mobilization. On the 17th the RiLssian van encountered the Gennan 1st (Konigsberg) Army Corps, which fought a delaying action at Stalluponen. It was a stubborn contest while it lasted, and the Ger- mans claimed to have taken the improbable number of 3,000 prisoners with six machine gun? before they fell back on Gumbimien. Here was fought the first considerable battle of this campaign. The lUissian advance covered a front of about 35 miles, from Pil- kallen on the north to Goldap on the south. The centre followed the line of main road and railway froin Stalluponen to Gumbinnen. The ground was fiat and nearly featvireless, a country of rye and potato fields, with scattered farmhouses, little villages and windinills. The Russian left had to clear and traverse the pine \\ oods which stretch for many a mile east and north of the important railway junction of Goldap. The Russians had at their disposal four corps of the active army and two reserve divisions. The Germans had only one first line corps (the 1st) with two reserve corps, and were therefore outnumbered by at least five to thi-ee. They relied in this, as in all the fighting on the Eastern Front, mainly on their second and third line troops. A force so manifestly inferior could only hope to fight an obstinate delaying action. The dispositions in this battle presented few features of interest. It began on the extreme right of the Russian lines at Pilkallen. The little town was cleared without much difficulty, and the Germans \\ ho held it fell back south-westwards towards Gumbiimen. The main battle was fought next day (the 20th) before Gumbinnen. It is a picturesque country town, with many fine old gabled houses, dating from the early eighteenth century, when it was colonized by Austrian Protestant refugees from Salzburg. It had 14,000 inhabitants, and was distant 22 miles from the Russian frontier. General Rermen- kampf's tactics were extremely simple. He had a numerical superiority which inight have suggested the possibility of an enveloping movement. He preferred a straightforward frontal attack on the enemy's centre. The fighting iDegan at dawn with an artillery duel, bvxt the Russian infantry charged with irre- sistible ardour without waiting for much in the way of artillery' preparation, and carried position after position by the use of the bayonet and the hand grenade. The Germans counter- attacked ^^■ith stubborn coiu^age, and some of the ground changed hand.s .several times in the course of the day. One Cierman brigade was caught in a cross-fire of rifles and Maxims, and left 3,000 dead on the field. The fighting la.sted fourteen hoiu-s, and it was only at nightfall that the Germans withdrew. The German wings held out longer, and von Fran9ois (the general of Huguenot descent, who commanded tlie Konigsberg corps, and its two auxiliary corps) niay even have hoped to outflank on the north. A German cavalry division retook Pilkallen on the 20th. It was expelled again on the 21st by a superior force of Ru-ssian cavalry, and had much difficulty in rejoining the main army. Roiuid Goldap also the fighting continued obstinately throughout the 21st. The 1st Corps, with its supports, had meanwhile fallen back through the town of Gimibinnen, and thence on Insterburg. It is hard to say whether von Francois could have achieved anj-thing by attempting a fiu-ther delaying action in the prepared positions east of Insterbiu"g. The place was an important railway centre, the junction of lines to Konigsberg, Tilsit, Goldap, and above all the key of the vital south-western line to AUenstein and Thorn. It was a dignified country town, with a fine market-square, and about twice the population of Gumbinnen (31,000). It would have been worth much to delay Rermenkampf here, but the importance even of these railway's might be exaggerated. The East Prussian system was so amply designed that Konigsberg was still very far from being isolated, even when it lost touch with Insterbiu-g. The Germans, moreover, had lost heavily in men at Gumbinnen, and they could not afford to repeat that loss in- definitely. The Russians took 12 field gims and 400 prisoners there, some of whom were Poles who boasted that they had not fired a shot against their brother Slavs. One notes the puzzimg statement in the German oflficial news, that von Francois on his side took 8,000 prisoners and some heavy gvms. An army which elects to retire may none the less have acliieved some local tactical success, but this German claim was improbably high. A re tirement was ordained, but tlie Germans niust have imagined tliat they had inflicted a severe check on Rermenkampf' s advance. A notice posted up in Insterburg stated that the German troops must " obey a superior order to march elsewhere," but told the inhabitants that the Russians could hardlv arrive within a week. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 227 EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN BOMBAKDMEN T IN EAST PRUSSIA. Top left: A wrecked street; top right: The last German Patrol leaving; centre: Irussian refugees leaving their homes ; bottom left : Barracks at Soldau ; bottom right : A ruined town. 22S THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL RENNENKAMPF (marked with a cross) AND HIS STAFF. In a town in East Prussia. and counselled them to remain in their houses and welcome the invaders with " hospitality." The Russians reached Insterbvirg in point of fact late on the 23rd, and by the 24th had occu- pied it in force. Henceforward Rennenkampf's advance was practically unopposed. His left wing pressed on from Goldap to Darkelimen, and southwards to Angerburg, on the edge of the lake countrj-. Thence it followed the cross-country strategical railway Nordenburg- Gerdauen-Allenburg. On the north it held Tilsit, and the Tilsit-Konigsberg railway as far as Labiau. On the main line to Konigsberg it reached Tapiau. The northern portion of East Prussia was securely held as far as the River Alle, and Rennenkampf's cavalry pushed doA\-nwards as far as Rastenburg and Korschan Junction. The claim was currently made for it in the Press that it had " invested " Konigs- berg. It hardly did that, for it left open the vital Konigsberg-Danzig railway. But cer- tainly it threatened Konigsberg, and might soon expect to be able to contain its garrison, and to press on towards Danzig and the Vistula. It held the main railway line, but the use which it could make of tliis facihty was limited. The gauge of the Russian differs from that of the German railway system, and though some rolling stock had been captiu-ed, it is not probable that it sufficed for all the needs of a great army. The prospect was dazzling, for the only con- siderable German force in this portion of East Prussia had been defeated, and no longer ventvu-ed to give battle. The retirement of von Francois from Insterburg had more- over been hasty, and the road to Konigsberg was littered with quantities of abandoned material. Meanwhile the Army of the Xarew was ad- vancing rapidly and successfully from the south. It was of about the same strength as the Army : of the Niemen, and consisted of five army ■ corps of the active army, and three cavalry divisions, and cannot have fallen far short of a total of a quarter of a miUion men. General Samsonoff had to operate in a niiich more diffi- '. cult country than General Rennenliampf — the region of the Masurian Lakes. He advanced , along three lines : (1) North-west by the Warsaw -Mia wa-Soldau railway ; (2) To Lyck by the Osowiec line, and thence by a detour south of the larger lakes to Johan- nisburg ; (3) To Lyck, and thence by a still wider detoiu" above Lake Spirding. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAF. 229 THE FLKJHT FROM EAST PRUSSIA. 1. A home in the fields. 2. Refugees in Berlin. 3. On the wav to Berlin. 4. On the road. 280 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL VON FRANCOIS. 9' The Russians found the enemy in very inferior numbers. In the early stages of this in^•asion only one corps of the active arn'iy, the 20th, was present in thLs region, but as it was stationed in times of peace at Allenstein, it had at least the advantage of famiharity with this diflficult country. The German defence de- pended for the rest upon Landwehr troops, the middle-aged men of the countryside, called to the colours to defend their own soil. A brigade of Landwehr fought a delaying action at Soldau, and were of covu"se forced back by superior numbers of younger troops. Neiden burg was next won. Allenstein was taken by the Russians after a stiff contest with the Land%\ehr. The hardest of this series of en- gagements was at Franlcenau, where Samson- off' s right encoiuitered the German 20th Corps, entrenched in strong prepared positions with rifle pits and \\ire entanglements. It held them for two days (the 23rd and 24th) and then gave way partly to the determined frontal attacks of the Russians, and partly to an out- flanking march of the Russian right. Its retreat to Osterode was some%vhat hasty, and it was forced to abandon guns, stores, and prisoners. On the same day that Rennen- kampf entered Insterburg, Samsonoff had broken the resistance of the weak forces whicli opposed the advance of the Narew Army. His cavalry swung round by Sensburg and Bischofsburg, as far as Rothfhess, a junction station on the main line, from which a branch lino ran up to Konigsberg. The main line was also held more solidly at Allenstein, an important junction and garrison town, an air- ship station, and the headquarters of the 20th Corps. The Russians, in short, had driven the enemy from all that part of East Prussia which lay east and south of the main railway line. On the north they were far to the west of it. Rennenkampf's front now faced south-west, on the line Friedland-Gerdauen-Xordenburg- Angerburg. Samsonoff occupied the triangle Soldau- Allenstein-Frankenau. The intervening space was over-run by their cavalry, which had nearly, but not quite, met. In a few days the converging invasions would meet, and two Russian armies totalling nearly half-a-million men would be threatening the lines of the Vistula. The Germans had lost the use of nearly one-half of their elaborate system of strategic railways, and the intricate defences of the lake-country had not availed to stay the invaders. It was a black week for German confidence A\ hich opened on Sunday the 23rd. The inva- sion of their territory was a heavy blow to their military pride. They were now suffering something of what they had themselves in- flicted on the Belgians. The civil population of East Prussia was everywhere fleeing before the invaders. The townsmen poured into Konigsberg and Danzig. The peasants packed a few belongings in their carts and trudged the roads in vast disconsolate cohuuns, impeding the movements of the troops and dislocating the supplies of food. Feu" of these fugitives waited for the appearance of the Russians : they fled from their owai terror of the Cossac ks. For the modern German the Cossack was still what he was in the days of the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic campaigns, a pitiless and un- disciplined marauder. The usvial tales of atrocity, miirder, and mutilation were told with the usual levity. Some frontier towns were destroyed by artillery or burned as a punitive measure against civiUan combatants. There were, of course, the usual requisitions of food. Some pillaging there naay have been when houses were found deserted, but the German newspapers stated quite candidly that in the to\vns at least the Russians paid for what they took, and one case is cited in which a Cossack THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 231 convicted of robbery was promptly shot as an example. The Mayor of Insterburg, Herr von Sachs, wrote an article in wliich he condemned the senseless cowardice of the fugitives, and went on to eulogise the " civility and con- ■iideration " of the Cossacks, the respectful behaviour of the Russian troops generally towards v/omen, summing up with a formal statement that to his personal knowledge the behaviour of the Cossacks towards the civil population was " exemplary and irreproach- able."' The panic, none the less, was general, and even Berlin was soon called upon to pro\'ide for many thousands of refugees, who arrived from the occupied territory. So little secure did the Germans feel, even on the lines of the Vistula, that the sluices at Elbing were opened and the country flooded. An almost pathetic telegram from the Kaiser reflected the general mood. It expressed his "deep sympathy" with his " loyal provinces of East Prussia " on the infliction of this invasion, and bade them " steadfastly believe in the help of the living God, who up to the present has rendered the German nation such wonderful assistance in its just cause and defence." It was not until after the defeat at Guxn- binnen that the Germans began to take the danger to East Prussia seriously. They were aljsorbed in their offensive in P'rance, and they had left only five corps of the active army (the 1st, 20th, 17th, 5th, and 6th) to operate on the entire Eastern Front. Of these the (ith (Breslau) was sent to assist the Austrians in Galicia, and only two (the 1st and 20th) were at this moment available in East Prussia. On Saturday, the 22nd, the General Staff realized that serious measvires must be taken to stop the Russian advance, and a telegram from the Kaiser summoned General von Hindenburg to conduct them. He was waiting for the call, and on Sunday, the 23rd, he reached his headquarters at Rlarienburg, a fortress town near the mouth of the VistvUa, on the extreme edge of the invaded province. He arrived when the German fortunes were at their lowest ebb, and the story of how within a week he tvirned the tide and achieved one of the few really decisive victories in this war makes a brilliant page even in the rich military history of Germany. Paul von Hindenburg was, when the war broke out, a well-preserved veteran of sixty-seven, living in retirement at Hanover. He came of a typical Prussian family, and for two centuries his ancestors had served the State, as officers and officials. Their estate was at Neudeck in West Prussia, on the edge of the province which he was called upon to save, a place rich in memories of the Napoleonic wars — of a COMMANDEERING. 232 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERALS VON HINDENBURG (left) AND VON LUDENDORFF (right). grandfather who had dealt face to face with the Emperor, and of a woiinded French soldier who had been nursed back to health after the retreat from Moscow. The General's father was a regimental officer who retired with the rank of major, and he himself was born in the garrison town of Posen. The traditions of the family are described in an engaging and very simple-minded biograjihy by the General's younger brother. They were based on that curious amalgam of piety, loyalty, and mili. tarism which was the moral foundation of the Prussian " Junker " class. Paul von Hinden- burg entered the Service at the beginning of Germany's period of military glory. He left the military college to serve as a heutenant in the Austrian campaign, and was slightly Moimded and decorated for gallantry at his first battle. He fought in the French war at St. Privat, Sedan, and Paris. Thereafter, he served on the staff of the 1st Army Corps at Konigsberg. Here began the studies which absorbed his mind for the rest of his military career. He was fascinated by the problem of turning the mazes of the Jlasiu-ian lakes and sv\amps to account for the defence of East Prussia. On duty and on holiday he tramped every mile of the country, and knew to a nicetj' what gravelly shore would bear the weight of a field-gun, and which swamp would engulf a battery. He lectvu-ed on this subject at the StafT College in Berlin, and in later life success- fully led the military opposition to a promising scheme launched by an agricultural sjTidicate for the drainage and cultivation of these in- valuable marshes. His military career was one TEl^' TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 233 of regular but not brilliant advancement, and he retired in 1911 from the conimand of an Army Corps. Of genius no one suspected him, and his powerful, square-cut face suggests rather resolution and method thaii inspiration. How far his brilliant success in East Prussia is proof of a military talent of the first order, how far it was the outcome of very special study and minute tojaographical knowledge, it is not easy to decide. He soon became the idol of Germany, but there were many who thought that a greater soldier than Hindenburg was his brilliant Chief of Staff, General von Ludendorff. The strategical problem that confronted Hindenburg was, with very limited forces, and those largely composed of second-line inaterial, to beat two armies which had nearly united, each of them equal to his own in numbers and possibly a little more than equal. Clearly he must take them in detail, before they supported each other. The essence of success was rapidity of movement and promptitude in assembling his forces. He set to work to gather all the men he could muster, but so siu-e was he of his stroke, that he did not wait to secm-e more than a local superiority in niunbers against one-half of the enemy's forces. He resolved to deal first of all with Samsonof5's army, and then, if that first stroke should prosper, with Rennenkampf. His chief strategical asset was the superb railway system of Prussia. It worked night and day collecting an army for him, and one German war-corre- spondent described the congestion at the end, when a solid and miinterrupted procession of trains filed back and forward on the main line from Thorn to Osterode. The available re- sources in men were, however, very limited. On the spot was the beaten 20th Corps and its Landwehr supports. The next step was to bring down von Francois' army from Konigs- berg — the 1st Corps and its Reserve auxiliaries. Some part of it was left in Konigsberg to reinforce the garrison, but the equivalent of two corps undoubtedly came down to join in Hindenburg' s coup. A choice of railway routes was open to it by Elbing and Marien- burg. The sea was also open to Danzig. Tlie garrisons of Graudenz, Thorn, and possibly of Posen were laid under contribution. They probably consisted mainly of Landwehr troops, but they supplied what was at least as neces- sary as men — heavy guns. The Russian General Staff, according to the military critic of the Russkoe Slovo, reckoned that by these means Plindenburg was able to gather nine divisions. That is a maximum estimate. Of these, seven divisions had already been heavily engaged, and must have been mucli weakened. Two consisted of fresh troops from the for- tresses. Of these nine divisions (if there were so many), four only were first-line troops. Hindenburg had, in short, the equivalent of about four full army corps (at most 160:00C men). Samsonoff liad five corps (over 200,000 men) under his command. They were some- what scattered, and it is said that not more than three and a half corps (seven divisions) were actvxally engaged in the disastrous struggle among the lakes which came to be known as t he Battle of Tannenberg. Where precisely the other corps and a half was posted (if it was absent), it is not possible to say, nor why it failed to come up to take part in the battle. The Germans in their official accounts stated emphatically that they had been dealing with a superior force of five corps. The Russian military critics were no less insistent that Hindenbiu-g had much the larger force. It is not possible to dogmatize on the point, though one ixiay note that even if Hindenburg had this not very large numerical superiority, it was nothing more than a local and temporary superiority, achieved at one point by his energy, against an enemy who outnumbered him by two to one. More than half his force, more- over, was composed of Landwehr formations, while the whole Rvissian Army was drawn from the " active " first line. A theory grew up that Hindenburg drew his army lai-gely from the Western Front, and the estimates of the number of corps which were sent to him from Belgium rose steadily from one to five or even seven. These corps were never named or identified. The theory was based on the state- ments definitely made and puhlishe-d at the time that on Friday night, the 28th, German troops were seen entraining in Belgium for the East. At that moment Tannenberg was virtually won. If these reinforcements (what- ever their extent) were destined for East Prussia, ratlirr than Galioia or Poland, thry nuist have arrived at a later stage, wluii the Germans had already crossiMi tiie Ru.ssian frontier. The probabilities aie h.eavily against this th(>ory. Hindenburg handled his tactical pronlen\ as skilfully - as he had conceived Ins lun;id strategical plan. The Knssians had iHi\;nieed with \ery little forethiuiulit • t'nr then- ea.sy 284 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. THE MASURIAN LAKE COUNTRY. A German trench with barbed wire entanglements in front. successes against an inferior enemy had led them to suppose that they had nothing worse to fear than a repetition of the same aimless opposition. They learned, as the fight went on, that they were dealing with larger masses of the enemy than they had yet encountered, but they realized too late that they were fighting against a well -conceived idea. They had some aviators, and an abimdance of cavalry, but their intelligence department was clearly defec- tive. Samsonoff's army was massed within the triangle Soldau-AUenstein-Frankenau. No attempt had been made to occupy the good road which ran from Osterode through Gilgen- burg to Soldau, still less the two railways which fed Soldau from Eylau, Graudenz and Thorn. Von Hindenburg's first step was to occupy this road (much of it concealed by forest) and to make himself master of Soldau junction. This line was gained on Wednesday, the 26th, only three days after Hindenburg had assumed the command. It was a line easily defended, for there were marshes before it and a good road behind it. Above all, there were railways at either end of it by which its flanks could be reinforced. Samsonoff saw that the loss of Soldau might be fatal to him, for it cut him off from liis own main line of retreat and supply. He tried on the 27th to concentrate his forces to retake Soldau, but the tract within his triangle was ill-supplied with roads, his forces were scattered, and he could not convert his total superiority in numbers into a superiority at the threatened place. He dislocated his forces to defend his left, only to be driven back- wards to Neidenburg, and still further isolated. The German line was also active on its left. One of the hottest corners of the great battle was at Hohenstein. In this pleasant village of 3,000 inhabitants the Russians were in con- siderable force, struggling to break Hinden- burg's line by forcing a way to the north-west. Their opponents were at first Landwehr troops, and the fightmg lasted for three days (20th to 28th). It was decided partly by the arrival of heavy artillery, which battered the place and its outlying defences to pieces, partly by the coming of reinforcements of first-line troops from AUenstein. which the Russians had evacuated. Two days after the battle a German war-correspondent saw the streets still full of dead Russians and dead horses. The village was carried eventually by a bayonet charge. Some of the Russian defenders hid in its cellars ; many surrendered ; the remainder were driven back upon the marshes and lakes behind it. On the 27th and 28th Hindenburg developed the more formidable part of his plan. He had already taken the first step to surroimd Samsonoff, by turning him with his right wing THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 235 at Neidenburg. He now gave his left wing an enormous extension. The Russians had aban- doned Allenstein more easily than Soldau, failing to realize that it was the key to their position. The Germans thus regained the us-e of their trunk railway as far as Rothfliess, and eventually of part of the branch line which runs down to Passenheim and Ortelsburg. They did not rely mainly on the railway, how- ever. They had also the good main road which runs beside it, and they used petrol to give mobility to their infantry. From all the towns within reach they had collected every conceivable species of motor-vehicle. Omni- buses, taxicabs, and tradesmen's lorries were loaded with all the human burden they could carry, to the number of many tens of thousands of men, with a due complement of machine guns. This novel motor-infantry swept round the Russian right as far as distant Bischof sburg. It took Wartenburg on the railway and then moved down the road to Passenheim, which was captured only after a bloody and deter- mined struggle. The Germans now held three good roads which ran round three sides of the Russian position. They could move their heavy guns upon them, and they flung their shells at will iipon the Russian masses, congested and bewildered in a nearly roadless area of swamps and woods. It seems at first sight increcUble that anything but a very superior armj'' could surround another so effectually. The achieve- ment is, however, by no means impossible in these conditions even for a nimierically in- ferior force. Hindenburg was able, as it were, to multiply his forces, partly by his foresight in providing motor transport, partly by his skill in mancEuvring to secure the roads. His minute knowledge of the topography of the district enabled him, moreover, so to utilize the swamps and lakes that, he need hold only the solid intervals between them ; while the un- lucky Russians, ignorant of the country, lost entire batteries in the marshes, and were drowned as often as they were shot. By the 30th whole battalions and even regiments were laying down their arms, and the only question was how many could escape by the only road open to them, via Ortelsbui'g and Johannisburg. On the 31st, in a last effort to rally his men and organize the retreat, Samsonoff, who had borne himself amid the disaster with steadfast GERMAN SOLDIERS IN TANNENBERG. 2m THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. COSSACKS ENTERING LYCK. EAST PRUSSIA. gallantry, rode with his whole Staff into a fire- swept zone. " My place is with my men," was his answer to remonstrances. He was. examin- ing a map, when a shell burst in the midst of his Staff. It killed him on the spot, and with him General Pestitch, his Chief of Staff, and several junior officers. His personal reputation suffered nothing in this defeat, and Russian opinion inclined rather to blame his colleague, General Zhilinsky, for the disaster. A Corps - commander. General Martos, was captured in his motor-car as he sought to escape. The Germans made in all about 90,000 unwounded prisoners in this battle. The killed, wounded and drowned must have numbered another 30,000 at least. One corps escaped intact before Ortelsburg was taken and the way of escape finally sealed, and with it about half of another. Isolated fragments of other corps or cavalry divisions are said to have broken away south to the Russian frontier, or north to join Rermenkampf. Hindenburg had destroyed one of the two armies with which he had to deal. He had won the most complete victory which had so far fallen to any commander in any single battle of the war. His prisoners were as numerous as those taken at Sedan. He now turned with hardly a pause for rest or re- organization to the other half of his task. He advanced, as rapidly as the damaged railways allowed, against the Army of the Niemen, north- wards with a trend to the east. His aim was to strike up past Nordenburg, Angerburg and Goldap to Gumbinnen or Eydtkuhnen, in order to intercept Rennenkampf's retreat. Tlie manoeuvre failed in the sense that this Russian army was not cut off. It succeeded in the sense that the threat to its left and rear compelled it to fall rapidly back on its bases and reserves on the Niemen. The fighting nowhere amounted to more than a rearguard action, but it cost the Russians the loss of some 30,000 prisoners, captured in bodies of 500 or 1,000 at a time in isolated positions. It hurried their retreat so that 150 guns and great quantities of warlike material were abandoned on the roads. On September 11 the Russians evacuated Insterburg, and in a general order dated from that town on the 15th, General von Hindenburg was able to armounce that Prussia was free from the last of the invaders, and that German troops had penetrated Russia. A Reserve army from Grodno, including a fresh corps from Finland and a fine Siberian corps, had been defeated with some difficulty at Lyck, and THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 237 again in a small affair at August owo. Suwalki, the administrative centre of the Russian frontier province, was occupied by the Germans, who set up a permanent administration, and allowed the wives of officers to join their husbands. The signs of over-confidence may be read also between the lines of General von Hindenburg's orders. He had achieved a brilliant success, which his under-estimation of the enemy was soon to neutralize. The obscure, retired soldier had become in a short three weeks the idol of the German people, and the Kaiser confirmed the popular verdict by making him a Field- Marshal and entrusting him with the supreme command of all the German forces in the East. The dashing Russian invasion of East Prussia had failed, and had cost ovu- Ally the loss of an army. It is easy to see, after the event, by what altered dispositions the mischance might have been averted. Samsonoff paid little atten- tion to the enemy's communications, which he neither occupied nor destroyed, and Rennen- kampf lost time in making contact with the Narew Army. The larger question is whether, in spite of the disaster, this great enterprise had a salutary effect on the Allied position as a whole. It is probably a mistake to suppose that it caused any direct and immediate trans- ference of troops from France to East Prussia. But without a doubt it did indirectly contribute to relieve the pressure on the Western front. It demonstrated the power of the Russians to assume an early offensive, and forced the Germans to provide against its renewal. It led the Germans to regard the whole Eastern front with a new anxiety and a new interest. It was the starting-point in adventm-e after adventure, in which they hiirled their forces on Warsaw, wasting their resources in the process. It was a shrewd blow from the left against a boxer whose whole attention had been directed to his right. It forced him at length to direct his energies to both fronts, and to meet the offensive by a counter-offensive. It was at once a challenge and a temptation. The sequel of Hindenburg's East Prussian campaign was destined to tarnish its glory, and restore the presti^ of the Russian armies. They showed, as they often did in this war, their> steadiness and imperturbabiUty imder reverses, their ability without a sign of any loss of nerve or confidence to resume the offensive after a costly retreat, their skill in taking advantage of the natural difficulties of their country to repel an invader. Suwalki was occupied by the Germans on September 1 5, and von Hindenburg, ^^•ho believed that Rennenkampf's big army had been " not merely defeated, but shattered," left the actual conduct of operations to General von Morgen, who had served under hun at Tannenberg. The order was given for a resolute pursuit, but it is probable that the Germans aimed at something more than this. If they could force a crossing of the Niemen, they might hope to cut the Petro- grad-Vilna-^^^arsaw railway, and even eventu- ally to work southwards, so as to threaten the great fortified camp of Brest-Litovsk. But if that supremely imprudent idea was enter- tained, it was soon abandoned. The Germans had no forces to spare for such an operation. Tliey had during the brief Campaign of the Niemen at most four army corps at their dis- posal, as the French General Staff stated in an official communique, and these were largely Landwehr and mixed formations. Rennen- kampf had saved his army intact, and got it safely across the Niemen by the 23rd. Here he could refit, and fill up the gaps in its ranks from his depots. To it we must add the corps and a half which escaped from Tannenberg, a corps from Finland, and a famous Siberian Corps, both composed of fresh troops, together with heavy artillery from the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno, cavalry, and an unknown number of reserve formations. It was a for- midable force, acting in its own difficult coiuitry, and it must have had a superiority of quite two to one. It had, moreover, gained in leadership, for General Ruszky, the victor of Lemberg, a brilliant scientific soldier, had been detached to conunand the defence. The Germans no longer had their admirable systera of strategical rail- ways at their disposal. They did indeed adapt their own rolling stock to the gauge of the Russian system, but of Russian lines there were hardly any in this region. Their troops were fatigued with hard marching, and when once the frontier was crossed, they discovered that only a few of the better main roads were practicable for their heavy motor transport. Most of the roads were nothing but beaten tracks, which had never been macadamized, and became in a wet autumn impassable sloughs of heavy mud. The good causeways, as it ha})- pened, were often narrow defiles between lakes and swamps, where no army could deploy. To add to the misfortunes of the invaders, it rained 238 THE TIMES H7ST0BY OF THE WAR. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL VON MORGEN. heavily for three days, from September 27-30, the critical period of the fighting. The Russian defences were formed primarily by two rivers, the Niemen and the Bobr. The latter is an inconsiderable stream, of no great width, but it is 12 feet deep, and it runs through a swampy valley of immense and impassable mai'shes. Across these marshes there is only one good passage, the high-road and railway from Lyck through Grajewo to Bialystok. The crossing is defended by the little town of Osowiec, which ranks as a third- class fortress. It has solid concrete forts, and these were provided, after the outbreak of war, with a new type of heavy gun, whose perform- ances surprised the Gennans. They guessed that naval guns had been brought up from the fleet, but the weapon was in fact a new siege gim, recently made at the Putiloff works. The Germans made an effort to take Osowiec, but it proved itself a more formidable obstacle than Liege. A place with impassable marshes before it cannot in the ordinary sense of the word be V>esieged, and an assault along a single causeway \\ ould be an almost impossibly costly operation. The defenders further improved a naturally strong position by opening the sluices of the Bobr. The attack on this gaJlant little fortress earned a singular distinction from the fact that, while it was in progress, first the Kaiser and then the Tsar visited the opposing camps. The bombardment began on September 27, and lasted for four days and nights without a respite. It destroyed some outlying villages, but did singularly little damage to the solid and well-built forts. The 17-in. howitzers made their appearance as usual in the newspaper accounts of these operations, but the probability is that the largest guns used were the more generally serviceable Austrian pieces, on motor carriages. The guns were pushed up to within five miles of the fortress, and the infantry lines were never nearer than four miles. The last episode of the siege was a brilliant sortie by the garrison. Bodies of infantry, by following paths over the swamps known only to the inhabitants, contrived to get behind the advanced German lines, both from left and right. Another body charged up the causew ay, and before the Germans had recovered from their surprise, contriv-ed to capture three of the guns, while the rest went hurriedly north- wards. It was the last event of the siege, and a Russian communique announced its end on October 1. It was abandoned not merely because Osowiec had proved to be unexpectedly obstinate, but also because the larger German operations against the Niemen had meanwhile failed even more hopelessly. A fortnight later the Russians were themselves pursuing a pros- perous offensive over the road by which the Germans advanced, and were on German soil engaged in an attack on Lyck. By September 23, when Rennenkampf's rearguard crossed the Niemen, the Germans occupied all the chief strategic points in the country between that river and their own frontier. The struggle which went on during the next week is generally known as the Battle of Augustowo. The idea of the Germans was to cross the Niemen, and presumably to cut the railway at or about Grodno. The idea of General Ruszky was not merely to repel them from the Niemen, but to drive them back to their own frontier, and to disorganize their communications by seizing the little town of x\ugustowo — a place of no intrinsic importance, but vital because it is the point at which several of the few good roads of this region cross. A curious circular strategic railway runs from Grodno to Augustowo, and thence through Suwalki back to the Niemen at Olita. Neither side could use it, for both had damaged it, and 1 THE TIMES -HISTORY- OF THE WAR. 239 the Germans had no rolling stock. The chief physical feature of this region is the im- mense forest, 30 miles long and 20 wide, on whose western edge Augustowo is situated. Intricate chains of lakes stretch on either side of the road from Suwalki to Seiny, begin again south-east of Seiny, and are found on either side of the road from Surino to the Niemen. It is not a country for rash adventures, and the Germans were to learn in it the lesson which the Russians learned amid the Masurian lakes. Above all, the Niemen is itself a formidable obstacle. It is more than 200 yards wide ; it is too deep to ford, and bridges exist only at Grodno and Olita, both of them fortified places. The defence had a further advantage. The right bank, which the Russians held, was high, and in some places might alinost be called a cliff. The left bank, on which the Germans had to operate, was low, and, what was worse, it was in most places swampy. The attempt to cross the Niemen was made simultaneously at two points. The more northernly of these was Druskeniki, about 27 miles north of Grodno. Here on the morning of September 25 the Germans constructed a pontoon bridge. The Russians on the steep right bank reserved their fire until a dense column of men was already on the bridge. Then from cleverly screened positions the Russian field guns and machine guns fell to work. The bridge was swept clean. The German guns were then brought into action and a long artillery duel followed. Thinking that their artillery had at last silenced the enemy's fire, the German infantry again crowded over the bridge. They met the same fate as their predecessors, and it is said that thousands of German corpses- floated down the river. A third attempt was made, after a further artillery duel, towards sunset, and with more determination and still heavier slaughter. The Cossacks crossed at nightfall by the German bridge, and pursued the Germans over a distance of tnght miles. Two divisions were engaged in this attempt, and they are thought to hLve lost fully half their effectives. The other attempt was made nearer to Grodno, not far from the village of Sopotskinie, where the Dul)issa enters the Niemen. Here the Russian heavy guns were posted on the cliffs of the right bank. The field guns were on the sandy shore beloN\- them. Across the river on the left bank was entrenched the Russian infantry, doomed to destruction if its defence should fail, and resolved at any cost to deny the Germans access to the river. The artillery began to fire on the afternoon of the 25th, and all through the night the Germans repeated their incessant efforts to take the Russian trenches. Twice the soimd of a Russian cheer mingled with the thimder of the guns, as the defenders delivered coimter-attacks against the Germans. The enemy retreated at dawn, and the Russians as they pursued counted his dead by thousands. * The rest of the operations which made up the " Battle of Augustowo " were little more than 'a retreat by the Germans along the few practicable roads, harassed by the fire of the Russian big guns, and pursued as occasion offered by the Russian cavahy. There was some hand-to-hand fighting in the forest, in which the Russians showed their usual superiority with the bayonet and the grenade at close quarters. The decisive action was fought in the clear spaces round Augustowo. The Germans had disposed themselves with considerable skill on three sides of a square, so that they commanded the exit from the forest with cross fire. The Russians crossed the canal, executed a wide turning movement by the south, and eventually bombarded Augustowo from the west and north-west with heavy guns. The town was taken by the Russians on the afternoon of October 1, and the infantry pressed on by the roads to Raczky and Suwalki, clearing the obstacles of barbed wire and felled trees as they went. The possession of the roads that GENERAL N. N. MARTOS. 240 THE' TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. converge on Augiistowo settled the " battle," if one can use that word to describe these contests. Deprived of these roads, the Germans could no longer keep touch with their forces before O^owiec, and these at once retired. Nor could they any longer supply themselves from the strategic railway Lyck-Marggrabowa, which runs parallel to their frontier within it. Defeated at Augiistowo and Suwalki, their scattered forces farther north, towards Mariampol, were compelled on October 3 and 4 to fall back towards the frontier, with the Russians pressing hard behind them. The stroke at Augustowo was well planned, and the whole series of operations was managed with a skill worthy of the reputation which General Ruszky had won in Galicia. A week of hard fighting and hard marching sufficed to hurl the invaders back to their own country, their glory not a little diminished and their mxmbers reduced by a heavy tale of casualties. Some of the credit belongs to General Ruszky, some of it to the swamps and forests of Lithuania, but the real hero of this battle was the Russian infantryman. First in renown was the famous 3rd Siberian Corps. Its men towered in height above the European average. They had de- veloped in their winters an endurance which laughed at fatigue and exposure. Impertvu-b- able under fire, they displayed an irresistible impetus in the charge. Their crowning exploit at Augustowo was a march of 30 miles, with a bayonet charge at the end of it. A pause of comparative inaction at this point followed Tannenberg and Augustowo. Through- out October and the early days of November the Russians and the Germans faced each other in entrenched positions, which followed approxi- mately the line of the frontier. The Germans dug themselves in elaborately, with all the paraphernalia of wire entanglements, concealed giui-pits and deep trenches. They attacked the slighter Russian trenches every night by a sort of habitual routine, with the aid of their search- lights, but they evidently had no thought of advancing. The real fighting on the Eastern Front was now in Poland, and it is probable that von Hindenburg had transferred thither most of the first-line troops in East Prussia. Towards the middle of November the German defence weakened. The Russians were again attacking at Lyck, while on their old road in the north they had reached Stall upone.i (November 14). Early in December they were slowly penetrating the maze of the Masurian lakes, and the Siberians were performing prodigies of courage against the elaborate obstacles with which their defiles were now defended. It was a war of trenches, and by sapping slow progress was made against the nearly impregnable German positions. They were weakly held by recent formations, and when the Russians took prisoners they were often mere lads of seventeen. Neither side could spare large forces on this front, and it was a desultory advance which wore down the resistance of a limited garrison. The Germans had forbidden their fugitives to return to the frontier regions of East Prussia, and so long as the Russians did not advance beyond GumbLnnen, Angerburg, Lotzen and Johannisburg the Germans seemed to regard their presence with equanimity. The Russians held this area with some vicissitudes through- out December, and no serious effort was made to dislodge them. The fortunes of war in this region were now fairly balanced. Von Hinden- burg had indeed destroyed a Russian army in a battle which was perhaps the most decisive victory, as it was intellectually the most brilliant performance, of the whole war. His error of judgment in attacldng the lines of the Nieraen went far to neutralize that fine exploit. The soldiers' battle of Augustowo had wiped out the memory of defeat, and at the end of the year the Russians in this region could con- gratulate themselves that they had cleared their own soil and once more carried the war into the enemy's country. CHAPTER LVII THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF GALICIA. Austro-German Misunderstanding of Russia — Plan of the Campaign — Crossing the Frontier — Advance of Austrian Armies — Russian Counter-Movements — Battle of the Gnita Lipa — Halicz — The Battle of Lemberg — Austrian Reinforcements — Russian Offensive in the North — Retirement of Austrian First Army — The Battle of the Grodek Line — Rawa-Ruska — The Crossing of the San — Jaroslau — Siege and Fall of Przemysl — End of the Campaign — Behaviour of Russian Troops. WHEN the Austrians began their operations against Russia on the Galician frontier they made cer- tain vital miscalculations. They grossly underestimated the quality of the enemy with whom they went to cross swords. They counted confidently on having the sjTnpathy of the Polish people against their Russian " oppressors " ; and they were quite unpre- pared for the rapidity with which Russia succeeded in massing her armies against them. That Germany and Austria should have failed to luiderstand at its true worth the wonderful regeneration of the Russian Army which had taken place since the Japanese War is curious ; for, though events, especially recent events in the Balkans, had subjected to con- siderable strain that " wire to St. Petersburg," on the intricate working of which Prince Bismarck set so much store, the German General Staff had every opportimity of being thoroughly informed on Russian military affairs. Their failure to anticipate the enthu- siastic loyalty to the Tsar with which all the peoples of the Russian Empire threw them- selves into the war was only symptomatic of Vol. III.— Part 33 241 the incapacity which the Germans had shown to grasp the psychology of any people but themselves. They looked for a revolt of the Poles against Tsardom precisely as they counted upon revolution in Ireland and the blazing up of sedition in India and in Egypt. In the case of Poland the stupidity was, perhaps, a trifle aggravated, because, whatever justification the Poles' may have had for grievance against Russia, Germany, as Sir \'alentine Chirol has remarked, " had oppressed her own Poles not less ruthlessly than Russia, but a great deal more scientifically."* In the third of the prime miscalculations mentioned above — namely, as to the length of time which Russia would take before she could oppose any effective opposition to their plans— the Avistrians had the excuse of the visible inferiority for strategic purposes of the Russian railway system as compared with their own. On the Austrian side of the international boiuidary two main lines of railway ran practically parallel to the frontier at no great distance away, well built, with abundant • " Germany and the ' I'car of Russia,' " >l)y Si» Valentine Cliirol (Oxford Pamphlets, No. 14). 24-2 THE TUIKS HISTORY OF THF WAR. ARCHDUKE CHARLES FRANCIS JOSEPH The Austrian Heir-Apparent. coruiecting lilies to the interior of the Empire, and with spurs running to the frontier itself at half a dozen points. On the Russian side the main line from Warsaw to Kieff via Lublin is on an average between 50 and 60 miles from the frontier, and only at three points do branch lines project into that intermediate space between Poland and the Bukowina. A spur from Kovel runs to ^^itliin 20 miles of the frontier at Vladimir- Volynsk ; and further east a line from near Rovno runs to Lemberg, passing the frontier at Brody, throwing off on its way a small branch to the southward as far as &emenez, wliile the main international Kieff - Lemberg line crosses the frontier near Tarnopol, Operating under Uke disadvantages, there is no knowing how long the Austrians would have taken to push any considerable armies into the enemy's country. But the rapidity with wliich the Russians, moving independently of rail- ivays, covered long distances with great masses of troops was one of the most remarkable features of the war. The efficiency of their seemingly irregular road transport was the admiration of observers. The Russian peasant soldier, too, was inured to hardsliip and scanty fare. It seems, however incredible, to be a well-established fact that a large part of the UiLs.siaii .-Viiiiies, ttiat of General Riizsky, in the campaign which we are now discu-sKing, liaving outdistanced its coixmiissariat, lived lor some six days of hard marching and stern fighting entirely on apples which it stripped from the orchards as it passed. At the end of the six days it executed one of the most arduous and most brilhant strokes of the war. Such performances had been left quite out of the reckoning of the Austrian General Staff. The Austrians thus miscalculated the spirit and capacity of the enemy opposed to them ; and it is doubtful if the plan of invading Russia at the beginning of hostilities originated with or had the full sj-nipathy of the Austrian General Staff. There is some evidence that they would have preferred to wait witliin their o^^■n territory and meet whatever troops the Russians sent agauist them on ground of tlieir own choosing. The plan adopted seems to have been forced on her allj- by Germany. The invasion was not intended as a blow at the heart of Russia. The operation was of an offensive -defensive character, havmg for its chief object the detaining on this front of as large a Russian force as possible, so as to prevent it from cooperating in the resistance to the German adv-ance in the north. The cliief offensive was entrusted to the 1st Austrian Army under General Dankl, consisting of some seven army corps with various additional units, or between 300,000 and 400,000 men. From its base on Przemysl and Jaroslau its business was to push upwards between the Vistula, on the left hand, and the Bug, on the right, to Lublin and lOiolm. Here it would cut and hold the Warsaw-Kieff railway ; and the road would lie open beyond towards Brest-Litovsk and the main coimiiunications in the rear of Warsaw. A\'hile the 1st Army tlirust forward to this position it would be protected from attack on its right and rear from the east and south by the 2nd Army under General von Auffenberg, \^hich, advancing north-east from Lemberg, would dominate Eastern Galicia from the Bug to the Sereth and the Dniester. The constitu- tion of von Auffenberg's Army at the opening of the campaign is uncertain. It was stated to contain no more than five army corps with five divisions of cavalry. Probablj^ it then amounted to about 300,000 men. Whatever may have been its strength at first, however, circumstances soon compelled a very large increase in its numbers, and in the course of THE TIME;^ HISTORY OF THE WAR. •243 the fighting, as it developed, von Auffenberg seems to have had under his command at least six full army corps (the 3rd, 7th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th), besides the five divisions of cavalry and some last reserves ; and he was reported to have no fewer than ten. This increase was drawn in the first instance from the 3rd or Reserve Army, in command of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. This army, as an independent \.mit, took an inconspicuous part in the operations. While General Dankl was advancing on Lublin, with von Aioffenberg protecting his right flank, the Archduke's Army seems to have been similarly pushed out on the left. Crossing the Polish border, it moved, without meeting serious resistance, as far as Ivielce and towards Radom. That was as far as it was destined or, perhaps, intended, to go. In these three armies Austria had immedi- ately available about, or nearly, one million men ; and it will be worth while to stop a moment to consider the position which would have resulted from the successful establishment of these three armies in their respective spheres. When gathering their forces for the cam- paign on the northern front, the Germans had left troops at both Posen and Breslau, not less than one army corps at the former place., and apparently two, with some additional units. at the latter. If their offensive on that front had been successful and they had reduced or penetrated beyond Warsaw, Poland would have been at their mercy. While General Dankl from the direction of Lublin was joining hands with the main German Armies in tlie rear of Warsaw, the Austrian Ai-niy of the Archdulce, advancing from Kielce, woiild have had the assistance of the Posen -Breslau corps in taking care of any Russian force which remained on the left bank of the Vistula. Any Russian troops thus surrovuided in Poland must either have surrendered or been annihilated. With powerful armies on three sides of it, Iwangorod could not have resisted long, and Poland would have been a second Belgium. By that time, also, it was hoped that the " smashing " of France would be completed and the two allies, with an unbroken front on a straight line from the Baltic to the Car- pathians, could have given their undivided attention to proceeding against Russia, with no fear of a flank attack. This they could not do, either from the north or south, so long as Warsaw, Iwangorod and Brest-Litovsk remained as a base from which the Russians could strike in either direction. This we know to have been the views of the German General Staff. The Austrian advance, thenj was part of, or auxili- ary to, the German movement in the north. "Ilie outbreak of ^^a^ had been received in RUSSIAN ADVANCE GUARD IN KIELCE. 244 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. RUSSIAN GUNS IN THE TRENCHES. Vienna with great enthusiasm. Those who had any forebodings when it was kno\\n that the enemy was to be sometliing so much more formidable than " Httle Serbia " were laughed at. Russia was huge but without coherence. It was preposterous to suppose that the nation wliich had failed against Japan would be able to withstand Germany and Austria combined. She was unready and woiild be beaten before her great shadowy forces could be brought into the field. All analogy to the Japanese Wai', hou^ever, was made fallacious, not only by the regenera- tion of the Russian Army, which has already been fully described, but, still more, by the different spirit in which the new war was accepted by the Russian jjeoples. After the fighting on the Galician frontier had been in progress for two weeks a Berlin newspaper quoted Austrian officers as saying that " Rus- sian troops are simply growing out of the earth, without interruption." It was true. In a nobler and more beautiful sense than either the Austrian officers or the German jom-nalist dreamed, the troops did in very truth gro\v out of the earth. Whatever differences of race or creed or politics may have separated various sections of the Russian people, they were united in one passionate sentiment of devotion to Russia — the great spiritual entity, beyond and above all creeds and governments, of which the material symbol was the Russian soil. All Russians loved the soil of Russia. It was the violation of that soil by the tread of the invader — the thought of its subjection to a brutal enemy — which enraged the people and aroused them to a unitj'^ of religious fervour as in a holy cause. It was the soil which bade them go to war. They " gi-ew out of the earth." In a series of striking letters* to The Times Mr. Stephen Graham described the extra- ordinary spectacle of the stirring of the Rus- sian peoples as he witnessed it in Cossack Adllages on the Mongolian frontier when the great news came and " a young man on a fine horse came galloping down the village street, a great red flag hanging from his shoulders and flapping in the wind ; and as he went he called out the news to each and every one — War ! War ! " From another angle another special correspondent of The Times, Mr. Stanley • Subsequently published in a volume under the title of " Russia and the World " (Cassoll). THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 245 •Wafihbiirn', was at the same moment describing what went on in Ht. Petersburg (as the town still was) and comparing it with what occurred at the opening of the war with Japan. In the former war " tlie peasants had to be driven almost at the point of the bayonet into box cars for shipment to Manchuria." Now : Before the Winter Palace, the great red house of the Tsars, stretches an enormous semicircle, which forms one of the greatest arenas in Europe. This is what we see now : More than 100,000 people of all classes and of all ranks standing for hoiu-s in the blazing sun before the building within which is their monarch. Quietly and orderly they wait, without hysteria and with the patience so characteristic of their race. At last the Tsar, moved by the magnitude of the demonstration, appears upon the balcony overlooking the square. Instantly the entire throng sinks upon its knees and with absolute spontaneity sings the deep-throated Russian anthem. For perhaps the first time since Napoleon's invasion of Russia the people and their Tsar were one, and the strength that unity spreads in a nation stirred throughout the Empire, from the far fringes of the i'acilio littoral to the German frontier.* Of all this in those last days of July and the beginning of August, 1914, the Austrians knew nothing. They knew that Russia was a giixnt, but attached no importance to any attribute of that giant-hood except its imwieldiness and supposed sloth. All the best Russian, troops had, moreover, it was declared, already been sent to the East Prussian theatre. It would be * From the volume of Mr. Washburn's correspondence to The Times as republished under the titlo of " Field Notes from the Russian Front." (Andrew Melrose.) long before she could marshal new armies to . oppose an advance on the south. As a matter of fact, by the end of August Russia had, chiefly from the districts of Kieff and Odessa, brought into the fighting line on the Galician front about 1,200,000 men. Not only did they outnumber the Austrian Armies brought against them, but they excelled them in fighting power, and, even more conspicuously, they were better generalled. The Grand Duke Nicholas and tlie Rassian General Staff took accurate measure of the Austrian advance from the outset, and the operations with which they met it will stand as a model for similar campaigns, even as it produced, perhaps, the most gigantic and most desperate fighting which up to that time the world had seen. Against the main Austrian advance of General Dankl with 350,000 men (roughly) of the 1st Army no serious resistance was imme- diately offered. It was allowed to come on almost to Lublin, to within 11 niiles of wliich it at one tune penetrated. We have seen how the 3rd or Reserve . Austrian Army had been sent, on a quite futile errand, into Poland on the left side of the Vistula to push towards Kielce, while General Daniel went due nortli. There is very little information as to incidents on either of these marches, but that is im- material. We know that Dankl's Army crossed RUSSIANS MnTERINU A BURNiNU TOW.N IN EASTERN CMtlClA, «' 33—2 24G TUK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the frontier, on a front al)out 11 miliss wide, to the west of Tarnogrod, on August 10. TJie frontier posts hardly stopped to have a brush with the Austrian advance cavalry before falling back. A second brush, but no more than a sldrmish, occurred at Goraj, and some- thing a little more serious at Krasnik. The Austrians seem to have thought that those wisps of troops \\ hich met them (even at Ivras- nik, of which the authorities in Vienna made much, there were only a few battahons) con- stituted the real Russian resistance, and they marched joyfully. They were going through a beautiful country, it was superb weather, and the enemy, after doing no more tlian delay therrt for a day or two, fell away before them, either behind the fortified position of Zamosc (which the Austrians kept on their right) or back towards LubUn and Kholm. Everything tended to verify the expectations with which they had set out. Russia, for all her vastness, was unready ; and war was a fine thing. Meanwhile, on the line from Lublin to Kholm, Russia had been massing an army — or two armies cooperating as one — under the dual command of Generals Ewarts and Plelive, though General Ivanoff seeuis to have beea in supreme direction or the combined force. Here the Russians had the railway beliind them, to Wai-saw in one direction and to Kieft' and Odessa in the other, and every day, as the Austrians drew nearer, tlieir strengtii increased. By the first days of S(!ptember the Russian force here probably amounted to upwards of 400,000 men. The Aastrians were within 15 miles of Lublin before they met real resistance and General Dankl became aware that he liad a worthy opponent in front of him. ,But it wa.s not in the Russian programme to strike on this line — -not yet. The Austrians found them- selves checked, and then definitely held up, by forces at least as great as their ov\'n ; and the Russians waited till news came that certain things had happened further to the south-west. There, it will be reinembered, was tlie Austrian second army tmder General von Auffenberg. This was not intended to be inmiediately an army of invasion, ^'on Auften- berg's task was to threaten, but probably not push much beyond, the frontier in a direction in which the fortresses of Dubno, Rovno and l^utzk lay in the path of an advance, besides RUSSIAN SOLDIERS KISSING AN IKON BEFORE GOING INTO BATTLE. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 247 L A.:..^ML. RUSSIAN TROOPS ADVANCING THROUGH A POLISH TOWN. Vladimii'-Volyntk, a foi'tified position of con- siderable importance. His chief object was to detain in this quarter any Russian troops which might come up from Odessa and the east, and to protect General Dankl's right flank and rear. He was la\'ishly provided with cavalry, with which he proceeded at once to harry and raid the frontier at various points. Even before DankJ had reached Russian soil spluttering hostilities had begun all along the Volhynian border of Galicia. According to reports received in St. Petersbiu-g the Austrians commenced operations 12 hovii-s before the declaration of war, on August 6, by firing on the Russian frontier posts at W'oloczysk, ^\ herc^ the Lemberg-Odessa railway line crosses the fron- tier close to the border of Podolia. They also blew up an arch of the railway bridge, but did not cross the frontier. A few miles to the soutli of that point on the same day, however, the frontier seems to ha\-e been penetrated in botli directions by raiding parties in the neigiibour- hood of Tonioruda and Satanov. These affairs, however, were mere fireworks. More serious matters soon showed that the 2nd Austrian Ai'my in tliis quarter was to find no -sucli complaifsaut recejition as was being accorded to the early advances of the 1st Army further to the north. On August 11 reports from Vienna spoke of a Russian cavalry demonstration, backed by machine guns, against Brody, a town on the Lemberg-Kieff railway a couple of miles on the Austrian side of the frontier. Two days later more significant news came from St. Peters- burg. An Austrian advance m some strength had apparently been nneditated in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsk, but before the Austrians could cross the border the Russian cavalry struck them, and struck unexpectedly hard, at Sokal, the terminus of the railway line fo Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg. Two Austrian infantry battalions and three regiments of cavalry are believed to have suffered here very severely, and the Austrian force fell back towards Lemberg in some confusion. The news of the affair at Sokal caused great re- joicing in Russia. In view of the number of troops engaged, its importance seemed at the time to be exaggerated. But these were early days of tlio war. A success at this point, moreover, on the flanks of both Austrian Armies, had evident strategic value, tuid the Sokal incident wtvs nuieli the most important 248 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 'that had yet occurred on tliis front. The 'Russian success in it was smartly achieved and excellently complete. It was then accepted as of happy augury for Russia ; while to von Auffenberg it showed, at least, that the enemy was less unready than had been supposed. Russia was very far from being unready. Four days after the Sokal affair it was officially announced from St. Petersburg that the general advance of the Russian Armies against Austria liad begun, as it also began against Germany in the north, it being then the seventeenth day after mobilization. The chief command of the armies on this front was in the hands of General Nikolas Ruzsky. General Ruzsky had been Cliief of Staff to General Kaulbars in the Japanese War and had taken a conspicuous part in the reform of the Russian military system which followed. What %vas, perhaps, more important, he had been for some time commander of the military district of Kieff, where he had not only brought the organization to a high degree of efficiency and Was worshipped by his men, but he had made it his business to render himself thoroughly familiar with the topography of this southern frontier country. He had here the advantage which von Hindenburg possessed in East Prussia. There was probably no highly- placed oilicor on the Austrian side who knew the configuration of Galicia to the last stream and hill and by-road as it was known to the Russian coimnander. General Ruzsky was already known as one of Russia's most conscientious and most scientific soldiers. He soon showed that he was also pre-eminently a fighting general, with a capacity for hard liitting and vigorous initiative. Cooperating with Ruzsky on his left was General Alexis Brusiloff, a typical cavalry officer, whose active service record dated back to the war with Turkey in 1877. The total Russian force under these com- manders was probably not less than 6.50,000 men. There were certainly twelve and apjjarently fourteen army corps, with several divisions of cavalry. Ruzsky, under liis per- sonal command, seems to have had eight a.'my corps. Brusiloff had not less than five, with at least three divisions of Cossack cavalry. The practice of adding extra divisions to regular army corps, alluded to in a former chapter, makes it difficult to estimate the actual number of men composing a Russian Army, wliich, it may be added, is one of its objects. But Ruzsky in the 2nd Russian Army (the OIL-WELLS IN GALICIA. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 249 RUSSIAN TROOPS IN THE HILLY COUNTRY 1st being that londer Ivanoff, with Ewarts and Plehve, at Lublin) had probably over 400,000 men, and Brusiloff, in the 3rd Army, little if any less than 300,000, composed of regiments drawn chiefly irom Odessa and Southern llussia. Combined they had, perhaps, double the strength which at the outset von Auffen- berg, with the 2nd Austrian Army, would have been prepared to oppose to them. As soon as von Auffenberg became aware of the strength of the Russian Armies against him, however, he drew on the 3rd, or Reserve Army (which, as we have seen, had been pushed into Poland as far as Kielce) for reinforcements. These troops, <'ro.s-;ing the Vistula by means of bridges of boats at Josefow, hurried to join him, and when the battle wuh really joined the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Army was operating in close contact with that of von Auffenberg. In the combined armies on both sides there were engaged then, in the operations which followed, not less than 1,200,000 men, some advantage in numbers still remaining on the side of the Russians. The Russian offensive definitely began on August 17. At the moment when General Dankl to the north, with the 1st Austrian Army, was finding himself held up in his progress towards Lublin, General Ruzsky threw the whole weight of his attack against von Auffen- berg. The Russian plan of campaign was simple but admirable. With his superiority in numbers, Ruzsky could afford to aim at enveloping the enemy on both flanks. With the 2nd, and larger, of the two armies he flung himself, advancing along the railway from Dubno, at the Austrian left and centre, cross- ing the frontier on August 22 and occupying Brodj' with only trifhng opposition on the following day. On the 22nd also Brusiloff, on his left, had crossed the frontier at VVoloczysk, the frontier station on the Lem- berg-Odessa railway. As the railway line changed gauge at the frontier, the Russian locomotives and carriages were of no service beyond it, and the Austrians, on the enemy's approach, had rushed away as much of their own rolling stock as they could towards Lemberg and destroj'ed what they could not take away. As has been explained in a former chapter, however, the Ru.ssians were perforce less accustomed to rely on railwajs than were tlieir opponents, and as soon as they were away from railways they much exceeded the Austrians in mobility and speed of movement. A good wagon road ran parallel to the railway towards I^emberg, pushing along which Brusiloff's advance cavalry on tiie 23rd hustled tin- I'ctreating Austrians, after some three hours' fighting, out of Tarnopol. Tlie Austrians 260 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. M. KRAVGHENKO, THE WELL-KNOWN RUSSIAN ARTIST, SKETCHING A SUSPECT. then fell back on the line of the Ztota Lipa, an affluent of the Dniester, which runs almost due southward, and on the 25th and 26th there was heavy fighting along this stream, especially around Brzezany. Up to tliis point Brusiloff's Army had encountered only the resistance of small detachments of the enemy, frontier posts and bodies of skirmishers thrown out to delay its advance. Xo considerable force of Austrians seems to have penetrated here much beyond the Ztota Lipa, on the eastern side of which there runs a line of small hills, which offered an excellent defensive position. Here the Austrians had set themselves hurriedly to make field works, and they were still at work on the trenches when the Cossack cavalry came driving the screen of Austrian skirmishers before them. The position was too formidable for the cavalry to handle alone, and they waited for the main body of the army to come up. Even then the Austrians offered an un- expectedly stubborn resistance, and it took two days of sharp fighting before the position, which extended some 20 mUes from north to south, was finally carried by direct assault, and the Austrians fell back, seemingly at moderate speed and in good order, in the direction of Halicz at the confluence of the Gnita Lipa with the Dniester. While Brusiloff was thus beginning to press von Auffenberg's right, Ruzsky was hammering his left and centre. Of tlie details of the fightmg there we know little or notliing. After crossing the frontier at and between Brody and Sokal, Ruzsky's Army spread out on a wide front, the centre pushing straight for Busk and Krasne in the direct line towards Lemberg, while the right, advancing almost due west, aimed at driving a wedge in between the army of von Auffenberg and that of Dankl to the north, and pressed with all its weight on von Auffenberg's left. Meanwhile Ruzsky's own left felt its way southward towards a junction with Brusiloff. The Austrians were forced back in all directions, but slowly and resisting gallantly. On Ruzsky's right and centre, especially, it is known that the fighting was sustained and severe and accompam"ed by very hea\'y losses on both sides. In liis army were some of the ^•ery best of the Russian first line troops, and narratives of those who took j3art in the operations showed that the Russians attacked every kind of position with the same recklessness, and the AnstriaiLs. though con- tinually overpowered, fought desperately. The THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 2.31 attention of the Western world was at this time engrossed in the stirring events which were occurring in France and Belgium, and so little v>'as recorded of the operations in Galicia beyond the mere statement of the successive steps in the Russian advance that the impres- sion was created that that advance was an easy one. This is far from being the truth. General Ruzsky had a week of such stern fighting as would at another time have fired the world's imagination before he had succeeded in forcing his way through on the line from Sokal to Tomaszow on the right, and had driven the enemy's centre back to the Bug at Krasne and across the railway at Zlocow. By that time Brusiloff had carried the position on the Ztota Lipa, and his right came in touch u ith Ruzsky 's left. With this juncture closed v\ hat may be considered the preliminary stage of the Lemberg campaign. Von Auffenberg's Army as yet not only was not beaten, but it was hardly shaken. It fell back into the strong and carefully prepared line of defences in front of Lemberg, stretching over a front of some 70 or 80 miles, from near Busk in the north to HaUcz on the Dniester in the south. Along the greater part of its length this line ran through a broken region of vol- canic hills, in places very irregular and con- taining extinct craters, ending to the south in a ridge roughly parallel to the course of the Gnita Lipa as far as the Dniester. The rail- way running due east of Lemberg skirted the northern end of this broken country. North of the railway the Austrian left rested on the river Bug and the lake district about Krasne. It was a line of great natural strength, and mile after naile of trenches with extensive barbed wire entanglements, and here and there strong fortifications of steel and concrete, made it a most formidable position to take by assault at any point. After the jimcture of Ruzsky and Brusiloff, on August 26-27, the Russians lost no time in opening the attack along the entire front. Knowledge of incidents of the terrific fighting which filled the following days is almost entirely lacking. Wliat is known is that the Russians attacked with fury and with a dis- regard for life which undoubtedly cost them very dearly. Again and again bayonet charges were pushed home, and individual positions were taken and retaken. At the end of two days the Austrian front was still unbroken, but the battle was decided. RESERVISTS IN VIENNA. 25-2 THE TIMES HISTORY. 'OF THE WAIL To General Brusiloff and liis corps com- mander, General Radko Dmitrieff (the Bul- garian hero of Lule Burgas and Kirk Kilisse), belong the lionoui- of the crucial and brilliant operation which detennined the fate of the battle. After forcing the crossing of the Ztota Lipa on August 26, while his right wing niade connexion with Ruzsky in the north, BrusilofT's left swung wide to the south as far as the valley of the Dniester itself. It niu.-t have been an extraordinary- inarch. 'J'lie country is rough, and not only devoid of rail- ways, but almost innocent of roads. On August 30 the main bod\r of this flanking force had arrived before Halicz, and on the following day -the assault began. During that day more guns came up, and a furious and, as it proved, irresistible attack was concentrated on a point on the enen-iy's position near the little village of Botszonce. The Austrians fought courage- ously, and the condition of the field afterwards, the ground everywhere ploughed up with shell fire, and almost every yard strewn with frag- ments of projectiles and tattered equipment, showed how desperate the struggle had been. The Russian 9th and 57th infantry seem to have carried through the final assault with the bayonet under co\er of a \ ery tf)rrent of shell fire. Their losses were terrible, but b\- night- fall of August 31 a breach some kilometres wide had been made in the Austrian position. Once the line had been pierced the entire Austrian right gave way. A last despairing stand seems to have been made in the village of Botszonce itself, but the Russian guns, pushing forward, imlimbered on ihe very hills on which the enemy had fought so stubb irnly, and the centre of tlie little town was qui kly reduced to a heap of ruins. The I'ctreat of the Austrians at this point then became a headlong flight. As the Russian offic al statement worded it: "The Austrian Army temporarily lost all fighting value." The road, strewn with abandoned guns, transport, and all the flotsam and jetsam of a routed army, showed abundant evidences of a panic-stricken stam- pede for safety. On the scene of the fighting around Botszonce and Halicz the Russians buried 4,800 Avistrian dead, and they captured 32 guns, some of which had been moiuited in positions from which they never came into use. At Halicz a fine steel bridge spanned the river Dniester, and the only thought of the extreme right of the broken Austrian Army HUNGARIAN LANDWEHR STARTING FOR THE FRONT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WJR. 253 ■>" - ^ -.•/ " - .i^-#Wf< -V- SUSPENSION BRIDGE CONSTRUCTED BY AUSTRIAN ENGINEEKS. seems to have been to get across this bridge. But the Russian cavalry was pressing close on the heels of the fugitives, and in such haste were the Austrian engineers to destroy the structure and stop pursuit that, it is said, one party blew up the bridge while another party was still at work mining one of the piers, with the result that all the latter were destroyed with the bridge The only other bridge in this part of the Dniester, at Chodorow, was also destroyed, and the pursuit southward was checked until the Russian engineers could throw pontoons across the stream. This they suc- ceeded in doing on the following day, when Cossack cavalry to the strength, it is said, of three divisions, crossed the river and caught up with the rear of the retreating enemy. Not much behind the cavalry followed some divisions of Brusiloff's infantry, which, without giving the enemy time to take breath, pushed on across the south of Lemberg towards Stryj. Once the extreme right of the Austrian line was shattered, the whole line disintegrated rapidly ; the more so as at the other extreme Ruzsky had also definitely attained the mastery. There also, while every mile of the Austrian front was being pitilessly pounded, a wid(^ flanking movement was being executed, en- veloping the Austrian left from the direction of Kamionka. While one end of the Austrian line was broken, the other was being bent back. On the shortening front the triumphant Russians redoubled the fury of their attack, and soon the whole Austrian Army was in flight, and the great city of Lemberg was in possession of the Russians. At many points the retreat of von Auffenberg's Army became a panic-stricken and disorderly rout, the misery of which was intensified by a succession of storms and drenching rains, by which much of the country wa.s flooded. The Russians had suffered tremendous losses in the two days, diuring which they had flung themselves in a continuous succession of reckless charges against the Atistrian positions. But those los.ses were nothing (ujrnpared to what they now inflicted on the enemy. On September 2 the GrantI Duke Niciiolas was able to telegraph to the Tsar: I uin liappy to gladiloii your Majesty witli (lie news of tho victory won by tlic Army of General Hu/.sky under Lwow (F^omherfi) after seven days' uninterrupted (indit- ing. The Austriiins are retreating in eomploto ilisorder, in some places running awav. abandoning guns, riQes. artillery parks, and baggage trains. ' o — o 254 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB GENERAL DANKL. The victorious Russians pressed, almost literally, upon their heels. There seems to have been, in the first moment of defeat, no attempt at any systematic retreat or delaying rear- guard action, though it is said that the Austrians adopted the rather crude device of placing their Slav regiments in the rear. When the Russian pursuers discovered the ruse, they are reported to have endeavoured to meet it by using a high-angle fire with their artillery, so as to reach the Austrian troops beyond. If this is true, it would in a measure explain the enormous number of prisoners that were taken ; and there seems no doubt that considerable bodies of the retreating troops did svu-render very willingly. Austrians afterwards made com- plaint that they had been betrayed by their Slav comrades, just as, in the disasters which were to follow, Germans made similar accusa- tions against the Austrians. The Russians appear to have taken no less than 64,000 prisoners, and the lowest estimate of the total Austrian losses (including Idlled, wounded, and prisoners) was 130,000, and some authorities placed them at nearly double that niunber. They were certainly very heavy. There was at the time much criticism of the Austrian commander for failing to rally at, and liold, the city of Lemberg itself. The criticism is unjustifiable. Thougli it is true tliat th« position which had been so stubbornly de- fended was over 10 miles east of Lemberg, after the line was once broken the city was indefensible. We have seen how Brusiloff's pursuing army swept to the west of the city. Ruzsky was already closing on the place from the north. The iimer defences were not sucli as to enable the city to resist for any length of time. To have attempted to hold it would only have been to surrender it to the horrors of bombardment, and to sacrifice whatever troops were left to defend it. It could not have interposed any material obstacle to the Russian advance. Lemberg or Lwow or Lowenburg was originally Leopolis, and was founded in 1259 by the Ruthenian prince Daniel for liis son Leo. It had had a chequered and stormy history, having been captured by Casimir the Great in 1340, besieged by the Cossacks in 1648 and 1655, and by the Tiu-ks in 1672, captured by Charles XII. of Sweden in 1704, and bombarded in 1848. Capital of the crown- land of Galicia, it had grown to be a beautiful city of parks and wide boulevards, with three cathedrals, many churches, and important public monuments. It was the seat of a University, and contained a most valuable library of boolcs and manuscripts, and many treasures of antiquarian and liistoric interest. After its evacuation in September, 1914, the Austrians explained that it was in order to save all these treasvires from destruction that the place had not been defended. That may have been taken into consideration. Certainly, the civil population was strongly opposed to its being defended. That population was extra- ordinarily cosmopolitan, and contained many elements — a minority probably, but a very strong minority — whose sympathy was with Russia, and who welcomed the Russians with enthusiasm. What was more important, how- ever, was that from a miUtarj' point of view the attempt to hold it would have been futile. Apart from the moral effect of its capture, the actual strategical value to the Russians of the possession of Lemberg was of the greatest. From it railwaj'^ lines radiated m all directions, giving the captors direct communication, subject onlj'^ to the inconvenience of the change of gauge at the frontier, with Kiefi and Odessa, with their fortified positions at Dubno and Rovno and thence with Petrograd (the nauie of which had now been changed from St. Petersburg), with THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 255 THH AUSTRIAN FAILURE: IN GALICIA. 1. Distributing bread to the poor of Vienna. 2. Types of Austrian prisoners. 3. Refugees in Calicin. 4. Austrian guns captured at I eniherg. 5. Austrian prisoners from I.embcrg. 250 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Brpst-Litovsk and Warsaw. Immediatoly after crossing the frontier the Russians had begun to change a number of raUway engines and car- riages to fit the Austrian gauge, but not least welcome among the trophies which awaited them in Lemberg were thirty locomotives and an immense number of railway vehicles of all kinds. Tl^ie Russians are said to have rushed the station with such rapidity that they caught trains loaded with war materials ready to steam out. The ability of the Russian Armies to operate and move about without the help of railways has already been referred to. Through- out this campaign hitherto the transport both of ammunition and commissariat had been con- ducted by road, independently of any railways, chiefly in carts diawn by the tough little Siberian horses. Few more remarkable inci- dents were produced by the war than the achievement, inentioned above, of Ruzsky's column, which for five or six days " lived on the country " in the form of the fruit of the orchards, or the feat of Brusiloff in striking at Halicz with the rapidity with whicR he did. Not only was no defence of Lemberg attempted, but very few of the retreating Austrian troops passed through the city. Various stories crept into contemporary reports of hand-to-hand fighting in the streets. These seem to have been wholly imaginative. On September 3 the Russians entered the citj- without a shot being fired and vnthout any sort of disturbance or any excesses on the part of the victorious troops. The results of the great \-ictory were communicated to the pub- lic in the following brief official announcement : 6even days of the most stubborn fighting m Ea<tern Galicia have resulted in a complete victory for the Russians. Five Austrian Corps were completely routed, and are retreating in disordu-r westward, abandon- ing their arms and baggage. Besides an enormous number of killed, the Austrians lost not less than 40,000 prisoners, inclu.ling many generals. The roads of retreat of the Austrians are so encumbered with carts, guns, and impedimenta that the pursuing troops are unable to use the roads. Panic is spreading among the Austrian troops. During the seven days the Russians have taken over 200 guns, ■several colours, and about 70,000 prisoners. Lwow (Lemberg) is in our hands. The news of the victory was received in Russia with almost frenzied jubilation. Grand Dulce Nicholas conveyed the information of the occupation of Lemberg to the Tsar " with extreme joy and thanking God." General Ruzsky received the Fourth Class of the Order of St. George for " liis services in the preceding battles " and the Third Class for the capture of Lemberg. General Brusiloff received the Fourth Class of the same Order. Thanks- giving services were held throughout the Russian Empire to celebrate " the reunion with Galicia " and General Count Bobrinsky was appointed Governor-General of the pro- vince. Everywhere it was felt that the imoor- UFFICERS' QUARTERS IN AN AUSTRIAN TRENCH. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 257 AN ABANDONED AUSTRIAN REDOUBT NEAR LEMBERG. tance of the indirect effects of tliis victory, in the disconcerting of all the German plans on both fronts, could hardly be exaggerated. It is now necessary to turn to the theatre ot operations further to the north. Here, it will be remembered, was the scene of the chief Austrian offensive, by the 1st Army under General Dankl, who was believed to have mider his command between 300,000 and 400,000 men. We left him, in the middle of August, hung up by the armies of Generals Ewarts and Plehve, which barred his way towards Lublin and Kholm. For the moment the Russians were content merely to bar his way. They were gathering strength, and waited their time to strike until Danld's Army was safely cut off from reinforcements and until their advance would synchronize with the fruition of the ad- vance of Ruzsky and Brusiloff on Lemberg. It was not until September 6 that a characteris- tically simple official announcement was made in Petrograd : Our armies on September i assumed the offensive along a front between the Vistula and the Bug. The announcement was received by the Rus- sian people, flushed and rejoicing over the victory of Lemberg, with immense enthusiasm. It will be remembered that in the advance of Ruzsky's formidable army, part of the Austrian Reserve Army, under Archduke Joseph Ferdi- nand, had been hastily withdrawn from its position in Poland on the left of the Vistula, across the rear of Dankl's Army, to help General von Auffenberg. The Austrian General Staff, in a communique published on September 3, referred to this movement as an " advance." It seems undoubted that even at that early date some German troops were also being brought up on the same errand. Part of the Austrian reinforcements were absorbed into the army of von Auffenberg and had shared his catastrophe. Part remained to screen Dankl's right flank. From this time onward, however, it is extremely difficult to trace the organization of the Austrian Armies, the fact being that, under stress of the emergency, that organization was continually changing. The plans of the campaign had been drawn up on the assumption of a successful and victorious advance. As soon as things went wrong, their weakness appeared. When Auffenberg' a Army began to get into difficulties and ita advance was checked, the gap betAveen its left and Dankl's right and rear grew uncomfort- ably wide. The hurrying of the troops from the left bank of the Vistula was an effort to fill that gap. Then, as the Russian strength grew daily more apparent, an entire new Austrian Army was hastily fonned, composed, apparently, of parts of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's (3rd or Reserve) Army, increased by two corps withdrawn from the Serbian fron- tier and some indeterminate number of German troops. This 4th Army, which appears to have been under the command of the Arclidiike, was hereafter spoken of in the Russian official annovmcements as the " Toniaszow Army." German troops from Breslau were also brought up to strengthen Dankl's left, whicli lay upt)u the Vistula at Opolie. 258 THE TIMES hislOEY OF THE WAPx. BATTERY OF HEAVY HOWITZERS. During the last days of August and the first few days of September there was a good deal of confused fighting between detached forces on either side in the frontier region between Zamosc and Sokal. From Berlin and Vienna official claims were made to some minor suc- cesses, which a semi-official statement from Petrograd immediately declared to be " wilful falsehoods." Out of the mass of reports and contradictions, clamis and counter-claims, all that emerges clearly is that the Russian wedge was successfully driven through to Tomaszow, where the Austrians suffere'd a severe and definite defeat, contemporary reports asserting that among their slain were two generals. From here the Austrians seem to have fallen back to the swampy eovmtry about Bilgoraj and upon Tarnogrod. These Russian suc- cesses put a final barrier between the two great sections of the Austrian forces. All interest now centred in the fate of Dankl's 1st Army. The fighting on the Lublin-Kholiu front, entirely defensive at first on the j^art of the Russians, had grown sterner day by day until it became one continuous battle along the whole line. With the defeat of von Auffeii- berg, and the threat to its right and rear, the situation of the northern army became so evidently critical that it was necessary for General Danlil to force a decision. Either he must break tlirough the Russian defence or fall back. A last desperate effort to pierce the wall of resistance between Lublin and Ivliolm was made on September 2. when the 10th Austrian Army Corps led the attack against the weaker portioii of the Russian line, and it appears to have reached to within 11 miles of Lublin. There it was beaten back with heavy losses. In the retirement 5,000 prisoners were left in Russian hands. With this effort the Aastrian offensive spent itself, and the game passed into the enemy's hands. The Russian offensive definitely began, we have seen, on September 4 ; and it began aits- piciously. " The enemy's centre, lying in the region west of Ivi-asuostaw," said the imper- turbable Russian official announcement two days later (Krasnostaw being almost due north of Zamosc, about lialf-way to the centre of a line drawn from Lublin to Kholm). " wa.*; particularly disorganized. The 45th Austrian Regiment was surrounded and surrendered, including the colonel, 44 officers, and 1,600 men." The same annoiuicement contained the interesting information that " a (German Division, coming to the relief of the Austrians, was attacked on the left bank of the Vistula." Tlie Russian troops there must presvunably have come from Iwan'_'orod. But Russian armies were indeed "growing out of the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •259 (>urth " ; and nothing is more strilcing in the whole of this Gahcian campaign than the accuracy with which the Russian General Staff took the measure of their enemy's strategy at every point, and the promptitude with which it met and countered each move. When once the Austrian 1st Army had started to retreat it was given no rest, and it is impossible to regard this phase of the opera- tions in Gahcia without profound sympathy with Dankl's Army and some admiration for it. In some ways it might be compared to the falling back of the British Army from Mons. There was not, however, on any part of the Austrian front the same terrible pressure from a hopelessly overwhelming force. There is good evidence indeed that over much of the front — the Austrian right-centre — the Russians were in a numerical inferiority. That was im- material, however, retreat being necessary to the Austrians as the only alternative to being left isolated and ultimately destroyed. As in France, the movement was strategically obli- gatory in conformity with the movement of another army, which army was also falling back from the right. And the spectacle of tlir Austrian retreat is uiade the more dreadful by the mere size of the army. The front on which the army of something over 300,000 men lay extended was approximately 80 miles. As it fell back, the left wing hemmed in by tlie river Vistula and the right subject to con- tinuovis pressure from the Russian forces to the east, where swampy country, moreover, barred a direct retreat, this front was continually con- tracting. By the time the army reached the San, the crossing of which, so far as the bulk of the force was concerned, had to be made by some four or five bridges at different points, the front had contracted to less than 40 miles. That such a movement might easily have degenerated into a panic, accompanied by awful slaughter, until the whole army had either been obliterated or had surrendered is evident. In Russia some such termination to the incident was looked forward to with some- thing like confidence, and it was evident that in other countries also the fate of the Austrian 1st Army was regarded as practically sealed. General Dankl deserves full credit for, at least, escaping this final catastrophe, however serious his losses were. AUSTRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF. 260 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. DlBartSj jihof j<urS2any Ponev'S o oWobOlniki ■^x Preh ¥ Ponewesct'i XUtziarii Ounaburg ■V5z'/e^ IXTiK ■0: \, '^\ ^srieRiun <o n i t z i^ ' oManenwerder 1 "'/arnisni] Lebedef/ SAloc uRAuOENZ^ Ortelsburg Ipikfiphr^ ^ Lbtzen i ASuwa/ki ^ , ^llenstein ^^ /\-^^» rv>^^ ^v Nikolaiev Dere vno ^J" y/isk 9RN Biezui Lipno Plocl?\ oSi erpe Drobii " Oioneie 3iva ROZHANi; DSTROLENKA PULTUS^ 3ial_ystok'''^ Kurnik 'Pleicnfen >l:?^^r jBRYTf PULTUS SIER^K ) urrtomcvfCi/ ' hchaczen Lowicz . .oGeo^cievsk __ ^"^ 'Siedlce S:teny 'Beresha <srtushka <BrestUtovski DW Kalisch \ R Lod2 U/ 'SkTerniewjce Lukom I .Nevei /' ■Ratno Gorodno 'V^iodom Piotrkowi bTiesuu-''"''"^..'^^'^'- Opocino Radom A///zy Lishnevka PNovo Radomsk] /CzestDchow3/ .ubiin / T^^ — ■-^.'.'^•|,.-r-^^^.! _ ^ .(-" "^^yi-^^i "N^'T'/ogAa droay^ '^Krementz ^■/ ~i'-'^y I'" \ (""oremobawa ■, -^ , ^f- /-^ r MuShOlo) j:rlau iHjneg^tia jBUDAf'ES^ Scale 01' Miles 10 20 3C <«) 50 6C 70 80 90 100 \}< iOebrec haMaramaros Sz^gef^^"^ . ^••.■.'^:. • ,. ^A* ^1 {2J ;o V,-^-'^Dorn3mtra Karoog Dees^ BORG Bistrit'z MAP ILLUSTRATING THR GALICIAN CAMPAIGN. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 261 The high -water-mark of the Austrian advance on this front would be represented by a Uno drawn from Opolie on the Vistula, through Krasnostaw to Grabiowiec, whence the line curved southward in the direction of Tyszowce, in the region of which place it was that the Austrian General Staff had claimed one of the successes which Petrograd had so promptly denied. We have seen how the Russian advance against this front, from the direction of Lublin and Kholm, had begun with the " disorganization " of the Austrian centre at Krasnostaw. The next blow was delivered at the Austrian left, beginning at Opolie and thence developing all along the line to Tm-obin. With sound strategy it was on this wing of the Russian Army that the chief strength had been concentrated, leaving other parts of the line, as has already been said, comparatively weak. All new troops that came up had been hurried over to the right wing, on the reasoning that, even if the Austrians succeeded in brealdng through the front where it was weaker, near K^holm, it would only make their being ulti- mately surrounded the more certain. The Russian attack on this Opolie-Turobin section of the line seems to have been irresis- tible, the enemy being driven southward, parallel to the course of the Vistula, in con- fusion. Many of the fugitives threw away their arms in panic, and for nineteen miles the Russian cavalry was busy with the demoralized rear- guard of the flying enemy. From here on, it was a continual rimning fight, the Russians never cea-«ing to press, the Austrians defending their rear as well as they could while making all speed to get away, and they were now traversing again imder vastly different cir- cumstances the coimtry over which they had advanced so easily and so triumphantly two or three weeks before. There seems to have been particularly desperate fighting at Suchodola and again at Krasnik, where two German D visions appear to have been engaged, the officers of which afterwards declared that the Austrians broke and deserted them. At Frampol there is record of a brilliant Russian cavalry charge. Thence the Austrian left was forced back into the morasses about Bilgoraj, while the right and centre were crowded together as they neared the river San. By this time 10,000 prisoners had been sent back to Lublin At Frampol one Cossack regiment is said to have captured 17 Austrian officers, 445 men, and many horses belonging to a trans- COUNT BOBRINSKY. Russian Governor-General of Ga.icia. port train. At a point below Zamosc one Russian infantry regiment took 700 prisoners, including many officers. One Russian subal- tern with three orderlies is said to have taken 80 prisoners, and a spectator spoke of the Austrians as " siirrendering in companies and battalions." Among the booty taken here- abouts was the treasure chest of the 17th Regiment of the Landwehr, containing 140.000 crowns. Such details give an idea of the char- acter of the retreat, on which the Austrians are said to have suffered badly from dysentery, as was shown by the nuraber of patients in the hospitals in towns which were occupied by the Russians. It is necessary to stop here for a while in the narrative, because contemporary writers on this phase of the campaign developed a theory of what was known as " the battle of tho Grodek line." It was declared that somewhere about Bilgoraj Dankl's retreating' army got in touch with von Auffenberg's left and, uniting with it, rallied and took its place in the northern section of a carefully prepared line of defence which reached, from somewhere about this point, through Rawa-Raska to Grodek at the extreme soutli. It was asserted that on this line both the shattered Austrian Ai'mies pulled themselves together and again 262 THE I'lMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. A RUSSIAN SEARCHLIGHT. offered a firm and united front to the enemy. Against them, it was said, the whole combined Russian Armies also fell into line, so that about 2,500,000 men confronted each other and then joined battle along their entire .front. This is only very partially true. While von AufTenberg's Army had been hold- ing the position before Lemberg, there htul, indeed, been prepared a new line of defence in its rear, which ran from Grodek to Rawn- Ruska, and thence, apparently, along tiie rail- way line towards Xarol. It was a fine achiexc- ment on the part of an army which had been handled as rouglil\- as tliis had been to pull itself together at once after a precipitate fiiglit and resolutelj'^ take up this new position. Very probably, also, as the Russian wedge driven in bet\\ een the two armies at Tomaszow had not as yet, apparently, penetrated as far as Tarnogrod, the extreme left of von Auft'en- berg's forces, or those of the Archduke, which prolonged von Auffenberg's front at this point, may well at some time have been in momentary touch with tiie fringe of Dankl's Anny on its way to the San. But there w as at no time an\ definite and combined stand. The gi'eat mass of Dankl's Anny fell back without pavise, anxious only to get across the river. None tiie less, the "battle of the Grodek line,"' even though IJankl's Army must be excluded from any iJarticipation in it (as also must the pm-- suing Ru.s.sian Army), was one of the gieat episodes of the campaign. We do not know the extent of the reinforce- ments which had been sent up from Au-stria or what the "stiffening" of German troops amounted to. According to . some accounts, von Auffenberg had no fewer than ten armv corps under him around Lemberg. The total losses to the Austrian Armies by this time must have exceeded 200,000 men. But it was jilso said that additional troops, both German and Austrian, from Przemysl, had been hurried up after the fall of Lemberg into the position at Grodek, and that the troops which the Russians met there were largely new regiments w hich had not gone tiirough the disheartening experiences of the campaign. It may well be tliat from Grodek to Rawa-Ruska and beyond there were engaged on this line in the combined armies on both sides over 1,250,000 men. The length of the line was about 60 miles, but over much of this distance the fighting was unimpor- tant, as the struggle concentrated more and more on certain crucial points. The two most critical of these points were Grodek on the ex- treme south, where the Austrians occupied a position of great strength, and Rawa-Ruska. The Austrians had the advantage of occu- pying positions which, if hastily, had been efficiently prepared since, and, perhaps, in anticipation of a retreat, before the battle of Lemberg. Their right at Grodek was protected by Nature against a turning movement, and they had good railway commimications in their rear. On the other hand, they had alreatly in the mass, if not all regiments individually, been defeated, Axhile the Russians were con- fident and flushed with victory. On the whole front the Russians also appear to have had a numerical superiority. They attacked at all points with the same conquering impetuosity as thej^ had shown since the beginning of the war. The battle was joined fii-st round the positions at Grodek, into which the Austrians had retreated, or been di-iven, immediately after the captvu"e of Lemberg. It was the extreme north of the line, however, which first began to gi\e %\ay. The Austrians were unable to make any prolonged stand here, where the enemy, besides attacking furiously from in front, proceeded to envelop their left. The fighting here went on confusedly over a wide area. Of it we have only fi'aginentary glimpsi^ of scattered units strngglinc in a broken and THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 263 uiarshj' country, ^^'e know that at several places considerable numbers of Austrian prisoners were taken, and, long afterwards, the Russians were finding Austrian guns and batteries entangled in the swamps. In the result, this upper part of the AiLstrian line was steadily forced back, fighting desperately as it went, until the whole line became doubled back on itself at an acute angle from Rawa-Ruska. At this point the fighting was of a truly terrific character. The town of Rawa-Ruska was a typical small Galician city, chiefly populated by Jews. Most of the town was very old, but a modern settle- ment had grown up near the railway station, for Rawa-Ruska was one of the important railway centres of this portion of Galicia. Two lines here crossed one another, one running north-westerly from Lemberg to the Polish frontier at Narol, the other a branch of the main line to Cracow, from a point near Jaroslau to the frontier at Sokal. Big railway works and round houses, besides extensive sidings and storage yards, made it an important centre of communication. To the east of the town a number of low-lying ridges commanded the approach from every direction except the west. Both for its strategic importance and its defensibility, it was evidently marked out as a place to be held if possible, and as the northern wing of the Austrians was forced back, the fighting here became more and more acute. It is not often that on the vast, extended front of modern battlefields one can put one's finger on any point and say : " Here the battle was decided." But in this battle of the Grodek line Rawa-Ruska was such a point. One can even pick out one bit of land, only ten acres, which was the key to the entire position. As the whole huge battle began to develop, the importance of this small area became accentuated, and it is probable that in the whole war there was no more bitter and furious fighting waged in such a small area as occurred around Rawa-Ruska, and especially on these bloody ten acres. The defences on the point of the angle of the Austrian line, just behind which nestled the little Galician city, probably did not have a front exceeding six or, at most, eight miles. Yet we are told that for eight days between 250,000 and 300,000 men fought here con- tinuously both night and day. After two days the Russians concentrated on the angle, the very apex of the whole, which had its point on AUSTRIAN TRENGHhS, SHOWING COVERED SHELTERS AND TRAVERSES. 2G4 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. tlie bluffs at the edge of the ten acres. What happened there was hardly less to the credit of the Austrians than it was to that of their victorious enemy In view of the rapidity and comprehensiveness of the Russian successes in Galicia, there had been a tendency everywhere to decry the valour of the Austrian soldiery. The Germans seem to have shared this view. As a matter of fact, whatever shortcomings there may have been in the organization or the strategy of the Austrian Army, there was abundant evidence from a score of battlefields in Galicia that the men fought gallantly. Nowhere was the evidence more convincing than here in this angle at Rawa-Ruska. A special correspondent of The Times inspected the battle- field very shortly afterwards, and described it in detail. For eight whole days the Rvissian infantry assaulted and stormed against the heights that defended this angle. The Austrians in a single mile made stands at no fewer than eight distinct points. Some of these were taken and retaken several times before being evacuated, and their evacuation then spelled only a retreat of a few hundred yards and a more determined resist- ance. There is one incredible position which the enemy held in a stubble field for hours, while a better position was being dug a few himdred yards behind in a small dip in the ground. For a mile or more across this field one could trace where the Austrian line had lain, for there was not a yard unmarked by bloody bandages, relics of equipment, and exploded shell frag- ments, while so thick had been the rain of shrapnel that from almost every clod of earth broken in the hand it was possible to sift out a few of the little leaden balls. The reputation of soldiers who could Ue in that hideous place needs no defending. Two or three hundred yards behind this line, just over a small swell in the ground, is another line, this time of fairly deep trenches, and here the Austrians held on for several days. At one time the Russians took the trench, but were not strong enough for the moment to push beyond it, so they dug themselves in on their side, only to be dislodged again on the next day by the Austrians. So one saw the curious sight of a ridge of earth with a trench on each side, the one filled with Russian relics and the other with Austrian. Once it became evident, however, that this was the strategic centre of the whole conflict, the Russians were not to be denied, and so, day after day and inch by inch, they drove back the Austrians until at last they had them in a deep trench on the slope of the crest of the final ridge of hills defending the town itself. Just over the ridge were concentrated the Austrian SHELLPROOF TRENCH. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 265 LEMBERG MARKET. batteries. Standing on the gun positions one could, with a pair of field glasses, pick out distinctly the eight lines of defence which the Austrians tried to hold and the Russians had taken. But with their recoil the resistance of the blue-clad soldiers became more and more desperately stubborn. The last trench was not above 400 yards in front of their own guns, and the Russians seem to have been quite unable to make any headway against it until they brought up and massed a number of batteries of their heavy field howitzers. Then, deliberately, in a patient and painstaking way, they proceeded slowly but surely to destroy with their big shells the entire front of the Austrian position. It was possible to read the evidence of this operation afterwards, not in the trenches, for it was hard to see where they were, but in the unbroken line of shell holes, each 10 feet across and 5 feet deep, which extended for hundreds of yards along the former Austrian line. A man could walk for nearly half a mile stepping from one crater to another, while the ground in and between and all around was strewn with shreds and patches of blue uniform, with fragments of equipment and relics of humanity. Here a clenched hand, there a foot sticking out of a boot, and, again. a soldier's overcoat ripped into ribbons, told what sort of execution the Russians howitzers did when once they came into action. Yet, in spite of it all, it seems that the Austrians stayed on here for above a day, when at last, at the point of the bayonet, the Russians carried the whole crest of the hill and captured the few gims which had not already been put oiit of action. This wiis the decisive moment in the whole great confiict on the Grodek line, and when the grey-clad soldiers of the Tsar swept over this ridge tlio issue of the day was settled. From the centre, in those bloody ten acres, now strewn with dead and wounded men and mangled horses (for an effort had been made to support the position with mounted infantry), the Russian wedge spread north and south, and by nightfall the Austrian centre was broken and the Rus- sians were dropping shells into the outsldrts of Rawa-Ruska. Behind the shells cauxe the ardent Russian soldiers with such promptness as to make any attempt to rally and hold the town itself impossible. According to the Russian official statement, the booty captured at Rawa-Rviska included 30gims, 8,000 prisonei-s, and " enormous stores of ammunition and food." m\ THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. A RUSSIAN PATROL. Even had the Austrians been able to hold Rawa-Ruska against the direct Russian attack. however, it could not long have delayed the inevitable issue of the great battle. Alreadx- events were shaping themselves on the southern end of the line in such a way that the position of Rawa-Ruska would have been enveloped on the rear, and its defenders must have been surrounded and either annihilated or captured. On September 8 the Russian official covi- miinique announced that " our armies attacked strongly fortified positions at Grodek." Apparently these attacks began as early as September 6, when the Russian northern army was engaged in driving the enemy back from Frampol to Bilgoraj. The defences of Grodek, including the position at Sadowa-Wisznia, were reported to be very strong, being pro- tected by a series of six connecting lakes and much marshy ground cut up by dykes. The Russians were under General Brusiloff, who repeated here the tactics of massed and con- tinuous assault with which he had overcome the Austrian resistance at Halicz. The Aus- trian position was on a cluster of wooded hills, to reach which the Russians had to cross a plain some three miles wide in a series of parallels under machine gun and rifle fire. It was only after five days' fighting that they succeedea in attaining a position from which their guns could effectively reach the Austrian trenches. These, when finally cleared witli the bayonet, were found to be almost choktd with dead bodies. Austrian prisoners declared that they had had no regular supplies for four days, but had lived on wild pears and raw potatoes while they fought from the trenches, the living lying alongside decaying corpses, for the Russians had given them no time, night or day, in which to bury their dead. These are all the details which we have of what must have been truly terrible fighting, the successful issue of which was communicated to the world on Septeinber 14 in one of the simply-worded and restrained annovmcements in which the Russian Headquarters Staff habitually con- veyed the news of most momentovas events : The army of General Brusiloff, againi^t whom the Austrians made their last desperate onslaught, has on taking the offensive captured many guns, prisoners, and artillery parks, the numbers of which are now being reckoned. General Brusiloff testifies that his troops displayed the highest energy, stanchness, and gallantry. The corps commanders calmly and resolutely directed their troops and frequently wrested the victory at critical moments. General Brusiloff specially mentions the distinguished services of General Radko Dmitrieff." From the references to the " desperate onslaughts " of the enemy and to " critical moments " we can gather something of the stubbornness of the fighting of the eight days since the attack on Grodek began. In a campaign on a less gigantic scale, less crowded with dreadful and sanguinary incidents, the carrying of the defences of Grodek would have stood out as an event of the first importance. It THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 267 will come to be recognized as one of the bril- liant and critical episodes of the war. At the time, on the day following the vmassnming communication quoted above, the Grand Duke Nicholas merely announced that, " The Russians, after occupying Grodek, reached Mocziska, and are now within one march of Przemysl." At the same time, while Brusiloff's centre was "reaching Mocziska" (about 40 miles west of Lemberg), his left was pushing south- westerly along the railway line to Sambor, arid on to ChjTow, wliich latter place, however, was not occupied ixntil September 24, thus isolating the fortress of Przemysl from the south. Brusiloff's men, when Grodek fell, had been fighting and marching continuously for more than three weeks. They had already performed extraordinary feats of endurance, but they hunted the flying Austrians from Grodek with the same pitiless impetuosity as they had dis- played in hunting them from HaUcz. Meanwliile, further north, as we have seen, Rawa-Ruska had fallen. Ruzsky was not, any more than BrusUoff, the type of commander to give a beaten enemy any rest, and while the latter was driving the Austrian right from Grodek to Chyrow on the south of Przemysl, Ruzsky, with equal vigour, was following up his success and sweeping the shattered remnants of the army which had opposed him along the railway towards Sieniawa, wliich was occupied on the same day, September 18, as Brusiloff captured Sambor, and Jaroslau, which latter place was carried ]:)y assault on September 21. On the \A"aj- there was heavy fighting aroimd Javorow, 15 miles east of Przemysl, when the Russians claimed to have captiu-ed 5,000 prisoners and 30 gims. Thus Przemysl was cut off on the east, north, and south, and behind its defences the remnants of von Auffenberg's Army took refuge. Events no less momentous, and equally disastrous to the Austrian arms, had also been going on where Danld's Army had been falling back before Generals Ewarts and Plehve. We have seen that the continuity of the Aus- trian line of defence had not been made good in the region north-west of Rawa-Ruska, though it extended beyond the frontier between Tomaszow and Tarnogrod. After the battle at Tomaszow the line of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand above Rawa-Ruska to that point had been bent back on to the Rawa-Ruska- Jaroslau railway, while the main body of Dankl's Army was falling back to the line of the San. The Russian pressure on its rear never relaxed. That pressure was particularly severe from the Russian right, which, after clearing the Opolie-Turobin district, had fought the battle of Krasnik. The greater part of the AUSTRIAN TEI.EGKAPH CORPS. 268 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. LOADING A RUSSIAN GUN. Austrian troops crossed the San close to its junction with the Vistula, and they must have hoped that while they, on the other side, would be in touch with the Austrian railways, the river behind them would form a barrier against their piirsviers. But the operation of crossing was to cost them dearly. Foreseeing the necessity of falling back across the San, General Dankl had, it seems, been sending his transport back in advance of his retreat almost since the retirement began. Some of the transport trains had been seen and shelled from the left bank of the Vistula as early as September 9. It was not until Septem- ber 12 that the army itself reached the banks of the San. While the main body and the baggage were getting across, two strong rear- guards, to north and east, were left to hold back the pursuing Russians. One of these rear- guards had its left protected by the Vistula, the other's right was protected by the San ; the two forming a bow or arch between the two streams. Attack on their front was made difficult by marshy ground. They seem to have been quite unable, however, to withstand the Russian assault, which pierced the screen long before the crossing of the river was com- pleted. An immense number of prisoners, said to have been 30,000, fell into the Russian hands, and there was terrible loss of life as the Russian artillery came up and shelled the bridges over which the Austrians were pressing in solid masses. Besides those killed by shell fire, many are said to have been forced into the river and drowned. Nor did the Austrians find any rest on the further side of the river. In theory, the forcing of the passage of the San by an army invading Austria should have been an almost impossible task. The Austrians had spent immense sums of money in the endeavour to make it so. The upper, or southern, part of its course was protected by the immensely strong position of Przemysl and by Jaroslau. Thence a light railway, built purely for strategic purposes, ran parallel and close to it.s left bank almost to its confluence with the Vistula. At various places, as the Austrians fell back, they destroyed the bridges behind them. Had they destroyed them all, the 1st Army would have had at least a few days' rest. But the Russians in their advance were too swift. By a brilliant stroke they rushed, captured and made good their hold on the bridge at Krzeszov, on the frontier a few miles west of Tarnogrod. In the words of an official communique from Petrograd " the Russian soldiers leaped across the river on the very shoulders of the retreating enemy." This victory on the San, with the crossing of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. i> the river, stands out as one of the conspicuous achievements of the campaign. What the Austrian losses were, in addition to the 30,000 prisoners taken, there is no \\ ay of estimating, but they were very heavy. What Avas more important was tliat the barrier wliich the Austrians had hoped to interpose between themselves and their ruthless enemies had failed them. Except that they were now in touch with their railways and within reach of safetj'. at least for the moment, under the shelter of C'racow, there was no more respite for the Austrians within the "riverine triangle" formed by the Vistula and the San than there liad been above it. Within that triangle the Riissians seized a prodigious amount of war material, supplies, and booty of all kinds. With the dash on Krzeszov, moreover, the last of the Austrian armies of invasion had been driven off Russian soil in this quarter. There was no longer an enemy left in the i'ro\inces of VolhjTiia or Podolia. Nor was this all. ^Mention has been made above of the fact that Russian troops, based on Iwangorod, had intercepted German reinforce- ments on the left side of the Vistula as the\^ hurried across Poland to the lielp of Austria. From that side of the river Russian gims liad also shelled Austrian transports retreating along the right bank. As the Russian right pressed on the retiring Austrians, it had been able to spare a considerable body of troops, which it had thrown across the Vistula at Josefow. These troops, reinforcing the Russian force already on that side of the river, had s\Aept southward parallel to the advance of the main army on tlie right bank, brushing aside any enemy forces which they met, effectually preventing any help from reaching the Austrians from that quarter, and, finally, at the same time when their com- rades on the right bank were delivering the final blow to the Austrians at the crossing of the San, tliey, on the opposite side of the Vistula, drove a strong Austrian force out of, and occupied, the important place of Sandomierz. Near San- domierz the Russians are said to have en- countered and defeated the German 2nd Landwelir Corps under General Woirsch. In and around the town tliej- appear to have taken 3,000 prisoners and 10 guns. This advance down tiie left banlc of the \'istula, with the occupation of Sandomierz, is a final detail illustrating the comprehensiveness of the Russian strategy and the precision with ADVANCE COSSACK PATROL. 27C THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. VIEW FROM OBSERVATION STATION ABOVE HALIGZ. which their movements worked in unison. It will be well to stop for a moment in the narrative to survey the course of events during this fateful month. It naust be remembered that Russia, more or less incompletely i^repared, found herself invaded over a wide front by armies operating in three different directions, and aggi'egating in the neighbourhood of one million n:ien. Her soldiers immediately saw and seized upon the weak point in the enemy's plans. The farther two invading armies operating on divergent lines penetrate into an enemy's covintry the wider must they become separated, and the more difficult it be for them to co- operate or for either to act as a shield to the other's flanks. The Russians were content, then, to allow the northern 1st Austrian Army to press on, almost unresisted, to within artillery range of its first main objective — LubUn and the railway line to Iwangorod and Warsaw. They then struck, and struck with decisive force, at the weak place between the two armies in the neighbourhood^of Tomaszow. To meet this tlirust the Austrians were com- pelled to withdraw their reserve troops from the extreme left across the rear of the 1st Army. When they proved insufficient, a new army was hastily organized and thrown into the gap. It might have served its purpose if it had been pushed forward at first simviltaneously with the other two armies, but such improvizations rarely J prosper when a campaign is already well advanced. The Russians had gathered strengtli, and, having once driven their wedge in at Tomaszow, they kept it there, and suc- ceeded in widening it by the subsequent opera- tions about Bilgoraj and the forcing back of the Austrian line above Rawa-Ruska. The 1st Austrian Army was thus left, at tlie extreme of its advance, suspended in the air. Meanwhile, Brusiloff's finely conceived and admirably executed turning movement along the Dniester on the extreme south, culminating in the blow on Halicz, while Ruzsky, with his main force, battered at the Austrian front and left, penned in von Auffenberg's Army on a con- tinually contracting front, and threw it back on its successive lines of defence in the Ztota Lipa, before Lemberg, and from Grodek to Rawa-Ruska. Hurled from eacli of these in turn, with the Cossack cavalry ranging wide over Southern Galicia on their right, the Austrians had no choice but to fall back, guarding their rear as best they might, west- ward towards Cracow. As soon as von Auffenberg's Army was definitely in difficulties, and occupied entirely with considerations of its own safety, the Russians could afford to give attention to Dankl's Army in the north. No help could now reach it, and it was already exhausted with futile efforts to break the rigid barrier which had been thrown across its path. The Russians THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. •271 rightly massed their chief strength against this aiTQy's left, for if that wing was broken, the whole army, heiTimed in on both sides, must fall back or submit to being surrounded. Driven from Opolie along the Vistula, pitilessly hammered along its whole front, threatened and harried on its right flank from Tomaszow and Tarnogrod, we have seen how Dankl'sArmy was hustled down to and across the San, to And no rest on the further side. Every chief movement on the Russian side was executed with the same certainty of touch, and th^ operations of all the armies synchro- nized to perfection. By September 23 Ewarts and Plehve had driven Dankl's Army back to the line of the Wisloka. Riizsky had taken Jaroslau on September 21. Brusiloff was in Chyrow on September 24. It had been on August 22 that Ruzsky had crossed the frontier and occupied Brody, while on the same day Brusiloff had also entered Galicia at Woloczysk. Beyond doubt the world has never seen a month of such gigantic fighting as had taken place since then. The end of the month saw all the Austrian Armies, beaten and broken, driven in from north, north- east, east, and south, all herded into the con- fined region west of Przemysl, like sheep driven from all corners of a field into one narrow pen, with only a single opening — the railway leading to Cracow. The whole scope of the campaign can be clearly followed on the map which is given on page 260. A map covering the A COSSACK SCOUT REPORTING TO HIS COMMANDING OFFICER. larger theatre, including Berlin and Vienna, has been published on page 220, As early as September 17 a Russian official statement put the Austrian losses, since the taking of Lemberg, at 250,000 killed and wounded, and 100,000 prisoners, with 400 gims, many colours, and a " vast quantity of stores." Again, we hear that the rifles captured num BRIDGE OVER THE DNIESTER DESTROYED BY THE AUSTRIANS DURING THEIR RETREAT. 27:2 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE ARCHDUKE JOSEPH FERDINAND. bered nearly half a million. What the total losses on the Austrian side were in the whole campaign there is no way of Icnowing. In ail they probably put into the field, including the later reinforcements, both Austrian and Ger- man, about 1,100,000 to 1,200,000 men. It is difhcult to believe that they lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, less than 500,000 of these. Official Russian estimates placed the enemy's total losses at from 35 to 50 per cent, of liis total forces. The Russian losses were heavy at times, but it is believed that in the whole campaign they did not reach 50,000. And the Russians were now masters of all Eastern Galicia, in possession of Lemberg and Jaroslau, of Brody, Busk, Grodek, Tarnopol, Sambor, Brzezany, and many other towns of importance, with all the railway system operat- ing between them. They controlled the GaU- cian oil-fields, of great importance to the enemy at such a time, and aU the agricultural output of the rich Galician plains. Russian cavalry was already feeling at the approach to the Carpathians, from the Dulila Pass to the Bukowina. Przeniysl alone held out. This war was an extraordinary solvent of the reputations of fortresses. In this campaign we have seen how naturally strong positions, with effective defensive works, like Grodek and Rawa-Ruska, held out gallantly for some time, and were then carried by assault. Lemberg had been reputed to be strong. As a matter of fact, tlie defences of the city itself were insig- nificant, and when the army shielding it «as l)rok(>n. no attempt was made to hold it. But the fall of Jaro-ilau has never been explained. Jaroslau was reputed to be stronger than eitlier Liege or Namur. It had been confidently ex- pected to offer a i)rolongcd and stubborn resist- ance. The whole defences of the San were very strong. They collapsed with hardly any de- fence, and Jaroslau itself only witlistood attack for two days. When the Russians brought their hea\ier guns to bear on the fortifications, it seems that the garrison simply deserted their posts and fled, showing how demoralized tlie Austrian Armies had become under tlieir suc- cessive catastrophes. Przemysl alone of tlie Austrian fortified places justified its reputation. Besides its strength as a fortress, Przemysl was a beautiful town, a veritable garden city, set around with orchards and flower gardens. It had a stormy history reaching back into the mists of the tenth century. In the town and its environs in 191-4 there was a civil popula- tion of about 50,000, chiefly Poles and Ruthenes, who lived together m great amity and with perfect religious toleration. In September of that year, when the victorious Russian advance swept all resistance before it, there was said, in official reports from Vienna, to be an army of 80,000 men based on Przemysl. under com- mand of General Boveerig. He, with a large part of this army, seems to have moved to tlie line of the Wisloka to help Dankl's demoralized forces to make their stand on that stream. Probably many of von Auf^enberg's troops, as they retreated, were used to form the garrison of the fortress^; which was vmderstood at the beginning of the investment to contain about 100,000 men, the defence being in the hands of General Kusmanek. Later, this garrison appears to have been increased. We have already seen how the railwaj^ com- munication with Przemysl had been severed on the south and east by the Russian advance after the fall of Grodek and the occupation of ]\Iocziska and Chyrow. The fall of Jaroslau and the occupation of Rad>^nno, a town on the main Cracow railway, on the left bank of the San, some eight miles east of Jaroslau. and 15 miles north of Przemysl, completed the isolation of the fortress. The stream of flight and pursuit flowed past, lapping round Przemysl on all sides, leaving it an islet in the middle of a flood. So it stood, except for one THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 273 short interval, when the tide was torced back, and for a while Przemysl was again in com- munication with Cracow, throughout the following winter until spring, for more than half a year. In those intoxicating days of September, 1914, the Russians took it for granted that the lonely stronghold must soon fall to them. The news- papers, not of Russia, but of all the Allies, told the world that its fate was sealed. But stores of aU kinds had been poured into it, and all pre- parations made for a long resistance. It was announced that it had provisions enough to last until May, 1915, and in General Kusn\anek it had a commander who had no inclination to surrender. The first investment was made complete by September 2G or 27, 1914. The Russians immediately called on the fortress to surrender. General Kusmanek replied that he would not even discuss surrender until all the powers of resistance had been exhausted. An effort was made to carry the place by storm, but it was a costly experiment, and the Russians gave up the attempt and settled down to a regular investment until such time as heavy siege grnis could be brougiit up and tlie way prepared for an assault. In the following month, as will be shown in 'a later chajDter, the renewed Austro-German offensive on this front forced the Russians back to a point where, it the pressure on the fortress was not entirely removed, the western forts were disengaged, and there was unrestricted com- munication with Cracow. It is probable that at this time extra forces were thrown into the RUSSIAN SHELTERS IN THE TRENCHES. fortress. The Austro-German tide again re- ceded towards the end of November, 1914, and from that time onwards the investment of the fortress was complete and more stringent than before. The besieging force was in command of General Ivanoff. The heavy siege guns, however, were not brought up for some time. They are said to have been ready at the be- ^^inning of the New Year, but determined attempts were then being made to relieve the fortress from the direction of the Carpathians, I PRZEMYSL. 274 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. GENERAL VON KJjSMANEK, In command of the fortress of Przemysl. and it was decided to \\ ait until the danger had passed, lest the gunji and siege material, diffi- cult of transport, should be captured. Real bombardment, then, did not begin until early in March, 1915. During the progress of the siege the garrison made many gallant sorties, but without material results. Towards tlie middle of March the heights dominating the eastern sector of the position fell into Russian hands, and on the night of the 13th the important positions at Mackiowice on tlie north were carried by an assault in the darkness. There followed a desperate sortie, led by General Kusmanek him- self, at the head gf the 23rd division of the Honved, wliich was beaten back with a loss of over 4,000 prisoners, and many killed and wounded, and the forts on the western side fell into Russian liands. This was the end ; for it seems that the garrison and civil population alike were on the verge of starvation. It was stated that the defenders in these last days deliberately used up all their ammunition l)y reckless firing. They destroyed their guns and had already eaten all the horses. A final but fruitless sortie had been made on March 20 in the direction of Oikovice. Early on the following morning loud explosions were heard from different parts of the fortress, where the Austrians were blowing up the work.s preparatory to surrender. At six o'clock that morning, INIarch 21, 1915, the place was sur- rendered tmconditionally. According to the official lists furnished to the victors by General Kusmanek, the girrison captiu-ed with the fortress included 9 Generals, 93 superior officers, 2,500 subalterns and officials, and 117,000 rank and file. The town of Przemysl was not injured, all the damage being confined to the fortifications and the outskirts. ARCHDUKE CHARLES FRANCIS JOSEPH (in the centre) VISITING THE FORTRESS OF PRZEMYSL. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. 275 AUSTRIAN OFFICERS IN BESIEGED PRZEMYSL The event was celebrated l)y a grand Te Deum at the headquarters of the Russian Commander-in-chief, at which the Tsar and the Grand Duke Nicholas were present. The Second Class of the Order of St. George was con- ferred upon the Grand Duke, and the Third Class upon General Ivanoff. The tenacity with which the Russians had clung to the siege through all the fluctuating fortunes of the war during the long winter, though reports from German sources declared that it had cost them 70,000 men previous to the beginning of the bombardment, and the frequent and deter- mined efforts made by the Austrians and Germans to relieve the fortress, showed how much importance was attached to its possession by both sides. Its fall seems to have come as a shock to Germany. A day or two before, the German Press had been loudly proclaiming its invincibility. In Russia the news was received with great rejoicing, and everywhere it was recognized that the captiu"o of the fortress profoundly modified the whole situation. This narrative of the fate of Przemj'sl, how- ever, takes us far ahead of the general course of events. The first Galician campaign may bo said to have ended with the complete and disastrous failure of the Austrian invasion. Przemysl was still holding out, but all Eastern Galicia — Sanak, Sambor, Stryj, Stanislau — wtus in the hands of the Russians. The Austrian field armies had all fallen behind the line of the Wisloka, where von Auf^enberg had his base at Tarlow, with Dankl and the remnants of hia broken army on his left. At this moment German aeroplanes were scattering proclama- tions along the East Prussian frontier whicli said : Soldiers ! On the Austrian frontier the Russian Army lias been routed and is retreating;. Many Russian soldiers have been lett on the battlefield. In Poland there is sedition, and in Moscow and Odessa there is revolution which will speedily extend to the whole of Russia. In order to prevent you from surrendering, your authorities tell you that we torture Russian prisoners. Do not believe this calumny, for where would be found executioners to kill tiio hundred thousand army of Russian prisoners ? Your prisoners arc now peacefully living within oiu- country, together with French, Belgians, and English. They are very content. It is not worth while to die for a lost cause. Live for your wives and children, your native land, and a new and liappy Russia. But in Vienna other tales were circulated. There it was stated that one Austrian General had been tried by court-martial and shot, and another had been removed from the command of a cavalry division which had been almost annihilated, and had shot himself. The immediate importance of (ho Hiissiuii victories was, perhaps, at first overostiiuattxl. There was talk in the Press of tiio imiurdiate •276 TBE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAll. capture of Cracow and overleaping of the Car- pathians, of the roads to Berhn and Vienna being now open, of the elimination of Austria as a serious factor in the war, and the proba- bility of her concluding a separate peace. None the less, the results of the campaign were of the utmost value. In itself it was on such a scale — not less than 2,500,000 fighting men being engaged in it from first to last — and its battles were so gigantic and accompanied with such terrible slaughter that the campaign, judged by any standards in liistor3% ought to raiik as one of the greatest of wars of all time. In comparison with the battles of Lemberg, Grodek, Rawa-Ruska, Tomaszow, and others, most of the famous battles of liistory were trifling things. And the Russian success was brilliant and overwhelming. If Austria was not, indeed, eliminated, she had received a staggering blow, and worse than the blow to Austria was the blow to the whole Austro- Gennan theory of the war. It showed, as was being shown also on the East Prussian front, that the Russian military power was a real and terrible thing. It showed how complete the miscalculations as to Russia's uiu-eadiness and unwieldiness had been. It showed the folly of all the German expectations of risings in Poland, or of any other form of dissension among the Russian peoples. It showed that, besides her fighting milhons, Riissia had generals of first-class strategic ability. It showed that all hope of a speedy " smashing " of Russia with one hand was as illusory as the same hope had proved in regard to France on the western front. We have seen that Germany had already been giving some actual support in men, albeit a useless one, to the Austrian Armies in their difficulties. From now on, liow- ever, she became much more the predominant partner in the alliance than had heretofore been the case. It will be sliown in another chapter how Germany assumed the direct control, not only of the joint operations, but of the individual Austrian and Hungarian forces, to the bitter humiliation of the pride of the Austro -Hungarian peoples. Certain aspects of the campaign and the inferences therefrom deserve especial treat- ment, especialh- the light which it tlirew on the quality and characteristics of the Russian soldier. The history of the Russian Army, tl:e story of its reorganization, and an account of its composition at the outbreak of the war ha\ e been given in detaU in Chapters XXVIII. and XXIX. of this History. Accompanying those chapters will be found many illustrations, in- cluding portraits of Russian Generals, wiiich it \\ ill be profitable to look at again in connexion with the narrative of the events with which we have just been dealing. ^lention has also been made of the miscalculations which Germany and Austria made in regard to Russia's readi- ness for war. Their misunderstanding of the RUSSIAN ARTILLERY. The new field gun. THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAE.- 'Ill A STREET SCENE IN PHZEMYSL. Russian soldier was no less remarkable : it was on a par with the view of Sir John French's " contemptible little army." The outbreak of the war produced no more remarkable phenomenon in any country than the conversion, as it were overnight, of the entire Russian people into a nation of total abstainers. The day after war was declared, ■every vodka shop in the Empire was closed by Imperial Decree during the time of mobilization. Subsequently the prohibition was extended for the whole diu-ation of the war. In Russia's cold •climate the use of strong drinlis by all classes of the people had generally been regarded as more or less a matter of necessity. In one day its use was stopped, and the whole population accepted the decision without complaint. It was only one manifestation of the extraordinary spirit of earnestness, almost of consecration, with which the Russian peoples entered upon the war. The Russian peoples had been known to be possessed of inunense patience and powers of endurance. In the mass they were inured to hard living and accustomed to scanty fare. They are fundamentally by temperament a pro foundly religious people. But the fashionable view of them throughout Germany and Austria, encouraged by many who must have known better, was that they were uncivilized bar- barians, heavy-witted and incapable of dis- cipline, and of ferocious and savage passion. The word Cossack, in particvilar, was a thing to frighten babies with. The contrast of all this with the actual behaviour of the Russian Armies in the field was absurd. The abstention from liquor probably con- tributed not a little to the powers of endiu-ance of the Russian troops. Certainly they were remarkable. Very seldom have soldiers had to endiu-e harder and more continuous work than was called for from the soldiers of the Tsar in the course of those four terrible weeks. Eye- witnesses testified to the fortitude which they displayed under all conditions of the campaign and when wounded, and to the uncomplaining cheerfulness with which they confronted every task. On the day after a desperate engagement . in which it had lost a large proportion of its numbers, a regiment would bo singing as it marched along the road. Nor up to tlie last did the troops lose their dash. Fresh men of 278 ■THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. any army could not have attacked with more impetuosity than did Bru.silort".s at Halicz after an advance of the most arduous descrip- tion, Ruzsky's at Rawa-Ruska, or the men of the northern army at the crossing of the San. The Cossacks, especially, enjoyed before the war a n^ost evil rejjutation. It has been men- tioned in a former chapter that, in the cam- paign in East Prussia, the testimony of German authorities was that in towns which they cap- tured, the behaviour of the Cossacks v\as " exemplary and irreproachable." The evi- dence from Galicia is to the same effect. Those who know the Cossack will, indeed, know that he is, as a rule, if high-spirited, very childish and- essentiall}'' good-natured. At Halicz, if ever, the fighting spirit of the Russians rnust surely have been aroused, and we have testi- mony from independent sotirces of what happened there. The Russian van which, after the Austrian defeat, pushed first through Halicz and across the river in ptirsuit of the enemy, was apparently composed of three divisions of Cossack cavalry. Here v\as an occasion, then, when one might have expected the worst, when, after a bloody action, the victorious troops swept tlirough a defenceless country full of Jews, and offering every tempta- tion to excesses. The valle-s' itself is a garden (illed to overIl(n\i)ig with all the good things that a rich and fertile agricultural country affords. So far from its having been pltuidered or devastated after the Russian advance had passed on, the fields were full of shocks of grain, in every garden there were chickens and ducks and huge white geese, and fat swine wandered about the streets of the town. On the outskirts of the town every acre seemed to be the grazing groiuid of happy and contented cattle. In the town itself there was not a single destroyed house, while at the settlement aroimd the rail- road station only a few buildings, such as ware- houses, had been demolished by the Russian artillery in the effort to keep the retiring enemy on the move. Still more significant was an incident which occiuTed at the neighbouring town of Botzonce. It has been told how the retiring Austrians attempted here to make a stand, and were shelled out by the Russian guns which pressed after them. The whole centre of the town was reduced to ruins, except tliree buildings. The two churches and the Town Hall, which had a chiu'ch-like spire, and was evidently mistaken by the Russians for a third place of worship, stood alone undamaged among the wreckage. It was impossible to believe that this had been the result of chance. The Russian BOHEMIAN DRAGOONS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 279 THE VICTORY OF LEMBERG— CELEBRATIONS IN PETROGRAD. gunners had obviously endeavoured to spare the religions bmldings, and to confine their fire to the streets and buildings of which the military necessity of the moment demanded the destruc- tion. Similarly, in other towns which the Russians were compelled to shell, it was always the region of warehouses, depots, station-build- ings and the like which was attacked, while the himibler sections occupied by the poorer classes were spared. It was, of course, not to the interest of the Russians to Ul-use the people of Galicia. They came not to oppress or spoU, but as deliverers. At the beginning of the operations, when Russia first assumed a general offensive on August 17, the Grand Duke Nicholas had issued the following appeal to the Russian inhabitants of Galicia : Brothers. — A judgment of God is being wrought. With Christian patience and self-annihilation the Russian people of Galicia languished for centuries under a foreign yoke, but neither flattery nor persecutions could break in it the hope of liberty. As the tempestuous torrent breaks the rocks to join the sea, so there exists no force which can arrest the Russian people in its onrush towards unification. Let there be no longer a subjugated Russia. Let the country which forms the heritage of Saint Vladimir throw off the foreign yoke and raise the banner of united Russia, an iiidivisihlr- land. May the providence of God who has blessed the work of the great uniters of the Russian lands be made manifest. May God aid His anointed, the Emperor Nicholas of All the Russias, to complete the work begun by the Grand Duke Ivan Kalita. Rise, fraternal Galician Russia, who have suffered so much, to meet the Russian Army for you and your brethren, who will be delivered. Room will be fovind for you in the bosom of our mother Russia withovit offending peaceable people of whatever nationality. Raise your sword against the enemy and your hearts towards God with a prayer for Russia and the Russian Tsar! It is impossible that a conquering army can pass through a vanquished country without the perpetration of some individual excesses. But there can be no doubt that throughout the Galician campaign the behaviour of tiie Russian troops was extraordinarily good. Nor did the Austrians make am- attempt to emulate the examples of the doctrine of " frightfulness " given by their allies in Bel- gium. In Galicia, of course, thej- v.ere in their own comitry. As they penetrated north into Russia, being in happy mood and meeting with little opposition, tliey seem to have done small wanton damage. On its retreat, however, Daniel's Army laid waste a large jiart of the province of Volhynia, ravaginy tlic country and burning villages and farnvsleads 280 THl'J TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. AUSTRIAN MOTOR CYCLISTS. as they pii.^sed. In a measure this was doubt- less dictated by supposed miUtary considerations, in the hope of delaying the enemy in his pur- suit. When a soldiery, however, is started on the work of destruction in an enemy's country, it is inevitable that many things should be done which neither military exigency nor any- thing else can excuse. It can only have been, also, a complete relaxation of discipline in the- beaten and demoralized Austrian Armies whic l> pennitted the pillaging which went on in some of the larger towns, even in Galicia, as Sieni- awa. As a whole, however, the campaign appears, on both sides, to have been con- ducted towards the civilian population witl> moderation and humanity. CHAPTER LVIII. THE PROBLEM OF EGYPT: A NEW REGIME. The British Occupation — Defensive Measures of the Egyptian Government — Factors of Discontent — The Khedive and the Extrejie Nationalists — German and Turkish Intrigues — Remedial Measures, Econojuc, Political, and Military — Measures against Enemy Subjects and Shipping — War with Turkey — jNIartial Law in Egypt — British Protectorate Proclaimed — Abbas Hilmi Deposed — Sultan Hussein of Egypt — Character and Accession — The Sudan — Naval Operations in the Red Sea till the End of 1914 — The Action at Bir en Nuss. IT is in the pages of Lord Cromer's " Modern Egypt " and Lord Milner's " England in Egypt " that the fascinating but complex history of the British occupation of Egypt can best be studied. To describe it and the events that led up to it in brief were an impos- sible task. It is, however, necessary to preface this account of recent events in Egypt by a short sketch of the principal features of the history of the country since 1882. Only thus is it possible to understand the relations between tlie British and Egyptian Govermnents which had a vital bearing on the developments in Egj'pt after the outbreak of the Great "\^"ar. Great Britain had been opposed to the con- struction of the Suez Canal, ^hich opened a new and shorter route to India to tlie Mediterranean Powers. Its completion made the fate of Egypt largely dependent on the will of tlie leading Sea Power. In 1875 Lord Beaconsfield pur- chased 176,602 original founders' shares in the Suez Canal from the embarrassed Khedive, or Prince, of EgjqDt, Lsinail Pasha. England thus acquired a definite stake in tiie country and was bound to intervene both in the management of the Canal and in tlie organization of Egyptian Vol. III.— Part 34. finance. Ismail Pasha was deposed by his Suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey, in 1879. He left an empty Treasury and an insubordinate army behind him. Anarchy ensued under his successor Tewfik, culminating in a military mutiny, inspired partly by real grievances against foreign usurers and corrupt officials, partly by fanaticism, and largely by the native Egyptian officers' jealousy of their Turkish and Circassian superiors. Great Britain intervened on behalf of the Khedive and restored order at Tel-el-Kebir in 1882. Owing to the national dislilcc for the responsibilities which such action would have involved she did not proclaim a protectorate over Egypt, There were, indeed, several occasions on which her statesmen con- templated the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation, but after the failure of the Anglo- Tiurkish negotiations of 1886-1887 it was recognized that this could only be effected, if at all, after many years. In spite of the jealousy of France, whose jioliticians had allowed themselves to be mananivred into an attitude of hostility towards England by Germany, the hostilitj' of reactionarv elements and of the Khodive 281 9R2 TIIJ': riMFS HISTOHY OF THE WAR. [From a paintinS by the Hon, John Collier, SIR HENRY MCMAHON, High Commissioner for Egypt. Abbas II., who succeeded his father Tewftk in 1892, the financial bondage in which Egypt Avas held by international jealoiisies, the abuse of the Capitulations, and the fact that none of the Great Powers had definitely recognized our special position and interests in Egj'pt, our influence increased and Egypt prospered more and more under the masterful hand ' of Lord Cromer, British Agent and Consul-General at Cairo. In 1898 the Sudan, which had rebelled under a religious impostor in 1882 and had been for sixteen years a prey to bloodshed and anarchy, was reconquered by an Anglo -Egyptian Army under Lord (then Sir Herbert) Kitchener and placed under an Anglo -Egyi^tian condo- minium. A French attempt to effect a lodgment on the Upper Nile failed. Six years later came the Anglo -French agreement of happy augury, by which France, in return for concessions in Morocco and elsewhere, recognized England's special interests in Egj-pt, while England iindertook to make no change in the political status of the country. The other European Powers, except, of course, Turkey, some sooner, some later, recognized the occupation. Henceforth, instead of France, more or less energetically supported by Russia, it was Turkey, encouraged later by the German Em- piic, that challenged Great Britain's political predominance in Egypt. The Porto had not recognized the occupation, had protested against the declaration of an Anglo -Egyptian condoininium over the Sudan, and had since 1887 maintained a "Special ^Mission" at Cairo, which was never recognized by the Britisli authorities, who held that the Sultan's official representative in Egypt was the Khedive, but was. nevertheless, able at times to exert its influence unfavourably to us. Egypt, it must be remembered, A^a.s a part of the Ottoman Empire. By the Firman of 1879 the Khedive possessed certain essential attri- butes of sovereignty, subject to the pajnuent of a tribute of abo\it £075,000. The Khediviate was hereditary in the House of IVIohamed Ali according to the law of primogeniture. But the same Firman debarred the Khedive from the right of raising loans without the consent of the Sultan and of keeping up an army of over 18.000 men in time of peace, nor could he conclude any treaty beyond certain commercial conventions with any foreign Power. At the Sublime Porte Egypt was regarded as an autonomous Ottoman province ruled by an hereditary Governor -General appointed by the Sultan, though possessed of greater indepen- dence than other Ottoman " Valis." In 1906 the Tm-ks, who had taken care never to agree to the usual defimtion of the frontiers of Egypt, attempted to occupy certain points in the Sinai Peninsula, from Avhich tliey only retired when the British Ambassador had presented an ultimatiun to the Porte. The eastern frontier between Egypt and Turkey was then delimited, but the frontier convention between the two countries was never ratified by the Porte. In 1907 Lord Cromer retii-ed, owing to ill-health, from the post of British Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General, which he had held with honour since 1883. He had found Egypt banknipt ; he left it solvent. He found the Egyptian fellaheen, as the peasantry are called, oppressed and poor ; he left them prosperous and secured against the gi'osser forms of injustice. His name will be for ever linked with the history of the revival of Egyptian prosperity and civilization. His departure took place at a time when the excitement aroused by the frontier dispute with Turkey had not died down, and the lOiedive and the Nationalists of the extreme party were violently hostile. THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. •28B Before j^roceeding with this narrative it is necessary to say a few words concerning tlie relations between the British Government and the Khedive and his Ministers. " I hardly need point out," wrote Lord Granville in 1884, " that in important questions where the administration and safety of Egypt are at stake, it is indispensable that Her Majesty's Government should, so long as the provisional occupation of the country by English troops continues, be assured that the advice which, after full consideration of the views of the Egyptian Government, .they may feel it their duty to tender to the Khedive should be followed. It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices." Since 1895 the relations between Ministers and their British advisers had grown steadily more cordial, but complete harmony between the British and Egyptian sides of the Administration had been frequently prevented by the action of the Khedive, who, though unwilling, after a couple of severe lessons, to place himself in open opposition to Gre^it Britain, never ceased for long to intrigue against the British and to undermine the authority of his own Ministers. Sir Eldon Gorst, succeeding Lord Cromer in 1907, doubt- less with instructions to avoid friction and " incidents," attempted a policy of conciliation which did not meet with the success which it deserved. He nevertheless was able tempo- rarily to detach the Khedive from the extremist Nationalist Party and to cvirb the license of the extremist Press. Dm-ing his tenure of office the Christian Premier, Butros Pasha Ghali, was assassinated by an extremist student, who would seem to have been in touch with the Committee of Union and Progress. After the sadly prematvire death of Sir Eldon Gorst, Lord Kitchener was appointed in his stead. His prestige as a stern soldier and his knowledge of Egypt enabled him rapidly to calm the local agitation of which the mvu-der of Butros Pasha had been a sign. The ex- tremist Nationalists lost ground or fled to Turkey, but the KJiedive and the Ottoman Special Mission continued their intrigues. Sedition was, however, scotched, though not killed, and Lord Kitchener by his lavish expenditvu-e on improvements and by legisla- tion on behalf of the fellaheen acqviired great popularity.* When war broke out in Europe Egypt was therefore quiet. The Moslem peasants, who * A full account of Lord Kitchener's work in Egypt has been given in Chapter XIX., together with portraits of Lords Kitchener and Cromer and Sir R. Wingate. THE OLD WORLD AND THE NEW. Australian Imperial Force near the Sphinx and Pyramids. 284 THE TIMK!^ HTSiTORY OF THE WAB. SIR GEORGE REID ADDRESSING AUSTRALIAN formed the enormous majority of the popula- tion, appreciated the benefits of the occupation, and had no knowledge of and less liking for Germans, while their memories of Turkish rule were unpleasant. But they lacked initiative, and were largely imeducated, so that whatever support they were disposed to give the British authorities in times of trouble was likely, to be platonic. Among the better educated classes in the towns there was little love for the Khe- dive and little fanaticism against Europeans, though Syrian and Coptic Christians were generally disliked. On the other hand, the numerically small but vocal extremist party, which comprised not a few students of law and theology and some of the Turco-Egyptians, who formed a sort of aristocracy since the days of Mohamed Ali, was hostile and had become more reactionary in its tendencies since it had begun to look to Turkey for support rather than to France. The great majority of officials, merchants, and landowners supported the occupation, which was, of course, anathema to the much less numerous entourage of the Khedive. The excitability, credulity, and fickleness of the urban lower classes, failings which extended to many of the half-educated intelligenzia, made them imreliable as sup- porters of any Government. The Arabic proverb, " The Egyptian has. fears, but has no respect," is too often true of this element. Religion was the side on which this town population was most easily approached by intriguers, and it is noteworthy that the connexion between Egj-pt and Turkey was popular among them and among some of the fellaheen for reUgious reasons. The Turkish Sultanate meant nothing to them, but to be. if only nominally, " under the protection of the Khalifate " flattered their amour-propre and was, so to speak, a sort of guarantee of religious orthodoxy. On August 2 the Council of Ministers declared the notes of the National Bank of Egj-pt obligatory legal tender. On the same day it prohibited the exportation of foodstuffs. On August 3 the Egyptian Government, in view of the outbreak of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and between Russia and Germany, i isued instructions similar to those issued during the Russo-Japanese War, to its authori- ties on the Suez Canal and its ports of access and at other Egyptian ports. But witliin forty-eight hours the situation had entii'ely changed owing to the entry of Great Britain into the war. On August 5 the Council of Ministers met and arrived at an important " decision tending to ensure the defence of Egypt in the war between Germany and Great Britain." The preamble ran : Considering that war has unhappily been declared between His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dependencies oxer Seas, Emperor of India, and the German Emperor ; that the presence in Egypt of the Army of Occupation of His Britannic Majesty rentiers the country liable to attack by His Majesty's enemies ; that in consequence of this state of affairs it is necessary that all measures be taken THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 285 TROOPS AT MENA CAMP. to defend the country against tlie risk of such attack — all whom it concerns are therefore informed that at a meeting of the Council of Ministers held on August 5, 1914 under the presidency of H.E. the Regent, the following decisions were taken. The first four articles of the Egyptian Goveriunent's decision forbade any person residing in or passing through Egypt (1) to make any contract or agreement whatever with the German Government or any of its agents ; (2) to contribute to or participate in the issue of any loan to the German Government or make any loan thereto ; (3) to conclude any policy or contract of insurance with or for the benefit of any person residing in or passing through the German Empire, or effect any paJ^nent on the basis of any existing policy or contract of insurance on account of any loss due to warlike acts by the forcjes of His Britannic Majesty or of his Allies ; (4) to conclude any new contract or enter into any new commercial, financial or other obliga- tion with or for the benefit of any person as defined in (3). Article 5 prohibited any Egyptian vessel from entering into or conmiunicating with any German port. Article 6 forbade the export of arms and munitions of war, military equipment and vehicles, petrol, benzine, air- craft, coal-sacks, coal and briquettes. The next two articles forbade the export of any mer- chandize from any Egyptian to any German port and the transhipment in any Egyptian port of any merchandii(;e for the above destination, and prohibited the departure from any Egyptian port of vessels which had not been specially authorized to sail. Articles 9 to 11 dealt with contraband. By their terms any neutral vessel which was in itself contraband of war in accord- ance with the definition of contraband adopted by the British Government, or carried contra- band or rendered any services contrary to neutrality " to the enemy," would be prevented from leaving Egj-ptian jjorts ; any neutral vessel embarking contraband of war in any Egyptian port would be liable to capture, and any neutral vessel on which contraband had been embarked before the date of the Eg5'ptian Govermnent's decision must unload the contraband cargo, if still in an Egyptian port. Article 12 forbade the discharging in any Egyptian port of any article or merchandize taken on board in a German port subsequently to the Egyptian Government's decision. The next four articles are given in full : Article 13. — The Naval and Military forces of Hifl Britannic Majesty may exercise all the rights of war in Egyptian ports and in Egyptian territory, and war- vessels, merchant vessels or merchandize captured in Egyptian ports or territory may be brought before the judgment of a British Prize Court. Article 14. — Under the strict observation of the pro- ceding clauses any German vessel which was in an JOgyptian port at the date of the opening of hostilities or which, having quitted its last port before that date, haa entered or shall enter an Egyptian port without know- lodge of the outbreak of war, will bo authorized until sunset on August 14, 1914, to load or unload and to leave port on giving such written engagements as may be required by the British naval authorities in con- formity with tlie dispositions of Chapter 3 of iho Conven- tion of 1907 relative to certain restrictions in the exercise of the right of capture in naval warfare. Article 15. — German merchant vessels which have left 34—2 28G THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ".jeam- «C-. HELIOPOLIS GAMP. their last port before the declaration of war, and which put in witliout knowledge of the declaration of war to an Egyptian port after sunset on August 14, 1914, and are authorized to enter port, may be required to leave immediately, or after the delay deemed necessary by the port authorities for the discharging of such part of their cargo as they may be required or specially authorized to effect, in each case giving in advance the written engagements referred to in the preceding article. Article 16. — A ship liable to the operation of any of the preceding articles, having cargo on board which, according to the rules applied by the British Prize Courts, constitutes enemy cargo, or which the British naval or military authorities wish to requisition subject to compensation (moyennant compensation) for the needs of the war, shall not leave port till this cargo shall have been discharged. Under Article 17 cable ships, ocean oil -tank vessels, ships of over 5,000 tons displacement and 14 knots speed, or merchantmen obviously con- structed with a view to their use as ships of war were expressly deprived of any of the benefits referred to in Clauses 14 and 15. Article 18 ran: — "All persons whom tliis concerns shall render the assistance which may te required of them to the naval and military forces of His Britannic Majesty." Article 19 Extended the operation of the Goverimient's •decisions to companies, associations, etc., having a' legal or de facto existence. Article 20 dealt as follows with the Canal ports : As regards the ports of access to the Suez Canal, the present decision shall be applied with the following modifications : ■■■ (a) Merchant vessels which have traversed or wish to. traverse the Canal, whatever their nationality or cargo, shall have full liberty to enter or leave the ports of access or to pass through the Canal without risk of capture or detention, provided that the passage of the Canal and departure from the port of access arc " Effected normally and without unjustifiable delay. (6) These ships may receive such provisions, in- cluding coal, as shall be reasonably necessary for the voyage on which they are bound. (c) Merchandize of all sorts which has passed the Canal may be transhipped at the port of departure. (d) Article 13 of the present decision shall be inter- preted in accordance with the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. On August 13 the above decisions were extended to Austria -Hungary, then at wa* with Great Britain, the date of August 22, 1914, being substituted for that of Augtist 14 in the application of Articles 14 and 15 to Austro- Hungarian merchant vessels. These decisions had been prepared before- hand, in view of the possible outbreak of a European war, by Mr. W. E. Briuiyate, C.]\I.G., Legal Adviser to the Egyptian Government, under the ausjaices of the Imperial Defence Committee. They could not be described as a declaration of neutrality. They formed, indeed, something resembling a Treaty of Alliance of local and limited application between Egyjjt and Great Britain and her Allies. Egypt, being in the military occupation of the British Forces, was exposed to attack by the enemies of tliose forces, and, therefore, took the necessary nteasures against such attack. Against the argument that Egypt as a vassal State of Turkey had no right to take any such steps the Egyptian Government could urge the plea of military justification, the naore so as her action harmed no neutral State whatsoever. Thanks to the Allies' command of the Mediterranean, Egypt had nothing to fear from naval raiders as soon as the Goeben and THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. 287 Breslau had disappeared into the Dardanelles. But the attitude of Turkey now became provocative, while the Germans resident in the country, the supporters of the Khedive, and the pro-Turk party required watching. Had the war caused Egypt no economic distress, their efforts to excite popular feeling against the occupation need have aroused no uneasiness. Unfortunately Egypt suffered severely from the war. The country lived on its cotton crop. The larger landowners, some of whom had already been hard hit by the financial crisis of 1907, the consequence of over-specula- tion in land, the effects of which were still felt, were not as a rule thrifty. They were in the habit of obtaining annually large advances against the coming cotton crop from the banks, and of spending these advances lavishly. The great mass of small landowners, if thriftier, were still too fond of spending sums they could ill afford on marriage feasts and similar festivi- ties. ]Many of them were more or less heavily in debt, while those who hoarded would only part with their money at the last extremity. To the landowners in general the war was a heavy blow ; all means of financing the culti- vators to enable them to lift and pick the crop were checked, the banks being unable to make the usual advances on cotton, and the general indebtedness of the native population conse- quently increased. The landowners had been looking forward to a big cotton crop and hoping to realize it at satisfactory prices. The crop, as a matter of fact, was, generally speaking, inferior in quality to the last, and the quantity was less than had been expected, owing to the ravages of the latest Egyptian insect pest, the " pink boll-worm." Owing to the absence of facilities for financing the cultivators, the ripe crop was often left unpicked for so long that the first, second, and third pickings were taken together, to the detriment of yield and quality. There were cases, too, in which the disheartened tenant farmers refused to pick, knowing that as soon as they had gathered in the crop it would be seized by the landlord for rent. In the early months of the war, therefore, the anxiety and depression of the peasantry were great. Trade natm-ally suffered. At the beginning of the war there was a short spurt in certain branches owing to the sudden replenishment of stocks. Complete stagnation followed for some time. Native industries suffered the most, and unemployment increased. The Public Works Ministry was compelled from motives of economy to cease work on all its various projects, except where it was necessary im- BRITISH SENTRIES ON DU lY AT THE CITADEL. CAIRO. In the background Is the Musque of Mohamed All. 288 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. -TT^»^C* . ^i-^^c^-V/- --ffi^. K V «. fir 'ti^ TROOPS AT RIFLE PRACTICE ON THE DESERT SANDS. mediately to spend money to conserve work that had already been done. The departm-e of a large nmnber of European residents — Frencli, German, and Austro-Hun- garian — called out for military service, affected the shopkeeping class and don:iestic servants, as did the general reduction of private expen- diture all round. The retiu-ns of imports and exports up to December 14 were eloquent of the economic loss sustained by the country' : Value of imports into Egypt from 1.8.13 to 31.10.13 ... £E. 7, 338.000 Ditto from 1.S.14 to 31.10.14... 3,357,000 Value of exports from 1.8.13 to 31.10.13 7,106,000 Ditto from 1.8.14 to 31.10.14 ... 1,583.000 Previous crises had merely affected a section of t lie population — stockbrokers, speculators, and owners of certain urban or suburban proper- ties for the most part. The present crisis affected all classes, and caused a very general rnalaise, more especially among the very poor. The risk that sedition-mongers would attempt to stir up trouble among the ignorant and needy had to be taken into account. Hostile intrigue from four different quarters — the Kliedive and his supporters, the extremist Nationalists, German agents, and Tiu'lcish agitators — had never entirely ceased, and was the more to be feared now that economic conditions were imsatisfactory. The Khedive was unpopular, but an Oriental ruler can generally rely on some support as long as he is on the tnrone, and Abbas Hilmi» as the lawful sovereign of Egj^pt, had his followers and even his admirers. Lord Cromer's " Abbas II." contains an interesting sketeh of his earlier struggles with the yoimg ruler of Egypt, who, fresh from the narrow training of the Teresianum at Vienna, ignorant of Egj-ptian conditions, and impulsive, made a series of rash " frontal attacks " on the British Occu- pation, and was repulsed with considerable loss to his prestige. Thereafter the Khedive waged a war of intrigue against Great Britain in Egj'pt. He did much to create the ex- tremist Nationalist party, wliich he financed from the proceeds of the sale of grades and decorations, often to eminently mideserving persons. His entourage was a stronghold of anti-British feeling. Officers and officials who had misconducted themselves and had been dismissed from Govermnent emplojinent often fotuid an asylum in liis service. Corrupt ex-officials of tlie Ministry of Finance were particularly eligible. For long he held the Wakfs (Pious Fotmdations) Admim'stration in liis hands, and added to liis private fortime therefrom. His ambition was, .as Lord Cromer has written, '" to enrich himself by every possible means in his power." His principal interest and amusement was political and financial intrigue. Lord Cromer has compared him to the Virgilian Dares, " seditione potens " — mighty in sedition. To such of his Ministers \\ho displeased liim or THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 289 pleased the British he could on occasion show the maximum of discourtesy. After Lord Cromer's retirement came a brief reconciliation between the occupation, in the person of Sir Eldon Gorst, and Abbas Hilmi. The Khedive did not, it was true, abandon liis sale of decorations or his hunt for " Naboth's vineyards," but liis intrigues against the occupation became temporarily less energetic. His friendship for the new British Agent was undoubtedly sincere, and his visit to Sir Eldon Gorst's death-bed should be remembered by Englishmen in his favour. It must also be admitted that, violent as his dislike for England was, he was invariably coiurteous to her repre- sentatives in Egypt. Sir Eldon Gorst undoubtedly broke the alliance between the Khedive and the Nationalists of the extreme faction. This alhance was not renewed till 1913, when Abbas Hilmi, who had large estates in Turkej^ and regularly visited Constantinople, fearing for his interests, made terms with some of the ex- tremists. Others remained hostile, and the Committee Government, with which he \\as frequently on bad terms, and against which he undoubtedly intrigued, supported theni. On July 24, 1914, a half -insane Egyptian student fired at and wounded the Khedive, then on a visit to Constantinople, as he drove past the Sublime Porte. The ruler's injimes were not severe : the would-be assassin was shot, stabbed, and sabred with much promptitude by the Otto- man escort, who. in their inopportune or prudent zeal, woimded several passers-by, and by dis- patching the culprit rendered further police researches fruitless. The Committee Goverrunent was prodigal of kind attentions to the previously detested '" Vali of Egypt." Ere Abbas Hilmi had fully recovered from his wounds, the Great War had broken out. He asked the British Government for help to retiu-n to Egypt. The request was most embarrassing. The Army of Occupation had not yet been reinforced, the population was already disttu:"bed by tlie economic crisis, and the return of a riiler who had sho\\n such capacity for intrigue and such skill in rendering the position of his Ministers impossible would have added to the difliculties. He was recommended to remain at Constanti- nople. The Austro-Hungarian and German Ambassadors promptly made full vise of theij* opportunity and, thanks to their efforts, the Austrophile or Anglophobe sentiments of Abbas and the assun:ied friendliness of the Turkish Government were speedily able to reconcile hiui with the all-powerful Committee of Union and Progress. Within a month of the outbreak of war he was discussing the invasion of Egypt by the Turks with INIinisters and Generals, while his agents at Cairo and Alexandria were spreading alarming reports concerning his intentions. The British Ambassador suggested that he should withdraw for a while to Italy. It was Abbas Hilmi's last chance. He refused to entertain the suggestion and thus signed his BRITISH SOLDIERS DIGGING TRENCHES IN THE DESERT. 290 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. EGYPT AND THE NILE. 1. Grfat Pyramid of Gizeh. 2. A street in Cairo. 3. Blrds-eye view of Cairo. 4. The Nile bridge, Cairo. 5. Assuan. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. ■29 J own political dpath-warrant. His alliance with the Turkish Government grew closer. The Egyptian police was constantly coming across the tracks of his agents. A few weeks after the outbreak of war with Turkey none who knew his historj' and that of his relations with the Committee were much astonished to hear that the Talaats and Envers, after flattering his vanity and informing the Moslem world that he would lead the " Holy Warriors " to Cairo, had suddenly turned upon their dupe, accused him of playing a double game, and sent him packing. It was left to the Egyptian Govern- ment, in deference to a request from Sir John Maxwell, to appoint a sequestrator of his private properties " in the interests both of His Highness and of His Highness's creditors." The extremist Nationalist group, kno^Ti as the " Hisb el Watani " (Patriotic Party), was in an evil plight when tlie Great War broke out. This party in its tendencies somewhat resembled the extreme wing of the Committee of Union R.nd Progress, which its brightest ornaments eventually joined. There had been " National- ism " enough in Egypt before it, largely owing to the great uncertainty that prevailed as to our intentions, but many so-called " Nation- alists " were simply trimmers, who, seeing the Khedive and certain magnates hostile to the British — who might one day leave the country — thought it safer to follow the lead of Abdin. After the Fashoda incident, and still more after the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, many of these waverers rallied to the British Occupation. The extremist party owed its existence to Abbas II., who assisted its leader, Mustafa Kamil Pasha, and his group with subventions which enabled them to foimd a violent but well- edited journal, called Al Lewa {The Standard). Mustafa was a Turco -Egyptian demagogue, whose pleasant manners and French veneer found him some influential friends at Paris, while his genuine eloquence inflamed the enthusiasm of the student class. After a while he showed independent tendencies which greatly annoyed the Khedive, who cut off supplies, and, after making use of him against Lord Cromer, gave him the cold shoulder when Sir Eldon Gorst was British Agent. Whether Mustafa could have stood on his own feet after tlie Khedive had disowned him is not certain. Ho died rather suddenly in the winter of 1907-1 90S, and the examination of his affairs revealed a deplorable confusion, from which his journal and supporters never completely recovered. After SHEIKH SHAWISH. [Lekeiian. his death the Francophile veneer of his party, which had already shown signs of scaling off, disappeared entirely, and it became frankly reactionary', Turcophile, and anti-European — save where Germany was concerned. Its leaders were Mohamcd Bey Farid, a rather unimportant agitator, and Slieikh Abdul Aziz Shawish, a fiery Tunisian who had learnt English admirably when Assistant Professor of Arabic at Oxford, spoke well, and thoiifjh known when a law student as " Ahmak ed Dawla " (the State Fool), appealed to the fnnatical through his knowledge of the Koran and tlie Traditions. The murder of Butros Paslia Ohali, already referred to, by a student named Wardani was credited by pnpulnr report to the promptings of Shawisli and his friends, but no proof of this was discovered, and the crime may equally well have been inspired by Wardani's friends among the revolutionaries of Constanti- nople, who had sent emissaries to Egypt in 1009. After Lord Kitchener's arrival in Egypt the relations between the extremists and the Khcdiv<e, who had a terror of assassination, were fitfully resumed, but neither trusted the other, and Abbas Hilmi was probably rather relieved when Shawish and Farid fled the country, to avoid trial on charges of abetting re ipon, and took refuge at Constantinople. With their less dangerous local successors he was on better terms, but the flight of Shawish took the sting out of the extremist group, which had never been really dangerous, except as a 292 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. TROOPS DISEMBARKING IN EGYPT. weapon in the hands of the Khedive and of Turkish fishers in troubled waters. Shawish became a leading member of the Committee of Union and Progress and counsellor to Talaat and Enver. Another Egyptian Nationalist, Dr. Ahmed Fuad, was appointed to the Intelli- gence Department of the Turkish Foreign Office. The leaders left in Egypt indulged in a certain amovuit of pro -German and pro -Turkish talk in bars and cafes, but no single Egyptian was induced thereby to risk his skin in derailing a train or blowing up a bridge. The censorship checked anj' jom-nalistic manifestations on their part, and when war broke ovxt with Turkey some of them, who had been allowed to continue to edit their newspapers, re- quested to be allowed to go to Italy, and their request was granted. A far inore dangerous group, the " Servants of the Kaaba " (the Holy Stone at Mecca), was scarcely represented in Egypt before the war. Sheikh Shawish was one of its leading lights, but its chiefs were usually Indian, Afghan, and Turkish Moslems. Some of its emissaries, who were sent to Egypt to incite the Indian Moslem troops against their officers, were caught and expelled from the country. They were Afghans or Indians. For several years before the ovitbreak of the Great War German dijalomatists, as the French ^'l'llow Book related, had sough* to make Egypt, as tlie intellectual centre of the Arab world, a base for their propaganda, which was directed against England, France, and to some extent Italy. By posing as tlie friends of Turkey they won to their side the pro -Turkish elements among the Arabs. By flattering the extremist Egyptian Nationahsts they main- tained friendly relations with the Hisb el Watani, and their relations with the Ottoman High Commissariat and with the Khedive were friendly. Baron Max von Oppenheim, Coun- cillor with Ministerial r^nk to the German Agency at Cairo from 1904 to 1909, an energetic but somewhat theatrical intriguer, showed much pro-Turkish activity in 1906, the year of the Akaba incident and of the Conference of Algeciras. In the same year a branch of the Deutsch-Orient Bank, the advanced guard of German political and financial penetration in the Near East, was founded at Cairo. Its methods included house-to-house touting, appeals to the nationalist sentiment against Coptic moneylenders and British '" Ijlood- suckers," the offer of credit on insufficient security, and the bait of heavy interest, amounting in some cases to 4 per cent., on deposits. Rival banlcs were loud in their denunciations of the unprofessional methods employed by the German and Austrian Jews who controlled and managed the Egyptian branch, but when the Germans burnt their fingers by losing unsecured advances to un- trustworthy, if Gennanophile, notables, anger gave way to mirth. The Deutsch-Orient Bank eventually brought its policy into line with that of other Egj^ptian banks, but had none the less temporarily to suspend payment after the outbreak of war, to the huge indigna- tion of its Egj'ptian clientele. More important than these politico-financial experiments were the intrigues carried on by members of the staff of the German Agencw Baron von Oppenheim, though he corresponded with the Kaiser over the indignant heads of his official chiefs, and was even invited to a " lunch intune " at Potsdam to which his then chief was not invited, was not a persona grata either with Herr Ruecker-Jenisch, A\ho dis- liked subterranean politics, or with Count Bernstorff. who preferred more open warfare. He was, however, on good terms with Prince Hatzfeldt, who succeeded Bernstorff, and from 1908 onwards lost no chance of establishing close relations with Nationahst or Turkish THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •293 intriguers. After the Baron's departure tlie threads of German intrigue in Egypt were confided to Dr. Pruefer, a retiring httle man, but a fme Arabic scholar, who had travelled Huich in Syria and visited the Egyptian extremist leaders and certain reputed Pan- Islamic agents in Oriental disguise. In 1911 the leaders of the Hisb el Watani, Sheikh Shawish and Mohamed Bey Farid, entered into an agreement with Prince Hatzfeldt whereby they pledged themselves to use all their influence with the Union and Progress leaders at Constan- tinople, to oppose any attempt to bring about a rapprochement between Great Britain and Turkey and to obtain jNIoslem support for the Deutsch-Orient Bank. In return they re- ceived " postal facilities " — i.e., the use of the German official valise for the forwarding of compromising documei.ts to Constantinople — and monetarj^ subventioiis. When the ex- tremists fell on evil days and Shawish and Farid had to fly to Constantinople, the German Acting Diploniatic Agent in Egypt, Baron Richthofen, had the effrontery to propose Dr. Pruefer as the German official candidate for the post of Director of tlie Khedivial Library, in which he \\ould have had abundant oppor- tunities of influencing Moslem students and divines. The scheme failed owing to the wari- ness of Hishmet Pasha, then Minister of Education, who refused to be " rushed," and the subsequent opposition of the British Agency. Meanwhile the German Agency maintained close and friendly relations with Abdin Palace and with the Ottoman High Commissariat, and attempted to open direct relations with the Sheikh es Senussi, while the German Embassy at <."onstantinople kept in touch with Shawish and other exiled extrenaists. Dr. Pruefer left Egypt early in 1914, and was next heard of in comiexion with the ^lors affair, which will Ije described later. He and liis chiefs, together with certain German resi- dents, had undoubtedly succeeded in infecting a limited nmiiber of Egyptians and P^gypto- Turks with Germanophile ideas, but this \\ as the limit of their success. More timid and more practical than the Turks, their Egyptian friends confined themselves, even when the ( Jerman armies were near Paris, to harmless demonstrations of sympathy, which became more discreet as each fresh British reinforce- ment reached Egypt. Abdul Hamid had organized Pan-Islam ism 0iemt^BSs^ ■ "■■■ SUDANESE SOLDIERS. 34 294 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. !^ ■ ¥ r^ AN EGYPTIAN DRINK. for defensive purposes. Having given the \\ iider Moslem elements of his Empire a free hand to plunder, and at times massacre, non-Moslems, he sought to exalt the prestige of the Turkish Kaliphate among Moslems subject to non- Moslem rule or administration, so that pressure exercised by Eiu-opean States on behalf of Ottoman Christians might be met by counter- pressure apphed by their Moslem subjects on behalf of an unjustly hmniliated Kaliph. In Eg5q:)t, as Lord Cromer confessed in 1906, he met with some success : tlie sympathies of a large number of Egjqjtians were on the Turkish side dvuing the Akaba dispute. After his fall the Committee of Union and Progress continued liis Pan-IslaiTiic policy, which in their hands gradually took an aggi-essive form, and though at first hampered in Egypt by the Khedive's change of front, tlie death of Mustafa Kamil, and the indignation aroused among Moslem Conservatives by the manner in which Abdul Hamid was deposed, its agents gradually regained ground. They \\ere helped in this by the general sympathy for Turkey felt through- out the Near East when Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire and by the long-successful resistance of the Turco -Arabs of Cyrenaica luider Enver Bey and Aziz el Masri, while Ismail Hakki, the real head of the Ottoman High (Commissariat at Cairo, was in close touch with the Nationalist extremists and lost no cliance of flattering wealthy Egyptian.s who were likely to subscribe to Turkish political or patriotic funds. When Sheikh Shawish and Mohamed Farid Bej- left Egypt to avoid arrest, the former edited a subventioned journal within a few doors of the Porte. Egyptian students of extremist views had already had a friendly reception at Constanti- nople ; Wardani, the murderer of Butros Pasha, had visited Constantinople in 1909 and had been photographed in the contpany of prominent members of the Committee. After the return of the Committee Government to power at Constantinople over the corpse of Nazim Pasha, Pan-Islamism of a most mihtant and aggressive description was openly preached by the Turkish Press and by members of the " Executive Committee," to which Sheikh Shawish and his imitator. Sheikh Salih et-Tunisi, Enver Pasha's Arabic tutor, belonged. Enver founded an " Arab bureau," which entered into close relations with Egyptian malcontents, and imder the auspices of Ismail Hakki Alexandria and Cairo became centres of political espionage and pro -Turkish propaganda. The plot against Aziz el Masri, if due in the first instance to the jealotisy of Enver Pasha, was worked up by Shawish, Sheikh Salih et-Tunisi, and certain Egyptian jotu:nalists and Beduins, though the better elements in the covmtry were disgusted by the persecution of this brave Egj'ptian. Many of the Turkish Ulema and students of Al-Azhar worked in the interests of the Com- mittee among the religious. Certain Beduin notables were also approached by Turkish agents, but it is an interesting fact that no attempt was made to win over the " fellaheen." The relations between the Ottoman Special Mission and Abdin grew closer, and in ]\Iay and Jume, 1914, Ismail Hakki caused alms to be distributed in certain mosques in the name of " Es-Sultan illi gaih " — the Sultan who is coming — a performance Mhicli would suggest that some at least of the Turkish extremists were well aware that 1914 would be a year of tension, if not of \\ ar, and had determined to profit from any trouble that ensued in Egypt. I<ate in June Ismail Hakki left Egypt. The outbreak of war in August seemed to the adven- turers of Constantinople and Salonika a heaven- sent opportunitj'- for the carrying out of then* Pan-Islamic schemes at the expense of the Triple Entente. To what lengths they were prepared to go long before the outbreak of war with Turkey was shown by the fact that Shukri Bey, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 295 Acting Ottoman High Commissioner, received orders as soon as war broke out in Europe to prepare public opinion in Egypt for a Turkish invasion, and by the disclosures of the Mors trial. A German, Lieut. R. C. Mors, of the Egyptian police, was arrested in Alexandria on arriving from Constantinople in September, He had explosives and compromising papers in his possession. He confessed under exan^ination that he had been introduced by Dr. Pruefer to Enver Pasha, who spoke of military opera- tions in Egypt. He had a long conversation with Omar Fauzi Bey, of the Ottoman General Staff, on September 6. This officer had planned a scheme for the creation of disturbances in Egypt by bands of malefactors under Turkish officers and for an attack on the Canal by Beduins. Enver afterwards discussed this subject with Mors, who was finally given explosives to hand over to Turkish agents or sympathizers in Egypt. He was condemned to death, but his sentence, owing, no doubt, to his interesting confession, was afterwards com- muted. Though more fitful, Turkish intrigue in Egypt was more formidable than that of the Germans, owing first to the religious ties that xmited Egypt and Turkey, and secondly to the quite undeserved prestige of the Turkish Army and Govemraent in Egypt. This prestige was mainly due to the fact that the Turkish rulers of Egypt had seldom lost an opportunity of beating, squeezing, or otherwise terrorizing the Egyp» tians, who had not yet got over their nervous respect for their former masters, and still felt flattered if they could marry Turkish wives. Nevertheless, it failed, as other intrigues failed, because the great mass of the Egyptians had no great economic grievances to complain of, and because the Turks, as usual, mistaking their own desires for realities, behoved that persons who from time to time invoked curses on the infidel and blessings on the Sultan were ready to sacrifice themselves for the Talaats and Envers. Lord Cromer, in his book " Abbas IL," describes how an old Anglophile Sheikh replied to those who asked him why he put his name to a petition to the Sultan begging him to save the country from the " abhorred presence " of the Enghsh. "It is all empty words," he replied, " I often say to my camel or to my horse if in some trifUng way he tries my patience, ' Curses on you. May Allah strike you dead, oh, son of a pig,' and if I thought it would really happen I should be silent ; but I know that the beast will remain unlianned. So also I know that tljo English will stay here, whether I sign a petition or not. What does it matter, then ? I please our Lord, the Khedive ; the English remain all the same and look after my interests and every one is happy all round." The economic meas\ires taken by the Govern- NEW ZEALANUERS AT ZEITOUN. 29G 77-//'; TUiE^ HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Zoli. MOHAMED BEY FARID. ment iniiiiediateiy after the outbreak of war in Eiiroi^e may now be described. The bank- notes issued by the National Bank of Egyp^. were made compulsory legal tender ; and the stock and share exchanges and the cotton and cotton seed futiire markets were closed. The latter markets were eventually re-opehed on December 7. The Government also issued (in connexion with the payment of debts) various moratoria, the last of which disappeared on January 31, 1915, and appointed Commissions in each Governorate and Province to fix the maximum prices of articles of first necessity. The exportation of foodstuffs was forbidden. This prohibition was afterwards modified in the case of beans, maize, and millet, the export of limited quantities of wliich was allowed after October 28. These measures, thougii useful enough, failed to improve the situation of the landowners, and especially of the smaller owners, who saw the price of cotton falling steadily and fast. In late August a cotton Commission, comj^osed of Mr. H. Higgs, C.B., Inspector- General to the JMinistry of Finance, 'Mi. Dickson, Sub-Governor at the Alexandria Branch of the Nitional Bank of Egj^-j^t, and Mr. Critchley, head of the Alexandria Branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, was appointed by the Minihtry of F. nance to take measures in England to meet the situation. Its members, who between them could claim an unrivalled knowledge of Egyptian economics and offic'al I i nance, held repeated consultations witli expert authorities on currency, finance, banking, and cotton in London and l^ancashire. They came to the following conchi.'iions : Owing to diflicultics of finance and otlwr considerations a fresh trade dt-mand for cotton was improbable before December. Consump- tion, for obvioas reasons, was likely to be le-r"? than usual, whereas the supply seemed much greater. There were classes of people interested in cotton who would be prepared to buy as a speculative investment, provided a minimum price were fixed. Banks would be prepared to finance such 2'>urchases subject to this con- dition. There were administrative difficulties in the way of making individual advances against cotton to landowners or to village vmits. Taking these factors into account, the Commission recommended : (1) That the novenimeiit should forthwith aniiaiinco its intention to buy and hold — if necessary till Ortober, 1915 — the estimated surplus production of cotton, fixing minimum rates for the purchase of first and second pick. ings as hii;;h as prudence allowed, and giving preference to small cultivators. It was the Commission's opinion that the mere knowledge of this decision, coupled with (2), would stiffen prices and stimulate demand with.out involving Government in heavy purchases. (2) That the acreas^e to be planted in cotton for next crop should be reduced by Decree to an amount roughly equivalent to the estimated carry forward from the season. (It appeared desirable to lose no time in artificially curtailing the price of a commoditv which was likely to be sold at a loss and stimulate the produc- tion of foodstuffs which were likely to become increasin;,'ly remunerative.) (3) That any Government piu-chases be financed by the issue of National Bank notes with the specific guarantee of the Eg3rptian Government. (4) That a Commissio'i should be appointed to authorise further issues of similar notes to exporters against approved forward sales. (o) That similar notes be issued as required for sound business by approved Bunks. (6) That in order to avoid an excessive note issue all emergency currency was to pay a penalty based on Bank of England rate. With this safeguard it was anticioated that a comparatively' small gold reserve would suffice t<? steady exchange. These proposals w-ere telegraphed towards the middle of September to the Egyptian ^Ministry of Finance, which maj^ or may not have discovered better expert advice in the interim, but in any case rejected some of them. On September 22 the Government decided to reduce the acreage under cotton to a million feddans (1,100,000 acres), and Umit the area under cotton in each holding to 25 per cent, of that holding. This gave rise to complaints from the tenants who paid rent on the basis of the area under cotton. Finally, on Octohei- .'JO, THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAF. •297 ♦♦ 7 Vij'^i- '^"yj^i.-r^y >i^'>-l- 8 THE EGYPTIAN MINISTRY AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [Phoiograpiisby /oia 1. Yusuf Wahba Pasha, Finance. 2. Hussein Ruchdi Paslia, Premier and Minister of Interior. 3. Ismail Sirri Pasha, Public Works. 4. Mohamed Moheb Pasha, Wakfs (Pious Foundations). 5. Ahmed Hilmi Fasha, Education. 6. Adli Yeghen Pasha, Foreign Affairs. 7. Abdul Khalik Sarwat Pasha, Justice. 8. Ismail Sidki Pasha, Agriculture. 208 THK TIMES TII.^TOjRY OF THE WAB. CAVALRY IN THE DESERT. the Goveniinent modified its decree of Sep- tember 22, and limited the proportion of any one holding under cotton to one -third instead of a quarter. Little had been done to prevent the breaking of the market, whether owing to the existence of the other claims on the attention of the British Treasury or not, it is uncertain. At the beginning of October the Government issued the following communique : The Egj'ptian Government will shortly issue Treasvii j- bonds to the value of £E. 8,000,000, .£E. 5,000,000 of which will be guaranteed h\- the British Government and the balance by the Egyptian Government's reserve. The bonds will be redeemable from a period of three to six months, the latter being the maximum date, but are renewable if necessary. They will be issued in London and Cairo, preference being given to which of the two places is the more favourable, but as far as possilije the decision of the Council of Ministers to issue £E. 5,000,000 in London and £E. 3, 000,000 in Cairo will be carried out. In no case will the unit of £E. 8,000,000 be exceeded. The bonds issued in Cairo will be paid by the Govern- ment in National Bank notes, printed specially for the purpose ; those issued in London will be paid in gold or in notes of the same value. These arrangements ha^"ing failed to assist the needy section of cultivators effectively, the Government at length fell in to some extent with the recommendation of the Cotton Com- mission, and commissioned four of the principal fiitns at Alexandria to buj- the cotton belonging to the smallest cultivators as soon as possible at reasonable prices to a limit of £1,000,000, and at the same time made arrangements for the guaranteeing of certain advances against cotton by the National Bank of Egypt. These measures produced a good effect, and the amovmt of cotton which the Government needed to purchase was small. The market improved immediately, but in the opinion ot" good judges earUer action would have saved the commimity very considerable losses and abated discontent more rapidly than did the somewhat tardy steps above referred to. But if the Ministry of Finance did not, perhaps, quite rise to the situation during the period that followed the outbreak of war with the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and preceded the rupture with Turkey, the ^linistry of Interior did admirable work. Its handling of the problem presented by the presence of large numbers of enemy subjects iii Egj'pt and the measures it took against Turkish and native . suspects when Turkey had joined our enemies will be described later. It may be noted here that, with the exception of a law- increasing the penalties for breaches of the peace committed by assemblies of more than four persons, no new legislation was required to meet the situation. The police did their work well, and both British and Egyptian Inspectors of Interior kept a vigilant ej^e on all possible agitators, while vagabonds were sent back whenever possible to their own provinces and bidden to stay there. The direction of the various administrative measures for the main- tenance of order during the first three months of the war was in the hands of the Adviser to the Interior, Jlr. (now Sir) R. Graham. After the proclamation of martial law the General Officer Conunanding the Army of Occupation was ultimately respon-sible for public tran- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 299 quillity, but the measures taken ad- hoc were still carried out under the orders of the Adviser, who throughout this -difficult period deserved right well of his country and of Egypt. The military measures taken at the outset cannot be described in detail here. In August the garrison was reduced through the departure of units belonging to the Army of Occupation, but in September Indian troops, detached from the Indian Expeditionary Force, landed in Egypt and were marched through Cairo, where they made an excellent impression. The Sirhind Brigade remained for some time with other Indian units near the Suez Canal, where all the Indian forces m Egypt were eventually posted, and was finally sent to France, its place and that of other Indian regiments which left for Europe being taken by fresh forces from Hindustan, including Imperial Service troops. In Septem- ber the East Lancashire Territorial Division and a brigade of Yeomanry arrived in Egypt. Once they had settled down, these troops trained on in admirable fashion, and though inferior in phy- sique to the Australian troops, who arrived later, were superior to them in discipline, shooting and manoeuvring power. Their relations with the native population were really admirable. At the end of November and the beginning of December the Australian and New Zealant Expeditionary Force arrived. Both contained admiraljle military material, and the New Zealanders, it may be noted, gave much less trouble to the military police. On the dejiarture of General Sir J. Byng in September, Lieut. -General Sir John Maxwell was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in Egypt. Sir John Maxwell, who at the outbreak of war was fifty-five years of age, joined the Army in 1879. He had spent the greater part of his military career in Egypt. He was with the Black Watch in the Egjqitian War of 1882, and was present at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir. He was a Staff Captain in the Hill Expedition of 1884-85, and then served as Aide-de-Camp to Major General Grenfell with the Egyptian Frontier Field Force. He was promoted Brevet Lieut. - Colonel for his services at Dongola in 1896, and commanded the second Egyptian Brigade at the Battle of Omdufman. In the South African War be commanded a Brigade, and was after- wards appointed Military Governor of Pre- toria. In 1908 he was given the command of the forces in Egypt, and he held this appoint- ment ixntil two years before the Great War. His great popularity with the native population of all degrees and his remarkable knowledge of 1 the country were \ aluable assets to the British SUDANESE TRIBESMEN. 300 thl: times jijstol'Y of the war. Occuptition throughout this period, and when martial law was declared he imposed it witii the nunimum of necessary severity and with practically no interference whatever witli the normal life of the country. There were obvious difficulties in dealing with German and to some extent with Turkish propaganda as long as tlie German and Austro- Hungarian Governments were diplomatically represented in Egj^^Jt, and Herr von Pannwitz, Acting German Diplomatic Agent in the place of Prince Hatzfeldt's successor, Herr von jNliquel, received a bi-weekly foreign office " bag ■' from Berlin by way of Constantinople and Beirut. At the end of August it was decided to expel those Gennan and Austro-Hungarian subjects, including Diplomatic and Consular representatives, whose presence was considered undesirable. An intimation to this effect was therefore conveyed to Dr. von Pannwitz and Count Louis Szechenja by General Sir .T. BjTig's aide-de-camp. The aggrieved diplomatists protested to the Egjptian Government, which retiu-ned no an-\\er to their protest. Article 13 of its decision of August 5 dispensed it from that formality. On Septeniber 10 both left Alex- andria for Italy by the s.s. Catania, and the American and Italian Diplomatic Agents took over the protection of their nationals in Egj^Dt. Four (Jerman Consular officials were left under the charge of the American Agency and t\\"o Austro-Hungarian Consular officials vinder that of the Italian Agency. The German Govern- ment and that of the Dual ilonarchy did their utmost to make capital out of this incident, more especially at Constantinople. But the measiu"e was pvu^ely a military one, and abso- Ivitely defensible on military grounds. As long as a British army occupied Eg^^pt the Com- mander of that army had the right in war time to take all necessary measures for the protection of the troops under liis orders, including the expulsion of enemy subjects, whatever their rank, wliose presence \vas inconvenient or dangerous. Till the end of August no steps had been taken either to register enemj* subjects resident in Egypt or to prevent Austrian and German reservists from leaving the country. Many of them did so ; those who were unable to make their way to Italy taldng passages for SjTian ports. In September, first unmarried and later married enemy reservists were prevented from leaving the coiuitr}-, and on October 1, 1914, a proclamation was issued by the General Officer Commanding the Army of Occupation callinc on all German and Austro- Hungarian subjects to register themselves, failing which they would render themselves liable to arrest b\' the military authorities. The registration form showed age, profession, length of residence in Egypt, family, and liability for military service. It was only retiu-ned, in the case of male enemy residents, to persons over 48 years of age, for whom it served as a licence to reside and carry on business in Egj-pt. The authorities, having thus obtained a list of enemy subjects liable to service, sent all un- married reservists to Alexandria, whence they were dispatched to Malta on November 1. ^Vith them v\ere deported the crews of enemy ships taken as prizes and lying in Egyptian ports. The papers of the remaining German and Austro-Hungarian subjects of from 18 to 45 years of age were then examined, and all who could not furnish proof of their exemption from military service were dispatched to Malta with a munber of married reservists and some more crews of prize ships on November 28. Between November 1 and December 17, 1,651 enc^my subjects were thub deported. After the pro- clamation of the British Protectorate and the development of Turkish military preparations in SjTia, it became necessary to take more sweeping measiu-es towards German and Austro- Hungarian subjects, many of ^^hom continued to indoctrinate ignorant Egyptians with a belief in the ultimate success of the Central Powers. iMalta being now overcrowded with deportees, including many Turks, a concentration camp to holii about 150 persons was formed at Alexandria. There were sent to it : (o) Germans and Austro-Hungarians who wished to go there ; (6) those who had no means of leaving the country or whose health would have suffered from a European winter ; and (c) persons who for special reasons had not previously been deported. Early in 1915 all Germans, of what- ever age, were requested to leave the comitry, and exceptions were only made in cases of age or infirmity, or where thoroughly satisfactory guarantees of good behaviour were forthcoming No male German or Austro-Hiuigarian subjects were allowed to land in Eg\pt, and no women without permission of the General Officer Commanding. These measures were strict, but they were by no means harshly applied. No Triestines, Dalmatians, Is;trians, or Austro-Hungarian Slavs were deported unless there were par- ticular reasons necessitating their expulsion. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 301 EGYPT AND THE TURKISH EMPIRE. 302 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. No women were deported or sent to concen- tration camps, and it was only found necessary to request three to leave the country. In cases where the head of a family had been deported and the fanaily hud no means of getting to Europe tiir cost ot the passage was borne by the Government. All petitions from Germans and Austrians were submitted to the General Officer Commanding, whose decision in their case was final. All denunciations of individuals were investigated liy the Ministrj' of the Interior through the police, and the decision of the General Officer Commanding was taken on the result. Enemy subjects who were in the service of the Egyptian Government on the outbreak of war were recjuired to sign a declara- tion in which they gave their name, rank, ftmctions, and nationality, and declared that the present war would in no way affect the proper discharge of their duties as Egyptian officials, and that during the war they would do notliing to injiu-e the arms or interests of Great Britain or her Allies. On November 25 Sir John Maxwell decided that no Austro- Hungarians or Germans could be allowed to remain in Government service, except such as could either obtain neutral or allied citizenship or a certificate from a neutral or allied Con-sulate that they had taken all steps in their power to renounce their old and to acquire a new nation- alitj'. On December '.i all enemy subjects in Government service were dismi.ssed, and the reinstatement of such as had been able to accept th(! above offer was begun. Those who were dismissed were treated as if their posts had been suppressed, and their rights to pension.s and indemnities liquidated. Ten mincjr Government emploj^ees were deported with other enemy subjects, and one only sent to England on parole at his own request. Through- out Sir John ]Maxwell used the administrative machinery of the Egyptian Govemment up to the point where enemy subjects were handed o\er to the military' authorities. That this machinery was in good hands was proved by the rarity of complaints, even on the part of tho.se ^s■ho suffered from its activity. Meanwhile a number of enemy merchantmen, mostly under the German flag, had been lying in the Canal, and had in many cas«s refused to take advantage of the provisions of Article 20 of the Egyptian Government's decision of AugiLst .'5, whereby they were permitted to pass through the Canal and quit it,« ports of NATIVES BRING FOOD TO BRITISH SOLDIERS. THE TIMES HISTOnr OE THE WAR. 803 AUSTRALIAN GAMP AT THE PYRAMIDS. access without danger of capture or detention (in Egyptian waters), provided that their passage of the Canal and departure from its ports of access were effected without undue delay. The danger ot a block in the Canal was thus greatly increased. In one or two instances attempts to sink ships in the Canal were only just foiled in time by the vigilance of the British and Egyptian authorities. The growing tension between Great Britain and Turkey made it necessary to remove this source of danger, and on October 14 the Egyptian Government, which had every reason to com- plain of the refusal of the captains of the vessels in question to respect its decision, took drastic measures against them. On that and succeeding days Egyptian troops arriving at the Canal ports boarded the ships in question, 22 in number, and occupied them with the object of preventing disturbances. Crews were then put on board which took the ships to sea, and at the three-mile limit handed them over to the British Naval authorities, who took them over. All reached Alexandria by October 20. Meanwhile the British Government issued a communication to neutrals and allied Powers which had been parties to the Suez Canal Convention. It pointed out that since the outbreak of war certain ships belonging to enemy countries had been detained by the Egyptian Government, some on account of hostile acts, others through fear that such acts were contemplated by their captains, while other vessels had declined to leave the Suez Canal though furnished with passes, thus proving that they wished to use the Canal ports merely as ports of refuge. The British Government could not admit such an interpre- tation of the rights of free access and use of Canal ports. To admit it would imply its consent to the early blocking of the Canal. It was obvious, therefore, that the Egyptian Government was justified in removing enemy ships which had remained long enough in the Canal porta to show that they meant to stay there till the end of the war. Three days after the arrival of the last of these ships at Alexandria the Supreme British Court sitting in Egypt gave notice that it had instituted actions in its capacity as a Prize Court against the owners and parties interested in the ships in question, " the said ships having been taken as prizes by H.M. Ships of War, and for the condemnation thereof." Meanwhile the Turkish Government was pushing on its preparations for a campaign against Egypt. The Sublime Porte assured the British Ambassador at Constantinople that these measures were piurely defensive and had 304 THE TIMES HLSTUUY OF THE WAR. SIR MILNE CHEETHAM. been taken only in consequence of the general mobilization of the Ottoman Army. But British Consular reports spoke not only of the mobilization of the Damascus Army Corps, but of the formation of reserve regiments in Syria, of the dispatch to Aleppo of troops belonging to the Xllth (Mosul) Army Corps, and of an active pro- paganda among the Arab tribes of the districts on the borders of the Sinai Peninsula. The officially inspired or controlled Arabic newspapers of Syria and Palestine were encouraged to publish violent articles against the Entente Powers. In September the entire Ottoman Press began to raise the Egyptian question, and to demand by what right the British military authorities whose occupation of Egypt the Porte had never recognized, had ordered the German and Austrian Agents to leave the country, though they received their exequaturs from the Porte. False accusations of a sort calculated to arouse Moslem fanaticism were also made, and wild and mythical tales of " massacres " of " harm- less Moslems " spread abroad. At a later date parties of " fedais " — the political desperadoes and agitators whom the Committee of Union and Progress eniployed for political assassina- tions, the persecution of minorities, and the promotion of revolutionary movements in the Caucasus and the Balkans — began to drift into Syria and incite the popnlatioTi against lOngland. At Alcj)po a local tailor was coiiinii.s.sioned t<» make " a variety of Indian costumes and measurements " on designs .supplied by German officers, it being the object of some of tlie " fedais " to enter Eg^pt in Indiaii disguise and stir up the population, i^argc quantities of arms were meantime being distributed among the Syrian Beduins with money subventions. Beh.:;-ed-din Shakir, a prominent member ot the Committee, had made an agreeimuit on behalf of the Government in September uitli the Slieikh of the Howeytat tribe, and large; bodies of Beduins were collected near Gaza. Finally, on October 26, the long-ex2)ected raid took place, and 2,000 armed Beduins crossed the Egyptian frontier and watered their camels at Magdaba wells, 20 miles ^\ithin the ICgypiian border. Before the Grand Vizier had received official news of this aggi-essive movement a Turkish destroyer flotilla had raided Odessa and sunk a Russian gimboat. On October ;}0 the British, French, and Russian Ambassadors asked for their passports, and on Noveml)er 5 Great Britain was at war with Turkey. The British authorities in Egypt were not caught unprepared. No sooner had the news of the attack on Odessa and the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Porte reached Cairo than a large number of suspected Turks, among whom were several officers, sent on enigmatic missions to Egypt, were arrested, together with certain Egyptians whose relations with the Ottoman Special Mission were suspect or who were notorious sedition-mongers. Sir John Maxwell's plan of campaign had been skilfully arranged. The British officials of the Ministry of Interior were promptly invested with what amounted to military powers to deal with sedition, under the command of Sir Ronald Graham, the Adviser to the Minister of Interior, who for the time being acted £S Chief of Staff to the General Officer Conunanding in all matters connected \^itli the maintenance of order. Orders for deportation or imprison- ment were signed by the Adviser until the situation was regularized by the proclamation of the British Protectorate. What amounted to a military dictatorship was thu*^ inaugurated. On November 2 the following proclamations wfjre issued : By the General Officer Commanding His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Egypt. Notice is hereby given that I have been directed by His Britannic Majesty's Government to assume mihtary control of Egypt in order to secure its protection. The I THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 305 country i>> tlioreioie placed iitidcr .Marlial Law from tliU date. I, John Grenfell Maxwell, Liouteiiant-Genera!, Com- manding His Britannic Jlaje-^ty's Forces in Egypt, /entrusted with the applieaiion o! Martial Law, hereby give notice as follows : (1) The powers to be exercizeil under my authority by the Military Authorities are intended to supplement and not to supersede the Civil Administration, and all Civil officials in the service of the Egyptian Government are hereby required to continue the punctual dischar;,'e of their respective duties. {'') Private citizens will best serve the common end by abstaining from all action of a nature to disturb the public peace, to stir up disaffection, or to aid the enemies of His J3ritannie Majesty and His Allies, and by con- forming promptly and cheerfully to all orders given under my authority for the maintenance of public peace and good order ; and so long as they do so they will be subject to no interference from the Military Authorities. (.3) All requisitions of service or of property which may be necessitated by military exigencies will be the subject of full compensation, to be assessed, in default of agree- ment, by an independent authority. By the second proclamation Sir Jolin Maxwell res-erved the right of interfering, if necessary, in the civil administration of the country. This right was not exercized. That this was so was due to the ^\ise and patriotic conduct of the Ministry. Telegraphing on December 19. after the proclamation of the British I'rotectorate, The Tltne.v Cairo Corre- spondent said : On the outbreak of hostilities with Turkey the position became admittedly more dilficult and delicate. Holding their mandate from the Khedive as the vassal of Turkey, -Alinisters must naturally have regarded certain measures which the situation demanded as inconsistent with that mandate, but they all realized that their first duty, overshadowing all other considerations, was to Egypt and the Egyptians. . . . But while the Ministry as a whole acquitted itself commendably, the lion's share of all the anxious and strenuous work has naturally fallen on the shoulders of its chief — Hussein Ruchdi Pasha - to whom the greatest credit is due. He had gone thiough. the most trying period of office of any Egyptian Pronier. The sudden assumption of control by the military authorities might well hiive been expected periodically to give rise to what many men in his position might have- resented as encroachment on the civil prerogatives. But Ruchdi Pasha has fehown remarkable adaptability and appreciation of the true requirements of the moment. At no time has there been friction, nor has one moment of anxiety been caused to the British authorities, who- appreciate very highly his sincere and valuable co- operation, especially in the difficult circmnstances of the past two months. On November 7 Sir John Maxwell issued a proclamation announcing that a state of war existed as from November 5 between Great Britain and Turkej'. The preamble was followed by these important pas -ages : Although from the outsat of the war between Hia Majesty and the Emperors of Germany and Austriii the- AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS BUILDING A BRIDGE OVER A CANAL. 306 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. SOME MEN OF THE 9th MANCHESTER Ottoman Govemmenl. under tlie influence of Hi.s Majesty's enemies, have repeatedly violated the riKhts secured to His Majesty by international law and by treaty, His Majesty's Government ha\'e scrupulously abstained from any retaliatory action imtil compelled thereto, not only by militar}^ preparations in SyriM, which can only be directed against Epypt, but by the violation of the Egyptian frontier by armed bands, and by an open and unprovoked attack by the Ottoman Naval Forces, under German ofTicers, upon the territories of one of His Majesty's Allies. Great Britain is now fighting both to protect the rights and liberties of Egypt, which were oriainally won upon the battlefield by Mehemet Ali, and to secure to her the continuance of the peace and prosperity which she has enjoyed durinc: the thirty years of the British Occupation. Recognizing the respect and veneration with which the Sultan in his religious capacity is regarded by the Mohammedans of Egypt, Great Britain takes upon Herself the sole burden of the present war, without calling upon the Egyptian people for aid therein : but She expects and requires, in return, that the population shall refrain from any action of a nature to hamper Her military operation or to render aid to the enemy. The dispositions of the Egyptian Govern- ment's decision of August 5 were appUed by Sir John Maxwell to the Ottoman Empire, bvit no period of grace was granted to Turkish merchantmen in Egyptian ports. Egj'pt being an Ottoman vassal, it was in\possible to take measures against Ottomans residing in the country. It was also iinnecessary, since a large number of the non-Egyptian Ottomans were Syrians, Armenians, and Greeks who were supporters of the British Occupation, and not a few of the Turlvs were deadl}^ enemies of tlie Committee of Union and Progress. The officers previously referred to were sent to Malta with certain Egyptians. Other suspects were ordered to leave the country, and requests to this effect were served on Prince Mohamed Ali, brother of the Khedive, and one or two other members of the Kbedivial family, who with- drew to Italy. The censorship of the Press was strengthened, as was the military censor- ship. The former was well managed at Cairo, less well at Alexandria. The inUitary censor- ship grew more efficient as its organization im])roved. Active steps were taken, on the whole successfully, to prevent the importation and dissemination of seditiovis literature. The l^lema, by a proclamation calling on the Moslem Egyptians to abstain from political agitation and excitement, greatly assisted the Govern- ment and the British mihtary authorities. This regime was, of course, exceptional and, as far as some of its features were concsmed, it was necessarily temporary. As long as Egypt was de jure a vassal State of Turkey- if de facto a " veiled " British Protectorate, Ministers who held their mandate from a prince who was notoriously on the enemy's side, and whose sovereignty was an emanation of that exercized by the Sultan, Egypt's Suzerain could not well sign orders for the deportation of persons whose crime was their devotion to the Sovereign or the Suzerain. On the other hand, Advisers and Inspectors of Interior could not exercize exceptional powers over the heads of the Premier and his colleagues for long without injuring the prestige of the latter. And the British authorities in Egypt had nothing whatever to gain by injuring the prestige of their good friends. The situation had some- how to be regularized. Three questions had to be settled — that of the Sultan's suzerainty over THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. 307 REGIMENT AT HELIOPOLIS GAMP. Egj'pt, that of the Khedive, and, arising out of the first two, that of the future government of the country. Turkish suzerainty was a ghost that had to be laid. It had ahvays troubled some men's dreams in Egypt ; of late it had s?emed to trouble more. The Turks, bj!- forcing war on the Allies and by massing troops in Syria for the invasion of Egj^pt, stood to lose their vassal province unless victorious. England had forborne to declare a protectorate after Tel-el-Kebir ; she had disappointed Count Achrenthal by declining to annex the coimtry when he had torn up the Treaty of Berlin and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina ; she had made no use of the occa.«ions offered when Abdul Hamid threatened the Sinai and when France declared a protectorate o^•er Morocco. The present situation^ — Egypt practically at \\ar with Germany and Austria- Hungary, yet the vassal of their ally, ruled by a Government whose mandate emanated from the Sxiltan, but which had undertaken to give every assistance to the British Army of Occu- pation in the struggle with the Sultan's allies — was too absurd to be prolonged. The Com- mittee of Union and Progress had led Turkish suzerainty in the game for Egypt. It was for ixs to take the trick and declare Turkish suze- rainty- forfeit to the King of England. The Khedive had shown little hesitation in joining the enemy. His past was not such that his defection could be excvised as having been forced upon him. He had intrigued with Abdul Hamid against Egj^Dtian interests, ^vith the Committee against Arabs and with Arabs against the Committee. He had encom-aged wealthy Eg\'ptians to aid the Senussi in his struggle against the Italians, and he had aided the Italians against the Senussi. He had intrigued with Turks, Arabs, and the Central Powers against the British Occupation. It M as impossible that he should remain on the Khedivial throne. But no Egyptian machinery for his dethronement existed. The Grand ]Mufti, as the mandatorj'^ of the Sheikh-vU-Islam of Tiu-key. who liad recently declared a Holy A\'ar (to which Egypt, by the way, paid small attention) against England and her AlUes, could not issvie a " fetwa " of deposition, nor could the ]\Iinisters depose their Sovereign. It was for the British Government to declare the Khedivial throne vacant by reason of the conduct of Abbas Hiln^i. who had joined the King's enemies. These two questions were easily settled. But the question of the future status of Egj^t was more difficult. There were two alterna- tives — annexation or protectorate — for Egyptian independence was not desired by the majority of Egyptians, and could not have been main- tained against even a second-rate European State without a close alliance with the domi- nant sea Power. There were arguments for annexation which seemed more cogent in London than in Cairo. The annexationists believed that the adoption of the more simjile if more violent course would enable Great Britain to deal with the problem of the foreign jurisdictions in Egypt more effectively and expeditiously than would otherwise be possible. ;iU8 THI^J TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Some tooI< llu' \ic\\ that the proclamalioii of ii protectorate would inerely lead in the end to fresh difficulties between the Eg\7)tian and J^ritish sides of the administration. At Cairo, on the otlier liand, it was held by those best (jualific^d to form an opinion that this less sliowy 2)olicy was the soundest. The intel- lectual elements among the Arab peoples \\ hom the TurlcLsh and Levantine Pan-Islamists had been striving to combine agauist us had been profoundly impressed by our unremitting efforts to prepare the Egyptians for self- government, and bv our abstinence from all action calculated to repress the developnient of local institutions. Again, we had entered into the world's struggle on behalf of " small nationalities." True, a national feeling as distinct from the religious bond of Islam had not vet sunk deep into the minds of the masses in Egypt. But it existed, if less strongly than in most European States, among the more enlightened classes, and there were indications that it was gaining ground among them. E\'en among the masses there was a racial feeling or particularism which contained in itself the germs of nationalism and deserved respect, the more so when it was remembered that the Egyptian people had on the whole behaved very well during the period in which its hostility might have proved most embarrassing to us. Finally there were large vested interests bound up with the maintenance of the House of Mohamed Ali, the dynasty which had given Egypt its rulers since the early days of the nineteenth century. It would have been folly to ignore, and ultimately dangeroas to annoy, them. After hearing both sides the British Government supported the " men on the spot " and decided in favour of a protectorate. It was necessary, too, to choose the Khedive's successor. Prince Hassein Kamil, uncle of the Khedive, the senior member of the reigning House and its worthiest representative, was the obvious choice. But the Prince, though willing to accept the of?er of the Khedivial tlirone, was in no hurry. " I am not " ar- riviste,' " he said to the Special Correspondent of Tiic Times, to whom he granted an interview just before his accession. " I had no need to be, for I ' arrived ' 59 years ago." He felt strongly and naturally that if he was to appear before his people as England's nominee to the throne of his deposed nephew he must appear with something in his hands. Negotiations followed between him and the British Govern- ment's representative at Cairo, Mr. (now Sir) jNIilno Cheetham. The acting British Agent conducted these delicate negotiations in a manner that won the admiration of all who were conversant with the facts. He received useful assistance from the Oriental Secretary to the British Agency, IVIr. R. Storrs. It was finally settled that Prince Hussein should ascend the throne with the title and style of Sultan, which had been borne by the independent Mameluke rulers of Egypt^ — the " Soldans of Egypt " of our crusading ancestors — and the Fatimides before them. His title in French STATE ENTRY OF THE SULTAN INTO CAIRO-CROWDS AWAITING ARRIVAL THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 309 was to be Hautesse, in Arabic " Azainat," to distinguish him from the Turkish Grandviziers and ex-Grandvi/Jers and Sheiks-nl-Islam and the minor princ(?sof the Khedivial family, who bore the title of " Altesse." The standard of the Khedivial House, three white crescents with their baclcs to the staff, each with a five- pointed white star between the horns on a red field, was adopted as the national flag of Egypt. The British Government appointed a British High Commissioner in Egypt, and the name of " British Agency " gave place to that of " British Residency," as the title of our repre- sentative's official residence. For this impor- tant and responsible post the British Govern- ment selected Sir Henry McjNIahon, an ex- soldier, who had won high distinction as a political officer under the Indian Governnient, and was thoroughly acquainted with Oriental ways of thought. The views of the British Go\'ernment as regards the new regime were set forth in the following commvinication, which was transmitted to Prince Hussein on its behalf by Mr. Milne Cheethain, and afterwards published : Your Highnkss, I am instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to bring to the notice of Your Highness the circumstances preceding the out- break of war between His Britannic Majesty and the Sultan of Turkey and tlie changes which the war entails in tlie status of Egypt. In the Ottoman Cabinet there were two parties. On the one side was a moderate party, mindfiu of the S3mipatliy extended by Great Britain to every effort, towards reform in Turkey, who recognized that in the war in which His Majesty was already engaged no Turkish interests were concerned and welcomed the assurance of His Majesty and His Allies that, neither in Egypt nor elsewhere would the war be used as a pretext for any action injurious to Ottoman interests On the other side a band of unscrupulous military adventurers looked to find in a war of aggression, waged in concert with His Majesty's enemies, the means of retrieving the disasters, military, financial, and economic, into which they had already plunged their country. Hopmg to the last that wiser counsels might prevail. His Majesty and His Allies, in spite of repeated violations of their riahts, abstained from retaliatory action until compelled thereto by the crossing of the Egyptian frontier by armed bands and by unprovoked attacks on Russian open worts by the Turkish Naval forces under German officers. His ]\Iajesty'b Government are in possession of ample evidence that ever since the outbreak of war with Germany His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha, late Khedive of Egypt, has definitely thrown in hLs lot with His Majesty's enemies. From the facts above set out, it results that the rights ovt-r Egypt, whether of the Sultan or of the laie Khedive, are forfeit to His Maje.^ty. His Majesty's Govenunent have already, through the General Officer Commanding His Majesty's Forces in Egypt, accepted exclusive responsibility for the defence of Egypt in the present war. It remain.^ to lay down the form of the future government of tlie coinitiy, freed, as T have stated, from all rights of suzerainty or other rights heretofore claimed by the Ottoman CJoverniMi'nt. f**\ pl'^ ^ \ ^^PJI^ *. ' ^^t^^r^'*^''^^^ 1^' • m^ ^mMMmj^'^Jt ^^''Nk Ik^^^ LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR J. iLif.iyeUc MAXWELL. Ot the rights thus accruing to His Majesty, no less than of those exercized in Egypt during the last thirty years of reform. His Majesty's Government regard themselves as trustees for the inhabitants of Egypt. And His Majesty's Government have decided that Great Britain can best fulfil the responsibilities she has incurred toward Egypt by the formal declaration of a British Protectorate, and by the government of the country imder such Protectorate by a Prince of the Khedivial Family. In these circumstances I am instructed by Hi> Majesty's Government to inform Your Highness that, by reason of your age and experience, you have been chosen as the Prince of the Family of Mehemet Ali most worthy to occupy the Khedivial position, with the title and style of Sultan of Egypt ; and, in inviting Your Highness to accept the responsibilities of Your high office, I am to give you the formal assurance that Great Britain accepts the fullest responsibility for the defence of the territories under Your Highness against all aggres- sion whencesoever coining ; and His Majesty's Govern- ment authorize me to declare that after the establish- ment of the British Protectorate now announced all Egyptian subjects wherever they may be will be entitled to receive the protection of His Majesty's Government. With the Ottoman suzerainty there will disappear the restrictions heretofore placed by the Ottoman tirnians upon the numbers and organization of Your Highness's Army and upon the grant by Your Higlmess of honorific distinctions. As regards foreign relations, His Jfajesty's Go\ern- ment deem it most consistent with the new responsibilities assumed by Great Britain that the relations between Your Highness's Government and the Kepresontatives of Foreign Powers should henceforth be conducted through His Majesty's Representative in Cairo. His Majesty's Govenmicnt have repeatedly placed on record that the system of Treaties, known as the Capitu- lations, by which Your Highness's Government is bomid are no longer in harmony with the development of the country : but, in the opinion of His Majesty's Govern- ment, the revision of those treaties may most con- V(>nienfly be postponed until the end of the present war. 810 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. In the field of intomal administration, I am to remind Yovir Highness that, in consonance witli tlie traditions of British Policy, it has been the aim of His Majesty's Government, while working through and in the closest association with the constituted Egyptian Authorities, to secure individtial liberty, to promote the spread of education, to further the development of the natural resources of the country, and, in such measure as the degree of enlightenment of public opinion may permit, to associate the governed in the task of government. Not only is it the intention of His Majesty's Government to remain fnithful to such policy, but they are convinced that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country will accelerate progress towards self- government. The religious convictions of Egyptian subjects will be scrupulously respected, as are those of His Majesty's own subjects, whatever their creed. Nor need I affirm to Your Highness that, in declaring Egypt free from any duty of obedience to those who have usurped political power at Constantinople, His Majesty's Government are animated by no hostility towards the Khaliphate. The past 'history of Egypt shows, indeed, that the loyaltj' of Egyptian Mohammedans towards the Khaliphate 13 independent of any political bond.s between Egypt and Constantinople. The strengthening and progress of Mohammedan institutions in Egypt is naturally a matter in which His Majesty's Government take a deep interest and with which Your Highness will bo specially concerned, and in carrying out sueh reforms as may be considered necessary Your Highness may count upon the sjTn- pathetio support of His Majesty's Government. I am to add that His Majesty's Government rely with confidence upon the loyalty, the good sense, and self- restraint of Egyptian subjects to facilitate the task of the General Officer Commanding His Majesty's Forces, who is entrusted with the maintenance of internal order. and witli the pre\ention of the rendering of aid to the enemy. T avail myself of this opportimity to present to Your Highness the assurance of my highest respect. • MILNE Cheetham. December 19. 1914. On Saturday, December 19, the following proclamation was published at Cairo : His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that, in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey. Egypt is placed under the Protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate. The Suzerainty of Turkey over Egynt is thus termi- nated, and His Majesty's Government will adopt ail measures necessary for the defence of Egypt, and protect its inhabitants and interests. The Proclamation was at the same time published in all the provincial centres. Its reception there was on the whole good. Many of the fellaheen were openly though undemon- Ktratively plea.sed by what they believed to be a guarantee that their rights would be resi^ected, that they would get their water without having to bribe the irrigation officials, and that the great landlords would not be permitted to oppress them. There were grumblers in the towns, especially in Tanta, always a centre of fanaticism from pre-Islamic days ; some of the Beduin notables who had been won over by Tm-kish agents^ or who resented the British occupation, which pre\cnted them from proyino; on the fellaheen as their ancestors had been wont to do, talked trea.sonably and hinted at an impending Turkish invasion. But no demonstration was made again-st tlic I'rotcc- torate throughout all the provinces from Assuan to Behera. In Cairo and Alexandria there was more discontent, not only among the ignorant who had heard wondrous tales of the coming of " Effendina " at the head of the Turkish legions, but among the fairly numerous class of extreme Nationalists, stu- dents, lawyers, and the like, some of whom donned black ties as a sign of their mourning. But this was all ; the majority of the population remained good-temperedly mdifferent to all that was happening. " Rather more than 10 per cent, of the Egyptians are with you, rather less than 10 per cent, against you, and the remaining 80 per cent, do not really care as long as they and their religion are left alone," \\as the verdict of a shrewd Oriental observer, and as far as Cairo was concerned he was probably right, though the pro-British forces were stronger, and hostile elements weaker, in the provinces. Thus terminated the reign of Abbas IT. of Egj-pt. In Lord Cromer's words he had " pre- ferred to throw in his lot with the enemies of Great Britain, being probably vuider the im- pression that he was joining the side which would be ultimately victorious in the w ar now being waged. In adopting this course he com- mitted political suicide." Yet his general unpopularity with the best elements of modem Egypt and with the peasantry, the abuses which he encouraged, and the rather squalid domestic scandals in which he was latterly involved, would probably have rendered it impossible for him permanently to retain his position. Even those who disapprov ed of his deposition, on the ground that, as a Moslem Viceroy appointed by the Sultan he could only lawfully be deposed by the Sultan, seldom affected to admire his character or his methods. The groups, largely composed of ignorant, or. at best, half-educated folk, who contiimed discreetly to espouse his cause were acttiated by fear of his return at the head of the Turkish Armies, by fanaticism, or by self-interest. The host of palace officials and parasites of both sexes, spies, secret agents, and other creatures of the ex-ruler, and their relatives, who had mostly robbed their master and had been permitted by him to rob and blackmail others. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. 311 BRITISH TROOPS. IN EGYPT. 1. New Zealand men at work. 2. East Lancashire Territorials pontoon making. 3. Brigadier-General Briscoe, in command of the Cavalry Brigade, with the members of his staff. 4. Australians on the trams. 5, Cooks preparing dinner at the Australians' (]amp. 6. New Zealanders at their Christmas Dinner. 312 thp: times histoby of the war. WESTMINSTER DRAGOONS IN EGYPT. No. 2. Troop, "C" Squadron. were naturally most genuine in their professions of regret, for Sultan Hussein would have none of tliem, and dismissed every person who was in the Khedive's employ. With some of the exalte students, especially those of the ]ja\v School, ever a centre of political agitation, and the more reactionary Ulema and their disciples, they formed what might have de- veloped into a sort of Egyptian " Legitimist " jjarty. But for the present they were silent, because they feared. The Beduin notables, with few exceptions, had already descended with their usual shrewdness to the British side of the fence. As for the fellaheen, who had no cau.se whatever to love Abbas Hilmi, " itkassarit sinunuh " (his teeth are broken) was their most frequent comment, when they read of the deposition of " Effendina." INIany of the members of the Khedivial family who had suffered from their kinsman's avarice doubtle s echoed the sentiments of the fellaheen in more polished language. His successor, Sultan Hussein Kamil, was born in 1853. At the age of 14 he was sent to Paris to continue his education, and there \\ as a guest at the court of Napoleon III. and the playfellow of the Prince Imperial. In 1869 he acted as Chamberlain to the Empress Eugenie at the magnificent opening of the Suez Canal, and retiu-ned to Egypt in 1870. He was appointed Inspector-General of the Delta in 1872, and later held several port- folios, showing exceptional energy during his tenure of the Ministry of Public Works, notably in the great flood year of 1874. On the abdica- tion of Ismail Pasha in 1878, Prince Hussein retired to Naples with his father. His brother, Tewfik Pasha, was reputed to be jealous of him, and there is reason to believe that Ismail Pasha had at one time the intention of altering the order of succession and appointing Hussein as his successor. After his return, he for long jDlayed no political role, but was able to render considerable assistance in manj' ways to the British Occupation. The Khedivial Agricul- tural Society was founded by him in 1898, and rendered great service to the country. Keenly interested in agriculture, gardening, and technical and industrial education, he could spare time for much philanthropic activity, especiallj- in his capacity as president of the Cairo First Aid Society. In 1909 he returned to political life and became president of the Legislative Council and General Assembly. He certainly did much to raise the tone of their debates, finally resigning in March, 1910, when these bodies, inspired by the Khedive and the extreme Nationalists, foolishly rejected the proposal for the extension of the Suez Canal Concession. Strongly Anglophile, and at the same time a patriotic Egj^ptian, with a thorough knowledge of, and liking for, the fellaheen, whom most Turoo-Egyptians were inclined to despize, the new ruler of Egj'jit was the anti- thesis of his nephew. Honest, open-handed to a fault, proud, yet courteous to all, and gifted with remarkable personal charm, he inherited the best qualities of his father, to which he joined a very genuine desire for the betterment of the masses. A spare, lithe-built man of aristo- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 313 cratic Albanian type, with a manner that com- bined dignity and chann, his presence was that of a ruler. In religion he was a devout and liberal Moslem, in ethics a gentleman. The first official act of the Sultan was to address the following rescript to Hussein Ruchdi Pasha, who, with the other members of the Cabinet, had resigned as soon as the deposition of the Khedive, from whom all Ministers held their mandate, had been offici- ally communicated to him : My Deab Ruchdi Pasha, Recent political events have brought about the establishment by Great Britain of her Protectorate over Egypt and the vacancy of the Khedivial Throne. By the communication, of which We transmit you a copy [the reference is to the British Government's communication published on page 309], to be brought to the knowledge of the Egyptian people, the Govern- ment of His Britannic Majesty has appealed to Our devotion to Our country to the end that We may take the Khedivate of Egypt with the title of Sultan, while the Sultanate furthermore shall be hereditary in the family of INIohamed Ali following an order of succession to be determined. After a life devoted to the service of the country, We might have aspired to repose : nevertheless We consider it Our duty, in the particularly delicate situation of Egjrpt which these events have created, to assume this heavy responsibility and, faithful to Our past, to continue to devote Our energies to the service of the Fatherland. This We owe to Egypt and to Our glorious ancestor the Great Mohamed Ali, whose dynasty We desire to perpetuate. In Our solicitude for the interests of the country We shall ever seek to ensure the moral and material well-being of its inhabitants by the continuation of the programme of reforms which has already been commenced. The constant care of Our Government will therefore be the diffusion and the perfecting of education in all its stages, the good administration of justice, and its organization on lines more appropriate to the actual conditions of the country ; it will devote the most vigilant attention to qviestions connected with the tranquillity and security of the population, and will give a new impulse to the economic development of Egypt- As regards representative institutions, Our aim -will be to associate the governed more closely with the government of the country. For the realization of this programme We have the assurance that We shall obtain the most sympathetic support from the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and We are convinced that the more precise definition of the situation of Great Britain in Egypt, by dissipating all causes of misunderstanding, will facilitate the col- laboration towards a common end of all the political elements in the country. For the task that awaits Us, We count on the loyal aid of all Our people. Knowing your experience and high qualities. We appeal to your patriotism in demanding your aid in the accomplishment of this task. We therefore summon you to the Presidency of Our Council of Ministers and invite you to form the Cabinet and submit to Our high approval the names of the colleagues whom you think fit to propose to Us. We pray the Almighty to bless Our efforts in this patriotic task. Hussein Kamix. Ruchdi Pasha's reply admirably summed up his attitude and that of his patriotic colleagues. After thanking His Highness for the honour conferred upon him, he continued : Though formerly holding office in virtue of a mandate from the preceding Sovereign, I am above all an Egyptian, and I consider it my duty as an Egyptian to attempt under the auspices of Your Hie;hness to .•serve my country, the higher interests of which have always guided me and have now proved euperior to personal considerations. The New Ministry was thus composed : Hussein Ruchdi Pasha, Premier and Interior. Adli Yeghen Pasha, Agriculttire. Ismail Sidki Pasha, Pious Foundations. Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, Education. AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS BUILDING PONTOON. su THE TIMES HlSTOllY OF THE WAIl. THE SULTAN OF EGVnT. [DOiricli. Ismail Sirri Pasha, Public ^^'orks. Yusuf \^'ahba Pasha, Finance. Abdul Khalik Sarwat Pasha, Justice. The only member of the former Cabinet who -did not resume office was INIohamed IMoheb Pasha, the former ]Muiister of Pious Founda- tions. This was accounted for by the abolition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the British Protectorate, and perhaps by the favour wherewith Abbas Hilmi was said to regard the ex-]Minister, who had left Egypt for Italy. On the day of his accession Sultan Hussein received the following telegram from Kmg George : On the occasion when You» Highness fintcis upon your high ofiSce I desire to convey to Your Hijjhno^^ the expression of my most sincoro friendship and the aasur- ance of my unfailing support in safes uardine tiiu integrity r.f Egypt and m secuiing her futiue wt-il-being and prosperity. Youi Highness has been called upon to undertake the responsibilities of your high oflico at a g»avc ciisis in the national life of Egypt, and I feel convjnccd that you vviJi be able, with ths cooperation of jour Ministers and the Protectorate of Great Britain, succestiu'Iy to oveicome all the influences which are seeUing to destroy the independence of Egypt and ths wealth, libeitj', and happiness of its people. Geobce R. and I. The Sultan telegraphed the following rt ph' : To H;s Majesty the King, London. I present to You^ Majesty the expression of xny doepe.si trntitude for tho feeling.-- of friendship with which you see fit to honour me and for the assurance of your valuable support ia safeguarding tho integrity and •independence of Eg\-pt. Conifiou'? of thr- respon^lbililie.- T have ju^t os'iimed. and resolved to devote myself, in entire co(;peration with the Protectorate, to the progress and welfare of my peop.e. 1 am happy to be able to count in this ta.-k on Your llajesly's protection and on the as.sistanco of Your Government. ^L'SSEIN KAsai.. On December 20 the Sultan made his cere- monial entry into Abdin Palace. Not a single incident marred the order and dignity of the {proceedings. The military and police arrange- ments were alike admirable, wliile the populace showed a good humour and obedience that rendered the task of the authorities an easy one. At half-past nine o'clock the booming of tlie first of the twenty-one gims of a salute announced that the Sultan had left the Palace of Kamil-ed-Din. As the cannon sounded, the troops all along the line of the route pre- sented arms — the smart Egyptian cadets outside the Kamil-ed-Din Palace, the long lines of the East Lancashire Territorials, who lined the route up the street past the Savoy Hotel, the tall New Zealanders along the Upper Kasr-en-Nil Road, and the Sharia ]\Iagh- raby to the Opera Square near the Continental Hotel, the hard-bitten Australians, who carried on the line into Abdin Square, where the Ceylon Planters' Corps, a trim contingent, were ranged between the Australians and the British and Egyptian Guards of Honour. The guns boomed slowly from the Citadel, and the [DuinJi. THE EX-KHEDIVE OF EGYPT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WALL 315 Egj'ptian and European onlookers crowded forward from windows and balconies as the head of the procession came into view. First rode the Vico-Commandant of the Cairo PoHce, then a squadron of Yeomanry moiuited on grey Arabs, next — a bright touch of colour amid the long lines of dust-coloured khaki and drill — came a squadron of Egyptian T.ancers, their red fezes and red and green lance pennons contrasting with the blue and white of their tunics. Behind them rode the Cavalry of the Bodyguard in black and dark blue, and then, preceded and attended by sj'ces in traditional garb, came the Sultan's State carriage drawn ])y four magnificent white horses, the scarlet and gold liveries of the coaclimen showing l:)rilliantly up against the white. The Sultan, with the Prime Minister on his- left, drove slowly past. His mien was dignified and resolute. The slight tilt with whicli he wears his high scarlet Egyptian fez gave his bearing just that little touch of panache that endears rulers to their people, otherwise he was soberly but perfectly dressed. As he gravely responded to the applause with which the people greeted him, looking full in the faces of the crowd, there was something in his aquiline features and aristocratic bearing that reminded one of the proud Skipetars, the Folk of the Eagle, of those Albanian hills whence came his great ancestor. Egyptians, like other Orientals, cheer but little, but all along the route, swelUng louder and louder above the strains of the Khedivial Anthem, sounded the clapping of thousands of hands. The streets were bright with flags, among which flashed most conspicuously of all the scarlet Khedivial Banner, with its three white crescents and tliree stars. The Ministers followed the State coach, then rode a fine squadron of yeomanry mounted on English horses. Next came, accompanied by kavasses in Pcark't, tiie carriages of the Acting British Higli Commissioner, the Agency Staff, and last of all, hieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell. A great multitude of dignitaries and notables, mostly from the provmces, assembled in a great marquee in Abdin Square, cheered and ap- jjlauded the Sultan as the procession moved up to the entrance to the Palace. As he ent(;red its doors he turned and saluted his subjects. A moment later the sky, which had till then been overcast, brightened suddenly, and the sun which Ancient Egypt had wor- shipped shone out. Thus Sultan Hussein entered his palace with favoiu^able omens. A reception which lasted over six hours followed. During it the Egj-ptian troops, whose officers, Egyptian and British, had taken the oath to the new ruler, acclaimed Sultan Hussein. In the coiu"se of the reception His Highness addressed advice on agricultural and financial matters to the provincial dele- THE SULTAN ARRIVING AT HIS RESIDENCE IN HELIOPOLIS. 316 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. gations, depre<"a(6>d n-ligioiis (jiiurreLs, and urged the notables of Gharbia province in particular to use their influence to put an end to the family feuds, wliicl^i are the principal cause of crime in Egypt, ile admonished the iJeduin Sheikhs of Fayum, warning them that they must remember that they dwelt in a civilized country, and must, therefore, submit to ordered rule. Those who preferred lawless " desert " conditions of existence had best leave the country. It was noted that Sir Milne Cheetham, the Acting High Commissioner, was accorded an enthusiastic recejjtion by the crowd when arriving at and departing from Abdin. At nightfall the whole of Cairo was brilliantly illuminated. Thus closed three of the most eventful days in the history of modem Egypt. During this period the Sudan had been absolutely quiet, to the relief and perhaps to the surprise of the British Military autho- rities. This huge country of nearly a million square miles in extent, peopled largely by Moslems who had been conquered by Lord Ivitchener only sixteen years before, and were among the bravest and most fanatical of African races, was jointly governed by Great Britain and Egypt with a comparatively small garrison which included few white troops. 1'he religious fervour of large elements of, the population excused and explained tlie fear that the action of Turkey might stir up the tribes to ri.se. It was largely owing to the action of the Governor-General of the Sudan, Sir Reginald Wingate, and of the many able officers under his control that the Ashole country was not only quiet but loyal, and that the entire population supported the British cause. Returning immediately after the out- break of the Great War to Egypt, Sir Reginald, who was also the Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian Army, spent some time at Cairo, and after satisfying himself that the spirit of the f]gyptian Army was good, went south to Khartum, \shere he held many informal meetings with the senior Egyptian officers and the chief local notables. After this he held a huge public reception at Omdur- nian, where he addressed the religious leaders of the people in Arabic, fully explaining the origin and causes of the war witli Germany. The speech was loyally acclaimed, and from that moment there was no doubt of the feeling of the leaders of the Sudanese peoples. The Governor -General afterwards made a rapid tour of the Sudan, and held receptions at the chief towns of the Sudan, always with the same excellent results. It was made clear by him and his chief subordinates to the notables in private con\ersations that Turkey ««l«il#t}H|J' ^ liUJ '^^ Jii |«Att:litl|ll |,,||^ 1:18 8 THE SULTAN'S ENTRY— ABDIN SQUARE. Yeomanry leading procession : Ceylon Infantry : Egyptian Guard of Honour on the right. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 31? INDIANS WOUNDED AT SUEZ CANAL ARRIVING IN CAIRO. was drifting towards war. When war broke out with the Porte the ground had been well prepared, and the people were not wholly taken by surprise. On November 7 fifty of the leading regimental officers, British and Egyptian, were suiximoned to the palace at Khartum, where the Governor-General ad- dressed them, and, after briefly explaining what had happened, read a proclamation announcing that a state of war between Great Britain and Turkey existed as from that day, and calling on the inhabitants of the Sudan to render all the assistance that might be required of them to the British, Egyptian, and Sudanese forces. A similar procedure was adopted in all the principal garrison towns by the Governors or Commandants at the same moment. On the following day the principal religious Sheikhs and Ulema were assembled, when the Governor- General addressed thorn, informing them that he was about to call upon the Grand Mufti to read them an address from him, and ex- pressing his confidence that as enlightened and patriotic men they woxild explain the truth and give good counsel to the people. The Grand Mufti then read an address in Arabic, in which, after recapitulating the benefits the British had wrought in the Sudan, he declared that this war had been unsought by Great Britain, but forced on her by the madness of " this syndicate of Jews, financiers, and low- born intriguers, like broken gamblers staking their last coin, and in deference to the urgent demands of Germany and our enemies, who have gone to war with the one Power who by her actions and the sentiments of her people has ever been a true and sympathetic friend to the Moslems and to Islam." Great Britain had no quarrel with Islam or its spiritual leaders. She would ever maintain and enforce on others the sanctity and inviola- bihty of the Holy Places. They need not fear that the war would affect the situation of Islam in the world. Their fears were groundless, for the British Empire would not change the position of a single Moslem subject for the worse, or repudiate a singje pri\ilege granted to its Moslems. The Ulema were most enthusiastic and pubUcly protested their loyalty. Prominent among them was Sherif Yusef El Hindi, a descendant of the Prophet, who had enormous influence in the Sudan, and the eldest son of the Mahdi, who vouched for the fidelity of all cx-Mahdists. The Ulema afterwards pro- duced an admirable manifesto, signed by sixteen of their cliiefs. The popular response was extraordinary. From all sides letters and telegrams promising support reached the Sirdar, and the Egyptian officers made similar representations. Generous gifts were made to the Prince of Wales's Eimd. Nor did the attempts of Turkish agents to excite the people meet with the slightest succa«»s. A typical m THP. TIMES BISTOBY OF THE WAtt. SLATIN PASHA. [Lekegian. example of their failures was the case of Elmaz Bey, Enver Pasha's aide-de-camp and creatm'e, an ignorant black, who had formerly served in the Egyptian Coastguards, joined the Turks in Cyrenaica, and had done his utmost to perjure away the hfe of Aziz el Masri. Girt with a lengthy sabre and clad in Turkish uniform this witless blackamoor landed near Port Sudan in fuU view of the Coastguards, and repaired to some Arab tents, whence he made his way in disguise to the oflficers' quarters of an Egyptian battalion. He called on the officers to revolt. They promptly arrested him, and he was sentenced to death after trial by court-martial, his sentence being afterwards commuted in consequence of the disclosures he made. The Sudan suffered one serious loss through the war. Sir Rudolph von Slatin, the Austrian officer, who had been for many years a Mahdist prisoner, and after his rescue by the Sirdar had done admirable service to England and Egypt in the country where he had been a captive, felt himself compelled to se\'er his cormexion with the service. His motives in so doing were creditable to his patriotism as a good subject of the Emperor Francis Joseph, and were misimderstood by none of his old colleagues, least of all by his old friend the Sirdar. Such was the history of the Sudan for the first seven months of the war. British officers stationed there regarded the loyalty and calm of its tribes as " little short of miraculous," and the Sudan Tiinefi truly said that what- ever loss or mihcry the war might have brought to the world, it had at least given the British a proof such as would never otherwise have come to light that their work in the Sudan had not been in vain. On the outbreak of hostilities with Turkey tlie .^lied warships in the Southern Levant and in the Red Sea received orders to observe hostile ports and to prevent any smuggling or fili- bustering expeditions that might be attempted, especially from the coast of Arabia. Details concerning the activity of these warships, main- ly British, on the coast of Syria can be more profitably given when the Turkish campaign against Egypt can be fully described. In the Red Sea an Indian expedition on its way to Egypt pluckUy effected the reduction of the Turkish fort at Sheikh Said on the mainland near Aden. A landing party covered by H.M.S. Duke of Edinburgh captured a considerable quantity of war material with a loss of three killed and a few wounded. On November 5 H.M. cruiser Minerva, which had observed Akaba during the Anglo - Turkish dispute of 1906, appeared before the town and demazaded the surrender of the fort. Though there were not more than seventy or eighty armed men in the place, mostly Arabs with a few gendarmes, the Turks refused, and the fort and Government buildings were consequently destroyed by the cruiser, assisted by the destroyers Savage and Scourge. A landing party exchanged some shots with the enemy in the Wadi Ithm, but suffered no casualties. After this a close watch was kept on Akaba till the end of the year. Shells were fired at parties of Turks who showed themselves near the beach, and on one occasion a landing party drove a small body out of a trench, suffering three and inflicting seven or eight casualties. The IVIinerva was once forced to shift her anchorage owing to the fire of a con- cealed field-gun, which dropped shells near her, and on another occasion had a man killed on board by snipers. Nothing of note, how- evev, occurred till the year's end. After the first invasion of Egyptian territory by Beduins on October 28, the remaining Anglo -Egyptian posts were withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula to the Canal. Fort Nakhl was evacuated, the cistern blown up, and certain buildings destroyed. Several rock wells THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 311 which might have been of service to an invading force were blo\\n in with ch'namite. The Egj^ptian officials ^\•ere withdrawn from El Arish \\ithout incident and tlie inajority of the nomad Arabs of the desert of Et-Tih repaired with their flocks and herds to the mountainous countrj' south of the Akaba-Nakhl road. The first raiding party which had crossed the border seems to have returned after stealing a few camels, but in the second week of November a force of Terabin Bednins from south-west Palestine accompanied by a few Turkish and German officers occuj>ied El Arish, and after- wards ad^ anced towards Katia. Save for the exchange of a few shots between Beduin scouts and Eg\'ptian Coastguard patrols no en- counters took place till November 21. On that morning an Egyptian patrol composed of twenty Sudanese camelmen was surprised while encamped east of Bir-en-Nuss, and captured to a man. Captain Chope, of the Bikanir Camel Corps, and an Egj-ptian officer, Lieutenant Anis, with a patrol of twenty men of the Bikanir Camel Corps, pushing eastward to gain touch with the Coastguards, found their camp empty. An hour's ride fui'ther east Captain Chope ?aw ahead of him a pa.rty of twenty men mounted on white camels, waving white flags. Thinking they were the missing Egyptians he let them approach. AA'ithin th irty yards the Bedains raised their rifles and were promptly shot down almost to a man by the Bikanirs, who similarly disposed of another party \\hich attempted to attack. Captain Chope then ad\'anced towards Katia, when suddenly 150 hoi'semen \\ere observed trying to move rovmd his right flank, while a like number tried to turn his left. He therefore fell back fighting, but ■\\ as hard pressed by the mounted men, who kept up a hot fire from the saddle but durst not close with the plucky Bikanirs, who shot straight and fought the enemy off till they reached their supports. Only five of them were then unwoiuided, with Captain Chope, who had a narrow escape, having his water-bottle pierced and his sword hilt shivered by bullets, while his camel was wounded in the hump by a ball froni a INIartini. The Egyptian officer lieutenant Anis and Subadar Abdu Tvhan were killed, with ten of the Bikanir men. Tliree of the latter came in wounded and two more wounded men were afterwards AIN MUSA WELL, SINAI, NEAR SUEZ. The enemy's scouts reached this point. 320 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. t'^i.^-J-hr '-^^-*^*%^ A ' 'A ^* A TURKISH HYDROPLANE. picked up by a patrol. One of them had a narrow escape from tho enemy, who slashed at liim as he lay, wounding him severely but not fatally in the neck. Of the Beduins over fifty, including the brother of the Tarabin chief, Sheikh Sufi, were killed and many wounded. Tactically the enemy had had the best of the skirmish, but the moral effect of the resistance of the gallant Indian soldiers was such that the raiders immediately fell back on Katia, and made no forward movement towards the Canal for nearly six weeks. CHAPTER LIX. THE GERMAN FAILURE IN POLAND. The Austro-German Objective in Poland — The Polish Question — German Temptations AND Appeals — Polish Solidarity — The First German Advance — Danger to Warsaw — Russian Reinforcements and German Retreat — Iwangorod — Defeat of the Austrians — Battle of Kielce — Austrian Advance in Gax,icia — Causes of Austro-German Failure — Second German Offensive in Poland — A Success at Kutno — Capture of Lodz — Russian Move on Cracow — Fighting in the Carpathians — The Situation at the P]nd of 1914. IN Chapter LVII. we saw the conclusion, in the last days of September, 1914, of the first Galician campaign, when the Russians had not only successfully beaten off the Austrian offensive at all points, but had swept the enemy back over his own borders, and had almost driven him out of the whole Province of Galicia. From the north, down the Vistula and across the San, from the east by Rawa-Ruska, past Lemberg and Jaroslau, and along the right bank of the Dniester, the Russian armies under Ruzsky, Ivanoff, Brusiloff, and Dmitrieff had forced the Austrians from one position after another until, beaten and temporarily demoralized, having lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners not much less than half a million men, the armies of von Auffenberg, Dankl, and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand were herded together in western Galicia, beyond the river Wisloka, and under the protection of the guns of Cracow. Przemysl still held out and was not to fall, under circumstances which have been described, until six months later. Mean- while the victorious Russian cavalry was scouring the covmtry to the southward up to the very foothills of the Carpathians and in places penetrating into the moxuitain pavsses themselves. In the later phases of these opera- Vol. TIL— Part .3.5 321 tions some, at least, of the Austrian armies had been reinforced by a greater or lesser niunber of German divisions, which had been powerless to avert or materially mitigate the catastrophe. The first month of the war on this part of the eastern front had ended in the humiliation of Austria, while the Russians had shown a quick- ness of movement, a vigour both in strategy and in offensive and a fighting spirit which had surprised even their friends. In the la,«t week of September the Russian advance, after tremendous and almost incredible exertions, had spent itself, its immediate objective achieved, in a momentary exhaustion and satiety of triiunph. For a few days the tide stood at flood. On Septenaber 27 began the first movement of an Austro-German coimtor-offensive. It is not necessary to dwell again at any length on the contour and strategical impor- tance of Poland, which have already been discussed. It will be sufficient to repeat that, thrust out like a wedge between the territories of the two empires, it was equally exposed to attack from the Germans on the north and from Austria on the south. On the other hand, so long as it remained Russian — especially as long as the great fortified positions of Warsaw 322 THI'! TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Novo Georgievsk, Iwangorod and Loinza, with their connecting railway lines, remained in Russian hands — neither on the north nor on the south could any effective invasion of Russia be attempted without evident danger of attack from the rear. The first object aimed at, then, in the Anstro-CJerman plans had been the reduction of Poland — its isolation and lopping off from the main body of Russia. If the first operations on the north by the Germans from East Prussia and on the south by the Austrians from Galicia had succeeded, the allied armies would have made junction somewhere in the Brest -Litovsk-Bialystok region, and, with all Poland in their liands, they would have had a continuous front on a straight line from the Baltic to the Carpathians as a base for further advances. But these operations did not succeed. They failed in the north and failed disastrously in the south. With both her right and left hands Russia held her enemies at bay. The next move of the allies, then, inevitably took the form of a direct thrust in the centre at the heart of Poland. In their first operations the Central Powers had hoped that such a direct thrust would be unnecessary. It would have been much smipler and less costly if Poland could be caused to drop in their hands, like a branch falling from a tree, by cutting through its junction with the trunk from which it grew. And the German General Stai¥ professed, at least, the belief that Poland would rejoice to be so severed, and Germans and Austrians alike proclaimed that the Polish people would seize the opportunity offered by the war to rise against Russia, and would welcome the invaders as the instriunents of their salvation. The alternative which confronted Poland was, indeed, a terrible and testing one. To hold true to Russia and resist invasion could only mean the desolation of the land. The country must be overrun by hostile armies and become one vast battlefield. If they had con- sulted their immediate material interests alone, the Poles must have thrown themselves into Germany's arms. It was, in fact, the same dilemma as Belgium had had to face in the west, and, like the Belgians, the Poles chose the nobler part. How far either Germans or Austrians really believed in the probability^ of Polish friendship for their cause it is difficult to say. Evidence is very contradictory. It is certain that up to ithat time neither Germans nor Austrians had been under much misapprehension as to the Polish dislike of themselves. As recently as two years before, when the Balkan War was in progress, Vienna had been unable to conceal its fears of a Polish rising. In the history of Poland hostility to the Prussian and the Teuton had been an infinitely greater factor than hostility to Russia. The former went back for over a thousand years. Compared with it the century- and-a-half-old fear of Russia was a modem thing. As has been noted in a former chapter, moreover, since the partition of the kingdom of Poland, the treatment of their section of the Polish people by the Germans had been in- finitely more ruthless and brutal than anything that had been done by Russia. If of late years the world had heard more of the struggles of the Poles against Russia than against Germany, it was only because Germany had long crushed out the power to struggle. A wounded thing still fighting for its life makes more noise than one which has already been beaten to un- consciousness and is on the point of death. It is impossible not to believe that well- informed people in Germany must have known that the Poles hated them more deejjly than ever they had hated Russia, and with good reason. The German people, as a whole, however, habitually showed singular obtuse- ness and ignorance in all discussions of the Polish question. The masses had but hazy ideas on the subject, and they were extremely willing, when this war began, to believe what they wished to believe. As for those who knew better, for the Austro-German Govern- ments and General Staffs, the friendship of the Poles was a stake worth making a bid for. If it was to be won it must obviously be the best policy to pretend that it was expected. Everything possible, then, was done to create an atmosphere favourable to a Polish rapproche- ment. Both Germany and Austria declared their confidence in the Polish goodwill towards themselves, and both were lavish of promises and proclamations explaining how they came against Russia as the deliverers of Poland. It was not by accident that the Bishopric of Posen, which the Prussian Government for many years had ostentatiously kept vacant, was filled by the appointment of a Polish Bishop immediately after the outbreak of the war. A characteristic German proclamation, typical of several issued during the present invasion of Poland, was promulgated by General von THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. RUSSIAN RESERVIST LEAVING FOR THE FRONT. Morgen, in command of the German First Army, which advanced on Warsaw : Inhabitants of the Governments of Lomza and War- saw ! The Russian Narew Army is annihilated. More than 100,000 men, with the commanding generals of t}ie 13th and 15th Army Corps, are prisoners ; 300 guns are captured. The Russian army under General Rennen- kampf is retreating in an easterly direction. The Aus- trian armies are victoriovisly advancing from Gahcia. The French and British troops in France have met witli disastrous defeat. Belgium is now midor Gorman a<l ministration. I come to you with the advance<l armies of other Ger- man armies and as your friend. Take up j'our arms ; expel the Russian barbarians, who enslaved you, from your beautiful country, which sluall regain once more its political and religious freedom. That is the will of my mighty and gracious Emperor. My troops have orders to treat you as friends. We will pay for what you sell us. I look to your chivalry to receive us hospitably as your allies. (Signed) Likutenant-Generai. vdv Morgen. In the Kingdcyn of I'oland. September, 1914. That the game was worth playing is shown by the fact that well-informed Russians were by no means unanimous in their confidencc in Polish loyalty. German emissaries had, of course, been secretly at work in Poland, as elsewhere, long before the outbreak of the war. That their labours had not been altogether 324 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. fruitless is shown by the reference to " certain Polish organizations " in the following utter- ance of the chief organ of Polish political opinion soon after the commencement of hostilities : Fellow-countrymen ! A danger threatens us, greatest, perhaps, among the many calamities which war brings to a country : the misdirection of the Nation's mind and understanding. Various instigations are pressing the Poles to go against their own instinct and the dictates of political reason in their attitude towards the armies now invading our Polish lands, armies ringing with German words of command, which even resound through Galician detach- ments lured into belief that Poland may be saved through alliance with the Germans. Various agitators on both the German and Austrian sides, having their own in- terests at stake, are seeking to make our people take active part in the terrific conflicts now to be fought out upon our soil. To attain this end by throwing dust into our eyes, various manifestoes signed by the leaders of the armies beyond the frontier, have promised the Poles extensive liberties and privileges at the close of the war. Certain Polish organizations, having lost, in the general excitement, their healthy sense of judgment, are doing likewise. Do not let yourselves be hoodwinked by these promises. They are lies. Neither of the invading armies has any intention of fighting for Poland's sake. Each is fighting in the interests of it.s own Empire, and to those Empires we are of no account. They only want, in a moment of necessity, to make the Poles pa-ssive instruments serving their own ends. Whoever tells you that Austria in alliance with Prussia intends to build up Poland once again is a blinded dreamer. The result of a victory for the Germans and Austrians would mean a new partitioning of Poland, a yet greater wreckage of our Nation. Grasp this, listen to no seducers. Remain passive, watchful, in.sensible to temptation. During the coming struggle the Kingdom of Poland will be the marching-ground of vaiious armies, we shall see temporary victors assum.ing lordship for a while ; but change of authority will follow, and inevitable retaliation ; this several time^, perhaps, in the course of the campaign. Therefore every improvident step will meei with terrible revenge. By holding firm through the present conflict you best can serve the Polish cause, in the name of the love you bear your country, of your solicitude for the Nation's future, we entreat you, fellov/- 3ountrymen, to remain deaf to evil inspirations, unshak- able in your determination not to expose our land to yet greater calamities, and Poland's whole future to incal- culable perils. — From the Gazeta Warszaws'<a, Aug. 1.5, 1914. If this shows that Austro-German intrigue had not been all barren of result, it also shows even more clearly that the intelligence of the leaders of the Polish people was unclouded. There was here no ringing appeal in behalf of loyalty to Russia — that would have been diffi- cult to make — but there spoke clearly the voice of the ages-long hatred of the Teuton which NEW POLISH LEGION FIGHTING FOR THE TSAR. The mascot of the Infantry of peasants. Cavalry of young noblemen drawn up lor inspection. THE TIMES HlSTOnY OF THE WAB. 325 made a popular rising in bclialf of tlie invaders impossible. On the following day the same journal and* the newspapers of all the world published a Proclamation from the Russian Generalissimo which may fairly be ranked as one of the world's epoch-making dociunents It was a promise of the reconstitution of an autonomous Kingdom of Poland under the suzerainty of the Tsar : Poles ! The hour lias struck in wliicli the sacred dream of your fatlicrs and forefathers may find fulfilment. A century and a half ago the Hving flcsli of Poland was torn asunder, but her soul did not die. She lived in liope that there would come an hour for the resurrection of the Polish nation and for a brotherly reconciliation with Russiii. The Russian Army now brings you the joyful tidings of tliis reconciliation. May the boundaries be annihi- lated which cut the Polish nation into parts ! May that nation reunite into one body under the sceptre of the Ivussian Emperor. Under this sceptre Poland shall be reborn, free in faith, in language, in self-government. One thing only Russia expects of you : equal con- sideration for the rights of those nationalities to which history lias linked you. With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched Russia steps forward to meet you. She believes that the sword has not rusted which, at Griinwald, struck down the enemy. From the shores of the Pacific to the North Si ^s the Russian forces are on the march. The dawn of a new life is breaking for you. May there shine, resplendent above that dawn, tlie sign of the Cross, symbol of the Passion and resurrection of nations '. (Signed) Commander-in-Chief General Adjutant Nicolas. 1 (14) August, 1914. While the weiglit of Polish ojiinion was already strongly against giving any aid to the Austro-German forces, it was this Proclamation which definitely and immediately crystallized Polish sentiment in enthusiastic loyalty to Russia. The promise made by the Grand Duke Nicholas was afterwards confirmed by Imperial Edict. Long before that, however, the attitude of the Polish people had been irrevocably settled. On August 17 the leaders of the several political parties in Warsaw- united in the following pronouncement : The representatives of the undersigned political parties, iissembled in Warsaw on the 16th August, 1914, welcome the Proclamation issued to the Poles by His Imperial Highness the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Forces as an act of the foremost historical importance, and implicitly believe that upon the termination of the war the promises uttered in that Proclamation will be for- mally fulfilled, that the dreams of their fathers and fore- fathers will be realized, that Poland's flesh, torn asunder a century and a half ago, will once again be made whole, that the frontiers severing the Polish nation will vanish. The blood of Poland's sons, shed in united combat against the Germans, will serve equally as a sacrifice, offered upon the altar of her Resurrection. The Democratic National Party. The Polish Progressive Party. The Realist Party. The Polish Progressive Union. EFFECT OF A GERMAN BOMB ON THE RAILWAY TRACK. An unexploded shell is seen in the foreground. From that date, though the Germans con- tinued their futile intrigues, there was never any doubt as to the position or sentiments of the Polish people. The invading Austro- German armies were the enemy ; the Russian troops were friends. It was only by degrees that the people of Poland were to leam the extent of the cala- mities which were to be visited upon their coimtry ; only by degrees did the German invading armies give up the hope that they were soon to possess and dwell in a hospitab'e and friendly Poland. In their first advance from the frontier they seem to have engaged in little wanton destructiveness. They regarded Poland as already their own country, and, as the invading troops expected to spend th» winter there, it w^as not to their interest to lay it waste. There was, it is true, at least one conspicuous exception. As soon as the German troops crossed the frontier at Kalisch they seem to have set themselves to spread a reign of terror in the population. Buildings were burned, harmless citizen.s were executed, and the jjlace was given up to plunder and rapine. The mayor of the town, one of its most respected citizens, was dragged from his bed in his night- 35-2 • 326 THE TIMES JJfSTOIfY OF THE WAH. RETREATING GERMANS REBUILDING A BRIDGE NE4R KALISGH PREVIOUSLY DESTROYED BY THEMSELVES. clothes and his old manservant was shot dead before him for trying to cover the half-naked body of his master with his own coat. The facts are, unhappily, too well established ; and hardly any town in Belgium was as brutally and ruthlessl}^ used as was the old city of Kalisch. No explanation of this outrage has ever been given ; but that there was not niucli, if any, excuse in the form of provocation by the civil population seems apparent from the fact that the Germans afterwards declared, whether truthfully or not, that the officer responsible for it had been disgraced. On the whole, however, the German advance into Poland seems to have been reasonably free from outrages on the civil population ; and it is to be noted that, from now on, whatever credit or discredit attaches to the allies for the conduct of this campaign must be awarded to the Germans and not at all to the Austrians- We have already seen that a certain " stiffening " of German troops had been intro- duced, without any material result, into the Austrian forces in the later stages of tlie Galician campaign. When the completeness of the Austrian failure in that campaign became apparent, Germany assumed control of all the military operations. General von AufTenberg came near to being relieved of his couunand. being apparently held to blame for the failure to protect the flank of Dankl's army in its advance on Lublin. The commanders of at least five Austrian Army Corps — the 6th ^ 7th, 8th, 11th, and 17th — seem to have been removed,* and the Austrian military organiza- tion as a whole was treated as if in disgrace. Vienna became full of German Staff officers, and German officers assisted in the defence of Cracow. A system was adopted of linking German and Austrian divisions, .and even brigades, together, and the supreme control of operations was vested in the German Head- quarters Staff. It will be remembered that there is evidence that the plan of the Galician cam- paign had apparently been forced on Austria by her ally, and that the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Konrad von Hotzendorf, never cordially approved of it. There was now a widespread inclination in Austria to hold Germany responsible for the miscarriage of that plan. In Vienna and elsewhere there came to be much complaint of the arrogant behaviour of German officers towards Austrians, whether soldiers or civilians. INIuch jealousy * The names of the new corps commanders, as announced from Vienna early in October, were : Cth Army Corps, General Arz ; 7th, Griesler ; 8tli, Scheucht- enstnel ; 11th, Julieic ; 17th, Kritck. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 327 was engendered and not a little hatred and bitterness, which grew as time went on. That the German commanders of joint forces, in •cases of retreat, gave to the Austrian troops the thankless and dangerous task of screening the rear of the retiring German corps was sufficiently shown by the identity of the prisoners taken. Many independent observers in Russia declared also that when German and Austrian prisoners were confined together there seemed to be more hostility between them than either showed towards their Russian guards. In the newspaper reports of the day many stories were told to illustrate the growing lack of harmony between the two allies. It was even stated that Austria before the end of tliis Polish campaign opened overtures looking to the making of a separate peace, when Russia demanded terms which included : (1) The surrender of Galicia to Kussia. (2) The surrender of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ■Serbia and Montenegro. (3) Withdrawal from the alliance with Germany. (4) The reconstitution of the Austro-Hungarian mon- archy into Federal States, one of which should be an autonomous Bohemia. Austria was said to have considered these terms too humihating. AVithout putting too much confidence in all the tales of Austro- German friction which gained ciurency in the literature of the time, it is certain that from the autumn of 1914 there ceased to be full sym- pathy between the two allied peoples, though the exigencies of the situation compelled Austria to cling to her more powerful neighbour ; and it is also evident that for the misunder- standings which arose the responsibility must be put, even more than on the Austrian defeats, on the arrogant behaviour of individual German officers. The first German offensive movement, it has been said, began on September 27. From documents which later came to Light it aj^pears that General von Hindenburg had been put in chief command of the combined Austro-German forces on September 25. For how long the preparations for the coding advance had been maturing we do not know, but ever since the beginning of the Austrian retreat there had been reports of German troops being moved from the western to the eastern front and of the massing of large German forces about the Polish frontier from Thorn to Cracow. The advance was begun, apparently, simultaneously by four separate armies or groups of troops. The first, froni Thorn, advanced along the left bank of the Vistula and the railway to and by Wloclawek. The second, from the neighbourhood of Kalisch, aimed at Lodz. The third, started from Breslau and proceeded via Czestochowa towards Piotrokow and Novo-Radomsk. The fourth, based on Cracow, moved north-eastward by RUSSIAN OUTPOST FIRING FROM A BARN. 328 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the loft banlc of the upper Vistula towards Kielce. I'his Fourth Army was largely coin- posed of Ausirian troops, with, it is believed, only two German army corps. The combined strength of the four armies probably amounted to about 1,500,000 men, of whom something over 1,000,000 were Gennan. This Ls exclusive of tlio main Austrian forces, which were, of course, still in Galicia where they were rallying in the country west of the Wisloka. The advance seems to have partially taken the Russians by surprise. It had rather been anticipated that the Germans would prefer to await attack behind the strongly entrenched frontier line from Thorn to Czestochowa. In the view of Russian military authorities the advance was a mistake, causing the battle to be joined on ground more favourable to the Russians. There appears also at first to have been some uncertainty as to the German objective : whether it was to be pushed home as an attack on Warsaw and an endeavour to conquer the whole of Poland, or whether it was merely a demonstration threatening the rear of the Russian armies in Galicia so as to compel them to retire. In any case, the Russians showed no haste to meet the new movement and the German advance was for a while almost unresisted. It was pushed with characteristic rapidity. By October 3 the Austro-German (Fourth) Army in the south was at Stobnica, a place seven or eight miles over the Polinh frontier on the left side of the upper Vistula, about midway between Cracow and Sandomierz. By October 8, farther north, the Second Army had reached and occupied Lodz, and wan issuing proclamations calling upon the people to rise and join in the task of " saving Poland." By the 11th of the month the First Army was at Sochaczew, and its right, or possibly a de- tached force from the Second Army, was in contact with the Russians at Skiemiewice. Already Warsaw could hear the thunder of the enemy's guns. While the northern forces were thus rapidly approaching Warsaw, the Austro-German Army had also travelled fast, in spite of torrential rains which were flooding the country, so that on October 13 fighting was going on at various points between Sandomierz and Iwangorod. On the following day (October 14) a German official statement from Berlin announced that " the whole of Poland with the exception of Warsaw is in our possession." Nor, if the statement had excepted also a small area round Iwangorod, would it have been an exaggeration. On October 15 the Germans were within ten miles of Warsaw and on the 16th they penetrated to within seven miles ; and there was no adequate force in sight for the city's protection. RUSSIANS ATTEND A RELIGIOUS SERVICE BEFORE GOING INTO BATTLE. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 329 7\rm rlO ^VlOClf "^ r Wy Com bin >Ss,. oOsmolinte Zycfmn ,.p .V 3 -' \ Kiernozia X erry iy\lilkowice , ^M/5trzew'ce^^L'_- ^=-^^t_ \i^ VI. _ in lew ice Strykow Brezi'n'(}>^ . Ko/uszki]/'^- Grodlsk . Yuszkow ryv/now PiasecznoQ \Bolimow y^Grodisk , ^lERNIEWtCE ^ Plyzwja ]^ iRawa Scale oF Miles 10 20 Warl 30 THE WARSAW FRONT. Warsaw was very difficult of attack from the north. On that side approach to it was barred by the rivers Vistula and Xarew and the strong line of fortified positions from Novo Ceorgievsk to Lomza. Beyond the last-named point ran the Bobr, with the fortress of Osowiec and a region of swamp and lake to and beyond Grodno. More particularly after the recent German repulse on the East Prussian front, then, Warsaw had little to fear from any enemy on the north Apparently the Russians were slow to realize how serious was the present threat against it, with forces of such magnitude converging upon it from all parts of the west and south ; though the actual force engaged in the immediate attack on Warsaw does not seem to have exceeded from five to seven army corps, only a small portion of which were first line troops. There was much discussion at the time as to why General von Hindenburg sent so com- paratively small a force for the direct assault on Warsaw. There is no doubt that the Ger- mans intended and expected to take the place. All arrangements had been made for its occu- pation on about October 17 or 18. Its value to them as a base for future operations against Russia was obvious, and its capture at that time, just a week after the fall of Antwerp in the west, might be expected to have great nioral effect. Yet the attack on the position was vmaccountably half-hearted. It was to be remembered, however, that the Germans were well aware that the Russian forces in Poland at that time were trivial. A few divisions of cavalry on that side of the Vistula were all that the Austro-German force had to deal with on its advance on Iwangorod. It was doubtful if two Russian army corps werie available for the defence of Warsaw. There was no considerable force at Novo Georgievsk. Iwangorod was masked and its garrison suffi- cienf ly occupied by the Fourth (Austro-German) Army, and no help could come from that direction ; and the Germans, still convinced of the dilatoriness of Russia, believed that it 330 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. HEAVY AUSTRIAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION. would be a long time before material Russian reinforcements could be assembled and sent to Warsaw, either from Brest-Litovsk or Bialy- stok and Grodno. In these circumstances, it may well have been thought that the half- dozen German corps under General Mackensen, which constituted the first army of invasion, were a sufficient force for the purpose, and as much as could be advantageously employed. The 2nd and 3rd Armies had pushed into Poland alongside of the 1st Army. They were now held in reserve for use in a comiter- stroke against whatever force the Russians might ultimately send for the relief of Warsaw. The natiu-e of this intended covinter-stroke, with the reasons why it was never delivered, was disclosed in the German official accoimt of the operations published three months after- v/ards, and will be referred to later. Mean- while, if the Germans underestimated the force which would be necessary to take Warsaw, the Russians on their side were extraordinarily slow in taking any steps for the city's protection. The thunder of the enemy's giuis was first heard in Warsaw on the night of October 10-11, From that time onwards the thunder drew gradually nearer, while hostile aeroplanes paid daily visits to the city, and something like panic soon began to spread. The Russian authorities for a time issued preclamations of an encouraging nature, endeavouring to restore public confidence ; but as each day the sound of the guns in- creased, and there was apparently no sign that any effort was being made to send help from Russia, the discouragement became profound. The State Bank packed up its archives and departed in haste for Siedlice, where it alighted for a day or two only, and then, taking wing again, flew in one spasm of apprehension to Moscow. In the meantime the aeroplanes, which were a novelty to the people of Warsaw, caused great annoyance. The first one that flew over the city was an object of immense curiosity to the people, and they showered the city with bundles of pam- phlets proclaiming that the Germans were coming to save the Polish race. The populace were exhorted to have no fear of the aeroplanes, as no damage would be done to the civil popu- lation, but onJj'^ troops and buildings of military value would be destroyed. It is probable that this was actually believed by the Poles for as much as a day, but not longer. For the next flock of airmen that flew over evidently came from quite a different source of authority^ Instead of scattering blandishments and words of encouragement about the " future of Poland " they commenced to drop bombs. It is hardly necessary to say that, as far as is known, not a single object of military value was injured, nor was any soldier wounded, though forty or more civilians were killed or hm-t, and a small amovint of private property was destroyed. Accoimts of the happenings of the next few days inside Warsaw are very confused. That THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 331 is probably inevitable in such circumstances. In Antwerp, in the days preceding its fall, wild and contradictory rumours were current ; orders to evacuate the city were given and cancelled, and the greatest luicertainty pre- vailed. So it was in Warsaw. It seems that the decision to evacuate the city was actually taken on October 15 or 16, and trains were provided for the officials and others who wished to leave. Practically all the British colony and many others who did not care to fall into German hands dejjarted in haste. Outside the fortifications the few Russian troops were holding the enemy back as stub- bornly as they could, though they were ovit- numbered by nearly three to one. Day and night the windows of Warsaw shook with the detonation of the guns, while from the roofs of the buildings the population could see the shells bursting to the west and soxith. Wounded were pouring back into the town, but still there seemed no sign or hope of relief ; and for a day or two the Poles gave themselves up to the un- happy conviction that in spite of their loyalty they had been abandoned. On Sunday, Oc- tober 17, the Germans were literally at the edge of Warsaw, and great shells from their 6-inch field howitzers were exploding just beyond the town Ihnits. Opposed to the advance in tliis direction was part of a division of one of Russia's magnificent Siberian corps, and it is this heroic band that Warsaw has to thank for its remaining in Russian hands. It seems to be well established that there was a period of seven hours when the Germans might have entered Warsaw unopposed. The Siberians had been fighting all day and were cut almost to pieces. Their artillery was said to have withdrawn, and they themselves were in retreat, offering scarcely any semblance of a rearguard action. Individuals departing on the train were told that the Germans were actually entering the town and that resistance liad been abandoned. In from the Radom road streamed the shattered fragments of regiments, and, according to the generally accepted version, there were four hours or more when there was not in this direction a single gun or effective unit to oppose a German advance. For some incomprehensible reason the enemy at just this critical moment ceased their attack. It is difficult to know exactly what took place during that lull of the German fighting. Someone seems to have whipped the retreating fragments again into shape, and mustered a few batteries and thrown them back on the Radom AUSTRIAN PRISONERS. 332 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. < o u o aq Z O o o U o H o z Q Z Z < CD THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 300 road, so that when the Germans, after those fateful hours, again resumed their attack they found themselves still opposed as before. The most reasonable hypothesis of the German failure to seize their opportunity seems to be that just at the moment when the Russians were giving up hope the Germans also decided that they were in too little strength to carry the position. Short as it was, the delay was fatal to them. The next day there came to ^Varsaw some weak reinforcements and orders to hold on. For another day the still un- equal contest was continued, when the Russians suffered terribly. Then came news that swept tlirough Warsaw from street to street and from house to house with such rapidity that everyone seemed to know it simultaneously. The population poured into the streets in an uproar of rejoicmgs and excitement. " War- saw," it was announced, " was to be held at any cost. The Grand Duke had said it. Rein- forcements were actually on the way." And almost on the echo of the first announcement came the tidings that reinforcements were coming as fast as steam could bring them. The first corps to come by the railway was one of those grand units from Siberia, and the first regiment to detrain is said to have been the 9 1st Siberian. It is told how the soldiers actually leapt from their box cars into their company formation and without a moment's delay swung out over the Vistula bridge through the main street of Warsaw and on l)y the Jerusalem road to the front. This regiment had already so distinguished itself in the Galician campaign that a sword of honoiu" had been presented to its commanding officer, Colonel Letchinsky. To had been conspicuous in the fighting before Lublin and in the fierce counter-attacks which drove the Austrians back into Galicia. Arriving there, it had taken an effective part in the eight days battle at Rawa-Ruska and had then been in the van of the advance against Jaroslau and beyond. It was still on active service when the orders came that Warsaw must be relieved. It was loaded into railway vans, and, as we have seen, was the first regiment to arrive at Warsaw in the moment of the city's crisis. People who saw its entrance into Warsaw and its march through the main street and out on to a new campaign (in which be it said that it fought for eighteen consecutive days and was then decorated by the Grand Duke with the Order of St. George), spoke of the scene on its arrival as an extraordinary one. With its brass band blaring, it poured through the town. The men unshaven, dirty, haggard, and war-stained from their campaign in Galicia, inarched through the main street witii the swinging strides of veterans. All Warsaw seemed almost to go wild. Women and children wept. It is said that the flower stores were stripped and every sort of blosson\ was thrown among the troops, while men and women alike ran beside the soldiers tossing them cigarettes, fruit, bits of bread, and anything and everything that a population frenzied with delight could offer to the men who had come to their rescue. I\Ien who witnessed it said that they could never have believed that they would live to see the Poles give such a welcome to soldiers of the Tsar. It seemed as if, in that historic hour, a century of bitterness had all but been obliterated. Behind this first regiment came another and another and another ; and then guns and ammunition caissons. Behind them \A'ere more regiments, more guns, more cavalry, and still again more divisions and more cori)s, until at last there seemed to be no end to the hordes of troops that Russia was pouring in. From the first day of their arrival Warsaw was safe. By October 21 the Germans were in retreat. In speaking of the reinforcements which Russia sent to relieve Warsaw a Russian writer says : " The march of the Russian armies down the right bajik of the Vistula oveT- roads of which English readers can have no conception, and where no automobile transport could travel in terrible weatiicr across swollen tributaries, was an exi)]oii worthy of an honourable place in the history of the Great War." What the precise strength of these armies was is unknown, but the same writer says that in one day " four columns, each 250,000 strong, crossed the Vistula over sixteen pontoon bridges," and deploj^ed upon the left bank to advance upon the Germans. Before the Germans definitely fell back thcire was desperate fighting, especially about Blonie, but a strong Russian force, pushing down the Vistula, swung round the enemy's left and occupied Sochaczew, making a hurried witii- drawal of the whole German force necessary. This movement was led by tlu^ Siberians Among the German troops which suffered most heavily are mentioned the 20th Army Cor|)s: and the 17th and Reserve Corps, which bore the brunt of the struggle about Blonie. 3r>-3 334 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A curious but seemingly well authentiratcci detail of these operations before Warsaw is that the King of Saxony was present with his suite, one of the equerries having been taken prisoner by the Russians. Inspired German newspapers had for some time been dropping hints of an act of great pohtical importance which was to take place as soon as Warsaw \\ as in German hands. It is believed that this act was to be the resuscitation of a Saxon dynasty in Poland. To have all preparations ready for so dramatic a stroke would have been entirely in accordance with the German pro- cedure throughout the war, and it may well have been calcvilated that this would be the best retort to the promise niade by the Grand Duke Nicholas, and confirmed by the Tsar, of the establishment of an autonomous Kingdom of Poland under Russian suzerainty.* * The claims of the Saxon Royal House to the Throne of Poland, strictly speaking, are inadmissible, as the Electors of Saxony were Kings of Poland only while the Republic was an elective monarchy, and the wearing of the Polish Crown conferred no sort of hereditary right on the children of the King. Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony, " The Strong Man of Sin," remark- able as the father of Marshal Saxe and an innumeraVjie progeny, was King of Poland as Augustus II. from 10i>7 to 1706, when he abdicated; only to be re-elected in 1709 He died in 1733 and his son was elected as Augustus III. (1733-63). When Napoleon erected the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1807 he gave the Throne to Frederick Augustus I., King of Saxony and grandson of Augustus III., who was deposed from it in 1813 and lost it definitely by the Treaty of Vienna in 181.5. The present King of While Warsaw had been going through such critical times, fierce fighting had also been in progress on the left bank of the Vistula opposite luangorod, where the Austro-German .tirmy under General Dankl had arrived with- out ineeting any more serious resistance than minor actions at Kielce and Radom, which had hardly delayed its advance. Iwangorod lay on the eastern or right bank of the Vistula about sixty miles to the south- east of Warsaw, and was credited with being a fortress of the first class. In the present operations it does not appear that its safety was ever seriotisly menaced. The Austro- German force sent against it apparently consisted of seven army corps, two of whicli were German, with some additional units. ^\'hatever its size or composition, it was not strong enough to take Iwangorod. If the Germans expected that it would prove strong eiiougli, it was but another example of their over-confidence in themselves and their under- estimation of their enemj\ Arriving opposite the fortress, on the west side of the river, without, as has been said, encountering any \-ery serious opposition on the way, the allied force opened a bombardment with heavy gmis on October 16. On the following days Saxony, Frederick Augustus III., is great -grand-nephew of the only Grand Duke of Warsaw, and five generations removed from the last elective Saxon King of Poland. CONVEYING RUSSIAN WOUNDED TO HOSPITAL. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 33i RUSSIANS ADVANCING THROUGH THH WOODS WITH FIXED BAYONETS. they made several attempts to force a crossing of the river on pontoons, but without any success. The point from which their main attack was directed was at and around the Httle village of Kozienice, a little north of, or lower down the river from, Iwangorod itself. Kozienice was about three miles from the Vistula, standing on tlie last elevated ground Iiefore the country dips almost to the level of the stream. The intervening area between the liigh ground and the river was under the best conditions low and marshy, and was commanded by the road that ran along the ridge. The Germans and Austiians had made this ridge into an effective line of defence, though there are evidences that it was done rather as a forjual precaution than out of actual fear of a Russian attack. On the night of October 20, however, a detachment of one of the Caucasian divisions crossed t-he river from the Russian side and seems to have gained a foothold on the west bank before its approacli was taken seriously. After reachmg the shore, the Russians still had some two miles of swampy country to cover before they could get at their enemy on the ridge. - We are told that while in the swamp the Russians came under the batteries of the enemy, which were able froiTi their elevation to sweep the low country with almost direct fire ; but the Caucasians, wading in mire up to their armpits., worked their way u[), regard- less of their losses, through the naorass and took the enemy on his exposed right flank. It is probable that this flank was not very strong. The nature of the ground between the position and the river was so obviously bad for infantry that attack froni this direction may well have been thought improbable. Once on solid ground, the Caucasians, not the most docile of the Russian troops, seem to have advanced against the exposed Austrian flank with such ardoiu* and impetuosity that it crumbled at the first assault. Under cover of this initial advantage the Russians brought up more troops, until the whole Austrian right was forced back from the road wliich it had been holding into a strip of wood that lay directly west of the road. The retirement of this flank involved the centre, and finally the left, which, it is believed, was the position held by the German contingent. In any event, the whole of the allied line was dislodged from its position on the road parallel- ing the Vistula and hustled unceremoniously into the edge of the forest. The army which had hoped to capture Iwangorod could not even prevent its supposedly inefticient enemy from crossing the river and attacking over a coimtry involving the greatest military dis- advantages, and tiu-ning it necic and crop out of a well-located and strong defensive position. The Austrians and Germans were 836 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LANDSTURM PATROL. ^\ell equipped with artillery, and after the engagement there were to be counted forty- two gim positions witliin a mile of Kozienice. Owing to the difficulties of the ground the Russians were rniable to give their infantry any material support from artillery, and the performance of the Russian troops under the circixmstances was one of the most remarkable exploits of the campaign. As has been said, the couiitry directly west of the Kozienice-Iwangorod road was heavily wooded. For perhaps ten miles east and west and thirty or forty miles north and south there extended a forest which was almost a jungle. Several excellent roads leading toward Radom pierced this belt. Otherwise it was difficult to traxel through the forest even on foot, so dense was the second growth, the fallen timber, and imderbrush. It was, then, into this belt, which Nat\are seemed to have devised especially for their protection, that the enemy was forced. Then followed an episode which was buried in Russian official dispatches in a brief mention of " satisfactory progress made against the enemy by our troops in the fighting around Iwangorod." As a matter of fact, here in this woodland for nine days was fought what must by all accounts have been one of the most terrible actions tliat c\er tof)]c place. The problem presented to the Russians wa.s a simple one. Into the woods had gone the enemy. The woods extended east and west for perhaps ten miles. The enemy must be driven out. It was perfectly clear that if enough Russians went into the eastern side of the woods and kept on going, eventually the rnemy, or what was left of him, would emerge from the western side into the open coimtr\-. So dense were the woods even on the outskirts that shi-ajjnel was of little value. In the first place, it was almost impossible to locate the line of the enemy, and the lack of roads and tliickness of the woods made anything like free movement of giuis impracticable. So, in single heartedness of piu-pose, the Russian in- fantrj'^ went at their task of driving the enemy back by main strength ; and with a stubborn- ness that challenges admiration the Austrians and Germans went back only almost inch by inch, every yard won having to be purchased dearly by the Russians. After two days the whole fight had become what might be called an informal one. Regi- ments and battalions might keep more or less in touch one with the other, but the man in the ranks had no idea of what was going on elsewhere than immediately in front of him. He knew, perhaps, that a company of the enemy had made a little fort of their own, and for a day or two the only thing in his mind was to take that one spot of resistance. With each day the fighting became more scattered and more general ; and with each day the lines of the enemy gave back slowly toward the west. Day after day saw fresh Russian battalions, regiments, even brigades and divi- sions, led into their side of the wood, to dis- appear and to all intents and purposes be lost sight of for a week. The losses on both sides were appalling ; but the Russians could fill their gaps overnight, while the enemy probably could not fill his at all. At the end of a week, then, the Austrians and Gernaans were almost through the wood, %vith only a mile or two between them and the stretch of open coimtr\- which they must traverse in their retreat, and the indications in the forest afterwards showed that the fear of that belt of unprotected country must have been present to the whole retreating army ; for the last narrow stretch of woodland was a continuous maze of trenches and small forts thrown up by a few soldiers ; THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 337 MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS IN POLAND. 33S THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. and the desperation with which each one was fought over was proved by the ahnost innumer- able graves and wooden crosses which studded the whole region. At last came the final stand, and then the retirement of the enemy across the bit of open ground. For nine days the sullen field artillery of the Rassians had been baying ineffectually or else waiting quietly with muzzled guns in the reserve until their hour should come. When the open country was reached it was their turn, and the spectacle on that open field must have been one ne\er to be forgotten. Some weeks after the action acre after aero was still stre%«i with exploded shells, cases, bloody bandages, dead horses, and broken equipment ; and between and among all were the dreadful fragments of hiimanity too small to hav'e been picked up for burial : a hand, a foot, fragments of bone, a bit of skull, a leg sticking out of a boot, and all the other ghastly relics which show- where human beings have been exposed to the rain of shrapnel and shell fire. The woods were still filled with unbui'ied dead, lying about in every conceivable nook or corner where a desperate man could take refuge from the guns or defend himself from a hand- to-hand attack with the bayonet. Already the Russians had buried 16,000 of their own and the enemv's dead. Still there were thousands left in tlie woods. It is safe to put down the killed alone in this action, from the crossing of the river until this open spot near the village of Augustow, at 20,000, and the total casualties cannot have been, in that single small area, less than 100,000. It should be added that while, in this war, it had already become the fashion, both in Germany and among the Allied Powers, to decry the valour of the Austrian soldiers, there can be no doubt that here, as at (.Jrodek and Rawa-Ru.ska, they fought, however ineffectually, with great gallantry. On October 23 a Russian official announce- ment said that the enemy was in full retreat from before Iwangorod, to the fortifications of which " no essential damage " had been done by his gun-fire. It was on October 21 that the Germans had begun to fall back from Warsaw. By October 22 the tide had already receded so far from the city, and the Russians were pressing the piu^uit with such ardour, that the cliief fighting on that day was on the Bzura beyond Sochaczew and in the neigh- bourhood of Louicz. On the 24th DankFs army had been forced back to Radom. On the 25th the Russian official communique spoke of the battle as raging along a front from Radom to Skierniewice, and on the 28th, at one end of that line, Radom, and at the other end, Lodz, had been reoccupied bj'^ the Russians. DEAD AUSTRIANS AFTER THE BATTLE OF KIELCE. THE TIMES FIISTOBY OF THE WAB. 339 THE AUSTRIAN HEIR APPARENT IN POLAND. According to a Russian writer, extraordinary scenes had been witnessed in Lodz during the German occupation. From the first days there had been a great influx into that demo- cratic and industrial town of Princes of the German Confederation and German aristo- crats. At the Hotels Bristol and Savoy stayed many Germans of high rank, including the Grand Duke of Saxe-Meiningen. These gentlemen, covered with decorations, devoted themselves to every kind of enjoyment. In the hotels which they honoured champagne flowed, nuisic played, and dancers exported from Germany gladdened the eyes of the princes. Not improbably they had assembled there to be on hand to give eclat to the accession of the King of Saxony to the Polish throne. Just before the German withdrawal from Lodz the princes and counts attached to the German Stafi went hunting in the Liusmerski forests, which are renowned as game preserves. It was a fine sight — the cavalcade galloping through the woods, the sun reflected from many glittering helmets. Two days afterwards, how- ever, the scene changed. The German Army had broken against the living wall of the Russian soldiers. The hunters became the hunted, on whose trail a merciless chase was organized. The chief lines of German retreat wer.- along the main railway from Warsaw by Piotrokow and Novo-Radomsk to Czesto- chowa, along the line of the light railway from Lodz to Kalisch, and north-westerly from Lowicz towards Thorn. The Austro- German forces fell back on the route by which they had come, by Kielce to Olkusz and the shelter of Cracow. All the retiring armies did their best, by destroying bridges, wrecking railways, and ploughing up roads behind theni to delay pursuit. The German ofiicial accounts of the operations, published three months later, declared that these measures were so successful that the Russian advance was rendered very slow and the allied forces had abundant time to retire in good order. This was only partially true of the n^ain German forces and very far from true of the southern Austro-German army. The Russian force which pushed the German arinies back was in command of General Ruzsky, who had already shown in the Galician campaign how thoroughly he understood the art of making things uncom- fortable for a beaten army and how rapidly his men could push a pursuit over any kind of country, however lacking in roads or railways. The fighting about Skierniewice and Lowicz wa.s of a serious character, the Germans attempting to make a stand in a carefully prepared position which the Russians carried with the bayonet. Around Rawa the Russians took 400 German prisoners and buried over 400 (Jerman dead. There was stern fighting along the Pilitsa, both nortli and south of the river. At the end of October the Russians were " advancing victoriously along the whole front."' In the first week of November the main German retreat had fallen back beyond the frontier, not even making a stand at Kaliscli or Czestocliowa. On November i) the Russian cavalrv crossed the frontier and 840 THE TIMES HISTOTiY OF THE WAR. RUSSIAN TRANSPORT IN POLAND. raided German territory at Pleschon, just north of Kalisch, and General Joffre and Lord l\jtchener sent glowing telegrams of congratu- lation to the Cirand Duke Nicholas. If the main German armies in their retire- ment, however, were thus harried, they did not suffer nearly so heavily as did the Austro- German force on its retreat from Iwangorod. To the Austrian troops, indeed, as not infre- quently, had been entrusted the most dangerous part of the allied operations, and, charac- teristically, it was, as we shall see, on their failure that the Germans subsecjuently put the responsibility for the collapse of the whole campaign. There is no doubt that in this retirement from Iwangorod such German troops as there were in the combined army went on ahead (bj' not less on the average, it is said, than one day's march), and left to the Austrians the whole work of protecting their retreat and fighting rearguard actions. The Austrians fully understood wb.at was being done, and it is said that in the coiu-se of the retreat many thousands of Austrian soldiers surrendered on the slightest pretext, giving as their reason afterwards their discouragement and disgust with their treatment hy their German allies. The Poles in the Austrian ranks especially began to lay down their arms and give themselves up whenever the^' could do so with safety. Mention has already been made of the fighting about Radom and the occupation of that place by the Russians. The struggle seems to have gone on for some four days in the Radom forests, but the occupation of the town itself, on October 27-28, was effected without serious resistance. From Radom to Kielce there ran an excellent road, which for u:iuch of its distance was an elevated causeway built above low-lying and often marshy ground, while other portions ran between heavily wooded forest land. The Austrians in retreat did everything that could be done to make this highway impassable. The road was ploughed up, bridges were burned or blowndown, and culverts exploded, leaving great ditches across the road. In many places to go round these obstacles would have meant traversing the soft meadow lands by the roadside, the sinldng of transport, and miring of guns. Along the wooded portions it was equally difficult to leave the road without felling hundreds of the big trees that pressed in close to the highway. The result was that the Russians were materially delayed during the following days in their advance. Though the infantry could press on, guns and transport had to wait for repairs to be accomplished. The Russian engineers, however, were on the "heels of the first regiments of the advance, and they worked desperately in extemporizing bridges and corduroying THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 341 roads through the marsh lands tliat flanked the highway. The delay served to give the Anstrians a chance to throw v^p hurried works in the vicinity of Kielce, where an action was fought on November 3 which in any other war would be chronicled as a battle of importance. The Austrian line was spread out here on a length of, perhaps, seventy kilometres from the west of Kielce to near Sandomierz, on the Vistula. The centre of the Austrian line was in a village perhaps ten imles east of Kielce itself, and in the centre of the village wa.s a walled-in graveyard, the whole of which had been flanked with gun positions and pro- tected with wing trenches and hurriedly <'rected barbed wire entanglements. It seems that the Austrians and their C4erman advisers {who, however, had pushed on to the south the afternoon before the action) considered the position sufficiently strong to delay the enemj'' for three or four days. But the Russian army, with the famous Caticasian corps in the van, came on with irresistible momentum. We are told that the main column, its transport keeping pace with it, «as moving at the rate of fifteen or sixteen miles a day, in spite of all obstacles, while flanking regiments thrown out to east and west were covering soinetunes as many as twenty-five nuU^s in the twenty-four hours. -After their gruelling experience in crossing the Vistula and the week-longhand-to-hand struggle in the woods, the Caucasians were thoroughly aroused and in no mood to be checked by any rearguard. Just as the Austrians were putting the finishing touclies to their field works the Caucasians, covered lij'' a screen of Cossack cavalry, swept in upon their front and deployed against their centre. This was towards the evening of November 3. The enemy, it appears, anticipated an engageinent commencing on the following morn- ing with the characteristic artillery action, to be followed later in the day, or perhaps not tmtil the next day. with an infantry attack, which the Atistrians would be fully prepared to receive. But they were not in the least jjrepared for what was to come. The Cau- casians, after just enougli rest to give them tinae to have sometliing to eat, without even waiting lor the complete development of their artillery support, attacked the Atistrian centre with the bayonet. The strongest position of the whole line of defence was the graveyard with the little white church in the middle. Before the Austrians A\ere fully alive to what was going POLISH COTTAGERS RAKING OVER THE KUINS OF THEIR HOMES. 342 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. a c o u . .5 o ^ y ^ I— s O C -J c« > 1 '— , -^ c .2 C/} 3 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 343 on the Caucasians were pouring over the wall, overrunning barlied wire and wing trenches, with an impetuosity which crumbled the Austrian centre as the incoming tide dissolves a castle on the seashore. Tho little graveyard where for centiu-ies the dead of the village had slept beneath the shadow of overhanging trees, was transformed into a shambles. The only outlet was a single gate, and the Russian soldiers took this in their rvish, effectually closing the compound within. Here in the darkness men fought hand to hand, stumbling over graves and wakening the echoes \\ith rifle shots and shoutings and with the groans and moans of the dying. It is no fiction to speak of the ground herfe as being soaked with blood. A Special Correspondent of The Times, who visited the spot soon after the action, found great clots of coagulated blood, " like bits of raw liver," lying everywhere. The surrounded Austrians, taken by surprise, liad fought with desperation and stubbornness, but as the hxindreds of dead crumpled up under the trees and among the tombstones too well indicated, they were no match for the Cauca- sians when it came to hand-to-hand fighting with cold steel and clubbed muskets. When morning came, the Austrian centre had dis- appeared and the whole line of the army left to screen the German retirement was in retreat. At one o'clock of the same day the Russians poured into Kielce, horse, foot, and artillery, while on the flanks tiieir infantry were sticking up the stragglers among the enemy, and, on the extreme left, entering Sandomierz, which had to be taken by storm against a triple line of defences. The Austrians are believed to have lost here heavily in dead and woLinded, while more than 12,000 prisoners and fifty giuis, with numerous nmcliine guns, fell into the Russian hands. After the fight the victors made no stop at Kielce but pushed right on. Kielce, which had been blue with Austrians at ten in the morning of November 4, was grey with Russians at two in the afternoon. The artillery that had been in action the night before, as well as that which had not had time to come up on the [)receding evening, now came pouring through the town ; the guns, dirty and blistered from tho contact with enemy's shrapnel in many previous engagements, came clanking and jingling over the rough stones of the streets, the tired but still eager soldiers eating their rations on limber and in saddle as they pushed forward to the front. By four in the afternoon the Russian advance was again pressing the Austrian rear and the hungry guns were once more at work. With the Germans well out of the way of the Russians moving leisurely with their transport and artillery, the Austrians evidently had no intention of fiu"ther sacrificing themselves vmnecessarily, but made what speed they could, losing now and again small con- tingents, on their way to the Polish border and the protection of Cracow. It is now necessarj'^ to turn to the events which had been happening since the invest- ment of Przemysl, in Galicia, for which a Russian Governor had been appointed in the person of Count Bobrinsky, under whom the civil administration of the newly acquired territory was soon working without apparent friction. The new governor divided Galicia into tliree provinces — Lemberg, Tarnopol, and Bulcowina — the first of which \^as destined to be part of the new Kingdom of Poland. Simultaneously with the begirming of the German invasion of Poland, the Austrian armies in western Galicia also began to show a tendency to take the offensive. It was like the slow tiu-ning of a tide or the resiu-gence of the water in a well fed by some subterranean spring. In a dispatch from the Russian Great General Staff the Austrian troops on the advance were described as " a mass, operating in diiTe- rent directions," and feeling its way "very cautiously." This mass seems to have been under the command of von Auffenberg and the Archduke .Joseph Ferdinand with CJeneral Bohm-Ermolli in command of the cavalry. To what extent it was composed of the rem- nants of the original armies of von Auffen- berg and the Archduke, and how much of reinforcements and German " stiffening," we do not know. In any case, moving on a narrow front for its size and with exceeding slowness, it constituted a formidable force, and before it the Russians, while their cavalry continually fenced with and hamed the front and sides of tho mass, fell back in the first week of October behind the line of the San. There they stood. We have seen in a former chapter that it was only by an extraordinary feat of arms that the Russians had succeeded in crossing the San, in the reverse direction, on the heels of the flying enemy. They had no intention now of allowing the enemy to force a recrossing against them. 344 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. This retirement partially relieved Przeiaysl, the western forts of which were disengaged about October 10 (or at the same time as Warsaw first heard the German guns), and had free communication v\ith their friends and with Cracow. The Russians, however, still pressed upon Przomysl on the eastern side. Though their main forces were east of the San, the cavalry continued to make raids and recon- naissances on the west of the river. Continuous rains had reduced the roads to a deplorable condition, but we heard of sharp cavalry engage- ments on the left, or west, side of the San on October 13, and fairly heavy fighting to the south and soutli-west of Przemysl on October 10 (hi the 18th the Austrians made a determined effort to cross tlie San, but were repulsed. The effort was renewed on the following days, seemingly with gallantry but without any success, and it was said that the river bore numbers of Austrian corpses down to San- tlomierz and Iwangorod. During these days, also, the fighting on the south-west of Przemysl, between Sanok and Sambor, increased in intensity, and here the Russians on October 20 claimed to have taken large numbers of prisoners tlirougli a dashing flanking movement by troops vrnder General Dmitrieff. Of aU these affairs we iiave only very frag- mentary information, but it is e\ident that much of the fighting «a.s of a desperate character, though the country was almost waterlogged and half-flooded. About October 21 or 22 (at the moment when the Germans were beginning to fall back from Warsaw) the Austrian attack seems to have lost its momen- tum. Russian official statements began to speak of " our advance " in the neiglibourhood of Przemysl, and fierce fighting raged aroimd Jaroslau, while farther south an Austrian division seems to have been almost annihilated in the neighbourhood of Sambor on October 28. On the last days of the month there was much confused fighting, in which the initiative was plainly passing into Russian hands. In the first days of November the Russians definitely took the offensive on the San, and, having beaten off every attempt of the enemy to pass the river, themselves began to force a crossing. By November i they had established themselves at various points on the west side of the river, and on November G the news of a complete victory there was celebrated by a Te Deuni at the Russian General Headquarters at wliich the Tsar was present. So ended in failure at e\'ery point the first Avistro-German invasion of Poland. When the completeness of the failure became apparent, the Germans spoke of the whole operation as AUSTRIAN AMMUNITION BEING TRANSPORTED TO THE FRONT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 345 THE KAISER (marked with a cross) RECEIVING THE ACCLAMATIONS OF HIS SOLDIERS DURING A VISIT TO THE POLISH FRONT. merely a " reconnaissance " If it was a recon- naissance, it was the most costly and most ill- advised reconnaissance recorded in historJ^ But reconnaissances are not iiiade with over a million and a half of men, nor are they pushed to the point of such fighting as took pjace at ] wangorod. Later, after two months of reconsideration, the ofifi(;ial German account of the operations, published on January 17, 1915, put forward a new theory, which it is not much easier to accept. According to this theory, as German troops could now be spared from East Prussia, it was decided to use them in helping Austria. With this object an Austrian Army, with a German contingent attached, started from Cracow on September 28 (the date is approximately correct) up the left side of the upper Vistula towards Randomierz. Nothing is said of the simultaneo\i.s advance of the other German armies. It was merely a flanking movement ngainst the Kussian troops in (jalicia to relieve the pressure on tlie Austrians on and beyond the San. At this time there were only some six Kussian cavalry divisions in Poland west of the Vistula. Unfortunately, according to the German view, the Austrians failed to take advantage of the new situation. They v\ere unable to cross the San, although the Austro-German invading army had pushed on with great elan towards Iwangorod. The Austrians having failed to push the Russians back, the enemj- was enabled to throw great masses of men across the Vistula at Sandomierz and Josefow, which threatened to encircle the allied right to the east of Opatow At the same time great Russian forces advanced from Twangorod. Only then was it that the dash on Warsaw was undertaken, in order to distract the enemj' and withdraw some of his strength from falling on the Austro-German Army. The difliculty of this part of the story is that the Germans were already close to Warsaw ten days before the Austro-German troubles began. The Russian force advancing on ^^'a^.saw outnumbered the 1st German Army by at least four to one. So German r(>inforcements were hurried up (which is the first that we hear of the 346 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. < U < en z o < Oh o -J l-H O H THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 347 2nd Gorman Army), and a counter-offensive was begun by crossing the Pilitsa with a view to falHng on the flank of the Russians by Warsaw. This would undoubtedly have suc- ceeded, but once more the scapegoat Austrians tailed to do their part. They allowed themselves to be dri\'en back from Iwangorod, by Radom and I^elce, whereby the German right becaine so exposed that there Was nothing for it, in view of the great numerical superiority of the (-nenxy, but for the whole Une to fall back beyond the frontier ; a movement which the (<erman armies accomplished with their usual steadiness, and with a thorough destruction of all the roads and railways as they went. This summary of the German official version is chiefly interesting for its ungenerous and almost brutally contemptuous tone towards the Austrians. As a serious story of the operations it can only be naade tenable by a complete ignoring of dates and an overturning of most of the main facts of the campaign. It has, however, been already suggested that one point which emerges from this story is [)robably true, namely, that while the 4th Austro-German Army was sent towards I\van- gorod to prevent any Russian force from crossing the Vistula on the reaches from Iwangorod to the San, the 1st Army was sent on alone to Warsaw, the other armies being lield in reserve for that counter-offensive by way of the Pilitsa which was to fall on the flank of the Russians when they came to Warsaw's relief. Unfortunately, when the Russians came, they came in such force and with such dash as to swee|) 1st Army, 4th Army and Reserve Armies together in one comnion ruin. What would Jiave happened if von Hindenburg had, in the first instance, sent a stronger force to strike at Warsaw, or if Mackensen, with such force as he had, had not failed to grasp the opportunity of seizing the place when it was at his mercy, it is not easy to say. Perhaps it could not have been held {igainst tlie strength which Russia puslied up to its relief. At least, however, the whole story of this Polish campaign would have been a different one, and this initial German failure would have been less inglorious than it was. It was, of course, unthinkable that the Germans should sit still under the rebuff which they liad received. The Russians had treated them, including some of their best troops, as ui\ceremonious]y as they liad previously treated GERMAN MACHINE GUN SECTION. the Avistrians. The natiu-al, indeed inevitable, reply must be a vigorous and immediate counter-offensiv^e. Long before the German invading armies had been beaten back to their frontier, it be- came known that still larger forces were being massed from Thorn and Breslau. There had been reports before, after the Russian successes in Oalicia, of the hurrying of German troops from the western to the eastern front. Similar reports now were indubitably true. It was asserted in Petrograd that the enemy now had no fewer than 3,000,000 men facing the Polish frontier ready for a new advance. By Novem- ber 10 the Russians had not only driven the enemy out of Poland, but between Kalisch and Thorn detachments of General Ruzsky's arinies penetrated 20 miles into German terri- tory. At the same date other Russian troops of General Ivanoff's forces were within 20 miles of Cracow. On November 14 it was annoiuiced from Petrograd that a German counter-offensive had been " noticed " from Thorn in the direction of Wloclawek. That the estimate of 3,000,000 Austro- German troops on the I'olish frontier was an exaggeration we may well believe. In llie operations recently described there had ajij^a- rently been engaged some 22 or 23 Army ("orj)?. 348 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. I RUSSIAN PRIEST BLESSING MEN IN THE TRENCHES. with various additions. Among these were some first line troops, but not many. Most of these liad been employed in the last efforts to gain a definite success on the Western front. Of the 22 Army Corps probably not more than 5 were active German Army Corps. With these appear to have been 8 Reserve Corps, the remaining 10 being Landwelir and Land- sturm formations. There also seems to have been a certain mingling of Austro-Hungarian troops with the German armies. In addition, the Austro- Hungarian forces projjer, under command of Duke Albert of ^\'urtemburg, seem to have been divided into three armies of some three corps each, with additional units. The Austrian troops, however, had suffered so severely tliat the formation of most of their vinits was no\v most irregular. The combined effective Austro- German strength on this frontier probably amounted to about 2,000,000 men. Against these the Russian armies, already great, were being constantly reinforced. It was supposed that early in November the total Russian forces from Warsaw to the Carpathians amounted to some 3o army corps, of which 15 were opposed to the Austrians in Galicia and the rest confronted the Germans along the Polish frontier. Of these Russian troops in Poland (excluding those in Galicia) much the greater number seem to have been concentrated on the southern part of the line, towards Cracow. Tn this direction were combined both those troops which had driven the Austro-Gemiau army from Iwangorod by Kielce to Olknoz and Cracow, and also the niain army which hafl followed the bulk of the Germans retreating along the line of the railway from Skierniewice to Czestochowa. The sparsity of railways in Poland, and the absence of any line parallel to the frontier on that side, made the transfer of large numbei's of Russian troops from one part of the line to another — from south to north, or vice versa — difficult. The Germans, on the other hand, had at their service a most complete railway system, by whicli their mobility was enormously increased. This fact, enabling the Germans to mass troops easily at one point or another much more quickly than their enemy, was sufficient to neutralize a very considerable total mmierical superiority on the part of tlie R ussians. Taking advantage of this fact, as the chief Russian strength was on the left, or southern. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 349 part of tlie line, whence it could only be laboriously transferred, the Germans threw the weight of their attack on the comparatively weak Russian right. In speaking of this as the Russian " right," it has to be ahvays borne in mind that, logically and in essence, the war in this eastern theatre extended over one continuous battle front, 700 or 800 miles long, from the Baltic to the Car- pathians. In that huge line the Thorn-Vistula region was not much above the Russian centre. But for pm-poses of narration it is necessary to divide this great field into sections and to treat the operations in East Prussia, in Poland, and in Galicia respectively, as separate campaigns, though they were in truth interdependent, a thrust in one quarter when parrieyl being replied to by a covinter-tlirust in another. At the present moment it was in the southern area that, after the last futile attempt on War- saw, the i^eril of Russian invasion of Gern^an territory looked most imminent. Here on what is generally called the Czestochowa-Cracow line, and beyond in Galicia, the chief Russian troops were massed. And the shadow of these troops almost overhung the rich industrial districts of Silesia. At the same time, so long as Przemysl held out and Cracow stood firm, serious Russian advance on this line by the valley of the Oder was obviously difficult. From Cracow north to Czestochowa, again, the <jrerman defensive position was very strong. Rough, broken ground lent itself to defence, and, as a Russian official communique frankly remarked, in the four months since the begin- ning of the war the Germans had been able to '■ fortifj'^ it in extraordinary strength."' The danger to Silesia, then, was less immediate than at first sight it might have looked. None the less, it had, if possible, to be removed. But against the great Russian strength in this quarter it was obviously better that the Germans should confine themselves here more or less to defensive action behind their formidable defences and deliver their blow against the more vulnerable part of the Russian Une further north. A success there would just as sui'ely compel withdra^\•al on the Czestochowa-Cracow line as if it had actually been achieved on that line. It was, it will be remembered, then, from Thorn towards Wloclawek that the first German offensive had been " noticed " on November 14. This offensive was pushed with great violence along the left side of the Vistula and by the railway line towards Kutno and Lowicz. On this immediate front the Russians do not appear to have had more than tliree army corps, and the CJerman advance soon assumed the character of another and more determined thrust at Warsaw. Tliis was obviously sound strategy. The capture of Warsaw itself, after the recent failure, would have been a triumph of the first magnitude, while, at the least, it was calculated, a serious threat to it would, as we have seen, compel the THE ROLL CALL. 350 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. withdrawal for its defence of a large part of the Ilussian forces in the south, with a resultant relieving of the pressure on Cracow. The comparatively small Russian strength in this region between the Vistula and the Warta, west of the Bzura, could ofTer no effec- tive resistance to such weight as the Germans threw upon it. So rapid was the German advance that by November 16 it had already, from its base from Thorn to Wreschen, reached a line from Plock to Leczica on the upper Bzura, some 50 miles inside the frontier, and about half way to Warsaw. Under von Hindenburg, the force Wiis divided into two armies — the left or northern one being com- manded by General von Morgan, tlie right by General von Mackensen. On November 15-16 tlie Russians, in spite of their inl'eriority in numbers, had ^'entured a delaying action against von Morgen in the neighbourhood of Kutno. They were, of course, driven back, and General von Hindenburg announced the RUSSIAN NATIONAL DANCE. result as a great victory, claiming to have taken 28,000 Russian prisoners. The news was received with enthusiasm in Berlin, and von i^Iindonburg was rewarded by being made * Field-Marshal. On the following day MackerLsen".s right successfully engaged a Russian force between Dubie and Leczica, driving it north-westward along the Bzm'a towards Lowicz. Pressing on the left flank of this force in its retirement, the Germans opened a gap in the Russian lines, into which they drove a wedge between Stry- kow and Zgierz. If they could make the penetration of the Russian line at this point effective, and could pour troops through it in any strength, the Germans believed that tliey had the game — and Warsaw — in their hands. According to the German official report, issued in January, 1915, it "now looked as if what had been originally undertaken merely as a counter-offensive movement to relieve the strain on Cracow, might be converted into a great success." New troops were therefore, it is declared, hurried up from Breslau. It is, however, as frequently, only possible to accept this version of the events with certain modifica- tions. It is true that at this moment the Germans were flushed with enthusiasni and full of tlie highest hopes. Disappointment at the earlier Russian successes had been intense, and the relief at what looked like von Hindenburg's triumph was so great that Berlin, decorated and wild with joy, was already speaking in exaggerated terms of the defeat of the whole Russian armies. But the present movement had no more been vmdertaken as a mere in- definite counter-offensive for the purpose of threatening the Russian left on the south, tlian the earlier attempt on Warsaw had- been a "reconnaissance." Its very formidable character had been apparent from the begin- ning. The victory of Kutno was no such great matter as the Germans claimed, and much happened, which is slurred over in the German report, between it and the penetration of the Russian line. After the affair at Kutno the Russians fell back upon the line of the Bzura. The Bzura itself is a small stream, but its banks are bordered for a large part of its length with wide marshes, which form a most formidable- obstacle to an advancing army. Against this obstacle the German progress, hitherto so rapid, was definitely held up. Time to bring THE TIMES HISTCRY OF THE WAR. 351 AN AUSTRIAN ENCAMPMENT IN THE CARPATHIANS. up reinforceinents to this part of their Hne was of the greatest importance to the Russians. On November 18 fighting was in progress around Lodz ; on the 20th. between Lowicz and Skiemiewice. On the 23rd the Russians claimed something of a success in the neighbourhood of Strykow, and from that date to the end of the month the Germans gained no advantage. The Russian armies here had by this time been heavUy reinforced, not by weakening the armies in the south, but by bringing up new troops from the east. According to German versions, considerable forces were also thrown across the Vistula from the right bank between Novo Georgievsk and Plock. At all events, after covering the first 50 miles of his advance in three days, in the following fortnight von Hindenburg beat in v.ain against the Russian line along the Bzura and to and beyond Lodz. During all this fortnight fighting was of the most stubborn and desperate character. The Russian official announcements recorded the fact from day to day. On November 26 there was " some advantage to our troops." On November 27 the action " continues to develop favourably." On other days there was " no change " or " nothing important to report." What was, however, of the utmost importance was that the Germans were not progressing. On the last day of the month the fighting was still " extremely stubborn." The triumphant German predictions following on the incident of the penetration of the Russian line between Strykow and Zgierz were by no means being fulfilled. It is necessary to explain what had happened at that point. The German troops which operated at Strykow and Zgierz seem to have come from two directions. One body had forced the crossing of the Bzura marshes at Piontek ; another appears to have crossed the Bzura, beyond the limit of the marshes, east of Leczica. At all events the German official statement spoke of their armies advancing " on both sides " of that place. Between Zgierz and Strykow two army corps with some extra units — probably 100,000 men in all — forced their way north-east of Lodz as far as Brze- ziny. If the penetrating force had been in such definitely superior strength as to be able to crumple back the enemy's line to the north- ward, the coup might have been of almost decisive importance. But Russian reinforce- ments were by this time arriving, coming by the railway from Warsaw, and by the time the thrusting corps had reached Brzeziny the 352 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ENTRANCE TO AN AUSTRIAN ENCAMPMENT. "Russian line had been so strengthened that it was able to close in on their rear. Later German troops, hurrying after the advance force, had their hands full in warding off Russian attacks from both sides, and it looked for two or three days as if the two isolated corps would be compelled to surrender or be annihilated. As a matter of fact, the Russian line behind them was not held in equal strength at all points, and they, or their shattered remnants, were able to force their way back. These two corps seem to have had terrible experiences in their endeavours to find a way of retreat. Roughly handled around Brzeziny, the force seems to have been broken up and fragments were described as roaming the frozen and desolated land " like a pack of hungry wolves." The greater part of those which escaped appear to have made their way northward by Bielawy and Sobota, between whicli places they were attacked by a Riissian force and again severely mauled. Ultimately, of about 100,000 men, something like 40,000 seem to have got back. Among them was the remnant of a regiment of the Prussian Guards. Besides the killed and wounded tho Russians took many prisoners. It is known that 5,000 were taken one day and 6,000 on the next. A few days later \\'arsaw \\as full of German prisoners, and apparently the two corps lost almost all their guns. The news of the catas trophe, even in the modified form in which it was permitted to the public to know of it, brought great depression in Berlin, where a comjjlete and brilliant victory by Field-Marshal von Hindenbiu'g had been confidently antici- pated. In importance, as in the numbers lost, it much ovitweighed the German success at Kutno. Both, however, were only incidents of the struggle on this front which went on unc^easingly and on a gigantic scale, and the issue of which was by the end of November definitely turning in favour of Russia. While these tilings had been going on in the region from the Vistula to Lodz, fighting had also been in progress farther south. In support of the armies advancing on Warsaw, other German armies had pushed forward along the railway from Kalisch by Sieradz towards Lask and from Wielun towards Piotrkow ; and the montli of December opened with an extra- ordinaril}' confused situation along the whole front. It was well described at the time as being less like one continuous action than " a series of more or less simultaneously proceeding independent battles," in which fortune veered from side to side. Retreats at one point were counter-balanced by advances at another, and at many places, in the course of isolated combats, troops from either side pushed far ahead of their general line and were fighting in the rear of the enemy on either side of them. It is believed that duriiig this period the German armies were reinforced by more corps transferred from the Western front. It would be useless to unravel and follow up each thread in all the tangled skein. The incident which stood out most conspicuously from the txirmoil in the early part of December was the occupation by the Germans on the 6th of the month of Lodz, of which they had not had possession since their hunting had been interrupted there in October. Lodz was a town of considerable commercial importance, the " Manchester of Poland." Since the beginning of the nineteenth century it had sprung from a village of a couple of hundred inhabitants to a manufacturing and commercial centre with a population of nearly half a million. Occupied and reoccupied as it had been since the begin- ning of the war, with battles raging around it for weeks together, Lodz had suffered terribly and become only a shadow of its usual busy self. Much the larger part of the population had fled THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 353 THE WAR IN POLAND. 1. Russian prisoners being marched through Lodz. 2. A wrecked village. 3. Sacks of flour burned by the Germans before their flight— two Russian soldiers on the left. 4. German field post oflice at Lodz. 5. A destroyed frontier station. 354 THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND GERMAN OUTPOSTS. to Warsaw, and those who remained had suffered serious privations, food being abnost unobtainable. The Germans celebrated the capture of Lodz as a great triumph, and claimed that they had taken a large number of prisoners and war booty. The Russians asserted that its evacua- tion had only been a strategic move to enable them to take up a shorter and more advan- tageoas hne and categorically declared that they " did not lose a single man " in the operation. It was even asserted that for fifteen hours the Germans shelled empty trenches from which the enemv* had retired on the preceding day. The truth undoubtedly is that the Russians would not have given the place up, if only for its moral effect, unless they had been obhged to do so. Its surrender was a reverse, and the Germans were justified in claiming the acquisition of it as a success of some importance. At the same time, it had become very embarrassing to the Russian campaign. Its defence occupied a large nimabor of troops and it constituted a costly saUent in a line which was a good deal stronger after it had been abandoned. There is, moreover, little doubt, from the narratives of individual Russian officers engaged in the operation, that THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 355 the Russian official statement as to the de- Uberate nature of the retirement, the reluctance of the Germans to advance, and the freedom from casualties was substantially acciirate. But the Germans needed whatever comfort could be drawn from the incident. It was known that they had promised themselves to spend their Clu'istmas in Warsaw ; but it was plain by now that the attempt to reach Warsaw had failed. Ner had they succeeded in compelling the Russians to withdraw any material portion of th.e armies which threatened Cracov\', either in Southern Poland or in Galicia. If von Hinden- burg's offensive had attained any object it may have been the prevention of an invasion of Silesia. But it is questionable whether that could not have been as effectively prevented, at less expense in German lives and with heavier loss to the enemy, by awaiting attack along the frontier. The course of the campaign had clearly shown how rapidly the German advance lost its momentum as it drew farther into Poland and farther away from its railways. On the other hand, every mile that the enemy advanced eastward made the Russian problems of reinforcement and supply less difiticult. About the middle of December the German attacks appreciably decrea.sed in violence. Much stubborn fighting still went on, as on the 1 5th and 1 6th of the month, about Sochacze\v. A few days later some bodies of German troops succeeded in crossing the Bzura, but were beaten back or wiped out. About the 22nd and 23rd there was heavy fighting about Piotrkow, and also near Bolimow, between Lowicz and Skierniewice. But this was ground which the Germans had reached a month earlier, without being able to get any farther. Early in December the Germans attempted a diversion by a wide flanking movement from East Prussia, directed against Warsaw from the north, which, however, though a part of this general conflict, belongs geographically to the narrative of events in that region. It was, though dashingly pushed, not made with any great strength, and was easily mot and beaten back by the Russians. The last v\eek of the year saw little of any importance in this region. Between Decem- ber 20 and 25 the Russian hne, as a whole, fell back a little, not so much under pressure as for the purpose of taking up a better position on a straighter front. Both sides were then content to dig and entrench themselves along a line which ran from the Vistula along the Bzura and Rawka to Tomaszow. Thence sonth- \\'ard confused fighting continued along the Pilitsa to the neighbourhood of Xovo-Radomsk, and thence along the Nida, where in the last days of the year the Russians claimed some minor successes with the capture of consider- able numbers of prisoners. Once more we must pick up the thread of ^:- RUSSIAN AMBULANCE AND TRANSPORT IN POLAND. 856 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. RUSSIAN PRISONERS TAKEN IN EAST PRUSSIA events in the Galician theatre, where we saw how the Russians, at the beginning of Novem- ber, after sviccessfnlly resisting all e-.^orts of the Austrians to force a crossing of the San, had themselves broken across the river and driven the enemy westward. In this final battle on the San it was claimed that they took 12,000 Austrian prisoners with 120 ofificers. The Austrians seem to have fallen back in great disorder, and contemporary reports declared that they were lacking in both food and amniunition, and that they suffered serious ravages from cholera. Once more the tide swept past Przemysl, which, again, and finally, as it was to prove, became completely invested. By November 13 the Russian advance cavalry, following on the heels of the enemy, was within thirteen miles of Cracow, which was now practically invested on two sides. It was on this and the following clays, it will be remem- bered, that the German offensive had begun to make itself felt from Thorn. We have seen, however, that the Russians did not withdraw any of their strength from their southern front to oppose the German advance. The pressure on Cracow, instead of loosening, increased. By the beginning of December Russian troops were within eight miles of Cra- cow, and on the -Ith of the month it was announced that they had occupied Wieliczka, and were within three and a half miles of the outer fortifications. On the same da\' Russian cavalry was reported, on the other side of the Carpathians, to be raiding Hungarian territory as far as Bartfeld, 20 miles over the border. In this advance towards Cracow, although the Austrians were more or less completely demoralised, the Russians had formidable defensive positions to carry besides the succes- sive rivers to cross. All the operations seem to have been performed with impetuous gallantry. The resistance naturally increased as the fighting swept w-estward. Bochnia. strongly fortified, had to be carried by assault, and the Russians claim to have taken 2,000 prisoners with ten guns and many machine guns. The Raba river had to be crossed by a ford in the face of the eneniy's fire, through ice- floes and bitterly cold water up to the neck- At ^^'ieliczka trenches and barbed wire en- tanglements were rushed with the bayonet when the temperattire was below zero. At the end of such experiences, the Russian General Staff was able to say that " the moral of our troops, seasoned by fortj^-five days of almost continuous fighting, is, according to the report^! of army commanders, of the highest order." THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 357 At this rrioment the safety«of^racow seemed seriously threatened. Tliroughout the war, both in the East and West, the characteristics of German strategy had been the resourcefulness and vigour of its counter-attacks ; even if that resourcefulness itself was of a somewhat stereotyped character. A rebuff in one quarter was immediately countered by an attack, as swift as possible, in another, generally delivered at the remotest point on one or other flanlc at wliich it could be delivered without becoming . ineffective as a retort. Von Hindenburg proved himself so adept at this particular manoeuvre that he gave it an individual character, stamped with his particular genius. To reUeve the pressure on Cracow and Silesia we have seen how he struck at once for Warsaw along the very banks of the Vistula, and when that attack began to spend itself he had even tried to swing round from farther north and reach Warsaw from East Prussia. So now, when the danger to Cracow grew imminent, he struck again,