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The Times HISTORY OF THE WAR Vol. VIII

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE. 

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES"

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON. 

1916


CONTENTS OF VOL. VIII. 



PAGE 

CHAPTER CXXIII. 
The Battle of Verdl'x (I.) . . .. ,. .. .. .. ., ,. 1 

CHAPTER CXXIV. 

British Ad ministration ix War Time . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 

CHAPTER CXXV. 

The Battle of Verdun (II.) .. .. ., .. .. .. .. .. 77 

CHAPTER CXXVI. 

The Adoption of Compulsory Military Service .. .. .. .. ..117 

CHAPTER CXXVII. 
The Germans in Russian Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 

CHAPTER CXXVIII. 
German Atb Raids: February to May, 1910 .. .. .. .. .. 174 

CHAPTER CXXIX. 
Russia at Wab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 

CHAPTER CXXX. 
The Conquest of German South-West Africa . . . . . . . . . . 233 

CHAPTER CXXXI. 
The Conquest op Cameroon and Togoland . . . . . . . . 273 

CHAPTER CXXXII. 
The Churches and the Armies . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 313 

CHAPTER CXXXIII. 
The EIxriERMi nation of the Ar.menians . . . . . . 363 

CHAPTER CXXXIV. 
The Irish Rebellion of April, 1916 (I.) .. .. .. .. .. 393 

CHAPTER CXXXV. 
The Frisii Re.';.':lmon of April, I'JIO (II.) .. .. .. .. .. .. 433 

CHAI'TEJi CXXXVI. 
The Wehti:kn Ikont i>i king tiik I'mttli; or Verdi;n ,. .. .. .. 473 



CHAPTER CXXIII. 

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN (I). 

Motives of the German Offensive at Verdun — The Winter Preparations — Position of 
THE Cbown Prince — Description of the French Salient — The Prei.iminary Bombardment 
— The Infantry Attack on February 21 — Analysis of the German Gains — How the French 
Checked the Advance — Result of the Operations, February 21 to February 24 — The 
French Motor Transport and what it Achieved — The Bombardment of the Town of Verdun 
— The German Strength and Order of Battle — General P^tain takes over the Veirdun 
Command — His Career and Personality — The Attack on Fort Douaumont — German 
Official Reports and Fictitious Claims — Lord Northcliffe's Dispatch to The Times — 
French Confidence. 



AX enthusiastic German siirvey of the 
war, at the beginning of 1916, would 
have shown that German arms had 
nearly everj'where dealt the enemy 
" hea\-y blows." Hindenburg and Mackcnsen 
had marched from province to province, from 
victory to victory, overwhelming the badly 
equipped but stubborn Russians. In the 
West the *' steel barrier " had held firm against 
the shrewd thru-sts made at it in Artois and 
in Champagne. The Italians were held along 
Austria's mountam frontier. The belated 
efforts of the Allies to come to the assistance 
of SerVjia had proved unavailing, and anf>ther 
Bmall people lay crushed. 

But, viewwl through less partial spectacles, 
there were disquieting elements. Just as the 
little nations of the war had refused to bow to 
Oermany and had continued the struggle, so 
the bi^ nations had ever denied complete 
a/;hievfrinent U) the Central Powers. As they 
ha/J faile^i at the gat*;s of Paris, and along tho 
Calais roa*], so ha^l thr;y failed in Prussia and in 
wjuth-ea«t*;m pyurope to push success to its final 
con'rinHJon. 

HucceMM but no dfi^^ision sums up German 
achievements in the first eighteen months of 
war. And on tlie horizon tho storm still 
gathered. The xmoke of war factories grow 
Vol. VIII.— Part 92. 



thicker and thicker over the lands of Germany's 
enemies. The khaki patch over the fields of 
Northern France was spreading steadily. The 
equipment of the Russ-ian armies was pro- 
ceeding. In every country of the alliance tho 
spirit of the first few months of war remained 
unshakable. 

Faihure had attended all efforts to sow dis- 
cord between them. Co-ordination was takin<T 
the place of isolated thought and action. 
German foreign trade lay dead, and tlio great 
Hansa ports were idle. Throughout the world 
the exchange value of the mark was falling. If 
internal troubles were rare and unimportant, 
the tinder for a conflagration lay plentifully to 
hand in the increasing cost of food, the extension 
of the rationing system, and in tlio lengthening 
casualty lists. 

Decision was becoming more and more ur- 
gently necessary. Limited success could no 
longer suffice, and victory to be complete had 
to bo won over tlie chi<'f land opponent and upon 
tho decisive WcHtern front. 

'F'ho first pre/jurntions ior u big Gernmn 
offensive in the West appear to luivo be(;n 
bfgun immediately after tho cheek of the gr(!at 
Vr<ni\\ atta<;k in Champagne in Sopk-ihber 
and October, 1915. Tho choice of Vordua as 
an ohjf;ctivo was dictated in tho main by 



2 



THE TJMF!^ IIISiTOHY OF TUK WATi. 




GENERAL HENRI PHILIPPE PETAIN, 
Who took over the command at Verdun after the first German assault. 



military considerations. Verdun, it was true, 
constituted a position of great strength. But 
German strategj' had a forceful logic wliich 
drove it to seek out the enemy's strength and 
to strike at it with the niaximimi of vigour. 
The maximum of effort had to produce the 
maximiun of result. The Germans were witliin 
ten miles of their objective. The position to be 
attacked formed a salient, the defenders of 
which had to fight with their backs to the 
Meuse and with their main line of railway com- 
munication cut by the German heavy artillery. 
In addition to the maximum of military 
result, the German Gteneral Staff also sought the 
maximum of moral effect both in Germany and 
throughout the rest of the world. The old 
glamour of the word " fortress " hung about 
the Meuse town. It was the key to Paris. It 
was known throughout Europe as the Eastern 
Gate of France, and by other names which 
luider the new conditions of war had lost their 
appropriateness. The Germans might have 
selected Soissons or Arras for attack, but there 
victory would have failed to create the same 



effect as would have been caused by the fall 
of " the Feslung Verdun " upon the spirits 
of the German and French peoples, and upon 
the general atmosphere of the Allied Conferences 
which were expected to assemble in Paris to 
discuss plans for a co-ordinated summer cam- 
paign. There was a fm-ther reason which may 
well have contributed to the decision of the 
German General Staff. Warlike success or mili- 
tary reputation was ever a necessity to the 
Hohenzollerns. Never was this more so than 
in this war — the " great adventure " of the 
German military spirit. Examination of the 
German commands show to how great an 
extent dynastic considerations were taken 
into account. On the outbreak of war the 
future ruler of Imperial Germany had re- 
ceived a command commensiu-ate with his rank 
if superior to his military record and experience. 
But even with the cotihsel and support of the 
veteran Field -Marshal von Haescler, and a staff 
comprising the best military brains of the 
empire, fortune had not imduly favoured his 
arms. Checked during the rush to Paris by the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



stubborn defence of Longwy, checked again in 
his furious endeavour to batter tlirough the 
Fort de Troy on in the closing days of the 
battle of the jNIarne, held by many to be respon- 
sible for the puzzling featiu-es of German 
strategy before the battle of the Marne, the 
German Crown Prince had led his men from one 
iisappointment to another. In the Allied 
camp there was, however, a tendency to attach 
too much importance to tliis series of set-backs. 
It was readily overlooked that while the Crown 
Prince had nowhere triumphed, he had also 
nowhere been routed. It was generally for- 
gotten, moreover, by the public in France and 
in Great Britain, that he was surrounded by 
advisers who made up for his deficiency in 
knowledge of the art of war. It was not suffi- 
ciently realized that the mUitary and djniastic 
interest which had allotted to the Prince his 
chance of glory had also seen to it that his 
chance should be as great as possible. In 
consequence his army, in addition to being the 



best staffed, was in many respGcts the best 
disciplined and the best equipped of the forces 
operating on the Western front. 

The preparations for the smashing of French 
military power occupied the opening months of 
the year. The task before the enemy was 
arduous. The Crown Prince surveyed a battle- 
field presenting uncommon difficulties as well as 
uncommon advantages. 

In the Verdun area, as elsewhere in the West, 
the front had solidified through chance and the 
small profits of trench war into an irregular 
line such as would be seldom selected or 
imposed by tactics or strategy. General 
Sarrail, who first commanded the army 
operating around Verdun, was the first 
General to whom the fortiuie of the fighting had 
given time to learn and profit by the fate which 
had overtaken the great fortresses of Liege, 
Namur, and Antwerp. In November, 1914, 
General Sarrail, speaking to the Paris corre- 




(;ENKRAI, Pf'.TAIN (centre) WAI.KINr; WIIH (;F.NF.KAI. JOMKF, (on left). 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



spondent of The Times, who was then visiting 
the IVIeuse front, said. " Fortresses are built to 
be taken and ' ville assiegee, villo prise ' is an 
old military niaxim which events have brought 
thoroughly uji to date." 

The General determined to give the Germans 
as little chance as possible of besieging Verdun 
in the old strict sense of the word. Little by 
httle, without any great offensive, he gradually 
pushed the German lines farther and farther 
away from the fortification system of the city. 
The result was that when the German offensive 
was launched at the beginning of 1916 the line 
of the French salient on the east bank of the 
Mease was based upon Brabant, Consenvoye, 
Haumont. Bois des Caures, Bois de Wavrille, 
Herbebois, Ornes, Maucourt, Mogeville, Braux 




FRENCH TRO(JPS WORKING A SMALL 
BOMB-THROWING MORTAR. 

Lake, Haute Charriere Wood, Fresnes en 
Wfwjvre, I^s Eparges and the neighl)Ourho(jd 
of St. Mihiel. In tliis large salient the French 
had turned to az-count the first lessoni of the 
war, and aimies of rnf,'n had toiled for months 
rrrmofJelling the system of defence of Verdun, the 
whole region of which hafi hcAiQxn'; an exhibit if n 
of every kind of fortification, fr< in the moats 
and battif rnf-nts of the town itself to tfic l(ifr-,t 
erecti'>n.H in thf; way <>i enrth and tren<h w(jrk. 
The front upon which the first fury of the 
Gerrnin ofleasive hrok*- wa< tfie northern sectf.r 
of th'! hne in the Iffiut-i de Meiis*;, a region <>\ 
roiUn'; hjlln an I tortuous valleys, which ofTenid 
j^eat diflifMjIties to both siflcs. Tliere werf) 
n-iifi'TOtiH poHJtirjnH from which the rival artiilrv 
rieH v,f<T*- able to enfihule nny rnf>v»rnf;ntH of 



troops. Countlo.-is wore the opportunities of 
sur[)rLse,of encircling, and of cuttmg expeditions. 
The splendid observation posts to bo found at 
othor places along the line — on the Aisne for 
instance — whence Generals were able to survey 
the whole of the front of their Army at a glance, 
were here entirely lacking. The barriers of 
wooded hillside which cut up the country, im- 
peding any large survov of the operations as a 
w hole, served as the real fortifications of the city, 
and the forts themselves ceased to possess the 
special significance of forts and became but 
specially strong points in the extended nctw ork 
of trench defence. 

The German preparations for their onslaught 
upon this very strong position were on a very 
largo scale. The magnitude of preparation, 
indeed, quite defeated any possibility of sur- 
prise. The German Emperor arrived at Meisieres 
to watch the progress of the work. The ap- 
pearance of at least thirteen new divisions upon 
the Western front, the removal from the front 
line of German army corps for rest and refitting, 
the bringing up of the 1916 class of conscripts to 
the Western front, the completion of units along 
the line, were definite shadows of coming events. 
In December, 1915, the Germans brought up 
the greater portion of their heavy artillery 
frcm Serbia as well as seme of the largo guns 
V. iiich had been used with such effect upon the 
Russian front. Traction material, Austrian 
12-inch howitzers, and several 17 -inch howitzers 
came in to strengthen the weight of the German 
gunfire. The final preparations were carried 
out under cover of great offensive activity along 
the whole of the W^estern front. There were 
" feeling " attacks in Champagne, along the 
coast, in Flanders, in Artois, on the Somme, 
the Aisne, the Moselle, and in Alsace. Those 
attiicks deceived no one on the aliicMJ si(l(>. 
They revealed no great strategic intention. 
They rtmainod local and wore mot with local 
ffjrces, the main rescsrvos of th<! French remain- 
ing at the free disposal of the Higher Command 
ready to be moved when the exact spot upon 
which the great effort of the enemy was to be 
iruvie became clear. 

I'oints of rcHrinblanco between the Cluirn- 
y)agnc of'fcnsivr! of tlm Fn^rich and the; grc^at G;t- 
mari onslaught on Verdun are many. The first 
similarity between these two gnuit battles was, 
however, due entirely t(( the iiormil (iovol()|)- 
merit of the modern biitlN^ in which aerialfij^ht- 
ing precedes intense cannonade. The aerial 
offensive f)f th<! (ionnans was aiitiounced on 




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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



February 21 and its results were of good omen 
for the future. All around the Verdun 
salient the enemy air services were active in 
attempting to interfere with the Verdun com- 
munications by heavy aerial bombardment of 
important railway and supply centres. The 
most persistent of these attacks was directed 
against the station of Revigny, one of the many 
towns in the eastern ^larne which bore traces 
of the Crown Prince's i:>assage after the battle 
of the Marne. In the neighbourhood of Revigny 
a squadron of 15 enemy machines was brought 
to a fight by the French and considerable 
damage was done to the raiders before they had 
had much opportunity of effecting their purpose. 
Here later in the day the French scored their 
fiist success in what was about to become the 
battle of Verdun when a motor gun crew brought 
down a Zeppelin in flames near Brabant le Roi 
and forced a sister ship to turn tail and return 
to harbour. 

After the preliminary air skirmishing, as in 
tlie battle of the Champagne, the artillery got 
to work. Along the whole Ime of the threatened 
front — at 7. 1.5 on the morning of February 21 — 
the storm burst with unexampled fury. The 
enemy had scientifically considered the results 
of the French attack in Champagne. They 
had seen that, with the expenditure of so 
many million shells on a front so many miles 
long with such and .such density of attacking 
troops, the French had failed to pierce through 
the whole of their defensive system. They, 
therefore, decided to increase all the factors 
of success. By employing a still larger number 
of guns anfl men upon a smaller front the 
intensity of the atta/^^k was increased enor- 
mously. It became possible to reduce the period 
of preparatory bombardment, and thus deprive 
the enemy of the chance of bringing up reserves. 
The concentration of Gorman artillery of every 
pf/HHihUi calibre upon the Verdun front was 
such that the French aerial observers abandoned 
the task of noting the exact f>osition of each 
battery upon their maps, whole districts, such 
as the Forest of Hpincourt and the Oremilly 
\\'()f,fl, having been converted into empln/tem'-nts 
of art,illery in a^;tion. The front to be attacked 
was Hysternatieally flooded with hi^h r;x|)lo.'<ive, 
tear and suffocating gas shells. One /.ouf in 
th'- neighbourhood of the Jlerbebois V\'oo(l, 
about thrf;e-fjUHrt*;rs of a square mile in ext<;nt, 
was W) H<^;ientifically treated by the Gemian artil- 
I'-ry that at the '!nd of a b'>rrib(irdm';nt of sorri" 



hours the whole region re.sembled a field the 
soil of which had been turned by some new kind 
of agricultural machine. A veil of smoke; and 
dust floated over the battlefield. After an 
hour's bombardment the first line of the 
French was practically isolated. All tele- 
phone communications had been cut, and 
Unison had to be attempted by means of 
runners. An eye-witness describing the Verdun 
bombardments wrote : 

Without ceasing shells of every calibre are hin.sting 
around, us with tremendous hubbub, and the air is torn 
\vith incessant explosions. Thousands of projectiles 
are flying in every direction, some vvhistlinj^, others 
howling, others naoaning low, and all this whistling, 
howling, and moaning unites in one infernal roar. From 
time to time an aerial torpedo passes making a noise like 
that of a gigantic rattling motor car. All these missiles of 
destruction flying over a fairly wide area burst one upon 
the other, so dense is the fire. Shell fragments fly on 
every side from the cloud of smoke and earth which 
soon becomes so persistent that it finally covers the 
earth like a thick fog. With a tremendous thud a 
giant shell bursts quite close to our observation post, 
breaking the telephone wires and interrupting all com- 
muiiifation %vith our batteries. A man gets out at once 
for repairs, crawling along on his bellj' through all 
this place of bursting mines and shells. It seems quite 
impossible that he should escape from the rain of shell 
which is falling with disquieting rapidity. The enemy's 
shell expenditure exceeds anything imaginable. There 
has never been such a bombardment in war before. 
Our man seems to be enveloped in explosives and 
shelters himself from time to time in the shell craters 
which lie thick upon the ground one upon the other. 
He finally reaches a loss stormy spot, mends up his wires, 
and, as it would be madness to try to return to cover, he 
settles down into a big shell crater, and waits for the 
storm to pass. 

Under this tremendous fire the first line and 
large portions of the supporting lines of French 
trench disappeared, and a mass of tumbled 
earth took their places. The woods in the 
first line of the French defences were splintered 
and shattered as though some wild tornado 
liiid swept down upon them. Great trees were 
uprooted and rent and the woods became filled 
with an undergrowth of splinters and debris. 
The French in their defensive organization of 
the woods had availed themselves to tlu) full 
of the barbed wire protection to be obtained 
l>y stringing wire from tree to tree and froin 
})ush to bush. As the bombardrnf^nt continued 
even this defence was destroyetl. Tlx; moral 
t)f the min never weakened, and using the 
material provided for them by the rain of 
de.struction around tlieni, they were busied 
tlirfiugh even the worst of the bombanlmt^nt 
in reorganizing th('ir positions, makifig chevmue 
d". f rises out of llus broken fimbcT, turning the 
largo shell cratr-rs into entrendinK^nts, Und 
g(!tting ready for the waves of men which they 
knew were to follow. 



THE TIMES IIIsrORY OF THE WAE. 



The boiiihui-iliiiitiit right aioii^ t)ui hu« reat-ht);! 
it.s cuhiiiiiiitiitK fxiirit htttuoeu two tind four 
o'c-loik in tluiut'turtioou, u htMi tloatiii^ over thu 
(ieiiaan lines to reguiuto the tire ot° their guiiH 
Mere tio lens than six captive hallooiLS. Meaii' 
while the Freru-h artillery was busy in n^ply, 
directing most of its tire upon the Forest of 
Spincourt, where the bulk of the German guns 
were missed, and endeiivouring by barragt* fire 
to imj)ede the launching of the (itrnim 
infantry attack. At five o'clock the (Jermui 
guns lengtheneil their fire, and along the lino 
the infantry advancetl in «nall detachmnnts to 
what hatl once been the French first defence 
trenches. They had been prepareil for great 
events I'nder the eye of the great War Lord 
tiiey had reiiearsed their victories. They had 
been toM by their Generals in Army Orders 
that the battle upon which they were entering 
was " the last offensive against the French." 
On both sides liopes were high that at last the 
decisive moment harl come. 

The front attacked in this first day of the 
battle is sufliciently indicated by the tluee 
woDiLs which stretch north of Verdun from 
Brabant to Ornes — the Haumont Wood, Bois 
des Caures and Herbebois. These were the 
three great centres of French resistance. Upon 



these woods all the fury of the Oermnn artillery 
fire hatl been directetl. The (lernian tactics in 
this «i|)ening stage of the battle consisted in 
overwhelming these <r<^ntres of r(<sistance with 
heavy calibre high-explosive shill, destroying 
tlugouts and nrrichine-gun positions, and at 
the same time surrounding them with such 
heavy barrier fire as to make it impossible for 
supports either of men or of nninitions to bo 
sent up to their a.ssistance. Once the work of 
destruction had been effected the infantry 
advance began. Tlie id<^a of tlie enemy 
was that the artillery could obliterate the 
defence, and the infantry could then advance 
after reconnaissance to occupy the position. 
Each wave of ififantry was preceded by a 
reconnoitring detachment, composed of 15 
mm, behind which camo grenadiers and 
sappers. Advancing in accordance with thi.s 
plan, the (Micmy soon got a footing at many 
points in the French line and gradually sought 
to flood out the defenders. 

Everywhere they mot with a defence 
\\ eakencd by the ravages of the bombardment, 
but nevertheless determined to delay and 
worry the enemy as long and as much as pos- 
sible. By nightfall the results of the first day's 
offensive were unimportant. Tlie Germans 




A SINGLE-BARRELLED REVOLVER-CANNON. 
Employed by the French at Verdun for trench work. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 




EFFECT OF FRENCH GRENADES. 
Bursting in front of a German trench. 

had got into the first line and had at several fringe of the position 
points got as far as the French support trenches. 
The course of events can best be described 
by following the episodes of the battle section 
by section. 



In the Bois D'Haumont, which constituted 
the left of the French position, the defence put 
up was particularly vigorous. The check 
administered by a few determined men to the 
German advance was of inestimable advantage 
•o the defence of the rest of the line, enabling 
an it did the French to bring up their reserves. 

The Germans had quickly realized that in 
Bois D'Haumont they had to meet particularly 
Htrong rf!Mistance, and the position received 
HfH'cial attention at the hands of the fir;rrnan 
gnnners, who covererl every passage, every 
ravine, every clearing in the wfHxi thrmigh 
which reinforcements and supplies might be 
moving. Unrler the violence of this bombard- 
ment the P'rench lin<« gradually crumbled 
away, anrJ towards six in the evening the enen\y 
wan f;rf*"f<ing into the wofxl. In spitf; of a 
de«pf?rate resistance, in spite of many isolated 
fights in which the flefmders gained a momen- 
tary a/lvantage, the Gcrinins then " filtererl " 
into the wxni in ever growing ninnb<Ts, and by 
eight o'c|fK;k th»'y hud n-m-hcd the southern 



The French in the 
course of the night endeavoured, following their 
classic tactics, to deliver a counter-attack 
The spring was broken, however, and under the 
constant hail of shell which was maintained 
throughout the night any offensive operations 
on the part of the defenders were quite out of 
the question. 

At dawn on February 22 the French, who had 
decided to make a last stand in the village of 
Haurnont, could find no comfort in their 
situation. No supplies were able to reach them 
through the shell-swept commimications. They 
were without news either fr( m the rear' or from 
the troops on their flanks. The artillery posted 
in the woods and on tlu^ crest around was in 
the same position. The history of one battery 
engaged in this region is typical of the adven- 
tures of the artillery right along the front in 
these first few days of the Geimm drive at 
\'rrduri. 

" Our t.'rf)iip of guns," said an ofTi<;er, in 
nlntiiig lii-i share in the fighting, " was south- 
cfisf of Hamnont wood wh(!n the fight began. 
One battery had scattered its guns oast of 
Maumont and south ntid nortli of Samogneiix. 
The two otiicr bnttr-riffs were farther south, 
Hupportefl by a batUtry of 90's. We naturally 
r<'f)li<d to Gciiiiiiri infantry attiu-k by bnrnige 



lU 



THE TIMES HISTORY ()E THE 



WAR. 



ftr« in oriler to prevent thw enemy from reacliiag 
our lines. One of our sectioiM went forward to 
an rtilvunc-etl potiitiun in thu Kavinu den Caiire.s, 
ami opened tire at almoHt poi-nt-biaulc rungt*. 
lint thu (iermaiu^, ia 8[)ite of trentendouis 
Kacrihces. Megan to flow in everywhere. They 
got into the Uo'ia ilea Caiires along the crests 
Detween the Bois il'Hatunont and the Bois des 
Caiirea and carried our positions one after the 
other. This section shorteneil its tire as the 
enemy advanced, mowing the Ciermans down 
in their ranks. It was all no good. A fresh 
wave at once took the place of that destroyed 
and the advance contmued. This section of 




A FRENCH SAPPER WORKING IN A 
MINE GALLERY. 

gims was blazing away when detachments of 
the enemy which had managed to get into the 
Bois d'Hamnont made their appearance in 
the rear of om* men. The gunners, having 
fired away all theii' shells, blew up their guns 
and retired. A battery of heavy guns on the 
Haumont crest did its duty under the most 
terrific fire. The battery had been found out 
with terrible accui'acy by a group of the enemy's 
305 nun. guns, which in less than a minute 
put 13 ' coalboxes ' into the position. The 
battery was compelled to cease fire for a while. 
At that moment a sergeant of artillery reported 
to the commanding major that liis own battery 
had been destroyed, and was told ofi' to serve 



the silenced lieavy guns, (fathering other 
delatthed *irtillerymen, he got the battery 
going again an<l ke[>t it at work for 48 
hours. He remained at his post until the 
«!nemy infantry were close upon him, and then, 
having e.xhausted all his shells and blown up 
his guns, the heroic sergeant endeavoured to get 
through to the French lines, but without success." 
(Jnnit interest atta<;hes to the following 
account of the first four days of the Oerman 
attack upon Verdun, as related by a French 
military doctor to one of his friends : 

On the eve of the attack the positiotiH of thu butt(!ri(>.s 
in tho L'uure.s wood had been changed. At the beginning 
«l' tho attack his battery was bombarded at first Ijy Iho 
(iiTinari 5-iii(;lt and 8-inch gunu, which, in other parts of 
llio Froncli front, had l»oen considered iieuvy artillery. 
'I'hen, wlion tlio wliolo position had been thorouglily 
" treated " with these shells, the Cermans began quick 
lire with 12-inch and 15-incli guns. It was terrific. 
ISchind tlio Kroiich batteries tliere were two or threo 
zones of Clerman curtain fire, tlirough which the supplii's 
of ammunition had to be brought up and tlie woundt;d 
removed. This was done, it seems, with astounding 
calm and unanimous heroism. 

One gun of liis battery was damaged by a shell and 
had to be removed to the rear. 1'hore remained three 
'* 75's," which fired ceaselessly. As soon as he had 
finished binding up the wounded and superintending 
their removal, he lent a hand in passing on tho shells. 
An 8-inch shell passed between the legs of one of tho men 
serving the battery, but it failed to explode. A little 
later a 12-inch shell caught this same man as it rebounded, 
threw him over the gun, and landed him head foremost 
in a dug-out. The man scrambled out again, saying, 
" Doctor, I really believe I am invulnerable." 

Meanwhile the guns grew hot and tired. The man 
had gone back to his piece, while tho doctor attended to 
the wounded 20 yards to the rear. Suddenly the gun 
burst. Raising his eyes, the doctor saw two of the gun's 
crew headless, and the poor " invulnerable " laid low 
with both legs cut off. Three minutes later he expired. 
The burst gun was removed. There remained two, of 
which one had a hole in its rifling as big as a five-franc 
piece, while the brake of the other was totally smashed 
— but still they fired. 'J'he gunners, who were splendid, 
stuck to their work as though nothing had happened. 

When the Germans had so " watered " the ground 
with 12-inch and 15-inch shells that it was completely 
cut up, they began "watering" with the .Austrian 
4-1-inch guns, which are the most redoubtable enemy 
weapon, for they are the nearest thing they have got 
to our " 75." 

It was then really hell. But it was notliing compared 
with the moment when tho Gorman machine-guns got 
on to them. It seems that no cannon is as awful a^s the 
machine-gun. The men were dead tired — stretcher- 
bearers, fatigue parties, and gunners. The severely 
wounded were tied on to the empty ammunition wagons, 
and back they went, plunging in and out of tho enormous 
craters which the German heavy shells had made. 

That lasted until the moment when the German 
infantry advanced from the woods ii\ rhythmio trot. 
Our fellows fired until the enemy was within 300 or 400 
yards. Then, not wishing to be caught, they retired. 

That was the worst moni0nl of all. The men retreated 
foot by foot. It made one's heart bleed. They lay 
flat on tho earth, enraged, but compelled to retire b.^foi-e 
the enemy's masses — and that lasted twenty-foiu- hjurs ! 

Then came a moment of mad delight. Our ntta-king 
Corps appeared. On they came with indesorihablo 
rapidity and uncanny power. Tho poor lVllo\\s, worn 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



11 




l-KKNCH HHKOES AT THE HATTLB OF VKRDUN. 

Dut.iiti one of the fiercest assaults the commander of a 7S battery fired 800 shells In succession. 
The men cooled their )(uns incessantly with drinking-water from their bottles. 



out, ]yitiiif\nt, watohcl tho oiitpoiiriiiK of that, t^cmf;Il(loll^^ 
Ujrrtnit of inun, ((uriH, amrriiiiiitiori, iiri'l all kiriflu of 
rn'tUrifl. On it went, riMliiri{{ forwanl, rifjvor Htop[»iii;^', 
uri'h»;'-k')'l, at a >«>wil(l<Tin;{ \iw:, with fiiiitfiHli'r daHli 
and " f{o,'' 

'\'Yi>: i\i>«-UiT daifl, " Novfsr havn f felt (tiich joy. From 
that in'iinf.fii w; all know that tht; iltinM w';ro done for 
and that th^rir a/lvarico wa« >itay*!f|." 

f^v«rywh»rr« it w»w tho HCtri*; Htory ; the 



((uriH wr^rr) unay)lo to got thfir shells up from 
tho rear, ovory road, cvtsry cornniiinication 
trench, every su[)ply column being exj)oserl to 
murflen>iiH and fatal (ire. The ^ regiment 
which held Ifinmiont had little doiil)! as to 
what itH duty and its end were to he. It, was 
<r)iii[)letely cut, (ill' I'loiii siipplieH from tho roar 



12 



'i'///-: TiMi:s iiis'KHiY or riii: ]VAn. 



ami ihti fiifiiiy luid cnvelojM^ct itti HunkH. 
'I'tui buiiibunliiteut towunlci tuglit o'«-l(ick 
lu'cuiiit; vwii luortt viult^iit, uiul so thick nmis 
the u4-rt)en uf tire befuru the villH^oot' HHiiiiioiit, 
where the gtiiluiit rti^iiiifiit Itty, that it htui tu 
wati-h ill iiiiutiuii the a<ivHuce uf the Cieriauu 
tiaiiie tliro\ver« tu tlie treiwheH in the Coiweii- 
voye Mooda aiul their steatly prof^renH <Iovmi 
the Ravine uf Hauiiiunt tuwards the western 
eilye uf Haiununt wuuil. At 10 u'clutk 
heavy Hhells were falling on the viiUiKf and 
neighhuurhuod of Hauniunt at the rate of 10 
a ntiniite. Suuth uf Hauniunt the bunihard- 
nient rut the furce off entirely. Towards 
two o'i'hx'k shells were falling un the village 
at the rate uf 20 a niiiuite, and the village 
of Hauin jnt wtvs nuthing but a rubbish heap. 
Kven the big annoiured cemant redoubt, upon 
which the French had at one tirnj rjlied, 
cuUapsod under the repeated blows of the 
heavy guns, burying 80 nijn and several 
michino guns, and destroying the Frencli 
ainn\unition dop3t. At five o'clock the enemy 
advanced to the attack of the ruins of Haiunont. 
They moved out a battalion strong in three 
columns from north, north-west, and east. 
The French, dazetl and stunned by the tre- 
la )ndou.s bombardment to which they had been 



. Hubje«ted, weakened by their losses in men, 
nta-hine guns, and anununition, spurred them- 
selves i)n to defend. The enemy's left got 
belli up on som3 wire which in spite of all the 
shell expeniliture uf the Ciennans had managed 
somehow or other to escape destruction. 
Hero the French got usefully to work with 
tluiir midline guns, but it was a vain ell'ort. 
The enemy had pushed forward on his right 
and centre, ami w (irking through the village 
had crept up to the hoase where the Colonel 
an. I liis stall were prej)aring to iiiike a last 
stand. 'J'he (Jerm in (lame fighters tlxrust 
fire into the cellars, and th(*ir machine guns 
swept the exit from (ho h')use. 'J'he Colonel 
and his stall" had two alternatives. J)(!ath by 
burning or the running of the mitrailleu.se 
gauntlet. They chose the latter, and the 
Colonel walked througli the machine-gun liro 
unscathed, organized the withdrawal of liis 
regiment, and prepared to bar the road fartlu^r 
down south of iSumogn(iux and Haumont. 

'J'he tactics which were employed at this 
section of the line were applied with equal 
success on the next portion of the French 
front, which must be considered as having 
been formed by t he series of woods Coasenvoyc, 
Haumont, Caures, and Herbebois. These woods 




A FRENCH HEAVY GUN IN ACTION. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 



13 




NEAR THE GERMAN TRENCHES. 
French troops cutting the barbed-w!re. 



were linked up by trench and organized very 
thoroughly for defence. The connecting trench 
defence, however, was the weak spot right along 
the line, and the enemy, while covering the 
main position in the woods with shell and 
plastering all apj^roaches to the wood was 
able to break the connecting links and carry 
out a series of enveloping movements. 

What happened at the Bois d'Hauinont was 
.repeated in circumstances of greater tragedy 
in the a/ljoining wood to the ea.st — the Bois 
des Caures, which was held by two battalions 
of thf; famous French Chasseurs under the 
command of Lieiitf^nant-Colonel Driant, a 
member of the Chamber of Deputifrs. Thf) 
first day of the offensive the Cerman artillery 
bore with most of its weight upon Haurnont. 
On February 21 their guns were, noverthelefs, 
extraordinarily active, anrl earrierl out a bom- 
bardment of terrible violence along the Bois 
fl<*» Caures front, crushing in every dug-out 
anfl leaving the [jOHition bruised and shattr^nsd 
at five in the evening. The next flay, the en- 
velofmient of the Haumont position having 
b«!gun, all the weight of metal availablr; was Cf;n- 
ceritrat^'d on the first trenches f>f the Bo'S des 
Caur*)<<, and the whole line bex;ame a fJiist heap. 
Unfl';r f:f>ver of this terrific fire the eri'-rriv now 



advanced from Haumont upon the western 
flank of the Bois des Caures position, and at 
noon on February 22 began to try to force 
a passage through the French support trenches 
from the west and to push down on the east 
of the woorl from tho direction of Ville. The 
French were considerably outnumbered. Their 
two battalions had suffered heavily from the 
bombardment, and the Germans were attacking 
with a com|)lete anfl fresh brigafle. 

Nevertheless the French fought with great 
determination against the encircling move- 
ment. The fighting was very largely with 
grenades, and the bayonet cnmc into play 
cf>nstantly throughout the day. In spite of 
all their efffjrts, hfjwever, the German hold 
on the position became stronger and stronger, 
anfl by 5. .30 that evening the j)f)sition of Colonel 
JJriant's Chasseurs became extremely critical. 
The (UirmanH had /nanag(!d with grfiat efffirt 
to get a gun into i)ositif)n alorig the Ville road, 
with which they were able to enfilade the chief 
point of thf! fir-fenee. Then it was that Colonel 
JJriant h(;ld a final fronsultation with his staff, 
to whf)m hf! statefl, withf)ut concealnient, 
" fn a ff;w ininulcs wo shall have to meet tleath 
or b<-f!f)mf! prisfjn<*rs." He pausf^rl for u 
mf)m(rit, mid iiddcd, " I'cirhaps we might 
nifUKigc. to Hiivi! Hoiiic of tlicse bravf! ff^llows." 



14 



THE TIMES HISTOUY UF THE WAR. 




FIELD-MARSHAL VON HAESELER. 

The veteran who accompanied the German 

Crown Prince. 

After making certain that nothing of value had 
been left in the dug-out, that all the anununition 
which could not be carried away had been 
destroyed, the survivors of the two battalions 
split up into five columns and began their 
retreat from an already impossible position. 
Colonel Driant insisted on being the last man 
to leave the wood. The columns, as they 
debouched from the wood, were met by wither- 
ing machine-gun fire, which took a heavy toll. 
Colonel Driant himself never left the wood. 
He was last seen alive taking refuge from a 
etorm of projectiles in a shell crater. He met 
the end which, as a nationalist, and deputy for 
the proud city of Nancy, he most desired. The 
defence which the men under his command 
put up cost the enemy over 2,000 in killed 
and wounded, and delayed and weakened the 
German attack upon the main line of French 
resistance. 



'J'hn niu.st auccos-iful oppcisitioa to ths 
(iernuui advance was luado in flit) Hois <l'Herbo- 
li(»xs, ti> the »uist of the Hois (Ids (/UuroH. On tho 
first day of the offensive ail tho euouiy managed 
to a(?hiovo hero was to gain a footing in tho lirst 
line and to captiiro one of the defensive works 
of the sujjporting tninoh. Here tho reaction 
was more i)ronipt and nujre oifectivo than it 
had been elsewliero along tho lino, antl at 
midnight on February 21 the French launched 
a counter-attack whicli went on until half-past 
four in the morning. It did not, liowever, 
do much more than pin the G(»nnans down to 
their jjositioiis. Throughout tho 22nd grenado 
ilf^hting conLinued without ceasing, and in 
night attack the enemy renewed his offensive 
after a heavy bombardment. His lack of 
success in no way diminished the ardour of his 
troops, and on the 23rd an enemy battalion 
advanced in serried formation upon the French 
position. Individual firing at 50 yards was the 
order of the day, and enormously did the 
French infantryman delight in such close range 
fighting. The French artillery here got to wofk 
with splendid results, and of the battalion 
which attacked but few were able to get tlirough 
the curtain fire of the 75's and regain their own 
line. Undeterred by this massacre the German 
staff launched four more attacks vipon the 
position with no more result. At a quarter 
past four on the 23rd the gallant defenders of 
Herbebois received an order to evacuate. They 
were informed that, the Wavrille wood having 
been taken, the whole position of Herbebois 
was endangered, and the staff was instructed 
to carry out the withdrawal with the very 
greatest discretion. The news of this order 
caused great grumbling among the men. They 
had fought as soldiers even in this war had 
seldom fought. Four of their grenadiers had 
remained for 20 hoiu"s at a point where the 
Germans and French met in a communication 
trench, hurling grenades at the enemy. The 
men had performed countless deeds of personal 
and collective heroism. They had fought like 
wild cats against greatly superior munbers, 
and with complete success. It required a rapid 
explanation of the requirements of strategy to 
make these men realize that they had to 
abandon a field of battle littered with hundreds 
of German corpses ; a-- field of battle upon 
which they had fought not only the Germans, 
but the intense cold, snow, lack of food, and 
almost overwhelming bodily weariness. When 
they fell back vipon the Chaumos wood, and got 




FKFNCH OFMf:F',K'S FAKHWHI.L If) HIS COMKADKS. 
f>»lf»nel Driant, Deputy for the Meune, leadin)i hi* men to tlic front-line in ihc Hois ties (^aures. The 
•oldier-politician %tood on the parapet of the trench nnd delivered a »hf)rt inspirin|( address to his men, 
oncludinfi with the worJn, " (>har){c. my children I I.on)J live France'" These were Colonel Driunt's 

last wordf). 

16 



u; 



77//V 77A//';.S' msTOltV OF 'llli: WML 




into touch with the troops on either flank, 
they had, however, done more than their share, 
and contributed more than their part to the 
total of sacrifice which had stayed the German 
ailvance along the whole front, and which had 
given the General Staff time to rush up reserves 
and meet the growing danger wliich threatened 
V'erdun. 

The situation on the morning of February 23 
was serious. The Germans had driven tlu; 
French almost entirely from the northerly 
woods which formed the first line. The French 
had been forced to evacuate Brabant, Haumont, 
the Bois des Caures, and Herbebois, and had 
fallen back upon positions based upon Samog- 
neux, Beaumont, the northern edge of the Bois 
des Fosses, and the little wood of Chaumes. 
The French effort to WTest the initiative from 
German hands on the morning of the 23rd was 
rendered hopeless by the storm of shell which 
burst over Samogneux, the starting-point of 
the counter-attack. By the evening of the 
23rd all was lost at Samogneux. The village 
was only nccninally in the possession of the 
French, and the French were forced to take 
into immediate consideration the necessity of 
withdrawing farther south, and of making a 
stand on the Talou and Pepper ridges. So far all 
activity liad been confined to the eastern bank 



MASSED GERMAN INFANTRY 

of the Meuse, and the extent of the German 
advance now exposed them to enfilading fire 
from the French artillery position on the west 
banli. As these guns came mto action Samog- 
neux was evacuated, and a regiment of infantry 
was thrown across the Vacherauville-Samog- 
neux road for the protection of the important 
Height 344. Throughout the whole of the 
night of the 23rd and the following day the 
Germans concentrated their effort upon this 
height. Time after time their attacks, when 
debouching from Samogneux, reeled and scat- 
tered under the fire of the French artillery and 
mitrailleuses. Their losses here first began 
to assume the magnitude which subsequently 
gave to the whole battle its peculiar character 
of horror. Time after time they charged upon 
Hill 344, and it was not till the night of the 24th 
that they succeeded in getting a bare footing 
on its slopes. Farther east their progress was 
equally slow, the special difficulties of tlio 
country delaying their advance. 

In the centre their attack was carried out with 
greater dash and quicker results. After pouring 
gas and tear-shells upon the Bois des Fosses, 
they gathered a large force east of that wood 
and north of Wavrille, in preparatioo for an 
assault upon Beaumont and the Fosse woods. 
This gathering of troops was rej)orted to the 
French artillery, which got to work upon it with 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



17 




MOWN DOWN BY FRENCH GUNS. 

deadly effect. At the same time the French 
infantry determined to forestall the enemy, 
and two battalions were sent forward with the 
north-western comer of Wavrilie wood as their 
objective. They got as far as the south- 
western edge of the wood, where they were held 
up by concentraterl maehine gun-fire. The 
Cermans, in view of the v^igour revealed by the 
French, and following their plan of destroying 
the defensive positions by artillery and leaving 
them to be occupied by the infantry, de- 
layed their infantry atta<^;k, and resumed the 
bombardment of Beaumont and the Fosses 
wood-i. At one in the afternoon they got their 
infantry going, turned the Zouaves and sharp- 
shooters out of the Wavrilie woorl, an'l, 
pushing forward, turned Beaumont on the west 
and the Bois des Fos.ses on the east. In half an 
hour, in sjjite of very heavy losses, the enemy 
ha^l captured the whole of the Fosses woods, 
and hafl got into the streets of Beaumont. 
Beaumont was fought house by house, but tlie 
Vnmf.h were unable to stay the forces of the 
enerny. I^ Chaume was the next to fnll fom- 
plr-tely into the Jiands of the Oennuns, and 
at 20 mii)Ut*!H past two large boditss of the 
enemy wf^re marching between Iyr>ijvf;mont and 
Hill 340 straight on to the main fortified lim- 
r|»-fending the Meus«; cafjitnl. Onies, surtouridid 
on thre^! HuUiH, ha'l to be given u|). 



The position was every hour becoming more 
dangerous. A great el?ort had to be attempted. 
Every available man was hurried into the 
line in a final suprenie efYort to stay the advance 
before it reached some vital spot of the Verdim 
defences. 

The troops upon both sirles had been fighting 
with the very greatest . sacrifice. The French 
forces were still those which had borne the 
brunt of the artillery preparation and the first 
days' as.saults. They were worn out with lack 
of sleep and lack of food, but were called upon 
to stave off defeat for yet a little longer, 
and to give time for the reserves anrl reliefs 
to reach them and take over their burden. 
Throughout the night they held out, and 
with their reli('f in the morning began a fresh 
and more checTful chapter in the history 
of the battle of Verdun. Up till that monuint 
the (Jermans could look uj)oii thciir offensive 
with satisfaction and with pride. 'J'hey had 
not, it was trut^ given the l^rench a sh^lge- 
hamiinr- Mow such as tlui l<'reneh gave the 
OermaiLs in one day in the ChampagiKs but 
they had carrii'd a large and important section 
of the frf)rit, rlriven the French hack in confusion, 
and piofited })y some of tlie weaicnesses 
u hi*;h showcfl th( rnselves in the French c(im- 
ni mil. In ap[)earance, if not in eircum-ftance, 
the Kreneh retreat from the I'rabant line to the 




18 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 



19 



Douaumont line resembled the retreat from 
Charleroi to the Marne. The achievement of 
the enemy in forcing the necessity and advisa- 
bility of that retreat upon the French was by no 
means to be despised. It was but the prelude to 
action upon an even vaster scale — the prelude 
to one of those periods when the fortune of a 
day makes the history of an age. 

The French then stood with their backs to 
tlie wall at bay. The whole nalJion from the 
PjTenees to the North Sea, from the Atlantic 
to the Eastern Front, knew that the fate of 
France trembled in the balance. The tremen- 
dous forces brought into action by the enemy 
clearly showed that he was seeking to inflict 
one of those crushing blows from which even 
the most elastic and buoyant of peoples do not 
recover. The losses which the enemy had 
suffered without blenching shewed as clearly 
that regard for human life was not likely to 
stay hLs efforts. Blood and steel were to 
batter and crush the defenders of the Eastern 
Marches of France. The people of France were 
to be ruthlessly brought to reaUze that nothing 
could stand against the organized might and 
iron determination of their enemies. 

The population of France had followed the 
course of events calmly but nevertheless with 
anxiety. They had watched the gradual 
withdrawal of their troops from position after 
position, knowing full well tliat iintil their 
armies fell back upon the main natural fortifi- 
cations on the east of the Meuse, the full 
resisting power of France could not be exerted. 
Never has a people shown a finer confidence in 
its army and its star than that displayed by 
the French in those trying opening days of the 
battles for Verdun. Never wa.s confi<lence in 
thf! end more clearly deserved. Knowing 
nothing of the steps taken to ensure the trium[jh 
of their final resistance, with their faith atta^;ked 
by en^rny nimo'ir nml by enemy lie they 
maintained a cheerful front and awaited 
calmly the news that the Verdun armies had 
turnefl ufjon tfieir opponents as Joffre had 
turned on the Germans in September, 
1914. 

Tiif; first phaw; of the Verdun battle came io 
an enrl on P'ebniary 24. On that date the 
whf»Ie of the first French line and a liirge 
ntn-U:h of country ha<i fall«n iritf» fJcrrnun 
han'ls, tfni/-tiu;r with several tlw>usand prisoners 
and many ^iins. 'I'h'; progress of events is 
nurnmarily indicated in tho following diary : 




A FRENCH "EYE" ON VERDUN. 
Captive balloon ascending near the battle zone. 

February 21. — Front from Brabant sur Meuse 
to Herhehois. — Haiunont wood and Beaumont 
salient captured by the enemy. Attacks 
against Brabant and Herbebois repulsed. 

February 22. — Front from Brabant to Ornes. — 
Haumont village evacuated. Part of the 
Beaumont salient recaptured. Strong attack 
on Herbebois stopped. Artillery bombard- 
ment from Malancourt to Etain. 

February 23. — Front from Brabant to south 
of Ornes. — Brabant evacuated. Attack against 
Samogneux repulsed. Part of the recaptured 
Beaumont salient lost. French witlitlrawal 
from Samogneux and Ornes. 

February 24. — No German attacks during 
the night. Fn^nch establisheil on i\\v lino of 
hfiights stretching from the east of ('linuip- 
rieuville to south of Ornes. 

I'rr)adly spoiking, what had happened was 
that the sali(!tit which the Germans attacked 
had been driven in and the French lino of 
defence In id moved I'romllic nyc to tho chord. 
The p6sition, more closely described, was tho 
following. On llic l''icrich left the Tidou 
Kidgf, criclosed on three sides }>y l\\(' .\1<his(', was 
tof> flangerous a sjMjt for cither side to winh to 
f)ceuj)y in force, but both sides desired to pro- 
vent thr; enemy from occuf)ying it. 'i'lic loop of 
tho Mouse was therefore neutralized, and froni 



•JO 



TUb: TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. 




the artillery of the opposing armies a stream 
of shell rendered it untenable for either. The 
elimination of this region from the fighting 
v^ery considerably reduced the front of active 
operations. The French, when the critical 
moment of the fighting began, found themselves 
upon a donunating plateau, well knit and 
affording excellent positions for artillery. 

The objective of the enemy had now become 
the capture of Douaumont and Pepper 
Ridges. 

Before entering upon any description of the 
series of bloody battles which covered this 
country with agony and horror it is necessary 
to refer in some detail to the forces which had 



GERMAN DUG-OUTS AND HUTS BEHIND 

THE FIRING-LINE. 

Small picture : Enemy reinforcements goin^ 

to the trenches. 

been engaged by both armies in the fighting 
and to events farther away from the actual 
front of battle. 

The great achievement of the resistance by 
the comparatively small numbers of the French 
on the first positions they occupied gave to their 
General Staff time to bring up their men, and 
to organize even more thoroughly than they 
had done the main lines of defence. The 
Germans in their offensive had, without 
question, reckoned among the difficulties 
of the French the question of transport. 
Verdun was dependent for all its cominvmica- 
tions with the interior of Franco upon two 
railways. The first, the main line from Verdim 
to Paris, was entirely under the fire of the Ger- 
man artillery, and the second was but a small 
line rimning up the Meuse Valley from Bar-Ie- 
Due. The French had done nothing visible 
to remedy this defect, and without doubt the 
Germans had imagined thatr the very greatest 
difficulty would be experienced in moving re- 
serves into the threatened sector and in keeping 
them supplied with munitions and food. But 
the possibility of a great attack upon Verdun 
had long been considered by the Fivnch General 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



21 



Staff, and the paucity of Verdun's comniunica- 
tions had been taken into account. 

The General Staff in the first few days of the 
offensive was somewhat harshly criticized for its 
faihu-e to build supplementary lines of communi- 
cation between the Verdun salient and the rest 
of France. As a matter of fact, the arrangements 
made for the re-\'ictualling of the defenders of 
Verdun worked admirably. It was quite clear 
that any attack upon Verdun would be accom- 
panied by a very ^^olent bonibardment of the 
Verdun-Paris main line, wliich would, if it did 
not interrupt conmiunication completely, make 
it at any rate extremely difficult. There re- 
mained only the .small raiJwaj'^ from Bar-le-Duc, 
which was plainly inadequate to mest the 
requirements of a large force during a period 
of intense acti\'ity. The General Staff decided 
that the best way of supplementing the yield 
of the Bar-le-Duc railway was to organize 
an " intensive " .system of road transports. At 
the beginning of February a special committee 
wa.s, appointed to take charge of tlie whole 



problem of transport in thi.-i region. Under its 
orders were placed 200 motor-lorry sections — 
that is to say, about 4,000 lorries — with 300 
officers and 8,500 men. The size of such 
an oi'ganization may be gauged from the fact 
that on an average journey of 70 kilometres 
a day 2,000 hectolitres of motor spirit, 200 
hectolitres of oil, and 2,000 kilogrammes of 
grease were necessary. This suj^ply of trans- 
jiort was entirely supiDlementary to the 
existing motor forces of the fortified region 
of Verdtui and the army of the Argonne. The 
committee got to work before the battle began, 
and after close examination of the situation it 
was decided in principle that the Bar-le-Duc 
railway should be used only for food sup^Dlies, 
and that the motors should be reserved as far 
as possible for the transport of troops, munitions 
and engineering ma,terial. It was further 
d.^cided that the whole network of roads around 
Verdun should be entirely closed to all wheeled 
traffic save that of the army motor-cars. The 
transport columns, it was determined, should 




IJOMIJAKlJlNf; nil'. (ihUMAN TKKNCIIES. 



22 



THE TIMES HISTOHY OF TllE WAR. 



not, ad wad ciutonmry wtu-u hiuth units rcuti 
the zone ui tire, uuIuhcI iiitu lioi'de vehicles, 
but uhoiiM luiluad Ht ouee iiitu ti|)eciHl depots 
of iiuuiitious aiul iiutteriul. 

T^ie querition of traffic coutrol and of road 
repair was al^o ini[K)rtant. ami a regular roa<l 
police was organizeil. Tliere were ahiiut 
75 kilonietrea to be covered by car. Thin 
distance was spht up into sectioiLS, eacli phu-ed 
under ttie control of an oflicer, and the day and 
ni^'ht duty of thia natui'e required the HerviccH 
of 31)0 othcers and rnen. 

'I'his organization was ordered to begin 
optration.s at noon on the second day of the 
CJennan offensive. In less than four hours the 
great circuit liad been cleared of all extraneous 



time to look after it. \\ hen (he roud sliowed 
signs of giving way under this <'on«tant grinding 
of heavy tnitlic, it hcjiuicI of military roiid- 
menders was there at once making rougli ami 
ready repairs to the surface. Day and night 
this stTvice of motor-cars, whi<-h had converted 
the Verdun road into a kind of moving platform, 
bore up to the front its load of shells, its binden 
of cheerful, resolute poiluti, its (uirgo of eag<fr 
75's. Some idtia of the capacity of this rather 
hastily organizefl service can be gained from 
the figures of trattic handled in the first fortnight 
of activity, when 22,500 tons of munitions were 
carried and unloaded at the various supply 
ppots. The kilometric tonnage amounted to- 
alxjut 3,000,000, or an average of about 




FRENCH CAVALRY ON THE WAY TO VERDUN. 



traffic ; the road had become a railway. Lord 
Xorthcliffe, in his telegram to The Times of 
March 6, thus described this service at work : 

As night falls we come across our first convoy of the 
creat hooded motor lorries, which my companion coimted 
by the thousand while wo were on our way between 
Paris and the Meuse. The war has reduced motor 
transport to a science, and in no way is French efficiency 
better demonstrated than in the manner in which 
they have added to the carrying capacity of their 
railways and great canals. They have utilized thousands 
of miles of poplar and lime lined roads for mechanical 
transport at 15 miles an hour. On one road alone we 
counted 20 motor convoys, each composed of about a 
hundred wagons, and each erroup indicated by S;m3 
simple mirk, such as a four-leaved shcmrock, an ace 
of hearts, or a comet. 

When a car failed no time was lost in lengthy 
repair ; it was just tumbled straight off the road 
into a ditch and left there until the army liad 



200,000 kilometric tons per day. The average 
daily journey of each car was 155 kilometres, 
and in a fortnight the cars specially told off for 
miuiitions transport alone had covered 1,200,000 
kilometres. In the same period 190 motor car 
groups, specially affetted to the transport of 
men, had carried into the threatened salient 
some 250 battalions, or close upon 200,000 n^en. 
In addition to all this specialized transport, the 
service also acted as a general Carter raterson 
for the army, medical stores, slightly wounded, 
and the civilian population being evacuated, and 
carried to the extent of 200,000 tons of material 
and 10,000 men. To put these Results into 
railway figures, the traffic liandled in that 
one fortnight reprc'sentetl the capacity of 15 
trains a day in each direction. Seventeen 







>^ S^ r M t 



A supply of thcllii ready lor transport i(» ihc hiittencH. Centre picture: Dispatchin)! si cIIn 

to the haltcrlcN. 
SHELI.S lOH THE IKHNCH (HJNS AT VEHHUN. 



T.\ 



•J* 



THE TIMFS HJSTOliY OF Till: WML 




BEFORE THE BATTLE : A VIEW OF VERDUN. 
Showing the Cathedral and the River Meuse. 



hundred lorries covered the road each day in 
each direction, so that the average intensity of 
traffic was one lorry every 25 seconds. This 
result was achieved in spite of excessively 
bad weather conditions, m spite of snow and 
heavy frosts. It was but fitting that General 
Joffre should have recognized the devoted service 
of the motor-car sections in a special Order of 
the Day, for it was largely due to their efforts 
that the French were able to build up along the 
Pepper and Douaiunont Ridges the barrier 
against which the German assaulting wave 
beat in vain. 

The Germaas, from the very outset of the 
offensive, indeed before the actual preparatory 
bombardment had begun, endeavoured by 
every means in their power to interfere with 
French communications. The great Zeppelin 
excursion, which ended in the destruction of 
one of Germany's most modern airships at 
Revigny, was the beginning of this attaclc upon 
the rail centres of the French, and when the 
Oerman heavy and field artillery opened fire 
upon the first-line trenches of the French, 
their long-range giuis began a systematic 
bombardment of the whole of the country to 



the south, Verdun, the Mouse bridges, and the 
I'aris- Verdun railway receiving special atten- 
tion. 

The town of Verdun itself had for many 
months lain at the mercy of the German artil- 
lerjTiian, who, whatever one may think of the 
German madness of destruction, usuall3' has 
method when he sets to work, and, no useful 
military object being attainable by an isolated 
bombardment of the town unconnected with 
active military operations in the field, the 
(Jermans had contented themselves, before 
the attack, with sending a few long shots into 
the town. Verdun paid the price of its proud 
position as a sentinel on the eastern frontier. 
It shared the fate of Ypres, of Arras, and of 
Reims. ^Ir. Warner Allen, the representative 
of the British Press with the French Army, 
describing the bombardment of the town and 
its approaches, Mrote : 

The air was trembling with the nois-? of the battle 
that was raging. Kven scm ■> five miles away tlie 
noise of the Geiman artillery was deafening. For 
minutes together it was absohitely a ooi>**nuous crash 
upon crash and bang upon bang, huge German sliells 
bursting in and all round the town, and tlic French 
guns answering frcm every slope. Silence seemed an 
impossible ideal. Yet even outside the town fri-m tinie 



THE TIMES HISTOh'Y OF THE WAR. 



25 



to tim? there would ccme a «ilonce, perhaps of 30 
seconds, and it was more nerve-racking than the eternal 
boom of bursting German shells and the trembling 
of the earth beneath the reply of the French artillery. 
During these silences one was waiting in tenso expecta- 
tion for the infernal din to break loose again. 

In the town, however, whore several big German 
shells were falling every minute, there is comparative 
peace. Houses deaden sound to a surprising extent, 
and in some of the small winding streets of Verdun 
one can fancy that the explosions that are destroying 
houses a few hundred yards away are merely distant 
artillery practice. . . . 

The Germans are shelling the gates heavily, and 
everyone in the town — so far as I have seen, there are 
exactly three civilians apart from ourselves — has been 
out to pick up the splinters that are raining down on 
the roofs of the bouses with a pattering sound like that 
of rain. 

This stonn of steel flung its fviry over the 
whole salient. It was ro intense that at 
moments and in places only one iu three of the 
supply columns sent up to the front ever 
got there. Yet the work went on, and hour 
by hour and day by day saw the concentration 
of more troops and more munitions in the 
threatened area. The French General Staff 
was unable in the first two days to dispatch 
to the Verdim sector all its available reserves. 
The intentions of the enemy were by no means 
certain. The attack upon Verdun, it was true, 
began with a tremendous power and vigour, 



but until the .second or third day it was still 
open to the enemy to change his objective, 
to regard Verdun as a feint, and to bring 
the full weiglit of liis ePfort to liear 111)011 
Nancy, Amiens, or Calais. The duty of the 
General Staff was to maintain an equal balance 
of force along the front, and to make the 
riposte fit the attack. Under the conditions 
of modern warfare it is essential, with the huge 
masses of men tliat have to be transported, not 
to displace the centre of gravity without the 
certainty that it has also been displaced 
on the other side. The attacking force in 
trench war is in consequence nearly always 
bound to have the supremaxjy during tlie first 
few days of a prolonged offensive. Limited 
success is assured to him, but it is oaly if he 
is able to exploit that success to its end, before 
his opponent has discovered the strength 
arrayed against him, that success becomes vic- 
tory. The French, therefore, had to wait 
until they were certain of the enemy's intentions 
before altering the distribution of their forces 
on the east. 

What was the position of the Germans ? 
To place against the one narrow-gauge French 
railway they had no less than H railways. 




DURING Till. 15AM LE: A VIEW Ol VERUUN, 



2«i 



77//-; 77.w/';,s' Hisronv of the wmi. 




frknc:h troops with scaling i.auuhks. 



They had been able, having the initiative, to 
prepare for many montlis before the attack the 
shock army which was to carry it through. 
Followmg the precedent of their of?en.sive of 
October, 1914, the enemy fixed their imme- 
diate requirements at four army corps. They 
were no longer able, as they had been then, to 
form fre.sh organizations, but had to assemble 
the new army from different j)oints of the 
front. In Russia the margin of safety had very 
nearly been reached, and it was mainly from 
the Western front that the higher command 
drew its Verdun supplies and men. The 
loth Corps was taken away from the 4th Army 
in front of the British ; the 18th Corps from the 
2nd Army on the Somme ; the 7 th Reserve 
Corps from the 7th Army on the Aisne ; and 
the 3rd Corps was brought back from Serbia. 
According to M. Bidou, whose writings on the 
Biittle of Verdun gained him a great reputation, 
the 7th Reserve Corps left the Aisne towards 
the end of October, 1915, so that it may be 
stated with some certainty that the preparation 
of an offensive was begun by the Germans 
immediately after the French offensive in the 
Champagne. The work of resting and training 
the troops which were to be called upon to 
jiiake tliis fresh gigantic effort, therefore, took 
some three or tovir months. At the same time, 
as has already been pointed out, heavy artillerj' 
was brought back from the Serbian and Russian 
fronts, and accumulated in the rear of Verdun. 
When thf battle was begun the German 
order of battle, accoi-ding to Lord Northcliffe's 
telegram to The Times, was as follows : 

The German order of battle on February 21 running 
westwards from a point north of Varennes comprised 



on the extreme German ri^ht tlio 7th UoMcrvo Corps, 
cijnsistinjj; of the 2nd Lundwehr Division, the 11th 
Reserve Division, ivntl the 12th Kexerve Division in 
tlie order named. During the fighting the 11th Reserve 
Division is msderstood to have boon rehoved by the 
22nd Reserve Division. Imniodiately before I lie 
Frenrh line to the north-oast of Vertlun lay the 14th 
Re.-ierve Division, with the 7th Reserve Corjjs and the 
11th Bavarian Reserve Division in support. These 
troops wore on the right of wliat may bo called the 
central force. Next to thoin was ranged the 18th 
Corps, the 3rd Corps, the 15th Corps, and the Bavarian 
Krsatz Division in tho order named, while south oi 
Etain in the Woevre were ran;jed the 5th Landwehr 
Division, tho 5th Army Corjjs, and the 3nl Bavarian 
Corps opposite Fresnes. 

The French Intelligence Department was 
naturally aware of this concentration of troops. 
It knew, for instance, that the 3rd Corps and 
the 7th Reserve Corps reached the Verdun 
front on February 8, that the 15th (^orps was 
moved up on the 11th, that in the districts 
of Damvillers, Ville, Azannes, and Gremilly 
there was a great concentration of troops 
about tliis period, and that the Gremilly wood 
was filled with heavy artillerj', including several 
pieces of 380 and 420 millimetres. 

The French, therefore, strengthened their 
central armies. Between February 11 and 
February 16 six divisions of infantry, six 
regiments of heavy artillery, as well as special 
heavy guns and heavy armoured trains, wore 
sent to reinforce the Verdun armies. Finally 
on the eve of the German attack, on February 
20, a further division was sent up, and two 
army corps were ordered to Bar- le- Due and 
Revigny. 

These forces had been iniequal^o the task 
of holding the first defences of the French 
line, and by February 25 the French had been 
forced back to tho Pepper antl Douaun\ont 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 



27 



Ridges. Tlie situation was perhajjs tlio gravest 
A\ liicli had confronted the French General Staff 
since tlie dark days of Charleroi. Every 
possibiHty liad to be foreseen. Retreat and 
the abandoninent of the right bank of the 
Meuse was the first of these possibilities. 
The first, that is to say, in the urgency of staff 
work The troops holding the WoevTC trenches 
to the east of the town were, therefore, brought 
on to the Meuse heights, whence their retreat 
was rendered more easy. An army was rapidly 
formed on the left bank of the river, with the 
duty of covering such a retreat, and of defending 
the Meuse. Meanwhile fresh troops were 
hurried over the river, and General Castelnau, 
acting under the orders of General Joffre, left 
for Verdun, entrusted with full powers to deal 
with the emergency wliich had arisen. He 
foimd the situation far from reassuring. 
Bliinders had been committed ; there had been 
weakness in the command, faltering over vital 
decisions, but still the French Une, although 
driven back, had been neither cut nor over- 
whelmed. It held, indeed, positions incompar- 



ably better than those from which the Froncli 
had been driven. There seemed, moreover, to 
be 25romiso of a respite from the icA-vWAy con- 
centrated fire of the German hea\y artillery. 
The captiu-e of some five miles of country 
made it necessary for the German heavy 
artillery to be brought forward, and the difti- 
culties of advancing heavy artillery over groiuid 
such as a modern bombardment creates are 
better imagined than described. It was de- 
termined to profit by this slight delay to take 
in hand the vigorous organization of the 
Douaumont defence, to replace the worn-out 
troops who had been fighting since February 
21, and to make a definite stand on the right 
bank of the river. With characteristic coiu-age 
and decision the French took energetic action 
to give to the operations a more resolute 
character and a more determined leading. On 
the evening of February 25, as the result of 
General Castelnau's visit and survey of the 
situation, General Petain, then commanding in 
the Champagne, arrived to take over direct 
control of the defence of Verdun. 




BHMIND TFIK MCJHTINCMJNH. 

ServinjJ (njt hoi Houp to the I'rtnch truopn. 



28 



Till': TIMES HISTDliV OF THE SVAU. 



General Potttiii was an ottu-er of a typo thu 
entire exihtenee of wtiic-h was unknown not only 
to foreigners, hut to the Frunch themselves. 
At tht^ he^inning of the war ho was just one 
of hiindrei-ls of colonels who were ahout to 
retire, the jealousiHs of political and religious 
pasifiion having barred the road to high oftice in 
his profession. He hail s])ent his time in t)ie 
army quietly, seeking neither notoriety nor 
fame, but conscientiously pt^rformiiig his 
regimental duties, sparing neither hiuLseU' nor 
his men in the strict performance of duty. 
The fact that owing to his strong religious 
views (he was a devout Roman Catholic at a 
time when war had not taught tolerance) ho had 
been passed over in the promotion lists, the 
frequent u.se of a somewhat ironical w it, gave to 
Ills cliaracter a flavour of bitterness, a touch of 
coldness, and tliis impression, upon those who 
came in contact with him, was increased by 
the austerity of his life. He was a tremendous 
worker, and dawn found him more frequently at 
his work-table than between the sheets 

At the outbreak of the war he commanded 
his regiment during the Charleroi retreat, and 
nis conduct chen marked him out for promotion, 



which in those days of wholesale ninoxiil of 
generals was not lacking. Very rapitUy General 
l*6tain got his brigade, and the step thus givtMi 
him carried him to the great May offensive in 
the Artois. Here, for the first time, a new 
school of trench warfare tactics showed itself, 
and General P6tain was its most successful 
exponent. He, more than any oiu^, was re- 
sponsible for the successea of that olTensivo, and 
recognition came to him with speed. On the de- 
l)arturo of CasCelnau to take over command of 
the Centre Group of Armies in tiie Cliampagno 
I'otain assumed command of the 2nd Army. 
When Castolnau had completed his plans 
for the Cliampagne offensive ho naturally 
called upon P6tain to assist in tlieir execution. 
In the Cliam[)agne offensive Potain again 
distinguished himself, and when Castelnau 
left to take over his new duties as Chief of tlio 
(Jeneral Staff General P6tain againsucceededhim 
in the command of the Centre Group of Armies, 
He very soon made his presence felt in his 
now position. Surrounded by his own staff he 
immediately set to work on the great task of 
stopping tlie Gorman advance. Well might it 
have been said of the battle of Verdun as it 




UNDER FIRE IN THE FRENCH TRENCHES. 
A soldier about to tire an aero-torpedo under the direction of a French officer. 



THE TIMES HISTOnr OF THE WAE. 



29 




FRENCH RESERVES NEAR VERDUN. 



was of the battle of the Mame, that the moment 
had come to turn and to die rather than to 
yield another inch of ground. The moment 
was one of those great moments of history 
when peoples cither fail through their hesitating 
weakness or put forth their strength in the 
final effort, as does the rtmner nearing the 
tape demand from hi-s heart a last effort. 

Alrearly help wa-s on the way, a division of 
the 20th Corps having crossed the river 
anri taken up a position on the right bank. 
Other troops were on the move, but throughout 
the 2.5tlj, before the new changes could take 
effect, the enemy continued to progress along 
the centre. By two o'clock, after a tremerirlous 
onslaught, ridge 344 fell into the hands of the 
Germans. By nightfall both slopes of the 
riflge were occufned by O "rm m troojjs and 
farther along the centre they got within striking 
distance of the key to the whole position — the 
great Douaumont plateau upon the top of which 
iitowl the first of the oU\ ring of Vcrrlun forts. 
T7iiii Douaumont position consisted, going from 
w(^*t to east along tlie plateau, f>f th<' village of 
Douaumont, a ref|(»iilif, and the ff>rt f)f Douau- 
mont. 1'h»! att«';ks upon this jKJsition were 
carri'-d through with complet«j diHr»'garrl of 
hmntm. Wave after wav<- of infantry surged 
iij» tho slofHTH and tlirougfi the ravine which 
s/'arr'!'l the |>laf«-au, only t*> melt away before the 
pitilf!HS Titfuiiiiu- guns and T.'j'h r>f th<- Fnnfli 



With a final convulsive effort a small detach- 
ment of the 24th Brandenburgers managed to 
reach the fort of Douaumont itself. Victory 
seemed to be within their grasp. But while 
throughout the world the Teuton was trumpet- 
ing his triimiph the plans laid hiuriedly by 
Petain were beginning to yield results. Fresli 
troops, amongst them the famous 20th Corps, 
were pouring along the "moving platform" 
of the motor transport on the Verdun road, 
and when dawn broke on the 26th the Cenn:\ns 
were confronted with new men and with now 
minds. A series of ferocious and admirably 
tinted counter-attacks drove the en^mv back 
beyond the Douaumont fort, and, from that 
moment on, battered and sluikea though the 
French line was at this point, it never yielded 




•3-53 B dpi 

.'•■ ^ Counereo = 

J^^- Bt'r.onvaux 






laFolle. 

CotedeFi 

- Tcrre 



320 '- ^ "•iao^,*-»>-^- 



,:^'aW<\'I,,,^ 



ll 5* CotedeFroidc * PIcliry 



#^"-'""^ 



It.;/ 



2 MiLti 



^Si... dcYaux 



/lys 1 



ao 



77//<; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




FRENCH TROOPS OFF TO THE FIGHTING-LINE. 
Motor convoys passing through a ruined village. 



Fighting continued with appalling intensity 
until the 29th. It centred mainly upon the 
village of Douauniont, situated about. 600 
yards west of the fort. Had the enemy 
been able to carry this point, he would 
have been able to exploit and enlarge the 
extremely precarious hold the Brandenburgers 
had got upon the fort of Douauniont. 

The village was held by one of the finest 
regiments in France, which arrived at its 
position on the evening of February 24, after 
two days' march. Alter a night in the open 
under hea\'y snow they were subjected to a 
day's fierce bombardinent, and towards three 
in the afternoon tliey saw the first five or six 
waves of the German assault moving out 
towards them under cover of what an officer 
described as a moving wall of shrapnel, the 
enemy artillerj' keeping its fire just m front of 
its advancing infantry throughout the attack. 
The bombardment to which the village had 
been subjectec* had been so systematic that 
the Cerman-s were entitled to their surprise 
when from the smoking ruins they were greeted 
with steady and deadly rifle and machine gun 
fire. The first wave reeled under the fire, 
stopped its advance, communicated its panic to 



those coming behind, and finally the whole 
advancing force turned tail and fled in disorder. 
To the left the second regiment of the brigade 
had an even harder struggle, but managed to 
hang on to its positions throughout the day. 
Then after another night, filled with more 
horrible discomfort than the first, spent without 
food under the snow in the ruined farmhouses 
which were mce.ssantly pounded by heavy shell, 
the brigade awoke to even fiercer struggles. To 
the right of the brigade a battalion of ^Moorish 
troops, caught under the nerve-destroying 
bcmbardments of 305's, showed signs of panic. 
A reservist captain who had spent some tim^ in 
France's African colonies rushed forward from 
the neighbouring regiment to steady them, 
shouting to them in Arabic. The mr;n returned 
with such dash that their officers had difficulty 
in preventing them from going too far in ad- 
vance. The village was thus fought for through- 
out three days. On the 26th the double attack 
broke dowTi completely. On the 27th the first 
attack carried the enemy into tho \illage, 
whence he was thrown again afte5.^bloody hand- 
to-hand fighting. The Germans succeeded, 
however, in capturing a redoubt to the west of 
the village. Here, agam, automatic counte;- 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



31 



attack drove him out. The afternoon of tlie 
27th a second furious assault again led to hand- 
to-hand fighting. A third attack the same 
afternoon was unable to reach the French 
trenches, the advancing columns being literally 
crushed by French artillery fire. On the 28th 
the Germans attacked on both sides of the fort. 
They succeeded in cariying the village of 
Douaumont. but were unable to hold it, and to 
the east of the fort they captured La Caillette 
wood, where also they were imable to hold on. 
Throughout the 29th they atta;Cked again with 
never-failing men and decision. Then came a 
pause, the most significant pause in battle 
smce the war began, for it marked the end of 
the first portion of this titanic struggle and t?ie 
failure of the Gennan battering ram to force 
a way by brute strength of numbers and brute 
weight of gunfire through the eastern gate of 
France at the point where they themselves 
considered theu" chances were best. The 
further development of the battle followed tho 
text-books. After the sledge-hammer blow on 
the centre came attacks on the wings. But 
the one condition of the text-books and of 
success, namely victory in the centre, was 
missing. 

There are certain aspects of the fii'st part of 
the battle of Verdun which mav now be con- 
siaered, leaving the course of the subsequent 



vast and important operations for ti-catment 
later. 

The German effort at Verdun was certainly 
the most determined military enterprise re- 
corded in the war up to that date. It was 
aecompanied by an intensity of slaughter, a 
wildness of butchery which up till then had 
not been imagined possible. It was also 
accompanied by a riot of official lying for 
which history has no precedent. In days v\'hen 
the connnunications were slow and faulty therc^ 
have been occasions on which a deliberate 
falsehood as to the fortimes of battle mifjht 
have had a definite effect upon the political 
aspect of war. The very improvements of 
science — telegraph, telephone, wireless, and 
the printing press — have so tremendously 
shortened the process ot transmitting and dis- 
tributing news that it would seem at first sight 
as though a falsehood must have been deprived 
of even momentary virtue. It was one of the 
achievements of the German General Staff, 
aided by a blunder of the French General Staff. 
to show, in tlie course of the battle for Verdun. 
that if their lie were only big enough it would, 
thanks to science, resound throughout the 
world , heartening their friends, dismaying the 
enemy, and stfiking the trembling neutral into 
fresh if awful admiration of the might of 
Germany s "strong arm." Parallel with the 
Verdun offensive there was waged by Germany 




ON nil'; KOAi) K) vi:i<iH i\. 

French convoy* carryinji frc»th troops to the fiftbtin^-line. 



9'2 



rm: timhs histouy of thk war. 



Hit ittTfiisive uf t'ultjuluio. 1 lu tirst irt tuiftttitH 
tioii wan tu be t'uiiii>l lit tlii^ (itYiciully iiispireii 
cuiiiiiiHiitti of thu (ieriii'iii I'resM, uliii-li tlirotigli 
iU milittvry eritieti invitml thu (iurnuui public- tu 
ttt«t) in the tivineiulouii hiippeiiiui^s of tho Hi'Ht few 
iliiyx hi-ouikI N'enliiu nuthin^ but iv mild stirring 
i»f the (4enii:in giant fnnii his winter slen[>. 
"^Ihe operations were dvi*- to notliinj.; in')re 
uranclio.se than a desire *' to rectify " the 
(ierinan front. V\hen their hopi's beoaiUH 
higher the offensive was ailmitted, but still it 
was a defensive offt nsive. Tfiey had no inten- 
tion of taking N'erdiin, but only of anticipating 
a great French uffensivtt against .Nh'tz, and had 
only de.sired to forestall any in jveinont on the 
part of the Allies. I'hey were afraid to raise 
hope.s too hij^h. Then as success followed 
succe.ss, the whole of the Gennan Centiral Staff 
was a|)parently seized l>y a mania for m.'n- 
tlacity. The first ilehnite falsehood |)roclaimed 
throughout th<» world was the announcement 
through German wirele.ss, at 2 p.m. on February' 
2."), of the capture of Chamj)neuville. It took 
the Germans two ilays to establish the truth of 



this announcemtnit, for the French on February 
27 were still in possession of the village. On 
the same ilay the (Germans claimed 10,(10(1 
prisoners. The French were unat>le to disc(iV4*r 
that they had lost more than about o.OOO. 
On February 2(J, at 8.55 a.m., (iermm wireless 
pro( laiined the capture (jf the fort of J)ouau- 
mont, tim miin pillar of the V^enhin defences. 
The whole world was shaken by tiii^ luiws, and 
by an unfort unate blunder the German falsehood 
hild the held throughmil iIk; world for twenty 
four hours, the French military authorities 
ha\ing decided to susp«'nd all telegra|)hic 
communicatioiLs with abroad for a tlay. Tho 
Gennan Empire was moved to transports of 
delight. Tilt! l']mperor received alliud ad- 
dresses and congratulations from various public 
bodies, to one of which, the lirandenburger 
Landtag, he had the ignorance or imputlence to 
reply, " I rejoice greatly at tho new ami grtsat 
exanii)le of lirandonburg vigour and tho faith- 
f ulnes.s unto death displayed by the sons of that 
province during the last few days in the course 
of the irresistible assault against the most 




ONCE A GERMAN TRENCH. 
Havoc caused by a French mine explosion. 



THE TIMES inSTORY DE THE If. 1 7?. 



33 




THK BRANUKNBUKfJHKS ATTAC:KING THE UISMAN TI.ED FORT OF DOUAUMON P. 

A nerieA of fierce and admirably timed counter-attacks drove the enemy hick beyond the fort, and, 

battered and shaken tliough the I'rench line was at this point, it never yielded. 



powerful forfr'«H oi our (■\\'uA (;n<rny. May 
(j<)<\ \>\f^.H Braridnnburg anri the whole Oorrnan 
fathfirlariH." Kvt-n thr; (gravity of hiHtory may 
[H!rhaf>M h«; p'Trnitt'jfl to rddx into a Mriiili! 
at t\\t: att^'rript rni'l'' \>y tlio ncrrrrin f;<ricrii! 
Htaff ari'l hy th»; 0<;rin(in I'lrrifHTor to <;onv«'y fo 
th<! worl'l at iar^^i; that in l/iiirirhin(( a ffrw ni'-n 



into th(! half-n})Hii(lono(l old fort of Douaiiiirmt 
the rjf;rmanH hud <'ai)tiired tho most pcjwcifiil 
fortn^HH of tFioir chif^f rinr-my. All the m')ro 
(MiiiisctrKint is to ho found in thi.s Imperial (ih 
wficn it \h r(!m<!ml>(!r(id that it vva.s th(! (!(Mni ins 
( hrins«!lv<!H who, hy tln^ir 17 inch jiiins. \\,u[ 
Hhown Uk' Fn-fifli ni l.i<'/ji;f, Antwerp. Naninr, 



84 



Till': TlMb:s lllSTUltY OF TllK WAIl. 



Mauheuge, ami Longwy, that tlie forts which 
Wfiu itiuderu uu Auguiit 3, 1914, had teasiHl to 
|N)(MM)UM military vahie of any Hurt on Aiigiut 4. 
Tlie I'aris corresponilHiit of Tkt Timt^", writing 
on Kebruaiy 27, «aid, " I have vitiited tiiu 
wholt) zuuo of the battle and I can vouch for 
the fact that the Douaiiinont fort ceased to 
exist in thj form which the German com- 
rnuniqud eiK.leavuiirs to t'ivi* it many mnntLs 
ago." 

The whole episode, possessed thcnigh it was 
of a comic sitlo to those who knew the ftuts, 
might have had Ji serious effect, both upon 
CitU'iuiUi internal coiuhtions and upon neutrals 
and also upon civilian mund in the allied coun- 
tries, luul not the French Government, by 
givitig to Lonl Xorthcliffe full facilities for 
proceetling ti> the Venlun front and viewing the 
situation for himself, taken the best stops to 
catch up the lie. The action was perhaps the 
best recognition given to the value of the Press 
as a part of the fighting forces of the Allies. 
Steps were taken to ensure the speedy trans- 
mis.sion of Lord Xorthcliffe's first dispatch to 
The Times to all the leading papers of the 
world. 

The dispatch was dated " Before Verdun, 
March 1." It began with a reference to the 



various theories regarding the motives oi the 
Cierman offensive, antl proceeded : 

From the evidttniie of (<Hrina.n deserters it is known 
tlmt the attack WHa orijjiiiivlly intemlwl U) take pluin a, 
month or two huiifo, wlieii the ^'roiniii was dry. Pro- 
mature sprinj^ cuusud tlio (jerinaiis to urceleriite lht<ir 
plans. There were two final delays owing to hail 
weather, and then came the coIomsuI onslaiij,dit of 
tebruary 21. 

I'lm (jurmaiis niu'le a j,'ood many of tin- fiuillh wo miidu 
al t.alHpoli. Tlioy annoiincud tiiat soMiti(hiii){ jarj^e was 
|>ending by closint; the Swiss frontier. Tlio Kronch were 
also fully warned hy their own astute Intelli^^enco 
Department. Tfieir aviona wore not idle, and, if con- 
firmation wore needed, it was given hy deserters, who, 
surmising the horrors that were to come, crept out of 
the trenches at night, lay down by the edge of the Mouse 
till the mofning, and then gave themselves up, together 
with information that has since proved to ho ac•cural(^ 
'filings went wrong with the (Jormans in other ways. 
A Zeppehii that was to have blown up important railway 
junctions on the French line of communications was 
brought down at R6vigny, and inpidontally the inhabi- 
tants of what remains of that niuch-bombardod town 
werii avenged by tho sijoctacln of the blazing dirigible 
crashing to tho ground and the hoisting with their own 
petards of 30 Huns therein. It is not necessary to 
recapitulate that the gigantic effort of February 21 was 
frustrated by tho coolness and tena<'ity of tho French 
soldiers and the deadly curtain of fire of the French 
gunners. 

Though a great deal of calculated nonsense has been 
sent out in oflicial communiquis and dilated upon by 
ditliyrambic Horlin newspaper correspondents as to the 
taking by storm of the long-dismaiUlod Fort at Douau- 
mont, nothing whatever has boon admitted by the 
Germans as to the appalling price in blood they have paid 
since February 21 i>.nd are still paying. Tho French 




FRENCH TROOPS CONVEYING A BOMB MORTAR. 



THE TIMES T7T STORY OF THE WAR. 




FRENCH LIGHT RAILWAY AT VERDUN. 



loases are, and have been, insignificant. I know the 
official figure. It has been verified by conversations 
with members of the British, French, and American Red 
CrosH Societies, who are obviously in a position to know. 
The wounded who pass through their hands have, in 
many cases, come straight from where they have seen 
flea'l Germans, as has been described by scores of 
witnesses, lying as lay the Prussian Guard in the first 
battle of Ypres. The evidence of one army as to another 
army's losses needs careful corroboration, and I have 
that in the evidence of many German prisoners interro- 
gated singly and independently at the French Head- 
quarters. 

lieyond this there are the careful conclusions, checked 
and sifted, of experienced and competent soldiers, who 
have every reason not to underestimate the remaining 
strength of the enemy. These conclusions are, roughly, 
that of the (iffrrnnn Corps known to have been onguged 
the .3rd and 18th (.'orjjs have been entirely usod up, or 
" spent," as the military phrase goes, 'fhe 7th lieserve 
Corps has lost half, and the 1.5th (>jri>s three-quarters, of 
its available strengths. According to these authorities, 
whfrt*: opinion, I repeat, <-aii be taken as erring on the 
si'le of prudence, the Gerrn'iri forces ha^l by the evening 
of .Marfh .3 " us«mJ up," in aridition to those alreiulv 
mentioned, a part of the 1 13th iJivision, the 5th Reserve 
C*jrps, and the Bavarian Krsatz Division, without taking 
into a'-coiint the losses of other reinforcements, whose 
presence on the baltlefiel'i has not yet been definitely 
ascr-rtainefl, 

•More rlirect, though pos-ibly lesfi reliable, evid(;nre 
WHM Df^eured by r|iiestioning closely a number of the 
(tfrrnan pris'»nf?rs. Among them wrire men from all 
partM of the Krnpire. Al^alians, I'ouieriinians, IIi-MMians, 
Wilesiann, I'rusMiarx, Hanoverians, liavariaiis, Wnrtern- 
burgers, and i'russian I'oles, all related experiences 
identical in subHtanee, though varying in detail. 

'f>ie rmtf. of one man belon;/ing to the 3rd lialtnlion of 
the 12th Regiment of the .Olh Division of the 3rd Army 



Corps may be taken as characteristic. On the morning 
of February 28 this prisoner reached the Fort ot Douaii- 
mont and found there one battalion of the 24th Regiinont, 
elements of the 64th Regiment and of the 3rd Battalion 
of Jager. The .strength of his company had been, on 
February 21, 200 rifles with four officers. On February 
22 it had fallen to 70 rifles, with one officer. The otlior 
companies had suffered similar losses. On February 23 
the prisoner's company was reinforced by 45 men, bearing 
the numbers of the 12th, the 52nd, the 35th, and the 
205th Regiments. The.se men had been drawn from 
various depots in the interior. The men of the 12th 
Regiment believed that five regiments were in reserve 
in the woods behind the 3rd Corps, but, as time went on 
and losses increa-sed without any sign of the actual 
presence of these reserves, doubt spread whether they 
were really in existence. 'JTie prisoner doclarod that his 
comrades were no longer capable of fresh effort. 

None of the prisoners questioned estimated the losses 
suffered by their companies at less than om-'lhii'il of the 
total effectives. Taking into aocoinit all available 
indications, it may safely be assumed thai, during the 
fighting of the last 13 ilays, the Geriiiaiis have lost iv 
killed, wounded, anil [)risoners at least 100, (K) I men. 

The profits — as the soldier speaks of sudi ninlters — 
being ho small, what then are the overwliehning motives 
that im(>el the attack on Verdun, an<l the chicanery of 
the (ierinun rommuiiir/n^.i V .... It caiuiot be ])r(5- 
lerided thai the attack has in it anything of military 
necessity. It was urged forward at a time of year when 
weath(!r conditions migiit (irove, as they have proved, 
a serious handica]) in such matters as the moving of big 
guns and the cMsenlial observation by aer()|)laMcs, 'I he 
(li<lrict of V'enliin lies in one of the coldest and also I he 
in >st rnisty Neetorsin tlio long line between Nieujtort iinri 
.Switzerland. Changes of temjjerature, too, are somewhat 
more frequent here than elsewhere ; and so sudden are 
tlii-se changes that not long ago here or'cnrred on 'a |)Mrt 
ot the front one of Nature's furiijiis arul roinuiUic 



80 



77//<; TiMt:s HisroiiY oi' tuk wau. 



r«iniiult)ra ol her |i^ivver tu iiuinwu Iter will. The upptisiiig 
Kroiuth anil UeriiiMii troiictuM, their parttpata hi*rii frozen, 
are uu eluao that they are aotuully within hearing uf each 
uther. 'I'liwut'iU dawn a ra|iul thaw tset in. 'I'hu 
parapeto nu-llutl anil .sulmiilutl, antl twu lung linets uf men 
tituuU up naked, a.-t it were, betore each i>ther, lace to 
iai'e with only two poatiibiUtieii — wholeaale murder on 
the line side or the other or a temporary unoltii'ial peat-u 
tor (he making of fretih parapet protectionti. 

The ait nation wa^^i a.itoumling and uniipie in the 
hiitory of trench warfare. The French and (iermun 
otticem, without conferriiit; ami unwilling to negotiate, 
turned their backs :io that they might not Hee ollicially 



so unwurlike a BCene, and the men on each tide rebuilt 
their parapets witltout the tiring of a single shot. 

This instance berveit to illustrate the preciiiious 
weather in which the (lermans have undttrtaken an 
adventure in the ipiick HuccesH of which the elements 
play Much part. That the attack would certainly prove 
more coHtly to them than to the French the (ieiinan 
Staff must have known. That the sulierings of the 
woimdeil lying out through the long nights of icy wind 
in the No Man's Land between the lines would be groat 
did not probably disturb the Crown I'rince. Yet it is a 
gruesome fact in the history of the war that the French 
peering through the moonlight at what they tboiiglil to 
be stealthily crawling ( lermans found them to be wounded 
iii(<n frozen to death. 

During the war, in France and in Flanders, in ramfis 
unii in hospitals, I have conversed with at least KlU 
(iermuns. I'risoners' talk is always to be accei)led with 
great reserve, but the j)risi)ners of the Verdun camjiaigu 
have HO plainly horror and misery depicted upon their 
countenances that I need no other ovidonco us to the 
tragedy through which they have passed. 

Thi^ vast battle of X'erilun might have been arrange I 
fur the benelit of interested spectators, were it not thai 
tho whole zone for miles around the great scene is as 
I ightly closed to tho outer world as a lodge of Froemnsons. 
l-'urnished with every p<jssil)lc kind of pass, acc(>m|ianic(l 
by a mcmb(!r of tho French ll<'a(l(|uart(!rs iStaff in a 
military car driven by a chaiilfcur who.sc steel helmet 
narked him as a soldier, I was nevertheless held up by 
intractable gendarmes. My colleague, the chief of the 
torcign (h^partment of The Timcn, who assist (sd me in the 
many in(iuiries 1 was prc.si^ntly allowed to make in and 
about the battlefield, was detained with me at a point 
25 miles away from the great scene. Even ut that 
distance the mournful and imceasing reverberation of 
the guns was insistent, and, as the sentry examineil our 
pajjers and waited for telephonic instructions, I counted 
more than 200 of tfie distant voices of KuHur. As one 
gets nearer and nearer the great arena on which the 
whole world's eyes aie turned to-day, proofs of Frcnih 




A FRENCH PORTABLli: SEARCHLIGHT. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



37 




FRENCH MACHINE-GUN SECTION IN THE TRENCHES. 



efficiency and French thoroughness are countless. I do 
not pretend to any military knowledge other than a few 
scraps gathered in some half-dozen visits to the war, 
bat the abundance of reser\-e shells for guns, from mighty 
howitzers to the graceful French mitrailleuse of the 
aeroplane, of rifle ammunition, of petrol stores, and of 
motor-wagons of every description, was remarkable. I 
can truly say that the volume exceeded anything in my 
previous experience. 

As one approaches the battle the volume of sound 
becomes louder and at times terrific. And it is curious, 
the mingling of peace with war. The chocolate and the 
pneumatic tire advertisements on the village walls, the 
kilometre stone with its ten kilometres to Verdun, a 
village cur<5 peacefully strolling along the village street, 
just as though it were March, 1914, and his congregation 
had not been sent away from the war zone, while their 
houses were filled by a swarming army of men in pale 
blue. Such a wonderful blue this new French invisible 
cloth ! A squadron of cavalry in the new blue and their 
ijteel helmets passes at the moment, and gives the 
impression that one is back again in what were known as 
the romantic days of war. 

Wlien one lias arrived at the battlefield; there are a 
dozen vantage points from which with glasses, or, indeed, 
with the naked eye, one can take in much that has 
happened. Verdun lies in a great basin with the silvery 
Meuse twining in the valley. ITie scene is, on the whole, 
Scottish. Verdun, from where I saw it, might bo Perth, 
and the Meuse the Tay. Small groups of firs darken 
dome of the hills, giving a natural resemblance to 
Scotland. 

The town is being ma'lo into a Bccond Ypres by the 
Germans. Yet, as it stands out in the nunlight, it is 
difficult to realize that it is a place whoso people have all 
gone, save a few of the faithful who live below ground. 
(YpreM looked like that the firnt time I saw it soon after 
the war began.) The tall towers of Verdun Htill stand. 
Close by uh in a hidden French battery, and it is pretty 
to se« the promptitude with whi'li it Honds its screaming 
•hells back to the Germans within a few seconds of tho 
dispatch of a miwive from tho Huns. One speedily 
grows ftccustome'l to the sounfl and the occne, and can 
follow the position of the villages about which the 
Germans pret«nd to mislea«i tho world by wtreloMa every 
morning. 

W« jfnim«y farther afield, and th« famous fort of 
Dooaiimont is pointwl out. 'ITie stormiiig of Fort 
Dotiau;ri'/rit n^ related by tho Gorman dispatches is 
on a par with the sinking of the 'I'iger and tho recent 



air bombardment of Liverpool. All the world knows 
that the Tiger is, as she was before the Germans sank 
her in their newspapers, one of the finest ships in the 
world, and that the air bombardment of Liverpool was 
imagined in Berlin. The storming of Fort Douaumont, 
gunless and unmanned, was about as important, a 
military operation of little value. A number of the 
Brandenburgers climbed into the gunless Fort of 
Douaumont, and some of them are still there, supplied 
precariously with food by their comrades at night. 
They are practically surrounded by the French, whose 
Headquarters Staff regard the whole incident as a 
simple episode in the give-and-take of war. Tlie 
announcement of the fall of Fort Douaumont to the 
world evinces the great anxiety of the Germans to 
magnify anything concerning Verdun into a great event. 
It should also cause people to apply a grain of salt 
to German official communiquis before swallowing them. 
These modern battles have now been described so 
frequently that there is little new to be said of them. 




REINFOKCEMKNTS WAIIING FOR 
TRAINS. 



38 



T///.' 77V/:,9 HISTORY OF THE WAB. 




CIVILIANS LEAVING VERDUN. 
One of the last inhabitants to leave the town. 



Of the battle of Verdun it can be said that on a fine day 
and out of sight of the horrors of the hand-to-hand 
encounters its surroundings make it a beautiful battle. 
There is rather more bird life in this part of Franca 
than in some others, and we noticed with particular 
interest the spirit and the cheerful song of a lark as it 
rose warbling hard by the spot where a French " 75 " 
was splitting the ears with its snap and scream. 

As we leave the battlefield and come to where is 
the first Red Cross Station it rejoices our English 
eyes to notice the number of English ambulances 
bearing the inscription of the British Red Cross and the 
Order of St. John of Jerusalem, which are allowed to 
aid the French. It will please the miners and mine- 
owners of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire to know 
that many of the wonderful carriages are of their gift. 
The Red Cross flags that flutter pathetically gay, as the 
cars drive along the well-cared-for road, make one 
anxious, but a few inquiries prove that the losses of the 
day have been inconsiderable. 

The dispatch spoke, as aU-eady quoted, of the 
wonderful transport service, and proceeded : 

Who are the men who are organizing the great battle 
for the French side ? Let me at once say that they 
are -young men. General Petain, one of the discoveries 
of the war, till lately colonel, is still in his fifties, and most 
of the members of his staff are n.\ich younger. One 
hears of luxury at Headquarters, but I have not expe- 
rienced it, either at our own Headquarters or at the 
French. General Potain, when I enjoyed his hospitality 



at lunelieon, drank tea. Most of his young men con- 
tented themselves with water, or the white wine of the 
Meuse. There should be less excitement at Headquarters 
of armies than at any part of the battlefield. 

In the ■ brief meal he allowed himself the General 
discussed the battle as though he were merely an inte- 
rested spectator. In appearance he resembles Lord 
Roberts, though he is of larger build. In accordance 
with the drastic changes that the French, like the 
Germans, are making in their Command, his rise has 
been so rapid that he is little known to the French 
people, though greatly trusted by General Jofire and 
the Government. I naturally did not ask his opinion 
on any matters connected with the war. We dis- 
cussed the Australians, the Canadians, the great growth 
of the British Army, and kindred matters. 

At another gathering of officers some one asked 
whether the French would not expect the British to 
draw off the Germans by making an attack in the West. 
" It is questionable," replied one young officer. " whether 
such an attack would not involve disproportionate 
losses that would weaken the Allies." The same officer 
pointed out that, although the capture of Verdun would 
cause great regret, owing to the historic name it boars, 
it would not, for many reasons, be more in»pt>rtant 
than the pressing back of any other similar number of 
miles on the front. Forts being of little account since 
the introduction of the big German luimmers, he believed 
that General Sarrail liad said that tlio qxiostion was not 
one merely of dismantling the forts, but of blowing 
them up. As it is, whenever the Germans capture 
a piece of land where an old fort happens to be, they will 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



39 



use it as an advertisement. But though the French 
officers are not looking to us, so far as I could learn, 
for active cooperation now, they are most certainly 
urging that when our new armies and their officers aro 
trained we shall aid them by bearing our full share of 
the tremendous military burden they are now carrying. 

The present attack on the French at Verdun is by 
far the most violent incident of the whole Western 
war. As I write it is late. Yet the bombardment is 
continuing, and the massed guns of the Germans are 
of greater calibre than have ever been used in such 
numbers. The superb calm of the French people, the 
efficiency of their organization, the equipment of their 
cheery soldiery, convince one that the men in the 
German machine would never be able to compare with 
them even if France had not the help of Russia, the 
five British nations, Belgium, Serbia, Italy, and Japan. 
It is unsafe to prophesy about war, as it is to prophesy 
about any other human affair, but this prediction one 
can make, and with certainty : that, whatever may be 
the result of the attack on the Verdun sector, every 
such effort will result in adding many more thousands 
of corpses to those now lying in the valley of the Meuse, 
numbers of which are being so carefully concealed from 
the neutral world and the Germans themselves ; and 
coxild neutrals see the kind of men whom the Germans 
do not scruple to use as soldiers their faith in Teutonic 
efficiency would receive a shock. 

Unluckily a pygray behind a machine-gun is the 
equal of a giant. " A^Tiat a pity your Highlanders 
cannot meet these fellows in fair fight," said a French 
officer, as we reviewed a gang of prisoners. " The war 



would bo over in a month." Personal contact with the 
miserable creatures who form the bulk of the German 
prisoners is needed to convince an observer that such 
specimens of humanity can really have belonged to the 
German Army, and especially to a corps cTHila such as 
the 3rd, or Berlin, Army Corps. One ill-favoured youth 
hailing from Charlottenburg was barely 5 ft. 4 in. 
high. Narrow-chested and peak-faced, he had the 
quick-wittednoss of the urban recruit, but seemed far 
better fitted for his stool as a railway clerk than for 
the life of the trenches or for the ordeal of attack 
Yet he had been taken at the end of 1914 and sent to 
Flanders after six weeks' training, " educated " in 
trench-making for another month, then left to fend 
for himself and his comrades as a full-fledged Prussian 
eaglet. Like the bulk of the other prisoners belonging 
to other units, he had been withdrawn at the beginning 
of February from the Flanders front and sent to the 
neighbourhood of Verdun. He had known that there 
was to be an attack, but until the order was actually 
given neither he nor his comrades had received any hint 
of the precise purpose of the operation in which he was 
to be employed. 

Of one thing he and his fellows were heartily glad — . 
to be taken away from the neighbourhood of the 
" frightful " English and nearer to the kindly French. 
From all the reports which these men had received 
from their families during the last two months it appears 
that, in the words of one of them, " there reigns in 
Germany considerable misery." All agreed that butter 
is unobtainable, meat scarce (except in Alsace and 
parts of Pomerania), fat almost unknown even in the 




fiERMAN I'KISONEHS Ol' WA«. 
Bcin^ interrogated by an officer of the French Intelligence Department. 



40 



THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR. 



Army, thuutjh iu uthur reapuctb the (uuU of the Army 
wttd tolc-ntble, th»ujjh nut (juihI or atiuiidttnt. All 
dc-i'ltirciU itittt eiittiuaMaiik fur tho wttr titMl Unit; >i>Q(^ 
svaporiittid, though, as two of the mure iiitnlliijeiit 
amuiitj them mAiiitained. the German Army duod aut 
expect tu be liealeii, even if it iiu longer hopes to win. 
The ctiief lunging of the nten. aa of their familieb. waa fur 
{teace. 

The only good thing about these prisoners waa their 
foot'j^ear. Their btuut Uliu-her Ijuota were an object- 
leeson in the necebiiity of tightening certain featured 
of our blockade and of adding a shortage of leather to 
the other deticiencies of the military and civil supply 
that are wearing down the German power of resistance. 

The true moral of the fighting tu the north and eu^t 
of Verduu is that the French, with a cumjiaratively 
small lusd of gruund, have warded uti the attack of 
armies uutnumbering them originally by tliree to one. 

After giviiiR the German order of battle, a.s 
already quoted, Lord Nortlicliffe added : 

There are no ineanj of estimating how long the 
battle of Verdun may still rage. To say that the 
French are confident of holding their own is not enough. 
They feel that they have the measure of the enemy, 
both in men and maUriel. They know that, given the 
necessary concentration of heavy artillery, either side 
can drive the other from first, or even from the second, 
po.Mtions, but that, unless the bombardment be followed 
up by infantry attacks of far greater vigour and per- 



Blstence than any yet executed by the enemy, anil unless 
the advani'u of the enemy's artillery can keep pace with 
that of the infantry, the defending force will have time 
to make its third positions practically impregnable. 

This is what Inib happened ruund Verdun. To the 
nortii and the northeast the lirat and second French 
liaea were obliterated bv an intense bombardment 
executed with guns of which the smallest weio 105 mm., 
while the bulk were 210 mm. Largo numbers of still 
heavier weajions up to 380 mm. were freely used both in 
direct and in curtain fire. 'J'he weakness of the French 
forces holding the first and second lines accounts for 
the insignificance of their losses. Ground having thus 
been gained by the Germans to the north tlio French 
evacuatc-d voluntarily the marshy ground east of the 
Verdun Itidges in the VVoevre. 

The effect of this action waa threefold. It gave the 
French a strong defensive line on high ground, it pre- 
vented the formation of a dangerous salient, and, appa- 
rently, it induced the Germans to believe that their 
enemy was demoralized. 

Verdun is unlikely to be taken. Nothing justifies a 
belief that the spirit and the stamina of the German 
forces are ecjiial tu the tusk of dislodging the French 
from their present formidable positions. 

The spirit of confident optimLsm, of efficiency 
and resolution reflected in this dispatch never 
failed the French in the long and bloody struggle 
which was still to come. 




FRENCH RED-CROSS UNDER FIRE. 
The heroism of ambulance men on the battlefield. 



CHAPTER CXXIV. 

BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN 

WAR-TIME. 



Wab Legislation — Nature of the Problems — War Control under Queen Elizabeth — 
And L'nder Pitt — Methods and Machinery in 1914 — Royal Proclam,\tions— Orders in 
CkJUNCiL — Orders from Government Departments — The Iving's Prerogatives— Defence of 
the Realm Acts — ^Trading wt:th the Enemy- — Aliens and Nationality — The Spy Peril and 
Control of Aliens— Some Remarkable Cases — The " Squire's Daughter '" — New Passport 
System — Special Constables and Their Work — The Drink Problem — Stringent Measures 
— The Board of Control — Air Raids and Restriction of Lights — Daylight Saving — The 
Summer Time Act — National Moral. 



THE abnormal conditions created by 
a state of war in the social and 
economic life of a people are 
necessarily reflected in the legisla- 
tive and administrative activities of the nation, 
and it is therefore important to bring these 
particular results of the Great War into non- 
technical but explicit compass. It is the more 
important because war legislation invariably 
extends beyond the time -limits of the war and 
in certain respects permanently modifies the 
constitutional and economic structure of the 
realm. 

Hero it in only intended to deal primarily 
with the machinery that had to be set up to 
meet the innumerable economic and .social 
questions that sprang from the state of war 
and flemandwJ irLstant solution. There was 
\\\f: fr,rnfjl»-x fjroblem of subordinating tlu; great 
privat*; railwayn Hystern of the country to 
the nwiessities of the war while preserving the 
iiHC of thfr«e very railways for [purposes of 
paHH*;ngfT traffic and tragic. The Continental 
nations ha/J no sufh f>roblem to solve. Primarily 
the Contin»mtal railways are military instru- 
mcjitn that in [>»;fu;e time are divf;rtf!d to civil 
ijw«, but are always really to bo brought bju;k 
to their military purpose. Peculiarly was this 
Vol. Vi 11.- Part 93. 



the case in Germany, where the fascination of 
interior lines really determined the method of 
campaign. Then England was faced by the 
great shipping problem, wliich was never 
adequately controlled vuitil the sunmner of 1916 ; 
by the food question ; by the drink problem ; 
by labour difliculties that were no new ques- 
tion ; by innumerable difficulties relating to 
the post, the press, the telegraph, the tele- 
phone, wireless installations, police, protection 
of railways, canals, waterworks, public build- 
ings ; by, above all, the amazingly difficult 
problem of the aliens who swarnuHl in England 
in 1914. None of these problems were really 
new. They had always arisen in past wars. 
But the operations of science and the increase 
of population, combined with immense facilities 
for the movement of workers and t ravellers, had 
largely transforrrKnl the problems and intensified 
the urgosncy of thorn. Tliere were of course other 
vast home probhsins that arose : questions of 
national finance, in n^lation both to defence 
and trade ; questions of the raising of armies 
and the manning of fleets ; questions of high 
[)olitics. Th(«e have be(;n or will be dcuiit with 
elscwh«!n! in this ilislory, and it is suf'fic^ient 
here to lay stress u[)on the fact that the great 
questions of National Defence and National 



41 



4> 



TUl'J TIMK^ HISTORY OF THK WAR. 




AT AN ENGLISH COAST TOWN. 
A photographer having his papers examined. 



Finance were really inseparable from all the 
other questions that arose in the great effort 
of an ancient and united people to secure its 
future as adequately as it had maintained its 
past. 

The record of the past gave the keynote to 
the whole of the legislative efforts that became 
operative from August, 1914, onwards, and 
we shall venture to explain in broad outline 
the steps taken by the nation in earlier ages 
to secure itself against the aggression of un- 
scrupulous foes. It is not necessary for this 
purpose to dwell on the history of national 
defence, stretching back in luibroken record to 
Saxon times, save to say that the same spirit 
which for more than a thousand j^ears had 
subordinated the entire resoiu-ces of the 
Realm to national defence remained un- 



broken. But it is important to glance back 
at the practice of national defence in the 
great age of Queen Elizabeth. When England 
was threatened with invasion by France at 
the end of the eighteenth century, Pitt gave 
instructions that the precedents of the Eliza- 
bethan age should be searched out, and when 
thLs was done h6 went to Parliament for 
additional powers to meet circumstances that 
ilid not exist in the earlier period. We search 
the Statute Book in vain to discover the 
measures taken by Queen Elizabeth to meet 
the Spanish perU. The earlier statutes of the 
pre-Reformation ages and the Common Law 
of National Defence were considered adequate. 
For the records of national ^^fence in the 
years 1586 to 1588 we look rather to the 
Registers of the Privj' Coimcil. We fintl 
some necessary legislation of readjustn\eut 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



43 



after the peril was past, but the work of 
national defence was undertaken by a small 
Committee of six or seven men sitting with 
the great Queen at the Palace of Placentia in 
Greenwich. The modern economist will, how- 
ever, ask, how did this Committee get on 
without the money wliich Parliament alone 
could supply ? The Committee of National 
Defence was a resourceful body, and one that 
put the fear as well as the praise of the Queen 
into the hearts of men. The Committee boldly 
substituted rates for taxes and the problem 
was solved. Thus, on March 30, 1586, the 
Pri\-y CouncU at Greenwich directed the Lord? 
Lieutenant of the maritime coiinties to mak( 
provision for the defence of the Realm, and 
for that purpose to make a collection in certain 
towns of money to be employed for the supply 
of match and powder, to be purchased at a 
reasonable rate from Henry Dale of London, 
merchant, the contractor nominated by the 
Crown, the immortal predecessor of the con- 
tractors of three centuries, but as yet iinrepre- 
sented by statuary or legend in the purlieus 
of ParUament or the open spaces of Whitehall. 
We have no reason to suppose that he was 
other than an honest Englishman for the 
simple reason that there is no record of his 
death at the hands of justice. The ways of 
justice were swift, violent and effective in the 
spacious days of Queen Elizabeth. 



Tlio volumes of the Register of the Privy 
Council covering the years 1580, 1587, 1588 
are of unequalled fascination, for in those 
golden pages we see England preparing herself 
for a great effort of national self-defence. 
Provision is made for the defence of the Channel 
Isles, the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth. The 
Sussex iron workers are busy forging ijiuis, 
" all marked with her Highnesses arms." The 
clergy are specially taxed to furnish " horses 
for her Highness's service in the Lowe 
Countries," and voluntary forces are raised 
for the same purpose. The raising and train- 
ing of county levies at local expense went on 
apace. The justices had to provide petronels, 
had to repress carriers of news, had to look 
to the landing of spies in the ovitward fashion 
of priests. We see the Admu-alty Court sitting 
for the condemnation of prizes, scouting skitis 
are watching for the Spanish fleet, on the East 
Coast the gentry are raising contributions for 
the coast ordnance, the beacons of Kent are 
waiting for the match, while watchers are 
ready to prevent false alarms. The Lortls 
Lieutenant have their trained bands read\'^ at 
an hour's notice to repair to their appointed 
stations, and a Roj^al Fleet is watching for 
Parma. The Lord Treasurer was bidden to 
transfer all necessary funds to the Treasurer 
of the Navy. Kent was presented with a 
Government grant to enable it to defend the 




IHADlSi. Willi I UK HNRMY TKIAL IN SCOTLAND 
A icene In the (>ourt of Justice, Hdinburgh. 



93 2 



41 



Tni<: TiMi':s history of the war. 



i'liuiaub, Tilbury ami Huiwich. 'I'railu with 
tile Luw (Juuiiti'iud vvuri iurbiddtiii and tliu 
export of proviHioiu stoppud. Ttio raising ot 
troops in Loiuluu ami uUewhuru went on merrily, 
and local contributiotui were thankfully re- 
ceivetl. Thn " Liberties " of London, the rich 
French and Dutch cliurchen in London, the 




clergy at Winchester and elsewhere poure<' 
out their gold. In 1588 many seaport towna 
were directed in medieval fashion to fm-nish 
shii)8 for the Queen's service, but the burden 
on the rates for tliis purpose was spreml as 
widely as possible, and furnished the precetlent 
that was destined to destroy Charles, King anil 
Martyr. Where neticssary the Coimcil at 
(Jreonwich ordered the local rate for local 
victualling to bo paid, and if any refused they 
liiul to appear and give explanations to the 
( Nnincil. Moreover letters were sent to the 
Lords Lieutenant of the southern and midland 
louiities for the new mustering, training and 
reviewing of soldiers. Despite local grumbling, 
18,000 troops and 2,000 horse were assembled 
at Tilbury and reviewed by the Queen in 
person ; but in fact there was much difliculty 
in arming other local levies. 

The picture of Elizabetlian England in war- 
time has much in common with the picture of 
the Great War : a slow appreciation of danger 
but much readiness to fight when the need waa 
felt. But there was no hesitation in the 
supreme direction of affairs; Parliament > was 
almost as non-existent as it is to-day, but the 
Privy Council knew its own mind, or the Queen's 
mind, and acted on it with speed and certitude. 
'Plie costs of the war were met out of the local 



i-fc. " *-'""*'-^V 






i 
^ 



LORD MAYOR OF LONDON AS RECRUITING OFFICER. 

Swearing-in recruits at the Tower of London. Smaller picture : Alderman Sir Charles C Wakefield, 
the Lord Mayor (1915-1916), arriving at his Recruiting Cffioe. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF TUF WAR. 



45 




COLONEL SIR EDWARD WARD INSPECTING SPECIAL CONSTABLES. 



rates sparingly supplemented by the Treasury. 

After the war and all national danger had passed 

Parliament dealt with the economic position. 

In I.ISO the embezzlement of military stores 

was made a felony. In 1593 and L595 a parish 

rate was levied for the relief of maimed soldiers 

and mariners, and in 1601 the whole -question 

of these poor fellows wa-s- raised anew at the 

same time that the great Poor Law Act waR 

passed. The preamble to the Act deserves 

revival. It runs : — 

Foraemuch as it is now found more needfiil than it was 
at tlie making of the Bald Aots to provide relief and 
nu.intcnanco to Boldiera and mariners that have lost 
their limbs and di<tah>led their bodies in the defence and 
service of Her Majf;Hty and the State, in respect the 
number of the waid Holdicrs is bo much the great f-r by 
how much Her Majf^ty's jimt and hononrriblo defensive 
wan are increa«ed. To the end that the said soldiers and 
rn«rin#^rs may reap the fruit of their good descrvings and 
nthfTn may iie encouragcl to perform the like 
«5ndcavoiirt'. 

So there- was set up very elaborate machinery 
of relief (entirely independent of tho Poor I^aw) 
tbrough parochial funds a^lministercfl by tho 
High Constables as treasurers. 

Xo doubt hII these points were brought 
befwft Pitt in 175)8. It was clearly impossible 
for him to rely f>ti the rates, and so ho at once 
legjslaterl (38 (U-n. Ill, c. 27). He laid flown 
two principles wliicb, says Mr. flode, the his- 
torian, *' must be kept in view in considering 



the measures to be adopted to meet any 
similar emergency." These principles were : — 

1. " Implicit confidence and obedience to 
the orders of the executive government, at the 
same time rendering to the Crown tho use and 
disposal of all prf)perty that could be made 
available for the national defence." 

2. " Compensation out of the Public Treasury 
for all losses sustained by those of His Majesty's 
subjects wlio should fulfil the obligations 
thrown upon them by tho Act." 

The Act directed tho County and Deputy 
Lieutenants to procure returns of men of 
fifteen years of age and under sixty, distinguish- 
ing which were in volunteer corps and whicli 
were willing to bo employed in defence of the 
country ; returns of Quakers, aliens and infirm 
persons ; returns of available boats, waggons, 
horses and provisions. If there were not 
sufficient volunteers the Militia laws for com- 
pulsory service were to be put in force. Kcqui- 
sitions on tho largest scale were authorized ; t h(^ 
principle' of' compulsory occupation and i)in- 
chose of necessary Innrj by tlie State was irifro- 
duccd. 

The statutes of 1797 luirj 179K are our fiiKt 
mf»<l(l of Parliamentary war legiHlnlioti iiiKJcr 
conrlitions of somi- fconortiic Hirnilarity to those 
of to-day. 'J'hiis on Novf^mluT .'JO, 1797, 
restrict )r»nH on payments of cush by the Hntii;, 



46 



THE TIMHS HlsronV UF Till': WAR. 




OFF TO THE FRONT: A SCENE 
Reservists with their relatives and friends awaiting the departure of the 



introduced in the previous year, were to con- 
tinue " until one month after the conclusion 
of the present war " * ; on the same day the 
Scottish banks were authorized to issue notes. 
The "aid and contribution for the prosecution 
of the war " (January 12, 1798, c. 16) was in 
part provided by what was in fact a graduated 
income tax on persons with incomes over £60 
a year. For incomes of £200 and upwards 
the tax was not to exceed one-tenth of the 
income. The tax was levied in respect of the 
residence of the victim and not directly on the 
income. Chapter 17 allowed men who be- 
longed to the Supplementary Militia which 
had been created in 1797 to enlist for a period 
ending six months after the conclusion of a 
general peace Chapter 28 cut off all com- 
munications with Holland. Chapter 32 raised 
the billeting rates to lOd. a day for each man 
in respect of diet and small beer in quarter? 

» 37 Geo. TTT. c. 91, 4.5 ; 38 Oeo. ITT. c. 1. 



and lOJd. in respect of each horse in respect 
of hay and straw. The former rate was 6d. 
" The traitorous practices of wicked and dis 
affected persons within the realm," persona 
prepared to aid invasion, were sternly de.-Jt 
with by Chapter 36. Chapter 45 cut off com- 
munications with Switzerland. Chapter 46 
was an Act for the more speedy and effectual 
manning of His Majesty's Navy and in effect 
suspended all statutory restrictions on impress- 
ment. Compulsory service for the Navy was 
in force from May 26, 1798. The King, more- 
over, was given power by proclamation to 
require aliens to register and to obtain licences 
for residence. No alien was to leave th» 
kingdom without a passsport, nor enter without 
a licence. Every person entertaining an alien 
for more than forty-eight hours had to report 
the fact. Suspect aliens were subject to arrest. 
Chapter 7(5 ordered all British ships to sail 
imder convoy. Chapter 78 regulated the Press. 
Chapter 79 made it a felony for a British subieot 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



47 




AT WATERLOO STATION. 

Southampton train after the issue of the Mobilisation Orders, August, 1914. 



voluntarily to repair to France, and felony for 
a British subject to correspond with a person 
who ha/J already gono to France. 

Pittcrystalhzed the Common Law of national 
defence into statutory foiin, he exteneled the 
Common I..aw principles to include compulsory 
purchase of lanrl, he widely extended the 
Militia system, he introduced compulsory ser- 
vice for the Xavy, he saw to it that T'arliament 
was supreme in war finance, and made littlt? 
us*; either of the Privy Counfil or the inherent 
powers of the Crown. Looking at the matter 
broarlly, we see that war in the reign of Eliza- 
hffh was exclusively condticted by the 7'nvy 
Council and in the reign of Ceorge ITL it was as 
excliiHively conflijct<rd by I'arliarrK-nt ; but in 
both cawfs it was, in Stut, conrliicted by a snudi 
group of det*rnnined and cl«-ar-headef| patriots 
who reHper;tive|y uwrfl the rna/;Fiinery that for 
th*5 purpos*,-s of the age apjxiareri the ma/-hinery 
be«t calculatcfl to defeat tlie enemy In flie 
Creat War of ]U]i Ijoth tin- I'rivy Council tind 



Parliament played an active part in the conduct 
of affairs. The subservience of the Council to 
Parliament was in theory beyond doubt, but 
in faet the members of the Coimcil exercised a 
controlling force in the deliberations of Parlia- 
ment, a reversion to the Elizabethan model 
which was hardly accompanied by the same 
tenacity of administration or grasp of the 
essential features of the problem presented by 
the economics of the United Kingdom. 

• 

The economic complexities of Great Britain 
in 1914 certainly exceeded those of the age of 
the yoiinger Pitt by far inorv. than those of 
Pitt's tiinr; exceeded the national economic 
problems of the age of P^li/.abcth. Steam and 
electricity had revolutionizf^d the commerce of 
all natioas and science had ti-ansfonned the 
art of war by sea and land. The English of the 
age of .Iilli'oc were very far away from the 
age of i'itt. Nelson and Napoleon, and while it 
v,iiH to bo expect(!d that the war legislation of 



4H 



Tin: TIMES HISTORY ol' Till: Wlli. 




THE KING AND QUEEN ENTERTAIN WOUNDED. 

Special constables taking the wounded soldiers to BuckiDgham Palace. 



1914 would show the ancient principles of home 
tleft'uce at work, yet it would also show those 
principles applied* in the most unexpected 
directions. When all the arts, industries, 
material and methods of peace production were 
of direct use in war it was inevitable that the 
new system of war legislation should cover the 
whole range of commerce and finance, should 
enlarge the ancient boundaries of military 
requisitions, place new limitations on aliens 
and strangers, bring all the operations of 
applied science within the confines of national 
safety and so reconstitute the national laws 
governing the economic structure of society as 
to enable English society to continue its 
normal labours screened from the dislocating 
operations of war. To maintain the condition 
of economic equilibrium necessary for the con- 
tinuance of national life is as necessary a part 
of war legislation as the provision of arms and 
men • to do this was easier in earlier ages than 
in the second decade of the twentieth century, 
but the problem was faced on the whole as 
successfully as in the days of Elizabeth or 
George III., and though a critical age poured 
its searchlight on the operation it was perhaps 



hardly realized at the time how hard a prob- 
lem the administrators of England had to 
solve. 

In this place it is not necessary to refer again 
in detail to the problems of war finance and the 
provision of war funds, but the question of 
commerciial finance needs an additional refer- 
ence. The outbreak of war had checked remit- 
tances, had caused a breakdown in the foreign 
exchanges, had deterred banks from discounting 
bills m the normal way. This tremendous 
difficulty was rapidly surmounted by an 
arrangement between the Government and the 
Bank of England by which the Bank was able 
to discovint home or foreign bank or trade bills 
accepted before August 4, 1914, and approved 
by the Bank. The position was fiu"ther relieved 
by the Currency and Bank Notes Act of 
August G, 1914, which sanctioned small notes 
and postal orders as ^egal tender. In February, 
1915, the financial problem was so entirely in 
hand that postal orders ceased to be legal 
tender. Other arrangements with the l^ank 
in relation to the Stock Exchange Loan scheme 
of October 31, 1914, and other matters, further 
illustrate the resourcefulness witii wliich the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



■I 9 



shock of \\ ar was warded off the economic basis 
of society. This was certainly a great achieve- 
ment, and the economic tliinkers who worked 
out the position of the Bank of England may 
be said to have played a great part in the 
successful prosecution of the war. The liistory 
of war finance has, however, been traced in an 
earUer chapter of this work, and the same is 
true of the Forces of the CrowTi ; but it is 
necessary to keep in mind the fact that the 
raising of such Forces was one of the essential 
subjects of war legislation, and it is in this 
connexion that probably the most pungent 
criticism was aimed at the successive Govern- 
ments led by Mr. Asquith. The slow approaches 
towards compulsory service undoubtedly 
delayed the progress of the war, but the problem 
was a very difficult one and the effort to avoid 
compi-ilsory service certainly complicated the 
problem, for the volimtary system carried into 
the fighting line men whose services were 
required at home and kept at home men whose 
chief usefulness would have been in the field. 
The struggle, however, lasted vmtil May, 1916, 
when it was at last recognized on all hands that 
national safety was bound up with compulsory 



service at home or abroad. The provision of 
money, arms and men, and the readjustment of 
the finance of commerce formed, however, only 
one aspect of the inunense problem which faced 
the Legislature and the Executive. The 
problems of home life loomed largely from the 
moment that war was declared. 

The outbreak of war brought forward, from 
the very necessities of the case, a subject of 
the profoundest constitutional importance — 
the method and machinery of war legislation. 
Svich legislation in the Elizabethan age had 
been chiefly effected by the Queen in Coimcil, 
in the age of Pitt by the Iving in Parliament. 
In this, as in all other matters, the early 
decades of the twentieth century were an 
eclectic age. Statesmen ransacked the records 
for new methods of legislation. There was 
hardly a possible form of legislative activity to 
which the Govenunent of Great Britain had 
not to resort in order rapidly to create an 
economic screen between the nation and the 
war zone and at the same time to carry on the 
Great War with efficiency. Success in the field 
and on the sea was not alone necessarv. It \yas 




CriY CONSTABI.hS KKCKIVI^ SWOKDS ON <>IJIAlM(\(; COMMISSIONS. 
PrcucntinK hwordn at Snow Mill I'ollcc Station, London. 



50 



'IHE llMhS HlSJOftY OF THE WAR. 



PCjuallv nf>of88ary to i>re«Tve a national life 
iitui'ime fruiii bui-ial and ecununiic iliisloeatiun. 

'J'hi^ legi^latlv^ methods — in ailililiun to the 
nonital passinK of btatuteu by 1 ailianient — by 
whu-tk tills yoal uaa Kuught were both reiimiU- 
able aiul complex, and it in important to 
anaiyse the process. Fiixt in the Ust of methods 
ue must name tlie Royal Proclamations. Some 
ol these were prerogatival (as, lor instance, the 
Proclamation ol Aug\i«t 4, 1014, a.- to tlu* 
l)»ifenco ol I he Uealm), othei-s vvtie nuulc " by 
and \Mih the advice of oui I'rivy Council '' (aa, 
for instance, the Hills (re- acceptance) Pro- 
citunation of August 2, 1914), others, again, 
were inaile in pursuance of powers contained in 
pre-war Acts of Parliament (such as the Army 
Acts ami the Bank Holiday Acts), and yet 




FOR CONSPICUOUS BRAVERY. 

Sir Edward Henry, Commissioner of Police, 

decorates a constable, returned from France, for 

gallantry in the field. 

others were made under special war statutes of 
the realm (such as the Currency and Bank 
Notes Act, 1914). The Bills (re-acoej)tance) 
Proclamation of August 2, 1914, was confirmed 
by statute the next day, but the j^rerogatival 
proclamations were t>ever f-o ^sonfirrned, even in 
the case where the giving of financial assistance 
to the enemy was proclaimed to be high 
treason, with the assurance that traitors would 
be proceeded against with the utmost rigour of 
the law. ^Vith such proclamations in any 
formal clas.sification must be ranked Royal 
Orders made xinder statutory authority, such 
as the Royal Order of August 4, 1914, authoriz- 
ing general or field ofVicers to issue requisitions 
of emergency. 

Proclamations made " by and with the ad\dce 



of our Privy Council " can hardly bo dis- 
tinguished ffoiii the second class of legislative 
iiLstruments, Orilers in Council, es[)«*ially whore 
such Orders have no statutory authority, as in 
the case of the Order in Council of August 3, 
1914, calling oflicers of the reserved and nftired 
lists into active service and suspending com- 
pulsory retirement from the active list. 'I'hat 
is one type of Ortier in Council. A more 
notal)le type if that of August 2S, 1914, pro- 
viding for the cancellation of so much of the 
K«>val Proclamation of September 17, I'JOO, as 
related to the distribution of the net proceeds 
of naval prizes. This typo illustrates the close 
inter-relation of legislation by Proclamation 
and legislation by Order in Council. But there 
were other types. There were Councils at which 
King (Jeorgo V. was personally present, with 
or without nominated Councillors, at Bucking- 
ham Palace, and there were Councils at the 
famous Council Chambers, Whitehall, at which 
His Majesty was not present and which solely 
consisted of " the Lords of His Majesty's Most 
Honourable Privy Council." These latter 
Councils sat to carry out the recommendations 
(authorized by statute) of a Government 
Department, as, for instance, where the Board 
of Trade, under section 2 of the Customs 
(Exportation Prohibition) Act, 1914, had power 
to recommend during the war the withdrawal 
of certain prohibitions of the exportation of 
provisions and metals to Colonies not possessing 
responsible government. These prohibitions 
were imposed under the Act by Royal Pro- 
clamation and were modified oy Order in 
Council on the recommendation of the Board 
of Trade (August 28. 1914). Here could be 
observed an extraordinary combination of 
legislative machinery : an Act of Parliament, 
a Royal Proclamation, a recommendation of a 
Government Department and an Order in 
Council passed in the absence of the King. 
Very ciunbrous it all looks, but, in fact, it was 
very speedy. The Act liad been passed on 
August 28, and under it the desured recom- 
n:iendation and Order in Council were also 
carried through on August 28 to vary Pro- 
clamations of August 3, 5, and 10, made under 
an Act of 1879 which the Act of 1914 had 
extended to all articles during the war. But «e 
get a tliird legislative method in <"onnexion with 
Government Departments. The action of such 
Departments ditl not alwaj's require the ftirmal 
assent and legislative authority oi the IVivy 
Coimcil. Sometimes a Department could act 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 



51 




IN THE EVKNT OF AIR RAIDS. 

Voluntary Aid Detachment starting out with a motor-amhulance and extemporising a receiving station 

for c ifiualtics. 



lefp'slativfJy on its own initiative in virtiu^ of 
jjtatijtory authority. ThuH the Hornn OfTico, 
UTuU-T the Aorial Navigation Arts, 1011. lui'l 
pf)W«:r (which it fixorcis^-rl on August 2, 1011, 
when the outbreak of war was alrewly imminent) 
to prohibit the navigation of uireraft. 'I'lien, 
again, the IVmtmaflt^r-Ocncral.iinflor the WirrilewH 
Telegraf>hy (Foreign ShipH) ReguhitioriH. 1!K)H, 
Trtfuif; by hirn un'l«;r the WirelewH Telegraphy 



Act, 1004, liaving boon informed by the Home 
OfJiee tiiat an emergoney had aris«)n, gave pu))lic 
notiec, on August 1, 1014, that the use of wire- 
l<;.SH telf!grapiiy on bfjarrl foreign ships in Hridsii 
waters siiould be Hubjf;et to Rules issued by Iho 
Admiralty. The Aflmirulty issued the Rules at 
onee. Here we se« three Government Depart- 
ments combining to ordf-r, without the inter- 
vention f)f the T'rovMi or Ili<^ I'ri\y Couneil, 

9;;— 3 






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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



53 



restrictions necessary for national defence. 
Many instances of such delegated legislative 
power might be quoted, but sufficient has been 
said to indicate the machinery that had grown 
up in 1914 to supplement the human limitations, 
of ParUament. a machinery which had been 
evolved from the mechanism handed down from 
those far of? simpler if less comfortable 
days when Proclamations and Orders in 
Council ^\ere the terror of the just. A fourth 
class of legislative activity that was apparent 
during the Great War is Likely to be less pleasuig 
to the student of constitutional history. The 
Treasury, on January 14, 1915, pubhshed an 
Order by which the issue of new capital under 
the Companies Acts w as forbidden without the 
consent of the Treasury. This Order, which was 
tolerated by a puzzled financial world as being, 
on the whole, necessary and desirable was, in 
fact, totally illegal, and it obtained its sanction, 
if sanction it could be called, in a most ciirious 
way. By the Stock Exchange Loan scheme, 
formulated by the Treasiiry on October 31, 
1914, the Stock Exchange agreed with the 
Treasury not to reopen without the consent 
and only on the conditions agreed to by the 
Treasury. Under the regulations issued in 
pursuance of this purely private agreement 
dealings in new issues were dependent on 
Treasury approval, and so the Treasury were in 
a position to check the issue of new capital by 
forbidding quotations on the London Stock 
Exchange. The fact that by the Government 
War Obligations Act 1914 advances to 
members of the Stock Exchange by the Bank 
of England were covered by a statutory 
guarantee may be said, in a sense, to have 
justified the Order, but even in war-time it 
would have been well to have kept within the 
linaits of a very elastic constitutional system 
and not to have relied on the dispensing power 
of a Legislative Authority which tended to 
become restive under a process of delegation of 
powers which in the early decades of the 
twentieth century tended to resich a limit 
beyonrl which the wit of n^ian could scarcely be 
expected to go. 

It will be useful here to illustrate the great 
constitutional power of the Crown that the 
war Bhowcd still to be in existence. It is shown 
in a Prerogatival Order in Council dated 
April 13, 1915, It opens with the following 
recitalH : — 

Whf.ri-.iiA n utat^of wnr o.xintM hotwe^n Tlix Mnjnsty an'l 
the O'jrmari Ernpfiror, tJio KrnpiTOP o( Au<ilriu Kin^ rjf 
Hungary, and tho Hiiltari of 'I'lirkny, 



And whereas His Majesty Holds it to be His Pre- 
rogative Duty as well as His Prerogative Right to take 
all stops necessary for the defence and protection of the 
Reaim. 

And whereas it has been made to appear to His 
Majesty that it is essential to the defence and protection 
of the Realm that in the exercise of His Prerogatives as 
aforesaid He shall cause the whole of the insulated spaces 
in British steamships usually engaged in trading between 
any port or ports in the Commonwealth of Australia or 
in the Dominion of New Zealand respectively, and any 
port or ports in the United Kingdom, to be requisitioned 
for the carriage of refrigerated produce from any port or 
ports in the Commonwealth of Australia and in the 
Dominion of New Zealand. 

Now, therefore. His Majesty is pleased, by ana with 
the advice of His Privy Council and in the exercise of 





Ai w A AwM« 

Any person finding any 
unexploded Shells are to 
report at once either to 

the Adjutant, Yorkshire Hussars 
Reserve, GRAND HOTEt, Scar- 
borough, or the Chief Constable, as 
they are very dangerous to touch. 

W. SMITHSON, Colonel, 
Commandtng Troops. 

Scarborough 
Mth December. 1914. 




^^^■i 



A RAID NOTICE. 
A warning to finders of unexploded shells. 

His Prerogatives as aforesaid, and of all other powers 
Him thereunto enabhng to order, and it is hereby 
ordered [a» recited] 

And Hia Majesty ia further pleased, by and with the 
(wlvico as aforesaid, to authorise and direct the President 
of the Board of Trade, the Mini.stor of 1'rado an<l Customs 
in the Gomraonwoalth of Australia and the Minister of 
Customs in the Dominion of Now Zealand respectively 
to give effect to this Order in the following way .... 

Hero wo have the perfectly Bound but 
unfamiliar po.sition of the King by his Pre- 
rogative Power directing the actions of the 
Ministftrs of a Solf-Kovornirig Dominion without 
the intervention of the Dominion Parliament 
or the Dominion Cabinet. It was a valuable 
instance of the fm;t that the Prerogative Powers 



64 



TUt: TIMES HisToay of tiii<: war. 



of thf Crown, so far from beiii^ exhausttnl, 
wer« Htill la 11)15 of vatst troiuuiiic U8« in 
s|K5«(lily arrungiii^ intHr-Colouial affairs and 
i-oncontrutiiig tho wholo available forces of 
the Kiupire on any Hpecial or urg»mt problem. 
That was a very different thing from the 
atttim[it by the Treasury, as part of an arran{<o- 
ment with a [)rivato body of financiers, to 
interfere with the issue of capital for industrial 
enterprise in the Hritish Empire overs»«as. Tho 
issue of new capital at that time required, no 
doubt, regulation, but that regulation should 
have been nuide by Orders in Council umler tho 
Defence of the Rtudni Act. 

In the hours inunediately preceding tho out- 
break of war the King Issued a Proclamation 
regarding the Defenco of tho Realm. Thi.s was 
followed on Augu.st 8, 1914, by an Act conferring 
on His Majesty in Council power to make 
Regulations iluring tho war for the Defence of 
the Realm, and on August 28 this wa.s supple- 
niented by a fiurther Act, and these Acts were 
consolidated and amended by a third Act passed 
on November 27, 1914. This Act was amended 



on March It) 191.''), by two A<t8, the first of 
which dealt with (juestions of defenco referred to 
above, while the second created powers for 
ex])editing the proiluction of war materials. A 
further Act to extend the Defenco of the Reaint 
Consolidation Act 1914 brought in the State 
Control of Alcohol. 'J'he business of the l(«gis- 
lation from August to November, 1914, was to 
provide against communications being sot up 
with the enemy, to secure tho safety of tho 
powers of the Crown umiI of any iiicans of 
communication, and of railways, ports and tiar- 
bours, to prevent the spread of false and dan- 
gerous rumours, to secure the navigation of 
ve8.sels in accordance with Admiralty directions, 
and generally to prevent assistance being given 
to th(^ enemy or tho successful prosecution of 
the war being endangered. From August 12, 
1914, elaborate Regulations with the.so ends in 
view were issued, such, for instance, as regula- 
tions dealing witli the kt^iping of carrier pigcsons 
or with tho obscuration of liglits, tho latter 
subject being one that wo deal with here in 
some elaboration as illustrating a peculiar 




MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. 

Sir Charles Johnston, the Lord Mayor (1914-1915), inspecting the Corps of Citizens 

in the City of London. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



55 



'^ji j^H^H 




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^-^^^ir^^^^l^li^Pl^KH^a^^K^KS^' rUH 


J^?-'-#IP^^^':S>:: >^ili^ HH U 




5^^^^ ^^'^^v% '"^1 f - 





PREPARING ALEXANDRA PALACE FOR THE INTERNMENT OF 

GERMAN PRISONERS. 
Fixing barbed wire in the grounds of the Palace. 



home feature of the war. While railways 
in matters of defence were fully dealt with, 
the taking over of the railways by the Crown 
was a different matter, and this was done 
on AugiLst 4, 1914, by the special provisions 
of Section 10 of the Regulation (A the Forces 
Act 1S71. 

The question of legislation relating to the 
regulation of Trade and IndiLstry in war-time 
Ls too vast a subject arifl one involving too 
many complex legal questions to be dealt 
with in thi-H chapter, but it may generally 
fx; noted that V>y an Act of August 28, 1914, 
the Hoard of Trade was given powers to 
obtain information as to stocks of articles 
of commerce and for enabling posses-sion to 
be taken of any such articles unreasonably 
withheld. The same day was passed the Cus- 
toms ^Plxportation Prohibition) Act 1914, by 
which all articlr,*s of every descrijjtion could be 
prohibitcfl from exportation by Orders in 
CoiinciJ, while the qiif-stion of enwny j>ro- 
prietr>rH of patfjnts an'i triuJe marks was dealt 
with in an equitable fonhion. On August 5, 



1914, came the Royal Proclamation which for- 
bade trading with Germany, and this was ex- 
tended to Austria -Hungary on August 12. The 
Prohibition was extended by Proclamations of 
September 9, 30, and October 8 and 26. On 
September 18 was passed an Act to make pro- 
vision with respect to penalties for trading with 
the enemy, and this Act was antiended on 
November 27, 1914. This .scheme of legislation, 
coupled with the provisions of the Common Law, 
practically stopped even indirect dealing with 
the enemy, though a few bad cases, such as 
the Fownes case, were severely punished. In 
any full consitleration of the subjc-ct would have 
to be considered the restrictions involved in 
the doctrines of contraband and blockade, anfl 
the varif)UH limitations on (he use of shipping 
that indirectly limited the trade of England 
during thf; (^rriut War. 

Tliir question of nationality was, of course, of 
the greatest importance at the opening of the 
(in-at War, and unfortunately the legislation of 
1914 had the tendency to blur the ancient dofi- 



5t) 



THH TIMKS HISTOHY OF THE WAB. 




ALIENS AT A LONDON POLICE STATION. 
Waiting to be transferred to an Internment Camp. 



nite lines The doctrine of quasi-allegiance 
due by aliens resident in England had, moreover 
sapped in some considerable measure the true 
doctrine of allegiance which underlies the whole 
conception of nationality. It is sufficient to 
say here that the subjects of the British Empire 
form one nationality, which is constituted by the 
common allegiance, despite many Parliaments, 
of many races to one King. In the war legis- 
lation of 1914, but certainly not of it, was in- 
cluded the British Nationality and Status of 
Aliens Act. This Act, which repealed the 
famous Naturalization Act of 1870 and much 
earlier legislation from the time of Edward III., 
defined a natural born British subject as 
follows : 

" (a) Any person bom within His Majesty's 
dominions and allegiance ; and 

" (6) Any person born out of His Majesty's 
dominions whose father was a British subject 
at the time of that person's birth, and either was 
bom within His Majesty's allegiance or was a 
person to whom a certificate of naturalization 
had been granted ; and 

*' (c) Any person bom on board a British 



ship whether in foreign territorial waters or 
not." 

Moreover, the child of a British subject is 
deemed to have been born within the King's 
allegiance if bom in any place where the King 
exercises jurisdiction over British subjects. 
From 1914 onwards the second generation born 
out of the jurisdiction was in all cases excluded 
from British citizenship, thus changing the 
ancient law. This was a hardsliip, and in the 
peciiliar circumstances of the Empire an un- 
necessary and perhaps dangerous change de- 
signed to overcome one of the difficulties of 
double nationality. A further provision in the 
Act with the same end in view pennitted the 
child of a foreign subject born in the Empire and 
the child of a British subject born abroad to 
adjust themselves as they thought fit to the 
environment they preferred. Thus the German 
could remain German still though born and 
li^'ing in the British Empire, while the English- 
man's child born abroad was almost encoiu-aged 
to renounce his father's nationality. Such a 
policy was opposed to national safety. The 
most dangerous class of traitors against England 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



67 



in 1914 included not only naturalized Germans 
but the English children of German fathers. Such 
legislation encouraged children of this class to 
remain anti-British. In 1914 there was no 
adequate war legislation on the subject of nation- 
ality Thus the children of Belgians born in 
England in 1914-16 were presumably English 
though the parental residence was not only tem- 
porary but vmwilling. Such was one of the 
sundry absurdities that the unwise Act of 1914 
brought about. Tliis Act, as ill-considered as the 
Declaration of London in another field, showed 
absolutely no foresight nor any appreciation of 
the often dangerous character of the hyphen- 
ated Anglo-Germans. The alien problem at the 
opening of the war proved this. On August .i, 
1914, an Act was passed to enable the King in 
time of war or imminent national danger or 
great einergency by Order in Council to impose 
restrictions on aliens and make such provisions 



as appear necessary or expedient for carrying 
such restrictions into effect. The Act dealt with 
numerous matters : 

Prohibition of or restrictions on the landing 
or departure of aliens from the United Kingdom. 

The (li^portation of aliens. 

Restrictions on the residence of aliens in the 
United Kingdom and their total exclusion from 
certain areas. 

The registration and the control of the move- 
ments of aliens in the X'nited Kingdom. 

The appointment of officials to carry orders 
into effect with powers of arrest and search. 

Restrictions on the masters of ships and 
others. 

" Any other matters which appear necessary 
or expedient with a view to the safety of the 
realm." 

The last provision gave the Privy CoivncQ 
practically the powers of a dictator ; but it 




f;KHMAN CONCRNTHATION flAMI' IN ENCH.AND. 

Sentriei placed in such a position lo en»ble ihcm lo Nee the whole of the camp. 




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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



59 



should be remembered that similar powers in 
similar eircumstances resided in the King at 
Common Law. There was no manner of doubt 
tha#the absence of earlier legislation requiring 
the registration of aliens in England had created 
a very dangerous situation. Neither the suc- 
cessive Governments up to 1908-9 (whena Special 
Intelligence Department was established by the 
.Admiralty and the War Office) nor the people 
at large had reaUzed, at any rate in adequate 
measure, the elaboration of the German spy 
system, a system degrading to any self-respect- 
ing people, but one that in its elaboration and 
its detestable character as well as in its curious 
inability to understand English institutions and 
the English people^ exactly represented the 
people that had invented it. 

One obvious criticism of the hasty Act of 
1914 was that it failed to deal in terms with 
two classes of persons often more dangerous 
than the aliens with whom the very competent 
London police were well acquainted : natural- 
ized subjects of the Crown and the children 
bom in England of aliens but who had not 
renounced their English birth allegiance. But 
it was probable that they could be dealt 
with under the general powers reserved in the 
Act. 

The first Order in Council under the Act 
was issued on the day that the Act was passed. 
By this Order there were only 13 approved 
ports by which aliens could enter and leave 
the kingdom. All other ports were closed, 
except under very special circumstances, even 
to alien friends ; while an alien enemy could 
not use an approved port without a permit 
signed by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and 
any alien could be excluded from entrance. 
Every inast<ir of every vessel arriving at or 
leaving a port in the United Kingdom wa.s 
obliged to do all that was nfK;es.sary to enforce 
the Order. The second [jart of the Order gave 
any Ser;retary of State power to restrict the 
area of resiflence of any alir;n enemy and forbade 
any alif;n <:nemy to reside in any of the pro- 
hibit»;d areas, whif;h jjra<,-tically included the 
whole coaHt line, excpt with special permis- 
HJori Any alien in a jjffjhibited area and an 
alien enemy in any area had to register with 
very full particulars and could not change nwi- 
'len/;e without notir;e. No alien enemy could 
travel more than five iin\fH from his regisUin d 
a^ldresH without a permit, nor possesH any thing 
of UW! iri war-time. The Order wuh ext<;ndrrd 
and amended on AugiiHt 10. An alien enrimy 



was forbidden to carry on any banking Ijiisiness 
without consent, or deal with any mon(!y or 
securities in his bank. The police were given 
full powers of search. The Order was further 
extended on August 12. The approved ports 
were varied ; the re-entry of deported aliens 
forbidden. The powers as to passenger ships 
were enlarged and the list of forbidden articles 
in the possession of aliens was extended. The 
Order was further extended on August 20 by 
the restriction of the circulation of alien news- 
papers among alien enemies. All these Orders 
were consolidated and extended on Septem- 
ber 29 and further extended by Statute to the 
Isle of Man. On October 8 alien enemies 
were forbidden by Order in Council to change 
their names. This Order did not extend to 
Anglo-Germans who were technically subjects 
of the Crown. These efforts to some extent 
met the acute dangers of the position. Spy 
charges in the Metropolis were frequent, while 
charges involving correspondence with Germany 
and the use of wireless created a feeling of 
imrest ; and the fear of German spies became a 
somewhat well-grounded obsession, though it 
sometimes took amusing forms, persons with 
German names acquiring reputations for scien- 
tific powers of communication with their native 
land that would have adorned the genius of 
Roger Bacon. 

The new special constables proved of con- 
siderable use in warding off expected attacks 
by German aliens on points of national imjjort- 
ance, such as water works and gas works, and 
in fact there were some signs that such attacks 
would have been made early in the war had not 
elaborate precautions been taken. In some 
cases popular feeling bore somewhat hardly on 
Germans who were bona fide traders in various 
districts, but in view of the widespread nature 
of the German spy system popular feeling was on 
the whole justified, and there can be no doubt 
that as time passed on and Gernian outrages in 
Belgium and France came to be verified the 
feeling against Germans who remained in 
England hardfined. 

On October 9 the Home OfTlce issued an 
elaborate statement as to German espionage. 
The Official Secrets Act of 1911 had enabloti the 
GovemiiKsnt, by means of the Special Intelligence 
])e[>artm<;nt, betw(i(!n 191 I and 1914, to discover 
" the. ra(riificati(;ns of th«; (j<!rnian Secret Service 
in lOrigliirid," and immediatelj' before the out- 
break of war 20 known sj)ieH wein; arrested and 
upwards of 200 ki'|)t luider Hpccinl observation. 



60 



THt: TIMFS mSTOUY oF TIIF WAH. 




THE GREAT CHURCH PARADE AT THE ALBERT HALL 

Divisions of Special Constables attended from all parts of Lonion. 



The Home Office believed that the spy organi- 
zation had been, at any rate temporarily, broken 
up. The cable and postal censorship created under 
the Defence of the Realm Acts had been of use 
in this respect. There had been no traces of 
se^'ret conspiracies to commit outrages, but in 
order to ward off the pos.sibility about 9,000 



Germans and Austrians of military age had been 
interned. French critics severely criticized IMr. 
McKenna's tempered optimism. The German 
system of espionage in England was, in their 
judgment, very elaborate, and pitblic opinion in 
England supported the P'rench view. The Ger- 
mans were using immense efforts to restort^ their 



THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 



61 



spy system. In mid-October 40 German spies 
dLsgiiised as Belgian refugees were arrested at 
Dover, and a few days later all alien enemies 
were ordered to quit Brighton, though natiura- 
lized Germans and Austrians were able to 
remain in residence. 

Towards the end of October there were 
arrests of alien enemies, including many pro- 
minent business men, throughout the country. 
The east and south coast to^^Tis were cleared, 
but in all of them the most dangerous class, 
the naturalized German, remained at large. 
On October 30 the London Chamber of Com- 
merce demanded more stringent precautions 
in the case of naturaUzed British subjects of 
enemy origin. On November 2 the trial of 
the German naval lieutenant, Carl Hans 
Lody, a spy of the first rank, was concluded. 
He was found guilty and condemned to be 
shot, a sentence dvly carried out at the Tower. 
This was the first of several executions for 
espionage. On November 2 there was a 
debate in the Hovise of Commons on the whole 
spy question, ' in which the vacillating poUcy 
of the Government on the alien question was 
vehemently denounced. ^Ir. Bonar Law, who 
was not yet a menaber of the Government, 
declared that the men who were likely to 
injure the country were the best educated 
and best class of aUens then in England. The 
warning took effect, for it was well known that 
persons of German origin were still exercising 
great influence both in English society and in 
English finance. Despite all these difficulties 
the British Nationality and Status of Aliens 
Act of 1914 was allowed unamended to come 
into operation on January 1, 1915. Indeed, 
the alien difficulty was by no means in hand. 
Mr. McKenna on February 4 stated that there 
were 22,000 male alien enemies in the Metropoli- 
tan Police District, of whom about 1 G.OOO were of 
military age, while there were still considerable 
numbers in the prohibited areas on tho east and 
Houth coasts. To what extent German spies 
flressed in khaki were present in the country it 
Ih impofwible to say ; the wildest rumours on 
the Bubject were current early in 19ir», and in 
fact the Admiralty warned contract ofb against 
work^TH of this tyiif. In Trflarifl alien fnornics 
of both fKixeM were allfj/ed, by the Grand Jury 
at the County Mayo Afsizcs at Ca«t!cbar on 
.March I H, to be at Iar>^e in the cotintry and it 
was Htatwl that no ad<;quat« precautions had 
\>fcn takfjn to prevent rommunication between 
such p*^HoriH and erierny HhipH and Hubmarines, 



This warning was apparently neglected by the 
Govormnent. 

On March 23 and April 13, 1915, Orders in 
Council further ainondod tho Defence of the 
Reuhn (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914. These 
were issued partly in connexion with the Defence 
of the Realm (Amendment) Act, 1915, which 
provided for the trial by civil courts, with a 
jiuy, but in camera if the prosecution thought 
it necessary, of offences lutherto triable only by 
court-martial. Under the new Act sei ten -e had, 
in any case, to be delivered in public. The 
Order of April 13 enabled per.-ons who were to 
be tried under the Act to be arrested without 
warrant on the formal request of the com- 
petent naval or military authorities. An Order 
of the same date also tightened the exist- 
ing provision as to passports in the case of 
incoming aliens. It also provided that after 
April 25 all persons staying at inns or board- 
ing-houses should be registered. But, despite 
many precautions and many arrests under 
the Orders in Covmcil, vinrest on the alien ques- 
tion pervaded the country, and in May, 1915, 
reached a crisis in Liverpool and London, 
after the sinking of the Lusitania. The Royal 
Exchange, and other exchanges, decided to 
exclude persons of enemy birth, and a large 
deputation urged upon the Government more 
stringent action. There was a growing move- 
ment in favour of a new measure of intern- 
ment even in the case of women. On May 13 
all enemy Ivnights of the Garter were struck 
off the Roll by the Order of the King, and 
the Cabinet decided to intern all alien enemies 
unless grounds for exceptional treatment were 
shown, and a special tribunal to decide claims, 
under Mr. Justice Younger, was set up. Many 
naturalized citizens of German birth, including 
certain eminent professors, publicly protested 
their loyalty, anrl there were, no doubt, many 
persons of German birth who were entirely 
loyal to tho country of their adoption. In all 
such cases it is certain that complete justice 
was done. The Prime Minister, on May 22, 
publicly testified to the loyalty of Sir Edgar 
Speyer. That member of tlio Privy Council, 
however, resented so strongly the allegations 
against his loyalty »lint he evoiitiially left 
his adopted country and r<^(irod to America. 
Meantime many Hj)y trials became necessary. 
Tho Germans had evichntly reorganized 
with some success their espionaiie system, • 
whilft tho story from America of Ignatiua 
Tiuif)lliy Tflbilili Liiieolu, ox-.M.P. for Dar- 



fV2 



v'///-; riMh:s histouy of the 



WAH. 




ON GUARD. 

Territorials on the English Coast. 

lington, a spy of considerable gifts, rang 
through the country. But naturalized Germans 
of eminence still remained at large, even in 
ca.ses that gave rise to unrest and serious 
siLspicion. A desperate attempt wa.s made to 
secure the freedom of Baron von Bissing, the 
half brother of the infamous military Governor 
of Belgium, and was only rejected by the 
Courts late in July, a few daj'^s before a series 
of important arrests of very dangerous German 
spies. Any hard cases of social estrangement 
could well be justified in the autumn of 1915 
by the fact that the reorganization of the 
German spy system sjTiclironized with a new 
Zeppelin campaign. Though there were a series 
of executions these were kept within the closest 
limits. No woman was executed, and Mr. 
Roosevelt in America testified to English 
magnanimity in the extremelj^ difficult position 
presented by the alien problem. 

On January 27, 1016, an Order in Coiuicil 
amended the Aliens Restrictions Orders by 
extending the duty to register with the police 
to all aliens everj^vhere except in the Metro- 
politan Police District, where only alien friends 
who entered the area after February 14 were 
required to register. One of the difficulties of 



tli'ulmg with dangerous aliens \vu.s that the 

laiiiuto pacifist party in the House of Commons 

was always ready to raise a cry against 

fontrni Thus Mr. CIuuIhh 'I'revelyan, on 

March 2:{, 191(5, dealt with fine indignation 

with the case of *' a sipiini's daiiglitt*r," wi»o 

was stated to be a lady of pure i'liiglish ex- 

iiaction, arrested in Septembcfr at liej- father's 

limi.se in his absence and wrongly d«>tained for 

montlis in an intenunont camp 'I'he Attorney- 

(Jeneral th»n-eiipon related the facts. Since 

1909 "the squire's daughter" had been an 

intimate friend of a person who had to flee 

from England because he wiis asscxiiated with 

sedition and attempts at assa.ssination Near 

the beginning of the war he loft Kngland and 

went to Berlin. Ho had since been employed 

as an agent of the enemy in Berlin — an agent 

of a particularly dangtsrous and vile kind. He 

h id from time to time left Berlin and visited 

ncnitral countries for the purpose of arranging 

iiKictings with people in England with whom 

iu! found it convenient or profitable to continue 

his relations. In May. 1915. this lady went 

to Switzerland to meet the spy and the two 

stayed in the same hotel several days. She 

had admitted that she was told by tlus spy 

that he was in the employment of the German 

Government and had an office in Berlin. She 

returned to England carrying a me.ssage from 

him to one of hLs proved accomplices in this 

country. On the occasion of her arrest there 

was found literatiu-e of an extremely .seditious 

character advocating revolution and murder. 

Some reference must be made at this point 
to the palssport system, which was the natural 
supplement to the legislation against alien 
enemies. England moved slowly in the matter. 
It was not until January 19, 1915. that the 
Foreign Office revised the system and form of 
passports granted to British subjects for 
travelling to foreign countries. On February 1 , 
1915, all British passports held by British 
subjects in the United Kingdom and issued 
before August 5, 1914, became invalid, and 
the holders needing them had to make appli- 
cation for new passports. Similar passports 
held "by British subjects in France, Algiers, 
Morocco, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, 
Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
became invalid on March 1, 1915, and could 
only be made out anew on application to 
the nearest British C^onsul. In all other 
countries the British passport became invalid 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



G3 



from August 1, 1915. Pas<!ports issued 
between August 5, 1914, and February 1, 
1915, at a cost of five shillings were to be 
valid for two years only, but were capable 
of renewal. If the holders desired to proceed 
to France or Belgium there was necessary a 
supplementary document and visa from a 
French or Belgian diplomatic or consvilar 
ofiRcer. From February 1, 1915, no person 
was allowed to leave the United Kingdom 
for France or Belgium without a valid 
passport, and this principle was extended to 
all saiUngs. 

By the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) 
Order of April 13, 1915, it was directed that 
after April 25, 1915, an alien coming from or 
intending to proceed to any place out of the 
United Kingdom as a passenger should not 
without the special permission of a Secretary 
of State, land or embark at any port in the 
United Jvingdom unless he had in his possession 
a passport issued to hin\ not more than two 
years prex-iously h\ or on behalf of the Govern- 
ment of the country of which he was a subject 
or citizen, or some other document satisfac- 



torily establishing his nationnlity and identity, 
to which passport or document there had to 
be attached a pliotograph of the alien to whom 
it related. Moreoverj after the same date an 
alien could not, without the special permission 
of the registration oflficer, enter any prohibited 
area unless he had in his possession such a 
passport and photograph. Moreover, by the 
Defence of the Reahn Consolidated Regula- 
tions the forgery of naval or military or police 
passes or of passports became an offence, 
while if any person was found in possession 
of a false passport, or being an alien enemy 
passed under a false name, heavy penalties 
could be imposed. The passport system 
which was being freely abused in the earliej 
nionths of the war, and was with some skill 
evaded by Germans under the guise and cany- 
ing the passports of American subjects was thus 
in some measiu-e safcgiiarded and amended. 
The system worked better than appeared likely 
on paper, and it was largely due to this method 
that the German system of espionage was 
brought within something like tolerable 
limits 




TALI'S Ol M.ANDF.US. 

ll'rom a puinlinu by Junct'li ClarU) 



t)4 



'lUl': TIMKS UISTORY OF THE WAR. 



'I'htJ fiiiiilauitiiital (|iie5itii)ii oi civil coiitiol 
ill uur-tiiiiti wu.s, ut' cuiutk), chiefly ujssociuted 
uith the civil police, ttiotigh in |ji'ucluiiauU 
arcod the control, iii a large tneatiure, wiitt 
riMcetisai-ily in the hantlh uf the military autho- 
rities. The iuterehtiiig htory of the history 
ot the police forces in England cannot he 
related hero in detail, but in order to appreciate 
the pocsitiou tliat existeil in 1914 it id neceswary 
to ilraw attention to the local, and in a sense 
voluntary, character of the policing of (England 
fittm Saxon davs. 




BARON VON BISSING WITH HIS WIFE. 

The Baron was the half-hrother of the German 

Military Governor of Belgium. He was interned 

July, 1915. 

The principle of suretyship underlay the 
whole system. In the earliest times men were 
elected by their fellows for the preservation 
of the peace, and, though the system gradually 
died away as the central authorities grew 
stronger, yet the elective officers of what 
were called head-boroughs were still in exis- 
tence in the mid -nineteenth century. Besides 
this universal organization, so peculiarly 
English, for maintaining law and order, each 



hundred had and still has a high constable, 
whiln putty constables were appointed in 
each township and parish. The origin of 
those oflicers was the necessity of having 
|)ersons who could report to the central autho- 
rities as to local readiness in connexion with 
the furnishing of men and arms for national 
defence, and on such ollicials over increasing civil 
[iolico duties were imposed by the local courts 
that appointed them. The i)etty constable 
could still exist in rural districts : the common- 
law jjower of creating local means of defence 
against crime was still existent. Shakespeare 
has made these constables famous for all 
time. Their place in towns was taken by 
beadles and watclimen, but these had long 
since disajipeared at the date of the Great 
War. As town conditions became more com- 
plex antl the growth of crime, drimkennosa, 
and sedition in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries became entirely beyond the gras[) 
of the amateiu", new means had to be taken, 
after a long period of chaos, to deal with town 
police problems. Thus in 1829 the famous 
Metropolitan Police Force was formed by the 
Home Secretarj', who became Sir Robert 
I 'eel. In 1839 the City of London (which was 
not within the Metropolitan Police area, 
and had always policed itself) secured by 
statute its own police force, and in the same 
year the County Police Act came into opera- 
tion, and provided a new national organiza- 
tion which became compulsory in 1856. 
There were in 1914 no fewer than sixty county 
police forces in England and Wales. Thus 
the local principle had been maintained, and 
had been found to work with a high degree of 
efficiency. In a practical sense all these 
various forces were united and worked together 
against crime ; but there was much local 
independence, and the various forces, no 
doubt, reacted upon one another with a bene- 
ficial form of competition in efficiency. In 
addition to these there were in existence borough 
police forces, and in 1914, according to Sir 
Robert Ajiderson's admirable article in Lord 
Halsbury's volumes on The Laws of England, 
there were no fewer than "128 cases of boroughs 
which maintain a separate police force." 
Over the whole system the Home Office kept 
a paternal eye, but it is probable that on the 
outbreak of war the extraordinary local com- 
plexity of the English police system made the 
control of aliens and of motor traffic an 
extremely difficult matter. But the various 



THE TIMES HTSTOBY OF THE WATi. 



65 




COURT-MARTIAL ON A (;HRMAN SPY. 

The trial of Carl Hann Lody at the Middlesex Guildhall, under the presidency of Major-()eneral Lord 
Cheylesmore. The prisoner was found ((uilty and condemned to be shot, a sentence which was duly 

carried out at the Tower of London. 



bodies of police }iad (irnple Btatutory power to 
awtiflt one another, urid this power wa« of 
j(reat une in the time of tho Great War. Yet 
in that war, oh in niany earlier tirncs of great 
ernerg»!n':y, it wjih f)l»iiri tliat t}jo police was 
inai-Je^pofite for tho whrilo of the work that, 
in due eourw;, wf>ij|d have fallen upon it ; 
and for two reaHonx. Firat, it was anticipated 



that largo nuinberH of tiio younger constables 
would join or rejoin tho fighting forces of the 
Crown, and this conting(!ncy was, in fact, 
ijeait with by Statute, and in any event 
without Huch r<;duction the police syHteni of the 
country was undermanned for tho new con- 
ditions and for 1 ho immense amoutit of local 
HuperviHion, inspection, and control that auto- 




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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



G7 



Tnatically became necessary with the outbreak 
of war against a country whose nationals 
had so deeply penetrated England. Conse- 
quently the GoveiTunent decided to supple- 
ment the regular police with men foiuid under 
the old practice of appointing special con- 
stables. It has alwaj'S, it is believed, been 
possible at common law for the local authority 
responsible for law and order to swear in special 
constables. Indeed, that was, in fact, the 
regular practice from Saxon times. But in 
1820 doubts had arisen as to the power of the 
■Crown to compel persons to act as special 
constables except in cases of tumult, riot, or 
felony, and so on July 8 an Act was passed 
enabling the justices to appoint special con- 
stables on the reasonable apprehension and 
for the prevention of tumult and riot. On 
October 15, 1831, the law on the subject was 
amended, and the following oath formulated : 

I, A. B., do swear, that I will well and truly serve our 
Sovereign Lord the King in the office of Special Con- 

etable for the parish or [township] of without 

favour or affection, malice or ill-will ; and that I will 
to the best of my power cause the peace to be kept and 
preser\'ed, and prevent all offences against the persons 
and properties of His Majesty's subjects ; and that 
while I continue to hold the said office I will to the best 
■of my skill and knowledge discharge all the duties 
thereof faithfully according to law. So help me God. 

This extremely important Act laid down the 
fundamental principle that persons liable to be 
nominated as parish constables could be com- 
pelled to serve, and this provision was in force 
at the opening of the war. On August 28, 1914, 
an Act was passed enabling the Iving by Order 
jn Council to make regulations with respect to 
the appointment and position of special con- 
stables appointed during the war under the Act 
of 1831 or the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. 
The Act applied to Ireland in virtue of the 
Special Constables (Ireland) Act, 1832 and other 
Acts, and to Scotland in virtue of the Burgh 
I'olice (Scotland) Act, 1892. It Ls significant 
of the Irish position that no Order in Council 
brought the Act of 1914 into efTwtivo operation 
in Ireland until March 11, 191.5. It was not 
clfrar whether, befr>re or after this order, the 
H[K!cial constabulary system was ever effectively 
UHcd for the vital puryiOWi of coast land control. 
Ha*J such a Hystem be<;n fully at work the wild 
attempt at the I'russiarii/.ation of Ireland might, 
fxrhafjs, never have bf*n made 

While Ireland liad to wait for har sp(!cial 
f<>nMta\>U;H till March, 19 1.'*, the P^nglisli system 
WHH at work in Aiigust, 1914, arifi was specially 
regulat<;d by Ordf;r in O^iincil on September 9. 



An Order dealing with Scotland followed on 
September 17 in pursuance of a Special Act 
passed on August 10. The English Order was 
amended on February 3,1915, and by subsequent 
Orders. The Scottish Act was amended on 
May 19, 1915. 

It is unnecessary to pursue further the 
machinery of the special constabulary system 
in England and Scotland, but it is desirable 
to say a few words about a force that was of 
the highest value at the opening of the Mar 
in defending points of so vital and vulner- 
able a character that any sudden attack by 
high explosives would have disorganized the 
entire economics of the great cities of England. 
The special constabulary steadily tended to 
become a highly organized body of men despite 
the fact that most of the constables were busily 
engaged in their ordinary avocations all day. 
No doubt a certain nvuuber of men in the early 
days were in the special police ranks who ought 
to have been at the front, and a certain nuniber 
of men in some divisions carried the badge while 
only doing a very low minimimi of serious work, 
but taking the vast majority of the special 
constables the cotintry through, the work 
rendered ^^'as worthy of the highest praise. 
It was work that involved neither glory nor, 
at first, uniform ; it involved much iliscom- 
fort and much deprivation of sleep, but it 
was of the highest importance since it created 
a great reserve police force which should 
never again have been allowed to lapse. This 
amateur force was received in the kindest 
fashion by the regular police, who rapidly 
instilled the lesson that civil control in England 
is secured not by force or threats but by tact, 
consideration and kindliness. The inherent 
capacity of Englishmen for government was 
shown fully in this small field wliere the men 
drawn from every class rapidly became efficient 
in the management of nicii, women, children 
and traflic, the control of the urgent lighting 
problem, and in many cases in the very didicult 
work of street control. For some time there was 
a tf^ndency among the [)ublic to smilt) at the 
special constable, but before many months 
ela|)sed it was realized that he was efliciently 
taking the place of men on more urgent service, 
an<l was well illustrating the Miltonic thesis 
that they too servo who only stand and wait. 
When largo numbers of special constables in 
April, 1910, marched through London and 
attended Divine service at the Albert Hall and 
elsewhere it was realized what a comj)etent 



t)H 



Till-: TIMKS niSTORY OF Till': WAR. 



police furco Imil beuu bi'oii({ht intu exiHteiici-, 
lui'|;uly by ttie ussistrtiu-e of thu itsgular jiolice, to 
ileal with thtt uiaay lii-obltMiLs of luetropolittm 
lit». What was triio of IahkIoii wuh eiitiuily 
truti of the othur givat towns ami t)f th« i-ountiy 
iliutriftH. 'I'hti iiiiijoitaiicti of thu work tlono 
by the Bpe<.:ial coiiatabulaiy ou tlit- KhhI Coa«t 
Ls not likely to be forgotten. 'J'his now force 
al.-io answered a more remote purpose. It 
brought men of all clax8eH and opinions together, 
it created a new sense of fraternity among dif- 
ferent grailes and thfterent political sectionH, 
and in the [)oorer districts aroused a sense of 
confidence ami lau -abiilinguess that had rather 
tended to be sappeil by the course of events in 
the early stages of the war. The movement was 
an example of something of lasting importance 
nrisinj; from small beginnings. The earlier use; 




NON-TREATING NOTICE 
Posted up in public-houses. 

of special constables wa.s at the most for a few 
days in limited areas. In the Great War the 
new police perambulated the land from end to 
end with the most useful social results. Such 
results were the recognition that the special 
constable chiefly desired. 

One of the most notable legi.slative events 
arising out of the Great War was the attempt, 
which proved unexpectedly successful, to con- 
trol the evils of the traflKc in alcohol. The ques- 
tion was attacked in an inadequate fashion at 
the opening of the war. On August 31, 1914, an 
Act was pas.sed enabling the licen.sing justices 
upon the recommendation of the cliief officer of 
police in any licensing district to restrict by 
order the sale or consumption of intoxicating 
liquor in licen.sed hou.ses or registered clubs. 



with the proviso that if a restriction waa to 
become operative eajlier than nine at night it 
had to be approved by the Secretary of State. 
iJefore thi.s date, on August 12, 1914, by the 
Defence of the Realm Kegulations, passed 
under the Defence of the KtNiim Act of August 8. 
the competent naval and military authorities 
were enabled to recjuiio all licensed promisoH 
within or in the neighbourhood of any defended 
harbour to be closed except during specified 
hours, and this power was, on September 1, 
1U14, extended to all proclaimed areas. The 
same Order ijnpo.sed the liability to penal 
•servitude for life on nny jjcrson who gave or 
sold intoxicating liquor to a member of any of 
llLs Majo.sty's Forces with the object of eliciting 
information for the benefit of the enemy, or of 
making any member of His Majesty's Forces 
(Muployed in the defence of any railway, dock, 
or harboLU- drunk when not on duty, oi- 
who gave or sold intoxicating liquor to Buch 
member when on duty, whatever the intent 
might be. 

These various provisions, intended to preserve 
order and eHiciency among the civil and 
military population, proved totally inadequate 
to meet a rapidly growing danger, and during 
May, June, and July, 1915, after tremendous 
agitation in and out of Parliiment, stringent 
machinery was created by Mr. Lloyd George, 
the Minister of Munitions, to de li with the w hole 
question of excessive drinlcing. The White 
I'aper of May 1, 1915, showed the vastness of 
the evil and the necessity of immediate action 
By the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) 
(No. 3) Act, 1915, passed on May 19, and the 
Order in Council establishing the Defence of the 
Realm (Liquor Control) Regulations of June 10, 
1915, the Central Control Board (Liquor 
Traffic) was established as the central authority 
for the State control in liquor traffic in such 
areas as should from time to time be defined by 
Order in Council. On July 6, 1915, ten such 
areas were defined in England, on July 28 two 
Scottish areas were defined, a third Scottish 
area followed on September 14, and the London 
area on September 24. Orders by the Central 
Control Board in each cape followed, with ten 
days' notice. These Orders, which, with the 
exception of the London Order, were practically 
identical, came into force as follows : Newhaven 
(July 26), Southampton (August 2), Barrow-in- 
Fvu-ness (August 2), Dartfonl (August tJ), North- 
East Coast (August 10), Bristol and Avomuouth 
(August 10), Liverpool and Mersey District 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAIL 



69 




A SOLDIKRS' RRFRF.SflMHNI BAR. 
A scene at Victoria Station. 



(Augiift 10), NffWfjorl, Carfliff and I'>arry 
(AutrnHt 18), Scotlanr], We«t Central (AnKUKt 
23), Hr:otlanfl, Kant CVnlral (AutrnKt 23), Scot- 
lan'l, Xoiilinm (Hftptrinbfr 27). '["hnn wn may 
«Hy that- a wholo y«;ar vvijus ollowofJ to frlnpw; 
b»'fore any Hiib8tariti;il attfmript wan made to 
d»!al with thn prf»hlf;iri. 

'( h<; Order--, of -fnly (ind AiigUHt, 10l.'<, pro- 



vidofl that the sale or sup|)ly of intoxicating 
liquor, vvhothcr for corLsumi)tion on or off 
the premises, should ordinarily be restricted 
to two and a half hours in the middle of the 
day and to three (or in some eases two) hours 
in the evening. Thus sale was prohilMted 
before noon and betwec^n 2.30 luid (> or 0.30 p.m. 
The sale of si)irits for ol'f eon.sumi)tion waa 



70 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




AT A YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION BUFFET. 
The Duchess of Argyll with Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, General Officer CommandiDg London 

District, serving out tea at Wimbledon. 



prohibited in the evenings and on Saturdays. 
" Treating " and credit sales were absolutely 
prohibited, and clubs were brought within the 
mischief aimed at by the Order But licensed 
premises could sell non-alcoholic liquors 
during the prohibited hoiu-s. The first Report 
of the Central Control Board, dated October 12, 
1915, showed that the Order had had an imme- 
diate effect on the prosecutions and convictions 
for drunkenness, and there was evidence that 
drinking had materially diminished and that 
i^ocial order and the condition of homes and of 
children had improved, while increased wages 
v\ere being saved. But it was necessary to wait 
for some months before the full ( ffett of the 
Orders coidd be measured. For some totally 
inexplicable reason London was practically 
excluded from the benefit of these pro\isions. 
" Treating," " on the urgent representations of 
the military authorities," was forbidden in the 
Metropolis and the dilution of spirits was 
sanctioned, but the question of the restriction 
of drinking hours (extraordinarily necessary 
from the point of view of the troops) was 
*' carefully considered with a view to the special 
requirements of Loiidon." 

But the need, in the interests both of labour 
and war problems, as well as of national health, 



was so urgent, the example of Russia and 
France so splendid, that London could not 
stand out, and the second Report of the Central 
Control Board, dated May 1, 1916, shows in 
detail how the Ministry of Munitions and other 
Departments involved in unison with the Board 
attacked the drink problem from its bases all 
over the country. The Board realized that 
the evil results arising from excessive indul- 
gence in intoxicating liquor are frequently due, 
not so much to the unrestricted facilities for 
obtaining it, or even to the detrimental practice 
of consuming it at irregular times and imaccom- 
panied by a meal, as to the absence of whole- 
some and satisfying svibstitutes, whether food 
or drink. The Board, therefore, pending a 
large reform of the machinery for the provision 
of refreshments, took steps at once to urge the 
improvement of public-houses and the pro- 
vision of good cheap canteens. IMoreover, in 
October, 1915, a Committee of Women under 
Mrs. Creighton was appointed to consider the 
question of excessive drinking among \\omen. 
The London District, with a population of over 
7,600,000 persons, was brought under Order on 
November 29, 1915, some 16 months after 
the outbreak of war. It is difficult to nieasm-e 
the misery and loss that tliis uiipardonable 



THE TIMES HJ.STOBY OF THE WAR. 



71 



delay entailed. The Report of May, 1916, 
sets out as an example of the Orders that then 
applied to over 30 millions of people the Order 
that on February 17, 191G, was applied to the 
southern military and transport area, including 
Portsmouth and Southampton. I.,icensed pre- 
mises and clubs were only to bo open for the 
consumption of alcohol on week daj's between 
noon and 2.30 p.m. and 6 and 9 p.m. ; on 
Smidays between 12.30 and 2.30 p.m. and 
6 and 9 p.m. In certain other areas the closing 
hour was 8 p.m., in others there were no midday 
hours on Satiu-days, and the places of resort 
were open instead between 4 and 9 p.m. For 
purposes of consumption off the premises in 
most cases off -sales had to cease an hotu- earlier 
than on-sales to prevent the carrying away of 
intoxicants for the purposes of continuing 
drinking at home. The off-sale of spirits was 
only permitted from Mondays to Fridays in the 
midday period and was forbidden altogether in 
the evening and on Sundays, while a minimum 
sale of a quart bottle was imposed, thus destroy- 
ing the trade in small flaslcs. The Orders 
placed substantial restrictions on the distribu- 
tion of alcohol. Alcohol sold by distribution 
had to be definitely ordered and invoiced and 
entered in a day book, and no money was 
allowed to be taken at the door on delivery. 
These provisions were aimed at checking what 
the Report called the " pushing " of intoxicants 
into private houses The Order permitted 
alcohol to be drunk with meals in a club or 
licensed premises during a period of half an hoi r 
after closing time if ordered before closing time, 
and did not limit the consumption of alcohol 
by persons residing on the premises. It also 
allowed the sale of alcohol at all hoiu-s on 
medical certificate for immediate medicinal 
purposes. These restrictions were reasonable. 
" Treating " was totally prohibited with effective; 
n^ults, and especially when the act of treating 
was extended from the licensed premises to the 
vicinity, thus meeting a rather obvious method 
of evasion. The giving of credit for intoxicants 
was absolutely forbidden in all the Orders, and 
the good eOcct of the provision has been 
universal. The Orders, moreover, abolished 
that vague and incrwJible person the bona-fido 
traveller and with him flestroyod the last 
vestige of the wandfjring trarnps anrl scholars 
of the Middle Ages, 

/iiiit the business of the Uoarfl wan not only 
to dis/;ourage and penalize the (Irink traffic but 
U) fa/filitate and encf>urage nnfl even undfrrtake 



the supply of food for munition and transport 
workers. For this pvirpose the Board strove to 
increase facilities at public houses and establish 
where necessary industrial canteens inside or 
within ea.sj'^ access of the works, supplying both 
substantial meals and light refreshments at 
reasonable prices. The Report gives a useful 
account of the establishment of these canteens, 
which had become, in view of the vast aggre- 
gation in certain areas of munit on and trans- 
port workers, an absolute necessity. Canteens 
were, in fact, established in large numbers by the 




THK REDUCTION OF LIGHT. 
Whitewashing the kerbs to enable pedestrians to 
discern the edge of the pavement after dark. 

Government itself, by the owners of controlled 
establishments, and by voluntary agencies. In 
the case of the vast majority of the workers 

tliia new Kiipply of nounahmpnt, oomJ>in<-(l with its 
change of HiirroundingH und iln wolcorno period of rost, 
has contributed substantially to tb.o fonnation of moro 
tomporato habits, witFi an improvement in physical 
health or woll-bciriK, and an incrcasod onor^'y and out put. 
'I'lie rOHullH whiili have alroady bdi'ii obtained, and the 
inorooHed proviHion which is coiiMtanlly beini^ made, 
cannot fail to produce far-reaching effoctM upon the 
induHtriul life of the nation. 

The K<!i>ort shows us a further dcvclop- 
nnjnt, the a<^;quiHition of licensed proniist^K by 
the Hoard itself in certain cases where it wiih 



72 



'////■; TIMKS niSTUHY Of Till': WAll. 



clear that the liquor uiipply >«houl(l Im iiiulcr 
itirect cuiktriil. It wau a new (.ioparturu ami 
was nut an unlikely btiginning of a new Hyhteni 
ol State control, 'i'he n'siiits ot the v\hole 
new Hystein of restraint were re|Mirtf(l hy 
the Hoard in Ma> , lltlti. Jn every area 
tlure warf a notable ilecline in convictions 
for drunkennesw. The decline began in the 
first year of the war as a result of the earlier 
restrictions, but the tiecrease was «'norinf)usly 
m-celerated w hen the Orders of the Board wt-re 




LIGHTING REGULATIONS. 

After dark all vehicles, including perambulators, 

bad to carry lights. 

issued. But apart from convictions the restric- 
tions proved, in the words of the naval authori- 
ties, " decidedly beneficial," not only in England 
but also, despite special difficulties, in Scotland. 
The one dark noto was " the undoubted in- 
crease of excessive drinking amongst women " 
reported by Mrs. Creighton's Committee, but 
fortunately this was " mainly among those who 
drank before," though various witnesses de- 
clared that " excessive drinking in the homes 
is on the increase." But the Committee " have 
received no e\"idence that women and girls who 



• litl not tirink befon< have taken in any con- 
hiderable numbers to drinking to excess in 
«»)nhe(iu«'nce of the war or the receipt of allow- 
ances," while " there is much ovidonco of 
improvement in the homes and in the condition 
<if the chihiren, an<l of wise spending on tlu) 
piu't of the great majority of those in receipt of 
war allowances." The net result of the English 
war legislation as to the consumption of alcohol 
seemed to show that the ancient evil of drun- 
kenness was liot only capable of cure, but of 
rapid prevention. 

Jn various matters the war of 1914 gave rise 
to ([uite new problems. The capacity of 
Zi'ppelins and other enemy airsliips and flying 
mtK'hines to raid England raised the whole 
fjuestion of defence against air attacks. That 
()U('stion is only relevant here from the point 
of view of the lighting of English towns. It 
was held, rightly or wrongly, that a con- 
si<l(Table measiu"e of obscuration and equaliza- 
tion of lights in the towns would so confuse tlie 
enemy pilots that it would be impossible for 
raids to take place with a specific goal in mind. 
Th\is the dealing with lights was part of the anti- 
aircraft policy. In another matter lights had 
to be restricted. From very early days it was 
alleged, in and out of Parliament, that Zeppelins 
were led by the upturned lights of swift motor 
cars and that the positions of towns and even 
houses were indicated in this way. It was very 
diflficult to know if a Zeppelin could be led by a 
car in any efficient way, but the possibility 
made prevention or an attempt at prevention 
necessary. The lighting question was first 
dealt with on September 17, 1914, bj^ an Order 
in Council making, under the Defence of the 
Realm Act 1914, Regulations for the Defence 
of the Realm amending those of August 12. 
The following Regulation was the basis of the 
whole system of lighting control : 

The Secretary of State may by order direct that all or 
any lights, or lights of any class or description, shall bo 
extinguished, or obscured, in such manner and between 
such hours as the Order directs, within any area specified 
in the Order and during such period as may be so speci- 
fied, and it the person having control of the lighting fails 
to comply wth the Order, the Secretary of State may 
cause the light to be extinguished or obscured as the civso 
may be, and for that purpose any person authoriz^nl by 
the Secretary of State in that behalf, or any police 
constable, may enter the premises in wliich the light is 
displayed, and do any other act whiclymay bo necessary 
for the purpose. 

In pursuance of this Regulation Mr. Mc- 
Kenna, then Home Secretary, issued an Order 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W iU. 



78 




LONDON'S NATIONAL GUARD. 

Ueicue drill at St. Kartholomew's Hospital: Volunteers carrying a "patient" downstairs during a 

practice alarm. 



on tho subjf.'Ct which directed tiiat in all logully 
Wt^hUid strf^jts and squares and on briflgoH tho 
rows ()f lightH wero to ho broken up and tho 
unextingiiLshwl lights rnimt be shaded ; all 
uky fligni^ and illuminated foHcnas were to bo 
exf iriffuirthed, in fall biiildin((H the greater 
f)Hrt of the wind'>WH to b«! shrouded and the 
lighting of lighN-d roof areoH redue«!fl tf» h 



niinimum, and tho lighting of railway stations, 
sidings and yards reduced to a nuniinuni con- 
sistent with safety ; tiio lights of tranns and 
omnibuses to be not more than sufTicient to 
collect fares and to bo wholly ol)scure(l on 
croHHinc bridges, while " tho u.so of powerful 
head-lights on motor r-ars " was t()tally pro- 
hibited, the use (A market flares was also for- 



74 



THhJ TlMl<:s HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




lit* 






< 

X 

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X 

X 

a: 
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H 

C/5 
'JU 

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£ 

a 

2 
O 

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o 



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en 

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hulden. wlule the Admiralty and ♦Jie polico 
\vnrn given power to onli-r riirtlim- rodiictioiiH. 
Thewe rules were inipowetl on London and the 
Metropolitan I'olice Distritit an from Novem- 
litr I, 1014. In addition to these provinions; 
the naval and military anthoritios throughont 
the fountry in a radian from any defended har- 
hour or proclaimed district had the widest 
powtWH to control the lights in houses and the 
streets in the whole area. It is probable that 
thes«» military powers were more effectively 
exertrised in the earlier days of the war than the 
special London powers. On Jannary 20, 191. 5, 
Mr. McKenna, under Regulation 11 of the 
Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regula- 
tions 1!)14, forbade in all places where the light- 
ing of the streets had been reduced, whether by 
Order imtler the Regulation or by a competent 
naval or military authority, the use of powerful 
lights on motor or other vehicles. Or» 
January 25 the Order was extended to Scotland. 
On December 9, 1914, the Order as to London 
had been renewed, and on March 17, 1915, this 
Order was varied as to the times when lights 
in shops should be reduced so as to make the 
Order applicable to successive seasons. On 
April 8, 1915, Mr. McKenna issued special 
regulations as to lights in the prohibited area 
from Northumberland to Dorset, ordering all 
lights visible from the sea to be extinguished and 
extending the London Order to this vast area. 
An Order of the same date and to the same 
effect dealt with lights in places on the 
coast from Dorset to Cumberland, and a 
third Order of the same date and character 
controlled the lights in places on the coast 
in Scotland. On April 3, 1915, all Hghts 
for the assistance of navigation within the 
jurisdiction of the Dee Conservancy Board 
were extinguished. 

It is probable that these limited Orders were 
not strictly enforced, at any rate in London and 
other inland towns, and certainly half-measures 
were viseless if any protection from aircraft was 
to be secm-ed by the obscuration and equaliza- 
tion of lights. The Zeppelin raids of the 
autumn of 1915 on the East Coast and the 
Ijondon area — raids entirely insignificant so far 
as military results were concerned, but never- 
theless forming a distinct danger to historic 
buildings, and causing, though a very small, yet 
a disturbing loss of life among ciyilians — roused 
the authorities to further action. This is not 
the place in which to relate the story of the re- 
organization of Britain's air defences : it is- 



THE TIMES HISTOnV OF THE WAR. 



75 



sufficient here to refer to the new development 
of the obscuration of hghts policy. On Sep- 
tember 29, 1915, Sir John Simon, as Home 
Secretary, issued a new Order (revoking an 
interim Order of July 31) for the regulation of 
lighting in the Metropolis. It considerably 
intensified the restrictions of the previous 
autumn and directed all sources of Ught to be 
screened. It made it, moreover, necessary to 
keep all railway carriage blinds drawn. The 
area affected covered nearly 700 square miles 
and contained nearly 7,000,000 inhabitants. 
The Order came into effect from October 1 and 
received the hearty cooperation of most of the 
public, opinion having been hardened by the 
September raids. The first night of the new 
conditions found London for the first time in 
something almost approaching darkness, and the 
experience of those who had to i^erambulate the 
streets was both unfamiliar and dangeroiis. 
The streets were very full of people, and the 
good-natured crowd took the new conditions 
as something of almost a humorous nature. The 
effect was peculiar. The sense of familiarity 
with the town-plan was lost ; it was difficult to 
find the way ; a mist seemed to have descended 
on the autumnal thoroughfares, through which 
the darkened and skilfully-driven vehicles 
moved with caution. London had become a 
place of mystery and was probably not unlike 
in many ways the London of the eighteenth 
centiory. Crime, despite the darkness, and 
despite many lurid fictions in the German Press, 
was notably absent. But there were at first 
many offenders against the new regulations. 
There were .still blazing lights and un(lra[>ed 
windows, and it was felt by the public that there 
were still many aliens about ready to welcome a 
new raid. But the policy was not one of Cim- 
merian darkness. The authorities wanted a 
tveak uniform illumination throughout the 
area, and this was pra/;tically He<-ured. The 
arc of light that ha/^1 marked Ix)ndon frf)in 
the hills that surround it had almost dis- 
appearwi. The reduction of light led at once 
U) earlier shoj^ping and banking and earlier 
hourH, and Ix^ndoners quickly relapHed into 
a home-kefr[jirig fjeoplo. Night rlubs were 
H'jppf'^jH.'Wjfl by the Order of thf; Home ScxTctary 
on Novcrrihfrr 18. The prilice issued sp«'cial 
warnings to motori«tH for reduction of spocfl 
and grf;at<rr can-, under the new conrJitions of 
the HtroetH. On I )cj:fjiiin:r 20, 101.5, a new 
Offlfrr waH iHHued for the greater part of tlio 
<ouiitry by whif;h two red lairipn wore necfHsary 



"SSH 


i\! 


P^Cj 


BLTERflTIoi 


^^^^^HL / 


OF TIME J 


In the night of Saturdav Sunday 


^^^1^ au 


May 20th21«t, -■ z.«..rv,'the time 

on .^]| rjuJ»A>>, -it aC Pb>l Wh«* tmi otSt< 


- ■. v t.m^^m 


r*».T.wi»iU tslaUu-Smoil* will bc put 

forward one hour :.> i .i- 


. ^M 








m '-^^A 




Ji M M 


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m 


ft 


L 



THE DAYLIGHT SAVING BILL, 

Reading one of the Notices issued by the 
Government. 

in the rear of every vehicle ; the use of head 
lamps was proliibited ; while the coast Orders of 
AprU 8, 1915, were re-enacted in an amended 
form incorporating the experience gained by 
the authorities. On March 10, 1916, a new 
lighting order for London of a still stricter 
character came into force. Light-coloured 
curtains or blinds were no longer permissible 
and no direct Ught was in any case allowed to 
shine into the street. 

Under all these circumstances it was not, 
perhaps, a matter for siorprise that the Daylight 
Saving proposals put forward before the war by 
the late Mr. William Willett should have been 
revived and adopted by the Government — 
although not until Germany and several other 
countries had led the; way. Those proposals 
made more dayhght available for workers and 
that at a time when artificial lighting was 
not only a danger but an exponsa tliat it was 
desirable to cut down. It promised to reduce 
Htibstantially the national expanditure. The 
Summer Time Act came into operation on 
Sunday, May 21, 1010. The law provided that 
clocks should be put forward on:* hour, from 
2 a.m. on that day, and thit " summer time" 
should remain in force up to and including 
Sei)tombor '.iO. 

Tho whole practice of civil control in war- 
time shows, perhaps, as wcM as any other 
aii)ect of tho Great War tho fundamentally 
balanced and quiet attitude of tho coitimunity 
toward.s the now conditir^ns No doubt the 



76 



THE TIMES HISTOTIY OF THE WAR. 



fMipulatiuii was far I^hh cotistraiikoii in Kngluii>l 
than ilk >iiiy ofhor Kuni|)eaii foimtry, but Htill 
ttit) artuKi i-otistiaiiit waii ({iiito uiifainiliar 
to tttM Kii^li.sli mill t aiil character. It wan, 
however, refeive<l with even more patieiiec 
than ill tlio Kli/abethau or tlie Na[)oleonii' 
period. The war exploded many fallacies 
AH to the nritt-ih people, ami not the least 
of these was the fallacy, of tJerman orij^in, 
that the people haii betiome inenicient, fickle, 
pleasiireloviny, and idle In fact, the cir- 
cumstances of the war ilisproved the alleged 
changn of character. It showed a peo{)lo 



ready to diMpense, in the interoHts of national 
Hafety, with familiar freedom, and to tolerate 
many things that wore positively shocking 
fr<jiii the traditional point of view. Tho 
people not only «how(«l this, but they showed 
also 111 every (rhuss a iiinv restraint ; wliilo 
crime intrreastid in (lermany it practi(;ally dis- 
appeared in Kngland. The new restraints had 
a good elTect on the entire moral of tho people 
Hiid gave some promise that th(» (Ireat War 
would prove tho beginning of tho future that the 
mystic Blake had prophesied for " England's 
green and pleasant land." 




/ 



CHAPTER CXXV. 

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN (II.). 

Position at the Exd of February — General Castelnau Arrives at Verdun — German 
Dispositions — Attack on the Forges Salient — The Fight at Vaux — German Endeavours 
AT ^Iort Homme — Germans Announce Its Capture — End of the Second Stage of the Battle 
— German Casualties — A Campaign of Mendacity — Effects in Fe.\nce and on Neutral 
Opinion — Resignation of General Galli^ni — French Heroism — Third Stage of the Battle 
— Fresh Attack on Mobt Homme — Malancourt Evacuated — Fighting at Avocourt and 
CuMiERES — Fresh Struggle for Douaumont — A Lull in the Fighting — Results and Lessons 
of the First Two Months. 



IX Chapter CXXIII. the opening moves 
of the Battle of Verdiin were described. 
The attack, which began on February 21, 
against the French saUent from Brabant 
to Ornes had resulted in the gradual with- 
drawal of the French from these advanced 
pcsitions, from the arc to the chord of the 
salient. By the morning of February 25, 
when General Castelnau, acting under orders 
from General Joffre, had reached Verdun, 
the French had been forced back to the Pepper 
and Douaumont Kidges. Then followed the 
furious German as-saults on the fort and village 
of Douaumont. A detachment of the 24th 
Brandenburgcrs succeeded on the 25th in 
reaching the fort of Douaumont, but General 
P6tain's counter-attack drove the enemy back 
beyond it, and not till the 28th did the 
Germans carry Douaumont village, which, 
however, they were unable to (lolii. The 
narrative was broken off at the 2!ith, when, 
after extraordinarily violent fighting, a pau.se 
ensuwl which marked tlie end of the first 
phoHf) of the fighting. Frf!Hh French troops 
harj been hurrif^i up to the scene of the struggle 
rluring the last thrr^e days, and General P^tain's 
line was growing stronger. 

The closing days of February, HHO, were 
arn'mg the rri'i^t fateful of the war. Tlie great 
G'TTnan battering ram of heavy artill(;ry and 
big columns ha<^l smashfid the first French 
Vol, Vrri.— Part 91. 77 



defences, and, pressing on in spite of tremen- 
dous losses, had reached the main defences of 
Verdun and of the Meuse salient. The Ger- 
mans were perhaps to be excused in thinking 
that victory was theirs, just as the splendid 
French fantassin, who had been fighting blindly 
and ferociously for days under the most terrible 
conditions of weather, suffering from lack of 
food and from the shattering effects of sus- 
tained bombardment, might well have thought 
that at last the great dyke in the West was 
breaking and that again the floods of invasion 
were to roll through France. 

The worst had to be foreseen, or at any rate 
provided for. No General starts his opera- 
tions of determined defence with the order for 
retreat, but nevertheless no General in the 
conditions of the fight around the northern 
front of Verdun could fail to prepare the 
machinery for that solution. This having 
been done, and the worst having been foreseen, 
the French command turntid all its energy and 
decision to the task of proving the super- 
fluity of such precautions. The withdrawal 
of the Frencli iiiKiS in the Woovro had betm 
ordered, and the movement was to be effected 
on the night of February 24-25. But events 
of the highest iinportanco to the whole war 
WfTc rncanvvhili' pr(!f)aring in the offices of tlie 
(irand <^uurtier-(<enerul. On the morning of 
February 23 General Langlo de Gary, who was 



7H 



77//; 77.W/';,S' lllS'l'(fltY OF TllK W I/.' 




C;ENEKAL FKTAIN (x) watching the battle at MORT HOMME. 



subsequently succeeded by General Petain in 
the conrunand of tlie Central Group of Armies, 
had informed the troops on the right bank of 
the river that the occupation of every point, 
even though it had become an island sur- 
roimded by the enemy, must bo maintained 
at all cost, and that there was but one order, 
"Hold Out." On the evening of the 24th, 
the moment when the withdrawal from the 
Woevre front was to be effected, General 
Jotire issued orders to the effect that the 
front between the INIeuse and the Woevre 
should be held by every possible means. The 
same day General Castelnau, Chief of the 
General Staff, was despatched by Joffre to the 
scene of the fighting, entrusted with full 
powers to deal with the situation as he thought 
best. On his way to the Verdim front he 
stopped at the Headquarters of the Central 
Group of Armies, and thence telephoned 
through to General Herr, who was in direct 
command at Verdun, confirming General 
Joffre's instructions that the detence on the 
right bank of the ^leuse had to be made good. 
Castelnau arrived at Verdmi on the mornmg 
of February 25, and that same evening General 
P6tain joined him and took over the control 
of the troops on both banks of the river 
The order he received on assiuning this post 
was : " Yesterday I ordered that the right 



bank of the Meuse north of Verdun should be 
held. Any commander giving the order of 
retreat will be brought before court martial." 

On the following day the impel us of the Ger- 
man blow broke itself upon the ridge of Douau- 
mont, and three days later General Castelnau 
felt at liberty to return to General Head- 
quarters, satisfied that the situation was for 
the moment at any rate in hand, and that the 
best possible dispositions had been taken for 
the defeat of the German att-ack. In those 
four days the whole aspect of the battle 
changed. All question of defeat or of retreat 
became impossible. The situation then was 
that from every side the French were receiving 
fresh troops. The initial questioning as to 
how far the enemy was letting himself go in 
the Verdun attack, as to whether it was or 
was not a feint , \\ as settled, and adequate steps 
had been taken to ward off the main onslaught. 

The Germans on their side had suffered 
heavily. The position of the enemy during 
the short breathing space which preceded the 
further battering upon Doiuiumont and the 
extension of the front to both banks of the 
Meuse was, according to "SI. Bidou, the French 
military writer, as follows : — • 

" In front of the French left the attack had 
been led by the Vllth Reserve Corps. It had 
advanced its two divisions one behind the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WylB. 



71) 



other. The 13th Division was ahead and 
suffered greatly during the first days of the 
struggle. On February 28 it was relieved by 
the llth Division, which extended its left as 
far as Pepper Ridge. In front of the French 
centre the XVIIIth Corps liad fovight with 
both its divisions in the firing line. The 21st 
Division had marched on the west from the 
Bois des Caures towards Ridge 344, while the 
division on the left, the 25th Division, had led 
in the attack on Beaumont and on the Bois 
des Fosses on February 24, and on the following 
day at Louvemont. It lost heavily in the 
desperate fighting. On the 27th it went back 
into support, its place being taken by the 21st 
Division, which had not been so badly tried. 
On the French right it was the Illrd Corps 
which led the attack. Its two divisions were 
in line, the fifth on the west, and the sixth to 
the east, but each division was in column, so 
that a regiment in the second line could relieve 
a tired regiment from the first line. Thus, on 
the evening of February 24, as the army 
corps reached the southern edge of the Vauche 
Wood, the place of the 1 2th Regiment had 
been taken by the 52nd. It was elements of 
the 6th Division (24th and 64th Regiments 
and 3rd .Tiigfr Battalion) which, on the 



evening of the 25th, got into Douaumont Fort. 
During this time the 6th Division was a little 
to the west, in front of Douaumont village. 
Finally, in order to link up the llird and 
XVIIIth Corps, the German command tle- 
tached a supporting regiment from the XVth 
Corps, which had not taken part in tiie attack, 
and which was in the Woevre. This regiment, 
the 105th, passed through Ornes, behind tlio 
front of the IlIrd Coriis, and took up a position 
in the Bois des Caurieres ; and on the morning 
of February 26 attacked Chauffeur Wood, 
while the right of the IlIrd Corps (52nd 
Regiment, 5th Division) attacked Douau- 
mont village. This attack failed, and the 
105th, in advancing on Chauffeur Wood, was 
completely shattered by machine-gun fire. It 
was the IlIrd Corps which again attacked on 
February 28. . . . On the 29th the exhausted 
troops were sent back to the rear. In order 
to take their place the XVIIIth Corps (21st 
Division) moved up on the left, while part of 
the gap was filled up by a new division, the 
1 1 3th, belonging to the army detachment 
operating between the Meuse and Moselle 
under the orders of General von Strantz." 

These were the first fresh troops to make 
their appearance on the enemy's side. The 




GBNHHAI. JOM'KK INSI'RCTINt; THH (iEKMAN I'KISONHKS. 



«H) 



77//'.' 77.Uf,'.s' niSToli'Y OF THE 111/?. 



(ieritian puHitiou.Mt tlu- Ix-^iauin^ of tin- 8t<i-uiKl 
|ihttriti of thti tiglttiiiy, wan ron^lily that tho 
tiriit nhiK-k ariity fumieil tOr the purpose uf 
ttiu (iffeiLriive, and tipt'cially trained and nitfted, 
liail been very badly handled. Of the \'llth 
Army C'urpd one divLsiun hail been sent back 
to reenporate, while the other had come 
tliroiigh with lo.ssieis which probably did not 
excet^d 10 per cent. The lllrd Corp8 wa.s 
contpletely broken by its cuiutant fighting and 
heavy lotjses, and hail been withdrawn. This 
also wiiji the condition of the XVIIIth Corps. 
Thits of the three eorp.s which were formed for 
the ertort of taking,' N'erdun only one remained 
in condition to liold the field, and all that luui 
been accomplished wivs the capture of the two 
tirst lines of the French defence. The attack 
upon the centre at Douaumont had been iuld 
by the French at the last moment, and the 
further development of the battle was jeopar- 
dised by that failure. The enemy had to 
attack upon the wings without having been 
able to achieve success on the centre. The 
special German shock army having worn itself 
out in the first onslaughts, the ordinary 
troops of the Crown Prince's command were 
called upon. The front they had to attack 
stretched from Malancourt, on the west 
bank of the Meuse, to the eastern clifTs of 



the Mcuse lieights, on the right hank of the 
river. 

The front, therefore, at the beginnmg of this 
extended effort of the enemy was miuked on 
the luft l)Hiik of the river by the villages along 
the stream of Forges, Malaneourt, JJethineourt, 
and Forges village. Fast of Forges thc^ front 
dropped down to the Meuse, and west of .Malan- 
court it cut through the Avocourt \\'ood. 
These localities marked out the first line of the 
French defence. It w«is not a very cHieient 
lino, nor one capable of long ilefence, but 
was intended rather to serve as a series of 
advanced |)osts to the bigger and more 
lormidal)le lines of defence which nature had 
provided farther to the south, on the heights 
of the I^Iort Homme, Ridge :J04, and the C6te 
(If roie. Still farther south the strength of the 
French position grew more and more formidable 
on the hills of ]\Iontzeville, Bourrus Wood, and 
the Marre Fort. 

The Germans on the east bank of the river 
having swept through the French first and 
second lines, the French artillery on the west 
bank, from the excellent artillery [)ositions of 
the ^lort Homme, the Cote de I'Oie, and the 
Cumieres Wood, was enabled to sweep the flank 
of any German attacks upon Douaumont on 
the east bank of the Meuse. It became, there- 







r- — 1j^^^^ 




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w 


v^ 


^Fv- '^f,;^ 


Wig 9 .-^-j* 




i:J 


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^^■MKa 




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JHIH 


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ON THH VERDUN FRONT. 
Entrance to a French communication-trench. 



TBE TIMES HlSTOliY OF THE WAB. 



81 




POSTS IN THE FRENCH LINES. 

An officer leaving the gallery of a counter-mine 
from which the mining operations of the enemy- 
are checked. 

Circle picture : Masked troops on the look-out. 

•fore, vital that before anything further was 
attempted on the centre, the attack upon tl e 
wings should be developed, and the Fren< h 
HrtUlery on the left bank forced out of its 
position.s. The extent to which the artillery 
fire from these positions had been disquieting 
to the opening stages of the German offensive 
on the other side of the river, was shown by 
the violent bombardment which they had 
undergone. The preliminary bombardment 
whJch prepared the way to the first infantry 
{iHsaults along the northern Verdun front wa" 
also directed upon the wholf; of the Men e 
section of the front, both east and west of the 
river, and extended, indeed, far into tl e 
Argonne. VV'hiie the infantry were unloow d 
on the nortliem front, the artillery maintmnt d 
its bombardment along the n;Ht of the front. 
On March 2 there was a noticeable increase 
in the strength of the bombardrncsnt of the 
Mort Hornrne, of Curni^res Woods, and the 
Cot*! *le i'Oio. This incTeased fire wa« main- 
tained until noon on March 0, when infantry 



for the first time in the Verdun battle entered 
into action upon the western bank of the Meuse. 
The attack was begun with two divisions of the 
reserve, the 22rid and the 12th, one belonging 
to the Vltii Reserve Cor|)s, and the other to 
the Xth, which formed part dI" tli(! General 
Ji(!servo of the German Army, which made 
its first appearance in the fighting at (liis 
moment. 

The first assault was luunchcd on tlie ligiit ot 
the left bank positions, and aimed at reducing 
of tlie salient around Forges. This wa-i 
(lone without very much (iiCliciiily, \,\hi 
nature of the position favouring th(^ oik itiy in 

1>4 2 




f 




THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAU. 



83 



many ways. Forges and Regneville having 
been carried, the Germans then turned to the 
west and sought to come to grips with the main 
French point of defence, the Mort Homme. 
But the advance already made on the left 
bank of the river was deemed sufficiently im- 
portant by the German General Staff to enable 
the main frontal attack to be resumed. 

^^'hile the attack upon the outworks of the 
JNIort Homme position was pushed with the 
utmost vigour, the whole northern line of 
Verdun burst into the flame of fighting, such 
as had not been witnessed up till then, and 
right along the front, practically from Malan- 
court to Vaux, the battle raged for three days 
from ilarch 8 to March 10. The front on the 
right bank of the river consisted of four distinct 
regions of activity. 

(1) Pepper Ridge district, which stretched 
from the north of Vacherauville to the Ravine 
of Haudromont Farm. 

(2) District south-west of Haudromont Farm. 

(3) From Douaumont Village to the Hardau- 
mont redoubt. 

(4) Vaux village and Vaux fort. 

On this battle front the reconstituted corps 
which had taken part in the first days of the 
offensive from February 21 to February 24, 
were once again brought into action. They 
had been verj- considerably overhauled behind 
the lines. The Ilird Army Corps had been 
addressed by the Crown Prince himself while at 
rfst, and fired to a final effort to capture 
VfTdun, " the heart of France." Since March 2 
the Jos.ses in officers had been made good — at 
least two-thirds of them being new. In 
the rank.s the gaps were tremendous. They had 
been filled up with men of the 191G class of 
conHfTipts, who were good fighters, but a trifle 
evij>)fTant and somewhat nervous. To the 
IlJrd Coryjs was added the 113th Infantry 
DiviHion, which had alfo been sent back to 
rest after March 2, and had also received drafts 
t<^j inake good its losses which in some regi- 
rncmts amounted to about two-fifths of i\w\r 
strength. Two rfgirnf;ritH of the XVth Cor})s 
complft'fl the forces launche<l on the first 
day of the figliting upon the third nection of 
th<! front from the village of Douaumont and 
tie- Hardaumont Redoubt. 

Tfur tactics einployfrd wen; familiar, and led 
to familiar tcm\x\\m. Launching larg*; jnasses 
of rnen to the atta/^k, the enciny sought to break 
through by sheer weight of nurnbfTS. The 
great concentration of artillfTy and fhells 




A GERMAN HAND GRENADE. 
Showing the tag of tape at end of handles. A 
hook is attached to the grenade, by which it is 
carried on the soldier's belt. Five and a-half 
seconds elapse between pulling the tag and the 
explosion of the grenade. 

effected by the French since the critical 
moments on this front at the end of February 
showed that they lipd turned the breathing 
s[)ace accorded to them to good accoimt. 
Time after time the German masses were 
caught by the French artillery before they were 
able to get under weigh from Douaumont, the 
outlets to which were kept under a continuous 
rain of shc^li by the French artillerymen. Time 
after time the Germans succeeded in piercing 
tlu! curtain of fire; which enshrouded their 
positions and daslied on to the French line only 
to be nu!t by deadly machin(!-gun and rifle fire. 
Tliat day's effort brought them as gain a few 
houses in the village of Douaumont and a 
redoubt of sniall importance at Hardaumont. 
'I'he next day the force in this neighbourhood 
was loo wfiakened to be able to attack with 
luntliiiig likf! its first vigour, and il mado no 
fiirthiT lii^adway. 

In ifs first actions at \\w bcginniii'.; ol' I hfi 
\'<rdiin l>jittl" till llird Army Corps had lost 



84 



THE TIMES lUS'iiUiY OF Till-: WAR. 



about it tliiiil of itft i-HVc-tiveH. la t}iis, it.s 
iM)coiiil vuiitiiru, ut'tfi- ivtittiiig, it8 lusseb wero 
tiliout the tiuiiie. It luiil l<> lit- rtinoved tiyuiii 
t'roiii the tiriit line. Iiuviiii; locit 2J,00U men uineo 
tlu^ hej^iniiiiig of tin- buttle. 

Uijijht uiitl li'ft of tliH lllrd L'orjis, on Munli U, 
thu buttle spretul ulong the whole lino. The 
tightiug oil Ahireh U formed, ua it were, the 
seventh wave of fury hurled upon the Verdun 
liefenceB. Kuot und west of the river storin after 
btonn of infantry sought in vuin to pierce the 
French liae8. 

In the I'epptT Uitlyu di.stncl of tlie front on 
the otkitern bunk of the river a violent attack 
was made by the 14tli and 15th Reserve 
Divisions. It failed to make any headway what 
ever up the bare slopes of the position. The 
enemy here lost very heavily indeed, being caught 
time after time in splendidly timed curtain fire. 

Simultaneously, in the region south-west of 
Haudromont Farm, the 21st Division, which 
liad been taken out of the first line for repairs 
on March 2, moved out through the ravines to 
attack the crests to the west of Douaumont 
along the road loading from Bras to Douaumont. 
The losses here also were extraordinarily heavy. 
Time after time the assaulting columns were 
scattered by the French <iuns before they pot 



to gripd with the French infantry and, even 
before the attack started, the casualty list was 
ah'eady high. The Frencli artillery got very 
correct observation reports of what was going 
on in the valleys, and plied the ranks of the 
assailants witli shell as they were gatluning 
for their forward movement. Indeed, at one 
spot where six companies of infantry bail 
gathered the guns got on to them as they were 
standing in tlmir ranks and swept almost the 
whole lot out of existence 

IJy far tne most deterininod and most costly 
eliorts of the enemy on those fateful days of 
March were directed against the position of 
\'aux. The village lay at the foot of the Meuse 
heights, at the entrance of a ravine into the 
W'oevro I'lain. This ravine, winding gently up 
the heights, reached the crest just in the rear 
of the centre of the French position at Douau- 
mont. Frontal attack upon that position having 
failed time after time the GermaiLs endeavoured 
to force their way tlu'ough Vaux to the rear of 
the defence. Thiire were many obstacles to 
their progress. The ravine of Vaux was shut in 
))y two plateauX; upon the southern of which was 
the Fort of Vaux, while to the north the table- 
land bore the well organized positions of 
Ifardauniont and the Caillotte Wood. 




THE GERMAN GROWN FRINGE ON THE VERDUN FRONT. 
Observe the horse-shoe for luck. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



8.-) 




THE FORT OF VAUX. 
Showing the effect of the German Artillery. 



In the attack upon these positions the 
Germans used their Vth Reserve Corps. On 
the first day of the fighting the neighVjouring 
troops had got a footing on the Hardaumont 
position, having, as sliown above, captured a 
small redoubt. 

On the 9th, the Vth Corps moved out to the 
attack of the village of Vaux, at the foot of the 
ravine, and of the Fort of Vaux, on the southern 
wall of that ravine. The first assaults were led 
by the 9th Reserve Division, which debouched 
from the neighbourhood of Maucourt-Omes 
early in the morning and marched on Vaux 
village. The operation had, of course, been 
preceded by tremendou.-i bombardment, in the 
course of which the village ha^J crumbled away. 
Either confident that all defence had been 
smothered by high explosives, or else misled 
by some erroneous report into the belief that 
the village had been evacuated by the French, 
the first troops of the attack (the 1st IJattalion 
19th Res*;rve) advanced upon the village in 
CfAumn of fours without even troubling about 
patrols or JuJvanced guard. The deterrmned 
Frenc?i, however, still lurked in the cellars and 
ruins of the village, arifl wniti-d with beating 
hearts for the enemy. One French officer, on 
w-*;ing the enfriny marching tranrjuilly forward 
four abreast, as though out on manf/ruvres, 
aft^jr the " Ceaw; fire," dr;clared that they only 
n'!*!ded their band to complete Mie jiictnre of 



complete ignorance. When tney got to the 
village they were met with a murderous fire 
from the machine guns. As they reeled, the 
waiting Frenelimen sprang from their shelters 
and their parapets and finished their rout with 
the bayonet. The battalion fled in disorder. 
There was a wild rush for cover, and those who 
found it in the cellars of the houses on the 
fringe of the village did not succeed in holding 
out. They were finished off in a series of 
grenade engagements. The second and third 
battalions meanwhile passed to the east of the 
village, and advanced towards the trenches 
occupied by the French on the nortli of the 
slopes dommatod by the fort of Vaux. At a 
little distance from these trenches the assailants 
were mown down by the fire of the French, and 
retired in disorder. 

During the night of INTarch 9-10 the 3rd 
liatbalion of the Oith Regiment (6th Infantry 
Division of tlie llird Corps) took post to ttie 
north of Vaux in order to relievo the 19th 
Regiment, which was destroyed, and to att(nnpt 
again the capture of the village. This under- 
taking was rendered impossible by the French 
artillery fire. During th(! day infantry attacks 
upon the ruint-d village followed one after 
thr) other with H(;arcely a f)auHe. Tlio enemy 
managed to gain f)OssesHion of a f(!W houses on 
the eastcTn outskirts of the place ; but from 
t lie Fort he was n^pulsed v\illi luuivy loss, 



8t; 



THE TIMFS fJlSlTORY OF THE ]V III 




leaving the wire entanglements of the slopes 
leading to the Fort burdened with his dead. 
His only other gain was the Hardaumont Spur, 
the capture of which by no means opened the 
road to Douaumont or Vaux, smce there still 
remained the strong position of the Caillette 
Wood. Another attack on the 16th and on the 
18th ended in failure, and also marked the 
close of the great battle for the wings, at any 
rate on the eastern wing. 

The fight for Vaux on the eastern wmg and 



Sterilising with chemicals before being stored. 

Centre picture : French soldier drawing his supply. 

Kottom picture : Barrels containing the water 

near the trenches. 

I the right bank of the river was accom- 
panied by fighting of equal fury on the western 
wing around the key position of the Mort 
Homme. In this sector of the battlefield 
the first step — namely, the forcing of the 
Forges-Regneville salient — had been accom- 
plished by March 8. This was considered 
sufficiently important as to allow the fighting 
on the right bank to proceed whilethe Germans in 
the western field of battle were to follow up their 
success by the capture of the Mort Homme, which 
would greatly improve the chances of a success- 
ful action against the centre at Douaumont. 

In this action on the left bank of the river, 
which went on at the same time as the frenzied 
but unsuccessful assaults upon Vaux on the 
right bank, but little more gain was made. 
Despite reckless sacrifice and valour the 
Germans were vmable to bite upon the Mort 
Homme. For the position leading to it they 
had to fight to the last. The Crows Wood, 
througli which they hoped to advance in 
triumph on the Mort Homme, was captured by 
them, bxit their possession was not long imdis- 
puted. Twelve hoiu"s after the French hail 
been driven from the wood the French went 
out to the counter-attack with such vigour 
that by the end of the day they had succeeded 
after fighting which time after time came to 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



87 



the bayonet, in driving the Germans out of 
all but a small portion of the eastern fringe 
of the wood. 

On the 10th, after iminterrupted bombard- 
ment throughout the day, the Germans made a 
really great effort to make good their loss at 
this point. They accumvilated heavy artil- 
lery and men and dispatched wave after 
wave of men to meet the deluge of the French 
fire. The German losses might well have 
made them pause, but throughout the whole 
history of Verdun it was noticeable that at no 
moment did loss of men appear to matter to 
the General Staf?.* Xo price was apparently 
too high to pay for success even of a minor 
nature. At the end of the day they dashed a 
whole division on to the Crows Wood and got 
through, driving the French from the portion 
of the wood which the Germans had lost in 
the counter-attack of March 8. Then fol- 
lowed a period of suspense, throughout which 
on both banks of the river the guns alone 
were heard. 

This pause was so general that for a day or 
so it looked as though the offensive in that 
region had come to an end. An artillery duel, 
without any infantry action, marked the 11th 
on both sides of the Meuse, and the French 
heavy artillerj' inflicted great loss on enemy 
troops gathering in a ravine north of Pepper 



I^idge. On the 12th the German infantry 
again took no part in the battle, but the artil- 
lery cea.selessly bombarded Bethincourt, 
Douaumont and Moulainville, a fort and 
village almost due east of Verdun and south 
of Vaux. The French reply w.os particularly 
spirited in this region. 

During the lull in infantry fighting it was 
possible to take account of various significant 
facts. It became obvious that the German 
losses in the later attacks on Vaux had been so 
heavy that the gaps had had to filled by young 
recruits of the 1916 class, in some companies 
to the extent of one-third of their strength. 
They had been at the front since December, 
after only tliree or four months' training, 
and were not used before Verdun till the first 
week of fighting had rendered their presence 
absolutely necessary. 

On the 12th the bombardment in the V^erdun 
region became more violent on the west bank, 
the French positions in the first and second 
lines at Mort Homme and Bourrus Wood were 
heavily shelled. The French observers had 
seen sufficient movement of troops behind the 
German lines to vmderstand the reason for 
this, and the violent attack launched against 
these positions in the afternoon of the 13th 
was expected, and although the assault was 
made with extreme energy, it was repulsed 




THE SHATTHHHD VIM.AdH OF VAUX. 



U8 



THt: TIMKS lUSTUliY OF Till!: [VAli. 



aloitt.' tht^ vvhulu liiiH, the onaiuy only gaining 
a ftHttiiig til tvvu |)uint8 uf the truachuti, butwuun 
B^thincuiirt uml thu Mi>rt lloiiitiu'. 

Mtireh 14 uuw thu Idng-exp^cted attack in 
furct^ upon the Mort Hoiiuae. The battle for 
the Mort Koiaine una a^ ini[)(>rtaiit and us 
cuMtly iM the atniggio for Douuuiiioiit. Tlio 
nature of tlie ooiuitry calls for description not 
on I hut account alone, but also on account 
of I he claims ntade by the CJeriaan (general 
Start during the progi-ess of the fighting. 

After the Germans had carried the Frencli 
advanced line formed by the villages of Forges 
and of Hothincourt, tliey found themselves at tlu' 




GENERAL VON STRANTZ. 

foot of a series of hills running almost per- 
pendicularly to their positions between Bethin- 
court and Forges. The first of these hills was 
double crowned. The hill nearest to them rose 
to the height of 2G5 metres, and immediately 
beyond, and a little to the south-east, was the 
higher point (295 metres), known locally as 
the Mort Homme, the exact meaning of which 
no one has been able to decide with certaintj'. 
The attack of this position was facilitated by 
the ravines leading up to it, in one of which, 
the Crows Wood, plenty of cover was available, 
as well as protection from bombardment from 
the southern battery positions of the French. 
Having captured this position in the earlier 
lighting, the Germans were at once able to use 



it as the starting-point ff)r a direct assault 
upon the main bastion of th(» French line. 
The front attacked by tlie cjnemy measured 
only about three miles. Upon it great masses 
of men were conc^entrated, which were moved 
out from the Forges-iJotliincourt Road, from 
the Crows Wood, and from Hegneville. Thon^ 
was very heavy fighting, at the end of whi(!h 
the French had been forced to withdraw from 
their positions to a new line, which ran through 
Methincourt, the height of the Mort Homme, 
the southern edge of Cumiores Wood and 
Cumiores Village. The Germans had carried 
Hill 265. but the P^ronch* still remained in 
possession of the 295 Height known as tho 
Mort Homme, which constituted the objective 
of the German attack. 

On the strength of this very partial and mosl 
costly success, the Germans announced tho 
taking of the position. 

On the IGth they attempted to achieve the 
success they had announced. At three o'clock 
in the afternoon, after the usual bombardment, 
a division moved forward from the Bois des 
Corbeaux, straight towards the formidable clifT. 
The French curtain fire fell between them and 
the French trenches, but they were not 
daunted until five successive waves of men. 
separated by two or three hundred yards, had 
failed to pass the screen of death between them 
and their objective. Their artillery gave them 
less support than they had expected in this 
open ground, for the French observers had 
discovered its position, and it had to reply to 
the French bombardment that ceaselessly fell 
upon it. At the end of the afternoon the 
CJermans were back in the Bois des Corbeaux, 
having abandoned even the small advantages 
they had previously gained. 

The Germans were to find to their cost that 
the ]Mort Homme was a position easier to 
capture by communique than by fighting. 
The formidable nature of their reception on it;- 
slopes forced them to abandon their plan of 
turning the French position from the right and 
of capturing the Mort Homme. Their next 
endeavour in this long drawn out and bloody 
battle of the wings was to seek to turn the 
French lines on the left bank of the Meuse 
from the extreme left. 

The INIort Homme was on the right of the 
French left ; Hill 304 was at its extreme left. 
The south-east horn of Hill 304 is the village 
of Avocourt, lying snuglj' among rolling downi- 
lands, and sheltered by its wood, through 




SCHNhS I.N AMJ NhAK 1111'. V1I.I.A(,1', <.)i' VAUX AM KK THK (;KI<MAN AIIACKS. 

r)n March 16, l'^16, five succesiive nttackH were hurled forward hv the enemy in tliis rejjion. Two 
wF-re directed ai^ainst the villa((c, two against the slopes of the ridjje crowned hy the fort, and finally 
;in attempt wa* made on the douth-cattt of the villa|(e. All attacks were shattered by the curtain 

fire and machine guns of the I'rtnch. 



H\) 



04 3 



tiu 



THI'. ri.MHS IIISTOUY OF THE WAR. 




IKKNCH SOl.UIKK RF.STING IN A 
RUINED HOUSE AT VERDUN. 

which the only easy ascent of Hill ;U)4 could be 
made. On the 20th the Crown Prince threw 
a fresh division, the llth Jiavariau, ajrainst 
this position. This division w'as one of the 
prides of the Cerinany army. It had been 



through the (iaiiiaau and I'olisli raiiipaigns 
iiiulcr Mtukeiisen. Tliese crack trooptj were 
thrown upon Avocom-t Wood, and, attacking 
with tiamo throwers, maiuigctl to make slight 
progresH in the eastern part of the IJois de 
Maiancoiu-t, and, capturing the Avocourt Wood, 
managed to reach the lower slopes of tlic littit- 
mound known us the Mamelon d'Haucourt. 
W hen the (firmans endeavoured, however, to 
debouch towards Hill ;{()4, they had to cross 
open country, and sutt'ered so terribly under 
the concentrated fire of the French guns that 
the attempt was abandoned, the throe regi- 
ments of this division having lost in two days 
between 50 and tiO per cent, of their strength. 
'rh(f battle for the wings was at an end, and on 
b(jth sides of theMeusesihince reigruMl fora while. 
Tlie Crown Prince, after the gigantic effort 
of his armies, was confronted with problems 
more vast, with a resistance more confident 
a 1(1 more efliciont, than tho-e which ho had had 
to face in the opening days of tlu! Ven-dun 
offcuisive. In three days the French had been 
driven off their first positions along a large 
portion of the Verdun front ; over a month 
later they were still defending with increasing 
vigour their second line. Behind that line lay 
yet another, and the prospect of the fall of 
Verdun was but faint upon the German 
Iiori'/.on. The French could already count upon 




--i^ltir^ »t \ I \\ 









BRINGING UP AMMUNITION. 
Engine drawing a trainload of ammunition behind the battle area. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



91 




FRENCH MACHINE-GUN SECTION IN 
ACTION. 

Smaller picture : A gun in a trench hidden from 
observation. 

victory, the price of Verdun having already 
been exacted in the enemy s blood, without the 
position having been captured. Tliat price, it 
was said, had been fixed by the Imperial 
General Staff at 200,000 casualties. The exact 
loas sustained on either side will probably never 
be known ; but certain indications will be 
sufficient to show that the German losses up 
to the close of the Vjattle of the wings were 
extraordinarily heavy. Throughout this period 
of the fighting the enemy was still advancing 
in masses, and relied to a foolhardy extent 
upon the devastating effect of artillery. Time 
after time large bodifss of troops, gathering 
in the valleys and ravines behind the German 
front, w«;re located and pounded by the French 
guns. The Germans, instead of adopting the 
system of relieving their worn-out divisions 
with new divisionw, brought back the used-up 
troops, and, after filling up their gaps with 
matfTi>iI from the dejj6ts, sent the divisions 
})Hfk to the firing lino after thn-fs or four 
days' rent. Thf> lilrd and XVilltli Army 
(Utr\m w*Te thu« removed from the front, 
after having, as shown above, left about a 
thirrl of their men on the field fiiiring the 
attfu;ks upon the first line. Thfjy rf^apfM^and 
^luring the |><Tiod under rr;view, and Jigain lost 
».\i'i\it the same nurnbfjr, })efore again being 
drawn out. Tfie XVIIMh Corf is had a total 



casualty list of 17,000 men, while for the llird 
Corps the figure was 22,000. 

The details are more precise as regards the 
losses of the 121st Division of Infantry, which 
moved on to the front to the north of Vaux 
al)out March 12. More than half the 7th Reserve 
Regiment was mown down by the machine guns 
during the fruitless attacks on the slopes of the 
fort ; the .same fate overtook the 60th Regiment, 
and the 19th Regiment, in attacking the village 
of Vaux, on March 9, lost about (50 per cent, of 
its men. Its i;5th company was snrpris(>d and 
destroyed completely in the houses of the viiliigc. 

The three infantry regiments of th<> I Ith 
Bavarian Division, which arrived frcsli trom 
the east to tak(; part in the fighting on llic left 
bank of the Meuse between March 20 and 22, 
siiffercd terribly. The losses of these regiments 
varied betwcMJii r)0 and (K) per e(>nt. The four 
regiments of the 2nd Landwc^hr Divisif)n, whicrli 
W(T{! engaged in tli(^ same (-onditions as (lie 
1 1th, had to |)ay similar (oil. Tlirsc indicntions 
(leu! only with tri)oj)s a(^tiiMJIv' engaged in 
active operatiojis, and they <lo not (akc! into 
account the treiiuTidous daily wastage that 
went on in a buttle of this sort when the whole 




H 
Z 

o 

as 



E 
H 

O 

H 

< 

H 
Z 

o 
z 

B 
U 

z 



92 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



'J3 



countryside was plastered with shrapnel and 
Jiigh explosive shells. As an instance of the 
extent of this sort of loss, the fate of the 
37th infantry regiment, which was surprised by 
artillery when relieving another regiment and 
lost 500 men, may be cited. 

The great shock army which was formed to 
give the Crown Prince his fame as the Captor 
of Verdun, was maimed and bleeding. Only 
one-third of its effectives were in a position 
to take the field. The army of the Crown Prince 
liimself liad been fighting for many weary days, 
beating its head without avail upon the French 
second line positions, and, in some cases even, 
still upon positions of the first line. A tre- 
mendous amount had been done, and jet but 
little had been accomplished. Verdun was 
stronger than ever, and blood had flowed very 
much more freely on the German than on the 
French side. So much for the military effect of 
this first month of battle. 

What effect the Germans had expected from a 
moral point of view, both upon their allies and 
upon neutral countries, was set out in the 
following order of the day i.ssued by General 
Joffre to the Army defending Verdun : 
'■ Soldiers of the Army of Verdun ! For throe 
weeks you have been exposed to the most 
formidable assaults yet attempted against us 
by the enemy. Germany counted upon the 
•success of this effort, which she believed to be 
irresistible, and to which she has devoted her 
best troops and her most powerful artillery. 
She hoped that the capture of Verdun would 
revive the courage of her allies and would 
convince neutral countries of German 
.superiority. She had reckoned without you. 
Night and day, despite a bombardment without 
prff.edfnt, you have resisted all attacks and 
maintained our positions. The struggle is not 
yet at an f?nd, frjr the German.s require a 
victory. You will succeed in wresting it from 
thtnn. We have munitions and reserves in 
abundance ; but, above all, you have indomit- 
able courage and faith in the destinies of the 
Republic. The eyes of the country arc; ujiori 
you. You will be among thost; of whom it will 
he Haid : they barred the road to Verdun to the 
(/fTUian."." 

Alhirtion haH been already made iti the 
l»reviou-* chaf)ter dealing with thf; batth? of 
N'erdiin, to the rrif^ans by wliich the (jermans 
Hr>ijght to r#;np in n»'utral cfnintries the advan- 
tftgfw of the vietorieM they failed fo a(hiev«\ 
ThiiH, in Ih'r f)'Ti'«l iiri'l'T review, the Geniiaiis 



more than once claimed successes which were 
never theirs. On March 9 a German ofi(ici;il 
telegram asserted that by a brilliant attack 
made in the course of the previous night the 
I'osen reserve regiments Nos. 6 and 10, 
under the direction of General von Guret/.ky- 
Cornitz, had carried by assault the fort of 
Vaux, as well as a number of adjoining 
fortifications. The French, who had learned by 
experience the nature of Germany's " wireless 
offensive," immediately took steps to publish a 
convincing denial of this false assertion. At 
the very hour when the German wireless was 
sent — namely, at two o'clock in the afternoon — 
a French staff oflficer entered the fort of \"aux 
and foiind that it had not been attacked. It 
was being bombarded, like the rest of the zone 
of battle, and the troops occupying it were 
perfectly calm, most of them, indeed, being 
engaged in the game of manille. The same 
wireless report further asserted (1) that German 
troops were occupied in clearing Crows Wood 
of parties of French who were still there ; (2) 
that the Germans had taken by assault the 
village of Vaux. At that time the greater part 
of Crows ^^'ood was held by the French, the 
Germans only occupying the eastern fringes. 
The village of Vaux had been attacked and 
vigorously defended. It remained in French 
hands, and the German troops which had 
succeeded in getting into the village had been 
driven out at the point of the bayonet. Tlie 
effect upon neutrals, upon Germany, and upon 
the Entente Allies was completely contrary to 
tliat which Germany desired to create. For a 
lime the German people, misled by inspired 
I)ress comment and official falsehood, saw in the 
\'erdun battle a success which would shorten 
th(! war. As, day after day, the casualties 
grew and the front remained the same, that 
feeling of elation changed to one of apprehen- 
sion. Among the Entente Allies official expres- 
sion was given to the admiration of the people in 
exchanges of telegrams. Sir Douglas Haig, 
telegraphing to (icneral Joffre on March 10, 
said : " While dcfjloring the loss of gallant 
l'"renelimen in the great battle still raging, the 
British Army desires me to assure you of its 
<ulmiration for the heroic performances of the 
Fniuch army roimd Verdun, where Germany 
bas chfjsen to break her strength in vain against 
th(! un(;on(ju«;rable .soldiers of France." Cieneral 
AlexcielT, in the name of the Czar, conveyed to 
Gentrral Balfourier and the XXth Army Corps, 
which hfwl taken part in the counter-attacks 



U4 



THl': TJMKS lllSTOUY OF Tilt: WAIL 



ni Dtiiitidiiiont, tilt' Kiii|(t<roi''ri wuriaetit ailiuini 
lutii at itH brtlliHiit cuiuliict. The telegram tuiicl : 
" Hift Majesty in Hriiily coiiviucetl that imiler 
the coininand *it' it8 gallant leailerH the Freiii-li 
Anny, t'aithful to ith gloriouu traiiitiuns, will 
ant tail to liiiii^ it8 savage eiieiuy to liis kueers." 
(ieueral Alexeiett added : " The whole Russian 
Army follows v\ith siisttiiiied attention the 
great deetls of the French Army. It oxpreHses 
to its hrothern in arms its best wishes for 
complete victory, and is merely awaiting orders, 
to engage the common enemy. 

These were certainly not the sentiments wliich 
the Germans desired to call forth in the allied 
countries. Upon French civilian and political 
inoml the effects were equally disconcerting 
to the CJemians, who, at the close of the battle 
of the wings, found all their efforts, in what- 
ever direction they tendetl, halHed and held in 
check. In I'aris the temper of the puV)lic 
becan\e day by day more confident. For the 
first time perliajis a consciousness of equipoise 
in the opposing forces, rather than an intense 
admiration for a gallant fight against odds, 
occupied the public mind. After tyie first 
days of darkness and disaster along the Belgian 
frontier the French had realised, faintly per- 



haps, the tremendous strength of the < Jermiui 
fighting nuurhine. The resistance on the Aisiuf, 
111.- imyiehliiig wall of (Jerman tnuieli, showtul 
them still more clearly how gr»»at would havo 
to be the successful prej)aiat ion of victory. 
At the outbreak of war the Fn^nch had been 
caught in the mitldle (»f a period of restoration, 
during which some of the defects and remedic^s 
of an extreme anti-political retjime were being 
slowly repaired. Their supply of heavy artillery, 
of nuiehine guns, and of sliells was completely 
inad('{juato to the demands of modern war. 

The Marno liad prevented the creation of 
any legend of German invincibility. 'J'iio 
fight for the road to Calais had shown that in 
sticking power the Allies need fear no com- 
parison with their enemies. In the Champagne 
were seen for the first time the fruits of the war 
industries which litul covered Franco with 
factories since the battle of the Marne. Aft<;r 
the first few days of anxious tension during the 
battle of Verdun, French public opinion began 
to perceive that here at last the German artillery 
and German " tackle " had found their equal, 
if not their master, in the products of France. 

In political circles, which in Paris were 
always peculiarly sensitive, there were momenta 




BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS AT CROWS WOOD. 
The scene of the German attack on March 10, 1916. 



THF TIMES HISTOIiY OF THE WAR. 



95 



FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS. 

Troops on foot and by motor lorries on the way 

to the fighting line. 

when rumoiir distxirbed the balance of judg- 
ment ; but it sufficed for the Prime Minister 
to speak a few reassuring words as he passed 
through the lobbies to restore calm and con- 
fidence. 

The quietness with which the politicians of 
France watched the progress of the struggle, 
and the lack of internal efiect it had, were best 
shown by the fact that in the middle of the 
action, on March 16, General Gallieni, Minister 
of War, was able to resign without in any way 
disturbing the public mind. The main cause 
of his resignation was ill-health, but there were 
contributing reasons of a more political nature, 
which, had the German offensive had tlie 
morally disturbing y)owers the enemy imagined, 
would have caused consideraVjle commotion. 

General Gallieni l^ocame Minister of War 
when the French Cabinet was reconstituted 
under M.' Tiriand's presidency at the end of 
October, 1915. Ife succeeded M. Millerand, 
whose administration had been widely con- 
demned both in the Chamber of Deputies and in 
the Senate, on account of its routine character 
and reHistance to the large and imaginative 
change-s rendfired necessary by the gigantif: 
Hcale of modf.-rn war, and the necessity for 
mobilising every latent force of efficiency 
anrl goodwill throughout the country. The 
a[»fjointrfient of a soMifir was in kerrping with 
the prinr,i|,K; uJiicli giiided .M. liriand in tlic 
Hele<;tion of all his colleagues. He choso 
Admiral I>>w;a/,(! a^ Hucc<»sHor to the lladical 





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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



97 



politician, M. Augagneiir, at the Ministry of 
3Iarine, and, while himself taking the portfolio 
of Foreign Affairs, the principle was main- 
tained by the appointment of M. Jules Cambon, 
one of the foremost diplomats of France, to the 
post of Secretary-CJeneral of the Foreign Office. 

General (Jallieiii, before his appointment as 
Minister of War, had held a post which in 
happier circumstances would have remained 
without any direct responsibility in the actual 
operations of war — that of ^lilitary Governor 
of Paris. This post, in ordinary times, was ore 
of honour and of distinction, rather than of 
action and responsibility. The great drive of 
the Germans at the beginning of the war gave 
to General Gallieni's functions an extra- 
ordinary importance. The arrival of the 
enemy almost at the gates of Paris, the con- 
-seqixent departure of the Government for 
Bordeaux, gave to him a role full reference to 
which has already been made in a previous 
■chapter. The energj- he displayed as Military 
Governor of Paris during the critical moment 
of the Battle of the Marne he brought with 
Iiim to the performance of his duties as Minister 
of War. He left this office for a nursing home 
in ord?r to undergo an operation, and was 
-succeeded by another of those generals who 
had earned their reputation on the field of 
battle, and not in the Parliamentary lobby or 
in the anti-chambers of ministers. That such 
a change was, effected without causing any 
apprehcn-ion on the part of the public, to 
whom Gallieni was an idol, was the best proof 
of P'rench confidence in the ability of the 
Verdun defenders. Broadly viewed, there was 
indeed ample justification for the assurance of 
the JVench. They saw Germany emliarked 
upon an enterprise which the German General 
Staff had considered to be so desperate at the 
outbreak of the war thfi,t they had preferred, 
rather than to attempt it, to run the almost 
of-rtain risk of iJritish intervention by tearing 
up the Scrap of Pa[)er, and to strike at J'rance, 
hcthhh the eorpse of f'<l;riiirri anfl through her 
northern frontier. 

ThfTf was another side effect which the 
psychologistH of the German General Staff may 
have hofx-d to j>nKiuce by this terrific on- 
slaught upon the country which, after many 
hesitationH, after many eHm[)aigriH of the 
Gott Htrafe Knglund ari«l the Hymn oi ilatt; 
variety, the Gennans hafl decided to Jionour, 
fiiT the moment at any rate, with the title oi 
"our ehi»^ enemy." It was but a Him|)le cal- 



culat ion upon the frailty of hiuiian and especially 
of political alliances to imagine that the French, 
when they saw tlieir sons falling by the 
tliousaiid on the liiils of the Meu.se, should 
exclaim in their agony : " What are the English 
doing ? Why don't they counter-attack, and 
draw off some of the troops which the Crown 
Prince is hurling on us ? " Tt was inevitable 
that among the iminstructed classes of the 
population there should be some talk of this 
sort. The great intelligent mass of the country 
had too great a confidence in the loyalty of 
their tried and proved Ally, too great a con- 
fidence in the closeness of the imderstanding 
between the British and the French General 
Staffs to allow themselves to be influenced by 
any such ideas. Great Britain had given too 
man.y proofs of her determination for it to be 
imagined possible by the French that she 
would refuse her help had it been needed. At 
Verdun the situation was that in their offensive 
the Germans were losing three men to one. 
The French, a logical people, did not require 
much convincing before they saw that for the 
British in the north to repeat the German 
folly in the east, would be a certain and disas- 
trous way of neutralising the fruits of the 
gallantry of the defence of Verdim. The help 
of the British, although it did not take the 
form of an offensive, was none the less valuable. 
It would have been impossible for adminis- 
trative and military reasons, for the British 
to have dispatched any appreciable body of 
men to fight side by side with the French on 
the battlefields of the Meuse. British assis- 
tance took the more practicable form, the more 
fruitful if less glorious form, of the extension 
of. the British line in France. (Jeneral Joffre, 
in re[)lying to the telegram of congratulation 
from Sir Douglas Haig, exi)ressing the admira- 
tion of the British Army for the doughty deeds 
of the defenders of Verdun, said : " The French 
Army thanks the British Army for the expn-s- 
sion of liearty goodwill which it has been good 
enough to address to us while llic great battle 
of Verdim is proceeding. From its fierce 
struggle the French Army is convinced that it 
will achieve results frmic whidi nil (lie Allies 
will reiip an advantage. It reimiiilK rs i-.lso 
that its recent call on the comradesiiip of tin' 
British Army met with nii immediate ami 
complete response." That complete response 
consinted in relieving the lOlli French Army 
by Hrilish troojw. 

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98 



THE TIMES HISTORY UF THE WAR. 



99 



Verdun arouse a fire of admiration, and re- 
stored without question in the neutral countries, 
in America, and in the Allied States oi Europe, 
the old military prestige of France. " Even the 
ranks of Tusculum could scarce forbear to 
cheer ; " and cries of admiration, reluctant, it 
calculated, were heard from Germany, where, 
indeed, a growing necessity was being felt for 
some explanation of the unavailing slaughter 
around Verdun. This admiration was based 
not onlv on the heroism, but also on the 
science of leadership displayed by the French. 
Above all, was it due to the further revelation 
of the France which had lain vmsuspected by 
the outside world, a dogged France, a France 



proud boast of Waterloo : " The Guard dies, it 
does not surrender." A sub -lieutenant of the 
same regiment, under the concentrated shell 
fire of the enemy, walked about smoking a 
cigarette, exposed to the view of the Germans, 
as an example of coolness to his men. A 
corporal of that same regiment, who was 
seriously wounded, refused to be carried away, 
saying : " Don't trouble about me, look after 
the Boches." Another soldier, still belonging 
to this regiment without a history, was wounded 
at the beginning of the attack, and refused to 
leave the firing line. He was unable to hold a 
gun, and busied himself cleaning and loading 
the weapons of his comrades. 




IN THE ENEMY'S WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS. 
The leader can be seen cutting the wire with pincers 



Btoic almost to the point of callousness, when 
the defence of the country was concerned. 

Never can all the acts of heroism which 
built up molecule by molecule the great 
deff.-nce of Verdun, m the two first battles 
which ended on March 22, become known to 
the world. Eaf;h inch of ground ceded by the 
French, each parcel of tf^rritory held against 
the Gfrrmans, waH drenched with glory. The; 
old splendour of war-like France illumined the 
wfjrds and thoughts oven of the most humdruin 
of regiments. f>iiririg the Douatjmont fighting, 
where a line r'-girn'-nt, ])()Hhchm'(1 of no jjarticiilar 
(hHi'mctifm, wan holding out superbly undi-r 
IrfJiYAfA br/rnhHrdrnent, a siTgeant chefjred up 
hi« men by oflapting to his ')wn regiment the 



The spirit which animated all was indicated 
in a story told by Mr. Warner Allen, special 
correspondent of the British Press with the 
French arinies, who, writing from Verdun, 
said : 

Tlio emliiranoo of tlio Fronc}) troops during this battle 
has been boyond all prniso. After two days and two 
iiifhtH' (•ontirmoiiH fi^jlitiiig thoy Htill rotiiiiiod tlioir da,«li 
iinrl unnhdkoablo moriil. " W<> nro t'oing to stay horo " 
said one of thoao poiltu to a Stuff ofTicor, " until wo Rr» 
killed, and in that way wo arc sure the reserves will l)e 
able to romo up in timo." I Hpoke to a wounded mun 
iiiMt bnfk from the firing trcnc:li. He bad lost Imh riirbt 
band, and I (;t)ndolf!<l with biin on bis bad bii-k. " 'I'bat 
ik nolbin«," ho replied rh<i<!rfidly. " I offrTod my life 
to ^'ran(^o, and Hho hnx otdy taken my band, ho there I 
Kain." 

Tn the ult'T fatitnie of the tJiird day, wlien under the 
Htorin of Ocrinan HbellH convoyM were few nnil fur be- 
tween to riracb (be advniiciMl poHilionR, the men fouf^hb 



IIMI 



77//'; TIMUS HlSTOliY Oi' Till': W III. 



nil ili>i:i4eilly wilhuut food ur ilriiik. An artillery <-u|i(niii 
liilil ine titu (ullowiiig titory nl' hia hattury ; Jt wa& in 
I kit* full hri^hr, u( the tu^Haillt, ami ttitiir guns had Imou 
Hriiit{ rtiuiiil tittvt ruuiul at thu higlmnt Kpt^eil. Al'titr 
afVtni nr fi^ht hiindi-ed roiiiiiU the 73'« beL'tiiiiu no hut 
I hat it is iiiipotMiibIt) to Are any ltiii($er until thti |iitt('»d 
huvu bfuii I'otiled. Ttieir guiiit hod macht^tl thin ><ta;;u 
lit ht^at, and thf<re van no water led exi-ept in the men's 
«atrr-h«itlle><. The aiHu were alniu.st dying of thirst, 
And yet of their own free will they rttfuued to ilrink a 
kindle ilrop, reHorvini; all the water in their tlatikii for the 
coiilini; of the pieces which were defending the infantry 
u inilu or two away. 

Ak Hii inntaiice of collective spirit of heroism, 

Mr. Warner Allen quoted the following : 

In the first battle a certain army corps, which included 
boliliers (if all clasises, from the 1015 contingent to men 




FRENCH SAPPERS WORKING 
UNDERGROUND. 

of the Territorial Reserve, resisted for five days and five 
nights the attacks of an enemy with a numerical 
superiority of four to one. Tlie soldiers knew that it 
was their duty to gain time and play the part of covering 
troops, and so untiringly they struggled on, exacting a 
lieavy pric;e from the enemv for every yard of ground 
gaii^ed. 

On the 26th these men were wnra out and fresh troops 
too'K their place. 1'hey held the line until March 10, 
and they are now for the first time returning to the rear, 
so that we are able to obtain their pci-sonal account of 
the terrible struggle. 

On the left of the village of Douaumont o. certain 
infantry brigade has opposed to the tJernuin assaults 
ii wall of steel that nothing could break. It is commanded 
by a young colonel who, like General Foch and General 
^lavid'huy, had in time of peace made a brilliant reputa- 
tion as a professor at the Eeole de Guerre. Brought up 
at full speed to the front, this brigade was hurled forward 
on tlie i!6th to relieve the worn-out troops who were 
defending the all-important position of Douaurnont. 



Its commander at once decided that the only taclicA 
possible was an iinmediatu offensive. Any tlolay under 
the terrible bomburdnittnt could only he fatal, and tlu) 
ciienjy promptly iliscovered that there wciti fresh troops 
iHtloru him. 

For Fourteen days these troops roiiiuiued under tlse 
enemy's (ire. Four times they met the furious assaults 
of the Germans, and four times they not only repelled 
the enemy but followed up their success with counter- 
attacks. tJn the (irst day olhcers and men vied together 
in deeds of heroism. V^■oundod soldiers refused to go 
to hospital, or, if sent back against their will, innisted 
on rejoining their comrades as soon as their woundi 
were bandaged. The colonel, to his surpiise, foinui an 
old sergeant whoso white beard suggested that his place 
was away behind the lines. " What are you doinp; 
hei-e ? " ho a.sked. " Mon colonel," was the reply, " my 
tion has been killed. I have come to avenge him." 

After the attack of the l!(iih the enemy retired, and 
the six following days the brigade set to work to dig 
themselves in, under u terrible bombardment. The 
Germans attempted no further infantry attac^lcs, although 
they had on the spot one of the (inest regiments of their 
army. It was not till the fourth that they ventured to 
return to the charge. Once again a French counter- 
attack throw back the enemy in disorder, and for four 
mort! days the French concentrated their efforts on 
strengthening their position. 'J'hen, on the tenth, tha 
(Jerrniuis. seeing that the French lines were fast becoming 
impregnable, determined to put an end to this stubborn 
resistance, and throughout the day liurlod wave after 
wave of assault against tliein. 

'I'ho first attack was preceded by a tremendous bom- 
bardntent, but it was met and broken bv the Fieiu'h 
infantry. An hour after a second assault, two tiours 
after a third assault, and the French line still lield. 
Finally, the enemy attempted his heaviest blow — an 
assault in columns of fours, which was to break through 
the thin French line like a battering ram. "Then," said 
one of the ollicors who took part in the battle, "every- 
thing we possessed opened upon them, particularly our 
75's and machine-guns, and half an hour after it wan 
over. Thousands of Gorman corpsoi covered the ground 
and we still held the positions that had been entrusted 
to us. The next day we were relieved, and our regi- 
ments niarched through a village in the rear with tha 
same magnificent dash and discipline as though they 
were just returning from repose." 

Amonii the bodies left in tront of tlie French lines 
the numbers of six different regiments were identifietl. 
The two regiments wtjo had held so gloriou'sly richly 
deserved the congratulations of France, which a few- 
days later were brought to them at their cantonments by 
the Generalissimo. 

It was examples of this magnificent heroism 

\vhich stirred the imagination even of the most 

sluggish of neutrals to an appreciation of the 

splendid fighting qualities of the French, to a 

realisation of the fact that now the French 

had in every ^vay taken an accurate measure 

of their opponents. The military correspondent 

of The Times, summing up the situation, 

wrote : 

If a German ofTicer could visit the French armies he 
would probably gather that no doubt at all is felt of 
their ability to deal with the Crown J'rince. Should tha 
latter report faithfully to his Imperial father he would 
tell him that, though an tmprecedente^ deployment of 
guns, an unheard-of expenditure of ammunition, and 
an immense superiority of numbers had enabled him at 
first to win some advanced jiositions from General lion's 
we.ik garrison of roser\o troops at Verdun, the German 
armies had subsequently failed, and, after suffering a 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAh'. 



101 




TWO HRAVF. /OUAVFS AT VKRDUN. 
During the German attack on the Fort of Vaux, the machine ^iin of two Zouaves fell into a small 
•hell hole. In order to cr)ntiniie firing, one of them lifted the )iun on his shoulJer, while the other 

kept the ^un in action until sill the cartridges were spent. 



Io»« of half thf^ir "tfrnKth, li)i<l not (Uilii<jv(!(l (ho aim of 
lFi'>ir v«!ntiirf. ffo would a^l'l that the firo of the firxt 
impulsion hia/l 'li<-rl down ; that the attack thrr^atoned 
to ili-.icfnf.rnif. info tronch wrangling of the nonnal typo ; 
nod that r<'irifor'-»Tn<;nt» w';r<j iioodcd to oavo hin military 
reptjtation from <lenii*y. 

That military rfjjiifiition wan ton [(rcfifjus 
»n HMWrt {(>r the floh'-nzolhrrn hoii-vc and ior 



Irnpfrial rJ(Tmaiiy. for tliciii tinl fo make a 
fiirtlior doHpcrate effort to rcstrjns it. llciiiforcc- 
/r^cnts vvcro nccdid, Init tho sit nation of 
(JiTttumy was Hiich that sho was nnahli' (o 
conduct a gr-noral offonnivo against the Allies 
along tho wholo front witli any liopc of succt'ss. 
Tho (jlcnnanH wore maintaining on (In- wr-sl two 



102 



T///-; TIMKS HISTORY OF Till': WAR. 



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Reference. 

^^ German Battle Front 
^™-on March 31 ^M 91 6. 

A..C. -Active Corps 
^.C —Reserve Corps 
I.D. — Infantry Division 
R.D. — Reserve Division 
Railways - — 

MILES. 
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16 IS 



'largo groups of forces, the one round Verdun, 
and tlio other opposed to the British north of 
the Somme. The rest of their hne was but 
lightly held, and in reserve on the Verdiin 
front from Vauquois to St. IVIihiel, the Germans 
only had two divisions in addition to the 
Illrd and XVIIIth Corps, which had been 
taken out of the line for refitting. 

The Germans might have drawn upon the 
tliree divisions they still had south of the 
Danube, but the political and military effects 
of this upon so treacherous and unsteady an ally 
as Bulgaria might have been serious. On 
the Russian front the coimtry was as yet 
impracticable for any operations on a large 
scale, the roads being still useless on account 
of the thaw ; so that from there the enemy 
was entitled to draw some additional strength 
for the Verdun sector. This step he took, and 
.for the new battle which was in preparation 



during those six days, from March 22 to 
March 28, he sent in the 192nd Brigade on the 
left bank in the neighbourhood of Malancourt. 
On the centre, around the hotly disputed 
points of Bras, Douaumont and Vaux, he 
massed the 113th, 58th. and 121st Reserve 
Divisions, which, with the 19th Reserve 
Division, took the place of what %\as left of 
the XVIIIth and llird Army Corps. A 
division from Russia arrived on the Genrian 
left. With these new pieces on the board the 
Germans, who throughout the period of infantry 
lull had maintained a regular bombardment of 
the whole of the French positions, opened the 
third great jDcriod of fighting, which was to 
extend froni March 28 to April 25. 

The two first portions of the Imttle of Verdun 
were clear-cut in their design and in their 
execution. The first, which lasted from Feb- 
ruary 21 to March 6, had witnessed the attempt 



TH1-: TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



108 



iiiid bloody faihu-e of tlie enemy to repeat 
Maekensen's great operation on the Dunajec ; 
when, by massed concentration of artillery 
tire, tlie ill-equipped if heroic resistance of the 
Russians had been broken down and a great 
gap rent in the centre of the line attacked. 
'Jliere the Germans had heroism alone to deal 
with. At Verdun they met heroism armed 
with the products of industry and science, and 
their first move brought them no profit. 

Still pursuing what was, at anj- rate at that 
time, a carefully thought out and orthodox 
strategic idea, the Germans opened the second 
phase of the battle with tremendous onslaughts 
on the wings, which lasted from March G to 
March 22. There again they failed to achieve 
their purpose 

Their position at the beginning of the third 
period, now under discussion, might be likened 
to that of an impetuous and gambling chess- 
player, who, having started an attack upon 
his enemy, captiires a few pawns, brings several 
major pieces on to advanced squares on liis 
opponent's side of the board, and then dis- 
covers that his adversarx", too, has had his plan, 
and that that plan has been consoUdated and 
improved at the very moment when the 
scheme of attack seemed most likely to result 
in mate. Obstacle after obstacle had been en- 
countered ; fresh difficulties, fresh and unsus- 
pected centres of resistance had made their 
power felt ; so that the Germans, at the open- 



ing of this third phuso, had to revise their 
procedure almo.st entirely, and devote them 
.selves at first to the reduction of positions 
which, up till then, they had thought it possible 
to ignore. 

The attack was renewed upon the left bank. 
The extension of the fightmg to the left haa 
been the consequence of the failure to pierce 
the centre at Douauniont, and of the resulting 
necessity to clear the French out from their 
artillery positions on the left bank, the fire 
from wliich raked all operations on the right 
bank of the river. This business of crushing in 
the French positions on the western edge of 
the bdttle had proved extremely costly. At 
the beginning of February the French line had 
run roughly between Avocourt and Forges. 
Beliind this line rose up the two main pillars of 
the chief defensive position. Hill 304 and the 
^lort Honrme. This line the Germans had 
attacked at both ends, in the east at Forges, in 
the west in Avocom-t Wood. They had cut 
through it by their pressure and formed a salient 
from Malancourt to Bethincourt. As has been 
seen, the enemy deemed tliis success sitfficient 
to enable him to begin at onco the attack upon 
these two staple points of the French line. Hill 
304 and the INIort Homme. From Forges 
they had endeavoured to advance through the 
Crows Wood upon the slopes of the Mort 
Homme. From Avocourt they had essayed 
to push up to the ridge of Hill 304. The mag- 




VHKDUN. 
Heiiiovinii the heaps of French nhell canes behind the lines. 



lot 



THE TIMKS }llSTi)}lY OF THE WAR. 



iiiticuiit (i()|)ooitiiiii u^uinist whk-h thrw two 
mulntivtuirn broke on Marth 14 hihI Manh 22 
htw bumi ilest-riheil. On tlu' Moit tlouuati Uu- 
mu'iiiy was alil*' to ^tt hut tlie han-wt footing. 
Ills attack tipuii Mill 'M)\ had nnvnr pieivtd 
tla-out,'h to itH ohjuftive. The (Jernmns, thure- 
tore, ill the perioil of rei-oiirtideratioii allowed 
them hy tho hill alter Manii 22, realized that 
the I'Veiieh were after all a stiihhoru and 
tenatiouH nation ; that they were alno a nation 
with military ideas of defenc*'. They «aw tiiat 
before they eould pOMsibly hope to carry these 
two treniendous points of the French line it 
was not sufficient to have cut through it on the 
twt) flanking positions, and that it was neces- 
sary to crush in the whole of the advanced 
French lines, so as to be able to deliver a 
ilirect attack upon Hill 304 and tlu) Mort 
llonune, along tht« whole of the front consti- 
tuted by those natural fortresses. (General 
Petain, who, one*' he had assured the safety 
of the Verdun salient by his splendidly timed 
and organized counter-attacks at Douaiunont 
in the closing days of February, had deliberately 
atlopted a defensive role, naturally exjjected and 
hoped that the ( Jermans would enileavour, by 
sacrificing if neces.sary two or three men to one, 
to carry position after [josition. C'onfident in 
the defensive quality of his troops, he was able 
to count with certainty that, whatever successes 
the Germans made, would be piecemeal and 
extremely costly. This in effect was the history 
of this tliird great operation of the enemy. 

The covrrse of events during the lull whith 
preceded this stage of the fighting was a 
monotonous repetition of tirtiilery action. On 
.March 23 the bombardment slackened down 
on the west of the Meuse in the course of the 
morning, but later developed into a sustained 
battering of the Malancourt region and of the 
French front Bethincoiirt - Mort Homme- 
Cmnieres, where the next infantry assaults 
were to be launched. This bombardment was 
distributed with almost equal strength upon 
the centre and the west throughout the lull. 

Towards three o'clock on March 28 the first 
German infantry set to w ork upon their task of 
flattening out this salient on the west, which 
stretched out into the German lines north-west 
of Hill 304. The opening stages of the action 
were unfavourable for the Germans, and 
contained a menace of new and aggressive 
features in the French defence. The first 
assault was delivered upon Malancourt, w lioro 



the enen^y faili-il to achieve anything except 
a notable <-asualty list, due to the elliciency of 
the French curtain tire. While the ( Iirmans 
\M'r») coniinn to grief here, tlic I'ri'iicli in 
A\'ocourt \\ ()i)d \v(ir»s giving fiuihc' proof of 
thi* complett* freshness of their troops and I lie 
confidence of their leaders. Up nil llien, 
I'Vench counterattattks hatl be«'ii tew in nunihcr, 
and had been for the most part confined to 
actions rendered imjieratively necessary by the 
still warm triumph of the enemy. Here in the 
Avocourt Wood, which had been ()C(iipi<'(l by 
the Germans on the 2()tli at'ler a bit Icily 
contested struggle in wliicli tliey iiscid much 
liquid flame, the I'Vench beg n an operation 
which amounted to a cons'dered offensive 
rather than to the countcT-attack delixerod 
nnnu'diateiy after the blow. 

I'ushing forward with great energy, the 
Frencli got al)out three hundred yards of t Ik- 
sou th-ea.stern corner of Avocourt Wood, and 
carried a point w hich was afterw ards destined to 
j)lay an imjjortant part in the ojjcrations. This 
j)oint, known as the Avocourt Kedoubt, had 
been \ery thoroughly prepared for defence, 
and the enemy took its loss to heart. Throw- 
ing one of the newly-arrived brigades into 
action, he made desperate but ineffectual 
attempts to recapture this position. These 
counter-attacks were rejjeated no less than 
thre? times in the course of the day. The 
(Germans suffered heavy losses during these 
operations, and left prisoners in the F'rench 
hands. On the following day, the 29th, an 
attack in great strength was launched vipon the 
\illage of Malancourt, which, lying in a hollow , 
had been exposed to particularly heavy bom- 
bardments. After ferocious bayonet and gren- 
ade fighting, the enemy was able to report that 
at the close of the day he had captured an 
advance work situatiHl to the north of the 
\illage and was in occu[)ation of two houses 
in the village it.self. The following days were 
filled with terrific fighting, in the course of 
which the Germans lost tremendously. The 
scene of this fighting w-as the south-eastern horn 
of the Avocourt Wood, in the defence of w hich 
the captured redoubt played an all-important 
part. Four counter-attacks were launch(>d 
upon the position in the coiu'se of the 2yth, 
and tliroughout the early hours of the 30th the 
enemy returned again and again^ the assault, 
leaving mounds of dead before tlie position. 

By March 31 the Gern\ans had succt>edeil in 
a \ cry small portion of their full purpose. 




ON IMF SI-OPH AT MOR T HOMMF. 
A fire due to (>erman iihelU. 

lor, 



]00 



IHi: TIMES HISTUUY OF TUJ-: WAll. 



Hitil thti Fitiitfh fvac-uattMl Mulancuiirt ; on 
tike MHiiit) afteriiKuii, touunlH t'uur o'clock, a 
Mgoroii8 utteiapt Uiih iitudt) iipuit the Ftviicii 
|MMitiua north cast of the Murt Huukino. 
The attack wtrn prccnilml and accompanied by 
a heavy hont hard n tent of lachryinatttry r>heil.s. 
For a time the attack wan successful ; a footing 
was obtained ui |iiirt of the tirht line, hut 
before tlm enemy hail had time to fortify 
himself and consoliilate his gain, the e\er- 
ready French counter-attack was upon him, 
and he was forced to evacuate his nowly- 
contjuered position. An attempt farther west 
to ierce through to the main Mort Homnio 
«lefences was crushed under artillery (ire. 
On April 1 a sencs of powerful assaults was 
maile again upon the Avocourt Redoubt, after 
the usual bombardment, but without any 
success. Meanwhile tho villapo of Hauccjurt 
was being continuously bombarded. ()i\ the 
2nd this bombardment gave way to a \iolent 
tlirust by the infantry between Haucourt and 
liothiiicourt. lliis attack was aimed at the 
positions held bj- the French on the northern 



bank of the little stream of Forges ; and it 
resultetl in a complete surprise im I lie (ier- 
mans. The French line at this point was iiiuii 
exposed to the German artillery fire, as w»<ll as 
to machine-gims ; and during the night before 
the (jerman movement the whole position had 
been stealthily evacuated, and tin- French 
had taken up positions of much greater strength 
on the south bank of tho streant, where they 
commanded a much better field of fire. When 
the enemy readied his supposed objective he 
was caught not only by steady tire from the 
new French standpoint on tho other side ol 
the stream, but also by a withtring fire from 
enfilading positions at licthincourt, and the 
attack melted away with intolerable losses 
before the Germans had even ber'n given an 
opportunity of getting to gi"i|JS with their 
enemj'. 

On April 3, at about tv\c)o'cl(jcU in the aftei- 
noon, the first unsuccessful attack upon tlie 
village of Haucourt was delivered. It was 
not resumed again until April 5. Once more 
the chess-player had too boldly advanced his 




AN OPEN-AIR ENTERTAINMENT NEAR THE BATTLE FRONT. 

French troops from the trenches enjoying an entertainment. A German shell is bursting near the 

church, but this is ignored both by actors and audience, who have grown used to such interruptions. 



THE TIMES llISTOh'Y OF THE WAR. 



]07 




pieces upon ground \\ hich had been too little 
studied. Once more, for a day or two, the 
artillery held sway upon this front. On the 5th 
a .series of attacks, in which large numbers of 
men were engaged, was launched upon the 
two principal salients then left — Bethincourt 
and Haucourt. At Bethincourt, on the French 
right, all attempts were broken by the French 
fire ; but at Haucourt the enemy was able to 
register an advance of another stage upon the 
reduction of the main salient — that of the 
capture of the village of Haucourt. It was 
effected at the price of tremendous sa<^;rifice. 
Time after time the Germans, after sweeping 
right up to the entrance of the village, were 
caught by the withering fire of machine-guns, 
and tho.se who remained alive were forced to seek 
th( sh'ilt^r of their trenches. In the course 
of thf; night the «;nerny gained a f (Kiting in the 
village, and gradually, by systematic if minor 
siege operations, drove the heroic defenders out 
of the cellars in which they harJ made tlieir last 
dcHperatft resistance. 

The next <Lty the enemy made an att(;m[>t to 
clear the approa/^hes to the village, where the 
French h«fl established themselves to the south 
and east. The attfu;k, which was carried out on 
a front of two kilfimetres, failed to nmch its 
objective. This endeavour was repeated on 
the following day, when the only success to 
♦ he enemy's acf;f>iiri* was the cnf)tiirf! of two 
Kriiall works betwfien Haiuonrt and ilill 287. 
'Jhroughout April 9 violent fighting wts in 



progress along the whole of the French front 
from Avocourt to Cumieres. The Frencli, 
who had evacuated Betliincourt and the 
salient of which it formed the centre on the 
previous night, had fallen back upon a con- 
tinuous line of defence, starting from the 
Avocoiu-t Redoubt, running upon the first 
of the wooded slopes to the west of Hill 304 ; 
thence, taking the southern bank of Forges 
Brook, it went to the north-east of Haucourt, 
rejoining the French position a little to the 
south of the Bethincourt-Esnes and Bethin- 
court-Chataucourt cross roads. 

The whole of this line was fiercely tried. I( 
stood the test well. On the front, between 
Mort Homme and Cumieres, the Cermans 
received a staggering blow. They advanced 
in ma.ssed formation from Cumieres Wood, and 
uere thus caught as they deboucJied by French 
shrapnel and mitrailleuses. The men hesi- 
tatfd, then broke, running in all directions, 
leaving the ground littered with corpses. A 
simultaneous action, directed against llie 
French line between Avocourt antl Forg(!s, met 
with the same nsception, and achicnod the 
sarric! result. After the evacuation of Bc'tliiii- 
court th<! Crown Prince had deemed his first 
f>l>jfrctive attained. The remaining ixmIiDu 
of the French advance line — namely, the troops 
occujjying th(! villages of Malancourl, Bethin- 
court and Haucourt had been drivc^ri l^iu-k. 
The Oown I'rince therefore thought t hcf 
moment come to deliver his great onHlaiigliC 



lus 



THE TIMES HJSTOIiY OF THE WAli. 



it|i<iii the two chief HtroiigholiU of the maiti 
French line. 'I'liis \va« the retiiilt. Siiiiiil- 
taneoiisly the Crown J'rince, witli tin- object 
iio doubt of weakt'iiiiig and ihviihn^ the Frencli 
rectervcrt, ilcUverml a great blow at the ohi 
point of attraction on the right bank of the 
river, and oii March 31 the enemy returneil to 
the blood-ilrencJied approacheH of the vilhige 
of V'aux and Douauinont Fort. There liad 
been no infantry action in X\\m region tor 
about tliree weeks, the hill being chie to the fact 
tliat all advances iti this part were rendort-d 
impossi )le until the French positions on tli' 
left bank of the river had V)een reduced. The 
French on the left bank having been engaged, 
and their artillery having \iite enougli with 
which to occupy it.self in that portion of the 
fighting, the Crown Prince thought the lime 
had arrived to make one more efl'ort to push 
through the main line at this point. On 
March 1 1 the enemy had succeeded in occupy- 
ing a few houses situated at the eastern end of 
the village, but had been unable to carry the 
whole agglomeration, and unable therefore to 
reap a tactical profit from this gain. After 
throe weeks' inactivity, on the morning of 
April 1 fighting broke forth again with all its 
previous fury, and in the course of the morning 
the French, gallantly though they fought. 



were compelled to evacuate the cellars and the 
ruins of this historic spot. All attempts on 
the part <jf the (Jermans to exploit (his advan- 
tage, to debouch upon the village and advance 
u|» the ravine which winds away from Vaux 
among the hills to the back of Douaumont, 
ended in l)loody disaster. 

Hut the enemy was embarked on one of (hose 
long and i)er(inaci(jus enterprises tlu* s(»ries 
of which turned thd Hauls de Mouse into an 
inf(«rno of flanm and fire for many weeks on 
vni\. 'Vhv next day, after an extremely violent 
bombardnuMit, in which guns of the heaviest 
ca!iV)rc were used, an attack in force was made, 
in which more than one dixision was (imployed 
against the Douaumont Vort - \ illage of Vaux 
line of defences. No le.ss than four of these 
tremcindous l)low8 were raiiKnl ufton the line, 
Hn<l .south-east of the for( of Douaumont the 
enemy, fighting almost inch by inch, suc- 
ceeded in penetniting the tanghMl, tumbled 
mass of timber which had once been the Cail- 
iette Wood. They were not long left in undis- 
turbed po.s.sesssion. Again the coiniter-attaxtk 
flared out, driving the enemy back from much 
of the groimd he had won at such heavy cost, 
and leaving to hini the po-ssession of only the 
nortliern portion of the wood. The fighting 
around Vaux developed to a degree of great 




DOUAUMONT. 
A photograph of one of the entrances of the dismantled fortress after bombardment. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



109 




FRENCH RED CROSS AT WORK. 
Wounded soldiers being removed to the rear of the fighting line. 



intensity en the following day, April 3. The 
successful French counter-attack, which had 
driven the Germans up to the northern portion 
of Caillette Wood, wa.s developed still further, 
and only the fringe of that position remained 
in the enemy's hands. A counter-attack of 
special violence, carried out by some of the 
best troops of France, bore the Frencfh back 
again into the western part of the village of 
Vaux. Towards three o'clock in the afternoon 
of April 4 the ('•(■rriiHn^ attacked south of the 
village of Douaumont ; the successive waves of 
the enemy were followed by small attacking 
columns which came under the deadly rain ot 
curtain shrapnel, and were forced to make a 
hurried retreat into Chauffoiu* Wood, upon 
whifh all the available guns of the sector were 
concf;nt rated. The losses suffrred by the 
enemy here were very heavy. 

In this engagenxrit the Germans, perhaps 
for the first tirno since the VY-rdun fighting 
begrtn, showcfj an evident flesiro to spare their 
men as much as possible. The mrithod of 
throwing solid masses upon the French hw.H 
\iful been abandi/ried. With the w;ientific use 
f»f artilhrry, such tactics had proved themselves 



costly out of all proportion to the moral effect 
upon the men concerned in the attack. The 
new system consisted in sending forward two 
or three lines of infantry in open order. These 
were followed by smaller bodies of better- 
trained troops. The idea of the German 
General Staff was apparently that those 
machine guns which might have been left lui- 
touched by a bonibardment were better em- 
ployed killing inferior troojjs than in mowing 
down well-trained men ; further, that if eitluT 
of the first lines succeeded in cft'ecting a footing 
in the enemy's trench, the defenders of the 
neighbouring trench would bo too i)usy in 
attempting to evict them to be able to devote 
much of their attention to the advance of 
further coIumrLs. This method proved no 
more successful than its predecessors. 

On the following day thf? Germans made an 
unsuccessful attempt on I'opper Ridge, and 
f^ndeavoured to clear the French out of Cail- 
lette Wood. 

During this early period of the month of 
April thc^ French b(;gan imt)arting a. little 
more aggression to their tactics ; and, while not 
undertaking any offensive <>i\ a largo scale, by 



uu 



'77//; ll\ti:s lllSTUHY OF THE WAH. 



ti aeries of vigonuus ami «ln»rt fouiitt^rattiuks 
they bt'gtvii to makt^ slow il' ritutuly prognvsa. 
They applied to the (Jeriiuin gHiiut botli on tlin 
east and uu the went tmnkti of the Meuue tlie 
Joffre policy of uihhling. Throughout April 9 
mul 10 the boinhurilinent of the Douauniont- 
\ rtiix hue was iiicertsant, and on tlu' lltli 
the first reaetion a^ainist thiH nib})lint4 policy 
led thi- iiu-iny to an attack in force upon 
Vaux. 

The character of the engapemonts which 
tilled the latter half of Aj)ril diftcred from that 
of previous operations. They were no longer 
pure offensiveci, in»d»'rtaken with the intention 
of achieving ininictliate tactical reHults. The 




KECONSTRUGTING CAPTURED 
TRENCHES. 

slow wear and tear of the new French policy 
upon the German line was having effects both 
material and moral, to which an end had to be 
put by vigorous methods. The assault on the 
11th was therefore a defensive offensive. It 
carried the Germans at the close of the day 
into some advanced elements of the French 
trenches between Douaumont and Vaux, 
■whence before night closed they were ejected, 
after heavy bombing operations. The ground 
attacked was among that nibbled away, and 
in spite of the liberal use of suffocating gas, 
tear-shells, and liquid flame, the attempt to 
retake it failed. A similar effort achie\cd 



similar negative results ou the following 
day. 

The next of these defensive offensives was 
launched on April 17, with greater use of 
artillery, and in even greater nmnbers. The 
attacking troops, consisting of troops drawn 
from at least five divisions, advanced upon a 
front of about two and a half kilometres, from 
a point between Champneuville and Vacherau- 
ville to Douaumont. The action, which was 
one of concentrated violence, lasted for about 
two hours, and the losses of the enemy were 
about thirty per cent, of the effectives he had 
engaged in it. Casualties inflicted upon the 
Germans in the ravine between Pepper Ridgo 
and Haudromont Wood wore especially heavy. 
The only progress made was the capture of a 
small salient of the French line south of the 
C'liauffour VV^ood, north-west of Douaumont 
village. 

A diversion of the enemy in the neighbour- 
hood of Les Esparges tailed to give him any 
local advantage, and in no way disturbed the 
disposition of the French troops in the main 
centre. 

After two months of the most tremendous 
fighting history had until then recorded, upon 
il front of some twenty-five or thirty kilo- 
metres, the massed power of the German 
Empire was still vainly seeking a " chink in 
the armour" of Verdun. At this stage the 
l>attle was already, if not a French victory, at 
least a German defeat. The enemy had been 
driven to take the offensive upon this gigantic 
scale because he was unable to stand still and 
watch the steady growth in military power of 
his opponents. Incapable of continuing much 
further his resistance to the wearing-down 
policy of the Allies, he was forced, in one 
tremendous stroke of his sword, to seek freedom 
from the steady grip of his enemies. At the 
end of two months he had reached on the right 
bank of the river the main defences of Verdun, 
where, for twenty-five days, all his efforts at 
fiu-ther progress had resulted in heavy loss. On 
the left bank his success had been even slighter. 
He was still struggling in desperation to forci^ 
his way through to the main defences of that 
side. The Germans had failed to impose their 
w ill upon their eneniy. 

The completeness with which they wore 
forced to fight vmder the conditions which best 
suited the French gave to the latter the right 
to claim victory m the first two months of the 
battle. Everywhere along the eastern salient 




A notice advi^in<> people who pass alon){ the ravine that they mi^ht be sniped, and passajje is forbidden 
iin\c%n military requirementi necessitate the journey bcinii made. Circle picture: Warning to drivers 

thai cars must prcjceeJ slowly an J in succession. 

UANCJEK ZONES NHAK THE BATTLE IKONT. 

Ill 



112 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



the Geirmans hml b«en fruitlehsly using tht-ir 
men. The French, moreover, were not in the 
potiition of the man who in the rini( ju.st uiunugeH 
to [)re«erve enou^'h btren^th unci enouj^h skill 
to avoiU the knock-out. Daily they were 
giving proofs of their conij)lete hold over theni- 
■KelveH, of increasing vigour unit initiative. 
'I'hti policy of small local counter-ttttackH, which 
began towards the close of the first two months 
of tighting, was receiving ever more and more 
frti|iicnt application and develoi)nicnt. 

It might have been oi)tiniistic to think that 
the fighting had readied a point when tlie 
dt«fence was reacting so vigorously as to deprive 
the assailants of the initiative ; but it certainly 
was the case that the French, to a great extent, 
had assumed the direction of affairs in the 
N'erdun sector. The French counter-attacks 
seemed almost to have reached a point wlu-n 
they became counter-offensives. This was 
especially the case on the left wing, but on 
the centre the enemy still retained his capacity 
for hard hitting. On April 20 he delivered a 
terrific blow along a two-mile front between 
Thiamont Farm and Vaux Lake. His infantry 
got into tlie French lines south of Douauniont 
Fort, and also ate into the defence north of 
Vaux Lake. But here, too, the French reaction 
was more vigorous than it had been at any 
other time throughout the fighting ; and the 
enemy was thrown out of these positions in the 
course of tlie same night. Elsewhere along the 
line the Germans were pinned down to the 
defensive, and seemed unable to hinder the 
list of small French successes, growing with 
every day. So stagnant did the enemy become 
that towards the end of April there was a 
growing, if niistakon, belief th.it the tremendous 
effort of the enemy had worn itst^lf out, that tlie 
occasional attacks on the Mort Homme and 
upon Douaumont were but the spurting flames 
of a dying conflagration. This feeling was, 
perhaps, strengthened by the appointment on 
April 28 of General Petain as Grand Officer of 
the Legion of Honour. His name was inscribed 
on the special tablet of the Legion with the 
follow ing note : " He is a most valuable general 
officer. Since the beginning of the wai* he 
has not ceased, as commander successively of a 
brigade, of a division, of an army corps, and 
of an army, to give proof of the most remarkable 
military qualities. I?y his calmness and firm- 
ness and the skilfulness of liis dispositions, he 
has been able to adjust a most delicate situa- 
tion, and to inspire all with confidence. Thus 



has he rendered most important services to his 
country." 

Indeed, in thn French Army itself there was 
considerable (hlferenco of opinion as to whether 
or not the Germans luul sped their b(jlt, as to 
whether the lull which marked the tilosing week 
of Ai)ril did not also mark the end of the most 
ambitious and most costly failure of German 
arms in the campaign up till then. A semi- 
(jlfitrial review of events before N'erdun, issued 
in I'aris on April 27, said indeed : " Tiiero is 
every reason to believe that the German 
operation, which, for want of a better term, 
will be known as the battle of Verdun, is in 
a military sense ended. The chock to the 
enemy's aims can now be regarded as final." 

There was considerable discussion, indeed, 
as to where the next manifestation of German 
activity would bo seen. There were some who 
iiiaintaineil that Russia, and particularly the 
Kiga sector of the front, was the next objective. 
Events upon the British front foreshadowed a 
resumption of activity there, "i'he Germans had 
shown a marked activity in the Ypres region. 
On the 21st and 22nd they carried out no less 
than four fairly serious attm^ks, each one of 
which was more than the usual trench raiding 
which constitutes the normal warfare of a lull. 
On April 26 and 27 a series of heavy attacks 
was made. There was also a fm-ther support 
to be fountl for the theory that Great Britain 
was about to become the " chief enemy " in her 
turn, in the great Zeppelin raid over Great 
Britain at this period, the naval raid upon the 
English East Coast, and in the outbreak of 
armed revolt in Ireland. 

The fighting along the British front looked 
uncommonly like the beginning of a big drive. 
The Germans had kept massed against the 
British lines an aggregate of eight hundi-ed 
thousand men, including army troops, heavy 
guns, and cavalry. In addition the field depots, 
from which losses could be made good, were full 
up. The attack on the British front was 
delivered on Wednesday night, April 26, and 
was continued until the 29th. The assault was 
launched upon several points between Ypres 
and Souchez, at Frelinghen, Hill 60, St. Eloi, 
the Hohenzollern sector, and the neighbourhood 
of Loos. The most serious effort was between 
Hulluch and Loos, where the Germans made 
two gas attacks. The enemy tfdops gained a 
footing in the British front, on support lines 
near Loos which had been heavily bombanled. 
but they were driven out again by counter. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 



113 




c;fhmans sl'hrkndkrinc; on tmk vfrdun battlefikid. 

Germans w[io survived a French Infantry assault near Douaumont hurryinjj over the French lines to 

surrender. 



attack by Irish troops. It i.s probable that this 
a/;tivity wa.4 partly undertaken in connexion 
with events in Ireland. It was also, no doubt, 
intended to encourage the French in the belief 
that the Verdun battle harl come to an end. 
In this latf^T obje^^t the atta^jk failed. And 
wh«^fn the storrn again burst the French were 
found fully firefmred for it, the dirtfjoriilioiiH 



of their troops having undergone no niinjerical 
<li(!ngeH. 

Before proceeding to dcsfribe the next phaf-o 
of the striigglo it will bo well to summarise the 
nisults and teaching of tho first two months of 
the battle. From October to January Germany 
was preparing a first-class movemerit of soma 
kind u[)Oii the Vvcitc]] frcjnt. INT. IJidou (hinks 



11 



THE TiMFs iiisroTtY or Till-: win 




(JERMAN PRISONERS BEING MARCHED TO THE REAR. 



that possibly she wished to take the wind out of 
the sails of any Allied offensive, possibly that 
she had need of a prompt and decisive action. 
In any case, even if she had not meant in the 
first place that the battle should assume a 
character of capital importance, it did so 
afterwards without her wish. Her preparations, 
however, give colour to the supposition that all 
along she meant her offensive to be on a large 
scale. 

The enemy had always kept a lirge part of his 
available forces on the French front, even when 
engaged in larger operations elsewhere. Between 
October and February he reinforced these 
troops, and re-disposed them. At the opening 
of the battle of \'erdun six divisions were in 
action ; but as the offensive broke on the rock 
of French resistance, time after time, as the 
object they had in view became ever more 
difficult of attainment, and, at the same time, 
of more and more importance if they were not 
to be openly and irremediably convicted of 
failure in the eyes of the Allies, of neutrals, 
and, worst of all, in the eves of public opinion 
at home in Germany, a determination amount- 
ing almost to fury became the characteristic 
of the German onslaught, and the original six 



divisions had mounted to thirty before the 
first two months of the colossal struggle had 
finished. 

In return for his expenditure the enemy had 
by then gained hardly enough to save his face 
in his daily communiques. On the right bank of 
the Meuse they had succeeded, as has been said, 
in reaching tlie main French lines of defence on 
the French right. Tliey had even bitten into the 
line at Douaumont, but the mouthful had cost 
them more, much more, than it was worth- 
On the French left, on this side of the river,, 
they were held, and had been for a long time, 
on a semi-cLrcular front around the ravine of 
Bras. 

On the left bank they had been able to rush 
the first line, and held the positions right along 
the Forges Brook whirli the French had found 
untenable. Behiiul those rose the ten'iblo 
heights of the i\Iort Homme and Hill 304. On 
the Mort Honune they had been able to gain a 
footing for a few minutes at a time, and no 
more ; they were so convinced of its uuportance 
that they had adopted their favouwt« tactics of 
announcing its captiuro before they had even 
entered upon its attack ; and the convenient 
confusion they created between Hill 20.') antl 



THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 



115 



its neighbour, the Mort Homme, liad not 
sufficed to prevent their claim to the latter from 
being a joke to the Allies and no comfort to the 
Gorman public. On Hill 304 they had been able 
to deliver no direct attack. Their onslaughts 
on Avocourt, wliich represented the best 
approach to tliis hill, had cost them dear, and 
such success as thej^ had been able to acliieve 
had been wrested from them, in the shape 
of Avocourt Redoubt. The few shapeless 
stones remaining of Avocourt itself, once a 
little village, snug bet\Aeen wood and wold, 
were drenched in German blood and French 
glorj'. 

So much for the gain made in groiind since 
the opening of the battle. It was httle enough, 
but viewed from the aspect of time, it dwindled 
to less. The advances made on the right bank 
had dated from February 21 to 26. Since then, 
they had managed to take, after dispropor- 
tionate effort and outlay, the village of Douau- 
mont on March 4, and, four days later, half 
the village or German shambles of Vaux. With 
these two exceptions, they had not moved 
forward an inch since ^larch 26, and their 
occupation of the seven kilometres they had 
originally gained had not been profitable, since 



to hold it at all they had had to fight with as 
much fury as if engaged on an advance. 

On the left bank they had made their 
advances on two separate occasions. They had 
succeeded in pushing back tJie P^rench front 
line between March 6 and 10, and a few days 
later this success had enabled them to take 
Hill 265, which they thought fit to announce as 
the Mort Honune ; and between March 30 and 
April 8 they had made such progress on the 
French left front that they had gathered 
confidence for the general attack of April 9, 
which was anything but profitable to them. 

Thus, on the right bank, they had been idle 
in advance, but not in casualties, for six weeks. 
On the left, where they attacked the untenable 
first fine a fortnight later, they had pushed 
tlu'ough to the second line by April 8. But the 
German forces on the right bank from March 8, 
and on the left from April 8, had been com- 
pletely unable to gain a foot more ground. 
They were like an angry sea, accustomed to 
wi'eak its will upon a sandy shore, wliich finds 
itself suddenly broken and hiu-led back from a 
sohd dyke. In addition to this check, tiio 
Germans were being assailed by French 
counter-offensives, and the French positions 




DOUAIIMONT. 

A pholo|(rapli of the "niacin" of the fori, tiikcn whilst in ihc <iccupali(>n of (he French trooph 

and iiftcr one of the (/crriiiin iilluckH. 



IIG 



THF TlMi:s HISTORY OF Till': WAU 



Yunl het^ii t>iilrtrg»«<l from thu imrth (if Vtiux Lake 
tu the 8outli uf iJuiuiuiuoiit, aiitl also in lim 
liaiuii'oiiiont \\'i>o(l, ami at the Murt Hoinuie. 

'I'hf Ciennaiid h;til wi.slied to overooiiie tJie 
French resirttanco on this front by a violent 
oiuilauv;ht ; tliey hail failed. The French hail 
wijihetl to reMitit ; they had succeeiled, ami they 
hail gone fiirthcr — they had reacheil the point 
when they were able to make onslaughts of 
their own. To pre\ent this French success, the 
Ciennans had vainly spent themselves, weaken- 
ing their line elsewhere, hurling men to death 
by the thousand, almost destroying the whole of 



their class '1(5. They knew thonjselves to be, says 
-M. Hiiloii, the weaker in a war of resistanct» and 
endiuimcf, and had Htakod heavily, almost to 
their fullest means, on a ilecisivo throw. 
.And after two months they found themselves 
in a worse position than at the bc*ginning, 
iiipjiled with lo.sscs at wliicli I lie iuiagination 
reels. They had lost on their flirow, and on 
many minor stakes the French were con- 
tinuously witming. If Verdun were to be yet a 
German success, a completely new problem must 
bo faced, a completely new scale of losses 
accepted. 




FRENCH SOLDIERS 
Leaving their rest-camp to return to the firing line. 



CHAPTER CXXVI. 

THE ADOPTION OF COMPULSORY 
MILITARY SERVICE. 



The End of the Derby Campaign — Farther Government Dei^ays — Mr. Asqitith's Pledges 
— The First ^Military Service BrLii — Its Provisions Described — The Opposition to the 
Bill — Labour Party Crisis and its Solution — The Exclusion of Ireland — ^The " Simonites " 
— The Bill Passed — Historic Proclamation — How the Scheme Broke Down — The Tribunals 

AND their ^^"0RK GRIEVANCES OF THE MaRRIED MeN CABINET CrISIS A SeCRET SeSSION OF 

Parliament — Orders in Council and Official Secrets — " Contingent Compulsion " — 
Government Bill Introduced and Withdrawn — Compulsion at Last — The Second Military 
Service Bill — Its Provisions Described — The Bill becomes Law — The King to His People 
— The TRnjMPH of Patriotism over Politics. 



WE have seen (Vol. VI., Chapter CIII.) 
that Lord Derby's final report on 
the result of his recruiting scheme 
was presented to the Government 
on December 21, 1915, and that the deci.'^ion to 
adopt tht! principle of compulsion was reached, 
after grave differences of opinion, a few days 
aft«r Chri.stma.s. No one familiar with Mr. 
Asr^uith's methods can have seriously expe<!ted 
that an imrne<liato (lcj-\aration of policy would 
have V^een forthcoming. 

The nscniiting campaign hful come to an end 
on DfcernlxT 12. The intake of recruits under 
the group system for four days of the final rush 
ha/J indeed been 1,070,478 — a remarkable 
proportion of the total of 2,829,2H;J inen 
attested, enlisted, and rejected up to the 
elfwing of the cam])aign. But everything had 
bfjcn donf; to make it eawy for men to enli.st. The 
mwlieal examination, if any, had in many ca«c>8 
Jm^jh vei-y trivial. The eyesight test had been 
Kusf^tid'-d. It was certain that after the s<;eorid 
nrnl mon; wrious iiu-dic.iil examination wliicli 
att*."st<yl in*m woiikl undergo <>n their b«;ing called 
up U) join the-ir depots, the total of uw-ful recruits 
would «how a v«;ry consideTuble reduction u[ion 
Vol VIM.— Part 9r, 



the figures of attestation. Meanwhile, the only 
question of immediate interest was the extent 
to which the single men had come forward. 
Figures purporting to be authentic were freely 
bandied about in private discussion and in the 
Press, but no two statisticians were found to 
agree. The delay which intervened before the 
publication of the report on January 4, 1916, 
and the introduction of the Military Service Bill 
on Januarj' 5, gave abundant op{)ortunity for 
the inveterate oppom^nts of compulsion to 
prejudge the issue. The Labour Recruiting 
Committee met at the House o^ Commons 
and issued a report on December 14, in which, 
while deffrecating any hasty judgment of 
the campaign as liable to cause " only injury 
to national unity," they .somewhat incon- 
sistently committed Ihcmselves to the belief 
that "a chantre in tlic nwlliods of rccruiling 
would not b(! justified."' Lord Derby lost 
no time in rebuking these speeulnt ions, o!i the 
ground that the; value; of tln! figures, without 
dc'luctifjn for starred nu^n, unfit men, and men 
indispensable to inuU:, " must bo f)urely guess- 
work." Nevertheless, on liici following day a 
band of 40 Liberal iuk! LiilioNr memberH waited 



117 



us 



'////■; 77.\//;.s iiisToin of the ^vAit. 



privately upon the Prime Minister to bt^ hiui, 
btiforu iutrixtiic-uig compuUioii, to give uaotlitr 
u^iaiice to the tiingle iiixn who hml not attetiteil. 
'V\iO ileputatioti uryiMt that the lA^rby ist-iitnae 
tiail yiekleil rwruit.s in sueli niiuilMfi'H that ••oin- 
piilHiott uaH iiiithinkahie. S(i[)|KMiiig, however, 
ttiat it were rcgariieil as possible, it uoiilcl be 
scandaloUH to braiui the uiu-nlisted siiiglt- mtii 
as " filacUt'iis." Suiiic oi thiuu liuil mothers antl 
other relatixes to support ; others had two or 
tliree brothers already serving; otlit-rs, ugaiji, 
had conscientious objeetiorts to ji>iiiing the 
anuy. INIr. Asquitli promised to take all that Imd 
been stiid into " serious consideration." 

Meanwhile the Dcrbv scheme received nil adili- 



tional touch of reality by the calling up, on 
Decemljer 20, ol tlie single attested meji beUjiiging 
to the second, tliird, fourth, and fifth groups, 
who were to present themselves for service from 
January 20. The first group, consisting of men 
betv\een eighteen and nineteen years of age, wa« 
left until they should have grown older, and 
was actually called U|), as will be seen, on 
February 2j. 

In his speech on December 21, in whi<"h he 
asked Parliament to sanction the addition to 
the Army of yet another 1,000,000 men — 
making the fourth million since August 5, 1914 
— Mr. Asquith renowod the jjlodge to the 
married men which he had given on Novomljor 2. 
'J'ho not result of this jilodgo, repeated several 
times in various forms, was to assure the 
attested married men that, unless all but a 
negligible quantity of available unmarried 
men attested, compulsion would be applied to 
them. But Mr. Asquith still hoped (hat those 
who had hung back would come forward. His 
views were sliared by the minority of the 
Cabinet, who were in favour of yet another 
attemjjt to keep the voluntary system on its 
legs before abandoning the position to their 




THE CALLING UP OF GROUPS 33 TO 4L 
Married men from twenty-seven to thirty-five waiting to be examined at the Recruiting Booth at the 
Horse Guards Parade, London, May 29, 1916. Smaller picture: Wives of recruits waiting in Whitehall. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



n!« 




MARRIED RECRUITS AFTER BEING EXAMINED. 



opponents. The de'jperate state which the 
voluntarj' system had now reached may bo 
judged from the fact that its supporters were 
driven to propose that the single unattested 
men should be compelled to show cause before 
the local tribunals why they should not attest ! 
Meanwhile, there were not lacking those who 
jjointed out that the mere adding up of the 
figures would by no means have settled the 
matter. The German Press, which was natu- 
rally watching the situation with intense 
interest, took pleasure in emphasizing the 
flifficultifjs. Thus, the Cologne Gazette re- 
marked : 

There arc ntill quite a iiuinher of comi)lii-(ito<l quca- 
fiori.i. In the first plaf;f, the real arrny whif.-h in to 1)6 
trairie<i haH to be extra*;t<;<l from thia cnorrnous mass of 
figures by a »':ries of caU-ulations. 'J'o bcijiri with, it 
haa to be decided whether really enough unmarried 
men — they are the kernel of thin whole rnonittiun 
HVxtein — have volunteered. Then the fit men will 
have to }>»•■ pirked out among them, as the mediciil 
nxAfnination which )i(m alrea<ly taken place was quilo 
Muperficial. Then comes the question of the men who 
are indi-<(X;nHahlo. . . . 'nieri the li^ts will bo checked 
to "ee whether all the unrmirrie*! men whose names 
are on the National f<e;.'>-iter have really volunteere<|, 
and an apfx^al will bo m/wJo to those whoKO namen arc 
missing. (>nly after all theiie qiientions have been dis- 
p'»«ed of will the call to the rnnrried men be issued. 

Am the days went by, «nd the conviction that 
rornpiilMion \irul been justified by the Derby 
nf<f>rt became Htrong'T, u different notf; wax 



struck. In an eloquent passage on December 

31 the Cologne Gazette declared : 

The introduction of conipiilsion is the formal admis- 
sion of Germany's military successes and of England's 
defeats. The old England has already lost the war. 
If an English Minister were ever in a position to speak 
the truth, Asquith and his colleagues would have to 
say this. The last attempt to avoid military service — 
Lord Derby's recruiting scheme — has proved an enormous 
failure. It is not without reason that the figures have 
again and again been held back, and have still not been 
published. If only half a million of able-bodied un- 
married men had enlisted, the figures, duly decked out, 
would have been published with pride, and there woultl 
have been endless talk about the tremendous success of 
voluntary patriotism. But the men simply did not- 
enlist. 

When the report was j)ublished*, the facts 
were seen to be that, while out of a total of 
2,179,231 single men of military ago, 1,150,000 
had been accounted for, there still remainetl 
651,1(10 unstarred single men who luid not 
answered the call. " This," as Lord Derby 
observed, " is far from l)eing a negligible 
fpiantity." "Under tlie circumstances," he 
»Mlded. " I am very distinctly of opinion 
that, in order to redeem the pledge men- 
tioned above, it will not bo possible to hold 
married men to their attestation unless nnd 
until the services of single men have been 
obtained by other means, the present system 
havitig failed to bring ihcm to the colours." 

• The text of the report was given in Vol. VT. Cliiip. ciii. 

U5— 2 




'i 



c 
o 
•a 
c 
o 



Ui 

**. 

a 
X 
U 



OQ 
X 
U 
Q 

Q 
a: 
O 

O 



E 



a 

s 
o 






s= 5 



<: 2 






u 



120 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



121 



He iirgod further that steps should bo taken to 
replace as far as possible the single men now 
. " starred " or engaged in reserved occupations 
by older and married men, even if these men 
liad to a certain extent to be drawn from the 
ranks of those already serving. Finally, Lord 
Derby protested against any fm'ther extension 
of the list of reserved occupations. It was 
indeed high time that the process whereby one 
Minister, by the frequent announcement of 
new occupations, membership of which implied 
exemption from military service, mterfered witli 
the efforts of another Minister, whose duty it 
was to provide soldiers for the army, shoukl 
be stopped. For even while the Derby report 
was under the consideration of the Government, 
a fresh list of reser\'ed occupations, supple- 
mentary to that published on Xovember 29, 
wa.s issued, and it was announced that yet a 
further list was in preparation. 

Simultaneously it was decided that men who 
had been rejected on medical grounds should, 
except in special circiunstances, be required 
to undergo another examination. Those certi- 
fied as medically unfit on account of organic 
disease would be registered, and those rejected 
on account of eyesight or slight physical defects 
would be attested and passed to the Army 
Reserve, to be utilized as required. 

The haste with which medical examinations 
had had to be conducted, while involving, as in 
the above cases a further scrutiny, had at the 
same time resulted in the admission into the 
army of large numbers of m( n who in no circum- 
stances whatever were likely to become efficient 
s^^^Idiers. The difficulty of getting enough men 
into the army under the voluntary system was 
only equalled by the difficulty of getting th«n 
out of it again. Cases were not rare in which 
an unfit man, often enlisting at an age having 
little relation to the truth, had spent half a 
year or more in going to and emerging from 
hr^Hpital before it had become possible to 
obtain his diymissal by a Medical IJourd. 
Thf-n, when dismissed — with a gratuity — 
he would as often im not re-cnlist, and the 
whole weary round would be gone thrcjugh 
once rn<^>re, the rnan, entirely useless as a 
HoUliir, Ixring all thr; while natiirally kept at 
the public exf)enH«>. Jt was even suggested 
in tb*i House of Commons on March 15 that 
Kfim(!t}iing lik'; 200,000 men unfit for any 
military purf<ose ha<l been taken into the 
Anny during tho past year. Under com- 
pulsion, with the entire manhood of the nation 



to 2)i(;k and clioosc from, only the jjliysi- 
cally fit need be selected. Hut with voluntary 
enlistment, with zealous recruiting officers and 
with civilian doctors eager to fill the ranks to 
the tune of 2s. 6d. a head for every man passed, 
this wasteful and unsatisfactory state ot things 
was almost inevitable. 

But in the midst of all Ihese conflicting: 
tendencies, and in spite of the Cabinet dilli- 
culties dvie to the resistance to compulsion, ou 
various grounds, of Mr. McKenna, Chancellor 
of the Excliequer, and Mr. Runciman, President 
of the Board of Trade — difficulties which led 
the German Press to indulge in triumphant 
prophecies of British national disintegration — 




MEN WHO WORE TWO ARMLETS. 

All men of the Volunteer Corps who attested 

under Lord Derby's scheme were ordered to wear 

their G.R. (fJeneral Reserve) armlet in addition to 

the one served out on attestation. 

the cold faets of military necessity w(vo 
forcing the Government to the only logical 
conclusion. As for the country as a whole, it 
had long since made up its mind. \\ hile to the 
Cologne Gazelle, ancl probably to otiier foreign 
observers, it a{)pearcd that 

Tho diviHJon m the Government is only (he ri-flcction 
of the <livi8ion throughout the country. All EnglaiKl is 
foiJiiy ill a Htiito of nj)lic!avttl, 

the fa«t was that at this moment the coimtry 
was quite exceptionally unmoved. It was not 
until the Military .Service Hill was introduced 
that " tho country " can be said t<> have 
shown any emotion whatever, and then tho 



12i 



77//-; TIMKS HlSTOIiV OF TllIC WAH. 




THE CALL lO ARMS. 
Recruits taking the oath of allegiance before a magistrate at a recruiting office in London. 



cause was not the j)rinciple of comjiiilsion, but 
the half-heartedness with which it was proposed 
to bo applied. 

In . one sense, indeed, the division in the 
Government did reflect a cUvision in the 
country. On the one hand stood the men who 
quite sincerely contemplated the war as an 
excrescence on the national life, to be waged 
without impairing normal conditions more 
than seemed agreeable. On the other stood 
those who realized that war mvolved the very 
national life itself. For people who have ever 
been accustomed to tliink m terms of peace 
and especially of the peace in which " money " 
seems infinitely desirable, and " militarism " 
infinitely detestable, it was hard to learn the 
bitter lesson of the war, that money without 
the means of protecting it is a vain thing. 
The politician, even though in his heart a 
patriot, is slow to forget his shibboleths, and 
the " little men with little minds " who still 
clamoured for a fixed limit to the expan- 
sion of the army merely represented the echo 
of bygone political controversies, and not 
the sense of any serious body of public 
opinion. 



On January 5 the Prime Minister at last 
introduced " A Bill to make provision with 
respect to military .service in c juuoxion with 
the present war." When it had become 
evident that the Derby recruiting schen e 
would not meet the necessities of the situation, 
the Crovernment had contemplated for a 
moment the immediate introduction of a 
sweeping measure, really embodj'ing all-round 
National Service. Such a mea-jure had, in- 
deed, been drafted. But, as visual, political 
considerations and considerations of supposed 
*' expediency " defeated any such wisdom, and 
the Government followed the principle of doing 
the minimum that their circimistances required. 

The Military Service Bill was, in fact, nothing 
but a measm-e to compel vmmarried men to do 
what they had failed to do at Lord Derby's 
invitation. Mr. Asquith positively insisted that 
the Bill was " confined to a specific purpose " — 
the " redemption " of his pledges, given in 
November, 1915, to the married men who 
attested under Lord Derby V scheme, lie 
argued that the Government had only two 
courses open. Either it must release the 
married men who had attested upon the cotx- 



THE TIMES HlSTOIiY OF THE WAli. 



123 



(lition that all but a negligible number ol 
unmairied men attested too, or it must hold 
the married men to their obligation, and compel 
the unmarried to fulfil the necessary condition 
of that obligation. The course now adopted by 
the Govermnent was " to provide that if after 
due opportunity of inquiry it is found that 
there are single men of military age who have 
no ground whatever for exemption or excuse, 
they should be deemed to have done what every 
one agrees it is their duty to the State in times 
Uke these to do, and be treated as though they 
had attested for enlistment." 

In a word, the Bill proposed compulsorj' 
service — with various exceptions or exemp- 
tions — ^for all male British subjects who were 
between the ages of 18 and 41 on August 15, 
1915 (the date of the National Register), and 
who at that date were unmarried or widowers 
without children dependent upon them 

Throughout the proceedings in Parliament 
the Government stoutly resisted all efforts to 
extend the scope of the Bill, although they 
could have liad an immense majority for any 
improvements of an always feeble measiure. 
On the other hand, they allowed its provisions 
to be watered down in not unimportant 
respects — the only consolation being that, 
grievous though the waste of time was bound 
to be, they were thus making the ultimate 
fate of their scheme, and the need for real 
Kational Service, inevitable. 



The Bill was read a first time in the House of 
Commons on January 6, by a majority of 298 
(403 against 105). The second reading was 
carried on January 12 by a majority of 392 
(431 against 39). The Bill passed through 
Committee on January 21, and was read a 
tliird time on January 24 by a majority of 347 
(383 against 36). It passed the House of Lords 
on January 20, received the Royal Assent on 
January 27, and came into operation on 
February 10. 

It will be most convenient to state at once 
the main provisions of the Military Service 
Act as it thus emerged from Parliament. 

Clavise I. provided : 

Every male British subject who — 

(« } on the fifteenth day of August nineteen hundred 
and fifteen, was ordinarily resident in Great Britain, 
and had attained the age of eighteen years and had 
' not attained the age of forty-one ; and 

(6) on the second day of November nineteen hun- 
dred and fifteen was unmarried or was a widower 
without any child dependent on him ; 
shall, unless he either is within the exceptions set out in 
the First Schedule to this Act, or has attained the age 
of forty-one years before the appointed date, be deemed 
as from the appointed date to have been duly enlisted 
in His Majesty's regular forces foi general service with 
the colours or in the reserve for the peiiod of the war, 
and to have been forthwith transferred to the reserve. 

Consequently men thus " deemed to have 
been enlisted " would come under the pro- 
visions of the Army Act and certain other 
legislation. But it was provided that charges 
arising out of " membership of the reserve " 
under the Act should come before civil, not 




AT A TKIHUNAL IN LONDON. 
Hearing an applicant for ponrponcmcnl to a later ^roup under Lord Derby's ncheme. 



1-24 



Till': 'IIMUS HISTORY OF THE WAIL 



iiiiliriiry, iHuirts ; thut iillem'il ottt-nceB bhuuld 
liiiwe Hi\ iiittiitliM at'tur tlu^ t'lul of tht- war ; anil 
that t'atliiru tt) obey a call to ptmnaiu'iit aervito 
tihoitUl iiof h» |)uiiiHhal>U* l>y ilt<ath, 

CltiuMti II. pruvuU-d that application tor- a 
Cfi-titU-ate of ti\«tiiiptiou could be iiiadu uh 
Ifollowti " by or in rewpeet of any man " : 

(a) on the gruiiiul that it U expticlitiiit in thi< iiii(i(iiuil 
iiiture^its thttt he bhuulil, iiiHteud t)f Ix-iiit^ i-iii|>luytMt 
in inilitary rjervii'e, be nnnu^ml in olh»T uoik in which 
he ia habituully ent;ageil or in which he wishes to 
be eat^a^'eii or, if he is bein({ etluctiteil or trained for 
any woilv, that ho shuiiUl conlinne to bo »o oducatocl 
or trained ; or 

('j) on the ;^round that serious hardship would 
ensue, if the man were called up (or Army Service, 
owing to his axcoplional financial or business obliyo- 
tions or domestic position ; or 

(c) on the ground of ill-hoiilth or inlirniity ; or 

{(1) on the t^'roiuid of a contciontious objection to 
the undertakini; of combatant service. 




THE PROCLAMATION 

Calling up the first eight groups of married men 
to the Colours. 

Secondly, it was provided that — 

Certificates of exemi)tion from the provision<; of this 
Act may also be granted by any Government Depart- 
ment, after consultation with the Army Council, to 
men, or classes or bodies of men, in the service or em- 
ployment of that Department, or, in cases where it 
appears to the department that certificates can be 
more conveniently granted by the department than by 
the Local Tribimal, to men or classes or bodies of men 
who are employed or engaged or qvialified for emploj-- 
ment or engagement in any -work which is certified by 
the Department to be work of national importance and 
whose exeiTiption comes within the sphere of the Dejiart- 
ment. 

Thirdly, Clause II. dealt with the duration of 

certificates of exemption, the treatment of 

" conscientious objection " to military service, 

and the prevention of " industrial compulsion " 

— matters which, as we shall see, caused grave 

inconvenience and bitter controversy : 



Any certineato of exemption may be absolute, con- 
ditional, or temporary, as the authority by whom it 
wtt.- granted think bttst suited to tho ruse, and also, in 
the rase of an application on conscientious grouncis, 
may lake thti form of an oxomption from condmtunb 
service only, or may be conditional on the applicant 
beinf{ engaged in some work which in the opinion of 
tho 'I'ribunul deuluig with the case is of natioMul iiii- 
[)ortttnce : 

I'rovidiMl that a cerliticate grunted on the gi-ouml ul' 
the continuatice of education or trainint,', oi- on tho 
groimd of exceptional financiiil or bu iiu'ss obligiitions 
or domestic [xisition, shall be a condiliomil or tem[)orary 
oertiticato only. 

No certificate of exemption shall be con litionul 
upon a person to whom it is granted continuing in or 
entering into employment under any specifietl oin[)loyur 
or in any s|)eci(ied phut; or establishment. 

("laiise, Jll. contiiincd " Ktippleincntiil pro- 
visions as to certilicafe.s of exemption.'" They 
were the caii.so of infinite delay in tho workinc; 
of the scheme of compulsion, nnci one of tho 
chief reasons for the ultimate failure of tho Act. 
The main provisions ran : 

It shall bo the duty o' any man holding a contlilional 
cortilicato, if tho conditions on which the cortificato 
was granted are no longer satisfied, to give notice to 
tho authority mentioned iti tho certificate that thi> 
conditions ui'o no longer satisfied ; and if ho fails with* 
out reasonable cause or excuse to do so, he shall bo 
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
fifty pounds. 

\Vhero a corlifieate of exemption cea-ies to be in force 
owing to tho withdrawal of tho cortificato or the failure 
to comply with tho conditions on which the certificate 
was granted or tho expiration of tho time for which tho 
certificate was granted, the man to whom the certificate 
was granted shall, as from the expiration of two months 
after tho date on which the cortificato so ceases to be in 
force, be deemed to have been enli?tcd and transferred 
to the reserve in the same manner as if no such certificate 
had been granted imloos in tfie meantime the man fios 
obtained a renewal of his certificate. 

Finally, it was laid down that, when an 
application for a certificate of exemption had 
been made, a man could not be called to tho 
colours " until the application had been finally 
disposed of." 

A First Schedule defined the " exceptions " 
of men otherwise liable to military service. 
They released men " ordinarily resident in His 
Majestj^'s Dominions abroatl " or resident in 
Great Britain for tho purpose only of their 
education or for some other special purpose " ; 
members of the Forces ; " men in holy orders 
or regular ministers of any religious administra- 
tion " ; discharged or " time-expired " men ; 
and men who " have ofl'ered themselves for 
enlistment and been rejected " since August 14, 
1915. 

A Second Schedule provided the niachinory 
for consideration of claims to exemption. It 
established (a) Local Tribunals, consistinsj of 
not less than five and not more than 25 persons. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 



12i 




CITY OF I^OMJON NAIIONAL (JUARI) OKII.LIN(; Al IHK (iUILDHAl.L. 

The VolunteeM approximated a "Home Defence Ferritorial I'Orce," trained i-nder a system by wliicli 
leave was given for those serving to look after their own urgent private affairs. 



in <7very \(K;a\ ntgwtration flJHtrict ; (h) A\>])i'»\ 
Tribiina|i<. in nrt-fiH to }»• rlffiri'-rl f»y tlif; C'rnwii ; 
arifj (c) a (Vrritral Trihimul lor (in-nt l^ritiiiri. 
" Any [HTKon auKrii vt-d by tho (U-c'iHion of n 
Jj(X-h\ 'f'rihiirial " HhoiiKJ \tnvr'. tho li^lit of 
Mpfx-al to an Af*f»«a) 'fVibiinal. Tfin App«!»il 



'I'rihimals could grant ](niv(! to .iiiiicul to lli(> 
t'ontriil 'rciliiiMil. 

In inf rofiiiring tlw I'lill, Mr. Asc|iiith rxprcHscul 
tli<^ Jiopf lliai it would rccfivf " Honifthing in 
the iiatiin', not of iinivcrHal, but of general 



120 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.Ui. 




TRAINING DERBY RECRUITS. 
Members of the City of London National Guard leading a batch of recruits oo a route march. 



corLsent." " Will any general sympathy," he 
asked, " be felt for men, for the most part still 
young — all of them under 41 — who, after full 
opportunity of presenting their case, are not 
«leemed in law to have done what everyone 
recognizes to be their duty as a matter of moral 
and national obligation in a time of greatest 
stress in all our history ? " He announced at 
the same time that the Derby group system 
would be reopened, so that the men could still' 
'' come in of their own free will." 

What were the real prospects of opposition ? 
What was the true importance of the antagon- 
ism to "conscription" about which the 
Government had itself shown such timidity ? 
It depended, first and foremost, upon the 
attitude of Labour ; for the rest upon the 
amount of rebellion with which Mr. Asquith 
might be faced among his own followers. 
When he brought in the Bill IVIr. Asquith knew 
that he had avoided the danger of serious 
revolt among the Liberal Ministers in liis 
Coalition Cabinet. Mr. Runciman and Mr. 
McKenna, and others who preferred a greater 
obscurity, had been reconciled to the needs of 
the situation. Only the Home Secretary, Sir 
Jolin Simon, had resigned office, and he at 
once attempted to create a sort of opposition. 



But the prospects were not bright. Prom- 
inent party politicians and former Liberal 
Ministers like Mr. Hobhouse and Mr. J. M. 
Robertson, after leading a " no conscription " 
movement up to the last moment, left their 
followers in the lurch and supported the second 
reading of the Bill. In the divisions in the 
House the minority only once rose above 40 — 
on the first reading, when the Nationalists 
voted against the Bill. Ireland had been 
deliberately excluded from the Bill — a matter 
iipon which later events were to shed a peculiar 
light. But Mr. Redmond opposed the first 
reading, saying that he and his colleagues felt 
that to be their duty, " takng the view that 
they did about conscription," and " in the 
absence of proof that this little Bill, which 
contained the principle of conscrijDtion, was a 
military necessity needed to end the war." 
But on the second reading Mr. Redmond said 
that the Nationalists, " having made their 
protest," would withdraw their opposition to 
" this purely British Bill," wliich had " a British 
majority in its favour of close upon ten to one." 
Far more important than, the behaviom- of 
either the Nationalists or the " Simonites," as 
thej'- soon came to be called, was the attitude 
of Labour. The situation was a dillicult one. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



127 



The e\ont ]•)^o^•ed afi-e.^^li the doteniiination of 
every section of the population to allow no 
political " principles " to stand in the way of the 
single British purpose — the achievement of 
victory. 

On January G, the day after the introduclion 
of the Bill, a Labour congress was held in 
London, under the presidency of iMr. H. 
Gosling, chairman of the Parliamentary Com- 
mittee of the Trade Union Congress. Its scope 
was extended so as to include delegates of 
societies affiliated with the Laboxir Party and 
the General Federation of Trade L'nions. On 
the other hand, the ^Miners' Federation refused 
to send representatives. The real question 
before the congress was whether the three 
Labour ^linisters^ — IMr. Henderson, IMr. Brace 
and ilr. G. H. Roberts — should be authorized 
to retain office, and whether the Labovir 
members should be left to vote on the Bill as 
they pleaised. The following ambiguous motion 
was, therefore, officially presented : 

This conference reaffirms the decision of the Bristol 
Traded Congress when it unanimously protested in the 
name of over three millions of organized workers against 
compulsory militarj' service ; it regrets that the unity 
and soUdarity of the nation have been gravely im- 
perilled and industrial and political liberty menaced 



by Ihi' Ill-lion of tli(> compulsionists, against which ifr 
iMiikes a tuost emphatic proiosi. 

The (roiifcrcnco rejoices at tho magnificent success of 
the voluntary principle, which in so short a period hasf 
supplied this country with an army of four millions of 
free men ; but it is compelled with regret to recognize 
1 hat, in spite of Lord Derby's scheme having produced 
nearly three million volunteers, the net results are 
governed by the Prime Minister's pledge to the married 
recruits, which, in the opinion of the Government, haa 
rendered necessary the Military Service Bill. 

The conference regards the results as not yet ascer- 
tained with sufficient accuracy and certainty to warrant 
so momentous a proposal being passed by Parliament, 
but wishes nevertheless to leave the Labour members 
to vote upon it as they individually think fit. 

The reference to the Bristol Trades Congi-ess 
was to the annual gathering, held in September, 
1915. A resolution had then been adopted 
upholding the system of voluntary enlistment, 
and " emphatically protesting against the sinister 
efforts of a section of the reactionarji' Press in 
formulating newspaper policies for party pur- 
poses, and attempting to foist on this country 
conscription, which always proves a burden to 
the workers, and will divide the coimtry at = a 
tune when absolute vmanimity is essential." 
There was, however, abundant evidence that 
iliis hesitating policy, based mainly' upon the 
fiction that the call for national service was 
" a newspaper conspiracy," could not hold 




.MAHHIKD MKN SKiNING-ON lOK MUNITION TKAININ(;. 
.Married men in the fierby ((roupo, beiiinnin|( at No. .36, were i^Iven free instruction in munition miikin^, 



in order that they mijiht be nuhiililutcd for fiinjile men then en({a;(eJ in this work. 



!t5— 3 



128 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



c'piiiiou in the country. At the end of No- 
vuuiber, when the dttuth of Mr. Keir Hardin 
cuusihI h varjiiicy in the repre«entation of 
Murtliyr lJoroujjJi.s, Mr. C \i. Stanton, with a 
majority of 4,206 voten, won a tremendous 
victory over the ollitial Labour candidate. 
Ajid .Mr. Stanton was victorious just because 
he promised, if it proved necessary, to give 
unequivocal support to any measure of com- 
puUion which the (4t)vernment mif^lit demand. 
At the London Con}.;reHs, however, matters 
proceeded as follows : after a rather heated 
thibate, in the coiu^e-of which Mr. Hendorson 
declared thiit, if he retired from the Cabinet, 




OFFICER OF THE ARTISTS RIFLES. 
Giving Instructions to scouts. 

he would also retire from Parliament and 
cxppeal to his constituents, the congress decided 
definitely against the Bill. Its main decision 
consisted in the adoption by a majority of 
1,215,000 (1,998,000 against 783,000) of the 
following motion, introduced by the National 
Union of Railwaymen : 

This conference reaffirms the decision of the Bristol 
Trades Congress when it unanimously protested, in the 
name of over three million organized workers, against 
compulsory military ser\'ice. It regrets that the unity 
and solidarity of the nation has been gravely imperilled, 
and industrial and political liberty menaced, by the 
proposal to introduoe such a system, against which it 
makes a most emphatic protest, and decides- to use 
every means in its power to oppose. 

The conference rejoices at the ma;inificent ■ success of 
the appeal to the voluntary principle, which in so short 
a period has supplied this country with an army of 
four million free men, and is emphatically of opinion 



that no CHiiti has lieun made out for any nieasiu'e of 
limited or temporary )'om|)ul.sioM, which wo regard as 
tht) tiriit xtep of u general application of a vicaous principle. 
W'li declare that all the men riKiutrcd for military and 
laduntrial piu'puHtt.s can lie obtauittd liy a contiauaucu 
of the volinitary nuilhod. 

'I'hm conference further considers ihal the propo.suls 
of the Ouvernment would be ecuiuimically diNa»truuii 
to tint life of the nation, and declarcH its opposition to 
the Kill, and rciciiinineiidH the Labour I'urly in I'urliu- 
iniiul to o])putie the ineaiiuru in all itis Hlagen. 

Tlu'reupon the* Labour Party in the House of 
Commons formally decided to o|)i)oso the Bill, 
and it was amioimc(^d that Mr. Hi'iiderson, 
Mr. Bra(!e and Mr. Roberts woidd resign their 
olVices inxmediately. They actually abstained 
front voting on the first reading of tlie J3ill, 
which was taken lliat night (.lanuary G). 
The Lal)our vote was otherwise divided^ 13 
members ^•oting against the Bill, and eight 
voting for it. 

It soon appeared, however, that the decision 
of the London Congress, reached by the much- 
condemned system of " card voting," was in 
hardly any quarter taken to represent the 
certain voice of Labour. IMeetings in the 
cotmtry gave warm support to the Bill, and 
I\Ir. Asquith entered into negotiations with his 
Labour colleagues. Their resignations were 
kept in suspense, and on January 12, on the 
^ve of the second reading of the Bill, they were 
withdrawTi. Mr. Henderson actually wound 
up for the Government, in a speech of great 
eloquence, the second reading debate. Tho 
arrangement was that the Labour members 
should for the time be free to vote as they 
chose — the whole subject to be reviewed at the 
annual conference of the Labour Party on 
Januarj' 26, when the Bill would have passed 
its third reading. Meanwhile Mr. Asquith liad 
given fresh assurances — that the Bill was not 
intended to do more than redeem the Govern- 
ment pledges, and that fresh safeguards would 
be provided against " industrial compulsion." 
It may be said at once that the final dis- 
cussion at Bristol ended in smoke. TJiere was 
again a " card vote," and again the delegates 
(by a majority of nearly 1,600,000) registered 
their protest against the adoption of conscrip- 
tion in any form. By another huge majority 
they declared their opposition to the Mihtary 
Service Bill. But, having done that, they 
promptly decided, by 649,000 votes to 014,000 
votes, against an agitation for the repeal of the 
Bill in the event of its becoming l*wr. Through- 
out the agitation against the Bill every effort 
had been made to whittle down Lord Derbys 
estimate ; it was even asserted that com- 



THE TIMES IJlSTOnr OF THE WAJi. 



]29 




RENDERING SERVICE TO THE REGULAR. 



\ member of the City of London National Guard 

destinations 

pulsion would at best yif;ld only some .00,000 
mem. Mr. Jlondcrsori was a)>Io to eay that, 
HJncc the Derby Report luwl ]>i^nn coniplctffl, 
there iuui been enlisted no fewer than 11. '5,087 
Hinglc men ! 

Thu« ended all proHpoef of serious oppoHitif)n 
by J^abour. 

We rnuHt return to the j)r';':'edirit'H in T'Hrlia- 



pilotin^ soldiers fresh from the trenches to their 
in London. 

ment. As already observetj, Sir John Simon 
had no sooner left the Cabinet than ho 
attempted to wreck the IJill. He first 
devoted himself to proving that l*]nf;land 
was about to " sell her birthright for a moss 
of pottage without making sure that it was 
likely to provide a scjuaro meal," and to 
fomfinting suspieion about " newsf)aj)'er pres- 
sure." and fspfcially an n.llcgc^d desire of The 



130 



Tin. 'ii\ii:s iijsrmtY or ////•; war 




RECKUITS 
The first stage : Drill! 

Times to liave " the principle of compulsion 

given legislative sanction before the House of 

Lords has dealt with the Parliament Act 

Amenchnent Bill." Of the other " Simonitcs, " 

Sir W. Byles gravely doubted whether the 

war would bo worth winning " if \\c wore to 

surrender our liberties and to Germanize onr 

institutions." As to this point, it is worth 

wliile to record a remarkable prediction by 

Mr. Herbert Samuel, a ^Minister who in those 

debates greatly increased his reputation : 

If anybody asked me what the dtinger of the futviro 
niilitarj' organization of this country is, I should say 
that we should rely after this war too much upon the 
notion that wo can call armies out of tlie ground by a 
wave of the wand. I am afraid that the fact that we 
have under the stress of these abnormal times done 
what no nation has ever done yet will delude us into a 
false security, and wo shall be apt to believe that when 
the moment of danger came a similar miracle can always 
bo performed. That is the danger I am afraid of — 
not the illusory danger that we shall find ourselves 
involved in a system of conscription. 

On the second reading the opponents of tlio 
Rill began to concentrate on tlie two points 
w hieh they had conceived to be the most pro- 
mising for their piu-jiose — " conscientious objec- 
tion" to military service, and tlie fear of 
*' industrial compulsion." Sir John Simon, 



IN CANADA, 
ng recruits in Vancouver. 

wliile disclaiming any sj-mpathy with 
" shirkers," declared that the conscientious 
objector was " a perfectly genuine person," 
and cheerfully predicted that his case could not 
adequately be met w ithout " making the 
meshes of the net too wide." As to " industrial 
compulsion," Mr. Anderson (Labour) trivuii- 
phantly quoted tlie Manchester Guardian for a 
description of the Bill as " a Bill for reducing 
the millions to industrial serfdom on the ground 
that the conjectural thousands ought to do 
uiilitary service." ]Mr. Asquith dc>alt at once 
with this dangerous argument. He accepted as 
genuine the fear that unscrupulous employers 
might put pressure on men — especially on 
active trade unionists — who would bo liable 
to military service if they were disniissed, and 
thereby lost their certificates of exemption. 
The Prime Minister promised " to devise 
machinery and safeguards which would prevent 
the possibility of any such abuse." 

The proceedings in Coimnittee occupied only 
four sittings. Thej- began with an entirely 
unsuccessful attempt to obtain the inclusion of 
Ireland in the Bill. ^Tr. Betlnuuul delivering an 
eloquent speech on the services of Irish troops. 



THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAU. 



131 



declaring tliat rocniiting in Ireland had l.-eeu 
" on the wliole very satisfactory," and 
saying to tlie House : — " Rest satislit;d ; do 
not seek to drive Ireland." As to the military 
age, the opponeiits of the Bill tried to raise 
tlie lowest age from 18 jears to 21 years, and 
to reduce the age limit from 41 years to 30 
years. 

At the same time another amendment \}vo- 
duced an extraordinary exposvure of the 
feebleness and lack of courage to which the 
Clovemment were reduced by their promise 
that the Bill should not go one step beyond the 
bare fulfilment of the Prime IVIinister's pledges. 
The Bill dealt only with men who were between 
the ages of 18 and 41 on August 15, 1915. 
(ieneral Sir Ivor Herbert moved that the Bill 
f-liould include " everj* male subject who, after 
Augu.st 15, 1915, had attained, or during the 
course of the war might attain, the age of 
18 years." There could be no reasoned objec- 
tion. But the Government were tied hand and 



foot. J\ir. Bonar Law wa'; put up to say tliat 
"the Bill did not pretend to h(; a measure for 
dealing in the most effective \\ay with the 
military situation." As this did not sulYice, 
the Government took the strange course of 
dragging in Lord Kitchener as an opponent of 
General Herbert's nendment. I\lr. Long 
declared that " he was authorized by Lord 
Kitchener to say tliat he did not desire this 
amendment to be made, that lie hoped the Bill 
woidd be passed practically as the Govern- 
ment had introduced it, that the measure by 
bringing in the unmarried men and enabling 
the others to be called up would provide the 
troops the nation required, and enable hitn to do 
all that it teas necessary to do.'' Events were 
soon to prove that this statement was the most 
eloquent condemnation that could be con- 
ceived of the Bill, and of tlie foresight of its 
promoters. The Government had its way, and 
General Herbert withdrew his amendment — 
after declaring, ho« ever, that " one of the 




UHGKl ITS IKOM TRINIDAD. 



JU-2 



Tilt: TIMES lllSTOltY OF Till'] WAR. 



most reiiuirkiible tilings in tlio wholo uai uaa 
ilu- lottti eolipso of the oHice of tiie Secretary of 
State for War behind tlio >liiulo\v of a ligiiru- 
heml," and that " in the inattor of rocruitinf; 
Lord KiteFu'mr had been wrong from first to 
hist." 

Till' only cliange actually made in the pro- 
posed u^'e limits was a provision releasing men 
who, although imder 41 years of age on August 
15, 1915, passed that age before the date 
ap|)ointed for the application of the Act. 

As to *' industrial compulsion " and " con- 
scientious objection," all the important con- 
cessions made by the Government will be found 
in the clauses of the Act uh-oady quoUni 
(pp. 123-4). It was provided that, a certificate 
of exemption might be granted on the ground 
of it being held " expedient " that a man sliDukl 
be " engaged in work in which ho is habitually 
engaged or in which he wishes to be tnrjaycd.'' 
In the event of a man leaving " certified " 
employment, and so losing his certificate of 
exemption, it was provided that a period of 
two months should exjjiro before, if he had not 
obtained a renewal of his certificate, he should 
be liable to military service. And, in the civso 
of an application " on conscientious grounds," 
it was provided that exemption " may take the 
form of an exemption from coiubatuut service 



only, or may be conditional on the applicant 
being engaged in some work which, in the 
opinion of the tribunal dealing with the case, 
is of national importance." 

Till! -Military Service Act came into operation 
on February 10. Hy the terms of tlio Act the 
" appointed day " for its jirovisions to take 
eilect was the twenty-first day after it eamo 
into operation — that was to say, March 2. 
-As already noted, the Derby " groups " were 
reopened when the Military Service Bill was 
introduced. They remained open for single as 
well as married men until March 1, after which 
date all men liable for service were brought 
automatically into the Reserve by law. In 
order, for administrative purposes, to distin- 
guish them from the men in " groups," nu^n 
coming under the Act were classified according 
to age in " classes," as follows : 



Year of Birth. 


Class. 


Year of Birth. 


Clasa. 


1897 


1 


188.-> 


13 


189G 


2 


1884 


14 


1895 


3 


1883 


15 


1894 


4 


1882 


16 


189.1 


» 


1881 


17 


1892 


6 


1880 


18 


1891 


7 


1879 


19 


1890 


8 


1878 


20 


1880 


9 


1877 


21 


1888 


10 


187C 


22 


1887 


11 


1875 


23 


1886 


12 








SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TRAINING IN CAPE TOWN. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



133 




RECRUITS FROM CEYLON ARRIVING IN LONDON. 



On February 10 a Proclamation was pub- 
lished which summoned the " classes " of men 
between the ages of 19 and 30 — the " classes " 
being thus made to correspond roughly with 
the " groups " already called up. This liistoric 
document ran : 

THE PROCLAMATION'. 

10th February, 1916. 
Army RESEnvE. 
•Military Service Act, 1916.) 
Whereas rjy a Proclamation dated the 4th August, 
1914, His Majesty in exercise of powers conferred on 
hirn by the Reserve Forces Act, 1882, ordered (The 
Rit'ht Honourable Herbert Henry Asquith) one of His 
Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, from time to 
time to give, and, when given, to revoke or vary sueli 
directions as might seem necessary or proper for calling 
out the Army ReserN-e or all or any of the men belonging 
thereto. 

And ^Vhereas under the provisions of the Military 
Service Act, 1916, certain persons will, on the 2nd Marcli, 
1916, be doemwl to have been duly enlisted in His 
Majesty's Regular Forces for general service with tlie 
Colours or in the Reserve for the period of the War, 
and to have l»cen forthwitfi transferred to the Reserve. 

And Whereas such HenerviHtH have been assigned to 
ClaftW;-* n':cordirig to the year of their birth. 

Now, therefore I, f'ield-Marshal the Right Honotirable 
Earl Kitchener, K.C., K.I'., one of His .Majesty's Princi- 
pal Secretaries of State, do hereby direct as follows : — 

Kvery Res/rrvist under the Provisions of the .Military 
Service Act, 1916, wlio belongs to any f)f the Classes 
merit ionwl in the subjoined Schedule i^, unless an 
applicatirjn for a certificate of exemption haa been 
r'la/le and has not l>een finally disposed of, hereby 
refpiired to report himself for the purpose of joining 
the Colours on such date and at such [ilaee as may 
hereafter be notified, or, if on or before the 17th day of 
.March, 1916, he ha»i not received any such notice, to 
report hims/jlf to the C'ominander of the Recruiting Sub- 
Area at the lieeniiting fXTice nearest to his usual place 
of residen'^ on the aforexaid I7tb day of .March, 1916. 

A Re»iervisfc who fails without reasonable eaus<i or 
excuae to comply with these directions will be guilty 



of an offence under the Reserve Forces Act, 1882 (45 
and 46 Vic, Cap. 48). 



Schedule. 



Class. 




Date on which the 

Classes will commence 

to be called up. 



3rd March> 1916. 



Second Clas.s, Men bori in 1896 



Third Class 
Fourth Clas3 
Fifth Class 
Sixth Cla.«s 
Seventh Class 
Eighth Class 
Ninth Class 
Tenth Class 
Eleventh Class 
Twelfth Class 



Only a few days later fresh Proclamations 
called up for service on March 18 all the re- 
maining "groups" of unmarried men (14 to 
2.3)* and all the remaining " cla.sses " (13 to 
23). There remained only the Derby " groups " 
of married men. We shall shortly see how their 
fate com})ined with the unsatisfactory opera- 
tion 1)1 tlic new Act to render further and more 
thorough reforms inevitable. 

The work of the tribunals charged with the 
duty of gninling cxcmj)! ions now assumed an 
ever-incrf;asing mifjortance. A siiries of instruc- 
tions had been issued for their guidance. 'J'ho j)rin- 
'•i[)al duty of the local tribunals was the decision 
of clainiH of men of inilitary ago and fifno.-«s to 
be excused service;, or to b<! temporarily jjost- 
poric*!, on the ground that they wc^re indis- 

• "Groups" 2 to r>, as noted above, were called up 
on January 20. Further proclamations on January 8 
eallerl up " groups" 6 (o 9 for Korvice on Febniury H, and 
on January .'10 " groups " 10 to l.'{ for' norvico on 
h'ebrnary 29. " (»rou[> " 1 was called on February 25 
frir Kcrvico on Manli L'K 



IJl 



nil-: iiMKs HisroiiY of Tin: wah. 




THE MILITARY SERVICE (No. 2) -BILL PASSED ITS THIR 
On the division the Government obtained a majority of 34 



! 



'////•; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 



1^5 




AfJINf; IN THK H(JUSK ()\- COMMONS ON JANUARY 24, 1916. 
■umber of vote^ heinii for the third readin)i, 383, against, 36. 



IBti 



THE TIMES UlfiTOnY OE THE MM/?. 



|)fnaat)le in a trrt<l«>, or for rnrt.ioii8, biutineMi or 
iloiiitMritic, iiersonal to thentselveH, Untlt-r tln^ 
Derby ucheine a claim wan made by tillmg up it 
lorm showing tho jfroiinds oa wliich it \v'a.s put 
t'orwanl. Tlurt c-luim was seat by tliw lorul 
tribunal to the military representative ia the 
locality, who hiul the assistance of an advisory 
committee composed ot persons conversant 
with local industries and conditions of life, and 
representing both employers and employees. 
If they and the military n-presentative con- 
siilered the claim reasonablts they infonned the 
local tribunal aad tlie man was placed ia a 
later group. If it was thought that the ciaioi 
required further invest igation, a ilato was fixed 
for liearing. The military representative was 
present and any necessary witnesses were called. 
A man could not bo put back more than ten 
groups on any one claini, but it was provided 
that an informal application to the military 
i-epresentative, mtide a reasonable time after the 
claim had been decided, might with his consent 
and that of the advisory committee result in a 
further postponement without the necessity ol" 
luiy further formal claim. 

As for n>en in the "reserved occupations," 
those who had attested were placed in their 
group of the Army Reserve, but were not to 
be called up for military service until it had 
been decided by the tribunals that it was no 
longer necessary in the national interest to 
retain them in civil emijlojnnent. The tribunals 
were, in fact, required to investigate the accu- 
racy of, and to revise, the " starring " already 
supposed to have been done at the time of the 
malcing of the National Register. In consider- 
ing a claim made by an employer on the groimd 
tliat an attested man was individually indis- 
pensable, the tribunal was directed to require 
the employer to show : 

(1) Good reason why the man was individually indis- 
pensable and that the Vmsiness in which the man wa<3 
employed could not he properly maintained if tlie man 
were called up for service with his group. 

(2) That the employer had made every effort tem- 
porarilv to fill the man's place ; 

(3) That the business ministered to war requirements, 
to essential domestic needs, or to the export trade in 
such a manner that the maintenance of the business 
was important in the national interest ; and 

(4) That the employer had given reasonable facilities 
for enlistment to other men (if any) in his employment. 

" Men engaged in operations connected 
witli coabnining," by which was meant all 
men working below ground and all colliery 
mechanics, electricians, pumpmen, weighmen, 
and winding-engine men, were not to be 
called up for military service without the 



consent of tiic Home OHice. This provision 
was s«joa to j)rove tin- cause of a vtM-y large 
iacreasti ia the numbers of young men of 
military ag»» who w«'rc anxious to embrace 
tht^ hardships oi the miaer's life. 

W ith the reopening of the group systeax, the 
tribunals continued to consider llie claims of 
the voluatarily attested. It became necessary 
to issue a fresh batch of instructions. On 
January 8, 191(5, it was aaaounced that " :a- 
dispcasablo " must be strictly interpreted. It 
was not enough that the employer should bo 
able to show that he would be inconvenienced, 
even .seriously inconvenienced. Eniployers 
were urged to do all in their power " in this 
time of critical need " to adapt themselves to 
changed conditions aad by tho employment 
of men not eligibh; for military service and of 
women, and by reorgaai/.ation, to do their very 
utmost to release men for the Forces. Tribunals 
were to confine their concessions of postpone- 
ment to the minimum that was rea-sonable. 

The reopening of tho group system on 
January 10 was advertised in liOndon by an 
announcement by the Lord ]\rayor that he 
would be present at the ^lansion House overy 
day to welcome recruits. During the dinner 
hour, the Lord Mayor, wearing uniform and 
accompanied by the Sheriffs, used to address 
large crowds, and the results, for a time, were 
highly satisfactorj'. A further public campaign 
was organized, and new posters — of a somewhat 
different type from the old, though in some 
respects equally objectionable — began to make 
their appearance. It is worth while to recall, 
as show'ing the characteristically narrow and 
political spirit which still persisted in these 
productions, the wording of one headed " Rights 
of Citizenship " : 

Your Rights. 

Your Rights of Citizenship give you the Privilege of 
joining your fellows in the defence of your Honour anil 
your Homes. 

Join under the Group System to-day and safeguard 
both. 

Your Duty. 

Your Duty is to fight the Common Foe and to get 
your Comrades to join you. 

The cynical observer will perceive the re- 
spective positions which " Rights " and " Duty" 
were thought to have assumed, imder the 
political teaching of past generations, in the 
eyes of the mass of the British gubUc. 

Owing to the large number- of exemptions 
granted by the tribunals, tho Derby groups 
hitherto called up for sei'vice had produced 
but a meagre output of actual recruits. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIl. 



137 




GLASGOW HIGHLANDERS IN TRAINING : IN THE TRENCHES. 



Under the jMilitary Service Act, as has been 
seen, local tribunals, consisting ot at least 
five members, were established in every 
local registration district. In an explana- 
tory circular issued by the President of the 
Board of Trade on February 4, it was sug- 
gested that the existing Derby tribunals 
phould, owing to the experience which they had 
already gained, be appointed as the tribimals 
under the Act. The various interests of the 
district were to be fairly represented, and an 
adequate representation of I^abour was enjoined. 
Women also were recognized as being likely to 
prove advantageous members. In dealing 
with different cla-sses of claims for exemption, 
whetlier absolute, conditional, or temporary, 
tribunals were instructed to adopt the following 
main princi|)les : 

In «Tnployrnent cases the question to be con- 
sidered \s a.s to be, not whether the man had a 
clainri for exceptional treatment in his own 
interests, but whether or not it was in the 



national interests that he should be retained 
civil employment. The expression 



in 



" national interest " was to bo construed 
broadly. It covered not only services which 
ministered directly to the prosecution of the 
war, but also services which were essential to 
the country, whether, for instance, in the 
maintenance of the food supply or of the 
export trade, or in tlie performance of other 
services which it was desirable should be car 
ried on in the interests of the community. 

In cases of ill health or infirniit}- a certifi- 
cate of absolute exemption was not to be given 
unless the ill health or infirmity was clearly 
permanent. In doubtful cases, tribunals were 
invited to leave the question of medical fitness 
to the military authorities, who had now re- 
vised their standards and were prepared to 
certify recruits in different classes according to 
the work for which they were physically fit. 
Thus, failing fitness for general service, a man 
might be deemed fit enough for field service at 




GLAS(;OW HI(;HLANnHRS IN TRAININC; : CHARGE 1 



13S 



TW/-; 77\//;.s msTifiiY or tuk w.u:. 




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Imhih-, fnr garrison sorvu^o at home or abroad, 
lor Ih)>(>u:', siicIi as mad and trtiicli making, 
or lor HcnU'ntary work, mihIi as clerical occii- 
|iati()iis. 

The caso of (h<' conscientious ohjcn-tor was to 
l)e considtM-ed in an im|)artial atid tolerant 
.spirit. Ak will l>o Hvmx lator, this unattractivo 
j)roduct of peaceful i)roHp(>rity and Romi- 
religiouH, 8onii-politicu1 aberration was, al- 
th(>uj.'h negligiljle in ((uantity, to cause much 
Inaible boforo he was finally disposed of. 
Meanwhile, the man whoso ol)joctions. genuinely 
rested on religious and moral convic^tions was 
to receive every consideration. It was for 
the tribunal to accomplish the unenviable 
task of deciding as to the genuineness of 
I he claim. 

]Jefore the end of Fel)ruary, 1916, a fresh 
batch of instructions was. announced, of which 
the general tendency wast to deprecate undue 
leniency on the part of the tribunals. It was 
felt that in a good many cases the tribunals 
had been guided too much by local sentiment 
in the granting of exemi)tions. Cases of 
" serious liardship " were in future to be shown 
to b(> really serious before a claim could be 
api)roved. Many of tlie claims were made on 
trivial grounds ; others were obviously absurd. 
Among the " indispensable men," applications 
on whose behalf were rejected by various 
tribunals, were a revue comedian, a church 
organist, the cartoonist of a weekly paper, and 
a packer emploj^ed by the Naval and Military 
Bible Society. Men claimed exemption very 
often because they were the sole maintenance 
of their w idovved mother, Vjut it was frequently 
foimd, on inquiry, that the mother could be 
perfectly well cared for by brothers or sisters 
of the applicant, while she would, of course, be 
entitled to the allowance fixed for soldiers' 
dependents. Among the conscientious ob- 
jectors many extreme cases of repugnance to 
take life were forthcoming. It was with 
difficulty that some of these unnatural sons 
would admit that if their motlier or sister were 
attacked they would defend them to the point 
of killing their adversary. There were, indeed, 
eases in Mhich they frankly said that they 
A\f)iild allow tiieir mother to be killed rather 
than take tlu^ life of anyone who attacked 
lier. Among tlie np]ilieatioiis refused vas 
that of a Civil servant who said that he did 
not like to leave his mother "in these times 
of Zeppelin raids." But, on the other 
hand, n\any conscientious objectors were 
perfectly willing to undertake non-com. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAJi. 



1:M) 



biitant service — although some regarded tlic 
work of the Red Cross or Army Service Corps 
with disfavour on the ground that it " helped 
warfare." 

Gradually, however, means were found for 
deaUng with the conscientious objector, whether 
the offspring of foolish parents or the Christ- 
adelphian who had hurriedly embraced the 
teaching of that obsciu-e sect in the hope of 
saving his skin. In a few cases of refusal to 
obey niihtary orders terms of imprisonment 
were inflicted. A more satisfactory step was 
the formation in March of a Xon-Combatant 
Battalion, wliich was reported in May to be 
doing honest and useful work quite contentedly 
at the Front. The men's conduct was exem- 
plary, an unusually large percentage of them 
being total abstainers as well as non-smokers. 
They were engaged, like the Xav\-ies Battalion, 
on railway work, receiving, like the navvies, 
an additional allowance of meat. Otherwise, 
they were treated exactly hke any other 
infantry battaUon, except that they wore no 
belts, and, of course, carried no arms. They 
u-sed no military- titles among themselves, but 
addressed each other as " Mr.," or by nick- 
names. The soldiers generally regarded them 
with good-natured indifference. It was reported 
that, as the result, doubtless, of the fine 
physical condition induced by hard work in the 
open air, one man had found his conscience 
less obdurate than he had supposed, and had 
asked to be allowed to become a combatant. 
Other conversions were anticipated. 

Notwithstanding, however, the increasingly 
stem official disapproval of the laxity of some 
of the tribunals, it was becoming clear that 
more dra.stic steps would be necessary if the 
tale of aseful recruits were to attain the hoped- 
for figure. It was decided forthwith, imder 
pressure from the War Office, to revise the list 
of reserved occupations. Meanwhile, in many 
cases, the irregularity of action on the part of 
the tribnnuLs produced great dissuti.-^faction 
among the men. Numerous cases were re- 
ported from agriculttiral districts inwhicli ublc- 
iKxJied young sons of farmers were unfairly 
obtaining exemption by masr|iierading, for the 
firnt time in tlifir lives, as shepherds or cowmen. 
Siinuharieoiwly, thousands of irien wen; being 
enlist<*d for " light setjentary duties " wh') 
ought never to have })<fn taken from civil 
life at all. It, was reported that in one Mirlland 
hfwpital of 210 b«-dM no fewer than 70 young 
men were engagefj in wtishing dishes, polishing' 



fiooiv, iianding dressings, feeding patKiits, 
running messages, and doing similar feminine- 
work. In another hospital the telephon<? and 
inquiry offices were being conducted l)y 
young soldiers. The existence of these and 
similar cases of " shirking " on the part of 
single men tended, as time went on and the 
calling up of further groups of the unmarried 
brought the moment over nearer when the 
turn of the married would come, to pro- 
duce a strong sense of injustice, which was 
reflected in complaints from all parts of the 
country. 

On March 1 voluntary enlistment \inder the 
group system was, as we have seen, closed to 
single ii^en. It remained open to the married. 
Those of the latter who had already attested 
had, as they admitted, in many cases done so 
in the belief that they would not be required, 
or at any rate not until the whole supply cf 
smgle men was exhausted. This belief, how- 
ever erroneous, was to a certain extent justified 
by tlie ambiguous nature of many of the public 
declarations which had been made on the 
subject. The recruiting phi-ase " Single men 
first " had been taken, all too literally, to mean, 
not that the single groups would be siunmoned 
before the married, which had been done, but 
that no married men should be simimoned while 
there yet remained single men available and 
unattested. And now, when it was recognized 
that large numbers of single men had been 
permitted to escape into the haven of a reserved 
occupation, the married men lifted up their 
voice. It is not to be assmned that the married 
men were lacking in a sense of their duty. \\'e 
have seen from the Derby report that 1,. "144, 079 
of them had attested up to the end of tlie year, as 
against 840,000 single men, and since January 1 
it ajjpeared tliat 130,000 married men had 
attested, as against about 400,000 single. Th(>y 
were for the most part reasonable and patriotic 
men, with little synipathy with agitation. Bui , 
in the absence of any (jOvernment scheme for 
their relief, thc^y were oppressed by nil kinds 
of anxieties as to tlirii- contractual liabilities 
in the matter of rent, mortgages, and (lie like. 
It was not until April 26 that the (!o\ criuiKiit 
produced a plan for mitigating these harassing 
f)bstafles to voluntnry enlistment. (Sec? ])ages 
1^0-7.) 'J'liis schenw, (•ou|)led with the power 
given to fanitary authorities under the Local 
GovrTument (Emergency I'rovisions) Act to 
make arrang^-nicnts for storing furnilurt! for 
MKii ciillcrl u|). " reasoruible expenditure " to 



uo 



////; 77.\//';n iiisTonY or the war. 




INNS OF COURT OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS, 
Bayonet Practice. 



I)p defrayed out of tlio ratos, did much to 
obviate the " breaking up of the home." 

Meanw-yiile Lord Derby strove valiantly to 
«!a\e the situation. He declared that the 
Government would have to take far stronger 
measures thf.n tliey had yet taken if the men 
necessary for the Army were to be got. The 
men must be extracted from the reserved occu- 
pations and women put in their place. No 
single man who had not attained the age of 31 
should be allowed to plead for exemption on the 
groimd that he was " starred," badged, or in a 
reserved occupation. All other single men, and 
all married men, should not be considered as 
being in the starred or reserved occupations 
unless they held their present positions or 
positions of a similar character in other firms 
before the previous August 15. These pro- 
posals would not apply to skilled munition 
workers. At the same time, Lord Derby, 
while maintaining that ]Mr. Asquith's pledge to 
the married men had been kept in the lettei-, 
insisted that the Government must, by limiting 
exemptions, enable it to be kept in the spirit as 
well. He recognized that the effect of the 
exemptions had been to make th^ married men 



feel that they were going to bo called up much 
sooner than they could reasonably have anti- 
cipated. 

The proclamation calling up the first eight 
married groups was posted on March 7. These 
groups (25 to 32) included men between 19 and 
26 years of age. The married men, aged 18-19 
(Group 24), were, as in the case of single men, 
called up later. 

With this siunmons to the first married 
grou])s the recruiting question entered on a 
new phase. Lord Derby hastened to explain 
to the married men the reasons of the unex- 
pectedly early call. In a speech at Manchester 
he declared : 

The whole essence of the situation is time. AVe 
must have men. I am perfectly certain that, given time 
— and, mind you, Parliament has lengthened that 
time — we shall get all the single men, but at the present 
moment there is no doubt that imless the married men 
come forward there will be a shortage — a shortage 
which may bo absolutely fatal to this country, not only 
in this gonoration but for all time. 

Meanwhile the Cabinet, now seriously 
alarmed, appointed a commit te£::rto consider 
the whole question of reserved trades and 
occupations. This committee, on ^March 14, 

announced that, as evidtMu-e had iicctniuilated 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



141 



to show that men had been entering certified 
occupations in order to avoid n\ilitary service, 
it had been decided that men in those occupa- 
tions only be exempted from mihtary service 
if they could show that they were similarly 
occupied at the date of the National Register, 
August 15, 1915. Umnarried men up to the 
age of 25 or 30, or, in some cases, up to 41, 
were to be released for service. Only in those 
occupations which were vital to the conduct 
of the war and where the evidence against any 
depletion was overwhelming were the younger 
unmarried men to be retained on the reserved 
list. It was further decided to delete from the 
list of reservations occupations connected with 
certain industries such as the luxury trades 
concerned with the manufacture of tobacco, 
silk and lace, which had received protection on 
account of the importance of their exports. 

It is significant of the embarrassment of the 
Goverrunent at this juncture that at the 
moment when Lord Derby was doing his utmost 
to compel them to enable him to fulfil his word 
to the married men they should have appointed 
him to preside over a committee on the con- 
struction of aircraft — an occupation, indeed, 



\\})ich ho soon found a sheer waste of time 
and energy. 

The attitude of the extrcmcr married 
objectors may be gathered from the following 
resolutions, passed at a mass meeting at 
Portsmouth on March 8. The men [jrotested 
against 

(1) The falling up of the married groups for service 
until the rrime Minister's pledge to the married men 
has been fulfilled in the spirit as well as the letter by 
withdrawing and sending into the ServicCM all single 
men from reserved occupations, starred men in Govern- 
ment and controlled establishments [munition factories] 
who have only recently been trained and entered for 
this class of work, and single clerks in Government and 
public offices ; and by a stringent revision of the cases 
of single men exempted by tribunals or rejected as 
medically unfit. 

(2) The calling up of married groups for service 
before compulsory service has been introduced for all 
unattested married men of military age, the attestation 
of married men having been obtained by statements 

.in recruiting literature that attested married men would 
be in a better position than those who did not attest. 

The posters publishing the proclamation of 
the call of the last groups of married men had 
been printed, and were on the point of being 
issued, when, on March 15, an indefinite post- 
ponement was announced, A week later it was 
explained that this had been merely due to the 




A LONDON KHC;iMKNT IN TKAININCi. 
Komb-throwin^ practice. 




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142 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



143 



congestion of the tribunals, but for tlie [)ubiic 
it served to emphasize the fact that the Govern- 
ment were now floundering in very deep water. 
Matters were not helped by an vmfortunate 
indisposition of Mr. Asquith's, which occurred 
at tliis moment. WTiile Lord Derby attached 
to the "reserved occupations the whole blame 
of the shortage which had led to the premature 
calling up of the married groups, and described 
how the Board of Agriculture had refused to 
follow the proposals of the Reserved Occupa- 
tions Committee in the matter of reducing 
exemptions, he was able to point to the various 
steps which the Government were now taking, 
at the eleventh hovir, to imdo the mischief 
caused by their own half-hearted mismanage- 
ment of the whole recruiting question. There 
had been an inter-departmental conference, 
which hatl " foimd " that an insufficiently 
representative Committee was already sitting 
at the Board of Trade. The Committee had 
been strengthened, and had, as we have seen, 
already dealt with a certain portion of the 
industries of the country. Meanwhile, the 
Home Office had agreed, with regard to the 
mining industry, that any men challenged by 
the military authorities who could not be 
shown by the employer at the Colliery Courts to 
he indispensable should cease to be exempted. 
The Admiralty, the War Office, and the 
Ministry of Mionitions were joining in a revision 
of badges. Women were being introduced to 
the lighter forms of shell work at the rate of 
]. 5,000 a month. Lorfl Kitchener followed 
with the frank warning that the married 
rnen would be wanted within the next few 
weeks. 

An interval followed, filled with hot political 
controversy. The Cabinet, distracted with the 
problem of devising measures for the relief of 
married recruits from pressing civil liabilities, 
wa8 attacked from all quarters of the House 
of Commons, and on every conceivable ground, 
for its inaVjility to make u[> its mind. It seemed 
to be utt*;rly {jowerlesH in tho alxenco of its 
leader. Meanwhile, the question of all-rounrl 
C(jin]>\iU\im was daily looming largfsr, and 
married men's m«jetings in its favour grew .ever 
more irnfH;rativo in their dfirnanfls. The Times, 
whifh had throughout the whole recruiting 
muddle been indefatigable in its criticism of 
the glaring injustice of the existing system, anrl 
in ifH ealirt for n-ivAnU', fw;tion on tho part of the; 
(j(OV»?mrnerit, thua guinmarizfj^l its afivico at 
thiM juncture : 



First let us liavo a plain authoritative statement of 
the true position of recruiting and tho nurnbora actually 
required. Nothing has boon such a handicap an the 
mystery in which this question has been involved. 
1'hen let us have such an amendment of tho Military 
Service Act as will do away with all tho injustice of 
attestation by includinK impartially all men of military 
age. Lot lis reverse tho whole system of reserved occupa- 
tions by placing the onus of obtaining exemption on 
each individual or his employers. That is tho one sure 
safeguard against the possibility of single " shirkers." 
And let us deal with the contractual liabilities of the 
married recruits before, and not after, they are called to 
the Colours. If the Government would have tho courage 
to announce such a programme at once, they would be 
far on the way to solving a critical problem. 

It need hardly be said that this period of 
delay and indecision produced an extremely 
bad inapression upon our troops at the Front, 
as well as upon oiu- Allies, who, regarding com- 
pulsory service almost as part of the order of 
nature, found it difficult to reconcile the Govern- 
ment's professions of determination to win the 
war with their reluctance to take the first 
essential step to that end. 

IVIr. Asquith was now absent on the Con- 
tinent, visiting Paris and Rome, and the task 
of representing him in Parliament fell to Mr. 
Walter Long. He sought at first, incredible 
as it may seem, to shift the responsibility on to 
the tribunals ! If, he said, they had taken the 
view that men with heavy liabilities ought not 
to be called upon to serve as soldiers, this 
particular grievance of the married would not 
have arisen. But, he added, as a matter of fact, 
the question of the men with obligations had 
been in existence ever since the first call for 
recruits was made. He now told the House 
that the Government had decided to give the 
necessary svims to the Statutory Pensions Com- 
mittee to enable them to make grants to men 
already in the Army, or in process of being 
called up, to meet cases of hardship arising 
out of their liabilities. 

]?y about the third week in March the 
whole position had become impossible. While 
the tribunals and advisory committees were 
struggling with their thankless task, and the 
(Government was still unable to call u[) the 
married "groups," tho state of tho Army 
in regard to numbers was clearly critical, 
'ilie seventy divisions which were the mini- 
mum of our field formations required 1,400,000 
rtjcruits for their maintenance and comj)lotion 
during the year 191G. Men must be found, 
and found soon. 

Ministerial and departmental conferences 
were now constant, but no results wore forth- 



144 



THE TIMES HISTOItY UE THE WAR. 



1 ^^^^^^^^^^^^iwB^^m^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

5^ ^J^"^ 






J 













A LONDON REGIMENT IN GAMP: DIGGINCJ TRENCHES. 



coming. Public opinion became impatient. 
In the House of Commons " War Committees," 
consisting of the most energetic members of 
the Unionist and Liberal parties respectively, 
became ever more insistent. On March 28 
those two " Ginger " groups, as they wore 
called, definitely announced their adhesion 
to the principle of " equal sacrifices from all 
men of military age." The Unionist group, 
led by Sir Edward Carson, decided to move a 
vote of censure on the Ministry, if no satis- 
factory solution of the recruiting problem 
were produced in one week. The Cabinet 
tried to gain time by the familiar plea that 
they were " examining all tlie figures," and 
Mr. Bonar Law was particularly persuasive 
in curbing the zeal of his own party. By one 
device and another time was, indeed, gained, 
but it could not be long. On April 11 The 
Times announced that Sir William Robertson, 
whose influence had grown steadily since he 
became Chief of the Lnperial General Staff in 
December, 1915, and the military members of 
the Army Council had " fiunished the Cabinet 
with a \'ery plain statement of their imme- 
diate requirements in men." On April 12 
Sir Edward Carson handed in the following 
notice : 

To move that this House is of opinion that the present 
system of recruiting is unfair in its incidence and in- 
adequate to f.erure the men urgently needed in order 
to achieve the objects which this country has set before 
itself in this war and to fulfil our obligations to our 
Allies ; and resolves that no further time should be lost 
in amending the Military Service Act so as to require, as 



far' as possible, ctiual sacrifice from all men of inililury 
ago, by rendering all alike liable for iniiitary service 
during the present war. 

Lord Milner announced liis intention to 
move the following even more definite resolu- 
tion in the House of Lords : 

That in the opinion of this House it is necessary, in' 
order to secure the objects for which the coimtry is 
fi;.'hting, that an Act should be passed without further 
delay rendering all men of military age liable to be 
called upon for military service during the continuance- 
of tl>e war. 

On the day of Sir Edward Carson's notice,, 
a deputation of the National Union of Attested 
]\larried Men waited upon Mr. Asquith, Lord 
Derby, and Mr. Walter Long, and told them 
plainly what they thought of the 2)osition in 
which attested married men had been placed 
by the recruiting methods of the Govermnent- 
and their agents. The leader of the deputation 
contended that every attested married man was 
prepared to fulfil his pledge, but in the name 
of justice there must be that equality of 
sacrifice which they had all been led to expect. 
" We think," he added, " that the present 
Derby scheme is in a hopeless n^uddle, and that 
the only way to rectify it is to applj' the ]Military 
Service Bill to all men up to the age of 41." 
The Government should not allow it to be 
recorded that over a million men had been 
pressed into military service -^tey trickery. 

This . allegation of trickery was based u|>on a 
recruiting poster ^^ hicl\ stated " no attestation, 
no appeal." It appeared that the men had 
inferred from this that thtxse who attested 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



145 



voluntarily would have some advantage over 
those who had to be " fetched." Lord Derby 
explained that, from the point of view of the 
War Office, if a man did not attest he did not 
exist. It was impossible, under the voluntary 
system, for a man who had not attested to 
come before the tribunals and ask for exemp- 
tion. But he admitted that there had been 
statements made locally which went a great 
deal farther than that complained of, and 
which, if he had heard of them at the tune, he 
should undoubtedlj- have repudiated. 

The Prime Minister declared tliat the only 
pledge for which he and Lord Derby were 
answerable had been fulfilled both in the letter 
and in the spirit. He also admitted, however, 
that eases of misapprehension had arisen, owing 
to unauthorized statements, and he under- 
took to consider whether machinery could be 
set lip to release men who could prove that 
they had attested as the result of such mis- 
leading statements. As for the alternative 
of compulsion, which one member of the 
deputation had suggested would " solve the 
whole thing," that was '" another matter." 

In the Cabinet matters were understood to 
be in the hands of a Committee consisting of 
the Prime ^linLster, ilr. McKenna, Lord 
Lansdowne, and Mr. Chamberlain. On April 
L5 The Times indicated that this Committee 
had reported against an extension of the 
Military Service Act to all men of military age, 



and were proposing (1) the extension of the 
Act to include those men who had reached 
the age of eighteen since August L5, and who 
reached that age hereafter ; (2) the retention 
with the Colours of all time-expired Regulars 
and Territorials; (3) furtlier "combing out" 
of single men from " starred " trades and 
munition factories; and (4) perseverance 
with all existing methods of enlistment, 
including the Derby scheme and the Military 
Service Act. On April 18 matters were 
reaching a head, and there were all appearances 
of a serious political crisis. On the 19th Mr. 
Asquith met a House of Commons which was 
expecting to hear the decision of the Govern- 
ment. But what he said was this : 

There are still, T regret to say, material points of dis- 
agreement in the Cabinet, and if these points are not 
settled by agreement the result must be the break-up' 
of the Government. The Cabinet is united in believing 
that such an event would be a national disaster of the 
most formidable kind, and it is in the hope that it may 
be averted by a few more days of deliberation that I 
shall propose that the House adjourn to-day until 
Tuesday next, April 25. 

On the following day, the Thursday before 
Easter, it was announced that the Cabinet had 
come to an agreement, and that their proposals 
would be submitted on April 25 to a secret 
session in each House of Parliament. The 
Times stated that what the Cabinet proposed 
was to introduce a Bill for the extension of 
the Military Ser\ ice Act — but a Bill which 
would only take effect if in the next few weeks 




THE NliW AHMV IN IKAININCJ: CAlARr.lil 



AC 



Till: TIMES HlSTOliY OF THE WAR. 




THE NEW ARMY IN 



" the regular intake of recruits from all sources 
had fallen below the definite niinimiun figure 
accepted by the Cabinet and the Army Council 
as the margin of safety." The arrangement of 
a secret session was described as a direct con- 
cession to the wishes of the Labour members, 
who held that they must be convinced of the 
necessity of any extension of the Military 
Service Act by military evidence which could 
not be disclosed in pubUe. 

On Easter Eve a Privy Council was held at 
Windsor, and new Regulations of a most 
remarkable kind were inserted in the Defence 
of the Reakn Regulations. The main passages 
were as follows : 

If either House of Parliament in pursuance of a 
resolution passed by that House holds a secret session, 
it shall not be lawful for any person in any newspaper, 
periodical, circular, or other printed publication, or 
in any public speech, to publish any report of, or to 
piu-port to describe, or to refer to, the proceedings at 
such session, except such report thereof as may bo 
officially communicated through the Directors of the 
Ofticial Press Bureau. 

It shall not be lawlul for anj' person in any news- 
paper, periodical, circiJar, or other printed publication, 
or in anj' public speech, to publish any report of, or to 
purport to describe, or to refer to, the proceedings at 
any meeting of the Cabinet, or without lawful authority 
to pubhsh the contents of any confidential document 
belonging to, or any confidential information obtained 
from, any Government department, or any person in the 
service of his Majesty. 



The second paragraph was obviously due to 
considerations arising out of the published 
reports of Cabinet discussions and hesitations 
in the past few weeks. It provoked much 
criticism, which, however, need not delay us 
here. 

The secret session occupied two days. Very 
brief reports were communicated to the Press. 
They stated that the Prime Minister gave 
particulars of the total military effort of the 
Empire. The report of the first day's pro- 
ceedings also said : 

To meet with the situation the Government have 
determined upon three relatively minor proposals : 

(0) The prolongation until the end of the war of the 
service of time-expired men whose period of service 
under the present law can be extended for one year 
only ; 

(6) To empower the military authority to transfer 
men enlisted for territorial battalions to any unit where 
they are needed ; 

(c) To render an exempted man liable to military 
ser\'ice immediately on the expiry of his certificate of 
exemption. 

With a view to an ultimate addition to the forces 
iixailable, they will further propose to bring under 
the terms of the Military Sen'ice Act all youths under 
18 on August 16 last as they reach that age. Fiu-ther 
tlie Prime Minister stated : — ^" 

(1) That the Government, recognizing that the neces- 
sary numbers required for tlie discharge of our military 
obligations will not be available for service at the time 
reqiiired under the present arrangements, agree that 
an immediate effort be made to obtain the men i-equired 



THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 



Ul 




TRAINING : PHYSICAL DRILL. 



by voluntary enlistment from amongst the unattested 
married men. 

(2) That if at the end of four weeks endinj; May 27 
50,000 of these men have not been secured by direct 
enlistment, the Government will forthwith osl; Parlia- 
ment for compulsorj- powers 

(3) That if in any week after May 27 15,000 mt-n 
have not been secured by direct enlistment, the same 
course will be taken, any surplvis over 15,000 in one 
week bring carricl over to the next. 

(4) That the arrangements in paratrraphs 2 and "X 
are to hold gocKi until 200,000 unattested men ha\ o 
been obtained. In the meantime the position will he 
imder constant review by the Government 

It was pointed out that, as under this scheme n'l 
nvaiiahie unattested married men would be enlLstcd 
'■ither voluntarily or by compulsion, the main grounrl 
allege<l for the release of attested married men would 

Civil Liabilities. 

'Ilio Prim« Minister also reterre<l to the question of 
the a<irii;<tance to be given to enable men in his Majesty's 
forces to meet their civil liabilities. 

On March 29 Mr. Long informed the House of Commons 
that his Majesty's Government proposed to take certain 
fiteps with a view to meeting cases of hardship which 
mi^ht arise out of the civil liabilities ot men joining thi; 
Forces. In addition to tlio proposed amendment of 
iho Courts (Em'-rtfcncy Powers) Act, Mr. Long intimated 
that financial assistance would bo provided through the 
me'liiim of the Hlatufory Committee. 

As the Htatutory Committee found that they could 
not undertake this work, it was decided to set up a 
•f>«cial committee for the purpose. Tliia committee 
Cfffinxnln tA Mr, Ifaycs Finhor, the Solicitor-General, tho 
Lord Advocate, Sir Paul Harvey, and Mr. A. V. .Syirionds. 

'I7ie C'ommitfco have made considerahlo proKress 
with the nt-humo and have obtained tho crmcurronco of 
the Treasury to tho following general principles : 

(1) Tlie scheme of assistance will apply to all men 



who have joined the Forces since the 4th August, 1014, 
or who may join hereafter, and to single as well as to 
married men. 

(2) The items in respect of which assistance will be 
granted include rent (including ground rent and rent of 
business premises), mortgage mterest, payments in 
instalments in virtue of contracts such as purchase of 
premises, business, or furniture, taxes, rates insurance 
premiums, and school fees. Relief will not be given 
for the purpose of enablincr any person to discharge 
such liabilities as ordinary debts to tradesmen. 

(.3) It is not contemplated that tho assistance to be 
granted in nny individual case should exceed £104 per 
annnm. 

(4) Persons desiring relief will be rcfjtiiri'd to i.mke 
application in a prescribed form. 

(5) These applications will bo investigated locally by 
Commissioners (who will bo barristers) specially appointed 
for the purpose. Tho Commissioners will n\ake recom- 
mendations to the central committee, who will be 
authorized to make grants. 

How serious was the financial aspect of this 
relief scheme was shown by the earmarking of 
£20,000,000. as a first instulinont of tho ninnfy 
roqiiirod. 

On Af)ril 27, tlic diiy after the secret se-ssion, 
Mr. Long asked for leave to introduce tho 
Bill which tho Prime Minister had foreshadowed. 
In a ff'w hours tho whole scheme was dead. 
As soon as Mr. Long had pk<'trhod tho pro- 
posals, they were denounced on all sides. Sir 
E. Carson showed that tho Clovornment, while 
still Hhriiiking from a policy of equal sacrifico, 
was sacrificing time-expired sf)ldierH, Terri- 



us 



THH TIMKS lllSTUli) o/-' THE WAR. 



ttirialM, and l»oy« ; tliey Wfm j)n»|)i).sinK " »)iie 
t<t lliM laout crutil uct^ thut hud ever ht'cii 
tttti-iiiptml." Mr. Walrth, dii Ih^iuU' t)f Ltibour, 
tIfiiiHiulfil thut ttiti Itill HtxHild ho i\ ithilriiwii. 
Dtla-rwinf th« ll«jiist' bhiiuld reject it, tem- 
porKse iiu liint^er, and " iuhiHt on the Htruight 
thiuy." Let the < Joveriuiient say, "The 
necetiMity )iuh ikiss' arisen uiid laiist he met," 
iiiul tliey need not fear the responwe of tlie 
eoiuitry. The prospect was lio|M'ltiH8. Mr. 
Asqiiith was hurriedly siuninoned to t)ie House. 
He reeogni/ed the strengtli of the arguments 
against tht^ Uill, and "suggested" that the 
motion for leave to introduce the Hill siioiild he 
withdrawn. "Contingent com|)ulsion " thus 
perished ingloriously with all the olhii- niaUr- 
shifts and compromi><e8. The collapsi' of the 
ihll was a humiliating blow to tht; (lovern- 
ment. Hut the public paid little attention to 
their humiliation ; there was only a feeling of 
almost universal relief tliat the probleni wa.« 
now siu-e to bo solved in the only possible 
wiiy. 

The same day, April 27. saw the belated issue 
of the proclamation calling up Groups ;j:}-41.* 

A curious minor incident which occurred at 
this juncture was the sending to the -King by 
the Married Men's League of an appeal that his 
Majesty should receive a deputation. " In 
days of national stress and lU'gency," declared 
the appeal, '" your Majesty's Ministers are 
apparently in a hopeless muddle over tlie 
important question of recruiting. . . . We 
appeal to you, Sire, to receive our deputation, 
knowing that national improvements are more 
likely to result when you receive opinions 
t hrough the direct representatives of those most 
deeply concerned than through the intermediary 
of those whose lives, homes, and future employ- 
ment after the war are not in such jeopardy." 

The married men, in fact, as one of tlxem 
phrased it, were " not going to wait for the 
politicians." 

On May 2 the Prime Minister made a state- 
ment on the whole situation, and announced 
that a new Bill would propose " a general and 
immediate compulsion." Incidentally, he an- 
nounced that the " total military and naval 
effort of the Emjjire " from the beginning of 
the war up to that date exceeded 5,000,000 
men, and that the whole military force had 
been raised to a strength of eighty-three 
divisions in all. 



* The final five groups were called up by a proclama- 
tion dated May 13. 



On the following day, May .'J, Mr. As(|uith 
introtluced "a Hill to make furChir provision 
with reH[)ect to military Service during the 
present war." 

I'he new Hill had a \ery rajjid passage 
through I'arliament. It was reail a first tune 
without a division, and a second time by a 
majority of 21)2 (."{28 votes against .'{U). It 
pa.s.sed through (Jonunitttie in the early hours 
of May 12, was read a third time on May 1(5 by 
a majority of 215 (250 votes against 35), and 
recened the Koyal a.ssent on May 25. 

'I'he ntain difference between the new Hill and 
tin- iiiciisiu'f so speedily withdr'uwn by the 
(j!overnm(»nt was th(! inc-lusion within its scope 
of the unattested iiuuiicd men — of all of them, 
not a limited number. In tlu^ main the Bill 
was an iunendment of the Military Service Act 
wliich wt' have already described, but it also 
contained imjjortant new features. Especially 
as most of the text is unintelligible without 
comparison with the earlier measure, it will be 
best to sketch at once the main effects of the 
new legislation, so as to show the position now 
established. 

From June 24, the "appointed date " under 
the new Act — 30 days after it had become law — 
every male British subject between the ages of 
18 and 41 and ordinarily resident in Creat 
Britain was " to be deemed to have been duly 
enlisted in His Majesty's Regular Forces for 
general service with the Colours or in the Reserve 
for the period of the war." ]\Ien who came 
within the operation of the Act at a later date 
would be subject to its provisions 30 days 
subsequently. At the same time it was ex- 
pressly provided that " steps shall be taken to 
prevent so far as possible the sending of men 
to serve abroad before they attain the age 
of 19." 

Regular soldiers and Territorials whose term 
of service expired would in future be retained 
with the Colours until the end of the war, and 
men already discharged on the termination of 
their period of service would be recalled to the 
Colours and restored to their former military 
rank. An exception, however, w as made in the 
case of nien who had served 12 years or more 
and had attained the age of 41. 

The main " exceptions " to the obligation to 
perform military service remained as stated in 
the first schedide of the earlier Act (see page 124). 
But whereas under the first Act men who had 
" offered themselves for enlistment and been 
rejected since August 14, 1915" were "ex- 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 



149 



ccpted ", it was now provided that on September 
1, 1916, this exception would cease to apply to 
any man, if tha Army Council were satisfied that 
lie should again present himself for medical 
examination, and sent him written notice to 
that effect. In other words, the authorities 
were empowered to examine afresh the large 
number of men who had been rejected without 
exhaustive medical examination. On the other 
hand, the new Act " excepted " all men who at 
any time during the war had been prisoners of 
war, captured or interned by the enemy, and 
released or exchanged. 

Otherwise, perhaps the most important amend- 
ment of the first Militarv Service Act was 



In all other easels of lapsed oxeniplion (•<t( id- 
eates a man would be deemed to lia\ c been 
enlisted at the expiration of two weeks, unless he 
had made an application for a rcncvNal of his 
certificate. 

Other clauses of the new Act provided that 
any Territorial might be transferred without his 
consent from one corps to another or to a Regu- 
lar battalion ; that the liability which any 
Territorial had accepted to serve in any ])lace 
outside the United Kingdom should continue, 
notwithstanding anything in the conditions of 
service, d'oring the continuance of the war ; and 
that every man holding a certificate of exemp- 
tion must produce it, or give particulars of it, to 




A SCHOOL OF FARRIERY. 
Teaching the soldier the art of shoeing horses by the aid of a diagram of a hoof of a horse. 



that which concerned the safegiaards against so- 
called " industrial conifxiJsion." As shown in 
the clause quoted on [(age 124, men whose 
r'«;rtificat*-H of exemption for any reason ceas3d 
to \>t: in force ha^l been given twrj infant lis' gra^re 
during whi*;h they migiit obtain renrrwal of their 
C'TtificateH. This provision had soon been 
found to be f»ne of the worst loofiholes for 
evaMion of military service, iiy the new Act 
the provision of two rnonlh.ft' grace was infule to 
aj)ply only i<> men who limi been engaged in 
work er-rtified to be of national inif)ortarK;e, or 
who h>ul been munition workers — and to afiply 
to tlirrn only if they lnul been r!rigagefj in the 
HMftti or Himilar work before Augunt II, l!tl.">. 



.any con.stabU; (jr person with authority from 
the Army Council. 

We need dcul only very briefly with (lie 
proceedings in Parliament. Mr. Asquith ])ro- 
sented the Hill as "a comjilete and rounded 
policy." It was wannly welcomed by Mi*. 
iJanieK on Ix-half of Labour-, and read a firsi ) inio 
on the day of its introduction. In (lie .s<coiid 
reading debatf! a most powerful s|)e<'(li wtis 
marie by .Mr. J>loyd (^eftrge, who had hcco Ihi- 
niiiin iriHlrument in the (,'abinet in secNrinj; the 
a,(lo|jtion f)f cfunpiilsory scTvice, and vviio ha.d 
received in consjrfjuencc! a full mcasuci' of violent 
abuHc from disappointed jladieal joiiitiMlists. 
lie -ii.ifi that Ihi' oiililiir's- mil h'liil ics Ixiirvcd 



150 



THE TIMES JUSTOTtY OF THE WAE. 




TRAINING OFFICERS FOR THE ROYAL GARRISON ARTILLERY : GUN DRILL. 



that the mon supplied by this Bill alone would 
make the difference between defeat and victory, 
and rather than have on his conscience opposi- 
tion to this military opinion he would rather be 
driven out of the Liberal party, and indeed out 
of public life. Mr. Lloyd George declared that, 
so far from being unable to " stay the course," 
we could outstay Germany by years, and he 
warmly denounced those who dared to regard 
the British working classes as if they were 
" doubtful neutrals." Sir John Simon again 
led the feeble opposition, and cast doubts upon 
the numbers set up by the Government as the 
probable or possible yield of the Bill. Mr. 
Henderson made a crusliing reply. He re- 
minded the " Simonites " that they had 
ridiculed Lord Derby's estimate that in Decem- 
ber, 1915, there were 650,000 unattested single 
men, and that they had said the Military Service 
Act would not secure 50,000 men. In reality 
the nmnber of vmattested single men had proved 
to be 750,000 ; the military authorities had 
obtained 300,000 of them, and already 187,826 
were with the Colours. 

In Committee another unsuccessful attempt 
was made to include Ireland. It was defeated 



by ]Mr. Asquith and Mr. Redmond, the latter 
declaring that " it would not only be a \\ rong 
thing, an unwise thing, but it would be well nigh 
an insane thing, to attempt to enforce con- 
scription in Irelanc." 

For the rest, discussion turned mainly upon 
" industrial compulsion," " conscientious ob- 
jection," and the question of medicalre-examina- 
tion of men who had been rejected. A curious 
episode was an attempt to secure special con- 
sideration for married men who were the " sole 
heads " of a business— ^in other words, for small 
shopkeepers. The Goveinmen' was bombarded 
with telegrams and Members of Parliament were 
visited by countless deputations — with the 
result that, although the matter was not dealt 
with in the Act, the Government promised to 
issue special instructions to the tribunals. It 
should be added that the amendment of the 
clause dealing with " industrial compulsion " 
was effected bj' the House of Lords, their 
proposals being accepted by the House of 
Conmions by a majority of 91. -^=- 

Let us conclude this review of the memorable 
military service legislation of 1916 with the 
names of those who on May 16 finally opposed 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



151 



the third roading of the new Bill. The minority 
of 35 WHS composed as follows : — 

Abraham, Rt. Hon. W. ; Anderson, W. C. ; Arnold 
•Sydney; Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.) ; Barlow, 
.Sir John Einmott (Somerset ); Burns, Kt. Hon. John; 
Byles, Sir William I'oUard ; Chancellor, Henry George ; 
Clynes, J. R. ; Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West) ; Hopge, 
James Myles ; Holt, Richard Durning ; John, Edward 
Thomas ; Jowett, F. W. : King, Joseph ; Lamb, Sir 
Ernest Henry ; Longh, Rt. Hon. Thomas ; Macdonald, 
J. Ramsay (Leicester) ; Mason, David M. (Coventry) ; 
Molteno, Percy Alport ; Morrell, Philip ; Outhwaite, 
R. L. ; Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H. ; Pringle, William 
M. R. ; Ricliards, Thomas : Richardson, Thomas 
(Whitehaven); Rowntree, Arnold; Runciman, Sir 
Walter (Hartlepool) ; Sherwell, Arthur James ; Simon, 
Kt. Hon. Sir John Allsebrook ; Snowden, Philip ; 
Thomas, J. H. ; Trevelj^an, Charles Philips ; White- 
house. John Howard : Williams. Llewelyn (Carmarthen). 

Tellers : Mr. Leif Jones and Mr. Goldstone. 

On the day on which the Royal Assent was 
given to the new Military Service Act, the King 
addressed the following message to his people : 

" BUCKINGHAM PALACE, 

"May 25, 1916. 

" To enable our Country to organize more 
effectively its mihtary resoiu"ces in the present 
great struggle for the cause of civilization I 
have, acting on the advice of my IMinisters, 
deemed it necessary to enrol every able-bodied 
man between the ages of 18 and 41. 

" I desire to take this opportunity of express- 
ing to my people my recognition and apprecia- 



tion of the splendid patriotism and self-sacrifice 
which they have displayed in raising ))y volun- 
tary enlistment, since the commencement of 
the war, no less than 5,041,000 men, an effort 
far surpassing that of any other nation in 
similar circumstances recorded in history, and 
one which will be a lasting source of pride to 
future generations, 

" I am confident that the magnificent spirit 
which has hitherto sustained my people through 
the trials of this terrible war will inspire them to 
endure the additional sacrifice now iinpo.^ed 
upon them, and that it will with God's help lead 
OS and our Allies to a victory which shall 
achieve the liberation of Europe. 

"GEORGE R.I." 

Thus, after more than 21 months of v\-ar, 
England " muddled through " to the inevitable 
solution of the recruiting problem — compulsory 
service for every able-bodied man of military 
age. We have seen with what difficulties her 
progress to this end was beset. We have seen 
how slowly the country roused itself from its 
comfortable slumber to face the stern necessities 
of a struggle for its very existence. We have 
seen how worthy was the effort which it 
voluntarily exerted whenever, though all too 
seldom, a clear issue was put before it by its 




IJAYCJNHl I'KACTICE. 



I5i 



T///-; TIMKS HISTifliY OF THK \V ATI. 



Iniulers. The Ht<»ry, imlwt'U, id iu)t without 
Its iiifLuiuhuly uspeetd. Hut whilti we may 
depKir.* the lack uf irua^iittitiun, the refusal tu 
accept clear vv.iriungs, tiuil the conjtieciueiit utter 
uu|irf|)iiretluesia, except of the Koyjil Navy, in 
which Kat^luncl was aurprincil ut the outbreak 
of war, it is not the pet)|»ln of Kaglaiul, and still 
iesiH of the Knipire, who will be sternly judged 
by tho historian of the future. We Enj<lish, 
from our very insularity, have never been, in 
the Contin'Mital seiwe, a military race. That 
we have always been a warlike race there is no 
part of tlie world that does not testify. Nor 
did our warlike qualities over shine brighter 
than in the CJreat War. But our minds 
move slowly until we get angry or afraid — and 
paacoful island-folk who are at the same time 
[)rosperous and confident in their Navy do not 
grow angry or afraid so readily as do nations 
with nothing bub a line of frontier-marks 
bftwoen them and the jx^rmanent mena<;e of 
their neighbours. Above all, we dislike experi- 
ments ; we are inclined to say that what we 
are " accustomed to " is " good enough for xis.'' 
We had been " accustomed to " voluntary ser- 
vice, and though we were also accustomed to 
compulsion in many of the affairs of life, our 
shrinking from military " compulsion '* was 
largely a shrinking from the unknown. 

This characteristic reluctance to take a bold 
step was accentuated by the fact tliat with our 
Prima Minister and a considerable number of 
his colleagues in the Government the stalwart 
device of our enemy " First think and then act " 
took the invertebrate form of " Wait and see." 
" The fact is," said Lord Derby on May 6, 1915, 
" we ought to have had universal compulsion in 
the first week of the war." This History has 
recorded what we had in its place. Not having 
" thought," we were powerless to " act " until 
it was almost too late. Our first idea was to 
double the Expeditionary Force, while retaining 
the ancient machinery and at the same time 
allowing the men most competent to work that 
macliinery to leave it for active service at the 
Front. Then, as our ideas expanded, came the 
chaos of recruits without accommodation or 
equipment, an army altogether beyond the 
powers of the ancient machinery to cope with. 
Then, as the machinery expanded and the 
maintenance of some 70 divisions became the 
ideal, there followed the long and painful 
struggle to make up for the shortage of men. 



It has been seen to what a i)light the Oovern- 
ment were nnlut^ed by their lui\ ing allowed the 
business of recruiting to be conducited on the 
lines of an electioneering cami)aign uiul by (heir 
failure to nuilize that what the country really 
netfded was, not soft words, com|)romise8, 
and jugglings with height standards and 
s«'paration allowances, but a clear-cut policy of 
all round justice. 

If the (jiovernmenl Imd known their country- 
men bett(!r, three-quarters of tlm diflicultioB 
caused by the attempt to treat the married 
men separately from the single need never liave 
arisen. It was not lack of patriotism that made 
the married men protest against being called up 
while more than half a million single men 
remained unaccounted for. They were per- 
fectly willing to fulfil their obligations, but 
their sense of justice revolted against tlu^ un- 
fairness of a state of things in which the un- 
|)atriotic citizen was left to profit from the 
sacrifice of his patriotic fellow. Hence, as has 
been seen, although compulsion was, in prin- 
ciple, no mor(! congenial to the married than to 
the single men, its merits from the point of view 
of all-round justice led them to in.sist upon its 
ap])lication to themselves as soon as military 
necessity had compelled its api)lication to the 
rest. 

But this was only one more instance of the 
manner in which the people of England led their 
leaders throughout the war. Much of the fear 
of " destroying the unity of the country " which 
the politicians alleged as their reason for their 
own failure to make up their minds was a pure 
hallucination. The strikes and industrial un- 
rest which formed a dark episode at an earlier 
period were, although serious enough in them- 
selves, but echoes of bygone controversies, 
signs of mismanagement on the part of the 
Government rather than of halfheartedness on 
the part of the people. To the question 
whether the people could be trusted the millions 
of voluntary recruits, to say nothing of the 
infinite and willing self-sacrifice of all classes, 
was a sufficient answer. To call forth this 
effort, and to equalize, so far as possible, the 
burden, was the duty of the Government. But 
the Government could not be trusted to do its 
duty without compulsion. It was public 
oi)inion, not the initiative of politicians, w^hich 
took the vast majority of the steps essential to 
tlie winning of the w^ar. 



CHAPTER CXXVII. 

THE GERMANS IN RUSSIAN 

POLAND. 



Three Ixvasioxs — ADiiENrisTRATivE Partition of Russian Poland between Germany and 
Austria — Clumsy German Efforts at Conciliation — Dropping the Mask — Prussian Rule 
AT ITS Worst — Administrative Machinery — The Poles and their Masters — Law — Education 
— Warsaw University Reopened — Tyranny in the Schools — Language Question — The 
Jews — The Censorship — EcoNO>nc Exploitation — Spoliation of Food and Raw Materials — 
General Devastation — Crushing Taxation— British Relief Offer Rejected. 



THE occupation of Russian Poland by 
the Germanic Powers was the result 
of three campaigns : Hindenbiu-g's 
first offensive against Warsaw, in 
October, 1914 ; his second invasion of Poland 
culminating in the battle of Lodz, in November, 
1914 ; and the great Austro-German advance 
in the summer of 1915 which, after the fall of 
Warsaw on Augu-st 5, left the Central Powers 
in possession of the entire country. During 
the lull which intervened in the winter and 
spring of 1914-1.5, the battle-front to the west 
of the Vistula extended along a practically 
straight line running north and south from the 
mouth of the Bzura to the mouth of the Nida. 
This line was during that period the eastern 
boundary of the part of Russian Poland occu- 
pied by the enemy. Meantime north f)f the 
Lower Vistula and of the XareiT, and in the 
government of Suvalki, the respective positions 
of the German and the Russian annies con- 
tmuf;d to undfTgo rapid and frequent changes. 
Hence no atff-mpt was made by the enemy to 
intrfKluf^ in thosf; districtH any form of govern - 
m'^nt othfr than that ex'Tcised by the com- 
manders of the occupying annies. The J^ower 
V^istula l)etwe*m Vyshograd and the Prussian 
frontifT TCTnained, up to the time when the 
Vol. VIII.— Part 9fi. 153 



Giemaan Government-General of Warsaw was 
established, the northern frontier of Poland 
subject to a regular German administration. 

\Vithin the occupied area, the border-line 
between the Austrian and the German spheres 
was settled by a compact concluded at Posen 
in January, 1915. The Austrians received the 
southern part, shorn, however, of its richest 
and most populous regions ; the country l)()r- 
dering on Pru.ssian Silesia and comprising the 
industrial centres of Tchenstochova and Sos- 
noviets, as well as a large portion of the mining 
district of the " Zaglembio " ("Depression"), 
was included in the German sphere of occupa- 
tion. With some small modifications this 
delimitation was maintained even after the 
great advance in the summer of 1915 ; the 
disposal of the new acquisitions was settled at 
a conference of Austrian and German delegates 
in September, and by an agreement concluded 
at Berlin on December 14, 1915, between the 
Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador, Prince Gott- 
fried zn Hohenlohe-Schillingsfiirst and the 
GfTiiian Foreign Sferetary, Herr von Jagovv. 
East of TomusliolT the boundary was made* to 
follow the Pilitsa down to its junction with the 
Vistula and from there it ran up the Vistvila to 
Ivangorod ; between tliiiL f(jrtress and the 



lot 



TUT': TIMFS llIS^TOnV OF TIIH WAH. 




GERMAN OCCUPATION OF POLAND. 



Prince Leopold of Bavaria (1) ; the Archduke Franz Josef, Heir Apparent of Austria-Hungary (2) ; 

and General von Woyrsch (3). 



River Bug, the southern frontier of the late 
Goveniment of Siedltse was accepted as 
dividing line between the two occupations. 
In the north, the Government of Suvalki was 
separated from Poland, and on May I, 1916, was 
linked up with the Govermnent of Vilna. In 
the east, the Governiuent of Cholm, though it 
formed no longer part of Russian Poland, was 
included in the part administered by the 
Austrians. Some 74,647 square kilometres 
were thus included in the German, and only 
about 52,303 in the Austrian sphere. The 
disproportion of population and wealth be- 
tween the two divisions was infinitely niore 
striking, as practically all the industi'ial districts 
and all the chief cities of Russian Poland were 
included in the Gennan share. The history of 
Russian Poland luider the enemy is therefore 
primarily that of the coimtry under German 
administration. Every agreement concerning 
the delimitation of the two spheres emphasised 
that its stipulations were not meant to prejudge 
in any way " the arrangements hereinafter 
to be made on the basis of the future peace - 
treaty." Yet it was clear that from the very 
beginning the Germans were careful to secure 



for themselves a favourable alatus possidendi 
with regard to their allies, and to occupy dis- 
tricts which could be made to yield rich returns 
to the German treasury and the German 
traders. 

In the early days of August, 1914, a distin- 
guished Russian Pole and his wife, whom the 
outbreak of the war had caught in Posen, were 
making their way with the help of borro\\ed 
passports through Eastern Germany. They 
expected the war -fever only to have sharpened 
the inveterate German hatred of Poles, and 
therefore, anxious as they were to avoid any 
kind of incident, were careful not to be heard 
talking Polish. Suddenly at some station, a 
Prussian officer who shared their railway com- 
partment, put his head through the window 
and shouted out to some fellow officer in 
frightfully broken Polish : " How do you do, 
kind folk ? We are coming to liberate you ! " 

Whilst German officers were thus practising 
the phrase which was meant to_j3rin them the 
hearts of the Poles, a detachment of their 
troops under Major Preusker entered the 
town of Kalish ; and, to use a historic phnvse. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 



155 



" it therefore was soon ablaze. ' * Some 30,000 
of its inhabitants scattered through Poland, a 
living evidence of the frightful fate of their 
homes. After that many a Polish peasant 
answered the prescribed greeting of the Geniian 
officers by muttering some grim question about 
Kahsh, and, whilst bowing deep in feigned 
reverence, followed it up by unrepeatable 
curses, naturally incomprehensible to the new 
Polish " scholars " of the German army. The 
moral effect produced by the catastrophe of 
Kalish frightened the Germans themselves, and 
a certain measure of restraint was imposed on 
the commanders. Even then German officers 
and soldiers continued to rob and steal, churches 
were desecrated, acts of gratuitous vandaUsm 
were committed (the destruction of the ethno- 
graphic museum at Lovitch may be quoted as 
an example). Nevertheless it is true to say 
that during the first offensive in October, 1914, 
a definite attempt was made by the G^ermans 
to conciliate the Polish population. Foremost 
in these endeavours was the poUtician General 
von Liebert, the first German governor of Lodz. 
In the past a well-known enemy of the Poles, 
he discharged his new duties with considerable 
tact and honesty. IMost of ail, he earned the 
thanks of the local population by confining his 
interference within the real limits of the mili- 
tary requirements, and by not obstructing the 
self-help and autonomous activities in his 
district. Conditions were difficult, as they are 
bound to be in an invaded country, but as yet 
not unbearable. 

Then carne the Gk;rman retreat to the west 
and the second invasion of Poland. The new 
German rule began with the note of displeasure 
and disappointment ; the Poles had not risen 
in their support. The old propaganda tricks 
were dropped, and the doctrine was now 
openly avowf^d that Poland was f^nemy-country 
(FeirvU-til/irul), and that it had to be treated 
accordingly. Henceforth no Polish social 
activity, no self-government weis tolerated 
except in so far as it served the convenience of 
the Genmm army and administration. A 
c^nnplicated Bystera wa8 established of a 

• Kalinh w«« J)«rnhar<l';'J and burnt botwJion AiiguHt 
A-H, I5>I4. \)i-Minti:\.nm waH in thow; dayH, in l'olan<l a» 
in IJ«jl«i'<m, the approved Gennan method of dealing 
with town* in whioh any aKHaiilt againnt German HoldierH 
wa« alleged to have oociirrod. \\<-Ti', in a typical army 
order : " HonifH or hlockn from which HhotK ore firefl at 
Oorrnan noMieni will \>»> in»tantly blown up or razed. Not 
even wom«;n or children will be allowed to leave thoHO 
houvjM." fMigne<l) ('.<)i/)sv.t. Zollkkn. (iJatcd) Tr;hon. 
fit'x;hov», Augiirtt 0, lyil. 



partly military and partly civilian government, 
The supreme inaster in the country \\as natu- 
rally Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, the 
Oberbefehlshaber Ost (Chief Commander in the 
East). It was by his order that, in January, 
1915, was formed the " Imperial German 
Civilian Administration for Russian Poland." f 
At first Posen was chosen for its headquarters, 
and even when a few months later it migrated 
to the provmce which it was to admim'ster, its 
seat was fixed in the border town of Kalish, 
from where it was by no means easy to com- 




DAWZIC 



.u 



Lyck^ •) 



\ Suvaiki •; 



— i | L ^ "J „ loGrodno 

.- Lomzha </ : • 



BialystoU 



Br£st 
trovsK 




REFERENCE. 

Eastern Boundary oF Russian Poland . 

En bent oF Territory under AustroGerman \ 
Administration, Winter 1914- to Summer 1915 > 
Sphere oF German Occupation | '■;■;.;!■; 

sphere oF Austrian Occupation 
Scale oF Miles 



^^^ 



50 



mo 



150 



^00 



646 



municate with the different parts of the country 
The civilian administraticm was therefore 
unable to develop the full measure of its 
activity until after its transfer to the conquered 
capital of Warsaw. German civilian officials, 
called Kreifi<hej8, were placed at the hctul of 
the prfivirifial districts, nominally responsible 
to the civilian administration, but in nullity 
bound liand and foot by thf; orders of the 
Army Command. The district of Lo<l/,, the 
most iiiifiorf urit industrial area in tlio \\li()l(j 



f When the OermcjiH roHumod thoir adv^inco into 
Poland, in .June, 101.'), i(H name wan oliant'cd to "Imporittl 
Ccnrian Civilian AdniinlHlration for I'oliiiirl, oil (ho Left 
Hank of the Vixtula " (linkn dtr \Vi:ir.nn(il). 



I5t) 



THK 7/.^//•;.S HISTOHY OF TUbl WAR. 



country, waa entrusted to a Polizei-PrdoUhnl 
(i'lvaiiltJiit ui tho I'oliiti) ; lleiT von Opjx'ii, a 
member of the Diplomatic Corps, not tin 
aclminititrative bureaucTut, waa tippointi-d to 
that unportant poist. Lotlz was ale>o mailtt tlie 
hcaclcjuartfrri ot a niiniber ot departmeuts 
directly df(>endent on the Army Conuuand 
(thus, e.y., the railway-administration, the 
cenriOfHhip and prej'.s bureau, etc.). It became 
the real centre of Uerman oftieial and military 
opinion, and the Kiudenjarten for the future 
giivenunent of a much wider province. It wjis 
here that the policy of the German adminis- 
tration in Poland was evolved and settled, 
and that its first experiments were tried. 




GENERAL VON ETZDORFF, 
German Governor of Warsaw. 

The new rulers of Poland were taken almoPt 
without exception from the ranks of the 
Prussian bureaucracy, as some of them used 
to insist with pride and pleasure. Admin- 
istrative reasons demanded that the bureau- 
cratic personnel sent to Russian Poland should 
have some knowledge of Polish conditions ; 
tliis was naturally to be found only in the 
eastern provinces of Prussia, in the so-called 
Ostmarken (Eastern ilarches). The officials in 
these districts belonged, however, to a quite 
pecuUar category — their main tradition was 
hostility to everj'thing Polish. For years they 
had been trained to fight the "' Polish peril," 
and were rewarded for efficiency in repressing 
any signs of national Ufe and ambitions among 
the Poles. They a\ ere permeated with hatred 
and contempt for Poland and the Poles. 

It was from among these champions of the 
Drang nach Osten — the German advance pres- 



sing eastwards — that the C'hit'f of the ('iviiian 
Administration, Dr. von Krius, his assistant 
llerr von Horn-Fallois, and the whole host of 
minor olliciais, were citosen. Assurances were 
given from Herlin in the matter of regulations 
issued to them ; after the fall of Wtu-saw, 
Ilerr von Delbriick, the German Minister of 
the Interior, whilst on a \isit to the Polish 
capital, personally lectured the Prussian 
oflicials on their attitude towards the native 
po[)ulation. All this proved of no avail. 
Insulting expressions continued to be freely 
used by the Germans in their official dc^ilings ; 
Polnisrhe Schweine (Polish swine) became a 
household word. Women of the upper classes 
• were insulted ; Major Schultz, Conunauder of 
Sosnoviets, actually used his riding-whip on 
Polish faces. The German Town-Chief of 
/giezh, bearing the attractive name of Stiibl, 
made a regular practice of slapping people in 
the face ; he inflicted this treatment, for 
instance, upon a woman in a baker's shoj) be- 
cause she did not know the exchange of mark 
and roiible, fixed by the German authorities ! * 
The host of minor German clerks, N.C.O.'s, 
etc., naturally followed the example of their 
superiors, and the " smart " Prussian manner 
could be seen everywhere in full eclat. t 

Tiien negligence, the usual companion of 
arbitrary and irresponsible power, soon became 
a marked feature of the German management 
of local affairs in Poland ; only where the 
interests of the Fatherland and of the German 
army were concerned did the Prussian officials 
maintain, the high level of efficiency exacted 
from them at home. Yet, as pajanent for all 

* Later on Herr Stiibl came to grief owing to a " most 
r^rettable mistake." A dog narked at liira in the 
street ; he therefore gave a beating to its owner. The 
owner rotaUated. He happened to be the local German 
manufacturer, Herr Hoffmann. Herr Stiibl had him 
arrested, together with his whole family, and, having him 
properly bound, tried once more his strength on him. The 
incident caiLsed violent indignation in the local German 
colony, and a.s they were Germans, Herr Stiibl's brilliant 
official career came to a premature end. 

^ The well-known Styrian novelist R. H. Bartsch, a 
captain in the Austro-Hungarian army, was sent as an 
official reporter to Germany. He visited also the " occu- 
pied districts " and saw some samples of Prussian 
Schneidigkeit (military smartness). In a letter to 
the Viennese Neuesh Wiener Tageblatt he describes how 
his criticism of the insolent behaviour of a Prussian 
officer was answered with the remark that this man was 
prepared at any moment to lay down his life for his 
country. " Thereupon I replied : ' I kaQW and appre- 
ciate that. But however great a hero he may be, he can 
never kill even one-tenth of the enemies which his 
manners create for his Fatherland.' ... I should like 
to see it calculated how much blood has flowed, simply 
because that smartness has become fashionable ! It 
would make a ghastly accoimt . . ." 



THE TJMHS IHSTORY OF TIIK WAIL 



157 




HNKMY TKOOPS KNTEKING A POLISH V1Mw\(;K. 
The inhabitants have to take off their hats to a detachment of Austrian cavalry. 



thftir bnifality and indolfnof, tho buroaucratic 
army of f>f:f;iipation i'-x(u:ted a heavy tributo. 
Ah wan pointf^fl out in tho fJcnnan ReiohHtag 
on M(i y 20, 1 U I *;, by tho Socialist Horr Stiicjklen, 
the (jJennan officials in RuHHian Poland, tboii(<h 
not expOH«;fl tf) any jjarticular fJan^<T.-i. were 
pairl twir;o tho salarioH wliicfi thoy would havr; 
n-coivod at horno. HiH doimind for a rodiictifui 
of that unJuMtificd r-xponditurf; was anMWHn;d 
^/y tho L'ndor-.Socrctary, l)r. Leu aid, with the 



stat(!rru'nt thai " not a single pcmny is paid by 
the G(!nnan I'^inpire for the; administration of 
the occupied di.stricts. Thewi districts tJiem- 
eelves have to raise the lujcessary sums. . . ." 
In these circutnatances tho cfiief fh^sii-cr and 
concern of the local i)opiilafion was to restrict 
their df!alings witli thi; (jl(»rman officials fo a 
iriinirrnim, and to settle by themselves and 
arriftng themsfflves th(!ir own affair:'. And 
indcsed tho CierinanH wore quite willin>4 to 

9(5 2 



15b 



Tilt: TIMES lUSTOUY OF TllK WAH. 



alliiw thJH within i-«<rtuiii strictly defined limitrt. 
The one thing which ttiey could never uihuit 
wttrt the eHtiibUslutieiit of a. co-ordinated byHtom 
of uelf-|;overning hoilieu acting independently of 
the Uenuan HuthoriticH^in «hort, anything 
which might have KuggeHted the idea of Poiinh 
autonomy and go\crnmcnt. A certain hciu 
hlance of corporate fu^tion and of government 
by consent wan nevertheless welcome to the 
Germans. It was more convenient to exact 
from towns and districts the performance of 
services required by the German army and 
ailministration, and to burden them with the 
exc<iiti(tn ol works of military \alu*s than to 




POLISH REFUGEES. 

A family leaving a town just before the arrival 

of German troops. 

have to transact business with an unorganized 
crowd. " Where there is nothing, even the 
Emperor forfeits his claim," says an old 
German proverb. This is true with regard to 
individuals, but corporations can be made to 
mortgage their future. Polish towns and dis- 
tricts, where nothing more could have been 
raised by taxation or even confiscation, were 
made to undertake costly works of strategic 
importance on money borrowed in Germany — 
clearly tlie raising of loans was a transaction 
which could not have been imdertaken without 
some ap})earance of representative govern- 
ment. Thus — e.g., in 1915-1916, whilst the 
expenditure of the City of ^^'arsaw exceeded 



Jive lu six limes its income, il had to spend 
between August 5, 191;'), and March 14, 191(5, 
on executing the orders of the German admin- 
istration, practically its entire rev€»nuo. J''inaliy, 
oncre the country had been thoroughly stripped 
of all resources and foodstuffs, it was advan- 
tageous to have local boditw to take charge of 
the starving population, beg for help in foreign 
coimtries, search for food among neutral 
neighbours, iinil cliimour foi- th(^ rtilaxatioii of 
embargo<'s and blockades — and as tluiir des- 
perate? »norts were bearing fruit, the Germans 
could start again the work of sj)()liation. 

At the time of the new Austro-(j!(;rman 
advance in the sununer of 1915, Russian 
I'liJiiiKJ, and especially the Goverrunent of 
Warsaw, was covered by a network of Citizens' 
Committees, presided over by the Central Com- 
mittee at Warsaw, and developing a most 
energetic and ben»'(icial relief activity. On the 
exacuation of I'oland by the Ru-ssians, these 
( 'onimittees had naturally to take over certain 
government functions, if only to prevent the 
country from being jjlunged into anarchy. 
Flardly had the Prussian bureaucracy hatl time 
\o settle in the newly occupied territory, when 
tiie Central Citizens' Conmiittee and all the 
local committees (with the exception of that of 
the City of ^\'arsaw) were dissolved by an order 
of the new Governor-General of Warsaw,* von 
Beseler, dated September 12, 1915. The ex- 
|)lanation given was that the Central Committee 
had undertaken " political action " by appoint- 
ing judges ; by raising taxes ; and by organizing 
police forces and issuing permissions to carry 
arms. " The organization of relief -action passes 
therefore entirely into the hands of the German 
administration. ..." 

The results of the dissolution of the 
Citizens' Conrmittees were catastrophical. 
In the Governnaent of Warsaw alone it 
entailed the closing of 20 hospitals and 30 
dispensaries, the stopping of sanitary and 
hygienic action (e.g., vaccination) : the closing 
of some 100 centres of food-distribution, 

* During the first month after the fall of Warsaw, the 
German commanders anil governors clianged in quick 
succession. The first military commander of Warsaw 
was General Baron von Scheffer-Boyadel, the first 
governor General Gereke. After some ton days the 
latter was succeeded by General von EtzdorfT. In the 
final settlement of the Government, General von Boselor 
became Governor-General of Poland imder German 
occupation. General von Etzdorff remained Governor of 
M'arsaw, Herrvon Glasenapp became police-pivsidont o( 
Warsaw, whilst Dr. \on Kries ami Herr von Born- 
Fallois retained their places at the head of the German 
Civilian Administration. 



THE TIMES HJSTOJIY OF THE WAll. 



150 




POLISH REFUGEES. 

Inhabitants leaving a town in Poland before the 

German occupation. 

some 150 tea-houses, and about 200 wholesale 
provision shops ; of a refugee bureau helping 
about 8,000 people ; of 300 schools, and many 
libraries and halls. Eleven inspectorates of 
civic police and about 6,000 special constables 
were prevented from discharging their duties, 
thus leaving many districts practically without 
any police protection. All w<jrk undertaken by 
the committees on the reconstruction of de- 
stroyed towns and villages came to an abrupt 
end. 

The German " relief -action," which in flic 
autumn of 1 9 1. 5 was to replace the work of the 
Citi7>;n«' Committees, consisted, as will be 
hhown furtFier on, mainly in the issuing of 
regulations for the trade in foodstuffs ; these 
regulations were designed in such a manner as 
to enable the Germans to export considerable 
amounts of food from Poland, whilst taxing the 
f)opulation most heavily on whatever was left 
for local oriHumption. The inisery in the 
country was growing rapidly ; the death rate in 
Warsaw — which was by no means worst off — 
n«e iK'tween August and October, 1915, from 
l.'*'S8 to I'lJ ]>r(> mill, (calciilatr^d hy the year), 
whilf; in some provincial towns conditions 
wer'- «;ven wors*-. At last, in lJf!Cf;mber, 1915, 
the German atjthoritifjs allowed thrj re- 
constitution of tho Committees under a new 



nan PI', and with a very strict limitation of 
llieir work to i)urely philanthropic action. 
However, even in tlii' domain conflicts could 
not he avoided; thus, e.g., in April, I91G, all 
th(! iiKinbers of tho Food Section hand(!d in 
Mi<;ir resignation, because tho German or/iciais, 
hesidf.'s hami)C'ring their work, look it ui)ou 
thfJinselvcH to sign with the name of the Section 



ir>(i 



THH TIMES UlSTOnV OF TllK WAU. 




INHABITANTS LINED UP TO RECEIVE BREAD RATIONS. 



orders relating to food questions which the 
Section had definitely refused to accept. 

Early in 1916 the Government-General of 
Warsaw published an order which created a 
kind of " councils " for 20 districts of Western 
Poland. Their competence was to include 
j)oor relief, the care of roads, and payments 
towards the building of new railways (('.e., those 
required for military purposes), public health 
(in so far as the stamping out and prevention 
of epidemics wliich might have spread to 
the German Army were concerned, the Ger- 
mans did very good work, sometimes in a 
grimly humorous manner) ; * lastly, " other 
economic affairs." The executive power of the 

* The following is an authentic story : On entering 
the town of Lovitch the German commander summoned 
the local notables and told them that unless the town 
was properly clean by the next day he would have them 
all shot. They knew that he meant what he said, and 
took good care to save their lives. On the next day 
the commander assured them that had they failed to 
clean the town he would have cone on appointing and 
court-martialling the " cleaning committees " imtil the 
desired effect was reached. 

In April, 1916, an Order was published by the German 
authorities in Lodz for the arrest of all dirty and ragged 
people covered with vermin. They were to be properly 
cleaned — but at their own expense. For this purpose 
they were to be kept at forced labour until they had 
compensated the authorities for the expense of the 
operation. 



district council was vested in the German 
Kreischef and the officials appointed by him. 
The council itself was to consist of the Kreischef 
and twelve to twenty-four members. These 
" are elected by the inhabitants ; the franchise 
is to be determined by the Governor-General ; 
the life of the council covers six years. The 
members of the first coimcil, however, or their 
successors in case of vacancies, will be appointed 
hij the Chief of the Civilian Administration. ..." 
A bigger farce of " representative " govern- 
ment could hardl}'' have been enacted. 

Towards the end of November, 1915, articles 
on German administration in Russian Poland 
were published in different German papers. 
They resembled one another to a remarkable 
extent — e.g., concerning the establishment of 
jurisdiction after the withdrawal of the Russian 
armies and administration they told the same 
lie in very similar \\ords. There were three 
degrees of jurisdiction in Russian Poland, of 
which the lowest — the offices of justices of 
peace and magistrates — were filled by local 
citizens, the two higher degrees by professional 
judges. These judges, being Russian officials, 
left with the Russian annies. According to the 
German Press, the local barristers then refused 
to fill their places " for fear of a return of the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE IIM/,' 



J(il 



Russians," * and thus through their fault tho 
entire judicial sy>stem was upset, imtil (Jerinau 
judges were brought to fill the empty seats of 
justice. This statement, incredible in itself, 
stands in glaring contradiction to the fa«t that 
one of the reasons given for the dissolution of 
the Citizens' Committees by the Germans, had 
been their attempt to appoint judges. But 
from the earlier liistory of the judicial system 
under the C4erman administration, and the 
regulations then introduced, can be got a full 
explanation of the refusal of Polish barristers 
tc take a share m jurisdiction. 

At first the administration of the law, in so 
far as it was not affected by the military 
government, was left m the hands of the 
citizens themselves. Suddenly, in March, 1915, 

* Max Wiessner, in the Frankfurter Zeitung, Novem- 
ber 23, 1915: "The work in the higher courts had 
oome to a standstill. . . . An attempt was made to get 
barristers to accept the places ; these refused, perhaps 
because thev were afraid that they might have to suffer 
if the Russians returned." 

Paul Harms, in the Berliner Tageblatt, November 23, 
1915 : " Difficulties arose in the higher courts. . . . The 
attempt to fill the places with Polish lawj-ers failed in 
vie^ of their refusal ; they were evidently afraid of the 
possible consequences in the case if the Russians 
returned." 

Paul Lensch (a German Socialist), in the Vienna 
A rheiter-Zeitung of November 30, 1915 : "... No 
officials, no police, no judges'. . . . And the Poles fre- 
quently refused co-operation, because they were still 
counting upon a return of the Russians. . . ." 



witliout any iippaicnt reason, the Gorman 
athninistralion published a new Order to operate 
from April I. In the local courts the law, 
procedure, and language remained unchanged ; 
Fjut only for the time being, and for i^rat-tical 
reasons, the remark being added : " If all tho 
parties in the local court speak German, the caso 
ought to be carried on in German." Into tho 
higher courts the German language and pro- 
cedure were introduced. The new organiza- 
tion of the juiisdiction, framed haphazard by 
the German bureaucracy, without any con- 
sultation with the lawyers of Russian Poland, 
and without any regard to the traditions and 
needs of the country, produced indignation 
among the Poles. It was a political couj) 
(Velat, which nnposed on Poland the German 
language as official, introduced German ofificials 
and German procedure, fixed the Supreme 
Court outside the borders of the country (at 
Posen), and finally superseded the practice 
which had lasted for more than a century by 
which the Code Napoleon was binding.f From 
the point of view of law it was absiu-d, for tho 
procedure was now mixed so that a case was 
judged in the first instance according to the 
procedure of Rassian Poland, but in the second 
mstance according to the German procedure. 

t The Code Napoleon in Russian Poland is a sur\i\al 
of the Napoleonic Grand-Duchy of Warsaw. 




IIIH COMhNIS (Jl 



A POLISH fJKJKCfl rHKOWN OL I AND UHSIKOVKl) 
HV IHli (iHKMANS, 



IGi 



Ttlt: TIMES IlISTOliY OF 'illl'l IF. 17?. 




POLISH REFUGEES AT A GERMAN QUARANTINE STATION. 



In certain districts tlio Gorman authorities 
called upon the Polish lawyers to take part in 
the organization of the jurisdiction, which was 
to be based on the principles given above ; 
naturally they met with a refusal. The bar- 
risters pointed out the defects of the new Order 
with regard to the law ; they showed that it 
did not tit the political conditions and protested 
against the introduction of a Germanizing 
principle into the jurisdiction. They also 
emphasized the fact that the population itself 
was quite capable of undertaking the care of 
the law, and that the barristers, as citizens of 
Poland, would not assist in the work of Ger- 
manization. This attitude of the local barristers 
gave rise to all kinds of oppression by tlie 
authorities. Contributions were imposed on 
towns (Lodz, Sosnoviets, Bendzin) under the 
pretext that the money was needed for the 
importation of German officials ; in certain 
places the barristers were deprived of the 
right of practising. At Lodz, the President of 
the Police, Herr von Oppen, having met with 
a sharp criticism of the new arrangement on the 
part of the la^vyers, demanded from the legal 
section of the Citizens' Committee that within 
24 hours judges be supplied to act under the 
new system (of course, only for the courts of 
the first instance). In case of refusal he 
threatened severe reprisals against the town 
and the lawyers ; naturally, under these circum- 
stances, the only possible answer was a cate- 
gorical refusal. He then imposed a contribution 



on the city and closed the law courts. Not even 
pending cases were allowed to bo concluded. 
The barristers were deprived of the right of 
practising in the German courts. At the doors 
of the chambers of tlie barristers of Lodz 
appeared the compulsory notice of refusal to 
accept any cases, whereas new plates appeared 
at the doors of unqualified clerks of doubtful 
standing. In case of contravention of the 
German prohibition, the barristers of Lodz 
were threatened with internment in a German 
camp for civilian prisoners ; one actually 
suffered that penalty. In a city with a popula- 
tion of 500,000 inhabitants jurisdiction was sus- 
pended for two months. WTien, at last, German 
courts were opened, different tricks were invented 
in order to keep away the parties {e.g., fees 
were exacted beforehand). As a matter of fact 
these precautions were uruiecessary : the German 
officials who were brought to preside in those 
courts showed such exemplary inefficiency and 
such terrifying ignorance of conditions, that 
the population did all it could to avoid having 
its business brought before the judges. But 
the Germans claim that it was they who intro- 
duced law and order into Russian Poland. 

Mutatis mii'andi.i the history of the law 
courts of Lodz is also that of the Warsaw 
tribunals and of the jui'isdiction in other 
parts of the country, A few-^^^ignificant 
passages niay be quoted from papers appear- 
ing under Austrian or German censorship. 
The Nowa Reforma 'Cracow) stated under 



THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAL'. 



Wd 



date of November 1, 1915, tliat a mooting of 
Warsaw lawyers took place on October 28. 
" H. Konic was in the chair. After heated 
discussions which lasted from 10 a.m. till after 
midnight a vote was taken at 1 a.m. on the 
question whether Polish lawyers are to act as 
justices of peace in the courts." (Here follow 
six lines suppressed by the Austrian censor.) 
The question was decided in the negative. On 
November 18, M. H. Konic was deported to 
Germany. Herr Wiessner, in his eulogy of the 
German administration in the Frankfurter 
Zeitung of November 23, stated that " even 
barristers had to be summoned from Germany." 
The reader can guess by himself the other parts 
of the story. 

To the whole world the German Press 
announced the news of the reopening of the 
PoUsh University at \\'arsaw — the rest was 
silence. And yet it is the question of prunary 
and secondary education which is the most 
important from the national point of view, for 
they, and not the University, concern the wide 
masses of the population most intimately, 
and even in the life of the comparatively few 
chosen, cover the decisive, formative period. 

In Warsaw, on the retreat of the Russians, 
the care for education devolved on the Citizens' 



Committee. This body immodiatoly formed a 
Board of Education, consisting of four of the 
most jirominent citizens of Warsaw, tv\ o Polos 
and two Jews. It was then reinforced by 
technical experts, and the four religious bodies 
(Roman Catholic, Jewish, Lutheran and Cal- 
vinist) were invited to select representatives. 
On August 23, 1915, on the motion of the 
Board, compulsory primary education was 
decided upon by the Citizens' Committee, and 
however bad was the financial condition of the 
city, a credit of £182,700 was voted for educa- 
tion. Meantime the work on primary ami 
secondary schools, and even on kindergartens, 
was carried on. 

Then came the unavoidable intervention 
of the German authorities. Field-Marshal von 
Hindenburg appeared in the new role of an 
educationalist. In an Order published from 
Headquarters on August 24, 1915, he laid down 
the law for school organization and educational 
policy in Poland under German occupation. 
No new school boards were to be formed, no 
schools were to be founded, no teachers ap- 
pointed without the consent of the German 
authorities. Teachers in primary schools are 
appointed and may be removed by the German 
Kreischejs. All books used in schools require 
the sanction of the German administration. A 




llhHK DKI.KHUCK, (x) (ierman Imperial Miniiiter of the Interior, and IIFRH VON I OnFI.L, 
PruMian Minuter of the Interior, on a tour of inNpection in Hushian Poland. 



Il'.l 



Tilt: TiMK^ iii.^iouY uF nil': wail 



(listinetioti vitis matin hflween «ihuol(j on a 
Lttftii ot uatioiiality ami foiitVs'.ii)ii, 'I'Iut*- 
wt<|-f tu lie (1) lieriikaik, (2) Jewish, aial ('.i) 
i'olUK Hfhot)lrt. All l'i«»tt'staul M'-lmnls uert) 
i'la{>;iti(l an (ifriiiaii. lit all (tfriitan aii<l .lewLsli 
I'Ifiitfiitary Mchutils tlu^ laii^iia^e ot iiiritriictioii 
WHM ti) Ih>< U'riuaii ; in tlit* I'olinh bclimils, I'dlisli; 
hilt ill thfse (ifi'titaii \NaH to l»' taught in thu 
lii)ili»T hiniii. 

A iiinrn tla^'i'aiit atti-n.pt at fiituicfi I (it-r- 
iiiaiiixatiDii aiul tlit^ Howiiit; >it int* -nuil (liK.s<-ii- 
tjioit aiii()ii>j; thi^ popiilatiott of I'olaiiil could have 
liiinllv lu'tiii inadi'. Many of tlu» l'i'ot«'.starit.s 
ui I'olaad art- i>f (ionuaii tixtra( tioii, hut the 
^ivattT part »'\'»'ii of this*- art* no morn («ei-iiian 
than th«' Mrandfiihiirti; Hugiu-nots are Fit^nch. 
Although a eertain small m'ou|) of the Jevvi.sh 
iipiK'f flassfH in Poland have ht«ome Poloni.sed, 
the grtuit mass t)f the Jews in Poland forms 
unilouhtetlly a nation in itself. owIiil' t(t ia<e. 



tratlitions, culture and lanj^iiage. Yet if their 
language is not to he I'olisli (whieh in itself 
\kould hardly destroy their separate n;dionality), 
il eaii 1)1) only Yiddish or Ihhiiw /un'er 
( ierman. 

As the result of a most vigorous protest on tin- 
part of the .h'wish eommunity of Warsaw 
against the introduction of (German into its 
school,-, the (•eriiian administralion allo\v(<d 
Polish to remain the language of iiiHtrue- 
tion in .lewisli s<'ho()ls in whieh it had het^i 
taught hi'fore the puhlicalion of the Oi'der ol 
August 24, 1015. 'i'lie Jewish <;ommunify 
ans\\('red vvith a lu'w nu'inorandum pointing 
out that ignorance of tlm Polish language 
is f(jr the Jews a stirious handicap in profes- 
sional life ; that the peaceful intercourse of Pohw 
and Jews recjuires that the .I(!ws should learn 
P( lish ; that they wish to do so ; and therefore 
ask that Polish should he tlu; language of 




THE REGISTRATION OF CATTLE. 

Peasant farmers registering the number of cows and horses preparatory to having them comraandeereJ 

by the German military authority. 



THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR. 



10.J 




GERMAN RULE IN POLAND. 
Inhab'tants of a Polish town drawn up for registratior. 



instruction in their schools. Even the Zionists 
and the Jewish workmen's organizations, \\hilst 
petitioning for Hebrew and Yiddish as the lan- 
guages of ii struction, demanded that Polish 
also should be taught in the Jewish schools. 
All petitioi s proved of little use. Whilst 
proposing 1o establish a new Ghetto for the 
Polish Jews and developing plans to prevent 
their immigration into Germany {Grenzsperre), 
the German authorities were determined to 
G( rmanize them in Poland ; divide el impera. 

Similarly tl e Protestant community of War- 
saw petitioned against the Germanization of its 
schools. In a memorandum to the Civilian 
Administration they pointed out that the 
}'rr<testants in Poland must not be identified 
with German nationality ; that according to the 
esrtimates made in 1907 by the Superintendent- 
General of the Protestant community of War- 
saw, out f f 20,000 members at the utmost 
<S000 werf- Germans ; that the percentage was 
now even less, as most of the German Protestants 
had been rf-moved by the Russians from the 
war-zorif, r-lc. AH these argtiments naturally 
fell on deaf ears. 

But evfrn the T'olish schools hml not yet 
S'-'-n tb»r cin\ of tfi<-ir troulilfs. Hindenburg's 
Order of August 24, I91.">, was merely tho 
Htjirtifig f)oint of a long Hcrics of measures, some 
g«Tieral, oth'Ts lo^al, but all aiming at the 
wiffie object : to withdraw tho elenicntary 
whrKjIs from the control nf the Polish F{f)ar'l of 
K<\i\cHtitiii, (iri'l t'l [iiif ihfiti iifidcr Gf-nnan 
Kiiperv'iHir»ri. TlKS'r rliff»niif , particular in- 



junctions were codified in an Order of Dr. von 
Kries, dated October 3, 1915, and stating that 
the only competent authorities in school 
matters in Poland under Gorman occupation 
would be henceforth the German Board of Edu- 
cation, which will issue orders concerning the 
plan of teaching, the books to be used, and the 
entire organization of schools. Thereupon, on 
October 29, Prince Z. Lubomirski, iti the naiiie 
of the Citizens' Committee, presented a memo- 
randvun to Governor-General von Beseler 
arguing that the only proper authority for 
issuing these regulations is tho Polish Board of 
Education which is anyhow subject to German 
control. " Let the German authorities leave 
to the Polish nation the education of its children, 
and the teaching of adults. No one will do it 
better for us than we can ourselves." 

No attention was paid to the menaorandiuu ; 
petty oppression and senseless interference even 
in the smallest details continued as before. 
The host of overpaid German ofificials * was 
desirous to establish its absolute authority 
over Polish education, and every day brought 
some new Gennanizing innovations (thus — e.r/., 
contrary to Hindenbiu-g's Order of August 24, 
an attempt was made to introduce the teaching 

• Men without any knowledge of PoliHh condition? or 
evRn of Iho I'oli^h lii;ij.'iiii;;c W(ir(! put in clmrj^c of I'olisli 
fHliifdtion. 'I'hi' ffiicf of iIk; (><!rrniiti IJoard wiis I'rof. J Jr. 
Horold, from iJiiMHoldorf ; under hirn Herron Schauen- 
l>nrg, 'I'tiiMrr and Midler, of whom only one iHid(THU)nd 
I'olJHh. 'J"ho Hcthool-innpcctorH were all i-illicr (i(;vninnH 
(I'ValHke, Oriihri, ()tlt(, etc.) or (Jurriiaiii/.c'd '.Slavrt, aH is 
Hhown hy tho HpellinK of their naiiicH (SakoljiolHl<y, 
S/iitnatiMky, .leiidriiMchki', iJatHclikfi, Cobulka, olc). 

eO 3 



iHr. 



THH TlMl':s HlSTUltY OF THE WAR. 



r 


O 


r 


^'"i, 


f " 


^^^^^ 4^H 


" » • «fiii 


■^^^■MVr^ r 


3bi 







Mill 1 AK\ t:OUK 1-MAK 1 lAL. 
A KuNsian soldier charged with espiunage. 

of Ceniirtii even into the lowest fonns of the 
Polish schools). On November 17, 1915, the 
Citizens' Committee of Warsaw addressed to the 
German authorities a second memorandum. It 
deals in a most dignified manner \\ ith a number 
of questions arising out of the C!erman inter- 
ference,* and concludes with the following 
summary : 

" 1. The issuing of new Orders by the German 
authorities is a denial of our natural rights, and 
of rights which we claim in the name of our 
cultiu-e. 

" 2. The Orders issued are contrary to our 
needs. 

"3. In view of the local pedagogical needs, 
the teaching of a foreign language (Germaji) is 
out of place." 

" Having considered tlie Memorandum of 
the Citizens Committee," began General von 
Beseler's reply. " I am compelled in view of its 
t«nor to refuse an answer. It entirely ignores 
the position which becomes the Citizens' Com- 
mittee in relations with a Power of occupation." 

Matters were clearly di-iving towards a crisis. 
Herr von Glasenapp, Police-President of War- 



* Of special interest is the point concerning tlie pre- 
paration of a school map for Poland. " We have not 
been summoned," says the memorandum, " to assist 
in the work of drafting a map of our country, the whole 
of which we know. Who will decide for us where 
Poland begins and where it ends, since it has hitherto 
remained partitioned ? The Polish nation enters a 
tirm and categorical protest against the fixing of the 
borders of Poland by the authorities of occupation of 
one State before the conclusion of the war, in which so 
many States take part." 



>avv, forbaili- iiu-iiiln'rs of thn {{oui-d to visit 
richoolM or UHtiist at the exanunatitins of letichers. 
The Hoard, seeing itself deprived one by one of 
all itt» rights, de4-idt:d to dissolve. Prmee Lubo- 
luirski tried to plead with the German autho- 
rities ; it WHS useless. In tiuj last days of 
.lanuary, 191(1, the Warsaw Hoard of Education 
dosed its HiCtivities in view of the imimssibility 
of cooperating with the Cierman authorities. 

\'ery similar was the fate of the Polish schools 
in other parts of the country under German 
administration. It will bt; suliicient to quote 
but one fact: that in November, 1915, all the 
I'olish town (iouncillors of Lodz voted against 
I lie grants of money for education "as under 
I lie conditions created by Herr Sakobielsky 
(the German school inspector) all work seems 
hopeless. " 

Hill what about llic famous University and 
Technical High Scliool opened at Warsaw by the 
Germans ? Some light is thrown on that 
subject by an interview with Father Gralewski, 
one of the niost prominent members of the 
Polish Board of Education at Warsaw, pub- 
lished in the Neue Ziircher ZcAtiing of March 20, 
1916. " The German authorities refused to let 
the Board bear the expenses of establishing 
and maintaining the High Schools, and agreed 
to their establishment only on the express 
condition that they should be maintained by 
the German authorities. ' The Germans,' said 
Father Gralewski, ' in founding these High 
Schools, were playing a political game, whereas 
we Poles saw in them a place of learning.' " 

In ail countries the censorship secured for 
itself during the war a place in history by its 
unconscious humour and exotic enterprise. 
Yet none can dispute the first place to the 
German censorship in Poland. We pass over 
the things which it suppressed or deleted, the 
corrections which it prescribed — sometunes 
even in poetry — its standing orders concerning 
" things not to be mentioned," etc. It was all 
done under the expert guidance of Geheinirat 
Herr Georg Cleinow, the author of several 
books on Poland and Polish history, notorious 
for their hostile bias against the Poles. Yet 
more interesting than his literary activities were 
*iis business dealings. 

From the very outset of his career as chief cen- 
sor at Lodz he knew how to combine^this office 
with the part of a newspaper propi'ietor. He 
spoke in all the languages ; he founded, ran, or 
supported newspapers in Polish, German and 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



107 



Yiddish * ; he claimed to voice the thoughts 
of every nationaUty. Could anyone have been 
a more fit censor to control their thoughts in 
less authoritative publications ? Anyhow, his 
papers were the best ; they always knew every- 
thing first (at Warsaw the censor's office closed 
at 6 p.m., so that only the censor's papers could 
publish the freshest news). Then the supply 
of paper gave rise to anxiety to other editors • 
not to the censor and newspaper owner in one 
person. The providential German Pressever- 
waltung (Press administration) took the trade 
in printing paper into its own hands, fixed its 
price at £275 for the wagon, and refused to 
sell it in smaller quantities. In 1916 it even 
started to ration papers. But even that was 
not yet the worst. Distribution by mail was 
refused to independent papers. And finally, 
however nxuch they were muzzled and curtailed, 
no Polish papers were allowed to leave the 
countrv under German occupation. They were 

* Especially interesting is the story of the daily paper, 
Godzina Polska, which started publication at Lodz at 
the Xew Year of 1916. By misrepresentations its editor 
obtained from different distinguished Polish writers the 
promise of cooperation. When they became aware of 
the true situation they tried to withdraw their names, 
but the censorship did not allow their letters to be 
printed. It also suppressed the letter of M. C. X. 
Jankowski denying in terms in no way offensive to the 
paper the news that he was going to act as its sec- 
retary. 



not to carry through the world the news of 
German oppression, economic spoliation and 
financial exactions, the marks of which it was 
almost impossible to remove altogether from 
the daily news of local events. 

It was through other channels that the trutli 
of the situation was made known to the woi'ld. 
Articles which kept appearing periodically in 
The Times unfolded a picture of barefaced 
robbery and endless suffering such as could 
hardly have been accepted as true, had not each 
assertion been supported by data and fact^. 
none of which was ever disproved, or even 
seriously challenged, by any German statesman 
or writer. 

The economic exploitation of Poland by the 
Germans assumed every possible form of 
spoliation. Money w^as extorted bv means of 
crushingly heavy taxes, contributions, fines, 
fees, excise duties, fiscal monopolies, and 
enforced fraudulent money exchanges. The 
material resouices of the countrv were sucked 
dry by the confiscation and requisitioning of 
foodstuffs, cattle, raw materials, and machinery, 
and by the devastation of forests — in short, 
by the carrying away of everything which it 
was possible to remove. Commercially, Poland 
was ruined by the deliberate immobilization of 
its industries, by most unfair forms of prefer- 




A POLISH FAMILY, WII H ALL IiniK WOKLDLY HI<:L0N(;IN(JS, SIKANIJIU) UY 

TMH WAYSIUE. 



ICS 



Tllh: TlMi:s HiSTDliY OF Till': WAR. 



eiife c'iHweiltHl tij <«friiiaii trrtilfis, ami by coiii- 
iiu^n-ial iiioni)|iolu<» c-n-ati-d in tlit^ir favuiii'. 
hiiially, Itibuur uhiili iiu;^tit have been ein[)loytM| 
in the reconstriutiDH oi liw ronntry (hnatitateil 
by the war, had (^nly the nec-eiMary niiterials 
b»'en isiiaretl fn m (iennm r«M(iii.-itions, was 
inailn to rifi\c the (ieinian strat»'t.'ii; net-ils, 
whfiever an opportunity aro8e ; and where it 
could not be ein[iloyed locally for (<erniaii aims, 
an organizetl attempt was imide to tarry it 
away to (Jermany for the use of (lennan 
iiuiustrieH, to work under conditions amounting 
practically to indi-nture. 

( ierman spoliation began with tlie ic(|ui.si- 
tioiiinu of food, cattle, and raw materials. 




GENERAL VON BESELER. 

For weeks in the autumn of 1914 thousands of 
German %\ agons were carrying off from Poland 
the grain, potatoes, etc., which had been com- 
mandeered. Early in 1915 an Order was pub- 
lished forbidding private trade in grain, flour, 
and other country produce between difTerent 
districts of Poland under German occupation, 
and the sole right of trading in them was vested 
in a Geiman Imjiort Company, the notorious 
W'areneinfukr-GeseV-schaJt. Field-^Iarshal von 
Hindenbiirg was closely connected with it, and 
it was he who arbitrarily' fixed the prices at 
which the monopoly bought and sold food- 
stuffs in Biissian Poland. Thus the fact 
was quoted at a meeting of the Town Coimcil 
of Lodz, in November 191.5, that the Import 
Company was paying "th roubles for 1 cwt. of 
rye, \\ hen it bought it in the districts of Russian 
Poland vmder German occupation, but charged 
at Lodz 23 roubles for a bag of " war flour " 
which contained hardly 40 per cent, of the 1 cwt. 



of ryi'. Herr Scho|)pfii, a (!<'rman oflicial, 
pointed out in reply to the above statement 
that the Ciermaii authorititts at Lod/. wen* 
unable to do anything in the matter, as tla^se 
prices had been fixetl by Field-Marshal von 
llindinburg. Under these circumstances it 
was but natural if tho Import Company 
yielded a profit of over 140 per cent., and if the 
death-rate in lUissian Poland rose in proportion 
to its profits. 

Agriculture itself was crippled by the frightful 
robberies which the (Jorman armi(ts had com- 
mitted on occupying the country. The Austro- 
llungarian Governor of the District of J^ublin, 
Major-(Jeneral Anton .Madziara, said to Herr 
.Max Winter, correspondent of the Viennese 
ArheiterZcUung : " In the eastern parts (of the 
district of Lublin) work in the fields is liailly 
done, chiefly because the Gennana on ihcir 
advance carried away all tluil could be re- 
moved. The scarcity of animals for draft pur- 
poses is especially bad. I know a landowner 
who has 500 acres of land to till, but is left 
with only fi horses and 3 cows. ..." * ^'et 
in spite of the reduced productivity of agricul- 
ture in 1915, the Germans continued their 
work of spoliation. The whole new harvest 
was requisitioned, and again thousands of 
wagons of grain and millions of quintals of 
potatoes frtm Poland found their way into 
Germany. On January 15, 19 IG, in the Ger- 
man Reichstag, General von Wandel, Dei^uty- 
]\Iinister of War, was able to speak with pride 
of the work of the military " economic com- 
mittees " ; it was due to their skill and " un- 
tiring activity . . . that large stocks, which 
have made it easier for us to feed our people, 
have been brought from the occupied terri- 
tories into Germanj-." He might also have 
added a word about the cheapness of those 
imports. Whilst the price for potatoes fixed 
by the authorities in Germany amounted 
to 2 1 marks a quintal, and according to the 
Frankjurter Zeitung oscillated in reality 
between 3 and ."jA marks, in Poland only IJ 
mark was paid for the quintal of sequestrated 
potatoes. 

The amount of foodstuffs available for local 
consumption in Russian I'oland was shrinking 

* Arbeiter-Zettunff, March 5, 1916, p. 7. The eastern 
parts of the district lay on tho " war-path " of Macken- 
seii, the western were crossed by the Fourth .Anst ro- 
ll uiicariau Army under Archduke Joseph Ferilinand. 
.An editorial footnote to this article states that it had heen 
heavily censored. What must have been its orijiinal 
disclosures, if the statement quoted above was pas.sed 
by the censor ! 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



1G9 




WORKING FOR THE GERMAN ARMY. 

Bridge across the NareflF. at Pultusk, burnt by 

the Russians during their retreat. Smaller picture: 

The construction of a temporary bridge. 

constantly. Bread and floiir tickets were 
introduced in Warsaw a few weeks after its 
occupation by the German armies. At first the 
per capita, quantities were fixed at 20.5 grammes 
(about 7 oz.) of bread a day, and 205 grammes 
of flour a week, or 24,000 cwt. of flour a week 
for Warsaw. On November 1 the amount was 
reduced to 20,000 cwt., on December 10 to 
18.000 cwt. — i.e., far below the rations allotted 
in Germany, where the population was much 
less dependent on farinaceous foodstuffs for its 
nonrishmf-nt. In the course of Fe})ruarv the 
allotted quantities were still further reduced by 
one-fourth. Moreover, a monopoly in meat 
was introduced, the maxim'im number of cattle 
to be slaughterefl in a town of a rMJIIiori in- 
habitants being fixed at 800 a week, a quantity 
wholly insufficient, cor.siflering that the con- 
sumption of mutton in I'oland is small, and that 
m'wt of the .Jewx, who form more tlian one-third 
of the population of Warsaw, do not oat prjrk. 
That, in spite of the ever-growing w^arcity of 
fof><lstuffs in Russian I'oland and of fho }iy[)o- 
critical cries ff>r relief which German ageiitM 
were raiMJng abrojwl, the export of ffKulstuffs 
from I'oland to Gennany continued is best 
shown by Art. 6 of the Mnnorandum presfjnted 
by the Central Council (,f (lie llelir-f' Committees 



(the reconstituted Citizens' Conuuittees) to Dr. 
von Kries early in February, 1910. It runs as 
follows : " That foodstuffs requisitioned by the 
fJerman authorities should not bo taken out of 
the country, but handed over at cost price to 
the local relief organizations." Were those 
liktOy to asjc for things wlii<'h w<^re alreiidy 
m:tually done, or to petition against non- 
existing abuses ? 

From tli(! very beginning the Gcrnuuis pro- 
ceeded to re(|uisition all raw maUTials vvlii(rh 
(•ouid be of tise to their own industries. Tlir 
wlif)lrr stock of oil, leather, sulpliur, iron, luid 
(innJly the entire store of wool and cotton was 



170 



THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE W'Alf. 




BEWARE OF CHOLERA. 
How the Germans warned their troops newly arriving in an inf^cced town in Russian Poland. 



carried away from the Polish factories — e.g., in 
the factories of the district of Lodz alone, 
according to the most modest calculations, 
wool and cotton had been requisitioned to a 
value exceeding considerably £5,000,000. Xot 
even their machinery was spared : the factories 
were crippled, if not ruined, for many years to 
come. The prices for the requisitioned materials 
were fixed in a most arbitrary fashion, but 
always so as to favour the German buyers ; 
thus the valuation of cotton was made on 
the basis of the pre-war price at Brenien — 
although the price had more than doubled 
since then ; not even freights and custom dues, 
whicli had origin&Uy been paid on it by the 
Lodz manufacturers, were considered. Out of 
the sum thus acknowledged as due to them, the 
German Government first of all paid claims of 
German firms against the Lodz manufactiu-ers, 
and then promised to pay out the remainder 
to the o^vners three months after the conclusion 
of peace. A similar procedure was applied also 
in other districts, whilst the list of things re- 
quisitioned or to be given up to the Gennan 
authorities was growing every month — con- 
traventions of these orders being punishable 
with a fine not exceeding £500, or imprisonment 



up to five years. Meantime, a true furor Teu- 
tonicua was shown in the work of devastating 
the forests of Poland. 

By May, 19 IG, hardly any form of textile, 
metal, or wooden goods could be manufactured 
in Poland. Similarly, most of the corn mills, 
alcohol distilleries, breweries, starch factories, 
etc., had to stop work for lack of raw materials, 
though these had always been produced in the 
country itself. By 1916 Poland, a great sugar- 
exporting country, could no longer cover even 
one-fourth of its o\\ti normal consumption. Out 
of 54 sugar refineries, 13 had been destroyed ; 
11 were in need of repairs, which could not be 
made as the Germans had carried off the neces- 
sary materials ; 15 were unworkable, because 
the copper or other parts of their machinery 
had been removed by the Germans, and only 
15 were still fit to work, provided they were 
able to obtain the necessary supply of sugar- 
beet and auxiliary materials. General unem- 
ployment was the natural consequence of this 
systematic work of destruction carried on by the 
Germans in Poland. In a meinorandum pre- 
sented to the German authorities in March, 
19 10, Prince Z. Lubomirski mentioned the fact 
that, for instance, in the Warsaw industries. 



THE TlMi:^ llJSTOliY OF TJIF WAR. 



171 



onlj'^ 10 per cent, of the normal number of 
workmen were at that time employed, and then 
pro eeded to make the truly pathetic suggestion 
that in future " the factory installations, 
machinery and tools, and the most indis- 
pensable raw and auxiliary materials {e.g., 
grease) be freed from requisitions and seques- 
tration . . . especially m tlie case of those 
factories and workshops which use small 
amounts of raw materials, whilst giving em- 
ployment to a considerable niunber of work- 
men." 

But of what use was it to plead in favour 
of Polish manufacturers, the competitors of 
German industry ? Tune after tune the case 
had been put before the German rulers of 
Russian Poland, appeals were made for mercy 
on the people to whom the measures spelled 
death from starvation — the answers given by 
the German oflficials merely added by their irony 
insult to injury. On September 25, 1915, the 
Pohsh manufacturers had presented a memo- 
randum to Governor-General von Beseler, 
asking that machinery be exempted from 
requisitions, and only such parts be taken 
which it was possible to replace ; that raw 
materials be not requisitioned unless needed 
for the army, and be not commandeered for the 
benefit of fJennan manufacturers, etc. General 



von Beseler's answer was simply this : that the 
German administration entertained the most 
friendly feelings towards the local jjopulation, 
though it must consider the country hostile 
territory ; that the position of the; German 
industry would be equally difhcnilt had it not 
been for the ease with wliich it readjusted itself 
to the production of war materials (how could 
the Polish industry have done it when it was 
given neither orders nor materials ?) ; and, 
finally, he asked that these views should be 
spread in the country. 

The conquest of the Polish market for the 
German industries was organized with remark- 
able thoroughness. The customs frontier be- 
between Poland and Germany was abolished 
without any period of transition being granted, 
and freights on the railways were manipulated in 
such a way as to turn the measure entirely to 
the advantage of the Germans. The German 
railway administration contributed in every 
way it could to the ruin of Polish industries. 
Specially ingenious were its devices with regard 
to coal ; even where the Germans did not 
introduce a monopoly of it (as Herr von Oppen 
had done at Lodz, making about £10 profit on 
each railway truck of coal), its price was raised 
very considerably, and most amazing of all, 
German coal finished by being cheaper in Poland 




TMH TYI'irilS F'.I'IDI'.VIIC 
A scniry |iu'.irdin|{ a I yphiih-Htrickcn Ikiunc. 



17; 



77//'; 77.\//;.s iiJs'KUi) or rm: wau. 



thiiii the luctil^uiitput. After tin- tall t)f Warsaw 
uu ottieiul (StTiiuui liurtuti of ('i)iitiiit'rce wtt.s 
entublihlifil 111 I'liliiiicl to take charge uf the 
iiitereiitb uf (.«eriiiuii iiianufacturerri tiiul traderw. 
It enjoyed great privilegeh in the matter of tele- 
phoned and wires ; itH letters passed uncensored ; 
on the railways its guotU were lalielled And- 
livhe Ilandelni/Wer (ortieial goo«ls), which in- 
tjured them priority before all other goods — 
they were second oidy to transports re(|nired 
by the army. Sj)ecial |)rivileges were given to 
it in the niatter of suing for debts. Finally, a 
regular system of commercial studit^s (or ratluT 
espionage) was organized luuler its aiis[)icos. 

Ruined by requisitions, exploited com- 
mercially, economically dead, Russian I'oland 
imder Gernuin administration iuul to stand the 
burden of crushing taxation. It assumt»d 
every thinkable form. A poll-tax was intro- 
duced. A special permit had to be bought for 
travelling from one district to another. But 
besides that, every inhabitant above the ago 



of 15 htwl to buy a passport, uhich ciitillcd liiui 
to nothing. A very heavy tax was introduced 
on dogs, in towns as well as in the country. 
Fiscal monopolies were established in alcohol, 
tobacco, and tea (the sale of " vodka " was rein- 
troduced in I'oland, simply in order tiiat 
Cierman distilleries might be able to grow rich 
by making spirits out of potatoes robbed from 
Poland, and that the (jierman State might in- 
crease its revenue). 'Die inn-war taxes were 
ifiiitniduced, and cm-ii iucieascd. .Mamifac- 
turers had to pay industrial taxes on idlo 
factories. In 11)14 the Russian (Government, in 
view of the general distn^ss, had suspended the 
payment of certain taxes. Jn 1915 the (jlermans 
insisted on the payment of those arrears ' It is 
a matter of utter impossibility to go into the 
details of all these exactions : no sum was too 
small, no man was too i)oor, no trick was too 
dirty for the (Germans, if only some profit could 
be reaped by it. The net result of their fiscal 
jneasures can, however, be summed up in ono 




AN INNOGENl VICTIM. 
Sisters and playmates of a six-year-old Polish girl killed by a German bomb, bearing her cotlin to the grave. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OE THE WAB. 



173 





,^tT?F?fS 



^|S"^^^.4. 



THE GERMAN BAND IN POLAND. 

In a main street, Warsaw, on the occasion of the 

re-opening of the University by the Germans. 

Smaller picture : Polish boys compelled by the 

Germans to act as music-stands. 

sentence : about the Xew Year of 1016 the 
Germans were drawing from the ravaged, 
impoverished part of Russian Poland under 
their occupation, where industries were idle, 
stocks exhausted, workmen unemployed, the 
same average monthly revenue which the 
Russian Government had been derivmg from 
the entire countrj' in the prosperous days which 
pnnefled thf war. 

Even volumes would no be s ifficient to sum 
up the results of German economic rule in 
Poland in terms of human suffering. There is 
no exaggeration in saying that its population 
was simply dyine fjff from sickness and starva- 
tif)n. The death-rate more than doubled after 
thrff or four months of German occupation ; 
all the efforts of cliaritable orgarnzations w<;re 
unable to cope with the appalling misery. " A 
city of a millif»n inhabitants cannot be fed 
except by a revival of its own trade activities," 
wrote Prince Tjibomirski in his Memorandum 
on thf! econ'jrriic condition of Warsaw. The 
same applies t'» a whole country. 'I'he Genoans 
wtTfr fully conscious of what they were doing 
whfn they ruincfl th'- <!Conornic life of Russian 
P'^lrtfi'l. It w(i tfirouglK>ut fleliln-rate murder. 
" Shoulrl ever th'- MriJiHh blockafJe conqufrr 
ns," f^nce sai'l G<ri'Tiil von F'r-Hclcr to a f>ro- 




minent I'ole, "you will not see it ; you will be 
dead, all of you, lone before that." The British 
Government, thougli fully aware that imports 
of food into Poland from neutral oountries must 
in tlie long run benefit also its (jerman masters, 
was still prepared to relax its blockade with 
regard to Poland, provided the guarantees were 
given without wliicii it knew that no schemes 
eould relieve the German-created misery in tiie 
unhappy country. It demanded tluit no food 
should bo exported from Poland, citlicr- to 
Germany or to Au.stria- Hungary, nor be taken 
for the use of the German armies. Hut vvcn-e the 
(i«!rmans to renoimce the possibility of direcrt 
corrunand(!ering in exchange for possible round- 
abf)ut gains (for the misery of the 1'olish poi)U- 
lalion was never any concern lo theiii)V No; 
th«!y rr'fu.H(!d the British offer. Von I5(!f<elrr was a 
gritri pro[)het, and knew tlic mind of his masters. 



CHAPTER CXXVIII. 

GERMAN AIR RAIDS : FEBRUARY 

TO MAY, 1916. 

Need of Better Methods of Defence — Action of Mayors of Enoush Towns — Supply of 
Anti-Aircraft Guns — The Question of Reprisals — Seaplane Raids — Zeppelin Raid ok 
March 5, 1916 — Seaplane Brought Down hy Flight-Commander Bone — Raid of March 31 — 
Zeppelin Wrecked near the Knock Lightship — Exploit of Lieutenant Brandon — Raids 
OF April 1, 2, and 5 — Improved Defence Arrangements — Extravagant German Claims — 
Other Raids in April and May — The L20 Wrecked in Norway — Zeppelin Destroyed at 
Salonika. 



THE Zeppelin raid on the Midlands on 
the night of January 31, 1916, fol- 
lowed as it was shortly afterwards by 
raids on the East Coast of Scotland, 
aroused the British people to the urgent need of 
adequate aerial defence. Up to this time there 
had been a tendency to regard the matter as 
affecting only limited areas on the East Coast 
and around London, and as not of great mili- 
taiy importance. But when the Zeppelins 
showed their power to travel so far inland and 
so far north ; and when it was demonstrated 
that a large part of the country was practically 
defenceless against this form of attack ; even 
sceptics of yesterday became unwilling con- 
verts to the necessity for further preparation. 

The Mayors of many parts of the covmtry, 
led by Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Lord IMayor of 
Birminghani, strongly urged on Lord French, 
the Home Office, and the other authorities con- 
cerned, the need of better methods of defence. 
While there was much difference of opinion con- 
cerning the best steps to be taken, it was 
generally felt that no changes would be ade- 
quate imless and until the control of the Air 
services as a whole w as placed in the hands of a 
single Department, jaresided over by a strong 
Minister of Cabinet rank. 

Many experts strongly sujiported the plea 



vigorously and constantly advocated in The 
Times that the only sure method of defence was 
not to await the attacks of the German air- 
craft, but to attack them in their own country. 
The raid of January 31 had shed a strong light 
on oiu" shortcomings. In many districts when 
the Zeppelins had flown low there had been no 
anti-aircraft guns to fire against them. There 
had been no recognized general system of 
warning, with the result that the first intima- 
tion many localities received of danger was 
when the Zeppelin bombs exploded in their 
streets. 

Active steps were now taken. The supply of 
anti-aircraft guns was greatly increased, and 
their range of efficiency much improved. A 
system for warning the local authorities was 
established. The restrictions on public and 
private lighting already in force in the eastern 
and south-eastern counties were extended to 
almost the whole of the central and north- 
western areas, from Northumberland and 
Durham to Dorsetshire, W^iltshire, Berkshire, 
and Bucks. 

Some towns took special precautions on their 
own account, closing factories early and arrang- 
ing for complete dtirkness early in the e\eiiing. 
One factory established a listening post, fitted 
with the latest and most effective type oi 



174 



THE TIMER H7.ST07?y OF THE WAF. 



175 




WRECK OF THE " L 20 " ON THE NOR- 
WEGIAN COAST, MAY 3. 1916. 

View of the Zeppelin after the vej^sel broke up. 
The airship returned from a raid on the North- 
East Coast, where she had been hit by gunfire, 
and became a total wreck at Stavanger. Smaller 
picture : Norwegian soldiers examining portions of 
the engines. 

microphone, by which it was hoped to detect 
the noise of any aircraft at a distance of 
60 or 70 miles. In some parts, immediate 
notice of the approach of Zeppelins was given 
by the extinction of the electric light from the 
supply station. In others, the public were 
warned by steam whistles or sirens. One great 
drawback to all systems of public warning was 
soon found to be that warnings had to be given 
if hostile aircraft came within 80 or 100 
miles, although the aircraft might turn in quite 
another direction. This produced much un- 
necessary unrest among private citizens in some 
East Coast districts. In one place the warn- 
ing was given for several nights in succession, 
as soon as hostile aircraft were announced to be 
on thfir way to this country. But the hostile 
aircraft never once came near the jjlace. 

The raid on the Midlands led to a renewal of 
the controversy about the advisability of a 
policy of reprisals. It was strongly urged in 
sornc fjuarters that when Zeppelin attac^ks were 
made on undefended towns in this country our 
aircraft slioiild in turn attack and (iestroy touns 
in 'Jerrnany. J his dernanfl found many distiri- 
guishefl arivocates ainong those who were 
unaware of the pra^-tical difTicuHies, but uas 
not supported generally, Convo^;ati'>ri, on thi- 
motion of the Archbishop of Canterbury, jwjHscd 
a ns'ilufiori to th'- cfU-rt that priricip|»H of 



morality forbade a policy ot reprisal wnicn had 
as a deliberate object the killing or wounding 
of non-combatants. This view was approved 
by Sir Evelyn ^V'oocl, who maintained that the 
killing and maiming of non-combatants was an 
accidental side of the Zeppelin attacks. " The 
Germans," he wrote, " would not willingly 
waste one air bomb, after having carried it 
hundreds of miles, in killing and maiming non- 
conabatants." Professor Sanday also voiced 
the opposition to reprisals. '* It is a strange 
kind of homeopathy," ho wrote, " to suppose 
that we should check these " (atrocities) " by 
adding to them." 

On the other hanri, it was maintuuiod that 
our first duty was to protect ourselves. " Re 
taliution may be the only defensive alternative," 
wrote Lord Dunraven. " Reprisal is a choice 
among evils of wliich that is the least as being 
I he surest protectimi of oni' own Wdincii and 
childr«!n and as a iiieaHuro which is tlu!ref(jre 
fhif to them," rnnintiiinr'd Lord I'osebery. Sir 



17G 



THE TIMES HISTUin' UF THE WAH. 



Artlmr Oi)iiau Duyle took tliM naiuu linn. 
" Sujuu of thtitM) ilays," he wrote, " there may 
be A grt'ttt fatarttropho, and thtMi it will be too 
late t'ur anything but rtneiif^e. 1 ilaiiu that 
thia tata.stiu[)he may be averted by a public 
ilei^'laratiuii of our iutentiou tn iiit back, coupltMl 
with &>U4h preparatiuiiri an will 8how that we 
can do what we tlireaten." 

While the ilebate about the best nu-thods of 
lU'tVnci' and the ailvisability of retaliation was 
in full progress, the Germans struck again. On 
Thius lay, February 9, two (Iciinui SL-aplanes 
flew o\t'r the Isle of 'I'hanet. Thous.mds of 
people aaw thtm oxer Kanis;i;ate shortly before 
four in the afternotjn, and at fust they were 
generally mistaken for British. Two nien were 
arguint: whether the aircraft were British or 
CJeimm wlien their controversy was settled by 
a bomb falling within a, comparatively short 
distance of them ami exploding. One ixMub 
fell on the roail close Ix^hind a tran^way car full 
of women and children, exploding w ithout doing 
any damage. The car was pulled up and the 
passengers alighted without panic. Three 
more bombs were droppeil, but fell in a 
neighbouring field. The second raider attacked 
a large girls" school at Broadstairs. Most of 
the girls were in the playing fields. One bomb, 
falling through the roof, exploded in an upper 
storey, doing some damage and causing portions 
of the ceiling to fall into the room below, where 
a class of small children was being held. A little 



girl and a miid were slightly injured. Three 
other bonds fell in the school grounds. British 
na\'al and niilitarx' aeroplanes went up as (juickly 
as [)ossible in pursuit, and the hostile aircraft 
at once hurried off. The Oermans puhlislied 
latter a fan< iful account of this raid, clcuuiing 
that their aircraft had dropped "a number of 
bombu on the ports and manufactuiing estab- 
lishments as well as the barracks at KamsL'ate " 
Another seaplane raid of a very similar kind, 
but on a more extended scale, was m idr on 
Suiulay, February 20, at Lowestoft and Waimer. 
Two of the raiders ap|)eared over I^owcvstoft 
shortly before tiie time for morning service. 
They remained over the south side of the town 
for a few mimites, attracting people into the 
streets, and then dropped some bombs. Rising 
to a groat height they disa[)poared from view, 
only to return a cjuarter of an hour later for a 
short time. In all, seventeen small liigli ex- 
plosive bombs were droppcfl. No one was killed 
or injiu-ed, but several persons had narrow 
(>scapes. A bomb struck the roof of one house 
and jienetrated through to the back of the 
bedroom, but faile<l to explode. The family 
were sitting in the kitchen at the time. Another 
liomb struck the roof of a large house and ex- 
ploded on the upper floors. A mother and 
daughter on the ground floor suffered no injury. 
The explosion of this bomb broke the windows 
of a Primitive Methodist chapel close by. The 
chapel was full. The service, wliich had just 




A SEAPLANE ABOUT TO TAKE FLIGHT. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 



177 




BRITISH NAVAL AIRSHIP. 



begiui, was stopped and the people quietly 
left the bnilding. 

That same morning two other German sea- 
planes made for the Kentish coast. One of 
thfrn passed over the Knock lightship and tried 
to destroy it with bombs ; the other made 
straight for Walmer, drojjped six bombs and 
immediately turned sharply, making back 
home. Two seaplanes went up from Dover, 
but were unable to catch the raiders. Four 
hiomhs all fell within a .small area. One; landed 
dose to a church, blowing in the windows as 
the congregation were singing the Te Demn. 
One bomb killed a boy who v^as walking along 
the roadway and fatally injured a man close 
to him. Another bomb, falling on the roadway 
running along the beach, killed one civilian 
and injurefl a marine. The total casunltios of 
the raid were two men and one boy killed and 
onff marine wounded. 

On Miir-'li I a small, futile raid was again 
riimle on the coa.st of Kent, when a German 
H.eaplan'! pa«wd over a town and dropixd 
S'-Vf-ral bonibf. The only casualty n [jorted on 
this occ«i.Hif>n was c»iu.H^'d in a sorrifiwhat curious 
manner, A bomb fell on the back of a dwelling 
hoti.'-r-, dfHtroving tin; roof and sorri*- of I Ik; 
Iirif-kwr^rk. A l<«Jy who was in the nursery 
with a baby Hnatched up the 'liild from I Ik; 
floor and in her (;xcitement dropfjcrl it ; the 
infant, falling to the ground, struck and 
injured its hefwi and di«d almost inunediately 
aft*TwardM. It w«h thought that the main 
pur(K>H« f>f th'! raid* r on Ibis occasion was 



reconnaissance, and that the dropping of bombs 
on the town was a mere incident in his jovirney. 
The French authorities at Dunkirk reported a 
day or two lat^r that a German seaplane had 
been picked up three miles north of Middel- 
kerke Bank, having been obliged to descend 
when returning from Ensland. One of tlie 
occupants was drowned and the other taken 
prisoner. Tt was the raiding seaplane of that 
night. 

On the evening of the following Sunday, 
March 5, a Zeppelin raid on a large scale was 
carried out over a consideraljle portion of the 
East Coast, from Kent to Yorkshire, uiid 
although no military damage of any descrip- 
tion was done, a large number of civilians were 
killed and injured. A heavy snowstorm was 
racing at the time. Hitherto, it had been con- 
sidered im|K)ssible for Zeppelins to cross the 
sea in safety under such conditions, but the 
Zeppelins now proved that this belief w as \\ rong. 
They visited Yorkshire, Lin'olnsliirc, Hiitland, 
lluntintrdon, \orfolk, Essex, nrid i\ciit. 'i'hero 
were, sf) far as (iould be discovered, three 
Zeppelins. They made; tlujir main attack on a 
town in Yorkshire. Th(>y sent a dozen ImhuIjs 
into a field near I'uIIjiikI, doing no damage. 
Api)arently th<;y did nothing in four of Mks 
counties tliey passed over. Six bombs were 
HUf)posed to hav(! fallen in Kent and to have 
exploded liarmlessly in a marshy field, but many 
♦•arefiil observers declared tlint lliiire was no 
exjilf)Hion whatever in that county. In one 
town in Lin<;olnshiro the Zep|)elins aj)prf)acli(Kl 



17H 



THI': TlMh:s HlSTOJiY Of Till'! WAR. 




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during tho time of fimrcli s»^rvice, iiiui llio con- 
KiH-f^ations wure infonnetl of thoir coming from 
till |)iilpit«. Service v\a« wtoppf<l in one 
ilmrch, iinil llii» congrt'gat ion disnuHsed ; in 
otluM'H, h<<rvicc-8 prooeododas usual. Tlio Zeppe- 
lins did not arrive until some hours latter. A 
t^ignalman was killed by a fragment of a bomb 
whiht moving from liis box to a place of Hholtor. 
An invalid hidy died through heart failure. 

In the important city by the East Coast 
where the main attack was made, the rettultH 
were mucli more serious. Two Zeppelins 
visited this place, dropping in all about twenty- 
five explosive bombs, uiid killing — according to 
the local Member of Parliament — seventeen 
persons and wounding fifty. Six persons died 
after the raid, purely of shock, all untouched 
and uninjiu-ed. One Itirge shop was blown to 
pieces, those immediately opposite were severely 
shattered, and the roof of a public-house was 
blown off. Two small fires were started. Largo 
|iieces of iron were blown off a gigantic crane. 
A parisli church was badly damaged, the 
lunount of damage being valued at £25,000. 

Some of the cases of deaths were very pitiful. 
In one house alone a woman and her foiu- young 
children, two boys and two girls, aged eight, fcix, 
four and two, were lulled, and the father was 
severely injiu-ed. The house was wrecked and 
the baby boy of two was found dead by his 
mother's side. WTien the explosion of bombs 
was heard, the caretaker of an abushouse 
hurried round to rouse the inmates and bring 
sonic of them out. One old man, 89 years of 
age, remained in bed. A bomb struck the 
building and set the room on fire. Tlie care- 
taker vainly tried to put out the flames with 
buckets of water. Before the fire brigade could 
come, the old man was burned to death. A 
mother left her house with her two children to 
trj^ to reach a safer place. As they were 
luuTj-ing along, a bomb burst quite close to 
them, killing one of the boys. In another 
house the father and the son had gone to bed, 
leaving three daughters do\^TQstairs. A bomb 
fell outside the house and wrecked the front. 
As soon as the father heard the crash he came 
downstairs and found two of his daughters 
lying at the foot of the stairs. They had been 
on the way upstairs to fetch him down wlien 
they \\ ere struck. The third daughter was also 
injured by the bomb explosion, but managed 
to make her way out of the house, and was 
tiikcn to a hospital. The tliree dsiughtors all 
died. 

A man and a boj were killed in the street. 



THE TIMES HISTORY UF THE WAR. 



179 



The bo}- was found sitting at a doorstep with 
his hands pressed to his eyes. When he was 
touched the hands fell limply down and it could 
be seen that a piece of bomb had passed through 
his head, just above the nose, killing hira 
instantly. The proprietor of one cnfc, a Swede, 
had bis head blown off. 

Great indignation was expressed in the dis- 
tiict at the fact that no precautionary measures 
had been taken to defend this important place. 
The Zeppelins remained over it for in all about 
one and a half hours, dropping bombs at their 
leisure. Diuing all that time no adequate blow 
was delivered against them. According to the 
official figures, the total casualties for all areas 
in this raid were 18 killed and 52 injured. The 
total was made up of 31 men, 26 women, and 
13 children. 

On Sunday, ^larch 19, four seaplanes visited 
East Kent, attacking Dover, Deal, Margate, and 
Ramsgate. They arrived over Dover about 
two o'clock in the afternoon and dropped over a 
dozen bombs, doing a considerable amount of 
damage. One bomb went through the roof of 
a Home where there were a large number of 
children ; fortimatelj', the children at the first 
sound ot the raiders, had been taken to the 
shelter of the basement. Several children going 
to Sunday school were killed or injured. A 
woman walking along the street was blown into 
a doorway of a shop and badly hurt. The 
inva^Jers were given very little time to do their 
work. British aeroplanes rose in pursuit. A 
sharfi fight followed, both attackers and 
defenders using their machine guns freely in the 
air. One British airman particularly distin- 
guished himself. Flight - Commander K. J. 
Bone, R.N., pursued one of the Cierman sea- 
planes out to sea for nearly 30 miles, in a small 
single-seater land machine. There, after an 
engagement lasting about a quarter of an hour, 
he forced it to descend, the German machine 
having been hit many times, and tho observer 
disabled or kilk-d. For this, Flight -Conunandor 
Bone received tho D.S.O, 

Full oflicial details of this tiction wore puK- 
liahed later. Tho commander left tho aero- 
drome while the enemy machine was still in 
Higlit, anfl making no attempt to climb steeply, 
kept the enemy in view. After a pursuit of 
nearly hu tniN-s be rose to 0,000 feet, 2,000 fe(;t 
jibovf- the enfjrny. F'a[)idly overhauling thu 
other machine, ho attemi>tod to make a vortical 
*live for it, both sides firing vigorously. Then 
he rnanf/jiivred ahead of the other ami st^jerod 



straight at him, diving below him and turning 
with a vertical right-hand bank immediately 
under him. The German pilot swerved his 
machine to the left before they met, and the 
Englishman as he passed could see the Gei-man 
observer hanging over the right side of the 
fuselage, apparently dead or severely wounded. 
The gun was cocked at an angle of 45 degrees. 
Continviing his courageous manoeuvres, Flight- 
Commander Bone brought his machine within 
15 or 20 feet of the enemy, and poured in five 
or six bursts of six rounds until the enemy 
dived deeply, with smoke poiiring from his 
machine. The propeller stopped, but the pilot 
kept control and succeeded in landing safely on 
the water. Here the English airman had to 
leave him, as he could not come down on a land 




FLIGHT-GOMMANDER BONE, R.N. 

Awarded the D.S.O. for pursuing and bringing down 

a German seaplane, March 19, 1916. 

machine, and his engine showed signs of giving 
out. 

One machine apparently escaped from the 
fight at Dover and rapidly made its way to Deal, 
u iiere it dropped seven bombs, doing consider- 
able damage to property, but not killing or 
injuring any persons. A second pair of sea- 
plancH aj)p:;arod over Ramsgate at 2.10 p.m. 
and dro[)ped bombs on tlio town. Four chil- 
dren on thiar way to Sunday school weio 
kille<l, and a man driving a motor-car near by 
was also killed. A hospital for Canadian troops 
was flnmjiged, but no one in the building was 
hurt, and tho nurses went out in the streets to 
assist in tho work of tending tho injiu-od. One 
of the seafjlanes travelled on from Rninsgato to 
Margate, whcro it rlr<)j)p(!(| a bonil», damaging 



1«0 



THE TIMES niSTUlil' UF THE WAR. 



A houtie. 'I'hr Ceniiaii ttiifral't wvvn all iiuvv 
pui'buecl by Hiitish iiiaihiiies and were drivtMi 
out to nea,. 

Ill ii trovvdt'il im-ftiiiy h«ld tli«' folluwiiiL' 
t'Vtuiiiig ill llaiiisgato Town Hall tlm Mayor, 
who was in the c-hair, uttfind a v»'ry stron^^ pro- 
tf«*t ayaiiist the abseiioe of adt'i|iiate dt'tVuce for 
the coast towns. Sirens giving the alarui liad 
not souiult'd unlil the boinhs were falling. Ha<l 
notice been given earlier, the children going to 
Suiulay (school would not have lost their liveH. 
'■ We in Ranistjate are simply li\ ing in a fool's 
paratlise," he dedaretl. A renolution, already 
tariied by the'l'own Council protesting against 
the absence of due warning was passeil unani- 
mously. Accoriling to the official reports, 
three men, one woman, jind five children were 
killetl in this raid in all the towns, and seventeen 
nien, five women, and nine children were 
injured. 

At the end of March began a period oi 
nights exceedingly favourable for Zeppelins, 
moonless, clear, and comparatively still. The 
(Jermans took fidl advantage of this, and for 
several nights in succession attempts on a con- 
siderable scale v\ ere made. A marked advance 
had now been made in the British defensive 
methods. London had been equipped with a 



number of anti-ain-raft guns of greatly im|)rove(l 
range, and many more searehlights had lu-cn 
installed. Some of these sean-hlights were far 
more powerful than anything known before. 
Kxtensive ])reparations had been mule in m my 
j)artH of the country su|)|)osed to be within 
ZepjK'lin range to givo the enemy a waim 
reception. 

Darkness and silence were the main methods 
used f(( buflie tlie enemy. Church bells uero 
siloncetl, and public clocks did not strike. All 
towns within the affected areas lay in a <()n- 
ilition of .semi-daikness or of comjilete darkness. 
In some phu-es faint lights were permitted in 
the streets. In (tthers, all street lights were 
put out, and no lights allowed to show, even 
faintly, frcm tlic windows of houses. At the 
first signal of the apj)roach of the Z('|)pelins all 
trains were stopped, save tho.se running under- 
ground, and railway services wen; suspended. 
Signal lights were pvit out, and the fires of the 
engines were banked. The .stoppage of trains 
naturally caused gi-eat inconvenience. People 
living in the outer suburbs of towns fovmd it 
imjiossible to reach home except by walking ; 
railway travellers were held up at small stations, 
and had to pass many hours during the evening 
and night there, unable to go forward or back. 




AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN IN ACTION AT NICHT. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WATt. 



181 




THK RAID OVHK WW. EASTHKN COUNTIES. 
A Zeppelin raider cauf^ht by searchlijiht rays. 



It waH cvirlcnt from tho Of-nnan rfportH that, 
iiriK-MM i\f\\\)fTn\f\y falw; Htatfrnr-ntH w(TO b<;in(< 
ifi^wl^r in th'-rri, th*'s<! prwantioiiH rlid nviccvi'A 
on 'liffjT'^nt of;<-aMionH in <'fiTni>l«;tt!ly fJw;f>ivinK 
th« invwIfTH RH tr» th»-ir wheniahoiitH. ThiH was 
H\\oi'm\\y w^-n in tho n-pori of the fir^t rjf Hk; 



Ai)ril raids. On tho ni^ht of March 31-Ai)ril 1 
a iiiiiiihcr of Zr-ppfHiLs, (^Htiniati^d at five, imulo 
an attiuk on Iho Kastuin coaHt, from tho 
OHtnary «)f I ho Thamas to Yorknliiro. O i tho 
followiriK 'lay tlio (Jorrnan Main Jloa(l<|uur<<'rH 
l)iihliHho(| an iwoiint of v\lin( had hcon a<'<!oin- 



182 



THE TIMES IIlSTOItY OF THE WAR. 








I 




ZEPPELIN RAID ON PARIS. 
A five-storied house wrecked by a bomb. 

plished, whifli was wilcUy and almost ridicu- 
lously inaocurate. It was claimed that bombs 
were freely dropped on the City between Tower 
Bridge and Lonc'on Docks, the military camps 
in the north-west of the City, and other parts 
around London ; and that various towns hatl 
been attacked, batteries silenced, manufactviring 
works destroyed, and incendiary fires caiised. 
Actually, tlie Zeppelins ne\er reached London, 
and town after town named in their report was 
not touched by them. Places that they did 
attack were not even mentioned. It was clear 
that they had travelled almost blindly, unable 
to pick out the places at which they aimed. 

The most dramatic feature of the raid of 
March .3 1 was a sustained attack by several of 
the invaders on the coast near the mouth of 
the Thames. As they approached they were 
picked up by powerful searchlights, which 
concentrated on them from a large area arovmd. 
These lights were so powerful and so well 
directed that, even at the great height at which 
the Zeppelins were flying, the effect must have 
been almost blinding. Batteries along the 
coast opened fire, and the Germans soon realized 
that the British now had at command some 



^uiia ctipitblo of Mending shells as high a;j 
Zeppehns could lly. Searchlights from many 
points stablx'd tho sky, kenpiug the sliining 
hoditis of till) Ziippcliiis all tho tinu* in view. 
'I'hu aii'shi|>8 ilropped bomns in ra()id succession, 
Heekuig to roach the batteries, and tlm bursts 
<tf llanio below were nut by tin' l)ri).'lil (lashos 
from ox[)loding shells in tho sky- 'Jime after 
time it seemed as though the nu>liips had been 
hit. Then one shot went home, hitting one of 
the airships right in th(» centre and breaking 
its back. Tho Zeppelin made a quick dive, 
crumj)ling u{) us it fell. Then it recovered 
slightly, tried to get away, but fell in tho water 
before it had gone far, collapsing a little over 
a iMJie from tho Knock lightship. 

It was quickly surrounded by torpedo-boat 
destroyers, mine-s\\e(![)ers and patrol -vtissiis. 
'J\vo ofilicers and fifteen men crept out of their 
cabins. The Zeppelin, whose marks showed it 
to bo L15, was sinking, and they climbed 
up on to tho envelope, making signs that 
they were willing to surrender. It was said 
at tho time that they left one young officer in 
tho cabin, whose business it was to blow iq) 
the airship when the others got off. He failed 
to do this, but it nevertheless sank The 
steam trawler Olivine rescued the Cerrnan 
crew, and they were taken to Chatham as 
prisoners of war. Their leader was a young 
officer of 33, Lieutenant-Commander Breit- 
haupt, decorated with the Iron Cross, and his 
second officer was Lieutenant Kiihne. They 
were evidently imder some apprehension that 
they would be shot, for as soon as they arrived 
Lieutenant-Commander Breithaupt formally 
declared to the British officers who received 
him, " I take all responsibility upon myself. 
My men are not responsible." They wero 
treated as ordinary prisoners of war. Some of 
the men were without coats, and barefooted, 
and one was without trousers. These were 
quickly provided with clothing and boots. 

Some foreign journalists were permitted to 
see the prisoners and to talk with them. They 
found them convinced that their craft had 
inflicted great damage on British military 
positions. Lieutenant-Commander Breithaupt 
strongly maintained that the killing of women 
and children in the raids was an accident. " You 
must not suppose that we set out to kill women 
and children," he declared. " WeTiavo higher 
military aims. You would not find one ofiicer 
in the German Army or Navy who would go 
to kill women or children. Such things happen 



THE TIMES HLSTORY OF THE WAR. 



183 



accidentally in war." Some of the crew, when 
a«ked if it was not a sorry business to go on 
baby-killing campaigns, gave the only possible 
reply, " We do as we are ordered." 

That same night Zeppelins passed over a 
number of to\^Tis on or near the coast. They 
had a very warm reception, being fired on from 
numerous batteries. At least one Zeppelin 
was hit, and showed by its erratic movements 
afterguards that it had been badly damaged. 
It had to dificard part of its cargo, and a 
machine gun, belts of cartridges, a new magneto, 
a shot-riddled petrol tank, and a tank contain- 
ing four gallons of petrol were thrown over- 
board. The Zeppelins had a very busy time 
in endeavouring to escape the guns and search- 
lights, and their evolutions were watched by 
thousands of people, who, defj'ing the in- 
structions to remain indoors under shelter, 
crowded every place of vantage. 



The damage inflicted during this raid was 
not important. Many bombs fell in fields. 
Five bombs fell on one town, killing five persons 
by suffocation and badly injurin^^ four more. 
A bomb fell on one house where tlioro were an 
old lady of seventy, her daughter-in-law, and 
two grandchildren. The old lady was killed 
instantly, and the other three were injured. 
Three people next door, a mechanic, his wife 
and a young child,were suffocated by a gas bomb. 
One village farther north suffered most, the 
Germans evidently mistaking it for a military 
station. It was twice visited that night. On 
the first occasion eight bombs were dropped in 
a field. Later a Zeppelin came back, dropped 
first an illuminating bomb, then two explosive 
bombs, and then after an interval two bombs 
more. These i id much damage to houses and 
killed thirty people. Two raiders passing over 
an East Anglian town that night dropped some 




ZHPPHLIN RAID ON I'AKIS, JANUARY 29, 1916. 
A hole cauited by a homh in the roof nf the (Jndcriiround Kailwny. 



\HA 



THE TIMES HISTOltV OF THE Win. 



htirnbti, killing two wom;in unci i> inuii iiiul 
injuritig i>t<vertil. In addition to tlu- uirrihip 
wluch litidud the Ktisti-rn l.'ountins, unotlK-r 
Mlii|> went over th(* North-KcLst Coast, attacking 
various points tlu-re. 'I'lu^ total I'asiialtin.s on 
that Friilay ni^ht were odicually given as 4:i 
killed aiul U(i injured. Ttie military daniago 
was nil. 

In adilition to fire from anti-airoraft guns 
the Zeppelinii received tlie attacks of a number 
of aeroplanes. These do not seem to have 
aeeomplished much. Lieutenant 13rHndon, of 
the Koyal Flying Corps, a young New Zea- 
lander, climbed 9,000 feet and dropped seveial 
bombs 1)11 an airshi|} underneath liiin, Ins own 
machine being hit many times by machine-gun 
bullets. He was fortunate in finding a Zep- 
pelin flying so low that night, for in many 
places, j)articularly where they suspected the 
presence of anti-aircraft gims, they flew so 
high as to make it a serious undertaking for 
aeroplanes to rise above them. 

The following evening a Zeppelin raided a 
v\ orking-class district on the North-Ea.st Coast 
and did considerable damage to a number of 
small houj-es, killing eighteen people and 
injuring one hundred. A well-known magi.s. 
trate, the leader of the local Labour party, was 
struck as he was walking along the street and 



was fiiund lying faci« downwai-ds di'ad flfl ecn 
yanls from a place wliert^ a hoiub luul explodi'tl. 
His body was torn wit'» fragments of shrapnel 
and glass. A tramway inspector went info the 
tram sheds as soon as tin* air.sliip was sighted. 
He was standing next to a wall, and one b(jmb 
burst in front ol him iiiid unuljicr Ixtliiiid the 
wall. The insjiector was killed by u wouixd in 
the heart. A brother and sister were killed 
in a very similar way. A man took his family 
downstairs when the sound of the firing was 
heard, and as his son, a ))oy of 1(5, was following 
the house was struck and wnHjked, the boy 
being kill(>d. A widow, aged 0(1, her daughter- 
in-law uiid a ur<ui(l(liil(l. aged 5, were in a house 
which was demolished. The widow and the 
child were killed and the mother injured. Two 
elderly men keeping a gro(;( r's shop were 
behind the counter when a bomb dropped and 
practically wrecked the pla(!e. In tiie d/'bris 
of tlu" shop next morning their bodies were 
found on the one side of the counter, and on 
the other side was the body of a se vent een-y ear - 
old girl who had been sent on an errand from 
the house opposite. A f)attern maker and his 
wife were in their house together when they 
heard the explosion of the bombs. In her 
fright the w ife ran out. Her husband followed 
and fetched her back. At that moment a 




THE "LIS" SINKING OFF THE KENTISH COAST, APRIL L 1916. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 



185 




[.Official photograph issued by the Press Bureau, 
LIEUTENANT-GOMMANDER BREITHAUPT. LIEUTENANT KUHNE. 

The commander, (lecorated with the Iron Cross, and the second officer of the Zeppelin "L15," which 
was hit by jgun-fire and came down in the estuary of the Thames, April 1, 1916. The crew were rescued 

and made prisoners. 



bomb fell on the liousj," ; both husband and 
wife were badly injured, the husband dying in 
hospital next day. A man was walking along 
the street with a daughter holding each arm. 
Hi.s wife wa.s in fror.t with two other girls. A 
bomb burst in the road between them. One 
of the girls was thrf)wn against a plate glass 
window and was killed, the other girls were 
injured, but the man escaped unhurt. Of the 
eighteen deaths, ten occuiTed indoors and eight 
outdoors. 

On the following night a fresh raid was made. 
This time the Oerrnans went farther afield, and, 
as in the .lanunry raid in the Midlands, they 
rear-hed a f)art of the cfjuntry whose inhabitants 
hafl considered it practically immune from 
ntteutk. Six Zeppfrlins crossed the North Sea. 
Two raided the Eastern Counties of Krigland, 
one the N'orth-pyast Coast of England, and threr; 
the Kast Coast of Scfitland. 'Iliis wjis the first 
time that Zefjix-lin- Imfl penetrated north of 
the Twe*d. 

Word was brought to an Eawt CoaHt Scottish 
city early in the evening that Zejjpelins wire 
af>firoa/^;hing. liy nine o'clock th(! news VM;came 



generally known. Various pn cautions, planned 
in advance, were taken. The electric light was 
reduced, the trams were stopped, and people 
had an opportimity of seeking shelter, of which 
most refused to avail themselves. 

The Zeppelins arrived shortly before midnight, 
flying at a great height. They rei named 
over the district for forty minutes, and dropped 
perhaps thirty bombs. The noise of the 
exploding bombs and the blaze of a great fire 
of a warehouse, struck by the first bomb, gave 
the impression that much damage had been 
done. Wlien, however, it was possible to 
learn what had hai)i)ened, it was found that the 
atrtual loss had been amazingly small. I'en 
p(;rsons had been kilhul, eleven seriously 
injured, and a dozen O" Iwo more slightly 
liurt. One warehouse had been burned, 
and some damage done to houses. Several 
imfiortant public buildings had Ix-cn barely 
mi-'sed, and a number of people inid narrow 
escaf)rs. 

A bomb drop[)ed on the pavcincut in a |)oor 
tenement street, penetrated into the cellar of 
one of the tenements and exploded. Six men 




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18lj 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. 



187 



were killod and a number of people injured. 
One of the victims was a young fellow just of 
age, who had been spending the week-end with 
his mother, a widow. Having brought a neigh- 
bour in to keep his mother company, he was 
on his way out to inquire after another woman 
near by who was living alone, when he was 
killed. Another was an old man who had been 
blown into a shop by the force of the explosion. 
His body was found lying across the shop 
counter. The tenement, which was substanti- 
ally built of stone, as is the custom in that part 
of the country, had its staircase blocked up by 
the shattered masomy, and the tenants in the 
floors above had to be rescued by means of 
fire escapes. One bomb fell on the boiler-house 
of a large hospital, and others fell around the 
hospital, but no people were injiu-ed. One tene- 
ment was struck and a bomb exploded on the 
upper part of the building, blowing off the roof 
and blocking up the staircase. The father of 
one family on the upper floor was out at the 
time of the raid. On his return he learned that 
his five-year-old daughter had been killed by 
the falling stones, and his wife and other child 
seriously injured. The other tenants in the 
building were severely shaken, some of them 
who were in bed at the time being thrown out 
of bed by the shock. 

It was found, however, that the fact that the 
buildings in this part of the country are so 
solidly constructed greatly minimised the loss. 
\\'hen bombs explode in the much more 
lightly built brick houses in the south, the 
whole of the buildings often enough collapses ; 
in the north, with stone houses, the loss was 
often limited to the toottlh immediately around 
where the explosion took [)lace. 

In one ca.«e a man, his wife and several 
children were in bed asleep, despite the bursting 
of several bombs in tlie district. Suddenly 
there canie a tremendous explosion which 
arouH«;d thenri all. " The lioiise shook," said 
thf rnan. "The winrlows wr-re broken in and 
articlr H of furniture moved and creaked. My 
wife anfl I at once roH<i and to our dismay ff)und 
everything in great disorder. After dressing 
with a view to leaving tlie house to get shelter, 
rny wife took our youngrjst child, a year old, 
out of tlie crib and shortly afterwards niadf; 
the UrrrWAf. diH<;overv that it was deml. On 
examining it we foiinfl that a piece of bomb 
ha/1 HtriKik it on the Ifft shoulder and in nil 
jjfobability h*wl fxriKtratod the heart. The 
boirib ha*J struck the Itard ground fifty yards 



away from the window and a splinter from it 
had passed through the bottom sash of the 
window (about 16 feet from the ground) and 
then through the wooden shutter at the head 
of the crib (an inch thick) and after going 
through two bed covers had passed into the 
body of the child. I never heard such a terrific 
explosion in my life ; it seemed as if it would 
tear everything to pieces."* 

One of the Zeppelins travelling through 
England that night attacked a little wood 
outside a peaceful country town. No less than 
fifteen bombs were dropped in a sylvan glade. 
Three fowls were killed and some windows were 
broken, and owing to the vibration a part of the 
roof of a house collapsed. No one was hurt. 
The inhabitants, half proud that their little place 
at last, after many centiu'ies of somnolent life, had 
stepped for the moment into the heart of world 
events, declared that they wovild put up a pillar 
stone on the spot with a suitable inscription. 

In another spot in East Anglia over one hun- 
dred bombs were dropped that night in an area 
of half a mile in which there are only two houses. 
The commanders of the Zeppelins — there were 
evidently two airships — clearly believed that 
they were over some very important place, for 
this tract of waste land was torn over and over 
with shells. Some panes of glass were broken 
in a lonely farm-house, and one side of the roof 
of a kennel was smashed in. In the north-east 
that same nigiit the raid was also a failiu'e, the 
Zeppelin commander being completely baffled 
in an attempt to find his location. One Zeppe- 
lin tried to tackle a town in a south-eastern 
county, but found itself met by a very warm 
fusillade and made off after droj)ping about a 
hundred bombs in fields. The Simday night 
raid was perhajjs the most ambitious the Oer- 
mans had yet undertaken. The Zeppelins 
which reached Scotland killed and injured a 
few civilians and aroused Scotland to a deeper 
detestation than ever of the methods of our 
foe. The Zeppelins that wander(>d through 
England lost their way. The military n^sults 
were insignificant. Yet the Cerman oHieial 
statement describrd the raid as though it were 
a great success : 

For llio tliird tiino, on I Ik; i)ij;lit, of Ajjril 2-.'(, a iiiisiil 
air rt(iiia(lron iiUiK-kfd ttio Knglisli I-wimI ('c)a»(, llii.s lirno 
llie (lorlhcni part. 

, K(liIllMl^^^l and J^(^il,ti, with the dockn on ifio ]''irlh of 
Forlli, N'cwcaMtl(!, nnd important wfiarvoH and l)iiildin)^'H, 
1)1(ihI, f iiriiaci's, and iiuitorioH on tJio 'I'yiic w(T<^ t)oni- 
hardcd with niitnoroiiH cxploHivc an<l iiiccndiary lionihH 

* Qnolcd in \\ni ScolMman. 



18M 



Till-: TIMKS mSTOUY OF Till': WAR. 



I 




< 




* 



'W^ 





J^ 



.>a*5'» 





a!^''' 



^'ii 



t. lO.C 



DESTRUCTION OF ZEPPELIN "L77" IN FRANCE, FEBRUARY 21, 1916. _ 

The airship was brought down at Brabant-le-Roi by a shot from a French " 75" gun. It was set on 
fire by an incendiary shell, and on coming to earth was further destroyed by the explosion of bombs on 

board. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 



189 



with very good results. Heavy explosions with exten- 
sive collapses were observed. A battery near Newcastle 
was silenced. 

In spite of the heavy bombardment all the airships 
safely returned and landed. 

The total absence of effective military pre- 
cautions on the east coast of Scotland against 
raiders aroused much indignation there and 
steps were at once taken to remedy this. 

On Wednesday, April 5, a Zeppelin attacked 
a district on the North-East Coast where the 
enemy had previously done some considerable 
damage. On the earlier occasions the re- 
sistance to the Zeppelins had been very shght. 
Now, as soon as the airship was discovered, 
searchlights lit it up and kept it in \aew. Guns 
immediately opened fire and shells could be 
seen bursting aU around the raider. The 
Zeppelin crew were apparently surprised by 
their reception. Blinded by the fierce beams 
of light, the airship ducked suddenly, but the 
light still held it. Then it rose again, trying 
to escape, and suddenly made out to sea. 
Crowds of people standing in the streets 
watched the guns, applauding every close shot 
and bursting into a cheer as one shell apparently 
hit the enemy. A few bombs were dropped but 
fell outside the city, doing no damage beyond 
elightly wounding a boy. 

People of this city who had been somewhat 
downcast by previous failures to offer resistance 
to raiders could not now express their gratitude 
and satisfaction with sufficient emphasis, and 
the Chief Magistrate formallv sent to the mili- 
tary authorities the thanks and congratulations 
of the city. Numbers of people were anxious 
to raise a reward for the splendid services of 
the gunners and .searchlight operators. The 
complete repulse of the raider here was really 
the first test of the new gun and searchlight 
defences of English cities, and competent 
authorities regarded it as a good omen for 
what would happen should the enemy try to 
come to London, now equipped with even more 
complete defences on the same lines as the sea- 
coast city in the North. 

Tlie feeling Vjegan to prow that the Gorman 
authorities now regarded another attP/Ck upon 
the heart of London as unsafe, for none was 
made diuing the spring months. 

Soon afterward.^ a German official version of 
the hhj)J>(ih*-jI effects of this series of raids from 
.March 31 to Af<ril 5 was publishfd. For pure 
imaginativeness it must take a high \i\ucii oven 
among German official accounts of the war. 
It vrfut clBime<J that the attju;k on the London 




LIEUTENANT BRANDON, R.F.C. 

Who, on the night of March 3L 1^16, dropped 

several bombs on a Zeppelin. 

docks dur ng the night of March 31- April 1 far 
surpassed all earlier attacks in severity and 
cffectivencMH. In the north-eastern quarter of 
the city numerous fires were started and serious 
damage was done. The district around Great 
Eastern Street and fireat Tower Str«!(!t had 
suffered particularly heavily and a ftictory had 
been burned down there. A transport steamer 
had been bombed between Tow(*r. IJridge 
and London liridge and Hcvercly damaged. 

NllllKTOIlH OtIl'T ilock.S IliMJ Ih'cii (liuuagOll, 



lyo 



THL 'nMi':;s msTuity of rni': wah. 





[Official photograpfi— Crown copyright reserved. 

AT SALONIKA. 

The control officer of the anti-aircraft gun, and 

the gun-layer who aimed the gun and fired the 

shot that destroyed the Zeppelin. 

warehouses burned down, anti-aircraft guns 
damaged, and numerous ships in the docks hit. 
A munition factory had been destroyed at 
Purfleet, great fires had been started on the 
Hiimber, widespread destruction had been 
caused at Grimsby, and several munition 
factories and sheds containing mvinition stores 
had been completely destroyed at Sunderland. 
A nnmition factory had been destroyed at 



.0/ficia I photograph — Crovtn copyright reseivcil 

THE DESTROYED ZEPPELIN AT 

SALONIKA, MAY 7. 1916. 

The framework was stripped bare by the flames 

from the airship's own petrol-tanks. The survivors 

of the crew, four officers and eight men, were 

made prisoners. 

Hexham and a w hole series of factories and slips 
put out of action at Gateshead. 

The claims for Edinburgh and Leith were 
perhaps the most extravagant. 

" Barracks, mvinition depots, ironworks and 
other factories lie in ruins. Two munition 
works broke out in flames and were destroyed. 
A large spirit factory was hit by incendiary 
bombs and was biu-ned to the ground. The 
railway station was also materially damaged. 
A train with material was destroyed. In the 
port several ships were hit ; one English four- 
masted ship was almost completely destroyed, 
and a transport steamer with war material was 
so badly damaged that it could not start on its 
voyage." 

The belief that London had been sewously 
damaged in the April raid was widely held 
throughout Germany and was the subject of 
much comment in the German Press, and many 
papers declared theii* delight at the terror 



THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. 



191 



produced in England by the Zeppelins and the 
devastation caused by their bombs. The 
Cologne Gazette heartened its readers by tales of 
Stockton and Middlesbrough reduced in parts 
to a vast heap of rums, and Newcastle with 
dozens of its factories and shipyards dis- 
solved in flame and smoke. 

The BerUn Lokalanzeiger drew a lurid picture 
of the fate of London, hit in its most susceptible 
quarters and most important places by the 
Zeppelin attack. The Munich Neueste Nach- 
rickten hoped the visits of the Zeppelins would 
be repeated until the Asquith Cabinet shuddered 
with terror and realized that its war aims were 
unattainable. German soldiers made prisoners 
in the fighting at the front were full of tales of 
the ruin of London, of the destruction of its 
streets, and the wreck of its buildings. When 
their British captors assured them that London 
had not even been touched during the spring 
raids, and that all London had heard of them 
was the sound of some very distant guns, they 
refused to believe them. 

A fresh series of raids began when the next 
spell of moonless nights came along at Easter 
week. The Germans had planned a great 
general offensive for tlus week. The uprising 
of the Sinn Fein group in Dublin began on 
Easter Monday ; a hurried attack from the sea 
was made on Yarmouth and Lowestoft on the 
Tuesday morning ; and an offensive was 
actively pushed on the Western front. The air- 
craft joined in the campaign. On Easter 
Monday a hostile aeroplane appeared over Dover 
from the ea^st at a height estimated to bo 
6,000 feet. Anti-aircraft guns at once came 
into action, and it was driven off without 
dropping any bombs. That sarm; evening there 
was a Zeppelin raid over Norfolk and Suffolk, 
but it 8eem.s to liave been more for the purpose 
of reconiiaiirsance than for a serious offensive, 
for the three airships which took part in it 
droppe^i only a few bombs and remained a very 
short time. On the follovvini; night four Zeppe- 
linH raided Ehh*;x ur^l Kent, ilcn;, too, possibly 
be<;au.se of the brisk fire of the anti-aircraft 
guns wliich rnet them at point after point, they 
fell bafrk after having accomplishefl little or 
nothing. Two hundred bombs were <lroi)[jOfl 
and on'; casualty was roportefl. On the follow- 
ing night the Zeppelins came biw;k again over 
the e;iHt cofwt of K'^nt with equally negative 
resultH. 

The n-id of May 2 witnr;i««ed the dispateh of 
probably the great^jst number of Zejipelins 



ever directed against England at one time. 
They arrived at different points all along the 
coast. One came southwards from tho 
Scottish coast ; another proceeded north- 
wards to Aberdeenshire. They were noted 
at different points from tho coast of Nor- 
folk northwards. The astonishing feature of 
this raid was that so little was accomplished. 
Only two of the airships made a serious,attempt 
to penetrate inwards. The airsliips did not 
discharge anything like their normal load of 
bombs ; iu only one locality was any seriou?i 




[0(/icial photograph 
CAPTURED AT SALONIKA. 
Sub-Lieutenant Thelen, the engineer, and 
Lieutenant Scherzer, the commander, of the 
Zeppelin wrecked by British gunners at Salonika. 

mischief done, and there tho total casualties 
only amounted to 36. 

In several instances the Zeppelins were 
riearly batHed. They missed certain obvious 
p lints at which they were aiming. The most 
striking instance of this was shown by ' L 20," 
which went northwards in Scotland. It uiissod 
Kdinburgli, at uhicli it was probably uiniingi 
and wandered away to Aberdeenshire. Here it 
missed tho towns and dropped bombs in fields 
faj away. One or two cjuiet Scottish manses 
in rural districts woro startled by tho noise 
of the explosion of bombs. " L 20 " then crossed 
to Norway, which it nrjuhcd mxt HKiiiiing. 
It caiiic <K)\\ti in llafsfiord iniicli (liuimi'ed. 



l"i-2 



Till': TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAll. 



The flow iihtiiuloiuul it uftor doHtrnyiny |)artti 
itl' thu iiuuhiiiery. Tliey werw tirre8teil uiid 
iiUerutitl. Th» euiaiiiaikilt^r of a Nurwegiuu 
rugiineitt statioiifil imar l>y had the wivrkt«l 
airHhip ilfHtruyeil. Appaiviitly it had hf»Mi 
yri'atly ilamagtid by Ihilish gunfire. One of tlit^ 
crew told a correHpundiuit that during the 
attark on Uritain the airship vvaei ao injured by 
itritish shells that the commander iiad hurried 
towards home to avoid capture. 

The spring air campaign may be said to 
have iinished with two raitls by sca|)lanes on the 
south-east coast towards the end »)t' May. They 
repeated the familiar features of such raids. 
The machines swept over the coast, dropped a 
few liombs, killed a few people, injured a 
church and some schools, and escaped before 
our pui'suing seaplanes could rise to attack 
them. 

The main features of the spring air campaign 
were the incroa.se of the defensive measures 
taken in England, the improvement in anti- 
aircraft guns, the advance in the form of 
searchlights used, and the. more effective 
regulations for bafTling the enemy's .sense of 
direction by throwing the country into dark- 
ness. The Gernians demonstrated the greater 
range of Zeppelins, and compelled England to 
divert a certain amount of strengtli to the 
maintenance of a widespread system of 
defences. 



As between Zeppt>lins and anti-aircraft guns 
the greater advance w»is made by the ginis. Tin* 
destruction of "LIS" at the mouth of the 
'i'hames and the damage inflicted on '" L 20 " 
in Scotland were due to gunfire. A raiding 
Zeppelin a[)proacliing Salonika on May 7 was 
heavily fired on by the Fleet and came down in 
a blaze at the mouth of the Vardar Hiver. The 
experience of our Allies also demonstrated that 
anti-aircraft guns of sufficient calibre can 
sometimes be used with great effect, not merely 
to compel an attacking Zejjpelin to soar high, 
but also to bring it down, even at a rna.<cimum 
height. 

The main disappointments of the spring from 
the British point of view wen* two. The first 
was the failure of the Government to consoli- 
date and unify the air departments and to 
build up a great Air Ministry. The Ministry 
was feeling its way, through a maze of com 
mittces and boards, to the best means of 
remedying the shortcomings of previous years. 
The second disappointment was our inability to 
launch sustained and vigorous attacks against 
the German air bases. Notwithstanding those 
disappointments, there was reason for encour- 
agement. Slowly, in face of deep-seated preju- 
dices, the Government was awakening to a 
realization of the almost vital necessity of 
supremacy in the air if victory in the war were 
to be assured. 




CHAPTER CXXIX. 



RUSSIA AT WAR. 



Russian Feeling at Outbreak of War — Relations with Germany — Internal Politics — 
Outburst of Patriotism — The Tsar and the Duma — The Goremykin Government — 
Demand for Reforms — Dissolution of the Duma — Ministerial Changes — M. Goremykin 
Resigns — Premiership of M. Stuemer — The Drink Problem and its Radical Solution — 
The Church — The Making of the Russian Armies — Finance — Trade Routes and the 
MuRMAN Railway — Gersl^n "Penetration" of Russia and its Consequences — Food 
Problems — Industries and Munitions Question — The Anti-German Movement and its 
Meaning — Attitude of the Jews — German Espionage — Anti-German Riots at Moscow — 
Refugees — Red Cross Work — Russia and her Allies — Anglo-Russian Relations 



WHEN Germany declared war, Russia 
was in the midst of a great trans- 
formation. The agrarian reforms 
undertaken in 1906 had already 
yielded surprising results. Communal holdings 
were being rapidly superseded by farmsteads, 
and these, again, combining in a network of 
cooperativ'e societies, greatly enhanced the 
output of farm produce. In an empire con- 
taining over 100,000,000 of rural population 
this change bade fair to exercise a very aus- 
picious influence upon the social and economic 
forces of the country. The communal system 
had offered little incentive to private enter- 
prise ; in passing away it might leave a few 
scars, but its disappearance would strengthen 
and invigorate the whole body corporate. Such 
remarkable changes could not escape the notice 
of Russia's ney^hbours. Each successive develop- 
ment of the agrarian reform had been watched 
by the Germans with anxious attention. Agri- 
cultural conunissions went to Russia and 
reported on the work of the land settlement 
^loards, the growth of individual holdings and, 
lat*;r, of the cooperative societies. 

As Russia waxf;d strong in the arts of jn-ace, 
Germany came to discuss the advantage of a 
" preventive war," the idea being that Russia 
should \x: crushed bf;fore she grew stronger and 
more enlightf-rirrd, nnd so prevented from 
l^ecorning too inflepenflent of Germany. Few, 
if any, Ku.HHians seriously believed in the 
[KiHHibility of such a war. 'I'hrr enonnous 
int*rr»«tH (irniinuy hml at Htuk*-, hr-r tnwle with 
t\ni (^nintry, tho innumerable tics of business or 
Vol. VIII.— Part 97. 



kinslxip that bound so many of her people to 
the Tsar's subjects were adduced as convincing 
arguments against the theory of German 
aggression. Russia was flooded with Ger- 
man goods, and German influence embraced 
.science, literature, art, even political insti- 
tutions ; German Marxism permeated and 
poisoned Russian labour ; German models were 
copied in the fashioning of ladies' dress and in 
the rules of parliamentary procedure. Thou- 
sands of Russians who had studied in Germany 
were holding high office ; tens of thousands of 
officials and officers were of German parentage ; 
the so-called monarchist parties in Russia were 
all imbued with the utmost reverence for 
German ideas, and only in the closest friendship 
with Germany saw any salvation for the Throne 
and institutions of Ru.ssia. 

Nothing short of brutal violence could, 
indeed, have brought the Russian people 
into a fighting mood. Yet there were 
deep-seated causes of dislike towards the 
Gennans. They held a position of privilege 
and favour that the Russians could never re- 
gard with equanimity. Moreover, enlightened 
Russians perceived that modern Germany, 
while continuing to exert an undue; influence 
over Ru.ssian affairs, h>ul herself sunk into the 
abyss of mat<!rialism, and that Kii.s.sia iTiust 
cut herself loose from this containintiliDM.* 



193 



• In on article entitled " The Dangers of Gommii 
ArliMli(;(;ultiir(!," piibliHhod in 19 IT), V. Kiirlmlov wrote: 
" Formorly tlin biiHicr fcattin-H of Gorman art wore 
trividlily (in<i the hlriviiij/ for eiiHy and noisy huccohh. 
'i'hin cannot lint induct! a Icvclliin; down of r<c|iij'rr montH 
in all domaiiiH of cnllnrc, wliicli, of courHC, leudu to the 



191 



Tin: TIMES HISTORY OF Till': WAR. 




THE TSAR. 

Conversing with General Williams, of the British 

Army, in Petrograd. 

It waf? this revolt from everything Gennan 
that prompted the decision to change the 
name of St. Petersburg to the purely Russian 
form of Petrograd, a decision which was made 
shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. 

During the last days of July, 1914, tlie 
Russian people were at last fully alive to the 

wrecking of culture itself. Investigation of this aspect 
of the question is of the utmost importance for Russia, 
since, thanks to the fact that masses of Russian youth 
have obtained their higher education in Germany and 
that masses of books have been translated from the 
German. Russian culture is infected -with the many 
defects of German culture. Such investigation does not 
involve an attempt to show that German culture is bad 
in all respects, just as it is equally impossible to prove 
that Germans in all respects are barbarians. It is 
possible that other peoples also, finding themselves in the 
position of conquerors of the world, as the Germans 
regard themselves, would display a certain insolence 
towards others. In the Germans, however, that insolence 
has passed all bounds known to historj\ . . . Russian 
art as yet has kept itself aloof from Germany and has 
gravitated almost exclusively towards France. Our 
artists who have been to Munich have not given us 
anything remarkable, whereas France has influenced 
Somov (who himself influenced German3') and Ostroumov 
and Levitan and Serov, while Italy captivated Vrubel. 
. . . Acquaintance with the culture of modern Europe 
in no case permits us to put Germany in the first place. 



gravity of th«» Hitttation. The war found them 
antl their Cloveriuiient united in a conuiioii 
purpose, smarting under a sense of wrong, 
uiilignant at the mendurity of the Cerman 
llinperor, who could dare to blame Russia f<ir 
thi! war. 'i'ho scales had fallen from their eyes. 
The French Presidential \isit to Petrograd 
in July, llil4, coincided with a general strike 
v\hirh CJtriiian agents had abetted and pcrliii|)s 

III tliB domain of art th«re is none to comj)iiro with 
l-'raiu'c ; in llio doiniiin of ucionco England nncjue.stion- 
iibly Htund.'i ulioad of her, while, when discuNhing lochnical 
pi;rfeclion, America muat be includtul with European 
countries. 1'he queution of Gorman culture is especially 
important to Russianis hecauHe, by virtue of geogruj>liical 
iiud lii.storicnl conditions, Germany has ixiworfully 
iilluctod Russian culture. 'I'lic present war may prove 
.^iilutary if it forces us to reap|)rai»o these questions." 

.M. Kurbatov cites the baneful influences of the 
German school upon Russian architecture. The horrors 
of t\w " munumontal " style offend the eye in Moscow, 
Petrograd and other cities. Unconsciously, by virtue 
of the intuition that the vmeducated masses frequently 
uispiay, the common people, long before the war, had 
conceived a violent dislike for the Gorman "art" 
exemplified in the now Embassy building in J'etrograd. 
Dcsigruid to resemble a prison or a universal store, the 
edifice was surmoimted by two colossal bronze horses 
led by a nude male figure, symbolizing diplomacy and 
trade dominated by Force. Tlie untutored muzhik 
know nothing about the "niceties" of the Gorman 
school, but he instinctively felt that the idea of this ugly 
fabric was a challenge and an affront to his country. 
Long before the war it was not an uncommon sight to 
behold the common people stop in front of the Emba.ssy 
building and give outward expression to their dis- 
approval. Soon after the war began the edifice was 
wrecked and the colossal figures were cast down. 




SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN 



THE TIMES HISTOliY OF THE WATl. 



195 




SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN. 
The British Ambassador at Petrograd. Elected honorary citizen of Moscow, May, 1916. 



provoked. ^Money was certainly forthcoming 
from unknown sources to pay the strikers, but 
if GJerman calculations had been based upon the 
spread of internal unrest in Russia they were 
woefully ill-founded. Xo sooner had the menace 
of war become apparent than the strikers 
willingly resumed work, and whatever difficul- 
ties were subsequently experienced in the 
labour domain they never engendered any 
doubt as to the deep loyalty of the working 
fla.sses of Rus.sia. Russia's enemies had under- 
estimated the spirit of the nation. Complete 
union between parties, classes, races, and 
religions was the response of the Empire to 
Germanic aggression. 

In the manifesto issued to his subjects at 
the outbreak of the Great War, Nicholas II. 
said : 

At pr»»Hcnt wc have not only to siicoour a kiiidrr^d land 
whif;h hfw bfsen unjustly v,t<iuu''i^i f"it to HafcgiianI Xhf. 
honour, dii^nity and int«;(/rit,y of KiixHia a« a Krcat 
I'ower. Wo firmly f>eliove that in tho d^ffsnco of thoir 
fountry all our trii« Huhj^otH will rine united in a npirit of 
»<elf-xa^;rifice. At tWm drea<l hour of trial rnay all internal 
differonces \)f, forj<rjtte,n ; niay the union of the Tuar and 
hiM people \>nf;(iinf. elofjer and xtronf^cr. 

In the rfw;ript to M. <^i!orernykin, March 0/19, 
H>I1, fli'-- I'r'-rriier whh t';l<l that tfie "welfare 
of hi(4 j>*;<>pU) HhouJfl not bo Hfujrificwl to futile 
HspiratioriH, HomelimeH rjiiite alien to those 



national traditions and historical foundations 
upon which Russia had grown and become 
strong." 

These two pronoimcements were destined 
to introduce an element of uncertainty into 
internal politics. 

During the first stages of the war, and until 
the disastrous retreat of the Russian armies 
had aroused misgivings as to the efficiency of 
the administration, all parties and classes 
loyally refrained from political agitation. The 
Tsar's call to union was implicitly oboycd. 

It is difficult to exaggerate the enthusiasm 
which prevailed throughout the country during 
the memorable days of July and August, 1!)14. 
A remarkable scene of reverent enthusiasm was 
witnessed on August 2 outside the Winter 
Palace, within which th(^ whole Imperial family 
and the Court were attc^nding a T(! Dcum for vic- 
tory. Over 300,000 [)oople of all ranks stood in 
the burning sun for three hours. The popularity 
of llie high personag(!s \\ lio cntisred the Va\iuo 
could be gauged by the '-heering of tho crowd. 
G(!n(!ral Sukliomlinoff, M. Sazonoff, M. Krivo- 
sliein, and M. Goreniykin wtin; enthusiastically 
greeted. A stonn ot apj)lause accompanied 
the (Jrand Duke Nitiholas as he drove by in a 
inotor-f;(ir flying the l)ln(!< and yc^ilow striped 
I)ennant of Command(!r-in-(Jhief. Th ' Kn rich 
Kmbassy and Sf^rbian Legation, nloim of (lio 



1% 



Tin: TlMKSi lIJSTOliV OF TUN WAIL 




THE UEKMAN KM BASS V AT 
PErROGRAD. 

The figures on the parapet were pulled down by 
the mob. 

foreign missions, attended the fimctiou and 
were received with the heartiest applause by 
the demonstrators. 

Inside the Palace, the Tsar told the assem- 
bled gathering of statesmen, courtiers, soldiers, 
and seamen : " War has been forced upon us. 
I hereby take a solemn pledge not to conclude 
peace so long as a single enemy remains on 
Russian soil." Then the Emperor and Empress 
appeared on the balcony. The sturdy figure of 
the Sovereign, clad in a khaki field tunic, was 
seen bowing repeatedly to the rnultitude. The 
innumerable banner bearers of patriotic societies 
bent the knee devoutly, invoking the blessing of 
the Sovereign. The common people, especially 
the reservists, remained kneeling, their gaze 
riveted on the Little Father. It was a sight 
destined to live long in Russian history. 

A week later, the reception of the Houses at 
the Winter Palace and the speeches of the Tsar 
and the two Presidents left an indelible im- 
pression on all who heard theni. President 
Rodzianko addressed Russia's enemies thus : 
" You think dissension and dislike disunite us, 
whereas all the nationalities inhabiting the 
boundless territories of Russia have joined 
together in one vast family since danger 
tlireatens our common fatherland." 



That old unruitics, |)arty haln<(ls, personal 
jealoiUjiuH had been forgotten became evident 
tioin such an extraordinary sight as the Cadet 
leader, M. Miliukoff, walking ann and arm with 
I he rtuietiouary Jew-baiter, M. Purishkevitch. 
.M. Purishkevitch had earlier made public 
recantation before a representative gathering 
of Jews. The Constitutionalist, M. Rod/.iunko, 
sat on the window-sill beside the reactionary 
M. Zaniyslovsky. 

At 11 o'clock the Emperor came out and 
stood in the midst of a circle formed by Minis- 
ters, Dt^puties, and Councillors. His Majesty 
svoro the campaign dress of a colonel of the 
l''oot Guards, and was attended only by the 
.Minister of the Court. Amid deep silence 
rang out words that \\(!nt straight to the 
hearts of his hearers. Ho welcomed tliem 
in these ominous and troubled days when 
(Germany and Austria had declared war 
on Russia. The great outburst of love of 
country and loyalty to the Throne that had 
swept tempest-like over the land was the 
warrant that the great mother Russia would 
carry the war to the desired end. He was 
animated by the .same sentiments of love and 
sacrifice, and was also Milling to lay down his 
life, and from that consciousness of unity with 
his people he derived strength and confidence. 
They were not only defending the honour and 
dignity of their own soil, but also their brothers 
by blood and faith. He rejoiced to see the 
union of the Slavs dcv^eloping as strongly as that 
of Russia. He knew that everyone there would 
do Ms duty. Then, raising his voice, the Tsar 
uttered the homely Russian saying : " Great 
is the God of the Russian land." The legis- 
lators responded with a thunderous hxirrah, 
and immediately afterwards sang "God save 
the Tsar." When silence had been restored, 
the acting Vice-President, M. Golubeff, replied 
on behalf of the Upper House. President 
Rodzianko, who followed, made a speech which 
deeply moved the Sovereign, who was seen to 
press his hand to his heart as if overcome by the 
depth of his feeling. 

The Tsar after a slight pause said, in a voice 
as strong and firm as ever : " Gentlemen, I 
thank you from niy heart for the sincere 
feelings of patriotism that you have shown in 
word and deed. I never doubted them. Jfifith 
all my soul I wish j^ou success." Then, raising 
his voice and devoutly crossing himself, he 
added, " God be with \is." 
In tliis very hall, on the previous Simday, 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



197 



over a thousand young soldiers about to go to 
the front had prayed together with the Tsar. 
Old courtiers, inindful, even at such au hoiu", 
of etiquette, had insisted that this would be 
irregular, but the young Empress overrode all 
their objections, and in a fine blaze of indig- 
nation exclauned, " It is they who are going 
to fight. It is with them that the Tsar must 
mingle his prayers." 

The special session of the Duma lasted tliree 
and a half hours. The voting of three Bills 
deaUng with war supplies occupied only as 
many minvites. 

Unfeigned and deep had been the delight of 
the masses when it had become known that 
Great Britain would join hands with Franco 
and Russia. Public feeling was thoroughly 
represented in the proceedings of the Duma. 
The Tima correspondent wrote that during 
the ten years he had attended the sittings 
of the Duma he had never heard stich ovations 
as those which greeted ISI. Sazonofi and the 
representatives of the Allied Powers. First the 



Serbian, then the Belgian Ministers, and later 
the French and British Ambassadors were 
cheered with indescribable enthusiasm. When 
Sir George Buchanan rose to bow his thanks, 
the whole House — the public and the Pres8 
galleries, the President and officers of the 
House, and all the Ministers — rose shouting 
" Hurrah for old England." 

One after another the representatives of all 
the nationalities— Jews, Germans, Tartars, and 
all parties ascended the rostrum, each pro- 
claiming his love of the Fatherland and determi- 
nation to stand shoulder to shoulder. The 
declaration of the Polish Deputy was particu- 
larly impressive. The Poles, he said, were 
throwing in their lot with the Slavs against 
Teutonic oppression, as they had done 500 
years ago at the battle of Grunewald.* 

Apparently nothing coiild mar the truce that 
had been called between political parties. 
The disastrous battle of Soldau-Tannenberg 

* Known in German history as the Battle of Tannen- 
berg. 




TilK TSAK RKVIHWIN(; (:OSSAC:KS. 
He is accompanied by the TNarcvitch. 



97—2 



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198 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



199 



at the end of Sej^tember, 1914, caused scarcely 
a ripple on the broad, deep waters of Rvissian 
confidence. 

The people did not for an instant doubt the 
country's determination to carry on the war, 
but there was not the same confidence in 
the ability of the Government to resist an offer 
of premature peace. Tlie ]Moscow merchants 
telegraphed a loyal address to the Tsar in which 
they ventured to expose their doubts and 
uncertainties on the subject : 

Repognizing all the historical importance and necessi- 
ties of the moment, we, in common with the whole of the 
Russian people, desire that this war should be carried on, 
even if all the energies of the Empire have to be exerted, 
and that peace negotiations should not be permitted 
until our \nctorious armies have penetrated into the very 
heart of hostile Germany. 

The Tsar telegraphed on November 4 : 
Please tell the Moscow merchants that I sincerely 
esteem and, at the same time, share the sentiments they 
have expressed. Their apprehensions are groundless as 
to the possibility of any peace negotiations whatsoever 
being permitted until our enemies are completely 
crushed. 

If anything could heighten the popular 
satisfa<;tion, it was the Grand Duke's proclama- 
tion to the Poles, announcing the resurrection 
of the Polish nation. 

Internal politics remained in an eminently 
satisfactory condition for several months. The 
arrest and trial of M. Vladimir Bourtsef? in 
February, 1915, was the only noteworthy event. 
M. Bourtseff, who had played an important part 
in disclosing the abu.ses connected with the 
political police system, decided when the war 
broke out that it was time for all Russia's 
sons to rally to their country. He returned 
home after publishing in The Times a letter 
explaining his motives, only to find that the 
police, acting upon a legal fonnality, considered 
him a fugitivf; from justice. He was taken 
unfler arrest, and subsequently tried for Use- 
majeite, incurring a nominal penalty. 

The Government and the people had ex- 
pected a hard struggle with Germany, but few 
if any RiiHHian.s entertairied any serious fear 
as to the war lasfing much beyond the winter 
of 1914. Ho long hh tlie Russian armies were 
advancing in Galicia, even if they had had to 
fall back in Poland, appn;henHion as to the 
struggle b'ing long protra<;tcd did not arise; 
and although the l»w;k of munitions, well known 
to tlif" arrny since the previous autumn, should 
have engendered some di.squiet, it was only 
when The Times bf^gan itn cainpaign for the 
friobilization of induHtries thnt Russian opinion 
awoke to the gravity of the situation. Russia's 



disasters in the (<alician theatre and the on- 
forced retirement of her forces brought matters 
to a crisis, resulting in the departure from oHice 
of General Sukhouilinoff and the appointnvent 
of General Polivanoff as Minister of War. 

Many sensational reports were current at the 
time as to the causes of this change, and they 
cropped up afresh many months later, when 
General Sukhomlinoff was arrested on charges 
of neglecting and exceeding his official powers ; 
but it is not necessary to say more. The lack 
of high explosive shells and deficiency in the 
calling out and training of reserves afforded 
ample cause for the change decreed by the 
Tsar. 



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M. BOURTSEFF. 

For soin»! weeks before this event, which 
took place at the end of Juno, 191.5, the political 
atmosphere hud become nuu^h obscured. 
Russian public men b(!l<)nging to all j)arties 
were engaged in Red Cross and otiicr war 
work, and knew f{uite well that tluue was a 
.s(!rious shortage of nuinitimis and men. Tiie 
truce could not be continued, at hiaft not iis 
between th(! Duma jukI (Iki ( Jovcrnniciit . 
Representative's of Dn- imtion had to spcal< iip, 
or be accused l)y the people of neglecting their 
jliity. President Rodzianko, Jicting with (lie 
froncurrencr- of his colleagues, made liis voi(^(" 
felt in high (juurtfTs, and it was said that the 
retin^ment of General Sukhornlinoi'f and I lie 
u[)f)ointment of C<(rjn nil Polivniiolt wcic dccidid 
somewhat hurriedly n,t I lie Grarxl Duloi's 



•200 



THE TIMKS nJlSTUliY OF Tllbl W Al! 




ABOUT TO SET OUT FOR A SLEDGE RIDE. 
The Tsarevitch (x) and some of his cousins in the grounds of the Tsar's palace at Tsarskoe Selo, 



headquarters, after an Imperial conference at 
which the President of the Dimia played nw 
inconsiderable part. 

During the sad months of the great retreat 
the feeling of disstitisf action naturally grew. 
It was unanimously agreed by all parties, 
excepting the extreme reactionaries, that other 
ministerial changes were essential. ]\I. Gore- 
mykin appeared to be concerned only with the 
carrying out of the Tsar's behests about 
'■ futile aspirations " — mentioned above. The 
Tsar's idea had been expressed in the phrase, 
" Reforms later ; meanwhile, all for the 
war." This sentiment, however, could not be 
reconciled with the internal situation after the 
failure of the War Office had become manifest. 
M. Goremykin cannot be excused from the 
grave responsibility he incurred in not advising 
the Emperor accordingly. Any change or de- 
partiu"e from the existing order of things was 
regarded by him as an insidious attempt to 
introduce Parliamentary government, which 
he regarded as utterly " irreconcilable with the 
national traditions and historical foundations." 
The " union of the Tsar and his people " jiro- 
clainied in the ^lanifesto of August 2 was never 



understood by M. Goremykin in a broad 
sense. 

M. Krivoshein, the strongest man in the 
Government, who had carried out the marvel- 
lous agrarian reforms, was looked upon as the 
coming premier. There seems to be every 
reason to suppose that the post w-as actually 
offered to him at the time when General 
Polivanoff entered the ministry, and that he 
declined the ofTer, because he wanted a free 
hand in choosing all his colleagues, whereas 
three of the ministers were notoriously incom- 
patible with any policy of conciliation. 

As the smnmer of 1915 waxed and weaned 
popular discontent steadily grew. It every- 
where took the form of an insistent demand for 
the assembling of the Duma. Both Houses at 
length met in August. After much criticism of 
the Govermnent, the vfwious constitutional 
parties both in the Duma and in the Council of 
the Empire agreed to draw up a list of demands, 
and to press tliem upon the sovereign 's_atten- 
tion. The movement resultetl in what wtus 
known as the programme of the Progressive bloc. 
As these demands were backed i;p by a largo 
majority of the Diuna and a sulistantitul section 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



201 



of the Upper House, and insisted in tlic first 
place upon the summoning of ministers i^n- 
joying the confidence of tiie nation, M. Gore- 
mykin had to make up his mind either to 
resign or to dissolve the Duma. He chose 
the latter course, and he did so without even 
consulting his colleagues. The terms of the 
rescript cited above probably satisfied hhn that 
he was only doing his duty. Through his in- 
fluence M. Rodzianko's application for an 
audience was unduly postponed. ]M. Goremykin 
was confirmed in his opinion by the absence of 
any trouble after the prorogation — a circum- 
stance which he somewhat hastily interpreted 
in his own favour. 

Public attention was much engaged at this 
time by the Tsar's decision to take personal 
command of the land and sea forces engaged in 
military operations. The command had been 
temporarily confided to the Grand Duke 
Nicholas at the outbreak of war, because, as the 
terms of his appointment read, the Emperor 
" for reasons of a general character found it 
impossible to assume these duties then." M. 
Goremykin would not support the majority of 
the other ministers, who did their very best to 
dissuade the Tsar from taking upon himself the 
direct responsibility of operations at a time 



when tlif) Army was still Ixuiig extricated 
from a difficult position. His Majesty said, 
with characteristic directness and nobility, that 
in the first place he felt it to be his mission and 
his duty to assume this responsibility ; in the 
second place ho preferred to take over the 
command at a tinrie when he could do so without 
wresting the laurels from anyone's brow ; and 
thirdly, that if it was written that he and his 
flynasty should perish — ^well, it was written, and 
he could not alter it. The Tsar and subse- 
quently the Tsarevitch accordingly wont to 
the Front, where in the course of the campaign 
they received the cross and medal of St. George 
respectively froin the hands of their generals. 

M. Goremykin's coup against the parliamen- 
tary institution of the country stimvilated and 
encouraged the reactionary elements. This 
movement led to a congress of the so-called 
Monarchist parties at Nizhni Novgorod, in De- 
cember, 1915, at which resolutions condemning 
the idea of a constitution and advocating the 
abolition of the Duma were carried, much 
to the disgust and disapproval of all genuine 
and self-respecting Conservatives in Russia. 
The high-sounding plirases of this congress 
did not, however, bring good luck to the 
Prime Minister, who had called them forth. 




MKMHHKS OF THR HOI-Y SYNOD. 
The Metropolitan of I'ctro|2rad (in centre). 



•20.* 



'nit: TIMES HISTOUY OF TUK ]VAn. 



llu wajii deHtined tu full within twu iiiontlit<, 
vt (it'll it liuil bt'iuinti tuo obvioiiH that hih pulicy 
tuwurilti thti Diuiiu liad only Htivngtht^ned tli» 
t^xtivnm imrti»'8 und wh« falt'uliit<<l to \v»'tik» ii 
tht< lorifs of the country. 

Kong beloiu M. ( Joreniykin'« vain stnigjiln 
a^aiiMt constitutional development came to 
an fill I, luiportant changes had lu-t-n made 
among the memherti of Ium Ministry. In June, 
191o, M Maklakoff had been relieved of his 
ilutit-s an Minister of the Interior. Pnbli(r 
Kpuiion liud long regarded him as one of the 
main nhstacles to a working agreement between 




GENERAL SHUVAEFF, 
Russian Minister of War. 

the Dimia and the Government. He was 
notoriously a retrograde in politics, but so long 
as the administration of his department was 
not marked by any serious disorders he retained 
oflKce. But soon after the Moscow distiu-bances 
(see page 225) he had to resign, and his post 
was conferred upon Prince Shcherbatoff. As 
Prince Shcherbatoff had long held important 
elective posts in the provincial administration, 
liis appointment was regarded as a distinct 
jjronuse of reform in the biu-eaucratic police 
methods. He did nothing to provoke criticism, 
but neither did he merit any particular recog- 
nition. M. ^Iaklakof?"s departvu-e coincided 



with that of M. Shcheglovitof?, the Minister of 
Justice, who, together with M. Ka.sso, (he 
Minister of Kducation, liad for many years been 
the pillars of reaction in the (Jovernment. He 
was replaced by M. Khvostoff, a moderate 
Conservative sitting in the ll[)j)er Hoiis«>, who 
beeanu- known as a conscientious member of 
the (iovi^nment. 

After the events connected uilii Ihf <lis- 
solution of the Duma, the position of M. 
Krivoshein and other Ministers who had 
re.soiiitely oppo.-^ed that measure became 
increasingly tlifhcult. It is true that the 
w orkmen had remained quiet and that there was 
no outward evidence of discontent, but hostility 
lijwards the Goremykin administration was 
undoubtedly assuming an acute form through- 
out the country. M. Goremykin's dream of 
breaking up the progressive bloc and organizing 
a Conservative majority argued Iiis entire 
inability to imderstand the situation. Popular 
discontent was voiced by innumerable resolu- 
tions of censure passed by various public 
bodies. Moreover, the rapid rise in the price 
of commodities and the scarcity of food and 
fuel in the great cities, superadded to the 
terrible circumstances attending the invasion 
of fifteen provinces, especially the wholesale 
exodus of millions of homeless refugees, all 
served to increase the general tension. 

Faced by the alternative of rendering himself 
a party to a continuation of ]\I. Goremykin's 
political experiments or of resigning office, 
31. Krivoshein decided upon the latter course. 
His resignation was probably hastened by the 
appointment of a new Home Minister in the 
place of Prince Shcherbatoff, and the dramatic 
dismissal of ]\I. Samarin, the procurator of the 
Holy SjTiod, an event which shocked public 
opinion because he was known to have played 
a very energetic part in an attempt to put an 
end to the Rasputin scandal.* M. Khv-ostofif, 
a nephew of the Minister of Justice, was Prince 
Shcherbatofi's successor. He had recently 
attracted notice by a somewhat violent speech 
in the Dmiia, directing attention to the rise in 
price of necessaries of life and to the dangerous 
influence of German capital in the Russian 
banks. The new Home Secretary mimediatelj'' 
began to conciliate the Press and the public by 
giving inmmierable " interviews " in _»;lnch 
he promised to apply remedies to all the ills 
complained of. The introduction of such a 
Falstaffian element into the Ministry was 
* Cf. page 207. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 



203 




TSAR INSPECTING MUNITION WORKS. 



calf;iilated to dissolxe the last elements of 
cohesion among its members. It is said that 
a group of them, including M. Krivoshein, M. 
Kharitonoff, and Count Ignatieff, the new 
Minister of Education, met and decided to 
f>res^;nt their collective resignations to the 
Tsar. 

M. Khvostoff's quasi -liberal declarations 
offendcfl the extreme Right party in the Duma, 
of which he was leader, and ni the same time 
«rousf;d some hopes that he n)ight be in earnest, 
arKi in that case M. fJoremykin would have to 
resieri the i'rerniership to hiin. Mr-nnwhile tlie 
reaswniblirig of the Uouhch liad been indefinitt-iy 
prmtponerj. M. fioremykin wfw still under 
the dflinif^ri tli;it dc roiiM Dilly a siiflifrient 
number of «uf»porters, in t }i<- Duma. After 
waiting two months, tfif; Krripcror, reiili/.ing that 
the age^l I'rirne Ministrfr harl b<-en illinfoniied, 
decided to allow him to resign. His succeHHf)r, 



j\I. Stunner, a statesman of Conservative, but 
not uncompromising tendencies, immediately 
succeeded in relieving the tension, and on his 
advice not only was the Duma assembled, but, 
making n departure from all precedent, the 
Tsar went in j)ers()n to attend, its opening 
■ — a step which called forth profound and 
unanimous approljation. 

'\'\\" dismissal of M. Khvostoff from the 
Home ()\'{\cc sliortly afterwards led to the 
disclosure of another scandal connected with 
fill- naTne of Rasputin. 

Ill March, lOUi, llie country learned with dec^f) 
regret that (Jciieni! I'olivanoff had rosignod. 
It was surmised that diCficulties had arisen 
with respfict to the subuiissiou of certniii 
inilitiiry (|ucstioris lo 1li<' l)unia. Under the 
RuHsiaii (;onst iliitioii the affairs of the Army, 
Navy, Church, and I'orciun af'fnirfl. are ex- 
pressly excluded from (he purview of the 



204 



Tilt: TIMI'JS HlSTUllY OF Tlll<: WAR. 




A MOTOR GVCLK COKFS AKMliD WITH MACHINE GUNS. 



Duma's decisions. General Polivanoff while 
Assistant-Minister during the 8iikhomUnoft" 
administration had dift'orod with his chief on 
this same question. Whatever were the pre- 
cise reasons of the resignation, it came happily 
at a time when General Polivanoff had already 
carried out far-reeiching reforms in the pre- 
paration of the reserves and had thereby 
enormously strengthened the armies in the field. 
His successor, General Shuvaeff, formerly 
Chief of the Commissariat Service, was a 
specialist in matters of business organization, 
and one of his new assistants, Senator Garin, 
had been instrumental in disclosing abuses in 
connection with army contracts. It was hoped 
that the new appointments would help to free 
Russia from the corruption that unfortunately 
still existed in several of the departments of 
State. 

One of the main strongholds of the old 
corrupt methods had been the railway adminis- 
tration. M. Rukhloff, Minister of Ways of 
Communication, had been compelled some 
months previously to hand in his resignation, 
and General Trepoff, an inexperienced but 
energetic and honest official, had taken his 
place. 

At the commencement of 1914 the Tsar had 
announced his firm, unalterable will to eradicate 
the drink evil. A change of INIinisters accom- 
panied tlois pronovmcement, M. Kokovtsoff's 
duties as Premier and Minister of Finance 
falling to INI. Goremykin and M. Bark respec- 
tively. But although none could gainsay the 



benefits of temperance, many remained under 
the conviction that the abolition of tho liquor 
revenue would hopelessly crij)i)le tho finances 
of the country without establishing a real 
reform. If, however, the loss of the revenue 
from drink was serious enough for the Treasury, 
its continuance meant ruin to many of the 
peasants. In his Rescript to M. Bark on the 
latter's appointment as Minister of Finance in 
February, 1914, the Tsar deplored " the mourn- 
ful spectacle of wasted lives, domestic misery 
and decaying business resulting from intemper- 
ance," which he had had to contemplate during 
his recent tour through some of the finest pro- 
vinces of his Empire, and annoiuiced that it was 
unseemly " to base the welfare of the Exchequer 
upon the moral and material ruin of his sub- 
jects." The Tsar's interest in the question 
brought an immediate response from the 
peasants. In many places they resolved to 
close the monopoly shops and petitioned ac- 
cordingly. Then came the outbreak of war. 
All were agreed that the difference between the 
conduct of a great war with and without tem- 
perance would be that between certain and 
doubtful victory. Dimng mobilization the 
liquor shops were closed and subsequently this 
temporary measure was made permanent. 
Probably no other country in the world could 
have secured the abolition of drunkenness at 
svich a crisis. The Tsar had both the power and 
the will to do it. He spoke the word ancRLTO 
millions of his people obeyed it. 

By suppressing the sale of intoxicating 
liquors the Tsar cut off nearly one-third of the 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



205 



annual revenue. Tlic vodka monopoly alone 
brought in about 650,000,000 roubles* net 
profit. Its removal affected almost every 
branch of national husbandry. The potato- 
grower, brandy distiller, bottle manufactiu'er, 
sealing-wax maker, carrier, dealer, restaurant 
keeper were bound to suffer more or less 
severely and claim relief or compensation. But 
the Great War itself introduced such sweeping 
changes in the internal economy of the State 
that an event so startling as the suppression of 
drink could be attempted without danger. To 
the Tsar's clear perception of these facts and 
to his high-minded and steadfast resolve 
Russia owed her greatest asset in the war — 
temperance. 

The drink evU had ever been prominent in 
Russia. The chronicles of a thousand years 
earlier recorded the popular predilection for 
strong beverages. Drink played a fateful part 
in Riassian history, being the direct cause or 
incentive to rioting and disorder. Xomially 
the mildest of men, the Russian became violent 
and bloodthirsty under the stimulus of liquor. 
Diu-ing the days of serfdom the rural masses 
could not indulge in unrestrained driuikermess. 
Afterwards the vice asserted its sway in growing 
measure as the peasant became independent 

* The exchange value of the rouble in normal times is 
about 9.5 to the £. Roubles may, therefore, be approxi- 
mately converted into pounds by dividing by 10. 





WOMHN WOKKI.Nf; A I IHH IJOCKS. 



M. STURMER, 

Who succeeded M. Goremykin in January, 1916, 
as Premier. 

and began to earn more money. The introduc- 
tion of the vodka monopoly, far from dis- 
couraging drunkenness, only provided a cheaper 
and sounder liquor, which being purchased in 
bulk was consumed in larger quantities at a 
time and often in the home, inducing habits of 
intemperance in the family. Under the old 
system the women and children had been spared 
this ordeal. Money becoming more plentiful in 
the villages as the railways and manufactiu-ing 
industries extended the field of labour, drink 
canv to play a still larger part in the life of the 
people. Every domestic event, like a birth, 
death, or marriage had to be celebrated by an 
orgy of vodka. Money spent iii drink and 
attendant expenditure must have run away 
with a third of the household budget. 

Inoalciilablo were the moral and material 
benefits of the change;. The villages were 
unrecognizable. Perfect order and tranquillity 
prevailed in plac(!S where bedlam liad reigned, 
where foul language and fouler acts liad been 
the order of iht; day. Lift; and f)roperty became 
Hcrf;ure. Productive cajxuMty increased by at 
k-awt 30 per (n-iii. Previo\isly jx-oplc had worked 
only three or four days » week, the nMiiainder 
being given up to (lfl>au«;hery. Most, if not all, 
of Mie vast sums squandered in drink, which may 
be computed at anything over a thousand million 

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206 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



207 



roubles per annum,* remained in the hands 
of peasants and went to swell the savings bank 
deposits. But adding 30 per cent, to the earnings 
of the family, in accordance with its increased 
productivity, another huge sum of something 
like two thousand million roubles would accrue. 
The temperance edict thereby assured to 
Russia an addition to lier wealth that would 
compensate for almost any strain upon her 
6nancial resources and credit. But for the 
purpose immediately at hand — that is, for the 
victorious outcome of the war, the effect of the 
edict was such that words cannot describe it. 
Never had there been a mobilization on so 
large a scale, yet, excepting for one or two 
places where the reservdsts looted the liquor 
stores,unbroken order and tranquillity prevailed. 
Had it been possible to pvu-chase vodka everj^ 
village, even,' izba (hut) would have ruined 
itself to speed the parting warriors, and we 
should have had to contemplate an endless 
series of appalling scenes that would have 
deeply marred the patriotism and loyalty so 
sincerely evinced by the nation. The suppres- 
sion of drink was largely accoimtable for the 
wonderful smoothness and rapidity of the 
Russian mobilization. 

There had been a certain amount of temper- 
ance activity in Russia for many years, under 
the auspices partly of the brandy monopoly (a 
•somewhat paradoxical combination) and partly 
of the Orthodox Church. The sectarians and 
Old Believers were all rigid teetotallers. They 
represented a fairly numerous contingent 
aggregating several millions, and to these 
should be added the Musulman inhabitants. 
It may be roughly figvu-ed that from twenty 
to thirty millions of people in Russia were 
proof again.st the wiles of strong drink. The 
temperance movement had therefore a very 
wide field, embrarnng much more than a hundred 
million people. From what has already been 
fiaid aV^out the extent and evils of rlrunkcnness 
it is evident that the entrrgies of this movement 
were far from fruitful. One of the main cau.ses 
of this non-HuccesH must be sought in the 
nnfavouraVile state of the Church. Its influence 
hnt\ l>een fast declining during the previouf 
df<;(u\f. The hierarchy, recruited f-ntinly from 
the rnonaHtie or lilfuk Ck-rgy, hfwl become a 
part of the bureauf;ratic maeliine ; while the 

* The p««uMnt«i paid much more for vrnlka than tho 

nmount T'-<:'nvinl by th«5 Treastnry (ahiout 1,000,000,000 
f'/iihlfwi), the fJifffirericfl going to illifit doak-nt and in 
extravagant ent*!rtninm»>Tit. 



White, or parochial Clergy, scarce superior in 
culture to the peasants among whom they 
worked, foimd themselves unfitted and unablt; 
to cope with the larger requirements arising 
from the irresistible growth of the village. 

But the Russians, in coimnon with other 
Slav races, were so profoundly imbued with 
religious faith that, despite these very adverse 
features of clerical life, there was every indica- 
tion of a religious revival as soon as the con- 
ditions became favourable. Certainly never 
had deeper religious fervour prevailed in the 
Russian armies than diu^mg the Great War. 

It would necessitate a very exhaustive study 
to present a fuU account of all the deficiencies 
of the Russian Church organization. That 
reforms were necessary became evident as 
soon as the administration of the coiuitry hiui 
been placed upon a new basis by the intro- 
duction of representative government. One of 
the crying evils connected with the Chiu-ch 
was the tolerance shown towards adventurers, 
who, rnider the guise of religion, exercised 
undue and sometimes dangerous influence in 
high quarters. One man in particular, a 
Siberian peasant named Gregory Rasputin, 
was commonly believed to have made and 
unmade Ministries and to have decided th(> 
fate of important measures. Whatever may have 
been the exact scope of his responsibility, there 
can be no doubt that his presence in the 
precincts of the court gave rise to unanimous 
disapprobation among all enlightened classes, 
including representatives of the Government, 
the whole of the bureaucracy, and officers of 
the Army and Xavy. 

In describing the conditions that prevailed 
in Russia diu-ing war time no attempt is made 
here td deal with military operations, which 
are fully covered in other chapters. But 
the record would be far from complete without 
some account of the manner in which the nation 
responded to the call to arms, hf)W Russia's 
armies were prepared, and how they came into 
the field. Briefly stated, their " peace footing " 
consisted of 75 divisions, nmubering about 
1,. '500.000 men. It was necessary to call u|) 
something like half a million men to bring up 
these tinits to war strength. On mobilization 
a resfTve division was formed out of parallel 
regiments for which the cadres had been pro- 
vided by the active units : in other words the 
jMitive divisions, riNinhering when brought to a 
war footing something like 2,000,000 men, 



lJ(JH 



THN TIMES lUSTOli\ OF THE WAR. 




A RELIGIOUS SERVICE ON THE BATTLEFIELD. 



were supported by an equal force of reserve 
formations. Thus, instead of 75 divisions, the 
Russian Army became .composed of 150 or 
more. But the process of forming reserve 
regiments and divisions took some time. It 
was necessary at first to have a sufficient 
niunber of active and reserve units to cope 
with the situation on the Austrian and Genuan 
frontiers. The task of mobiUzation involved 
the transfer, over distances more or less great, 
of something like 4,000,000 men in addition 
to the coniplex task of equipping reserv^ists 
and providing the new formations with trans- 
port and artillery. Germany had a similar 
task to carry out, but she enjoyed an enormous 
advantage in her extensive and perfect railway 
system and her great industrial resovurces. 
Moreover, she had been nearly half a century 
preparing for this war and had chosen the 
moment most favourable to her in a military 
and political sense. It was less than 10 years 
since the war with Japan had almost completely 
exhausted the war stores that Russia had been 
a long time assembling along her western 
frontier. 

The deficiencies had been made good during 
the administration of General Sukliomlinoff. 

It may be inferred from certain indications 
that Russia succeeded in mobilizing the neces- 
sary forces within l(i days. Without the 
abolition of drink such a remarkable result 



could not have been attained ; but, on the 
other hand, the singular rapidity with which 
men and units were equipped showed that 
the nation had responded like one man and 
that tlie necessary preparations had been 
made by the military authorities. It was a 
case of every man doing his b(!st. A gain of 
five days on the schedule represented an 
enormous advantage for Russia. She was 
thereby enabled immediately to repulse the 
first advance of the Austrian armies and at the 
same time to hurl troops into East Prussia. 
This had an important effect upon the German 
offensive in France. 

During the early stages of the Great War 
the Russian armies included an appreciable 
number of volimteers drawn from all classes, 
among them being many women and children. 
Thousands of yovmg men belonging to the 
leisiu-ed classes joined the ranks. Public 
offices were almost deserted, and so were the 
senior classes of the public schools. In the 
rush and hurry of departure for the front 
many boys were smuggled into the trains going 
to the front, and in the Cossack villages n\miy 
girls accompanied their brothers, or even acted 
as their substitutes. Later the authorities ■ 
succeeded in excluding volunteers of too tender 
an age and sex, but meanwhile many heroic 
deeds had been accomplislied by ciiildren anil 
women. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



209 



Russia's practically inexhaustible resources of 
human material were never for an instant open 
to doubt ; her potential strength in other 
directions was also fully recognized, but the 
capacity of her finances to respond to imme- 
diate calls tipon them was less a matter of 
common knowledge. At the outbreak of 
hostilities the free balance of the State Treasury 
exceeded 500,000,000 roubles (£53,000,000), 
some of which was deposited in foreign banks, 
for the most part French and English. The 
gold reserve fund of the State Bank amounted 
to 1,744,000,000 roubles, with a paper currency 
aggregating 1,630,000,000 roubles. The revenue 
receipts for the first half of 1914 showed an 
increase of 155,000,000 roubles compared with 
the corresponding period of 1913. Russian 
financial experts have expressed the opinion 
that, on the basis of the above showing, Russia 
might have borne the burden of war for some 
time As-ithout recourse to increased taxation 
had it not been for the heroic decision to forego 
the drink revenue, whereby at a single stroke 
the Trea.«ury was deprived of a net income 
exceeding 650,000,000 roubles per annum. Fail- 
ing this source of revenue, the Finance Depart- 
ment wa.s forced to resort to an increase of 



existing taxes and the introduction of new 
taxes in order to balance the Budget. Almost 
all direct and indirect taxes were raised ; 
customs and stamp duties, postal and telegraph 
rates were appreciably increased. An a.ssess- 
ment per poud was levied on nearly all goods 
carried by rail and water ; new taxes were 
imposed on telephones and raw cotton, and a 
personal income-tax was introduced. The liquor 
excise, in so far as the sale of intoxicants w as 
permitted under certain restrictions, was also 
increased. 

But the financial, as well as the military, task 
confronting Russia was so stupendous as to 
necessitate a series of extraordinary measures 
for the discovery of ways and means. A brief 
summary of the fiscal demands entailed by the 
war will help to explain and justify the sub- 
sequent course of ]M. Bark's policy in this 
regard. According to the figvu-es submitted 
to the Duma by the JNIinister of Finance, 
from the commencement of the war 
till January 1, 1916, Russia expended on 
military needs approxmiately 10,588,000,000 
roubles. At the beginning of the \\ ar the daily 
expenditure was 8,000.000 roubles, but by the 
end of 1915 it had reached 31,000,000 roubles. 




*>3i^ 



Bf.RSSINr, A FIRF.n HOSIMTAI. AT PRTKOGKAI). 
A priest bles«in{ a Britiith ambulfince with holy water. 



210 



7///'; TIMES HlSTOliY OF THtl WAR. 




M. RODZIANKO. 

President of the Duma. 

To cover these imprecedented ovitlays was, of 
coiirse, beyond the limits of ordinary State 
revenue and called for recourse to State credit. 
Russia, for the first time in her liistory, awoke 
to the enormous imtapped resources of the 
domestic money market. By the end of 1915 
the Government succeeded in raising within the 
country three long-term loans to the amount of 
2,000,000,000 roubles, and one loan for ten years 
to the amount of 1,000,000,000 roubles ; while 
in the spring of IPIG a further domestic loan for 
2,000,000,000 roubles was issued. To the abova 



siuus, not counting I Ik* last-named issue, must 
bo uddwtl tht) proceeds »)f Kxchequer Hills 
• irculated within the coiuitry to the amount 
of 708, 400,000 roubles, and the (liscotinl of 
short-tenu bundu on I lie i)j)t;n market amounting 
to l,O(M),O00,00() roubles. Thus for a year and 
u iiiiil ul' war ICussia managed to draw from tha 
internal pecuniary resources of the country 
more than 4,r)00,000,000 roubles, leaving 
0,000,000,000 accoiuitable to other credit 
sources, including the sums obtained from her 
Alli(is. 

An incidental bu) ^M-alifying aspect of 
Russia's domestic loan polic-y was its educa- 
tional vahn« for the pea.sant masses. The 
fuiancial autliorities were well awaro of the huge 
stores of wealth pent up in town, village, and 
himlet throughout (lie length and breadth of 
the Empire. Striking proof of th(» captu;ity 
of the masses for a sliare in these national 
obligations was afforded by the growth of 
jjopular savings as shown by bank deposits. 
In nineteen months from the beginning of 
the war deposits in credit institutions 
increased by more than 3, ."500, 000,000 roubles, 
indicating an average growth of 185,000,000 
roubles monthly. In the State Bank the growth 
of deposits for 18 months amounted to 
854,000,000 roubles ; in private banks of 
short-term credit to 1,419,400,000 roubles; and 
in small credit institutions to more than 
(5,000,000 roubles. The rate of increase in 
the State .savings banks was from 1,874,000 
roubles for January, 1914, to 119,000,000 
roubles for that month in 1910. The total 
deposits at the State savings banks on 
May 1, 1910, aggregated 3,714,000,000 roubles. 

The task before Russian statesmen was to 

• 

tm-n this vast streani of wealth into the 

channel best calculated to lead to victory. 

Hence these domestic loan bonds, contrary 

to the previous practice, were issued for 

smaller denominations, which brought them 

\\ell within the reach of the most modest purse. 

In addition, special means were adopted to 

facilitate subscription to the loan in the most 

remote and out-of-the-way country districts. 

This policy was abundantly vindicated by 

brilliant results, and through the travail of war 

was born a wider national consciousness of the 

individual citizen's duty to the State. "^ 

But besides loans in the strict sense of the 
word, Russia, like the other belligerents, was 
obliged to have recourse to the increased issue 
of paper money to cover war expenditure. On 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



211 



the eve of the struggle the amount of credit 
notes in circulation was 1,630,000,000 roubles ; 
by January 1, 1915, this figure had grown to 
3,031.000.000 roubles ; and by May 1, 1916, to 
(),21 3,000,000 roubles. An analogous extra- 
ordinary measure evoked by the disa])pearance 
of silver and copper coins from circulation was 
the issue of stamps and paper notes for amounts 
up to 50 kopeks. 

The outstanding feature of Russia's foreign 
financial relations was the adoption by the 
Allies of the same principle of mutual support 
as had been accepted in the purely mihtary and 
political domain for the promotion of the 
common cause. Brief experience sufficed to 
show the difficulty under the abnormal con- 
ditions of exchange and settlement that had 
arisen, of effecting long-term loans on the 
foreign market, and, though Russia obtained 
accommodation in the form of short-term 
issues on the London market and other opera- 
tions of a similar character, an agreement was 
eventually arriv^ed at between Great Britain and 
France on the one hand, and Russia on the 
other, whereby the former Powers undertook 
to cover Russia's expenditures on accotmt of 



foreign orders for war materials and her 
payments on account of State and municipal 
loans. Thus the entire complicated and confused 
system of foreign settlements, disturbed by the 
war, was repUiced by a simple, clear, and 
mutually advantageous agreement. Russia, on 
her part, pledged herself in case of necessity 
to help the Allied Governments in the task of 
strengthening the rates of exchange with her 
gold, on the security of short-term bonds of the 
Allied States, on the understanding, however, 
that these demands should be restricted to the 
utmost. No small share of the credit for the 
successful conclusion of the above agreement 
was due to the Russian Minister of Finance, 
M. Bark, who made two trips abroad for the 
personal conduct of negotiations in this 
connexion. 

One of the immediate consequences of the 
war peculiarly detrimental to Russia's economic 
position was the closing of the Baltic Sea 
route for foreign trade, followed later by the 
loss of the Black Sea outlet on the adhesion of 
Turkey to the Central Powers and the conse- 
quent closing of the Dardanelles. The influence 




REFLRLNCt. 
Railways ir: operation 
" under construction 
" project ad 



I, AM) AMJ SI'lA KfJUIHS TO NOK IHIiUN RUSSIA. 



212 



THi: TIMES HISTOItV UP llli: WAli. 




< 

as 
'^ 
O 
se, 

H 
Ui 

cu 

< 
< 

Q 

0^ 






c'XorciHfd hy th<» 1ok« of those routos was not 
hlovv to manifest itself in a sharp decline of 
the (ij^iii-es hoth for export and import. Kor 
the hrst nine montlis of 11)15, as coiinjared 
uiih tiie eorre«|)on(iinj^ period of 1914, the 
laninj{ (»tf iiiuler exports amounted to 
(i;Jl»,0()l.(J(J() roiihies, and under im|>orts to 
;{(J7, 472,000 rouhles, while the excess of im- 
ports over ex[)orts amounted to 271,589,000 
roiihles. In this emergency the eyes of all 
Kussiii turned longingly towards the hitherto 
despised und n(>glectt^d Arctic, as the only 
practical oc(»an outlet available, with the oxcep. 
tion of the distant Pacific at Vladivostok, which 
also acquin-d immcuisely increased importance 
us the war proceedcid. 

On the White Sea the nearest i)ort. Archangel, 
had hitherto failed to attract a large quantity 
of freight through a variety of drawbacks* 
among which were lack of Ijroad-gaugo con- 
nexion with the main railway system of the 
I'^mpire, the necessity for transhi[)ment of 
goods at Kotlas, owing to the freezing of the 
Northern Dvina and its unsuitability for 
navigation during a large part of the year ; 
and radical inlicrent defects in the equipment 
of Archangel itself for the needs of an up-to-date 
port. The only link connecting this port with 
the main railway network of the Empire was 
the narrow-gauge Vologda-Ai'changol lino, built 
in 1897-8. Soinewhat to the east of it another 
line struck the bend of the Northern Dvina 
at the hamlet of Kotlas. This was the Perni- 
Kotlas Railway, designed to convey freight 
from the Urals to Archangel. 

The limitations of Archangel had long been 
recognized, and as far back as 1895 the project 
was mooted of constructing a line to an ice- 
free port on the shores of the Arctic Ocean in 
order to realize Russia's traditional dream of 
access to the open sea. Amid the swamps and 
virgin forests on the other side of the Polar 
Circle, immersed for six months of the year in 
absolute darlviiess, lies Katherina Harboiu", 
ahuost on the frontiers of Norway. Thanks to 
the beneficent influence of the Gulf Stream, 
the waters of the bay never freeze, and for this 
reason Russian engineers finally decided upon 
the town of Kola, situated on Katherina Bay, 
as the terminal point of a new^ line from Petro- 
grad. The construction of the Murman Rail- 
wav, as this line was called, was attended bv 
stupendous difficulties, both teclmical and 
climatic. At the same tune the Government 
set about converting the Archangel Railway 



THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 



213 





RUSSIA'S PAKIJAMHNT: A SITTIN(; OI< THF', IMPFRIAI. DUMA. 



•214 



THE 77A//VN lllS'nUty OF TllK U'.J/i'. 




MKMBhKS OF TIIK RUSSIAN DUMA WHO VISITED ENGLAND IN 1916. 

Left to ri^ht : M. \' . T. Detnchenko, M Ichass, Count Olsufieff, M. A. Oznohishin, Dr. Andrew 

Shingareff, Colonel Bois Fngelliardt, i\L S. Skadovski, Professor A. Vassilieft", M. A. D. Frotopopoff, 

Professor Paul Miliukoff, M. V. (jourko, M. A. Radkevitch. 



into a broad-gauge road, tho plan bt'iiig to 
have the work conipleted by the end of 
1916. 

The UTunense impulse given to import through 
\'ladivostok as the re.sult of the loss of the 
Baltic and Black Sea outlets will be seen from 
the following comparative figures : In 1914 t lie 
total value of imports at Vladivostok was 
only 29,144,000 roubles, whereas in 1915 it 
amounted to 301,094,000 roubles, of which 
Japan's share was 113,481,000 roubles, the 
United States' 106,070,000 roubles, Great 
Britam's 54,192,000 roubles, and China's 
20,550,000 roubles. 

The sharp dislocation in Russia's trade 
balance, involving a disproportionate increase 
of imports over exports and a correspondingly 
augmented demand for foreign currency, 
natiu-ally had the effect of depreciating the 
rouble quotation, to remedy which an agree- 
ment was entered into with the Bank of England 
and the Banque de France whereby means were 
provided for the liquidation of the previous 
indebtedness of Russian trade and industry in 
England and France, while the credits opened 
for Russia on the Paris and London markets 
were utilized not only to meet the State's 
needs, but also as a method of satisfying the 
demands for means of paj-ment on the part of 
Russian trade and industry. A special ex- 
change chancery was established in the Ministry 



of Finance whore for all legitimate purposes for- 
eign currency could be procured at a minimum 
rate. 

For purposes of private travel the war 
virtually reduced communication between 
Russia and ^^'estern Europe to the Scandi- 
navian route through Norway and Sweden. 
For commercial purposes the exchange of 
goods between Russia and Scandinavia, 
formerly carried on by sea, during the war 
found a route via Karungi in Sweden and 
Karimki in Finland. A new line was built on 
the Finnish side of the river Tornea linking 
Tornea with Karunki, and a Swedish railway 
to connect Karungi with Haparanda. 

For the first seven months of 1915 exports 
of food supplies to Finland rose to 39,400,000 
roubles against 15,900,000 roubles for the same 
period in 1914, and exports of raw and semi- 
manufactured materials increased from 
5,600,000 roubles to 21,600,000 roubles. The 
exports of cereals rose from 9 to 24 milUon 
roubles. Imports into Russia througli Finland 
for the same term amounted to 106,000,000 
roubles, or almost three times as much as the 
figiires for the corresponding period of the 
previous year. In pjxrticular imports from 
England in 1915 showed scarcely any decline, 
amounting to 85,000,000 roubles through the 
European customs as against 105,000,000 
roubles for the first seven months of 1914. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



215 



■while if imports through Vladivostok are added, 
the difference entirely disappears. 

The extent to which Russia before the war 
had depended upon Germany and the German 
middleman for the satisfaction of the larger 
proportion of her material needs is referred 
to in some detail elsewhere. The abrupt stop- 
page of German imports, though it naturally 
gave rise to grave embarrassment at the outset, 
was after all a blessing in disguise, since inevi- 
tably it tended to tlirow the country back 
upon its own internal resources, when it did 
not lead to the greater stimulation of com- 
mercial intercourse with the allied and friendly 
States, more particularly Great Britain, Japan 
and the United States. 

A marked impetus was given to the establish- 
ment of home industries for the manufacture 
of many staples which had pre^dously come 
from Germany. In an article contributed to 
The Times Russian Supplement for January, 
1915, IMr. A. J. Chambers, Assistant Superin- 
tendent of the Department of Industry, wrote : 

By the end of August (1914) not only was no further 
diminution of production observable, but, on the 
contrary, with the declaration of war the mills again 
began to increase their activity, while the number of 
enterprises that had curtailed work up to October 14 
represented only 12 per cent, and the suspended enter- 
prises only .3" 3 per cent, of the total number of mills and 
factories. 



Shortage of labour in many cases was due 
to the calling up of reservists, but frequently 
this disadvantage was largely counterbalanced 
by the increased intensity of production arising 
from the influence of temperance, which mini- 
mized the number of idle days j)rcviously 
caused by drunkenness among workmen. 

Incidentally it may be remarked that the 
mobilization of industry, originally inspired 
by the urgent military needs of the country, 
thanks to the valuable training it afforded 
in habits of order and organization, paved 
the way for greater economic efficiency 
after the war, and hence for vastly increased 
development of Russia's trade and manu- 
facttires. 

A movement which played an important part 
in connexion with this economic mobilization 
was that of the cooperative societies. They 
succoured refugees, cared for the families of 
reservists, supplied the population and Army 
with food products, and provided clothing and 
munitions for the forces. The cooperative 
movement had now reached the village — the 
centre of all public life. Upon the societies 
the Zemstvo relied in its undertakings ; to 
the societies the State appealed when it wished 
to summon the people to the task of State 
defence ; and the societies in the villages were the 
most energetic vehicles of cultural enterprises. 




WAU W(JI<K Al A MONASrivKY. 
Kuwitian nuni preparing banda(ic<« fur the army. 



2U\ 



THE TIMKS HISTDHY OF TUF WAlt. 



KiMtiiu'H ({real tisHtit in tht< war v\um uii 
lUiiibttiilly her mhnreutly mt^xlmiwlitjlo tuod 
(iroiluctiou, wliic'li uhoulil iiroptirly liuvu provtul 
fi|ual to any strain iuipoijeil upon it. L'nt'or 
tunatfly, owing to want of organization and 
tht' morn rtiiiLstttr nianit'»".stationH of »j)eculativK 
activity among all tlasscs of the population, 
this natural advantage was gravely discounted 
early m tlu' strug;.'lf. The urtititial demaiul 
for supplies of all descriptions createil by tlu- 
Army also served to stimulate the rise in 
prices. The country WHS less ad\'ersely affected 
by this phenomenon than the town ; indeed, 
the peasantry were not slow to avail themselves 
of the opportunity thus attiordeil for extra 
[Jiofits, mid fit'ipiently concealed vast (luanti- 
ties of gram and other agricultural jiroducts 
in oriler to command high |)rices. 1'he con- 
gestion of the railways, due partly to military 
causes and i)artly to wholesale corr\iption 
prevalent among railway oHicials — who ileli- 
herately Jieltl up goods en route to suit their 
own purposes, exacting heavy bribes to expedite 
transport- -led to sjjoradic shortages of mun*. 



of the principal neeeuHariuM of life, including 
fuel. 

"('rises" in almost every branch of the 
human dietary figured daily in the I'riss ; 
and in I'etrograd, Moscow, and other «ities, 
su<h staples were dohul out in small (|uanliti(!s, 
at lixed lunirs, to endless (pieucs of men, woiiifii, 
and children, who, during the exceptionally' 
severe winter of WilT) Ki, Huffered no little 
hardship on this lu-count. It was in vain that 
the prefectural authoritii^s sought to regulate 
prices. l'n.scruj)ulous di-alers, acting in <'ol- 
hision, had a very Mim[)le method of coun- 
tering all such wdl -meant efforts. Tluj 
moment the price (jf a j)articular commodity 
was fixed at a lower rate than that at which 
the dealers felt disposed to sell, it promptly 
disappeared from tho market us if by magic, 
and the only means whereby its resurrect ion 
could be achieved was submission to private 
dictation on the part of the dealers. In several 
cases speculators and forestallers on a large 
scale were arrested, but the abuse clung 
tenaciously to life, and was responsibh* for 




RUSSIAN RED CROSS NURSES, 
Who tended the wounded Serbians at Nish. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



217 




WITH THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 
An American doctor and his staff at a dressing station. 



wholly unnecessary misery and privation, 
rnainly among the ixrban masses. The average 
rise in prices since the spring of 1916 was 
officially reported to be .50' 7 per cent., but i» 
the case of many individual staples the incre- 
ment was aa high as a hundred and even two 
hunrlred per cent. 

Though dishonesty and speculation accounted 
for no small part of the ills to which the country 
was subjected, a funflamentally serious situation 
was created by a decline in the cattle capital 
Btotk of the country amounting to some 2.5 per 
cert, as the result of military ref|uirernents, 
and n reduction in the area under tillage from 
242,000,000 acres in 1913 to 216,000,000 acres 
in J91.'>, eonriirreritly with which the crop of 
rhe prineipfil citihIh in 191.5 showed a deficit 
of abf.iit 78,000,000 tons. On the other hiuid, 
a/eording fo M. .N'aumoff's statement to the 
l>iiiriii on Mjirfh .'{, J 9 1. 5, airnoHt the entire 
prrxJtietion of eereals destined for export since 
the outbreak of the war —about 11,000,000 
tons rernainfid in Mie country. Tin; annunl 
d<'rnand of the Army jirifl pofjulation was 
appffiximntely 48^000,000 tons. Kussiii, lie 
anirmed, pOHtv^HMul one-third of flu: iuuniiil 



flemand in reserve to counterbalance the 
temporary reduction of the area under tillage. 
Enormous stocks of grain existed in Western 
Siberia ; in Akinolinsk, for example, there were 
stocks sufficient to provide European Russia 
with a two-years' supply, but improved railway 
transport was necessary before these resources 
could be rendered available. To meet the 
crisis arising from the reduction in the area 
under tillage the agiicultural authorities pro- 
posed to make extensive use of prisoners 
of war, refugees, soldiers, and, within speci- 
fied geographical limits, Korean and Chinese 
labour, while to remedy the meat crisis the 
Duma a(l<)|)fcd a Hill [)nivi<liiig for four fast 
days per week, on which no meat .should be 
sf)ld or served in restaurants, and on which 
all abattoirs should be closed. 

TIk! battle of the Dunajec was decided 
within the first week of May, 191.5. On (he 
1 Jth The Times Military Corrospondcuifc re- 
veided the fact that the lack of sue(r(\ss on 
the VVestfsrn front ha^l bcicn due fo the 
want of an unlimitf^d supply of high 
explf>HiveH. These fatefid words marked the 



21S 



THE TIMES ins;TOnY OF THE WAR. 




ONE OF RUSSIA'S MANY WOMEN 
SOLDIERS. 

She is wcariag the cross of St. George awarded 
for bravery. 

starting-point of a new epoch in tlie war. To 
Great Britain they were a sad commentary 
upon the neglect of her unrivalled industrial 
resources which, had they been turned to proper 
account earlier, wovild have hastened victory. 
To Russia they meant much more. Industries 
in that country were still in an imdeveloped 
state, and it was all the more necessary that 
they should have bean prepared to bear the 
strain of niodern warfare with its enormous 
expenditure of munitions. 

The Russian nation had known nothing about 
the shortage of shells except froni ominous 
references in the tales of the wounded to the 
silence of the Russian guns, a silence which was 
costing so many valuable lives. From London 
the cry of " more shells " was immediately re- 
echoed in Moscow. A representative gathering 
of manufacturers met in that city within a 
week of the appearance of The Times article, 
and the mobilization of all Russian industries 
for the war was thenceforth merely a matter 
6f time. As the magnitude of the task became 
apparent, local conunittees, acting in concert 
with the central organization, quickly sprang 
into existence. These bodies all worked in 
connexion with the specially created committee 



on iiiunitiouH which inehidcd representatives 
of ail the niinititries coiK)erne<l. 

When war broke out there were only two 
iiiuiiitioM factories in lluHsia, each turning out 
2."), •)()() hlielLs per month. Within a year the 
Miiiuher of works had increased a hiuidrcdfold, 
iiiid the output aggregated I,2r)0,000. Although 
( iiiiibersonio in sonie respects, anil attended 
by wjwte of time and energy, the conmiittoo 
system gave sat isf jictory results on the whole, 
and it afforded an opportunity for public 
opinion to satisfy itself as to the [irogress of 
munition work. 

A movement was eventually set on foot to 
include representatives of the working men on 
the public conunittees. M. Goremykin had been 
far from willing to permit representatives of 
tlie two Houses to sit on the committee. The 
admission of representatives of the workmen 
was categorically declined. Uniiappily this 
([uestion touched upon a sore point of Russian 
internal politics — namely, the police methods 
of dealing with the labour question. While the 
Department of Commerce and Industry had 
been for years devising ways and means to 
enable the working men to organize them- 
selves on a non-political basis, and thereby to 
safeguard their interests from political adven- 
turers and agitators, the police mvariably de- 
feated these ends by interfering with any and 
every labour organization, and arresting the 
men's delegates. It speaks well for the 
patriotism of the Russian working men that 
they stuck to their work and turned out the 
mvmitions plentifully. The cases of shrapnel 
and high explosive which reached the Front 
bearing inscriptions from the workers — " Don't 
spare them, there are plenty more," contributed 
much to raising the spirits of the Russian 
Army after the terrible ordeal of the great 
retreat. 

Although the internal output had been so 
greatly increased, it was still far below the 
requirements of the Army. Huge orders were 
placed in France, England, and particularly the 
United States. The centralization and dis- 
tribution of these orders necessitated tlie 
creation of an Anglo-Russian commission in 
I.iondon with branches in New York and Paris. 
Immense quantities of raw material had subse- 
quently to be transported across the Pacific and 
Arctic Oceans to Vladivostok and Archangel 
respectively. This task was not the least 
important of the many duties that devolved 
upon the British Navy and merchant service. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



219 



and witli a view to preventing any wasteful 
•expenditure of tonnage, it was decided tliat all 
the available Russian merchant ships should be 
placed under the orders of the British Admiralty. 
This somewhat onerous measure was cheerfully 
submitted to in the hope that later on British 
mercantile enterprise would invigorate Russian 
shipping. 

Japan had early in the war made offers 
to Russia to supply her with all the mixnitions 
that she could produce. The Russian 
mihtary authorities were offered the benefit cf 
all the Japanese experience obtained during 
the war with Russia. General SukhoirxUnoff 
accepted these offers at a later period. Japan 
immediately mobilized all her industries and 
delivered all the munitions that she undertook 
to supply expeditiously and cheaply. 

The extent of Russia's military requirements 
from abroad unhappily contributed to an un- 
precedented development of the " graft " 
system. Bribes, " commissions," and specula- 
tion in huge army contracts suddenly placed 
enormous sums of money in the hands of com- 
paratively obscure persons. This fact was 
largely responsible for the unseemly dissipa- 
tion and luxury that were so flauntingly dis- 
played in Petrograd, ]Mofcow and other large 



cities during the Crcuit War. Casual visitors 
were often misled by those appearances. J'he 
heart of Russia was sound. There was little 
in common between Petrograd and the pro- 
vinces. 

Geographical proximity from the first had 
favoured close intercourse between Russia 
and Germany. It was, therefore, in no sense 
surprising that, when searching for models 
and instructors in Western " culture," Russian 
reformers, from Peter the Great downward, 
should have looked to their next-door neigh- 
boui*, whose mateiial and intellectual achieve- 
ments seemed to qualify her for the role of 
mentor. Nor is it any more astonishing that 
Germany should have eagerly responded to 
this appeal for guidance and direction, or that 
in return she should have sought concrete 
compensations in the form of commercial, 
industrial, and even agrarian privileges. Russia 
was speedily overrun by German commercial 
travellers, and largely settled by German 
colonists, wholesale and retail traders, who 
throve amazingly in their new habitat. Sup- 
ported secretly by the Government and openly 
by a magnificently organized banking system, 
these " economic " emissaries were soon enabled 




" -•■ 



-r^TTfrr mi w\ ' m m\\ ;«mTi iittttf !»»:[ 



J 




% 






i 






m 




i 



THH TSAH'S WINTKH PALACE AS UEIJ GROSS flOSI'ITAI.. 
Girls makinii respirators in the entranoe hall of the Imperial Palace. 




220 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



221 



to outdistance the majority of their competitors, 
both native and foreign, anil to secure virtual 
monopolies, which finally reduced Russia to a 
position of economic dependence upon Germany. 

This dependence assumed the form, first, 
of consimiption of German products witliin 
the coiuitrj', and, secondly, of recourse almost 
solely to the German intermediary in trade 
in products not of German origin. The Moscow 
Mercantile Association collected exhaustive 
data designed to demonstrate the extent of 
tliis economic dependence, from which it 
appeared that Germany before the war had 
vested interests in no fewer than 1,300 separate 
lines and staples. Germans held iindisputed 
control over the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry in various regions of Russia, wire 
nails, machinery, textiles, insiu-ance, and 
transport, steamship and building enter- 
prises, sawmills, cotton-mills, mines, universal 
stores, hotels, rubber manufacture, not to 
mention such essentially German activities 
as bre\^-ing and electrical engineering. Not 
infrequently German enterprises gained a foot- 
hold by masquerading in French or Belgian 
colours. 

In addition to the natural effects of personal 
" push,"' capacity, and enterprise, and the 
maximum exploitation of the resources of 
" publicity," Germany was tremendously aided 
in her campaign of peaceful penetration by 
the large number of Germanic residents and 
colonists in Ru.ssia, who, thanks to the con- 
venient German law of dual nationality, 
were German and Russian subjects at one and 
the same time, but whose congenital gravita- 
tion towards the Fatherland rendered them 
useful instruments for the promotion of 
German interests. The Baltic Provinces, .settled 
by German Ru.sHians almost as far as the 
capital of the Empire, also formed a hotbed 
for the cultivation of German predominance, 
while the Jewi.sh element, among whom the 
German language is widespread!, possf^sing 
ties of kindred and business with German 
Jews, in its turn served as a link between 
the markets of the two countries. 

Up to a WTtain point, no doubt, this exercise 
of Germanic influence was perffK,-tly legitimate, 
nor would any fair-rnindf-'l Hussian publicist 
have HtaUnl that KxinHoCi-nuan intercourne 
ha^l, from the firnt, been [)rofluctivr; Hr>lf|y 
of evil for RiisHia. In both the muterial and 
intellectual Hj>\nrT(m Germany coukl teatth a 
grfMt deal, and having reg<ir<l to the iinif|iie 



advantages of her situation, it would have 
been manifestly unreasonable to expect her to 
abstain from persistent efforts to gain for 
herself a preferential position in a virgin 
field. It might not be easy to define the 
precise line of demarcation between the legi- 
timate use and the abuse of a preferential 
position, but when the war broke out authentic 
revelations of the methods piirsued by Teutonic 
agents for the furtherance of their political 
and economic aims in Russia were of 
such a character as to facilitate greatly the 
task of making such a definition. As 'SI. 
KLhvostoff, ]\Iinister of the Interior, showed 
before the Duma, the spirit of world domination 
which had permeated all classes of the German 
nation since the accession of William II. was, 
from the beginning, specially directed to this 
subjugation of Russia, which offered excep- 
tional plastic raw material for the purpose. 

As the sequel, moreover, proved, what at the 
outset was a perfectly lawful advantage accruing 
to superior ability and energy, was eventually 
prostituted to the nefarious objects of political 
intrigue and military espionage. The capture 
of Russian indu.strial and commercial concerns 
was ingeniously utilized by a powerful spy 
organization which, when the war broke out, 
diligently fomented strikes and labour troubles. 
The colonies of German settlers, originally 
perhaps purely agricultural undertakings, were 
so manipulated by German Government and 
military agents as to command strategic points, 
particularly near Russian fortresses. The 
lands of Russian peasants were purchased 
wholesale by German syndicates, which peopled 
them with Germans, and in some of the pro- 
vinces thus colonized the Gennans gained 
decisive influence over the Zemstvos. ]\Iany 
Russian firms were also compelled to sell their 
business to Gennan syndicates which had 
chosen Russia as a field of operation, and 
were imified undc-r the leadership of the 
Berlin Deutsche I'lank. Thanks to the whip- 
hanfl thus gained, the (Germans were able to 
achieve political and military aims through 
agreements entfsred into between these osten- 
sible " Russian " firms and foreign and R\issian 
shipbuilding works, pledging these latter nut, 
to a<;cf!|>t contracts for lius.Hian warships 
unl««s they could be sure of a profit of 100 
yjer *:ent. Similar ma<*hirmtions wen! not 
r>n foot to control gun and iMUiiilion factories, 
and HO retard the execution of Russian Govern- 
Mietit orders. 



•2'2J 



77/ A" TIMKS msTOIlY OF THE WAR. 



A voltiiiiti ftmkl k)ti clevuted, and more tliun 
Kiie hah befii ho devoted, to uii Ht-c-ount of th« 
unoiiialoiui (MMition of the lialtir I'rovince CJer- 
iitHUH, more ertptfially the so-culled " haronrt " 
uhobe iirtiiieri bulk HO lur^ely ill Ku-sHitui otlUial 
and tliploiuatic life. 'I'lie Hubjeet luw been 
tlioroiighly iliseiuwed in Chapter LXXXIII., 
N'ol. \'. Tliouj^h coiMtituting lean than 
7 per cent, of the total population of 
tho^e province."!, and in the country dihtricts 
scarcely 1 i>er cent., this Gerinan element, 
thanks to its hereditary privileges, often of a 
purely feudal nature, had acquired a wholly 
disproportionate influence in the direction of 
Ux-al affairs. The value of these privileges was 
estimati^l at many millions of roubles annually. 

Action was at length taken, and the 
Government in March, 1915, appointed a 



allowed to ojierato in Russia, and Uussian 
|)artnershij)s if they included subjects of enemy 
States. Niunerous restrictions were likewise 
imposed on their right to engage in trade and 
industry. Still more interesting, road in con« 
junction with what has ]hk^i\ said about the 
biintlul intluence of Cierman colonization, was 
a law discontinuing (jierman and Austrian land- 
ownership in ex -urban regions of the twenty- 
five provinces adjacent to the Haltic, Black, 
and Azov Seas, wliere the disal)ility extended 
to CJ«'rmans naturalized as Hu.ssian subjects 
and their descendants who luul acquired immov- 
able property later than .June 14, 1870, the date 
when, significantly enough, Germany promul- 
gated her law of <lual citizenship. 

The map reproduced on [>age 223 originally 
iippeannl in the St. I'dershnrfjer Zeituny during 




M. KRIVOSHEIN. 

Former Minister of 

Agriculture. 



M. GOREMYKIN. 

Russian Premier until 

January, 1916. 



PRINCE ALEXANDER 
OF OLDENBURG. 

Head of the Russian Sanitary 
Department. 



special commission to draft a law for the 
abolition of special privileges enjoyed by the 
German barons in the Baltic Provinces. Tlie 
repeal of privileges fundamentally at variance 
with the general legislation of the Empire was 
highly desirable, but these privileges were often 
so inextricably bound up with the rights of 
private contract protected by law, that the 
Government had to move cautiously before 
committing itself to a concrete measure. 

Against avowedly enemy subjects prompt 
steps were taken. On the outbreak of hosti- 
lities all rights and privileges granted to sub- 
jects of enemy States by special conventions 
automatically lapsed, but the powers of legis- 
lation were further invoked to prohibit the 
acquisition and possession of inamovable pro- 
perty, not only by individual enemy subjects, 
but by joint -stock companies and partnerships 



1906. It shows the density of German popu- 
lation and German colonization in Russia. 
From the Prussian frontier and Poland, German 
"peaceful penetration" eastward was pro- 
ceeding " like an avalanche," and it will be 
seen that it was particularly powerful along 
the strategic lines to the north-east and south- 
east. 

The war at length fully roused the Russian 
people to the perils lurking in German domina- 
tion, and created a resolve to eradicate the 
canker at its roots. Nevertheless, by the ii-ony 
of fate, the interest of many Germans in the 
Russian market was actually stimulated by the 
war. Thousands and tens of thousands of 
German prisoners, the bulk of whom were 
interned in Siberia, set themselves the t»xsk of 
learning Russian and ot studying the country 
as a field for conunercial and industrial activity 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF , THE WAB.. 



223 




MAP SHOWING DENSITY OF GERMAN POPULATION IN RUSSIA. 



after the war. So great was the demand for 
Ruasian text -books that local supplies were 
sf>eedily exhausted and fresli consignments 
had to be imported from Leipzig. Many of 
these prisoners patiently awaited the end of 
the war in order to put the knowledge thus 
acquirtjd to practical u.se and establish lasting 
business connexions with a land of unlimited 
f)[>port unities. 

ii<gardint^ the gf^rifrral jjositioii of war 
prisf>n«;rs in Russia, the fact should not be 
overlooked that whereas in other countries 
pri?w)ners were interned in concentration carnf)s 
or fortrtmses, this methrxl could not very well 
^>♦; ail(>])U-A\ in Russia owing to the sparse 
pf>pulatiori, anfl also Fxjcause a v«;rv large 
proportion of the [irisonirrs were Slavs by 
df«w;cnt and hmi, in many case», surrendcjred 
voluntarily, ft wouM, thfrfjforf;, have be<!n at 
variarif^; with fhf [(oliey of the State arul thr; 
wishes of the j>eoj>l«' that they shfjuld be trr'ated 



with rigour. For these reasons German prisoners 
proper were sent to remote provinces, while 
the Austrian -Slavs remained in Eviropean 
Russia, distributed chiefly among the agri- 
cultural regions of the south, where they found 
lucrative employment. There was practically 
no difference established in the treatment of 
interned non-combatants and prisoners taken 
on the field of battle. The majority of these war 
prisoners were not compelled to live under 
conditions more onerous than those to which 
the local inhabitants were exposed. 

When the war broke out the Russian 
military authorities at once recognised the 
iinportance of preeavjtionary measures to 
Haf»!guar{l military secrets from the ubiquitous 
curiosity of Gi^rman agents who were 
strongly suspected to ha numerous among 
l|]i- rnillionH of <;<rnians scattered over the 
country, aiid in no ollirr coNtilry affected by 
tli<- war was tlie censorshit) ap|)licd with ho 



2'24 



THE times; inS^TOBY OF THE WAR. 






4 s .«< ».tf%^~^ 



\. ^-l „mm^JhM% 



H I I 




1 

J 



A CAMP I'OK PRISONERS OF WAR IN SIBERIA. 



much rigour. Nevertheless, it was subsequently 
showTi by overwhelming testimony that the 
Gern^ans wore frequently informed of ill I 
RiLssian military movements. Placards were 
often displayed in the German trenches 
notifying the Russians opposite that they were 
about to be moved elsewhere, and correctlj' 
defining the time and place of the contemplated 
change. 

The Gentian espionage system as practised 
in Russia bore a general family resemblance 
to the procedure adopted in other coimtries, 
notably France and England. 

The presence of German agents in mills and 
factories, both before and since the war began, 
is a well-established fact, and their share in 
instigating strikes, fomenting discontent among 
the workmen, and retarding production gene- 
rally, especially of mimitions, also leaves little 
room for doubt. It has also been claimed that 
Russo-German managers of munition factories 
assisted the enenay by scrapping shells and 
other mvmition products for perfectly trivial, 
if not non-existent, defects, which could in no 
wise detract from their practical utility. 
Some, if not all, of the explosions that occurred 
in powder and miuiition works diu-ing the war 
were traced to Gennan macliinations. In May, 
1915, the large powder mills at Okhta, a subiu-b 
of Petrograd, were the scene of a terrible 
explosion, which wrecked the buildings where 
nitro-glycerine was manufactm-ed and killed 
several hundred workmen. This catastrophe 
was attributed to German hands, but the 
suspicion was never satisfactorily proved. Far 
greater anxiety was caused by explosions at 
several powder magazines at Kronstadt in 



April, 1916, as in these cases there was good 
rea.son to suspect that they were of sinister 
origin. 

The gathering suspicion aroused by the size 
and influence of the (!t)rman elements in Russia 
reacted very painfully against the Jews, 
especially in Poland, where the Ru.ssian troops 
undoubtedly found palpable evidence of 
treachery on the part of the Jews inhabiting 
the frontier districts, such as subterranean 
telephones connected with the enemy's posi- 
tions. Soon, therefore, it came to be 
generally belie veil in the Army that the Jews 
were not to be trusted. 

Suspicions of this kind completely vanished 
wherever the scene of operations shifted from 
t he original borderlands. There was never any 
doubt about the loyalty of the Jewish popula- 
tion in the interior, and in spite of their well- 
known disinclination for military service many 
Jews made excellent soldiers. The eminently 
loyal behaviour of the Russian Jews at the 
outbreak of the war was bound to be recalled 
in after days and to help to solve the much- 
vexed Jewish question. The war itself by 
displacing old boundaries involved sweeping 
departures froin the system which confined 
the legal right of residence for Jews to certain 
districts. Many Jewish refugees were sent far 
inland beyond the Pale. It was felt at the time 
that it would be impossible to compel them to 
return westward when the war was over. 

It was not enough that the Russian civil 
and military authorities should have had to 
make headway against the formidable handicap 
imposed upon them by the intricate organiza- 
tion of alien espionage. That tiisk was still 



THE TIMES HlSTOllY OF THE WAR. 



2'2{ 



fiirther complicated by Ihe far more repulsive 
phenomenon of domestic treachery, wliicli 
ultimately focussed into the celebrated Miaso- 
yedoff affair. Before the war Colonel Miaso- 
yedoff was in the gendarmerie corps and became 
well known to all travellers to Russia as an 
official in charge of the poHce arrangements at 
the frontier station of Wierzhbolowo. He fell 
into disgrace on account of some frauds against 
the Russian Customs, and was relieved from 
further active employment. Witliin a few 
months after the outbreak of hostilities he 
applied for leave to rejoin the Army. His 
application was granted, and he was attached 
to the stafT of the Tenth Army then hold- 
ing Eydtkuhnen, the scene of his previous 
labours. He discharged the duties of censor 
and intelligence officer, which, of coiirse, gave 
him admirable opportunities for suppljing 
information to the enemy. There is good 
reason to believe that the Germans owe to him 
some of their success in the drive which led to 
the second retreat of the Russian Army from 
East Prussia. Miasoyedof? was tried and, 
together with two of his accomplices, executed, 
while a number of others were sentenced to 
various terms of hard labotor. 



Ilepeated disclnsuros of Coriiuin intrigue, 
I lie cflVct of wliicli was ii(i(, in any wise lessened 
by rumour and surmise, at length bon; un- 
palatable fruit in the shape of outbreaks of 
mob violence, ostensibly directed against 
the German element, but not infrequently 
manipulated by tmderground forces against 
perfectly innocent persons. Popular excite- 
ment on a really serious scale began at Moscow 
on June 8, 1915, when crowds of women, 
for the most part wives of reservists, appeared 
before the Conunittee for the distribution of 
Govermnent work and became unruly on the 
false pretext that a large contract had been 
given to a German firm. Wild reports were 
later circulated of wholesale mysterious gastric 
troubles among employees of the Proldiorovsky 
Mill, said to be due to the poisoning of artesian 
wells by the Germans, and in their wake mobs 
of workmen, women, and children visited the 
local factories with a demand for the smnmary 
discharge of all German officials and employees. 

The first tragedy occurred at the premises of 
Emil Zindel and Co. In response to a demand 
for admission the manager of the mill, G. G. 
Karlsen, ordered the gates to be closed, where- 
upon the infuriated mob burst into the yard 




I'KISONKKS OF WAR IN SIMF'-KIA. 
Austrian prisoners and their laundry outside a hut in the prison camp. 



226 



Till': TIMES IIISTOltY OF THE WAH. 



jCiUiwidmunnc 



J 




BOEHHblH 
S'iVoSAEMb 



ADVERTISEMENT FOR THE 5i PER GENT. 
WAR LOAN. 

and lynched the unfortunate Karlsen. A similar 
tragedy was enacted at the Shrader mill. On 
the morning of Jiuk^ 10 the disturbances 
assumed a wholesale character, and mills and 
factories at Danilov, the Simeonovsky settle- 
ment, Zainoskvorechie, etc., suffered badly. 

In due course the riots developed from a 
more or less coherent manifestation of anti- 
German sentiment into an orgy of lawlessness 
pure and simple, in no small degree stimulated 
by liquor, of which the crowd had gained 
possession. The more central quarters of the 
city became involved, and in the chaos that 
ensued not only Germans but numbers of 
Russians and svibjects of friendly States were 
exposed to mob violence. Crowds assembled 
at the Borovitzkiya gate of the Ivremlin, and 
being reinforced by contingents from the 
outskirts of the city, proceeded to wreck and 
loot shops and other commercial establish- 
ments in the neighbourhood. Towards night- 
fall fires began to break out, which continued 
throughout the following day and were with 
difficulty extinguished by evening on Jiuie 12. 

A partial list of the damage sustained 
included 475 con^mercial undertakings wrecked; 
207 flats and houses wrecked, looted, and biu-nt; 
and total financial losses anTOunting to more 



than 40, ()()(), ()()() roubles, not including vahiabln 
[taper securities. Among tlio puruonul cahualtien 
\M'ro 113 Austrian and German subjects; IHO 
Ku.s.siuiis witli foreign names and foreign sub- 
jects of frii'udly Stati's ; and UU Russians with 
Kussian names. Similar disturbances occurred 
at some other provincial towns, on a far less 
serious scale. 

The riots had one good result. They led 
to the dismissal of the Homo Secretary, M. 
Maklakott" (a reactionary brother of the Liberal 
Diputy), who liad long b(Hin most un|)opiilai 
on account of liis opposition to the Duma. 

Tn addition to the inevitable evils inseparable 
from the conduct of even the most successful 
war, lliLssia, as the result of the forced ovacua- 
tioii itl Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic Provinc(!s, 
iuul Galicia, was called upon to shoulder 
unforeseen burdens which the other allied 
belligerents, with the exception of Belgium 
and Serbia, were happily spared, or experienced 
upon a small scale. 

The probleni of succouring the vast mob of 
hiuigry fugitives, old men, women, and children, 
gravely embarrassed the Russian authorities at 
a time when it was vital that all efforts should 
be concentrated on the work of beating the 
enemy in the field. The number of refugees 
for whose destiny the Russian Government 
liad to assume responsibility is variously esti- 
mated at from 2,600,000 to 3,000,000, the 
latter figure being the estunate of ^L Naumoff, 
the IVIinister of Agriculture. This veritable 
exodus of nations before the then irresistible 
advance of the Teuton legions entailed suffer- 
ings more terrible in their way than those to 
which actual combatants were subjected, 
because the victims for the most part were 
the old and the weak, incapable of offering 
the smallest resistance to a ruthless foe. 

Russian and foreign writers have not been 
lacking who have attempted to tell the story 
of this world tragedy — of the harrowing 
scenes witnessed along the main channels of 
civiUan evacuation, where, amid the rigours 
of a northern autunm, himdreds and thousands 
must have perished from hunger and exposure. 
These conditions applied more especially to 
the refugees from Poland, Lithuania, and the 
Baltic Provinces. In the case of the evacua- 
tion of Jews and peasants from Galicia, the 
hardships endured,^ though serious enough, 
were less terrible, because there had been more 
leisure for organization, and the Russian 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



227 



military and civilian authorities in occupation 
of the conquered Austrian territory were 
better able to cope with the undertaking. 
Thus these thousands of unf ortiuiate fugitives, 
fleeing before the Austro-German advance, 
svere passed along through the lines of the 
Russian Army with far greater semblance of 
order than had proved possible in the case of 
the abandonment of Poland, though it goes 
without saying that the gigantic supple- 
mentary labour thus imposed upon the Army 
on the Galician front taxed its resotirces to the 
utmost and aggravated the peril of a situation 
sufficiently grave at best. 

In the stupendous labour of succouring 
these unfortunates, the members of the Imperial 
Family played a leading part, setting an 
example of devotion and self-sacrifice which 
was not lost upon the rank and file. Irrespec- 
tive of measures adopted by the Government, 
as far back as September, 1914, the Tsar sanc- 
tioned the establishment of a special Committee 
for the extension of aid to war sufferers, of 
which the Grand Duchess Tatiana Nikolaevna 
was appointed Honorary President, and ^I. A. 
Xeydhart, a member of the Imperial Council, 
-was chosen President. 



In connexion with the work of relief generally 
sjilendid service was rendered by Her Majesty, 
the Empress Marie, as the moving spirit of the 
great Russian Red Cross Association, and tiio 
Grand Duchess Olga Alexandrovna, sister of 
the Tsar, the Grand Duchesses Olga and Tatiana, 
daughters of the Tsar, the Grand Duchess Eliza- 
beth Feodorovna, the young Empress's elder 
sister, and the Grand Duchess Marie Pavlovna, 
younger sister of the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlo- 
vitch, all of whom volunteered as sisters of 
mercy. Among other official organizations of 
later date, that under the superintendence of S. I. 
Zubchaninov, member of the Imperial Council, 
did admirable service in helping refugees of the 
north-western front. 

For dealing with alimentation, points were 
organized at regular intervals where a cold 
ration was provided to last for a week, and 
where medical help was furnished, while at 
other places camp kitchens supplied the popu- 
lation with hot food. The business of feeding 
the population near the front was attended by 
exceptional difficulty, because owing to the 
requisition of horses and the shortage of 
forage there was a dearth of the means of con- 
veyance. Here the splendid Zemstvo and 




EXIIIUmUN 01< UKIIISH KHCKUITINC; FOSTERS IN RUSSIA. 



228 



T///; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



iirhan relk-f uruam^atiunti rendtTed inetitiiitablH 
service. 

AiiothtT umliBnabln uutcuiue of tht^t^e l"ori»'d 
inigratiDUs was the larmi additiun involvnd to 
th« |)0|iutatiou ol litiuii in tlio rear, notahly 
I'f trograd, Moscow, Kiev, Samara and Saratov. 
On the avei'age thi.s adilition repreHented a pro- 
portion of about 8'82 per cent, of the reguhir 
population, though in some ca^es, of cournc, 
it \va.s far more considerable. Naturally, thin 
unforeseen influx had a prroat deal to do with 




A WOMAN MUNITION WORKER. 

the depletion of food and fuel supplies, the 
shortage of dwelling accommodation, and the 
consequent unprecedented rise in prices and 
rent. 

As in the case of civilian refugees, so as regards 
sick and wounded soldiers and care for their 
dependants, the members of the Imperial 
Family were conspicuously active. At the head 
of the organization which iindertook the care of 
soldiers' families was the Empress Alexandra 
Feodorovna, as President of the High Council 
formed specially for this purpose ; at the head 
of the Red Cross was the Empress Marie Feo- 
dorovna, while other members of the Royal 
family took the lead in other relief organizations. 



Tlie organs of local self-government (Zemstvo 
and (iiwn councils) splenilidly respomled lo liio 
(•all of these newly-arisen necessities. Jioth 
these classes of organizations apjintpriated large 
sums for the requirements of soldiers' familiog. 
As far back as December, 1!)14, the amount 
disburseil by the Zemstvos for this jjurpose 
came to 97U,0()() roubU^s, and by the towns to 
l,47ri,((()0 roubles. Moreover, the Zemstvos 
undi'rtook the duty of harvesting the crops, 
sowing the fields, and threshing the corn for 
reservists' families and providing them with 
agricultural niacliinery and seed when neces- 
sary. 

The outbreak of the war did not take the 
Russian Red Cross unawares. In accordance 
with the plan of mobilization drafted earlier in 
conformity with the instructions of the War 
Department, there were formed without delay 
and dispatched to the war theatre 48 hospitals, 
37 stationary military hospitals (lazarets), 'Mi 
mobile hospitals, a total of 118 field medical 
institutions with 13,100 beds and equipment, 
permitting them to take in double the regulation 
number of sick and wounded, and in atldition 
ten advanced detachments. Two months later 
there were in operation 69 hospitals, 71 sta- 
tionary and 37 mobile hospitals, disposing of 
more than 35,000 beds, and 24 advanced de- 
tachments. Later still were organized six 
automobile detacliments, one sanitary-surgical, 
six X-ray detachments, five sanitary-epidemic, 
seven sanitary-disinfectant, 65 fixed dressing 
and feeding stations, 17 mobile feeding detach- 
ments, and two sanitary or hospital trains. 
Simultaneously, for the equipment of these 
establishments with materials, there were set 
up tliree field depots with complete equipment 
for 5,000 beds each, and for the advanced posi- 
tions five branches of the field depots, of which 
three were mobile. Turkej'^'s accession to the 
Central Powers called for formation of four 
stationary hospitals, four advanced, and four 
feeding and dressing detachments, which were 
dispatched to the Caucasus. 

Thanks to preparation in time of peace no 
shortage of men was experienced. The medico- 
sanitary institutions of the Society in the war 
theatre were served by a staf^ of more than 700 
doctors, 500 students, 160 superintendents, 
2,625 Sisters of ISIercy, and about 10.000 
stretcher-bearers (sanitars). Moreover, over 
3,700 Sisters of Mercy were appointed by the 
Red Cross to serve the medico -sanitarv institu 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



229 



tions of tho War Deptartmont. Tin|)rof=isive as 
aro the foregoing figures, thoy uniloubtedl/ 
tell short of those obtaining at a later date, 
seeing that the work of the Red Cross grew daily 
and hourly in conformity with the demands 
conferred upon it. 

Brief reference has already been made to the 
share of the towns and Zemstvos in the task of 
relief. The Red Cross gladly welcomed valuable 
cooperation extended by what was known as tl e 
All-Russian Zemstvo Union, with Prince G. E. 
Lvov at its head ; the Urban Union, comprising 
385 towns (chief delegate IM. V. Chelnokov, 
Mayor of Moscow), the Nobility organization, 
and others. ^Nlore particularly the Zemstvos 
and Urban Unions won for themselves an 
abiding place in the affections of the army, 
thanks to their philanthropy, giiided by inti- 
mate first-hand knowledge of the ordinary 
pea.sant soldier and his needs. 

Not the least of the many difficulties which 
Russia had to face in her conduct of the war 
were the supply of drugs and surgical instni- 
ments. The country's dependence upon Ger- 
many before the war for the bulk of such sup- 
plies was a matter of common knowledge, and 
it can therefore be vmderstood that with the 
a<^iditional handicap of a war on her hands 




HMtETI. XOWIiEHlE HAPABHL, 
Cb M-felHOPi: MOHETOH. 



ni 



ONE op THE NEW SMALL 
DENOMINATIONAL NOTES. 

One kopek is equivalent to a farthing. 

Russia had to reconcile herself temporarily to 
the bitter anomaly of still purchasing many 
special articles from her principal enemy, and 
it was for that reason mainly that, despite the 
war, it was not found feasible wholly to suspend 
trade with Germany. Thus, the monthly 
statistical publication of the Council of Ministers 
regularly printed the figures for German imports, 
which in 1915 exceeded 20,000,000 roubles in 
value. Nevertheless, strenuous efforts were 
made to render Russia more self-supporting 
in this respect, and gratifying progress was 
achieved. The hospitals were able to replenish 
their stocks exclusively from home production. 
The manufacture of hygroscopic cotton wool 
was permanently established. Thanks to the 




KOVAI.IV VISITS WOUNDHIJ SOLDIERS, 
The Dowa[(er E.mprevn of KuHsia in one of the wardN in the Polytechnic HoNpital, I'clroifrad. 



2{10 



THt: TIMKS HlSTUliY OF Till': WAR. 



ilUeovery of rifli contents of iodine in the soa- 
ueeil of the ttlaik Sea the nmniifac-tiu'e of tliis 
|ii'CHlu(t waa organizeil upon an exteiwive wale, 
uhikt tfie lah»juiH of Hu-ssian savants gave u 
Htart to the aitiui.sitioii hy the simplest means of 
various medically valuable alkaloids. 

No lu-eount of war relief would be com|)hite 
without Home reference to I'rince Alexander t>f 
OklenbuVg, heatl of the Sanitary Department 
of W'ai', for wliich post by trainmg ami tempera- 
ment he was jieculiurly fittoil. Though 72 years 
of age, thanks largely to his wonilerful energy 
and powers of organization and iniliation the 
health of the Russian forces on the whoh* 
proved to be satisfactory during the war. Ho 
get a fine example of patriotism by devoting the 
greater part of liis splendid palace on the banks 
of tlio Neva to the purposes of a military hos- 
pital with 150 beds. His promptitude in 
dealing with the poisonous gas emergency was 
characteristic. Within two or three days 
organizations employing thousands of hands 
were at work preparing masks, of which millions 
were ready within a week. Prince Alexander 
was greatly interested in the development of 
native spas, and one of the finest health resorts 
on the Black Sea (Gagry) owes its exi.stence to 
his initiative In this connexion his invitation 
through the columns of The Times to wounded 
oflHcers of the British Aimy to be his guests 
at the unrivalled hot baths and medicinal 
springs of the Caucasvis will be recalled. 

Valuable in itself, and doublv so as an o\i- 



dence of British sympathy with Russia, was the 
Anglo-Russian Ho.sj)ital, installed in 1910 in the 
handsome palace of the Orand Duke Dmitri 
I'avlovitch, situated at the corner of the 
I'ontanka river and the Nevsky Prospekt. The 
work of adaptation was skilfully ptfrfonued, and 
ami)le accommodation for 200 patients provided 
with operating rooms, a bandaging room (a 
special feature of all Kussian military hospitals), 
an X-ray cabinet, laboratory and drug dc-part- 
ment. The .senior Sisters of Menry were Lady 
Muriel I'aget and J.,ady Sybil (Jrey, and the 
senior physician Dr. Fleming. During the 
summer of l!(i() the Hospital sent a well 
ecpiipped Ambulance Detachment to the Front. 
British working men had subscribed for twenty 
b(;ds for wounded Ru.ssian workmen. This gift 
was sent through the Anglo-Russian Hospital. 
Lady (Joorgiana Buchanan and Miss Muriel 
liuchanan worked devotedly in the cause of 
hospital and relief work. 

While no doubt whatever could prevail 
among Russians at the outbreak of the war as 
to the stability of their alliance with France, 
which had already lasted upwards of twenty- 
three years, the position that Great Britain 
would take up in the struggle forced upon these 
allies by Germany gave rise to heartfelt anxiety. 
Russians had ever felt respect for England's 
word, and this feeling had given place to growing 
warnith of sentiment, one niay say friendship, 
ever since the mistakes of Russia's for(>ign 








^M^S^S^S^'^^m^^^^ 



^ijC4<^•>•^s^ • __ 



[b'rpm the Vtchenue Vremyft. 

REFUGEES FROM POLAND ; SCENES ON THE WAYSIDE. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 

3 5 



231 




12 4 6 ? « 

[Waring & Gillow. 

A PARTY OF RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS AND PUBLICISTS IN LONDON. 

(1) Count Alexis Tolstoy. (2) The Times Correspondent. (3) M. Chukovsky. (4) M. Nemirovitch- 
Danchenko. (5) M. Aladyn. (6) M. Nabokoff. (7) M. Yegoroflf. (8) M. Bashmakoff. 



policy had been exposed by the war with 
Japan, and the country had come to reahze 
that its interests nowhere clashed with those 
of Great Britain, while, on the other hand, 
the continuance of mistrust between them 
could only serve the ends of Germany. 
Russians instinctively realized that Germany 
wanted at all costs to undermine Russia's 
independence, and that perhaps one of the 
reasons why she had provoked the war was her 
arrogant displeasure at the spectacle of an 
Anglo-Rassian rapprochement. Russians, high 
and low, appreciated the value of such an ally 
as Great Britain. Those were anxious days 
in Petrograd and throughout the Tsar's 
domains when Russia was waiting to learn 
which way England would decide. Later 
they came to know us well enough to realize 
that they should never have entertained any 
doubts on the subjf;ct. R«-ference lias already 
\M-Jm made to the remarkable outbursts of 
[iofiular joy which were disjilayed all over 
Russia when the news came that England 
would not sit idle while Germany dealt one 
by one with the Allies. The readinens with 
which the 'IVar's armies hurled themselves at 
the U)ti in order to divert his att<'ntion from thf; 
hard-fjrefsed legions of Franer; anrl the British 
Exfieflitionary Force was an exprrission of the 
national spirit as well as of sfxuifl strategical 
wmsiderations. 



As the war dragged on its uneven course, 
as defeats in the field of battle and the domain 
of diplomacy retarded the day of victory, as 
the magnitude of Russia's own losses became 
more and more fully realized, there was 
naturally a tendency to look more and more to 
relief from the Allies. On the other hand, it 
was difficult if not impossible for the lay 
mind to grasp the difiiculties of the position 
on the Western front. Intercourse between 
Russia and her Allies was of such a restricted 
character, both in the form of travel and in the 
information produced by the Russian Press, 
that the country knew almost nf)thing of the 
extent of France's achievements and of the 
enormous burden that England had assumed 
in the naval, military, commercial, and financial 
domains. As the Russian armies retreated from 
(ialicia the Russian nation wondered why there 
was no corresf)onding advance on the part of 
the Allies in France; and Flanders. The pro- 
Gfinnan elements in the country raised their 
heads, hoping that the lack of information in 
the Army and among tiie public would iitford 
a favourable soil for the negotiation of a separate 
peace. But their hopes were shortlived. 
Thanks to the efforts of the Press, led by 
The Times and suf)f)ort<!d by the two Govern- 
ments, the truth about their Allies soon came 
to be known iiiiiong the Russians, and espe- 
cially among I lie Russian Army. Tin- \ isit 



•l\i'> 



THE TIMES tllSTUHY OF THE WA1{. 



of Rujdaiau juurimliiits and writura to Ent^iand 
auU Kraitce during thtt wiuter ui iU16-191tt, aud 
later thu llu>*.siiiii piirlitiiiuiitin y visit, (li.sp«llt tl 
the rtMiuiiiul.s ui any iloiibt ttiat niigtit havu 
reiuaiiuHl, and fstahiished a iina, unalterablu 
cuntideiice in the Allied Aniiied. At the isuino 
tiiue the heroic, uni>recedented defence of 
Verdun for ever put a Btop to any fiu-thcr 
attempt on the part of the pro-Genntin aj^itutcjitj 
to ea.st retlcction-s upon the Allies of Uu.s.<ia. 

It wouUl lu) ini|)o.s.sihlo to close tliis reference 
to Ant;lo-UuHsian relations without dvveliinj^ 
upon the auspicious influence that hud hccn 
exerted diu-ing all the years of his term of ollice 
by the British Ambassador, Sir George 
Buchanan, who, thanks to his high qualities 



of heart and mind, had won the respect and 
ati"e«-tion of the Uussian people. As a mark of 
the ••xtriiordinary eHt«'(»m whicli nil Russia felt 
towards him, the municipality of Moscow con- 
ferncl upon him the freedom of the cslty, an 
hon<fur which the Tsar was ])leased to ratify. 

That the policy of Russia had nulically 
changed from the old suspicion of England to a 
new, sincens and lasting spirit of confidence, 
amity, and alliunc*! must be ascribed in a gieat 
degre*! to the friendly and eminently loyal direc- 
tion of foreign alfairs which characterized M. 
SazonofY's administration from its very outset. 
The fruits of the new policy were bound to 
influence international relations long after the 
Great War. 




AN OPEN-AIR RELIGIOUS SERVICE FOR INTERCESSION FOR THE ARMIES IN 

THE FIELD. 



CHAPTER CXXX. 



THE CONQUEST OF GERMAN 
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA. 



Germax Acquisition of South- West Africa^Sguth African and German Forces and 
Supplies — The Strategic Problem — Xatuhe of the Country — Political Difficulties — 
Invasion by Germans — Occupation of Luderitzbucht — Disaster at Sandfontein — Maritz 
IN Rebellion — Rebuilding the Railway — Swakopmund Taken — General Botha Takes 
Command — The Southern Campaign — Battle of Gibeon — General Botha's Advance — Fall 
of Windhuk — The Northern Campaign — Surrender of the Germans. 



WITH a little more wisdom and fore- 
sight on the part of British and 
Colonial statesmen, the campaign 
agairtst German South-West 
Africa might never have been necessary. It 
was in South- West Africa that the colonial 
ambitions of Germany were first given rein, and 
her conxplete success tliere— first in hood- 
winking the British and Cape Governments, 
and then in compelling them to face the alter- 
native of accepting the accomplished fact of 
Germany in pos.session or of turning her out by 
forwj — undoubtedly encouragerl her to pursue 
her ambitions in Africa by the use of the same 
twin weapons of deceit and brava<lo. 

The Ht/jry of Germany's acquisition of South- 
We«t Africa in not pleasant reading for Knglish- 
men. Up t^i 1882 there wa« no question but 
that the whoU; territory waw generally regarded 
as under Britiih influence, if that influence did 
not extend far into the interior and was no 
very effw.-tive instrument of actual government. 
For wnrin years beff>re that German trailers 
hfuJ h*fi*;n fjHtablishing themHelves along the 
coant, and Cierman miHsionaries hmi pushed 
int'> the interior, cmtiing now and then into 
conflict with the natives and making vain 
nfij>f:n\n through their Gov<Tnrnent for the 
arrnwl prot«'^;tion of Great liritain. As early 
Vol. VIII — J'art 98. 233 



as 1878 Sir Bartle Frere, then Governor of the 
Cape, saw where these conflicts between German 
missionaries and the natives might lead, and 
persuaded the Imperial Government to declare 
formally that Walfish Bay and the country 
round it for a radius of 15 miles was British 
territory. Otherwise, his fears were treated 
as the dreams of an alarmist, and both the Im- 
perial and the Cape Governments proceeded on 
the easy assumption that Germany would never 
have colonial ambitions and that nothing was 
to be feared from her. 

In 1880 all British oflicials were withdrawn 
from th(! territory, then usually known as 
Damaraland, and only Walfish Bay n inained 
under the British flag. From that time the 
(Jerman Government began to be; increasingly 
pertinacious in its inquiries about the facts of 
the position and in its demands that the German 
missionaries and trailers should have some 
effective [irotection. By 1882 the "Colonial 
i'arty " ha<l at lost got the u[)per hand in (Jer- 
many and Imd jicTsuaded Bismarck tliat their 
projects were worfli bafking. Thcur first 
enterpri.se was the expedition of llcrr Liidcrit/.. 

He fonned the jjroject of a coniiaorcial settle- 
ment on the coast of South VV'cist Africa, and, 
in the autumn of 1882, formally a-sked jihe (Jer- 
ri lun Foreigti Oflico whether he could count on 



234 



7///-; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WATi. 




\Mii^ 




'\ 



DISCUSSING FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS. 
General Botha and Lieutenant-Colonel Francke, the German Commander-in-Chief, after the 

surrender of the German Forces. 



In^perial protection for any rights that he might 
secure. Bismarck, tlirough his son Herbert, 
proceeded to sound the British Government. 
A factory, he told theni, was going to be estab- 
lished on the coast of South- West Africa by a 
German merchant. The protection of the Ger- 
man Government had been asked in case of 
need. Did her Majesty's Government exercise 
any authority in that locality ? If so, would 
they extend British protection to the German 
factory V If not, the German Government 
•would " do their best to extend to it the same 
measure of protection which they give to their 
subjects in remote parts of the world, but without 
having the least design to establish any footing 
in South Africa." The British Government 
sent a procrastinating reply. They did not 
know whether they could protect the factory 
unless they had more precise information about 
its position. When they got that information 
they woiild send it to the Cape Government 
" with instructions to report whether and to 
what extent their wishes could be met." This 
was enough for Bismarck. Liideritz was told 
that if he could acquire any harbour to which 
no other nation had any just claim he could 



reckon on Imperial protection. His expedi- 
tion was fitted out, and arrived at what was 
then known as the Bay of Angra Pequena, but 
was afterwards called Liideritz Bay, on April 9, 
1883. By the beginning of May a concession 
had been obtained from the local chief selling 
to Liideritz about 215 square miles of land on 
the Bay of Angra Pequena, with full rights of 
sovereignty. The German flag was hoisted ; 
the captain of a British warship, going from 
Cape Town to look into these strange proceed- 
ings, was tokl that he was in German territorial 
waters ; and the Imperial and Cape Govern- 
ments found themselves faced by an accom- 
plished fact. By October a German gunboat 
was at Angra Pequena to protect German 
interests, and in November the German Am- 
bassador in London was formally asking whether 
Great Britain laid any claim to the Angra 
Pequena district, and, if so, on what ground. 
The Imperial Government returned a doubtful 
reply, and the whole business was allowed to 
drag on till at last, in April, 1884, Gennany wtus 
ready for the final steji. The German Consul 
at the Cape then informed the Cape Go\ernmont 
oflKcially that Liideritz and his possessions were 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAE. 



235 



under German protection. Even then tlio 
Imperial Government clung to the belief that 
Germany had no i^inister designs. They were 
not left much longer in doubt. In June 
liismarck's son Herbert came to London to 
bring matters to a head, and on June 21 the 
In\perial Government decided to recognize the 
German protectorate over Angra Pequena. By 
the end of Augvist the whole territory from the 
Orange river to the boundary of Portuguese 
Angola had been formally annexed by Germany 
with the exception of Walfish Bay and its im- 
mediate hinterland. At the end of the year 
Great Britain formally notified Germany that 
she would make no annexations west of the 
20th parallel of longitude, which was thus 
definitely established as the eastern border of 
German South-West Africa. 

On the map German South-West Africa 
seems an easy prey for a superior force invading 
it from South Africa. And General Botha 
was able to command a greatly superior force. 
Taking it all in all, he had from beginning to 
end of the campaign between forty and fifty 



thousand men engaged. Against this, the 
(jlermans had in the later stages of the campaign 
about 5,000 regulars and " reservists " — men 
who had been settled on farms in the German 
territory, but who had done their period of 
military training in Geirmany and were 
available at the order of the (Jerman com- 
mander. But it is certain that this number 
did not comprise his whole force, for many 
" reservists " were sent back to their farms 
when the campaign began to go against the 
Germans. These " reservists," on the testi- 
mony of those who were engaged in the cam- 
paign on the British side, were for the most part 
far superior from the military point of view to 
the ordinary farmer, as we understand that 
classification. They were young, able-bodied 
men — good military material, and requiring 
little additional training to make them valuable 
soldiers. 

The Germans had, too, abundance of arms, 
munitions, guns, machine-guns, stores, and all 
other kinds of material. Again and again 
the South African trqj)ps, entering towns or 
positions on the heels of the retreating enemy, 




THH C:APrrAI. Ol- the GHKMAN COI-ONY. 
(ttnera] Rotha'n column <iwa!rin)i the order to enter WinJhiik. 



236 



THl'J TIMES HISTQIiY OF TllK HI/?. 



were aiiia/ed at the Hhitnilance of tho ariiiw 
uml iiuiiiitioiui uhiili they luuiiti, in ispite of 
hii»ty atteiu|itu that had been inaih< to destroy 
them before they i-anie. 'I'snnieh was tlie 
moat ton.s|tieuon« m^stanee. Ttie way in wliic-h 
It came to be taken by the South Afiifan 
troo|)b while tlie (ierman.s were aftually 
lic)lihiij( ita tlefeneew, will be exphiint^d later. 
As it waH, THiuneb amazed the South Afrieans 
by the profuse abundance of its military 
re«oiu"ces. It was a huge arsenal. Piles of 
rifles and anuuunition were found, sullicient, 
on tfie testimony of an eye-witness, to equip 
a force of from 2(K()00 to 25,000 men. Such 
estimates mu»t necessarily bo rough. But it 
should be remembered that the capture of 
Tsiuneb came at the very entl of the campaign, 
only a few days before the final surrender of 
the Germans. That there shoukl still liave 
been in one town, at that late date, so enormous 
a quantity of military stores, is a very remark- 
able fact. The truth see^ns to have been 
that German South-West Africa had long 
been regarded by the^German authorities as 
a base for military operations against South 
Africa. Everything goes to confirm the justice 
of this deduction. The mere geographical 
appearance of the territory on the map — 
where it seems to lie open to easy invasion 
by the South African forces coming by land, 
and equally expo-sed to niunerous landings of 
sea-borne troop.s — is delusive. 

Invasion wa.s, in fact, a problem of real 
military difficulty. The territory of what 
was Gennan South -West Africa lies in a long 
striji along the west coast of Africa. Its 
southern border is the Orange river, which 
divides it from Xamaqualand, that western 
district of the old Cape Colony which is now 
a part of the Cape Province of the Union of 
South Africa. On the east and for the most 
part on the north, the boundaries of German 
South-West Africa are purely artificial. For 
almost two-thirds of its length, the eastern 
frontier follows without deviation the twentieth 
parallel of longitude, turning abruptly then at 
right angles to the east for about GO miles, and 
thence going dead straight again to the north. 
At its north-eastern corner it throws out a long 
and narrow strip that reaches across Central 
Africa to the Zambesi. On the north the 
boundary is that of the Portuguese territory of 
Angola, again an artificial line for a great part of 
its length, though on the west it follows from the 
coast the line of the river Kiuiene till that river 



tiu-ns tiefinitely northward, and on the east 
the line of another river, the Okavango. 

The artificiality of the whole ea8tern frontier 
lino, the long stretch of the wttstern «-oast, would 
seem to o.xpo.se (ierman South- West to the at- 
tat^k »>f the Power which conuuands (he sea 
routes, supported by the allegiance and military 
In I)) iii the (Jov«wmuent of South Africa. Hut 
here, an in so many other cases, the superficial 
appearance of the map tells nothing of the 
actual difliculties of the country. Nature, in 
fjut, had provided for this (Jerman territory 
the most formidable defences. The long 
line of coast is barren of harbours, swept by 
violent winds, studded with shifting sand- 
banks and liii(-d with small islands, hardly 
rising from the sea-level and often shrouded 
in banks of heavy fog. TIm^ dangers of navi- 
gation in this region are well known to .seamen, 
who, passing to and fro on the voyage to the 
Cape, give that inhospitable and treacherous 
shore a wide berth. I'^ven so, it has an ill 
rejjutation among them, for the currents are 
strong and variable, and the surge of the 
Atlantic sweeps across from the shore of 
South America without meeting any inter- 
vening land, yet southward enough to be 
troubled continually by the storms and icy 
currents of the Antarctic. The only safe 
harbour on all this coast is Walfish Bay. There 
a long spit of sandy beach juts out almost 
due north into the ocean, and inside this natural 
barrier there is a large calm lagoon — safe 
anchorage for many ships. This port Great 
Britain, when she yielded the rest of the 
territory to the Germans, kept for herself, 
though she left the Cape Government to 
administer it. General Botha, when he sent 
his northern force against Swakopmund, 
made full use of its advantages, as we shall 
see. But, apart from it, the prospects of a 
landing on any part of the German coast- 
line, with all its difficulties for the maintenance 
of an invading force that would have to be 
supplied with every necessity of life — even 
water — were not attractive. And, as though 
this frowning and stonn-swept coast- line 
was not enough defence for the Gernaan 
territory from the sea. Nature had buttressed 
it with all the resources at her command. 
The coast itself, for n\any miles inland, is a 
wilderness of waste sand. Rain falls there 
only at intervals of years. The sun smites 
down on a region that gi\es no sign of life. 
It is sand, and sand, and sand again, along the 



THE TIMES HIRTOEY OF THE WAli. 



237 




I'liolu by Africa;, I i.in Ufpru'tiiclioHi, Ltd., Julialin sbur^. 

fJKNRRAL JAN CJHKISTIAN SMUTS (on left). 
Commanded Union Force in Southern field of operiitions. 



M liolf; Iftrij^Ji of t}i<' c.otiHt. Such rivoi^ as 
i-otna frorn the intorior to the sea lose thoraselvorf 
UuifC l>';fore they renrh the const-line, in that 
.•U^mity of HHnfJ. The only Hignn thiit thoy 
nn: rivef>< ure their dry he'ls, hollowed out of 
th*! Hurrounding flenert. No vvnUjr fi[>pearrt in 
thewj river \k;<Ih. 'J'hey ure dry an the country 
nil round f,h»!rri, f:x(:v,\)t when — onco in jjerhajw 
a do-/>;n yearx — there h«ive hocn oxcoptionai 



rains in \\n' intirior. Tlien a spntc of wntrr 
showM that the; n\ii' 'Iocs exist im<l tliiit lln- 
line <jf itH courHc is nut rjKTc doluKion. At 
other times the wattir that struggles to the s(!a 
lin.^ to |ii-reolate through the; sand. Jn the 
centre of these ri\<T heds there is always a 
small lielt of stunted \egctation, showing 
where the water is trickling ihr-iugh luidci- 
ground. Ilfii-, liy horirip, water imm ]u', IVaind, 

li8— 2 



•28S 



Tin: TIMES inSTORY OF THE WAR. 




TRANSPORT 
Clearing away sand 

even ill the driest years. But even these i)oor 
rivers are rare, and the i)rosf)ect for an invachnji 
army of having to su>)sist on the supply that 
could be drawn from them would be suflicient 
to dismay the most adventurous. 

Such is the great sand-belt that, after the 
frowning and treacherous coast, is the second 
line of defence of German South-West Africa 
again>;t invasion from the sea. But there is yet 
a third line of defence in a broad strip of rook 
country, bare also of any vegetation, also 
waterless, and even more torrid than the sand- 
belt. Here, by some action of earthquake or 
of water in the remote past, the rock has been 
split and hollowed into fantastic gorges and 
\alleys Unearthly shapes of rock formation 
frown down upon the traAeller as he passes 
through them. The hot and metallic groimd 
scorches his feet. The \alleys are swept V>>- 
burning \\inds, the infernal cousins of the 
sandstorms that blow continually over the 
dunes nearer to the coast. Thus for some 
seventy miles from the sea the whole coast-line 
of Clerman South-West Africa is little else than 
desert, forming, with all these defences of a 
hostile Natiu"e, about as formidable a barrier 
.against invasion from the sea as can be found 



DIFFICULTIES. 

from the railway lines. 

anywhere in the world. Nor was the prospect 
of invasion Ijy land any more favourable for 
the South African forces. Here, too, the desert 
covered the (Jermans. South was the wide 
and rapid Orange river, with few fords that 
were practicable for a hostile force, and tluxse 
defended by the rocky passes through which 
they had to be approached. Even to get to 
these fords tlie desert had to be crossed. The 
nearest rail-head to this southern frontier was 
at O'okiep, the chief town in Cape Namaqua- 
land, though Steinkopf, a town on the line, was 
actually nearer to thf river. From either it 
was a long and waterless ride to the Orange 
ri\-er. A force enduring that ride would 
find itself at the end of it, with the thirst- 
belt behind it, committed to an attack on 
a "drift " over the river which could bo 
defended by a small nmnber of hostile troops 
well posted, and with all the terrors of a 
retreat through that dreadful country to be 
faced if it should be defeated. On the east, 
again, the broad, almost waterless, and tracklass 
desert defended German South-West. If the 
South Africans aimed at invasion from this 
side they would luixo to make for Rietfon- 
tein. Rietfontein had long boon a police post 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



239 



maintained by the Cape Government — the 
most remote of all the far posts in that country 
of great distances. Men would go in the days 
of peace to fill Government positions at Riet- 
fontein — of magistrate, or police couuuandant, 
or postal official — as though they were going 
to exile in some unexplored region of the 
globe. It was five days' journey from Kuru- 
man, not bad country for those who lilce the 
life of the desert, with fairly frequent water- 
holes, and abundant game to be had for the 
shooting ; but remote, infinitely remote, from 
civilization. 

But all these difficulties counted for little 
with the South African Government when war 
broke out. It was far less the strategical than 
the pohtical problem that was serious for them. 
Representing the Dutch people of South Africa, 
they knew well that a considerable section of 
that people would be opposed to any aggressive 
action against the neighbouring German colony. 
The objection of this section — which notori- 
ously included some of the most devoted 
personal followers of General Botha and 
General Smuts — wa^s not principally due to any 
sympathy with Germany or to any friendly 
feeling for the Germans of South-West Africa. 
When the Boer war ended, many of the Boers 
refused to settle down under the British flag 
and " trekked " to South-West Africa. Thev 



soon found that the little finger of the German 
was thicker than the loin of the British official 
in the Transvaal or the Free State, even 
though the Gorman had every reason for treat- 
ing the Boer well and the British official repre- 
sented a victorious people. The trutli is that 
the ideas of the Boer — his personal indepen- 
dence, his impatience of restraint, his naturally 
empirical methods of life — are incurably opposed 
to German logic, and submission to discipline, 
and inherited subservience to the least reason- 
able whims of official or officer. The Boer.« 
who went to live among the Germans, in short, 
found that the life was intolerable. Most of 
them came back to South Africa as soon as 
they could, and they came back in open hatred 
of and contempt for the German. There was, 
of coiu-se, a small number of Boers who, design- 
ing treason against Great Britain and their 
own Government, had found it natural to look 
to Germany for aid. But these men were a very 
small minority. Most of the Boers objected to 
hostile action against German South-West 
Africa not at all because they loved the Ger- 
mans but because thej^ believed that South 
Africa had no real concern with European 
quarrels, should keep herself aloof from them, 
and was vmder no obligation of honour to help 
Great Britain except by providing for her own 
land defence. There was, too, the usual touch 



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A RUNNING IIGUI IN IHE DLSLKT SAMJ. 



240 



'lUK TlMKii insrOllY OF THE WAR. 



of belf-iuttirt^Mt in their uttitiulo. Tluty argiu*<l, 
ou the Gt^nuund thtiiiiselveu still argue, that the 
fate of the GeruuiucolouieM wuuld be ducidf^d by 
the event of the « ar in Europe. If the Alliert won, 
South Africa would naturally get CJtuiuun .S»>utl»- 
West. If tliey lopst, the fact that South Africa 
liad taken no aggrt^nsive part agaitibt lier 
neighbour would be some prote^^tion against 
ho8tiie idea8 on the part of the victor. Sudi 
caleidations of profit and los^s natiu'aliy caused 
inuiieruju re.sontnient among tho British people 
in South Africa — hot witli loyalty, and burning 
to ilo everything pos.sible, evt'u to tlu- oxtronie 
uf iulventiu'e and self-sacTiti<re, to help thr 
Mother Country. Yet they were not at all 
iiruiatural in a people that had always been 
remote from international ambitions and wei'e 
convinced of their ability to doftnul South Africa 
against tho worst that (^oruumy could do. If 
unackiiow lodged reliance on the invincibility 
of the British fleet had a good deal to do with 
this contitlonce, that wa.s not uncharacteristic 
of the Boer and need not be counted too heavily 
igainst him. 

All the more credit to (Jenoral Botha and 
his colleagues that they did not allow any 
such calculations to influence them for a 
moment. To representations from the Im- 
|)erial Govermnent that it would be very 
advantageous to Great Britain if the wirele.ss 



stations itstablished by the Germans in their 
territory couhl be put out of at:tion, they 
returned an unla^sitating and imqualifie'd as- 
siuanrc tliat they would do what was recpiired. 
I'arliament, hastily summoned to ratify this 
derision, supported the Ministry by a large 
majority. Meanwhile the Germans had them- 
selves cut the ground from under the feet of 
their supporters in South Africa by invading 
tho territory of the Union. This they did 
oi)posite a police post of theirs at Nakob, on 
the extreme south-east corner of their fr<jntier. 
Tlie South African (iovcrnment, too, had a 
police post at this point, just on the other side 
of the frontier, and this also was marked on 
some maps as Nakob — a not unnatural dupli- 
cation of names in a waste country with very 
few inhabitants. The confusion of tho names 
ga\e tho oppcjuonts of General Botha a chance 
of arguing that it was the German {)ost which 
had been attacked by South African, not the 
South African l)y German troops. But this 
disingenuous, if characterLstic, attempt to 
whitewash the eneniy was easily disposed of 
by the Government. They hiu\ the unirn- 
peachal)le evidence of reputable witnesses that 
the CJermans had crossed the frontier in ag- 
gression. The incident was given a good deal 
more importance than it really deserved. 
The Government had no. need to justify in- 




GERMAN TROOPS AT WINDHUK. 
Riding down the main street. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



241 




LOUIS BOTHA" AT LUDERITZ BAY. 

One of the guns at Shark Island. 



va,sion of German South -West Africa by the 
plea that the Germans had attacked first. 
Their right a.s ^Ministers of the King to attack 
h« enemies wherever they were and without 
themselves waiting to be attacked was im- 
questionable. But some allowance must be 
made for the difficulties of their position, and 
it was natural that they should make their 
oa-ae as strong n» possible, even by the use of 
irrelevant arguments, for the benefit of the 
more doubtful among their habitual supporters. 
Their first task was naturally to decide the 
strategy of the campaign ; their next to see 
that it was undertaken with an adequate 
force, properly supplied. The second was 
infinitely the more difficrolt of the two. Th<! 
military forces of tho Union were organized 
on the basis of a defensive army composed 
iriainly of men who were essentially volunteers, 
though their numbers were fixed by an Act of 
Parliament which also gave the Government 
flic right of comf)ulHion through tho ballot in 
any district that failed to HupjWy tho com[)le. 
rnftnt of men which the Act required. I>iii, 
the organization of these forces did not f<m- 
teftnfAixU) any expclition outside tho I'tiion. 
Th'TO WBH a smiill body of " [Mirmantiril, " 
troops — rfnUy jnount/;d and armf:d polic(^ — 
but thia was quif/O insufliciont for tho invasion 
of a country like Gomuiti South-Wust Africa. 



More, the organization of the Union forco=;. 
even on a defensive basis, was hardly complete, 
for the Act had only begun to take effect a 
bare two years before. All these difficulties 
had to be overcome But even in this the 
Government had many compensating advan- 
tages. South Africa was full of men, British 
as well as Dutch, who had had long experience 
of war. Many could still remember the part 
they had played in the last of the native wars, 
and of course the Boer War itself was so recent 
that a very large proportion of the male popu- 
lation had taken part in it. on one side or the 
other Thus tho material was abundant. 
Again, the peopl<' of tho towns. British for the 
most part, had supported the volunteer move- 
ment with groat enthusiasm before tho Defence 
Act cunio into existence. This admirable! and 
experienced infantry was ready to the hand of 
the Government, and bore most of the burden 
and heat of the cairipaign, as General IJotha 
himself nckn<)\vledg(Hl again and again, though 
the Jiurgher mounted men had tho privilege 
of most of the spectacular work of riding 
round tlm flanks of tho enemy in tho later 
pArt. To say this is not in the least to dis- 
[>arage tho value of tho Burghers as a fighting 
force. As mounted infantry thfjy wore in- 
comparable. They could make forced marches, 
carrying' their r)wn scanty Hup|)lies with them, 




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242 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



'2\n 



into parts where the changes of finding water 
depended ahnost wholly on their instinct for 
" country." In every engagement they showed 
that dash anil caution in combination which 
had been their great characteristic during the 
Boer War. They did not take spectacular 
risks. The Boer is never spectacular. But 
the}' were all the better soldiers for that ; and 
when the enemy had to be attacked, his retreat 
harassed, his flanks tiu-ned, they were always 
adequate for the task, moving with a rapidity 
that amazed him, showing an instinctive 
knowledge of the best jjositions for their 
purpose, and subsisting on a minimum of 
food eked out with much less than a bare 
minimiun of water — reckoned by the standard 
of what is reqviired for ordinary troops. Yet 
theirs was the romance and the delight of the 
campaign. They rode bj' night, and ofT- 
saddled when the sun grew hot. They were 
always on the heels of the enemy, or actually 
behind him, riding round in a wide circle to 
take him by surprise, threaten his communi- 
cations, and compel him to evacuate hLs well- 
prepared positions. For them there were the 
compensations of constant movement, frequent 
brushes with the Germans, repeated journeys 
of exploration into new country. The infantry 
had none of this. They toiled behind in the 
heat and dust of that sun-snxitten land. On 
the march their kit, even their uniform, was 
intolerably heavy upon them. And when they 
were not marching they had the monotonous 
and tiresome duty of guarding lines of cormnu- 
nication, or, still worse, of waiting for months 
ill dreary, sandy, almost waterles.s camps for 
the advance to begin. General I^otha, in his 
nuissages to his men, never forgot to say that 
t}ie infantry -^fitanfling and waiting -had fjone 
anrl were doing most valuable work. His sym- 
pathy with them wa.s anothc^r proof of his kind- 
linfiSH arifl his gift of imaginative sympathy. 
TJiose who tlifnk that in those qualities lies 
the secret of his greatness are not far wrong. 

With these tr'iops at yiis coriunand — and it 
would have been difficult to find anywhere in the 
world rnen bett*;r suitf^'l for such a campaign 
- — (icncral liotha, in consultation with General 
Srnut.H and his t^jchnical fuiviserH, liad (o 
d<y:ide how they nhould be uwrd. TIk; physical 
relation of ({finnan South- West Africa to the 
Union flry;ided, through thowj frharucUjristieH 
whi/;li have been de.H<ribed alnnwly, the main 
fMitlinCM of the, strategical jjlan. From tlio 
Hf;n Uu:r»: were two towns of tin- ('•ifiiinu 



Icn'itory tliat had to bo attacked — J-<ii(ierit/.- 
bucht in the south. Swakopmund in the nortli. 
Swakopnuiiid was not far froin Walfish Hay, 
where there was a harbour which would make 
tiio landing of troops and their supplies easy. 
Liideritzbucht was a more difficult proposition 
from the point of view of landing facilities, yet 
not impossible. From these two ports rail- 
ways went almost due east in each case into 
the interior. They joined — the northern line 
at Karibib, the southern at Seeheim — the main 
line rimning almost due north and south 
through the centre of the territory. From each 
end of the main line spurs of railway went 
north and south. The south spvu* plunged into 
the desert, came almost to the Cape frontier and 
there expired^a monument either to the 
mental aberration or to the sound military 
j^revision of those who built it. There is no 
doubt at aU that it owed its existence, not to 
any kind of madness on the part of the rulers 
of German South-West Africa, but to their 
appreciation of strategic possibilities. As a 
non-military railway it was the undertaking of 
a lunatic. As a strategic line, based on the 
same idea as inspired the lines that ran to the 
Belgian frontier, and there stojjjjod, it had 
sound justification. Almost at its extremity 
was Kalkfontein, a fort and arsenal in one. 
Placed there on the fringe of the desert, it 
frowned towards the day when the Boers sliould 
ri.se against Jiritish rule, when the arsenal 
should pour rifles and amnuniition to their aid 
o\er the frontier that was not many miles away, 
and when all the troops that Germany had in 
the territory sliould l)e Jiun-ied down the line 
and thus be hurled swiftly against the Sontli 
African enemy. The north spur, in contrast 
to the south, was pm'cly coinniercial. It 
served tht; mineral w<jrkings at Otavi, 'I'sumeb, 
and Grootfontein, and liad no military signi- 
ficance, except, perhaps, towards the day w hen 
the Germans might find themselves .strong 
enough to attempt the subjugation of the 
natives in the northern parts of the territory. 
That day was not yet. And on the rnain 
central line, placed with true German metliod 
almost in the exact geographical dead -centre 
ol th<^ whole Colony, was Windhuk, the capital. 
rniin|)ortant in itself, it hold the gigantic wire- 
IcHs station that th(! Germans had built |»ovver- 
ful enough to recfiive messages direct from Hcilin, 
and in daily commnincatirHi with Togo|and. 

It is easy to see 1 hat from a strat«(gical point 
of view, in a country where water was so 



541 



TflF TJME^ lUSTOltY OF THE WAH. 




A VIEW OF LUDERITZBUCHT, 



scarce that an army of invasion would have to 
take even a large part of its drinking supply 
with it, the railway was tho ono important 
factor. Thus the natiu-e of tho railway system 
in German South-West Africa imposed the 
broad features of General Botha's strategy. 
Descend by sea upon Luderitzbucht and 
Swakopmund. Captiu-e there the two termini 
of the lines running inland from the coast. 



Work up them to the interior, tlius jjroviding 
an avenue of supjily for the troops. That wa« 
tho first and most obvious feature of any 
strategic plan. But tho conformation of tho 
railway system must also have suggested 
another line of attack. If tlie southern railway 
spur to Ukamas was made for invasion fronj 
the German side, it was also eminently suited, 
once it could be taken, to supply an army 




SWAKOPMUND, SHOWING UNION JACK FLYING. 
Occupied by Union Forces, January 14, 1915. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WJR. 



245 



coming overland from tlie south against the 
Germans. But there was one grave defect in 
this conception — the distance of the Gorman 
rail-head in the south from the nearest rail- 
heads in South African territory. These were 
at O'okiep and at Prieska. The intervening 
country \\as in both cases iliflicult, dry, with 
no real roads — a very fonnidable obstacle 
to the transport of any considerable force. 
The route to O'okiep or Steinkopf from the 
German border was worse than it was to Prieska 
]3ut the Prieska road %\as quite bad enough, and 
one of the most renaarkable achievements of the 
whole invasion was that of the engineers, who. 



ha\'ing Steinkopf for its base ; was to cross the 
thirst-belt to the Orangi' river ; and was to force 
the jjassage of the river at Raman's Drift. 
The other was to move from Prieska and 
Upington ajjainst the other main ford over 
the river at Schuit Drift. Both would then 
join hands and dispose of the German positions 
in the south. The whole plan was sound, as 
later experience showed. But incalculable 
events ruined the land adventure and led the 
South African troops that marched from 
Xamaqualand into tne most disastrous check 
that the Germans were able to inflict upon the 
invading forces during the whole campaign. 




KUniSH Hl>OGKHOUSE IN (iEKMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA. 



whiif General Smuts wlvancod irom the south 
in the se<^;ond half of the canijiuigii, built behind 
liirri at >ui extraordinarily rapid pii<-e and witli 
wonderful efTir-iency the railway that now 
linloi the Union HynUiJii at I'riesloi to tln' 
G(n7iianbuilt syHteiri at Kalkfotitcin. 

TliiH, fh'-n, was the first flehign for the cam- 
(jaijqi— to Hjrike by nea at Liiflerifzliueht an«l 
.Swakof)rriund. arifl io combine «if Ji that Htrokc 
a two fr»ld luKanee overland ayainst (ieruian 
t«Tritory. Both thew land ffireen wen; to make 
for tlif! Gcnn/m wtrorij^liold nt Kalkfontrin. 
One wan to atari Ironi Cape Namaqualand, 



Before this happened, however, South Afri(tan 
troops had set foot on German territory. The 
force destined for Liid<Tit/.bu(ht sailed from 
Capo Town in the middle of September, li)l4. 
1 1 was ('riMiiiiiiiHli'd l)y (Jolonel Beves, of Die 
South African [)ennanent fonte, and comprised 
\\\i) iiifiintry rcj;iuicnfs, a sfjuadron of the 
liiipr-rial Light Hornc, a battery of the Citi/.cn 
Ar) illcry, and a seetiori of the Cii|)c (Jari-ison 
,\itillciy with two guns — about 2,000 men in 
nil. on the authority of the eornispondent 
iMi[(loy<(l by Renter's Agency, who accompanied 
the exp(;dition as the solo aecredilcd Pr-csH 

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THE TIMES HISTOliY OF THl'J WAR. 



247 



correspondent. The expedition was trans- 
ported in four ships, and was escorted by 
H.M.S. Astrsea. One of the ships, the Monarch, 
took over 750,000 gallons of fresh water from 
the Cape Town reservoirs, ^^'ith a wise pre- 
vision, the organizers of the campaign realized 
from the first that the supply of water would 
be one of their most formidable diflficulties. 
The ships reached Liideritz Bay on Septem- 
ter 18. Plans which had been made for a 
landing of a part of the force south of the town, 
the cutting of the rail behind it, and the 
hemming in of the garrison, were found to be 
impossible owing to the difficulty of landing 
men and their supplies on that inhospitable 
shore, exposed to the full weight of the Atlantic 
swell. Fortunately, perhaps, a storm sprang vip 
which forbade even the attempt, and though a 
few scouts did get on shore and actually rode 
into the town, which they found completely 
deserted by troops, long before the formal 
landing was made, the rest of the expedition 
was compelled to make straight for Liideritz 
Bay. They reached it at night and anchored 
off the town. Next morning the surrender of 
the pla<;e was formally made by the Burgo- 
master, the troops were landed, and the British 
flag was hoisted over the Town Hall. The 
number of civil inhabitants left in the town was 
found to be about 750. They gave a good deal 
of trouble, were found at last to be communi- 
cating with their troops outside the South 
» African lines, and were then rounded up and 
sent away to the Union for internment. For a 
week the troops made no move from Liideritz- 
bucht. The Germans had retired to Kolrnans- 
kuppe, about ten miles away, blowing up tlx- 
railway ; then to Grasplatz, and then again to 
Rothkiippe, about ten miles farther on. An 
advanced post which they left at Grasplatz 
was cut up by Union troops, who made another 
similar raid a few days later. But meanwhile 
rebellion hmJ broken out in South Africn, 
diHanter had overtaken another South African 
column of invasion at Sandfontein, and it was 
decided to attf rnpt nothing more, but to hold 
I^iideritzbucht as a base until the rebellion had 
been cnjHhed and General Botha could again 
dervotc all HIh energies to the campaign. The 
force under Sir Duncan McKenzie, which had 
Hailed for Swakof^rnund, was therefore diverterl 
t') Liid<Tif zbu<hf , and the two cohinm.s held 
that fl'Molate and thirsty town, with its imme- 
diate outHkirt.H, until the tiirie came to rcaume 
thie general advance. 



The Sandfontein disaster occurred a wet 1< 
after the occupation of Liideritzbucht. Briga- 
dier-General Lukin had left Cape Town on 
September 2 and had landed his men at Port 
Nolloth, the port of Cape Namaqualand. From 
there a narrow gauge railway, built by the 
copper-mining companies and chiefly used for 
their needs in normal times, goes to O'okiep. 
On the way is the station of Steinkopf , and here 
General Lukin established his base. The plan 
was to invade German territory over Raman's 
Drift. Between Steinkopf and the river is the 
thirst-belt — terrible, sandy country, with only 
one water-hole in its forty-five miles, and that 
eight miles away from the most direct route 
across. Lukin's force was chiefly mounted 
men — five regiments of the South African 
Mounted Rifles — but he had with him also the 
Witwatersrand Rifles, and three batteries of 
the Transvaal Horse Artillery. The first step 
was to seize Raman's Drift. Two regiments 
of the S.A.INLR. were sent forward to do this. 
They struggled with difficulty through the thirst- 
belt, drove out the Germans posted at the 
drift, captm-ed an officer who refused to join the 
flight of his men, followed up the enemy, 
routed them in a brief skirmish, and pursued 
them to their camp at Sandfontein, twenty-five 
miles north-east of the drift and about half-way 
to Warmbad. The Germans seemed to have 
evacuated completely all that country of sand 
hills and waste spaces. They had poisoned the 
water and destroyed the pumps at Sandfontein. 
The place was held lightly, after patrols had 
scoured the country and had foiuid no enemy 
troops. The main body of the South African 
troops reached the river, where there was water 
for them, on September 24. The next day the 
patrol which was holding Sandfontein was 
attacked by the enemy. Reinforcements were 
sent up to them — another squadron of the 
1st S.A.M.R., with two guns and about thirty 
men of the Transvaal Horse Artillery, the whole 
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Grant. They reached Sandfontein on the 
morning of Sej)tember 20. Hardly had they 
off-saddhid when the Gcirmans, who had con- 
centrated all the troops they had in the neigh- 
bourhood, attacked th(?ni in force, columns 
moving against tho^m frojii all sidc^s. The 
enemy had a number of guns, an ample supply 
of jnachine-guns, and nuistcTcd in all, on the 
testimony of credible witnesses, not leys than 
1,500 men. Colonel Grant's retreat towards 
the river was cut off. His surprise was singu- 



248 



////'; 'LIMHS lilSTUHY OF THH WAH. 





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HOW IIIK r.HKMANS ri<ll<:i) TO HAMI'RR THH HUl FISH ADVANCH. 

After blowing up u ruilvvay bridge, the enemy rushed at full speed tliree engines, which, on reaching the 

bridge, overturned and choked up the gap caused by the explosion. 



livrly ct)m|)lt'ti'. It is ciitlicniit to resist tlio 
conclusion that tlie scouting was bad, and that 
the belief that the country lind been thoroughly 
cleared of the enemy had lulled him into a false 
sense of seeurity. Be that as it may, he found 
hitnself hea\ ily outiuimbered both in men and 
guns. 

The German atta<k was skilfully conducted. 
It .seenis that the Gennan Commander-in- 
Chief, Colonel von Heydebreck, was him- 
self in charge of the enterprise. His cordon 
once drawn round the South African force, 
he did not exj)o.se his men needlessly, but 
mule full use of his much greater weight ot 
artillery. The two guns of the Transvaal 
Artillery were gallantly served. Tliey replied 
with effect to the enemy's fire and for some 
hours held him at a respectful distance, lint 
I he only real hope for Colonel Grant was that 
reinforcements froni the Orange River would be 
able to break the circle that von Heydebre( k 
had drawn round him. The attempt was 
made, but made without succe.ss. Here again 
the South African command had been caught 
napping. All that was available at the momcMit 
was two squadrons of the 4th S.A.M.R. The 
action had begim about nine o'clock in the 
morning. By noon the enemy's artillery had 
asserted itself. One of the South Airican guns 
was out of action. The other was being served 
by only two unwounded men. Just then the 
smail relieving force tried to break through. 
Colonel Grant's men heard the sound of their 
tiring in the distance. It soon faded away, and 
with it went their last hope. Colonel Grant 



himselt was wounded. His guns were now 
out of action. The enemy began to close in. 
An attemjit to rush the South African position 
with cavalry was driven back. But this 
momentary repulse could not affect the ineviL- 
able result. For two Jiours longer the South 
Africans fought on. Then they sent a flag to 
the German commander and surrendered with- 
out conditions. Tluis in a few hours the first 
real attempt of the Union connnanders to 
establish themselves well within German terri- 
tory ended in a mortifying defeat and surrender. 
To all appearance, it might have been avoided 
by a little foresight in the preparation of the 
advance, or, even when the worst threatened, 
by some greater promptitude of the main 
South African force and a sterner resolution in 
Colonel Grant and his men. But criticism after 
the event is easy, and it is best to leave the 
disaster with the \erdict tliat over-confidence 
in attacking an enemy so determined and 
resolute as the German had its natural, if \mfor- 
tunate, result. 

So mucli for the action of Santlfontein itself. 
But there is more to be said about the train of 
causes which made it possible for the (>erman 
commander to fight it imder such favourable 
conditions of surprise and superior force. At 
the moment when Colonel Grant reached Sand- 
fontein, \ on Heydebreck should also have had 
on his hands another South African cohnun 
advancing against him o\er the Orange Kiver 
by way of Sehuit Drift, about 100 miles ea.st 
of Raman's Drift. The advance of this cohunn. 
its cooperation with (Jeneral Lukin's forc<> 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 



211) 



moving froin Naniaqiialaiid, was, as we have 
seen, an essential part of tlie plan of campaign. 
It was to move from Upington. having estab- 
lished a base there, anrl \\ as designed to join 
hands with the Namaqualand column in German 
territory. This colmiin was to be conmianded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel ^laritz, a Di^^trict Staff 
Officer of the " permanent " South African Force. 
But Maritz failed the South African Govern- 
ment. Instead of leading his men against tiic 
Germans, he made a treaty with them, induced 
hLs men to go into rebellion — compelling the 
loyalists among them to submit — and advanced 
to overrun the very South African districts of 
which he had been given supreme command b\- 
a too-trusting Government. The " defection " 
of Maritz is no real part of the story of the South 
African invasion of South- West Africa. But 
its efiect — followed as it was by the rebellion of 
Beyers and of de Wet — -was to make General 
Botha concentrate all his strength against the 
rebels at home and to suspend for months his 
operations against the German colony. Its 
immediate resvilt was without doubt the dis- 
aster of Sandfontein. If the cohimander of the 
Namaqualand column cannot be entirely 
acquitted of rashness and of failure to take the 
projjer precautioiLS in sending his advance guard 
to Sandfontein, it should also be remembered 
in extenuation of this obvious fault that he had 
every reason to rely upon the cooperation of 
Maritz, that the defection of that adventurer 
took the Headquarters Staff at Cape Town 
itfieif utterly Vjy .'<urpri.se, and that von Heyde- 
breck was thus given an opportunity which he 
should never have had of making prompt u.se 
of his chance of inflicting a shattering reverse 
nprjn the Namaqualand column. 



During the long halt in (he operations 
against South-West Africa the ff)rce under 
General Sir Duncan McKenzio held its ground 
at Liideritzbucht. It was for tlio most part 
inactive. Nevertheless, preparations for the 
ultimate advance went on continually and 
good work was done, especially in the vital 
matter of railway reconstruction, during those 
long months of waiting which tried so severely 
the patience of the troops. The real advance 
against the Germans only began on March 28, 
when McKenzie moved his headqiiarters for- 
ward from Liideritzbucht to Garub, and sent 
his column out to drive the enemy from the 
positions which he had prepared at Aus. 
The intervening montbs had been spent in 
almost complete inactivity by the fighting men. 
There were a few unimportant skirmishes, the 
enemy always falling back as soon as he was 
seriously threatened. Thus on October 15 and 
16 McKenzie made a drive to the south of the 
town. It was pvished as far as Elizabeth Bay, 
but did not come into touch with the enemy. 
A week later ISIcKenzie again moved out 
against the Germans, who were on the railway 
at Rothkuppe, about 23 miles east of Liideritz- 
bucht. Only moimted troops were used, and a 
cordon was drawn round the German patrol. 
There was a sharp but unimportant skirmish. 
Most of the enemy were taken prisoners un- 
injured. By these prosaic methods the task of 
pushing into the interior, which depended 
entirely upon the po-ssession and reconstruction 
of the railway, was carried farther and farther. 

This railway construction work was under the 
charge of Sir George Farrar, who lost his life in 
the performance of his duty owing to a railway 
accident, a few weeks after McKenzie's cokimu 




hh; mhiiish (;uns in (;kkman south-whsi aikica. 



250 



THE TIMFS HISTOliY OF TllF W'AJi. 



htiil rriiv\iiti(l ttittiiti i>>iig iiu'iiltui ul ]irt'|mi'U- 
tioii by ilitisive victory at CJibeuii. Furnir 
Imil by UiH t>\\ti ability aitil energy won t'ur hiiit- 
Mttlt the (K).sitiiin of one of the |)rin<i])al leathers 
of the nttniiiK iiuliL->try of the 'i'run.svaal. llis 
serviceti to .MtKeu^ie, by tlio te.stiniony tit all 
wlio knew what he hail done, were nxo8t vahtable. 
lie had ill a high degree the gift of organi/atioti. 
Hf kn«nv how to get on witli lutii, and was iin 
rivalled in getting work out of them. Ho was 
punctual, energetic, deterniintid. Absolutely 
di'\(iid of " sidti," hei wa.s the i-omraile of his 
men, without forfeiting for one moment their 
respect anil confidem^e. The value of a iiiaii of 
this metal at moments when progress seemed 
to be at a standstill, when the task ahead 
showed intolerably great, and when doubt and 
discouragement were everywhere, cannot easily 
be estimated. Farrar never gave way to pessi- 
mism. He had volunteered for his ta.sk ; he 
was determined to see it through ; and he did so. 
It meant fur him constant travelling up and 
down a railway which had been dynamited by 
the enemy and had only been hastily repaired by 
his construction gangs. He faced these risks with 
the careless courage that ho had shown many 
times before, especially dining the South African 
War. And wlien at last he met his fate — his 
motor trolly colliding in a mist of rain with a 
light engine — he had the consolation of knowing 
that the most formidable luidertaking of a life 
fidl of ri.sk and adventure liad been gallantly 
and most ettlciently accomplished. 

With Farrar and his construction gangs there 
went of course a gviard of troops. But for the 
most part McKenzie's men were kept for some 
weeks in or near Liideritzbvicht itself. Ho had 



mtder his commamt quite a considerable force. 
Two infantry brigades and a section of mounted 
and gtnieral units, made up a total again on 
the authniity of Keuter's correspondtMit , who 
was with thtM-olumn of about (!,()()() men. 'i'iitu'e 
is no neeil to dwiill long on the conditions uiider 
w liich they lived. They were j)ru<li«ally a 
garrison in o<'cupali()ii of hiideritzbuchl. TlKur 
sxork lay in front of them, and they waitid willi 
natural impatience for the day wlion (Jeneral 
Hotha should luue roundcHl up the rebels in 
their own country anil should be fri'e to li-ail 
them against the (Jormans. Meanwhile Farrar 
with his railway gangs anil his guard of troops 
worked continually at the relniilding of the 
railway. On .November 8 the way was clear 
for an advance to Tschaukaib, juwt over 40 miles 
up the line from I^iiderit/.bucht. The enemy 
retired another 20 miles or so to Garub, and at. 
T.schaidcaib McKenzie's main camj) was estab- 
lished. But this was not until J^ecember 13. 
The reyjellion in South Africa was .still engaging 
the whole attention of the (Jovernment, and 
McKenzie, no doubt, had hi« orilers to do 
nothing until the time came for tho.se concerted 
movements of converging columns which, when 
the day for the advance did come at last, made 
such short work of the German resistance. He 
waited, therefore, with sublime caution, after 
driving the enemy from Tschaukaib, until everj- 
l)os.sible preparation had been maile for setting 
up a permanent camp at that place. On 
December 13 his infantry marcheil up to 
Tschaukaib and there were encampeii for 
another nine weeks. Meanwliile his mounted 
men raided towards Garub. There they nar- 
rowly escaped being ambushed by the enemy. 




DIGGING FOR WATER. 



THE TIMES HJSTOTiY OE THE WAn. 



251 




AT A WATER-HOLE. 



and after a smart action with him, finding that 
he had reinforcements at hand, retired with one 
man killed and two wounded, and leaving two 
of their nunrxber prisoners in Ciennan hands. 
The Germans after this skirmish immediately 
retired towards Ans, evacuating Garub. But 
McKenzie, acting beyond doubt on instructions 
from Cape Town--^)r Jie was a veteran fighter, 
proved in the native wars that the men of Xntal 
had fought, and a l(;ader of known enterprise 
and energy — <Vu\ not pursue them, being content 
to consolidate his prjsition at Tschaukaib. 

Here his troops were encainperl in a dry and 
Bandy filain. They were vi.sited day after 
day by liiinding dust stonns, and harl to 
eruiure all thos*; other minor annoyances 
which are a torment to civili/ed men engagcnl 
in ili-Mt-ri warfare. The hciif was very great. 
The wind eontiriually Ijlew down fheir tents 
(ifid left fh<ni without "heltep. The sand 
wjiH everywh<Tf. It penetrated clothes, equip- 
ment, it)f)(]. <')fherwisr! the conditions wore 
not unb«-anibl<'. ^*ood way. abundant. Water, 
•<i"anty at first, t)ecame more jilentiful fis the 
efTici'mcy of flir- fransjiort firr»uig<inents im- 



proved. The worst thing for the men to 
bear was their inactivity, vmrelieved by the 
drill and route-marches through which they 
were put. They had come out to fight the 
Germans, and here they were kept waiting 
aVjout in the desert vhiie their o\\n country- 
men, back in the Union, fouglit an internecine 
warfare with rebellion. There was, however, 
no h(!lp for it, and, on tlie whole, the men 
bore the long waiting with j)atience, though 
these delays had their effect in leading a number 
of them, who had enlisted for a period of 
six months, to insist on tluiir discharge when 
their time was up. The monotony of existence 
at Tschaukaib was relieved, if not too j)leasantly, 
by frcfjuent attju;ks iroiw the air. 'J'lui enemy 
had at loaxt three aeroplanes which ho could 
use against them, and he visitcil (lie <iui\p some 
<lo/,cn times, droj)piiit.' lioinbs, anrl, as was found 
inter on, taking photographs of the cainp. 
Tlii'sr; \'isits did iittli- damage, for it v\as 
Hoon found that tlic liostile airrrum could 
fly only in th(! CMrly nioining, b(!forc tin- sun 
was hot, HO thill the men u<Te moved out of the 
ciuiip 111 thes(! eafly hours, wliicli \sere also 




< 
y 

2 

< 

H 

CD 
W 

■ 

H 

o 

z 

< 

w 
O 



253 



254 



THE TIMES HISTOliY OF THE WAR. 




THR UNION FORCHS IN NAMAQUALAND. 
Ceneral Kotlia's bodyguard trekking through the sand-dunes. 



the most suitable for t xercising them. At 
Tschrtukaib. then, McKenzie's cohimn rested 
till nxid-February. By that time the rebellion 
in South Africa had been thoroughly scotched, 
if not wholly quelled. On February 8 General 
l^otha was able to come north, and xlsited the 
camp. He watched the men march past, 
and spoke to them in wann prai.se of their 
physical condition and bearing. He told 
them of that which they all know, but had 
perhaps been inclined to reckon too lightly — - 
the work that he had done in crushing the 
rebellion. He assured them that " the British 
Empire is grateful to you for the work you 
have done." And — most welcome of all — 
he gave them a broad hint tliat they would 
not have to sit still much longer. " We in 
South Africa have undertaken this task, and 
we are going to carry it through with all 
possible determination. Your loyalty and 
your ability are going a long way towards 
achieving it. I am now going to discuss the 
whole situation with General McKenzie, and 
I hope you will soon get the order to go forw ard. 
I wish you all possible success. God bless 
you." On February 19 ]\IcKenzie moved 
forward to Garub, and there halted for another 
tive weeks. 

But, though to ^McKenzie's troops thi;? 
long delay at Garub seemed the last strain 
on their impatience, the moment had actually 
come when the campaign of invasion had 
begun to gather itself for its decisive move- 
ments. Swakopmund, the northern GGi-man 
seaport town, had been occupietl by South 



African troops some time before. The expe- 
dition whicyi carried out this task was uudci 
llic coinuiand of Colonel Skiimer, but it was 
known that General Botha would take com- 
mand of it himself as soon as the serious 
business of the (•am[)aign began. Skinner 
had with him the IJrd and 4th Infantry Brigades, 
the 1st Imperial Light Horse, Grobelaar's 
Scouts a Hea\y Artill(;ry Brigade, and a 
machine-gun section. He sailed from ('ape 
Town on December 21 and reached Walfish 
Bay on Christmas Day. Walfish Bay had 
been in German hands, but Skinner's landing 
was not opposed, though a small German 
mounted outpost came into collision with the 
South African troops soon after their landing, 
when the morning mists were still heavy. 
They retired after firing a few shots, leaving 
one of their number wounded and a prisoner. 
Walfish Bay was the natural base for opera- 
tions against Swakopmund, some thirteen 
miles north on the coast. Skinner's first 
task was to ensure the safety of his force, 
to arrange for sufficient water, and to organise 
the elaborate supply service which would 
be essential during the advance from S\xa- 
kopmund into the interior. This tlone, he 
moved out of \\'alfish Bay with a small body 
of men on January 13. His intention was to 
reconnoitre the enemy at Swakopmund, to 
find out whether the town was held in strength, 
and then to prepare his advance against it. 
But he met with no resistance at any part of 
his march. Just on the hither side of Swakop- 
mund from Walfish Bay a long spit of sand runs 
out into the sea, forming an obstacle in the path 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAIL 



iOi) 



of anyone coming along the coast which must 
be avoided by skirting its end close to the 
beach. Here the Germans had prepared their 
reception for the South African troops. As 
Skinner's advance gviard rode past the end of 
tliis sandy promontory, a mme explo(le<l 
iinder their feet. That explosion was followed 
by another, and then by two more. 1\\ o 
South African troopers were blown to bits, 
with their horses. The rest escaped practically 
untouched. Skinner rode on into the town ; 
found it deserted, not only by the enemy's 
troops, but also by the whole civihan popula- 
tion ; and decided there and then to convert 
what had been meant to be merely a recon- 
naLssance in force into a permanent occupation. 
Here, too, the Germans had poisoned the water 
supply, and experience of their methods made 
it certain that the outskirts of the town- and 
the railway track leading into the interior 
would be heavily mined. Both anticipations 
were found to be correct. But the South 
African engineers were expert by now at 
circumventing these infernal de\-ices of an 
inhuman enemy, ^^'henever a new place of 
water was reached, their first ta.sk was to 



pump out the wells. Tn the detection of 
contact mines they became so skilful that 
singularly little damage was done by them. 
The misfortune of Skinner's column on its 
niarch to Swakopmimd, slight as the real 
loss was, was exceptional. The mines there 
laid by the Germans were not the ordinary 
contact mines. They were connected by 
wire with a dug-out skilfully constructed in 
the sand liills near by, and were exploded by a 
German concealed there, at a moment when 
he thought that the whole of Skinner's force 
was at his mercy. The man escaped, and 
afterwards published in the Windhuk paper, 
Sud-West, a highly coloured description of the 
havoc he had %\TOiight among the South African 
troops. His dug-out was found later by the 
South Africans, carefully concealed among the 
sand-hills and connected by telephone with 
one of the outposts to which the Germans had 
retired from Swakopmund. But even the 
ordinary contact mine was not easy to detect, 
for all the care of the engineers. All that 
could be seen above the ground was a small 
iron rod, showing where the detonator was 
hidden. This, of course, was covered with 




IHK UNION F(JHC:HS AT WALMSH HAY. 
Condenser* constructed to replace iIionc destroyed by the Germans. 



•Jot; 



lui: iiMi:s iiis'KU!) (>!■ 77//-; war. 




THE BRITISH ATTACK AT GIBEON. 
The German forces defeated on the railway line, April 25, 1915. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 



257 



fjand or small stones, and was exceedingly 
difficult to find. It often marked the hidden 
presence of tons of dynamite, suCticient to cause 
wholesale destruction among marching tro()|)s. 
Luck, the care of the engineers, the assistance 
of natives — who throughout the cami)aign 
were eager to aid tlie South Africans against 
the Gennans — and, in some cases, the dis- 
covery of plans niade by the eneniy, showing 
the places where they had laid mines, combined 
to save the invading armies from any con- 
siderable loss Of these safeguards luck was 
perhaps the most eflficacious. There were 
some marvellovis escapes. Men who went 
through the campaign tell astonishing tales of 
these adventures with contact mines. The\- 
attribute the comparative unmunity of the 
cohmins chiefly to good fortune — for it was 
impossible to be sure that all mines were found 
before the troops had to pass, whatever the 
care taken ; but also to the fact that the 
explosives of which the mines were made \\ ere 
probably not too fresh when they were first 
u.sed and deteriorated rapidly when laid in 
the ground. As to the poisoning of wells, 
this barbarous method of resisting invasion 
was used systematically by the Germans. 
General Botha, when he reached Swakopmund, 
protested against it in messages .sent to the 
German Commanfler-in-Chief, Colonel Francke, 
who had by then succeeded Colonel von Heyde 
breck, killed by the accidental explosion of 
bombs with which he was experimenting. 
Francke replied that it was legitimate lo 
poison the water-supply of places abandoned, 
provided that notices were left giving warnin'j 
of what had been flone. He contenfled that 
Huch notices were always left by his men. 
This wart fal.se in almost every case, an<i Jiotlia 
at lawt sent Francke a stem mes.sage telling 
him that he wouM be hf;ld personally respon- 
Hible for these outrages against tin; rules of 
civilizes] warfare. This had a good effect, 
though the pnw;tice was never wholly abandonr-d 
by the enemy. 

But this is to anticipate. Skinner, finding 
8wakf>prniind abandoned, |)rof;e<d<-d to pn' 
jjare for its pennurK-nf oceiipHtion. 'I'lic worU 
t(m\c Horne time. The water supply had tr) be 
f>iirified and r'-sfored io its [)rcjj)er working. 
'J'ran.Hport from Walfi^'li I 'ay was not r-asy. 
J..anding of HUfiplies at .Swako|jfnund ifsrif was 
Unpfwwibl'- on any <;ori><iderable Mf;ale, for the 
rotulHU-ful lay f>peri to the sea, and flic tr(')in nt 
gnlcM prevent#!<l rniieli use being rn)wl<- of the 



small jetty, which, hcsidc.--, had been damaged 
l)v slicll-fire from a British auxiliary cruiser 
some time before. On January Ki, neverthe- 
less. Skinner was able to proclaim the formal 
occupation of Swakopmund. The British 
flag was hoisted at the signal station, and lines 
of defence were drawn round the town. . The 
enemy had retired to Nonidas, only a few miles 
away on the dry bed of tli«> Swakop River. 'J'he 
outposts of the two forces were close to each 
other, and men who went through these early 
days of the northern campaign seem to believe 
that more might have been done at once to 
push the Germans back. The purely defensive 
tactics which Skinner adopted, however, cer- 
tainly served their purpose, and he may well 
have thought that any forward move had 
better be left till General Botha himself came 
north to take command. A few days before 
that happened. Skinner did make a recon- 
naissance. This was on February 7, when he 
moved out at dawn with his moimted troops 
and guns. Curiously enough, the Germans 
were at that very moment marching to attack 
him. The two forces came into contact, and a 
few men were lost on each side, but there was no 
serious aotion. The Germans retired promptly^ 
refusing battle to the South African troops. 
On February 1 I General Botha, after visiting 
INIcKenzie's trot)ps at Liideritzbucht and Tschau- 
kaib, reached Swakopmund, and took over 
conunand from Colonel Skinner. Foiu* days 
later, on February 15, the Swakop River came 
down in flood — an almost unprecedented 
event. It washed away the rails which the 
engineers had laid in its dry bed, and did a good 
deal of other damage. lint the flood was a 
Messing in disguise. It meant that water 
would be found cpiite cIo.se to the surface, 
even after the surface flood had dried up, along 
the wliole bed of the Swakop River. Thus, if 
it did not comjiletely solve the problem of 
water for an advance up the river, it made it 
\cry much less nieruicing than it would have 
l)(cn otherwise. Hotha had now completed 
I lis plans for thr; northcirn campaign. A few 
days after he n^ached Swakopmund huge 
iiMMihcrs of liurglicr troopers began to arri\'e. 
Their numbers miwli- it clear that they were to 
bear the brunt of the advance;. Many think 
lliat. but for the flooding of th(! Swakop Kivcsr, 
Motha would not have ventured to use; mounted 
men on sucli a. largf scale. Thai may be so, 
and the knowledge tlial there would be at least 
a Huflicif^ncy of wntir in the interior must havo 



•JoH 



THE TIMES niSTOUY OF TJIK WAlt. 



MiHili- H (litTerence to hi.s plaiiH. lint Hotliti 
\\m\ only liet'ii fleveii iluyu tit Kwukt>{)iniin(l 
wlifu hu bent out Mh firtit clouil of aioimted 
lut-n to test the htrt-n^'th ot the Cierinrtnu. 
During those days nionnttil Hurghers had Immmi 
pouring into Swukopmund. The Swakop flood 
tmly tame on February 15, tour ilays altfi 
Uutha had arrivtul. lie must therefore have 
the credit of having de^igntil, l»>ng hef<jre the 
Hooding of the river came to increjiwe his 
liroHpec'trt of aucces.s, the o[>fration.s which tlu' 
hurghers wtrt- to liury through with such tlash 
and vigour. 

'I'he supply of the largo force of men luul 
horses now concentrated at W'alfish Bay ai d 
Swakopmund became increasmgly difficult. At 
Waltish the water was very bad, ev-en for 
horses. I'umpcd from wells four mile's away, 
it was " brak " — so tinged with salt that no 
horse would drink it until he had got used to 
that bitter taste. They had to be inured to tlu' 
use of this water, and that took time, which was 
also necessary in order to get them into con- 
tlition after their sea journey. Those who 
have seen horses transported by sea know how 
quickly they lose condition, and the trans- 
ports that brought them from Cape Town met 
very rough weather. .VII the more need for 
them to have rest. Yet it was only February 22 
when General Botlia was on the move out of 
8wako[)mund. He used for this skirmish — 
it was nothing more — the same tactics that he 
afterwards employed with imfailing success 
throughout the campaign. The mounted men 
were sent out on either wing, riding in a wide 
circle, in this case at night, so as to get behind 
the enemy's main position. That position was 



believed to be at floanikontes, on the Swakop 
Kivtir. He was knnvvn to have retired from 
Nonidas, which General liotha, commanding 
the central force, reachetl t^arly in the m<trning 
\vith<jut oppttsition. The sound ol what 
seemed lik*- heavy (iring in the distance encou- 
raged the ho|>e lliat the flanking columns iiud 
hemmed thtt enemy in. Hut this time, as al- 
ways afterwards till the very end, he Huccoedod 
in slip|)ing thr<»ugh before the circle of mounted 
Hurghers closed behind him. What had 
seemed to be the sound of (iring was in reality 
the exjilohion of large (plant it ics of small -arm 
ammunition, Ixunt- by the (icrmans before 
they retired. Hut, though the «'nemy escai)ed, 
the occupation of Goanikontes was a viseful 
operation. The j)l»w;e had an excellent supply 
of fresh water, and its fields of lucerne provided 
welcome fodder for the horses. Nor were the 
Germans left unilisturbed in their retreat. 
Patrols followed them up tlie gorges through 
which the bed" of the Swakop River runs. They 
were pushed back to Kiet, Ix^yond Husab. 
At Husab, too, good water was found, and 
this beciuiu! Botha's front -post until his next 
move was made almost a month later. From 
February 22, then, to March 19, General 
Botha w as occupied at Swakoj)mund with pre- 
parations for Iiis advance. McKenzie, witli liis 
hesxdquarters still at Liideritzbucht, had just 
moved the bulk of his force from Tschuukaib 
to Garub, where they halted for five weeks 
before advancing on Aus. 

Meanwhile the invasion of South-We.st 
Africa from the south, beginning much later — 
if we except the disastrous Sandfontein enter- 




J 



' Wtth Motor tn ihe Fteld." Moo'f RtUhie. 

PARADE OF GERMAN TROOPS IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



259 




' With Motor m the Field" Moore Ritchie. 

GERMAN PRISONERS. 
Smaller picture: Drawing water from a well. 

pri.se — than either of the two movements from 
the sea, was being pu-shed forward with sucli 
energy that it threatened to outpace both 
The main advance from the south was com 
manded by Colonel van Deventer. He movet I 
forward in three colunuis. One, under Colonr! 
Bouwer, came by way of Raman's Drift. Van 
Deventer hinrtself advanced on Schuit Drift, 
detaching also a column which marched on 
Nakob, the point where the Ciermans had 
first inva/Jed South African territory. This 
southern afJvance began to g<!t under wa\' 
towarfls the end of February and in the early 
days of March. About the same time anothe;- 
devf?lf>pmf:nt of the South African plan of 
campaign began to unfold itsf-lf. A colurrui 
under Colonel I^errange left Kuriirnan and 
ftriick ajcs(yHH the desert for I^ietfontein — that 
farthest north-eastern post on the South 
African frontier which has alrearjy been dr;- 
wriberl. Thus from the south van Devonti^r 
in three roliirnns was threatening the fiennans, 
while from the south-east iJerrurige, if he could 
carry hi.s column HucceHsfully ar;ross the rlefscrt, 
would Htrik'^ thcin on tin- flunk nt, >i rriorncnt 
wh#-n they might \n- f\\»-<\<i\ to he giving 
fn';st of their att^^ntion to van I)(n cnt^-r. 

I'oth van F^evwit^-r and IJcrrangf'r hud, at 




least as far as the surface appearance ot affairs 
on the border went, a good deal of lee -way to 
make up. On all that .southern and sonth- 
<'iist(^m frontier, the Germans — victorious at 
Sandfontein and aided by the rebels Marit/. 
and Kemp — nriaintained the semblance of 
permanent success from the (^rHl of Sc^ptember, 
1014, till Mie middle of February, 1915. After 
Sandfont(!in, Lukin had had to witlidraw even 
his outp(wts frfun lliiman's Drift. It wiis 
reocciipied by tlie (iennans. 'I'hey held 
Schuit Drift, too, and with it the whole frontier 
fornujd hy thi! Ornrige iliver hritwc^en tlieso 
two points, and Ijcyond Schuit Drift to its 
south-eastern corner. From that corner north 
to lli(!tfont«!in and beyond, the whole eastern 



2*i() 



Till': TlMl'lS lllS'lOh'Y OF llll<: WAR. 



ivQiit'wv utin uUo ill their humU. During all 
t^U5 luHt iiiontiM of lit 1 4, thtt South Atricttu 
foive ill I'ruHkti tux I KiMihardt and rpiii'^toii 
an I Kuninitin outpo.st.-i ot tiit) South Alrii^un 
I'liion dot toil here aiul them in tlie ilry wildnr- 
iittiM of thuHe vawt rtjmfe.s were tar too l)iwy 
with .Vhirit^ and i\fMi|) and their (iernian 
haekerH t«) ht)ther luiich ahoiit wlio held the 
frontier. The (Jernuins, covered alwayw hy 
th»'ii rihi'l alhes, came holdly Honth and ea.st 
into South Afri«'an territory. On Deeeinher 2 
they tried to siuTound the Rarrison of Noun, a 
po8t near water about 17 miles due .south ot 
Sffiuit Drift. \ous wa.s j^arrisontid hy <lose 
on 500 men (hav\n Irmn the north-western 
coinniandtw - from liritstown and Kakamas 
and Kenluirdt, and other north-wostern towns 
of the Cape I'rovinee ; not very reliable 
material and closely akin to tliost< who had 
gone into rebellion with Maritz. Major Breedt 
of the Britstown Commando was in command. 
Rebels and (lermans, 800 strong, with four 
gun.s and as many machine guns, attacked iiim 
at dawn. Some of the commandos fled at the 
Hrst shot. The rest he rallied, and with them 
retired in good order to Kakamas, 44 miles 
away, hghting through the whole of the 
retreat to prevent the enemy surroimding and 
compelling him to surrender. The fate of 

Nous was the fate of many other border posts. 
Meanwhile the rebels under Maritz and Kemp 
gi-ew bold and attacked Upington. This was 
on January 23. There van Deventi>r was in 
command, *ind gave them much niore than 
they bargained for. Their smnmons to Upington 
to surrender was contemptuously refused, 
and when they came to the attack they 
foimd themselves no n\atch for the South 
African Artillery. Routed at last, they broke 
and fled, with van Deventer in pursuit for 
15 miles. Soon after this ill-fated attack, in 
wliich he lost at least 18 men killed — the South 
African officers who fought in the engagement 
put his casualties much higher — Kemp sur- 
rendered to van Deventer at Ujjington. With 
him 40 officers and olT men of his comniando 
laid down their arms, and of ]\Iaritz's com- 
mando 4 officers and 46 men. T'he rest of 
Maritz's conunando, it was vmderstood, were 
to surrender in the various places in wliich 
they were scattered. But while this was being 
done the Cennans attacked Kakamas, where a 
hot engagement took place. The enemy was 
driven off, and admitted afterwards the loss of 
5 officers and 7 men killed. The South African 



troops lost 1 oflictM' killed and 2 nuMi woundtvl. 
Maritz seemingly as the result (»f this light - 
did not surrender, but e.s<'a|ied through Cerman 
Stiuth-West Afrii-a t«» Angola, where he was 
captiu'ed months later by the I'ort ugiiese. 

This unhappy adventure against Kakania> 
was undertaken by the (Jcrmans on l''ebiuary 
;{. It was alidiil llif la.^l liiue that they had 
any clmnce of met'ting South African troops 
outside their own borih'r. In just over three 
weeks \an De\enter was on tin- iiio\'e against 
them, tlis westi^rn ccjlunin had taken bm^K' 
Kaman's Drift some time before, on Jamiary 12. 
Still earli»'r, at Schuit Drill, the (Germans had 
had none the better of aii action with South 
African troops under .Major \'ermaas, who at- 
tacked them and drove them from the Drift, 
which they abandoned after destroying the |)on- 
toon and all the boats. The South African 
troops, however, were clearly not strong enough 
to hold Schuit Drift at that lime, and the (ler- 
mans reoccupied it when they withdnnv. It was 
not till February 20 that van Deventer was 
ready to b(>gin his advanct; against them. His 
Hrst stroke was on his right, where Nakob was 
rushed on that <lay, though the (!erman garri.son 
of the post escaped. On March (5 he came 
again — and this time with complete and stable 
success — against Schuit Drift. The Drift was 
taken and with it 10 officers and men of the 
enemy. About the same time fell Vellor Drift, 
between Schuit Drift and Buman's Drift. So 
that, by the end of the first week of March, 
van Deventer had in his hands the whole line 
of the Orange River and was pushing on into 
German tefritory. His left wing, imder Colonel 
Bouwer, was advancing from Raman's Drift. 
He himself moved against Nabas, where the 
enemy was strongly entrenched. On March 7 
the place fell to the storm of the South African 
troops — the prize of five hours' fighting. The 
Germans managed to escape once again. But 
with Nabas they lost all the south-eastern 
corner of their territory as well as the end of 
the southern spur of the railwa}^ and I'kamas, 
a strong military post and the head of the spear 
of aggression that the Germans, when they built 
that line, had levelled against South Africa 

The enem_\- was now threatened, too. from 
the east. On March G, the same day as vaii 
Deventer c^arried Schuit Drift, T^t>rrange started 
on his march from Kuruman to KietfontiMu. 
It was a hazardous enterprise. To strike thus 
across the desert with a considerable body of 
mcMi was to take the risk of a eoniplete break- 



THE TIM.KS lIlsroilY OF THE Win. 



201 




CONOUESI OF GERMAN SOUTH-WESI AFRICA. 
The Burgomaster of Windhuk yields to General Motha. Windhuk was occupied by the Union I'orces, 

May 12, 1915. 



'lown of hi.s transport. Tf that harl l)aj)j>frnorI, 
lierrBng*; f;o(jlr| liardly liavo avoided dLsantor. 
WaUT — Oft always in this ranripaiyn, wlion; 
.N'ature was tho rno>it formi'laFjlc i;nomy — w»i.s 
th« *hi<rf difFiciilty. Borrango had to covor 
MH) rfiilf!« of wasto country l>c-foro ho made 
liictfoiitciu. VVutor holoa woro w.-arco and far 



apart 110 miUss .separated thorn at one part 
of tho inarch. Tho column was thii.s compoilod 
to take water \sith it. Only motoi- (raiisport 
rnad(! thi.s powwihlo. Mcirange had with liirri in 
nil ulioiit 2.000 iiicii, with m.ii\H and niaehitio 
guns. His troojiB wore tho 5th South 
.\fricun Mounted Rifles, the Kalahari Jlorso, 



'M.'2 



nn: TIMKS lllSTURY UF Till': Will. 



Culltiiuii'a Ilorsf riml tlu) IU'(;huaaaluii(l KiHes.* 
Iviiruiium Hill hihiiul on Marc-li 0, llin clilli- 
cultieH (»f the itiarch lit^^an aliuont at oiu-n. 
'I'hiiy \v tire sucfeasfuUv siiriuuunted — an arhiove- 
luciit vv'luoh rtiflu4-tii great c-rtidit on tlioso 
who nianagnil 4h(> motor trannport 8ervuu^ 
IJy Maivh 31 Borrangt', who had thrown hark 
an t'ut'niy patrol in a skinaitih at Schaajikolk 
»»n Nhirfli lit. waa over tho honliir iin<l had 
CM-tnipied without opposition Haauur, a (Jornum 
ptilice poMt, 15 n^iles north-west of Riotfontnin. 
Thu whole of the Monthern and eastern fronUer 
of South-West Africa, as far north ua Hiet- 
fonteia, was thiLs in the hands of the South 
African troops. 

\'an Deventer meanw liili' was moving uj) 
fron^ the soutli. His objective was Kalk- 
fontein, where tlio Germans were known to 
have a stronghold for troops, and ample 
supi)hes of war mattrial. But, evem if Kalk- 
tontein fell into his hands, he would still have 
to surmount tiie nuist formidal)le o))stacle to 
his invading troops in all that southern country. 
Between Kalkfontein and Keetmanshoop the 
railway runs bt>tween two great ranges of 
mountains — the Great and the Little Kanis. 
An officer who fought with van Deventer's 

* The authority for the names of troops composing 
this column is. as in other cases, Router's correspondetit. 



left v\int» is (juoted l)\ Keut»!r'?i correspondent 
us his authority lor a striking tlett(!ri[)tiou of 
this mountainous and diflieult region. Noaeheb, 
the pass betwe«'n the (wo ranges, he says, "is 
a regidar (Gibraltar. . . . Fifty men with 
machmo guns entrenched on those slopes 
could have k«ipt a thousand men at bay for 
a month at least." Van Deventer well knew 
what ho had to expect there. It was ikj use 
for him to hiu'ry on to Kalkfontein so long as 
his further progress to Keetmanshoop was 
barred by the eiufmy, holding so strong a 
natural position. Faced by this tactical 
problem, he adopted the usual plan of Dutch 
South African commanders. He had taken 
Nabas on .March 7, \nit liis loft wing under 
Colonel Bouwor was not yet up parallel with 
him from Raman's Drift. \\'armbad lay in 
Houwor's j)ath — a town of some importance, 
which the enemy might well attempt to hold 
in strength. Everything, therefore, was in 
favour ot a strategic scheme, which would 
enable van Deventer to take his time about 
his further advance, would allow Bouwer to 
come up with him, would enable him to assist 
Bouwer if he should meet with strong resistanc;e 
at Wannb.ad, and would compel the enemy to 
evacuate tlie pass between the Karas ranges 
without being driven out at a heavy cost to 
the South African troops. Van Deventer 




THE ADVANCE TO WINDHUK. 

South African Irish troops resting. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 



263 



W 




DR. SEITZ, IMPERIAL GERMAN GOVERNOR OF SOUTH-WEST AFRICA, 

Being greeted by General Botha at Kilometre 500. 



knew that Berrange had marched from Kuru- 
man for Rietfontein the day before he himself 
had taken Xabas. If all went well with 
Berrange he might be expected to be in German 
territory by the end of the month, as, in fact, 
he was. Once there, he would have turned 
the German position at Xoacheb, between the 
Karas ranges, and the only question would 
be whether his threat to their line of retreat 
was powerful enough to compel them to 
abandon the position. Van Deventer deter- 
mined to make certain of this. He sent 
his brother, Colonel-Commandant Dirk van 
Deventer, to ride round the eastern spurs of 
the Great Karas range, to join hands with 
Bfrrang6 west of Rietfontein, and to fall 
iif)on the rear of the enemy if he persisted in 
clinging to the natural stronghold of Noacheb. 
Dirk van DevcnUr had with him the 4th 
Mounted Briga^lf. All went well with his 
enterpriso. On March 22 he occupied Davig- 
nab, a German police post on the eastern 
fffrntier. At Plattbeen, a day or so later, 
he fell in with a party of the enemy, holding 
an entrenched camp. Their position was 
taken by storm, and Dirk van Dovontnr wont 
on his way. At GcitsHiib, on April 2, the f-ncmy 
again opposfjd his advance, but was again 
defeated. Van Deventer lost no men in this 
af'tion. Tlif! r;nemy htul two men kilW-d and 
oni; woiinfJ*!^], while aixUif.ji were takr^n pri- 
soners. Ho w;w now almost in iotioh with 
iii^TTAngh, who froiri JIasuiir )i(wi sfnt a dc;tach- 
mr^nt of HIm mounted men 00 inilea to the 



north-west. At Koes this detaclmieiit had 
a bnish with the Germans and retired, having 
capttu-ed large numbers of cattle, wliich it 
succeeded in bringing off in spite of an attempt 
by the Germans to recapture them. Berrange 
himself was striking meanwhile straight to 
the west, taking a line which, if he could 
follow it to his objective, would bring h'm to 
the railway near Keetmanshoop, thus .cutting 
the communications of the enemy at Noacheb. 
He had, too, with great enterprise, already 
detached a force of mounted naen to ride straight 
for the railway north of Keetsmanshoop, and to 
try to cut it — an ambitious plan which came 
very near success, and must have alarmed the 
Germans to the south considerably. At Iviriis 
West, on April 14, Beirangd was joined by 
Dirk van Deventer, while the men that he 
had sent against the railway rejoined him 
there, having had a heavy cngagcmont with 
the enemy, who were driven off with the loss 
of two officers and two men killed and several 
wounded and captured. 

Wliile Berrange and Dirk van Deventer were 
thus cutting at the German communications, 
van Dcventor's columns were coming up rapidly 
from the south. Van Deventer himself readied 
Kalkfont«in on April 5, and entered it without 
o))|)osit ion, pushing an advance guard at once 
to th(! nr)rtli, wliich entered Kanus, fifteen 
miles away, on tlio same day, also without 
oppf)sition. At Kalkfontcin van Deventer 
liiul his hendfiuartcrs for Home days, liouwer, 
on his left, was nut yet up with liira, and he 



•Jt;4 



77//-; TIMHS msTOltY OF TUK 11.17.'. 




WAITING FOR 
(jeneral Botha and his staff at 

could hardly have known by then how Berrango 
and his brother Dirk had fared on tlieir flanking 
movement to the east. Two days later, on 
April 7, Bouwer reached Kalkfontein with his 
mounted colunm of about 900 men — the 17th 
Mounted Rifles and Hartigan's Horse. Bou\\er 
liad occupied Wamibad on his way, a well- 
known health resort of the Germans with 
natural hot springs, but not a place of any 
great miHtary importance. Foiu" days later, 
DU April 11, General Smuts himself reached 
Ivalkfontein. The strategical plan for the 
southern campaign had reached the point of 
effective coordination, and Smuts — who had 
done a giant's work in the preparation and 
equipment of all the southern columns^ — now 
came to take personal command of the opera- 
tions which they were to conduct with such 
rapid efficiency and complete success 

The position of the armies when Smuts took 
command was such that a great semicircle had 
already been drawn round the Germans in the 
south. McKenzie had moved out of Gariib 
on March 30 and had occupied Aus. To his 
force we shall have to retiuu in a moment. 
They were to strike the decisive blow agauist 
the Germans in the south. Van Deventer, 
now joined by Bouwer, was at Kalkfon- 
tein. His brother, Du-k van Deventer, was 
already far to the north-east, working round 
the outer spurs of the Great Karas range, 



THE SURRENDER. 
Kilometre 500 on the Otavi line. 

and almost on the point of effecting his junc- 
tion with Berrange. So far the southern cam- 
paign, resumed after so long and irritating 
a delay, had gone marvellously well for the 
South African troops. They had had hardly 
any serious fighting, and the principle of using 
their greatly superior force to outflank strong 
German positions and compel a bloodless vic- 
tory had proved imfailingly successful. It was 
for Smuts to apply the same principle on a 
larger scale ; and he lost no time about it. 
Within three days of his arrival at Kalkfontein 
his columns were moving from the west, from 
the south, and from the east — as though along 
the ribs of a vast fan — all converging against 
the central line of railway up which the enemy 
— outnumbered and outgeneralled — must mako 
his escape, if he could, to the north. It f'>ll, 
as we have said already, to McKenzie to deUver 
tlie decisive stroke — a piece of good fortune 
which his men well deserved for their long 
patience under the weary delays of the cam- 
paign. We left liim at Garub, to which he 
had just advanced his main camp on Fol)- 
ruary 19 after a delay of nine weeks at 
Tschaukaib. At Garub he stayed, or i-ather 
his camp stayed, for his headquart-ors were 
still back at Liideritzbucht, for another five 
weeks. INIeanwhile the enemy, with ostenta- 
tious energy, pursued the work of fortifyinix 
the heights almost within sight of the caiu|i. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 



265 



Garub is on the inner verge of the lower country, 
just before the hills lift to the central plateau 
of South-West Africa. In the " nek," or pass, 
tlu"Ough the hills that lies between Garub and 
Aus the enemy was given ample time to pre- 
pare a formidable position of defence. There 
were, of course, ways round it, and McKenzie 
was perhaps wise to refvise to waste men in an 
attack on fortifications which, as the event 
showed, were certain to be abandoned by the 
enemy without bloodshed when the hovir was 
ripe for the real advance. But his men 
naturally chafed under this new delay. Again 
a visit from (Jeneral Botha, who hurried round 
from Swakopmund, was the sign of another 
move. He came on March 26, and two days 
afterwards McKenzie's headquarters were moved 
forward to Garub. Another two days, and 
the advance began in earnest, not to stop this 
time until the enemy had been finally routed 
at Gibeon. The (Germans did not contest it 
at any point. Aus occupied, the work of con- 
centrating the mounted men and the supplies 
for a dash across country, to attempt to cut 



oft' tlio Germans retiring before Smuts in the 
centre, was hastily pushed on. McKenzie 
finally moved out of Aus on April 15 with a 
coluiun of moimted troops. Ho was to strike 
north-east across country, tlirough Bethany 
and Beersheba, for Gibeon ; and the hope was 
that he would arrive there in time to get 
astride the railway in strong force before the 
main body of the retiring German army could 
get past. He just failed. That fortnight's 
halt at Aus, while the supplies for his mounted 
men were being collected, was fatal to his 
complete success. But, once started, he did 
very well. He was in Bethany on April 17 ; 
in Beersheba on April 20. There he was com- 
pelled to halt for another four days to get his 
transport up. He left Beersheba on the night 
of April 24, and, pushing on with all speed, 
came within sight of Gibeon the next evening. 
An attempt made by night to break the railway 
line behind the enemy came into contact with 
powerful hostile forces and failed badly. 
^McKenzie's troops suffered a rather costly 
reverse, and lost a number of men killed 




THE SURKKNnf-:R. 

The German Commander, I-ieutenant-Colonel Francke (at back), rcaJinii the terms of surrender. llie 
other Hiuret in the ((roup are: (1) f^oionel (^ollyer; (2) Obcr-I.eiiinant Trynor ; (3) Governor Scit/. ; 

(4) Major Mok ; (S) (Jenc-ral Molhn. 



26U 



THE TIMES mSTOHY OF THE WAR. 



wouiulad, aiul Ccipttut'il. But he retleoiiu'd this 
check ttinply next dtty, wlu-ii lio tVIl on the 
Cieriuaii rearguurd iu bittliuient slrengih mid 
w ith the necessary vit^our. Hurrietlly repairing 
the niiiitukeH of tJic night attmk, ho entJircled 
thM enemy <>n three sides and sent his ooUuunH 
to I'li^se in on the hostile position at duvvn on 
April -'tj. His guns were well served, and his 
men — HO long balked of a fight with the 
(Jt'nn'Wis — went into the Imsinesp with spUitidid 
• lush. The German commander, who no tloubt 
never intended to do more than fight a retirint; 
ui-tion to cover the retreat of mo muni body, 
succeeded in getting most of hia troops away. 
The South Africans wore in no condition for 
a lori'j; chase. Their dash across country had 
left men and horses on the border of exhaustion. 
So that tht> H.ittlo of Gibeon, though the most 
considerai)lo of the whole souttiern c»imp>iign. 
failed of being the comfilete victory for McKenzie 
that it might liave been. Neverthole.ss it was 
decisive. The enemy's losses were 8 killed, 
[\0 wounded, and lOf) prisoners left behind ; 
with 2 guns, 4 machine guns, and much ammu- 
nition and material. But its results were far 
more serious for tlie enemy than the.so com- 
[)aratively slight losses might imply. The 
southern campaign was over. The Germans 
who just escaped McKenzie were the last that 
were left in all the southern parts of South-Wost 
Africa. Smuts, inarching with van D(>ventor's 
columns, had entered Keetmanshoop on 
Ai)ril 20. The flank movement of Berrange 
and Dirk xan Deventer.. if it seems to have 
been rather barren of really decisive results, 
hail certainly begun the whole German retire- 
ment from the southern positions. Smuts lost 
no time. By April 27 he was .at Aus. There 
he issued a proclamation annoimcing the con- 
quest of the whole southern territory, and on 
April 29 had already started tor owakopmimd to 
confer with Botlia. 

The ideal ending of the campaign would have 
been for General Botha to seize the railway 
north of Windhuk at the same moment as the 
southern armies were dri\-ino tlie enemy to the 
north. The Germans must . then have been 
caught somewhere on the central line between 
Seeheim and Karibib and have either been 
brought to battle under those disadvantageous 
conditions or have svurrendercd out of hand. 
Tint campaigns are in the way of not working 
out exactly as they are planned and no experi- 
enced soldier will blame Botha or Smuts for 



having failed (o achieve such a miracle of 
" liming," especially in a country wliero every 
possible natural obstiwlo fought against their 
cohunns. It is even doubtful wluither Botha 
and Smuts, when they designeil the plan of 
campaign, intended to try to cut off the enemy 
from his retreat to the n<irth. They may have 
thought that if he was caught between two South 
African armies iu the neighbourhood of his 
capital there would bo nothing for him to do 
but to fight in a forlorn hope of saving it ; 
wiiereas if V\'in(lhuk fell liisl, and he escaped 
north, he wouki then be able to say that he had 
don(t everj'thing possible and might surrender 
as one in the la-st extremitv. However that 
may be, men who rode with the Burgher 
columns of Botha's force tell strange tales of 
reaching positions on the railway north of 
Windhuk where they could have held up many 
German troojjs in their retreat, and then of 
being halted for two days while the enemy, with 
horses and guns and supplies, rolled safely by. 
It is perhaps safest on the whole not to be too 
credulous of such tales. Men who ride on the 
separate columns of an army are almost as 
prone to misunderstand the reason for the 
orders which they have to obey as armchair 
critics are inclined to find fault with column 
commanders for not getting from one point to 
another in the time that the distance on tht 
map suggests as ample. The end is what the 
Commander-in-Cliiof has to think of, and he has 
a right to be judged by his success in attaining 
it, not by the details of his measures at any one 
moment. We left General Botha a little way 
out of Swakopmund. On February 22 he had 
occupied Goanikontes, had secured a good 
water su[)ply, and had pushed his outposts as 
far as Husab. It was not till March 19 that he 
was in a position to do anything more. Then 
he moved out against the enemy, attacked him 
at Pforte, Jackalswater and Riet, and drove 
him from all three places. This engagement — 
fought, as so many of General Botha's engage- 
ments have been fought, by two flanking 
cohmins and a central force — gave General 
Botha the chance of striking straight for the 
junction at Karibib and of cutting the railway 
in the north while the operations in the south 
were still developing. He is said to have been 
eager to march at once. b\it found that his 
transport could not possibly be ready for another 
month, and was compelled to wait before 
beginning his final advance. It should be said 
of the engagements at I'forte, Jackalswater and 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



267 




AT THE SIGNING OF THE SURRENDER. 
General Botha (on right) sitting opposite Lieutenant-Colonel Francke (on extreme left). 



Rif't that they were very gallantly fought by 
all the three South African columns. The 
force which attacked Riet made skilful use of 
its big guns, the enemy retiring without waiting 
for infantry attack. The Burgher column under 
Colonel Alberts whicli attacked Pforte had a 
better chance, and took full a^lvantago of it. 
These mountcrl trootJH rode the defence down, 
taking tlie slow Germans by surprise by riding 
in upon thern at a gallop and firing from the 
sadflle. So successful were these ta<^:tics that 
they cajjtured 210 prisom-rs, two guns and two 
mar;hine-gunH. The column which attacked 
.Tackalsvvater also had some stiff fighting, 
finding the i-m-my strongly posted there and not 
being strong enough to storm liis position. The 
reHiilt of the South African successes at Pforte 
nrifl Kiet was, of conrwj, the evacuation l)y the 
eneiny of Jackalswater also. 

Hotha's position now waa that he had tested 
the strength of th«! enerny opposed to liitn and 
}i«d provf!fl his own strengtli to he ani|)le. His 
[<robleni was the finding of food atid water for 
hi-* men. The railway had been broken up by 
tlie eri'^rny as he retired, find could only hi 
ref>«ir»^f| slowly. Ah it was, a water train went 
every day from Sunkopnuind to the ffirlheMt 



construction post and back, to keep the troops 
and working gangs supplied. It was obvious 
that an advance, if it was to be in time to cut 
off the enemy from theh' retreat to the nortii. 
would have to be rapid, and that the re-building 
of the railway could not possibly keej) pace 
with it. The actions at Riet and Pforte were 
fought on March 20. It will be remembered 
that by April 11 the Southern campaign had 
reached the point when General Smuts could 
take command of the converging columns, 
(inishing the wliolo business off in less than Ihree 
weeks. General I'otlin ktie\\, of cours(\ how 
nenr the final moxcment in the south was 
getting. He iruist have seen tlinf it would be 
im[)o.s.sible for him to be up in (inic The 
alternative would have been lo delay fho 
operations in the south till ho was n^ady to 
strike for the norlhei'n railway. I>iil he saw, 
no doubt, that it was fur more huportaiil lo 
krjep the enemy on the run, and Ihaf any delay 
in the southern f)])erations would leave (he 
columns of Berrange and Dirk van l)(!venter 
"in the air" and would expose tliciu (o I he 
dnnti'i of Ixfing attax'kf'd by an overwhelming 
<(>neentral ion of <Jernian troops. Botha, was 
to<j old u commander to take the risl< of anothoi" 



2m 



Till': TIMES HlSTUllY OF Till'] \VAH. 



Suutlt'oiittiiii. Hi- wLH«ly dtH-Klftl to hit iIh 
souttitirii i>|iticutioiiH take thtnr cuiu'ue, tuul wont 
taiiL»olt° to LiitUuit/hiulit to viwit M<K«'n/it 's 
iiiliiiiiii two ilti^.s tnttort- ttiu iiiureh on (iihtton 
hf^un. It Wtt.s not till April 2H timt Im ua.-s 
ri'rtdy tor lii« torwunl movts ami tin n ln' Ixjhlly 
uhiiniloMt'il the lino of thi; railway and struck 
Htraight up the courHe of the Swakop river, 
« huro he had alreaily piwhed the enemy bark 
lur beyond Hiet. At the rianie time Skinner 
with a mounted hijuatlron wa.s ilirected to 
reconnoitre the line of tlio railway beyond 
'I'rekkopjes, where his main body stood. He 
moved out on the night of April 25 and ran 
right into a body of the enemy, which wa.s 
moving to tjike him by night sui-priso at 
Trekkopjes -the second time that Skinner and 
the liernums luul ccjlliiletl in the night, each 
trying to siu"pri.se the other. Skinner withdrew 
on Trekkojjjos, where the Cormans attacked 
hiiu in the morning, using their heavy guns t<j 
.shell his camp. He himself had no giuis, <i.s 
liis had been witlidrawn for the general atlvance 
by the other route. But Ills inftmtry held their 
position.s under a heavy fire, and a Naval 
armoured ear detachment attacked tlie Uermans 
and did considerable execution with machine 
guns. The action was hot for about four hoiu-s. 
Then the Germans cU-ew off, having lost throe 



otliiers and 6 men killed, mikI two onieers and 
1 1 men wounded. 

Hotha, laeunwliile, hiul begun his ad\an(H^ up 
the eour.so of the Swakop river. On the same 
day as the (Jermans were driven off at Trek- 
kopjes, he moved out fi-om Husab and Jiiet 
with a large force of mounted Huighers — three 
brigades under Urigadier-Cjienerals Hrits, 
Myburgh, and Manio liotha — and advanced 
straight up the dry bed of the river. He movo<l, 
not in one compact body, but, after the Hex r 
fashion, in a number of columns, each in 
touch with the other, but spread over a wide 
tract of country. Between tho.se spreading 
lines of his advance Botha himself went con- 
tinually in a motor-car with a small body- 
guard. An enterprising enemy might have had 
abundant chances of intercepting liim, but the 
Clennans in tliis campaign showed an astonishing 
lack of initiative. It is true that they were 
heavily out-numbered, l)ut, so were the Boers 
in the South African W ar. Yet the Boers 
harassed the' British communications con- 
tinually, and were always descending unex- 
pectedly upon isolated colunms. Such tactics, 
if the Germans had used them, might have 
delayed Botha's jidvance, if they could not 
have stopped it. As it was, he was singularly 
inimune from any kind of attack. By this 




GOVERNMENT HOUSE, WINDHUK, 
Showing the Union Jack flyinjf. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



2C0 




ENTRY OF THE UNION FORGES INTO WINDHUK. 
General Botha addressing his troops. 



time, of course, the Battle of Gibeon had been 
fought and won ; the southern campaign was 
over ; and the enemy was thinking of little 
but getting away to the north before Botha 
could cut off his retreat. By April 30 Botha 
was at Dorstriviermund. A day or so later he 
halted for two or three days, while he sent 
Myburgh and Manie Botha north to cut the 
railway between Karibib and Windhuk. At 
this camp General Smuts, who had left Aus three 
days after the Battle of Gibeon, came to confer 
with him, travelling across country in a motor- 
car and catchine up Botha's column during its 
halt. Then on May 5, hearing that Myburgh 
and Manie Botha had successfully pcrfonned 
their mission, liotha moved straight across 
country for Karibib, the junction of tlie railway 
from the west and south and the point where 
the nortlif;m spur of line that goes to Tsumeb 
and (^irootfontein begins. From the enmp to 
Karibib was a rnareli of 40 rnilf?s, over waterless 
ountry, and with thi- rlitinee of a stiff action 
at the erifl oi it. 'I"lic rink was rjbvious, but 
Jifjtha took il. fl<- i/iJirfb'd ()ir')iii.'b the cool 
morning hours of darkrir-Hri, and was in sight 
f>f Karibib frarly in tin- affem(»on — t'* find the 
])\aff rea*ly to surrerifler. It was oficiipir-rl at 
<mee. Irnporfnnt froin the railway j)oint of view, 
it had n\-i<) a gorxl Hiijjjjly of wafer. But Uxxl 
WBH w;aree for some ti;ne, until the fngineers, 
working at high j>r'-HHiin-, niaid i|]< railway. 



In a few days the infantry, which had followed 
the line of the railway — that followed a double 
route — arrived at Karibib. There the force 
halted for a time, while General Botha himself, 
with a mobile column, dashed forward to re- 
ceive the surrender of Windhuk. 

The Burgher Brigades, a battery of artillery, 
and a machine-gun section had gone on in 
advance. Before he started, on May 11, Botha 
iiad already been in conversiition on the tele- 
phone with the German authorities left in 
Windhuk, and had heard from them that th(^y 
were ready to surrender the capital. H(! liim- 
self and his personal staff travelled in motor- 
cars. The track was difficult and tangled, and 
the motors made heavy going. , Two nights 
were spent in the bush, and on the morning of 
the third day Windhiil< cainc in sight. The 
Burgher Brigades had arrived, and were drawn 
up outside the town to await the ceremony of 
surrender. General Botha then entered the 
(J(-nnan capital. The British flag was hoisted. 
Colonel Mentz was placed in command of the 
town, and a proclamation was read declaring 
martial law. The chief importance of Ww, 
occupation of WindliuU was tliat it put the 
wireless station out of action. This, it will be 
remf;rnberod, had l)een the main rfvison foi- the 
request of the Imperial (Government tiiut 
General Botha and his Cabinet should under- 
take tlic iuMi ion of South-West Africa. Other- 



270 



Till': TIMKS lllSTDRY OF Till': W'Ali. 




SHIPPING (JENFUA 
Big guns, used in German South-West Africa, bei 

wise, the most memorable feature of this por- 
tion of the campaign was its extreme rapidity. 
In 16 days Cleneral Botlia had struck from 
the fringe to the very midst of tlie enemy's 
country. He had pushed, with his Burghers, 
far ahead of his supplies. He had brought his 
infantry — who surpassed themselves, then and 
later on, by their heroic marching through great 
heat, with too little water, and in awful dust — 
up to occupy critical points and to hold his 
lines of communication. His reward was the 
bloodless occupation of Windhuk, and an 
impression made on the mind of the enemy 
which must have gone far to dispose him to his 
ultimate surrender. 

Almost at once, indeed, a message from the 
German commander came to Botha that he 
was prepared to discuss terms of surrender. 
Botha returned, again b\^ motor, to Karibib ; 
arranged an armistice of 48 hours from 
mid-day on JNIay 20 ; and at Giftkop, 
30 miles north ot Karibib, met Seitz, the 
(!erman Governor and Francke, the Com- 
mander-in-chief. The German terms would 
have been insolent, if they had not had every 



L BOTHA'S GUNS. 

ng transported for use in another part of Africa. 

appearance of being put forward in all serious- 
ness. They proposed that hostilities should be 
suspended, and tliat each army should continue 
to hold the country it occupied at the moment 
until the end of the war in Europe. Botha, of 
course, would have nothing to do with such 
proposals, and refused to prolong the armistice. 
Tt remained to prepare the final advance 
against the enemy, who had retired north along 
the railway. The organization of the troops 
holding the line of conununications had first 
to he recast. They were reinforced by regi- 
ments which had been fighting in tlie south 
and were now brought round to Swakopniund. 
By the middle of Jtine the work of organization 
and preparation was complete, and on Jime 18 
Botlia moved out of Karibib to begin the last 
stage of the campaign. 

Again he adopted his favourite formation. 
Myburgh, with one Burgher colinun, rode far 
out on the right flank ; Brits, with another, did 
the same on the left. Botha in the centre, 
had with him two mounted brigades, an 
infantry brigade under }^rigadier-Gi>neral lieves, 
and some heavy artillery. These dispositions 



THE TJMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



•271 



brought their nonnal i-r.ccosp. In just tliree 
weeks from his first move out ot Karibib Botha 
had received the surrender of tlie wliole 
German force, and the campaign was at an 
end. He liimself marched witli gi-eat rapidity, 
sparing himself and his staff as httle as his men. 
On Jime 20 he entered Omaruru. Forty miles to 
the north was a strong German position at 
Kalkveld. They did not hold it, but again 
retired north, with Botha's column hot on their 
heels. In less than a week Botha had covered 
more than 120 miles, and was at Otjiwarongo. 
But he cUd not stop long there. He left Otjiwa- 
rongo on June 27, and by the evening of June 30 
his advance guard was only six miles from Otavi. 
There the enemy put up some show of resist- 
ance ; but his bolt was nearly shot, and though 
he had mined all the approaches to Otavi, the 
South African troops marched into the town 
without any loss on the first day of July. 
About 10 miles north, on the railway line to 
Tsumeb, the enemy's main body was now 
concentrated. At Otavi, Botha halted a while 
to allow his dispositions to develop. His infantry 
marched into the town three days after the 
mounted troops had reached it. They had 
covered more than 250 miles of that hot and 
thirsty country. The last 80 miles they had 
done in four days, and the last 45 in 36 hours — - 
great marching, even in ordinary country ; and 
in the circumstances of their case a wonderful 



performance, i'ully justifying the praise of tlicMr 
commander, General Boves. " Under th(i con- 
ditions of this country," he told them, " vvliere 
water is difficult to obtain, heavy dust is the 
rule, and not the exception, and difficulties of 
transport necessitated yoiu- receiving half, and 
for six days, quarter rations, I look on the per- 
formance as one that reflects the greatest credit 
on all who have taken part." When they 
reached Otavi they found a local armistice in 
force. The Germans were given till the morning 
of July 9 to surrender. 

Myburgh on the right, in the meantime, and 
Brits on the left had completely encompassed 
the enemy. Their Burgher columns went with 
their visual speed, carrying with them the 
scanty food that they needed to supplement 
the meat with wliich their rifles provided them 
from the abundant game of the covmtry, and 
taking their chance of finding enough water 
for themselves and their beasts. Myburgh 
made a bold sweep on the right flank. By 
July 4 he had crossed the railway that goes 
north-east from Otavi to Grootfontein, and 
had routed a small enemy force in an engage- 
ment at Gaub. Following hard on the heels of 
the Germans, he came the same day to Tsvuneb, 
where his advance guard was met by a flag of 
truce. During the parley the German guns 
suddenly opened fire from their positions round 
the town. The Burghers — enraged at this ap- 




AI'IKK IMK CONOUKST ()l I HI-: (;i'.l{\IAN COLONY. 

At the Inank<i(;ivin|i Service at the Wandercru' (>lub, August .^, 191.S. Left to riiJlit (<encral Smuts (1); 

Mrs. Botha (2) ; (General Hotha (.^) ; Mr. Louis Kotlia, junior (4). 



272 



THt: TIMI'lS HISTORY OF THE 



WAR. 



poruikt truttfhtiry leapt to tiieir Ihh-hkb, mul 
riM.lu dtrai^ht at thti town, la u fnw iuiniitt«> 
Uu>y lutil i-tiurgtitl ttiroti^h thu HtreetH, had 
M-atti^rtnl the enemy froiii their positioivn, and 
were lit j)ut!.sffi.siuii ut the wiiole cirele of tlel't'Mfe.s. 
Thereupon the CennaiM prote«te«l that tlie 
hriiig had hfcit a mistake, and pleaded the 
armij^tic-e at Otavi tis a reason for demamhii^ 
that Mshiirgh Mhoultl give up again what hici 
men hail won. They Uttle knew tlieir lioer. 
Mybiirgh demamletl to speak to Hotha on the 
telephone. The Ciermans admitted that they 
cuulil put hint through to Otavi. A brief 
conversation served to conhrm Myburgh's 
Mutipicions. He learned that the armistice at 
Otavi wa« local and no concern of his. There- 
upon he insisted upon the surrentler of Tsumeb, 
and had his way, tints po.sses.sing himself of nil 
its vtust stores of aruLS and military equipment 
without allowing the enemy any chance of 
destroying them. There he releaweii, too, a 
large number of prisoners lield by the Germans. 

Brits, too, was doing to the German po.sition 
on the left what Myburgh had done to it on 
the right. The circle that he drew round it 
was even wider than Myburgh's. On July 6 
he suddenly appeared at Namutoni, about 
40 nxiles north-west of Tsumeb. There he 
received, without any fighting, the surrender 
of the German commander with 170 officers and 
men and huge quantities of transport anil 
amniunition. The cordon had tliis time been 
drawn tight round the enemy, who must have 
known that his time had come. 

Yet Seitz and Francke prolonged to the 
very last moment their surrender to General 
Botha. It was not till the time allotted had 
all but expired that their me.ssenger came into 
Otavi to annoutice their acceptance of the 
terms that had been offered. For an enemy 
who had fought the campaign with every foul 
device that a malign ingenuity could invent, 
had poisoned wells, and had treated prisoners 
with infamous and deliberate brutality, those 
terms were, in the opinion of many South 
Africans, generous to a fault. The officers 
retained their arms, gave their parole, and 
were to be allowed to live in any place that 
they selected. The non-commissioned officers 
and men kept their rifles but no amnumition, 
and were to be interned within South-West 
Africa at any place chosen by the South 



African ( Jovernment. The "reservists" were 
allowed to return to their farms on parole, and 
vsem given btu'k their rifles. This, if they wore 
to be allowe<l to stay in the (•(uuitry at all, was 
inevitable, for it wa.s nect<s.sary that they 
shoulil have the naums of self -protection 
against tim natives. There has naturally been 
mukIi (litiiism of these terms of surrender. 
(Jeneral Botha, however, was on the spot, and 
knew what his position was. An attack in 
force on the CJermans at bay would have b<>en 
costly in men, and could hardly have Xmcn 
delivered until a much larger body of infantry 
hill! hciii brought uj). Each day's delay 
nieant a great expenditiu-e of money, and the 
South African Government, with .so many 
h<jstile critics who were eager to make all the 
capital they could out of the cost of the cam- 
paign, were naturally anxious to see the end 
of it OH soon as possible. When all is said and 
done, political considerations will enter into 
the decision of such matters, and General 13otha 
carried through the whole canipaign with such 
rapidity and efficiency that criticism of his ac- 
ceptance of the Gennan surrender on such terms 
must be very well founded to justify itself. 

Thus ended the campaign. It had been a 
triumph of organization rather over the diffi- 
culties of nature than over a worthy enemy — 
for the Germans, outnumberetl though they 
w ere and in a hopeless case, showed themselves 
throughout to be contemptible opponents. 
General Botha or any other of the Boer com- 
manders, given the chances which Francke 
had, would certainly have made very effec- 
tive use of them. This German did little but 
conduct a not very efficient retirement, till 
the moment when he allowed himself to be 
hemmed in. The real credit of the campaign 
rests with the South African troops, who were 
splendidly adequate to every demand that was 
made upon them. General Botha amply recog- 
nized this in the General Order that he issued 
to his army. " The commander-in-chief," he 
said, " finds in tlie magnificent work which has 
been performed so uncomplainingly and reso- 
lutely an indication of what may be expected of 
the citizens of the Union, who place their duty 
before personal feelings and interests." That may 
well serve as the summing up of the campaign. 
Its justice was soon to be proved both in East 
Africa and on the battlefields of Europe. 



CHAPTER CXXXI. 



THE CONQUEST OF CAMEROON 

AND TOGOLAND. 



Eighteen Months of West African Wabfare — The Germans in Togoland — German Pro- 
posals FOR " XeUTRALITY " IN AfBICA — FrANCO -BRITISH CO-OPERATION SURRENDER OF ToGO- 

land — History of Cameroon — German A^ibitions in the Congo — More " Neutr.\lity " 
Intrigues — Cameroon Operations Analysed — Plan of Campaign — Surrender of Duala — 
General Dobell's First Operations — The Campaign of 1915 — The French Operations — 
Joint Advance — Fall of Yaunde — Surrender of Mora in February, 1916 — Review of the 
Campaign 



GERMANY lost Togoland, the smallest 
of her African possessions, in the first 
month of the war. French troops 
entered Togoland from Dahonney on 
Angii.sf ; on August 7 Lome, the capital, and 
a strip of territory extending seventy-five miles 
north from the coast was surrendered to a 
British officer sent from the Gold Coast. The 
GenTian.s mafle an effort to defend Kamina, 
farther inland, where they had a powerful wire- 
less telegraphy station. On August 22 they 
were engaged at the Chra river, south of 
Kamina, by an Anglo-French force under 
Lieut. -Col. Bryant. On the night of August 24 
the Germans destroyed their wireless station at 
Karnina, and on August 26 Major von Doring, 
the Acting fJovemor, unconditionally surr<rri- 
riered to Col. Bryant. Northern Togoland was 
at the Mame time occupied, with scarcely any 
oppfj«ition, by French and British troops. 

TTie camf>aign in Cameroon lawted eighteen 
months. It was attar^ked on the north-eawt, 
♦ra«t and Houth-east by French trofjjjs from the 
('Aifu\ Territory and the Congo regifjn ; on the 
we«t by jiritish trofjps from Nigeria, and from 
the Hca by an Anglo-French force under <''<-n. 
Hir Charles DoVjell. 'the first attat-ks, maxle in 
August, 1011, from the Cha^l Territory and 
Nigeria, h»ul not br;en succfissfni. An (ift<rn|)t 
Vol. Vlff. I'»irt, 90. 



by a British column to seize Garua failed with 
heavy loss. But on Septeinber 21 Gen. 
Largeau, at the second attempt, captiu-ed 
Kusseri, the German post near Lake Chad, 
thereafter sending a column under Lieut. -Col. 
Brisset to cooperate with the British forces in 
Nigeria, the combined columns being placed 
under Brigadier-General CunlifTe, who took 
command in February, 1915. It was not till 
June, 1915, that, by the capture of Garua and 
Ngaundere, the northern columns achieved 
their first important successes. 

Meanwhile the French columns advancing 
from the south and south-east, under Gen. 
Aymerich — who had the help of a detachment 
from the Belgian Congo — failed to make the 
I)rogres8 expected. Gen. Dobell occupied 
Duala, th(! chief port of the colony, on Sep- 
tember 27, and in November took Buoa, on the 
slopes of the Cameroon mountain and the 
a<Jministrative caj)itul of the colony. The 
governor, Herr Ebermaier, and the commander 
of the troops. Col. Zimnjennann, with the bulk 
of the forces had, however, withdrawn, after the 
surrender of Duala, to Yaunde, in the centre of 
the southern part of the colony. A French 
oHicer, <'ol. Mayer, took eorrunand of the 
ff)rccH sent })y Gen. Dobell towards Yaunde, 
iirid on October 26, lOH, Ed«!a, 32 miles in n 



ii:\ 



274 



TUt: I nil's iiisroitY of riiH win. 




A SQUAD OF THE ROYAL MARINE LIGHT INFANTRY. 



direct line east of Duala, was occupied. In 
January, 1915, the Germans nnade the only 
considerable offensive nioven^ent undertaken 
l)y them during the campaign ; they tried, 
unsuccessfully, to dislodge Col. Maj'er from 
Edea. In March a combined movement 
on Yaunde by the troops of Generals Ajinerich 
and Dobell was planned, but did not succeed. 
Gen. Aymerich's troops failed to make pro- 
gress, and Col. Mayer, after advancing some 
distance, was compelled to fall back on Edea 
(.I\.me, 1915). 

A new combined movement was begun 
towards the close of September, in which the 
forces of Generals Dobell, Cunliffe, and Ay- 
merich all took part. The Germans at first 
resisted firmly, but by the close of December 
their opposition had been overcome. Yaimde 
was occupied by one of Gen. Dobell's 
columns on January 1, 1916. A few days 
pre\'iously that place had been abandoned by 
the Germans, who^ despite the efforts made to 
cut them off, succeeded in escaping into 
Spanish Guinea, where they were interned, 
being subsequently removed to Spain. Those 
Gemians who found refuge on neutral territory 



numbered over 800, and included the Governor 
and the conxmander *of the troops. 

The last place to fly the Gorman flag in 
Cameroon was Mora. Its garrison, under 
Hauptmann von Raben, occupied a practically 
inipregnablo position on an isolated mountain. 
All attempts to capture it failed, but on 
February 18, 1916, Hauptmann von Raben, 
seeing the hopelessness of his position, capitu- 
lated. Independent operations undertaken by 
the French had earlier in the war cleared the 
Germans out of that part of their colony lying 
south of Spanish Guinea. The conquest of 
Cameroon was complete. 

Togoland and Cameroon were acquired by 
Germany in 1884, being among the first fruits 
of the partition of Africa among European 
Powers — a partition which resulted from H. M. 
Stanley's discover}^ of the coixrse of the Congo 
and his revelation of the abundant ricliness of 
the interior of the equatorial regions of the 
continent. Togoland, part of the old Slave 
Coast of West Africa, has only 32 miles of sea- 
board, and though its hinterland widens its 
total area is less than 34,000 square nxiles ; 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



27o 



it is a trifle larger than Ireland. When tin- 
Germans entered into the scramble for Africa, 
Togo was the sole patch of coast in Upper 
Guinea not appropriated by other European 
States, and it was hemmed in, save seawards 
by French and British territory — Dahomey on 
the east, the Gold Coast on the west, and the 
Upper Senegal and Niger colony on the north. 
Differing in no essential respect in physical 
features from the adjacent districts of the 
West Coast, Togoland is rich in sylvan pro- 
ducts, and its resources had been greatly 
developed by the Germans. Lome, the capital 
and chief port, a creation of the Germans, lies 
near the Gold Coast border. In the interior, 
and connected with Lome by railway, is 
Kamina, where just before the war began 
the Germans had, as has been seen, completed 
a very powerful wireless telegraphy station. 
It communicated direct with Nauen, near 
Berlin, and with the wireless stations in 
Cameroon and German South-West Africa. 
Though only 38 miles from the Dahomey 
border, the wireless station at Kamina had 





i.->lieau;ld. 

MAJ(jK-f;RNHRAI, SIR CHAS. DOBKLl. 
C^ommanJed Allied Forced in (Cameroon. 



[Bas^ano, 



COI.. E. H. GORGES, C.B., D.S.O. 

been erected with such secrecy that the 
French authorities were not aware of its 
existence. Baron Codelli, the designer of the 
station, was still in Togoland, and on August 16 
was taken prisoner by the British. 

When the European situation became 
threatening in July, 1914, Major von Doring, 
Acting (iovernor and commander of the troops 
in Togoland, made preparations to attack the 
French in Dahomey, on the assiunption that 
Great Britain would not enter into the 'p ar. 
When he found out his error ho abandoned his 
design. Acting on instructions from Berlin, 
in telegrams dated August 4 and 5, addressed 
to M. William Ponty, Governor -General of 
French West Africa, t(. tl o Lieut. -Governor of 
Dahomey and to the Governor of the Gold 
Coast, he proposed that Togoland and the 
neighbouring French and British colonies 
should remain neutral. The German Govern- 
m(;nt shortly afterwards came to have wider 
conceptions of neutrality in Equatorial Africa, 
conceptions to which reference is made later on, 
hilt the Togo proposal was a distinct move, 
and though reasons of liunrmnity and the 
siipposofl n(!cd of the white races to present a 
solid front to the blacks were urged by Major 
von Doring, the real object of the Germans in 
wishing to keep Togoland neutral was to 
f)rcserv(! for th<)ir use the Kuminu winilcss 
HtAlion. l'>oth (ho French and the British 
authorilioH refused to cnt<Ttniri the i)roposai. 
The Lieut. -Governor of Dahomey, M. Cii. 
NoiilTliird, who did not oven answer Major 
von Doring's telegram, directed CVmunandant 



270 



THE TIMES HlSTDin' OE THE W'All. 



Maritix, the cMHiiur uulitury tiHU-er in Utiliouitiy, 
to upen liodtilitie^. On Augiut (i, French 
i;oluiiiHi troopB crobaetl the Tugulaiul honler 
near the cuatit. 'I'hey met with no opputiition ; 
Little I'opo (Aiim-ho) wa8 rieizett, and on the 
eveuinj^ of August 8 the town of Togo wan 

OUt'llpUHl. 

t)n tlieir uule the Gold Coa^t authorities 
had not been idle. Mr. VV. C. F. UobertHon, 
Acting Uovernor, in tlie absence of Sir Hugh 
Clifford, and Capt. F. C. Bryant, H.A., senior 
officer on tfie (Joid Coai<t station, took prompt 
and fnergetic mejvHurt\s. bhu'opoan voluntci-rs 
at Accra, Sekondi and Kiunasi wore eiu'oiied 
and every necessary step was taken, botli for 
defence and offence. On August 6 Capt. 
Barker was sent to Lome under a flag of truce 
to demand the surrender of Togoland, and 
was told to point out to Major von Doring 
that, as strong colunuis were ready to invade 
the colony from west, east and north, his 
position was hopeless. A twenty-four hours' 
armistice was granted. When Capt. IJarkt-r 
retiu"ned to Lome at U p.m. on August 7 
he foimd that the Gernian troops had evacuated 
the town and that the District Comn\issioner 
left behind by Major von Doring had in- 



utructionx to surn^ndir the colony as far 
as a line drawn 120 kilometres (74.57 miles) 
north of Lonif. Major von Doring, the (Jernuin 
tniops, and many (merman eiviUaus luul retired 
up the railway, the Acting Governor having 
received iniperative instructions to defend the 
wireless station at Kamina.* 

Up to this time the Fn>nch and British 
authorities Imd worked independently, but 
on August 8 arrangements were nuule between 
.Mr. Robertson and M. NoufHard for their co- 
ojjeration. Capt. Bryant, who was granted the 
temporary rank of Lieut. -Col., was in chief com- 
mand of the Allied forces. Capt. ('astaing, of 
the French Colonial Infantry, commanded the 
French column (eight Europeans and 150 
Senegalese Tirailleurs), which, having com- 
|)Ieted the occupation of south-east Togoland, 
joined Col. Bryant's troops on August 18. 
Col. Bryant had landed at Lome on August 12 
with two companies of the Gold Coast Regi- 
ment, machine guns, medical transport, and 
sjpply staffs. The total strength of the British 

♦ In the diary of a Protestant pastor, J. Spieth, who 
took part in the defence of Karnina, is tlie entry, under 
date August 18, that Major von Doring had received the 
message, four times repeated, to defend Kamina. 




P^ 









•^- » 



V^' 



^ J . - 






-1 



.S > AV .«. 



BRITISH MACHINE-GUN SECTION. 
Ready to advance. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



277 




BRITISH MACHINE-GUN SECTION. 
Smaller picture : British Field Gun. 

force was 57 Europetins and 535 natives, with 
2,000 carriers and labourers. Pushing up the 
railway towards Kamina, the main body came 
into contact with the enemy on August 15. 
On the same day Capt. Potter, with the " I " 
company of the Gold Coast Regiment, very 
neatly trapped a much stronger column of the 
enemy, operating on the railway at Agbelafoe, by 
getting })(itween it and von Doring's force. By 
August 20 Col. iJryants column had marched 
to Xuatja, and on the 22nd there was a stiff 
fight at the village of Chra. The enemy, 
wh<'>se force consisted of fJO Europeans, 400 
native soldiers, and three machine guns, held 
a very strong entrenched position north of 
the river, the railway bridge over which had 
been blown up. The V>iLsh here was very 
dense, and the attacking columns were una?)le 
to keep touch with one another. After attacking 
all day the Allies failed to dislodge the enemy. 
At nightfall they entrenched themselves, pre- 
parf;*l to renew the attack at dawn, but during 
the night the GerrnariH evafiuated their position. 
.Major von Ooring iiiwl lf;i.rn'f| that anf)ther 
force, a Frerich f;oliirriri urifhr ( 'ornriiiitKhint 
Maroix, fuJvancing trom the frast, was witfiin 
two flays' march of Kamina, and he wa-( 
unwilling to risk rlfpletion of llic garrisf)n 
available for its defence. 

At the Chra river fight the GermanH suffered 
little IfiMH, but the Anglo Fnjrich casiialtirrs were 
7.3 fineliiding 23 killed), or 17 per eent. of thr^ 
force engage<l. The hotte,Ht fighting fell tf) thf; 
French column, whi'h attacked the r-netnv's 



left, but after getting to within fifty yards of 
the trenches was obliged to retire. Here Lieut. 
Guilleniart, of the French Colonial Infantry, and 
Lieut. G. M. Thompson (Royal Scots, attached 
G.C. Regiment) were killed. Lieut. Thompson 
had been placed in command of a company of 
Senegalese Tirailleurs ; after the fight he was 
found surrounded by the bodies of a Gold 
Co,ast native N.C.O. iu\(\ thci sergeant, two 
corporals, and nine privates of the Senega- 
lese, who had died in liis defence. They 
were buried on the sjx)!, 'riiompson's grave 
in the centre. 

On the night of August 24-25 loud explosions 
were heard at Col. Bryant's camp in the diiici ion 
of Karnirm., and in thf! morning the masts of 
the windless station, whi-h liii,d been clearly, 
visible from the Allies' advanced post, were seen 
to ha\(^ disap()eared. The vvirtsloss station hud. 
in fact, V)een destroyed by the enemy. There 
hii.d br-en n, good deal of dissension atnoiig (ho 
200 ( lei'iruiriM, niilitary and civilian, gM,t JMicd 
at Kiunirm., and Mnjor von l)<>ring, though 
amfily supplied uilli lU'iiis and nnurninition, 

!t!) 2 




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278 



THE TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



■11'.) 



abandoned his intention of resisting to tlie last. 
On August 25 he sent Major von Koben, liis 
second in command, to Col. Bryant, offering 
to surrender on terms, but von Robcn w as told 
that the surrender must be unconditional. To 
this von Coring agreed on the 26th, and on the 
next dav Col. Bryant took possession of 
Kamina. He had brought to a rapid conclusion 
a little campaign which, mishandled, might 
easily have been prolonged, and its success was 
very largely due to his initiative and prompti- 
tude. For his services he was promoted to tlu- 
substantive rank of Major, and received the 
C.M.G. Credit was also due to the excellent 
work of Dr. W. W. Claridge, best known, per- 
haps, as author of a history of the Gold Coast, 
and the other members of the West African 
Medical Staff cormected with the expedition. 

While Col. Bryant's campaign was in pro 
gress British and French columns occupied 
Xorthern Togoland. The rapidity of the 
movements of the AlUes completely surprised 
tlie Germans, who offered but a feeble resistance. 
Acting on instructions from Capt. C. H. Armi- 
tage. Chief Commissioner of the Xorthern Terri- 
tories, Major Marlow with a force of eight men 
only occupied Yendi, the German Commissioner 
being misled by spies into thinking that a large 
force was being brought against him. The 
rfst of Xorthern Togoland was seized bj- 
French forces ntombering 630 rifles all told 
under Capt. Bouchez, of the 2nd Regiment 
Senegalese Tirailleurs. Traversing an inun- 
dated region, crossed by numerous unfordaljle 
rivers and under continuoas rain, the French 
r-olumns covered 310 miles in twenty days. 
The German troops at Sansanne Mango, over 
400 strong, fled before them, and on the second 
day of their retreat 180 of the German native 
soldiers deserted to the Frencli. This was 
typical of the attitude of the natives of Togolantl 
to their German masters, by whom they were 
harshly treated. Equally tyj)ical was the 
eagerness of the natives ot the French and 
British colonies to helj) in crusliing the Ger- 
mans. A picturesquf! feature of Capt. 
Bouchez's fffl-ce was a body of Mossi warriors, 
inhabitants of a kingdom in the Niger Bend 
under p'rench prot<f;tion. They volunteered 
their services, ea*;h chieftain coming in feudal 
fa«hioTi to the rend««vouH with his retainers. 
Col. Bryant »;niployed no partisans, but the 
ehief« and peoplirs of the Gold CoJist anrl 
Ashanti w».Te lavish in help. Besides uiikIi 
other finari'ial a«'<i''t(irife. llie^- defnived the 



whole cost, £60,000, incurred in the British 
military operations, and also the cost of subse- 
([uent administration — £3,000 a month. 

A grave charge fully proved, that of using 
explosive bullets, was brought against ilajor 
von Doring and Dr. Gruner (Commissioner of 
the Misahohe district). Some 200,000 rountls 
of soft-nosed bullets of large calibre issued by 
t he G erman Government were captured. Ma j ( )r 
\on Doring also armed natives over whom he 
liad no control and hundreds of them were let 



UFJPZR SEJSTE GAL &. NIGER 
BorjgaV^- Scale of Miles 

I / r ^=— -^ ' -J ' —I -^ 1—1 

^ ^ o \ Sansanne t 
bambaga • Mango of K^^ 



L 



I 



r 



^-~Salag3 



f Kompongu *\ 

"i Kwartann^ 

j Yendi V V 

' Bimbila V'^' \ 

TOGO- / 




MAP OF iOGOLAND. 

loose in the busli. 'J'lie \ jist majority of the 
natives gave, however, no trouble, and in a few 
w eeks the economic life of the country was being 
carried on as smoothly as if there had been no 
interni()tion to it whatever. 

Tin- conquest of Togolantl wius a compara- 
tively simple task, though luul they had good 
leiwlership the Germans could have made iv 
much stronger defence. It w»us otherwise in 
CJaineroon. In the first place the size of the 
colony must be borne in rniml. It luul an jin-a 
of 202,000 square miles, being t^qual to the area 
it (Jermany and Gn^at Britain combined. Then 
the ejuirnetef of the coiinflA slioilld l»e remeni- 



•2«0 



nil': iiMt:s history of the wab. 



bered. Extending from thti (Julf of (Juinea 
north to Lake C'htu.1, wedt to the Henue, and 
fttst and isouth to the ('t»nj<o lia^in, it naturHliy 
|)r<-r<eat.s many varying ty[iet> ot iaiid. In a 
hroatl gentn'ahzation it may be uaid ttiat the 
northern third of the colony in flat and open, 
Have on the wentern border, where art; I lie 
Mandara Hillti. The central region iu a broken 
|ilatfaii, mostly covered with long gratjri and 
mountiiinous in its western section. The; 
Hoiitht-rn third, also mountainous in the west, 
IS largely covered with primevjd forest which in 
the east grows thinner, becomes park like, and 
finally gives place to the low and marshy valley 
of the Sanga. The climate in general is un- 
healthy, and tht' weather, save in some of the 
higher districts, is always hot, niglit and <lay, in 
the rains and in the dries ; malaria is very 
prevalent. \[oreover, Souttiern Cameroon is 
one of the wettest regions in the tropics. Tie 



country gets its name from a broad and deep 
estuary called by its Portuguese discoverers 
Kit) dos Camaroes.* Immediately north of the 
estuary the great volcanic mass of Cameroon 
Mountiiin rises abruptly from the sea, its 
Hummit 13,700 foot high. The only lofty 
mountain on the coast of Africa, with smoke and 
vapour ever issuing from its many cratiu-s, it is a 
magnificent and unforgettabh; landmark. But 
it wjvs the fine harbourage j)r(*s('nted by tlie 
e.stuary which proved the attraction to the 
West Coast trader, and since the seventeenth 
century Europeans have traflicked with the 
natives li\iiig on its banks, a very shrewd 
negro people called Duala. From the begin- 
ning till towards the close of the nineteenth 
century the Duala were under liritish influence, 
and generally regarded the nearest British 
consul as their overlord. To Baptist mis- 
sionaries — notably Alfred iSaker and C!eorge 
Grenfell — the Duiila owed their early training 
both in civilisation and Christianity. 

The treaty on which (jermaiiy based her 
claiiiLs to Cameroon was concluded on July 15, 
1884, with an ebon and bulky figure long 
familiar to tradi^rs on the West Coast — King 
Hell, of Bell Town (now Duala), in the 
Cameroon estuary. King Bell (his real 
name was Albeli), a veritable merchant prince, 
had long sought British protection, and had 
been fobbed off by a Colonial OHice over 




[" 1 i/H« " Photograplis. 

FOUND ON GERMAN NATIVE TROOPS. 
Saw-edge bayonet, belt and scabbard, caps and eagle. Smaller picture : Identificatioo discs. 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OE THE WAR. 



281 




BULLETS USED AGAINST THE BRITISH TROOPS 
German dura-dum bullets of various patterns, used by the Germans In Cameroon. 



[" Times " Photograph. 



aaxioiis to avoid responsibility. Too late 
Downing Street awoke to the designs of Ger- 
many, and Consul Hewett was on his way 
from the Oil Rivers (the Niger Delta) to con- 
clude the overdue treaty with King Bell when 
Dr. Gustav Xachtigal, a famous explorer of 
Inner Africa whom Bismarck had turned into 
a diplomatic agent, put into the estuary on 
the gunboat Mo we, having ten days before 
induced the King of Togo to cede his coimtry 
to Germany. King Bell had waited long and 
in vain for his friends the English — whose 
tongue in the quaint pidgen dialect of the West 
Coast he spoke fluently — and he was per- 
suaded by Dr. Nachtigal to sign a treaty with 
him. When, five days later, Mr. Hewett 
arrived it was only to find that King Bell, 
having parted with Yaa birthright, could only 
lament that he had nothing left to give the 
Great White Queen but liis blessing. Bell and 
h'm neighbours soon found that in the Teuton 
they had a master not to their liking, and 
certain unplea-sant incidents induced the Ger- 
mans to s*;nd a squadron, under Rear-Admiral 
Knorr, to the Cameroon coast. It was on 
board the liismarck, h ves.sel of thiis squadron, 
that Admiral von Schoer, who conunandcd 
the German Fleet at the Battle of Horn Reef 
(.May 31, 1010), made his debut as a naval 
officer. 

Of the later liistory of Cameroon, save as it 
affected Franco-German relations, it is not 
rif.nfHHary to say mur;}i. For yf^ars it exhibited 
all the worst forms of Genriiui colonial rriethofls. 
In 1900, after some rather unsavoiiry scandals, 
the GovcTnor, Herr von Puttkamer, luwl 
to be recalled, his succesHor being the l)r. 
HfM'A who aft^jrwardfl, as governor of South - 



West Africa, was fated to surrender thai 
colony to General Botha. In consequence of 
the harsliness with which the Germans treated 
the Duala and other negro tribes of Southern 
Cameroon, those natives were never recon- 
ciled to German rule, and their very doubtful 
attitude towards the government before and 
after the declaration of war in 1914 was given 
by the German colonial officials as one reason 
why they abandoned the coast region so 
readily. In Northern Cameroon, where many 
of the inliabitants are Moslems and the Fula 
(a non-negro people) are the leading caste, the 
Germans adopted in part the wiser plan of 
ruling through the native chiefs, and they 
had rallied to their cause certain Fula sultans, 
to whom they had left a considerable measiu-e 
of autonomy. One of these sultans in the 
early days of the war took the field with a 
train of mounted warriors on the side of the 
Germans. 

Along the whole of its western frontier 
Cameroon was bordered by the Bjitish Pro- 
tectorate of Nigeria. This frontier remained 
constant, but on the east and south, where 
Cameroon bordered French Equatorial Africa,* 
there were important changes subsequent to 
the early agreements between Franco and 
G<!rmany niSfjecting the limits of their resjiect ivo 
powers of influence. Internal communica- 
fiouK in Central Africa being largely by river, 
(•mil State; endeavoured to seciuro navigable 
waterway for its possessions, and th(^ bcjun- 
darifis of Carnerf)ori were so fixed that the 
Genrians obtained in the north-fiast access to 
the Shari, the greatest feeder of Lake (-had, 



♦ Formerly officially, and still often popularly cuiicd 
Froncfi ConK'J- 



'*H'l 



THt: TlMl':s UliS'WltY Ul' THE WAli. 



uiid Ilk the duuth t^ast part ut tha I'ppfr Suii^u, 
a iiuvigabie tributary of the Congo. A iiuuli- 
ticatiun uf the froutim' was nuule in I'JOK im 
mutually hatisfa^-tory lines, Germany giving up 
part of the Shari rt^gion, and gaining a betti^r 
potjitiun in tlie Sanga dihtrict. 

Then followed the Agadir crisis, arining out 
ot the extension of Freiuh authority in 
Moroffo. Into that question it is not necessary 
to rnter here save as it affticteil W't^st Afrit-a. 
At first (Jennany demanded in return for her 
rtH-ognition of a French Prot»'<torate in Morocco 
the ct'Hsi(ju to her of the major part of French 
Equatorial Africa, including the whole of the 
seaboard. Her ambition was to extend Cerman 
territory from Cameroon jutoss the Congo 
basin to join up with Cemian Ea.st Afri<a, ;nid 
thus create a vast trans-continontal oiiqiiro 
stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian 
Ocean. France strenuously resisted those 
ilemands, but in the end, by the agreement of 
November, 1911, she sacrificed a con>siderablo 
part of her equatorial possessions. The eastern 
border of Cameroon was greatly enlarged. But 
this wa.s not all ; Germany also secured two 
tongues of land which gave her direct access 
to the Congo River and its great northern 
tributary, the Ubangi. One of these antennae 
was the valley of the Lower Sanga to its con- 
fluence with the Congo ; the other the valley 
of the Lobaye to its confluence with the Ubangi. 
As they touched the rivers these strips of 
territory were only a few miles wide, but they 



sulticed (Germany for the moment. Her fingers 
touched the covete«l land, and at a later period 
she intended to extend her grasp. For the 
French the sticrifice they had been callc<l 
u|)on to make was unpleasant. Tlu' (Jormaii 
antenna; cut the means of connuunic-at ion 
betwtfcn the various colonies included in Fren«:h 
Kcpiatorial .\frica save by river, and then* 
colony of Middle Congo was rechicod to a 
fragment. 

Anotluu- territoiial concession which the 

French felt obliged to make revealed clearly 

Germany's African ambitions. When the 

s<*ramble for Africa was in progress Spain had 

made good a claim to a s<piarish block of 

eo\mtry on tiio coast between French Congo 

and Cameroon. It was known variously as 

Spam'sh Guin«'a or (from its chief estuary) 

Muni. Up to 1911 Spanish Guinea was bounded 

east and south by French territory and only on 

the north by Cameroon, while Spain had given 

to France the right of pre-emption in case 

of the sale of her colony. But by the 1911 

agreement Spanish Guinea became an enclave 

of Cameroon, the German frontier being drawn 

20 miles south of its southern border. The 

Germans thus obtained the southern shore.'^ 

of the Mimi estuary and part of Mondah 

Bay, and their frontier was only a few miles 

north of Libreville, the chief seaport of French 

Equatorial Africa. In area alone the Germans 

by the 1911 agreement added 107,27(1 square 

miles to Cameroon, the only return — apart 




BRITISH OFFICERS TRAINING NATIVES. 



THE TIMES HISTORY oi' Till': WWII. 



•IS:i 



from Morocco — being tlic cfSfiion to Fr.mcc 
of 6,450 square miles in the Shari region, tlic 
German frontier there being drawn in to tlic 
Logone river as far as its confluence witli tlie 
Shari. 

If to France as a nation the sacrifices made 
in Equatorial Africa were painful, in spiti^ of 
the immense advantages involved in tlie 
settlement of the Morocco question, the 
Colonial Party, in particular, felt them to 
be grievous. Most of the ceded area had 
been discovered by de Brazza and his asso- 
ciates, and tliroiigh French capital and by 
French enterprise floiu-ishing stations and 
plantations had been established in it. The 
French of Equatorial Africa regarded New- 
Cameroon as, in the words of 'SI. ^lerlin, the 
Governor-General, " our Alsace-Lorraine." Thus 
when the war began their first object was to 
recover the ceded territory and so prompt and 
so successful were their measures that by 
August 7 the German posts at the Sanga-Congo 
confluence and on the Ubangi were in French 
|jos.se5sion. The war in Cameroon began 
with a French success, and on the Congo 
side that success was, at the outset, rapidly 
followed up. 

It was at thLs junctiure — on August 23 — that 
the German Government made a singular 
'lemarche. It was the day after the fight at Chra, 
in Togoland, and the eve of the destruction of 
the wireless telegraphy installation at Kamina. 
Germany saw herself being cut off from com- 
munication with her other African colonies, 
and knew already that the German navy could 
not afford them any protection. She bethought 
herself of a declaration of the Berlin Conference 
of 1SS4 H'} m favour of the neutrality of the 
convontional ba.sin of the Congo and invoked it 
to preserve, as far a.s possible, her pos.session.s 
in Equatorial Africa. By the Berlin Act tho 
banin of the Congo wa.s conventionally extended 
V) that it include*! not only the Belgian Congo, 
but about half of French Equatorial Africa, a 
tliird of Cameroon, all Gf^nuari VaihI Africa, 
all British Kast Africa, all Uganda, all Nyasa- 
larid, the northern part of Portuguevo 
WcHt Africa, (ind a small jmrt of Northern 
Khofle«ia. 

fn a note fuldre-t-wd by 1 1 err Zimmerman, 
rnrl«T-Secretary of Htale in the German Foreigu 
()iV\rj-, to Mr. Gerard, .Aiuerican Amba-Hsador 
Ht iVTiin, the aid of the United Stat«!H Govern- 
ment wa« a«ked to procure the neutralizatir>n 
of all thin regirni. In a subHequent coMiiiniiii 




OUTPOSTS. 
Men of the Nigerian Regiment in the trenches. 

cation, dated September 15, 1914, to Mr. 
Gerard, Herr Zimmerman stated that Germany's 
object in making the proposal was " to prevent 
an aggravation of the state of war which could 
serve no purpose, while prejudicial to the 
community of culture of the white race." 
This was so far from being the truth that the 
Germans hiid made elaborate preparations to 
attack French Equatorial Africa ; Berlin 
simply sought a, way of escape from a position 
which left it without means of succouring its 
colonies. The German proposals met with 
no encouragement at Washington, the State 
Department contenting itself with forwarding 
— without any observations — the German pro- 
posal to the Governnients concerned. And the 
Governtnents concerned refused to entertain 
Berlin's ovcM'tiu-es. 

G(!rinan diplomacy tried hard to prove that 
it was tho Allied Powers which " violated the 
neutrality " of tho Congo basin. As to that 
the text of tlio Berlin Act to which th(\v 
ap[)caled left the declaration of neutrality iii 
the Congo basin facultative, not obligatory, 
and the only State affected by tho Berlin Act 
whose African territory had been declared 
neutral wa.H Belgium. At its foundation the 
Congo Free State proclaimed its perpetual 
neutrality, and when that State became a 
Belgian colony the f)bligation of neutrality 




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THE TJMKS H J STORY OF THF. WAB. 



285 



was taken over. And Belgium had loyjilly 
endeavoured to preserve neutrality on the 
Congo, even after the violation by (Jermany of 
Belgium's own neutrality, accompanied by 
acts of such infamy that they could not have 
been exceeded in brutality by the cannibal 
tribes of the Congo. On August 7, 1914, M. 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who liad instructed the Governor-General of 
Belgian Congo to observe a strictly defensive 
attitude, addressed a note to the British and 
French Governments asking if it was their 
intention to proclaim the neutrality of their 
territories in the conventional basin of the 
Congo. On the 9th the Belgian ^Minister at 
Paris assvired ^I. Davignon that the French 
Government was " very disposed " to pro- 
claim neutrality. This attitude was soon 
modified in view of the hostilities actvially 
begiin in Central Africa, and on August 17 
Comtes de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in London, 
informed ^I. Davignon that neither Great 
Britain nor France could adopt his suggestion. 
The action of Germany both in the Congo 
and in East Africa had shown her true inten- 
tions. There was the fiu"ther difficulty that 
in West Africa large parts, both of Cameroon 
and of French Equatorial Africa, were outside 
the conventional basin of the Congo, which 
— had neutrality been proclaimed — would have 
left the German-s free to attack Nigeria and 
Gabun without serious risk of being themselves 
attacked in rear. It was not until a full week 
after the failure of the Belgian proposal that 
(iermany — in view of her unfavouraVjle situa- 
tion in Africa— made her own proposals for 
neutrality. Belgium, however, for some time, 
still ftTidfavf)ured to preserve the Belgian 
Congo neutral ; it was not until August 28, 
when the movements of (;lerman cohutms 
towards the Ubangi and the Middle Congo 
con«titiite<I a direct rnenacje to Belgian territory 
— which, mfjreover, had already been attacktid 
l»y GermanH in the Tanganyika region- — that 
the GovfTnor-Genf;ral ot the CJongo, M. Fufihs, 
y»nn given perrniHsion to help the Fren(;h in 
their campaign in Cami^roon. This help M. 
.Mfflin, tfie G^wemor-General of French Equa- 
torial Africa, anked for, find on SepU^rnber 150 
Melgian iorvAm w«t«! phwjed at his disposition. 
'V\ii: German allegation that the iJrlgians 
began hostilities by sei/.ing th*; post of Zinga 
on the Cbangi on August 7 was falsf; ; tfie fjrHt 
jut of war in f'elgiuri TJongo was <;fimrriit ted 
by the Grrrnans when tlieir Hfcfuner (led wig 



\()n Wissiniuwi,* on August 22, bombarded the 
Belgian port <jf Lukuga (Albertville) on Lake 
Tanganyika. 

The first efforts of the French, as of the 
British, were directed to purely local objectives ; 
with the forces immediately available each 
struck at the enemy w-here he found him. 
But when towards the end of September, 1914, 
an Anglo-French Expeditionary Force, under 
Gen. Dobell, secured Duala, it became possible 
to consider plans of cooperation. The 

strength of the enemy could only be esti- 
mated. According to official statistics the 
n:iilitary force in Cameroon consisted of some 
200 Germans and 2,000 natives, supplemented 
by an armed police force of 40 Germans and 
1,250 natives. In reality the native soldiers 
employed by the Germans were about 20,000, 
and fully .3,000 Germans were under arms. This 
number was reached by calling up all Germans 
of military age in the colony, including the 
crews of the merchantmen which, on the eve 
of war, sought refuge in the Cameroon estuary. 
Not all the Germans hastily enrolled at the 
last moment possessed military ardour, as was 
shown by 400 of them staying behind in Duala 
on its occvipation by the Anglo-French force. 
This apart, the enemy forces were well trained, 
well armed, and well led, and they were plenti- 
fully supplied with machine guns. The Police 
Force (Polizeitruppen) were armed with a 
carbine firing a soft-nosed bullet, but the 
ychutztruppen were armed with the regulation 
rifle. The defence had further the advantage 
of possessing nearly thirty fortified posts, all 
placed with a good eye to military recpiire- 
ments. Col. Zimmermann, the commander of 
the troops, proved an able and resolute soldier. 

When the Expeditionary Force landed at 
Duala, French coluums under Gqn. Aymerich 
were advancing, from the south-east and east, 
up the tongues of land which the Germans 
had acquired in 1911. On the Nigerian bonier 
the British columns which had invaded Came- 
roon had met with serious reverses, and all l)ut 
one were acting on the defensives. On tlie 
Ivake (JIumI sid(! G<!n. Largeau had (;a[)tur(!d 
KuHseri, and was preparing to .s(!nd a column 
sout h. Warships had made various dcwnonslra- 
tions, notably at Victoria, th(! j)ort at tlic foot 
of Mount (/umeroon fourid(-d hy ihc Uaptist 

• Thoro W(1H anothor («(<riii(iri iiriiKid HtctimiT, Mio 
(((^rrdiiiiii von WiHHiiiiiim, on Liiko NyiiHii. 'I'Iim IiimI 
hcofi civpturod hy tlio JlritiHh Oovoniinont BtoaimT 
(iworidoloti on AiikiihI, IH. 

99— .T 



>M 



THE TIMES mSTOny OF THE WAR. 



lubiiiioimrteti, uiul iiaiiiud t>y them in honour of 
Qiiutai V'ictoiiti Hhit Ehurniaier, the (Jovernor 
ot Cameroon, whoxe adminiHtrative centre was 
lUiea, a hill station beautifully Hituated on the 
Mouthtu-n hlopes of Mount Cameroon, had in- 
Mtructetl Col. Zinunermann to preparti (left'osive 
meaHun^s. The diary of Lieut. Nothna^al, who 
was stationed at Duala, afterwards fell into the 
possesHiiin of a liritish ollicer, and it gives a 
'^'raphic jiicture of life in that town in the two 
montlis precetling its capture by the Allies. 
Col. Zimmermann arrived at Duala on August 4, 
followed the next dtiy by the (Jovernor antl his 
.start. On August ti i)ro[)osals were made for 
laying mines in the estuary. A significant 
entry in the diary under date August 8 reads : 

In the afteniuua Kiidolph Bell [a, member of the royiil 
family of tliu Duala] and Ne^ro I)ia haii(;ed before the 
pi-i.suii for hij^h treason. (Jreat outery among the 
populace ail night. 'I'he DuuIh.s h-iuing the town in 
crowds. 

With this entry may be cou[)lcd uiu)tliir 

entry in the diary, under date September 8 : 

The British were led at Victoria by two Dimlii ruscals. 
A reward of 1,(10.1 marks has been put on eueh of thoir 
heads. All canoe trallic in the creeks is stopped. No 
le.ss than 48 Diiala.s have been captured by the patrols 
and brought up for jutlgment ; eight are to be hanged. 
No Duahi native may cross tlie roail after dark. 

By their wirele.ss conunimications the Ger- 
mans were kept cognisant of the movements 
of the enemy at sea, and on August 8 Lieut. 
Nothnagal notes " Two Knglish cruisers were 
yesterday at Tenerift'e." It was not till 



August 30 that danger came near. On that 
ila> a Itritisli cruiser w»is reported at Fernando 
I'o and the (Jerman boats at Duala were 
anchored further up stream. The estuary ha<l 
by this time be«»n mined about 12 miles below 
Duala and sincral small steamers hiul been 
siuik in the fairway. The IJritish shii)s which 
now appeared oil the coast were the Cumber- 
land, ('apt. Cyril Fuller, ll.N., a cruiser of 9,800 
tons, mounting 14 6-in. guns, tlu* branch boats 
Walrus and N'ampire, the gimboat Dwarf, the 
Nigerian (jovermnent's armed yacht Ivy, and 
other craft from the Nigeria Marine — craft 
suited for work in the creeks. On September 3 
a liritish detachment was lantled at Victoria 
without opposition, but the next day " Capt. 
(jiaisser ordered theni to leave the [)lace at once 
or he would throw them out." Thoy did leave, 
but as soon as they got aboard ship Victoria 
wjus l)oml)arded, and all food stores were de- 
stroyed by gunfire. ]3y September 9 the 
British ships were ancltored off the mouth of 
the estuary. That Lieut. Nothnagal had a 
true appreciation of the situation is shown by 
his entry on Sej)teml)er 10 : 

At the barrier the gunboat Dwarf is anchored and 
weeins to be working at its removal. V\'o may be sure 
the enemy means business. If he is sharp it won't go 
well with >is. The Dwarf has been this side of the 
barrier already. A light jjinnace ha.s been sighted at 
Malimba ; it almost looks as if they wished to cut off 
our retreat. In the evening wo pack up everything at 
the Prst Office and load it into the train, which is ready 
standing waiting. To-morrow we expect an attack. 




GERMAN MISSIONARIES IN CAMEROON, 
On their way to Nigeria. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 




BRITISH 12-POUNDER IN ACTION NEAR YAUNDE. 



The attack did not come the next day, but 
the Dwarf continued her activities at the 
barrier, and on September 1 1 came under fire 
from the shore battery. The Germans now 
fitted out small petrol-driven launches with 
infernal machinefi — home-made torpedoes — and 
sent them under cover of darkness to the 
barrier in efforts to blow up the Dwarf (Com- 
mander Fredk. Strong, R.X.), a 701-ton vessel 
armed with 2 4-in. and 4 ;j-in. (12 poimders) 
{runs. One of these attempts nearly succeeded. 
On September 14 a boat carrying a " torpedo " 
was towed by a man in a rowing boat close to 
the Dwarf, the infernal machine just missing 
the gunboat. The man in the row-boat 
sprang overboard, but was captured among the 
shipping the next day.* 

On the arrival of the transports with the 
Expeditionary Force a passage tlirough the 
obstructions in the estuary was forced by the 
light cruiser ChalU-nger (/j.SSO tons), which 
mounted 1 1 fi-in. guns. She was accompanied 
by the plucky little Dwarf, which had met with 
many fuJventures and misadventures, and under 
hot fire found and destroyed over 'JO mines. 
On Sept^-mber 2.~> the Challenger took up a posi- 
tion 7,000 yards from I^uala, and General Dobell 



♦This indivirlual provofl to be a miHwonary, and whrin 
int«>rro(5affi'l (\i-i-]ar<;tl, " I firn a Hol'licr firif, (irid a rniH- 
nionary Mjcori'l." 'I'ho Oonnuri Coloriiul OfTice, pained 
by certain comment* ma^le on thin incident in P'liKl'i'id, 
explairicl, with a wfiilth of cirrohorativf) detail, tliat 
Jhfj n)an warn only a lay l/rothor. whs of inililary iii(i; and 
h«/l tx!«!n failed to ttie colourc. 



sent an officer in a launch to sumiron the 
Commandant to surrender the whole colony. 
This being refused, Duala was bombarded 
early on Septen ber 26, a land demonstration 
being made by way of a neighbouring creek. 

As soon as the bombardment began Col. 
Zimmermann left Duala by train ; the Governor 
had already gone, and Lieut. Nothnagal 
became commandant. His diary for that day 
reads : 

26.9 — At six o'clock tlic first shot. The Comrniindnnt 
goes to Kdea, Slow boinbardinont, various buildings 
destroyed, but no loss of life. At noon news that large 
bodies of troops are landing. One thousand men 
aflvanoing from Gori. I'itti, and Japoina. I am now 
Commandant of Diiaia. 

Out at five a.m. under f\ill protection as the bombard- 
ment may be expected at once. At 7.30 instructions 
from Ca[>tain Haedicko that the companies are to retire. 
I am still keeping up telephonic communications with 
the commander, and receive the definite o'rder to give 
up the useless opposition, march off the coloured troojjs 
with arms, make all war material useless, and hoist the 
wliitc flag. 

Acting on his instructions, Lieut. Nothnagal 
surn-ndered Duala tho next morning and with 
it all the shipping in the estuary. Nine liners — 
eight belonging to the Hamburg house of 
VVoermann — witli a total tonnage of 30,!) I.') wero 
the chief jjrizes. They included sonu! of the 
newest and best boats (ingaged in the West 
African trade. Many othc^r boats wore (lap- 
tured as well as the Governor's yacht. 

Major-Gen. Sir Charlos M. Dobell, K.C.H., 
tho ofTlf^or chosen to com'tiau'l I he I'lxiicijl- 
lionary Force, wiis, wh(!n th(! war began, Iiispec- 



2WS 



nil': TIMKS HlSTOliY OF 'Hit: WAR. 



tiii-(4eiu<riit ut thti VV'n«t At'rk-aii Frontier Force 
—a forfw foiupo8tiil entirely of nutiveei of the 
NVetit C'oHrtt, miller tttticerB weeomletl from tlieir 
ISritirth n-^iiuentti. It now fiirniished the 
Hritiiih contingent wtiich Hervetl mider Clen. 
Diihfll. 'I'he French on their purt hImo jaiule 
iijj tlieir exjietlitiontiry force of West Africanri 
- the funiouM SeitegalttHe Tiriiilleiiris. ConipoKcd 
of Hii ii|iicil imiulier of French and liritinh 
troojiH, the total force placed at the diispo.sal of 
(Jen. Dohell at the begirininf^ of the canipaij^n 
\\ as 4,3UU. Thia was not nearly strong enough, 
nor was it adecjuateiy supplied with heavy 
artillery. The power and resistance of the 
enemy had been under-estirnat«'d. 

(Jen. Dobell \\»is in London in August, 
1914, and having completed his plans ho sailed 
for Dakar, where the French contingent under 
Col. Mayer, of the French Colonial Infantry, 
embarktMl. Here the liruix, the principal 
French unit in the convoying squadron, joined 
the Cumberland, which had gone to Las 
I'almas to meet (Jen. Dobell, who, it is inte- 
resting to note, was travelling in the Appjim, 
which later on was captured by a disguised 
(Jerman auxiliary cruiser anrl taken to an 
An\erican |)ort as a prize. The Britisli troops 
were embarked at Sierra Leone and other 
ports on the West Coast, although owing to 
the reverses su.stained in their frontier con- 
flicts, tlie Xigeriaii authorities were not able 
to send Gen. Dohell all the men they had 



•Jriginaliy prt)mi.->ed. The expedition reached 
Duala without incident, 'i'ho surrender of 
Diialu was ai^compunied by the surrender also 
of the town of Honaberi, on the opposite* side of 
the Cameroon estuary. JJonaberi's importance 
lies chiefly in the fact that it is the sea terminus 
of a railway running north in the direction of 
Nigeria and that it gives access to (he culti- 
vated regions on the eastern slopes of Mount 
Cameroon. Duala, besides being the chief port 
of tlu! colony, is the starting-point of another 
railway, a line running eastward in the direction 
of the Congo. Duala and Jionaberi afforde<l 
(Jen. Dobell safe and convenient bas(!K for further 
ojx rations. 

The loss of Duala had gravely compromised 
the prestige of the (Jermans among the natives 
of the coast region, and Herr Kbermaier felt it 
necessary to make some counter-stroke. \u a 
circular letter to th(^ ofTicials concerned the 
(;o\'ern()r wrote that, as the loss of Duala <!ould 
not be conciudt d ami as " damaging perversions 
and exaggerations " would be the result if the 
circulation of tlic news was left to native 
gos.sip, he authorized the district authorities 
to announce the fact in a form "suited to 
the circumstances of each district." Lest 
they should bo in doubt as to the suitable 
form Herr Ebermaier added that the pub- 
lication was to be made on " the following 
lines " : — 

.A.t home the Kaiser has first taken the country wliioh 




IN THE CAMEROON ESTUARY. 
The plant on the Wuri River. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



289 




CAPTAIN FULLER. 
Of H.M.S. " Cumberland." 

inflicted horrors on tlie natives— namely Belgium, to 
which the Congo belongs. . . . The Kaiser has captured 
General Kitschener, whom the English regarded as their 
be«t commander, together with 10,000 soldiers. . . . 
As our enemies at home cannot do anything to us they 
are now trying to rob us and our natives in Africa. 
Africa is further from Germany than from France and 
^>ngland so that their ships can be here sooner than we 
can. The English were not strong enough to take 
Duala, but had to call in the help of the French. We 
have, moreover, only surrendered Duala because there 
were so many white women and children there to whom, 
according to the law of the whites, nothing can happen 
if no figJiting takes place in a town. 

Till now things have gone as follows in Cameroon : — 
We have allowed the Engli.sh and French a short dis- 
tance into the country. As soon as they were within 
it we, with our brave black soldiers and witli tYu: help 
of our natives, drove them out and killed many wliites 
among the enemy. ... At Duala the same will occur. 

Herr Eberrnaifr endod hi.s instructions to 
hi.s subordinates in the art of lying by an 
injunction which revealed a condition of 
afTairs which seernf;*! strange to many of the 
' I'ritish officers making their first acquaintance 
with Wf«t Africa. TJi'' natives f>f J)uala and 
the whole coast region of Cameroon speak 
pidg<m English —thirty years of resolute rule 
hJuJ not taught, them to appreciate the beauties 
of tfie Germ>Mi tongue-, and the lin'jwi franca 
of the W<!ft Coast is English. Jliit on this 
fKxiasion H<rr Kb'Tmaier forbade its uae. " In 
announc'nnents the Enghsh language (he wTot<') 
is, und<T all circurriHtHnces, to be avoided " ; 
and lie added the difTieult injiirietion, " fyOftil 



language to be used as far as possible " — and 
flie number of distinct languages spoken by 
Cameroon negroes is perplexingly large. 

While on the one liand the Germans 
endeavoured to deceive the coast nativcjs 
in the way described, in Northern Cameroon, 
where a large number of tlie inhabitants 
are Moslems, they endeavoured to stir u|) 
a jihad, and backed thes^ endeavours l)y 
propaganda among the Moslems of Nigeria, 
a propaganda which did not meet with success. 
A proclamation in Arabic addressed to tlie 
Chief of Marua stated tliat the great Caliph, 
the Sultan of Turkey, was the friend of the 
Cermans, and that wai- had come because 
the British wished to take Constantinople 
and give it to the Pagans. ^Vhen they found 
that these appeals were useless the Germans 
adopted a policy of persecution, and on the 
pretext that they were disloyal several chiefs 
and Moslem religious leaders were killed. 
Wherever they had the power, and felt the 
least suspicion of any lack of devotion on 
the part of the natives to their cause, the 
Germans treated them with characteristic 
brutality. In the north the Havisa settlers 
from Nigeria — generally the chief traders and 
business men — were the especial object ot 
persecution. The result was that the natives 
retaliated whenever they had the chaiice ; 
some Germans were killed and much German 
property looted. 




CAPTAIN BUTLKK, V.C. 



U'x) 



THE TIMES HlSTOnV OF THE WAU. 




THE " DWARF.' 



While (ion. Dobell liad not to fear tlie 
hostility ul the natives, he had to overcome 
not only the Germans but manifold natural 
obstacles to easy campaigning. Writing of 
the region in which most of his operations were 
carried out, he said : " All the coast line, and 
for some 150 miles inland, one meets the same 
monotonous, impenetrable African forest, 
fringed on the coast by an area of mangrove 
swamp in varying depth." To those who 
know the West Coast thi.s brief sentence is 
pregnant with meaning. Nothing at once 
more witching or more forbidding can be 
imagined than a mangrove swamp in AWst 
Africa, where in some places for fifty miles 
from the coast tliere is not a foot of solid 
land. A phrase or two from letters written 
by officers may help to convey an idea of 
what campaigning in these swamps was like. 
" The mangrove swamps are awful," wrote 
one young officer, adding thoughtfully. " the 
crocodiles don't look invitmg." " We made a 
reconnaissance up to our knees in mud," said 
another ; and a third, " Nearly every night 
there is a tornado, and the rain comes down 
in buckets." "Always wet and hot: tem- 
perature 104° F." ■■ Hundreds and hundreds 
of creeks, 200 to 300 yards wide ; all the 
islands soft mud in which alligators wallow " 

As to the forest its solituds and gloom and 



aj)parently limitless extent are its most oppres- 
sive features. Native clearings with cultivated 
patches of ground are very few and the forest 
yields no food supplies save a little game. 
Moreover the Cameroon forest is gorilla and 
elephant country ; herds of elephants more 
than once routed the troops.* 

This everlasting forest (wrote one officer). You go 
mareliing along in single file, never knowing when you 
are going to be shot at. The enemy may be only a few 
yards away, but you cannot see them. It is a bit nerve- 
raoking when suddenly a shot riiips out in the wonderful 
stillness — very often a signal for all your carriers (oOO 
or more) to stampede with their loads. There is an 
eternal twiliglit in these forests, the trees meeting 
overhead and interlaced by creepers. It is a fine sight 
to see the column on the marcn ; it covers two to tliree 
miles of road, taking nearlv an I'our to ))ass a given spot, 
and it IS a senous matter to aefend tliis long line. And 
the heat ! 

After having occupied the country in the 
neighbourhood of Duala, General Dobell orga- 
nized colurrms to follow up the enemy eastward 
to Edea. In their retreat the enemy had 
WTecked the railway, breaking in t\\o places 
the bridge, 900 yards long, by which the 
Dibamba creek is spanned at J.ipoma. The 
enemy held the farther side of the creek, the 

* One officer wrote home, " We were having a hot 
scrap with the Germans when sudilenly an angry elephant 
appeared between tif, and darted first one way and then 
the other. Before you coidd cou^h both siiles liad done 
a bunk." Other small parties had similar experiences, 
and one large camp was completely overrun by a l;erd 
of elepliants. Insect poeits were an equal terror. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



291 



passage of which was forc-cd by the French 
tirailleurs under a galJing rifle and niachine- 
giui fire. In this operation the Navy and 
Royal Marine L.I. gave material aid. 

General Dobell sent tliree columns to Edea, two 
going by land on a line north of the railway, 
the third ascending the Sanaga River, on which 
Edea is situated. The Sanaga (which must not 
be confounded with the Sanga in the extreme 
south-east of Cameroon) is the largest of the 
rivers which rise in the central highlands of 
Cameroon and flow direct to the Atlantic* 
It enters the ocean just south of the Cameroon 
estuarj-. The Sanaga has a bar at its mouth 
and sandbanks obstruct its passage all the 
way to Edea. Nevertheless, Commander L. \V. 
Braithwaite, R.N., brought an armed flotilla 
up to Edea, which was occupied on October 26. 
The column advancing on a line parallel to the 
railway had met with strong opposition, but 
Col. Zimmermann retired before the converging 
movement, and the Allies were not strong 
enough to pursue him. The force stationed at 
Edea consisted of French troops, vinder Col. 
Mayer. They looked eastward, in the direc- 

* Next in importance of the rivers running direct to 
the Atlantic is the Xjong, which has a course .south of 
and roughly parallel to that of the Sanaga. 



tion where were the colunans under Cf>ri. 
Aymerich ; but .something like 400 miles 
separated them from their comrades. And 
between them was Col. Zimmermann, with the 
largest section of the Gorman forces. Col. 
ZimmeiTuann had taken up his headquarters at 
Yaunde, 100 miles east of Edea. Thither also 
had gone Herr Ebermaier, and at Yaunde the 
seat of the German administiation remained 
until the end of the campaign. It was a place 
well chosen. It was on the tableland, beyond 
the edge of the primeval forest, between the 
Sanaga and the Njong, and in a position where 
communication could be maintained with the 
Gei-man forces in the north and in the east. 
The enemy garrisons left in the region of 
Mt. Cameroon were, howev^er. cut off from 
help, though they were able, if they chose, to 
retire northward. They did well in thair first 
engagement. General Dobell sent troops up to 
attack Jabassi, a place on the Wuri, a river 
entering the Cameroon estuary from the 
north. This was an amphibiovis fight in which 
armed river craft co-operated. The attack, 
delivered on October 8, was a failure, partly 
because the native troops, for the first time, 
came luider machine -giui fire. The force was 




A 12-l'(JUNlJhk ON IIOAKD A UKIIISII MOA 1. 



292 



Till': TIMES lUSTDllY OF THE WAR, 



LOHOJA 



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o 



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a '^^^^ ft/ 



Zarii 



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uchi > 



^ 




ZUN( 



^^ Buke 



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ukeru '' A 



MaiduaaHM^u 5 sen 



f*\.,.. ^ora 
f Afarua 



°Birke 



Massenya 






[flaro 



C^.^^ 



.V 



,v^ 



Yola^ 



j8^T Adumre 



V 



^ 



/^ '^•^^Gaafiaka'- oNgaunden 

,^ oBamenda o M'Karet 



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Kataena 





Gore 



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^ Cur 30 



Calabar 



*^:S. 



U'o/'^ / 



V/ctOno 



Ba.;,r CAMER O ON V 



nabcn 



yjory: 



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s 

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BIGJIT VGhBatgnqd e^be/owa -^~~^,^ \ W l O fV 



Lib?.nge 



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KiRocti. 



CoriscoU,hj 



„6ata \-B,ta^ Mat, Molundi]^' "-.P^""'' I J ^ Cj 

'BIO MUNI J oOy^l, ^ ^ •— ^ - '" " 

(Spanizh) | ^ _.-^»'*^* -^WCSSOr/fr/^ 



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GAB UN ^C 



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Scale oF Miles. 



50 100 



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Bolobo 



953 



MAP OF CAMEROON. 



reorganized, renewed its attack on October 14, 
and this time captured Jabassi. Lieut. -Col. 
A. H. Hajrw-ood, E-.A., an officer known to 
travellers as the only Englishman who, in recent 
years, had crossed the Sahara, took charge at 
the beginning of October of a coUmm which 
started to advance up the northern railway. 
The enemy, who had the use of an armoured 
train, was vigorously pursued. Gen. Dobell 
also sent a naval force to make a demonstratioii 
at Victoria, while two colunins, one under 
Col. E. H. Gorges, D.S.O., who had had con- 
siderable experience of warfare in East Africa, 



and the other, under Lieut. -Col. Rose (Gold 
Coast Regiment), advanced overland and 
occupied Buea on November 15. In it were 
60 white men with 20 white women and 
children. It was for gallant conduct diu-ing 
Lieut. -Col. Rose's later operations that Capt. 
J. F. Butler, K.R.R., won the Victoria Cross. 
General Dobell now decided to clear tlio 
w holr line of the northern railway of tho 
enemy, and Lieut. -Col. Haywood w»is rein- 
forced by a strong colunui under Col. Gorges. 
This cohunn grj^dually i)ushed iVs way north- 
ward, and captured railhead, Nkongsamba, 



THE TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



298 



on December 10. Among the spoils were 
two " steamers for sky," as the natives called 
tlie aeroplanes. These machines were the 
first that had ever arrived in West Africa, 
and the Germans had not even unpacked 
them. Col. Gorges pushed north to Dchang, 
55 miles beyond railhead, and destroyed the 
fort there (January 3, 1915), retiring to Nkong- 
samba and its outpost Bare. This withdrawal 
was unfortunate, for Dchang lay near the 
region where the Cross River column sent from 
Nigeria in August had been practically anni- 
hilated. 

The net result of three months' operations 
was that Gen. Dobell held the country for 50 
miles east and 70 miles north of Duala, a 
mere fragment of Cameroon. In addition the 
whole coast line as far as the guns of the ships 
could carry had been evacuated by the enemy, 
and small forces were stationed at the three 
ports south of the Cameroon estuary — I^ibi, 
Campo and Coco Beach. Gen. Dobell realized 
that his original force w^as too weak for the task 
assigned it, and he asked for reinforcements. 
Col. Zimmermann had shown that he had good 
reason for not surrendering Cameroon without a 
struggle ; indeed, at tliis juncture — January, 
191.5 — he took the offensive. 

Col. Zimmermann had been preparing a blow 
at the French column under Col. Mayer at Edea 
for some time, but had not been able to keep his 
intentions secret. Consequently Col. Mayer's 
outpost at Kopongo, a few miles east of Edea, 
ha^i been strengthened on January 4 by 90 men 
.sent from Edea, and when on January 5 it was 
assailed by 150 Germans the attack was easily 
Ijeaten off. Almost at the same time a German 
<^-olumn 800 strong and with several machine 
guns attacked Col. Mayer's main force at Edea. 
The buildings at Edea are scattered, they lie 
/•losfj to dense forest, and the ground Ls much 
broken iij). Tlicse factors favoured the attack, 
but Col. Mayer had vfsry skilfully constructed 
his defenceM and the marksmanship of thf; 
tirailleurs was so ar-curato that after sustaining 
H<^v(;rc lostwiH the enemy retired — and never again 
atiemfjt*;d an offensive movement on a con- 
(HJdfrrable w;ale. The G«'rnians left au tim 
ground 2'-'> df^ad EurofjeanH, of wlifiui six were 
officers, SS native soldiers kilUid and 102 
woiindfd ; their canualties were thus 25 p<!r 
o-nt. of the force engagfrfl. They also Itrfl 
behind a nuu-hine gun, a quantity of ammuni- 
tion and ifiany rifles, 'i'ho French losses wtiro 
*>\\f Kurojx-ari N.f'.O. Hfid three finiilleurs 



killed and 11 tirailleurs woundi^d. Notwith- 
standing this success Col. Mayer was unable to 
take the offensive. From various causes, 
chiefly lack of men and heavy guns, the opera- 
tions were at a standstill. This was the case 
also with the British and French forces in the 
north and General Aymerich's columns in the 
south-east. 

It was essential to strengthen, reorganize and 
co-o dinate the efforts of the forces at the 
disposal of the Allies. The French and British 
West African colonies were appealed to for 
additional men and the reinforcements asked 
for arrived at Duala in February. Meantime 
Brigadier-Gen. Cunliffe had been selected to 
take over the command of the French and 
British troops in Northern Cameroon, and in 
January he went to Duala to consult with Gen. 
Dobell, the result being a decision to prosecute 
the northern campaign with more vigour. The 
enemy forces were showing considerable bold- 
ness at this time in the direction of the northern 
railhead, and in two engagements in February 
the British had 120 casualties among the native 
soldiers, chiefly among the Sierra Leone Batta- 
lion of the W.A.F.F.'s. An attack made by the 





MF^N OF THH WKST AFRICAN 



•2'Jl 



77//-; 77.\y/;.s uisTunv of tuf. wah. 



tirituih (March 4) iit this rti^ion <>it the points 
kiiovvii Its Htuebui'D Hiul Htiniiunn'ri Ftirius 
ftiilttd, mauiig tht! killml beiu^ twu white otticers 
(Lt.-C't>l. CJ. \*. NeWBttniil, CDiuiu iiuliu)^ the 
Sierra Lhouh Htittahun ; hikI Captain C. 11. 
l>iiui»a, Start' Captain). The enemy luul, how- 
ever, aiiffereil severely, and he evacuated the 
posit iuiLs, retiring north. 

M. Foiirneau, Lieut. -Governor of Middle 
Congo, arrived at Duala in \hir( li and a8ked 
(Jen. Dobell to co-operate witli <ien. Aynierich 
in an imnieiliate ti(lvtince on \'a(inde. C^en. 
Dobeii was very doubtful as to the wisdom of 
sucli a move, as is obvious from his statenn^nt 
in his despatch concerning tlie operations. He 
vvrote : — 

I fully realiztxl the politioui and strategic importance 
of Yauiule. but deniurrcil t-inlitirkiiig on such uu opera- 
tion at that moment. It was late in the sea^ion and the 
rainii were already he^innin^, liesides which the troops 
I was ahle to employ were insutlicient to ensure .success 
in the absence of eti'ective co-operation, in the immediate 
vicinity of Yaunde, by the troops under (Jenoral 
Aymerich. Owing to the diUiculty of communication 
it y/AS quite unsafe to count on this. 

However, in view of the great advantage 
which would follow an early occupation of 
Yaunde, (Jeneral Dobell consented to co-ofjcrate 
with all his avaihiblo strength. The result 
was not favourable. Colonel Haywood, wlio 
was sent east to make a methodical advance in 
co-operation with Colonel Mayer's force at 
Edea, met with strong opposition. Colonel 
Zimmermann withdrawing troops from dis- 
tant posts to hel[) ill stemming the advance 



1)11 ^'ilunde. J{y May 1, however, ('(ilonel 
Haywood had leaciied u point \\hi<-li enabled 
Colonel Mayer to advance, 'i'hti Hiitish and 
French columns mo\ t*d foruard on parallel 
linos. The Fnuich column follow ed tlie linti 
of the railway east — the line itself hiul been 
torn up l»y tin- enemy — and Commandant 
Mechet, who conducted the advance, occupied 
Kseka, Colonel Mayer's immediate objective, 
and the terminus of the railway, on May II. 
The British column followed a route north of 
the railway, and on May 3 canm up to a for- 
midable entrenched position which the enemy 
occui)ied on I lie left (farther) bank of t he 
Mbila river — a tiibiitury of the Sanaga, at 
W'um liiagas. The enemy's position extended 
over a front of some three miles, and hundreds 
of natives had been employed for many months 
in digging the trenches. After an action 
lasting 18 hours Col. Haywood stormed this 
position on IVlay 4, but not without serious loss 
both in Europeans and native ranks. After 
the capture of W'um Hiagas Commandant 
Mechet moved from K.seka to that place, and 
Col. Mayer came from Edea to take pt^rsonal 
command of the comVjined foroe in its furtlier 
advance on Yaunde. Su[)plies and stores were 
hurried forward, also a naval 12-pounder gun 
to reinforce the lighter pieces. 

It was at this point — ^lay 1 1 — that General 
Dobell learned from M. Merlin, the Governor- 
General of French Equatorial Africa, tliat 
a? Dume and Lomie, re.spectively 140 miles 



«4vL« 




DIFFICULT FIGHTING GROUND IN CAMEROON. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



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THE GERMAN BLOCKHOUSE AT YOKO. 
Captured by the French under Colonel lirisset (x), December 1, 1915. 



N.N.E. and 150 inilea S.S.E. of Yaunde, the 
iiriirifdiatf; objectives of General Aymerich's 
coliirrinH, had not been capturf;d, no definite 
date could be given for the advance of the 
French from thoHc places on Y^'aunde. Never- 
thelcHS General DobeU decided nf)t to abandon 
his opf,TationH, and in accordance with his 
instructions Colonel Mayer left W'uin IJiayas on 
May 2'>. His total force numbered aljout 
2,0")0 men, of whom :U)0 hml been Virou^ht 
from Ed<-a and )i>id not takrm part in l\n- 
fati((ues of the first 7»art of flir; advance. He 
bad mfwihine (^uris, and besidf; the ii(i,\)i! 
12-[»ounfler a number of SO mm. guns. Tin- 
deriisifjn to nend tlie erjliimn forwar*!, a^ wits 
quiekiy apparent, waw founded on an insulliciont 



estimate of the obstacles to be overcome. 

General DoVjcH himself sot out those obstacles 

with commendable frankness : 

I regret (he wrote) that supply (lifliciiltics soon iiiiido 
1 lii-ins<-lves evident, tJio country was barriin, nnd witli 
all available carriers and the few motor vcliiclo.s at my 
di.spoHal, at that time only three, I was luuililo to trans- 
jiort food for Kiirofxrans mid natives with sutricienl 
rapidity. Ifandiiappod liy the nhnost inipenetrnhlc 
liiish and a terrain wliieh afforded many defensive 
jiositionH, the advance beciime exceedingly slow. At 
every turn of the road the advance was mot by machiiie- 
KHfi fire, HO t)iat during the 25th and 2(!lh May oidy 
five miles was made ^(jod. 'J'lie enemy evidently had 
rer'cived rr-inforeementH and eommeneed to iid,erl'ero 
wilfi our line of communication, which was peculiarly 
HiiHC(?ptib!e to attack, while the lon^ convoys of carriers 
were hiiiKularly j)rone to panic* 1 received an appeid 
fpDm (iilonel Mayer for reinfcjrcomentH. as, in ailditiim 
to oth(;r disaljilitioH, dysentery liad broken out in his 
force. 1 Bont forward such troops as were available anil 



'296 



THt: TiMi':s uisrony of the ]VAit. 



iiiuk iiiL-tiouiuB lu ubtttiii mure earriurtf fruiii llio U'u.it 
African Culuiiitui. 

My " tlcMiwt' biwh " tho n-uili-r rtliuulil uii»lti 

attillll U iort-.sl 8<J eloilStt tlltit otttUl till lulvUlKf 

cuulil unly be nuiil« by lelliii^ tho trees - 
Culuiiel Muyer iuul in grim fact tu iuK-k bis 
way tbroii^li the l't>ivHt. To utld to tin- 
hoiTorrt ol the sitUHtion t Ik- ^^rmiiul wum u iiiuru.ss, 
tiiul tit tiliiumt every Htep the riuk wti.s run <>t' 
.siiikitin in the H\vtitii|). Oii June 5 Colunt I 
Miiytr held euvereil only twelve miles from 
\\ um Hiatus ; the nite of |)rogres.s wtvs extictly 
II mile ti tliiy. \ iiimde was .-it ill 40 miit-s 
ili.sttmt ; siiikness vmis rife, tlie enemy wtis 
.stubborn, tind the situation such that Col. 
.Mayer informeil CJen. Dobell thtit in his opinion 
any fiirtlier lulvance on Yaunde wtis impriu- 
ticabh'. M. .Merlin having telegraphed (May 7) 
thtit there wtis no fm-ther news from (Jen. 
Aymerieh, Col. ^hlyer'8 coliunn was ordered to 
vvithdrtiw. Col. Mayer htvving lost part of his 
food supplies through a rtiid by the enemy 
on ti convoy of 500 ctirriers, began his retreat 



at unue. his rearguards being constantly 
liartiHsed, but never broken. Ch-n. l)ol)ell 
hurried foruiird the Itist avivilable men to 
the succoiu" of Col. Mtiyer. 'J'hcst) troop.-, 
ntade a wondtM'ful march in tropictil rain 
ami reailii-d Cul. Mayer at an oj)portune 
moment, for his rt-arguard \\as biung hi'tivily 
attticked. Jiy June 28 Col. Abiyer iwid taken 
u|) new strong positions, and tlie j)ursuit 
by the enemy ceased. In this ill fated tidvanee 
the (rasualties reached 25 jjer cent, of the 
force engaged. Yet neither tho Sonogalest) 
nor the W.A.F.F.'s lost their discipline, 
coiu'age, and inextinguisluiblo gaiety. Tlio 
failure of the ad\'tince was in no rcfspect due to 
(Colonel .Mayer. "I fully recognize," wrote 
(Jeneral Dobell, "that Colonel .Mayer was not 
in ti position to undertake, single handed, an 
advance on Yaimde, but I had hoped that the 
I)r(!.ssixre which was being brought on the 
liostilo forces in the Southern Cameroons 
would ha\e had the effect of preventing a 
concentration against lis." 




A GERMAN BLOCK-HOUSE AT GARUA. 

Destroyed by the Allied Artillery. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 



•297 




After this episode there was a prolonged 
pause in Gen. Dobell's operations. In the 
area in which his forces were engaged the 
heavy rains rendered the renewal of active 
campaigning impossible until September or 
October. 

The unsuccessful advance on Yaunde coin- 
cided with brilliant successes achieved by the 
Anglo-French forces in Xorthem Cameroon, 
though the scene of operations there was too 
distant to affect Col. Mayer's fortunes. The 
campaign in the north began with Gen. Lar- 
geau's atta^ik on Kusseri. Gen. Largeau was 
one of the most distinguished of that brilliant 
band of French officers who made their fame in 
Africa. He had been one of Marchand's com- 
rades at Fashoda, had played a major part in 
bringing the central Sudan under French 
rule, and in 1913 he had crowned his efforts by 
the defeat of the S^^nussi. He now organized 
the French forces which invafled Cameroon 
from the north-east jukI remained in com- 
mand until October, 191"), when the end of the 
cam|>aign being near, he returned to France, 
(iiven n brit/fwle of infantry at Verdun in 
February, MtHi. he was killed there on Marcli 26, 
aged 47. 

(ifin. r^argeaii l<d in pr-rson the battalion 
which in the firMt wf^;k of the war endeavoiin <l 
to carry KiwHori by aHHaiilt, Situated just 
above the junction of the I^fjgone with the 
river Hhari, with a waf*T frf»nt, Hfrongly fort I 



field and strongly garnsoneu, Kusseri proved 
too strong for the force brought against it, and 
Gen. Largeau was obliged to retire. The 
Germans on their side took the offensive, cap- 
tured a small French post and induced Karnak, 
Sultan of Logone, to raise his levies against 
the French. On Augu.st 28 the Frencli met 
and defeated these levies, Sultan Karnak 
being killed. This was the only instance in 
Cameroon of a native chieftain allying liims(>lf 
\sitli the (Jermans ; and the fate of Karnak may 
have served as a warning to others. On 
September 21 (Jen. Largeau again attacked 
Ku.S8cri ; this time; with success. After a 
stf)ut resistance the German troops gave way 
before a })ayonet charge of the Senegalese. In 
a f)anic flight (hey abandoned everything 
giuiH, amiriunition, horses and baggage?. VVitli 
KiiHH«Ti in liis jjossession (Jen. Tjargeaii organized 
II roliiriin to go Houtli niid join witli the British 
forces from Nigeria. 

(Jol. Urisset, to whom the command of tliis 
colurfin wa-! gi\cii. left Kiissfri on October 4, 



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THE TIMES HISTOin' OF THE WAE. 



299 



taking a south-west route towards the Maii- 
dara mountains. His force was largely com- 
posed of yoiuig recruits from Mossi, the coimtry 
north of Ashanti which had raised a levy to 
lielp in the conquest of Togoland. Capturing 
three or foiu* small German posts en route, 
Col. Brisset on October 14 joined a British 
column camped south of Mora, a fortified post 
on a cormnanding eminence in a very rvigged 
and diflficult coiuitry, in parts inaccessible. 
Mora was abundantly provisioned and almost 
impregnable. Its commandant was Haupt- 
mann von Raben. 

On the instructions of Sir Fredk. Lugard, 
Governor-General of Nigeria, three columns 
dra\^n from the Nigerian Regiment of the 
West African Frontier Force were, as soon as 
the war began, concentrated at points close 
to the Cameroon frontier. A larger move- 
ment was designed, but the demands on the 
military strength of the protectorate by Sir 
Charles Dobell reduced the role of the frontier 
columns, for the time being, to that of " loca' 
activity." All the columns crossed the German 
frontier on the same day — August 2.5. For 
forces destined simply for " local activity," 
they acted ambitiously. The most northerly 
column, starting from Maidugari under Capt. 
R. W. Fox, tried to carry Mora by assault, and 
failed. It was still watching Mora when it 
was joined by the French under Col. Brisset. 
The French in their turn tried to capture 
Mora, and they likewise failed. Coir Brisset's 
men carrierl several positions in night attacks, 
from which, however, they we^re driven by 
counter-attacks. The figh.ting wa.s so severe 
that the Germans sought an armistice to bury 
their dead. It was then decided that Capt. 
Fox's column shouifl remain to blockade 
Mora, while Col. Brisset marches! south towards 
Marua, a considerable Moslem town. He 
drove ba/;k a German for<te sc^nt from that 
[)\(U-ii to the relief of .Mora and later on attacked 
Mama itself. The conflict appearefl to be 
indecisive, but under covt^r ')f darkness the 
fiennan commandant evacuated tin; town, 
retiring to Garua. This wa,s on Decombcr 12. 
ftn'l thus, with the, exception of Mora, tin; 
extreme northf;rn end of Cameroon j)ass(!d 
from the pr^sesHion oi the Germans. 

It may f)e add* d )i<r<: that the situation 
at Mora remained unchanged till the end of 
the war., V]> to August, \'.iir>, the British 
w'Te cotiti-ni to maintain a hlof;k»uif^ l'ctw(^<Ti 
August 2.3 and S'-ptember 10 Iirig.-(<fri. 



Cimliffe in person made unavailing efforts to 
storm the fortress. In one desperate attack a 
foothold was gained on the summit, and part 
of the 1st Nigerian Regiment attempted to 
carry an outer work with the bayonet, but 
was stopped within sixty yards of the enemy 
defences. These gallant fellows held on to 
the position they had gained for forty-eight 
hoiu"s without food or water, but after every 
effort to supply them had failed Gen. Cunliffc 
was compelled to order their withdrawal. 
From September 17 onward to the end no 
further assaults on Mora were made, the 
Ijlockade being resunied. 

Of the other colmnns wliich in August, 
1914, entered Cameroon from Nigeria, one, 




HERR EBERMAIER. 
German Governor of Cameroon. 

under Lieut. -Col. P. Maclear (Dublin Fusiliers) 
starting from Yola, attacked Garua on the 
night of August 30. One fort was captured, 
but at dawn the following day the enemy 
counter-attacked in force and compelled the 
British to retreat. In this fighting Col. 
Maclear and tlu-ce other oflicers were killed, 
three were wounded (f)ne of whonn died), and 
two doctors of the \\'.A. M(>dical Staff were 
eaj)turcd wliiW; atlf-nding to th(^ wounded. 
The loss(;s in the native ranks were h(>avy, 
and the eoliuim was compelled to fail hack 
oil ^'olil. l-jilcr ill I lie year the ^'ola coliimn 
\v)i.s [iliiccd under Lieut. -Col. V\rl>l) Uowc^n, 
luid u force! wjis again sent towards (hirua. 
It was joined liy the French column luidcr 
Col. Brisset, who hnd received reinforcements 
from Gen. r.,argeau. 'i'lie VVebb-Bovven-Brissefc 



soo 



THE 'ii.U/;,b Ills WHY OF T^'l'] WAR. 



coliinuui iiitide no utteiupt to take Otarua, the 
situation tlu-ru rtMikaining unt-iiangtil uiiiil 
tl^iti inidillu i>f April, 1U15. 

W hilu thti Muulu^tui coliuim had nut tu hifviil 
iiiia-h, and the Yola coliuiiii had HiiftWed a 
Merioiw rtiverHe, it fared still worse with tho 
i-(tluiuii which uivaded Cameroon in Angu-st, 
11»14, liKin lki>ia, in the CVosh River distritt. 
This coliuun, u«i<h'r Lieut -Col. G. T. Mair, 
Heizeil Nsanakan^, ju.st within the (Jernian 
horiU-r. On Scptt-nilH-r U the garrison left at 
Nsanakang was aiirprised by a largt'ly superior 
fort-e brought from Duala, and in spite of tlio 
most gallant resistance was practically aiuii- 



i\fa,t\ atKi the pni<iMoii wa.s hopeless lliiil Miiiic<-llowo 
gave tliu urilor tu i-hurgu, ami tliuy wuiit thruugh llio 
oiiumy and eac-a{)e<.l intu tlie bimh. Thuro they mostly 
managed to evade the Gernama, and uflur duyH uf 
blurvatiun gut bock to Ikom. Un thu following Friday 
(Sei>tember 11) I vibited Naanakuiig with the murine 
trantiport ollicer. We went un u launcii flying llio white 
tlug and the Ued Ciohh flag, and took with im modiiwil 
Blorua for the wounduil and puruonal istures for tho 
pridonttrti, Tho Ciermiin ollirord wore very good tollowH, 
and we and tliuy and the ]>ri,son()r(i (who were on paroix) 
Bat round u big table and smoked cigarette-i and ilrank 
Bweut ehampagne. 

On onr way np strouin we discovcrrcil two fugilivon, wno 
litui been bix duyu in tho bu.sh without food. You never 
Baw two Buch bedraggled apecimnns of BritiHh oflii^ere. 
They were wet, dirty, and torn, but they luul smiles 
on their worn faces and loaded rovolvern in their Ixflts. 
Thoy had evaded the enoiny whoro iliey could, shot 




THE RAILWAY 
Blown up 

hilated. Only two offieers and 90 native 
soldiers escaped by forcing a way through the 
enemy with the bayonet. The Britisli losses 
were two officers, one European N.C.O., and 
95 native rank and file killed, one officer and 
10 natives wounded, and three officers, one Eiu'o- 
pean X.C.O., and iQ natives taken prisoner — a 
total of 168 casualties. The German losses in 
personnel were even heavier than those of the 
British, but the effect of their victory was 
marked. 

A medical officer serving with the Nigerian 
forces who visited Nsanakang a few^ days later, 
describing his experiences, wrote : 

It was only when the trenches were piled tip with 



BRIDGE, JAPOMA. 
by the enemy. 

him where they could not, slept in the dense bush, 
cut their way at the rate of eight miles a day, swimi a 
river, and finally brought up on British territory and saw 
our launch approaching. We took them on board, 
gave them food, put them in the dinghy with some more 
and sent them down to Ikom. The following day, as 
we were coming back, we found a whole section who 
had been with Rod well and refused to follow him over 
the liver ; they had made a handrail for those who 
could not swim. They had been a week without 
food. 

Col. Mair later on reoccupied Nsanakang, 
and advanced to and seized Ossidinge. 
Bet\\een December 25, 1914, and January 8, 
1915, he made a further advance in face of 
strong opposition, but a little later drew back 
to Ossidinge. 

The position in the north in February, 191.">. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



301 




MBO FORT. 



when Brig. -Gen. F. J. Cunliffe, commandant of 
the Xigerian Regiment, took over the command 
both of the French and British forces on that 
front, was one approaching stalemate. Gen. 
Cunliffe in consultation with Gen. Dobell had 
agreed to take energetic action. He had for 
Chief of Staf? Col. W. D. Wright, V.C, who 
had up to then been on Gen. Dobell's staff. 
Foreseeing the need of " big guns " — the term 
in relative — he obtained the loan of a 12- 
pounder from the Challenger, while from Dakar 
Col. Bris.set was supplied with a 95 mm. gvm. 
These two guns played an important part in 
the subsequent defeat of the Germans, although 
the gunners suffered from the same disability 



as their comrades in Europe — a shortage of 
ammunition. 

The reduction of Garua was the first impera- 
tive step in the northern campaign. Gen. 
CiinlifTe was not, however, able to invest the 
place until the middle of April. His force at 
Garua consisted of 11 companies of infantry 
(8 British, 3 French), one company of mounted 
infantry (British), and one squadron of cavalry 
(French). The Challenger's naval gun was 
with the force ; the French 95 mm. diil not 
arrive till May 28. Hauptmann von Crailsheim, 
commandant of Garua, hatl a force of about 
40 Eiu-opeans and 400 natives His defensive 
strength was. however, great. Garua lies 




MBO lOKT. 



302 



nil. ilul:,'s uistohy of tih: wmi. 



on til' lit Mill', wliitli |>rot<'<'ts it (in i\w stuitli, 

Ui tuUy I'uuatn, uuU il tuul been luriunl into 

an butrent'hetl (-anL|> which wtmid hu\t) doiif 

crtitlit ti) thu ttnginuers t»n thu tniiit ni I'linnt . 

W'ithuiit tilt) uiil i>f thu tvvu big guns it» rudiic- 

tiun uuulil Imvt) bui-n ulmoist inipuKbible. In 

the early ihiyu uf the iavuritinent }luu[>tinunn 

von Cruilslioint diMtingiiifs)if<i liimscll' by a 

daring munuinvre. V\ ith a lew EnropeanH, 100 

luuuiited men and 170 infantry he bruke out of 

Cariia and was joinetl by 80uu! four Kuroixan 

and r>0 native soltUers from Xgaundtsre. >ic) 

then attacki'd a British outpost, but failed to 

captine it, and next, to (piotu L!on. Cunliffe's 

words : 

by avuidiiig all loud^ ami making a woiidurful march of 
28 hours without a halt\ succeedetl in avoiding thu 
troop.s I Imd aeiit to intoroopt him, mid inadf his wny 
aut'ely htii'k to (iunia 

Hy the night of Ma\ ."U) tlie bulk of the troops 
wore entrenched from 3,000 to 3,500 yards from 




NLOHE STATION. 

the fort upon which Cen. Cunliffe had 
decided that the assault should be made. 
This was called Fort A, and was on the simimit 
of a spur at the northern end of the defences, 
liy advancing and entrenching under cover of 
darkness, the Allies hatl by June 10 a line of 
trenches witli 400 yards frontage within 
1,000 yards of the fort. Part of the difficulties 
the force had to meet may be gathered from the 
fact that water had to be carried to the front 
trenches in pots over a distance of two miles. 
On the night of June 9 the enemy had niiuie two 
attempts to break out to the south across the 
river ; but they were met by a hot fire, and the 
majority were driven back. The Benue was 
in flood, and nvmibers were drowned in trying 
to cross it — the British recovered 70 bodies. 
About 45 native soldiers only made good their 
escape. 

On June 10 Gen. Cmiliffe was preparing 



to as.sauh Fort A, when at .I.-'IO p.m. the wlilfe 
Hag was lioisted. Tlio lierman native soldiers 
tiaii got out of hand, and had ntfiised to fight 
any longer. It appeared that the lire of the 
two heavy guns, which had been bombarding 
(Jarua since May 28, had wrought nuich damage, 
and had had a terrifying effect on the natives, 
who had ne\er before had such an exficri- 
enee. liauptnumn von C'railsheini at (irst 
askeii for lerniH ; ho was told that failing un- 
eoiulitional surn-ndir in two horns the attiu^k 
would begin again. At the last minute of the 
second hour a (Jorman officer bearing a white 
flag issued from the fort, and surniiulered 
Garua unconditionally. The jiersonnc;! of the 
fort was 37 Kuropcians and 212 native ranks. 
Five guns and ten maxims and a good ileal of 
anununition was also taken. 

Immediately after the fall of Garua Gen. 
Cunliffe sent troops south to seize the edge of 
the plateau on which Ngaundere standa, and 
thus prevent an enemy concentration on a 
valuable strategic line. "On June 28 (German 
outposts, holding the steep paths leading up 
t o the edge of the plateau, were, in the midst of a 
terrific tornado, completely surprised and 
defeated by the advance guard of Col, Webb- 
Bowen's column, and Ngaundere itself was 
occupied the same evening." In the night the 
enemy counter-attacked, was repulsed and 
retired on Tiliat i. 

At this point. Gen. Doliell's attempt to 
capture Yaunde having failed. Gen. Cunlift'c 
decided to be content to hold the line 
Xgaunderp - Kontscha - Gasiiaka until Gen. 
Dobell and Gen. Aymerieh were ready to 
resume their offensive. Meantime he made the 
effort to capture .Mora, which we ha\'e already 
chronicled. 

G(Mi. Ayint>rioh, the officer in command of 
the troops in French Equatorial Africa, had 
made it his first duty to secure his lines of com- 
munication, tlireatened by the German posts at 
Bonga, on the Sanga, at its confluence with the 
Congo, and at Zinga, on the Ubangi. Inspector 
Leprince embarked at Brazzaville with a small 
force as soon as war was declared, ascended the 
Congo, and on Aiigiist (5 surprised Bonga and 
captured its garrison. Descending the Ubangi 
from Bangui, 60 miles above /^inga, with a 
single company of Senegalese, Capt. Beon siu-- 
prised and captured that place on August 7. 
Documents found in the captm'ed positions 
showed that the Germans had instructions to 




TIH', ADVANCE ON YAUNDE. 
The Britixh l-orces at(ackin|i a fort. 
303 



304 



THt: TIMK.'i HISiTORY Of Till': WAR. 




YAUNDE FORT. 
Occupied by British Force under Colonel Gorges, January 1, 1916. 



invrtcU' French territory, a sufficient com- 
mentary on the German propo.sals for neutrah- 
zation. Gen. Aymerich then organized two 
coliunns : one, under Col. Hiitin, was to advance 
north up the Sanga valley ; the other, under 
Col. Morisson, was to advance west along the 
Lobaj'e, which joins the Ubangi near Zinga. 
The Lobaye column did much good work 
completely out of the linu'light. By October 
Col. Morisson had occupied Carnot, over 
200 miles from his starting-point, and farther 
south, Bania, where he got into touch with 
Col. Rutin's column. Pu-shing still west- 
ward Col. Morisson found that the Germans 
retreating before him and Col. Hutin had con- 
centrated at Baturi, on the road to Dunie and 
Yaunde. On December 9 Col. Morisson reached 
Batiu*i, which is in the dense forest area. The 
Germans, who had hastily evacuated Baturi 
dviring the night of the 8th, retired to Bertua, 
33 miles farther we.st, whitlier Col. ^Morisson 
pursued them. After a sliarp fight on Decem- 
ber 28 the Germans again evacuated their 
position in the night. So far Col. Morisson's 
advance had been rapid, and he pushed on to 
the neighbourhood of Dume ; but as the Ger- 
mans fell back and the garrisons of various 
posts vmited, they became stronger. Col. 
Morisson's progress was not only checked, he 
was forced to give up Bertua, and the Germans 
estabhshed themselves solidly at ]Moopa, 25 
miles south of Baturi. 

The Sanga column under Col. Hutin also 
made good progress at the beginning. It was 
a combined river and land expedition. At 



the outset a number of French planters and 
traders in the Upper Sanga tlistrict had made 
their escape to Wesso, a French border town at 
the junction of the N'Goko witli the Sanga, 
and had with the help of a few native troops 
seized a neighbouring German post. There 
they had been surprised by the enemy, and all 
the Frenchmen save one killed. The survivor 
fled to ^^'esso, which was hastily evacuated 
by its small garrison. The Germans took 
possession and began to loot, but, in their 
turn, hastily fled before Col. Hutin. By 
October 18 Col. Hutin had secured the impor- 
tant and fortified post of Xola, on the Sanga 
over 300 miles from Bonga. Several German 
ofificers and N.C.O.'s, together with a small 
cannon, four machine guns, and a large quantity 
of ammunition were captured. But a German 
force coming from Molundu on the N'Goko 
cut his line of comnumication by seizing 
the post of N'Zimu, midway between Bonga 
and Nola. Gen. Aymerich himself took com- 
n^and of a force which hurried from I^onga 
to retake N'Zimu. It \\as at this junctiu-e 
that the Belgians came to the aid of the F'"rench, 
placing their river steamers and their artillery 
at the disposal of Gen. Aymerich. They 
also sent 180 tirailleiu-s with the force which 
attacked N'Zimu, theu- boat, the Luxem- 
bourg, conveying part of the troops The 
Belgian contingent N\as later increased to 
580 rifles, besides supply trains, carriers, etc. 
At N'Zimu, which w as '-etaken on October 29, 
after three days' obstinate fighting, the Belgian 
native soldiers, as in subsequent engagtMuoiits, 



THE TIMES HlSTOliY OF THE WAR. 



300 



behaved with the utmost gallantry. The 
Lvixeinbourg was steered under heavy fire to 
within 150 yards of the German position, 
and its small guns had a good deal to do with 
the victory. M. Fourneau, Lieut. -Governor 
of Middle Congo, who was on board the boat, 
was seriously wounded, but recovered. 

The N'Zimu incident showed the danger to 
which the Sanga column was exposed on its 
left, and Col. Hutin had to devote much time 
to clearing the Germans from the N Goko 
region. It was not mitil December 21 that, 
after very hard fighting, Molvmdu was occupied 
by the French. Col. Hutin then from his 
main body — his total effectives, including the 
Belgian contingent, were at that time under 
2,000 — formed two divisions to advance west 
towards Lomie, on the road to Yaunde. 

It was about this period that ^l. Foumeau 
went to Duala to propose the joint advance 
on Yavinde. Gen. Aymerich had, however, 
overestimated the ability of the comparatively 
weak Hutin and Morisson columns to make 
good Dume and Lomie, whence the advance 
on Yaunde was planned to be made. As soon 
as they lost the advantage of river transport 
they had to face all the difficulties presented 
by forest and swamp which hindered Gen. 
Dobell's advance. It was not until June 25, 
1915, that Col. Hutin captured Lomie — three 
weeks after Col. Mayer's column had been 



compelled to give up its advanco. Col. Hutin 
had had many engagements and had taken 
prisoner several Eiu'Of)cans and some hundreds 
of German native soldiers ; he was also joined 
by over 300 German native troops who had 
deserted, wliile the natives in the region south 
of Yaunde were in open revolt. 

Col. Morisson had not been able to advance 
anew until May, 1915. Ho attacked Moopa 
(June 3-7) but failed to break through the 
defences, which were cleverly constructed. 
Another attack was made on June 23, the 
assailants being now provided with a mountain 
gun of 80 vara. Six hours' bomliardment was 
followed by a bayonet charge, and Moopa was 
captiu-ed. On July 22 Bertua was again 
occupied, and on July 25 Col. Morisson entered 
Dimae, which the Germans set on fii-e in their 
retreat. 

French forces, whose activities had not 
liitherto had any effect on the general situa- 
tion, now began to threaten Col. Zimmer- 
mann's position from the south-west. In 





Al HANVO I'OKI. 
Signaller with heliograph communicating with the troops attacking Uanyo Hill. Smaller picture: A 

view of the fort. 



l'J($ 



THE TIMES HlSrOEY Ot THE 11.17.'. 










f FeHNANDO 



ATZANTfC 

Camp 
OC£Am 




nana-Basfi , 



A 






Lomie b 



^Ebelovva 



RIO M U N I j 

(Spanish ) I 



ReHerence. 

R3il\/V3ys — PrincipsI Roads- 

MILES. 
50 100 

' ■ II r t-— ' I 



a.'-z 



UEIAIL MAP 01< CAMEROUN. 



the first week of the war the German armed 
l)oats Rohlfs and Itolo had made demonstra- 
t ions on the Gabun coast. The French repUed 
l)y sending some 600 Senegalese, convoyed 
l)y the giinboat Surprise, to Coco Beach, at the 
entrance to tlie Rio Muni, and the capital 
of German Muni. After a very stiff fight, in 
which the Rohlfs and Itolo were siuvk, Coco 
Beach, which the Germans had renamed 
I'koko, was captured on September 21, 1914. 
'I'hereafter French troops, under Col. ^liquelard, 
cleared the enemy entirely from German 
-Muni, and a column under Col. le Meillom- 
advanced north, parallel to the eastern frontier 
of Spanish Guinea. Col. le Meillotir took 
successively Oyem and Bitam, the last-named 
station, near the north-east corner of Spanish 
Guinea, being carried by assault on July 17, 
1915. A French force also advanced from the 
port of Campo, parallel to the northern Spanish 
frontier, the intention being to cut off the 
Gernians should they attempt to escape 
into neutral territory. This object was not 
attained- the Campo force and that of Col. 
le Meillour not being able to join hands in 
time, while closely to guard a frontier 130 miles 
long was an undertaking beyond the power of 
the force available. 



By the end of July (ien. Aymerich's 
forces were ready for the final advance on 
Yaunde, and Gen. Cunliffe's forces were 
but waiting for the signal to sweep south. 
Further consultations between the various 
commanders took place ; the combined move- 
ments were planned and as soon as the rains 
permitted Gen. Dobell again took the 
offensive. ' His command had been strengt hened 
by the arrival of the 5th Light Infantry of tl)e 
Indian Army, and in November, 1915, his 
force reached its maximum strength of 9,700. 
The new advance on Yaunde had by that 
time made good progress. It began on Sep- 
tember 22. This time the French and British 
columns under Gen. DobeU moved eastward 
separately'. Col. flayer's force went forward 
from its base near Edca along the railway, 
reoccupied Eseka on October 30, and was 
directed to make good the road leading from 
Yaimde to Kxibe. The British colunm, operat- 
ing somewhat to the north of Col. Mayer, 
foimd its passage most stubbornly disputed 
until the end of Xovember, when Ngung was 
taken. By this time the British had worked 
their way almost through the primevivl forest, 
and on December 17 they seized Dchang Mangas, 
which stands in more open and cultivated 



THE TIMES HISTORY OE THI'! W'AL'. 



;i01 




FRENCH TIRAILLEURS AT JAPOMA. 



country. On December 21 the French column, 
which had been very heavily engaged and had 
suffered serious loss, had broken down the 
enemy resistance, and Col. Mayer's tenacity of 
I)urpose had its reward in the capture of 
ilangeles on December 21. 

Both Gen. Aymerich's forces and those of 
(ien. Cunlif^e were also now closing in on 
Yaunde. The northern forces, wliich at this 
time numbered between 3,000 and 4,000, were 
set in motion in October, Gen. Cimliffe's first 
movements being flirected to llic line Tibati, 
Banyo, and BarnenHa. wliieh forms a rougli 



semicircle in north-central Cameroon. The 
French column under Col. Brisset togetlier with 
Col. Webb-Bowen's column entered Tibati on 
Xovember 3. Bamenda was occupied, after a 
l^risk fight, by the Cross River column, now 
under Major Crookenden, on October 22. In 
the Cross River sector, where the Nsanakang 
cUsaster had happened, Gen. Dobell cooperated 
by sending the .5th Light Infantry of the 
Indian Army and other troops under Lieut. - 
Col. Cotton forward from the northern raihva_\'. 
This column had a great deal of hard marching 
and several minor encounters witli the enemy, 
who retreated uortli. Col. Cotton reocciipicd 




TKANSI'(JKI DIFMCULTIHS IN CAMEROON. 



auH 



nil': TiMi:s history of the war. 



Di'huiig oil Noveiuhin* ti, uiui ^oiii):; on to 
Hu^Hiii, there joiitetl Major C'rookenden. Meuii* 
tiiiiti, Mbo hull \Hnvin ueiztHi. 

The ^upturn of Haiiyo, which Vwn betwean 
BtiiiifiulH unci Tihtiti, whs tin o|H*r>itioM of 
iiioif ilirtifulty. Tht' Kuropeun ri»'ttl«iinMit ut 
Hanyo wan occupied on October 24, hut the 
gnrriison were entrenched on an isolatftl moun- 
tain rising utetiply 1,200 feet from tlie «iu' 
rounding country. It hati very utrong defencen, 
was amply provisioned, the garrison vmis well 
armed, and every (Jerman in Cameroon believed 
that it wtxiltl hold out till the end of tlu^ war. 
By November 2 Gen. CunlittV, ulm personally 
directed the o|)erations, luul five companies 
of infantry on the under - feat ures of the moun- 
tain, with his mounted infantry in a wide 



circle on the plain — rolling grass land, im- 
inhabited — to give notice of any attempt of 
the garrison to break out. 'I'hree 2.yr)-inch 
guns supported the attack. 

Kroii) Munyo (Iik ttiiiMiiy'H |i(iNili<iii on lh« iiKiiiiiltiiii 
liMikiid ^riiii tiii<l ht ii|ii)ii(liiiis (wrottj tin iilliccr in u 
luttt'i' Id Sir Krtxik. hn^'ttnl). Iiiij^d rocky boulilcr.^ 
r<tunUiii({ otil prominently ri^ht up lo the vttry l()|), 
and thti Hiduti of tli» inounlitin bricitlin^ with Htrongly 
liiiiil ■■ -iiuiKurH." W'e lie^iin our tiKuck eiirly on tlio 
inorninM of NoveinlMir 4. Tim infantry, coveiod by 
tlie lirt) from our tlire« jjiniM, workud their way up 
(ilowiy and do;iKudly foot hy fool, climbing over rocks 
and tearing their way through the thorny Hcrub and 
liinn jiruss, under a heavy rifle and maxim-^im fire 
from the enemy'ti " Hanpirn " and concealed HuiperM 
amon^ the rocku. By tiie evening; most of tiie com- 
panieH had managed to Htru({gle half-way up the liill, 
tliere getting; what uhelter they could from the inceH- 
saiit lire of the enemy, aido<l by tli<^ lijihl of lireballM 
and nickelH. (Jllieurs and men, exhausted and drenched 
with rain, luing on determinedly to the ^roimd Ruined. 
[Under cover of tfio fog Capt. Bowyer-Smijth Imd led 
hi.s company right up to the summit. There it came 
under a hot cross fir<', and ('apt. HowyerSrnijl h having 
lieun killed, the company was forced back to the foot 
of the mountain.] 

At dawn on the morning of the Sth they started 
climbing onco more. Our troojjs luiving got directly 
luider the first lino of " .sangars," the enemy, in addi- 
tion to rifle and maxim-gun fire, started rolling down 
rocks and throwing dynamite bomb.s. AH that day 
our men gradually worked their way up, capturing 
a small stone redoubt and " sangar " here and there. 
Owing to the paucity of gun ammunition, the covering 
artillery fire could not afford the infantry the assistance 
so imperatively necessary on these occa.sions. For- 
tunately a convoy arrived on the afternoon of the 
i)th bringing with it 200 more rounds of gun ammuni- 
tion which, hurriedly sent out, enabled the guns to fire 




AT J A POM A. 

Tirailleurs resting. Circle picture : A house at Japuma. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



809 




BRITISH TROOPS ON THE ROAD 
TO YAUNDE. 

somewhat more rapidly till the upward advance of the 
infantry rendered it too dangerous to continue their 
fire. 

Darkness set in early that evening — at 5 p.m. An 
hour or two later a terrific thunderstorm burst over tho 
mountain. Heavy firing and the explosion of bombs 
and fireballs continued. A misty morning prevented 
our seeing what was happening as dawn broke on the 
6th, but a-i the mist dispersed a white flag could be seen 
on the top of the hill and our men silhouetted against 
the sky-line. 

The enemy, completely demoralized by the deter- 
mined a^lvance of our men despite heavy losses, had 
during the night of the .'>tli-6th broken into small 
•»catt«red parties. Owing to thf: darkrioHs of the night, 
the noise of rain and thunder, and their knowledge of 
the country, the majority of the enemy parties had 
managed to worm their way down the hill without 
lieing intercepted, only, however, to run up against 
the detach':d posts of our mounted infantry guarding 
all roa/ls in tho vicinity. Thr^so enemy parties then 
flred a few wild shots and scattered into the long grass 
(10 ft. high] where it was difficult to follow them. 

" This HCtioii," wrote Gen. Cunliffc, and not 
without rea.son, " iriay, I think, be juntly 
<lewrib<'fl a« one oi the rnoHt arduoiiH ever 
fought by riativ'f; .iXfrican troops." 

After the tdll of JJanyo Gen. (Nnliffe's 
columns struck towards Yaunde, the enemy 
still offering st<-»Mjy resistanec; and destroying 
the bridges over the rivers in his retrr-jil. 
Yoko wjiH seized by (/ol. Hrisset on Di-cj-hAxt I, 
Kurriban by Col. (/Ottf)n and .Major L'ni»wke 
<»ri I >»'cj^n\>t!T 2, and by .January !, lf>H», Gen. 



Ciinliffe had concentrated hi.s striking force on 
Ihe line Ngila-Ndengo and was ready for the 
final advance. Col. Brisset, who was sent 
forward to secure the crossing of the Sanaga 
river at Nachtigal Falls, soon came into 
touch with Gen. Ayinerich's columns, which 
were pouring eastward on Yaunde. By Janu- 
ary 8 Gen. Cunliffe's advanced troops were 
within forty miles of that place. It was 
only on that day that the general learned 
that Y'aunde had already fallen. 

When the British column from Wum Biagas 
had fought its way through the forest and 
reached the open tableland at Mangas, Gen. 
Dobell directed it to push forward to Yaunde, 
without waiting for the French column under 
Col. Mayer. For a few days the enemy still 
offered resistance, but from December 22 
onward strongly entrenched positions were 




majok-i;knkkai. dohhi.i. (on idi) wrm 

GOI.ONHL (J0R(;ES. 



HIO 



THi': riMt:s histohy of tiik wab. 




THE ENTRY OF THE 1 RANGO-BRITISH 



found to be abandoned. On January 1, 1910, 
the British column under Col. Gorges marched 
into Yaimdo unopposed. Herr Ebermaier, Col. 
Zinunermann and over 800 Germans, with 
native troops and several thousands of carriers, 
had evacuated the place some days previously, 
making south-west for Spanish Guinea, the 
nearest point of neutral territory being 125 
utiles distant. 

The enemy had had a good start, and though 
colunins went in pursuit they failed to over- 
take the main body. After a rearguard action 
on January 8 at Koimaka on the Njong river, 
Col. Haywood, however, released seventeen 
British and seven French civilians, and seven 
British and three French officers and N.C.O.'s 
who had been held prisoners by the Germans. 
( These prisoners, among whom were some ladies, 
had been very fairly treated during their 
captivity.) 

By January 18 Herr Ebermaier and Col. 
Zimmermann had retreated beyond Ebelowa. 
A strong French force under Col. Morisson 
followed them up, the French column working 
west from Campo cooperating. They did not 
bring the enemy to a stand, but, in Gen. 
Dobell's phrase, they " succeeded in driving 
the German force across the Campo river 
into neutral territory." 

The firbt German refugees entered Spanisli 



territory on February 4, and a few days later 
Herr Ebermaier was jjcrmitted to send an 
oj)en telegram in French to Dr. Solf , the Colonial 
Minister at Berlin, announcing that " want of 
numitions compels me to leave the Protectorate 
together with all troops and stafT." Herr 
Ebermaier and Col. Zimmermann surrendered 
to the Spanish authorities, and a little later 
on the Germans, who numbered 825, were 
transported to Spain, where they were 
interned. 

A British officer. Col. Gorges, and his column 
were, as stated, the first of the Allied troops tO' 
enter Yaunde ; next to arrive was the French 
column from the north imder Col. Brisset. It 
had been on active campaign over fifteen 
months, and had marched and fought over 
1,000 miles of territory. On Col. Brisset's 
heels the French troops from the east poured 
in, and Gen. Aymerich took command of the 
Allied forces at Yaunde. A little later, on 
January 28, the Belgian contingent niarched 
into Y'aunde, and the flags of Britain, France 
and Belgium were hoisted on the fort. 

The few places wliicli remained in the hands 
of the Germans were abandoned by tliom by 
tlie end of Janviary. Hauptmann \on Raben 
on his moimtain fastness of Mora in the far 
north alone held out. To take the stronghold 
by force would be a costly proceeding, and 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. 



Bll 




FORGES INTO GARUA, JUNE 11, 1915. 



Gen. Cunliffe decided first to offer terms to the 
gallant garrison — that the officers should retain 
their swords, that all Europeans should be 
interned in England,* and that the native ranks 
should be released and given safe passages to 
their homes. Von Raben accepted this offer, 
and on February 18 Mora was surrendered. 

Cameroon was conquered. Apart from the 
very valuable help given by British and French 
warships and marines, some 7,000 British, 
11,000 French, and 600 Belgian troops had 
been employed, the rank and file, save for the 
Inflian .0th Light Infantry, being all natives 
of West or Central Africa, f They had beaten 
an enemy fully as numerous and in whose ranks 
were sorrif; 3,000 JCuropeans. Mistakes had 
be^n made, as we have indicated, but the 
operations as a whole were well conceived and 
brilliantly executed. Generals Dobell, Aymerich 
arifl Cunliffe worked in perfect harmony, and 
the crKjrdination of the final advance on 
Yaunde was a triumph of organization. The 
lines of communication, both of Gen. Aymerich 
anfl Gen. Cunliffe, were over 400 mil<!s long ; 
thow! of rjcn. Dobfll fully 200 miles. Yet 

• Th« (innimnn ha*l a great dread of being interned in 
Africa. 

t f'fjrh»if»« another nxfoption nhould hf. mode, iih 
pnrt of fh'j Vii-Mi, In'liu It'^irrKjnt wrrvwl iindrT (ion. 
i)ii\i*:\\. 'Hiifi Ti-i/irnnril, tiow(!V<Tr, Ih compodod of nogrocH, 
though rfscruitwi in tho W'fjyt (ndir-H. 



it is to the officers and men that the chief 
tribute is due. There is no finer fighting 
material in the world than the West African 
native, and when led by officers in whom he 
has confidence " no day appears to be too long, 
no task too difficult." Tlie attachment of 
the Senegalese to their officers is common 
knowledge, and it would be impossible to praise 
too highly the devotion and loyalty to their 
British officers of the native ranks of the 
West African Frontier Force. Several of the 
native soldiers received the Distinguished 
Conduct Medal for rescuing, or attempting to 
rescue, exhausted officers. Among other valu- 
able lessons, the Cameroon campaign proved 
beyond question that in West Africa Great 
liritain and France possessed reservoirs whence 
c(;uld be drawn great and invaluable additions 
to their fighting forces ; soldiers not unworthy 
to take rank with the best European troops. 

Throughout the camjjaign the Germans — 
with some honourable cxcejptions in the case 
of officers — treated the native population with 
great severity. In the words of a report by 
a Nigerian official published by flm British 
Colon i)i,l Olliee the conduct of the enemy 
" created a reign of terror in t lie neighbour- 
hood of any G<Tirian garrison." l*'ood supplies 
and cattle were tak(!ri without payuK^nt, 
and many natives were dr^libernlcly iruirdered. 



H\2 



THE TIMES HlSTOh'Y n/-' THE WAIi. 




A SECTION OF THE GOLD COAST BATTALION, W.A.F.F. 



The policy of the authorities was exempHfipd in 
a memorandum written by a German captain 
which fell into the hands of General Dobell. 
The German officer wrote : — 

I have ordered the destruction of all Duaia villages. 
All Dualas met on the roads carrying weapons (matchets, 
bows and arrows, spears, and also rifles) are to be shot. 
Prisoners will only be made when they are caught red- 
handed and can be legally tried and condemned to death. 

While this officer's orders reflected the 

general attitude of the Germans, they did not, 

in some cases could not, restrain their own 

native troops from outrages. In the early 

months of the war the establishments of the 

French traders in New Cameroon were looted, 

and this, among other offences, led Gen. 

Aymerich to lodge a formal complaint with 

Herr Ebermaier. The Governor's answer was 

characteristic. He would, he said, do what he 

could to prevent outrages, but as France and 



England, as European kultur nations, had 
chosen to bring war into Africa they must take 
the consequences. On their side the Germans 
complained of ill-treatment by the French and 
British of German colonists — complaints either 
entirely untrue or frivolous. Such damage as 
was suffered by German residents was inflicted 
by natives, Duala and others, in retaliation for 
injuries inflicted upon them. As was naively 
stated by some of the Germans themselves, 
their overthrow was hailed with such joy by 
the inhabitants of Cameroon that " the sky 
rang again with an indescribable shout of scorn 
and rejoicing." The British, wrote Gen. Dobell, 
were received by the people as their deUverers, 
and similar testimony was borne by the French 
authorities. The disappearance of the German 
flag from West Africa opened up for its native 
races a future bright with hope. 




CHAPTER CXXXII. 

THE CHURCHES AND THE 

ARMIES. 



The Aemy Chaplains' Department — Organization for War — The Chaplain -General — 
Selection of Chaplains and their Work — The Clergy and Combatant Service — Church 
OF England Chaplains in the Field — Rev. E. N. ]Meixish, V.C.^ — War and Religion — The 
Presbyterians and their Work — The Roman Catholics — Organization under Cardinal 
Bourne — The " Free Churches " — The Wesleyans — Other Denominations — The Jews — - 
Common \\'ork of the Churches. 



IX practically e\eiy dispatch sent home 
by British Commanders, and in practically 
every bestowal of honours and distinc- 
tions, reference ^\■as made to the great 
.services rendered by Army Chaplains in the 
special sphere allotted to them, and, in not a 
few instances, to the performance of deeds of 
bravery outside the scope of their ordinary 
duties. Indeed the spirit which everywhere 
manifested itself among the chaplains, not of 
one denomination only but of all who went 
to the war, was a spirit which prompted them 
to do and dare and die if only they could pro- 
mote the welfare of the men committed to their 
charge. The Army Chaplain held military rank, 
and he was no feather-bed officer. Again and 
again, in France, in Egypt, in Gallipoli and in 
the other theatres of operations, he proved his 
rea/liness to endure the hardships and to 
identify himself with the life of the men. 

A Chaplainw' l^epartment had been an essen- 
tial part f)f the organization of the War Office 
for many years before the war. Tlie office of 
<^.'hapluin-General was first cstablishwl in ITOfi. 
It was, however, siispenderl in 1S2!), but 
restored in 1840. In peace tiitie nii(\ lor 
the regular anny the [jrovision ma<le was 
arriplf ; tlie organization of the ChH|)lains' 
I>*;partmcnt whh wfsll ♦!qui[>pcd jind ev^Ty- 
thing worked smoothly and wfll. But with 
the outbreak of war in Aiijfiist, 1914, eanie a 
rttfw exfX'rieriee, and a great and very <lini- 
eiilt f>robl»-rn hful to be factul. New armies 
w#Te called into beini/. llecruitH came forward 
in huridredM of thousands, and the f>roblern was 

Vol. vrrr.— fart, loo. :{i: 



how could the \\ ork of the Chaplains' Depart- 
ment be developed so as to meet the new need. 
In those early daj^s of tlie war, clergy and 
ministers of all denominations rose splendidly 
to the occasion. In hamlet and village and 
town, wherever troops came or were quartered, 
religious leaders did everything that was 
possible for the social, moral and .spiritual 
welfare of the men. It is not siu-prising that 
in those early daj's the extreme and unexpected 
pressure jiroduced in many districts a state of 
chaos ; and although organization soon yielded 
a more orderly state of things it should be 
remembered that it was the prompt action of 
clergy and ministers, with the cooperation of 
devoted helpers, which saved the situation. 

Nor did the connexion between the Churches 
and the armies ever really close, for in town 
after town and i)arish after parish the religious 
leaders mmk^ the welfare of the troops in billet 
or caitip flicir cliicf (iirc. If in some districts, 
after the first few montiis, the novelty wore off 
iuid the enthusia.sm seemed to flag, what was it 
hut an indication that the arrangcnncnts hastily 
irnprf)vised 1i>mI given j)la(;e to more settled 
|)lans anil more adequate organization '! Clergy 
and ministers did not grow weary in this well- 
doing, nor were they t^ver lik(!ly to do so as long 
as there were men who nci'dcd tlicir help. 
Many were ai)pouited Chaplains to the Forces 
Ifir Flonu! f>r Foreign service ; while others wer«» 
chosen by the (Jenc^rai Oflicer (/onnuandingin- 
Chief as Officiating ('l(Tgy or Ministers oq either 
(liiily pay or ca[)itation allowance. 'J'heir 
churches continued t«> be used for I'arade 



au 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 




CHUKCH SERVICE IN A FRENCH CASINO. 
A British Army Chaplain preparing for Holy Communion. 



Services, their Parish Halls were given up to 
social work among the men, and in a hundred- 
and-one different ways they devoted themselves 
with truly noble self-sacrifice to the best and 
highest interests of the troops. Much was done 
also by voluntary organizations such as the 
Young Men's Christian Association, the Chiu"ch 
Army, and the Church of England Men's Society, 
but the debt the nation owed to the hundreds of 
clergy and ministers who in their individual 
parishes or districts worked among the troops 
quietly and unobtrusively and with splendid 
results deserved the warmest and heartiest 
recognition. And among those who thus 
helped none were more devoted or more en- 
thusiastic than the coimtry clergy. 

The problem of providing for the spiritual 
needs of the troops wa-s a complex one. It 
might, perhaps, have been more easy of solu- 
tion if the men had been all of one faith and 
all members of one Church. The King's 
Regulations were most clear and emphatic 
about respect for religious liberty. The 
soldier, like the civilian, was free to profess 
liis own religion, and, as far as possible, the 
State provided him with the ministrations 



of his own religious denomination. Some 
limitations, of course, were necessary. II 
would obviously have been impossible to give 
representation to each and all of the many 
sects which exist in England, but within the 
bounds of reasonableness ample security was 
offered that men's religious consciences should 
be respected Thus chaplains were provided 
representing (according to the order in the 
Army List): (1) The Church of England. 
(2) the Presbyterians, (3) the Roman Catholics, 
(4) the Wesleyans, (5) the United Board 
(embracing other Nonconformist bodies), 

(6) the Welsh Calvinistic Methodists, and 

(7) the Jews, and a survey of their work must 
now be attempted. 

To begin with the Church of England. The 
responsibility for making full and adequate 
provision for the spiritual care of Church of 
England troops rested entirely with the Chap- 
lain-General, subject, of coiurse, to the require- 
ments and limitations unposed upoi\ \\hx\ by 
the military authorities. This condition wtis 
not always borne in mind, with the result that 
criticisms were made which were seen to be 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



'.]]r> 



without foundation when the real facts were 
known. 

The appointment of the Chaplain-General 
rests, of course, with the Crown, on the recom- 
mendation of the Secretary of State for War. 
The office at the outbreak of war was held by 
a bishop, but this, while advantageous, was not 
necessary ; indeed, the previous Chaplain- 
General, the Rev. J. C. Edghill, D.D., who was 
in office at the time of the South African War, 
was in priest's Orders. 

The Chaplain-General, the Right Reverend 
John Taylor Smith, D.D., C.V.O., was appointed 
in 1901, after a wide and varied experience. 
In earlier life he was Canon-Missioner in Sierra 
Leone. During the Ashanti Expedition he 
acted as Chaplain to the Forces, and it fell 
to him to attend the late Prince Henry of 
Battenberg in his last hours. He succeeded 
to the Bishopric of Sierra Leone in 1897, and 
four years later came home to take up his 
Army appointment. He had many special 
qualifications which fitted him for the post. 
He knew the needs of the Army thoroughly in 
all its sections. He was a capable organizer, 
and his administrative qualities were great. 
He had, too, remarkable influence over men. 
As a Churchman he had his own distinctive 
views, but his appointments were by no means 
all of one ecclesiastical colour. He sought 
to make them thoroughly representative of all 
sections of the Church of England. 



Even in peace times the Chaplain-General's 
Department was sufficiently burdened ; on the 
outbreak of war its resources were taxed to 
the utmost, and the strain remained con- 
siderable. As time went on there wore con- 
siderable developments in the organization of 
the department, but in the earliest days of the 
war the Chaplain-General had to bear the 
burden alone. 

The immediate need was the provision of 
extra chaplains. As with the Regular Army 
so with the new armies, 70 per cent., and 
sometimes more, registered themselves as 
belonging to the Church of England. It will, 
therefore, readily be understood how large a 
number of additional chaplains was required 
to make the necessary provision for their 
spiritual welfare. There was no lack of 
candidates from among the clergy. It has 
been stated, indeed, that upwards of 4,000 
applications were received. The number may 
have been exaggerated, but it is certain that 
very many more applied than could possibly 
be appointed. Large n\imbers were for various 
reasons quite obviously unfit, and were re- 
jected. The task of selection was in the 
hands of the Chaplain-General, and he dis- 
charged it with resolution and thoroughness, 
interviewing personally every likely candidate. 
The standard was necessarily a high one, and 
not a few of the men failed to answer to 
the tost. Th" extremely important character 




A l)l<nMIII':AI) SI'.KVICH IN CAMI'. 
The Archbishop of Armajih prcachinii lo the troops. 



316 



Till': TiMi':s HISTORY of the war. 




•Aitun", 



i^liciially taken fui " I he I one^. 



BISHOP TAYLOR SMITH, D.D., C.V.O. 
The Chaplain-General. 



and the higli responsibility of tlie work wliieli 
the chaplains were called on to do, whether 
serving in camps at home or on the battlefields 
abroad, were kept steadily in view, and the one 
pre-eminent qualification insisted upon was 
that the ohaf)lains a[)j)()inted must be men 
of special character. All other qualifications were 
subordinated to tliis. A candidate might excel 
in many other things, but if this qualification 
were wanting or deficient he was not accepted. 
From this standard there was no deviation, witli 
the result that the Church of England was 
represented in the Army bj' some of the very 
best of the clergj', men of unquestioned devo- 
tion, men of large vision, men who were deter- 
mined to give of their best and to do their 
utmost for the welfare of the British soldier. 

In the early daj'S of the \\&,t everything had 
to be done at top speed. The Rev. F. H. 
Gillingham, the well-known Essex cricketer. 
Rector of Bermondsey, who offered himself for 
service abroad on the day on which war was 
declared, and was accepted, gave a vi\id ac- 
count of his experiences abroad, prefacing it witl i 
a reference to his hurried departure for the front . 
The following passage from his article * gives 

* Southwark Diocesan Chronicle. 



an idea of the business-like precision with 
which the cliaplains were sent to France : 

I was ordered to get ready to go at ten days' notice. 
Arrangements then were by no means so cut and dried 
tus tliey are to-day, and I am afraid the Chaplains' 
Department had a sudden strain put upon it for which 
it was not fully prepared. Getting my kit, settling up 
my parish for 12 months, and saying a few neces- 
sary good-byes (no one dreamed of leave in those days) 
took up most of the intervening days, and on August 28 
1 caught 'the 5 o'clock train for Southampton. Fortu- 
nately I was not quite alone, another cha)>lain got into 
the same carriage, and thus wc helped each other to 
brush aside thoughts that will arise whenever such 
partings occin-. 

In the same compartment travelled a General, and 
lie evidently overheard our misgivings as to what we 
should do at Southampton, for on arriving there he 
toid us to follow him, as ho was the Chief Embarkation 
Otlicer. It was nay first e-xperiencc of a Staff Odicer, 
and thus early I learned what all through my 12 
months I never had cause to imlearn, viz., the unfailing 
kindness and courtesy I always met with irotn Staff 
Officers ; and provided that tlie Padre is blessed with 
common sense and does not obtrude at inconvenient 
moments, I am sure that my experience is the general 
experience of all chaplains. 

He told us at what liotel to put up, and gave us papers 
to report ourselves on board the Italian I'lince next 
morning at 6 a.m. 

Wc were up betimes, and urged our bioken-down cabby 
to urge his broken-down horse (one that, for obvioxis 
reasons, had not been commandeered by the military 
authorities) to get us to the landing stage in time. 

Wo eventually managed to arrive about tivo minutes 
before 6, only to find (as or. many occasions subsequently) 
that being ordered to appear at a certain time does not 
necessarily mean (hat that is the tinje for starting. It 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



317 



was long past noon when we finally said good-bye to 
England. We were a cosmopolitan crowd on board : 
500 loaders and labourers, details of many regiments, 
and seven Padres. 



The Chaplain-General had interviews with 
the new chaplains before they left for the front. 
He addressed to each one a moving and im- 
pressive letter; not concerned with official 
details or instructions, but dealing rather with 
the message he desired them to give to the men, 
and throughout he sought to keep in close 
touch with all the chaplains. 

Bishop Taylor Smith also issued (through 
the genercsity of friends) 200,000 copies of 
a Prayer Card, specially designed for soldiers, 
and of a size that they coxild slip inside 
their hats. He made, through The Times, 
a direct appeal to the nation, asking all 
people, " when the fingers of the clock pointed 
heavenward at noon," to offer a prayer on 
V)ehalf of oiu- sailors and soldiers. This appeal 
met -with a wide response. The noon-day prayer 
quickly became a recognized institution, and the 
knowledge of it spread to the trenches and proved 
a source of inspiration and strength to many. 

But, of course, the Chaplain- General's main 
work was that of selecting the chaplains, and 
generous testimony was borne to the splendid 
bo<ly of men he got together. The Bishop of 
Oxford spoke most warmly about it. *' It is 
a tremendous task," he said, " sudderJy to be 
called upon to equip in spiritual things such a 
gigantic host, and I do not doubt that there 
have been many failures and mistakes in 
spiritual things as there have been in material 



matters. Nevertheless, I wish to bear my 
witness thus : I have had nothing to do with 
choosing the Army or Navy chaplains from 
this diocese. But if I had had the chance of 
choosing 30 men — and that is the number 
that have gone from this diocese — I feel sure I 
could not have picked 30 better men tliau 
those who have been chosen." From 
another point of view the Bishop of Chelms- 
ford, when speaking froni his place in Convo- 
cation, was equally eulogistic, and on the same 
occasion the Bishop of "W inchester spoke of the 
justness and scrupulous fairness the Chaplain- 
General had shown to Churchmen of different 
kinds in receiving and choosing men. 

The work of the chaplain was, of course, of 
a distinctly ministerial nature. The question 
was soon raised whether clergy of military age 
• ought not to join the forces for combatant 
service. Many of the younger men were 
anxious to do so, but quite early in the war the 
Archbishop of Canterbury addressed a letter 
to the bishops, in which he said he had given 
the question much consideration, and " by 
every line of thought which I have pursued I 
am led to the conclusion that I have been right 
in maintaining from the first that the position 
of an actual combatant in our Army is incom- 
patible with the position of one who has 
sought and received Holy Orders. The v^hole 
idea which underUes and svurovmds ordination 
impUes this. We have a calling of our own of 
a quite specific kind, and throughout the 
whole history of the Church authoritative 
expression has been given to the paramount 




ON TUH WI'.STIiKN IkONT. 
Australian Transport Drivers at (Church I'urude. 



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318 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



319 



obligation of that calling. Under this obliga- 
tion those who have been ordained to the 
Jlinistry of Word and Sacrament ought, even in 
time of actual warfare, to regard that ministry, 
whether at home or in the field, as their special 
contribution to the country's service." 

For the moment the Archbishop's very deci- 
sive words set the question at rest. But m 
February, 1915, it canie up again, and a long 
correspondence upon it ensued in the columns 
of The Times. It recurred later in the year 
under Lord Derby's recruiting scheme, and the 
Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to Lord Derby 
(October 28, 1915) saying that clergy in many 
parts of England were perplexed by receiving 
a letter calling upon them to volunteer for 
combatant service, and asking " whether I am 
right in believing that the circular was sent to 
the clergy, not with any intention of bidding 
them ignore or override direction or counsel 
which the Bishops had given, but merely 
because they were men within the military ages 
whose names had not been ' starred ' by the 
local officers." Lord Derby replied the next 
day that the Archbishop's assumption was quite 
right, and added, " I recognize to the full the 
great extra demands that are made upon the 
services of clergy of all denoniinations, partly 
due to the fact that many are serving abroad as 
cliaplains and partly due to the demands of 
hospitals both abroad and at home for their 
minLstrations, and person.ally T am strongly of 
opinion that niinLsters of ail denominations, 
however much they may wish to enlist, equally 
do their duty when obeying the directions of 
those who are set in authority over them." 
Lord Derby's lett*jr settled the question so far 
as the home clergy were concerned, and com- 
paratively few of these enlisted. 

But in tlie Colonies it was different, and The 
O'imes, within a few days of Lord Derby's letter, 
announced that " in con.sequenre of the larg<! 
number of cl'Tgymen who hafi n})plied to join 
the 85th Xova Scotia Battalion, the Com- 
manding OHicfT of the battalion ha/1 autho- 
rized the formation of a seeti'm or, if siifTifirut 
numhi-Tn are available, a platoon which would 
h*j entirely coinposofl of elergyinen." Two well- 
known AiiHtralian elergynicn also joincfl the 
combatant forces the Kfv. F. K. 15. Ifultoii- 
MaroM, Rector of VV'int<jn in the diocese of 
Kockfianif^tori ^idncated at Ifarrow anfl Trinity, 
Cambridge), who, b«'irig unable to obtain 
an Arrny Chafdainey, fnlJHt'-'l and afterwards 
re«;eived a eotnrniH,sion ; and the llev. Kdward 



Diggos La Touche, Litt.D. (gold medalist and 
Donnellan Lecturer, I'rinity College, Dublin), 
who had gone to Australia for his health, volun- 
teered for the Australian contingent Both of 
these men were killed in action, Mr. Hulton- 
Sams in Flanders and Dr. Digges La Touches in 
Gallipoli. Canada was also represented among 
combatant clergy. The Rev. Hugh Speke, 
formerly Vicar of Curry Rivel, Somerset, was in 
Western Canada in connexion with the Arch- 
bishops' Mission when the war broke out, and he 
joined up, " determined," as he wrote, " to see 
this thing through to the bitter end." He also 
fell in Flanders. 

The splendid response to the call of the 
Empire made by the manhood of the Dominions 
foimd its counterpart in the readiness with 
which the Churches in those lands took their 
part in the great conflict. Their clergy did 
much to aid the cause of recruiting, the pulpits 
everywhere resounding with the spirit of 
patriotism. When the time came for the 
various contingents to leave for one or otlier 
of the various theatres of war the Churches 
were ready with a supply of Chaplains to 
accompany them. They were appointed by the 
respective Governments, and clergy and minis- 
ters of all denominations, inclviding the Salva- 
tion Army, offered in very large numbers. 
Some of the best work in the War was dont> by 
these Chaplains, and, as illustrating the 
devotion with which they applied themselves 
to their ministerial duties, it should bo added 
that a British Chaplain placed it on record that 
it was the custom of the original Chaplains 
who came from Australia to go into the firing 
line with their troops, instead of staying at the 
rest billets behind the line and visiting the 
trenches, as was tlu; more general plan. But to 
return to the position at hoine. 

Not a few persons were anxious about the 
position of clergy under any measure of 
(•orn|)ulsion, but all doubts were set at r(!st 
by th(! introduction of a clause into the 
Military Service Act excepting ministers of 
n^ligion from liability to serve. Qucwtions also 
arose regarding the position of theological 
students, ami regulations were issued giving 
exemption to thcjse who were [)repai'ing for 
" itruriediato " ordination. TluTe was not 
absrjlutr! uniformity nrnong the Tribunals ((tti- 
eerning the meaning of the word " iiiirne(,liate," 
but ("hurch of England aulhorilicH asked only 
for exem|)tifjn for 1 tioso to be ordained oti 
I lie Trinity Sunduv IIkmi onsuiny, and I tins no 



a2o 



THE TIMES niSTOliV OF TIIK WAR. 




THE ARCHBISHOl' 
CANTERBURY. 



ibpeaipa. iLUtot 6- Iry. [Kussell. 

OF BISHOP GWYNNH. AKCHDKACON H. H. I'HARCH. 

Deputy Chaplain-CJeneral. Assistant Chaplain-General. 



real difiiculty vvjis experienced. Of other 
theolo^'icnl students a very large number 
joined the King's forces voluntarily. 

As time went on it hccame clear that the 
organization of the Chaplain-Ceneral's Depart- 
ment needed strengthening, and that fvirther 
supervision was needed at the front. In July, 
1915, the Convocation of Canterbury discussed 
this and kindred questions, and resolved to seek 
a privat(> conference between the War Office 
authc)rities and certain representative bishops 
" upon the whole question of religious ministra- 
tions to the Army at the present time, both at 
home and abroad, with a view to securing the 
best help available, both from chaplains and 
from the parish clergj- at home." The passing 
of such a resolution no doubt lent much support 
to the position of the Chaplain-General, and in 
the course of time important developments were 
announced 

One of the first of these was the appointment 
of Bishop Gwyrme, of Khartomn, who was 
alieady serving as a chaplain, to represent the 
Chaplain-General at the front " and to be his 
deputy there for all purposes connected with the 
Chiu-ch of England chaplains and Chiu-ch of 
England troops." The appointment was one 
that was most fitting in every way. The new 
Dtiputy Chaplain-General was known to be a 
personal friend of Bishop Taylor Smith, and it 
w as recognized in the terms of the appointment 
that the supreme control of the ChajDlain- 
General was not in any way to be interfered 
with. The Deputy Chaplain-General was given 
the rank of IMajor-General. Unfortunately 
this caused a little friction, inasmuch as the 
Principal Chaplain to the Forces, who was a 
Presbyterian, held a lower rank, but the 
difficulty was surmounted by promoting the 



Principal Chaplain, and both ho and Bisliop 
Gwynne were then of equal rank. 

Nor was this the only change successfully 
carried through. An Advisory Committee was 
brought into being, which niu.st have proved an 
immense relief to the C'haplain-General, who for 
the first 12 months of the war was almost over- 
whelmed with work. The names of the mem- 
bers of the Ad\isory Council were not published 
at the time, nor was the composition of the 
Council at all generally known. It may be 
stated here, however, that the members in- 
cluded the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Grenfell, 
Lord Midleton, the Bishop of Winchester, the 
BishoiD of Ripon, and Sir Reginald Brade. To 
secure the cooperation of men so distinguished 
for their service to the State and the Church, 
and so anxious to promote the spiritual well- 
being of the Army, was a great step in advance. 

It was clear, also, that the Chaplain-General 
needed help in carrying througli the very 
heavy daily work of his department, which had 
grown to enormous proportions, and early in 
1916 the appointment of an Assistant Chaplain- 
General was aruiounced, the Rev. E. H. 
Pearce, Canon of Westminster, who acted in an 
honorary capacity.* Again the selection was 
an admirable one. Canon Pearce had had a 
long experience as a Territorial Chaplain, his 
gi'eat capacity as a man of affairs was well 
recognized, and he had very clear ideas ui)on 
what was needed to bring the Church into true 
relation with the Army. 

One more development must be noticed — 
the appointment of Assistant Chaplains- 
General for the Home Conunands, which in- 
cluded the London District, the Ejustem 

♦ Canon Pearce was subsequently, in June, 1918, 
appointed Archdeacon of Westminster. 



THE TlMEiS HISTUh'Y OF THE WAU. 



821 



Command and Central Force, the Southern 
Command (Salisbury), the Aldershot Com- 
mand, the ^^'estern Command (Chester), tlie 
Northern Command (York), and the Irish 
Command (Dublin). The Chaplains of Armies 
and bases at the front were also made Assistant 
Chaplains - G eneral . 

Thus it will be seen that the organization of 
the Chaplain-General's Department was as 
nearly perfect as it could be made. This 
elaboration of the machinery, it should be 
added, was found to be absolutely necessary 
owing to the overwhehning preponderance 
of Church of England chaplains. It was esti- 
mated that during the first two years of the 
war, no fewer than 1,460 additicnal chaplains 
were appointed. These ^ere divided between 
the Home Camps and the different fronts. 

The official duties of a chaplain were laid 
d^wn in the Army Regulations, but a footnote 
to these best expressed the spirit in which the 
work was to be done. This ran as follows : 
" It is, of course, to be understood that chaplains 
will not regard their duties as being necessarily 
restricted to those prescribed by regulations, 
but that they wiU take advantage of every 



availaljlc opportunity for advancing tha 
spiritual and moral welfare of the men luider 
their charge." How liberally and generously 
this " note " was interpreted during the w ar 
by chaplains at home and at the front was 
well known. They displayed the utmost self- 
forgctfulness, and devoted themselves to the 
interests of the men with a zeal and an enthu- 
siasm wliich knew no bounds. 

Before proceeding to give some account of 
their work, it may be convenient to quote, the 
following orders and recommendations which 
were issued for the guidance of Church of 
England Army Chaplains : 

I. At all services, whether in church or on parade, 
chaplains must be vested in black cassock, suiplice, 




AMKK ONH YHAK OK WAK. 
Interc«Mion Service in Vicloria Square, liJrmin({ham. Smaller picture : The Bishop of Birminiiham (on 

left) addressinit the iatUcr'ini. 



3-22 



THE TIMES niSTOIlY OF THE WAR. 







A SOUVENIR. 

An autographed portrait presented by General de 

Castelnau to the Kishop of Birmingham during his 

visit to France. 

hood of their degree (if any) and scarf, with college cap. 
At the administration of the Holy Sacraments* it is 
permitted that the chaplain officiating or celebrating 
may wear a stole in addition to his scarf, if he so desires, 
but this does not apply to the chaplains who may be 
assisting. 

Parade Services. 

II. Parade Services are to be held b}' chaplains at 
such time and place £is the General Officer Commanding 
may select. The form of prayer appointed for Parade 
Services consists of a hymn, a sentence, the General 
Confession, the Absolution, the Lord's Prayer, versicles 
and responses, the Venite, a psalm or psalms, a lesson, a 
canticle, the Apostles' Creed, collects (and special 
prayers), a hymn, the address, a hymn, the National 
Anthem, the Blessing. Chaplains should select suitable 
hymns, and the aim snould be to make the service 
distinctly congregational; hence elaborate music in 
which the men cannot join should be discouraged. It 
is a useful plan to gather out a choir of men with good 
voices and to arrange that they should practise the 
selected hymns, and also the chants for the canticles, 
if such are used. Where Parade Services follow one 
another in succession the Form of Prayer given abo^■e 
may be varied by selecting any parts of " The Order for 
Morning Prayer " in the Prayer Book, provided that 
the above elements are represented in due proportion. 

Xo service in the open air, or wherever the men have 
to stand, should exceed fortj- minutes in length. 

The Holy Commuxion. 

III. The Holv Communion should be administered 



c-st-ry Siintlay uiid on Holy Days ut buch hours in I lie 
eui'ly nioi'iiin({ uuil uttcT (hu Purudti Servient, or ut oilitir 
liiaeti, ai> will enable all to coainiiinicate who desirti to 
du eo. The custom in the Army iu to have two candles 
on the Holy Table ; and to light them at early cj-lcbra 
lions, but not at mid-day (or later) cuifbraliona, uiili'ss 
requiifd for the iiurpoae ot givwit; ailililional light. It 
i» iittual for the celebrant to take the Katitward I'ouition. 
Clia|ilaiii8 ehoiild try to keep u list of oDiceru and men 
\tlio are communicants, and should arrange, if possible, 
for periodical meetings or services ot ]ir<'|iaratioii for 
Holy Cominunion. Whenever a celebration of the Jloly 
Communion follows the Parade Service a suHicieut 
pause should be made before the exiiortation " Ve that 
do truly and earnestly," Ac, &c., in order that any 
who desire to do ao may then withdraw, and tlie celi^lira- 
tion be continued for them " that come to receive the 
Holy Communion." 

i'KusoNAL Deamnqs with Men. 
i\'. Any chaplain who is asked to hear a confession 
is bound to du so in accordance willi the invitation 
eontained in the first Exhortation of the Communion 
oliicc, anil especially with theso words : " And in'iiiiiso 
it is retjuisite that no man should come to the Holy 
Commiuiion but with a full trust in God's mercy, and 
with a quiet conscience ; therefore if there be any of 
you, who by this means cannot quiet his own conscience 
herein, but requirelh furtlier comfort or counsel, let 
him come to me, or to some other discreet and learned 
Minister of God's Word, and open his grief ; that by 
the Ministry of God's Holy Word he may receive the 
benotit of absolution, together with ghostly counsel 
and advice, to the quieting of his conscience, and avoiding 
of all scruple and doubtfulness." It is not necessary, 
but it is often convenient, that tliis should take place 
in a church, church-hut, or cliaplain's room attached. 
The Prayer Book does not advise any set or system of 
questions to be addressed to the penitent, nor docs it 
(except in the case of the sick) lay down tlie lines to be 
followed by the questioner ; nor (with the same excep- 
tion) does it prescribe any form of words in which the 
penitent " may receive the benefit of absolution." A 
chaplain is thus allowed a large liberty in this matter, 
the only restriction being that, in accordance with such 
liberty, he must neither teach, nor act upon the pre- 
sumption, that confession to the chaplain is necessary 
before Confirmation or Holy Communion or in any 
circumstances except those described in the extract 
given above. 

Those recommendations were useful as far as 
they went, but, of course, they gave no indica- 
tion of the variety of the work which fell to the 
lot of a chaplain at the front. " Thos^e who 
think that a chaplain's work is ' an easy job,' ' 
wTote the Bishop of London in his Foreword 
to the Rev. Douglas P. Winnifrith's interesting 
work " The Church in the Fighting Line," " will 
find their mistake ; but, on the other hand, tlicy 
will find that it is a glorious bit of work to be 
called tipon to do. . . . AMiat the chaplains feel is 
that nothing too much can be done, and no 
sacrifice too great can be offered to stand by 
the glorious men who are fighting the greatest 
war in the world's history." General Sir H. L. 
Smith-Dorrien, who contributed the Preface 
to Mr. Winnifrith's work, also paid tribute to 
the "splendid services" of the Army Chaplains 
who " were always near at hand, and showed 
such devoted indifference to danger and hardsliip 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.-iU. 



323 




THE WONDHK OF NOTKIi IJAMK IJKHUlfeKES. 

The remarkable effect of a CJerman shell wliicli struck the nummit of the church of Notre Dame 
Brehieres at Albert. The German t^\lnntrn smaNhed the framework that held in place the pedestal of 
the statue of the Viriiin turmountin^ the Tower, with the result that it fell partly over and remained 

suspended in mid-air. 



8-24 



THi: TIMES HiS'lOliY OF THE WAR. 



in their iuini<^tratioii(i to tho sick >iihI \«(>iiitclf(l 
§ui to place them on ttie liigheht li mI of those 
IteroeH who uro tigittiiig that our Empire may 
prevent all thtit counts tor Trutli, Higliteouw- 
lieKii, unci Honour from lu-ing gruiuid in the 
diirtt." To thif- luird Krenoh'a own magnifi«ent 
tribute may vvtit be added. In his tit'tli dispatch 
he wrote, '* I cannot apeak too hij^hly of the 
devoted manner in which all cha|)lain.s, whether 
with the troops in the trendies or in attendance 
tiu I lit' .-^ick and wounded in casualty clearing 



stations anil hospitals on the lin(> of coinmunica- 
t ions, iia\e worked llirDii^'lioul the campaipn." 

Tliose were oflicial testimonials- and most 
valuable. Was the gratitude of the men in 
any way l(!ss cordially expressed '! A soldier 
from tlie froiit, writing in Nov«<iubor, 1915- 
his letter was quoted in the Sjh'a tutor — said, 
" We have a chaplain uiio conuis up into the 
front line every <lay, no mutter how dangerous 
and rough things may bo ; in fact lie always 
makes for the most dangerous place on 
princij)!e. One day, during a particularly 
hot bombardment, instead of leaving the 
trenches, ' the |)adro ' as he is called strode 
lip and down the line cheering and help- 
ing. . . . All the men worship liim. I shall 
try to find out his name, but at present ho is 
' the padre ' — the simplest, finest gentleman 1 
have ever met, and he has .stood the test." 

Of Parade Services many accounts were 
given. Mr. VVinnifrith, in the volume above 
referred to, mentioned one he held during the 
battle of the Aisne. The first time that lie 
was able to get his brigade together for a 
Parade Service was on September 27, 1914. 
" It was a novel experience for mo," he wrote, 
" to see my congregation with rifles as well as 
side-arms. I liave never heard the hyimis 
' Jesu, Lover of my soul,' * Oft in Danger,' and 




SERVICES IN THE NAVY. 

The Archbishop of York visits Admiral Jelllcoe on board the " Iron Duke." Top picture : A service 

on board a troopship. A 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 



325 




A CHAPEL ON A BRITISH BATTLESHIP. 
A Roman Catholic Service in a troopship. 

' O God our help in ages past ' sung more 
heartily. On the hill, not half a mile from us, 
the Germans were bursting their shrapnel with 
disastrous resvilts." But the services which 
impressed him as much as any were those con- 
ducted for the men in the billets. " They 
would- crowd in and sit upon the floor, and on<' 
was able to give them a straight heart-to- 
heart talk in a way that is not possible at a 
more formal service. It was then that the 
men would unburden themselves, produce 
from their pockets a New Testament, or some 
small book of devotions from which they said 
they had derived much comfort and help, and 
speak of their Sunday school and choir-boy 
days, and of the old church at home." Mr. 
Winnifrith's experience went to show that while 
the soldier mi^ht have a rough exterior, " his 
heart, is a heart of ep](\" and ho fonnrl few 
upon whom religion hud not inkcn a strong hold, 
" though, ordinarily, they do not speak of it." 

The testimony of chaplains was practically 
unanimous to the high character of the men. 
TTie Rev. C. M. Chavasse, son of the Bishop 
of Livfrr|)Ool, when homo from Frari<ro on a 
Hhort furlough, in February, HH5, said that 
while war w»ih a very grirn and a very bitt^T 
thing, the woruler of it all was the che<irinfiSH, 
dogg»;flri#;H«, and gallantry of the Hritish 



solflier. "True, he did not look very much 
like a hero when he crawled from the trenches 
covered with mud and blood, and limped back 
to hospital to a tune played on a moutJi organ." 
The oflficors, Mr. Chavasso declared, were 
deeply religious men, and every morning left 
the trenches to attend Holy Communion. The 
men also loved to receive Testaments, which 
they road in the trenches. One man, a lance- 
corporal, hml brought in a sergeant from the 
barbed-wiro ontanglcinents. While doing so 
ho was shot through the hoatl, but was still able 
to carry his man back to the trenches. , In his 
dying moments he cried, " I brcnight liim in,. 
I brought him in." 

100—3 



B-2G 



THi: TIMl':s lIISTOliY OF THE WAU. 



SuMiluy, <>!' course, wa.s ulwayH a huwy liuy 
with c-tiupluiii.s at the frtuit. Here in the time- 
table of one of theiu : 8 a.m., Holy Com- 
iiumion ; io u.m., Mm-iiiiig Service at the 
cuiii|i ; 11 a.m., Moruiug Service at some 
barrtu-k*; 'A |).m., serviee at the hospital; 
3.45 p.m., service m imothiT hospital ; 5.30 
p.m.. Evening Service in another canip ; 
tj.30 p.m.. Evening Service at the ,SolilierH* 
Koom ; 7.15 to 8 p.m., hymn sing-song at the 
SoKliers' Room. The chaplain wrote of the 
Simclay evening service that it was (piite 
popular, aiul tlmt it was quite pathetic to notice, 
out of the corner of one's eye, hou many of the 
men ha<l to blow tluir noses while they were 
singing " Holy Father, in Thy mtircy, hear our 
anxious prayer." 

Again and again testimony was borne to the 
great work the chaplains accom|)lishe(l in minis- 
tering to the wounded and sick. Not less 
valuable was their work at casualty clearing 
stations, although chaplains thenvselves were 
often conscious of the little they were able 
to do when first the men were brought in. 
Mr. Ciillingham wrote of one .such .station 
where he stayed six weeks : " Everything 
was rush and hurry ; convoys of wounded 
would arrive, bo ' .dressed ' and fed, and 
would be removed by train to a General Hos- 
pital, all in the space of 24 hoiu-s, conse- 
quently the Padre's work is again very diffi- 
cult : the men are tired, w ant to sleep, or 
are suffering acutely, and beyond a.sking you 
to WTite a postcard home, they wish in many 
cases to be left alone. Over urgent cases one 
lingers, but the ignorance is sometimes appalling, 
and in so short a time it is difficult to awaken 
any spiritual appetite in a man who has starved 
himself for 20 or 25 years." Probably the 
chaplains' work even during the rush at the 
casualty clearing stations was more effectual 
than many of them thought. 

One of the siiddest duties which fell to the 
chaplains' lot was the burial of the dead. Mr. 
Winnifrith in vivid language described the 
scene at one funeral. " The eldest officer walks 
by iny side, the six stretchers, each carried by 
two men, follow, and, as we wend our way 
tlirough the farmyard between wagons and 
machinery, there fall upon the stillness of the 
night the glorious words, ' I am the Resurrection 
and the Life, saith the Lord.' Having groped 
our W-iy to the graves the bearers reverently lift 
the lifeless forms from the stretchers and at once 
lower them into the ground. Then the prayer 



of committal and the rest of the Ohunih's beauti- 
ful form of service for the burial of the dead 
are recited from nu-mory. What a multitude 
of thoughts ru.>-hed through our minds as we 
.stood u while beside tin- open graves ! On the 
morr<JW loving hands would phute above them 
wooden cros.s»<s, and successive regiments will 
keep the mounds green." 

It was whiUi proceetling to the trenches to 
take some funerals that anotlu-r chaplain, the 
Rev. {'. E. l)ou(hiey. Vicar of St. Luke's, Hath, 
was killed. He was about to come home on 
leave ; he had his pass actually in his pocket. 
He went out v\ith ch(<ery face and smiling lips 
into the shell-fire zone at about 10 p.m. He was 
sitting in the front of the ambulance car when 
a shell burst close by and he was hit. He was 
removed to the clearing station and ojierated 
u|)on, but complications ensued and he died. 
This was in OctoJjcr, l!)l.'"), and his death was a 
painful reminder that, although non-combatants, 
chaplains were exposed to very real danger. 

Yet their heroism was magnificent. Many 
of them received honours and decorations 
in recognition of distinguished services in the 
field, and one of them, the Rev. Edward Noel 
Mellish, Curate of St. Paul's, Deptford, re- 
ceived the much-coveted honour of the 
Victoria Cross. The announcement in the 
Gazette of Ajiril 20, 1916, stated that it had been 
conferred " for most cons{)icuous bravery," his 
heroic deeds being thus described : " During 
heavy fighting on three consecutive days he 
repeatedly went backwards and forwards, under 
continuous and heavy shell and machine-gun 
fire, between our original trenches and those 
captured from the enemy, in order to tend and 
rescue wounded n\en. He brought in ten badly 
wounded men on the first day from ground swept 
by machine-gun fire, and three were actually 
killed while he w as dressing their wounds. The 
battalion to which he was attached was relieved 
on the second day, but he went back and brought 
in 1 2 more wounded men. On the night of the 
third day he took charge of a party of volunteers 
and once more returned to the trenches to rescue 
the remaining wounded. This splendid work 
was quite voluntary on his part and outside the 
scope of his ordinary duties." Onlj'^ once 
before had the V.C. been bestowed upon a 
clergvHTian — the late Rev. J. \\'. Adan\s. The 
distinctions and honours conferred upon chap- 
lains were numerous. As an example of the 
deeds of heroism which were tluis recognized 
reference may be made to the experiences of 



THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 



.'527 




SOLACE FOR BELGIAN REFUGEES IN ENGLAND. 

Ma<t« he'inti celebrated in a private house near Tonbridge, where Belgian refugees were tended under the 

Red Ooss. 



thf; Kftv. A. G. Parharn, Tf^rnporary C}iu[)lain, 
4th ClaHH (Prec«;ritor of (Jhrist Church, Oxford), 
who rucj-Avnd the Military CroHS. Tho story 
of hirt gallantry won thus given in the Chvrch 
Time/i : " ll'in brigade wiih in the atta<;k 
on the 'I'lirkiHli fiostition at Suvia fjri AiiguHt 
21, wh';n the Hhrii(>H on fiie Anafarta I'lnin 
eaiight fire. Willi tlx; li(l|> of liis nervant 



he rescued many wounded men and carried 
them to a place of safety beyon<l reach of 
the flames, and the following day, obtaining 
a large number of volunteers from his own 
brigadti to act as stretcher-beanirs, he was 
chi(;f1y itistnimental in evacuating the wounded 
from (Chocolate Hill. After tin: l.atllc li(> re- 
iiiJiincd will) fill- litii'iulc ill tlic trenches for 10 



b'28 



THl'J TlMtJS HISTORY OF THE WAIL 



weeks luuW foiiHtuiit fire, luiiiiHtering t») tin- 
wuiuiiluil tutd burying the lU-twl. He reguluily 
celebrated the Holy Coiniuuiiion early eat;h 
luuriiiiig, .siiiiie litiys tvt two or more positions 
in tlie trenches, and during the period mentioned 
atlministered the Ulestied Sacrament to over 
1,000 eommiuiicants. Subsequently he accom- 
panied the brigade in the campaign against tttc 
SeniLHsi on the western frontier of Efjypt." 

The chaplains were not left to bear their 
burtleiirt alone. From time to time they w<'re 
visited by ilistinguished Chui-clunen, who, while 
cheering and heartening the chaplains, also 
ministered to the men. The Bishop of London 
visited the front at Easter, 1915, and had a great 
reception. He described in The Times of 




REV. F. H. GILLINGHAM, 
Rector of Bermondsey. 

April 13, 1915, some of his experiences. (The 
article is quoted in Vol. V., p. 47.) 

Another episcopal visitor to the Front was 
the Bishop of Birmingham, who went across 
more thAn once, and he recorded his impressions 
of one visit in a little volvune entitled " A Fort- 
night at the Front." The bishop was full of 
praise of the chaplains who " have to be busi- 
ness men as well as clergy." 

The Archbishop of Armagh in January, 
1916, also spent what he called " a never-to-be- 
forgotten fortnight " at the front visiting, 
more particularly, the Irish troops. In an 
account of his experiences it was recorded that 
on the first Sunday he addressed the men at 
open-air Church Parade at 9 a.m. At 10 he 
addressed over 2,000 men at an open-air parade 
at headquarters. At 11, several miles off, the 
next service was held in a large field, in which 



a coveretl platform hud been cituted. llctf* 
2,000 men were assembh^tl. Tho last parade 
service was some 12 miles from this, and, 
like the others, was in the ojx'm air. llttro 
over 1,500 attended. In the afternoon the Irish 
I'rimate visited the sick and address«i(l them in 
chtiering and encouraging words. That even- 
ing, at 6.30. he administered the rito of Con- 
firmation to 30 soldiers at a most unpressive 
s«irvico cTowded to overflowing. All the week 
tlirough ho was kej)t busy, and on one occasion 
he experienced the shelling by Iho enemy, 
a shell bursting within 25 yards of him. On 
the following Sunday he hold four Horvicijg, and 
visited the hospitals. Tho devotion of tho 
chaplains and the cheeriness and gallantry of 
the men made a deep impression upon him. 

Yet another et)iKcopal visitor to tho war 
area wa.s Bishop Bury, who had perhaps a sort 
of natural right to be there, seeing that ho 
occupied the position (under the Bishop of 
London) of Bishop for Northern aoad Central 
I'^urope. His experiences were of a n'iost varied 
character. At one time he was with the 
Naval Division interned in Holland, for the 
men of which he held, as he said, "one very 
inspiring Confirmation " ; at another he was 
with the troops after Neuve Chapelle ; he was 
jiermitted to visit the trenches and the firing 
line ; he attended the sick and wounded at 
the clearing stations and in the hospitals. He 
afterwards bore ungrudging testimony to the 
v\ay the troops were helped by the clergy. 
" I have lost my leg here," said one man to the 
bishop as he left a hospital, " but I have 
found God." The witness of a yoimg sub- 
altern was still stronger : " You know, bishop, 
I have had among my men here the hottest 
crowd I have ever seen. I think they must 
have been up to all kinds of crime and mis- 
chief. In fact, they were regular young 
devils. But now they are all changed men." 

The change — moral and spiritual change — 
■RTOught in the men by their experiences at 
the war was vouched for also by the Arch- 
bishop of Canterbury, who, in May, 1916, 
visited the whole British Front. His Grace 
had some exciting experiences. First liis 
motor-car broke down, then as he was pro- 
ceeding to a certeun spot he was escorted by an 
enemy aeroplane which dropped bombs, and 
finally, when he was visiting the trenches, he 
suddenly found himself in the midst of a 
hea\y bombardment. But none of these 
things disconcerted him, and he went about his 




(1) Rev. A. fl. Pwrham, awarded the Military Cross; (2) Captain Adjutant CIreene, of the Salvation Army 
• warded the Military Croii ; f.l) Kev. M. T. W. f:<.nr!in, iiwtirdi-d the Military Cross ; (4) Kev. M. I'. 
Plumptre, of Bcrmondscy Old I'siriih f:hijrch, London, iiwardcd the MilitHry Cr«)»H ; '5) Kev. Noel Mellish, 
Curutt of St. I'aijl'«, F)eplford, awarded the Victoriii Cross ; ((u Kev. (^yril A. Wiihon, (»f St. I'cter's, 
Clapham, London, killed in the naval h«tile of .liilhuid, May ,11, 1916; (7) I'lither Anthony, a Roman 
Catholic f^haplain, hurnt in savinj! twfi sailors durinjt the Rattle of Jiitliind; (H) Rtv. .lotin Cocker, (.]uratc 
t>f St. Ceor){e's (Church, Hulme. served as u private in the Sportsman's Rattalion, killed. 

HKHOES OF Tin: WAR. 

:i2U 



330 



T///-; 77.)//';.S' HISTORY OF THE WAH. 




THE BISHOP OF LONDON VISITS AN EAST ANGLIAN AHKODKOMH 



v\H)rk quite unperturbed. The Primate's visit 
took a fonn somewhat different from that of 
other episcopal tours. It was more in the 
nature of a visitation. He met a largo 
number of generals in an informal conference ; 
he discussed the position with the Church of 
England chaplains, and afterwards held a 
reception for chaplains of all denominations ; 
he held a special service of intercession, at 
which he gave an address, described by one 
who heard it as " simple, sane, searching, and 
strong " ; and confirmed a large number of men. 
No official account of the visit was published, 
but the archbishop discussed the position at a 
private meeting of bishops, held at Lambeth 
Palace the day after his return. The Bishop of 
Worcester, speaking at his Diocesan Conference, 
summed up the position in these words : 

The Archbishop told me that he come back full of 
thanksgiving and hope. He drew a remarkable contrast 
between the state of religion among the soldiers a year 
ago and now. He attributed the change, under God, to 
the strong value attached to religious influence by most 
of the higher officers, and to the work of the chaplains 
organized under Bishop Gwynne. These clergy were 
at one time severely kept at the base, now they are at 
the front. He pictured the chaplains as having risen 
magnificently to the occasion, and having themselves 
grown extraordinarily, and he described the increasing 
relation of religious life to the ordinary life of the soldiers, 
and observed that now it was not only the hour on 
parade which was attended, but that the voluntary 
services were crowded. Of course, there are careless 
men and evil men still in sad abundeince, but the better 
scrt are manifestly increasing. 

Another aspect of Church of England work 
at the front ought not to be overlooked. It 
was felt that it would strengthen men who had 



been influenced religiously if they could he 
united in some form of fellowship or brother- 
hood. There was no opportunity of forming, 
even if it had been desirable, a new organization, 
and to meet the need the Executive of the 
Chiu-ch of England Men's Society decided that 
soldiers might be admitted as temporary members 
for the duration of the war. Each man soadmitted 
wa.s given a card on which was inscribed the 
society's simple " Rule of Life " — viz., " To 
pray to God every day, and to do something 
to help forward the work of the Church." The 
names of these temporary members were 
transmitted to the headquarters of the society 
in London, and, after registration, were for- 
warded to the Secretary of the Branch, or the 
incumbent of the parish in which the men 
lived, with a request that a letter of welcome 
might be sent to them. Thus a strong link 
was formed between the home parish and the 
men at the front, and temporary members 
were urged that after the war they should take 
their place in the Branch \\ here they happened 
to find themselves. This extension of the 
work of the Church of England IMen's Society 
greatly strengthened the hands of the chap- 
lains, created a fine sense of fellowship among 
the men, and prepared the way for retaining 
in full Church membership the men of the 
armies as they came home from the wtvr. 

An effort in a similar direction, although not 
exclusi\ely associated with tlie Chiuvh of 
England, was the formation of " The League 
of the Spiritual War," which was founded by 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



331 



the Rev. E. A. Burroughs, Fellow of Hertford 
College, Oxford, whose letters to The Times in 
the earlier days of the war, dealing with the 
religious aspects of the great conflict, excited 
wide attention. It was formed for the purpose 
of collecting the names of men in the King's 
Forces who had been influenced, keeping in 
touch with them during the war, and linking 
tliem up with their own Home Clivu-ches on 
their return. ^Mr. Burroughs was Honorary 
Secretarj', and Canon Scott Holland Chairman, 
and the Principal of INIansfield College Vice- 
Chairman of the Committee. 

It should be added that the work of the 
chaplains both at the front and among the 
troops at home was greatly helped by the ample 
supply of Bibles, Testaments, Gospels, Portions, 
Service Books, Books of Devotion, tracts and 
similar literature which was granted to them 
by religious organizations, such as the Society 
for Promoting Christian Knowledge, the Re- 
ligious Tract Society, the British and Foreign 
Bible Society, the Scripture Gift Mission, the 
Pocket Testament League, the Trinitarian 
Bible Society, and kindred societies. 

Thas it will be seen that the Church of 
England made every effort to provide for the 
spiritual needs of the troops. It took them in 
hand, as it were, from the moment the men 




At the dedication of motor ambulances at liryaniiton Square, London. Circle picture: 'Ihe Hishop with 
Rev. Wilton (Jarlilc, of the (church Army, drinking tea at an automobile bar-car. Top picture: Tlie 

iiisliop wearin)i liiw medalf*. 
THE BISHOI' Ol' I.ONIKJN. 



332 



THE TIMES HISTUHY OF THE WAIi. 



join»il up ; it laiiiiiitort'd tu them >>oi-itilly and 
reli^iourily while they were in tin* ruiiip> at 
home i it Kent hundredtt of ohapitiiiut tu fiilli>\v 
them up wlieu they went to the front ; it mrtdt? 
provifliun tor receiving them on their return 
from th<< Httr tiiul iuiking thtia up in the ^n'lit 
t'ellowbhtp ol the Churcli. The war enst u 
heavy rebpunhibihty upon the Nutiunul Ciiuroh : 
it rone to the uccdriiun Hpiendidly, and itti work 
earui'il tlie gratitude of all concerned for the 
moral and s[>iritual welfare of the Hritish 
soldier. 

The Scottish rejjiujents were, of course, 
ministered to by chaplains of the Presbyterian 
Churches, tluo provision being made for Epis- 
copalians. The Presbyterians had lonj; had 
otlicial recognition at the War Office. They 



were not, however, represented in the urbaniza- 
tion of till* War Office in the sjuae way a.s llio 
(liurch of England was by tht^ Chaplain- 
Oenerul, but Lord lialfour of iiiuleigii, une of 
the Church of Scotland's most distmguishcd 
sons, was (Jhairnian of the War Office AtKisory 
Conunittee. 

The Presbyterian churches providing chap- 
lains for the troops were the Chui'ch of Scot- 
land, the United Free Church, the Irish Presby- 
terian Church, the Knglish Presbyterian Church, 
the Scotli.sh Synod in Kngland, the FreeCliurch 
of Scotland, and the Free i'rcsbyterian Cluuch. 
The Chui'ch of Scotland had also a temporary 
chaplain on the Indian lOcclesiastical Estab- 
lishment. On the outbreak of the war regular 
and acting Presbyterian chaplains numbered 
only eighU'cn, of whom nine were of the Church 
of Scotland, four of the United Free Church, 
tliree of the IrLsli Presbyterian Church, and 
two of the English Presbyterian Church. With 
the recruiting of the new Armies the problem of 
making provision for the religious needs of the 
men became as acute in Scotland as it wa.s in 




COLONIAL TROOPS IN LONDON. 
Canadians marching Lato St. Margaret's Church, Westminster. Smaller picture: Australian and New 

Zealand troops entering the church. 



THF: TTMEf^ HISTORY OF THE WAB. 



sm 




CHURCH PARADE AT THE CITADEL, CAIRO. 



England, for the flower ot Scotland's manhood 
rallied to the Colours. Indeed, the relation of 
the Scottish Presbyterian Churches to the 
war was shown in the extraordinary response 
made by the sons of Scottish ministers. In 
■i'.i Presbyteries of the United Free Church of 
Scotland within three months of the outbreak 
of war every son of military age, physically fit, 
joined thr- Colours ; and before the end of 
1914 about 92 per cent, of the sons of the 
Man.se harl volunteered. 

The Churches recognized the claim the new 
AniiifiH ma<Je upon their help, and responded 
generously to the call for chaplains. 'J'he 
eiglit*;en chaplains of pre-war days increase*] 
within the first two years of the war to 184, 
and there were in addition a large number of 
Preftbyt<Tian Territorial Force chaplains mobi- 
lized locally for service in Scotland. Of those 
184 <:iifi]i\kiinH thf! largest number — SIJ — be- 
longed to tho (Church of Scotland ; the United 
Free Church carne next with 00 ; then tho 
Knglinh I'reHbytf,Tian fJhurch with 18, and the 
Irish PrfjHbyt«Tian ('hurch with l.'<; the Frn<i 
Church of Scotland Hiij>f»liefl thrr:e, the Scottish 
Hym><\ in Kngland anfl tli<' I'vif I'rcsbytcTiun 



Church two each ; and there was also the one 
Church of Scotland cha])lain on the Indian 
Establishment. These Churches would have 
been ready to find many more chaplains if the 
oj)portunity had been afforded them, and it 
was made a matter of complaint that the War 
Ofifice had been too " grudging " in tho matter. 
The dissati.sf action increased when an addition 
of two Church of England chaplains was 
granted to each of the English Divisions in 
France, and the feeling found expression at the 
sittings of the General Assembly of the Church 
of Scotland in May, 1910, when it was announced 
that the Army and Navy Committee were 
pressing for a similar addition to the nuanV)er 
of Presljyterian chaplains in each Scottish 
Division, in concert with tho Committee of the 
United Free Church and with the support of 
the Moderators of the two General Assemblies. 
Another matter which engaged tho attention 
of till' (^'hurch of Scotland Assembly was the 
f)ucstion of promotion, regret being ex^jressed 
that an arrang(!inent had been saruitioned by 
tho Army Council undcT whi(;h Church of 
lOngland cha|)lains were promoted to a higher 
rank than they would otherwise be entitled to, 



334 



THE TIMES HISTOHY OF 'illl<: WAli. 



fur tilt* j»iir[)(»He of enabling them tt) (lischargH 
the iliitieu of HtMiior ('ha(>lain8. Diirin^^ the 
dehutu Liinl ItuUour of Hurleigh Ktiid hH did 
not tik») the idou of rank union^ irhH|iltiinH ut 
till. It WU.S wron^ in |>i'iiui|jle, tind thu crea- 
tion of extra rank for one denomination was 
undoubtedly iinfuir to othi^rs. Hut, be added, 
he h(»|ied the matter would not be made a point 
of attack agiunut the Church of England. 

The position t»f " I'rincipal Chaplain " on the 
Western Front was held by the Kev. Dr. 
Simms, u Senior Chaplain btilonginj^ to the 
Pre.sbyterian Church of Ireland. He wa.s t?iven 
the rank ot Hriyadier-Cleneral, but on tlie 
appointment of lii.shop (Jwynno as I)e|)uty- 
Chaplain-Goneral with the rank of Major- 
CJeneral, Dr. Simms was promoted to equal 
rank, and he still retained the position of 
I'rincipid Chaplam. It must not be assumed, 
however, that question.sof rank and precedence, 
wliich loomed largely at home, were any sort 
of hindrance at the front to the closest co- 
operation among chaplains of the various 
Churches. The Bishop of London left it on 
record that during his mi.ssion he received 
much help from Dr. Simnus, whom he described 
as a man who had served all over the world, 
and was universally loved and respected. His 
fairness and impartiality were everywhere 
spoken of ; and he and the bishop had much 
spiritual talk and prayer together, Dr. Simms 
a.sking the bishop for his blessing b(>fore ho 
left. 

In the Presbyterian Churches the rule against 
ministers serving as combatants did not 
apply, and it was stated at the Church of 
Scotland Assembly that 85 parish ministers 
and assistants were serving in the combatant 
ranks of the Army. No doubt they exercised 
their ministry among their comrades as far as 
their military duties would permit, but it was 
naturally the regular work of the official chap- 
lains which had the greatest religious influ- 
ence. The chaplains had excellent material to 
work upon. It was said that there never 
had been a war in which chaplains had a better 
chance of making their influence felt upon the 
soldiers, because it was a war in which the 
soul and the conscience were involved, and 
certainly the Presbyterian chaplains were as 
eager as any others. 

The work of a chaplain wa.s sufficiently 
varied, whether at home or abroad. Parade 
.services, voluntary services, visiting in billet 
and hospital, bm-ying the dead, organizing 



clulw, concerts, etc.; helping the men in lluir 
corre8|)ondenee, and answering incjuiries from 
home — these and a hundred-and-one otiicr 
things w»'re undertaken cheerfully and un- 
grudgingly for the benefit of " .Jock." 

Not even at home <'ould servi<"es always bo 
held in ehunh, the dining halls of dii'fentnt 
regiinentH or the Y..M.C.A. hut olttu having to 
be re(juisitioned lor the puiposc. Abroad llie 
places used for worship were still more remote 
from the convj'ntional kirk. A hall Hhatter(«l 
by shells, a bullet-riddled room, a barn, a cow- 
shed — the.se were the plac(«s in which soitMun 
and inspiring services were held. Often the 
church parade took place in the open, care 
being taken when necessary to seek a place 
sheltered Ijy trees from the enemy's aerojjlanes. 

It was not in Franci! only that rough and 
ready provision had to be made for such gatlutr- 
ings. A chaplain with the Salonika Force 
held his first service on the hillside, and a 
picturesque and imjjressive account he gave of 
the experience. " The novelty of the situa- 
tion," he wrote, " and the historic scene 
around us. Mount Olympus in front, the country 
of Alexander the Creat around us, and Salonika 
of Pauline memories at our feet, put us in the 
right frame of mind for worship. And as we 
looked on the mountains of Greece and thought 
of the Bens of Bonnie Scotland so far away, 
we sang with the fervoiu- of our race, ' I to the 
hills will lift mine eyes.' Probably for the 
first time in history the hills of Greece re- 
echoed the grand old refrain of the Scottish 
Psalm, and, though we were on the threshold 
of unknown events, as our lips uttered th& 
words, our hearts felt the assiurance ' My safety 
Cometh from the Lord, Who heaven and earth 
hath made.' " The first Communion service 
was held in an old stable built of mud -bricks 
dried in the sun, with roof neither sun-proof 
nor rain-proof. But such experiences were only 
temporary, for the village priest, when once 
he was convinced of the orthodoxy of the new- 
comers, offered them the use of his chiu-ch — a 
building decorated with pictures, crosses, and 
images. In these surroundings — so different 
from the kirks of the Highlands of Scotland — 
the chaplain conducted service for his men. 
There were no seats in the church, but stalls 
for standing in were all around the chiu-ch, and 
also formed a large square in the centre. The 
native service began at 5 a.m. and ondetl about 
9.30 a.m. At 10 a.m. the fir.st, and at II a.ni. 
the second service for the troops took place. 




The exterior view of a travellinii altar, dedicated to Saint HIisahcth, which was presented to the Queen 
of the Keltiian<i hy M. OjUtermantt-Ucnrichu, of Antwerp. The interior view (hottiim picture) shows 

the jiltar prepared for maNH. 

AN ALTAK IN AN AUTOMOIJILK. 



Xio 



936 



TUt: TIMUS lIISrOBY OF THi: WAU. 




[Russell. 



MAJ.-GEN. J. M. SIMMS. 



For many Sundays could be seen the unwonted 
sight of the native congregation, arrayed in tlu« 
most brilliant colours and costumes, streaming 
out, while the kiltctl Highlanders marched uj) 
to worslup in the same place. Tlie chaplain 
who gave this account added that " it was 
altogether most stimulating to our services," 
and he moralized upon it thus : " It was good 
to feel that Christians so widely apart as 
Presbyterian Scots and orthodox Greeks could 
so truly strike the note of Christian brother- 
hood, that with perfect goodwill each could 
worship God in liis own way in the same 
church. How much sweeter would religious 
life at home become if those who worship 
the same Lord would agree to differ in this 
way ! " 

The good behaviour of the troops no doubt 
facilitated the gi-anting of such courtesies. 
Another chaplain, writing from Macedonia, 
told liow in certain villages the Greek Church 
building was offered and accepted for the 
worship of several Scottish regiments. The 
villagers had seen many wars, and Balkan 
combatants would sometimes lielp themselves 
to sheep and lambs without payment. Soldiers 
were not welcome when the Scottish troops 
arrived, but they quickly earned a good name. 
It was frankly acknowledged that " they do not 
steal, they pay what they promise, they are 
kind to the children." 

The visitation of the men, getting into close 
personal touch with them, was always regarded 
as of primary importance. This was done not 
only in billets, but also in the trenches, which 
offered, as the senior Presbyterian chaplain 



IWksscW. 

LORD HAl.FOUU OF BURLEIGH. 

pointed out, unic|ue opportunities for the 

cha|)lain's ministrations : 

In rest billets (ho wrote) men are constantly taken foi 
variuus dutioH at all hour» of the day and night, eoti- 
Beqnontly it is ditficult for chaplains, who limit their 
visiting to rest bilietH, to know their men as they should. 
The fire and support trenches offer chaplains golden 
opportunities. With the exception of the sentries on 
duty, all the men arc either resting in dug-outs and 
shelters, or repairing their own portion of the trench. 
Having ample time for conversation, they eagerly 
welcome and appreciate the chaplain's visits. It is 
perhaps no exaggeration to say that the surest way for 
a chaplain to become popular with both officers and 
men is to be freauently with them in the firing line. 
These visits are not paid without incurrmg personal 
risk, but the " standing " gained by so doing is well 
worth the venture. 

Ministering to the sick, the wounded, and the 
dying, the Presbyterians, like other chaplains, 
did their utmost to comfort, cheer and sym- 
pathize, and their visits were always greatly 
valued by the men. Perhaps one of the most 
trying duties which fell to the lot of the chap- 
lains was the burial of the dead. A Church 
of Scotland chaplain in France has told of the 
deep impression one such service made upon 
him. Four men had been killed by an aerial 
torpedo, and he had to bury them. When the 
first body had been lowered into the grave he 
asked for the other three. A soldier handed 
liim a small sack ; it contained all that re- 
mained of three brave men ! The service 
proceeded amid the rattle of inachine-guns 
and the spit, spit of bullets overhead. 

At home, at the various depots and camps the 
chaplains and ministers of the Presbyterian 
Churches were particularly active in seeking to 
guide, counsel, and uplift the troops with w horn 
they were brought in contact. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 



337 



In regard to social service, the Church of 
Scotland Guild had been at work since 1904, 
when the first tent was pitched at Stobs Camp, 
near Hawick. Later a Joint Committee, 
consisting of representatives of the Chiu-ch of 
Scotland Guild, the United Free Church Guild, 
and the Y.M.C.A., was appointed to confer as 
to centres of work axid so to avoid overlapping. 
The work went on harmoniously, and when, in 
August, 1914, war was declared strenuous 
efforts were made to meet the new need. The 
Committee appealed for ftmds and upwards of 
£6,000 was subscribed during the first 15 months 
of the war. Large institutes were bvdlt and 
tents pitched in different places, and schools, 
church halls and other buildings were utilized, 
over 50 centres in all receiving attention. 
Early in 1916 the Committee, acting on lu-gent 
appeals from chaplains and officers in France, 
determined to cross the Channel and offer the 
Scottish lads there the help afforded to them 
in Scotland. Two great " Scottish Churches' 
Huts" were erected as a start, and afforded 
the greatest satisfaction to the men. In this 
work the Church of Scotland and the United 
Free Church of Scotland co-operated most 
happily. 

Both at home and abroad the services of the 
chaplains were most highly appreciated by the 
men, who admired their fearless courage. 
Officers bore equally emphatic testimony, 
and in Lord French's generovis tribute to 
the value he placed upon the work of the 
chaplains of all denominations, those of the 
Presbyterian Churches miist inevitably have 
occupied a large place in his mind. It 
should be added that, among distinctions, no 
fewer than seven ministers of the Church of 
Scotland had special honours conferred upon 
them in the first two years of war. The 
Rev. W. S. Jaffray, the Rev. A. R, Yeo- 
man, and the Rev. A. M. Maclean wore ad- 
utitUA to the most Diwtinguished Order of 
St. Michael and St. George ; the Rev. D. A. 
Cameron Reid, the Rev. J. McGibbon, the 
Rev. O. B. Milligan, and the Rev. A. S. G. 
Gilchrist receive^! the Military Cross, while 
aevcral others had their names mentioned in 
dispatches. Minist/jrs of the United Free Chiin^h 
of Scotland also received distinctions, the Rev. 
J. Ma<:K. McNaughton being among those who 
rec<}ivwl the Military Cross. 

77io first iiornan Catholic CommiHsionwi 
OiMfjInins to the Force* were appointed U) the 



Army in the Crimea. Except for a temporary 
increase during the years of the Boer War, 
they averaged, in later years, 16 to 18 in 
number, and wore scattered in military stations 
tliroughout the world. A certain nurnbor of 




CARDINAL BOURNE, 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster. 

" Acting Chaplains to the Forces," who were 
not commissioned, also gave their whole time 
to the troops, receiving the same pay (but not 
the allowances) as the Fovirth Class Commis- 
sioned Chaplains. A larger body of *' Officiating 
Clergymen," remunerated on a capitation basis, 
gave part of their time to the troops stationed 
in or near tlicir parishes. 

Thus, at th(5 outljroak of the European War, it 
happened that there were but 15 Roman Catholic 
Commissioned Chaplains attached to the Brif ish 
Army. Of these, two, stationed in South Africa, 
wore unable to join the Army in the field imtil' 
later ; one was transferred to the Royal Navy, 
and one, in ill-health, was precludetl from active 
service. The remaining II, with one retired 
chu|)lain who rejoined, accompanied the British 
Expoflitionary Force <Jvorseas. 

The creation of the Nf>w Annies, tho largo 
niiinb<!r of Irish and other Catholics who joined 



338 



Till': TIMF.S IllSTOliY OF Till': WAR. 




I'KAVhK Hl<;i(JKl-: HAlllh. 
Irish Guards making supplication before going into action. 



the Colours, abovti till, the new conditions of a 
cleailly war, rendered absolutely imperative an 
augmentation of the Chaplain Service. In 
peace time one chaplain might do duty for 
considerable bodies of troops concentrated in 
niilitar.v stations or in barracks ; in time of war 
the saiitb munber of men are scattered, whether 
at home or on the battlefield, over large areas. 
Furthermore, the realities of war bring home to 
the soldier the truths of religion. In face of 
death the indifferent become serious, the good 
more fervent. Where regular attendance to 
religious duties at stated intervals had sufficed 
in peace even for the best, facilities for frequent 
reception of the sacraments were demanded by 
those who now, in danger, felt their need. 
The need of chaplains cannot be fully under- 
stood unless it be remembered that the personal 
attention of priest to man is the essential part 
of the work of a Roman Catholic Chaplain. 
One chaplain nmy hold a service for some 
thousands of men. No one priest can give to as 
many soldiers in a short space of time the 
attention required by the Roman Catholic who 
wishes to die well. 

To meat the need of an increased establish- 
ment of clergy of all denominations, the War 
Office evolved an excellent scheme of Ten:iporary 
Commissioned Chaplains. The Acting Chap- 
lains were given commissioned rank, and thus 
enabled to proceed overseas. As a class, indeed, 
they disappeared, with few exceptions. This 
was the case of two or tliree priests who, 
belonging to allied or neutral nations, were 
imable to hold the King's commission, and who, 
nevertheless, were able to do excellent work for 
the troops at home. Meanwhile, throughout tlie 



country, the Oflicialing Clergymen and a great 
number of local and mu'cnuinorated pri(!sts, 
many of whom afterwards received this status, 
worked hard for the men in training. 

The new volunteer Regular Chaplain.s received 
the title of Fourtli Class Cha{)lains to the 
Forces, with the equivalent rank of captains. 
They contracted to serve for tliree years or for 
the duration of the war, whichever period 
should first expire. This was later changed to a 
promise not to quit the service until the expira- 
tion of 12 months from the date of leaving 
England. Except in the case of those compelled 
to resign because of ill-health, hardly any failed 
to renew the contract at the end of their year's 
experience of the horrors of the battlefield. 

The Roman Catholic Chaplains, both at home 
and in the field, except when detailed for hos- 
pital, ho.spital ship, or training centre duty, 
were appointed in the ratio of one to a division. 
This was found quite inadequate and the War 
Ofifice increased the establishment to a standard 
of one to a brigade, i.e.. three to a division. 

This scheme, definite and yet elastic, bade 
fair to render efficient the establishment, were 
the priests forthcoming. This, throughout the 
whole war, remained the cluef difficulty. 
Xiunberless hospitals grew up in town and 
country : Belgian refugees came in their 
thousands : attention to religious duties 
became more keen : parochial work had to 
be carried on often with depletetl staffs : 
the local priest had frequently to assist, or 
even replace, the military chaplain : despite 
the generous Government allowances, with the 
rise in prices poverty reniained much the same. 
Yet from the same small body of priests (with 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



339 



assistance from Ireland) had to be raised this 
large number of chaplains. The older priests 
cheerfully \indertook double duty that the 
younger might volunteer. Those who were 
debarred physically, or by special work, took 
the place of others who were free to don the 
King's vmiform. Monks came forth from the 
cloister, scholars laid aside their books, schools 
reduced their staffs, preachers of eminence gave 
themselves to the care of the soldier. 

So much for the recruiting of the chaplains. 
As to their appointment, the special organiza- 
tion of the Roman CathoUc clergy must first be 
noted. Every priest is either a " secular " ap- 
pointed by his immediate superior, the bishop, 
to parochial, administrative or educational work 
in the diocese ; or a " regular," that is, one 
Uving a monastic life, owing entire obedience 
to his provincial, abbot or prior, according to 
the constitution of the Religious Order or 
Congregation, Benedictine, Dominican, Jesuit, 
etc., of which he is a member. Volvmteers for 
naval or military chaplaincies had therefore 
first to seek the permission and approbation of 
their bishop or of their ReUgious Superior. 
Again, the Roman Catholic Priest, acting as 
a Military Ohaplain, is in a very different 
position to the lay officer. In so far as he 
is a soldier, like the combatant o^cer, he 
derives his authority from the Go\ern'nent 
of which he is a servant. As a priest, how- 



ever, the exercise of the sacred powers, received 
in his ordination, depends entirely from eccle- 
siastical authority. Thus if he was to do his 
work, the volunteer for the post of chaplain 
during the Great War was obliged to have ( 1 ) 
permission from his bishop or Religious Superior 
to offer his services ; (2) ecclesiastical approba- 
tion and " faculties " to exercise his powers ; 
and (3) due approbation and appointment by 
the War Office. 

Fortunately no new organization was needed 
at the outbreak of the conflict in order to cope 
with this necessary dual control and allegiance. 
The relations of the Admiralty and War Office 
to the Roman Catholic Church and of both to 
the Roman Catholic Chaplain in respect of his 
status had long been settled. Cardinal Boiu-ne, 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, had 
been appcin':ed by the Holy See years before 
its Delegate for military affairs, and, as such, 
had been recognized by the Admiralty and by 
the War Office as sole ecclesiastical superior of 
Roman Catholic Naval and Military Chaplains. 
Thus from the beginning of the war, bishops 
and Religious Superiors offered to the Cardinal 
Archbishop their volunteers. To him these 
became entirely subject ecclesiastically for the 
time of their service. From him they derived 
their " faculties." To the Cardinal the Govern- 
ment appealed for chaplains, and to him matters 
relative to priests who bore the King's coni- 




PKAYINC; BHFORH I III: CKUCIMX AT ANTWHKI'. 
Soon after the firit shells had fallen on Antwerp : refu((ceN praying before the sucrcd shrine representing 

the Crucifixion. 



340 



THt: TIMES HISTOHY OF THh: WAlt. 




WITH THE FRENCH ARMY. 
A mUitary chaplain returns to his quarters after a visit to the firing-line. 



mission were referred. The local officiating 
clergymen, not being commissioned, were sub- 
ject to their bishops, with whose consent they 
were appointed by the military authorities. 
The affairs of the Chaplain Service were ad- 
ministered by the Cardinal Archbishop of 
Westminster through the Naval and Military 
Chaplains' Department, Archbishop's Hovise, 
Westminster, of which the Secretary was 
Monsignor Bidwell, the Assistant Secretary 
being the Rev. F. Kerr ^IcClement. 

The military side of the appointment of the 
Roman Catholic Chaplains was the concern of 
the War Office. Each member of the Army 
Coimeil had a certain number of departments 
imder his control. To the Secretary of the 
War Office, acting under the immediate super- 
vision of the Secretary of State for War, fell the 
Chaplains' Department. \Vhile the Depart- 
ment for the Church of England was 
under the control of the Chaplain-General, 
that for other denominations came inuuediately 
under the Secretary of the War Office, acting 
under the supervision of the Secretary of 
Sta'e for War, to whom, therefore, the 
Roman Catholic Military Chaplains were 
subject directly. The Army Council, in the 
manner explained, acted in concurrence with 
the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. 
The latter nominated to the former alone 



and was consulted in the movements of 
chaplains. The only exception to this rule 
during the war existed in the case of the divi- 
sions of the New Armies raised in Ireland, for 
which it was arranged that Cardinal Logue, 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Armagh and 
Primate of All Ireland, should nominate the 
chaplains. It may here be added that early 
in the war, Cardinal Logue also, by arrangement 
with Cardinal Bourne, nominated eight Irish 
chaplains to be attached to purely Irish Regi- 
ments (while acting for the brigades of which 
these regiments formed part, there being no 
regimental chaplains strictly). The Irish 
bishops and Religious Superiors were repeat- 
edly appealed to for chaplains throughout 
the war, and all who volunteered ^with the 
above exceptions) were appointed in the usual 
manner, through the Cardinal Archbishop of 
Westminster. Prior to the war there had 
been no Commissioned Chaplains in Ireland, 
where the parochial clergy did duty for the 
troops. Ireland and India, indeed, had formed 
exceptions to the system explained above. 
In India, chaplains were appointed by agree- 
ment of the Govermnent and the Bishops of 
India. 

At home the allocation of chaplains was 
simple. The military anil ecclesiastical authori- 
ties appointed directly to brigades, training 



THE TIMES HTSTOBY OF THE WAR. 



341 



centres and hospitals. The divisional chaplains 
remained as a rule with their brigades and 
accompanied them abroad. Those attached 
to training camps or hospitals, having gained 
some experience, were moved overseas to 
replace casualties or fill new needs, their places 
being taken by new volunteers or by con- 
valescent chaplains. 

In the field the arrangement was more 
complex and corresponded to the supreme 
control at home. For military purposes the 
chaplains came under the Adjutant-General, 
who was represented by the Principal Chaplain, 
resident at General Headquarters. The latter 
was the Senior Chaplain in the field, irrespective 
of denomination, and was assisted by an 
Assistant Principal Chaplain, who, similarly, 
might belong to any creed. All Chaplains at 
first were subject to the Principal Chaplain, 
but, later, in France the Church of England 
obtained a separate establishment. 

For ecclesiastical purposes, the superior of 
the chaplains was the Senior Roman Catholic 
Chaplain in the area. He aided the Principal 
Chaplain in matters military — e.g., the move- 
ment of chaplains, and was in frequent consul- 
tation with him. In France, at least, the Senior 
Roman Catholic Chaplain, Monsignor W. Lewis 
Keatinge, C.M.G., was stationed at General 
Headquai-ters. He also acted as representative 
of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster for 
all ecclesiastical matters. This arrangement 
obtained in all fields, and worked excellently. 
The Senior Roman Catholic Chaplain in each 



area was usually one of the pre-war regular 
Commissioned Chaplains. 

The chaplains to hospital ships were 'ap- 
pointed directly by the military and eccle- 
siastical authorities, and were often priests 
who, because of wounds, injuries, or illness, 
had become unfit for service in the field. On 
arrival at their ports, they became subject to 
the local Principal and Senior Chaplain, and 
cotild be moved ashore, or otherwise trans- 
ferred. In Mesopotamia a peculiar situation 
arose owing to the triple control of the Ad- 
miralty, War Office and India Office, over the 
Naval, Mediterranean and Indian troops. 
Each of these Forces had its own Roman 
Catholic Chaplains. 

In almost all fields local priests and mis- 
sionaries gave great assistance, particularly 
in Egj'pt and East Africa, and in France where 
the French clergy gave considerable help to 
the British Chaplains. 

The Colonial Contingents were accompanied 
by their own establishments of chaplains to the 
various areas where they were to assist the 
Imperial Forces. The Roman Catholic soldiers 
in the Indian Contingent in France and the 
Indian Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia 
were vmder the care of chaplains appointed by 
the Government and Bishops of India. In th© 
field they came under the authorities at 
General Headquarters in the same manner as 
the Imperial Chaplains. The Canadians brought 
over with each contingent a suitable number 
of chaplains, others joim'ng at a later date. 




WITH THK FRENCH ARMY. 
Main in the trenches. 



84'2 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE 11.1/.'. 




Wan Oyh ] 

CAKUINAL LOGUE. 



FATHER FINN. 
Killed at Sedd-ul-Bahr. 



\l:lliol .'■> J-,y. 
KT. KHV. MGR. BICKER- 
STAFF E-DREW. 



They were for the most part bi -lingual, 
Hiid were appointed by the Canadian Govern- 
ment in concert with the Apostolic Delegate 
and the Archbishops and Bishops of the Do- 
minions. Tlicir organization and disposition 
was controlled by the Canadian Chaplain 
Service Office in London, and in France they 
possessed their own independent ostablisli- 
ment in necessary connexion with General 
Headquarters. 

The Australian and New Zealand or Anzac 
Contingents arrived at Gallipoli with a full 
coniplement of Roman Catholic Chaplains, 
furnished with their first faculties by their own 
ecclesiastical authorities at home. In Gallipoli 
the Anzac Forces held a position more inde- 
pendent of the Imperial Forces than later in 
France, owing to the peculiar nature of the 
operations. Thus, while in the European 
battlefield their chaplains seem to have be- 
come more closely part of the Imperial Chaplain 
establishment, in the East they formed more 
an independent department for the contingent 
than a portion of the Mediterranean Expe- 
ditionary Force establisliment. They, how- 
ever, acted in connexion with the General 
Headquarters of the latter, and in Egypt seem 
to ha\-e come under the ecclesiastical and 
military authority of the General Headquarters 
of the Egj'ptian Command and Egj-ptian 
Expeditionary Force. 

The other and smaller overseas contingents 
brought with tliem a few European Chaplains 
speaking native languages when necessary. 

Above all it was the ambition of the Roman 
Catholic Chaplain to be with the stricken 
soldie in time to hear his Confession, give 
him the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, 
and, if possible. Holy Communion in the form 



of Viaticum in preparation for his journey into 
Eternity. This, however, was often impossible 
when numbers of men were making their 
sacrifice sinudtaneously, and over a large area. 
Hence, every efiort was made before d(^parture 
from England, and at the Front in times of 
lesser activity and when the troops were in 
rest billets, to prepare eacn man for the death 
which might so soon overtake him. To tliis 
work was necessarily added that of a secondaiy 
nature which involved parade services, short 
sermons, etc., and other labour for spiritual 
and temporal benefit. Mass was celebrated in 
trench or ruined church and in huts, the men's 
Confessions heard and Holy Commimion given 
them. Thus, at the close of many a battle, the 
chaplain was able proudly to say that every one 
of the fallen had received Absolution and Viati- 
ciun before his death. Before the Battle of Loos 
one chaplain gave over 1,600 Cormnunions. 

As it was recognized early in the war that, 
wliile a chaplain might, in the trenches, assist 
a few who wovdd otherwise escape him, the 
streams of severely wounded would come to 
his hand from a far larger area \Aere he to be 
stationed with the field ambulances or in the 
casualty clearing stations behind the line. As 
a rule, though a frequent visitor to the trenches 
in qmeter times, the Roman Catholic priest in 
action was stationed at the latter posts. 

Extraordinary privileges were granted by 
the Pope in the unusual cLrcmustances of the 
Great \^'ar. Chaplains were endowed with 
powers ordinarily obtained only on application 
to a bishop : permissions rarely granted were 
conceded them : spiritual privileges seldom 
accorded were showered on them. Any and 
every priest approved could mmister to 
soldiers irrespective of many of the usual 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE 



WAR. 



MS 



rliocesan and parochial restrictions ; military 
Chaplains could satisfy the religious needs of 
civilians as if appointed by the local bishop ; 
the ordinary rules of the Liturgy were in certain 
ways simplified. Strangest of all, every 
soldier in the firing line, like one in danger of 
death by sickness, could receive Holy Com- 
munion non-fasting. In regard to the Sacra- 
ment of Penance, an entirely new permission 
was accorded by which soldiers going into the 
firing line and vinable to make individual Con- 
fessions, because of their numbers or of lack of 
time for the chaplain to hear all of them, 
after making an act of contrition for their sins 
and an implied promise to go to Confession in 
the ordinary manner when possible, could 
receive absolution en bloc and be admitted to 
Holy Communion. 

The lesser though important work of the 
chaplains requires little explanation. Needless 
to say they did all they could for the bodies of 
their men as for their soiils. The Cardinal 
Archbishop of Westminster early in the war 
paid a visit to the Front. He made a prolonged 
tour of the camps on SaUsbury Plain (where he 
gave eleven addresses to 3,000 soldiers, covering 
350 nules by automobile in three days), and 
visited Aldershot, Warley, etc. Clubs and huts 
were opened in various places in England and 
at the Front — for instance, the floiirishing 
" St. Patrick's Club for Soldiers " at Boulogne, 



and the Huts of the Catholic Women's League 
adjacent to Westminster Cathedral and at 
Fovant on Salisbury Plain. The Catholic 
Soldiers' Association and other organizations 
helped to sena requisites, spiritual and other. 
And, let it be mentioned, much was due to the 
kindness of the authorities, at home and abroad, 
of the Yoimg Men's Christian Association, who 
everywhere placed their hvits at the service of 
Roman Catholic Chaplains and men for spiritual 
and recreative purposes. 

The chaplains did excellent work, and 
foimd a high place in the honours lists. 
Before the end of the second year of war, of 
those attached to the Imperial Forces, four had 
gained the C.M.G. (one of these being also made 
" Ofificier " of the Legion of Honour), five 
the IVIilitary Cross, and some 30 had been 
mentioned in dispatches ; two, indeed, three 
times, and two twice. An incomplete list gives 
to the Australian Chaplains oneD.S.O. and one 
Military Cross, to two of the Canadians the 
latter decoration. The casualties included two 
killed — Father Jolin Gwynn, an Irish Jesuit 
attached to the Irish Guards, laying down his 
life at Loos, and Father William Finn, whose 
heroic death at the awful landing of Sedd-ul- 
Bahr in Gallipoli was thus described by Renter's 
correspondent : 

Father Finn was one of the first to give his life in the 
landing at Sedd-ul-Bahr. In answer to the appeals 




INSIDK AN ITAF.IAN HOSPITAL. 
Wounded at prayer in the Ho«p!tal Chapel. 



344 



Till': TJMKS HISTOliY OF Till': WAR. 



ttittt were iiktula to tiim not to leave the 8hi|i (tlie River 
l^'lyile), he re|ilied, " A prie.-it'ii place id liesidu the Uyiii^ 
ttciUller." Mhuruupiiii he btu|>|K)<i uu tu the gangway, 
ii lug a bullet thruugli the chnsl. 

( ; ' I i idu livi way acrudd the lighteru, re- 

ceiving another bullet in the thigh, and still another in 
the lug. By the time he reached the lieaeh ho was 
litt-rally riddlet^l wilh bullets, but in tipitu of the great 
|iain hn must have been sullitriiig, ho hiroically wont 
about hid dutietj, giving consolation to the dying troops 
U wad while he wa^ in the act of attending to the spintuul 
requirements of one of hid men that the |in<vst'd hiuid 
wad shattered by shrapiioi. 

FiveImperialChai)Utiu8andHoveralAii.strttliaiiH 
were wouudod, sovenil were injured, tiud a very 
large number, almost all tliose, in fa«;t, who 
served in the Meiliterraneaii in the eiirher [)art 
of the VV^ar), .succumbed temixirarily to ilUiess. 
One chaplain died of sickness, and Father 
Muilan, vvlio acconipanied tlie Indian Expe- 
ilitionary Force in Mesopotamia, after being 
woimded and recommended for ilecoration, was 
captureil at Kut. 

A word might be said as to the niuuberH of 
volunteers from the \'arioiLS dioceses and 
religious orders, but statistics would bo mis- 
leading, since the smaller, with fewer priests 
and sometimes greater work, gave proportion- 
ately to their powers as well as the larger. All 
contributed to the spiritual care of the soldier, 
to whom all owed so much : to all be equal credit. 

Passing now to the work of what are known 
as " The Free Churches," it should be pointed 
out that before the war the Wesleyan ^lethodist 
Church was the one and only Viody of English 
Nonconformity which was officially recognized 
by the War Office. Recognition of others 
came later, as will presently appear, but at the 
first the Wesleyans held the field. The names 
of their ministers had appeared in the Army 
List for 11 years before 1914, and the good 
work done by these ministers, in home barracks 
and in garrisons abroad, was very generally 
acknowledged. Moreover, it is important 
and interesting to note, as a measure of 
their disinterestedness, that, while the War 
Office had been ready to grant Wesleyan minis- 
ters conunissions in the Army, the Conference 
decided that these could not be accepted. The 
ministers who were thus serving the troops 
were therefore designated by authority as 
acting chaplains. The arrangement worked 
well enough in times of peace, but it was clear 
that under war conditions some fresh arrange- 
ment must be made. 

Accordingly at the beginning of the war 
official intimation was received from Whitehall 
that the acting chaplains should be gazetted 



a.s ehapluii\M to the Forces for the period of the 
war, in order tliat they might have their pro|)er 
utaturi in the Army us coimnissioned of1[i(;ers. 
Su<;h a proposal was, of course, reasonabit', 
ami it wtvs accepted by the VVi'sleyan authori- 
ties. At the moment the inunber thus gazetted 
was small-^ — only fifteen, but it «iuiekly in- 
creased. Willi the growth of th«i now armies, 
many more ministers came forward and offeri'd 
tliemselves as chaplains, with th(» result tlmX 
before the t-nd of the second year of war the 
number Inul risen to between 150 and lUO, 
distributed among the honu3 garrisons and the 
lOxpeditionary forces. The chaplains were 
duly gazetted, their selection and nomination 
to the War Office being undertaken by the 
Army and Navy Board of the Wesleyan 
Methodist Chiu-ch, of which the Rev. J. U. 
Jiateson was the secretary. 

But this provision of chaplains was only a 
part of the splendid contribution the Weslej'aii 
Methodist Church made to religious work in 
the Army. Troops in training at home;, 
whether billeted in houses in town or quarten^d 
in camps in the country, needed moral and 
s{)iritual supervision. This work was largely 
undertaken by " Officiating Clergynnen," that 
is to say by ministers who, acting under the 
direct sanction of the War Office, performed 
the duties of chaplains whilst retaining their 
own pastoral charge. Of these Officiating 
Clergymen between GOO and 700 belonged to the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church. Moreover, some 
300 other ministers were appointed for the 
special service of the sick and wounded. 

In its- scope and purpose the work of the 

Wesleyan Methodist Chaplain or Officiating 

Clergyman or ^linister followed nuich the same 

lines as that of those belonging to other religious 

bodies. It was recognized that the call to arms 

afforded a unique opportunity for influencing 

for good the flower of Britain's young manhood 

which had heard and responded to the call, and 

in a Report prepared for the Representative 

Session of the Wesleyan Conference it was 

pointed out that whilst provision was made 

to meet the social needs of young men away 

from the restraints of home, living in a new 

environment and exposed to great perils, their 

spiritual and moral needs were not overlooked. 

On the distinctively religious side of the work 

the Report continued : 

In the autumn open-air services vvero arraagod in 
many of the }jroat camps. During the winter etYorts 
have everywhere been made to wii\ thorn to Christ 
At Aldershot some remarkable scones have been wit- 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



345 




A CFRl'MONY I 
A priest officiating in the mountainous district on 
an altar constructed of rou|{h 

newt^i, OH many aH fifty BoldierH Htanding up beforo 
th<;ir comradeM in tokori of their surrender to Chrixt. 
There have httun conveniionH at parade, aa well an at 
voluntary y^-rvlrj-n. Wherrjvfsr tho B'lldinrs have boon 
camfj<!d or billot.«!<J thoro have been definite deciBionH for 
ChriHt. .Similar resultH have followed tho efforts of our 
ch«»plaini* and Chureh workers in tho fighting lino of 
Franf:*!, Flanders, and tho fJardanelles, and tho grout 
bMV; earnpn. 

It in hardly nRorMwary U* (50 fiirthor into detail, 
but tho ffu;t Hhoiild be not*;<l that tho work of 



N THE MOUNTAINS. 

the road to F'ontebba. Italian troops kneeling before 
boxes covered with an altar-cloth, 

tJie chapIainH at the Front was deeply valued 
by the military authorities. The name of the 
Senior Cliaplain, tho Rev. O. S. Watkins, vva.s 
mentioned throe times in the dispatches of 
. Field-MujMlial Vineount French, two chaplains 
received the ('.M.fJ., and several otheru were 
awarded the MiliDary Cross. 

The work at home had several features of 
special interest which demand a word or two of 



34t> 



Till': TIMES HISTOIiV OF THK WAli. 




KKV. J. H. BATESON 
(Wesleyan). 

notice, if only for the evidence they jjivo of the 
tljoroughness with which the Wosloyan Metho- 
dist Chiirch rose to a senses of its responsibihty 
in connexion with the war. 

For several years before the war the Wes- 
leyans hatl been providing at great expense 
Soldiers' and Sailors' Homes in all the great 
gjurison towns and naval ports of the Empire. 
The capital cost of the buildings exceeded 
£150,000. In all, they numbered 39. They 
were always well used, but never, as the Report 
put it, had they rendered more effective service 
than during the war, and it will readily be 
understood how greatly they were appreciated 
by the men. Indeed, so urgent was the demand 
for further accommodation to meet the needs 
of the thousands of men who ever and anon 
s\velled the ranks of the new armies, that 27 
additional buildings were erected. It was 
generally recognized that this was a really 
wonderful achievement, and that the authorities 
of the Wesleyan ^lethodist Church were entitled 
to wama congratulations upon the fact that the 
cost of it was defrayed witliout making a single 
advertisement-appeal. During the war these 
Homes were patronized as never before ; their 
hospitality helped countless men to avoid the 
temptations with which they were faced ; and 
their social, moral and spiritual activities were of 
the greatest value to the troops in training as 
well as to the sailors of the Fleet when their 
ships were in port. 

Further provision to meet the social needs of 
the troops in training was made in cities and 
towns and villages, by the opening of rooms 
attached to the local chiu-ches as Soldiers' 
Institutes. Such beneficent action was not 




REV. J. H. SHAKESPEARE 

(Kaptist). 



r/v'i,vvr;/. 



peculiar to the Wesloyans ; the Church of 
England, as has been already pointed out, and 
other religious bodies made similar provision, 
but that fact does not detract from the spirited 
action of the Wesleyans ; it only goes to show 
that the Chiu"ches vied vidth each other in a 
wholesome rivalry to do everything they possibly 
could to promote the comfort and social well- 
being of the troops. It was stated that between 
400 and 500 of these temporary Institutes were 
provided on Wesleyan Church premises, and 
that the men using them aggregated more than 
35.000 nightly. 

While providing for the well-being of men at 
home, the troops abroad were not overlooked. 
Every week from the early days of the war 
parcels of comforts were dispatched to command- 
ing officers and chaplains for distribution among 
the men " with the Affectionate Greetings of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church." These weekly 
parcels (some being sent to the Fleet, for the 
Wesleyans had strong work going on in the 
Navy as well as the Army) averaged about 
3,000 lb. in weight. The whole of ^lethodism, 
it was said, shared in this service — service which 
was much appreciated by all ranks. The 
" Active Service " booklet was also circulated in 
large numbers, the desire being to supply a copy 
to every Methodist in the King's Forces. 

The Wesleyans not only provided for the 
needs of the living ; they did not forget to 
commemorate the gallant dead. Memorial 
services were held from time to time at the 
Central Hall, Westminster; a Roll of Honour 
was prepared containing the nanies — some 
thousanfls in all- — of men\bers or adherents of 
the Wesleyan Church who were killed in battle 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



347 



or died of wounds ; and a Memorial Service 
was held during the Representative Session of 
the Conference. Nor was this all. By the 
decision of the Conference a " Memorial Copy 
of the Roll of the Gallant Dead," signed by the 
President, was sent to every home therein 
represented. With the pamphlet containing the 
names was bound up the Memorial Service, 
with its hjanns and addresses given in full ; and 
this kind act of sjTnpathy brought comfort and 
consolation to the hearts of the bereaved. The 
Wesleyan authorities sought also to provide 
information for aU families whose relatives were 
reported missing, and to procure wherever 
possible photographs of soldiers' graves through 
the Graves Commission. 

The number of Wesleyan officers and men 
serving in the King's Forces was estimated at 
the end of two years at 170,000, but whatever 
the exact proportion to the total strength, it 
must be admitted that their social, moral and 
spiritual interests were well provided for by the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church. 

It was only to be expected, after IVIr. Lloyd 
George's impassioned appeal at the City Temple 
in the early days of the war, that there would be 
a strong raUy to the Colours of " the young men 



of the Nonconformist Chiu-chcs," to whom he 
specially addressed himself. And so it proved 
to be. Months afterwards a distinguished 
representative of English Nonconformity said 
that " oiu- churches are denuded of young men." 
This was said not complainingly l)ut proudly, 
for it related to the period before conscription. 
But with this large accession of Noncon- 
formist young men to the Armies a serious 
question at once arose, " What provision can 
be made for their spirittial welfare ? " The 
Wesleyans had been for years " recognized " by 
the War Office and acting chaplains appointed 
according to need, but Wesleyan Methodism is 
only one branch of Nonconformity. What of 
the Baptists ? What of the Congregationalists ? 
What of the other branches of Methodism ? 
Before the war these had not received official 
recognition, and in the early days young 
men, members of these Chm-ches, found on 
attestation that no provision was made to meet 
their religious needs on the lines of their own 
distinctive creeds. Covild they not place them- 
selves under the care of the Wesleyans or some 
other chaplains whose position was recognized ? 
At first the War Office evidently thought their 
case could adequately be met in that way, for 




SI.KIUAN IKOOI'S Al DIVINH SFKVICI- IN SALONIKA. 



818 



THE TIMES lllSTOHY OF TlIK WAR, 



on Augtuit 17, 1914, m coinnuiuicatioa wom 
rufwivwtl by thu Hnnretary of the Haptut Union 
front the War Ottice cixprebning rejrjret tluit 
" ciri-uni8taaft'B! «lo not permit of the appoint- 
ment of any Chaplaina of tliu Itaptiut or Con* 
gregationalist t'hiireliea to accompany this force, 
hut it may he poHuihle for you to arrange with 
one or the other of the Churches named above 
[i.e., the Church of l'!nglan(l, tlio Roman 
Catholic, Presbyterian, or VVoaleyan Churclies] 
for the care of troo|)s of your denomination in 
tiie tielil." The War Oflice, however, agreed 
to the appointntent of " Ofliciating Clergymen " 
for ministering to Nonconformint troop3 in 
training at home. 

Further negotiations with the War Office 
proct«eded apace, and eventually it waw agreed 
that the religious bodies in question nnight 
pro\ide their own chaplains. There wore 
four denominations more immediately con- 
cerned, and to deal with each one separately 
would naturally cause a great deal of extra 
work, which, with the corustant pressure at 
the War Office, it was most desirable to avoid. 
The difficulty was arranged by the formation of 
one " United Navy and Army Board of the 
Four Denominations (the Baptist, Congrega- 
tional, Primitive Methodist, and United Metho- 
dist Churches)," with the Rev. J. H. Shake- 
speare (Baptist) and the Rev. R. J. Wells 
(Congregationalist) as Joint Secretaries. 

The War Office lost no time in making known 
the new arrangonient. The following letter 
was issued to the General Officers Commanding- 
in-Chief Home Commands, Secretaries of Terri- 
torial Associations, etc. : 

I am commanded by the Army Council to acquaint 
you that strong complaints have been made to them, 
from many parts of the country, to the effect that 
recruits joining, and men serving in, the Regular Army 
and the Territorial Force, who desire to be recorded as 
belonging to religious denominations other than the 
Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, 
have experienced difficultj' in obtaining accurate registra- 
tion of this kind. 

I am therefore to ask you to be so good as to call 
the attention of all officers and non-commissioned 
officers to the provisions of paragraph 919, King's 
Regulations, and to say that whenever — on attestation, 
for the marking of identity discs, or for any other pur- 
pose — it is necessary to obtain information as to a 
soldier's religion, his own statement on the point should 
be taken, without any attempt to influence him, and 
should be acted upon without question. 

Soldiers should also be afforded facilities for attending 
Divine Service at churches of their own denomination, 
where this is possible, even though it may not be con- 
si lered necessary to appoint an officiating clergyman of 
that denomination \mder Article 400 of the Pay Warrant. 

I am to add that, in any cases in which men express 
a desire for the correction of an existing inaccurate 
record regarding their religious denomination, such 
correction should at once be carried out. 



Paragra[)h 019 of the King's Regulations 
w as as foUowb : 

A Holdier will be olu'iijilifd under one uf llie following 
douoniinatiouu : 

Church of Kngland ; Preabyterian j Wosleyun ; Hap- 
tist (ir Congregationalist ; oilier Protestant denomina- 
tion (name of denomination to be noted) ; Honmn 
Catholic ; .lew. 

Even after the issue cjf thi.s Icttir there still 
reimiined some cases in which difficulty was 
experienced locally until exj)lanations were 
offered, but before long matters righted them- 
selves and everything worked smoothly. 

The Nonconformist Churches in question 
showed by the response they made to the call 
for chaplains that they were prepared to 
give of their best for service among troo[)s 
who were fighting for King and coimtry. 
The nomination of the chaplains was made 
by the secretary or other representative 
of the different denominations and forwarded 
by the United Board to the War Office 
for appointment. About 120 chaplains were 
so appointed, and among them were many of 
the best known and most highlj' valued of the 
ministers. Tn addition to these, there were 
upwards of (500 officiating clergymen appointed 
for home service. 

In the new establishment of chaplains 
sanctioned by the War Office one Free Church 
chaplain was attached for duty to each 
of the tlu-ee brigades forming a Division, 
and he had to be responsible for all Free 
Churchmen, irrespective of their particular 
denomination, in that Brigade. An arrange- 
ment of this kind naturally tended to break 
down denominational partitions and to pro- 
mote linity, but the one really unifying force 
was the war itself. The Rev. F. C. Sjjurr, in his 
volume, " Some Chaplains in Khaki," meutioned 
a little group of six chaplains who m?t at a 
central rendezvous for the purpose of talking 
over certain phases of their common work. 
" Those six men," he said, " represented 
several denominations, yet no stranger sud- 
denly appearing in their midst could have 
determined, by any outward and visible sign, 
the denomination to whicli each belonged. 
Anglican, Presbyterian, United Board, Wes- 
ley an and Catholic — they are dressed alike ; 
for the most part they hold common rank ; 
they confer together, they pray togetln r, 
they work together. They respect each other, 
although son\e of them profoimdly differ from 
each other." Mr. Spurr added that when the 
war was over, and khaki w us* discm'dod in 
favour of the ordinary clerical costmne, they 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



349 




A VILLAfJE THANKSr,IVING : RUSSIA. 



rriight, nnd [jrobahly woiiUl, unlesH a miracle 
()CJ'-UTTt;<\, rcuew their difT«;r<!nceK quite openly. 
But he hazarded the opinion that never again 
could they be fjuit*; tFie same men an they were 
before- the war. TFie exjierienccH of chaplainH 
in iFie field Hiipplied many instancen of dose 
fellovvHhip anrl cornra/lenhip among the ehap- 
lainH, ffu-h rewly ^nd w illirijf to aHHist the other 
in hi-4 work. Two Htriking ilhi.strationH may 
>>fc 'pjot<:d to rej^rew^nt thin H|)irit. A Free 



Church chaplain was inquiring about some of 

his boys : 

A Homuii Cut liolic priest, freRhoomploxionod and hourly, 
fiiirie Inrwiirrl and in lovely InHli broKuo Koid : "Can 1 bo 
of Hcrvicc to ye to show yo where your boyH are ? I know 
lotH of BiiptiHtH (iiKK'onKrt^nutiondliHtHandodKM'H." Away 
ho wont, and from that day J have not waiitod a friend. 
In tho hoHpituI, an we look at the men's (Iihch, the padro 
will Hay, " Hray, hero's one of yours." Ho camo over a 
distance of five iniliis to toil me a Jtaptist boy had boon 
killed by a shell, and would I como and bury him. 

Tlxis story of a Roman Catiiolic prio.it iiolping 



350 



THh: TIMESi IIISTOHY OF THE WAR. 




RUSSIAN SF.KVICH IN THH MHI.D. 
The Gospel resting on cross oavnnets. 



a Five Chiui'h luinister was inatclied by oi»o 

of rt Frt't* Church minister acting for a l^oiuan 

Catholic j>rit'.st. It was known as one of the 

great glories of the war, and related to a Roman 

Catliolic lad dying on the field of battle : 

He aiiked to see his priest, who however wa.s not 
available at the time. One of tlio Free Church oliaplains 
went to the dying man and said to liim : " Can 1 lielp 
you ? I am a Free Churciiman, a I'rotestant, bin you 
are passing, latl, let ine pray with you." and takiii)^ tlio 
boy's crueiKx which hunj^ around his neck he pressed 
it to the dyinji lips of the lad, and spoke to liiin of the 
great Priest who forgives human sin, and iu His Name 
assured the Catholic lad of absolution. 

The chaplains of the I'nited Board were 

second to none in their self-sacrificing devotion 

to the interests of the troops. At home they 





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RUSSIAN DEDICATION SERVICE IN 
PETROGRAD. 

At a British convalescent home for wounded soldiers. 



and the oflitiating clergymen ministered to the 
needs of their men in training, holding i)arado 
and other services, visiting hospitals, providing 
recreation rooms and erecting institutcR. — one 
of the largest of these latter being dedicated 
t(j the memory of Mr. Percy lUingworth in 
recognition of his interest in and services to the 
work of the United Board. At the Front the 
work of the Free Church chaplains was wonder- 
fully varied, but in whatever they did for and 
among the men they never lost sight of their 
one aim, the spiritual uplifting of those to 
whom they ministered. 

And the work of the chaplains, whether at 
the Front or in the camps at home, was strongly 
supported by members of the Free Churches. 
Emergency Committees of the Baptist and 
Congiegational Women's Leagues were formed 
in the early days of the war for war service, 
and all through they maintained a steady and 
continuous suppl}' of parcels of comforts, 
etc., needed by the men. A close watch was 
kept on the columns oiThe Ti?nes, &nd whenever 
a new need was mentioned or a fresh appeal made 
these women w orkers made w arm response. 

ThiLS were the needs of Lhe Free Churchmen 
in the Army most carefully supplied, and it is 
not too much to say that the work done by 
the United Board tliroughout the war will 
remain one of the brightest and happiest in 
the historj' of English Nonconformity. 

The Welsh Calvinistic Methodists were repre- 
sented by a chaplain of their own denomination, 
for the Welsh Division, who also received oflicial 
recognition from the War Ofifice. 

One of the most noteworthy features of the 
recruiting campaign was the patriotism dis- 
played by the Jews. It was fostered and 
encouraged by tlie Chief Rabbi and other 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



351 



Jewish leaders, and thousands of Jews joined 
the Army. It became necessary to make 
provision for their spiritual needs, and there 
were not wanting the necessary number of 
Jewish clergjTnen to act in the capacity of 
Army chaplains. A careful and elaborate 
organization was set on foot. A War Service 
Committee worked in conjunction with the 
Office of the Jewish Chaplain, and by means of 
co-ordination and centralization progress was 
made in ev-ery direction. Among other things, 
a register was compiled of all the men of the 
Jewish faith who were known to be in the 
Army. Tliis at first was not an easy matter, 
as not all Jews who had joined had so described 
themselves. But when the macliinery of the 
Chaplains' Office was set to work additions to 
the register came pouring in, and an vip-to-date 
record was kept, as far as possible, of every 
man. The value of such registration was 
jjroved again and again. It facihtated hospital 
visitation, and a monthly retiirn was furnished 
by the visitor of the men sick or wounded. 

The number of Jewish chaplains and officiat- 
ing clergJ^T^en, excluding those not working 
under military rule, was roughly about 25. The 
Rev. S. Lipson, C.F., was in charge of the 
Chaplains' Department for the whole of the 
United Kingdom. The country was mapped out 
into area.s, for which officiating clergymen and 
assistant chaplains were appointed. In this and 





l/jinliar. 



HhV. H. III'^ON. 
Jewish (JtiapliiLn to the i'orces. 



[EViot & Fry. 

DR. MICHAEL ADLER, 

The Jewish Chaplain. 

in many other matters the Secretary of the 
United Synagogue rendered the chaplain in 
charge most valuable assistance and advice. The 
work of Jewish chaplains in England was not 
dissimilar from that of the chaplains of other 
denominations. They held services for the 
men — the generous hospitality of the Y.M.C.A. 
in placing their huts at the disposal of the 
chafjlains for the purpose often made this easy 
when it might otherwise have been almost 
impossible ; they distributed to the men the 
.Jewish Military I'rayer Book supplied by tlie 
War Office — an interesting compilation con- 
taining not only the ordinary daily prayers, but 
uls<» prayers for the Jewish Festivals, as well as 
the Jewish Calendar, a copy of the letter from 
Karl KitchciHsr and the King's message to his 
troops; th«^y visited the hospitals, having in this 
work the valuable! cooj)eration of the Union of 
.Icwish Women ; and generally provided for the 
socifil (Mid religions nec^ls of those UMd(»r their 
ciinrgc. In addition to llicsc oidituify iiiiiiistra- 
tions it devolved upon Jewish clmplains to 
attr-nd to all cpn-stioiis incid(!ntnl Ut the special 
rc{|niremontH of the soldiers of the Jewish fail h. 
i)i the work abroad it should be said that; 



352 



THl': TIMKS HISTOH): ol' IllK WAli. 




ON THE WESTERN FRONT. 
Welcome guests of a chaplain. 



the Rev. Miclia<>l Adler took charge of all 
arrangements in France, and there were with 
him also as chaplains the Rev. V. Simmons 
and the Rev. A. Barnett. Mr. Adler was thu 
first Jewish chaplain to accompany a British 
force in the field, and in The Times of March 13, 
1915, he thus describes some of liis earlier 
experiences : 

I found (he said) that I bad considerably under- 
estimated the number of Jews who are with the British 
torces. I have compiled a list of many thousands, and 
everywhere I went I found Jewish officers and men of 
whom I had no previous record. Wherever possible I 
held services and organized the officers and men so 
that they might hold services for themselves. What 
gave me much pleasure was the way in which Jews 
would tramp for miles along the worst of roads in order 
to join with us in prayer. 

On my field cap I wear a badge which is unique in 
the Army — the interlaced triangles, the shield of David — 
and everywhere Jewish soldiers recognized it and made 
themselves known to me. I held services everywhere 
consecrated burial grounds, and ministered to the 
wounded and the dying. Whenever I met a Jewish 
soldier I made a point of writing to his people at home. 

In The Times article Mr. Adler was described 
as " the shepherd of a flock which is scattered 
over the five continents and the seven seas," 



which was only another way of indicating that 
the Chaplains' Department was in touch with 
Jewish soldiers in all parts of the Empire, and 
in all the theatres of the war. 

Nor was the social side of the work forgotten. 
The formation of the Jewish Naval and Military 
Association was a notable step in advance, and 
the opening of a Jewish Soldiers' and Sailors' 
Club at 113a Tottenham Court Road, as "an 
auxiliary to the Y.M.C.A.," was an indication 
of the growth and development of a spirit of 
broad-mindedness and charity. 

And upon this note we conclude, for one of the 
greatest of the outstanding impressions which a 
survey of the work of the Churches in connexion 
with the Armies produced upon the mind was 
that the war had had a wonderfully unifying in- 
fluence upon the various religious bodies of this 
country. Distinctive principles were not inter- 
fered with, but common work for a common 
purpose produced a common unity which before 
that memorable fourth day of August, 1914, 
would have been deemed unthinkable. 



CHAPTER CXXXIII. 

THE EXTERMINATION OF THE 

ARMENIANS. 



The Armenians and their Relations with the Turks — The Six Vilayets — Description of 
THE Country — Armenian Character — Former Turkish Atrocities — The Young Turks and 
THEIR Policy — ^Military Reverses and Armenian Persecutions — The Scheme of Disarmament 

TtTRKiSH Tortures — The " Pan -Turanian Idea " Made in Germany — " Deportation " — 

History of the Atrocities in 1915 — Zeitoun — Cilicia — Van — Urmia — Djevdet Bey's 
Massacres — Heroism of American Missionaries — Sassoun — The Horrors of Flight — 
Treatment of Armenian Women — ^Extent of the Atrocities — Deliberate Policy of Ex- 
termination — German Responsibility. 



AT the beginning of the year 1915 
there were upwards of two million 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. 
By the end of the year, two-thirds of 
them had either been maasacred in their native 
towns and villages or uprooted from their 
homes, while of those " deported " (as the 
latter process was officially styled) less than 
50 per cent, ever reached their allotted destina- 
tions. The rest perished by outrage or exhaus- 
tion on the way, and even those who reached 
their journey's end died off rapidly after their 
arrival, through farninf;, exposure and disease. 
" Deportation," in fact, was simply a method 
of gradual massacre, more effectual in dealing 
with numbers, and, above all, more cruel to 
the individiiul, tliari instant massacre by 
bullet or bayonet. 

When one rea^ls the story of these atrocities 
(and there is abundant testimony from neutral 
eye-witnfrfwes who escaped from Turkey and 
rna/le depositifjns abmit the hccucm they saw), 
one almost imagines cjneself back in the eighth 
century K.c, hearing tifiings of how the children 
of Isniel were " carricfl int/> captivity " by the 
As»iyrian«. This method of destroying u 
Vol. VI rr. Part 101. 



353 



nation has indeed been practised in the Near 
East since the days of the earliest Oriental 
empires. Sargon and Nebuchadnezzar and 
Darius set the precedent wliich was followed 
by the Young Tvu-ks, but the latter had means 
at their command which their predecessors 
never possessed. There was a mxiformity, an 
efficiency, a thoroughness in their work which 
betrayed the Prussian connexion. The depor- 
tation of the ArmoniarLS in 1915 was organized 
from the Ministries of the Interior and of War 
at Constantinoj)le by telegraph and telephone ; 
the exiles were in many cases conveyed by rail ; 
the recalcitrants were overawed or shot down 
by quick-firing mountain batteries and machine- 
guns (th(! artillery being actually directed, in cer- 
tain itistanc(!3, by German of licers) ; and all these 
modern appliances added immeasurably to the 
horror of the crime. The scenes in the crowded 
cattle-trucks and at the jimctions and rail-heads 
of the Anatolian and Baghdad linos were almost 
more terribhj than those on (ho mountain -tracks 
and in the gorges of tho Euphrates, 

To <!Xplain this frenzy of frightfulnoss which 
swept over tho Near East in tho year 1916, we 



854 



THH TlMt:s HISTOHY OF Till: WAii. 




REFUGEES IN CAMP AT PORT SAIU. 



must describe very briefly who the Armenians 
wore and what were their relations with the 
Turks. 

The Armenians were one of the scattered, sub- 
merged nationahties of the Near East. They 
were a Cliristian nation, held together by their 
national chm-ch,* with its Bible and liturgy 
in the native language, but there has been no 
united kingdom of Armenia since 387 A.D. The 
Katholikos or ecclesiastical primate of All the 
Armenians, who resides at the Monastery of 
Etclimiadzin in Russian Caucasia, is the only 
surviving representative of this ancient Ar- 
menian State. Not even a fragment of the 
Armenian nation has enjoyed political inde- 
pendence since 1375, when the refugee prin- 
cipality of Lesser Armenia in the Cilician hills, 
which had been a stalwart ally of the Crusaders 
and had taken to itself a French dynasty of 
kings, succiuubed to the surrounding Moham- 
medan Powers. Diu-ing all the intervening 
centuries the Armenian people has been subject 
to foreign, and for the most part unfriendly, 
rulers ; yet, like the Jews, they seem actually 
to have found a stimulus in adversity. By 
the year 1915, they had spread themselves over 
the world, from Calcutta and Singapore to 

* Called the " Gregorian Church " after St. Grep;ory 
the Illuminator, who converted Armenia to Christianity 
towards the end of the third century A.D. 



New York and California, and, wherever they 
settled, they made their way and made them- 
selves at home. The vast majority of the 
nation, however, was still to be found within 
the frontiers of the Ttirkish and Russian 
Empires. 

The original home of the Armenian race, 
and the seat of the ancient Armenian kingdom, 
is a plateau of upland pastures, buttressed with 
Inige mountain barri(>rs and intersected by the 
deep ravines of rivers, which interposes itself 
between the Caspian, the Black Sea, the 
^Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf, and 
feeds the waters that flow into all four. This 
plateau is intersected, from north-west to 
south-east, by the Russo-Turkish frontier 
established in 1878, and the great advance of 
the Grand Duke's armies in the early months 
of 1916 brought practically the whole of it 
within the Russian lines. But in 1915 the 
Armenian population in Turkey was not 
confined to the plateau. The provinces which 
were considered specifically Armenian and 
which were known to Near Eastern diplomatists 
as the " Six Vilayets," extended west of the 
Euplirates far into the Anatolian Peninsula ; 
Cilicia — the region facing Cyprus at the north- 
eastern corner of the ]Mediterranean, which 
had been the seat of that last Armenian priix- 
cipality which fell in 1375 — was still sowi\ thii-k 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



355 



with Armenian towns and villages ; and there 
was a very strong Armenian element in 
the neighbourhood of Constantinople — about 
150,000 Armenians in the population of the 
city itself, and perhaps almost as many again 
in the Asiatic districts along the eastern and 
southern coasts of the Sea of Marmora. The 
Armenians were thvis very widely distributed 
in Tiu-key, but, as has been said, they were a 
scattered and submerged race. No territory 
was in their exclusive possession. Even their 
native plateau was tenanted in part by the 
Kurdish shepherd tribes, who pastured their 
flocks on the alps and down-lands, confining 
the Armenian cultivators to the valleys and 
plains. In the towns and countryside of the 
Anatolian Peninsula they were mingled with 
the Turkish townsfolk and peasantry. They 
shared Constantinople with all the nations of 
the Near East. It was only in the mountains 
of Cilicia and in the basin of Lake Van — the 
north -easternmost province of Turkey towards 
the Russian and Persian frontiers — that there 
was anything like a pure, homogeneous Ar- 
menian population. 

Thus, in 1915, the Armenians amounted 



numerically to no more than 10 per cent, of the 
population of the Ottoman Empire — 2,000,000 
out of 20,000,000 in all ; but their social and 
economic importance was far in excess of their 
numbers. They were a keen-witted, business- 
like people, gifted with a remarkable energy, 




LANDING RFFUCJRHS FROM A FKFNCII CRUISRR. 
Smiiller picture : A French Nailor carryinji a iimall Armenian. 



85ti 



Tilt: TlMt:s HISTORY OF THE WAIi. 



uml with an inihiHtry wliich ihuiIh i\w luoHt of 
what their energy Hchieveil. They litiil in- 
herited an aniuent and deep-rooted eiviiixation, 
and they had been invigorated liuring the last 
century hy inihsionary infliieni-ert from tlin 
Wetjt. The coining of the Jesuit and Ainerican 
nuHHionaries to Armenia, and the counter- 
inovement8 of Armenian enjigrants to Venice 
and Lemberg, Mar«eiUe8 and London and New 
York, brouglit the Armenian i)eople into 
living contact witli VV'eKttun Europe, and raised 
them in civilization altogether above their 
Moslem neighbours and fellow-citizens. 

The result was that, by 1915, the Armenians 
had risen to extreme social and economic import- 
ance in Turkey. In all parts of the Empire, 
except the Arabic provinces of the south-east, 
they had taken on themselves the functions of a 
middle or professional class. The big import 
merchants and wholesale dealers at Constanti- 
nople were recruited from their ranks ; tht^y 
were the bankers and shop-keepers of the pro- 
vincial cities ; and skilled work, whether of 
brain or hand, was so entirely dependent on 
Armenian practitioners, that it literally camo to 
a standstill when the Armenian population of 
any given locality was massacred or carried into 
exile. " Now that the Armenians are gone," 
write several witnesses from different centres, 
in almost identical words, " there are no doctors, 
chemists, lawyers, smiths, potters, tanners, 
weavers left in this place " — and so on, through 
the whole catalogue of trades. So far as the 
Ottoman Empire kept abreast with the intellec- 
tual and technical progress of the modern world, 
it did so through the enterprise and intelligence 
of its Armenian citizens. 

But the position which the Armenians had 
won for themselves in the country by their 
natural capacities did not at all correspond to 
the position assigned to them under the tradi- 
tional constitution of the Ottoman State. The 
Ottoman State, like the Hapsburg and Hohen- 
zoUern States with which it entered into alliance, 
is based on the antithesis of democracy — on the 
forcible domination of one race, or rather one 
caste, over a subject population, and in Tiu-key 
this domination took on an even cruder form 
than in Central Eiirope. The Moslem con- 
querors were a chosen people ; the conquered 
Christians were " Rayah " — cattle — who were 
hardly regarded as integral members of the 
State. But such extreme injustice had pro- 
voked rebellion, and in the course of the nine- 
teenth century the Ottoman Empire was out 



short by the breaking away of one Christian 
nationality after another. The junjcess culmi- 
nated in the Balkan War of 1U12, which almost 
ejected the Turks from Eurojje, and left their 
former Christian subjects on the EurojMfan 
continent organized in indeptuulent national 
States. The war of 1912 pra(!tically conliiunl 
the problem of the subject nationalities to the 
single problem of the Armenians. 

Unlike their fellow-subjects in Europe, the 
Armenians had never played for i)()litica! indti- 
pcndonco. When 'i'urkey was beaten by Russia 
ill 1878 and many Balkan populations obtained 
their freedom from Turkish rule, the Armenians 
merely asked for a reform of administration in 
the six north-eastern provinces of Turkey in 
Asia (thereafter known as the " Six Vilayets "), 
and they limited themselves to the samo demand 
when Turkey was prostrate once more in 1913. 
This moderate policy was dictated by obvious 
national interests. Scattered as they were 
through the length and breadth of Asiatic 
Turkey, the whole Empire was tluur potential 
economic heritage, while no part of it was 
sulliciently their own in population to make of 
it a politically independent Armenian State. 
They had therefore everything to gain from the 
maintenance of Turkish integrity, if only the 
injustice of their present status in Turkey were 
reformed ; and the Turks, in turn, had every 
interest (if they were wise enough to see it) in 
giving the Armenians reasonable ci\'il rights and ' 
a free hand in the economic sphere ; for the 
Armenians were the only native element which 
could regenerate the country and keep it in line 
with modern developments from within. If 
the Armenians were hindered from doing this, 
it was clear to any observer that it would be 
done by some covetous and high-handed Power 
from outside, and this is precisely what hap- 
pened. By eliminating the Armenians in 1915, 
the Tiu-ks merely opened a wider door to the 
German interloper. 

Ever since 1878, the year in which Turkey 
had to cede to Russia the north-eastern part 
of the Armenian plateau and the Ottoman 
Armenians first asked for administrative 
reforms, the Armenian people had been singled 
out by the Ottoman Government for repression. 
The Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid (1870-1908) con- 
ceived the idea of re-arming the Kiu-dish tribes 
(who had been disarmed \\ith infinite pains by 
his predecessor Malunud, fifty years before), 
and giving them carte blanche, as " Hamidia " 




IHh Dhl-ENCH Ol- VAN: ARMENIANS IN THE TKENCHES. 



101-2 



858 



77//'; riMi':s nisronv of tiii: war. 



(Irregtilcir (it^iulHi'ineriM), to rub thu guutU aiul 
I'upo thti wointMi ot tht^ir ilt^t'tuH^tiltMM Arinonimi 
iioi^hbuuiij. 'I'hiis policy |)ro\ oktul an AiiiuMiiua 
I'twolutioiiary inovt)iuuiit, tiiul v\itliiii iivo ytuirs 
uf th» uriiiiu^ of the Kuniti racial I'tHtliiig wa.s 
HO envuiioiiuHl uu botli uideM that Abil-ul-Maiiiid 
waM able to ort^aai/e a neriuH of AriuDiiiaii 
luaMHacrnH ( 1894-0) in the chief Ariaeaian ceatroa 
of the Kaipire, eulaiiaatia^^ ia aa opea butchery 
in the atreeta of Cua-staaliaople. The I'owers 
were paralyzed by mutual jealousy, and were 
a.s little able to stop the slaughter in 1894-6 
AH they had been to iatpost^ the adaiiaistrative 
refornw stipulated at Berlin in 1878. la these 
niaHsacres about 100,000 pcuiple ptjrished (the 




figure is dwarfed by the statistics of 1915) aad 
the Araieaiaa population ia Turlctty was further 
thiaatHi by tlu^ atceieiated current of eaiigra- 
tion. 

Abdul lliuuid'.s work ia 1891 (i uus ci-ownod 
aad coaiplete<l iii 191") by tlit* ^'ourij^ Ttu'Us, 
aad yet, whea the Youag Turkish llevolution- 
aries overthrew the Sultaa ia 1908, the Ar- 
aieaiaas iauigiaed (and not without justifica- 
tion) that a better day had dawned. The 
Young Turks had drunk in ail tlio political 
ideas of Western Kuropo. Tlufy preached the 
" Liberty, Kcpmlity and Fraternity " of the 
French H(»volution ; they s(»t uj) a parliamen- 
tary constitution, and the Arnuinian revolu- 
tionary societiivs joyfully transformed tlunn- 
selvos into parliamentary parties, liut there 
was another aspect of the Young' Tm-kish 
programnu*. Thi^'o was an " e(|uality before 
the law," for instance, wliidi principally 
declared itself in the extension to Christian 
citizens of compulsory military service, which 
formerly had b(>en obligatory on Moslems alone. 
And there was a doctrine of " Ottomanization " 
(that is, of assimilating all other peoples in the 
]*]mpire to the dominant Turkish race), wliich 
quickly drove the Armenian members of parlia- 
ment to the opposition benches, where they 
voted side by side with the Arabs against such 
ominous proposals as the compulsory use of 



YOUTH AND AGE. 
A wedding in the refugees' camp. Circle picture : The oldest refugee in camo. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



359 




RECREATIONS IN CAMP. 
Children at play after school hours. 



the Turkish language in all secondary schools. 
The Young Turks, in fact, had imbibed the 
chauvinism as well as the -liberalism of their 
West-European ensamples. To the religious 
fanaticism of the Old Turk they had added the 
new-fangled fanaticism of language and race, 
and it was simply a question which of their two 
incompatible ideals wovdd vdtimately prevail. 
TTie years 1908 to 1914 were the critical period. 
In the sununer of 1908 the Young Turkish 
regime began with a veritable Golden Age; 
but in six weeks that had pa.s.sed, and, under 
the influence of failures and misfortunes, 
chauvinism stea/Jily gained the upper hand, 
while the power of the party became concen- 
trated in the hand.s of a gang of unscrupulous 
adventurers. Within a year of the constitu- 
tion came the new outbreak of massacre 
at Adana, \)\it the Armenians were not alienated 
even by that. It was represcmted at the 
time a*! a device of Abd-ul-Hamid's adherrmts 
for diw;rediting the new rc'jime, and the 
a<^rtual guilt oi the Young Turks th(;m- 
»elve« was not fliwiiosed till Inter oti. fn 
1912, when the Ijalkan War broke out and th(j 
ArrnenianH w»;re f;alled upf)n, under" the new 
law, to w.Tve the Ottoman State in arms, they 
fu-x^yiitU;<\ thernWilvcH ho well in doing f)aftle 
for th<! roiniiKni fathfrrlund of Armeniaii iinrl 
Turk, tfiat thev exU<rted the eoinm(;nr|)ition 
of th'^ir Turkish oiTictrrH. In I Oil' (he Young 
Turks (ucjfitftl (with rnodifieationH) flic rjrvv 



reform scheme for the " Six Vilayets." It 
seemed that the breach might still be averted, 
and the liberal tendency prevail ; but all hope 
was lost when the Young Turkish Government 
deliberately involved the country in the 
European War. 

The Young Turks entered the war from 
thoroughly Prussian motives. Their object 
was to restore Young Turkish prestige — their 
international prestige by territorial conquests 
at the expense of Russia and Persia and Great 
Britain which would eclipse the territorial 
losses of the Balkan War, and their prestige at 
home by a drastic process of Ottoinanization 
and the solution of otlu^r problems which had 
not yielded to negotiation and parliamentary 
procedure. In fact, the Gordian knot in 
which they had entanglefl themselves during 
their half-dozen years of jxjwer was to be 
hacked through by the sword. Their first l)id 
was for military success, but v\ h(!n the offen- 
sives launched successively on the (Caucasian, 
J'ersian and Egyptian fronts Imd successively 
come to grief, they threw themselves all tlio 
morf! savagely into the project of Oltoirmnizu- 
tion at home, which meant, in eltect, the 
ej^terrnination of the Armenian race. 

An almost exact correHponrlciici" ciui bo 
traced in (lie "Voiing 'I'urkisli ({ovi-innient's 
policy between Itu^ir revcrsc^s iil I lie Ifont iitid 
llicir |)<THcciil ioM (if the Ai'iiicnians in I lie 



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THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAll. 



80 1 



interior. The sufferings of the Arnu'nians 
began indeed with the declaration of war, for 
all male Ottoman citizens between the ages of 
twenty and forty-five, and soon between those 
of eighteen and fifty, were mobilized without 
distinction of religion or privilege, and Ar- 
menians who had passed the age of training 
before the ratification of the new military 
service law of 1908, and were therefore legally 
exempt so long as they paid their annual 
commutation-tax, were thus called up in 
violation of their rights. There was also a 
wholesale requisitioning of private property 
for military use, which liit the Armenians 
more heavily than other sections of the com- 
munity, because they were the principal mer- 
chants and dealers and shopkeejjers of the 
country. 

But all these measures were prima facie 
mihtarj' rather than political in intention, 
and might be ascribed to the pressiire of war 
as plausibly as to the discrimination of the 
Government. Young Turkish circles were in 
an optimistic mood, and they hoped that the 
confidently expected succes.ses at the front 
would solve all their problems for them at one 
stroke. When the Young Turkish Govern- 
ment declared war on the Allies in the latter 
part of October, 1914, the " Dashnaktzoutian 
Party " — the chief Armenian parliamentary 
group in the Ottoman Empire — happened to 
be holrling its annual party convention at 
Erzerum, anrl the Young Turks sent emis- 
saries to lay proposals before this congress. 
They projjosed that the Armenians, as a nation, 
shonlrl make common cause with the Ottoman 
Government in prosecuting the war. They 
8uggf?Hted that the Dashnaktzoutian leaders 
should raise bands of Armenian volunteers to 
yt'in in the coming invasion of Russian Cau- 
casia ; and, as a rewanl, they sketched a pro- 
ject for breaking u[) a larg*; zone of Russian 
territory into autonornrjus national states 
under Ottoman suzerainty. The most sub- 
stantial of these protectorates was to bo the 
Armenian one, and the Young 'I'urkish emis- 
saries even hinted at the possibility of incf)r- 
\)<>Tn\\uii with it f>arf, at least, of the Ottoman 
provirues of fiitlis >irid Van all this on con- 
dition that thf; Artfienians cofjpfrrated with 
them lifrart au'l soul in \\if war. These ambi- 
tious overtun« wcrre met by the Dashnaktzou- 
tian T'onference with a flr!cide<l refusal. Tlicy 
ha/1 no fjuarrel with Kussia ; they doubted 

til*' pOW<T of tlltr 'i'urkistl f i0VfTIUfl<-|lt to 



conquer the territory it was sf) comf)lacontly 
partitioning on the map ; and they doubted 
still more whether it would fulfil its engage- 
ments if it were really to gain such an over- 
whelming success ; they could not forgot that 
the Turks had treated them as aliens and 
almost as outlaws in the past, and the appeal 
for an Armeno-Turkish entente was crossed 
in 1914 by the shadow of the Adana massacres 
and the massacres of Abd-ul-Hamid. The 
Armenians affirmed their intention of doing 
their duty as Ottoman subjects, but declined 
the proposal that they should do more, and 
here matters rested for the moment, while 
everybody's attention was concentrated upon 
the winter offensive. 

The coiu-se of these military operations has 
already been described in detail.* The main 
enveloping movement in Caucasia, which looked 
so promising in the last week of December, 1914, 
turned to disaster in the first days of January, 
1915 ; the subsidiary advance further east, 
which had brought most of the Persian province 
of Azerbaijan under Turkish occupation, ebbed 
again in the coiu-se of the same month in con- 
formity with events in the principal theatre ; 
in Febrviary Djemal Pasha's much-advertised 
expedition against Egypt ridiculously missed 
fire. The Turkish offensive was over and done 
with. The Turkish armies had fallen back 
ignominiously upon their own frontiers, with the 
prospect of facing a counter-invasion in the 
coming spring. Under these circumstances the 
swollen hopes of the Young Turkish Government 
gave way to a feverish pessimism, and the 
Armenian nation was the inevitable scapegoat 
of their renewed disappointment and their 
irreparably damaged prestige. 

Several factors conibined to sharpen their fear 
and hate. The danger of invasion was much 
more imminent on the Russian front than on 
the others. The next carni)aign in this quarter 
was almost certain to be fought on Ottoman 
territory^on the Ottonuin portion of the Arme- 
nian plateau with its strong Armenian popula 
tion, which had been hopele.ssly alienated from 
t he Ottoman Government by the previous policy 
of th<! Young Turks th(!m<elves, and was likely 
to givf! a cordial reception to the invaders. The 
fri<:iidly ftn-ling towards Russia which was 
cherished by the Armenian nation as a vsholc 
luul indeed been brought home to the Tui-ks 
in the course of the winter campaign. The 

• Sfii \'>)l. III., CliaphT 1,1., luid Vol. I V.. (;iiiii)t<>r 
L.NMII. 



8fi'2 



Till': TIMES IllSTOTiV OF THE WAR, 








MOSUL. 



Russian Armenians had clone of their own accord 
what tlie Ottoman Armenians had refused, when 
appealed to, to do. They had raised bands of 
volunteers for their Government's service, and 
had contributed valiantly to the discomfiture 
of the Turkish armies at Ardalian and Sari- 
kamish. Of course the Turks had no proper 
ground for resentment in this. These Armenian 
volunteers were lawful Russian subjects, doing 
battle for the State to which their allegiance was 
legally due. If the Ottoman Armenians had 
not been moved to do likewise, that was a serious 
reflection on the behaviour of Turkey towards 
her Armenian subjects as compared with the 
behavioiu* of Russia. But the Young Turks 
were in no condition to consider the cold truth. 
Their armies had been disastrously beaten ; 
there had been Armenians in the enemy's 
ranks, some of whom had come all the way from 
New York in their eagerness to beat the Tiu-ks. 
Well, they would take their revenge on those 
other Armenians who still remained in their 
power. It was in this spirit that, at some time 
during the course of February, 1915, the Yoimg 
Turks made up their minds to strike at the 
Armenians with all their might. 

But before a comprehensive scheme could 
be set on foot the Armenians must be rendered 
powerless to resist, and so the first step taken 
was to deprive them of their arms. En\'er 



Pasha, at the Ministry of War, undertook to 
deal with the Armenian soldiers. In the very 
month of February, 1915, ho had praised the 
conduct of the Armenian troops in an interview 
with the Gregorian Bishop of Konia, and had 
even allowed the Bishop to communicate his 
words, fortified with his signature, to the 
Armenian and the Turkish Press. Yet within 
a few weeks of this the order came from the 
War Ministry that all Arn^enians in the Army 
were to be disarmed. They were drafted out of 
the service battalions and re-formed into labour 
battalions, to work behind the front at throwing 
up fortifications and building roads. At the 
same time, under instructions from the Ministry 
of the Interior, the provincial administrative 
authorities set about disarming the Armenian 
civil population. The Armenians had, in fact, 
possessed themselves individually of a certain 
nvimber of arms since the year 1908 — and this 
by the permission and even advice of the 
Young Turks themselves ; for in their earlier 
and better days the Yoimg Tvu-ks had been 
genuinely desirous of restoring indi\idual liberty 
and creating an equilibrimii between the diffe- 
rent races of the Empire, and as it w as beyond 
their power to undo Abd-ul-Haniid's work by 
disarming the Kurds, they attempted to restore 
the balance by sanctioning the acquisition of 
arms by the Armenians. The private bearing 
of arms for personal defence was an establit-hed 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



863 



privilege of the Ottoman ^losleni, and the 
Young Turks were only carrying out their 
avowed principles in extending the privileges as 
well as the duties of the Moslem to his Christian 
fellow-citizens. Now, however, this Uberal 
policy was arbitrarily reversed. It was declared 
that the young Armenians of military age had 
been taken for the Army in a lesser proportion 
than the Tiu-ks, and that, in the critical military 
situation of the moment, their presence in the 
interior with arms at their command was a 
menace to the security of the state. Violent 
measures were enjoined by the Central Govern- 
ment to meet the alleged emergency. In every 
town a nimaber of Armenian men, amounting 
in the larger places to as many as four or five 
hvindred, were suddenlj- arrested and thrown 
into prison. It was announced by the local 
governor of whatever place it might be that a 
certain niimber of rifles were believed to be in 
the private possession of the Armenians of the 
district, and that that niomber must be delivered 
into the hands of the authorities by a certain 
date. If they were not forthcoming, the 
severest punishment would fall upon the host- 
ages in prison, in the first instance, and, in a 
secondary degree, upon the Armenian coni- 
munity as a whole. 

The Annenians were very unwilling to siu-- 



render their arms, for they realized that by 
doing so they would place themselves entirely 
in the Government's luinds, and thej'^ remem- 
bered that the massacres of 1908 and 1894-6 
had been preceded by a precisely similar 
demand. But the clergy and the political 
leaders (especially the leaders of the Dashnakt- 
zoutian Party, who had once worked with the 
Yoimg Turks in the Ottoman Parliament) 
realized very strongly the importance of avoid- 
ing a breach and of giving the Government no 
pretext for putting the Armenians in the wrong. 
Generally a nieeting of the local Armenian 
notables was convened to decide what action 
should be taken in view of the Government's 
decree. One neutral witness (a Danish sister 
serving with the German Red Cross in a certain 
Asiatic town) describes how, when the Armenian 
meeting was unable to arrive at a decision, it 
was resolved to invite the Turkish notables of 
the place to hold a joint conference with the 
Armenians. In tliis case the Armenians were 
induced to deliver up their weapons by a 
guarantee, on the part of their Turkish neigh- 
bours, that they, personally, would see to it 
that no harm came to them through taking this 
step. Possibly these local Turks were sincere 
in their undertaking, but, in the instance in 
question, the Governor had the arms photo- 




A (JOHNhK ()l 1 m-: TOWN Ol' VAN, 
bhowinii the f^afillc Kock in the distance. 



8«; 1 



'/'///•; TIMES msiouY (>/.' v'///-; 



WAR. 



grA[t\ivd HM goon as they were brought in, and 
bt^nt thti photograph to Ctuuituntinttplf, .^ul) 
Mittting it as proof of un iiiiiiiintuit Armenian 
rebellion, anil tisking what aition the (io\'ern- 
inent deeiirecl hini to take. The CJovernnient 
telegraphtil bai-k that it gave him a free hanti, 
anil there followfii in that pUictt a succeHnion of 
atrocities on the fittimlanl [)attern that will he 




set forlli in the Heiiud. in (his instance tho 
l:>»al governor and the central authorities were 
ohviourtly in eolhi.sion. 'J'hi-re were certain 
caseM, it IS true, in which the local administrators 
refused to carry out the atrocious instructions 
trom Constantinople sjich honourable oflicials 
were [)n)mptly relieved of (heir posts and re- 
pliictd by more pliant tools — and there were 
instances of well-intentioned but weak-minded 
governors who were overl)orne l)y tlie heml of 
the local branch of the Committee of Union and 
I'ldgress (as at Trebizond) or even by a junior 
olUcial in their ouii entourage (as, in a certain 
degree, at Kharput). Hut in llic majority of 
cases there was evidently a complete under- 
standing between the central and the local 
authorities. On the question of policy they 
saw eyi! to eye, and an excellent telegraph 
system kcjit them \ery effectively in touch. 
Apparent disagreements or discrepancies can 
nearly always bo traced to a prudent intention 
of concealing the origins of the crime and 
obscuring the ultimate responsibility for it. 

The Armenians, as has been said, were 
unwilling in the first instance to surrender 
their arms, but, as soon as they had decided 
to do so, they were painfully anxious to obtain 
arms to surrender. Even since they received 
permission to bear arms in 1908, they had not 
possessed themselves of sufficient to go round. 



DINNER IN CAMP. 

Refugees preparing a meal. Smaller picture : Carrying dinner to the camp. 



THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 



305 



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FOOD FOR THE REFUGEES. 

Carrying bread and stores to the store-house. 

Circle picture : Serving out dinner. 

and the local authorities were now demanding 
an arbitrary and excessive total. In many 
places horrible tortures were inflicted upon the 
hostages in prison. They were bastinadoed till 
their feet were reduced to a pulp (the process 
is described in detail in the depo.sition of a 
German mi.ssionary) ; their hair was plucked 
out ; their nails were torn out by the roots. 
A black.smith employed by an American 
college in a certain place was almost beaten to 
death on the charge of having " constructed a 
bomb " — the bomb in r^uestion was a salid 
iron shot which he had been forging for the 
competition of " putting the weight " at the 
forthcoming college sports. In the same 
place a real bomb was unearthed by the 
gfndarmerie in the Armenian burial ground ; 
VMjt it was so rusty with age that it obviously 
dated from th