[[ Mirrored from archive.org, with more info at http://www.314th.org/times-history-of-the-war/times-history-of-the-war.html ]] The Times HISTORY OF THE WAR Vol. IX PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE. PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES" PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON. 1916 CONTENTS OF VOL. IX. CHAPTER CXXXVII. The Russian Offensive of 1916 : First Phase ... ... ... ... ... 1 CHAPTER CXXXVin. The Battle OF Verdun (III.) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 4 1 CHAPTER CXXXIX. Austrian Offensive of May, 101 (i, in the Trentino : Italian Politics ... 81 CHAPTER CXL. The Battle of Jutland Bank ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 121 CHAPTER CXLI. The Western Front in May and June, 1916 ... ... ... ... ... 161 CHAPTER CXLII. The Work OF THE Y.M.C.A 179 CHAPTER CXLTII. The Russian Offensive OF 1916: Second Phase ... ... ... ... ... 201 CHAPTER CXLTV. The Medical Service of the Royal Navy ... ... ... ... ... ... 241 CHAPTER CXLV. The Senussi and Western Egypt ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 281 CHAPTER CXLVI. The Intervention of Portugal ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 321 CHAPTER CXL VII. Germany's Second Year of War ... ... ... ... ... ... ... :1G1 CHAPTER CXLVIII. Operations North of the Pripet Marshes : Summer. 1916 ... ... ... 391 CHAPTER CXLIX. The Intervention of Rumania ... ... ... ... ... ... ... -101 CHAPTER CL. The Law and Enemy Trading... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 441 CHAPTER CLI. The Battle of the Somme (I.) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 477 CHAPTER CXXXVII. THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1916 : FIRST PHASE. Results of the Austro-German Advance in 1915 — The Russian "Offensive" of March, 1916 — Russian Objects and German Exaggerations — Preparation for the Great Russian Offensive — Analysis of Positions and Strengths — ^The Russian Commanders Described — The Germans and Austrians — Austrian Confidence — Luxury in the Field — The Strategic Problem — Russia Strikes — Analysis of the First Three Weeks — Austrian Line Broken — Fall of Lutsk — and Dubno — Kaledin's Success — The East-Galician Front — The Buko\ ina — Fall of Czernovitz — Dramatic Account of the Evacuation — Conquest of the Bukovina. THE great Austro-German advance of 1915 had stopped without having achieved its strategic object. It had not attained the line on vhich the initiative for further operations would have rested exclusively with tlie Central Powers.* East of the Xiemen and the Bug the Genuanic armies had occupied tlie main strategic centre of Vilna and the important railway junctions of Baranovitche and Kovel ; in the south thej' had advanced their front to the line of the Ikva and Strj-pa ; and on the right bank of the Dniester they had advanced ahnost to the ver\^ frontier of Bessarabia. Yet our Allies had retained in the north the line of the Dvina with Riga and Dvinsk, the railway junctions of Molodetchna and Minsk, the railway across the Pripet Marshes, the strategic centre of Ro\Tio — wliich occupied in the region south of the Pripet Marshes a position analogous to that of Vilna in the northern districts — and a considerable tract of East Galicia, which in view of its highly developed net of roads and railways formed a useful base for future Russian operations. Thus, on the stra- tegic line separating Inner Russia from the * For a detailed analysis of that line c/. Vol. ^'11., Chapter CX., especially pp. 81-82. Vol. IX.— Part 105. 1 outlying Lithuanian, White Russian and Polish provinces, tlie relative position of the opposing forces with regard to the next campaign remained one of even balance. It \\as now the main task of the Rassian forces to preserve intact the advantages wliich that line offered for a future offensive, whilst behind the front new armies were raised and trained, and arrangements were made for equipping them and supplj'ing them with plentiful niimitions. To have gained the necessary respite without having anj'Tvhere jielded ground to an enemj' who had already reached the full development of Iiis forces was, between the autumn of 1915 and the first days of June, 1916, the achievement of the armies defending the Russian front. Xumerous local encounters — the usual inci- dents of stationary trench warfare — and two series of bigger operations constitute the sum of miUtary events during the winter and spring of 1915-1916. German imagination expanded the operations of that period into decisi\e offensives, so as to be able to proclaim their " total failure," to speak of the " terrifying losses of the enemy," and to repeat once more the hacknejed tale of the " unbreakable " nature of the Gennan front. As a matter of THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WyllL MEN OF RUSSIA'S NEW ARMY ON THE MARCH. fact, liowever, both the Russian attacks in the Bukovina — about the New Year of 1916 — and the operations which our Alhes undertook in Lithuania in the second half of INIarch were merely local actions very much restricted in piu^ose and extent. In either case one of the chief ahns of the Russians was to forestall an imminent movement of the enemy — and in so far as that object was concerned they were fully successful. Throughout the period inter- vening between the close of the great Germanic offensive of 1915 and the commencement of the AUied offensive in 1916 the Austro-German forces proved unable to resvime the initiative on the Eastern front. On February 21 the Germans opened their offensive against Verdun. In the following weeks elaborate preparations were begvm by them also on the Dvina, evidently with a view to similar operations against some sector of the Riga-Dvinsk front. Partly in order to reUeve the pressiu-e in the west, and partly in order to forestall the offensive which, for the coming spring, was expected on their own front, our Allies opened on March 16 a short counter-offensive in Lithuania. The time and place chosen by the Russian Command by themselves sufficiently explain the aim and nature of these operations. The blow was delivered in the district which, north of the Pripet INIarshes, forms the most vital sector of the German front. Vilna is the main strategic centre for the entire region between the Niemen, the Dvina and the Marshes ; its safety was an essential preliminary condition for a Gennan offensive anywhere between Dvinsk and Bara- novitche. Between Postavy and Smorgon the battle -line approached, however, within from 40 to 60 miles of Vilna. Attacks against that sector left no choice to the enemy ; he had to counter them with all his strength. Still it is evident that our Allies could not have expected to carry by a coup de main a sector of such enormous strategic importance. The strength of the German fortifications in it was certain to correspond to its significance, and at all times it was held by a concentration of forces greater than was to be found in any other part of the line. Moreover, the neighbourhood of Vilna and the comparatively high development of railways and roads in that region furnished the means for the rapid bringing up of reinforce- THE TIMES HlSTOIiY OE THE WAIi. 8 inonts. In view of the lessons tauglit by the fighting round Vcrdiin, which had been j)ro- ceeding for more tlian tliree weeks wlien tlic Russian operations were started, a strategic; rupture of the Gernian front in the region of Vilna could hardly have been hoped for except as the result of long and steady pounding of their lines. Yet the Russian " offensive " was started in the country of tlio thousand lakes, of forest and marshy valleys, at a moment when the imminent melting of the snow was certain soon to render the entire region unfit for any serious military operations. But then the Russians did not mean the attacks which they delivered in Lithuania in March, 1916, to be the beginning of a big offensive. They aimed at inxmediate results ; by a threat which could not have been left unheeded they meant to disturb German calculations — and it is .'vident that tlioy succeeded in acliieving that aim. Tlio time for decisive action against the Central I'owers htid not yet arrived — either in the east, west or south. The attacking Russian forces operated in two groups. South of tho Bereswetsh-Postavy- Svientsiany railway-line stood a group of three army corps and one cavalry division under (Jeneral Baluyeff ; the isthmus between Lakes Narotch and Vishnieff was the main objective of its attacks. A similar force commanded by (Jeneral Ple.slikoff operated between Postavy and Lake DrLsviaty. On the German side the front between Lake Vishnieff and Lake Dri.s- viaty was held by the Tenth Army under (Jeneral von Eichhorn, consisting of llj infantry and two cavalry divisions (besides two other cavalry divisions in reserve), and supported on the left wing by a few divisions of the Eighth A RUSSIAN OFFICER INTERROGATING AUSTRIAN PRISONERS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Army uikIit (Jouoral vuu Scholtz. Tims, in so far lis imiubers were concoraed, the opposing forces were fairly evenly matched. On March 16 the Russian batteries opened a violent bombardment of the German lines. In the hope of forestalling, or at least disturbing, the coining Russian attacks, the Germans delivered on the following day an impetuous attack against the Russian positions south of Tverietch, and on March 18 at Miedziany. The attacks failed completely and the enemy had to retire in haste, leaving some booty in the hands of the Russians. On March 19 our GENERAL KUROPATKIN, Commander of the Northern Armies. Allies captured the village of Velikoie Selo, north of Vileity. On the same day marked progress was made by them between Lakes Narotch and Vishnief?. After a severe fight the Russians succeeded in carrying the village of Zanaptche and in occupying part of the enemy trenches near Ostrovliany and in front of Baltagouzy. The next few days witnessed a series of attacks and covmter-attacks on the isthmus between the lakes, during which posi- tions were frequently changing hands. By March 23 our Allies had advanced their lines still farther in the direction of Blizniki and Alokrytsa. In this region betweenLakes Vishnieff and Narotch the troops of General Baluyeff captured during the four days, March 18 to 21, 18 oflicers and 1,255 men and one 5-m. liowitzer 18 machine-guns, 26 field mortars, 10 hand mortars and considerable quantities of small arms and ammunition. Simultaneously with the fighting on the isthmus similar encounters were proceeding in three other sectors of the Lithuanian front : between the Lake Miadziol and Postavy, near Tverietch, and north of Vidzy, on the line Lake Sekla-Mintsiouny. Finally, on the Dvina, half-way between Riga and Dvinsk, in front of the curve which the river forms between Lievenhof and Friedrichstadt, our Allies carried by a sudden and sharp attack a series of German trenches in the region of Augustenhof and liuschhof. In almost every part of the line where fighting was proceeding the Russians succeeded in improving their tactical position. That was all that had been counted upon. " On the whole, the series of engagements latterly reported in the ofificial communiques, '' wrote The Times correspondent at Petrograd, under date of March 23, " bears the character of an encounter battle " — and warnings were given out from well-informed quarters at Petrograd that nothing more should be ex- pected at that season of the year, on the very threshold of spring. And indeed in the last days of March the general thaw and the melting of the snow, which was lying on the ground several feet high, put an end to the fighting in Lithuania. It was once more resumed in the last days of April. By a considerable military' effort the Germans recaptured the trenches which the Russians had taken from them in the isthmus between Lakes Narotch and Vishnieff, but were unable to advance any further. In June, when the great Russian offensive south of the IMarshes was breaking up the Austro-German front and casting a shadow far before it over Central Eiu"ope, the German Headquarters felt the urgent need of reassuring the population by means of a heroic legend. A grapliic description had to be given, so crudely coloured as to impress itself even on minds beginning to yield to fear. It had to be demonstrated that every Russian offensive m.u^t necessarily break down and end in disaster ; it had to be shown tliat the sacred ground of the Fatherland could not ever again be in danger of contamination by a hostile foot. On June 9 — the date is significant — German Head- quarters published an account of the Russian "offensive" of March, 1916. The official pen ran riot in describing an encounter of Russians THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. GENERAL BRUSILOFF, Commander of the Russian Armies in the Great Offensive south of the Pripet. and Germans : " Indeed, a shattering and yet elevating pictiire ! Out yonder, masses forging forward tliroiigli deep mud and swamps, driven by blows of the knout and by the fire of their own guns. Here the iron wall of the Hinden- biu-g Army. Firm, rigid in iron and steel. Still firmer in the will of every single man : to hold out even against overwhelming odds. Nobody here turns back with anxious glances, nobody looks back at the police behind the front. There are no police. All eyes are bent steadily to the front, and the stones of the wall are tiie soldier-hearts of the defenders." One wonders wliat German soldiers must liave felt when reading the fustian of their own Headquarters, whether rage and shame did not 105-2 77//'; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. nuikti tlit'ir 1>1(m»i1 hoil when tliiriking of the twaddler who, somewhere safe beliind tlie front, w»is writing <l()\vn tlie opponent for tlie comfort of nervous j)eo[)le at home, and making tlie tigliters of liis own anny ridiculous. And a month later these very scribes were complaining of tiie British communiques being *' written in a style which has nothing in coiiunon with mili- tary brevity and simplicity " and '" is no longer the language of a soldier " ! Hut the immediate tactical results were not the only aim and profit of the military opera- tions undertaken by the Russians in the autumn and winter of 1915-16. They had also their educational \iilu(\ " In every movement, great or small, that we have made this winter," said General Brusiloff to The Times correspon- dent, Mr. Stanley Washburn, at the conclusion of the first stage of the offensive in June, 191(5, " we have been studying the best methods of Jiandling the new problems which modern war- fare presents. At the beginning of the war, and especially last summer, we lacked the pre- j)arations which the Germans have been making for the past 50 years. Personally I was not discouraged, for my faith in Russian troops and Russian character is an enduring one. I was convinced that, given the nuinitions, we should do exactly as we have done in the past two weeks." The task of Russia was in a way similar to that of (ireat Britain. In the middle of the war she had to build up new armies and devise the means for supplying them w ith the necessary war material. As against England, indeed, RiLssia was favoured in having vast cadres of highly trained officers and in possessing, in the widest sense of the word, the tradition of a great national army. But she was handicapped in matters of industrial development and of commimications both within her own empire and with the outer world. In spite of this, however, Russia, dm-ing the period of suspense in the fighting, accomplished results which had never entered the calculations of the enemy and surpassed even the hopes of her Allies. In fact, they could never have been achieved had it not been for the unanimous, enthusiastic support which the entire Russian nation gave to every enterprise connected with the war. That is true of individuals as well as of organiza- tions. Among the latter it was especialh* the Unions of Zemstvos and Towns which did the A CAPTURED AUSTRIAN TRENCH. On the right is Captain BaranoflF, chief of General Brusiloff's escort. THE TIMES HJSTOUY (W THE WAR. RUSSIAN DUG-OUTS. Near the fighting-line. most important work. " The desire to work on the part of the Unions was so great,'" said General Alexeieff, Chief of the General Staff. " that they wiUingly undertook am-thing, great or small, provided it was of use to the army." Whilst the. direction of the armies in the field rested with General Alexeieff, dependent im- mediately on the Tsar himself, up to the end of March General Polivanoff presided over the work of the War Office. On March 29 General Polivanoff was relieved of liis office, and was succeeded by General Shuvaieff.* The smrmier of 1916 foimd the Russian armies between the Baltic Sea and the Ru- manian frontier grouped in three main divisions. General Km-opatkin, who by an Imperial Ukase dated February 19 had been appointed Commander-in-Cliief of the Northern Armies in place of General Plehve, was in charge of the Riga-Dvinsk line. He had three armies under his command — the Twelfth Army of General Gorbatowslci with headquarters at Venden, the Fifth Army based on Rzezytsa, and the First Armv of General Litvinoff ii»the * See Vol. Till., p. 204. district of Disna. German UTiters put their aggregate strength at 35 to 41 divisions of infantry, and 13i divisions of cavalry. The centre facing Vilna remained under the command of General Evert, who by the mag- nificent skill displayed in the retreat from the Niemen and \'ilia had enhanced the high reputation which he had earned in the Ru.sso- JapaneseWar. His group included the Second Armj' under General Smirnoff round Dokshitse, the Tenth Army of General Ra(lkie\itch with headquarters at ^linsk, the Fourth Army of General Rogoza on the Upper Niemen, and the Third Army of General Lesh on the northern outskirts of the Pripet ;Marshes. German estimates of the strength of the Russian centre Z C/2 u a *^ o 'C 0j -o H .S , ^ O 2 X I u a OS 5JJ X «- O & THE TIMES HISTOL'Y OF THE WAE. varied from 42i to 50J iufantiy and 8J ravalry divisions. One may safely assiuue that those figures wore more or less exaggerated. It was the regular policy of German wTiters to enhance the figures of the forces opposetl to them (not of those opposed to the Austrians !) and to discount the strength of enemy reserves, so as to magnify the greatness of their own " achievements " and to prove the hopelessness of the onenu"s cause. Ever since the distinction l)et\\een northern and southern theatres of war had arisen on the Russian front, the armies south of the Pripet Marshes had remained under the command of General Ivanol?. In the first days of April, that fine old soldier having been called to Imperial Hea<lquarters to act as military adviser to the Tsar, his place at the front was taken by General Brusiloff, who had hitherto led the Eighth Army. At the beginning of the siunmer offensive his conunand included four armies (towards the end of June, \\ hen Volhynia had become the main battle-ground of Eiurojjc, the army of General Lesh also was transferred to this theatre of war). The four original arinies of General Brusiloff were — his own okl army with headquarters at Rovno, now under the command of General Kaledin ; the Eleventh Army under General Sakharoff on the borders of Volhynia and Podolia ; the Seventh Army i-uider General Shcherbatieff in Eastern Galicia ; and lastly, the Ninth Army of General Lechit- sky on the Dniester and the frontier between the Buliovina and Bessarabia. German esti- mates put the strength of the Southern Armies in May, 1916, at 41 divisions of infantrj^ and 14 divisions of cavalry — which is much nearer the mark than the estimate of the northern groups. It w as in the southern area, and especially in the spheres of operation of the Eighth and Ninth Russian Armies, that the decisive battles were to be fought dm'ing the opening stages of the new Russian offensive. The victories of Jvuie, 191(5, added new lustre to the reputation of General Brusiloff, and made kno\\Ta through- out the world the hitherto mifamiliar names of Generals Kaledin and Lecbitsky. Alexey Alexeyevitch Brusiloff belonged to an old Russian noble family. Of mediuni height and spare build, Mith finely moulded features, steady, sharp grey eyes, and elegant, easy movement. General BrusiloflE had pre- served to the full liis bodily vigour. A famous ri A E-5 1 mKKKr r^ f BP^^^^^^H V ^ Cj SSfiBBmiai^^ ^E »* ^^^^h^^^^^:,^ GENERAL EVERT, Commanded the Russian Armies in the centre. horseman — a distinction which it is by no means easy to earn in Ru.s.sia — he liad all through life kept in training. Although th<} requirements of his professional work, as its sphere was widening, led him away iroin the interests of his yoimger years, he pre- served the appearance of the typical cavalry officer. It was in the ca\alry that he started his career. His work for the development and training of that arm, which had always taken a prominent part in the Ru.ssian forces, left a permanent mark on its organization. In 1906, at the age of 53, Brusiloff was appointed to the command of the Second Cavalry Division of the Guard. Being known as an able adminis- trator, he was subsequently attached for some time as mihtary assistant to the Governor- General of Warsaw, General Skalon. In 1911 General Brusiloff was entrusted with the command of the army corps stationed at Vinnitsa (Russian Podolia) and of its military district, which, bordering on East Galicia, was the most important military area within the Ivieff command. Thus General Brusiloff had spent the years following on the Japanese ^^'ar, diu-ing which the Russian Army was reorganized, in the frontier-districts to the north and east of 10 'JHF. TIMKS IllSTOUY OF Till': WAll. Caliciii. 'I'lif outhrcak of tlic \Mir foiiiu! liijii in lomiiiuiul of the foiTcs coiUM'iitratfd in Hussiiui rodoliii. It was tlien but natural that iic slioiild l)<- liioscu to lead thf uriny whicli invadt'd (iaUcia from tlio east. Previous cluijjter-^ of this history have told the story of liis rapid advance on Ni/.hnloff and Halitch, of tli<' grand battles whieh the Eighth Army fought under his leaderslup in the C"arj)athiaix Mountains, of its raids into Hungary, and finally of the retirement which followed on the catas- trophe of the adjoining Third Army on the J)unayets. Kven in the course of that retire- ment Brusiloff's army still managed to capture vast numbers of prisoners, and it concluded its retreat in the first days of September, 1915, by a brilliant counter-offensive in Volhynia, which gave it for a time command of Lutsk, and per- manently secured Rovno. It therefore sur- prised no one when General Brusiloff was chosen successor to General Ivanoff. In the command of his own army he was succeeded by General Kaledin. Before the opening of the great Russian offensive Kaledin's name was little known, even in Russia, except in military circles. At the beginning of the war he led a cavalry division in General Brusiloff's army. He distinguished himself in e\ery one of the many actions in which he was engaged, and was soon entrusted with I he command of an army corps, and finally was picked out by General Brusiloff to succeed him at the head of the entire Eighth Russian Army. He was a short, thick-set man. His quiet, sober eyes inspired confidence in anyone wlio had dealings with him. The conduct of the Volhynian battle in June, 19 IG, proved that at any rate in the military art he was a [last master — a fact which not even enemy writers dared to question. One other of General Brusiloff's anny-com- maiiders rivalled in June, 19 10, the fame of General Kaledin. It was General Lechitsky, the leader of the Russian (jpfensive against the Bukovina. His career reads like a romance. He was born in 1850, the son of a Greek- Orthodox priest in a small provincial town. He himself was intended by his parents for the Church and consequently attended the theo- logical school at Vilna. He felt, however, that his real vocation was that of a soldier. Too poor to enter a military school, he joined the army as a volunteer in a reserve battalion, and by this roundabout way reached the cadets' corps. He then spent some 10 years as a company officer in Siberia. For many years he struggled in obscurity with hardly a chance of ever rising above the level of so many patient. RUSSIAN INFANTRY ON THEIR WAY TO THE TRENCHES. THE TIMES HISTOID Y OF THE WAR. 11 GENERAL LECHITSKY. The leader of the Russian ofTensive against the Bukovina. quiet regiiuental officers whoso \\ nrk makes the life of the Russian Army and whose names pass into the oblivion of the crowd. The Boxer Revolt in China gave him his first chance of showing his true mettle ; he was soon promoted to the rank of a colonel. He subsequently did excellent work in the Russo-Japanese War, and was a short time afterwards made a general. In 1906 he was entrusted with the command of the First Division of the Guard, and in 1011 he was put at the head of the army district of Chabarovsk in Eastern Siberia. During the Great War it was not until June, 19 IG, that ho appeared in a big offensive action as com- mander of an Army — with the result that in tho south, between the Dniester and Pruth, the Russians advanced within a month about 50 miles, and that the name of General Lechitsky became one of the best known in Europe. On the side of the enemy the Pripet IMarshes marked approximately the division between the spheres of the two Germanic Allies. Al- though one Austro-Hungarian army corps remained in the northern region, and a few German divisions and two German commanders operated in the southern district, it is still cor- rect for the period of relative suspense (Sep- tember, 1915--June, 1916) to call the line between the Pripet Marshes and the Rumanian border the Austro-Hungarian front. Having done most of the work in 1915, the Austrians wished to be able to call some quarter their own-, soon after the fall of Brest-Litovsk a segregation of troops was carried ovit, and Field-.Marshal Arcliduk<' Froderiok (an<l also Genera! f'onrail von Hotzendorf, tho Cliief of the .\\istrian General Staff) came again to tlieir own. The Archduke now conunanded the armies south of tho Marshes, whilst Field- Marshal von Hindenburg and tho sha<low\ Prince Leopold of Hn\ aria directed the fones between the Baltic Sea and the Pripet. HindenbiLTg'scommanfi embraced four ai luie?* whilst one army and an army detachment looked for guidance to tho military genius from tho House of Wittelsbach. .\ group consisting of 7} infantry divisions and one cavalry division held the lino from the Jialtic Sea till about Friedrichstadt. Next to it stood tho Eighth German Army unch^r General von Seholtz ; it consisted of nine infantry and three cavalry divisions, and its sphere of operation extend(;d till about Vidzy. The adjoining Tenth Army under General von Eichhorn had the biggest effectives at its disposal, but htul the sliortost front to defend. It included 11^ infantry and two cavalry divisions (besides another two cavalry divisions in reserve), and occupied the district between Vidzy and the Upper Viiiji ; it was thus primarily upon this Army that de- volved the ta.sk of protecting Vilna, its head- quarters. From north of Smorgon down to the GENERAL KALEDIN, Commanded the Russian Army at Rovno, 12 77//'; TIMl'y HISTORY OF THE WAR. N'lt'iiUMJ »<xtninli'ii the pusitioiis oi" tht) Tvv(li'th Army under (ictu'ral von Kalx-ck (fight divisions with one brigade in reser\'i')- South of the Nienien extended the reahn of J'rince Leopold of Bavaria, monarch of one of the many kingdoms of Pohmd which were vainly jilanned iluring the war, and chief of a group of armies which never existed.* The line Ijctween the Xiemen and the Oginski Canal wjus held by his one and only companion, General \on W'oyrsch, commanding the Ninth German Army (in a "birthday article" which the N'ienna Neue Freie Presse devoted to Prince Leopold in November, 1915, he himself !iad been described as its commander). The Ninth Army included eight Geriuan infantry (Hvisions and the 12th Aiistro-Hungarian army corps. This detachment, consisting mainly of Transylvanian troops, was the remainder of the Kovess Group, which had become engulfed in Woyr.sch's Army in July, 1915, when General Daniel, with part of the, in any case, slender First Austro-Hungarian Army, had been transferred to the Italian front. Subse- quently, on the commencement of the new campaign against Serbia, in the autumn of 1915, the leader of the remainder of the First Austro- Hungarian Army in the north, General Kovess von Kovcsshaza, was removed with part of his troops to Serbia, whilst the 12th army corps was left in the midst of its German comrades. However \\ ell tlie Germans conducted publicity campaigns for themselves and for any German conunander or division which might happen to find itself within the Austrian lines, the pre- sence of their " weaker brethren " within their own half of the line was regularly passed over in silence imtil it came to bear the brunt of a Russian attack. Then, on June 16, 1916, the Vienna Xeue Freie Presse devoted a whole article to that newly discovered Austrian detachment, stating that " the news of their presence in Lithuania " may surprise its readers, " as it was not hitherto generally known that a detaclunent of Imperial and Royal troops stood so far north in the midst of German armies." In fact, the only writer who had previously nientioned it was the Military Correspondent of The Times in his remarkable article on the German Armies in Russia, pub- lished on April 23, 1916. * Attention has been previously called to the peculiar military career of Prince Leopold, who had risen to the rank of commander of a group of armies for the occasion of his entry into Warsaw ; cf. Chapter XCI., pp. 328 anl 358, ani Chapter CX., p. 114. Besides the Nintli Army there was only a small detachment in the thick of the PriiJet swamps (made separate probably in order to mark the difference of standing between mere army conunanders and t\\o Royal Prince of Bavaria). That detaclnnent consi.sted of three infantry and two cavalry divisions. Thus the Gen nan forces north of the Pripet Marslies seem to have included 48 divisions of infantry and 10 divisions of cavalry, repre- senting an aggregate strength of probably 1 ,200,000 men. The most striking feature was the almost complete absence of strategic reserves ; these had been drained for the Verdun front. It was the kindly, gi-andfatherly spirit of Archduke Frederick which presided over the fates of Mittel-Europa in the country south of the Marshes during the spring of 1916. The days of the grim Mackensen had gone, and the Prussian Von Linsingen and the Bavarian Count Bothmer were as yet merely subordi- nates of tlie old gentleman whom fate and the Habsburg family had chosen for a general. Born in 1856, he celebrated his 60th birthday on June 4 — indeed a day which history v\ill remember, though for reasons very different from those on which the courtiers of Vienna expatiated. It is a family tradition of the Habsburgs to produce military geniuses. Archdtike Frede- rick, a grandson of Archduke Charles, the hero of Aspern, and a nephew of Archduke Albrecht of Custozza fame, was chosen to be a real soldier. He entered the army at the age of 15. At the age of 24 he was already a colonel, two j-ears later a general. As a man of 30 he was put in command of a division, and three years later of a whole army-corps. Having shown such extraordinary abilities in his youth, he became in 1906 Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Landwehr, and on July 12, 1914. the Emperor Francis Joseph appointed him to the highest command of the common Austro- Hungarian Army. At the time that the Germans thought Ru.«sia to have been " finished off for good " they handed over to him the southern portion of the Eastern front. Two separate regions may be distinguished within that area : the Russian district of Volhynia and the Austrian territories in East Galicia and the Bulcovina. The differences in the development of means of communication and in their directions preserve the importance of this frontier line, which otherwise (accord- ing to the principles of the text-books) should THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. i:i A SACRED SYMBOL OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. A portrait of Nicholas II. under j^^uard during an advance. have ceased to exist with the outbreak of war. The Volhynian district was lield by two Austriarx armies : the Third Austro-Hiingarian Amijr under General Puliallo von Brlog. betA\een the Marshes and Tchartoryisk, and the Foiu'th Amiy under Archduke Josepli Ferdinand within tlie Volhynian Triangle of Fortresses (the An^trians held Lutsk and Dubno, and were facing Ro\aio). Into these two annies seems to have been merged, at a date wliich was never annotmced, and in a way which was never described, the army of General von Linsingen — and he himself re- mained in Volhynia in a cliaractcr which was never defined until the middle of .Time. 1916. Then, after the first Atistrian defeats, the Gennan official communiqties (not tliose of \'ienna I) suddenly began to speak of a new " group of arnues " under \'on Linsingen. The Prussian had now openly taken out of the weak Habsburg hands the command in tlie Volhy- nian battle area. It will be remembered that in the winter of 1914-15. when the battles were raging in tlie Carpathians, a German "Army of the South " was holding the moimtain-chain from the Uzsok Pass to the upper coiu'ses of the Bystrzytsas. 105 .-} 14 THK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. H B ^^^^^H^^^B. ''^ .^^1 m^ ^^^^^V**' ^K^i ^^^^^n.'^^ ITv^^^^B -^ iM ARCHDUKE FREDERICK. The Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Army, with his grandchildren — the children of Princess Hohenlohe. Its chief commander was Von Linsingen, and its elite, the Prussian anny corps containing the Third Division of the Guard, was led by Count Bothmer. Even then more than half of the effectives of the " German Army of the South " consisted of Austro-Hungarian troops. During the advance in the summer of 1915 it w as split up, Linsingen proceeding to Volhynia, whilst Bothmer advanced against the Tarnopol- Trembovla front. Each of these halves served as framework for a new army filled out with fresh Austrian troops. Meantime no increase was made in their German leaven — on the contrarjs much of it was removed. The last withdrawal was the Prussian Guard of Both- mer's Army, which had to go to replenish the German effectives before Verdun. Towards the end of May, 191G, there were left hardly more than three German divisions in the midst of the Austrian forces. Two of these stood in Vol- hynia, whilst the 48th German Reserve Di- vision was the only one remaining with the army of Genera! Count Bothmer. Of Austro-Hungarian troops the two Volhy- man armies included 12^ infantry and seven cavalry divisions, besides the Polish legions composed of all arms and amounting to some- tliing more tlian a division. The front of the adjoining Second Au.stro- Hiingarian Army under General von Boehm- Ermolli also extended mainly over Ru.ssian soil. Its line stretched from south of Dubno to a point north of the Tarnopol-Krasne-Lvoff rnilway-line. Still, up to the time when it was dragged into the maelstrom of the Volhynian battle, this army, with its headquarters and bases on Austrian soil, belonged to the Galician rather than to the Volhynian group. It included about eight infantry divisions — all of them Austrian or Hungarian. The rest of the Austrian front was held by the two Armies of Count Bothmer and General von Pflanzer- Baltin, the point of junction between them lying in the district of Butchatch. In March, 1916, their aggregate strength amounted to about 20 Austro-Himgarian and two German infantry divisions and four divisions of Austro- Hungarian cavalry. It was especially within that sector that changes were effected in the course of the spring. Besides the Third Division of the Prussian Guard, whose with- drawal to Verdun was mentioned above, these armies lost a few infantry divisions to the Italian front. Yet the largest withdrawals for the Trentino offensive did not come from the armies at the front, but from the bases in the rear. The Italian campaign had an effect on the position of the Austro-Hungarian armies in the cast analogous to that which the Verdun offensive exercised on Hindenburg's line. It left them bare of strategic reserves. The best authorities estimated the strength of the enemy's infantry in the south at the time when om" Allies opened their great offensive at about 38 Austro-Hungarian and three German infantry divisions. Their strength in infantry seems, therefore, to have been about equal to that of General Brusiloff's armies, though the Russians undovibtedly possessed a marked superiority in cavalry. The fact has been frequently commented upon that at the time when the Russians opened their offensive of 1916 the Austro-Hungarian armies at the eastern front included hardly any Czech, Yugo-Slav or Ruthenian regiments — i.e., few elements friendly at heart to the Slav cause. Those troops had been sent mainly to the Italian front, whilst Germans, Magyars, Italians and Poles were sent to Russia and Galicia. Indeed, all along the line could be found Magyar regiments or whole army corps. THI': TIMES HISTOHY OF THK WAli. I.", as, e.g., the group of General von Szurniay in the north, the detaclunent of General von Goglia near Podkaniien (south of Brody), and very considerable nuiuhors of Hungarian regiments within Pflanzcr-Baltin's army. Simi- larly, German-Austrians — Viennese regiments, Alpine divisions, Germans from Bohemia and Moravia — were posted along the entire front. Still, Czech and Yugo-Slav soldiers were by no means absent. They were scattered in groups among the troops whose loyalty could be relied upon by the Austro-Hungarian Army Command ; the.se had to keep watch over them, send them everywhere into the most exposed positions, and where any suspicion of " treason " arose, fire at then\ from behind. Yet even so, it remains to be known whether these bodies of men, devoted to the cause of Slav freedom and hating the German-Magyar rule, did not contribute in some measiu-e to the victories of oiu" Russian Allies. Anyhow, the Russians soon became aA\are of their presence, and whilst the true enemies among the prisoners were started of? on their weary journey to Siberia or Turkestan, the Slavs were placed at once on farms behind the Russian front, where labour was needed for the approaching harvest. They were a real godsend to the farmers, as was shown by nvimerous notices on the subject which appeared in the Press of Southern Russia. Of all the handicaps under wliich the Austro- Hungarian Army Conintand was suffering the most dangerous was perhaps its almost pathetic conceit. It wa.s not merely the daily twudtlle of the A'euc Frcie Prettae and inspired statements for the consumption of neutrals which proclaimed the impregnability of the Austrian pfwitions and the invincibilit}- of Austrian troops. Prominent army conunan- ders made statements (o that effect even ia private, intunate conversations. Of their pub- lic declarations it will sufhce to quote a single one. On the very eve of the new Russian offensive Baron Conrad von Hotzendorf, Chief of the Austro-Himgarian General Staff, wa.s reported as saying to the Swedish journalist, Herr Nils Lago Linquist : " We have held out for two years, and those two years were the worst. Now we can hold out in a cheerful and confident frame of mind as long as it pleases our enemies. To hold out, of that we are certainly capable. W'e are not to be conquered again."* The Pester Lloyd had the doubtful taste to reprint that conversation in its issue of June 8. Even the production of food was a concern of the Austro-Hungarian Army at the front. Convinced of the impossibility of ever again having to retreat, it devoted all its spare energies to the tilling of the fields behind the * " Uns rinpt man iiioht mehr uieder." A CAPTURED AUSTRIAN TRENCH. Built on a river bank. X u < CD e c a b o a J M > 'C u V Z .= C c 0^ ■= D - a Z i: < -3 u u e u O c a 3 16 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. battle line. Th(> pcacct'ul pursuits of its detachments in rpser\i^ ([uart(>rs no less eloquently proves the confidence then pre- vailing in the Austrian Anny than the luxuries and amenities of the life of its oflicers, even in what for th(Mr soldiers was the (iring-line. Towards the end of June, 1910, Mr. Stanley Washburn, The Times Special Correspondent with the Russian Forces, v-isited some districts behind the Austrian front in Volhynia and described the elaborate arrangements which had been made in that region for the well-being and pleasiu-e of the troops : At a safe distance from rifle fire behind the lines one came on the officers' quarters, which seemed like a veritable park in the heart of the forest. Here one found a beer garden with buildings beautifully coti- structed from logs and decorated with rustic tracery, while chairs and tables made of birch still stood in lonely groups about the garden just whore they were left %vhon the occupants of the j)lace suddenly departed. In a sylvnn bower was erected a beautiful altar of birch trimmed with rustic traceries, the whole being surrounded by a fence through which one passed under an arch neatly made of birch branches. The Austrians must have had an extremely comfortable time here. Every- thing is clean and neat, and, no matter how humble the work, it is always replete with good taste. One of the advancing corps captured a trench with a piano in it, and if the stories of large quantities of miscellaneous lingerie (not included in the odicial list of trophies) that fell into Russian hands are to be believed, one feels that the Austrians did not spend a desolate or lonely winter on this front. ... Emerging from the belt of woods, we cross an open bit of country, and everywhere find signs of the Aus- trians' intention to make their stay as comfortable as possible. In fact, the Russians can make no complaint of the state in which the enemy has left the territory .which he has been occupying. Xothing has been destroyed that belonged to the Russian peasantry, and, indeed, very little of the works the Austrians themselves created. Every village has been carefully cleaned up, each house is neatly white-washed, with numbers painted on the front. Ditches have been cut along the sides of the streets and most of the houses have been tastefully fenced in by the rustic birch-work which one sees every- where here. In several villages parks have been con- structed, with miotic bandstands. Arrangements had also been made for the local revictualling of tlie armies. Besides bakeries and slaughter-houses the Austrian Army had close behind the front its own sausage factories ( Wurstcrzengungsnnlagen ), rooms fitted for the pickling and smoking of meat, and, finally, suitable places for the cold storage of the provisions. The meat-packers of one army corps alone of the army of General von Pflanzer-Baltin produced every third day about a ton of sausages and .smoked meat. (And the description of all these indescrib- able delights was officially given out to hungry Austi'ia about a fortnight before the Gonunencement of the Russian offensive !) Yet strict economy was exercised in the slaughter- houses of the *' Imperial and Royal Army." All tallow v\n,s carefully collected, and whatever r.-maiiicd after the 8oldit>r8 had been pro- \idcd with crease for their rifles and boots waa liaiuled over to the soap factory — of course, again one owned and worked by the Army itself. Every detachment had behind the front its own vegetable gardens, which were tilled and look-'d aft r by the soldiirs resting in reserve positions. The total surface of these garch-ns amounted to thousands of acres. And in those villages and camps behind the front the Army fattened even its own pigs and cattle ! Work on an even greater scale was done in conjunction with the local populaticn. The horses of the cavalry and artillery \\cre used in the fields, motnr-plougiis and all kinds of machines, strange and incomprehensible to the local peasant, were worked by the army mechanics and engineers. Thus, for examjjle, the army of I*flan/.er-13altin, behind whose front lay the Bukovina, one of the most fertile coimtries in the world, cooperated in the tilling of many lumdred thou-sand acres of land. Of course, it never crossed their minds that it might be not they who were to reap the harvest. One more detail may be mentioned as illustrat- ing the feeling of absolute seciu"ity which pre- vailed in Austrian and even German Govern- ment circles. \'ast quantities of grain bought in Rumania were stored in the Bukovina, comparatively close behind the front. When the Russian offensive broke tlirough the Aus- trian lines, and all railways were blocked with war material, transports, woimded soldiers, refugees, etc., there was no time to remove to safety all the acciunulated stores. A consider- able part of them was captured by the Russians or perished in conflagrations. Thus near Itskany no less than five big Austrian granaries and 15 smaller ones belonging to the tJerman military authorities wt-re consunted by fire. Yet one can hardly be siu-prised if the Austro- Hungarian Army Command thought its front impregnable. Every possible device had been adopted to render it so. In most sectors there V. ere five distinct con.secutive lines of trenches, many of them even 15 or 20 feet deep. The woodwork and fittings were most elaborate, the dug outs of the same pattern wliich weis familiar on the Western front. A thorough and efficient system of conununication had been established in the rear of the battle-line. IS THE TIMF.S IllSrOTiY OF THE WAE. PATROL OF RUSSIAN LANCERS. About to set oflf to scour the surrounding woods and plains. Everywhere were field railways, and one could hardly find anywhere more beautifully laid tracks than were those behind the Austrian front. And this system of roads and railways was always being further developed. When tht! Russians broke through the Austrian lines they came across many tracks which were only just in process of construction. More difficvilt than on the high plateau of the south was the work of entrenching and of constructing roads and railways in the marshy regions of northern Volhynia. It was there in many places impossible to dig trenches of the \isual kind. Recoiu^se was had to a system of parapets secured by breastwork such as was generally used in the wars of the seventeenth century. The roads were made of logs, not of stone ; they were artificial causeways rather than roads. In some districts they presented one long stretch of wide bridges, at points even of considerable height, so as to secure them against the spring floods. In the country between the lower courses of the Styr and the Stochod some of these bridges attained even the length of two miles and more. In short, as far as the mere worlc of preparing their positions was concerned and of organizing their communications and supplies behind the front, the Austrians can hardly be reproached with carelessness or inefficiency. They had practically the same technical means for resisting the enemy's offensive as the Germans north of the Marshes or in France, and if their resistance was not equal to that of their allies, it was due to the fact that their Headquarters were caught napping, that the general standard of the average Avistro -Hungarian soldier liad been lowered during the preceding two years of war, and that many of the troops had not their heart in the fight. It is possible that an excessive amount of artillery had been with- drawn for the Italian front, and it is certain that no sufficient strategic reserves had been left for the Eastern front. Yet, above all, the fact remains that the Russian soldier liad established a marked individual superiority over his opponent from the Habsburg Monarchy ; and he who would not acknow- ledge that fact would search in ^'ain for the causes of the catastropliical character which from the very first day the Russian offensive assimied for the Au.stro-Hungarian Army. " Everything in war is very simple," said Von Moltke, " but the simple things are very difficult." This is certainly true of the Russian summer offensive of 1916. Its strategic scheme was extremely simple, but its execution was one of the most colossal undertakings which any army ever had to face. The offensive extended all along the line— fe., in • all the most important districts some Sectors were singled out for attack. The timing ot these attacks to a single day made it impossible THE TIMES HISTORY UF THE WAR. 19 lor the enemy to throw his forces to and fro behind the front, and conijielled him to fight each of the series of initiul l)attks with the support of merely local reserves. The results of the fiist two or tliree days determined the further development of tlie Russian scheme. " You can plan a cam- paign," was another of Moltke's .sayings, " only up to the beginning of the first battle." The Russian offensive wa.s successful beyonil all expectation in the districts of Luts-k. Butchatch, and between the Dniester and tJie Pruth. It failed to break through the enemy front on the line extending from the border of N'olhynia and Gaiicia (round Zalostse) to about Vis- niovtchyk on the Strypa. Similarly, in the north, hardly any progress was made on the Styr below Kolki. The question therefore arose, how far a strategic advance was possible tlirough the breaches effected in the enemy front. Two of the opposing armies — those of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and of General von Pflanzer-Baltin — had met with complete disaster ; but the army of General von Puhallo on the Lower Styr, of General von Boehm- Krmolli south of Dubno, and of Count Bothmer on the rpjxr and .Middle Strypa, thoiiph by no means inta*,-t, Htill represented a very serious fighting force, luid reinforcements were certain soon to make their appearance. Would it have been safe for the Russians to have poured troops through the gaps in the Austrinn fnmt, or was it wiser to altstain from an experiment whicli, if unsucces.sful, might have chanj-ed one of the greatest victories yet won in this war into a drawn battle ? The answer to this question depended mainly on the chance which the Russians had of reach- ing vital points or linet- beliind the enemy's front without dispersing their own forces and without placiiig them into positions fraught with difficulties or dangers in view of the inuuinent (German counter-ofTensive. Tliere were behind the Austrian front three centres of vital imi)ortance : Kovel, Lvoff (Lemberg), and Stanislavoff (with tiie Dniester crossings at Nizhnioff, Jezujiol, and Halitch). On the Riussian side the main centres were Rovno and Tarnopol, and to a minor extent Tchortkoff. The ]-{ussian force which broke tlirough the Au^strian front near Butchatch could not lia\(^ miidc its j)rcssure felt in the AUSTRIAN TRENCHES AND DUG-OUTS Captured by the Russians •20 THE TIMES TUSiTOPY OF THE WAR. est LltOVSk ^^ Oso.ce-^^"oy PiiisJ V^^^"**^' L« 'uda J L > NeudorF Tuf °Mokee )Prip^ Lasiei- Xfstro\/'ic '.3(fl< • i Zhoren T'f _..\JXr \Serpik ^^^ /I/ \fStepan lyod^ °RuchatcborF( I Savift Opalin ■■<' LubomI o Kovcl Olesk) °M0S0r, $01 be lackie ::(Datyn4f^°Nujno / fj J/ y life, "^ V/-' / •■■' — -", / \\\a ^ (^ c. L , I \<y/adzii/rrzets yzvj VfOJ jihotobykhva ji\J o V K^ ^/ ,. Y§3raloi/k3 \ y \ Marieyj/iche lm-^^' , '(ToKieFr-^ Chafcory/sk 9 Regovice \ ^Mn-^nriyy ' ^^'dnth, ^ Vajsiavice ^ 9Verb3^^°'^""^^^"<> ' \. r*"^v. \olki Berestiany Stepar. TymJf / ,htch verz\, Dero. \/iofc 'erezm iolbvin KrytoFF^ \Tsu Ijexandryi Kolbanie Tuciyn jVilkovo ^Narol Lokatchv JUULSilV^' "^^^ Q/uk ISvinluhhy^ BludoFF ,. Tk * ^ «.^ ,' oydkoFF^A°?QrycV ° Shl<J"' '^bekna t Y^^RovnO '/" V*^ <r/ '^jGorokhoFF " U^rinorr^^SMIynoFf oJarTcHoFF ff 's^^Druzkopol '^olm^do... ^^.j— ^ ^.--2^2^^.,,. «,..., J^ >^^^^'^^^^^*7/f;>^n';^A I oL^,oFF ^ ^ ^ af ))< >> MemlroFf \KamionUa?V. ^ROD'^C^'^"'^"°^ i'^rtm\zr\\tX.s ^, ToPrzemv^^, n>^ ^^SF^^rrrrr-. ^X^^lpczoFFV •gATcxiniets^ .^ , , Jf, S ^Teofipo/ alosts" ^ JEemberg REFERENCE ^^ Russian Front in Spring 1916. Scale oFMiies /O ?0 J(? 40 50 Vzemyslany \ Jeilern'a< Zbara'^h nXoilof}^. arnopoJ ToProskc^ iLL. THE VOLHYNIAN THEATRE OF WAR. direction of Lvoff until it had reached and conquered the Dniester crossings. But tliis was vinder any circiuustances a formidable task, and was rendered still more so by the fact that it would have had to guard against Bothmer's army on its right. Outflanking cuts both ways : a Russian force advancing past the unbroken Austro-German front on the Middle Strypa might have outflanked the enemy or might itself have suffered that fate. But whereas a successful Russian niovement to the west would have still left Botluner the possi- bility of falling back on to the. Halitch-Pod- haytse-Denysoff line, a failure of our Allies would have thrown theni back on to the " belt of the Dniester," a region devoid of practicable lines of communication. Hence an advance on the northern bank of the Dniester west of Butchatch would have been an extremely risky enterprise as long as Count Bothmer continued to hold his part of the front, and in any case could not have affected within reasonable tinae the position in north- eastern^ Galicia and Volhyma. A Russian army advancing tliroiigh the Volhynian gap could therefore have relied only on its own forces. But what were the main lines of advance in front of it ? The two rail- ways from Rovno to the west (the Rovno- Rozhishche-Kovel and the Rovno-Brody-Lvoff THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •21 lines) open out into an angle of about G0°. An advance to the west would, therefore, have had to foHow divergent hnes and would have spread out like a fan. Such a movement, risky under any circumstances, was rendei-ed dunti:erou.s to an extreme degree by the fact tliat in the course of the war Kovel had been linlcod up • with TAoff by the railway which, between Vladimir- Volynsk and Sokal, connected tlic^ older Kovel-Vladimir and Lvoff-Sokal lines. In other words, at the base of the triangle formed by Kovno, T.voff, and Kovel the enemy pos- sessed a lateral line of comnuuiication (rein- forced, moreover, by the L\'oft'-Kamionka- Stoyanoff railway), whereas oui* Allies, advanc- ing from the east, would have had no such assist- ance for quick manoeuvring. The topograpiiical conditions analysed above determined the main outlines of the Russian strategy during tlie first pliase of theii- summer offensive in 1916. In the Volhynian area our Allies advanced as far to the west as was compatible with safety and then met the German counter- offensive on a lino on which they suffered from no disadvantage in matters of communications. In the district of Butchatch the imtial success was not pressed any further than was necessary with regard to the progress made south of the Dniester. It was in the country between the Dniester and the Carpathians that the advance was pressed most vigorously diu-ing the first month of the Russian offensive. Here it was possible to exploit to the full the initial advantage with- fWyl f^ >im^\ 1 m^ fl L Jl ■ ' ■ ^M AUSTRIAN MITRAILLEUSE GUN Captured by the Russians. It was used as an anti-aircraft gun. AT RUSSIAN HEADQUARTERS. At work on a tape machine. o\it any danger of sudden reverses. The belt of the Dniester, with its canons and forests, covered the right flank of the advancing Russian Armj'. By a rapid movement to the south and south-we.st our Allies reached the foot-hills of the Carpathians and soon even their mountain i)asses. To the west the a<^lvance was carried on to the very neighbourhood of Stanis- lavoff, where the Cerman counter-offensive was met. To the superficial observer the progress south of the Dniester may appear to have been an advance into a blind alley, or at least into a district of secondary strategic importance. This was not, however, the case. Quite apart from its great and obvious political and econo- mic meaning, the Russian advance south of the Dniester was also of first-rate strategic signifi- cance. It cut a possible line of retreat of the Austro-German centre, vvhich clung tenaciously to the line between Brody and Visniovtchyk. Had the district south of the Dniester remained in Austrian hands, the armies on the Tamopol front wotdd have been far less sensitive to ])ressure from the northern flank ; their retreat would not have been confined to a westerly direction. The first onslaughtj togetlier with the period (luring wliich the initial successes were deve- loped and consolidated — the advance of our Allies west of Rovno and the resistance wliich thej^ subsequently offered to the German »)•) Till': TlMi:s HISTORY OF THE WAR. C'oijiit«'r-<)(T«'iisi\(', and tliiir ii(l\am;e south of the l)nifsU<r, i-uliiiiimting in the capture of Czeriiovitz- constitute the first phase of the great Russian ofTcnsive. It coincides rou^ilily with the first niontli of active operations. The first days of .July, in w-yiich General Lecliitsky carried for« ard his advance to the west beyond Koloniea, and (Jeneral Lesh opened his offensive nortli of Kolki, on the right flank of General Kaledin's Lutsk salient, can be regarded as the beg! ruling of tlie second |)hase of the Russian ad\ anee in the summer of IDlti. On June 1 and 2 the Germans attacked the Russian positions north-east and also south of Krevo ; they continued their onslaught during the night of June 2-3. The fear of approacliing events in the southern theatre of war was the ex[)lanation of this sudden belated burst of German activity north of the Marshes. On June 4 the Austrian official communique reported a violent Russian bombardment of difTerent parts of the Austrian front, especially of the line held by the army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and closed with the follow ing significant statement : " Everywhere there are indications that infantry attacks are imminent." The German diversion came much too late to influence in any way the Russian offensive which was now commencing in the southern area. For months our Allies had been studying the enemy positions and working out the details of the coming advance. Everything for the big attack had been arranged before- hand, and on Jime 4 the Russian guns began slowly and methodically to place their shells on previously selected points of the enemy Une. It does not appear that any attempt was made to wipe out the enemy trenches themselves ; the object was rather to cut avenues in the wire entanglements through wliich the Rvissian infantry could proceed to attack the enemy positions. The artillery pre- paration in the different sectors lasted 12 to 30 hours. Then followed the Russian bayonet attacks. As soon as the Russians entered the Austrian front trenches the Russian artillery developed a curtain fire which precluded all communication with the rear. The Austrians were trapped ; their fine deep trenches, covered with solid oaken timbers, fastened with cement, and siuTuounted by thick layers of earth, once the Russians had reached them, were cages, and death or surrender were the only alterna- tives for their occupants. During the first Injurs the enemy infantry, especially the Hungarians, fought furiously. Thousands were killed. Then their resistance began to slacken, and they began to surrender. On the first day alone the haul of Austrian prisoners amounted to 13,000. On the third day (June • G), by noon, the armies of General Brusiloff had taken prisoners 900 officers and over 40,000 rank and file, and captured 77 guns and 134 machine-guns. Further, 49 trench-mortars wi'Tv captiu-ed, in addition to searchlights, telephones, field kitchens, and a large quantity of arms and material of war, w ith great reserves of anununition. A niunber of batteries were taken intact with all their guns and limbers. As amnii.mition magazines are usually stationed about 10 miles behind the front trenches, the enormous hauls of the first days by themselves bear witness to the swiftness of the Russian advance. The shortness of the bombardment preceding the attack and the simultaneous character of the operations along a front of about 250 miles were the novel features of the Russian offensive. The results brilliantly justified these new Russian tactics. " The main element of oui success," said General Brusiloff to Mr. Wash- burn, The Times correspondent, about a fort- night after the commencement of the Russian offensive, " was due to the absolute co-ordina- tion of all the armies involved and the carefully planned harmony with which the various branches of the service supported each other. On our entire front the attack began at the same hour, and it was impossible for the enemy to shift his troops from one quarter to another, as our attacks were being pressed equally at all points." The most important fighting and the most signal victory of those opening days occurred within the triangle of Volhynian fortresses. The original front in that district extended from about Tsuinan on the Putilovka, across the Rovno-Kovel railway, past Olyka — half-way between Rovno and Lutsk — and then a few miles east of Dubno across the Rovno-Brody line towards Kremieniets. The coimtry north of the Rovno-Kovel railway is a sandy plain covered with swamps and woods ; south of Mlynoff the marshy course of the Ikva and the huge oak-forests, from which Dubno derives its name,* presented a serious barrier ^o an * " Dub " means in Russian " oak." THE TIMES niSTOHY OF THE Will. 23 THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT. Cattle for the Army. advance of our Allies. The higher and more open country in the centre offered, however, tactical facilities for an offensive movement. On June 3--4 the entire sector between the Rivers Putilovka and Ikva was subjected to a vigorous bombardment, the advance being pressed most vigorously due west from the district of Olyka, along the Rovno-Lutsk road, and from INIlynoff in a north-westerly direction. Thus the attack against the fortress of Lutsk itself was conducted along concentric lines. The brvmt of the Russian onset was borne by the 10th (Himgarian) Division and the 2nd Division, composed largely of Slav troops. The attack on the very first day cut clean through their lines and Russian cavalry poured through the gaps. Large bodies of Austro- Hiuigarian troops between Olyka and the Ikva were cut off from all possibility of retreat, before they even knew that their front had been broken. On June 4, at headquarters at Lutsk, celebrations were held in honoiu" of ArchcJuke Frederick's birthday. The news of the disaster came like a thunderclap on the Austrian commanders. The 13th Division was thrown into the gap to hold up the Russian advance. It fared no better than its prede- cessors. The speed with wliich our Allies were moving beat all records. Almost to the last nioment the Austrian commanders at Lutsk do not seem to have realized the full extent of their disaster. By June (5, two days after the ad\ance had begun, the Russian forces had advanced more than 20 miles from their original positions. They were approaching Lutsk from two sides. Lutsk itself, in a strong natural position, covered on both wings by the deep and tortuous valley of the River Styr, had been changed in the course of the war into a regular fortress. Defences of enonuous strength covered its approaches. Yet such was the demoralisation of the beaten Austro- Hungarian troops that they proved unable to offer any serious resistance. Their lines were broken through near Podgaytsc and near Krupy, and on June 6, at 8.25 p.m., the first Russian detachments entered Lutsk, which the commander of the Fourth Austro-Hun- garian Army, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, had left only in the afternoon. The ancient town and the ruins of its magnificent old castle — in which the Polish king. Wladyslaw Jagiello, met in 1429 Vitold, Grand Duke of Lithuania, and Sigismimd of Luxembourg, Emperor of > z u O I as r- z D O u z <: :d o z 5 o X o o a: (- Z CD 24 THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR. 25 Germany — suffered practically no damage, no serious fighting having occurred within that area. Tlie panic among the i>nen»y troops round Lutsk was such that at one point they left six 4-in. guns withoiit stopping to imload them, and many cases of shell were still along- side the weapons. In Lutsk itself considerabU- military stores fell into the hands of our Allies. Similarly the Austrians had not had the time to clear out the hosjjitals, antl thus had to abandon thousands of tluir wounded. By June 8 the Russians had not ini'rel\- reached the line of the Styr and the lk\a. but had even crossed it at many points. On the same day German reinforcements began to make their ajipearance. First to arrive was a scratch division gathered from the region of the Marshes, and including the o7th Land- wehr and the 39th and 2()8th Landstunn regiments. Subsequently the 18th, 81st, and several other German divisions, also from the northern area, were thrown into the VolhjTiian battle ; they were drawn mainly froni the Dvina front — e.g., the 22nd (Jernian Division — and from the Ninth German Army. Field - Marshal von Hindenburg could liardly dare to weaken his forces in front of \'ilna. \\ith the German reinforcements General von Luden- dorff. Chief of Hindenburg's Staff, was sent to retrieve the Austrian fortunes. Von Linsingen was put in coimnand of the VoUiynian front. . Yet it was not until full ten days after the Russian offensive had begun that its advance in VolhjTiia came to a halt, and then its arrest was due as much to the requirements of the Russian strategy as to the new armies which the Germanic allies had drawn together from all fronts. On Jiine 8-9 the severest fighting raged round the two main crossings of the Rivers StjT and Ikva — namely, in the districts of Rozhjshclie and Dubno, where the two chief railway hnes (Rovno-Kovel and Rovno-Brody) pass over those rivers. Rozhyshche was. moreover, an iniportant base town containing large military stores and a centre of com- munications : it was here that the light Austrian field railways to Lutsk and to Kolki joined the main line. The Austrians, vigorously supported by fresh German reinforcements, offered a desperate resistance to the Russians who attacked Rozhyshche from the south-east. Still, under cover of heavy artillery fire, the Russian troops — recently formed units — crosseit the Styr and drove out the enemy, taking numerous [)ri»oners and booty. At the southern end of the Volhynian salient our Allies ca[)tured on the i-ame day the fort and town of Dubno. Here, however, the work was not as easy tvs it ha<i In-en at Liitwk, and the picturesque old town suffered very severe damage. Simultaneously with this advance another Russian detachment captured the Austrian point d'aii/iui at Mlynoff (on the Ikva). crossed the river, and occu|)ied the region of the village Dcmidovka. During the next few days they completely cleared of the enemj' the forests which cover this region, thus securing the Lutsk salient from a sudden counter-offensive from the south. On .lune l.'J they reached the village of Kozin, 18 miles south-west of Dubno and 9 miles west of the old battle front on tlie Ikva. Due west of Lutsk the Russian advance was, meantime, progressing at considerable speed. A screen of cavalry was thrown out, and detachments of Co.ssacks were traversing the country in e\'ery direction. On .June 12 oiir Allies reached Torchin, 18 miles west of Lutsk. The next day fierce fighting occurred near Zaturtsy, more than half-way from Lutsk to Vladimir-\'olynsk. By June 1 6 the sweep of the Russian tide to the west in the Lutsk .salient had attained its high-water mark. Their outpo.sts occupied a wide semi -circle round Olyka, with a radius of about 45 miles. It stretched from about Kolki (on the Styr) in the north, then followed the Stochod from near Svidniki to the district of Kisielin, reached its farthest extension to the west in the sector Lokatchy-Sviniukhy-C^orokhoff, and then bent liack to the east towards Kozin. It was on the two wings of that salient that the last considerable gains were effected during the first stage of the Russian offensi\e. The Germans were certain to start soon a counter- offensive. They were bringing up frerh troops not merely from the northern area, but even from France. They had to defend Kovel at an_\ price. Its loss would have meant the cutting of the direct connexion between the northern and southern armies. In view of this strong gathering of the enemy a further advance in the centre towards Vladimir-\'olynsk was clearly inadvisable. The enemy forces witc being concentrated not only round Vladimir, but also on the wings. The flanks of the salient ha<l therefore been secured. In the marshy district of Kolki, where so 20 THK TIMES HISTORY UF THE WAR. nuiiiy pitched Nattles had been fought in the rtutiunn i)f 1 •.)!"), tlie enemy was offering a tougli resistance. Nevertheless progress was made by our AHies, and the village of Kolki itself was captured on June 13. The Austro- Cennan troops were slowly retiring behind the Stochod. On June 1(5, liowever, the enemy attempted to coimter the Russian advance near CJadomytchc, some 6 miles west of Kolki, and also round S\idniki on the Stochod. A violent battle developed in the narrow sector where the courses of the Rivers Styr and Stochod approa^'h within some 6 to 8 miles of one another. The German attacks were re- pulsed, and in pursuit of the retreating army a Siberian regiment, imder Colonel Kisliy, crossed the Stochod near Svidniki, capturing an entire German battalion. In the sami' battle the Hussars of White Russia, supported by horse artillery, charged through three ex- tended lines of the enemy and sabred two Austrian companies. In the course of the next few days the counter-attacks of the enemy against Svidniki \\ ere repulsed, special mention in the Russian official communique being earned by a Cossack regiment under Colonel Smirnoff. WJiilst the right wing of General Kaledin's Army was thus securing the Russian front roimd the Rovno-Kovel line, the extreme left, with the help of the adjoining wing of General Sakharoff's Army, was strengthening its positions in the district south-west of Dubno, on the Rovno-Brody railway. On June 15 General Sakharoff's troops conquered the Austrian positions on the River Plash- chevka, between Kozin and Tarnavka (the same region in which the famous Third Cau- casian Army Corps, under General Irmanoff, won its first victory over the Austrians in August, 1914). One of the newly formed Russian regiments under Colonel Tataroff, after a fierce fight, forded the river, with the water up to their chins. " One company was engulfed, and died an heroic death," says the Russian official communique of June 16, " but the valour of their comrades and their officers resulted in the disorderly flight of the enemy, of whom 70 officers and 5,000 men were taken prisoners." On June IG our Allies entered Radziviloff, the Russian frontier-station on the Rovno-Brody-Lvoff railway, whilst to the south-east they reached the line Potchaieff- Lopushno-AIexiniets. RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON DUBNO. An Austrian trench under a ruined house. THE TIMES HISTonV OF Till-: W AH. •27 RUSSIAN TROOPS ENTRENCHED IN A FOREST. Thus the 12 days of the Russian offensive in Volhynia resulted in an advance of 30 miles to the south-west of the recaptvired fortress of Dubno, and of a similar distance to the north- west of Lutsk, the scene of their initial successes. The entire Volhynian triangle of fortresses was again in the hands of our Allies, whilst their outposts approached within some 25 miles of Kovel and reached the north-eastern border of Galicia in front of Brody. In the course of those 12 days the Army of General Kaledin alone took prisoners 1,309 officers, 10 surgeons, and 70.000 soldiers. It also captured 83 guns, 23G machine-gxms, and an enormous quantity of war material. About the middle of June the pressure of the new German concentration was beginning to make itself felt in Volhynia, and resulted in about a fortnight of fierce but more or less stationary fighting. Besides the divisions from the northern area, previously mentioned, the Germans were bringing up reinforcements even from France, wliilst the Austrians were with- drawing all available reserves from the Tyrol, the ItaUan front, and the Balkans, and from their bases in the interior. Xatiu-allj- parts of these armies were 'detailed to the Tarnopol front, others were sent to hold the Dniester crossings, still others to guard the Carpathian passes leading into Transylvania. Yet the majority of these reinforcements were directed to Volhynia, to ward off the danger which was tlireatening Kovel and to prevent a further Russian advance on Lvoff. The desperate liurry in which these transfers were made is best shown by the fact, which the Ru.ssians learned from the note-book of a dead Austrian officer, that a German army corps htxd been moved from \'erdun to Kovel in six days. But the Ciermans seem to have come soon to the end of their available reserves — and then our Allies resumed their offensive in VolhjTiia. " To illustrate the desperate shortage of the German armies," said General Alexeieff on July 22 to the Petrograd correspondent of The Times, " I need only recall the well-cstal)- lished fact that four divisions were hurried here from France soon after Jmie 4, when our offensive began. These were the 19th and 20th, forming the 10th Active Corps, and the 11th Bavarian and 43rd Reserve Divisions. \\ e were expecting the 44th Division, but it did not appear. As usual, tlie Germans had luider- rated French powers of resistance. Although 17 divisions remain before Verdun, the enemy found it impossible to move another man hither, and as soon as the British armies advanced all idea of transferring troops had to be abandoned. The units confronting us represent the maximum effort of Germany. They are being moved about along the Russian front, chiefly to the southward, in order to fill THE TIMES HISTORY Ol' THE WAi:. 2l» up the tremendous gap caused by the cncr- throw of the Austrians. Not a single frosli unit has been produced by the enemy. Twn badly mauled divisions withdrawn from \'erdmi constitute the strategical reserve of the German Army." On June 10 the counter-offen.sive of the enemy against the Lutsk salient began on the entire front. The Cennan operations which had Kovel for their base were directed mainly against the Stochod-StjT sector, whilst the Austrians, supported by some German troops, were fighting in front of ViadhnirA'olynsk, Sokal and Stoyanoff, attacking the Lokatchy- Sviniukhy-Gorokliof? line. Before the persis- tent, violent German onslaughts oiu' Allies had to withdraw their troops from the western bank of the Stochod near Svidniki. Then a furious battle ensued on the front extending from Sokal by Gadomitchc, Linievka, \'or()n- chin to Kieselin. On June 19 the fighting resulted in a marked success for oiu- Allies, who captured considerable numbers of prisoners. The engagements continued imabated on th(^ following day. "The village of Gruziatyn (two miles north of Gadomitchc)," says the Petrograd oflficial communique of Jimo 22, " changed hands several times. Yesterday afternoon our troops raided the village, cap- turing 11 officers, 400 men, and 6 machine-gims. Nevertheless the heavy German fire once more obliged us to evacuate the village." On the .same day, German attacks near Voroncliin and Raymiesto were completely defeated, and the enemy was compelled to withdraw in haste. The battle was renewed during the next few days, losing, however, gradually in fierceness. No less violent was the enemy's counter- offensive against the apex of the Lutsk salient. " In the region of the village of Rogovitchi, south-east of the village of Lokatchy (four miles south of the high road from Lutsk to Vladimir - Volynsk)," says the Petrograd official communique of June 19, "the Austrians attacked our troops m massed formations, and, breaking tlu-ough one sector of the fighting front, captured tliree guns of a battery wliich bravely resisted until the last shell had been fired. Reinforcements came up and routed the advancing enemy, recaptiu'ing one gim.* taking prisoners 300 soldiers and capturing two machine-guns." * The recapture of the other two guns is mentioned in the retjort of June 2C. GENERAL KASII TALINSKI. Sunilar and even more successful fighting was reported mider the same date fron\ the Svini- iddiy and the Gorokhoff fronts. In those sectors the enemy \\as put to flight, losing heavily in prisoners. Further encomiters were rej)orted in the coiu-so of the following few days. Having inflicted some more or less sensible reverses on the enemy, our Allies gradually withdrew their line in the centre about five miles. The western and south-westeni front of the salient were slightly flattened out, being withdrawn on to the Zatiu-tsy-Bludoff-Siiklin-Lipa line. Here, also, about Jvme 24, the fighting began to show signs of slackening. In the last days of the month the Austro- German armies resumed the coimter-offensive with redoubled fury. Desperate attempts were uiade to drive wedges into the Riussian front on the Linievka-Kobclii line in the north, near Zaturtsy in the centre, and roimd Ugrinoft" 30 Till': TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. i Stuwtntjn ' Podhayt jAiriymatowik / \- YiTrcmbovla X^ : i^" tMuiiaczoxice oHoroianha law a to Bobo/. irCsel Mona? < ]% // \\ ViShniovtchyK*^ noo2dno¥V Choroatkow 3 uchtstat* Kalusz, I TO Strj/ PBohorqdt rOasic Kopyczynce^ ,^^ ^ rr^bukhovtse \ /y ^Wugiatyn ■ r '^ y ^X Prohuzna ,Jw Ip L^ .zhmoFFW. I (.^ Y-^ f I -PotOK / \;g\ (A, S \ Xc. TS^ \ 't^^utromi'ntse { jj "\] I ^^^=.=4^ ^^,^,?/;^|^Ustsietchko Kamieniec Podolsk^ lienibs: Tlumatch Fastectna A\ hupii ovtt K^f j^Rarar CZERNOVIT^^^sJo^ fJepokoTooi' ^^-^ Berhoi — . *y " I fy^ StQrozhynietS Be Ha Jt r^^^i^ .^ L Brodma •"■"V*'' Suliguii Su/iOu/i ■- ^J^,. MihaUeni Dorohoiui "PatnaS Sacetu en , %. SotkaJ/i '''^y^^ J-': ■rsa ■■.■.liiv;.- "•/' ..w -v./^iiSi^ '-/y A Pniana I ^1^ Barduje ^orsfe ■.■.■.'liw;.- «.«/5^^^TRqLPASS • • Pqjana,^ k- ,k^^X ■rramos3\ Molit: \ SadoM^ ■■'"',. o Varna P/aiu 'Jacotenie""" * • ' ^ -* — GuxajHumora ^u,. » ,^- ~vi> inoasaj ^ ' f** •( 'RodnaPass*. •Dor^a went. ■'Rosea REFERENCE. ^ Russian Front inSpring 1916. Scale oFMiles 5 10 so 30 ■Poiani 11// 1^^ Obciki DornaVabrk\ V fl^' "Poienajr^iiip;; ^di ',ha'cS":/' -^ArMotargasu ''Pif,;r;su JORGO PaSS'^v^ SJSS:!;., ^ (a£7) ' THE BUKOVINA AND SOUTH-EASTERN GALICIA. in the sotith. " During these operations," wired INIr. Washburn from General Kaledin's Headquarters under date of July 1, " the conflict has been ranging over the entire front of this army without the enemy gaining a success anywhere. It is stated that they have never thrown forward such continuous masses of troops heretofore in their efforts to break through." A vast concentration of heavy artillery, up to and inclucUng 8-in. caUbre, with quantities of animimition which were stated never to ha\-e been equalled in vohuiie within Russian experience, was used in those battles. Yet the Russian hne nowhere wavered, and the enemy's counter-offensive ended in failure. The meaning of that last desperate attempt at driving in the Lutsk salient is obvious. The Germans undoubtedly must have known of the new Russian concentrations between the big marshes and Kolki, AAhere on July 4 the army of General Lesh was to assume the offensive, and of the near renewal of activities by General Sakharoff, in front of Brody. They also knew that a British offensive was THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WJIi. 81 imminent in tlie West. They liad, tlierefore. to seek an immediate decision in Volliyniu or to give up their atteini)ts at regaining the line of the Styr and Ikva. The fateful day came upon them both in the East and in the West, before tliey liad l)<M>n able to acliieve their design in Volhynia. The East-Galician front, in .Time. 1916, fell approximately into two divisions, Nvliich might best be described as the Tarnopol and the iiulchatch sectors, the frontier between them lying in the district of Burkanoff. North of this boundary the ground is midulating, wooded, the valleys marshy, and the rivers widen out at many points into ponds and small lakes. Roimd Zalostse and Vorobiyovka, tiie course of the Sereth and of its tributaries and the intervening hills offered excellent opportiuiities for defence ; south of KozlofT, the Stryj)a was in the main the front between the opposing armies. Below Burkanoff the aspect of the covmtry changes completely. It rises into a high ])lateau. c\it by many deep river cafions, with steep banks ; marshes are naturally very few, forests cover mainly the sides of the canons, occa.sionally extending tm to the HiUTOunding plain. These an* the natural lines of defence in Southern Todolia. In front and south of liutchatdi, the Austrians possesHcd, moreover, qviite exceptionally favoiirabhi con- ditions for defence. On a stretch of about 12 miles the stream Olekhoviets runs parallel tc the River Stryjia at a distance of only about a mile to the east ; the country intervening between these two river canon.s lies like a rampart in front of the Strypa lin<-, whilst the wooded, rocky sides of the winding canons, frequently bordered by stone (piarries, olTer most excellent opportunities for fortifications, amlniscades, gun emplacements, and enfiltuling positions. The eastern apjjroaclies of the Trybuldiovtse-Yasloviets front (as the line of the Oleklioviets was usually called from the two chief localities on its banks) are open fields ; there are but few depressions, and no woods on the high plateau which intervenes between it and the canon of the Dzhuryn. In the extreme south, near the Dniester, south of the Ustsietchko-Shutromintse-Yasloviets n)!Kl BURNING VILLAGES ON THE VOLHYNIA FRONT. To envelope their retreat in smoke, the Austro-German forces set on fire villages and crops along their line. 3-J TIIK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the ground presents Hcrious difliciiltios for military operations on a large scale. On .June 4, 191(5, the nmin Russian attacks were directed against the Tsebroff-\'()robiyovkii sector, the gate on the Tarnopol-Krasne-Lvoff railway ; against the district of Burkanoif and against the Trybnkhovtse-Yasloviets line, guarding the approaches to Butchatch and the Butchatch-Nizhnioff-Stanislavoff railway. In front of Tarnopol, in spite of most heroic acliievcmonts on the part of the Russian troops, supported in tliat quarter by a detachment of Belgian armoured cars, under Major Semet, very little ground was gained. The defensive posi- tions of the Austrians were exceedingly strong, and the immediate neighbourhood of the Tarnopol -Lvoff railway, one of the best in Eastern Europt^ (it was part of the Berlin- Odessa line), offered them naany advantages. Whether the leadership of the Bavarian general. Count Bothmer, contributed in any way to the success of the defence — as was hinted by Ger- man writers — is a subject which may best be left for discussion to MiUcl-Europa itself. The story, however, that it was due mainly to the "heroism" of the German soldiers can be dismissed, as there were very few of them on the Upper Strypa, the majority of the troops en- gaged having been West Galician reginxents, especially Polish mountaineers from the Tatra and Beskid Mountains. In th^ Burkanoff- Bobulintse sector, as a result of a series of battles which proceeded throughout the first ten days of the Russian offensive, our Allies drove the enemy out of any positions which he held on the eastern bank of the Strypa and even gained on a considerable front the opjiosite side of the river. The most signal success attended, however, the operations of General Shcherba- tieff's Army in the region of Butchatch. As the result of an intense artillery preparation, followed by infantrj^ attacks, our Allies had carried, by June 7, the entire line of the Olekhoviets and reached the ridge between that stream and the Strypa. After further bitter fighting the Russians, at dawn on June 8, entered Butchatch itself, and, developing their success, captured the same day the villages of Stsianka and Potok Zloty, a few miles to the west of the Lower Strypa. In Potok Zloty our Allies seized a large artillery park and consider- able quantities of shells ; near Ossovitse (north of Butchatch) a complete battery of 4-4 in. howitzers ; they also took in the same neigli- bourhood many prisoners, including the staff of an Austrian battalion. After a week'.s progress their advance in that region came, however, to a halt, for reasons explained in our general strategic survey of the first phase of the Russian offensive. It was not resumed until the first days of July, in conjunction with the very considerable conquests of ground south of the Dniester. The prol)lem with which General Lechitsky was faced in his attack against the Bukovina was by no means an easy one to solve. From the north, where the Russian positions extended about 40 miles farther west than in the Buko- vina, that coimtry is protected by the belt of the Dniester. Of the three bridge-heads across it, only the most westerly, that of Ustsietchko,* was in the hands of our Allies ; it was the least important, as the topographical configuration of its surroundings hardly admits movements of any considerable forces across the river at that point. It could serve as gate for cavalry or nainor detachments, not as an opening for an invasion by a whole army. The most important bridgehead of Zaleshchyki , where both a road and a railway cross the Dniester, was entirely in the possession of the Austrian army ; the enemy held also the strong defensive positions which on the northern bank cover the approaches to the river. There remained the bridgehead of Ustsie Biskupie, where the river separated the opposing armies. At this point, however, the Russians had a decisive advantage : the southern bank (held by the Austrians) is low, and can be dominated and taken vmder cross-fire by artillery posted on the high northern bank of the Dniester loop.f This sector was indeed to play a most important part in General Lechitsky's offensive against the Bukovina. Towards the east between the Rivers Dniester and Pruth the northern corner of the Buko- vina borders for about 20 iniles on Bessarabia ; south of the Pruth Rvimanian territory pro- tected the flank of General von Pflanzer- Baltin's Army. Most of what appears on the map like a gap between the two rivers is in reality blocked by a range of hills, called the Berdo Horodyshche, and rising 300-800 feet * At Ustsietchko both banks of the Dniester are Galician ground. There has been some confusion amon;; iiritish writers concerning the western frontier of the Bukovina, and it may therefore be worth emphasising that the towns of Horodenka. Sniatyn, and Kuty are all three in Galicia, and that Kolomea lies no less than 35 miles west of the Bukovina border. ■[■ A description of the Okna-Ouut depression was given in Chapter LXXXV., p. 142. THE TIMES HISTOnr OF THE ITM/?. 33 THE RE-OCCUPATION New recruits passing through above the valley of the Priith.* Only in the nortliem corner, between Dobronovtse and Okna, in the \alley of the Onut, does the range drop into a small plain. Tins plain, A\liich was to become the oi^ening for the Riissian offensive, is almost isolated on the southern and south-eastern sides, where, on Russian gromid, the wooded hills extend to the very caiion of the Dniester. Xot even a secondary road approached Okna or Dobrono\-tse from that direction. An advance from Bessarabia seemed, therefore, to be fraught with almost insuperable difficulties. Yet, having found during their operations on the Toporovtse- Rarantche front in January, 1916, that the defences of the Berdo Horodj'shche covild not be forced to any appreciable extent by a frontal attack, our Allies decided to attempt the seeniingly impossible, and to open their offensive by a concentric attack against the north-eastern corner of the Bukovina. It must be accounted one of the most extra- ordinary achievements of the Russian troops in that district that they were able to carry out their vast preparations in that diffi- cult region without being noticed by the enemy. From the west the access to that sector is extremely easy, and even if the depression of Okna could not have been held. * Cf. the description of that sector given in Chapter ex., pp. 114-116. Oi RUSSIAN TERRITORY. a town to join the Russian Army. » with reasonaljh; foresigiit the Austrians ought to have been able to offer effective resistance on the Toutry-Yurkovtse-Dobronovtse line. But they seem to have been caught by surprise. On June 2 the Russians began to bombard the Austrian positions at Okna ; in the after- noon of the following day the fire increased considerably in violence, and on Jime 4 the first infantry attacks were launched across the river. The Austriiin troops withdrew about 3 miles south of the Okna position on to Hills 233 and 238. About the same time our Allies opened their attacks against Dobronovtse. As soon as the plan of the Russian offensive had been disclosed, it became clear that an abso- lutely decisi\c battle was being fought in that secluded north-eastern corner of the Bukovina. Some of the best Hungarian troops were sent against the Russians ; some of the best Magyar blood was shed in this desperate contest on the ramparts before the gates opening into Transyl- vania. * After four days of fighting the • Among tlie casualties ot the battle of Ukna was Count JuHus Esterhazy, the third member of that family to be killed in the war. He was a man of 47, yet had volunteered for the army as a private. Wliatever one may think about Magyar policy and the heavy burden of guilt which it bore in this war, their patriotism deserves the fullest praise. Whilst the Viennese aristocracy from the very beginning left the hard work of fighting to evidently less precious members of society, and whilst the Prussian Junkers for the most part dis- creetly withdrew from the front and busied themselves, for instance, with guarding the Dutch border, the Mag^-ar aristocracy continued to tight and bleed for their country. 34 THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. defence of the enemy began to weaken. By June 9 his position nnjis practically lu)peless. '■ In spite of a desiierate resistance on the part oi the enemy," says the IVtrograd oflicial communique of June 11, '"a violent flanking fire, and even curtain lire, and the explosions of whole sets of mines. General Lechitsky's troops captured the enemy's position south of Dobronovtse, 14 miles north-east of Czerno- \itz. In that i-egion alone we captured 18,000 soldiers, one general, 347 officers, and 10 guns, and at the time this report was sent off jirisoners were still streaming in in large parties." On the same day the Austrians blew up the railway station at Vurkovtse. A wedge had been driven into the enemy front between the Rivers Dniester and Pruth, the positions of the Berdo Horodyshche were turned, the bridgehead of Zaleshchyki, one of the proudest re-conquests of the Austrian armies in that region — dearly paid for in blood — had suddenly lost all strategic value ; the Russians were now in possession of the ground both north and south of Zaleshchyki. By June 12 our Allies held the bridgehead itself, and even the village of Horodenka, the junction of six first-class high roads (inckiding one leading by Ustsietchko to Tchortkoff). All gates into Northern Bukovina were now wide open and safe against any counter-attack by the enemy. The greater [lart of the defeated anny of General von Pflanzer-Baltin had to seek safety beyond the Pruth ; his front now extended east and west, tliiis leaving only weaker detachments north of the Pruth, on the road towards K<jlomea. Our Allies made the fullest use of their opportunities. They were advancing rapidly. The following is the account of those days given in a Polish paper by a land- owner from the neighbourhood of Sniatyn : "During the night of June 12-13, terrific artillery fire was heard in the town. Somewhere near a battle was raging. For the third or foiu-th time since the beginning of the war we were passing through that experience. I went to the army-command to ask advice. A staff- captain had just arrived with news from the front. The Austrian troops were resisting. Still, after the front between the Dniester and Pruth had once been broken there was no other natural line for resistance. According to the accounts of the Austrian officers, the Russian artillery was, with magnificent bravery, driving up to new positions, thus preventing our men from entrenching and preparing a new line. " ' How long can we hold out ? ' was my THE ADVANCE IN THE BUKOVINA. A Russian patrol reporting at Headquarters after a raid. THE TJMKS IIISTOIiV OF THE WAR. Sf) A RUSSIAN TROPHY. A gun captured from a regiment of Prussian Grenadiers. question. The old general looked at me and answered : ' Only our rearguards are now- engaged ; our forces are gathering a few miles .from here. If ovir flank near Horodenka holds out overnight we shall not evacuate the town.' "I returned to Sniatyn. . . . Small groups of inliabitants were standing about the streets, commenting on the news. Artillery and anunu- nition were at full speed passing through the ■ town for the front. A few regin\ents of infantry marched tlirough at night. . . . The horizon was red with the glow of fires. For the third time our poor villages were bviming. Whatever liad survived previous battles was now given up to the flames. Homeless refvigees, evacuated from the threatened villages, were passing with their poor, worn-out horses and their cows — all their remaining wealth. In perfect silence ; no one complained ; it had to be. . . . Mysterious cavalry patrols and despatch-riders were riding tlirough the streets. No one slept that night. . . " In the morning the first mihtary transports passed throvigh the town. The retreat had begun. Questions were asked. The Mag\ar soldiers quietly smoked their pipes ; there was no way for us of understanding one another. Onlj' one of them, who knew a few German words, explained ' Russen, stark, stark, Masse ' (' Russians, strong, strong, a great ma.ss '). . . The api^roacliing violent fire of hea\y gims was even more enlightening. Ovir trained ears could distinguish their voices. Like a con- tinuous tlumder was the roar of the Japanese (Russian) guns ; at inter\ als they w(>re answered nervously by the Austrian artillery. " Suddenly the gim-fire stopped and tlie expert ear could catch the rattling of machine guns. The decisive attack had begun. All a-strain, we were awaiting news. Some soldiers appeared roimd the comer of the road, slightly w oiuided. . . . Then a panic began. Someone had come from a neighbouring ^•illage reporting tliat he had seen Cossacks. Soon refugees from the ^•illages outside were streaming through the town. General confusion. Cliildren w ere crying, women sobbing. A mass flight began. Again cavalry and despatch-riders. Then a drum was heard in the square. It was ofticially gi\-en out that the situation w-as extremely gra\e and that whoever wished to leave the town liad better do so inunediately. " We had to go. As I was mounting the carriage I perceived in the distance, near the wood on the liill, a few horsemen with long lances — Cossacks from Kuban. They were slowly emerging from the forest and approach- 86 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. as -J < > < z < O a o ai < X u iiig vtiG town. ' Drive ahead ! ' I shouted to the cuiuliiiian." On June 13 the Russians entered Sniatyn for the third time in tlie course of the war. Tlie Austrians soon came to see that, at least in this part of the country, the game was up. Near Niezviska, north-west of Horodenka, on tlie Kolomea-Butchatch road, in the biggest of the Dniester loops, they had been constructing a new bridge across the river. It was meant to become one of the most important bridge- heads, safely covered against attacks from the north by the two narrow necks of the river loop. Once the Dniester line had been turned from the sovith the position at Niezviska lost all value, just as had that of Zaleshchyki. The l)ridge, a structure some 40 feet liigh, was now destroyed by its builders. Farther back to the west, at Tlumatch, Ottynia, and Kolonaea measures were taken for the evacuation of the civilian population. Tlie Austrian officials were leaving the towns, and all men of military age were compelled to join in the flight ; in many cases their families followed them, and a new wave of refugees was rolling towards the west. To many of them, with characteristic egotism and heartlessness, Hungary closed its doors. No less hopeless, in the long run, was the ])osition of the Austrians south of the Pruth. The strong line of the river made it possible for them to hold up the Russian advance for a few days. Yet no illusion could be entertained concerning the loltimate issue of the struggle for Czernovitz. On Sunday, Jvme 11, at G a.m., an official proclamation, signed by Herr von Tarangul, Chief of the Czernovitz police, was posted on the walls announcing that on the same day the town was expected to come under the lire of the Russian guns. What a sudden change ! After a break of a year and a half, the University of Czernovitz, the farthest outpost of German Kultur in the East, had just resiimed its work.* Its Pan-German Professors, who in the summer of 1915 had been celebrating noisj'' festivities of " brotherhood in arms " {Waffen- bruderschaft) with German officers, had now shown their sure military instinct by appoint- ing Archdukes Frederick, Eugene and Joseph * German was the language at the University cf Czernovitz, although 40 per cent, of the population of the Bukovina are Little Russians, 35 per cent. Rou- manians, 13 per cent. Jews, 3 per cent. Poles (mainly of Armenian extraction), and only about 9 per cent. Germans. These Germans are concentrated mainly in the town and direct neighbourhood of Czernovitz. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. 37 RUSSIAN TROOPS PASSING THROUGH LUTSK. The principal street, through which the troops are passing, called Emperor Nicholas Street, was renamed by the Austrians Emperor Franz Josef Street. Ferdinand, and also General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, " honorary doctors " of the University. Even the fatal day of June 4 was still meant to be at Czemovitz a day of festivities. The town was beflagged as "an Imperial Eagle in Iron " {ein Reichsaar in Eisen) was unveiled at the Rathaiis " in memory of the time of Russian occupation " [ziir Erinnerung an die Russenzeit). The wide town- square was filled with people, and General von Pflanzer-Baltin himself was expected. Bvit then in the afternoon, whilst the artillery fire in the north, in the direction of Okna and Dobronovtse, was getting louder and louder, a despatch-rider arrived with the following mes- sage, wliich was read out to the expectant crowds in the square : " His Excellency General von Pflanzer-Baltin is prevented from taking part in the festivities of to-day, and gives notice of his absence." Six days later cr(J%vds were again filling the town-square — no longer to " commemorate " the Russian occupation of Czernovitz. " On Saturday, Jvme 10, at 6 p.m.," wrote a cor- respondent of the PoUsh daily Gazeta Wieczorna (Lvoff), who spent in Czemovitz the fatal ten days in June, " military transports began to traverse the main streets of the town, moving from the direction of the bridgehead of Zhuchka towards Starozhj-niets. It was an interminable chain of all kinds of vehicles, from huge, heavy motor lorries down to light gigs driven by army officers. The waves of war were rolling through the city. " As if at a given sign the town-square filled with people. Frightened, searching eyes were asking for an explanation. Terrifying news began to circulate, the excited imagination of the crowd was at work. Mysterious informa- tion was passed from mouth to mouth, yet no one kiiew anytliing definite. A fever got hold of the town. . . . With bags, boxes and baskets people were hurrying to the railway station. 'Is an "evacuation-train" leaving, and when ? ' they were asking with the persis- tence of desperation. The hours were moving slowly, and the night came over the city, full of despondency and gloom. " And still the endless military transports were traversing the streets. But no longer was 38 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 39 any notice taken of tlieni. . . . Tlio puns were playing, the exciteni(Mit was growing. At 7 p.m. the civihan authorities received the order of evacuation. Everything was to l)e ready for the train at C a.m. ^\hi(•h, besides Government property, \\as to carry of? the raihvay emploj-ees and their famiUes. "The coffee-houses were filling with people. . . . All Government oflk-ials jnit on their uniforms, all Government authorities, even the police, granted leave to their employees, demanding no more than a show of the per- formance of official duties. The town cor- j)oration paid out to its officers two months' salaries and sent them off to Sutchava, where all the evacuated Government authorities were going. No oflficial was, however, to leave the Bukovina without permission. (The fact which naturally is not mentioned in this account is that, before leaving the town, the Austrian authorities arrested a number of prominent citizens of Russian or Riunanian nationality — among them the Greek-Orthodox Archbishop Dr. Repta — and carried them away to Doma Vatra, and subseq\iently farther on to the interior. ) " Tlie command of the army corps from Sadagora (4 miles north of Czernovitz, on tie opposite side of tlie Prvitli) took up quarters at the ' Black Eagle ' Hotel. " Suddenly — no one knows how — the news spread that the anny-group of General Papp had evacuated its positions and was retreating. Even the hour of the event was known. The information was correct. . . . The greatest optmiists now gave up all hope. . . . The safety of the Bukovina was closely connected with the name of General Papp. . . . " The grey dawn found the city in full flight. . . . The streets were filled with crowds, the tramcars were carrying wounded soldiers, as at the order of the army-coramand the evacua- tion of the military hospitals had been started. The square before the railway station was closely packed with people, but the police were admitting only railway officials. The women were begging, crying, lifting up their cliildren. They had to wait — that train was not meant for them. " At 8 a.m. the first evacuation train left tlie city. The next was due at noon, or at 3 p.m. Many people preferred to fly by foot, as the prices of cabs and cars had risen to an incredible height. The artillery fire was drawing closer and closer, and above the heads of the crowd appeared a Ru.><«ian aviator. 'J'heir hearths were shaking witli fear. . . . " The i)ri(!es of goods in the town were falling rapidly. Tobacco and cigarettes, wliich pre- viously were liardly to be had anywhere, were offered at lialf-price without any restrictions. AVomen from the suburbs who, not knowing what had happened, liad brought their vege- tables to the market, were .selling them for a third of the itsual price, only to be able to return to their laomes and children. For the merchanta in Czernovitz the evacuation was a catastroplie. As they had been sujjplying the anny with goods, they Imd gathered stores valued at millions of crowns. None of them could be carried away ; only Govermnent property was being removed. " Tlie news that the town wovild soon conie mider fire led to a sheer panic. The crowd in front of the station was seized with frenzy. Against the resistance of the officials it forced its way into the station and invaded a half- empty military train. Tlie same happened in the case of the next train, and to all the following ones. In the course of Sunday 6 to 8,000 people left Czernovitz. . , ." By June 13 our Allies had reached the Pruth on the entire front from Nepokoloutz to Boyan. The Austrians had evacuated Sadagora, and, withdrawing across the river, had blo^^•n up the bridge at Mahalla. They effected their retreat, not without very heavy losses both in men and material. At Sadagora the Russians seized a large store of engineering material and an aerial railway. Reviewing the entire captures made by the anny of General Lechitsky since the beginning of the operations, the Russian official communique of June 13 stated that liis troops alone had taken prisoners 3 com- manders of regiments, 754 other officers, 37,832 soldiers, and had captured 120macliine gims, 49 gvins, 21 trench mortars, and 11 mine- throwers. For three days the Austrian forces were holding up the Russian advance across the Pruth. They were considerably favoured by topograpliical conditions. On the southern bank a range of hills rises above the flat Pruth valley ; they conunand all the passages across it. Hence the forcing of the river was by no means an easy task : it was acliieved by our AlUes on June 16. The same night the Austrians began the first military evacuation of Czerno- vitz, and on Jime 17, at 4 p.m., Russian troops entered the to\ATi, and were received with joy by 40 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. their owti compatriots and the Rumanians (in so far as they had not been "evacuated " by the Austrian authorities). As a matter of fact, the town liad suffered very little ; although it had been for almost a week within the range of the Russian gvuis, it had not " come imder their fire." Only the main railway station had been shelled and destroyed (to the " Volksgarten " station the Austrians themselves had set fire after tlie last " evacuation train " had left it on June 17, at 2.30 a.m.), and some streets near the Pruth had been slightly damaged during the battle for the river crossings. The Vicar-General of Czernovitz, Herr Schmid himself, in an interview with the Vienna Reichspost, denied the stories about the destruction of Czernovitz circulated by certain German and Austrian journalists. " The tales about the residence of the Greek-Orthodox Archbishop and the centre of the town having been shelled and destroyed are inventions. Altogether six civilians have been wounded during the bombardment." One sincerely \\ ishcs a similar account could have been given of Reims or Ypres. On the occupation of Czernovitz, Colonel Bromoff was appointed commander of the city, whilst Dr. George Sandru, the Greek- Orthodox vicar of the Paraskieva Church — a native of Czernovitz of Rumanian nationality — was entrusted with its civilian administration imtil the return of Dr. Bocancea. (The latter, a local Rimianian barrister, had been mayor of Czernovitz during the second Russian occupa- tion, November 27, 1914-February 22, 1915, and had then withdrawn ^\ith the Russian troops.) The piercing of the Dniester-Pruth front had knocked out the keystone of the Austrian defen- sive system in the south. It had practically cut ofi the army of General von Pflanzer-Baltin from that of General Coimt Bothmer. Then the forcing of the Pruth line tlu-ew back the troops of Pflanzer-Baltin on to the Carpatliian passes ; the forces gathered in front of Kolomea, Stanislavoff, and the Dniester crossings passed henceforth under Bothmer's command. The line of tlie River Sereth (not to be con- fiLsed with another river in Galicia bearing the same name) was the only one south of the Pruth on which the Austro-Hungarian troops might have held up the advance of our Allies, had tliey been given time to organize their defences. But the Russians allowed them no respite. On June 18 they had already reached Starozhyniets, south of which the so-called " Transylvanian road " crosses the Sereth. On the same day our Allies captured also the town of Kutchiu-mare. On June 19 they crossed the Sereth, and on the 21st they entered Radautz, 30 miles south of Czernovitz. At the same time other Russian detachments were advancing to the west, up the valley of the Tcheremosh (a confluent of the Pruth) past Vizhnits, towards Kuty. Retiring in haste before them, the Austrians set fire to the new big bridge over the river. On Jmie 22 our Allies entered Kuty, and during the next few days hacked their way through past Kossoff to Pistyn. From three sides, from the north- east, the east, and the south-east, they were now closing in on Kolomea. In the Bukovina itself the Russian advance was, meantime, continmng with amazing speed. Within 24 hoiu-s of the captvu-e of Radautz, our Allies entered Gora Humora, some 20 miles farther to the south. By the evening of June 23 they had taken, after a fierce struggle, the town of Empohmg, cap- turing about 60 officers and 2,000 men, and 7 machine-guns. Thus practically the whole of the Bukovina had passed again into the hands of the Russians. As the result of a three weeks' campaign, they had conquered a province more than half as large as Wales, a province dearly loved by the Austrian-Germans as a reputed outpost of Deutschtum in the East, highly valued by the Magyars as a rampart covering Transylvania. u CHAPTER CXXXVIII. THE BATTLE OF VERDUN (III.). Position at End of April, 191G — The Fourth Month of the Battle — 1'olitical Situation in France — A Secret Session of the Chamber — M. Briand's Position Strengthened — Fic:htinc; on the Left Bank of the Meuse — Avocourt Wood, Hill 304, and the Mort Homme — French Attack on Douaumont — Changes in Command — General Niveli.e— General Mangin — Destruction of German Observation Balloons — Heavy Fighting Described — The JMort Homme Again — German Progress at the End of ;Mav — Enormous Loss of Life — The Fall OF Vaux — INIajor Raynal's Heroic Defence — Fresh German Assaults — Situation at Fleury — Co-ordination of Allied Strategy — Preparation of the Franco-British Offensive on THE SoMME— Effect on the Verdun Battle. THE issue at Verdun, once the first German plan of overwhelming the Meuse fortress by weight and by surprise had been abandoned as being impossible of attainment, was mainly a question of time. The Germans sought feverishlj' to rain blow after blow upon the Frencli ; to attract to the Meuse front the French general reserves, and so to pound the French Armj'^ as to render it incapable of giving any really solid assistance to the British offensive on the Somme which in June, to the knowledge even of the man in the street, was inevitably imminent. The months of May and June, 1916, were in this respect decisive. The French by the valour of their infantry, by the skill of their leadership, by the growing strength of their heavy artillery, were able during this period, not onh' to defend Verdun and gain time for then- British Allies to bring the weight of their mobilized resoiu"ces to bear upon the northern front, but also to avoid the extensive loss, the utter crippling, which their enemy sought to inflict upon them. Not only was Verdun, or what remained of it, still in French hands when the British began their great offensive on the Sonune, but in that offensive the French triumphantly showed that their reserves of men and of material were Vol. IX.— Part 106. 41 still capable of supjiorting the double action of defence on the Meuse and offence on the Somnxe. This result was not achieved without great labour, without stern heroism. The fovu-th month of the battle for Verdun was ushered in by some of the fiercest fighting of the war. Worn-out troops — or rather men who, accoi'ding to all the tests of human resistance, should have been worn out — were called upon to furnish an effort of resistance greater than any up till then demanded of an armj-. There was more than that. The enemy at the outset of the war had clearly shown by the nature of his propaganda, by the tone of his Press comment, that he still possessed a notion of French psychology dating from the terrible year of 1870. He still imagined, as was shown in a hundred ways, that the French were incapable of bearing defeat. This idea he extended both to the army and to the civilian population. Especially was it a firmh'-fixed idea of the Germans that when every other ally played thenx false they would be able to count upon the pas- sionate blindness of the French politician. There can be no n\istake about the \'erdun battle. It cost the French very dear. There was hardly a village tliroughout the coimtry which had not contributed to the glory of its 42 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAJl. THE COMMANDER OF General JoflFre visits General Nivelle (on right), defence. In spite of a censorship which at times and in certain ways took too timorous a view of the character of the French civiUan, the country as a whole knew only too well what was the price of glory on the Meuse. It may be easy for a demagogue to declare from the comparative safety of a public plat- form that a country prefers death to slavery, but when the icy fingers of death seem to be feeling at the heart of everyone in a country, only true coiirage, only the purest patriotism, can support the strain. The strain placed upon the French bj' the continuance of the Verdun fighting was manifold. There were moments when all seemed lost. It became a commonplace both in France and in Great Britain to say that the peoples of the two countries had shown themselves infinitely superior to their Governments. Great though were ' the services of the French Parlia- ment to the common cause, it is equally true to say that the French Parliament in its THE VERDUN ARMY. who in May, 1916, succeeded General Petain. main manifestations did not adequately repre- sent the courage and steadfastness of the con- stituencies. There were occasions when Par- liament, which knowing little feared much, seemed likely to leap the barriers of common - sense and embark upon political and mili- tary adventures of an extremely hazardous nature. That temptation became increas- ingly strong during the months of May and June, when the nature and conditions of the early part of the Verdun battle became generally known. The whole of France knew more or less directly that mistakes had been committed. It was but natural that there should be a clamour for enquiry and for remedy. It is to the honour of French Parliamentarism that this demand never went outside the limits of common-sense. The French Deputy showed the enemy clearly that all his calculations founded upon political internal disruption were based upon false premises. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. 43 There was another and more sul)tle strain. British propaganda — a propaganda destineil to inform France of the real nature of Britisli effort and achievement — had been singularly in- effective. It seemed as though the British Government was unable or imwilling to attempt to set on foot any adequate machinery for supplying the friendly French Press with a proper service of British news which would give to the bulk of the country a real notion of the extent of the wholehearted cooperation of Great Britain in the war as well as of the value of the services already rendered by the British Fleet. The ordinary Frenchman of 1916 was able to converse with complete fluency and with some intelligence about a number of Continental problems which liad never tired the brains of his British colleague. But wlien it came to an understanding of British conditions, of British character, and of the unvarj'ing nature of British foreign policy, there wa-s as much ignorance in France as was displayed in those circles in England — f ortmiately limited — which before the war feared the recrudescence of a jingo France. The French had been told of the efforts made to recruit the British Army. They had followed with svnnpathy, but, be it said, without compre- hension, the (lying compromises of the Volun- tarj' system. They admireil our voluntary effort without in the least understanding its magnitude. There was no one to point out authoritatively to them that Great Britain, jierhaps alone of the three great Powers of the Entente, had furnished the means of defence promisetl at the very outbreak of the war. Tiiere w»is none to draw French attention to the fact that in the preparation of tlie defensive league of the Entente it was never contemplated that Great Britain should fur- nish an army on the Continental scale. We were to represent the sea and finance force of a defensive combination, the sokliers of wliich were France and Russia. None had shown them that our first duty to ourselves and to our Allies had been to see to the Fleet ; that therefore the first call upon our industrial resources was naval. There was none to remind the French peasant of the actual mathematical problems of war equipment. It was, therefore, but natural that while the French were bearing alone the great blood draih of Verdun there should have been a hopeful field for German projiaganda directerl towarc^s creating bad blood between the Allies. Xow and again indeed, in moments of depression, a A FKENCH GUN. In an improvised emplacement for indirect fire. it THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. few Frcnchmon exclaimed, " What are the Knglisli doing ? " And yet it was proved iiltiiiintcly tliat a fmv frank words from British Ministers deihuing that the British Army had placed itself completely at tlie disposal of General Joft're from the very start of the Verdun operations almost sufficed to remove this feeling. The effect ofVerdun upon the internal political situation in France was more marked, and indeed at one time seemed likely to be consider- able. Throughout the w-ar the role of the French Chamber of Deputies and of the Upper House, WAR'S ALARM BELL. A bell removed from a ruined village church and fixed up in a trench to warn French troops against the German asphyxiating gas attacks. the Senate, had been one of great delicacy and difficulty. At the outbreak of the struggle Parliament in a fine expression of the country's feeling decided at once to biu-y the political hatchet and to leave the Government unfettered by criticism to grapple with the many problems of national defence. In the first months of the war there was in France a series of problems to be settled similar to those which arose in England. The French had their shell shortage to meet. They had many gaps in their heavy artillery to make good, and towards the end of the first six months of war it became apparent that in some respects at least the Government had not displayed the requisite energy in dealing with these matters nor the necessary foresight in arranging for heavy gun construction. Par- liament, therefore, felt it to be its duty to resume the function.s of control conferred upon it by the Constitution. The exercise of that control brought about no small amount of friction between Government and Chambers. The Ministers attacked defended them.selves with tenacious vigour, and already in 1914 there were Parliamentarians who wondered whether in the machinery of secret sittings of the Chamber the Government might not be forced to reveal all and to deliver peccant Ministers to Parliamentarj' judgment. When the first accounts of the early days at Verdun became known, the clamour for a secret sitting at which the House could be informed of all the documents bearing upon the conditions of the defence of Verdun increased. The agitation had the support of M. Clemenceau in the Senate, and in the Chamber of Deputies a large bodj'^ of opinion favoured the demand, which, after much Parliamentary fencing and skirmishing, was finally accepted by M. Briand, the Prime Minister, and the first secret sitting of the Chamber of Deputies was held on June 16. The main purpose of secrecy was to enable private inembers to inform themselves fully as to the steps taken by the Higher Command to place Verdun in a proper condition of defence before the beginning of the German offensive on February 21. A subject of this nature was quite evidently not proper matter for public comment. A Parliamentary debate upon the Higher Command during the very height of battle was evidently full of danger. M. Briand determined that a debate restricted to this military subject would be more dan- gerous than a general discussion of the whole of the Government's war policy. The pro- ceedings were marked by one or two inci- dents, notably by a speech by M. Delcasse on foreign policy, which failed to obtain the approval of the House. The final result of the secret sittings in the Chamber, as well as of those held later in the Senate was to strengthen the Government's hands and to increase the prestige of its leader. No other result was, indeed, possible at a time when ■the whole future of Em-ope was still under public and violent debate in the fighting on the Meuse. THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE MAE. 45 A CORDUROY ROAD ON THE FRENCH FRONT. Trees destroyed by the enemy bombardment. Meanwhile, the French nation as a whole admirably resisted all the pressure placed upon them by events, and the attitude of the popu- lation, civil and military, was a model for futurity. They passed through weeks of strained anxiety. It was a time of severe test for the General Staff, for people, and for Parliament. The French war spirit emerged triimiphant from these tests, and the enemy failed to reap any permanent moral or political advantage from the blood poured out upon the Meuse slopes in the continuance of the great 106—2 40 TH?J TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. FRENCH TROOPS Leaving their billets to take their place in the iighting-line. effort begun against Verdun at the end of February. The growing activity of the Germans on the Bi'itish front, the aerial activity over the British Isles, the attempted Irish rising, and signs of fresh naval activity in the North Sea led many persons to imagine at the end of the month of April that the German had learned his lesson, was about to accept defeat at Verdun, and was getting ready to turn his attention to the once "contemptible" army in the north. There were, indeed, not a few General Officers in France who were incUned to share this view, which, indeed, fomid expression in a semi-official statement issued in Paris. At the General Staff, however, there were no illusions, and when after a pro- longed pause the battle flamed up again there was no weakening in the French armour. The next great outburst of activity began in the first w-eek of May. The course of the fighting was extremely simple. On the left bank all German progress had been stayed by the resistance of the Mort Homme, and the fighting here consisted throughout May and the greater part of Jvme in a series of tremendous thrusts, some aimed directly at the Mort Homme positions of the French, while others bore upon the flanking bastions of that great natural fortress. On the right bank of the riv«'r the enemy proceeded to bring all his effort to bear upon one point after another, his attacks being centred mainly upon Thiaumont work and the region of Douaumont and Vaux. During the first week of May, imder cover of heavy preliminary bombardment, the enemy completed his new concentration of troops. The battle began again upon the left Ijank, where, at the close of April, the French had begim to make local "progress in the neigh- bourhood of the Mort Homnie. A characteristic feature of the strategic course of the Battle of Verdun was the tendency of the German attack to displace itself ever farther westwards and away from the main objective. They had begun in February with the vain attempt to batter straight through the northern front. They were stopped by the Douaimiont defence and tried to find a vulnerable spot in Pepper Ridge. Here, also, they were foiled, and were forced to carry the battle over to the left bank of the Meuse, trying to get through Crows' Wood, Cumieres Wood, and Goose Ridge. This also proved impossible, so long as the French held the Mort Homme, which, in its turn, became the centre of attack. Frontal FRENCH TROOPS On their way to the trenches. THE TIMES JllsroHY OE THE WAU. 47 '^r 1 \ i^mLJimBK "V j ^All^flil^^flii ^f \ iA - 1'' 1 B ^T '•jr^ KB B r\ A I In Kltt ■190 ■^^^^^^^^Ikl&kJ^I ffiui^^^ jjpE ^^ ^^|^^m| ^^^^tiii^S^ wf^P'^^St^^ yCttiP^^^^^l^k^HO^^^^^Bv^^^R?^' Ki*^-^^ , _ r«<>»:-^— -i » ^^^ft;^^' TO STEM A COUNTER-ATTACK. French advanced party waiting for the Germans. assault upon the ]Mort Homme liad proved altogether too costly a plan to be followed, and at the beginning of 3Iay the front spread farther west again to Hill 304 and Avocoiut Wood. The INIort Homme was the cubninating ]>oint of a long, imdulating plateau, running almost due north and south from Forges Stream to the Bois Bourrus. East of it lay the broad valley of the ]\Ieuse. On the west the plateau sloped more gradually do\A-n to the little stream of Esnes, which divided the.]Mort Honmie from Hill 304. The ground here rose rapidly through a fringe of thin woods to a bare, C-shaped plateau, about two and a half miles long and a few hundred yards wide. For three days and three nights the whole of this ridge was swept by artillery fire. The French were driven out of their first-line trenches, and the enemy got a footing on the ridge. Using fresh troops with great prodigality, the enemy made almost suiDerhmnan efforts to develop tliis small success, but on May 10 he was forced once again to withdraw liis shattered divisions, and, following the logic of the battle, to prepare for a further effort, and to seek for some means of turning Hill 304. Thus the enemy had attacked the :Mort Honmie in order to tiurn the Bois des Corbetiux (Crows' Wood), he had attacked Hill 304 in order to tiun the Mort Homme, and he next attacked Avocourt Wood in order to turn Hill 304. The French artillery posted in Avocourt ^\'ood had proved itself extremely irksome to German progress on Hill 304, as it was nl)le to pour an enfilading fire upon the German troops which debouched from Haucourt. Ojierations here Ijegan with an assault u]ion Avocourt Wood at (i p.m. on May 17. Very great preparations had been made in order to ensure success. French airmen flying behind the German lines had reported growing activity along the roads and at the rail centres behind the German lines ; fresh troops and fresh guns were being brought in from the east and from other portions of the line in France. The action begim at Avocourt spread east- wards imtil it embraced the whole of the western half of the Verdun bat tie -front from Avocourt to Cumieres. The most desiderate fighting was in the immediate neighbourhood of the :Mort Honune. On ^lay 18 the volume of normal artillery fire rose to the fortissimo of battle, and reached its culminating point at about one o'clock on the afternoon of ]klay 20. Over sixty German batteries con- centrated their accelerated fire upon the French positions along the north-western and north-eastern slopes of the Mort Homme, and almost immediately afterwards the in 48 THE TIMES UISTOJIY OF THE WAR. THE MORT HOMME AREA. fantry moved out to the attack. The tactical idea of the German plan was to cut in behind the hill -top of the Mort Homme from the north-east and north-west. The troops of a fresh division were told off to push through the attack from the north-east, to carry Crows' Wood, and Les Caurettes, and to join \ip with the thrust made froni the north- west. The eastern attack met with but slight success. The first-line trenches of the French had, as was inevitable, crumbled away under the preliminary bombardment, but with their splendid tenacity the men of the French machine gun sections did not lightly abandon their positions. The Germans were received by a vigorous fire, but pressing forward in ever- growing numbers, they swept on across the first trench line, and advanced in strength upon the second line of defence. Here they were met by concentrated and combined machine gun and artillery fire. Their losses were extreniely heavy. They fought with great vigour and determination, and at one time succeeded in getting right into the second Une of trenches. Here progress was stopped. In vain did the Germans fling a neighbouring division into the battle in the hope of consolidating the first positions captured, and of driving through to the rear of the Mort Homme ; they were quite unable to make any headway. On the western slopes the enemy fared a little better. At the cost of heavy losses he gained possession of the French trenches on the south and south-west slopes of the ridge. The result acliieved by the operations was small in geo- graphy, but large in promise. The Mort Homme was no longer a French position. Its siunmit was swept by the fire of the guns on both sides. The French had been driven down into the •slight depression separating the top of the Mort Homme from the next eminence to the south. The exact price paid for this progress will never be known, but there was enovigh in the evidence of the battlefield and of prisoners to Justify the belief that about three-quarters of the total number of troops engaged on the drive from the north-east were killed or wounded. The attacks were not, however, carried out in the most deadly formation, but were entrusted to seven and in some cases eight successive waves of infantry, separated one from the other by between fifty and a himdred yards. The whole of the Bavarian brigade engaged, which took part in the fighting at this point, was caught in the curtain fire of the French machine gims, and ceased to exist as a useful unit. The desperate nature of the fighting can well be imagined from the account given of it by an officer who was engaged. He had seen Ypres, Souchez, and Carency, and declared that even after Ypres and Carency, even after the first onslaught in the Verdun sector, he could not have believed that a battle could reach such a pitch of fury. " Nothing that the manuals say, nothing that the technicians have foreseen, is true to- day. Even imder a hail of shells troops can fight on, and beneath the most terrific bombard- ment it is still the spirit of the combatants which counts. The German bombardments outdid all previsions. " When my battalion was called up as rein- forcements on May 20, the dug-outs and trenches THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 4'J of the first French line were already completely destroyed. The curtain fire of the Gennans. which had succeeded their boniburdnient of the front hnes, fell on the road more than two kilometres behind these. Now and then the heavy long-distance gims of the Germans lengthened their fire in an attempt to reach our batteries and their conununications. At eight o'clock in the evening, when we arrived in auto- 'buses behind the second or third lines, several shells reached our wagons, and killed men. The excellent spirit of the battalion suffered not at all, and this is the more to be noted, since it is far easier to keep one's dash and spirit in the heat of actual battle than when one is just approaching it. I have read a good many stories of battle, and some of their embroideries appear to me rather exaggerated ; the truth is quite good enough by itself. Although they were bombarded beforehand, my men went very firmly into action. The cannonade worked on the ears and the nerves, getting louder with every step nearer the front, till the very earth shook, and our hearts jumped in our breasts. " Where we were there were hardly any trenches nor communication trenches left. Every half -hour the appearance of the earth was COMMUNICATION TRENCHES. A stairway leading from one French trench to another. IN THE TRENCHES. A deep and well-constructed trench. changed by the unflagging shell fire. It was a perfect cataract of fire. We went forward by fits and starts, taking cover in shell-holes, and sometimes we saw a shell drop in the very holo we had chosen for our next leap forwards. A hundred men of the battalion were half buried, and we had scarcely the time to stop and helj) them to get themselves out. Suddenly wo arrived at what remained of oiu: first-lino trenches, just as the Bodies arrived at our barbed wire entanglements — or, rather, at the caterpillar-like remains of our barbed wire. "At this moment the German curtain fire lengthened, and most of our men biu-ied in shell-holes were able to get out and rejoin us. The Germans attacked in massed formation, by big columns of five or six himdred men, preceded by two waves of sharpshooters. We had only our rifles and our n\aehine-guns, because tlie 75"s could not g.>t to work. " Fortunately the flank batteries succeeded iu catching the Bodies on the right. It is abso- lutely impossible to convey what losses the Germans must suffer in these attacks. Nothing can give an idea of it. \\'hole ranks are mowed down, and those that follow them suffer the same fate. Under the storm of machine-gun, rifle 50 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WJ]}. 51 and 75 firo, the German columns were filonnlu'd into furrows of death. Imagine if you can what it would be hke to rake water. Those gaps filled up again at once. That is enough to show with what disdain of human life the Cerman attacks are planned and carried out. " In these circumstances CJennan ad\anco3 are sure. They startle the public, but at the front nobody attaches any importance to them. As a matter of fact, our trenches are so near those of the Germans that once the barbed wire is destroyed the distance between them can be covered in a few minutes. Thus, if one is willing to suffer a loss of life correspontling to the number of men necessary to cover the space between the lines, the other trench can always be reached. By sacrificing thousands of men, after a formidable bombardment, an enemy trench can always be taken. " There are slopes on Hill 304 where the level of the ground is raised several metres by movmds of German corpses. Sometimes it happens that the third German wave uses the dead of the second wave as ramparts and shelters. It was behind ramparts of the dead left by the first five attacks, on May 24, that we saw the Boches take shelter while they organized their next rush. " We make prisoners among these dead diu'ing our counter-attacks. They are men who have received no hurt, but have been knocked down by the falling of the human wall of their killed and wounded neighbours. They say very little. They are for the most part dazed with fear and alcohol, and it is several days before they recover." The flame on the left bank spread the next day (May 22) to the whole Verdun front, and the French in a brilliant dash upon the Fort of Douaumont opened one of the most glorious chapters of the defence upon the right bank. Douaumont had long been one of the white- heat points in the furnace. When the Ger- mans annoiuiced throughout the world on February 26 that their " doughty Branden- burgers " had captured the position they doubt- less piously believed that they had in fact won conamand of the key of the whole Meuse posi- tion. As has been explained in previous chapters, the course of modern warfare had completely altered the kind of services which the ring of old-style forts around Verdun was called upon to play. While the positions which had been crowned by forts naturally retained GENERAL JOFFRE AT VERDUN. Congratulating the General in command at Hill 304. their former importance in relation to the terrain, they became from a fortification point of view nothing but extremely strong links in the wide scheme of field works. Douaumont Fort, therefore, while completely changed by the devolo])ment of war, while it had lost its old meaning, nevertheless kept its old import- ance as an observation point and as a position from which the approaches to Vaux and Bras Fort could be swept by fire. Moreover, the Germans who first entered the fort on February 26 were few in number, and for many a long day the chief preoccupation of the enemy at this point of the line was to hang on like grim death to the slender hold he had acquired without a thought of any advance towards Paris. Having with difficulty consoli- dated his position, the enemy then sought to improve it. After much hard fighting he pressed the French down the southern slope of Douau- mont, but he was never able to. make his posi- tion there entirely sure. The French, on their side, had here as at 52 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR: LOADING A FRENCH MORTAR. other points along the line the fixed principle of profiting from every opportiuiity to hinder the enemy's progress and upset his calculations with vigorous local counter-attacks. It was the settled policy of steady defensive with occasional flashes of aggression. When Douau- mont Fort fell, its work devolved upon Vaux Fort, and with this point of resistance as a sort of base behind them the French in March and April worked steadily if slowly back towards Douaiunont. \^^hile the Germans were getting more and more heavily engaged upon the left bank of the river in their effort against the Mort Homme, the French pushed up east and west of Douau- mont towards Thiaumont Farm and Caillette Wood as a preliminary to a direct attack upon the Douamnont position itself. The Germans devoted their picked troops to the capture of Douaumont in February, for only solid troops could be expected successfully to carry a position of its strength. The French, in their turn, entrusted the execution of the operations to the Fifth Division under General INIangin, one of the most dashing of our Ally's leaders. The preparation of the French attack was carried out with a secrecy which had been notice- ably absent from the planning of other opera- tions of this importance. Directly responsible for the plans was General Nivelle, who from the beginning of May had been placed in direct command of the Verdun army in succession to General Petain. General Petain had taken the place of General Langle de Gary, who at the beginning of the Verdim offensive was in com- mand of the Central Group of the French Armies and included in his front the Verdun area. General Langle de Gary was appointed to an Inspectorship in the rear in the early stages of the Verdun fighting. Petain's successor had a long record of pre- war service in the Colonies. He was an old Polytechnique man, and had speciaUzed in the use of artillery. His career was in many respects similar to that of Petain. The war found him in command of the Fifth Infantry Regiment. In October, 1914, he commanded a Brigade. In February, 1915, he was acting Commander of the Sixth Division and then as General of Division took over the Third Army Corps. Invention had placed in General Nivelle's hands a very useful means of ensuring tactical secrecy, so difficult to obtain with the develop- ment of the Air Services and the swarms of kite sausages which floated above the Meuse Hills. A new type of bomb for destroying these balloons, which was used with such effect later in the opening stages of the Somme offensive, was introduced in the preparation of the French attack upon Douaumont, and before General Mangin's men were set in motion the enemy was partially blinded by the destruction by aircraft of six of his observation balloons. The great interest of the Douaumont battles THE TIMES msTOh'Y OE THE WAR. r>3 is tliat tho study of no other portion of tlio operations gi\ es so clear an idea of tlie real cau.-i' of German failure to break through. The great factor \\ hich the Germans had comjiletcly under- estimated was the fighting spirit of the Freneli soldier. And at \'erdun the French showed tluit however great niigiit have become tlie importance of artillery tlie infantry wen^ still, and perhaps more than ever, the Queen of Battle. The troops allotted to the recapture of Douau- mont were no strangers to Verdun. Upon the Fifth Division had fallen the brunt of the enemy onslaughts in the \'aux-Douaumont region at the beginning of April. They suffered heavily, but before they left to refit in the rear General Mangn, addressing his men, said : " You are gv>ing to refonu > our depleted ranks. Many among you will return to your liomes and will bear with you to your families the \\<xrlike ardour and the tliirst for vengeance which inspires you. ' There is no rest for anj' French- man so long as the barbarous enemy treads the hallowed grovmd of our country ; there can be no peace for the world so long as the monster of Prussian militarism lias not been laid low. You will therefore prepare yourselves for further battles, in which you will have the absolute certainty of your superiority over an enemy whom you have seen so often flee or raise his hands before your bayonets and grenades. Y'oii are certain of that now. Any German \\ ho get.s into a trench of the Fifth Division is dead or captured. Any position methwlically at- tacked by the Fifth Division is a eaj)tured position. You march under tlu; wings oi \ictory." A month later they were back, burning to ju.stify the confidence of their chief. The " methodical " preparation of the assault wius thorouglily well carried out. For two days tlie French poured higji explosive upon the already battered ruins of the Fort. An oflicer who took part in the attack thus described the operations: "On the horizon the toj) of Douaumont was crowned with sombre smoke. It looked like a volcano in full eruption, and under the fonnida])le fire of the French artillery our infantry was getting on w ith its prejjaration for attack, was digging its attacking trenches and making all its last dispositions. Shortly before eiglit o'clock on May 22 one of our air- s(|uadrons flew up and went over the enemy lines. A few minutes afterwards six of the sausage balloons of the enemy on the right bank of the Meuse exploded. Our pilots litvd carrii d out their task, they liad deprived the German artillery of its best means of observation, and had considerably interfered with its efficiency for a part, at any rate, of the day. One of our soidiers, who was struck by the fact that the enemy shell was falling far from the zone nomially swept by their gvms, said to his colonel : ' We've put a bandage round the Roche's eyes.' " GETTING READY TO FIRE. 106—3 5J THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. NevertheU>.>us, the (iornians, feeling the iniiniiifiK'e of the attack and tlie approach of iUmger, Hooded our first hnes with a stonn of slira|)nel, wliiie our artillery increased its speed, ami was xoiiiiting shells with all its strength. As an officer said, tliere was a per- petual moan such as had never been heard before. The hour of attack drew near. All our men knew the price of it. They knew the fighting at Neuville St. Vaast, the offensive in the Champagne, the hand-to-hand struggles in the Bois des Caillettes ; they knew the work of Gennan artillery and of the enemy in front of them. Their respective duties were care- fully laid down. The centre had the big job allotted to it, to carry the ruins of the fort ; the right and the left were to take the enemy trenches east and west, and entleavour to surround the position. Each one of them knew his duty, and appreciated the value of the effort demanded of him. Soldiers such as these would not be denied. At 10 minutes to 12 they all dashed forward. There was no singing, and they did not form a battle pictiu-e. They bounded from shell hole to shell hole, from obstacle to obstacle, lying down, disappearing, rushing forward again, some falling never to get up again. A splendid flame burned through them. At noon the staff aeroplane reported that a Bengal fire was burning on Douaumont fort. The 129th Regiment had taken 11 minutes to carry three lines of enemy trench, and to reach its objective. On the left, all the German trenches on the west of the fort as far as the road from Douau- mont to Fleury had fallen into French hands : the 36th Regiment had carried out its part of the task. At the same time detachments of infantry and sappers got inside the fort, and covered the operations of those entrusted with the destruction of flanking positions, and with the blocking of exits from the fort. Bengal fires going up one after the other showed what progress was being made. It was reported to the staf^ of the Tenth Brigade that the surrounding movement w^as being effected in excellent conditions. The north- western and the northern angle were reached, and mitrailleuses were put in place. Meanwliile, east of the fort, the progress of the 74th Regiment had met with great opposition. The left had pushed forward rapidly, but the right had been ixnder heavy fire from the enemv's communication trenches which commanded their flank. In spite of all efforts this break slowed down progress. The north-eastern angle of the fort was .still in German hands. We held over two-thirds of the whole position, and sent back many prisoners to the rear. Half an hoiu" after the staff aeroplane signal had been received — that is to say, less than 50 minutes after the begin- ning of the assault — two German officers, some non-commi.ssioned officers, and about 100 men arrived as prisoners at the command post of the Tenth Brigade. Our men were wildly enthusiastic, and had but one thought, to push on to their success. Before the troops started out on these operations orders had been issued in w^hich it was said : " The Germans will make every effort to prevent us from getting into Douaumont Fort. Con- sequently, if we do get in, don't think that you're going to have a .second of rest." It was certain that the reaction of the enemy would make itself felt ; it was of almost unheard-of violence. That night ma.sses of infantry collected east of Haudromont Wood, and towards ten o'clock at night a violent bombardment was begun upon the French positions west of the fort. It was followed by a very vigorous infantry attack, which forced us to yield a little of the line we had won in the morning. In the fort, tliroughout the night, the struggle turned to our advantage. We kept all we had got, and even slightly increased our gains. At dawn the next day, the 23rd, our positions in the fort w-ere subjected to an appalling bombardment. Although the trench organization wliich had been successively tumbled and turned by French and German artillery seemed absolutely untenable, the 129th Regiment, in spite of the losses w'hich had weakened its ranks, hung on to the ground gained with a tenacity that was perfectly extraordinary. It was in vain that the enemy multiplied his infantry attacks and resumed and reinforced his bombardment. He met with an indomitable resistance. Nowhere was there any faltering, nowhere did the German manage to get his teeth in ; and when, during the night of the 23rd and the inorning of the 24th, the 10th Infantry Brigade was relieved, it had not lost an inch of the ground it had captiu-ed Heroic episodes in this desperate fight were legion. All ought to be quoted, they all resemble each other ; and yet how many will remain unknown ! There are the Grenadiers, LEAVING A BALLOON BY PARACHUTE, The balloon had broken loose and was drifting towards the enemy's trenches during a storm. The French airman landed safely behind the French lines. 55 oO THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. who pushed forward into perilous positions, right into the German lines, and did great killing before they rejoined their comrades. They even went the whole round of the fort, throwing their grenades, and yet managed to get back to their regiment. It was good to hear the officers talking of their men. " I've been in twenty-five campaigns," said a colonel who commanded a brigade ; " I've never .seen anj'thing finer than this assault. My men have really moved me into a siu-prised adinira- tion. There is nothing finer than om- French soldiers. They are better than they were a year ago, better to-day than they were yester- day. They are always siu-prising. I watched them coming back from the lines, both yoimg and old were the same. There was one carrying a German helmet, another moved slowly but gloriously along upon a long stick ; SCENES IN THE TOWN OF VERDUN. Buildings reduced to a heap of ruins by German artillery fire. they were all laden with splendid booty, they were real warriors, and I adore them." The fighting at Douaumont was not only a fine episode and a glorious episode in the history of the French army ; it contained a lesson for the enemy. The lesson for the Germans was that the spirit and dash of the French infantryman was still as great as ever. The enemy, even in operations in which their best troops were engaged, had been obliged frequently to resort to close formation in attack. The French infantry streamed out of its trenches in open order and advanced faultlessly upon the plateau. There was no faltering of any sort and the men stood the strain of ad\'ance in open order with complete success. Once they had got inside the fort their troubles were in some respects only beginning. The garrison made the most determined stand and hung on to its positions in the north and north-east of the fort with grim tenacity, waiting for the counter- attack to come to their relief. They had not long to wait, and the rest of the day and the following night were filled with the roar of battle as fresh coxinter-attacks followed one after the other at short intervals. Fighting was carried out right along the Douaimaont front, and the fort itself was attacked time after time by strong bodies of infantry who were launched against it from west, east and north. The efforts of the two fresh Bavarian divisions were finally triumphant, and on May 24 the ruins of Douaumont were once again in enemy hands. The whole Verdun front was now ablaze, and from Avocourt to Vaux the Germans hui'led thp: tjmi-:s history of the war. 57 regiment after regiment of new troops upon the Frencli lines in a supreme endeavour to break through. They re-entered Douaumont, as \vt^ have seen, on May 24, and the same day they made progress of greater significance on the h-f t bank sector of the field of battle. On May 2:J the situation on the left bank was extremely critical — the wliole battle of \'erdun was an unending series of critical days. Here, as upon the right bank, the Germans had some- what antedated their victories. They had announced the capture of the Mort Homme, and they had followed this example by declaring that Hill 304 was in their hands, at a time when from a military point of view they were still far from undisputed mastery of these positions, ^^'ith regard to Hill 304, it is clear that on this day, May 23, the Frencli still held the military crest and the western slopes. It is perhaps necessary to explain that, owing to the development of modern artillery, hill-crests in the geographical sense of the term possessed no military \alue whatever. The tops of the Iiills and ridges of the Meuse were so pounded with liigh explosive as to be imtenable by either side. What happened in most cases was that tlie defending party held on to the military crest as long as possible. This military crest consisted of trench positions, situated a few himdred feet below the sky-line, and scre»'ned from direct artillery fire by the geographical crest of the hill. In many ca-ses there existed a complicated system of tunnels which led right through from behind the jieak to the slope exposed to the observation of the enemy. Hero on this exposed surfac(> artillery observation posts were established, protected and strengthened by a few machine-guns. The top of the hill itself cea.sed therefore to possess any value. This use of what the Fnmch call the contre-pente had first been introduced into general practice by the Gennans in the course of the ("liampagne offensive in the autunui of 1915. It was indeed mainly these positions with their large fields of barbed wire, which lay hidden from direct artillery destruction, whicli held up the French in their onslaught upon the last German lines in the neighbourhood t)f Tahure. The situation at the Mort Homme at tiie beginning of May may be described roughly as ANOTHER VIEW OF THE TOWN After the German bombardment. 5« THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. z 'J ai O H Z D O U z U < W H z >^ OS OS <: u as u Z o 2 z <: OS u o Q OS D H Qu < U follows : The enemy had crept a short w ay up the northern luce of the ridge, and liad formed a salient in the French positions estabhshed u[M)n the eastern and the western slopes of the liill, tlie suimnit of which liatl been converted into a shell-swept No Man's Land, upon wliich occasionally ventured an absolutely essential artillery observation oflicer. On the contre- ))cnle French infantry \\ere as solidly entrenched as was possible, and in the horse-shoe round the ))ase of the hill the French held hastily-con- structed trench defences. The opening of the horse -shoe was represented by the Glerman salient on the northern side. On the neighbouring position of Hill 304 the state of affairs was not exactly similar. There the Germans had pushed through the stubble of shell -shattered woods which lined the base of tlic ridge, and had occupied positions which were almost exactly the opposite of the relative situations of the two armies upon the Mort Homme. Here it was the German Army which liad placed a horse-shoe at the base of the hill, and it was the French from the western slopes who formed a salient. The general plan of the enemy on May 23 was to turn the whole Mort Homme plateau by cutting through the trench organizations which linked it up in the west with Hill 304. The enemy had pushed the French down to the base of the Mort Homme, and endeavoured to swing themselves up to the crest of Hill 287, the next eminence on the road to Verdun. At tlie same time the Germans endeavoured to cut through to the east of the Mort Homme plateau, and into the combined operations, wliich were launched after a bombardment of great fury, the enemy lavmched at least two army corps. Fortunately the French had in this sector of the front troops of well-tried valour ; the new systems of liaison and fire control were becoming perfected ; the infantry had but to press a button, so to speak, to have an almost instan- taneous curtain fire from the artillery in the rear. It was one of the curious things of the war that for long the unquestioned changes wrought in tactics, and in the use of artillery, had failed to affect the general organization of the French armies. The divisions employed could have, at this stage of the war, no general or individual strategic mission, which is another way of saying that for the divisional general the tactics had almost entirely vanished, or were applied upon a minute scale involving the capture of a cellar. THE TUJES HISTOIiY OF THE WAIi. 59 BEHIND THE FRENCH LINES AT VEKUUN. Reinforcements leaving motor wagons to relieve their comrades in the trenches. or the flanking of a ditch, and strategy had completely disappeared. For the anny corps this was even more the case, yet, nntil an atlvanced period of the battle for Verdun, the old almost watertight army organization had remained intact. The general commanding a division still had under his direct control the same amount of artillery as at the opening of the war. Heavy artillery was almost entirely the special property of the army corps com- manders, to whom requests for barrage fire had to be addressed tlirough time-wasting and circuitous routes. General Petain was the first French army commander to introduce a system which was already employed in both the British and German armies. He abolished, partly at any rate, the iron-bound system of divisions of army corps, massed large nimibers of divisions together, and gave to each of them their pro- portionate quota of heavy artillery. The importance of this change is quite e\-ident when it is reahzed that in all the later stages of the Verdun battle the curtain fire was, in the majority of cases, carried out by lieavy artillery. Ciu-tain fire, to be effective, had to be instan- taneous. Immediately the forward artillery observation officer saw the enemy's bombard- ment slacken, and the " war-grey " forms of the enemj' appear above the trench-line, he liad to telephone at once, or, as was frequently the case when telephones had ceased to work, to signal with rockets, for an immecUate curtain fire. The shell of the 75"s had proved itself quite imable to stop the massed rushes of tlie enemy, and luiless what at the beginning of Verdim was the Corps Artillery, that is to say the heavy guns, could pour its thousands of pounds of melinite upon the advancing waves, the attack was almost certain to succeed. It was through a curtain fire of this tremen- dous density that the German infantry advanced on the left bank front on ^lay 23. The scene was described by one of the band of American ainnen who did such excellent work in the Verdun sector, in words which conjure up, as do all the aerial photographs, and particularly those of the assault upon Douaumont, a battle picture painted in completely novel perspective. This airman had been sent out as artillery observation officer at the beginning of the German assaults in the Mort Homme region. His mission, he declared, was absolutely fruit- less. Although he flew at an extremely low altitude, only some few hundred feet above the earth, notliing whatever could be seen, except a tremendous pillar of smoke ; the ground itself was completely hidden from his eyes. There was not even a flaah. A column of smoke 600 feet high covered the wliole position. In this smoky inferno wave after wave of Ger- mans fell blasted to pieces by high explosives, or were dropped in their rush by the savage chattering machine gims. On the east of the ^lort Homme the enemy was unable to get through the horrible zone thus formed, and his dead lay in patches in the shell area, and in long swathes where the machine guns had mown them dov\Ti. Between Hill 304 and tlit. Mort Homme, however, greater progress was made. For a time here too the enemy spent himself in un- availing dashes at the curtain of bursting shell ; but, as there were ever more and more men pressing forward to take the places of those who fell, towards the close of the day the Germans managed to sweep through the danger zone, and to install themselves close enough to the first trench lines to render the use of French r.ii 77//: TIMES HlSTOliV OF THE WAR. FRENCH TROOPS CHARGING ENEMY'S TRENCHES With fixed bayonets, and led by a bomb-thrower. high explosive impossible, without there being a certainty of Icilling as many French as Germans. Here for a time the enemy hung on, and meanwhile the special detachntient (f flame-fighters who had just arrived in this region were sent forward. There is no mask against fire, and with their diabolical flame- throwers the Germans succeeded in burning the French out of their first lines. Before nightfall the French came back at them again — it was one of the constantly hopeful features of the Verdun fighting that at no period did the French infantry fail to react — and after half an hour's fighting the Germans had been driven out of the ground they had purchased at so high a cost, and were filtering in isolated disorder back to the trenches from which they had begun the attack. Dastardly and despicable though German methods of fighting were, it would be foolish to deny that in the whole effort they made against Verdun their men displayed the most formidable doggedness. Time after time they stormed to the assault of the most for- bidding positions, over the corpses of hundreds who had failed before them ; time after time regiments which had reeled and melted beneath the deadly sputtering of mitrailleuses formed up again, and again returned to obvious de- struction. The French were not long left in THE TIMES HISTCmV OF THE W.in. Gl ENTRANCE TO French troops in a vi possession of their recaptured line, but had. before night fell, to witlistand again the counter- attacks of the enemy. This night effort was most pronoimced to the west of the Mort Homme, a section of the front which had seen some of the most desperate fighting in the whole history of the battle. The Caurettes AA'ood and Cmiiieres Wood, which formed tlie first cover of Cumieres village, had, as has been related in earlier chapters, been the scene of desperate and bloody fighting. They had been captured and recaptiu-ed several times, and when this climax was reached, the Fi'cnch were still hanging on by the skin of their teeth to a portion of these woods. The day attacks had A DUG-OUT. llage near Verdun. failed to get home ; at night the shiice-gates of Germany were open, and horde after horde of infantry rolled down in the effort to force a passage to the east of the Mort Homme — down the valley of the Meuse itself. In spite of the explanations fumislied by the German General Staff there can be no question whatever that this great drive was intended to bring the Germans into position from which they could begin the direct attack upon the main defences of Verdun on the left bank. It is to be noted that in this area of the front tlie Germans were still battling with tlie advance work defending the Meuse capital. They had not here even reached the same point on May 22 THE TIMES HISTOBY OE THE WAB. as they Jiad attained on February 26 on the right bank by the capture of Douamnont. The French still had to protect their ^hole Verdun salient, the formidable hne of wooded hill and dale constituted by the fort of Bras, Bourrus Wood, and the Esnes position. It was to the piercing of this second line of defence that the great attacks of INIay 23 were devoted. As was frequently the case in the long battle, the enemy very nearly succeeded. He felt the cup between his lips, but could not drink. During the night of May 23-24, profiting by his gains on Hill 304 and the Mort Homme, which, although slight in measurement, were capable of great strategic profit, he pushed forward upon the second line of Verdun defences. Once again troops which had liitherto been spared the horrors of Verdun were gathered in strength upon .the restricted front A FRENCH TRENCH IN THE MEUSE SECTOR. Showing the method of construction, and the white lines of the communication trenches in the distance. Smaller picture : Poste de Comman- dant at a French Brigade Headquarters near Douaumont. of the ]Mort Homme and the country \\est of it as far as the IVIeuse. The village of Cumieres was the immediate objective of this resumed attempt. It had long before been ruined. Lying as it did in the valley at the extreme western point of the great loop formed by the IMeuse between Samogneux and Bras, its strategic value was doubtful. The whole place was covered with shells, and reduced by the most elementary and, be it added, effective methods of warfare. After every few hotirs of bombard- ment waves of infantry were sent up to it. When they returned, broken and depleted under the iire of tmdestroyed macliine gims, the big guns again took up the story. By this alternate battery and assault the Germans on ]\Iay 24 smashed the line, drove the French right out of the village of Cimiieres, and, profiting by their disorder and disarray, pushed their infantry right down to the neighbourhood of Chattancourt railway station. Once again the French automatic counter- attack, at any rate partly, re-established a balance. The infantry went at the advancing Germans with all their old dash and bite, and drove them back into Cumieres village, where, throughout the night of the 24th, they held out in trenches on the southern ovitskirts of the ruins. This hold enabled them to start methodical operations for the recapture of the rubble heap. Getting into the bushes and tree trimks east of the \'illage, bombing parties made good progress during the next few days, while the enemy was having an all too brief breathing space. While the infantry were at work in the east, the artilleryman was THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 63 pounding the German positions in tlie village and to the north-west of it. On May 27 tlio progress made V)y these two arms was deemed sufficient and the two assaulting columns, which had been brought up east and west of the village, were launched at simdown. On both flanks progress was made. The great landmark of Cumieres, the mill, was carried by the eastern colunm, and at dusk the French were engaged in the especially desperate business of cellar fighting, in the attempt to strengthen their hold upon the village. The western coluntn made sufficient progress to cause the Germans to fear that the whole village would be surrounded, and vigorous counter-attacks to the strength of a brigade and a half were launched upon this one point. It is interesting to note, at this stage in the battle, what tremendous effort in effectives had been demanded from the Germans. It is also interesting to note the first definite instance of large co-ordination between the western AlUes, which is to be found in the relief of the French Tenth Army by British forces. The Germans at this stage of the battle began a great artillery demonstration in Alsace and elsewhere along the front, with a view to preventing the free handling by the French of their reserves. The Paris Correspondent of The Times, commenting upon this on May 28. said : 'l'lii> Fronoh, it woiiWl l)C pnorile to <J<'ny, have paid, niicl urc jmyiiiK, llie prico whicli their li<T<)i<' resiKinnce lit Vcnhiii (Ipmuiid.s. 'J'heir losses diirint; the last week's fighting have probably been proportionately greater than at any other time throughout the Verdun fighting. It would, nevertheless, be folly to imagine that the hidk of the Fri-nch general reserves has been flung into battle. The relief given by the Uritisli in taking over the front of the French lOlh .Army, liberating it for service else- where, is an indieation of the method by which the Allied effectives in the West are constantly growing and the heavy losses at Venlun constantly being made good. The fact that the enemy, for the continuance of his tremendous drive upon the Verdun bulwarks, has been forced to scniteh together fresh divisions from Kussia, irom the Balkans, and from the nortliern front, is the FRENCH TRENCH IN A STREET IN CUMIERES. Smaller picture : A trench and barricade. z D Q ai Oi > < Z o o z o H > OS en PQ O E U z CD a; THE TIMES HISTOnr OF THE WW. 65 best evidence of the price wliieh the French are exacting for every yard of advance made by the tiennans toward-, the eastern (late. Some indication of that price is con- tained in the Echo de Paris in a tole;:;ram from the Verdun front. The writer of this dispatch says : " It is proved that from May 20 to May 25 seven different divisions were flunj; into the battle on both sides of the Meuse. Four of those were brou;,'ht from other points of the Western front^two from Fhuiders, two from the Somine. " On the left bank alone four divisions were employed in the last week-end fighting. Without a thought of the enormous losses caused Ijy our curtain fire and machine guns, the German Command threw them one after the other into the boiling pot east and west of Mort Homme. On May 22 alone, before the capture of Cumi^res village, which ha.snow been retaken, the enemy made no fewer than 16 attacks upon the front from the Avocourt Wood to the Meuse. Over 50,000 men sought that day to climb the slopes of Mort Homme and the plateau of Hill 304. The great charnel heap had 15,000 fresh corpses flung upon it without the French lines hav^ing yielded." All estimates of losses must naturally, at the present moment, remain estimates, but, according to all the information available, it seems to be established beyond question that there is a great disproportion between the losses of the French and Germans. The battle of Verdun throughout its development seems, indeed, to have shown that the French have reached a watershed of victory. In other words, that their artillery equipment and shell consumption have almost, if not entirely, reached a point of equality with that of the Germans. I'nder the conditions of modem warfare it is inevitable, with such equality of armament, and with, at the very least, equality of moral between opposing men, that the attackers should suffer more heavily in the casualty lists. There is good ground for the belief that in the first six weeks of the Verdun battle the Germans were losing very nenrly three to one. Losses seemed, however, to be of no import- ance whatever to the enemy in the pursuit of his ami. The iiimdredth day of the battle of Verdun was marked by a tremendous up\\ard swoop of the cvirve of bloodshed, by another and even more vehement blow, dehvered no doubt with a full and considered apprecia- tion of miUtary requirements, but aimed also at affecting the course of internal affairs in France. The agitation, briefly simimarized at the beginning of this cliapter, for a full and free discussion of the conditions of defence at Verdun, was taking a more and more alarming shape, Tliis great blow at the military might autl civilian moral of France was begun on ^lay 28. The Sunday was passed in what in Verdim constituted quiet — that is to say, the whole countryside shook and trembled under the fire of thousands of guns. In the evening the German infantry moved out of Crows' ^^'ood and delivered an assault xipon the French trenches between the Mort Homme and Ciunieres. This effort was shattered beneath French cm-tain fh-e, and it was not until mid- BEFORE VERDUN. The German Crown Prince with his Chief of Staff. night that the enemy again got going. But this .second attempt met with no greater success. The casualties sustained in tliis fighting had clearly shown the Germ.ans that, intense though their bombardment had been, it had not been heavy enough to obliterate the French defence. The artillery once niore took up the story, and for some 12 hours over 60 heavy batteries of enemy artillery pom-ed shell upon the Avocourt- Mort Honime-Cutnieres line. At three in the afternoon the next assault was launched. In these attacks no less than five fresh divisions took part. Two had been drawn from the front of the Sixth Arnij', while the main reserve of the German Army in the West at Cambrai had been called upon to furnish the other two. To give these fresh troops backing and aid in the tremendous task which lay before them, the greatest concentration of artillery seen up till then on the Western front was carried out with speed and secrecy. Each hour of battle saw the establishment of a fresh record in shell con- svunption. There had been nothing like it in the world's history, and nothing which even the most imaginative writers of war fiction had said in forecasting the conditions of modern war in any way approached the storm of horror un- loosed in this stage of the great struggle for Verdun. The German attacks, broken and 66 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. shattorecl as they vvero Ijy cDnstant ciirtnin firi', were repeated with tremendous rapidity along the front. It was, as one officer put it, as though the whole (Jennan .Army had been con- verteti into a nuichine-gun, and was delivering a series ( £ blows in which each bullet of the machine-giu) was represented by a regiment. The enemy's losses were gigantic, and at one time it seemed as though success might have been within his grasp, but the toll taken of the (Jermans as they advanced in wav'e after wave upon the French positions was too great for any army to withstand the drain. The objective of all this fighting was the reduction of the salient formed by the French lines in the Mort Homme- Cumieres section of the front ; the results obtained were scanty. The big blow of their guns was delivered upon the French centre, and right along this portion of the battlefield the French first-line trenches were obliterated. But what the artillery had shattered the German infantry was unable to seize. The enemy found himself much in the position of a man, anxious to increase his bag, who has brought down his bi'rd, but whose retriever is quite unable to bring it back. At the end of this stage of the fighting the French positions on the Mort Homme had been greatly weakened, but they still w-ere holding out in trenches to the east, south and west. The village of Cumieres had been captiu-ed, but there also none of the expected fruit of the German victory had been gathered. The attempt to storm through and begin the direct attack upon the great second line of the left bank defences of Verdun ha8 failed, and in spite of the strenuous and constant striving of the enemy to accomplish his object in the month of June, he was still occupying the positions on the Mort Homme, was still fighting for Hill 304, was still far from the Bourrus- Esnes line of positions when the joint Anglo- French offensive in the Somme burst with its fury on July 1. It cannot be definitely stated whether the next move of the enemy was due to the recog- nition of his failure on the left bank, or whether it was due to an almost incredible exaggeration of the effects of the small success achieved. The main cause of the left bank operations was that operations on the right bank in the neigh- bourhood of Douaimaont had been impeded by the enfilading fire of the French batteries posted farther north upon the left bank. The Mort Homme position had proved to be particularly disturbing. It inixy be that with the practical reduction of this ba.stion the Germans felt that they could afford to concentrate once more upon the northern front of X'erdun, and once again attempt to pierce straight through to the city. The Paris Correspondent of The Times, tele- graphing on June 1, was able to report that " so far the German blows have only dented the French defence, and there seems no reason to suppo.se that the enemy will ever succeed in driving right through it." Telegraphing earlier in the day the same correspondent .said : " On the right bank the bombardment, which has become almost chronic, was continued yesterday along the whole front from the Meu.se to Vaux. . . . Diu-ing the night the bombardment both east and west of Fort Douaumont attained an intensity which can only precede great infantry operations on one side or the other." Such indeed was the case. The French first and second lines during 26 hours had been subjected to a constant bombardment, of a violence seldom seen even in the course of this battle. All the heavy quick-firing batteries at the disposal of the enemy had been drawn up, and had made it impossible for the French supply and ammunition cohmans to furnish their front lines. The storm was a prelude to a long and desperate struggle for the Fort of Vaux, the captiu-e of which had been announced by the Germans three months previously, when they had succeeded in getting a footing on the northern slopes of the ridge. The two great efforts of the enemy against this position in March and in April had been very costly, and in no way successful. Throughout those two months they had been constantly pushing in small local attacks, which were equally un- availing. The June fighting, which lasted for a week, gave them the position, but to take it they poinded out men in a profusion unequalled in any attack of so small a front. After the fall of Douaumont, Vaux had taken up the duties of that position, and had become the advanced bastion of the big Souville fort to the south-west. Its fire swept the ravine through which the ground rose from the Woevre plain to Souville. The line of attack, as in the case of the Mort Homme, was from the north- east and north-west, through the Fumin Wood and Caillettes Wood. On June 1 the enemy, advancing from the norj;h-west, captured the Caillettes spur, and advanced through Vaux village, and on the following day began the direct assault upon the fort. THE TIMES HISTOnr OF THE WAR. 07 RUINS OF VAUX FORT. After seven days' desperate fighting against assaulting troops the enemy occupied the work, v.'hich had been completely ruined by furious bombardment. An official account of the figating round Vaux said : " It is impossible to retrace in detail the movements of such fighting. A modern battle is too fragmentary and too complicated for even approximate reconstitution to be possible. Nevertheless among the episodes there are some which give a good idea of the nature of the whole fighting. Among these is G8 THE TIMES HISTORY UE THE WAR. the defence of Trench R.I. by the 101st Infantry Heginu'nt. R.I. was a small trench north-west of \'aux fort, about halfway between the fort Hiul the viihige. In front of it, about 40 yards away, the Clernuius were entrenched, artd they also occupied positions to the right and left. It was a ditticult spot, but it hud to be held, as it interfered with the plan of encircling the fort, which the enemy had been trying to carry through for many weeks. In this part of the coimtry, where 280 mm. shells were flung in packets of 10, everything was topsyturvy, all trenches were level, and there wan not a shelter or dugout which offered security against the artillery, which was firing with such intensity as to prevent all work of repair. On June 1 at eight o'clock in the morning, after a short struggle, the Germans managed to carry a small length of French trench, which jutted out west of R.I. They were then seen advancing in single file along the lake, trying to filter through towards the slopes of Fumin Wood. Two French machine guns at once stopped their progress. R.I. was not attacked ; there was nothing but an exchange of shots and grenades V/ith the trench opposite. The bombardment continued throughout the niglit. Food and drink could not get up to the trench, where the men were beginning to suffer from tliirst. No one complained about it. Each man had an ample provision of grenades by his side, and packing cases full of them were dotted about close up to the trench. At 5.30 in the evening the rain of 105 and 130 shells was tropical. At eight o'clock the enemy left their trench and advanced on R.I. They were met with a hail of grenades, and streamed back to their trench in disorder. The order was given to send up a rocket asking our artillery to throw out a curtain fire in front of R.I. By bad luck, befon^ the rocket was got off, it burst and set Hre to all the stock of rockets. Fire and smoke filled the trench, and red and green flames roj-e above it. Those at a distance could not under- stand what had happened, and wondered whether the enemy was attacking with liquid fire, or had turned the French position. In the trench everyone was calm, officers and men joining in the work of placing the stock of grenades out of danger. At 10 o'clock the fire was mastered, and at the same time a reward arri\('d ; Hi ))ints of water were brought through from Finnin Wood, and divided immediately — one mouthful to each man. There was a pause until half-past two on the morning of June 3, when the enemy again attacked. "This tinie," said the captain who commanded the trench, " we must be more patient. Last time we were too quick." The enemy were allow'ed to come within about 15 paces, before they wore struck down by grenades and rifle fire. One German, who had got up to within three yards of tlie trench, received a grenade right in his face, and fell on the parapet. The officers were throwing bombs with as much zest as their men. By a last effort the Germans were beaten back, and at half -past three all was over. The trench, however, was still isolated by the enemy's curtain fire, and the men suffered more from thirst than from the enemy. Luckily it began to rain. Canvas was spread out, and in other receptacles water was gathered. Throughout the day. the bombardment con- tinued, and the Germans, who had succeeded in advancing in the trenches on the right and on the slopes of the fort, got a machine gun into position, and opened enfilading fire upon R.I. FRENCH GUNS IN THE ENVIRONS OF VERDUN. THE TIMES HISTOnr OF THE TIM/?. r,9 WAITING TILL THE SHELLS HAVE CLEARED THE WAY. French troops in a trench getting ready to advance. Another machine gun in Fiunin Wood swept the left of the trench. After a further burst of bombardment, between 1.30 and 7.30, German waves again rolled up to the French Une, and were again tlirown back. The night was passed under intense bombardment, and at tliree o'clock in the morning the enemy again came on ; but the French had acquired complete confidence in their grenades during the three- days' fighting, and gave them a warm reception. By da\\-n the Germans liad once more been repulsed. The first light of day lit up an extra- ordinary pictiu-e in the French trench. Every stone was splashed with blood ; the ground was littered with all kinds of debris, shell splinters, and more ghastly evidences of battle. For 24 70 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A FRENCH GANNON Gun of 155 mm. (6 in.) calibre which did more hours the bombardment continued, but the enemy was mastered, and at nine o'clock on June 5 the gallant garrison of the trench was relieved. The Colonel of the 101st, in reporting to the General commanding the 124th Division, during the thick of the fight, had said : " We are fighting to the end. Both men and officers, who have shown the most splendid devotion and self-sacrifice beyond praise, are determined to fall to a man in the defence of their trench." While both east and west of the fort fighting of this nature was going on all along the line, the attack upon the fort itself was developing. The Germans knew that it was beyond their strength to carry the fort by direct as.sault. They had got a footing on the slopes in March, and although they had done their vitmost DATING FROM 1881. excellent duty In the defence of Verdun. they had been unable to progress. In the weeks which followed they endeavoiu-ed to invest the position. Their infantry held the north and pushed down east and west, but their constant efforts to close the circle in the south had failed. Their artillerj^ accomplished what their infantry had been unable to effect. The whole southern slope of Vaux was covered with a curtain fire of heavy shell , which formed a wall of steel and high explosive and com- pleted the encircling of the fort. It was estimated that since IVIarch the Germans had flung no less than 8,000 heavy shells a day on to this position. During the latter days of the defence of Vaux this figure had greatly grown. The fort itself was torn and twisted by explosion. The usual entrance was completely blocked up, and for long the THE TIMES! HISiTORY OF THE WAR. 71 IN A VILLAGE NORTH-WEST OF VERDUN. German shell exploding and destroying a small station in the line of fire. only w&y into the fort was through a wicket in the north-western corner. It was tlirough this gate that, in spite of tremendous difficulties, commiuiications liad been maintained and supplies kept up. Mr. Warner Allen, the special representative of the British Press, in an account based upon official information, %vrote : The fort itself wa^ completely demolished by the explosion. In this hell-hole a little garrison under Major Rajnal continued to resist. Around the fort all work was impossible. Trenches •were demolished while they were being dug. A man had to wait for hours and choose his moment if he was to have the slightest chance of passing. On June 1 the enemy began a terrific attack. Under the violence of their fire certain elements of the French advanced line retired. A few men, slightly wounded, seeking for some shelter agamst the rain of shell, made their way into the ruins of the fort, and were an embarrassment to the garrison rather than a reinforcement. The next day the German advance made it impossible to use the north-western postern. Henceforth the fort was deprived of the only communication with the French lines. Since it was impossible for dispatch bearers to get through an attempt was made to communicate by signals. Signallers were posted at a window to com- municate with other signallers just over a mile away. But the scheme did not work satisfactorily — Vaux could not see the signals distinctly. A volunteer came forward to carry the news through the zone of death. He managed to escape the German fire, though not a movement passed undetected by the Germans. The signaller's position was changed, and he returned to his post in the fort, his object accomplished. A young officer named Bessett succeeded in leaving the fort with a report, and then went back to encourage his comrades, whom lie refused to desert. A private in the 124th Division, Stretcher-bearer Vanier, worked imtiringly with the wounded, hiding them among the ruins, and bandaging their wounds. When he had no wounded to tend he went out to fetch water, for water was the most serious problem of all. Throughout the battle of Verdim thirst has been one of the most terrible trials to which the soldiers have been submitted. Letters captured on German prisoners continually refer to it. Troops were entirely isolated THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 73 l)y curtains of shell firo on a narrow front, making al\ movemont impossible. Darkness was the only pro- tection ; but in June the nights are short, and star- shells were continually blazing. Isolated men succeeded in passing, but at terrible risk, with a tiny supply of water. But the task of providing 150 men with water, to say nothing of 400 more who had taken refuge in the fort, was beyond human power. From outside attempts were made to send water into the fort, but not one was successful. Yet the fort was held, and held for four days more. The enemy advanced on the higher ground, but the French organized the ruins of the buildings inside the fort. At every window, at every opening, behind the dibris of a wall machine-guns were placed, picked shots took refuge, and every German who reached the court- yard of the fort was shot down. Barricades were raised at every corner, and piles of German corpses lay before them. The Gerinans tried the experiment of letting down at the end of a cord baskets full of grenades, and, when these baskets were on a level with the windows held by the French, they dropped into them a grenade with a time-fuse and swung them in through the opening to explode inside. But still the garrison fought on. There is, however, a limit to human endurance. The last message sent by Major Raynal ran as follows : We are near the end. Officers and soldiers have done their whole duty. Vive la France ! June 6 was the final day. In the morning Vanier, with a few wounded who were determined not to be taken alive, escaped through a grating. They crawled towards the French lines, but several of them were killed. Those who won through were full of joy. When his colonel congratulated him, Vanier, who already holds the Military Medal and the War Cross with two palms, replied, " Mon Colonel, I would rather be killed than be taken by the Boches." This is the last definite news received concerning the Fort of Vaux. The same day our aeroplanes observed thick columns of smoke and explosions in what was once the fort. The defence of Vaux was one of the finest examples of French doggedness, and the French Government, departing from a rule which tip till then had always been observed, for the first time mentioned an officer bj"- name in a communique, and held up to the admira- tion of the world Major Raynal, the conimander of the fort. Before the fort fell it was announced that he had been promoted to the rank of com- mander in the Legion of Honour. He was one of those French officers who had won their way up from the ranks in a life of steady hard work. He was severely wounded on September 14, 1914, and mentioned in dispatches as follows : " Commanding the advance guard of his regiment, and having come into close contact with strongly entrenched enemy forces, imme- diately placed his battalion on supporting points, and maintained it there imder the fire of infantry, machine gims, and heavy artillery. Severely woimded in the afternoon, he retained the command of his battalion, staying in the first line, in order the better to control the fighting in difficult and covered coimtry, until he was obliged by loss of blood to go to the rear." Before his wounds were healed he wa* clamouring to got back to the fighting, antl as the medical board refused to pa.ss him for service in the field, he asked for a fortress command, and was given Vaux. The gallantry of Major Raynal's defence moved the enemy to admiration, and he was permitted by the Gorman Crown Prince to retain his sword, on his removal to ^lainz. It was from the Gennans that he learned of the honour bestowed upon him by the French Republic, and in special recognition of his gallantry, the insignia of his new rank' in the Legion of Honour were conferred upon liis wife at a special review at the Invalides. The effect of the fall of V'aux in its moral aspect was merely to strengthen French iletemiination, and the effect upon the enemy of the resistance put up there was shown in the German Press. The special correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt, after paying a tribute to the heroism and tenacity of the Vaux garrison, thus related a conversation he had had with a French soldier captured in Caillettes Wood : " I said, ' We've got Vaux Fort.' The French- man calmly said, ' Well ? ' and then, with a smile full of irony, added, ' Perhaps you've got Souville also ? ' This extraordinary optimi-sra of the French makes one really despair." The value of Vaux in the general reduction of Verdun proved to be small, but its fall was the necessary preface to the beginning of a direct operation against Souville. The front formed after the fall of Vaux. going from west to east, ran through Hill 321, north of Froide Terre Ridge, Thiaumont work, Fleury village, and the woods of Chai)itre, Fumin, Chenois, and La Laufee, which formed the approaches to Souville and Tavannes. The only road open to the Gennans lay down the valley which separated Froide Terre Ridge from the table- land upon wliich were the forts of Souville and Tavannes. The entrance to this valley was blocked by Fleiu-y village, but before the enemy could hope to carry this they had to obtain possession of Thiavunont work. After a prolonged pause, following the fall of Vaux Fort, the systematic attack upon this Une was begim. From June 19 to June 22 this attack bore do^^^l in three main directions, upon Ridge 321, Thiaiunont work, and Fleury. The main assault was delivered on June 23, when nearly a hundred thousand men were flimg upon a front which measured barely three miles. In the first sector in the west 74 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Tliiaiunont work was tho niiiiii objective. Between ridges 321 iiiid 320 — that is to say, on a front of j ust over a mile, no less than three divisions were engag(Hl. The attack began at eigiit o'clock in the morning, and it was not till the afternoon, wlien fresh troops had been brouglit up to strengthen the shattered divisions, that the first small breach was made in the French line. The point of this break was jiist east of Thiaumont Work, and at two in the afternoon the Germans flung a tre- mendous concentration of men upon tho spot, burst right through the line, and poured right over the Tliiaiunont position. Upon Fleury their action was not so rapidly successful. At one moment in the day they managed indeed to reach the village, but were flimg out of it again with very heavy losses. By Jime 25, after further murderous assaults, the enemy had succeeded in driving a wedge between the two main positions of the French, and had gained possession of Fleiu-y village. For a moment matters had looked very black indeed, and it had seemed as though the German General Staff had been able to profit by the critical moment which follows retreat to push forward and complete the disorganiza- tion of the defence. The Frefich coimter- attacks at Fleviry, however, upset their cal- culations, and the Germans were destined for long to remain unable to exploit their pos- session of Fleury villag;'. While Fleury was still the scene of hotly con- tested grenade fighting, already in the north, on the liritish front, a prolonged bombardment foreshadowed coming events. The time was at liand when the patient, if belated, efforts of the Allies to ensure co-ordination, to have — as IVI. Briand, tho originator of the Allied con- ferences, put the matter — unity of action upon unity of front, were to come to fruition. Away on the Eastern front the Russians were sti riding from victory to victory. On the Southern front the Italians had stemmed the threatened Austrian invasion, and were pre- paring a vigorous reaction. On the Western front also, the initiative was about to be wrested from the enemy's hands. The Allies, in dealing with this question of co-ordination, were at a disadvantage, as com- pared with their enemies. The Entente alliance was one of free and great peoples, proud of their independence, and jealous of their heritage in history. It was impossible for one of them to impose liis will, his poUcy, and his leading upon all the others, as Germany did upon Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Nevertheless, much had been accom- plished in the series of conferences held in France and in England, and the most complete unity of view had been obtained. The rumours which were spread about by men of little faith in France, as to the unwillingness of Britain to take up her full share of the burden pressing on the French, spread very naturally owing to the anxiety of the moment throughout the coimtry and across the Channel. As day after day the Germans slowly pressed in upon REFEREN Ck. BATTLE LINE: Fcb.20_ " 28 — .— June 14 .Mi^ GERMAN PROGRESS IN THE BATTLE OF VERDUN. The first week and the first four months. THE TIMESi HISTORY OF THE WAh\ 7:') "ILS NE PASSERONT PAS." The spirit of France at Fleury. the Meuse capital, tlie waiting for relief from the British placed a great strain upon tlie judgment and the faith of all. A good cor- rective to this anxiety was delivered by ]\Ir. Bonar Law on his arrival for the Economic Conference in Paris, when he said that on two occasions the British Army had been placed at the disposal of General Joffre, and was ready, and had long been ready, to carry out all that might be asked of it. The whole world waited on the tip-toe of expectation for the striking of that hour. It was every\vhere realized that the French at Verdun had been fighting for time. As Sir Edward Grey pointed out, they were fighting not for France alone, but for the whole alliance. If the French had failed there the whole arch of allied cooperation would have tiunbled to the groimd, the machinery of victorj- would have been flung out of gear, and many a long month added to the duration of the war. The enemy failed, and the extent of his failure can only be appreciated by a rapid survey of events since the begirming of his offensive on February 21. The original ahn of the offensive had been the captm-e of \'erdun. The first few days of the battle brought the Germans to Douauiuont, 'J z < H as Z '^ ►— . t„ O ° o .1 as « H ■£ Z 13 Z a 76 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE FORT DES PAROCHES. and within sight of Douaumont they were still fighting when the joint offensive on the Somme began on July 1. When, after the first two months of the battle, it became clear that Verdun was not to be captured, except at appalling cost, the objective was changed. The Germans were told that the offensive was purely defensive in character, that it aimed at destroying the military power of France, at preventing any possibility of co-ordinated action on the Western front. The magnificent dash made by the French south of the Somme in the first days of July proved how complete had been German defeat in this direction. General Joffre declared on the occasion of the second anniversary of the war : The great sacrifices which France has supported at Verdun have given our Allies time to build up their resources, have enabled \is to mature our plans and carry them out with perfect appreciation of the neces- sities of all fronts. We are now able to employ all our resources simultaneously in a thoroughgoing way. I desire to pay homage to the manner wherein all the Allies are fulfilling their part. Drawing on her inexhaustible resources Russia has been afforded time to bring forward men in ever-increas- ing numbers, and is now deploying her huge armies with telling effect in Galicia, Volhynia, and Armenia. Gi-eat Britain, too, has had time in the past two years to show the world the extent of her varied resources. Her troops are pro\'ing their splendid valour on the Somme, showing what a determined nation can do in such times £ts these. No doubt Italy has a difficult and limited part to play in a more restricted sphere of action, but her troops are fulfilling their role splendidly. The Serbian Army is beginning at this moment to enter the firing- line anew. After this brief review of the position of the Allied armies General JolTre outlined the Ger- man situation in a few crisp sentences : We know positively that our enemies, although fighting {IS desperately as ever, are drawing on their last reserves. Up to now they have followed the policy of transferring their reserves from one place to another, but in face of the Allies' united effort they now find it impossible, and will find it increasingly impossible in future, to pursue such methods. All our sources of information confirm that. It is not for me to say how long this struggle is going to last, but the question matters little. We know that the rupture is coming. You, no doubt, feel as well as we do, that we have reached the turning point. The five months' resistance of the French troops at Vei-dun has shattered the plans of theGennan Staff, and brought us round the comer, heading for victory. Don't, how- ever, imagine that there is yet a marked weakening of the German effort on the western front. Two-thirds of their finest troops are still opposed to us on this side. The English and French face 122 of their best divisions. On the Russian front the Germans have .50 divisions to which must, of course, be added the .\ustrian Armies. I won't go into details on the condition and temper of the French Army. You cannot do better than avail yourself of the facilities to see our troops in the field with your own eyes. You will sec the .\miy a.s it is after two years of the hardest fightir.fi. You will see an Army of which the spirit and energy have been vastly increased by this bitter struggle. To that I can add that ths number of our troops at the front is greater now than at the beginning of the war. I can think of no more eloquent fact than that as illustrating France's capacity for waging a just war. The country is determined to see the war to a victorious conclusion. The .Allies are fighting not merely for the respective interests of their countries, but for the liberty of the world, and will not stop till the world's liberty is definitely assured. The magnificent spectacle of French heroism at Verdun had robbed the Germans of that 78 THt: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. inoml viltory whicli, to jiidgo from their caiu[«wKn of lies, they held most dear. The doj^gi'duess of the poilti aroused the admiration of tlie world.. Everywhere, even in Germany, Verdun was regarded as symbolizing the whole fighting spirit of France— the spirit which found itself adiniraV)ly translated in Orders of the Day issued by General Joffre and General Nivelle. On June 12 the Generalissimo, in informing the troo[)s of the Russian successes in Galicia, wrote : " The plan elaborated by the councils of the coalition is now in full course of execution. Soldiers of Verdun, this is due to your heroic resistance, which has been the indispensable condition for success. All our future victories are based upon it. It is your re.>?istance which has created throughout the whole theatre of the European War a situation from which will be born to-morrow the final trimnph of our <;ause." On June 23 General Nivelle in Army Orders said : " The hour is decisive. The Germans, feeling themselves himted dowTi on every hand, are lamiching furious and desperate attacks upon our front, in the hope of reaching tlie gates of Verdun before themselves being attacked by the united forces of the Allied Armies. You will not let tliem pass, my comrades. The country demands this further supreme effort. The Army of Verdun will not allow itself to be intimi- dated by shells, and by German infantry, whose efforts it has destroyed during the past four inontlis. The Army of Verdun will keep its glory intact." At a later date General Nivelle, in acquainting his men with the address of praise sent to them by the French Academy, added : " It is one of the greatest sources of pride for the Verdun Army to have earned the testimony of the great assembly which incarnates and immortalizes the genius of the French tongue and the French race. The Army of Verdim has had the good fortune to answer to the appeal addressed to it by the coxintry. Thanks to its heroic tenacity the offensive of the Allies has already made brilliant progress . . . and the Germans are not at Verdun. But their task is not yet finished. No Frenchman will have earned his rest so long as there remains a single enemy upon the soil of France, of Alsace, or Lorraine. In order to enable the allied offensive to develop in freedom, and later on to lead us to final victory, we shall continue to resist the assaults of our implacable enemies, who, in spite of the sacrifice BEFORE DOUAUMONT. French Officers watching effect of Artillery fire. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 70 BEFORE VERDUN : TAKING SOUP TO THE FIRING-LINE. of the half-million men wliich Verdun has already cost them, have not given up their vain hopes. And, soldiers of the Eleventh Army, you will not be content with resistance ; you ^\Till go on biting in order to keep in front of you by a constant threat the largest possible nvunber of enemy forces, until the approaching hour of the general offensive has struck. The past is a guarantee of the future ; you will not fail in your sacred mission, and you will thus acquire further '"^claims upon the gratitude of your country, and of the alUed nations." The effect upon Germany may be clearly indicated in a few quotations from the German Press, which towards the middle of Jime, with the Russian victories in process of development, looked at the great gamble of Verdun with somewhat melancholy eyes. The Kolnische Volkszeitung, for instance, the chief organ of the Roman Catholic Centre party, which had distinguished itself from even the rest of the German Press by the virulence of its hatred of France, publislied towards the end of Jime an article headed " The Goal Not Yet Reached,." bO THE TIMES HISTOIiY OF THE WAn. THE ENTRANCE TO FORT ST. MICHEL. in which, after expressing its astonishment at the colossal Russian attacks in GaUcia and Volhynia, it said : " On their side, the French, in spite of the considerable sacrifices they are making at Verdun, are continuing a resistance which will take its place among the great miUtary feats of all ages. They are pro\ing that they will shrink from nothing in order to deprive us of the benefits of our past victories. No one knows when or how this war will finish, nor whether certain past hopes will be reaUzed. It is better not to speak about it." The Hamburger Fremdenhlatt, in the same strain of censored melancholy, said : "It does not matter much if Verdun fall or not. Posses- sion of this or of that fortress is of little value. What we must know is if the war is going to be of profit to one of the belligerent Powers, and if that profit is worth the price it will cost." Neutral opinion summed up the situation created by the splendid defence of Verdun in the words, of a Spanish paper : " In no sector of the vast front which they defend will the Germans be able to make a finer effort than that of Verdun, and, if they are not victorious in front of the great Lorraine fortress, the Empire is lost, for it will not have the necessary elements for defence against simultaneous attack." Perhaps the most striking testimony to the value of the stand at Verdun is to be found in a study of the disposition of the Allied troops in France. Apart from the relief of the French trench army by the British the German offensive had led to no considerable change. The Ger- mans had every advantage to gain by forcing on an attack by the British, by obliging Britain to carry out big operations before the training of her new Armies and the provision of her new artillery rendered such operations advisable. They failed in this, as they had failed in driving home every one of their partial successes in the field. The fighting at Verdim. was by no means over. It was destined to remain for long an open sore. Both Germans and French saw in it a means of relieving pressure on the Somme, but as will be seen, the whole aspect of the struggle before \"erdvui was changed when the French and British leapt from their trenches on both sides of the Sonime, in the great offensive that began on July 1. CHAPTER CXXXIX. AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY, 1916, IN THE TRENTINO: ITALIAN POLITICS. The Winter of 1915 — Situation in the Spring — The Col di Lana — Capture of the Adamello Glacier — Austrian Concentration in the Trentino — ^Analysis of the May Offensive — Inadequate Italian Preparations — Description of the Austrian Gains — Threat to the Venetian Plain — General Cadorna's Plans — The New Fifth Army — The Turn of the Tide — Austrian Retirement — Results of the Campaign — The Political Situation — Decline and Fall of the Salandra Government — Italy and Germany — National Demand FOR More Vigorous Prosecution of the War — A National Government under Boselli. TKE first months of 1916 saw an inevitable lull on the Italian front. Our Allies had carried on offensive operations right up to the tiu-n of the year, well beyond the limit which had .seemed to be set by weather conditions, but winter could no longer be defied. Deep snow covered the mountains and all the upper vallej's, and mist began to lie thick on the lower ground, especially on the Isonzo, jireventing accurate artillery preparation and support. By Cliristmas men were coming South on leave, and they continued to be sent liome in relay.* tliroughout the w inter and early spring. There was a lull chu-ing these months, as far as heavy fighting went, but all winter tlirough the opposing armies were feeling for each other, worrying each other, testing each other's lines for weak points, harassing conuuunications bj'^ long-range artillery fire, and, above all, working to make ready against the coming of spring. Only to keep the line on the mountain front meant bitter and ceaseless toil, for the snow and the Alpine storms imposed an effort and a strain greater than in any other theatre of war. To get food and fuel and clothing up to the front lines, at anything from 5,000 to 10,000 feet Vol. IX.— Part 107. above the sea, implied a struggle that can have no parallel in warfare. The Austrians were no longer the chief enemy. Frostbite threatened continually, and the rigours of a winter at extreme altitudes found out any weakness in physique. On the whole the health of the troops was wonderful. The dangers of frostbite were minimized by the provision of special foot- gear and by insistence upon proper precautions, while the well -equipped encampments that were huddled among the snows gave adequate shelter against the terrible driving tempests that sweep the Alps in winter. The task of furnish- ing supplies was made difficult and dangerous by frequent avalanches. A number of supply trains were buried on their way to the front lines, and a loss of this kind was a dovjble disaster. Not only was the convoy destroyed, but men at the front had sometimes to go hungry and cold for lack of food and fuel, for it took time to re-open coramimications. The problem was eventually solved, or nearly solved, by the construction of leleferiche ov filovie (they went by both names at the front) — aerial cable railways that carried a load of nearly half a ton. In this way supplies and mmiitions were rapidly conveyed to the highest points, and 81 S-2 THE TIMES HlSTOT^y OF THE W.4R AN ITALIAN SIEGE GUN. where this method of transit was possible the danger from avalanches was largely avoided. All along the front the work of fortification and preparation went on. The hard-won positions on the Carso were made much less " unhealthy " by the construction of main and commimication trenches cut deep in the rock, and by the excavation of dug-outs which were really " blasted-outs." The task of the Italians in this sector had been made much more arduous owing to the difficulty of constructing and adapting trenches as they advanced, and by the lack of cover for supporting troops. Their lines were greatly strengthened diu-ing the winter, and while this ensured smaller losses in the event of an Austrian attack, they also provided a much better " take-off " for a forward movement. Military and political conferences at Paris in ]\Iarch, 1916, following upon M. Briand's visit to Rome, showed that the idea of united and simultaneous action had finally been accepted by each member of the Quadruple Entente, and in Italy, as elsewhere, the day when all the Allies should strike together was eaeerly ex- pected. At the end of March, when the tremendous pressure brought against the French lines roimd Verdun seemed almost to go beyond human resistance, there was a considerable movement in Italy in favovu- of sending direct assistance to France. Senator Humbert's ap- peals in the French Press were backed by various Italian newspapers and found special support among the " Interventionists of the Left," who looked with favour on any step which should associate Italy more closely and clearly with her Allies. As the military authorities, and those who were aufait with the general situation, realized, and as events were later to prove, such a step would have done no service to the common cause. But the desire for united action was growing ever stronger, and when the Italian guns began to thunder on the Isonzo, at the end of March, there was a general feeling of satisfaction throughout the country. The heavy bombardment which took place, and the infantry actions which followed, were in fact only a " bluff," though considerable losses w^ere incurred on both sides. No general attack was intended ; the increase of activity was due to the news that Austrian guns were being sent to France, and it was essential to prevent any such movement. During April two actions of special interest, if not of first-class importance, took place on the moimtain front. It has been explained in THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 83 Cliaptcr CIX.* how after the taking of Col di Lana on November 9, it was found impossible to hold the summit so gallantly won by Colonel " Peppino " (Jaribaldi. The Italians held th<> greater part of the momitain, but the Austrians still clung to the far slope of the main psak. It was decided to timnel through the peak Jiiring the winter months and blow the Austrian gar- nson oft its last foothold on the mountain which had seen so much hard fighting. The operation, which took three months to complete, was entirely successful. A fortnight before the work was finished the Austrians realized their danger and drove counter-mines into the moun- tain. One of these was exploded, but its direc- tion was wrong, and on the night of April 17 tlie vast Italian mine was touched off, and the fragments of the Austrian position were rushed by an infantry attack. The mine crater was 1 50 feet wide and nearly 50 feet deep. For some days the Austrian artillery fire from the west made things very uncomfortable for the Italians, but the new lines were soon firmly estabUshed, and a further advance was made along the ridges of Monte Sief and the Settsass. * Vol. VII., p. 76. About the time that the Col di Lana mine was nearing completion, the commander of a " group " of Alpini, Colonel Giordana, was pre- paring an attack that stands alone in the history of mountain warfare. On the western frontier of the Trentino, the Adamello range, with it>: vast glacier, seemed to oppose an impas.'-ablc barrier between the Italians and the valleys that run down from it towards the Adige. In the summer of 1915 small raiding parties hat! fought on the glacier, and on the dreary rocks that ri.se above it, but Colonel Ciordana be- lieved that by this seemingly impossible route the Austrian lines might be seriously invaded. His plans were compromised by the necessity of detaching the greater part of his command to another sector of the front, but he deter- mined to carry out the first portion of his scheme, the seizure of the Austrian positions on the far side of the glacier, with the lessened forces that remained to him. The huge Adamello glacier is cut by three rock ridges running roughly parallel, north and south. The eastern and western ridges are almost on the edge of the glacier, and these were lightly held by Austrian and Italian posts. But ACROSS A MOUNTAIN TORRENT. An Italian surprise-attack across a river. bt THE TlME^i HISTORY OF THE WAIL ea "ly in April tlic Austriaiis sent forward out- posti to the central ridge, which runs from Lobbia Bassa by Lobbia Alta and Dossoii di CJonova to Mont ? Fiuno. They were not long left in peace. On the night of April 11, 300 Al|)iiii, clothed in their white, winter uniform, l-'lt the Kifugio Garibaldi on skis and reached tho glacier by way of the Brizio Pass. Here, at 10,000 feet above the sea, they entered a region that is polar in its aspect — and in its severity, for here they met with a wild Arctic storm. They lost their way in the turmoil of wind and snow, but kept going all night to escape the death that would have gripped them if they stopped. The morning found them scattered over the glacier. All hope of surprise was gone, and the Austrians had machine guns on the central ridge. They ^A^i VeneRSCOUO If %^v--r .%air|i;-^^)V/yMENlCiGDLO)///( \, £ ■"mvpneziaX -^^.m/%';|rM.STABLEl> (f^r.s-r^^"''. •■■^^l^^-'-icA Heights THE ADAMELLO RANGE. divided into two columns, and in spite of their weariness and heavy losses, succeeded in storm- ing the Austrian positions on Lobbia Alta and Dosson di Geneva. The Austrians were nearly all killed or captured. But this was only the first step. Seventeen days later, on the evening of April 29, 2,000 Alpini set out from the Rifugio Garibaldi. It was a very clear, starry night, and by 5 o'clock in the morning the Alpini, who were in three columns, found them- selves imder the eastern ridge. The central column had the easiest work. The Austrians had left the highest point, Crozzon di Lares, to shelter on a lower saddle. When they sighted the Alpini beneath them it, was a race for the peak, but the Alpini outpaced the enemy and were first by a few minutes. By the occu- pation, of the Crozzon di Lares the lower saddle and the Passo di Lares were completely domin- ated, and the Au.strians made no att^miit to attack, retiring eastwards along the ridge that runs to the Crozzon del Diavolo. The northern column had a stiff fight before it could gain ])ossession of the Topeti Pass and tlie peak to the north of it, the Crozzon di Fargorida, but here, too, th(! Austrians were driven back. The southern column had a harder task. Tho apfjroaching march, by way of " the ]<]nglish- inen's Pass," between the highest peak of the Adaniello and Corno Bianco, had been longer and more difficult, and the ridge that faced the advancing troops seemed to make a frontal attack impossible. The men were very \\ eary ; one or two actually died of exhaustion and cold as they moved to the advance. A small flanking party was sent out under a volunteer officer, and while the main body advanced slowly and drew the Austrian fire, this handful of men scaled a rock pinnacle north of the Passo di Cavento and turned the enemy's position. When the fianldng party, after a two hours' climb, reached their goal, the main body attacked furiously, and after a struggle that lasted many hours the position was won. Most of the Austrians were killed or taken prisoners ; only a few succeeded in making their escape across the Lares glacier. A fortnight later the Italians completed their occupation of the eastern ridge and also occupied the Crozzon del Diavolo, the highest point of the ridge that divides the Fargorida and Lares glaciers. The accovmts of the undertaking emphasize the support given by the ItaUan artillery, which had been hoisted into impossible places. Even a battery of six-inch guns had been brought up to the western edge of the Adamello glacier. These are only the barest facts. It is im- possible to convey in a few words a just idea of the skill and toil and liardsliip involved in the conduct of the operations. A volunteer subal- tern who was with the southern column found the right word : "epic." Imagination must do the rest, and even imagination can only serve those who know the glaciers of the high Alps, not in the tourist season, but when the year is changing from winter to summer. As a result of the operations the Italians dominated the heads of the valleys which run down to the Val Giudicaria, and particularly the Val di Genova. The occupation of the new positions enabled the Italians to tlu-eaten from the flank the Austrian lines opposing the Italian , advance in the Val Giudicaria, and it was hoped THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 85 LOWERING A WOUNDED SOLDIER FROM THE MOUNTAIN HEIGHTS. An Italian method of lowering the stretchers in a sling along a guiding-rope. On the lower level Red Cross orderlies, at a hospital tent, control the descent. 107-2 86 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Scale or Miles. 12 3 4-5 ^ ' I— t I I gClVEZZANO,^^^ ^iA' \MV/ ♦ \RENT0 ''ON^IOGNO^ " PALON^r^MARGONE ' MARZOLA , ?;?,:PANAROTTAn-- ' '^^ ----'^'^^ -ji Rnnfregnqi iplevico:. r/<BuSAGiFlANOE" spedaletto =f5'A Mattareltm ; *f •.';l-Av VVy^' " FiNONCHid ""ORTESINO^°*^'^l°a '^^'^' RO>^_RETO n SommoAlto n '^'^'"^ ^v.-!!^)!, A- ^.,-,,;;i!;s,',^Ki , \10 ^f^ALTIPl:AN'{0 ^■' Campolongo4'^^E"°"0 UZ'z.ana '[Marco fc 11 S^ -. . ^: r ^m^\ V ^|,C L S AN TO I'l.'rOy^'.^ 1^-- .-.. . lORARO x<v. VFrenzelt! LSiago^ C.EccHER,;; *M.!i( .«„.^' ToneiZcT- 'TORMENO-tSilV? TrescAev^ SETTER Aor7rf^sunaLE„E^LE^('''-.,>v^#^ ToRTA m'C D;;';t'w;^o.^,^<'^'^^^''c/LAGHi :Laghi_ M CONlZUG ^ ^BJo7e-<^^'W"""'' C-i^>^"i~'° V>^CAR|ZZE ^PRfAF^A'^^S^^-^ « Parmes ^ * - [M.oi Mez zo I' WW^ .v«\\ M.SUMMANO al/ideiSionori '?i|v. '^;.- i- chiq Thiene (86G) THE AREA OF THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE, that the operations might be fruitful of result sus the season became more favourable. * It has been said that Colonel Giordana had to see the withdrawal of the greater part of his command at the very moment when he was preparing his arduous enterjjrisc. This with- drawal was due to the expectation of an Aus- trian offensive on an important scale to the east of the Adige valley. The Italian Intelli- gence Department was aware of a very large concentration of men and material in the neighbourhood of Trento, and it was evident that the Austrians were preparing for operations on a scale quite different from anything that had been hitherto seen on that part of the front. In \iew of the terrain, the greatest possible niunber of Alpine troops were dis- patched to the scene of the expected fighting, and Colonel Giordana's men were sent to the Eastern Trentino. * Colonel Giordana was promoted Major-General, and transferred to the Eastern Trentino, where he was .shortly afterwards killed. The Austrian concentration had been carried out very gradually. The Trentino front had been reinforced at the end of November, 1915, and all through the winter troops and guns were being quietly conveyed from the Russian front, or from the depots and munition factories within the Empire. It was certainly the belief of the Austrian Command that the Russians would be incapable of any important offensive action in the early summer, and they had every hope that they would be able to carry out what the heir to the Habsburg tlirone, in an address to his troops, termed a "' Straf -expedition,^' before any danger could threaten from the East. The Italian Command, of course, knew what the enemy did not know, the real condition of the Russian armies, and they doubtless assumed that the enemy Intelligence Department was better informed than it actually was. Doubt- less, also, they were misled by the gradualness and secrecy with which the Austrians carried out their preparations. In any event, they miscalculated the extent of the coming Austrian THI': TIMKS HISTORY OF Till-: WAl! 87 offort. Tliey bolitntvl in a hard pusli, and took measures to meet it, though on certain parts of the line the local commanders had not realized the absolute necessity of unlimited spadework, in the literal sense. But the Italian Command was not prepared for the haiunxer-stroke that came in the middle of May. On jMay 14 the Austrians began a very heavy bombardment along the whole front froin the Val Giudicaria to the sea, but it was quickly evident, even if it had not already been fore- seen, that the enemy's offensive was to be concentrated upon the comparati\ely short front between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana, and jjarticularly upon the sector be- tween the Val Lagarina and the Upper Astico. On May 15 the Austrians followed up the initial bombardment by massed infantry attacks all along this sector. Here it will be well to recapitulate the infor- mation given in Chapter CIX. regarding the positions which tlie Italians held in the Eastern Trentino, and to add a further description of the terrain which was to be the scene of a long and desperate struggle. When tlie Austrian attack began, tlie Italian line east of the Val Lagarina ran from just south of Rovereto up the Val Terragnolo north of Col Santo ((i,s;{0 fe«!t), which is the norlliern ridge of the great I'asuhic. tnas»if (liighost jjoint 7,:}3.5 feet), as far »is Monte Maronia (.3,i')4() feet) ; thence in front of the Folgaria group of fortiGca- tions to Soglio d'A.spio (4,;{75 feet). From Soglic d'Aspio it bent back eastward. The Italians had made no impression on the fortified lines of the Lavarone |)lat(^au and their positions followed a line not far west of the old frontier as far asCima IManderiolo (6,665 feet) ; whence they ran northward across the V^alle Maggio and the Val Sugana to Monte Collo, a point north-west of Borgo ; thence north-eastward to the Val Calamento. There were other advanced posts outside this main line, but they were of little importance, and indeed it is mis- leading to term this the main line, though it was all effectively occupied by Italian troops. There were certain positions, the occupation of which formed part of an offensive schenu", which were obviously untenable in the fjue of an Austrian attack in force. ZugnaTorta and the slopes leading down to Rovereto formed a dangerously expo.sed salient, commanded from the west by the Austrian positions on Biaena, on the north by JNlonte Chello, and on the north- east by the fortified lines of Finonchio. The lines in the Val Terragnolo were \ery nuich exposed, and Soglio d'Aspio, flanked by the ITALIAN TROOPS IN THEIR FIRST-LINE TRENCHES. THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR. 89 groat Lavarone-Liiserna plateau on tlie nortli, was prnctioally in the air. The real Itahnii (Icloiisive line ran from >Serravalle in the \'al Lagarina by Malga Zugna across the Vallarsa to I'asuhio ; from Pasubio by the Borcola Pass to Monte Maggio (5,730 feet), and thence, leaving the exposed frontier, by Monte Toraro {(i,\~') feet), and Monte Campomolon ((),030 ftfct ) to Spitz Tonezza (5,512 feet) ; thence along the highest part of the Setto Comuni plateau to Cima Portule (7,510 feet), and thence across the Val Sugana to the slopes east of tiie .Masn s(i'(>iun. But this lin(^ was not satisfactory, especially the sector ))etween the \'al I'osina and the UppiT Astico. Experience had sliown that massed infantry attacks, if preceded by a sufficiently shattermg artillery fire, can generally win a footing in the first-line system of defences. In level or nearly level country the various lines of defence may follow one another at very short inter\als, and the ]>reaking of a section of the front line need not very greatly affect the position as a whole. In hilly country the lines of defence are conditioned by the nature of the groimd. A second line may have to be a considerable distance from tlie first, in order to give its defenders a fair chance of resistance, and the occupation of one dominating point in a line has a greater effect than it has in level country. Good positions in a mountainous country make the best line a defender can hope for. A bad mountain position leaves him much worse off than in the plains. Between the ^^al Posina and the Upper Astico the Italian position was bafl. It has already been explained how the main defences of the Arsiero plateau had to nui along the line j\Ionte INIaggio, Monte Toraro. Monte Cam- pomolon, Spitz Tonezza. But this defensive line had nothing to back it. The ground falls away south-eastwards in a long glacis that drops steeply at last to the Posina valley on tlie south and the Astico on the east. The position was bad bj^ nature, and only the most careful and complete preparation could have made it a really stout bulwark against a deter- mined attack. And that preparation was lacking. In the first place, the Italians were short of guns. This shortage had handicapped them in their attacks on the Isonzo line, and it had not yet been made up, though great progress had been effected in the output of war material, and France had supplied some heavy howit- GENERAL PECORI-GIRAI.DI. Commanded the First Army. zers of a new type. In the second place, the dispositions taken by the general commanding the First .Vrmy, and by some of the local com- manders, were not only insufficient, but, as far as they went, unskilful. In Chapter CIX. it \\as said that in their gallant offensive actions on the Isonzo in 1915 the Italians had suffered from a lack of techni- que in trench warfare. But the armies on the Isonzo, officers and men. had been gradually hammered by the stress of hard fighting into splendidly efficient weapons, well able to deal with the new conditions of war. In the Tren- tino it was otherwise. There had been a good deal of desultory fighting and a great deal of artillery work tliroughout the year that had elapsed since the beginning of the war. But no serious offensive had been undertaken b\' the Italians, and the enemy had never even tested the Italian lines. It seems certain that General Roberto Brusati, the General in com- mand of the First Army, had failed to realize the nature of a modern offensive on the grand scale, and that some of his officers were equally lacking in insight. It is understood that General Brusati fully believed in the imminence of the Austrian offensive, imlike some of his subordinates, who declared it to be practically impossible. If this be true, there is the le.ss 90 THK TIMKS HlSTOliY OF THE WAl^ fxi'uso for the coiulition ol un|)r«*|mivtlnoss in wliifh rt part of the front under his connnand was found to be It }ia.s been said tliat the Italian ('oniniand miscalculated tJie extent of the coming otTen- 8ive. General Cadorna was correctly informed t»f the number of enemy troops concentrated in the Trent ino, and he had detailed sufficient reinforcements to cope with the attack whicli he expected. He did not expect, however, the immense weight of artillery wliich was injussed upon the front between the Val Laga- rina and the Val Sugana. It would apjiear, too, that he did not exactly anticipate the direction of the Austrian attack. The Au.strian concen- tration at Trento, and the excellent sy.stem of roiKls which branches south and south-east- wards through the Eastern Trentino, permitted an attacking force to be thrown at anj^ point on the Italian line. The Italian lateral com- mimications in the uplands were not favourable. A great deal had been done in the way of making roads, but the lie of the country complicated the problem. General Cadorna's strategic reserves had to be concentrated in the plain, and from tlie course of the fighting which fol- lowed it seems that he had rather expected the main Austrian efforts to be directed again.st the wings of the Italian forces in the Eastern Trentino, along the parallel highways of the Val Lagarina and the Vallarsa on the west, and the Val Sugana on the east. He had good grounds for such a calculation. There is a railway both in the Val Lagarina and in the Val Sugana, and the terrain in the centre is very difficult for heav-y artillery. An envelop- ing movement seemed on the whole naore likely than a drive at the centre. Towards the end of April General Cadorna tran.sferred his quarters to the First Anny. It may be deduced that he was not satisfied with the dispositions taken, for within a few days (ieneral Brusati was deprived of his comnaand,* and General Pecori-Giraldi was appointed to the First Army. General Pecori-Giraldi hatl been under a cloud when the war began. He had been sent home in disgrace from Tripoli at the end of 1911, on grounds whi<?h it was difficult to recognize as adequate, and there is too much rea.son to believe that political con- siderations led to his recall. General Cadorna • General Brusati wa,s placed a disposizionc on May 13. On May 25 lii.s ca^se was deliberated by the Cabinet, and he was retired from tlie Army by a special Government decree. had always field a very high opinion of (ituieral Pecori-Giraldi, and when the war brcjke out lie was given a division in reserve. He was soon transferred to the front line, where his work earned him promotion to the command of an army corps. He was now to Ix; te.sted very severely. He took over the First Army too late to be able to repair the deficiencies in the preparations made by his predecessor, and before he had time to grip his cfimmand the enemy blow fell. The bombardment which opened the Aiustrian offensive came as a \ery unwelcojne surprise to the defending army. It was at once evident that the amount of heavy and medium-calibre artillery at the enemy's disposal was very large in proportion to his numbers, and the storm of high explosive which was directed against the Italian lines soon found out the weak spots. The concentration of Austrian artillery was certainly formidable. Well over 2,000 guns (one detailed account which should be correct put the number in the Trentino at 2,400) were collected on a front of less than 30 miles. Of these nearly 800 were of mediiun or large calibre. There were not less than 40 12-inch Skoda howitzers on the narrow front, and in addition there were three, or possibly four, German 420's, and a couple of 15-inch naval guns. At least eighteen Austrian tlivisions were concentrated in the Trentino, ctnd the attacking force \\ hich was thrown against the front between the Ya\ Lagarina and the Val Sugana consisted of 15 divisions, all of them picked first-line troops. In all .some 350,000 men were launched upon the Straf -expedition . It was soon clear that the main drive was to be in the centre. No fewer than 30 of the 305's were massed on the Folgaria and Lav^rone plateaux. In this sector, too, were the 420's, and the big naval gnns. One of the latter was placed at Cost' Alta, near the road that runs from ]Monte Rovere to Vezzena under the old fort of Busa di Verle. From this point 15-in. shells were flung into Asiago, 11 miles away. A torrent of high -explosive was poured unceasingly on the main Italian positions, and the roads leading up to them on the Asiago and Arsiero plateaxix were subjected to a very severe tir de barrage. As the Austrian infantry attack de\eloped the Italians withdrew from their advanced positions, taking heavy toll of the enemy before they went. The first forward move- ments took place on the wings, against Zugr.a THE TIMES jnsTOh'Y OF THE WAfL 01 INFANTRY ADVANCING UNDER HEAVY SHRAPNEL FIRE. A concealed Italian machine gun assisting an advance. The advancing infantry, on all fours, are carrying bags filled with sand on their backs to protect them from the flying bullets. Torta and the Arnientera ridge (south of the Brenta, between Levico and Roncegno). The Italians lost a good many prisoners in the outlying positions near Rovereto, where they counter-attacked several times, but the enemy paid dearly for the ground won. On May 17 five separate infantry attacks on Zu^'ua Torta were repulsed with hea\ y loss, hut the following day Zugna Torta was evacuated. the Italians retiring upon their prepared positions at ]\Ialga Zugna. The Anucntera ridge was evacuated two days later. iMean- 02 THE TIMES HISTOliY OF THE WAIL COUNT OF TURIN (on right) In Command of Italian Cavalry. while the Austrian ad\ance in the centre was developing under cover of a ceaseless fire from guns of every calibre. On May 18 the line running northward from Monte INIaggio to Soglio d'Aspio was abandoned, in accordance with expectation, but the following day a very serious loss befell the Italians, who were driven off the Monte Toraro — Monte Cannpo- lon-Spitz Tonezza line. This was the sector of the Trentino front where preparation had been specially necessary and where it had been notably lacking. The troops, without adequate cover against the ttorm of heavy shells, had little chance, and they were further handicapped by a shortage of field and mouijtain artillery. The position seems to have been arranged as though the Italians were on the offensive. The big guns were well forward, and there were not enough field and mountain guns to hold back the advancing masses of the enemy. One brigade broke under the tre- mendous strain : the Austrians gained a footing on the main Italian line before remforcements could arrive, and took a very considerable number of prisoners. The ItaHan centre Mas now practically gone, and the Austrians were pressing hard on the left. The Italians had fallen back from Col Santo upon Pasubio, and both here and against Coni Zugna a very fctrong attack was developing. Between the Astico and the Val Sugana the fighting was now ecjualiy furious. The Italians were holding their own, and had succeeded in winning back \arious points that they had lost in the first (nislaught. But the whole position was pre- judiced by the loss of the only line that could defend the Arsiero plateau, and our Allies were outgunned in the Sette Conumi as well as farther south. On May 20 the Austrians })ushed farther forward through the hole in the centre, occupying the Cimon dei Laghi and the Cima di Mesole. They also occupied the Borcola Pass. The Alpini on the Coston dei Laghi, between the Borcola and Monte Maggio, repulsed a determined infantry attack, but their position was quite untenable, and they were withdrawn. On ]May 20, after the break in the centre. General Cadorna, who had assumed supreme control of the operations, decided to withdraw his whole centre line. His plan involved a considerable sacrifice of territory, but he had little alternative. A counter-attack upon the Campomolon-Spitz Tonezza positions, delivered by reserves who had been hurried to the spot, had failed, and it was essential to find favourable positions for further resistance. It has been explained that the plateau falls right away from the Camponnolon line \mti] it drops mto •S^^S "'^^^^^^m ^.^4tKS^^& ' *f4^^ JPc' ■ ^^^^K^^^^^^^^^^^KSSb^^^Bs^^ ^^^y ^^^HBH^BHk 'J THE DUKE D'AOSTA With his son, Prince Amadio, at the front. THE TIMES HISTOIiY OF THE WAR. 93 ENTRANCE TO AN ITALIAN GEN the Posina and Astico valleys. It was to the south of the Posina and east of the Astico that General Cadorna traced his new line. Biit this retreat implied a corresponding withdrawal in the Sette Coniuni, and the line chosen ran from Cima Portule, east of the Val d'Assa, and east and south of Asiago. On May 21 the withdrawal began, and it was conductod without much interference from the enemy, who had suffered very heavily, and were engaged in consoUdating the positions they had won. By INIay 24 the Italians were, for the most part, south of the Posina and east of the Astico and the Assa, leaving only skeleton rearguards to contain the enemy's advance as long as possible. But the situation was still far from satisfactory. There was no time to dig in deeply on the new positions ; the Austrians had a great preponderance in artillery, and it was clear that in a few days at most the second phase of the attack would begin, with the Avistrians coming do\\Tiliill. jMoreover, every tiling hung upon the wings holding firm, and the Austrians were attacking Pasubio and the Coni Zugna ridge with very large forces and many guns. Pasubio was now a salient, for the Austrians had pushed up the Vallarsa ERAL'S UNDERGROUND QUARTERS. towards the old frontier between Pasubio and INIonte di ^Mezzo. They were hurling infantrj' attacks up the eastern slopes of the Coni Zugna-Cima Mezzana ridge, and it was clear that even more detennined efforts were still to come both here and at Pasubio, which was under a very heavy bombardment. The troops that had withdrawn to the south of the Posina depended absolutely upon Pasubio standing fast, and if any serious progress were to be made by the enemy in tlie Vallarsa, Pasubio was gone. The position was critical, and General Cadorna had to contemplate the possibility of the Austrians reaching the Venetian plain. On the morning of ^lay 21 he gave the order to draw up plans for the fonnation of a new Army, to be concentrated in the Vicenza district, and by midday on May 22 the plans were finished and approved and the necessary orders given. The fonnation of this new Army will be described later on ; for the moment it is enough to say that it was in place, and ready, by June 2. But meanwhile things were going badly on the Italian right, or rather on the right of the centre, in the highlands of the Sette Comuni. On the extreme right, in the Val Sugana and among 107—3 {•4 THh' TIMES HlSrOUY OF THE WAR. th«> liills to the north, thf Itftlituis liad retiri-d slowiy utid iiu'thodictvlly to tlie ponitions choKen on the liills eust of the little river Maso, which ftilLs into the Brenta neivr Strifnio. They had dealt the eiu'niy Koine shrewd blows as they retired, lint by May 24 the Austrians were pressiiig hard upon the Italian positions to the east of the Val d'As^a. On tlie following day they succeeded in ad\ancihg to the north of the \alley, breaking the Portule line and occupying the height of Corno di Canipo Verde (6,815 ft.). Owing to a misunderstanding the Alpini e\ acii- ated the practically impregnable positions of Cima Undici (7,140 ft.) and Chna Dodici (7,610 ft.) before the Austrians attacked ; but the mistake was of little consequence, for on May 26 the Austrians, attacking to the east of the Val d'Assa, succeeded in dri\'ingtlie Italians back from the whole range rimning down from Corno di Campo Verde to Monte Meatta, between the \'al d'Assa and the Valle di Gal- marara. Owing to this success of the enemy Cima Undici and Cima Dodici would have had to be abandoned in any case. The figliting on May 26 was very stiff, and both sides lost heavily, but the Itahans were still completely outgmuied. They retired across the Galmarara, leaving behind them a niunber of prisoners who were cut of? from retreat, and it was clear already that they would have to go farther still. On May 27 the enemj^ crossed the lower waters of the Gal- marara torrent and occupied part of Monte Mosciagh (or Moschicce). A very fierce struggle took place on this movmtain on May 27 and 28. The Italians fought very stubbornly, and before they finally withdrew farther east a brilliant covmter-attack by the 141st Regiment (Catan- zaro brigade) succeeded in bringing away two batteries which had been isolated. But the word was still : " Go back." General Cadorna required time for the assembling of his new army, and General Pecori-Giraldi had to gain it for his chief. He had to hold the Aus- trians for a fixed time, but he had always to be able to extricate his troops. He had to keep his lines intact in order to i^ermit the formation of the new lines behind him. When too hard pressed he had to fall back as long as there were positions left for him to fall back upon ; the time had not yet come for his men to die where they stood on the uplands of the Sette Comuni. On the left, and on the left of the centre, that time had already come. On May 24, after a very heavy bombardment, the Austrians attacked all along the line from Coni Zvigna to Pasubio. They came forward in masses, in the early morning, against b(jth sides of Coni Zugna, against the Pass that di\ides Coni Zugna from Cima di Mezzana^ — the Passo di Buole — and against Pasubio ; but they were everywhere rej)idsed with heavy loss. Before midday they renewed the attack against Passo di Buole, but were again flung back, and the Italians, counter- attacking, occupied the position of Parmesan, south-east of the Pass, on the northern slope of Cima di INIezzana. The artillery tlumdered all day, and on the following morning the enemy came again to the assault, in compact masses. A brigade which was sent against the Passo di Buole was hterally exterminated. None went back. For six days the figliting continued, practically without ceasing. The enemy showed the utmost braverj^ but nothing could shake the resistance of the 37th Division (Sicilia and Taro brigades— 61st, 62nd, 207th, 208th regi- ments) who occupied the Zugna ridge. It was old-fashioned fighting, except for the guns, for the trenches were makeshift affairs, where they existed at all, and when the enemy approached the Italians leapt at them with the bayonet. On May 30 the Austrians made their last attack in mass on the Passo di Buole. Again and again they came up the slopes, but the 62nd and 207th regiments, who held the Pass, never moved a yard, except when they dashed forward to finish their work with the bayonet. On this day alone it is calculated that 7,000 Austrians were killed, and during the six days' fighting they lost some 40 per cent, of their infantry effectives in this sector. After their failure on June 30 their efforts slackened and their methods changed. They came forward in lines instead of in masses, and it almost seeined as though their attacks were rather directed to keeping the Italians occupied tlian inspired by any real hope of success. Stubborn fighting still went on, but the fury and intensity of the enemy's onslaught were dulled. The resistance at the Passo di Buole was more than a splendid feat of arms. It saved Pasubio, and on the fate of Pasubio depended the fate of the Italian line south of the Posina. All the weight they could bring to bear was flung by the Austrians against this bulwark. For weeks the heavy gims thundered against the Italian posi- tions, and wave after wave of massed infantry was dashed to pieces against those granite lines. The Austrians advanced from Col Santo along the great ridge ; they came up from the Val Terrag- nolo by the Borcola Pass, from Anghebeni and ITALY'S MOUNTAINEERS. Alpioi scaling the rugged mountain sides on the Austrian front. 95 96 THE TIMES HJSTOIiY OF THE WAR. ASPHYXIATING GAS CYLINDERS AND GRENADES Captured by the Italians. Chiesa in the Vallar.-^a. For three weeks they outniunbered the ItaUans by four to one in this sector, and their artillery superiority was immense, as all along the front. But neither massed men nor massed gnns, nor both together. could break a way tlirough. The conditions Avercj terrible for both sides, for in May and June snow still lay deep on the high ridges. Italians ;iad Austrians struggled in the snow, but the Italians had also to sleep in the snow, and thtTe were often 200 cases of frostbite in a daj-. The defenders loiew the immense importance of their task. Tliey knew that if the Pasubio angle ^\ ere smashed in the Austrians would almost inevit- ably roll up the Italian line south of the Posina. and find two good open roads to the plaiti by way of Valli di Signori, while the Lower Astico would also be freed for the enemy's advance. They knew what depended upon their standing fast, and they stood — stood like the everlasting liills upon which so many earned a glorious grave. When the details of the fighting in the Trentino are forgotten by all save those who make a study of military history, Italians will remember, and Italy's Allies should remember, how the troops on Zugna and Pasubio blocked t'.ie advance of the Austrian right and so held up the tide of invasion. It has already been said that on May 24 the Italians had practically completed their withdrawal from the region between the I'osina and the Astico and were concentrating soiitii and east, respectively, of these two streams. On the same day the Austrian artillery opened fire from the positions on the .Monte Maggio-Campomolon line, from which tlui Italians had been driven five days before, antl the infantry Mere already pouring down the slopes of the tilted plat«au. On May 25 the enemy entered the hamlet of Bettale on tlie L'pper Posina, and occupied the south- eastern limb of the Tonezza plateau, that rises sheer-sided, like an immense battleship, l)etween the Rio Freddo and the Astico, and ends in the peak of Monte Ciraone (4,031 ft.), completely dominating the Arsiero basin, 'I'iie next day they were down in the Astico \alley and close upon Arsiero. On May 28 tiie Austrians crossed the Posina in force, and on the following day battle was joined all along the slopes to the south of the stream. Par- ticularly hea\^ fighting took place beneath Sogli di Campiglia and Pria Fora (5,415 ft.), and the Italians fell back on the mountain line, which they had orders to hold at all costs. This line ran from Forni Alti (the extreme eastern section of the Pasubio inassif) by the Colle di Xomo (3,438 ft.), Monte Spin (4,630 ft.), and Malga Vaccarezze (4,730 ft.) to Pria Fora ; it was practically the last line of defence in IN THE TRENCHES. Firing a big Italian gun. THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAT^. 07 tlio movintains. Behind ^falgii Xomo ami Monte Spin lay the Val Loojjia. Behind Alalia \'accarezzo and Pria Fora the lino Monte Cogolo (5,390 ft.), iMoiito Novegna (ij,04G ft.), and Monte Brazonio (4,028 ft.) fonned the M'ry last bulwark. Beneath lay Schio and the Venetian plain. The Italians withdrew from tlio \'alle\- on the evening of Maj' 29, anfl tlie troops tliat were ordered to occupy Pria Fora lost (heir way in the dark. Instead of reaching the main height they struck too far to the soutli and halted on Monte Ciove, the ridge that runs towards Novegna and Brazonie. When dawn came Pria Fora frowned on them from tlie north, and the Austrians were in possession. Pria Fora is only about 200 ft. higher than tlie southern ridge, but the drop is almo.st i^re- cipitous, except for a narrow approach, and the enemy was already in force, having come up the easy northern slopes. A desperate attack failed to win the main height and the Italians were tlirown back on Monte Ciove. The position looked bad. Monte Cio\ e' lay bare to the Austrian fire from Pria Fora as well as to the heavy artillery across the Posina, and it seemed alnaost untenable. But rein- forcements were sent up and the order was given by the general coniinanding the sector AN ITALIAN PATROL, With machine gun, in the Trentino. ITALIAN TRANSPORT In a Mountain Pass. that there must be no going back. June I seemed a happy date for the Austrians. Pria York not only commanded the Italian positions to the south ; it looketl down upon the Lower Astico from the west, and ]Monte Cengio on the other side of the valley was already threatened by the troops coming down the L^pper Astico. Punta Corbin had been evacuated by the Italians two days before, and the enemy were spreading over the south-western corner of the Asiago plateau, north-east of Arsiero. On Jvmc 1 the Austrian ("onunand issued an Army Order to the troops in the Posina sector, saying that only one mountain remained between them and the i^lain. The Italian line ran across the Lower Astico, just below Arsiero from ]\Ionte Brazonie by Quaro, Velo d' Astico, Seghe, and Schiri to the slopes of Monte Cengio, and here, too, the fight ^^as soon raging, only four niiles froni where the \alley gives on to the Vincentine plain. On June 1 a furious storm of shells was hurled against the wliole Italian line from Colle di Xomo to Rocchette, at the entrance to the plain, antl deteranined infantry attacks were delivered against" Monte Spin and the Seghe- Schiri line. Thej- were thrown back with heavy loss. The Italian artillery, particularly 9^ THE TIMES HISTOliV OF THE WAH. the lit'lil iirtillcry, liad iM'en strongly rrinforccd, ami shrapiH'l tiro wrought havoc Hiiumg the (h<nst' cohimiis of the (Mieiiiy- '^"'t Cciitiio was l)i'ing liarcl j)rt'.s.s<Hl from the north, whore tlic Aiistrians occupied Monte linrco. In the Sette C'oninni the Italians were still falling !)ack. Asiago liad been evacuated on Afay 28, and the retirement across the <ial- nuirara was followed by a further retreat across tlie parallel valleys of Xos and Camponuilo, the Austrians occupying Monte IJaldo (0,450 ft.) and Monte Fiara (5,81o ft.) on May 30, though the Alpini still retained a footing on the latter nioiuitain. Farther north, on June 1, the enemy advanced eastwards from INIonte Mandrielle (5,100 ft.) on to Austrian territory. The move sounds peculiar, but it is explained by the fact that here they entered one of the strategical wedges secured by the frontier of 1866 — a wedge tlirust forward down the Brenta. The enemy were now less than four miles from the Val Sugana at a point well behind the Italian main line of defence in that valley. But com- munications were bad in this region, and they were to make little more progress here. Nor was the Graz Army Corps, which had pushed back the Italians across the Val Campoixiulo, to gain many further laurels. » ■ More to the south, however, the position Btill seemed critical for the Italians. Des- perate fighting was going on below Asiago. A brigade of Sardinian Grenadiers was clinging to ]\Ionte C'engio, attacked from north and west, and on the plateau to the north-east, a little west of the steam-tramway line that runs to Asiago from the plain, the hill of Bel- monte was taken and retaken several times. It seemed as though the Italians must be driven eastward across the Val Canaglia, as, indeed, they were on June 3, but on that very day General Cadorna announced that the Austrian offensive had been stopped all along the line. His new Army was ready, and he had taken the measm-e of the enemy. A fortnight's heavy fighting had shown him that his troops and their leaders could do what he asked them, and he expressed his confidence in them by the communique which he issued to the world. There were many days' bitter defensive fighting in front of the Italians. They were still to fall back a little way in the Sette Comuni, but no position of first-class importance was to be lost. Where they with- drew there was ample room for retreat, and it was now General Cadorna's game to draw and hold the enemy well inside the salient that their great drive had made. The southern ha'f of the final line, from which tlkere was to be no withdrawal, has already been indicated. It ran from Zugna to I'asubio, thence eastwards to the Val d'Astico, . crossing the valley near Velo d'Astico ; thence l)ending backwards to east of the Val Cana- glia. Here it ascended the rim of the Asiago plateau and ran by Monte Pau (4,515 ft.) an'd Magnaboschi (4,420 ft.), sout;h of the Asiago basin, to the Val Frenzela ; thence north-east- wards to Monte Lisser (5,310 ft.). From here the line turned north-westward, along the edge of the high, bleak tableland that drops to the Val Sugana, to beneath the line that the enemy had established along the frontier peaks. In tracing this line General Cadorna had issued the foHowing Army Order : " Remember that here we defend the soil of our country and thu honour of the Army. These positions are to be defended to the death." His troops did not fail him, and while they stood and died he prepared his counter-stroke. The Fifth Aj-my was assembled on the plain, complete in all its details, by June 2, exactly ten days after the order for its formation was given. Great reserves had been concentrated in the war zone ; between the Tagliamento and the Jsonzo in readiness for the offensive that was being prepared against Gorizia and the Carso ; east of the Tagliamento, on central positions that allowed a quick move to any part of the front ; and in the permanent depots of the north. By the night of May 22 the whole of the Venetian plain was amove with troops and their transport — the immense transport required by modern war. In 10 days more than half a million men, with guns, ammvmition, and provisions, with countless motor camions and endless trains of mule -transport, were ready in the plain to meet the enemy. It was a magnificent feat of organization and energy. But by June 2 General Cadorna knew that the enemy would never reach the plain, if, indeed, that was their real objective. In addition to forming the Fifth Army he had been able to draw on other reserves to reinforce the lengthening line in the uplands, and fill the gaps. For days the wonderful motor transport of the Italians was moving men and machine- guns and ammunition up to the mountains, while behind them, more slowly, came artil- lery, and more artillery. The most amazing THK TIMICS; HISTOHY OF THK WAli. !»•• fact, or at least tho most spectacular, was the traribference of an entire division by motor, in a single night, from the Caniic Al[)s to the I'asiibio district). These reinforcements were enough to hold tlie enemy, and the duty of tho Fifth Army became offensive, not defensive. On June 2 the Fifth ,\inny was ri'ady in the plain, but to prepare the forward move took It) days more. The ditliculties of transport were enormous. The Asiago plateau in par- tictilar is very scantily supplied %^ith water. The troops already there had suffered nuuli from thirst, and it was essential to a.ssure an adequate water supply for the greatly-increasi d forces which were soon to be thrown against the Austrians. And new roads had to be made for transport, or old tracks widened, for the exi.sting roads would not serve General Cadoma's purpose. This purpose was to take the enemy on both flanks — to come up to the Asiago plateau on the right, and di-i\e at Col Santo on the left. The plan required minute and careful preparation, and diu-ing the interval between plan and action the Austrians ham- mered unceasingly at the Pasubio, Posina, Astico and Asiago lines. For fifteen days tlic lighting in tlie I'ufsina sector was heavy and continuous. Kvery morning the Au.strian guns opened fire at (»,;{(» precisely, and the bombardment never cea-ed as long as daylight hvsted. On June 2, 3 and 4. the enemy delivered massed infantry attacks ITALIAN CAVALRY PATROL IN THE MOUNTAINS. Top picture : An officer studying the surrounding country. 100 Till': TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 101 on various parts of the front, from Colh; di Xomo to Schiri in the Astico valley, bub they were vinsuccessful everywhere. On the night of June 4-5, while a violent storm was raging, a furious attack was thrown against Montt; Ciove and INlonte Unvzonie, supported by a hail of shells. The Italians never moved, though they were very highly tried, and a similar attack on the night of Jiuie 5 had a similar result. The next three days were quieter, and on June 9 the Italians were able to push forward a little and improve their positions in the ]Monte No\egna sector of the line. June 1 and 1 1 were comparatively quiet days, but a terrific bombardment began on June 12, and the Austrians attacked all along the hne. Their efforts were especially directed against Monte Ciove, and at one time it seemed as though the position could not be held. It was swept and torn by shell, the enemy were advancing in mass, and the brigadier in command sent back word that the pressure was likely to be too strong. The reply of the general commanding the sector was stem and peremptory, and it had the necessary effect. But they were anxious hours. All telephonic commimications had been destroyed by the storm of shells. Nearly all the divisional staff were killed or woiuided by an unlucky direct hit. Orders had to be given entirely by megaphone or bugle. Battalions and regiments had all but passed out of the general's direction, and he could only trust to officers and men fulfilling his orders to stand fast. His orders were obeyed, and at nightfall the Aus- trians retreated. Next morning, under cover of the usual bom- bardment all along the line, the Austrians made one more attempt upon IMonte Ciove. About 11 o'clock, after a furious prelhninary shelling, they lifted their fire to the rear of the Italian positions and laimchcd a powerful infantry attack. Nearly all the Italian officers were put out of action, and it was almost im- possible to get supporting troops through the cvurtain fire. The general could not see how the defence was going, so a colonel of the staff climbed to a point of vantage and called through a megaphone to his waiting chief. His voice came through a lull in the storm of fu-e : " They are holding marvelloiisly." They did not cease to hold, and at 3 o'clock the Austrians fell back. That evening the Caghari brigade (63rd and 64;th regiments), which had held Monte Ciove so gallantly, was reheved by rein- forcements which had arrived thi? previous night. The brigade came out of action witli only 30 |)(>r cent, of its original strength. It had lost 4,000 men on Monte Ciove. Further attacks were made on Monte Brazome early in the morning of June 14, and again on the oxening of the same day. They were easily repulsed, and it was now clear that the Austrian bolt was shot. Even the daily bombardment was soon to slacken, and on the evening of June 23 the 12-inch shell in the direction of divisional headquarters, which had always closed the days work, came over for 'the Inst time. Meanwhile a desperate struggle had b«>en going on in the Sette Coniuni, particularly on that part of the plateau which lies to the south of the Asiago basin. On the night of June 3 the Austrians, attacking in greatly superior force, drove the Sardinian Greuatliers off Monte Angio, but not until the brigade had lost far more than half its effectives. They retreated across the Val Canaglia, but the Italians still held the south-western slopes of Cengio, above Schiri, and on the following day they gained some ground in this direction. An attempt to retake the mountain failed, howe\'er, and the Austrian pressure grew very heavy, both here and to the north. There were two danger - points : the uplands between the lower Astico and the Asiago basin, and the head of the Vai Frenzela, where the Austrians were little more than three miles from Valstagua, low down in the Brenta valley. From Jime 4 to June 8 a long and stubborn battle took place on the line running east of the Valle di Campomulo to the head of the Val Frenzela. The Austrian losses were enornious, and they \\ere driven back repeatedly, but on the e\ening of June 8 the Italians retired a short distance to the eastward, leaving the sumnxit of Casteigonberto (5,928 feet) in the hands of the enemy. At this point the Aus- trians now came under direct fire from Monte Lisser, and the limit of their ad\ance was reached. Masses of artillery were now being placed in the jNIonte Lisser sector, reinforcements were arriving daily, and the preparations for the Italian counter-offensive were well under way. Persistent artillery duels followed, but the enemy niade no further infantrj- attacks. South of Asiago the Austrian effort was more prolonged and more violent. On the evening of June (j a furious attack was delivered on the Italian positions. The battle raged ail 1(»2 Till': riMKs in^rnin' of the war. ITALIAN INFANTRYMEN Carrying anti-aircraft guns. night, and the enemy were driven back, but on the following afternoon they came again, only to be repulsed once more. They had, however gained a footing on Monte Lemerle, and two days later the Italians were driven off their positions on the summit of the mountain. But the Forli brigade (43rd and 44th regiments), wliich remained on the south-eastern slopes of Lemerle, yielded no more ground. They were attacked by greatly superior forces on Jtme 10, but they did not move until the moment came for a bayonet charge, when they counter- attacked and scattered the Austrians, pursuing them for some distance before returning to their positions. From June 9 to June 15 they were subjected to repeated attacks and un- ceasing artillery fire, but, magnificently sup- ported by the new field guns which had now been put in position, they defeated every at- tempt to overcome their resistance. On June la thej' were reinforced by the 149th regiment, and at 5.30 p.m. their brigadier sent them for- ward in an irresistible rush which captured the summit of Lemerle. A coimter-attack came lit once, but was repulsed. Next day the enemy attacked again and again. Late in the evening they swarmed down over the summit upon the Italian jiositions, which had been witlulrawn 100 yards for the sake of cover. The defenders feinted a retreat, but returnecl' at the moment when the Austrians were trium- phantly establisliing themselves on the aban- doned lino.. None of the enemy escaped. On June 17 the attacks continued, being directed especially on the line between Lemerle and Mag- naboschi. The Forli brigade lost many officers and fell back, but they were reinforced by the 33rd regiment, and their positions were re- gained. A further desperate onslaught was made on June 18, but it ended in failure. The Austrian situation had become critical. The enemy had realized the development of the Italian counter-offensive, and they staked everything in an attempt to drive a wedge between the Lemerle-Magnaboschi line and the positions east of the Val Canaglia. On a narrow front, well under two miles, they sent in an attacking force of over 20 battalions (the 43rd division, the 24th and 41st infantry, the 20th and 22nd Landwehr). On Jvme 15 the Austrian command had issued an army order to the troops saying that Lemerle would fall in two days, and that afterwards only three mountain? lay between them and Milan. But in the four days' fighting they did not gain another yard, and the attack on June 18 was their last effort These four days tried the Italians very liighly. No further reinforcements were available for the moment, and the Forli brigade suffered terrible losses. Only their indomitable courage and the splendid work of the field artillery saved the position. Farther west, on the Val Canaglia line, the struggle was no less grim, and here the Liguria brigade won for itself a glorious name. Tliis brigade, one of the new formations created during the year of preparation, was territorially recruited and consisted almost entirely of Genoese. They were stationed at an angle where the Italian line bent north-eastward from the Val Canaglia to Magnaboschi and Lemerle. The siunmit of Monte Pau lay behind them to the south, and to the west and north the Austrian positions faced them in a curved line, running from the eastern slope of Monte Angio, by Monte Barco, Panoccio and Belmonte to Cesuna, with the height of Busibollo tlirust forward as a bastion on the near side of the road, and the steam-tramway line running up THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAh' 103 the Val Canalgia. The point tliey held, Zovetta, is not marked save on the largest -scale staff maps, but it is a shoulder of the Monte Pau-^Iagiiaboschi raugfi. Wlien the Liguria brigade took np its position bad news was coming in both from nortli and soutli. The Grenadiers had been driven off Cengio ; the Aiistrians soon gained a footing on Lemerle, and farther to tlie nortli Castelgom- berto was evacuated. Tlio Genoese of the Ligin-ia brigade were first attacked in force on the evening of June 6, simultaneously with the attack on Lemerle, They were heavily engaged in the battle of Jime 10, when they suffered severely from artillery fire. The Aiistrians had nearly 200 guns on the ciu-ved line described above, and the greater part of their fire was directed against the Monte Pau positions. The TtaUans had not yet placed all their fresh artil- lery, and the main support of the Genoese \\as two batteries of mountain guns on .Monte Pan, Their heaviest trial, like that of tlieir com- rades of the Forii brigade, was to begin on June 15, On that day and the two following the Austrian infantry attacked in force. They were able to concentrate in dead groimd, pro- tected from artillery fire, in the valley beneatli Zovetta, and their attacks were persistent, liy this time the Genoese had fallen back some 150 yards from the edge of the hill, to a roivd that crossed the shoulder from the north, and hero they waited and mowed down the enemy as they came over the brow of the slope. The defenders suffered very severely. After one onslauglit had been repulsed no news came to brigade headquarters from an outlying company on the right. WJicn a supporting party was sent out the message came back that the entire company was dead or disaliled. On the evening of June 17 the renmants of the higuria brigade* were replaced by fresh troops, but no further attack was to come from the enemy. The next few days saw an intense artillery bombardment from both sides, and all along the line from tlie Adige to the Brenta the Italians were beginning to test the ground for an advance. The Austrian offensive was over. Three out of the four reserve divisions conc( n- trated at Trent o had either been brought aher.dy * The various units mentioned by name in this brief account are far from exhausting the list of those who greatly distinguished themselves. They have been selected by the writer because the fighting in which they earned renown was specially important in the story of the Trentino operations. ON THE LOOK-OUT. An anti-aircraft gun sentry in winter garb. a* c o Z 2 ^ CO E •= s Z c < J 104 THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. 10;: into the front line or sent in haste to Galicia ; tlie fourth division was formed of second-line troops, of doubtful value, and there was no more reinforcement possible. The smashing blows dealt by the Russians on the eastern front showed tliat the Trentino attack had been based on a very grave miscalculation, and instead of being able to bring more troops against Italy the Austrian cominand had now to study the pro- blem of removing a part of those which were already engaged. On June 10 the Italian right wing liad made useful progress. The Alpini astonished the enemy by climbing the steep cliffs of Castelloni di San Marco (6,033 ft.), on the frontier above the Val Sugana, and by this move they prepared the way for the occupation of Monte ^lagari and Malga Fossetta, positions which were verj' strongly held by two infantry regiments (70th and 76th) and eight battalions of Bosnian Feldjdger. On the following day the Alpini pushed westward and captured the Cima d'lsi- doro (6,270 ft.). The whole right wing was now moving forward, and the left wing was also under waj% in the Vallarsa and at the head of the Posina valley. Guns and men were massed on the Italian centre. The time had nearly come for the Austrians to go. For a week the Austrians opposed a firm re- sistance to the Italian pressure, but on June 25 the retreat of the invaders began. Their posi- tion was becoming untenable. The Alpini were recapturing the high peaks on the right, and on the left Col Santo was being seriously threa- tened. Attacking on June 25 the Italians rapidly occupied the Austrian positions imme- diately confronting them. They met only a rearguard resistance, the main body of the in- vaders being in full retreat. Within three days the Italians were attacking the mountain? east of the upper waters of the Galmarara, and they had already occupied Monte Interrotto and Monte Mosciagh, to the north of Asiago. Far- ther south they were on the line of the Assa, as far as its jvmction with the Astico, and to the west they had crossed the Posina and were attacking Monte Majo. In the Vallarsa and Pasubio sector they were making progress against Col Santo. They were picking up a good many prisoners and machine-guns, and finding a good many tuiburied dead, but the Austrian retreat had been planned and was being conducted with great sldll. Above all, the guns were being got away. General Cadoma's counter-offensive was to have only partial results, for the enemy realized it in time. On the other liand, it never fully developed ; tlie retreat of the enemy from the salient they had made changed the circumstances, and c()nsf>(juentlj' the plan. The hne that the Austrians intended to liold was clearly indicated, for as they apiiroached it their resistance stiffened. It ran from Rovereto by Col Santo to Monte Maggio via the Borcola Pass ; thence along the rim of the Arsiero plateau, north of the Posina and east of the Upper Astico ; thence across the Tapper Astico north of the Assa to where the valley turns north- ward, and thence, crossing the river, by Monte ^Nleatta and the Portule Une to the frontier. This was an immensely strong defensive line, backed as it was by the heavy guns of the Folgaria and Lavarone plateaux, and everywhere looking down on the Italian positions. General Ca- doma had no intention of letting things be in the Trentino. It was his business to keep as many Austrians as possible pinned on the line, and he worried the enemy by continual strong pushes on various parts of the Trentino front. But he had equally no intention of knocking his head against the stone wall of the enemj''s lines, and wasting men who might be better employed elsewhere. At three points only he hastened to I^ress the attack home — east of the Galmarara, ]\Ionte Cimone (immediately north of Arsiero) and in the Pasubio sector. In each case the attacking troops were successful. The east side of the Galmarara valley was solidly occupied, ]Monte Zebio being brilliantly carried by the Sassari Brigade (151st and 152nd regiments) and the Bersaglieri, the Italian lines on the Pasubio massif were pushed forward so as to give more breathing-space at this all -important position, and ]Monte Cimone was taken. The capture of this peak deserves a special word . Its position and formation have already been de- scribed, and it will be clear that it was an ideal spot to defend. Several times the Italians endeavoiu-ed to climb its steep sides, both from the Rio Freddo and the Astico valley, but machine-gun fire mowed them down, and it seemed impossible to reach the plateau. As the steep sides were apparently impracticable, it was resoh'ed to give the Alpini another chance of showing their special qvialities. They were sent against the southern end of Cimone, a wall of rock rising 350 feet above ]\Ionte Caviojo, a spiu" already occupied by the Italians, Before dawn on July 23 they scaled the rock face by the aid of ropes and after a long and bloody struggle ICG THE TIME^ HISTOliY OF THE WAPi. HAULING A FIELD PIECE Under a roof to hide the bombed the Aiistrians off the summit. The bombs had to be passed up from below by a chain of men, roped on the cliff. By the evening they had extended their occupation suf- ficiently to cover the advance of the infantry from the Rio Freddo and the Val d'Astico, who came up the steep paths and estabUshed them- selves solidly on the plateau north of the sum- mit. This victory took from the Austrians a very useful observatory, and gave the Italians a firm footing on the Tonezza plateau. Farther west they were firmly entrenched on the hills north of the Posina. They had occu]:>ied Monte !Majo and were threatening Como del Coston and the Borcola Pass. And near the border of the Trentino and Tirol a new movement had been started from the Val Cistron and the Val Pellegrino, which threatened the Val d'Avisio and the great liighway that rmis down by Cavalise to the Adige. The Italians were carrying out their task very successfully^ and despite all their efforts the Austrians had not been able to detach more than three divisions, or possibly four, to the help of their routed armies in Calicia. The Trentino adventure had come to a disas- TO THE FIRING-POINT— gun from enemy airmen. trous end. The invaders had inflicted heavy losses on the Italians, both in men and guns, and had made a rapid and brilliant advance on to Italian soil. But they had not the neces- sarj^ staying-power, and their effort died out. They lost at least 150,000 in two months' fighting, and though they were better placed strategically than before their offensive, the price they had paid was far too high for what they gained. It might perhaps have been worth paying if it could have paralysed the Italian preparations for a big movement on the Isonzo, and many critics consider that this was the real purpose. B\it while the echoes of the heavy guns in the Trentino were still resounding. General Cadorna smashed through the iron fortresses of Sabotino, Podgora and San Michele, occupied the entire western seg- ment of the Carso, and drove the Austrians headlong from Gorizia. The Italian Army won immortal honour by its resistance in the Trentino, and, like his troops, their leader gained laiu-els that will not fade. Yet a greater title to renown will be that he could dare to hold back the invaders with his left ar!n and keep his right ready for a blow elsewheie THE TIMES HISTOliV OF THE WAli. 107 When the Aiistrinii offensi\c in tlie Trentino began the ItaUan I'arlianicMit was not sitting. It was not until June G that the Chamber of Deputies reopened, and by that time the advancing tide of invasion had been stemmed. Three days before, General Cadorna's com- munique had stated that the Austrian forward movement had been definitely arrested along the whole front. The Government, therefore, was assured of a more favouraljle reception than it would have had a fortnight earlier, when the issue of the fighting still seemed un- certain, and many people feared that the enemy might win their way to the Venetian plain. But it was generally felt that the Cabinet could hardly hope to escape a storm, lOr the con\'iction was widespread that the Austrian successes in the Trentino were due, in ijart at least, to lack of foresight and pre- paration on the Italian side. The temper of the Chamber was critical and everytliing depended on the way in which the deputies were handled. In point of fact, the Salandra Government, and particularly the Premier himself, had for a considerable time been losing in popularity. So far back as the autumn of 1915 it had been said, with some justice, that Signer Salandra not only took no trouble to keep in touch witli the leaders of opinion in Parhament and in the country, but seemed m;tually averse from contact witli any- one outside liis own immediate political circle. Tlais attitude of extreme re.serve was under- stood and appreciated dui-ing the fliflicult period of Italian neutrality, and at the- moment of Italy's entry into the war. Signer Salan- dra's position in the country was very strong Perhaps he retu^hcd the highest point of his popularity after his speech at the Capitol on June 2, 1915, when he answered the attack made upon Italy in the Reichstag by the Gernaan Chancellor. At that moment Signer Salandra held a place in the political life of liis country that no Italian statesman had occupied since Cavour. It lay with him whether he could keep that place. His task was not easy. Italian public opinion is diflicult to hold, diflicult to manage, and it cannot be ignored. And iu Parliament his position was not satisfactory. His Government was formed upon a narrow and not too stable foundation. The party to wliich he belonged, the Liberals of the Right, counted compara- tively few votes in the Chamber, and the great AN ITALIAN TRENCH IN THE MOUNTAINS. 2,000 metres high. lOS THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. majority of the deputies were political oppo- iR-nts. Tlie (Jioiittian.s had voted for Italy's intervention because intervention had been elearly demanded by the country. The " In- terventionists of the Left " — Radicals, Repub- heans and Reformist Socialists— who had worked unceasingly for war, were antagonistic to Signor Saiandra and liis party on every question save that of the part that Italy should play in the European struggle. The situation, therefore, required specially skilful handling. To assure the position of his Covernnient it was necessary that Signor Saiandra should keep in close touch with feeling hi the coimtry, and that ho should take steps to assure the support of those who were not his natural political allies in Parliament. The first task was one which is the duty of every politician who aspires to power in a democratic country ; the way was cleared for the second by the special circumstances of the time. The name of Saiandra stood for Italy's entry into the European w^ar, and the adherents of the war policy were ready to forget all domestic differences and lend their loyal support to the nxan who had led Italy in the great choice. The .sympathy of the Interventionist Left was increased by the appointment of Signor Bar- zilai as Minister without i^ortfolio. All Italy approved the inclusion in the Cabinet of the recognized leader of the Irredentist movement, himself a native of Trieste, as a symbol of the national aspirations which should be fulfilled by the war ; but to the Left the appointment was especially welcome. Signor Barzilai had fought niany parUamentary battles under tl:e Republican flag, and though he had ceased to be identified with a party which seemed now to have little raison d'etre in Italian politics he continued to be one of the leaders of '' the democracy " in the Chamber. His inclusion in the Cabinet stood as a pledge for the com- pletion of national unity, but it was also taken as a recognition of the part played by the Interventionist Left in arousing Italian opinion to the necessity of war. This strengthened Signor Salandra's parlia- mentary position, but, even allowing for the assurance of added support to the Government, the Giolittians formed a majority in the Chamber. A number of the party, including their leader, were practically vowed to emuity against the Government. They had gone altogether too far in their endeavours to preserve Italian neu- trality, and, incidentally, to regain political power for themselves. They might vote for the Goverrmient, but not out of friendliness, and they could as little ha\e dealings with the man who had ilefeated their schemes as he could have dealings with them. On the other hand, there were many members of Signor Giolitti's majority who were in a quite different position. They had played no part in the backstairs negotiations of May, 1915, and most of them, probably, gave a sincere if not enthusiastic acquiescence to Signor Salandra's war policy. They felt that as Italians their one duty was to collaborate in the work of pursuing the war with the utmost vigour and bringing it to a successful conclusion. Here, too, there was a chance for the Government to win solid support, without any sacrifice of principle or dignity. The tasks that confronted Signor Saiandra, when Italy's decision was finally taken, required abilities of a special kind. Above all they required tact and the gift of handling men. Unfortunately Signor Saiandra was not able to display the qualities demanded by the situation. With Baron Sonnino at his right hand he had guided Italy through a long and fateful crisis. He had faced and overcome, with firmness and skill, the most exceptional dififieulties, and he had won a remarkable place in the esteem of his countrymen. He was to fail in a task that seemed much less intrinsically difficult, but called for gifts which he could not bring to it. He was to lose a great personal opportiuiity and see the gradual dwindling of the popularity which he had most justly earned. In Italy as in most democratic coimtries, but perhaps more in Italy than in others, the quality of souplesse is practically essential to permanent political success. It was for lack of tliis quality that Baron Sonnino had for so long failed to wield the influence in Italian political life to which his abilities and character had entitled him. He had shown himself lacking in the necessary parlianaentary gifts. He had won power but failed to hold it, and until his hour came, the hour so fateful for Italy's future, it had seemed that he would never have the chance of giving to his country what he could give. The chance came under the leadership of the man who had been his close friend and political ally for 30 years, and had served as his lieutenant in two Govern- ments. It was the moment that gave to Baron Sonnino the opportunity of proving himself, but if he had been Premier himself,- he could never have carried his programme through. THE TIMJ'.S HISTORY OF THE WAR. 100 \ MOUNTAIN WARFARE. Alplni hauling a gun up a mountain. And he could hardly liave done his work under another leader, just as Signor Salandra could hardly have led Italy to war if anyone but his old chief had been at the Consulta. During the period of Italy's neutrality, after the death of the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Salandra-Sonnino combination had shown itself specially suited to the circumstances. Above all, both men wvve trusted. The\- were lvnov\n to be beyond the suspicion of intrigue, and everyone was willing to admit the necessity of reserve. With the declaration of war the situation changed. It remained to be .seen whether the Government could adapt itself to the new circumstances. The duty of adaptation lay with Signor no TH7-; TJMES HlSTOhY OJ- lliK ^V All. ITALIAN TKOOPS Throwing hand-grenades into an enemy trench. Salaiulra. No one expected Baron Sonnino to <'hange liis spots, to be outspokc^n with the supporters of the Government, old and new, or to keep in touch with the Press, which counts for so much in Italy. It was hoped that this essential part of the Government's duties would be performed by Signor Salandra, but after a few months it began to be said that he was " worse than Somiino." Before Parliament mot on l^ecember 1, 1915, there was a good deal of discontent, which was no doubt accentuated Ijy the fact that things seemed to be going badly for the Allies. It would not have been so hard to be patient and go without inforina- tion if the progress of the war had been satis- fsictory, but the debacle in the Balkans made a profovmd impression in Italy, and men's minds wore imeasy. The general uneasiness was accentuated by a doubt as to Italy's exact position in the Entente. AA'hen Italy declared war against Austria, the Government and the country expected a declaration of hostilities on the part of Germany within a few days. Signor Salaiidra's speech at the Capitol was thought to make war finally inevitable, but still Germany did not move Before relations were broken off with Turkey, on August 21, Naby Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in Rome, warned Baron Sonnino that war with Tiirkev meant war w ifli Germany, that Germany luid pledget! herself to declare war on Italy if Italy declared war on 'Tiiikoy. Italy's answer to this warning was an iinmcdiaie declaration of hostilities, but the pledge to Turkey- liad no more value than any other German promise. When Serbia was invaded by Germany, Austria and Bulgaria, and Italy declared war on Bulgaria, but not on Germany, Italian oi)inion, and the opinion of Italy's allies, were further puzzled. The grounds of the declara- tion published by the official Stofani Agency on October 19, 1915, seemed rather to increase the anomalous nature of the situation. The official statement ran as follows : " Bulgaria having opened hostilities against Serbia, and having allied herself with Italy's enemies to fight against the Allies, the Italian Government, by order of the King, has declared a state of war to exist between Italy and Bulgaria." It was at thi.s period that the talk began to go round of a secret agreement between Italy and Germany, signed shortly before the ruptvu-e of diplomatic relations and the declaration of war against Austria, wnich preserved a bridge between the two countries, and provided that they should not come to open 'lostilities. There was no truth whatever in this suggestion, though it was freely made by some who ought to have known better than to lend their autho- rity to the rumour. The facts were available to those who chose to apply for them, and the story is an interesting comment on the way in which an imposing, if shadowy, edifice can 1)6 bmlt up on a slender foundation, or rather on no foimdation at all. A special agree- ment between Italy and Germany was signed before diplomatic relations were broken off, but it was not of the nature insinuated. When Italy's intervention was certain and imminent, the Italian Government proposed both to Ctermany arfti to Aiostria-Htmgary that in the event of war eacn country should (1) respect and protect all private property belonging to the other's subjects within its own borders and (2) should permit the repatriation of the other's subjects. The property clause was to the advantage of Austria-Hungary and Germany, both of whom had large interests in Italy. The clause providing for the departure of enemy subjects was to protect the very large number of Italians, principallj^ of the working classes, who were resident in Germany or Austria - Hungary. The Germans and Austrians doini- THE TIM!':s HLSTOBY OF THE W Al! Ill ciled in Italy, wlio, generally spfaUin^i. !)«•- longed to the well-to-do classes, had for the most part left Italy before the rupture of diplomatic relations became nnmment. Austria-Hungary refused the Italian pro- posal ; Germany accepted it, and on May 21, 1915. an agreement to the effect indicated was signed bj' the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, and the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Signor Bollati. It will be seen that the agreement gives no groimds whatever for the most vmjust and mischievous suggestion that Italy was endeavouring to keep a foot in the enemy's camp. The agreement was in fact little more than an attempt to re-affinn principles which had seemed to be well estab- lished before Germany began to break most of the rules of war to which she had put her signature. The two important points about it, in view of the gossip to wliicli its existence gave rise, are : 1. The ternxs it contained were offered to Austria-Hungary, upon whom Italy was about to declare war. 2. It deliberately provided for a state of war between Italy and Germany. The story of a secret agreement was entirely luifoimded, and it was at length definitely contradicted by Signor Barzilai, in an inter- view givi-n in February. lUltJ, Imt the fact that it was started, and rejM atcd, and half believed even by many Italians, shows how Italy's position was compromised by liic absence of a formal declaration of war from or against (Jermany. It has already been sr.itl that the omission to take the opportunity of the attack upon Serbia increase<l the confusion both of Italian antl Allied opinion. Some month.- later, when the question was again arousing lively discu-ssion in Italy, Signor Bissolati stated in the course of a conversation that the (Jovemment had mi.ssed an excellent chance of regularizing the position, but comment was silenced for a little, in Italy at least, by the announcement that Italy had adhered to the Pact of London,* which pledged its signatories not to conchide a separate peace. This an- nouncement was made by Baron Sonnino, in the Chamber of Deputies, on December 1, 1915, the opening day of the short winter session, and it was then stated that Italy's signature had been aflfixed to the Pact the day before. It is understood, however, that Italy * ITie original declaration was signed in London in September, 1914, by Cirent Britain, France and Russia, and Japan ailhered to the nKroemcnt a year Inter. A WELL-CONSTRUCTED SHELTER: ITALIAN "DUG-OUT." 112 THI-: TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. had givon fnnnal assiirances of hor acUicsion home time previously, and Signor Orlando, Minister of Justic-<\ had prepared public opinion for Baron Sonnino's statement in an important speech delivered at Palermo on November 20. In the course of that speech Signor Orlando had emphasized the impossi- bility of an " isolated peace," and had already ilaslied t)ie liopes of those few Italians v\ho thought that Italy ought to confine herself to what had been called contemptuously " a narrow-gauge war." It was not long before the Government began to come in for fresh criticism. By this time it was well understood that Signor Salandra wa^ not likely to modify his attitude of reserve. And a luuuber of charges were accumulating against the Government, most of which, no doubt, admitted of an excellent answer, but to which no adequate answer was given. Italy, like other countries, was slow to realize the extent of her munition requirements. It began to be known that it was largely owing to lack of sufficient artillery preparation and support that the Italian attacks on the Isonzo had not succeeded in Oreaking the Austrian lines. Critics were quite well prepared to excuse a shortage of guns and shells, if they felt that every effort had been made to furnish an adequate supply. It was on this point that there was a sense of uncertainty. Those who had to provide the shells showed an vrndue complacence regarding the output which per- haps they did not feel, but the effect was imfortunate. At the front, at least, there were no illusions. When a representative of the Munitions Department gave the assurance that there was an " abiuidance " of shells, he received the true and only answer to his easy optimism: "There is never abundance." Here was the point. Italy bad certainly done marvels in the way of military preparation. The danger was lest it should be thought enough to have done marvels. Over the question of munitions the Govern- ment began to be accused of lack of forethoi:ght, and similar accusations began to be made in regard to other deficiencies which were making themselves felt. The question of the supply of coal and grain w^as becoming acute, owing to the shortage of shipping and the ever- increasing price of freight. It was asserted that the Government had shown a lack of foresight in regard to these problems, and of energy in dealing with them. Not all the criticisrru? were justified, but some were fair enougli, and the situation was made worse by the isolation of the Government from the leaders of public opinion, whicli forbade dis- cussion and explanation. The short winter session (the Chamber sat from December 1 to December 13, and the debates in the Senate lasted only tlu-ee days, from December LI to December 17) had not gi\en much chance to those who desired fuller information on the various points that had begun to trouble public opinion. The Chamber was not to reopen till March 1, so that during a period of more than 11 months, except for the historic single-day sitting on May 20, 1915, the elected representatives of the nation had only a fortnight for parliamentary discussion of the situation and its problems. This would not have mattered — many people were against parliamentary discussion altogether — if the Ministry had in the interval maintained a reasonable contact with its supporters. No such contact was maintained, and public opinion soon began to be restless again. The Inter- ventionists of the Left were particularly dis- satisfied. They thought with some justice that the part they had played before the war entitled them to consideration, and they were specially concerned over the question of inunitions. Moreover, they were still imeasy in regard to Germany. The adhesion to the Pact of London had satisfied them for the moment, but on reflection it did not seem sufficient. Almost from the first they had regarded Germany as the principal enemy, and they realized clearly that the absence of a declaration of war put Italy in a false position. By a Go\ernment decree dated November 3, 1915, Italy had requisitioned all German ships in Italian ports, deferring pay- ment " till after the war," and at the beginning of February a further decree was published for- bidding all trade between Germany and Italy, direct or indirect. But these measvu-es did not satisfy those who felt that the situation must be cleared of every kind of apparent ambiguity. Early in February Signor Salandra went to Turin, w here he delivered several speeches. In one of these ho made what must be considered a serious error in tact, by claiming for the party to which he belonged the credit of having led Italy to war in defence of her rights. This claim was resented by the Interventionists of the Left, and matters were made worse by the suggestion of a Turin deputy (the Parliamen- tary correspondent of the Gazzetla del Popolo) Tube of explosive being carried across a stream. The men are protected by steel shieltJs. Nearing their goal. Mining party taking the tube carefully through Explosion of the tube, causing destruction of an the undergrowth. Austrian trench. ITALIAN TROOPS MINING AUSTRIAN TRENCHES ON THE ISONZO FRONT. 113 11 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. that their rcsotitnient was duo to tht-ir wish for Sigiior Hissoluti's iiichision in the Cabiiiot. This was an unfair criticism. The object of the niilcontents was not power, though they did de?ire to see Signor Bissolati, and others of their number, rephice certain Ministers who they con- sidered had iiot proved equal to their duties. They \\islied to be assured that the war would he conthicted with every possible energy, and thej- believed that the best guarantee for their aims was the infusion of fresh blood into the Cabinet. An interview granted by Signor Salandra to the Deputy mentioned above, Signor Bevione, did not mend matters. Signor Salandra declared that political crises must always be resolved in I'arliament, but that neither newspapers, nor political groups, nor even a Parliamentary majority, could compel the Premier to discard some of his colleagues and appoint new Ministers. This seemed a direct challenge to those who hoped for a recon- struction of the Ministry, and on February 9 a memorial was sent to Signor Salandra by the representatives of the Interventionists of the Left and the Nationalists. The memorial stated that the Interventionist groups had given the fullest support to the Government, but that they felt it their special duty, as advocates of the war, to draw attention to what they con- sidered the shortcomings of those who were directing the policy and actions of Italy. These alleged shortcomings have already been indi- cated, and need not be repeated here. Signor Salandra replied the following day, in 20 words, promising that the memorial would have all his attention, but no further answer was received. Further discussion was delayed bj' M. Briand's visit to Rome, which was a sjonbol of the increased solidarity between the Allies, but the reopening of Parliament was awaited with special interest. The spring session began well with a speech l)y Signor Bissf)lati proposing that a message should be sent to the French Chamber expressing complete unity between Italy and France. He insisted on the unanimity of the Allies, and declared that as on the western front France and England were fighting against Austria- Hungary, so on the Isonzo Italy was fighting against Germany. The speech was received with the greatest enthusiasm, all the Deputies, except the official Socialists, rising to acclaim his words and signify their agreement with the proposed message. But stoinis were soon to come. Within a week Signor Salandra offended a !arg(( section of the Chamber by the manner in which lie refused to accei)t a proposal to di\ idc the House on an unimportant motion brought forward by the official Socialists. The Ex- treme Left were certainly displaying an attitude unworthy of the times and had given much provocation, but unruly behaviour on the part of the Socialists is a long tradition in Italian politics, and no Premier can afford to lose patience with the Chamber. Signor Salandra did lose patience, and astonished the House by tlireatening an appeal to the Crown if Deputies continued to press for votes on all occasions. The I'remier's words were taken by all the Left as indicating a lack of proper respect for the rights of the Chamber, and the Interventionists who had hitherto supported him seemed to re- sent what they termed his " reactionary atti- tude " as much as did the official Socialists. It was from this date that the movement for a National Government, which had hitherto re- ceived little support, began to gain weight. Several stormy sittings followed, but the criti- cisms which had been expected from the Inter- ventionist Left were not well defined. An interview between the Premier and Signor Bisso- lati led to an alteration in the attitude of those who were working with the latter, and it seems clear that the Reformist leader received some assurance as to the position of Italy in regard to Germany. The kejTiote of the Interventionists' argument had hitherto been that the diplomatic situation must be cleared up. Now their chief contention was that the Governmf^nt must be reinforced, so as to represent all the elements favourable to the war. The debate on the Government's economic policy brought no very satisfactory statements from the Ministers attacked, and before the division an event of first-class political importance took place. The Interventionist groups of the Left, who had been acting together since before the war, formally joined forces under the leadership of Signor Bissolati, and constituted themselves into a bloc under the name of the Democratic Alliance. Speaking on the eve of the division in the name of the 140 members who constituted the new party, Signor Bissolati declared that he and his friends were not satisfied with the answers given to the critics of the Government. He said, however, that they were convinced that the Cabinet saw the necessity for complete solidarity between the Allies, and for that reason they had resolved to do nothing that might weaken the Government on the eve of THE TIMES nisroh'Y or 1111: wah. ll-> AT AN ADVANCED POST. A lonely Austrian sentry on guard in the Dolomites. the Paris Conference. In the course of his speech in defence of the policy of the Govern- ment Signor Salanth-a had resented the sugges- tion that Italy liad not put her whole heart in the war, declaring that Italy " now holds her place in the front line of the great war, on equal terms with those Powers with whom in full and loyal solidarity of action she is fighting for the defence of human civilization and the law of nations." This seemed a fairly satisfactory statement, and no doubt did something to placate the malcontents. There had been a long discussion between the leaders of the new bloc as to whether they should continue to sup- port the Government, and Signor Bissolati had some difficulty in winning his followers to his way of tliinking. Indeed, when the division came, the Reformist Socialists, Signori Rai- mondo and Cabrini, broke away iroxn their friends and \oted against the Government, as did the small Nationalist group. The Govern- ment majority, however, was sufficiently impo- sing : 394 votes to 61. Signor Salandra was safe for the n^oment, but it was realized that the Democratic Alliance, from that time onwards, practically^ held the Government in their hands. The closing passage of Signor Bissolati's speech, every phrase of wliich had been considered by the leaders of the new party, outlined the policy for which they stood. It ran as follows : Tlie programme, not of this Government only, but of any Government which would not betray Italy, is one only — Victory. A victory which, fortunately for civiHzatioii, cannot be the victory of Italy, of France, of Russia, or of England, but is the victory wliich, bcinn aflirmed in the resurrection of Belf;ium and Serbia, in the liberation of Franco, in tl;e attainment of Italy'.s national claims, and in the reconstitution of Poland, will lay the granite foundations of a Kurope free and truly civilized, assured against the maiurnvres of n military caste, and dedicated to the fruitful works of j)eace. The visits of Signor Salandra, Baron Son- nino and General Cadoma to Paris, the reso- lutions passed at the Paris Conference, and the visit of Mr. Asquith to Rome, combined together to strengthen the position of the Government, which had been badly shaken. There was comparatively little criticism of Baron Sonnino's definite and emphatic refusal, in his speech on the Foreign Estimates, to consider the suggestion that Parliament should be more closely associated with the conduct of Italy's foreign policy. He pointed out that the abandonment of " secret diplomacy " would simply play into the hands of the enemy, and both the Chamber and public opinion saw the force of liis argument. The Foreign Esti- iir. THE TIMES IIISTOIiY OF Till': Ml/,'. innte:) were pasned by 352 vuto« to :{(}, and there st'oint'il III) sj>ecial reason to anticipate a crisis whtn I'arliamt'nt reassi inbled. Signor Salan- <lra was, in facit, ready to include Signor Jiissolati in his C'abinet, but tlic Reformist leader was unwilhng to accept ofHce. He felt that it would bo ditlicult to reconcile his ideas with the Preniier's methods; and preferred to retain his indepexidence of action, but it was generally hoped and believed that Signor Salandra would learn from the experience of the March sittings that he must modify hi.s attitude towards the Chamber and the country. Tlie storm blew up very quickly at the end. The (^hamber reo|)(»ned on June (i, and the >3, rr.*,'^ 1 \ r^pV ^^B i MR. ASQUITH AT ROME. (On the right Signor Salandra.) first two days of the session were occupied in quiet discussion , of the Budget. On Jime 8, however, a motion was presented by Signor Eugenio Chiesa, a prominent member of the Democratic Alliance, calling upon the Govern- ment to make a declaration regarding the military situation. He suggested the liolding of a secret session if the Government was un- willing to make a public statement, but lie urged that the country was growing restive at the absence of any Government declaration, and resented the discussion of the Budget at a time when all eyes were turned upon the Trentino. Signor iBissolati deprecated the pressing of the motion, but suggested that the Government might find a way of taking tlie leaders of the various groups into its con (idence. Signor Salandra's reply did not satisfy tlu! Chamber. He a[)pealed for patience, assuring the House that they would liave ample oj)portunity of discussing the general policy of the Government when the time came for the \'ote on Account. The Vote was to be taken in four days' time, and meanwhile lie asked the Chamber to continue its ordinary work. In ol)cdience to the appeal of Signor liissolati, Signor Chiesa withdrew his motion, but the Chamber quicklv altered the situation to the disadvantage of the Government. When the Debate on the Estimates of the Ministry of the Interior was resinned only one Deputyspoke, and the Estimates went through without further discussion. The Estimates of the ^Ministries of Finance and the Treasury were disposed of without a word, the' Colonial Estimates were passed after the briefest dis- cussion, and the sitting closed early. No fewer than 110 Deputies who were inscribed to speak on the various Estimates withdrew their names, and it was clear that the Chamber meant to answer silence by silence. The next day's sitting was short, the voting being taken on the Estimates which had been discussed, or rather, not discussed, on the previous day. The Government was far from obtaining its usual war majority ; the Estimates of the Ministry of the Interior, for example, being passed by a majority of only 71 — 191 votes to 120. The small number of Deputies voting was significant. By the evening of June 9 the situation was fairly clear. Signor Salandra was tired of the Chamber, and the Chamber was tired of Signor Salandra. The Premier had perforce advanced the discussion on the Vote on Account two days, and had indicated that he meant to ask for an unconditional vote of confidence. The Interventionist Left, who held his fate in their hands, were still uncertain. Conciliation woiild have probably saved the Ministry, bvit Signor Salandra was in anything but a conciliatory mood. It is believed that he was weary of office. He had lived through two years of exceptional strain, and the sittings of the spring and the summer had seemed to indicate that his nerves were feeling the long trial. In any eN-ent, he had showejd himself un- yi(>lding to suggestion, and when the moment of crisis came he showed hin\se]f equally imyielding to the pressin-e of circumstances. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 117 BOMBARDMENT ON LAKE GARDA. Shelling the Austrian trenches to assist the Italian Army in the Trentino. The speech he made in requesting a vote of confidence was not happily phrased, and he gave the impression of being altogether out of touch with the Chamber. One passage in particular was unfavourably received. He said that better prepared defences on the Trentino front would at least have arrested the enemy at a greater distance from the Venetian plain. This was, of covrrse, perfectly true, and it was typical of the feeling that had grown up against the Premier that the Chamber strongly resented his bringing the question cf the military command into liis speech. In answer to criticism, Signor Salandra rose to exi:)lain that he was not criticizing the Comando Supremo, but merely expressing their con- sidered opinion. The explanation might well have been sufficient, bxit it was not so considered, and it must be admitted that Signor Salandra ought to have said either more or nothing. lly THI'J TIMES HISTOIiY OF THE WAR. SIGNOR BOSELLI. Italian Prime Minister. After his speech it was generally felt that the Premier had already fallen, and the result of the voting — 197 to 158 against the Govern- ment — caused no surprise. The majority which defeated the Salandra Government represented almost all shades of opinion. It was composed as follows : Official Socialists, 37 ; Reformists, 20 ; Radicals, 35 ; Giolittians. 50; Right, including the National- ist Group, 25 ; Republicans, 10 ; Democratic Constitutionalists, 20. The important point was that more than half of the malcontents came from those groups which from the first were most strongly m favour of Italy's partici- pation in the war, the groups which had recently been pressing for a declaration of war on Ger- many and the reconstruction of the Cabinet on a wide basis. The balance was turned by the Democratic Alliance, and it was clear at once that their ideas would count for much in the formation of the new Cabinet. Signer Salandra was defeated on Jime 10, and resigned on June 12. The King, who arrived in Rome from the war zone on the morning of June 12, did not at once accept Signor Salandra's resignation, reserving liis decision vmtil he had consulted various political leaders. Two currents of opinion made themselves felt iiumediately — one in favour of a reconstruction of the outgoing Ministry, still under the leader- sliip of the two men who had led Italy to war ; the other supporting a "National Ministry" under the presidency of the veteran Signor BoseJli, Father of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. It was soon realized that the " re- incarnation " of Signor Salandra would prcbably lead to a repetition of the difficulties which had caused his fall, and opinion quickly concen- trated upon Signor Boselli, who was the first choice of King Victor Emmanuel. Signor Boselli was indicated to the King by Signor Salandra, and also by the Presidents of the Chamber and Senate, and it was felt that ho, better than anyone else, might be able to unite a sufficient number of elements in the Chamber to form a Cabinet on a really broad basis. He quickly secured the adhesion of Signor Orlando, Minister of Justice in Signor Salandra's Cabinet, who represented the Liberals of the Left and had recently been spoken of as a possible Prime Minister, and of Signor Bissolati, who brought with him the support of the Democratic Alliance. Signor Boselli's chief difficulty lay in filling the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was anxious to secure the cooperation of Baron Sonnino at his old post, and in tliis desire he was backed by the great body of opinion in the country. Two obstacles arose. In the first place. Baron Sonnino was not anxious to remain at the Consulta. He was unwilling to sever liis political fate from that of Signor Salandra, and he was determined to make it a condition of his remaining in office that adequate reserve should be maintained regarding foreign policy. In the second place, there was a strong move- ment in Parliament and in the Press in favour of Signor Tittoni. the Italian Ambassador in Paris. Signor Tittoni, however, was not ac- ceptable to the Democratic Alliance, who con- sidered that his career had been too much the creation of Signor Giolitti to allow him to preside at the Consulta at such -a period. Baron Sonnino's personal scruples were overcome and his conditions were readily met by Signor Boselli. The opposition to his remaining at the Consulta never took serious form, and on June 15 it was announced that he had consented to retain his portfolio. The construction of the Cabinet progressed quickly after Signor Boselli had assured himself of the support of the three leaders mentioned, and late on the evening of June 18, a list of Ministers was THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 110 AN EXPLOIT OF THE ALPINI AT MONTE TOFANA. Scaling the precipitous peaks of Monte Tofana, where the Italian troops drove the enemy out of the trenches. l-2() THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAll. |)ul)lis)u>(l which was jututitully complete. A tlay h*ter the hvst names were added, and tlic new Cabinet received tlie approval of tlic King. The Ministry wa.s composed as follows : Sip'iior Boselli, Prime Mininier, without portfolio. Huron Sonnino, Foreiiju Affairs. Sij;nor Orlniulo, Interior. Sijfiior Hi;?solati, without portfolif). Signor Carcano, Treasury. Signor Meila, Finance. Sijiiior Kiitlini, Education. Goneral Morrono, War. Admiral Corsi, Marine. Signor Arlotta, Transport. Sipnor .Sacchi, Justice. Signor Hononii, Public Works. Signor Fera, Pt/.st Office. Signor Colosirno, Colonies. Signor Raineri, Affriculture. Signor Do Xava, Industry and Commerce. Signor Comandini, without portfolio. Signor Scialoja, without portfolio. Signor Leonardo Hianchi, without portfolio. The Cabinet now consisted of 19 members, instead of 13. There were five Ministers with- out portfolios instead of one, and two new portfolios were created by the establishment of a Ministry of Transport and the severance of the departments of Industry and Commerce from the ^Ministry of Agriculture. The new Ministry came very close to the ideal of a National Government, There were six Liberal Conservatives or Right Centre members, Signor BoseUi, Baron Sonnino, Signor De Nava, Signor Arlotta, Signor Riiffini and Signor Scialoja. There was one Catholic, Signor Meda. There were five Liberals of the Left, Signori Orlando, Carcano, Raineri, Colosirno and Leonardo Bianchi ; two Radicals, Signori Sacchi and Fera ; tw^o Reformist Socialists, Signori Bissolati and Bonomi ; and one Re- publican, Signor Comandini. The announcement of the new Ministry met with as great a measm-e of acceptance as could be hoped. Naturally there were some dis- appointments. There was not room, even in a greatly enlarged Cabinet, for all those who had strong claims to office. And some of those whose claims w ere strong per se were not Ukely to work well with those whose choice was in- evitable. The greatest danger attending a Government which included so many different colours lay in the possibility of internal dis- sension, and it was necessary to avoid appointments whicli would clearly lead to frietifm. The fall of Signor Salandra was greatly re- gretted in Italy even by many who liad felt bound to criticize his attitude. His name will alwaj's be associated with the most important" action taken by Italy since her existence as a imited countrj', and if he could have accommo- dated himself to the requirements of the situa- tion, satisfaction would have been general. Another cause for regret was the retirement of Signor Ferdinando Martini, Minister of the Colonies. Signor Martini was closely associated with Signor Salandra and Baron Sonnino in the policy which guided Italy to intervention. But he, too, was suffering fron^ the long strain. He was approaching his 75th birthday when the crisis took place, and he had earned the right to rest. The new Government was certainly stronger than the old, as far as personnel was concerned, and it commanded a very different measure of support in the Chamber. The moderate Giolittians, who had come to see the absolute necessity of Italy's intervention, could much more readily give their adhesion to a Government of which Signor Salandra was not the head. They were directly represented in the Cabinet by Signor Colosimo, and there were old ties, which they could renew, with Signor Orlando and others. Far the most striking figure among the new Ministers was Signor Bissolati. A Socialist who had parted company with his comrades on the question of the Tripoli expedi- tion, he had from the first stood openly for Italy's intervention against Germany and Austria. From the first, moreover, he had seen that Germany was the prime enemy. He had a great following in the country and was specially popular in the army, which remembered that for many months he had fought as a sergeant of Alpini, and had been wounded in the early days of the campaign. Signor BoseUi was 78 years old, but he brought to his task a fresh and vigorous mind, as well as long Parliamentary experience. And all his colleagues were united in their determina- tion to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour, and to consolidate the alliance with England, France and Russia CHAPTER CXL. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK, Looking; Forward to a Fight — German Naval Policy — First News of the Battle: a Mis- leading CoMMUNiQuiS — Official Excuses — German Versions — The Ships Engaged on Both Sides — The Battt.e -Cruisers Come into Action — Sir David Beatty Draws the Germans Northward — Arrival of Sir John Jellicoe with the Battle Fleet — Retreat of the Enemy — Work of the Light Cruisers and Destroyers — British and German Losses — Tales of Gallantry. IN the afternoon and evening of May 31, 1916, an action was fought in the North Sea between the Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe and the German High Sea Fleet iinder Admiral Reinhold Scheer. The genesis of the encounter will be discussed later, but its successive stages, with one important difference, followed the normal lines of similar affairs which had taken place during the war. First, the advanced vedettes, the light cruisers and destroyers, got into touch, and then the reconnaissance squadrons, the battle-cruisers, became engaged, just as happened in the Heligoland Bight on August 28, 1914, and at the Dogger Bank on Janviary 24, 1915. Presently, the unusual happened, and the German battle fleet arrived, to support its cruisers, and a little later the British battle squadrons came into the fray. Then the aspect of the conflict underwent an entire change. For twenty-two months the British public had looked forward almost daily to such an encoimter — a pitched battle at sea, as it was called. There was no anxiety as to the result, for although the dire consequences of a naval defeat were well recognized, the nation had entire trust in its seamen, and confidently expected that if a suitable opportmiity offered they would win a decisive victory. It had been asserted that the command of the sea Vol. IX.— Part 108. could not be obtained imtil a fleet action had been fought. The reasoning by which this theory was supported was against the teaching of history, and, moreover, it derived no con- firmation from known conceptions of German strategy and noval needs. The conditions in which the two navies faced one another were not such as to give promise of a speedy conflict on a large scale. The enemy's flag had dis- appeared from the ocean. The oversea traffic of the Allies continued practically unmolested, save by submarines. British naval policy was in the main directed to the destruction of the enemy's commerce and trade and to the enforcement of what in all but name \\as a blockade. His warships were shut up in port, watched by the British seamen, whose only desire was to draw them out and drub them. So long as the enemy made no attempt to take to the sea in force, it was not easy to see how a decisive engagement could be brought about. Nevertheless, it was hoped that, as the blockade became more stringent, this and other circiun- stances might operate to force the Germans to risk a battle. The British seamen only waited an opportunity to translate their desires into deeds. When, however, the battle occiured, neither the manner in which it was made known to the country, the circmnstances in which it was fought, nor its results, were exactly what the 121 122 THH TIMKS HISTOHY OF THE WAR. nation had expected or the seamen liopod for. liy a trick of fortune they were baulked of complete satisfaction. Tlie disappointnient was not lasting, for with later news came an iussurance of triumph, and in any case the faith of the people in the Navy never weakened or abated. The message of congratulation which lung George sent to the C.omuiander-in-C'liief after paying a visit to the Grand Fleet ex- pressed in felicitous terms their trust and satisfaction. " Assure all ranks and ratings," said the Kng, " that the name of the British Navy never stood higher in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, whose pride and confidence in their acliievements are unabated." The significance and import of the battle, however, were not immediately realized, and until all the conditions were known attempts to appraise its strategical value would have been premature. The purpose of the " enter- prise directed northward," in wliich the Ger- mans annoimced on June 1 that their Fleet had been engaged, remained obscure. The extent of the enemy's success or failure could not be calculated until the precise military object which they were seeking to attain was known. Manifestly, it was not to the advantage of either of the participants to reveal details of the engagement which might be of value to the other side. Reticence was essential so long as hostilities continued. Even were the war ended, the features of an encounter wliich illustrated so much that was novel in sea fighting ; the relations wliich certain move- ments bore to the intelligence of the enemy's position and strength ; the manajuvxes by which the German admiral saved his ships from destruction ; the use of various cla.sses and types of vessels ; the eflficie icy of methods of protection and equipment — these and many other technical problems were likely for a long time to afford subjects for professional dis- cussion. Similar questions concerning earlier naval actions of the era of steam and steel — Lissa, Santiago, and Tsushima — were still de- bated, and after a hundred years the tactics of Trafalgar were under examination by an official committee of experts. For nearly two years the Grand Fleet had occupied a position in the North Sea facing the principal bases of the enemy. Behind tliis guard, the Allies were able to conduct the passage of their trade and troops practically unmolested. Campaigns for the possession of the enemy's colonies, and oversea expeditions, were undertaken ; and assistance was rendered to the land forces in three continents without let or hindrance. Furthermore, the Fleet pro- vided a safeguard to these islands from inva- sion, and enforced what was to all intents and BRITISH LIGHT CRAFT Watching for the German Fleet. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAF, ^2^ ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE, G.C.B., G.C.V.O , Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet. purposes astrangxilation of trade with Germany, the stringency of which was only limited by the diplomatic requirements of the Govern- ment. All tliese operations could not have been performed without exertions which im- posed a severe test upon those qualities of endiu-ance, resource, patience and skill for which British seamen are renowned. The strain was ceaseless. It necessitated arduous work in all the weathers to be experienced in the higher latitudes. The peril from the mine In the uniform of a Vice-Admira), and the submarine" menace were always present, and the call upon the vigilance of the flotilla.*; and fleets on patrol service imroniitting. But every demand was fully met. While, however, the predominant position at sea wa.s thus maintained, there was in being, within a short, distance of our shores, the second strongest fleet in the world, manned by courageous and competent ofiicers and men, and controlled by the same wily, unscrupxilous, and determined authorities in Berlin whose barbarous methods 121 TH!'. TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ^/ Islands ^^,f Orkney (ijXg^drkwall J&BiairdsHead -t:^ CHRJSTIANM ilz: ChrisC*3nsati<L- TheNaze^ , - - ^fv •rA^ ,40lM't''' libiNisUIlGli 7V^^ t? iz r M ■th'o( Forth ig^fz, ^SO Miles ^~^^^^i^. FlamboroughHd S E A Dogger Bank - -v -:^^44 EN G LAND i|haven ^^\^ G' Yarmouth Lowestoft "^'"^^m^^r^ SouthamjJton ENGLISH CHANNEL /738 THE SCENE OF THE BATTLE, May 31-June 1, 1916. of waging war had received shocking demonstra- tion alike on land and sea. Forced by the rigours of the blockade, by the economic pres- sure which told upon the production of material for the land warfare, and by the restriction of their sources of wealth and prosperity resulting from the loss of sea-borne commerce — this fleet might at any time be flvmg into the arena to pick up the gage of battle, opportunity for which was always offered and ardently desired by the British seamen. When the opportunity did occur, and the hopes which inspired the latter seemed likely to be fulfilled, their opponents fought indeed with courage and skill, but they evaded decisive action, and retired to their fortified bases. The Grand Fleet still retained an undisputed mastery of the sea communications ; its grip was not weakened, much less broken ; while, tried in the test of battle, the prestige of the British Navy, as well as its efficiency, stood on a higher plane than ever. There was, as always, a moral as well as a material aspect to the battle. Although the Germans were able, owing to the proximity of their harboiu-s, to promulgate their version of the action first, the impression created by their false and misleading announcements was THE TIME.S IU6lUliY UF I HE WAR. 125 dissipated when the fuller British accounts were published. The conflict afforded an oj)portunity to the British seamen for a display of those qualities of courage, endiu-anco, and skill which were confidently expected of them. It is not in mortals to command success, but in this battle there was disj^layed in the CJrand Fleet convincing evidence of readiness to take the initiative, of consummate ability in execu- tion, antl of capacity, boldness, and daring wliich thoroughly deserved to succeed. Great Britain and Germany were the two most formidable of naval Powers, and, despite the material superiority of the former, their navies were in other respects apparently well matched. The Germans were assured tliat their methods of training, their guns and mechanical equip- ment, with the armament and amiour supplied by Krupp, were better than those of their opponents. Given that they coukl choose their own time and place for action, they believed that these advantages would more than com- pensate for a deficiency in numbers. Yet when tried in the stern ordeal of battle, the higher standard of technique was on the other side. Neither in nerve nor in moral were the staying powers of the Germans equal to those of their opponents, nor did they prove the better in tactical efficiency, scientific gunnery, or the handling of ships and machinery. In character and organization the fleet which Grand Admiral von Tirpitz created was designed to serve two purposes. It was to be both a political influence and an instrument of war. In the event of European complications, it was intended that the possession of a fleet of such strength by Germany should force Great Hrituin to remain neutral. Not even the mightiest Naval Power would, it was said, dare to incur the risk involved in fighting it. Thus the nuich-dreadod blockade would be pre- vented. The other and nuich older purpose was the u.se of the Fleet — its inferiority being recognised— for making sudden onslaughls, Ixjlts from the blue, hussar-like strokes, whi<;h at little cost to the assailant would inflict damage of a serious character principally on the hostile naval force, but with avoidance of a contested or prolonged action. The first purpo.se failed when Mr. Churchill and Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg sent the Grand Fleet into the North iSea to its fighting stations, and this country decided on war. Great Britaiji, thanks largely to Mr. McKenna and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, had built up a fleet which was in a position to take the risk of engaging even the High Sea Fleet if required to do so. But in the early months of the war a naval battle on the grand scale was not in Germany's programme. The strategic line imposed upon her l)y the appearance of that supreme British Fleet in the North Sea was a modification of the two ideas above mentioned. In the outer seas an attempt was made to interfere with British trade, which was to some extent successful, but it came to an untimely end, with no inconsiderable loss of useful cruisers, as a result of the British victory oft the Falklands. Nearer home, sallying tactics were tried, with the a,ssistance of the mine and the submarine, in the belief that such damage as resulted might gradually wliittle away the supremacy of the superior fleet and provide an opportunity for larger operations. In the THE GERMAN DREADNOUGHT BATTLESHIP "KAISER," which took part in the battle. 108—2 126 THE TIME^ HISTOliY OF THE WATi. VICE-ADMIRAL SCHEER, Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet. face of the energy, resource, and ingenviity of the British seamen, this plan also was of little avail. The new naval policy was thus one of strategic reticence, varied by cruiser raids and siihmarine adventures. In its defended ports the High Sea Fleet was beyond the reach of our naval forces, while at the same time, by reason of the Kiel Canal, it served to secure the flanks and rear of the armies which on interior lines were operating on two fronts. Nevertheless, it could not protect Germany's foreign possessions or her sea- borne commerce. It could not prevent that naval compression, the strangling effects of which were severely felt, even when minimizeYl to some extent by economic organization, by the help of neutrals, and by the development of internal comrmmications. The new plan offered a striking contrast to Germany's bold campaign on land, but the Grand Admiral quoted with approval Nelson's saying : " Do not imagine I am one of those hot-brained people who fight at a disadvantage without an adequate object." Attempts could still be made against the floating trade of the Allies, and von Tirpitz threw himself with character- istic energy into the enforcement of a "sub- marine blockade " — a secret, sneaking war, directed alike against neutral and belligerent, merchantman and fishing boat. The " selected moment," the time to strike with advantage, had not yet come, and before it was thought to have done so von Tirpitz went into retire- ment. Diu-ing the time that the Grand Admiral .was at the Ministry of Marine the policy of ruthless sul)marine activity prevailed, and the crui.ser raids which preceded the Dogger Bank action were made against the East Coast. It was said, however, that in regard to the use of the battle fleet Tirpitz counselled prudence and caution, and that he was even opposed to risking the Dreadnoughts in the Baltic. If, therefore, he had a deciding voice in naval strategy, it was assuined there would be no fleet action. Up to September, 1915, when the first rumours of the removal of von Tirpitz appeared, there had only been on© mention of a movement on the part of the High Sea Fleet. This was in April, 1915, when the Fleet was said to have advanced into English waters. What exactly was meant by this official announcement was never made clear, but it followed upon the appointment of Admiral Hugo von Pohl as Commander-in- Chief in the place of Admiral Ingenohl, who was supposed to have been relieved in conse- quence of the failiu-e at the Dogger Bank. It seems likely that von Tirpitz had more to do VICE-ADMIRAL HIPPER, Commanded the German reconnoitring fleet. THE TIMEF; HISTOBY of the WAIi. 127 THE "WARSPITE," ONE OF THE "QUEEN ELIZABETH" SQUADRON. Engaging the German Battleships. with the policy of slaip construction than with the control of the Fleet. There appears to be some reason for the beUef that instead of pressing on the building of heavier vessels he concentrated the resources of the arsenals and shipyards — on the former of which the land requirements must have been making a very heavy call — upon submarine output and perhaps some novel deNices. The rumoiu"s of changes in the armament of ships, and of the appearance of new and strange craft — " the novel dangers requiring novel expedients," as Mr. Churchill said — were founded to some extent on a phrase in a letter to von Tirpitz from the Kaiser, who thanked him for what he had accomplished during the war " by preparing new means of fighting in all departments of warfare." The composition of the German Fleet in the action of May 31 afforded no support, however, to this theory. The direction of the operations of the Fleet appears to have been more particularly in the hands of the Xaval General Staff, and the appointment in the autumn of 1915 of von Holtzendorff (who had commanded the Fleet himself ^om September, 1909, to January, 1913) as Chief of that Staff, in succession to Admiral Baclimann, apparently coincided with changes in policy. At all events, on December 19, 1915, the Admiralty Staff at Berlin annoimced that a poition of the Higii Sea Fleet in the previous ^\(ek had searched the North Sea for the enemy, and then cruised on the 17th and 18th in the Skager Rak, searching sliipping. Fifty-two steamers were examined, it was stated, and one stenmer loaded with contraband was seized. " During this entire period," the announcement con- cluded, "the English fighting forces were nowhere to be ?een." It must have been about this time that von Pohl found himself too unwell to continue the active work of h:a command, and he was temporarily succeeded by Vice -Admiral Scheer, a division com- mander. In February, 1916, von Pohl died, and Scheer was confirmed in the appointment, but even before this hap- pened there began to be rumoxirs of increased liveliness, and reports from fishermen and other sources that the High Sea Fleet, or portions of it, were making short cruises. In March, 25 ships were seen off Vlieland, on the Dutch coast, and a little later other squadrons moving in the same locality. Then in April the Yarmouth raid occurred, and both from Holland and Denmark move- ments at Kiel and Heligoland, as. well as unusual activity in the dockyards, were re- 128 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL VICF-ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., GDmmanded the Battle-cruiser Fleet. In the uniform of a Vice-Admiral, ported. It was widely believed by neutrals that the enemy would attempt some stroke, and that the gun practice continually being carried out behind the mine-fields, with the airships which in fine weather were always patrolling the North Sea, were symptoms of this impending movement. Most certainly there were reflections in various directions of a more energetic hand at the wheel. Simul- taneously, all that portion of the Press which derived its inspiration from the Admiralty — Count Reventlow and the naval officers writing for the German papers — appeared to be under instructions to prepare the German people for some development of the war at sea. More- over, the increasing effect of the blockade, internal discontent and vmrest, with the new co-ordinated efforts of the Allies in the land theatres, could not but exercise an influence in this direction. Although, therefore, the situation was not without indication of the possibility of a coming conflict — and it may be assimied that the signs had been noted and acted upon bv the naval authorities — yet the public experi- [Russell. REARADMIRAL O. DE B. BROCK, Commanded the First Battle-cruiser Squadron. enced a great shock when the first news of the battle was announced on the evening of Friday, June 2, The nation was disappointed, and the world deceived. There had been rumours in London of a naval engagement on Wednesday night, but such rumours were of almost daily occurrence, and as no confirmation was forthcoming the story was dismissed as others had been before. On Thursday, the tidings became more circum- stantial, and received support from news which leaked out in the dockyard towns and naval bases. As, however, the House of Commons adjourned shortly after nine p.m., in accordance with a resolution moved by the Prime Minister, without any announcement on the subject of a naval battle having been made, there were still doubts as to whether it had taken place. It was afterwards explained by Mr. Balfour, at a luncheon in the week following the battle, at the British Imperial Council of Commerce, that he got his first intimation from the Commander-in-Cliief that an engagement be- tween the hostile fleets was imminent on Wednesday afternoon, and from that time, until a telegrain was received from Sir John Jellicoe on Friday afternoon, the Admiralty THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 129 [Lafayette. REAR-ADMIRAL W. C. PAKENHAM, Commanded the Second Battle-cruiser Squadron. had no news from him as to the covirsse of the engagement. Such information as they had was mainly obtained from intercepted wireless messages, which included, no doubt, the report by the German Admiralty to Washington on June 1, describing the action and the lo.sses which the British were said to have suffered. It was not until seven p.m. on Friday, June 2, that the following communique was issued by the Admiralty tlirough the Press Bureau : — On tlie afternoon of Wednesday, ^lay 31, a nava! engagement took place off the coast of .Jutland. The British ships on which the brunt of the fi;;htiiit; fell were the Baltle-Cruiser Fleet and soino cruLsers and lif,'ht cruisers, supported by four fast battleships. Anions; those the losses were heavy. The German Battle Fleet, aided by low visibility, avoided prolonged action with our main forces, and soon after these appeared on the scene the enemy returned to porl, though not before receiving severe damage from our battleships. The battle-cruisers Queen Mary, Indefatigable. Invincible, and the cruisers Defence and Black Prince were sunk. The Warrior was disabled, and. after being towed for some time, had to be abandoned by her crew. It is also known that the destroyers Tipperary, Turbulent, Fortune, Sparrowhawk and Ardent were lost, and .six others are not yet accounted for. No British battleships or light cruisers were .sunk. The enemy's losse? were serious. At least one battle-cruiser was destroyed, and one severely damaged ; one battleship reported sunk by our destroyers during a night attack : two light cruisers were disabled and probably sunk. The exact niunber of enemy destroyers disposed of during the action cannot be ascertained with any certainty, but it must have been largo. [Lyfayate. REAR-ADMIR.\L THE HON. HORACE L. A. HOOD, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., Commanded the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, In the uniform of a Captain, R.N. The wording of tlus communique, with its admissions of British losses apj)arently much heavier than those inflicted tipon the enemy, gave the impression that it was the preliminary and guarded announcement of a naval reverse. The evening papers published the news in their later editions, and generally it was taken to indicate that the Geimans, in great strength^ had surprised a jiortion of tlie British Fleet and inflicted heavy loss upon it before Iclp coidd arrive. The very frankness with \\ hit h heavy casualties were ac mitted, coupled with the statement that soon after our main forces "appeared on the scene the enemy returned to port,"" was suflicient to justify such appre- hensions as werc^ created by the news. The early editions of the morning papers, ami most of those published in the provinces, contained the same coinmuniqut', with cf niments founded on it. At one o'clock or\ Saturdav morning a further announcement was made which put a slightly better complexion on the affair. This second statement was as follows : — Since the foregoing communiqiti was issued, a further report has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, stating that it is now ascertained that our H u J U H <: Z t o o s t « Q •£ .c ■5 I C o Si ■= I b .c o a: , , « c W m o H "S -g '£ S [i, «- o QMS 2 ■" o OS c •<3 Q£ » « <( S « So •00 a> •S 8 S 3 13U THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 131 total losses in destroyers amount to eight boats in all. The Commander-in-Chief also reports that it is now po^^jible to form a closer estimate of the losses an<i damage sustained by the enemy fleet. One Dread- nought battleship of the Kaiser class was blown up in an attack by British destroyers, and another Dreadnought battleship of the Kaiser class is believed to have been eunic by gun-fire. Of three (Jerman battle-cruisers, two of which, it Ls believed, were the Derffiinger and the Latzow, one was blown up, another was heavily engaged by our Battle Fleet and was seen to be disabled and ■topping, and a third was observed to be seriously damaged. One German light cruiser and six German destroyers were sunk, and at least two more German light cruisers were seen to be disabled. Further, repeated hits were observed on three other German battleships that were engaged. Finally, a Gei-man submarine was rammed and sunk. This was published, by the newspapers in their later editions, and the alterations made in the editorial comments showed that it liad a rea.ssuring effect. Many people, however will long retain unpleasant recollections of that first Friday night in June, 1916, when they might have been sharing in the satis- faction of a British naval triimiph, had the Admiralty acted more judiciously in circulating the news. On Satvirday and Sunday, June 3 and 4, a third official communique and two semi-official announcements were issued from the Admiralty through the Press Bureau. The first-named was, in effect, an epitome of the dispatches from the Commander-in-Chief pub- lished a month later, and showed the action in its true light. It finally disposed of the idea that the Germans had won a victory, but even so its encouraging effect was to some extent minimized by the semi-official statements which appeared at the same time. The first of these was an analysis of the British and German losses by Mr. Winston Chvu-chill. After com- paring the tmits of the Fleets alleged to have been sunk on either side, and pointing out that so far from ours having been the greater the balance was the other way about, ]\Ir. Churchill went on to say : — Our margin of superiority is in no way impaired. The despatch of troops to the Continent should continue with the utmost freedom, the battered condition of the German Fleet being an additional security to us. The hazy weather, the fall of night, and the retreat of the enemy alone frustrated the persevering efforts of our brilliant commanders, Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty, to force a final decision. Although it was not possible to compel the German main fleet to accept battle, the conclusions reached are of extreme importance. Al! classes of vessels on both sides have now met, and we know that there are no surprises or unforeseen features. An accurate measiu:e cein be taken of the strength of the enemy, and liis definite inferiority is freed from any element of uncertainty. This calling in of Mr. Churchill by the First Lord to give what the former termed " a reassuring interview " was regarded as a weak step on the part of the Admiraltj', and aroused much criticism. Both Mr. Balfour an<l Mr. Churchill felt constrained to explain why tJ-.e latter was asked to intervene, but neither in tills matter nor in the attempt to throw tl.c blame for the misleading impression created by the first communique on to the Press were the excuses regarded as entirely satisfactory. The other semi-official statement came from " a naval officer of high rank," who had ha<l access, like Mr. Churchill, to special sources of information. It was in the .shape of an inter- view with a representative of the- Associated Press of America on June 3, but was issued by the Press Bureau on the following day. The various stages of the battle were described, with additional details and connnents on the official reports. To the interviewer, this oflicer further remarked : We can only say that we were looking for a fight when our Fleet went out. Stories thai it was decoyed by (lio Germans are the sheerest nonsense. . . . The battle had four phases, the first opening at 3.15 p.m., when our battle-cruisers, at a range of six miles, joined action with the German battle-cruisers. Shortly after, the second phase began, with the arrival on both sides of battle- ships. The Germans arrived first, but before their arrival our three battle-cri;isers had been blown up, supposedly as the result of gun-fire, but there is a possi- bility that they met their fate by torpedoes. Such close-range fiphtine by battle-cruisers might be criticised as bad tactios, but our Fleet, following the traditions of the Navy, went out to engage the enemy. On account of the weather conditions however, it could only do so at short range. The third phase .was the engagement of battleships, which was never more than partial. This pha=e included a running fight, as the German Dreadnoughts fled towards their bases. All the big ship fighting %vsus over bj' 9.15. Then came one of the most weird features of the battle, as the Gennan destroyers made attack after attack, like infantry following an artillery preparation, on our big ships ; but these onslaughts were singularly futile, not a single torpedo launched by them getting home. With the morning these attacks ended, and tlie battleground was scoured by Admiral Jellicoe'.s Fleet, which reported not a single enemy ship in sight. After a summary of the losses believed to have been inflicted upon the enemy attention was directed to the circumstance that tlie weather conditions were the hardest bit of luck the Fleet encoimtered, as shown by the following paragraph in the official report : " Regret misty weather saved enemy from far more severe punishment." This account of the engagement was published in a great nvmber of the British and foreign papers. It formed the basis of much of the conunent and criticinn that was made by naval officers and others in the United States, where it was doubtless intended to counteract the erroneous impres- sions created by the announ'^ements which the 1R2 THE riMHS HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Russell. CAPTAIN E. M. PHILLPOTTS, Commanded the Battleship " Warspite." German Admiralty were issuing. The Ameri- cans got their first notion from a Berlin message wliich, being sent bj^ wireless to Sayville, escaped the censorship over the cable lines. Tliis was supplemented by the German Ad- miralty report dated June 1, the text of wliich was as follows : During an enterprise directed towards the north, our High Sea Fleet on Wednesday (May 31) encountered the main part of the British fighting fleet, which was coii- .siderably superico' to oiir forces. Durins the afternoon, between the Skagger Rak and Horn Reef, a heavy engagement developed, which was successful for us, and which continued during the whole night. In this engagement, so far as is knoivn to u.s at present, we destroyed the great battleship Warspite, the battle- cruisers Queen Mary and Indefatigable, two armoiu-ed cruisers, apparentij' of the Achilles type, one small cruiser, the new destroyer leaders Turbulent, Nestor and .\lcaster f Acasta), a large nvunhfT of destroyers, and c«ic submarine. By observations which are unchallengeable, it is kr.own that a large number of British battleships suffered damage from oiw ships and torpedo craft during the day and night actions. Among others, the great battleship Marlborough was hit by a torpedo, as has been confirmed by prL<oners. Several of our ships resrued portions of the crews of the sunk British ships, among whom wore the only two survivors of the Indefatigable. On our side, the small cruiser Wiesbaden was sunk l>y the enemy's gxin'^ in the course of the day action, and the Pommeni diiria;,' the i;i;:ht by a torpedo. The fate of the Frauenlob, which is missing, and of some torpedo boats which have not yet returned, is unknown. The High Sea Fleet returned to-day (Thursday) to our port-i. A second official message was issued by tlie Chief of the German Naval Staf? on June 3, in which the loss of the Elbing was admitted, and another on Jvine 7, in which was admitted the loss of the vessels Lixtzow and Kostock — [Riissell, CAPTAIN F. C. DREYER, C.B., Flag-Captain and Gunnery Director of the Fleet. information hitherto withheld, it was announced, for military reasons. The xiew generally taken by the American Press, from the early British and German reports, even by those papers which sympa- thized with the "cause of the Allies, was that the British had suffered a defeat. As an example, the Philadelphia Inquirer, an old-established journal of well-balanced judgment, said in its leading article of June 3 : In the first great naval engagement of the war, in a conflict tor which the British have been a-weatying, and in which they counted with confidence on success, they have been decisively defeated, and have sustained losses which not the most optimistically inclined can regard as negligible. ... So far as can be gathered from the information at hand, only a comparatively small section of the British Fleet was engaged, and it is hardly necessary to point out that Great Britain's naval superiority has not been materially affected by the losses it has sustained. The early reports gave rise to erroneous con- clusions by others than civilians. The Army apd Nain/ Journal, of New York, in its issue of June 10, stated that in the opinion of officers at the Navy Department, the British battle- cruisers got into a place in the engagement for which they were entirely unsuited. In some quarters there has been a tendency to criticize the commander of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, and par- ticularly the commanders oi the light armoured cruisers, for impetuously rushing into a struggle whore they were at such a disadvantage, but this is explained in part by the suggestion th.at in all probabilitj' the British naval officeis had been held in leash so long that when they got an opportunity to get into action they showed more •courage than prudence. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. 133 [Russell. CAPTAIN ARTHUR L. CAY, Flag-Captain of the "Invincible." Rear-Adniiral Caspar F. Goodrich, after quoting from the statement ot " the naval officer of liigh rank," said : It would seeiu from what we are told that o\cr-non- fidence in the battlo-cruisers led to their taking an undue share of hard knocks, and that it would have been more prudent to let them draw the German battleships to within range of the British battleships fa^t comint; to their relief. Other naval officers expressed similar views. Even Admiral Dewey spoke of the imfitness of the battle-cruiser to play a leading role in naval dramas, and Captain W. S. Sims was evidently of the opinion that the Battle -Cruiser Fleet had attacked the main body of the German Fleet on sight. It was not until the dispatch of Sir John Jellicoe and report of Sir Da\dd Beatty were published that these mistaken inferences were corrected, and it was made abundantly clear that such conclusions f omid no warrant in the facts. On Tuesday, May 30, the ships of the Grand Fleet left their anchorages by instructions from the Commander-in-Chief to carry out one of those periodical sweeps of the North Sea of which the iirst to be announced was mentioned in an official communiqae as far back as Sep- tember 10, 1914, and many of which had been carried out at intervals since the beginning of the war. Sir John Jellicoe made it clear in his dispatch that every part of the Grand Fbet was under his command, and was operating in accordance with his orders. From the state- ments of visitors to the Fleet, it was kno\\"n to iMaiili ..- lox. CAPTAIN CHARLES J. WINTOUR. Commanded the Destroyer "Tipperary." have been in three sections, and a few days earlier the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was reported as being in the Firth of Forth. It is essential to note tliat the concerted movements of the Fleet were made on Tuesday, because it thus becomes clear that the enemy could have had no certain knowledge that the Grand Fleet was at sea. The location of the sections of the Fleet might have been di.scovered by Zeppelins in the day- time, but these could not have seen and re- ported the movements of the ships after dark. Similarly, the survivors of the Elbing when landed in Holland stated that the High Sea Fleet had put to sea at 4 a.m. on the morning of Wednesday, ^lay 31. This movement, therefore, could not have been the cause of the Grand Fleet's putting to sea on the previous afternoon. An unusual briskness and stir had, indeed, been reported at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel. Both Fleets were no doubt fully prepared for battle when they left port, but the actual meeting appears to have happened by chance. The object of the sweeps made by the Grand Fleet was clear. The intention was to meet the enemy, if he could be foimd, and to engage him. The sole purpose in view was his annihi- lation as an effective force. The sweeps, it may be said, were made in conformity with the policy adumbrated by Nelson, " The enemy are still in port, but something must be done to provoke cr lure them to a battle." It may be asked, on the other hand, ^\hether the Grermans had 108—3 184 THF. TIMI':s IIlSTOliY OF THK WAR. UIUTISH BATTLE FLEET , VI.ISo***'. / »■".• GCRMAN BATTLE CRUISCRS a.-. '. All! 30 PM ,v BlUTISU BATTLE CRUISEOS- Approximate Track oF British Battle Fleet " " British Battle Cruisers — — — ^c^ LITTLE FISHER BANK Mpprcumgtc Track of dric-sft Battfe Fleet >. " '« Brittsh83ttle Cruisers— •• •» £flemys Ships JUTLAND BANK Horn ReeFs t_ Light Vessel -^^^*- Daylight I. VI. 16. NOTE Tiiis chart must be taken as diagrammatic only .and as a genera/ indie at/on nfthe course of the Battle- THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK. thp: times FUsroRY op tiik war. 1?5 any sorioiis iindprtnkiiig in viow in coining out as thoy did. l'rol>ably tliey had, first, because nothing they had done had lacked purjiose, and secondly, they had certain advantages which were denied to their opponents. The fleet which keeps the sea cannot ahvays be at its maximum strengtli. As Admiral W. H. Hen- derson pointed out* : — Re6ts and repairs "require constant attendance, and although our Fleet is supeiior to that of the enemy it is not possible to count upon all the ships of which it is composed being perpetually on the spot. . . . The Queen Elizabeth and the Australia appear to have been absent from the battle, or over 13 per cent, of the strength of our fast divisions. Can anyone doubt what the addition of those two ships would have meant to the liardly-presscd and splendidly-fotight squadrons during the time in which they were engaged with superior force. The Germans could select the moment to appear when they were at their full strength, and of this they evidently took advantage. It was obviously their correct plan to look for an opportunity to cut off and destroy any unit of the opposed force inferior in strength, and separated so far from its main body as to be dealt with before support could be obtained. By such tactics the material strength of the fleets might be more equally balanced. The semi-oflticial statement from Berlin on June 5 that " the German High Sea forces pushed forward in order to engage portions of the British Fleet which were repeatedly reported recently to be off the south coast of Norway " may well have referred to the " enterprise directed northward " of the first ofhcial com- mvnique issued on June 1. It was possible that by means of Zeppelins the Germans had discovered that the periodical sweeps were not always carried out by the whole of the Grand Fleet. When, therefore, the Britisli Battle -Cruiser Fleet was sighted by Hipper's scouts on Wednesday afternoon, it would have been a natural conclusion to draw that a chance had presented itself to attack with their full force a weaker British division, and thus to gain a comparatively easy success. If this was their endeavoiu", it was completely frus- trated by the dogged tenacity of Sir David Beatty, with the effective support supplied by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, and the decisive stroke of the Commander-in-Chief when he arrived on the scene of action. In any case there was no sign of an intention to seriously contest the command of the sea, of a plan for breaking the- blockade, or of an adventiu-e into the Atlantic. Such projects could only be carried * Contemporary Reiiew. July, 1916. I Kusseli. COMMANDER SIR C. R. BLANE, BART., H.M.S. "Queen Mary" (killed). out successfully after the British naval forces had been depleted by attrition, and that this was recognized by the Germans was shown by their immediate retirement when it was seen that the battle squadrons of Sir John Jellicoe were join- ing in the battle. Both sides wanted a fight, but the Gennans only on their own tenns. A further advantage would be obtained bj' the Germans, should an engagement occur, if they could contrive to bring it about nearer to their own ports than to those of the enemy. Although not due directly to their own efforts, it is nevertheless the fact that this happened. The locality in which the battle began was in the vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank, and to the westward of the Jutland Bank, two shoal patches at no great distance from the Danish coast. The approximate position of the British Battle-Cruiser Fleet on sighting the German battle -cruisers was somewhere about 56deg., 50min. Xorth latitude, and odeg. 30min. East longitude. This position is nearly twice as far from the British coast as it is from that of Germany. Wlien the battle came to an end on the morning of June 1, while the retreating Gentian ships had approached much closer to their own ports, the Grand Fleet was over 400 \VA\ Till'] TIMES HlSTOltY OF Till': WAR. miles fnjin its main base, ami its other bases were all considerably farther away than the tJerman ports. Hetween the two positions which marked the beginning and the end of the encounter, the Horn Reef projects from the Danish coast about ten miles, its outlying point marked by a light vessel, and the action was certainly nearer to this reef tlian to the Skagcr Rak. This explains why the encounter was sometimes called in this country after the Horn Reef, which was much more appropriate than to call it after the Skager Rak, as the Germans did. Ajiparently they wished to suggest that they had no advantage from the scene of the battle being in the \icinity of their defended harboiu-s. Tliis, however, was not the case. Some uncertainty exists as to the identity of all the ships which took part in the action. A note appended to the dispatch of Sir John Jellicoe says : " The list of ships and com- manding ofiticers which took part in the aetion has been withheld from publication for the present in accordance with practice." It was believed that vessels from all the types in the following table were present : THE GRAND FLEET. TYPES OF SHIPS. BaTTLKSHU'S. Name. Date. Royal Sovereign ... ... 1916 Queen Elizabeth (Fifth 1915 Squadron) Iron Duke (First Squadron) 1914 Orion (Second Squadron) ... 1912 Tons. 25,750 27,500 25,000 23,oao Dreadnought (Fourth Squadron) 1906 17,900 Speed. 21 25 21 21 21 .\rriianient. 8 IS-in., 12 6-in. 8 15-in.. 12 6-in. 10 13-5-in. 12 6-in. 10 13-5-in., 16 4-in. 10 12-in.. 4-in. or 12-pr. Lion (First Squadron) ... 1912 New Zealand (Second 1912 Squadron) Indomitable (Third 1908 Squadron) Battlf.-Cruiseus. 26,350 28 8 13o-in., 16 4-in. 18,800 25 8 12-in., 16 4-in. 17,250 25 8 12-in., 16 4-in. Armouked Cruiser?. Defence (First Squadron) ... 1909 14,000 23 4 9-2-in., 10 7-5-in. 6-in. Achilles (Second Squadron) 1907 13,550 22i 6 9-2-in. 4 7-5-in. 6-in. Black Prince (First 1906 13,550 221 6 9 2-in. 6-in. Squadron) 10 6-in. Light Chlisers. Galatea (First Squadron) ... 1915 3,750 29 2 6-in. 8 4-in. ■ Southampton (Second Squadron) 1913 5,400 25 V f ( or 9 6-iii. — Falmouth (Third Squadron) 1911 5,250 251 8 6-in. — Calliope (Fourth Squadron) 1915 3,803 ~ 30 2 6-in. 8 4-in. — Fearless (First Flotilla) 1913 3,440 25 A 10 4-in. — Destroyers. Tipperary 1914 1,850 31 6 4in. — Pelican 1916 I^articvi lars iniknown. Onslow 1916 Particu! lars iniknown. Nestor 1915 Partiou lars luiknown. Moresby 1914 Particulars unknown. Landrail 1913 965 29 3 4-in. Acasta (" K" type) 1912 935 29 3 4-in. Badger ("I" type)... 1911 780 29 2 4-in.. 2 12-pdrs. Abdiei Enyadine — Miscellaneous. Particulars unknown. Seaplane carrier. Belt Armour. Si.ster-Ships. 13-in. Revenge, etc. 13-in. VVarspite, Valiant, Barhani, Malaga. 12-in. Mailborough, Emperor of India, Ben bow. 12-in. Conqueror, Monarch, Thun- derer, King George V., Ajax, Audacious, Cen- turion. 11-in. Bellerophon, Temeraire, Su- perb, St. Vincent, Colling- wood, Vanguard, Neptune, Colossus, Hercules. 9-in. Princess Royal, Queen Mary, Tiger. 7-in. Indefatigable, Australia. 7 in. Inflexible, Invincible. Minotaur, Shannon. Cochrane, Warrior. Duke of Edinburgh. Aurora, Inconstant, Royalist, Penelope, Phaeton, Un- daunted. Chatham, Dublin, Birming- ham, Lowestoft, Notting- ham. Dartmouth, Falmouth, Wey- mouth, Yarmouth. Caroline, Carvslort, Cham- pion, Cleopatra, Comus, Conquest, Cordelia. Active, Blanche, Blonde, Bellona, Boadicea. Botha, Turbulent, Terma- gant, and others. Petard, etc. Onslaught, Obdurate, etc. Nomad, Nicator, Nar- borough, Nerissa, etc. Manly, Mansfield, Mastiff, Matchless, Mentor. Meteor, Milne, Minos Miranda, Moorsom, Morris, Murray, Myngs, etc. Lydiard, Laforej', Lookout, Legion, etc. Ardent, Fortune, Garland, Ambuscade. Shark, Spar- rowhawk, Spitfire, etc. Defender, Attack, Hornet, Phoenix, etc. THE TIMK^ IIISTnjfY OF THE TIM/?. 1:]7 GERMAN SUBMARINES A I TACHED TO THE H1(JH SEA FLEET. With regard to the Clrand Fleet, the com- position of the battle squadrons was not dis- closed, the 'names of only a few of the vessels, being mentioned. Sir John Jellicoe refers to the movements of tliree squadrons — the First, Second, and Fourth, in the last-named of wliich liis flagship, the Iron Duke, was placed. The Marlborough was the flagship of Sir Cecil Burney in the First Squadron ; and the King George V. of Sir Thomas Jerram in the Second Squadron. According to the Geiman account, a squadron of three ships of the Royal Sovereign type was also present. One of these was men- tioned by the Commander-in-Chief, who stated that when the Marlborough was partially dis- abled by a torpedo Sir Cecil Biu-ney transferred his flag to the Revenge, of the Royal Sovereign class. The Fifth Battle Squadron, wliich supported the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, consisted of four ships of the Queen Elizabeth tj^e, but the name-sliip was absent refitting. Rear- Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas flew liis flag in the Barham. The nine battle -cruisers present on the Biitish side were organized in three sqviadrons, com- manded respectively by Rear -Admirals O. de B. Brock, W. C. PakcMiham. and the Hon. H. L. A. Hood. The I'rince.ss Jioyaii flew the flag of the first-named : the New Zealand that of Acuniral Pakenham ; and the Invincible that of Admiral Hood. Tlie flag of \'ice- Admiral Sir David Beatty, Conunanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, was flying in the Lion. The five other battle-cruisers were the Queen Mary, Tiger, Indefatigable, Indomitable, and Inflexible. Admiral Beatty also had mider his command the First, Second, and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons, and destroyers from the First, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Flotillas With the Conmiander-in-Chief and the battle squadrons were the First and Second Crui.ser Squadrons, the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers from the Fourth, P^leventh, and Twelfth Flotillas. There were also a number of special and auxiliary types represented, in- cluding the Engadine, seaplane-carrier. There is more doubt about the composition of the Gemian High Sea Fleet, imder the com- naand of \'ice-Admiral Scheer, which accord- ing to the Germ m account consisted of ^a main battle fleet in tliree squadrons, and a reconnoitring fleet of five battle-cruisers under THE GERVIAN BATTLE-CRUISER "SEYDLITZ," CAPTAIN VON EGIDY Reported to have been seriously damaged in ihe battle. 138 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. \'ico-Acliniral Hijjper, with light cruisers and destroyers attached to both divisions. The heavier vessels were probably of the types in the table below : presence of which would necessarily reduce the wpeed and fighting capacity of the whole force. Admiral Hipper's five battle-cruisers are said. THE HIGH SEA FLEET. TYPKS OF SHIPS. BATTi.Esmrs. Belt Xarne. Date. Tons. Speed. Armament. Armour Sister-Ships. Wilhelm 11. (ex-\V6rth) .. iyi6 29,000 21 8 15.in., 16 5-9-in. — " T." •' N " (ex-Salamis) 1U16 19,200 23 8 14-in., 12 6-in. 10-in. Unknown. Konig 1014 25,.387 21 10 12-in.. 14 r.-9-in. 14.in. Markgraf, Grosser Kurfurst, Kronprinz. Kaiser l'Ji:5 24,310 21 10 12-in., 14 5-9-in. 14-in. Kaiserin, Friedrich der Grosse, Konig " Albert, Prinzregent L\iitpokl. Helgoland 1911 22,500 20 J 12 12.in., 14 5-9-in. 12-in. Ostfriesland, Thuringen, Oldenburg. Nassau 1909 18,600 20J 12 11-in., 12 5-9-in. 12-in. Westfalen, Kheinland, Poson. Deutschland... 1906 1.3,040 18J 4 11-in., 14 6-7-in. 9i.in. Hannover, Pommern, Schle- sien, Schleswig-Holstein. Braunschweig 1904 12.907 18 4 11-in., 14 6-7-in. 9-in. Elsass, Preussen, Lothrin- gen, Hessen. Battle-Cruisebs Hindenburg 1916 28,000 27 8 16-in., 14 5-9-in. — Unknown. Liitzow 1915 28,000 27 8 12-in., 12 5-9-in. 11-in. Derfflinger. Soydlitz 19];{ 24,640 26 10 11-in., 12 5-9-in. 11-in, Moltkc. Von der Tann 1911 18,700 25 8 11-in., 10 5-9-in. e-in. None. Boon Armoured Ckuiser. 1905 9,350 21 4 8-2 in., 10 5-9-in. 4 -in. Accepting the German statement, the First Squadron of eight battleships would probably be composed of the Konig and Kaiser types ; the Second of the Helgoland and Nassau types ; and the Third of pre-Drcadnought ships, the Deutschlands and Bratinschweigs. There is reason to believe, however, that two new battle- ships, wiiich were known when bviilding as the Ersatz-Worth and " T," were present. The fornaer is said to have been named the Wil- he'.m II. It was on board a new ship of this name that Admirals Scheer and Hipper re- ceived the freedom of Wilhelmshaven a few weeks after the battle. It was also suggested that the Pommern, a vessel of which name the Cermans admitted was sunk in the action, was not the old pre -Dreadnought ship of this name — which was understood to have been torpedoed in the Baltic by a British submarine in July, 1915 — ^but the much more modern and power- ful vessel known as " T." Another po.ssibility is that the vessel named the Salamis, which was building in Germany for the Greeks when the war broke out, took part in the battle under some other name. At all events, it is diflficiilt to believe that the homogeneity of the German squadrons would have been broken by the inclusion of some of the older sliips, the in the German official accovmt, to have consisted of the Derffiinger and Moltke classes, as well as the Von der Tann. The Liitzow, in which Admiral Hipper's flag was flying during part of the action, was the sister-ship of the Derfflinger, and the Seydlitz of the Moltke. Some British observers were of opinion that a later battle - cruiser, the Hindenburg, was present, and not the Von der Tann, and this is the more likely, as the inclu,sion of the latter would have tended to reduce the speed of the squadron. Thus at about two o'clock on the afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, two large naval forces were approaching one another in the North Sea. Each of these forces consisted of a main body comprising three squadrons of their latest battleships. Each also had an advanced or reconnoitring squadron of battle-cruisers thrown out some distance before the main body. Each, too, was accompanied by satellites, some of which were still more advanced, for scouting piu-poses, and as a protective screen against submarines. It is characteristic of the sea operations that two such bodies as these, each •containing all the latest scientific ajDpliances for sea fighting, although they might be cruising in the same waters, might seldom come into THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAF. 1H9 A SCENE OF THE MIDNIGHT BATTLE. Engagement of one of the British destroyers with German cruisers, as revealed by German star-shells, and firelight caused by a huge shell which struck the British vessel. Caught between two fires and fighting to the last, the officers and men of the destroyer gave a good account of themselves before she sank. The German vessel was badly damaged by a torpedo. contact, and that months might elapse without an engagement. Even when they do meet, it does not follow that there is continuity of fighting, such as may be observed in the cla.<h of armies on lantl. It was, as Sir David Beatly tells us, a fine 140 Tin-: TiMi:s history uf the war. afternoon, with a li^lit wind irom the soiith- ea^t, the sea calm, and tlie visibiUty — that is to say, the range of \ision- — fairly good. At abont -2.30 the satelhtos of the two bo(he.s sighted one another. Seine Dutch fishennen wlio were present des^cribed this first meeting of the hght cruisers wliieh were tlirown out before the battle-cruiser squadrons. Now it was that there occurred one of those incidents which illustrate the change in (he conduct of sea fighting. Whether the niast(>r (J. 8. Trev.in, ns obserxer, quickly recon- noitred to the east -north-east : Ow iiiji to floiid.s it was neccs-sary to fly very low, uiiil in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the sea- pliuie had to fly at a height of 900 ft. within .5,000 yards of thorn, the iiijht cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would hour The information obtained in tliis way indicated the value of such observations. It may be remarked, however, that in clear weather, and under favourable conditions, observatiorLS might })e made from Zeppelins for far greater dis- VIGE-ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES MADDEN, K.G.B., C.V.O., Chief of Staff. Germans were accompanied by Zeppelin scouts remains imcertain. It was suggested that they might have been present, because of the reference in the official German version of the battle to observations which were indubitably reliable, and because the Danish fishermen reported that they saw two airships near the coast of Demnark. But the British certainly made use of an air scout, for on a report from the Galatea, Coimnodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, who wdth the First Light Cruiser Squadron was scouting to the east- w-ard, Sir Davdd Beattj^ ordered a seaplane to be sent up from the Engadine, Lieut. -Com. C. G. Robinson, and tliis macliine, with Flight- Lieut. F. J. Rutland as pilot, and Asst.-Pay- [Rtissell. COMMODORE LIONEL HALSEY, C.M.G., "Iron Duke," Captain of the Fleet. tances. It has been calculated that the radiu? of vision of observers in these airshijis at 10,000 feet is about 90 miles. As the distance by wliich the battle-cnu'ser squadrons on either side were separated from their main bodies could not have been more than 40 or 50 miles at the most, a Zeppelin at the above-named height should have been able, on a clear after- noon, to have seen both the approaching battle squadrons. There was nothing, however, to indicate that tliis knowledge was available to either fleet. The admirals commanding the battle -cruiser squadrons became aware of the proximity and of the strength of one another at about the same time. Their proceedings illustrated one THE TIMES HISTOnV OF THE WAR. 1 II THE GERMAN LIGHT Officially admitted to have of the functions such vessels are built to per- form. The purpose of the battle-cruiser was twofold. It was to be a commerce protector, its speed and weight of armament enabling it to catch and overwhelm sea wolves preying on the trade, as was shown by ^^ice -Admiral Sturdee's victory at the action off the Falkland Islands. Its other purpose was to push home B, reconnaissance — to sweep away the protecting screen scouting for the enemy, and again by its speed and power to get near enough to find out the composition of the approaching foe. In this instance, Vice -Admiral Hipper, discovering his force to be inferior to that of his opponent, promptly tiu*ned to retire on his main body. Sir David Beatty, not yet aware whether there was any main body behind Hipper, altered covu-se and proceeded at full speed in a direction which would enable him to make the discovery or to cut off the enemy cruisers from their base. There was, therefore, no question of luiduo risk. Sir CRUISER "ROSTOCK." been sunk in the battle. David Beatty, with superior force, was carry- ing out the primary purpose for which his \essels had been created. It is true that while he was steaming away from his main forces, Hipper was steaming towards his friends ; but it should be noted that although the distance in the latter case was decreasing at the rate of the combined speeds of the squadrons, the distance between Sir David and the British battle fleet was only increasing by the difference in the speeds of the two bodies. The first stage of the battle, then, took on a similar form to that of the action off the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915. Hipper's five battle-cruisers were flying back to the south-east, from which direction von Scheer was advancing, while the six heavier and more powerful British vessels were in chase. The latter, moreover, were supported by the four ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron imder Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, be- tween five and six miles to the north-westward. THE GERMAN PRE-DREADNOUGHT BATTLESHIP "POMMERN." Officially admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo on the night of May 31. 14-2 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Summing up tlu- position at this stage. Sir David Beatty said : " The visibility at this time was good, tlie sun behind us and the «ind south-east. Being between the eneiny and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good." At 3.48 p.m. the ojiposed forces had closed to a range of about 18,000 yards, and the action began. Both sides opened fire liraotically simultaneously, steaming on parallel lines. It was a little later that there occiu-red one of those catastrophic strokes of fortune which have been made possible by the tremendous power locked up in the niodern engines of battle. The ships on both sides were vigorously engaged, when suddenly a heavy explosion was caused in the last ship of the British line, the Indefatigable. A black column of smoke 400 feet high shot upwards, said the German account, hiding the ship, and when it cleared away a little later the cruiser had disappeared. Out of her .ship's company of about 900 officers and men, only two are believed to have sur- vived. The fighting, we are told, was of a very fierce and resolute character, and as the good marksmanship of the British vessels began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciated. The Fifth Battle Squadron, too, liad come into action, and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards upon the enemy's rear ships. At 4.18 the third ship in the enemy's line was seen to be on fire, but soon afterwards another tragic misfortune befell the British squadron. The magnificent battle-cruiser Queen Mary was vitally hit, and with a terrific explosion, which appeared to blow her hull asunder, also- disappeared. The loss of life in her case was terrible also, for she had at least 1,000 people in her, and only about a score were saved. In modern warfare seamen have to face perils unknown to their predecessors, for in the old wars ships were more often captm-ed than sunk. Now the sacrifice is demanded with awful suddenness, and in a moment the whole of a ship's company may be added to the list of those brave men who have died at their post of duty. It was in this run to the southward that the German gunners displayed their best qualities. The manner in which they concentrated the fire of several ships and bunched their salvoes on an object was remarkable. With regard to the loss of Beatty's two cruisers, an officer of one of the larger vessels gave in the Da 11// Mail what appeared to be a possible explana- tion. He said : 'I'hey were purely ehaiice shots which hrou(;ht about tlioir destruction. The armour would have withstood any amount of shell-fire. Under the deadly hail from the British ships, however, the quality of the German gunnery fell off, and their fire became far less effective, whereas the result of that from Beatty's ships became more marked every nnoment. For an hour all but six minutes the engagement continued to the southward, when the enemy's battle fleet, in three divisions, was sighted by the Southampton, Commodore W. E. Good- enough, and reported to the Vice-Admiral. Thereupon Sir David Beatty, having attained one purpose, proceeded to carry out another. He had driven in, by superior force, the enemy's advance guard, and had discovered the compo- sition and direction of their main force. At the same time, he had prevented the enemy's scouts from approaching his owm main body in order to obtain similar information. This was not falling into a trap, but, if trap there was, he now set it. Tm-ning his squadron round — the ships altering course in succession to starboard — he proceeded northwards to lead the enemy towards his own battle fleet. The Fifth Battle Squadron, following in his wake, but more to the southward, came into action with the van of the enemy's battle fleet, which Admiral Hipper, who had also turned, was now leading on a parallel course to the British squadron's. Possibly the Germans assiuned that Beatty and Thomas were unsupported, and that the odds now in his favour offered von Scheer the opportunity for which he had been looking. If so, he was to be disillusioned. Thus ended the first stage of the contest. With the second stage there came about a change in the conditions of light and visibility. The British ships were silhouetted against a clear horizon to -the westward, with the setting sun behind them, while the enemy, obscured in an increasing veil of mist, presented very indis- tinct outlines. It says a good deal for British moral and marksmanship that, despite these disadvantages, during the northward run " the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition." Other of the ships also showed signs of increasing injury. • Beatty's battle-cruisers had been reduced to four, and at an interval behind them were the four fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 143 THE END OF THE DESTROYER "SHARK." After being engaged about ten minutes, the British destroyer was struck by two torpedoes, which sank her almost at once. But before she settled down the "Shark" fired her last available torpedo. The portrait is of Loftus W. Jones, Commander of the "Shark," who was killed in action. II ////, i!.\ii:s iiisTonv OF nil-: win. tyjjo, tlio latter l)£'in« onf^iVKed not only with Hi|>|)»«r's font" l>ut with that of vf)n Schcer as woll. The nuifit' hctwecn the two liiu's was still about 14,000 yanls. An onicer in Admiral Evan-Thomas's squadron wrote : W'v MtTc ut thi-i time receiviiig a very heavy firo iii<le«l, Diir ciwii liattlo-c-i iii^ors liuviii^ bocoine dis- engrt^'eJ for twenty ininute.s to half an liour, so that tlie fire of till' whole (Jorinan Fleet was concentrated on us. K.sjjeeially unpleasant was a period of half an hour, during which we were unable to see the enemy , while they could see us clearly. Thus we were unable to firo a shot, and had to rest content with steaming through a tornado of shell-fire without loosing off a gun. which was somewhat trying. It should be borne in mind, however, that at this time Boatty was getting into a position to hustle the Germans over to the eastward, and towards the Danish shore, w hile help was coming to the sorely tried Britisli force at the rate of the combined speeds of the British battle fleet and the contending forces moving to the northward. That no serious loss occurred on the British side during this, the most critical, phase of the battle, testified alike to tlie splendid handling of the ships and the excellence of the material and workmani-hip put into their eon.struction. The third stage of the engagement w as intro- duced by the arrival of the British battle fleet. Its proximity had already been notified to Sir David Beatty, the speed of whose ships had enabled hhn to draw considerably ahead of the (ierman line, giving him the advantage of' position, and he now turned to the north- eastward, crossing, as it were, ahead of them, and, as he says, crumpling up their leading ships. He notes that only three of their battle- cruisers were at this time in sight, closely followed by battleships of the Kiinig class. They were already turning to the eastward, partly because of Beatty's action, but possibly also because they had realized wliat they were in for. It has been suggested that it was now that von Scheer ordered the pre-Dreadnought sliips to make the best of their way lujme. Anj'May, none of them appears to have taken a part in the sub.sequent dayligiit fighting, as should otherwise have been the case had they retained their position as the rear division of the German line. When, at 5.56, the flagships of the British battle squadrons were seen bearing north, distant five miles, Beatty altered course to the east, bringing the range down to 12,000 yards, and proceeded at his utmost speed. The object of this movement was to give room for Sir John Jellicoe's force to deploy — that is, to open out and extend his divisions from column into lire so as to come into action astern of the battle- cruisers. The second purpose of Admiral Beatty had been attained. As the Commander- in-Chief, in a deservedly eulogistic passage in his dispatch, said : The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed o^ving to the southerly course steered by our advanced force during the first hour after commencing their action with the enemy battle-cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our battle-cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact. The Battle-Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, and admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan- Thomas, fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner GERMAN WAR VESSELS OUTSIDE KIEL HARBOUR. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. 145 AFTER THE BATTLE. Shell-holes in the side of a British warship. The shell-hole on the left is stopped up with bedding. that was in keeping witli the best traditions of the Service. Before describing the way in wliich tho German High Sea Fleet was brought to acticn by the British battle squadrons, it will make the narrative more clear if the subsequent movc^ ments of the force under Sir David Beatty are first dealt with. Continuing his course to the eastward, at 6.20 the Third Battle-Crviiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. L. A. Hood, which had been ordered to reinforce liim, appeared ahead, steaming soutli towards the enemy's van. Sir David reports : I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out magnificently, Rear-Ad;;iiral Hood brinuinu his squadron into action in a most inspiriiip^ mannfr, worthy of his great naval ancestors. It was at tliis stage of the battle that, as the Germans themselves admitted, the increasing mist, particularly in the north and north-cast, made itself most unpleasantly felt. Hood, advancing at great speed, to carry out the operation described by Sir David Beatty, swung across in front of the battle-cruisers, and in the mist ran on to within 8,000 yards of the German line. What followed is thu.s described by a spectator : The Invincible, which had sunk a German lij;ht cruiser at 5.4.5 ji.m., after an action la.sting five minutes tackled a vessel of the DerfHinger class. The German ship was hit by the first salvo, and was petting several knocks to every one she got home on the Invincible, when the shell came that sank the Invincible. There were only six survivors, and when they came up they witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of both the bow and stern of their sl.ip standing vertically 50 ft. out of the water. lu; THH TIMKS HISTORY OF Till': WAR. An soon as Sir David Heatt y realiztul what w as happening ho alteroil course in support of tic TliinI Battle-Cruisor Squadron, and directed its two remaining vessels to take station astern of his squailron and to prolong the line. This m jis the first ooeasion on which any of the battl«>- cruisers engaged at less than 12,000 yards, and Beatty was aft'ording succour to his consorts of Adniiral Hood's division. The Invincible was simk, as the Indefatigable and Queen Mary had been, in action with other battle-cruisers, and there is no evidence in the dispatches that up to this raonient our battle-cruisers had been in action with battlesliips. Any suggestions, therefore, that undue risks were taken in regard to range, or by the engagement of battleships by battle-cruisers, are unsupported by the facts. Nor does the action necessarily show that battle -cruisers cannot fight battleships. Later on, when the Geiman battlesliips were engaged by vessels of other types, they were admittedly showing signs of demoraliza- tion, wliich had all the disturbing efiect of defeat. The visibility at 6.50 was not more than four iiiles, and soon after the enemy's ships were temporarily lost sight of. Sir David continued his course to the eastward until 7 o'clock, when he gradually altered course to the south and west in order to regain touch with the enemy. Twice more he was in action, and now with battleships as well as battle-cruisers, at ranges of 15,000 and 10,000 yards respectively. Both times his gunners got home on these retreating vessels. On the last occasion the leading ship, after being repeatedly hit by the Lion, turned away eight points, emitting high flames, and with a heavy list to port. The Princess Royal set fire to a tliree-funnelled battleship, and the New Zealand and Indomitable reported that the third ship hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. Then the mist came down again and enveloped them, and the battle- cruisers' part in the engagement ceased. If any vindication of the tactical ability of the Vice- Admiral Commanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, or the brilliant manner in which he carried out the duties entrusted to him, was required, it may surely be found in the appreciation and approval of his work and talents by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe : Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He appreciated the situations at once on sighting first the enemy's lighter forces, then his battle-cruisers, and finally his battle fleet. I can fully sympathize witii Iiim feulingx when the evening mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that compkno victory for which he had manoeuvred, and for which tl»e vessels in company with him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greato.«t value. There remains to des-cribe the concluding phase of the daylight engagement — that between the battle squadrons. It was, however, a very one-sided affair, because as soon as von Scheer recognized what he was up against he turned to the .southward, and, imder cover of the declining daylight, the thickening mist, and smoke-clouds from his small craft, with- drew from the fight. Before he could got away, however, the three squadrons of the Battle Fleet formed in a single line were hurled across his van, and vmder a paralysing fire from the British 13'5-in. guns the German formation was shattered and the ships them- selves very severely mauled. It was the supreme moment, leading to the climax of the whole battle, when Sir John Jellicoe brought his magnificent Dreadnoughts at their top speed into the melee. The situation called for the highest tactical skill, cahn judgment, and instant and vinerring decision on the part of the Commander-in-Chief. His own account of this important phase is singularly brief and modest. " I formed the Battle Fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir David Beatty'a report, and dtiring deployment the fleets became engaged." Pictvire the circumstances. . Flashes of guns were visible through the haze, but no ship cotild be clearly di.stinguished. Even the position of the enemy's battleships could not always be determined. So thick was it, in fact, that great care was essential to prevent the British ships being mistaken for enemy vessels. The conditions were cer- tainly unparalleled. Yet, without a moment's hesitation, Sir John Jellicoe, with cool courage, delivered a vigorous and decisive thrust which threw the enemy into confusion ar.d completed their discomfiture. After this, all their tactics were of a nature to avoid further action. How they extricated themselves was not made clear. The fighting between the big ships lasted inter- mittently for two hoiu"s more. It developed into a chase. " During the somewhat brief periods," says Sir John, " in which the ships of the High Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle -cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy's vessels were seen to be constantly hit. REAR-ADMIRAL ARTHUR C. LEVESON. C.B.. Second in-Commaad, Second Battle Squadron. REAR-ADMIRAL ERNEST F. A GAUNT. C.M.G.. Second-in-Command, Fourth Battle Squadron. VICE-ADMIRAL SIR THOMAS JERRAM. K.C.B.. Commanded the Second Battle Squadron. 1 ■ ■ 1 ^H ^11^ HI 1 " 1 1 9 1 " REAR-ADMIRAL ALEXANDER L. DUFF. G.B. Second-ia-Command, First Battle Squadron. Photos by Russell. Elliott & Fry, Lafayette, L'Estrange. 147 REAR-ADMIRAL HUGH EVAN THOMAS. M.V.O., Commanded the Fifth Battle-Squadron. 148 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Houw bfing obliged ti) liuul out of the line, and at least one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this period was not effective, and the damage eaused to our ships was insignificant. " The story would not be complete without some accoimt of the operations of the light - cruiser squadrons iiud destroyer flotillas. It was hero tha't the changes in the conduct of sea fighting since the last time the British Navy was engaged in a fleet action were most clearly marked. In the old wars, over a hundred years ago, ships of the line of battle, unless incensed by some openly offensive act, scorned to throw away ammunition on a frigate or a slooj), and these vessels were left to fight duels with others of their own class. This has been entirely altered by the introduction of the torpedo, and now the smallest boat thus armed may become a formidable antagonist to the biggest Dreadnought. The light craft, therefore, which enter the field of a fleet action nuist expect a hostile reception if they come within range of any enemy ship. The lighter craft, however, whether cruisers or destroyers, cooperated with their heavier comrades of the line, and engaged with intrepidity and daring. The skilful way in which every type of vessel was used to assist the others bears witness to the development of fleet organization in accordance with modern demands. Sir David Beatty testified to the value of the light cruisers. " They very effectively protected the head of our line from torpedo attack by light cruisers or destroyers, and were prompt in helping to regain touch when the enemy's line was temporarily lost sight of." No higher praise could be given to the destroyer flotillas than that of Sir John Jellicoe. " They sur- passed the very highest expectations that I had formed of them." Although with grim determination rind resolute bravery the small craft threw them- selves into the fight, no light cruiser was lost, and only eight destroyers were sunk. It may be described as a conflict between egg-shells and sledge-hammers, but the egg-shells did not often get the w-orst of it. Very many ships were reported to have been seriously damaged by our torpedo attacks. Three times the light cruiser squadrons, carrying no heavier gun than a 6-in., and relying for protection on their own rapidity of fire and movement, attacked armoured ships. The dispatches contain many instances of individual heroism and devotion to duty on the part of those in the destroyers. and these are only typical of many brilliant feats which, under the conditions of the battle, were imseen and imrecorded ofTicially. Then there is the tragic; e[)isode of the destruction of Sir Robert Arljuthnot's .squadron. At 6.16 the Defence and Warrior of this squadron, which had gone into action ahead of the British Battle Fleet, were observed passing down between the engaged lines under a very heavy fire. The Defence, flying Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot's flag, disappeared, and the Warrior passed to the rear disabled. They had only a short time before been observed in action with an enemy light cruiser, which was sub- sequently seen to sink. Says Sir John Jellicoe : It is probable that Sir Robert Arbiithnot, durinj; his engagement with the enemy's light cruisers and in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were caught imder a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when the Black Prince, of the same squadron, was sunk, but a wireless signal was received from her between eight and nine p.m. The ships' companies of both the Defence and Black Prince were lost, but that of the Warrior, as mentioned elsewhere, was saved by the Engadine. The dispositions of the Commander-in-Chief after nightfall recalled the methods of Togo when he lost sight of the remnants of Rozh- destvensky's fleet after Tsushima. Realizing that Admiral Niebogatoff would make for Vladivostok, Togo headed in the same direction, and, as is known, found him the next morning and accepted his siurender. Sir John Jellicoe mancBuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing his destroyers in a position where they would afford protection to the larger ships and also be favourably situated for attacking those of the enemy. As it turned out, while a heavy toll of the German vessels was taken, not a single ship was touched in the British line. The Fom-th, Eleventh and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore J. R. P, Hawksley and Captains C. J. Wintour and A. J. B. Stirling, are mentioned by Sir John Jellicoe as having " delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy losses." The Twelfth Flotilla attacked a squadron consisting of six large vessels, including some of the Kaiser class, which was entirely taken by surprise. " A large number of torpedoes was fired, including THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 149 some at the second and third ships in the line ; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up." Jellicoe, however, was not to experience the good fortune of Togo, for under cover of the darkness of the night, and the thickness of the weather, \'ico-Adiniral Scheer, with his battered ships, wtis able to escape. It was not until the following day, after the whole of the large area co\ered by the fight had been thoroughly searched, without a trace of the enemy being seen, that the British Commander- in-Chief returned to his bases to refuel and refill his magazines. As was officially stated, he was ready again within a very few hours to put to sea. interviews with a large number of these ofCcors. Sir John Jellicoe compiled a list of the Gennan lo.sses, to wliich reference will be made later. With the British losses, of coiu>?e, there wa.s no imcertainty whatever, for at the earliest opportunity the Admiralty published th<m in full, in contrast to the policy of the (iciman Navy Office, which aimed at concealment an far as possible, only revealing the destruction of those sliips whose loss for various reason.s had already become known to a number of people. Of the three battle-cruisers and three ar- moured cruisers sunk on the British side, the Indefatigable, Captain C. F. Sowerby, was the first to be destroyed, followed about twenty REAR-ADMIRAL T. D. W. NAPIER, M.V.O., Comin-inded the Third Light-Cruiser Squadron. The circumstances of the weather which obtained on the afternoon of ^lay 31, and the approach of night soon after the main battle was joined, made it difficult to obtain exact information as to the losses inflicted on the enemy. As Sir John Jellicoe says, owing prin- cipally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle line. " The conditions of low visibility," he wrote in his dispatch, " under which the diiy action took place and the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the dama:^e inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces." After a most careful examination of the evidence of all officers who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal [Russell. REAR-ADMIRAL HERBERT L. HEATH, M.V.O., Commanded the Second Cruiser Squadron. minutes later by the Queen Marj-, Captain C. I. Prowse. It was at a later stage that the third battle-cruiser, the Invincible, Captain A. L. Cay, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. L. A. Hood, and the armoured cruisers Defence, Captain S. V. Ellis, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Black Prince, Captain T. P. Bonham, and Warrior, Captain V. B. Molteno, were sunk or disabled. Sir John Jellicoe records at the end of his dispatch how "the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet (the imits of wliich were less heavily armoured than their opponents), the Fifth Battle Squadron, the First Cruiser Squadron, Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, and the Flotillas." Of these forces 160 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 151 the Battle-Cruiser Fleet under Sir David Beatty, and First Cruiser Squadron under Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot, each lost three units, as has been shown, but the Fifth Battle Squadron, com- manded by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, and Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron (Commo- dore C. E. Le Mesurier), escaped without loss, no battleships or light cruisers being sunk at all on the British side. The destroyers sunk were eight in number — the Tipperary, Ardent, Fortune, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Nestor, Nomad, and Tm-bulent. In the first-named vessel, Captain C. J. Wintour, commanding the Fourth Flotilla, which, said Sir John Jellicoe, he had brought to a high pitch of perfection, lost his life. The foregoing was the complete toll paid by the British Fleet in driving back the Germans into their ports. It was added to by the enemy, sometimes liberally, with the intention of supporting their claixa to a " victory," but the Admiralty on more than one occasion definitely denied these new claims from Berlin. One of the most persistent of the latter related to the battleship Warspite, Captain E. M. Pliill- potts, which was declared to have been simk. In spite of the fact that the Admiralty issued a notice on June 4 saying : " This is untrue, that ship having retiurned to harbour," the allega- tion was repeated in an official communique from the German Fleet Command on the Gth, and again in the long official account published on June 8. On June 10, however, the Admiralty granted permission to a representative of the Associated Press of America to see Captain Phillpotts, who was full of praise for the conduct of his men in the battle and what he termed the amazing powers of resistance of his ship. He said : I am not surprised that there have been reports that the AVarspite was sunk, as from our position, between our Fleet and the German battleships, our escape from such a fate was simply miraculous. Several times we disappeared from sight in the smoke and spray. The Captain went on to explain that after two hours of action, in much of which the Fifth Battle Squadron, to which the Warspite belonged, engaged the whole German Battle Fleet in an effort to protect the British battle- cruisers until Admiral Jellicoe came up, the steering gear of the Warspite went wrong, and she rap amuck among the enemy. Some six German battleships concentrated their fire on her, but iinder a worse pounding than the Lion received in the Dogger Bank fight she remained in action without a single vital injury. An officer in another ship, describing the incident in a letter published in the newspajiers, said : It was at this etap;e that, owing to some temporary deffct, the Warsjiito's hi-lm jammed, and slio went stniipht at the onomy into a hell of fire. She looked a most wonderful sight, every gun firing for all it wa« worth in reply. Luckily, she got under control quickly, and returned to the line, and it was tliis incident which pave rise to the German legend that she had been sunk, Sir John Jellicoe conmiended the Warspite's captain for lus conduct at this trying moment. " Clever handling," said the Commander-in- Chief, "enabled Captain Edward M. Pliiiipotts to extricate his ship from a somew hat a<\ kw artl situation." There was a rather amusing touch at the conclusion of the incident, for the captain told his interviewer that when the defect had been quickly repaired the Warsjnte wanted to return. But lier previous movements had been so erratic that Captain Phillpotts and his crew found that they were not popular ! Sufficient battleships were present by this time to fill the line, and the possibility of the vessel's running amuck among her own friends was not wel- comed. So she steamed home. Other ships in the British Fleet suffered the same fate as the Warspite of being sunk on paper. In the official German accounts the battle-cruiser Princess Royal, the battleship -Marlborough, the light cruiser Birmingham, and the destroyer Acasta were all consigned to their destruction in this manner, obliging the issue and repetition of a denial by the Admiralty. The cruiser Euryalus was also said to lia\e been set on fire and completely bvirnt out, but, as the Admiralty stated, she was not even present in the battle. In the case of the Marlborough, Captain G. P. Ross, which flew the flag of Vice- Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding the First Battle Squadron ( Second -in-Command of the Grand Fleet), there was some justification. At 6.54 p.m., after having been engaged with a battlesliip of the Kaiser class, and with a cruiser, and later still another battleship, this vessel was hit by a torpedo, and took up a consideraV)le list to starboard. In spite of this misfortune, as the official dispatch states : She reopened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser, and at 7.12 p.m. fired foiuteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the Konig class, hitting her frequently vintil she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the toi-pedo was most creditable to the ship, and a very fine example to the squadron. An eye-witness also said that the sight of the gunlayers in the Marlborovigh calmly and coolly serving their weapons while the vessel was 152 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. dainiped and in pos.sihle dnnger of sinking \vu.s a nio.st inspiring one. It is significant that the Marlborough continued to perform her duties as flagship of the squadron imtil 2.30 a.m. next morning. Then, as she had some diffi- culty in keeping up the speed of tlie squadron, Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag to the Revenge, and the Marlborough was detached by the direction of Admiral Jellicoe to a base, driving off a submarine en route. Unlike the British losses in the battle, which were known in full all over the world within a few hoLU"S of the end of the engagement, tho.se of the German Fleet were only revealed in easy stages. In the first German report, circidated by wireless on June 1, they were alleged to include only three ships and " some torpedo boats." The communique said : On our side the small cruiser Wiesbaden was sunk by hostile artillery fire during the day engagements, and the Pommern during the night by a torpedo. The fate of the Frauenlob, which is missing, and of some torpedo boats which have not j'et returned, is unknown. In the second German official message, issued on June 3, the loss of the small cruiser Elbing (Captain IVIadlung) was added to the list. She was said to have been blown up by her own crew after being heavily damaged by collision with another German war vessel, which made it impossible to take her back to port. The crew were rescued by torpedo boats, with the exception of the commander, two officers and 18 men, who remained on board in order to blow up the vessel, and who were brought to Ymuiden in a tug and landed there. Without a doubt, it was the presence of these survivors in Holland, reported in the Press, which induced the German Admiralty Staff to admit the destruction of the Elbing. According to some accounts, it was the Warrior which put the Elbing out of action. In a semi-official statement issued on the same day, the loss of the Frauenlob was accepted as a certainty, and the ship was said to liave been sunk apparently during the night of May 31 in an individual action. The loss of five " large torpedo boats " wa.s also admitted. On Simday, June 4, a Berlin telegram, which attained added significance in the light of later events, was dispatched. " Contrary to the British Admiralty report," it said, "it is stated that no German naval vmits were lost other than those mentioned in the official German com,m,uniquey During the next week, however, on Wednesday, June 7, there was issued from the Marine-Amt a long account of the battle, and in it occurred the following passage : The total losses of the German High Sea forces during the battle of May 31 and June 1, and subsequently, are : One battle-cruiser. One ship of the line of older construction. Four small cruisers. Five torpedo boats. Of these losses, the Pommern, launched in 1905, the Wiesbaden, the Elbing, the Frauenlob, and five torpedo boats have already been reported sunk in official state- ments. For military reasons we refrained till now from making public the loss of the vessels Liitzow and Rostock. In view of the wrong interpretation of this measure, and moreover in order to frustrate English legends about gigantic losses on our side, these reasonii must now be dropped. Both vessels were lost on their way to harbour after attempts had failed to keep the heavily-damaged vessels afloat. The crews of both ships, including all severely wounded, are in safety. This was as far as the Germans went in regard to the admission of losses. In an enclosure to his dispatch, Sir John Jellicoe compiled a " list of enemy vessels put out of action," in regard to which he expressed the opinion that it gave the minimum in regard to numbers, although it was possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels simk, added Sir John, it was unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack. In this connexion it has to be remembered that as the Germans fought nearer home than the British they had by far the greater chance of getting their damaged ships safe into port. They were only about 100 miles from the shelter of the Heligoland forts, and probably less from the minefields in the neighbourhood of the Bight, when the battle finished, whereass Sir John Jellicoe's bases were 400 miles away. The Warrior, after being disabled during the action, was towed by the Engadine for 75 miles from 8.40 p.m. on May 31, all through the night, imtil 7.15 a.m. next morning, when she foundered. Had the conditions in this respect been equal, the British losses might have been less, or the Germans much higher, according to the position in which the battle was fought. It is fitting to note here, in passing, the tribute paid by Admiral JeUicoe to the artisan ratings in his Fleet. They " carried out much valuable work dm-ing and after the action," he said; " they could not have done better." Doubt- less the hard and conscientious work of these men contributed largely to the speed with which the Fleet was made ready for sea again within a few hours. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 153 Heath. COMMODORE CHARLES E. LE MESURIER, Commanded the Fourth Li^ht-Cruiser Squadron. There were several ships in the German Fleet which were seen to have received severe punishment, making the chance of their getting back home a small one. As regards the battle-cruiser squadron a Dutch report stated that the Derffhnger sank whilst being towed to Wilhelmshaven, and there was like- wise a doubt as to whether the Seydlitz, the stern of which vessel was stated to have been blown off, got into port. A large number of relatives of her crew, residing in Schleswig, were notified of casualties, although this was not in itself conclusive evidence that she had been destroyed. When the Liitzow was put out of action Admiral Hipper transferred his [HaCX>n. SIR ROBERT ARKUTHNOT, BT., M.V.O., Commanded the First Cruiser Squadron. flag to the Moltke, which seems to have suffered the least of the battle-cruisers. Of other cruisers present on the German side, the Roon, an armoured vessel of an earlier class than the two sunk off the Falklands, was believed to have been sunk. A midsliipman in the Marlborough wrote to liis parents : I believe we torpedoed a cruiser wliich has not yet been claimed. We think it was the Roon. sister-ship to the Yorck. We absolutely did for her with gvin-fire before we fired the torpedo. We could see rijiht into her hull. She was a mass of flames inside and had lost a funnel. In the same way, so many British sliips claimed to have disjiosed of light cruisers that the four in the German list must have )>een COMMOEfORE E. S. ALEXANDER- SINCLAIR, M.V.O., A.D.C., Commanded the First Light-Cruiser Squadron. [Russell. COMMODORE WILLIAM E. GOODENOUGH, Commanded the Second Light-Cruiser Squadron. l.-.t THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Russell. COMMANDER E. B. S. BINGHAM. Commanded the destroyer " Nestor." an under-statement of losses in this class. The municipality of Frankfort opened a fund for the relief of relatives of the crew of the light cruiser named after the city. Then as regards their battle fleet, the Ger- mans only admitted the loss of one unit, the Pommern. Captain Bolcke, commanding this vessel, was among those who went down in her. The British official estimate, however, claimed four battleships, three of which were seen to sink. One of these may have been the Ost- friesland, which Dutch accoimts stated had been sunk. Her sister-ship, the Thiiringen, may have suffered a like fate, and sailors' caps bearing the name of this vessel were found at sea by an Ymuiden trawler. By way, doubtless, of contradicting the report of the loss of the Thiiringen, an article appeared in the Kreuz Zedung at the end of June, purjDorting to be written by an officer of the sliip, in which it was said that she was not touched. Three weeks earlier, on June 10, the German Admir- alty had allowed the publication of an account of the battle alleged to have come from a mid- shipman of the Ostfriesland, which was given a rather suspicious prominence in the German papers, and in which occurred the sentence : " The Ostfriesland did not receive a ningle hit." In their revelation of the fine spirit shown by the officers and men of the Royal Navy, the details and incidents of the battle were most inspiring. The confidence wliich the whole Fleet had in its commanders. Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty, had never been excelled at any period in our naval history. Of the Commander-in-Chief, the Archbishop of York had \vritten : I left the Grand Fleet sharing to the full the admira- tion, affection, and confidence which every officer and man within it feels for its Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Jellicoe. Here assuredly Ls the right man in the right place at the right time. His officers give hira the most absolute trust and loyalty. When I spoke of him to his men I always felt that quick response which, to a speaker,- is the sure sign that he has reached and touched the hearts of his hearers. The Commander-in- Chief — quiet, modest, courteous, alert, resolute, holding in firm control every part of his great fighting engine — has under his command not only the ships, but the heart of his Fleet. As for the officers and their relations with one another, the Archbishop said he never heard one word of criticism, never felt the slightest breath of jealousy. In manner, in word, in spirit they justified the boast of one of the Vice- Admirals : " We axe all a great band of brothers." As for Sir David Beatty, every incident in his career, and they had been both many and glorioTos, had pointed him out as one of the men to command the fleets of England if ever she was engaged in a great naval war. The affair in the Heligoland Bight, the action off the Dogger Bank, and other episodes had inspired feelings which were amply confirmied by the great action off the Jutland coast. What liis men thought of him was well typified in the answer of a sailor who was asked, just after the battle, if the seamen had full confidence in their leader. " Confidence in David ? " he replied ; " why, we would all go to Hell for David." This implicit trust in the officers in conunand was reciprocated to the full. Sir Jolin Jellicoe says in his dispatch : The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld — whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers — the same admirable spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a oheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded wets the admiration of all. I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 155 THE DESTROYER "SPITFIRE" (Lieutenant-Commander C. W. E. Trelawny) torpedoing a German warship ^Moreover, the one thought in all ranks after the contest was that it might be renewed and completed on a future occasion. Sir David Beatt}', in a message to Admiral of the Fleet the Hon. Sir Hedworth Meux, said : " We drew the enemy into the jaws of our Fleet. I have no regrets, except for the gallant comrades, all pals, that have gone, who died gloriously. It would have warmed yovu* heart to see the gallant Hood bring Ills squadron into action, ^^'e are 150 THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 't! DeaTHOTER £L-«rw * "*$ * TYPES OF GERMAN WARSHIPS ready for the next time. Please God it will come soon." The officers' tributes to the con- duct of the men vie with those which the seamen paid to the leading and example of the officers. One officer, a lieutenant-com- mander in a vessel which got into action a little after 5 p.m. on the 31st, said in a letter : " I am very glad the men have had their baptism of fire. They were simply splendid. Everytliing went just as if we had been at target practice. Two young boys in an exposed position were extremely good. I do not think either of them is seventeen yet, but these boys never tui-ned a hair." Sub-Lieutenant G. A. Nunneley, of the Warrior, testified, in a letter quoted in the Yorkshire Post, to the coolness of the men in that ship when she had been disabled. They did not see how they could possibly escape, as the Warrior was on fire amidships and aft, but " the spirit of the men and the heroism displayed were wonderful ; everybody was cheerful and nobody lost his head." This fine display of true discipline had its reward when the whole of the crew, in most difficult circumstances, Were taken off by the seaplane carrier Engadine. It was diu'ing the transhipment, on the morning of June 1, that Lieutenant F. J. Rutland performed the gallant feat for which he received the Albert Medal of the First Class from the Kang. A severely wounded man from the Warrior, owing to the violent motion of the two ships, was accidentally dropped overboard from a stretcher and fell between the vessels, which were working so dangerously that the commanding officer of the Warrior had to forbid two of his officers from jumping overboard to the rescue of the wounded man, as it was considered that this would mean their almost certain death. Before he could be observed, however, Lieutenant Rutland went overboard from the forepart of the Engadine with a bowline, and worked himself aft. He succeeded in putting the bow- line aroimd the wounded man, and in getting him hauled on board, but it was then found that the man was dead, having been crushed between the two ships. Lieutenant Rutland's escape from a similar fate was miraculous. " His bravery," as the official account of his gallant deed stated, " is reported to have been magnificent." He had already distinguished himself at the beginning of the battle by his work as pilot of the seaplane which, as indicated elsewhere, was sent up from the Engadine for scouting purposes. Lieutenant Rutland was one of the few officers in the battle who had been prcmoted from the lower deck. He was among the first group of candidates selected in 1912, in accordance with the new Admiraltv scheme, to qualify for commissions, by courses of training at Greenwich and elsewhere, and by a period of service afloat in the grade of " mate." He THE TIMEfi HISTORY OF THE WAR. 157 GERMAN B ATTLE FLEET DESTROYER SCREEN WHICH TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE. vros appointed to torpedo boat No. 35 when war began, but in Deceinber, 1914, transferred to the Royal Naval Air Service as an acting flight sub-Ueutenant, afterwards being promoted flight-lieutenant. The action of May 31 thus produced, as it were, the first-fruits of the decision, taken when ]\Ir. Churchill was First Lord, to open the commissioned ranks of the Navy more widely to the petty officers and seamsn. In a striking speech when introducing the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons on February 15, 1915, Mr. ChurcliiU, after review- ing the salient features of the first six months of naval war, and the lessons of the victories off the Dogger Bank and the Falklands, said : "It is my duty in this House to speak for the Navy, and the truth is that it is sovmd as a bell all through. I do not care where or how it may be tested ; it will be found good and flt and keen and honest." Demonstration of the correctness of this estimate is to be found in the performances of all ranks and ratings in the Jutland Bank action, wherein the various branches of the Service vied with one another in efficiency. If two may specially be singled out where all did so well, it is the engineering and medical branches. The prelude to action, said Sir John JeUicoe, is the work of the engine- room department, and " diu-ing action the officers and men of that department perform theu- most important' chities without the in- centive which a knowledge of the covu"se of the actions gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review. Several ships attained speeds tliat had never before been reached, thus shoNving very clearly their higli state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and several instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of injured sliips." Most praiseworthy also was the devotion to duty of the surgeons. " The work of the medical officers of the Fleet," Sir John records, " carried out very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing critical operations, and with their staff seriously de- pleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude." The confidence of the men in their officers was indicated in many ways ; and there are numerous letters and incidents which show how real and deep it was. Reference is made by Sir Jolrn JelUcoe to the fact that in tlie On- slaught, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander A. G. Onslow, D.S.C., Sub -Lieutenant H. W. A. ir»8 TilPJ TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Ktiamis, assisted by Mi(lshi|man K. (!. Arnot, K.N.K., who were tho only executive oHioers not (iisabled, broiiglit the ship suoeessfully out of at'tioii and baek to her homo port. A stoker petty officer, in an interview, described bow tlie Onshiiight was swept pretty clean .of everytliinp, and on her way baek could not get into toucli by wireless, because both the ojjerator and signaller had been kilit d. The bridc(> had been JOHN TRAVERS GORNWHLL, Of the " Chester.'' The boy, who was under 16^ years old, although mortally wounded, remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded around him. The gallant lad died from his wounds. carried away by a shell, and therefore the charts were gone, and so w as the compass. He added : I would like to say something of Sub -Lieutenant Kemmis, who took us home. We had a rare time of it, because we had to pick our way as best we could, and there was the sub-lieutenant sticking to the wheel for over forty hours. He refused to be relieved. He kept on saying that the men had quite enough to do to look after themselves, and nobody was to bother about him. We thought a lot of hiin, I can tell you. Natixralljr, in the circumstances, the men in the destroyers had, if anything, an extra share of thrilling and trying experiences. The stubborn and s[)lpndid efjisodo of tho Shark, which went down fighting to the very last, may be cited. She formed one of a small division, led by the Tipperary, which was caught and overwhelmed. With about half of the crew killed or disabled, the Shark continued to maintain the action with only one remaining gun. The captain, Commander L. W. Jones, is said to have had one of his legs shot away, but he continued the fight, and himself helped to serve the gun to the last, when he was swept into the sea as the vessel foundered. Some survivors from the Shark sprang on to a raft, wliere tliey stayed for no less than five hours watching the battle. They kept their blood in circulation by jumping overboard and swimming round the raft, all doing this in turn and being hauled in afterwards by those on the raft. A similar experience was shared by the seamen from some of the larger sliips. Com- mander Dannreuther, one of the six svirvivors of the Invincible, was shot into the sea when the battle-cruiser exploded, and went down 20 feet or 30 feet. Coming up, he found himself near a raft, and clambered on to it. In a few minutes he saw a broad, black, smiling face, covered with grease and soot and oil, appear at the side of the raft. "I'll bet that's Sandford," said Commander Dannreuther to the visitor. " An Irishman would be sure to smile after an experience like this." " You're right," replied Lieutenant C. S. Sandford, as he .limbed on to the raft. Both were picked up half an hoiu* later by a torpedo boat. It was of this handful of Invincible survivors that a midshipman related an incident which he said he should never forget, as it was the pluckiest thing he had ever seen. As the ship he was in steamed ahead into action, he saw four men on a raft, and at first thought they must be Germans. But as the ship passed by, " the four got up on their feet and cheered us like blazes. It was the finest thing I had ever seen." Three other destroyers of the same division as the Shark were the Ardent, Fortune and Sparrowhawk, and Sir John Jellicoe records that when the waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched next morning, some survivors from each of these boats were picked up, and also from their flotilla leader, the Tipperary. The Sparrowhawk had been badly injured in collision, and was no longer sea- worthy, so she was sunk after her crew had been THE TIME^ HISTORY OF THE WAH. 151> "FOR YOUR SPLENDID WORK I THANK YOU " King George V. inspecting some of the seamen who fought in the battle. The King taking the salute during his visit to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, June, 1916. On the King's right is Admiral Beatty. taken off. A petty officer of Xeath, \\ho was in the Fortune, related how 23 men of that destroyer got on to a raft when she was siinlc, 15 minutes after going into action, but onlj- seven of this number survived the terrors of the night. All the officers were lost. One of them clung to the rail until exhausted ; then his hold slipped, and he went down. It was the saddest sight of all, related this petty officer, to see comrades sUpping off when those who remained alive were so nmnbed and cramped that they could give them no help. Yet, in spite of tlieir sufferings, the men were amazingly cheerful; and it was related by another petty officer how a seaman, ^\•ho was the possessor of a good bass voice, helped to keep up the spirits of 26 other men from the Tipperary who were stranded on a raft by singing to them, even though he himself had been Moimded in the leg and had had two of his fingers shot away. These men were afterwards rescued by the disabled Sparrowhawk, and had not been long in her when — insult added to injury !-^a German submarine appeared on the starboard quarter. But the two remaining giuis were quickly brought to bear on her, and she dived 160 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. at once and made off. Besides tlie 27 men saved from this particular raft, there was a suV)- heutenant who was swimming alongside, with one hand clutcliing the ropes lianging around. Hf had been swimming thus for some hoiu-s, having refused to board the raft, as it might have capsized with hi.s additional weight. In the end, he was in better condition than several of the men who were on board, many of whom suffered from the cold and exposure. When on board the Sparrowhawk, much amusement was caused by one survivor who, dressed only in a piece of serge round his loins, was anxiously ch-ying a number of £1 Treasury notes which he had saved, explaining as he did so that he was to be married on his next leave. To his relief, the notes dried out all right, and then he was able to take an interest in his own miracu- lous escape. There was one episode which, more than any other, stirred the popular invagination when the official dispatches were published, and that was the deathless story of Boy Comwell, who remained at his post of duty to the end of the fight, faithful to the last, and then died of his wounds. Sir David Beatty says : A report from the Commanding Officer of the Chester gives a splendid instance of devotion to dvity. Boy (1st class) John Travers Comwell, of the Chester, was mortally wounded early in the action. He nevertheless remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded all round him. His age was under 16 J years. I regret that he has since died, but I recommend his case for special recognition in justice ID his memory, and as an acknowledgment of the high example set by him. The body of the brave lad was at first buried in a common grave, but on July 29, having been exhumed, it was reinterred with full naval honours in a private grave in Manor Park Cemetery, when the Bishop of Barking and Dr. Macnamara, the latter of whom was the bearer of a wreath from the Royal Navy, delivered eloquent tributes to Cornwell's heroism. A nnovement for a national memorial was set on foot, in which the Navy League and Sir John Bethell, M.P., among others, were interested, to endow a ward for disabled sailors in the Star and Garter Home, to provide cottage homes for disabled and invalided sailors and their families, to institute naval scholar- ships for deserving boys, and to erect a suitable monument on the grave. It is unnecessary to emphasize the fact that the spirit which animated little Jack Comwell was displayed in numerous other deeds of coiu-age and valour on May 31, and it would be true to say that what he did so splendidly many others were ready to do if the need had arisen. One case of the kind was that of a commander, who, despite his wounds, con- tinued to issue orders, and remained in charge of the ship till she had finished fighting. When he reached port, this gallant officer, before allowing himself to be removed to hospital, insisted on bein^ taken round his ship to inspect the damage inflicted by the enemy's fire. Rather a touching narrative was told of the chaplain of another vessel, who, sis he lay dying from a shattered spine and leg, prayed for victory for the British Fleet. Another incident among the many glorious and inspiring deeds on this memorable day is that of a very heroic action which affords an opportunity for giving to the gallant Corps of Royal Marines the praise which is its due. An officer of the corps is said, in his last moments when mortally wounded, to have used his remaining breath to issue instructions which prevented a catastrophe and possibly the loss of his ship. For obvious reasons, neither the name of the officer nor of the vessel were publicly disclosed, but at some later date the esteem and honour in which his memory is now held by his comrades and friends within the Service will also be accorded him by all his fellow-country- men. On this note the relation of the Battle of Jutland Bank may be concluded. The loss of life was indeed serious, both to the Navy and the country. Sir John Jellicoe, in his dispatch, pays a tribute to the officers and men whose death was mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. " They fell," he added, " doing their duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire." The sorrow which the Navy felt at the loss in action of so many gallant seamen was fully shared by the nation. CHAPTER CXLI. THE WESTERN FRONT IN MAY AND JUNE, 19 16. Desultory Warfare in .May — Poison Gas and its Uses — Th?: Anzacs in France — Analysis OF THE Fighting — A Third Battle of Ypres — The German Attack — The Canadian Counter- attack BETWEEN Hill 60 and Hooge — The Southern End of the British Line — A Series of Raids Eve of the Great Franco-British Offensive on the Sommk. FHO^I the end of Ai)rii until the begin- ning of the PVanco- British offensive on July 1 the warfare on the Western front partook of the same character as that described in Chapter CXXXV^I. ; that is to saj% the fighting was continuous, but yielded no important results. On May 2 the Genuans delivered one of those assaults in the X'erdun region, west of the Meuse, which had now become routine, and. as usual, without any practical gain : there were also encounters in the Argonne. Thus affairs went on from day to day, until the 8th, when a bombardment of great violence was directed against Avocourt Wood and the region round about it. A German infantry attack, which followed the fire, was brought to a standstill by the French curtain fire and that of their machine-guns. On the 11th, in the Champagne region, the French demolished a Geiman trench for a length of 100 yards near Tahure, otherwise there was comparative calm along the whole front except north-east of Vermelles, where the eneiny seized about .500 yards of tlie British front trenches. Part of the los^ ground was, however, quickly regained by a counter-attack. It was the first endeavour that the Germans had made on this part of the British line since April 26-29. A heavy bombardment during the night of May 12-13, between the river Somme and Vol. IX.— Part 109. KU ^farieourt, was followed by a (i(?rman attack ill tliree columns, of which one only succeeded in penetrating our line, and even this was at once driven out again. In the neighbourhood of I'loegsteert Wood the enemy attacked our lines, and here also he succeeded in penetrating at one point, but was rapidly expelled. At another his troops were met on the parapet by some of the Scots and forced to retire in confusion. This, from the German point of view , highly irregular proceeding on the part of our men <ame as a great surprise to the enemy, who did not tliink that after the severe artillery Hre they w ould be equal to any such resistance. (Jenerally along the line there was considerable artillery activity, but very little else to note. Mining operations were also carried on. An ordinary day at the front was somewhat as follows : What our men called the " morning strafe " (one side might commence it or thc^ other) was followed by the ascent of observation balloons and aeroplanes scouting to ascertain what was going on behind the enemy's front line, taking photographs of his works or disturb- ing his movements. When the enemy's aero- planes were noted in the air the anti-aircraft guns got to work at them. In the middle of the day there was soinetimes a lull for dinners, and later on the fire would begin again. In the course of the night the enemy sometimes attempted to raid our lines, and we did the iid THK TIMES HlSTOJiY OF THE WAli. Slime with liis. Those incursions were made fitliHF for Ww purposf of gaining inform ition or in order to keep the otiier side jvlarnied and inchice the belief that a htrger attack was iniini- ni-nt. There wore always patrols to send out to reconnoitre over " No-Man's Land," and some- times covering parties were piislied on ahead of our trenches to cover the working ])arties, both dangerous duties.* Again, when it was ascertained, or surmised, that there was a con- -iiderablo accumulation of (Jlerman troops opposite a British trench, a heavy artillery fire would be brought to bear to make them keep close xmder cover. Then the gims would suddenly lift their fire, and a bombing party, rushing over the intervening distance of " No- Man's Land," would hurl death and destruction among them. In addition to all this there was the usual repair work to be executed, both on the trenches and on the wire entanglements. When a raid was determined on from eitlier side the artillery set to work to prepare the \\ay, that is to say, it smaslied as much as possible the enemy's entanglements which protected the part selected for attack When the destruction was deemad suflficient, and as the points where raids were made were not far * " Xo-Man'« Land" was the name given to the dividing space between the opposing trenches. distant from the a.ssaulting side's trenchas, the attacking infantry advanced to the assault. The gims then turned their energies to making a ciu-tain fire beliind the selected part to prevent the enemy sending up supports to it'. 'J'ho opponents meanwhile were engaged in much the same manner, endeavouring to stop the assault, or, if they could not do this, in throwing a barrier of their shell -fire behind the attacking party to prevent reinforcements reacliing it. • This procedure caused a considerable loss of men to both sides, as the lists of casualties issued from time to time showed. From our point of view the results obtained were com- mensurate. We wanted detail knowledge of the enemy's works so as to make proper plans for the grand advance which was to be made at the right and proper time. Tliroughout the operations since the Second Battle of Ypres the Germans had made use of all their brutal auxiliary weapons — poison gas, lachrymatory shells and flame jets. When gas had been used at Ypres it came as a surprise and enabled the enemy to gain some success, but it soon becam3 only a pmill factor in warfare, and for all the good it did might have been withdrawn. We were fully armed against it. Every nian carried a helmet which filtered out the noxious gas and enabled him ^^^^^m . % B i - / v. '■ ^j S « tt ' r i B w Z ^■/i:*}4^ iij -,.#*^lj««,*j ^t9f^fS>f^ i£j^"^ ^■^ m mm ^^^^^^^9 ^H ^M -'.if 1 ^1 H ^amm jg^^«^^jj**,«j^^^^^*j3« iM^ 3 H H EFFECT OF A GERMAN HOWITZER SHELL Bursting behind the British lines. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.ilL \m BLOWING UP BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLE- MENTS. Circle picture : British troops stacking wire. to breathe the air, which, passing through the chemicals, was rendered fit for human respira- tion.* One of the latest developments was the introduction of " stink " gas, so called from its disagreeable odour, but not in itself danger- ous. This was sometimes mixed with poison gas. Until this little dodge of the gentle Gennan was understood many accidents occvured to om- men. They were apt to remove their protected helmets on account of the snaell which pene- trated through them and then fell victiins to the poison. The lachrymatory shells, as their name implies, produced a copious flow of tears. To guard against this goggles were introduced * Originally, chlorine was the gas the Germans made use of, but others were subsequently employed. Chlorine produced the long and agonising death that was so common with our men when first they met it. Later it had become possible to treat all but the very bad cases and to nurse them back to health. Some of the later kinds of gases employed were more subtle in their action, and while not instantly incapacitating, had the property of developing acute illness. The gases were kept under pressure in steel cylinders, and let out when the wind was favourable and blew towards the Allied trenches. which in the latest pattern helmets form part of them.* It will be easily conceived that the combina- tion of stink, poison, and tear -provoking gases would be very deadly if proper means had not been introduced to render nugatory their deleterious effects. Occasionally it happened that a change of direction of the wind blew * The material, usually benzyl-bromide, was fired in 5-9 shells from howitzers. Each shell held about six pints of it, and being opened out by a small bursting charge on impact, scattered the liquid about, which slowly vapourised. It had a very irritating effect on the eyes, making them smart severely and producing a flood of tears. < O o a: z t7 OS O z b a. CD Z D C O <: z ^ 1()4 THE TIMES lUSTORY OF THE WAPx. K5 back the poison gas among the Gennans, which may be looked on as a providential arrangement. Against the flame jets the only defence was to avoid them, which w£is not always possible. But fortunately they were very local in their effects, and had also the disadvantage of destroying the wooden revetments of trenches (planks, brushwood, gabions, or hurdles), mul therefore making it difficult for the Germans to occupy them. On the defensive, to stop an attack of the Allies, they proved of soTne utility, but always had the disadxantage of thoroughly rousing the temper of the troops against whom they were employed, with a resulting reluctance f.o take prisoners when the German position was gained. On May 6 the Anzaes. who had arrived at the front but a short time j)reviously, had their first encounter with tlie (Germans. The latter liad sent a reconnoitring party to penetrate our trenches, w^hich gave them the desired opportunity. Nor did they v\ait on the pure defensive. On the contrary, when they saw the Germans approaching, and that they were within a short distance of their trench, they rushed over the parapet bayonet in hand to meet them. A fierce hand-to-hand <;onflict took place, in wliich the Germans were pressed back ; reinforcements were sent up to help them, and the Australians were also strengthened. Once more the two sides came to handy-strokes, and again ovir men, plying bomi) and bayonet, drove back their opponents with substantial losses in killed and wounded. It was a pretty little fight, one in which the Anzaes showed their mettle, and for which they deserved good credit. Thus, witliin a fortnight of their landing in France they had got their liearts' desire, and had showed the Germans what they could do with them. The change from the trying conditions of Gallipoli or the great heat of Egypt was an agreeable one, and they thoroughly appreciated it. The fighting went on continuously in the .\rgonne and Champagne region, and at many little points the French had straightened their line. One of these incidents may here he described. The Germans at the particular point held a position of \antage which was a source of considerable annoyance to the opposing Frencrh trench only soma ten yards distant from it. As a preliminary the French infantry were quietly withdrawn tlnperceived by their opponents. 'J'he retirement was necessary because otherwise the French shells might have struck tlieir own men. Once it wtis jucomi)lished, the French j)roceeded to oxorwholna the (jlermans with a storm of ir» <-m. (6 in.) shells. These heavy l)roje<rtiles [julverized the selected point while a number of 75 cm. field guns cut off access to it . from either side by barrier fire. The operation wjis comj)Ietoly succes.sful, the French infantry advancetl and overpowered the defenders without didiculty, and then .set hard to work to reconstruct the enemy's position and connect it with their own front line. Curious to relate, this was acquiesced in by the Gennans without any attempt to reconquer it. ' On May 14 there was a renewal of activity ngainst the British during the evening and AN IRISH V.C. Private Morrow, 1st Royal Fusiliers. uight between Loos and the Betbune-La Bassee Canal. To the east of the former ])lace the enemy .selected a small secti< n of our trenches for a particularly severe bombardment, and a party of their infant ly s\icceeded in enttn-ing it, but was not able to make good its footing. On our side, the German trenches near the Hohenzollern redoubt were severely bombarded, as were tho.se north and ju.st south of the canal. The enemy sprang a mine 2.i yards from our trenches and seized the crater, but after a short dose of shells from tl.i- Jiritish trench mortars our infantry cajitm-ed it, driving back its garrison. This was about the only infantry fighting. Both sides exploded 109—2 IfJIi THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. BRITISH HEAVY GUN READY FOR ACTION. mines near Hulluch, and oiir artillery fired with success on the enemy's posts opposite Fauquis- sart, and silenced his trench mortars near St. Eloi. While this was going on the German artillery plastered their shells on the Englisli position with a stem disregard of the results of their fire. Thus the ruined villages of Souchez, Ablain, St. Nazaire and Neuville St. Vaast all received a great deal of viseless attention. On the night of May 15, on the Vimy Ridge, the Lancasliire troops, including the Loyal North Lancasliire and the Lancashire Fusiliers, with whom were a company of Royal Engineers and some Welsh Pioneers, who rendered most valuable assistance in the assault, advanced and seized the enemy's forward line over a length of 250 yards, and inflicted considerable loss on the Germans.* The Vimy Heights were important to the Allies, as they domi- nated the ground to the east of them over which we should have to pass in any future advance, t This attack was the first serious offensive movement against the Ridge since the portion of the old French line at this part had been taken over by the British. The enemy here occupied a series of craters, six in number, in two groups of three, separated from each other by an interval of 40 yards. The craters formed * This appears to be a moderate estimate ; some observers rate the length at ."^GO yards. t It will be remembered that at the Battle of Loos the French made a great effort to secure this ground, but failed to do so. a curve convex to the trench held by our troops. Frcm them a powerful fire could be brought to bear on our line, which was dominated, while they also facilitated the observation of our trenches, and it was, therefore, desirable to turn the Germans out of them. For the two previous days the weather had been wet and cloudy, so that the enemy coiild see but little of our preparations. Among these were two series of m'nes, one directed against the left group of the German craters, the other against the right. At the determined moment our heavy artillery deluged the German position with powerful shells to send the Germans back into their dug-outs, and then our two groups of mines were fired in suc- cession, throwing dead and living up into the air. The explosions blew up four out of the six German craters, and knocked out a machine-gun which had been very destructive to us. On the German left there was, however, still one crater untouched, and against this went forward the Loyal North Lancashires. The German energies had already been shat- tered by the explosion so close to them, and our men had little trouble in seizing the position, and disposing of its garrison. At once, aided by the working parties and the Sappers, they set to work to occupy the crater lip, and to dig back communication trenches from it. " Simultaneously with the Loyal North Lanca- shires the Lancashire Fusiliers had advanced THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.ll!. 1(17 to assault the right group of craters and the interval of open ground between this and the others, and they, too, were successful. Lights went up from the German side, and then their gunners began to overwlielni the position just won witli every species of projectile. But the men of the Red Rose held firm to tlie position thoy had gained, and reinforcements of msn and bombs were sent up to aid tlu^m. By 9.30 p.m., one hour only after the attack began, the whole five Ceiman craters, or what had been Geiman craters, were occupied by our troops. The scene was one of cruel anguish, for many of the troops, both British and Ger- man, were half -buried beneath the miss of earth which oiu" gvuis and mines had tlirown up. We offered to cease fire if the Germans would do the same, so that the wounded might be rescued, but the only reply was a volley of bombs. The fighting and the working, there- fore, went on, and our men managed to con- solidate their position and hold it. On May 16, in the Champagne, the Germans tried to surprise a French post near Mesnil, but were driven off by bombs. In the Argonn(! there was a heavy artillery contest near the Four-de-Paris, the Courtes Chaussees, and Vauquois. Two raiding parties of Seaforth Highlanders entered the Geiman trenches north of Roclincourt and succeeded in killing nnny of the enemy and in bombing three dug-outs, one of which was blown uj). Our own casualties were shght, and both parties returned safely to the trenches. Ojjposito Auchy a patrol raided the enemy's trenches, wliich had been disturbed by a mine explosion, and jienetrated towards the second line, exchanging .some bombs with it. On May 17-19 the usual artillery and trench - mortar actions took place along the British front. The Germans exploded a mine southeast of Roclincourt, but we seized tiie near edge of the crater ; on the other han<l, we fired a mine near Calonne, and effectively bombarded the enemy's position there. Tn the AA'estern Argonne the Germans sprang a mine and tried to seize a .salient near St. Hubert, but were stopped by curtain fire. On Saturday, May 20, the enemv, after a heavy bombardment, raided our line to the south-west of Loos. For a time he managed to seize our front trench, but was quickly driven out again, and on the Viniv Ridge the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment recaptured ii crater which the enemy had taken on the 18th ; we also blew up a mine near Hulluch and occupied the crater. In Lorraine the Geimms succeeded in pene- trating one of the French trenches to the west of Chazelles after a \iolent bombardment, but the artillery and macliine-gun fire soon ol)liged the Germans to evacuate the position. READY FOR ACTION. A British heavy howitzer on a railway mounting. ICH THE TIMES HlSTOnr OF THE WAH. On May 21 the CJermans dotermined to rera|)tur<> the position at the north oiid of the V'inxy Kidgo. At't»'r a hea\'y b()nibiirtlni'>nt, which lasted well on into the afternoon, their infantry caino on and succeeded in penetrating our front line of trenches on a front of 1,500 yards, and a depth of 100 to ,'JOO yards. According to the CJermans, sevt^ral hnes of the Hritisli position over a length of a mile and a (juartt>r were captured, and during the night counter-attacks were repulsed and 8 ofHcers and 220 men, with 4 machine-guns and .*{ trench- mortars were taken. On the next day our guns, in their turn, subjected the enemy to a heavy bombanhnent, btit nothing more was done. We again sprang mines near Rodin- court, the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the Quarries, while vigorous mining was carried on near Neuville St. Vaast ani south of Fleiu*- baix. There was also considerable artillery firing at Loos and east of Ypres. May 24 being Em|>ire Day, the following telegram was sent to the King by General Sir Douglas Haig : " On Empire Day, on behalf of your Majesty's Armies now in France, representative of every part of your Majesty's Dominions, I respect- fully submit the assurance of om* loyal devotion to your Majesty and to the principles of free- dom and justice which are symbohzed for us by the Crown and flag of the British Empire." His Majesty replied as follows : " I warmly appreciate the assurances of loyal devotion which you send me to-day in the name of the Armies of the British Empire serving under your command. Tell them with what pride and interest I follow their fortunes and of my confidence that success will crown their efforts. May the comrade ship of the battlefield knit still closer togetiier the peoples of the Dominions and Mother Country in the age of peace which, please God, will be the fruit of this long and arduous war. " George, R.I." In his reply to an Empire Day message of congratulation and goodwill from President Poincare the King expressed his confidence in the victory of the Allies, and declare.l the solidarity of all his Empire v\ith the noble French nation. During May 27 the British bombarded the enemy's trenches to the south-east of Xeuve Chajjelle, and destroyed some stores at Guille- mont. The enemy for their part directed a heavy bombardment lasting 20 minutes west of Fricourt, and tlu!n about Serre. The British S|)rang five mines, three about Hulluch and two south-east of Cuinchy. The enemy also ex- ploded one near the Hohenzollern Redoubt antl another on the Vimy Ridge, of which oiu" troops occupied the crater. On the whole the Germans displayed rather more activity than during the previous few days and expended a large amount of ammunition, and the enemy's mines south-east of Neuville St. N'aast, south of Loos and east of Souchez, did some damage to the British trenches, but inflicted no casualties. On May 28 there was considerable activity in Alsace, when the Germans attempUid to push home an attack on Belschweilier (north-west of Altkirch), but it was stopped by the French fire, and in Champagne the French guns blew up an ammunition depot in the region of Ville- sur-Turbe. On May 28 and 29 the German artillery delivered a heavy but intermittent fire against the British front between the La Bassee Canal and Arras, against our trenches near Loos, and as far north as Neuville St. 'V^aa.st. On our right the re-entrant in our line about Mametz and Fricourt also formed a target for German artil- lery fire, and from Zillebeke to Hooge and near Elverdinger the British position was also shelled. By way of reply our artillery breached the hostile parapet just north of Hooge and destroyed a machine-gun emplacement, and generally along the whole line our guns did considerable damage to the enemy s works, as well as to the hostile batteries. There was no iafantry activity. On May 30 the enemy continued liis general bombardment. That about Neuve Chapelle was particularly heavy. It lasted for 80 minutes, and was followed by an infantry attack which penetrated our trenches, and took some of our men prisoners. A counter mo\ement drove the Germans back. The Germans sprang a mine north of Bethune, and our troops occu- pied the near lip of the crater. There w as also some mining activity near Loos. On May 31 the artillerj' duel went on iniin- terruptedly. British and Gernian guns of all calibres were engaged near the V^iiny Ridge, and from time to time the fire became intense. The activity of the guns extended also, in a lesser degree, northwards in the tlirection of J.,oos and near Ypres, and also near the Somme the same occurred, but beyond this there was no serious engagement. THE TIMES HIISTOIiY OF THE WAH. 109 A MISSILE USED IN TRENCH FIGHTING. The rifle-grenade about to leave the rifle (on left). It will be reinenibered that round Ypivs tliere liad already been two .severe battles. The first lasted from October 20 until November 1 1 , 1914, the second April 22-May 13, 191;"). On June 2, 191(5, a series ot" engagements com- menced which may be fittingly described as the third battle. The ground o\er which the battle was fought was roughly confined between the Ypres-Menin road and the Ypres-Comines canal. It was in the main an open, rolling country with no very pronounced feature ; but the culminating portion of the ridge which swept round Ypres had an average height of about 120 feet above that town and was of sufficient elevation to make its possession of importance to the British, for it overlooked the ground in front of it. Equally was it desirable to the Germans, because if oiu* hne were forced back here it would be difficult to construct a continuous barrier behind it, and Ypres would 170 VVy/-; TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. rret- ■ai^v SdeLillA Ch»"<-..««^ ^ajj .Jif'\'U :?.^ «-^^ Veidhoek rro/5 /?0/5 *iCh'^' *^ Verbranden Molen^ .Lankhof ^O/i, Voormezcele //I' ^J in \ . 'SVi:ioi)»4 Oosthoelc Eikhof •i"'''^ llllHlV ?^-'^J w s /'M/// Klein Zillebek^^i?:'"^!"'^::^ " ■""" ' ^ = 1 ^^•iK Zan.dvoordc\ ^^^ri" Scale of One Mile /4 '/i ■% Heights in Metres 86B THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, have fallen into the enemy's hands. It must not be forgotten that our trenches in " the Ypres salient " had all the disadvantages which that geometrical form possesses, in the liability of the flanks to enfilade fire ; but still the possession of Ypres was considered to be of sufficient importance to justify hanging on to it, because if it fell into German hands it would have been necessary to draw back our front line of trenches, both north and south of it, for some considerable distance. North of Hooge was Bellewarde Farm, a mass of ruins, while to the right of it might be 'seen the German lines behind their wire entangle- ■ ments. Hooge and the trees round it existed no more, but the Sanctuary Wood and the copses along the main ridge running south from Hooge to Zwartelen and Hill 60 still afforded cover. From Hill 60 to the canal the ground slopes gently downward. From the liill, and running in a north-easterly direction parallel with the railway, is a minor spur, at first fairly flat and then descending more abruptly to Zillebeke and the lake to the west of it, which is 110 feet below the main crest. This spur afforded a secondary position for the British, secured on its left ffank by the lake, but somewhat open to enfilade on the right. Plainly, for the reasons given above, the line frcm Bellewarde to Hill CO was of great tactical importance for the British to stop an advance on Y'pres, for the Germans to commxnd the ground which led to that ruined city. The German attack was delivered against our front between Hooge and the neighbour- hood of Hill 60, Zwartelen. At 9.15 a.m. on June 2 the enemy's gun- fire reached an intense development, which was continued without intermission until noon. It was directed not only against the front line of trenches, but the ruined village of Hooge was especially favoured, also the ground behind, particularly towards Zillebeke and Ypres, forming a barrage to prevent reinforcements being sent to our men. Although the British gunners replied to this they were unable to subdue the fire of the enemy, which seriously damaged our trendies and the comm'inications to the rear. The Canadians, who garrisoned this part of the position with British divisions to the north of them, fought well and stood the pounding without flinching, although their losses were heavy. Their troops included the Canadian Mounted Rifles, the Royal Canadian Regiment, Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, and Canadian THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR. infantry from all part;* of the Dominions. Ot these the Patricia's, with some battalions of tlip Royal Canadian Regiment, held the northern end of the line south of Hooge and in the Sanctuary Wood. -More to the south were tiie Canadian !Moimted Rifles and various other units. Shortly before one o'clock the artillery fire against our front line was lifted and us(>d to form a barrier to prev(>nt reinforcements coming up. Masses of liostile infantry, nine or ten l)atta- lions, were now seen approachii g it on a front of less thm two miles, crossing the intervening paces between the two lines, which was often not more than 100 yards wide. By half -past two the enemy had succeeded in penetrating the front line at many points, as he greatly out- numbered the defenders. A desperate hand- to-hand struggle took place, which was parti- cularly fierce in the neighbourhood of Sanctuary Wood and on the rising groxmd a little to the north of Hill 60, many of the Canadians refusing to yield to superior numbers, and preferring death to surrender. But the enemy gradu- ally overpowered the brave defenders, and diu"ing the afternoon our troops fell back to a position about 1,000 j-ards in rear of the original line. In the wood, and in ^laple Copse close to it. it \\a^ a fight to the dealh Twice were the as.saiiants ilriven back with heavy loss Hein- forcem mts were brought up but suffered severely from the enemy's barrier fire. During th(' night the action was not so intense, but parties of the enemy penetrated to a depth of some 700 yards in the direction of Zillebeke, and here and there infantry encounters took place, while the artillery on both sides continued in action. That of the British gradually increased in vigour during the early morning. The position the Germans had gainej afforded them very little defensive capability, for it had been destroyed by the previous artillery fire which they had directed against it. and which our men had withstood for 24 hours before they fell back. Our guns also executed barrier fire to prevent further reinforcements from reaching the enemy. At 7 o'clock in the morning the Canadian counter-attack coram 'need. H\ about 8.30 they had driven back the CJerman centre and penetrated the lost trench at several important points. Thus near Hooge a long stretch was carried at the first attempt, and in a more southerly direction in the middle of the disputed line and at two or three points lower down the Canadians won a footing, and then proceeded .systematically to bomb their LISTENING POST Established in the crater formed by the explosion of a shell. en ta c« ■9* s z -^ a >« u Q < Z a o < 2 <-> a c U Q U 172 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 173 way right and left until the whole of the trench had been recovered, including the high ground a little to the north of Hill GO. The advance was very difficult, especially on the right, as the attackers were taken in reverse by machine- gun fire and suffered from a murderous artillery bombardnient, and this prevented them holding on to the ground they had regained. Still the outcome of the counter-attack was that part of the Germans, especially in the centre of the ground they had captured, were pushed back and the limit of their advance was reduced to some 350 yards. Our troops proceeded to throw up cover in the new position. Tliis was concave to the salient position we had previously held, the left horn resting on the old trench about 1,000 yards south of Hooge, while the right was on a point 800 yards north- east of Hill 60. The German attack was in the nature of a surprise, and they managed to capture Major-General Mercer and Brigadier- General Williams of the 3rd Canadian Division, who were inspecting the front trenches at the time of the assault. According to German accoimts the former violently resisted capture and struck a sergeant across the face with his sword. He was then bayoneted and died of his wound. The losses of the Canadians were severe, especially during the commencing defensive of the battle, but the Germans in their alternative roles of assailant and defender also suffered heavily. On June 4 there was no material change in the situation ; we maintained the recaptured ground and the fighting was limited to the artillery. The next day the lull in the infantry opera- tions continued, though the artillery was still very active on both sides. On June 6 the Ger- mans directed a heavj'^ bombardment to the north and south of Hooge and also towards Ypres-Comines railway and canal. Between 3 and 4.30 p.m. the enemy sprang a series of mines over a front of 2,000 yards to the north of Hooge and he succeeded in capturing the front trench of the British position where it passed through the \dllage. Attempts against other portions of the line farther north were repulsed by the British holchng. There was also another attack directed against our trenches west of Hooge ; but thereafter the struggle died down again into an intermittent artillery fire only. The fight now became of normal and quieter character, chiefly artillery fire and occasional small raids of no very great import- ance ; ))ut on the 10th the Gennan bombard- ment against our Ypres position became mucn more violent, our trenches north of the Ypres- Comines railway, between the hours of 1 and 3 p.m., being severely punished, as was the ground we held south of Hooge ; but there were no infantry engagements. The next day, Sunday, June 11, during the mornuig, there was a further bombardment of Ypres and the ground to the south of it, also of our trenches north of the IMenin road, while in the aftQrnoon the main attention of the enemy's guns was directed against the Canadian position from Hill 60 to the north for a distance of 1,500 vards. But IN THE TRENCHES. An Australian amusing himself with a toy aeroplane. again there were no infantry attacks of unport- ance. Monday, Jime 12, was an uneventful day, with only a heavy bombardment between Hill 60 and Hooge by both sides ; but the 13th saw a vigorous counter-attack delivered by the Canadians to regain the ground lost on June 2-3. Our artillery had been very active during the previous days against the part of the enemy's position selected for assault — viz., that portion of the ground the enemy had won between Hill 60 and Hooge, the ridge dominating from the east the valley down to Zillebeke. From 12.45 p.m. on the 12th it was raised to the highest possible intensity, and lasted to 1.30 a.m. on the 13th. The night was very cold, wet and dark, and indeed the weather for the past week had been extremely unpropitious. But this had 109—3 174 THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR in nowise affected the ardour of the men, who burned to retake the position they had lost 10 days before. At half-past one our fire lifted and the infantry dashed forward. The enemy poured out a severe barrier fire to prevent the approach of oiu" men, but so great was their impetuosity that they pushed through it and quickly gained their objective before the sun rose. The resist- ance of the Germans was but feeble ; they seemed thoroughly cowed by the previous artillery preparation, and groups of them surrendered at sight, and seemed glad to do so. Over 150 prisoners were taken. One German officer who svirrendered with 132 men said : " I knew how it would be. We had orders to take this ground and took it, but we knew you would come back again. You have done so. So here I am.' * It was plain that our continued * Daily Telegraph, June 16. SNIPERS ON THE WESTERN FRONT. Practising. Circle picture : A Sniper at work. shell -fire had prevented the enemy from properly digging himself in and that he could not hold the line effectually. At one point he had even failed to discover certain stores and ammunition hastily covered in by the Canadians before their retreat. Our men at once set about consolidating their position and, although subjected to very heavy artillery fire during the next 24 hours, clung bravely to the position they had gained. Once the enemj' massed his infantry for attack, but it was met by such a hail of fire from our guns that no attempt to advance was made. The advance of the main attack had been much facilitated by two flank attacks or raids, one on the left by British troops against the Ger- man trenches north of Hooge, and another, on the right, made by the Anzaes. These were covered by gas to cau.se the enemy to believe they were serious, and both were successful and with slight loss. They served to prevent the concentration of more German infantry and to safeguard the Canadian assavilt from flank attack. Particular interest attached to certain docu- ments belonging to a German Grenadier Regi- ment that were captiu-ed in the Ypres salient by the Canadians during the course of their successful counter-attack of June 13. Stress is laid in these documents upon the necessity to collect all the debris after a fight. THE TIMES IIISTOnr OF THE WAIi. 1 <y It is urgently enjoined that search shnll invaria})Iy ho made for tlie recovery of " boots of all kinds, all sorts of weapons and parts of them, entrenching tools, steel helmets, leather equi|)ni(>nt, pouches, all kinds of weapons for close fighting, belts, tents, material of all kind.-, haversacks, tunics, trousers, and sandbags. Tliese goods are of most decisive iinportance to the final success of our great cause." This did not sound as if tlie Germans were too well provided with equipment. This was emphasized by tlie instruction " The enemy's dead will be divested of articles of woollen clotliing and boots." Special instructions are given to guard against the deterioration of German fighting material : " This must be brought back from the first position and its communication trenches as soon as possible. The exceeding disorder of the second line must be at once thoroughly cleaned up." One sentence conveys what the Germans really thought of the men opposite to them in the Ypres salient more eloquently than even a column of typical Teutonic abuse : " In view of the enemy's characteristics, we have to expect a strong attack at any time." Six days after this opinion was written down the attack came in good sooth, with the result already described. June 15 was marked by no special activity. The artillery fire continued on both sides, but there were no infantry actions. Nor were any further serious attempts made to turn us out of the position gained during the remainder of the month. Artillery fire there was, and some small minor operations, but no serious effort to dispute our position. Let us now return to the southern end of the British line. The principal efforts during Jime 7 were made by the enemy against the sector comprised between the Vimy Ridge and the La Bassee Canal. The artillery fire was active and several mines were exploded. Near the Hohenzollern Redoubt we sprang a mine wliich laid bare the hostile defences and enabled our snipers to shoot down nine of the defenders. At Souchez our artillery did good work, and just south of the canal a successful raid drove out the Germans from one of their trenches and inflicted considerable loss on them. At this southern end of our position, just as at Ypres, after June 13 the fighting, while costing us <"<>nsiderable losso.i, was not productive of any great tactical results. \\'hen, .so to say, two hostile forces engag(j one another at very short distances, often not twice the length of a cricket pitch apart and rarely over 100 yards, it is plain that daily casualties mu.st be incurred on no light scale, and it spealts volumes for the troops on either .side that they stood this ever-present (langer without flinching. By this period, however, we had attained a suj)eriority in artilkiry, and from time to time overwhelmed the Germans at points where we wisher! to press forward. Then it was usually found, as in the ca.se of the Canadian counter-attack from Hooge to Hill 60, that the Germans were shattered morally a=< well as physically. In the ordinary routine of reciprocal shell and trench-mortar fire, of sniping and patrolling, they still maintained their reputation. But it became clearer and more clear as the result of our experience, both in raids and larger attacks, tiiat they did not relish the close-quarter combat with bomb and bayonet. To the.se methods of destruction were added the constant danger from mines, which were used by both sides to an extent hitherto undreamt of in battle fighting. On the earlj morning of June 22 the Germans sprang a very large mine in the neighbourhood of Givenchy, just north of the La Bassee Canal. This they followed with a heavy barrage fire behind the British line, under cover of which they penetrated our front on a narrow space. The Welsh Fusiliers were guarding this jiart of the line, and were deceived by the calm into thinking the Germans had no intention of dis- turbing the quietude of the locality. Suddenly there was a terrible roar, the earth opened, and a huge mass of timber, soil and sandbags was upheaved and fell back with a crash into a vast crater, 120 feet across, and the trendies in its neighboiu-hood, destroying the parapets and replacing the well-ordered constructions by a cleared space and a deep pit. Then came the hostile artillery fire, pounding the position and seeking by a veil of shells to cut oft" all access to it. It was followed by three distinct assaulting parties, who rushed forwaril to occupy the mine-pit. But the Welshmen were equal to the .situation. Some had been blown up, others dazed by the shock, yet right and left of the riven groimd there were others eager for revenge. They closed on the flanks of the raiding party and drove them 176 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR, 177 IMMELMANN. The German airman, killed In June, 1916. LIEUT. McCUBBIN. Who brought down Immelmann. back, fighting hard, into the crater, out of it, and bade to their own trenches. The Germans had captured a machine gun and tried to take it with them, but the men dragging it were all shot down, and after lying in the open till Saturday morning it was recovered by the Fusiliers. A pleasant incident in this little fight was the gallant conduct of a pioneer battalion working in the vicinity. The men rushed forward with their spades and dealt shrewd blows with them on the astonished Germans. Diu-ing the night of June 24-25 there was an attempted raid by the enemy on our trendies north-east of Loos, wliich was easily driven back. All day long on the 25th our artillery were very active along the whole front, and at places there were considerable replies by the enemy, who also exploded four mines — two opposite Hulluch, one south of the Bethune- La Bassee line, and one north of Neuve Chapelle. None of them caused any casualties ; nor did one sprung on the 24th near the HohenzoUern Redoubt. On the other hand, we destroyed six Idte balloons out of 15 which we at- tacked. On the night of the 25th-26th we executed ten successful raids, which inflicted considerable loss on the enemy, who also lost prisoners, while our casualties were slight. Our artillery, too, fired with great effect, damaging the hostile lines in many places, and causing four heavy explosions among tiie rearward part of the German position. The preparatory bombardment of the enemy to pave the way for the great advance of July BOELCKE. The German airman, who claimed his nineteenth victory, June, 1916. had begun. From Ypres to the Somme his position was subjected to a hail of projectiles, generally distributed, but also concentrated at various points, so as to leave the enemy in doubt as to where the attack, which he quite appreciated was coming, would really be delivered. The German reply, except for short intervals and against a few places, was feeble and ineffectual. Our fire was one of pure devastation intended to destroy the Germans, their batteries and trench defences, blow up their ammunition depots, and bombard far back their resting places and lines of communication. This was all effectively done. Xor was the infantry idle. Raids were made on the enemy's trenches, inflicting heavy losses on him, but with few casualties to ourselves. Some of these attacks were covered by gas, and at one place where this had been employed the trenches when entered by our men were lull of German dead. No less than a dozen successful raids were made by our men on June 28-29, in which the Liverpool Regiment, the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, the Highland Light Infantry, and the Australians all took part. The prologue of the play was coming to an end, and in a couple of days the grand drama would commence. All this time the battle raged round Verdun and in the Champagne. Further away, in Alsace, there had been more or less continuous fighting. The Gennan was every- where held ; the Allies were about to begin theii- offensive. 178 CHAPTER CXI.II. THE WORK OF THE Y.M.C.A Work fob Territori.\ls and Volunteers in Peace Time — Beginnings of the War Work — Origin of the Y.M.C.A. — Training Camps — Marquees and Huts — The Y.M.C.A. in France — Hostels for Soldiers' Relatives — Railway St.^^tion \\'ork — The Shakespeare Hut — Estab- lishments IN London — Work for the Navy — H.M.S. Crystal Palace —Munition Workers- Troops from the Dominions — The Y.M.C.A. in India. SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS, the Founder of the Yoimg Men's Christian Associa- tion, took a keen interest during the closing days of his life in the experiment made by one of its auxiharies at tlie time of the South African War. This included the provision of marquees for the use of the troops as reading, writing and recreation centres, and also as meeting places for rehgious services. It was thus that the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s entered upon its first connexion with the soldier in actual warfare, and the naodest beginning proved a great success Before tWs period the Association had established relations with the Volunteers, and then later with the Territorials, during their fortnight's training in camp, by setting up its marquee equipment in the centres marked out for summer training camps and providing a place where the men could ^^Tite their letters — usually it was the official post office — and purchase tea, coffee and light refreshments. \\Tien the war began these two experiences decided the Y.M.C.A to prepare similar services for the new Army. It had the macliinery ready and its work with the ^'olunteers and Terri- torials inspired confidence £is to the results. Mr. A. K. Yapp, the General Secretary of the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s, suggested an immediate appeal for £25,000. The appeal was launched by a special War Work Committee, of which Sir Thomas Stmrney Cave was chair- man, Mr. A. K. Yapp secretary, and Mr. F. J. Chamberlain assistant secretary. Somewhat later Sir Henry E. Procter became acting treasurer. In a few weeks' time the £25,000 appeared to be totally inadequate and another £25,000 was required immediately. Before tliis second amount was received it was seen that even £50,000 would not meet the demands which poured in from all parts of the United Kingdoin. Extensions often proceeded before the money was in hand, owing to the urgent character of the work, but in the first two years of war the subscriptions amounted to £830,000 — a total which included donations from the King and Queen. Queen Alexandra, and other members of the Royal Family, as well as gifts from rich and poor alike. As the war advanced many gifts were made in order to perpetuate the memory of sons and brothers, and in France, at home, and elsewhere there soon were many memorial huts. Children in the elementary schools raised over £16,000 by gifts from many thousands of schools. Harrow in the second year of war gave a complete building, and other public schools rendered help in a mo-st generous spirit. I^ivery companies and railway, banking and commercial undertakings added their share to the funds, wliile hiunbler people brought their shillings. To appreciate the significance of this assist- ance, the beginnings of the Y ^T.C.A. have to 179 180 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. A HUT FOR SOLDIERS AND SAILORS. The Duchess of Argyll opening the Rest and Refreshment Hut at King's Cross. Left to right : Duchess of Argyll, Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, Mrs. Joy and Mr. Alexander Joy, the donors of the Hut. be remembered. The movement, as originally started in England — from whence it spread throughout the world — came from an evan- gelical source. Its creed of membership con- tained evangelical doctrine, and the Paris Con- ference which determined its international character set forth the following basis : The Young Men's Christian Associations seek to unite those young men who, regarding Jesus Christ as their God and Saviour according to the Holy Scriptures, desire to be His disciples in their doctrine and in their life, and to associate their efforts for the extension of His Kingdom among young men. The founders were good men, for the greater part trained in a somewhat narrow mould. At the commencement, in 1844, the object was described as " the improvement of the spiritual condition of young men engaged in the drapery and other trades by the introduction of religious services among them." Membership was confined to those possessing a definite religious experience. One of the rules stipulated " that no person shall be considered a member of this Association unless he be a member of a Christian Church, or there be sufficient evidence of his being a converted character." In the early 'sixties a severe rebuke was administered to Archbishop Trench and Dr. Dale, the well- known evangelical theologian of Birmingham, because they had " trailed their Christian priesthood in the dust to offer homage at the shrine of a dead playwright " at the Shake- speare tercentenary celebrations. There was also a reference to " the oratorio of the ' Messiah ' wherein, as John Newton once said, roughly but pointedly, " the Redeemer's agonies are illustrated on catgut.' Masquerade and sermon, pageant and oratorio ! — it is very mournful." Nevertheless, and largely owing to the indomit- able enthusiasm of the founder. Sir George Williams, the branches increased at home, in France, and other parts of the Continent, and eventually in the United States and our Over- seas Dominions. Its social features were developed cautiously — if not jealously — because its leaders feared that the religious side of the work might be jeopardized. Smoking was prohibited in Y.M.C.A. buildings and the members were advised to abstain from athletic contests. Naturally such points were criticized by the younger men who gradually came into their own on the committees, and presently a broader and more catholic policy found expres- sion. According to current opinion, the Asso- ciation created a particular type of young man supposed to be addicted to personal introspec- tion and lacking virility and commonsense. In some quarters the Y.M.C.A. provoked satire and derision, and in both Church of England and Nonconformist circles there did not appear that measure of cooperation that might THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 181 have been expected. The general situation with respect to the establishment and i:)rogress of the Y.M.C.A. and its limitations up to the time of the war need to be remembered in connexion witli what was afterwards accomplished. Neither barracks nor temporary buildings were sufficient at first to house the himdreds of thousands of recruits who joined the new armies. Away on lonely commons, under canvas, in barns, halls and schools, billeted in private houses, or in many cases occupying empty ones — often without beds, blankets, chairs, forms or tables — their accoimnodation taxed all resoiu-ces to the breaking point. Moreover, coming straight from civilian life, many from middle-class families, the men found the social amenities in camp less than those usually enjoyed by the soldier in barracks. It was at this point that the Y.M.C.A. came to the assistance of the New Army. The methods adopted appeared exceedingly simple. In the early days of the war marquees were erected in every camp to which commanding officers gave permission. Tea, coffee and re- fresliments were supplied during the soldier's off-duty hours. He could obtain an early cup of tea before going on duty at six o'clock on an autunm morning, and when he returned after a night march ho usually found hot refreshments before ho turned in for the night. Cigarettes, matches, boot-laces, buttons and other sundries could be obtained at the Y.M.C.A. counter. The Association never coveted the position of haberdaslier and tobacconist to the troops, but when the camp was situated miles away from a town the soldier appreciated this service. Concerned with the social benefit of the soldier the leaders did not disguise their defi nitely religious objects when they undertook tliis war work. They appreciated the fact, however, that religion cannot be forced on men. They did not therefore attempt either religious button-holing or cross-examination. An un- denominational service was arranged on Sun- day evenings, but in the mornings the marqut^e could be used by Church of England, Roman or Free Church chaplains. This hospitality on the part of a religious organization with deeply embedded Protestant traditions received grate- ful thanks in due coiu-se from Cardinal Bourne and from the Rev. M. Adler, the chief Jewish chaplain. At the start the service of nearly every available Y.M.C.A. official in the country was INSIDE A HUT AT WIMBLEDON CAMP. Soldiers writing to their friends. 182 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. retiuisitioncd. So great was the pressure owing to the rapid extension of the agencies that the leaders gladly availed themselves of the help of teachers, undergraduates and others who were free from their ordinary duties during the holiday period that followed the outbreak of the war. Some mistakes occurred here and there, arid men unfitted by temperament and lack of knowledge for such positions were found in places of triLst, but on the whole these instances were comparatively few. The enthusiasm of the undertaking and the splendid spirit of the new Army carried the helpers along, and it was not unusual for them to keep at their duties in the marquees during IG or 18 hours of every day in the week. From the first the work won the approval of the Army authorities. They smoothed away difficulties, provided facilities for transport, and detailed orderlies for pitching the marquee's and other heavy work. The marquees were usually within the camp boundaries, and be- came a part of the life of the camp. This recognition by the military authorities proved a great asset. The winter of 1914 settled the policy of the Y.M.C.A. A brilliant autumn was followed by an exceptionally wet winter. Even high and exposed country like Salisbury Plain re.sembled a morass, while the I'oads in the district were covered with water four or five inches deep. The autumnal gales wrecked scores of marquees, and it became necessary, instead of the mar- quees, which were comparatively cheap and portable, to embark on the erection of huts, costing on an average £600 to £700. Some of the first to be erected accommodated the Cana- dian troops just arrived in England. Many improvements were subsequently made in the interior arrangements of the huts. An audi- torium was provided at Crowborough, for example, to seat 2,000 men. Satisfactory cooking arrangements were possible in the hut, which enabled the helpers to prepare more expeditiously the hot refreshments re- quired by the men. In large camps a double hut was built, which contained a special room for concerts, lectures and services apart from the conimon room used for games, correspon- dence, and the ser\ ing of refreshments from the counter. In addition to marquees and huts, public halls, mission rooms and other suitable build- ings were hired in centres occupied by thousands DINING HALL AND RECREATION ROOM FOR SHELL-MAKERS AT WOOLWICH. Munition workers going to dinner. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. iR8 FOR CIVILIANS AND SERVICE MEN. Mr. l.Ioyd George visits the dining-room for muni- tion workers at Bonder's End, while Mrs. Llovd George (smaller picture) distributes chocolates and cigarettes to soldiers at the Temperance Hut at Hampstead Heath. of troops. One of the most notable enter- prises was the transformation of a huge shell - like building in the ^V^lite City at Shepherd's Bush, formerly occupied by Bostock's menagerie, for the use of 10,000 Territorials in training there during the winter of 1914. The usual activities were here supplemented by the estab- lishment of a lending library and the organization of .war lectures. Both agencies justified them- selves, and as the war progressed this depart- ment received increasing attention not only at home, but, as will be shown later, in the British camps overseas. Whether in hut, marquee or elsewhere the effort was made to provide club facilities. Apart from the officers' quarters the Y.M.C.A. centre was the only place that boasted chairs and tables for the men. The Bishop of London, one of the few English Bishops who had practical experience of the camps (having spent a month under canvas at Crowborough), in recording his impressions of camp life, stated that marquees where the men could write letters home were immensely appreciated, and that was the reason why the Y.M.C.A. was so popular with the men. From the commence- mont notepaper and envelopes were supplied free, and thi.s distribution involved many million sheets of paper and envelopes at a considerable cost. The soldier's love of music was recognized in tlie provision for the Territorial camps. Every niarquee had its piano. A penny edition of ■' Camp Songs " sold in hundreds of thousands. Tliis little book contained a selection of humor- ous, sentimental and patriotic songs that an^ always favourites with men, and proved of considerable service in promoting the succes.s of the " sing-song." After a long and tediou.s day the camp " sing-song " gave that liappy relief to a large body of men which cannot bi found in any other way. The " sing-song ' closed a few minutes before tlie men had to be in their quarters for tlie night, and almost 184 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. THE LATE SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS, Founder of the Y.M.C.A. invariably the majority remained for a hymn and short prayer, followed by the National Anthem. No one was forced to stay, and the whole service lasted but a few minutes. Neither at the period of the commencement of the war nor in its later days were the soldiers, speaking generally, subject to the conditions of a religious revival, such as was claimed in some quarters. They were, however, eager listeners and interested in unconventional religious services with plenty of singing. Here they showed preferences of a striking character. They loved to sing Dr. Monsell's "Fight the good Fight," Charles Wesley's " Sun of my Soul " and Cardinal New- man's " Lead Kindly Light." The Sunday evening service was addressed by a chaplain or one of the Y.M.C.A. helpers, and frequently when tliis closed the men continued another hour singing further hymns. An attempt to measure the religious influences would be mis- leading, but thousands of signatures were secured for the Y.M.C.A. War Roll. Trained to a strict observance of the Sabbath, the Y.ALC.A. leaders perforce modified their opinions and opened the huts and marquees during the whole of the seven days. The majority of the centres were not closed, except at night, from the time they were first opened. Several huts kept open doors both night and day. Sunday trading naturally presented a difficult proposition. Some people severely criticized the policy adopted, but the large majority who knew the conditions recog- nized the necessity of the course that was followed. The Association had to decide whether the sale of hot refreshments should be prohibited on Sundays and the men driven to the wet canteen. \\'hilst replying in the nega- tive, they limited Sunday labour as far as possible and restricted amusements, but neces- saries could be purchased at the counter as on other days. Soon after the war commenced the necessity became evident of establishing in France similar agencies for the troops to those that had been provided at home. Lord French, then in command of the British Expeditionary Force, expressed complete sympathy with this desire though vinable owing to the nature of the military operations to suggest an imme- diate beginning. By November, 1914, however, the Y.M.C.A. was permitted to start its work in some of the base and rest camps as an experiment, on the implied understanding that if successful it would be allowed to make extensions. This cautious policy was probably wise in the absence of previous experience, for the fact had to be determined to what extent voluntary agencies could be associated with the British Army in the war zone. Many questions were involved, including the difficul- ties of transport and the exact relation of a civilian organization to military discipline which was necessarily stricter than at home. The tentative period proved the value of the work. Writing on November 23, 1915, after a full year's experience, Viscount French testified to " the fine work done by the Y.M.C.A." Continuing he said : The problem of dealing with conditions, at such a time, and under existing circumstances, at the rest camps has always been a most difficult one ; but the erection of huts by the Young Men's Christian Associa- tion has made this far easier. The extra comfort thereby afforded to the men, and the opportunities for reading and writing, have been of incalculable service, and I wish to tender to your Association and all those who have assisted, my most grateful thanks. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 185 The history of European wars contains no experience similar to that of this large and or- ganized enterprise for assisting soldiers in the field with social and religious agencies. Military commanders naturally placed such efforts outside their sphere of action, and neither churches nor other bodies jireviously realized the necessity and value of these undertakings. The Salvation Army and the Church Army followed the British soldier into Franco on more or less similar lines, but the Y.M.C.A. deserves the honoiu- of the start as well as recognition for the completeness of its organization. From November, 1914, the agencies in France were gradually extended, until by the time the war had been two years in progress 180 centres had been established. The majority of these were huts, built, so far as later editions were concerned, in 5 ft. sections, so that they could be easily moved. Various kinds of buildings were also requisitioned, including an old church, a convent, a cinema., a winter garden and theatre, a mayor's parlour, and farm buildings and structures of various descriptions, upon all of which the sign of the Red Triangle was affixed — an indication of a warm and constant welcome to the British troops. At the earnest wish of the Y.lNl.C.A. leaders, the generals commanding divisions at length permitted them to go up to villages where the men in the trenches had their billets. The Heath Harrison Hut, for instance, was situated near cross roads 3^ or 4 miles from the German lines and exposed to shell fire. From early morning until late at night a continuous queue passed to and from the refresliment counter, and indicated the benefit of the place to these trench heroes. Again, the Threapwood Hut was situated within a mile or so of the enemy, and before it was destroj'ed by the Gennan fire, fifty evidences of the damage by bursting shell or shrapnel were to be seen in the buiUling. The sivfety of the workers had been ensured to some extent by the pro- vision of a dug-out by the military authorities, and when the Germans managed to drop a sliell upon it the leader and his helpers, warned of the danger, were able to escape. By permi.ssion of Her Majesty, the first Y.M.C.A. building erected in France was named the " Queen Mary Hut." This was situated a short distance from the quay of one of the French harbours, being largely used by the men who came from the Port of London Authority to unload the transports. Though dres.sed in khaki, they ranked as non-com- batants and did the work of ordinary dock labourers. Hanging in the Queen ^Nlary Hut was a framed copy of the Queen's letter ex- pressing warm sympathy with the Y.^I.C.A. work in France. Other members of the Royal Family exhibited similar interest. Princess Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein rendered great service by accepting the post of President of the Ladies' Auxiliary Committee for the Y.M.C.A. base camps in France. The Princess paid visits to France and inspected the whole of the arrangements in oi'der to effect improve- ments and modifications. Her conunittee collected parcels of comforts, footballs, cricket sets, musical instruments, and other articles for the use of the men. The same con^mittee also organized lady helpers, who gave their services and thus saved the necessity of em- ploying men required for the fighting line. These ladies, to the number of 300, performed arduous duties in an admirable manner and to the complete advantage of the work. MR. J. J. VIRGO, Field Secretary, Y.M.C.A. LORD KINNAIRD, President of the National Y.M.C.A. Council. MR. A. K. YAPP, General Secretary, Y.M.C.A. 180 77//!,' riMJiJS HISTOJiY OF THE WAR. Tho whole of the oiu-nitions in Fnuice wdic ctttitrolltHl on tlie spot In Mr- Oliver McCowcii, LI^.I?., who WHS orifiiimlly V.M.C'.A. soc-retarv in Miinimli. He gradually built up a large organization, whicdi !)>■ August. 1 !)!(), consist ed of a staff of "00 workers. Only a .->iuall |)ro- portion wer'o men of military age, for wlioin exemjition had been ( lainiod, and tlx^se princijially took the places of ladies wlio were naturally prohibited tioni servmg near tlie firing line. Many of Mr McCowen's asi^is tants were active clergy and ministers who obtained leave of absence Irom their home duties. Many well-known people gave their services for special duties. Professors from tlu; l^niversities lectured on war or literary subjects and found eager audiences. Miss Lena Ashwell organized concert parties, which brought keen enjoyment and pleasm-e to the men in the huts and in the hospitals. One and all roughed it with no thought for the dis- comforts of wind, rain, and heat, and the long hours. The British camps in France not only pei- mitted the usual featm-es of the work at home — such as the religious services, letter-writing, games, and " sing-songs " — -but afforded man\- interesting additions. When a British battalion anivetl at u Fron<;h port, tirod, unwashed and unshaven after a rough pa.ssage acro.ss tliG Chamiel, they found hot refreshments awaiting their purchase. Wearied by the long joiu"ney oNcr land and sea, they had the chance of a rest, and relieved their home-sickne.ss — a feeling common to many lads on first landing on a foreign soil by writing home. On such days thousands of communications passed through the letter-box. Under normal conditions a great stream of men started daily from the trenches on their seven days' furlough. They arrived at the railhead laden with their kit and with the mud of the trenches thick upon them. Here they foimd the sign of the Red Triangle and seciu-ed a wash, food and sleep until the leave train passed on its way. At the principal stoppmg- places hot refreshments and other necessaries could be purcha.sed. Another boon was a series of hostels for the use of relatives of wounded soldiers. The ■^'.M.C.A. gradually increased the number of these hostels to eight, and further arranged to meet the soldiers' friends at the boat's side and motor them direct to the hospital where A REST HUT IN THE LITTLE THEATRE, aDELPHI. In the reading and writing room. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 187 HUTS IN LONDON. A building in Euston Square erected for soldiers. Sleeping accommodation was also provided for twenty-three men. Circle picture : In a rest hut in the Little Theatre, Adelphi. Bottom picture : The Dormitory at the Earl Roberts Rest Home, King's Cross. their husbands, brothers, or other relatives were to be found. This assistance was provided without a penny of charge to friends of non- comniissioned officers and men. A beautiful villa was rented for the use of officers' relatives, where similar accommodation was provided at moderate charges in order to cover the cost. In various impromptu directions the Y.M.C.A. rendered acts of kindness to the wounded. The service shown to the Australians at a clearing station after one of the " pushes " supplied an illustration of the help that the Y.M.C.A. was only too eager to offer : When we arrived the sight which presented itself to us beggars description [wrote a Y.M.C.A. secretary 1. Hundreds of men were lying about everywhere witli head, leg, and arm wounds, all of which had been attended to by the medical staff, the work of which is beyond all praise. The men were now waiting the arrival of the train which was to convey them to a hospital outside the range of guns. They were a cheerful crowd, though bearing the unmistakable marks of battle, and many of them carried trophies captured in the fight. . . . The men soon recognized and welcomed the Y.M.C.A., and we were immediately invited to write postcards and fill in field cards acquainting the people at home of the wounds of which all of them were proud. One of the Australian secretaries hastened to the Tynemouth hut for cigarettes, as there was a sad lack of smokes and money in this company of wounded, heroes. . . . When the train arrived our work was by 188 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. no means finished ; men with leg wounds gladly availed themselves of the Y.AI.C.A. man's shoulder in treading the painful path to a carriage door. Postcards had to be written even hero on the footljoards of tlie train and many times a comrade was heard to remark to some poor fellow who was struggling with a borrowed pencil and field card, " Oh, there is a Y.M.C.A. man there, he'll do it for you." Both the British aiul the French authorities gave all possible assistance. The fonner facili- tated transport and the latter removed liin- drances harassing the workers. A French admiral in charge of a port gave instructions that the Y.M.C.A. was to be afforded every help and not to be delayed by restrictions, even though generally necessary. French sentries on the roads outside towns became so accus- tomed to the red triangle on cars that they rarely demanded the production of cards of authorization. Those high in authority in France watched the enterprise with much interest and commenced in an experimental manner something similar for their troops. It should be remembered that the French Y.M.C.A. carried on a small but excellent work for the French troops in the Vosges. When the King was in France he inspected the Y.M.C.A. huts and expressed his great pleasvu-e concerning its arrangements. In a more formal but equally expressive manner he sent the following message to Lord Kinnaird on May 26, 1916 : — " His Majesty congratulates the Association on the successful results of its war work, which has done everything conducive to the comfort and well-being of the armies, supplying the special and peculiar needs of men drawn from countries so different and so distant. It has worked in a practical, economical and unostentatious manner, with consummate know- ledge of those with whom it has to deal. At the same time the Association, by its spirit cf discipline, has earned the respect and approba- tion of the Military Authorities." If space permitted a story full of daring and adventure could be told of the Y.M C A. work on the shell -strewn shores of Gallipoli, of its less exciting but equally useful services in Malta, and of its much-needed help in Mesopo- tamia and East Africa. As people realized during the first year of war that men on furlough arrived home in the early morning at Victoria laden with their com- plete kit, and with nowhere to go before the trains some six to eight hours later conveyed them to their destination, an immediate demand arose for more satisfactory arrangements. In the majority of cases these soldiers lay about the station precincts or tramped right across to the northern stations, there to wait until the morning. The Y.M.C.A. organized a staff of workers who met the leave trains at Victoria and conducted the men to a disused brewery in Westminster, where they could secure bed and refreshments at moderate charges. The build- ing did not provide luxurious fittings amidst its cavernous depths, but served its purpose. The King permitted the use of the Royal Mews at Buckingham Palace for the entertainment of the men. Refreshments were supplied from the Palace kitchen on arrival, and in the morning, after a substantial breakfast, the royal carriages conveyed them to the various railway stations. The King's practical sympathy encouraged various developments. The beginnings of this service in the Metropolis developed into a net- work of agencies, coordinated in a wise and statesmanlike manner, in order to cater for the wants of the incoming and outgoing soldier. The railway stations became the strategic points. Not only did the soldier depart from London, but he arrived there at all hours of the day and night on his way back to France or the home camps, and frequently had long and weari- some intervals between his journeys. To pro- vide shelter for the thousands of men — sailors as well as soldiers — using the route to the north, or vice versa, the first station hut was erected at Euston on ground placed at the disposal of the Y.M.C.A. by the directors of the London and North-Western Railway. This provided sleeping accommodation at moderate prices, so that for sixpence a man could obtain a bed with clean sheets and everything comfortable. If all the beds were engaged, he could secure blankets and a shakedown on the floor for two- pence. In the morning he purchased his food on an equally economical basis, and the advan- tages of the club, including books, papers and Wi'iting materials, were open to him without charge, while for a few pence he could enjoy a game of billiards. Very often the police brought in men the worse for drink who were a danger to themselves and who invited punish- ment. By tactful handling the Y.M.C.A. secretary got them to bed, and in the morning they were sober once again and ashamed of the trouble they had occasioned. Such services explained in part the popularity of the Y.M.C.A. amongst the men. Similar huts were in due course established at King's Cross, Victoria, Waterloo, and Pad- dington.' As these buildings increased in num- An entertainment in a Welsh camp. Smaller picture: At a concert in London. THE Y.M.G.A. ENTERTAINING TROOPS AT HOME AND ABROAD. 189 190 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. bers, various improvements and additions were made, such, for instance, as the provision of hot batlis. This boon proved welcome to the soldier from France who had been subient to insect - infested billets. Another addition of a prac- tical character was the annexe erected at Water- loo for the use of soldiers' wives,, who frequently came to meet their husbands or to witness their departure. At Victoria, in addition to a large hut for non- commissioned officers and men, a hostel was erected in Grosvenor Gardens, only a few yards distant from the railway station, for the u.se of commissioned oflficers. Its control was undertaken by the Y.M.C.A., but its erection and equipment owed everything to the generous cooperation of Mrs. Charles Tufton and her friends. This building was a comfortable club, where young ofhcers could seciu-e bed and breakfast and other meals. It was opened by Queen Alexandra. Linked iip with the station huts the Y.M.C.A, presently established still more commodious PASTIMES IN THE HUTS. Lady Askwith watching a billiard match at a hut in Horseferry Road, Westminster. Circle picture : A game at draughts. buildings with a greater claim to architectural fitness in the inner circle of the ^Metropolis. At Aldwych, abutting on the Strand, an exception- ally bright and convenient structure was erected at a cost of between £7,000 and £8,000. This was designed primarily for the requirements of overseas troops, but was open to men of other units, A later enterprise was the Shakespeare Hut at the rear of the British ]\Iuseum, wluch owed its inspiration to the Shakespeare Memorial. Committee and the Tercentenary Committee. Naturally it was impossible to devote any por- tion of the Shakespeare ]Memorial Fund to the building or equipment, but £1,000 was collected for the purpose from the Dean and Chapter of Westminster, the Temple Church, University College and Bedford College for Women. To- wards the £7,000 or £8,000 required £2.000 was also received from the New Zealand Y.M.C.A.,. and substantial subscriptions came from the boroughs of Westminster, Kensington and Marylebone. The Shakespeare Hut was ad- mirably designed with canteen, billiard room, quiet room, verandah and sleeping and bath room accommodation. It was probably the best of its kind, and the fittings and colouring were planned in memory of tlie great dramatist who, as already indicated, did not receive honour from some of the members of the Y.M.C.A. in its early days. THE TIMBS HISTORY OF THE WAR. I '.I I Tlie V.M.C.A. also tranHforin'vJ the Little Theatre in John Street, Adelphi, gcMiorotisly placed at its disposal by the laridlonl, Mr. Coutts, into a more or less similar rendezvous. Its size and proximity to Charing Cross enabled large numbers of men to enjoy the atlvantages. Another development deserves mention here because of its effect upon the internal organiza- tion of the Y.M.C.A. and the coordinated facilities for entertaining the soldier in London. Practically speaking, from the start of the Y.M.C.A. movement the Central Y.M.C.A. pro- vided the metropolitan headquarters. Origin- ally this central branch jiossessed Exeter Hall, and whilst using a portion of the building for club purposes let the halls for religious and philantliropic gatherings. After the death of Sir George Williams a new and more convenient building was proposed as his fitting memorial. Exeter Hall was sold, and at a cost of £100,000 an island site was purchased in Tottenham Court Road and a new Institute was erected. This provided the features of a young men's club — including lounge, swimming batlxs, shooting gallery, gymnasium — besides being thoroughly- equipped as an educational and religious centre for men. Its management was undertaken by Mr. J. J. Virgo, who was specially invited to accept the post of secretary because of his Austrahan experiences. The Central Y.M.C.A. was entirely responsible for its erection and management and the National Council did not share either liability or control. The latter body had its own headquarters in Russell Square in a house (called the Sir George Williams' House) presented to it by the family of Sir George Williams. When a large addition to the clerical staff proved necessary the adjoining house was secured and in this enlarged building the National Council pursued its work until the autumn of 1915 Just before this period the two organization^ had conducted their operations in separate channels, but the exigencies of the war suggested cooperation, and the respective officers and committee considered and approved fresh arrangements for wiser and ampler provision on behalf of the soldiers Under this scheme the Central Y.M.C.A trans- ferred the Tottenham Court Road centre to the National Council. This arrangement not only coordinated existing agencies but provided adequate accommodation for the National Council staff and enabled this handsome and commodious building to be utilized day and nig'.it for the war work. From this period Mr. Virgo becain j Fiel<l Secretary to the National Council an;l later started on a world tour for the advanceniont of Y.M.C.A. interests. With Tottenham Court Road, its station huts, au'l other metropolitan centres, the Y.M.C.A. accommodated on an average 7,500 men every week in its cubicles. The whole of these huts and buildings were connected by the military authorities at their request with the telephone, so that pressure at one place could freciuently be relieved by vacant beds at others— each and all bearing the description of " ever-open " huts. With the assistance of .scouting parties supplied with motors the streets were scoured for soldiers stranded late at night. From the headquarters flowed a perennial stream of new ideas and activities. En- quirers from all parts of the world desired particulars of husband, son, brother or friend who had been mi.ssing in such and such engagemsnt. Usually it wa? the story or an officer, non-commissioned man, or private who was last seen in attack and no record could be obtained concerning his whereabouts. Through the good offices of the American Y.M.C.A. in Germany, to whom the official list of British prisoners in Germany was available, immediate steps were taken to get in touch with the facts. Again tliere were difficulties with the prisoners' letters, and in many cases it was po.^sible to .secure an avoidance of delay. On other occasions the Y.M.C.A. obtained news respecting men who through various reasons had not communicated with their friends. An oft-repeated request was for a photograph of the grave where loved ones lay buried Disabled soldiers turned to the V.M.C.A. after their discharge from the Army for assistance in securing suitable employment. These inquiries suggested an Emplojinent Bureau, and through its agency hundreds of men were brought into touch with employers and saved from the neces- sity of tramping about in search of work. A novel method of bridging over the period of separation between soldiers and their friends was initiated by the Y.M.C.A. through its Snapshots League. With simple but efficient machinery 11,000 amateur photo- graphers were enrolled who secured 500,000 snapshots illustrative of the sailor's or soldier's family and friends. This work was performed without charge. Men of H.M. Forces were sup- plied with forms upon which they stated that they desired photos of their wife, parents or sweetheart living in the place specified. These 192 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. were returned to the Y.M.C'.A. Snapshots J. eague, Tottenham Court Koad, and forwarded to till) nearest vohmtary helper, ^\■hen the pliotos were prepareil the pliotographer dispatched eopies in special weatherproof envelopes to the soldier in France, Salonika, Kgyptor elsewhere. The enterprise cost about £10,000, which was subscribed privately by those who recognized Its value and significance. It was also ailoptud by the Y.M.C.A. organizations ui Australia, Xew Zealand, South Africa and Bermuda in order to perform for their troops serving under tiie British flag a siindar service to that enjoyed by the home armies. Throughout the Com- iMonwoalth the necessary forms of application could be obtained in the Post OfiHces. Tlu-ough the cooperation of the General Coimcil of the Bar and the Council of the Law Society arrangements were made for providing ill the Y.M.C.A. huts free legal advice to non- commissioned officers and men in H.M. Forces. This help was given by barristers and solicitors on active service and confined absolutely to .civil matters. The Y^.M.C.A. stipulated that litigation would not be undertaken either at its cxpon.se or with its help. In special cases the men were put into communication with the odicial department at the Koyal Courts of Justice established under special rules of Court. The Xa\v required the a.ssistance of the "\'.M.C.A. as nuuh as the Army, though the circumstances of its work did not pre- sent the same opportunities. To serve the sailor on board ship was not yet iMacticable, aid therefore the Red Triangle greeted hina w hen he came ashore on leave. At places like Portsmouth, Chatham, Harwich, Newcastle, Rosytli, Cromarty and Invergorden — to name a few such centres — the National Council, in conjunction with the Scottish Y'.M.C.A. (of wliicli Sir Andrew Pettigrew was chairman and Mr. Jas. Mackenzie secretary), wliich wivs responsible for the agencies in the north, made provision for naval men. In all essential respects the naval and military departments were organized on kindred lines. The appre- ciation of officers and men of all ratings in the Navy testified to the value of the work. Admiral Jellicoe and Admiral Beatty gave A "CABBAGE PATCH" IN LONDON Turned to good account : A hut erected on an old building site in Kensington. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 198 AT THE LITTLE THEATRE. Lady helpers preparing a meal for a number of Barbadians and recruits from Trinidad. every possible facility and supported the undertakings both privately and in public. During the early days of September, 1914, tlie Y.il.C.A. commenced operations at the (Vystal Palace for the benefit of lad8 training for the Royal Naval Division. At certain ))eriods nine to ten thousand were at the Crysta Palace, before being drafted to other spheres of action. They \Aere enlisted from the North of Kiigland, from ^A'ales and the Midlands and from many quiet villages, east and west, as well as north and south. The opportunities for service in tliis H.]\LS. Crystal Palace, as it was styled, were therefore considerable. For its accommodation the authorities granted the use of a large amovuit of floor space, including the Egyptian, Grecian and Roman Courts in the centre transept, and later placed at the disposal of the Y.M.C.A. the Jlorocco and Alhambra Courts, as well as the North Tower Gardens and theatre. The services were varied and in- teresting and included quite unconvenfional agencies. Owing to necessity the organization acted as washerwoman to thoiLsands of these naval men in training. The laundry business developed into a great concern and necessitated a large staff and a careful methodical system m order to avoid confusion and delay, but its sole genesis was the comfort and convenience of the men. In ordinary course the naval no«)nian delivered the various mails as tliese arri\(';l at the Palace, but in such a hu2e building the men could not be easily found, especially when on dutj-, and letters were frequently delayed in consequence. Times of great pressure prevented the naval authorities from employing a special staff to deal with " dead " letters or parcels. To the men, Iiowever, these communications from their friends were all-important, and much relief wa.s experienced when, at the request of \'J4 'nil:: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. INSIDE THE EUSTON HUT. the officers, the Y.M.C.A. undertook an important share of the postal service. During twelvemonths the Y.M.C.A. dealt with 1,000,000 le iters and parcels ; the sale of stamps in that period was valued at £3,000 and postal orders were purchased by the men to the amount of £9,000. The Savings Bank possessed, on an average, between two and three thousand depositors with a substantial amount standing to their credit. By request also of the officers the Y.M.C.A. published a little book at the price of one penny enabling particulars to be recorded concerning the man's pay, the amount he had received and, where necessary, the amount due to the Divi- sion. It was of a size made for his cap — the best of pockets for a sailor. Concerts and lectiu-es were regularly organized in the theatre, and on certain evenmgs, as well as on Sundays, services arranged of a definitely religious character. Help of a more personal nature was rendered on behalf of wives and mothers, who unfailingly turned to the Y.M.C.A. in times of necessity. Two or three workers attended specially to such cases. Parental anxieties were relieved, and when the wives of married men did not receive regular letters, a tactful word frequently pvilled them up to the scratch. Thousands of men signed temperance and purity pledges, and every effort was made by the Y.M.C.A. to assist the men of the R.N.D. to keep sober and healthy for the campaign on which they would enter when the period of training was completed. The Scottish National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s, whose executive worked in conjiuiction with Tottenham Court Road, devoted considerable care and thought to the sailors in the northern part, of the kingdom, and established naval centres at Rosyth, Invergorden, Cromarty, and elsewhere. The places at which sailors put in for a few hours were but ill provided with reasonable means of recreation or enter- tainment, and were not designed for a crowd of men anxious to make amends for a fairly long spell at sea. The presence of the Fleet off the coasts of Scotland changed the social conditions of many northern towns. Little Highland burghs were caught up in the machinery of war, and accom- modated themselves and their institutions to thousands of men passing to and from the ships, and to the large staff of artificers engaged on repairs and refittings. At one small town, when the trams were usually late on the journey up, hundreds failed to reach their ships, and had to wait until the morning. These situations provoked the despair of the provost and leading townsmen. Every public building sheltered the men, and on occasions even the small lock- up with its one or two cells was utilized for the purpose of affording relief from the streets, and as a protection from the weather. In this emergency the Y.M.C.A. came to the rescue. Plans were designed for a permanent building and obtained the approval of the Admiralty, who made a grant for its immediate erection, as THE TIMES HISTOIIY OF THE WAU. 195 well as tliat of the Admirals on tlic Division. Experience quickly showed that the institute was too small, an* I in the course of a few months a substantial addition became necessary. Like the Y.M.C.A. station huts in tlio metropolis, which were equally open to the sailor, it provided rest, refreshment and recreation, and ga\c much satisfaction to the sailors. When the cry wfnt up for shells and^ig gims and labour became mobilized in a Irax- never before witnessed in England, occasion arose for meeting the bed and breakfast require- ments of battalions of men posted to districts alreadj' crowded with workers. Even where the question of lodgings presented few diffi- culties, the midday meal for thousands of men had to be met adequately by outside agencies so that localities concerned could be relieved of the impossible strain. From the circum- stances of its foundation the Y.M.C.A. hail not received the support of Trade Union members to any considerable extent. Until the war its operations w^re assigned principalh to the shop assistants, clerks, buyers and managers of retail and wholesale houses. It possessed a sprinkling of professional men. but the working classes were uninfluenced. Some of the Y.M.C.A. leaders sought the co- operation of the industrial workers, but they held aloof and the gulf seemed wide and insur- inoimtable. Temperament and outlook prob- ably accounted for this division of interest, which g^e^^ deeper and w ider as the years ad\-anced. AN'lien the abnormal situation ci-eated In- the enlargement of munition factories became acute in various parts of the country the Y.M.C.A. had alreatly nuxde good on its war work. To the Y.M.C.A., therefore. peoi)|e turned for help on behalf of the nninition workers, and the Red Triangle responded eagerly and willingly. As a rapjirochement liad been established with soldiers and sailors, the Y.M.C.A. leaders gladly embraced the oppor- tunity of another and unexpected extension of their activities. Tlie :\rvmition Workers' Auxi- liary Committee was established l)y Mr. A. K. Yapp, the General Secretary, and Princess Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein accepted t!ie office of president, attending the commhtee meetings with almost invariable regularity, ;ind .showing the keenest interest in the various undertakings. Lord Derby, who had recognized the necessity for special voluntary efforts in order to deal with the problem, became chair- man of the committee. Mr. R. H. Swainson was organ zer. Some of the committee became responsiVjle for the operations organized in imi)ortant areas. Lady Henry (irosvenor, for instance, had charge of the Y.M.C.A. -services for mimition workers at \\'oohvich, Crayford, and the adjoining district^ ; ]Mis. \\in.stoii Churchill superintended the agencies at Enfield Lock and Waltham Cross ; CJonntess Fitz- williani supervised the arrangements at Shef- field ; Lady Hugh Grosvenor was responsi})le for work in Cheshire ; Mrs. A\'illiams (of Miskin) ^^^m mmmr^am Iff If ■—^-.^ g^HHg- ■ ^W n '^ni . .1, ■ 1 ^ ' f Jp% i EP^ M l**-^ m WImi 0'^ :m^^m "S^ ^T^ n '^^^^^^B^ "^iP^^^^^^^^H^^M^^ Abl ^*^ <A^ "^ JL^^ * s^^k'^^ww^ "^rl ■B Hj 'V^mf^^ ^'W m MIDNIGHT AT THE WATERLOO HUT. 196 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. pprfonned a similar duty in connexion with the munition oontres in South Wales ; and the Scottish National Couneil imdertook the ar- rangements in Scotland. K very thing had to be evolved and co- ortiinated jus the circumstances demanded. The lady superintendents were responsible for .securing lady workers and for equipping their district centres, even to kitchen utensils. cutlery, crockery, and the details incidental to su[)plying heavy meals and sleeping accommo- dation. W^ithin a short time they organized 3,000 ladi«!s who did not receive a permy in salary, and where they lived at the hostel paid for their own board and lodging. These voluntary helpers performed a variety of work, necessitating in many instances night shifts or early morning duties. To their tact, womanly qualities, and arduous work were due the attractiveness, cleanliness and good management of the establishinents in munition centres. At Woolwich, owing to the large influx of workers, the question of supplying meals became urgent. During the dinner hour every public house and refreshment shop was crowded, and men often waited in long queues to be served. The Y.M.C.A. did not desire to com- pete with legitimate trading concerns when these met the need, but an impossible situation was created, and men and women who \\ orked long hours in munition factories could not secure nourishing food at moderate prices served with some degree of comfort. The supply of guns and shells suffered as well as the workpeople, and employers and employees equally rejoiced when the Y.M.C.A. organized a great undertaking. When in full work- ing order Lady Henry Grosvenor organized 20,000 meals every day, the majority of which consisted of the heavy midday order. For the highly paid operative the popular demand was a shilling three-course dinner, of excellent quality. An orchestra was provided and the diners enjoyed their meal whilst listening to a oaj)ital musical programme. Later it l)ecam(^ necessary to meet the require- ments of those who preferred something less expensive on the a la carte basis. The men who went on night shifts also found their wants studied, and in order to serve them a staff of ladies worked through the night. Inspection of the Woolwich centre satisfied the conditions of cleanliness, quality of food, and the attractiveness of the general surroundings. In the London Dock centres, where Lady Askwith was in charge, the labourers appre- ciated a sevenpenny dinner of hot meat and potatoes supplied in liberal quantities. They were accustomed to larg<* portions and did not require sweets or coffee. But for the Y.M.C.A. Hut they would perforce have had to make shift with the helping of cold meat and^^read carried with them from home in the typical red handkerchief. Similar provision was made in the provinces for the labourer or artisan on war work. Thus at Liverpool, where the need existed for can- teens on the dock premises, the Dock Board and Shipowners' Association formed a company with a capital of £10,000 for the erection of huts, which were handed over to the Y.M.C.A. Originally the Dock Board subscribed £5,000, but when the first two or three buildings proved successful the Board immediately doubled the capital. .Absolute necessity demanded these places of rest and refreshment for the dock labourer. Some of the eating houses previously fre- quented by the men were extremely dirty, and they had to be content with indifferent food and unpleasant conditions. In the huts by the Liverpool Dock side the equipment was clean and the sevenpenny dinners well cooked and of the best quality. The result must in the majority of instances be credited to the lady workers who volunteered from some of the best middle -class families in the city of Liverpool, and took a regular share of the duty, some giving one or two days every week while others attended during the whole of the six days. The test of the pudding is in the eating. These ladies when the dinners were served were con- tent to piu-chase a cut off the joint from which the customers had been supplied or a helping from the same make of puddings. Those competent to judge of the effect of the arrangements stated that the men performed their heavy work under improved health con- ditions, while its volume was greater and there was less heavy drinking or striking. The opinion of the Liverpool Dock Board and Shipowners' A.ssociation may be gathered by the readiness with which the capital was doubled. At Sheffield, Newcastle and elsewhere the committees under lady presidents met the needs of the workers according to local con- ditions. Cast-iron plans were avoided and the locality allowed to determine the best way of meeting the emergency. At Newcastle, for instance, with the cooperation of the firm of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. lit; THE SHAKESPEARE HUT IN GOWER STREET, LONDON. Opened by Princess Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein (in smaller picture) August 11, 1916. Sir Wm. Armstrong, Whit worth & Co., the Y.M.C.A. served midday nieals in a building in <'lo.se proximity to the Hrm's works. Special ])rovision was established for the women, who came at 12 o'clock and retired from the building in time to permit of the male workers obtaining their meal. One general rule ob- tained in all thes3 Y.M.C.A. dining rooms — cleanliness, quality of food and reasonable prices. A more ambitious scluniie included hostels iov the workers where they could not only obtain meals b\it sleeping accommodation and th(> usual recreative and other attrac- tions. Owing to the abnormal conditions lodgings were difficult if not impossible to obtain by the man suddenly diunped down in i\ district many milc\s from his home ties. Wliere obtainable the bedroom often proved unsatisfactory owing to the crowded state of the dwelling. Scores of cases occurred of landladies letting the bedroom in turn tlu-oughout the whole 24 hours. Men had either to endure such places or seek quarters several miles distant from the factory. The latter coiu"se in\olved tiresome journeys after long hours and au absence of comfort or home life during the meal- times. To meet an unquestioned need the Y.M.C.A. initiated an experimental scheme at Enfield by which the workers could live imder healtliier and pleasanter conditions. This developed in raanj' other districts. At Enfield it pro\ided for the erection of wooden huts with- in easy distance of the factories as sleeping c[uarters, so that the worker could secure a small but clean and convenient cubicle to his own use. He had a comfortable bed, clean 198 THK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. slu'ets, a box for his clothes, the use of baths and otlior necessaries. In close proximity to the cubicles a common hall was erected for meals, recreations and letter writing. The food was well cooked and served by lady helpers on dainty-looking tables always bright with freshly cut flowers. , For an inclusive sum (averaging usually about 20s.) per week the munition worker secured full board, lodging and wasliing. Moreover, he enjoyed many club facilities impossible in the ordinary private lodgings. Without leaving the common hall he could piny billiards, listen to the concert or write his letters. Employers recognized the advantages offered by the hostel and in many instances contributed liberally to its equipment. According to the conditions for the assessment of war profits tlie Exchequer sanctioned the payment of a certain proportion to schemes for the betterment of their employees. Advantage was taken of this arrangement, for instance, by Messrs. Stewart & Lloyd, of (Glasgow, who financed tlie whole requirements of a hostel for their workers situated clo.se to their factory. Lady Hugh Grosvenor undertook the charge of a small garden city in Cheshire which developed through the generosity of Messrs. Brimner, Mond & Co., who were engaged on war work. In order to meet the needs of their employees, many of whom had been brought from the front, provision was made for 500 cubicles erected in blocks and fitted with baths and washhouses. The club accommo- dation for meals, games, lectures and con- certs was excellent, whilst the kitchen equip- ment was equal to that of a first-class restaiu-ant. Lady Hugh Grosvenor and her staff of lady workers made an innovation at this centre by the supply of hot midday meals carried to the works two or three miles distant for those resi- dents who could not return to the hostel fcr dinner. Those who visited this large hostfl were delighted with the artistic fittings and the bright and attractive curtains which guarded the place from any suspicion that it was a poor- law institution or an ordinary philanthropic home. The luuiiition \\orker received his money's wortli, j)lus sympathy and cooperation, and whilst he was a customer he had a personal relationship to the whole undertaking. The Y.M.C.A. did not attempt to pauperize liim, but ran the enterprise on business lines, charging against it a fair interest on capital expenditure. Tae profits were not devoted to the general work of the Y.M.C.A. but placed to a fund for the bettennent of the institute itself. Moreover, he was not badgered with religion. It was there all the time, and probably he remained con.scious of the fact, but its influences were pervasive, rather than aggressive. He was taught t<> realize that Christianity was making its con- tribution to the requirements of the war by the provision of the hostel. Mr. Lloyd George, who was then Minister of Munitions, visited several of the Y.M.C.A. hostels, and expressed his warm approval of the arrangements. By friendly arrangement, the Young Women's" Christian Association undertook the provision of huts an<l equipment for the women workers, and places started by the Y.M.C.A. were later handed over to this organization in order to create a proper division of labour between the two Associations. The linking up of the Mother Country and the Overseas Dominions to face a common foe showed the necessity for fresh efforts. The first contingent to reach England preparatory to service in France was that from Canada. Thirty thousand strong, it proceeded to Salisbury Plain for training. The Canadian Y.M.C.A. obtained permission from the Cana- dian Militia Department for seven secretaries to accompany the Expeditionary Force. With the idea of facilitating military discipline, they received honorary rank as captain and wore officer's unifonn, but did not perform military duties, and were quite free in carrying on social, religious and recreational work amongst the Canadians. WTien the first division proceeded to France in lOL'j it was accompaned by five secretaries. The second Canadian contingent arrived in the spring of the same year with six secretaries, five.of whom crossed to France when the training of this division was completed. Another five secretaries came over with the third division and the whole of these went to the front. Fifteen Y.M.C.A. secretaries were there- fore in association with the Canadian Divisions in France, and later a score of secretaries arrived from Canada to meet the requirements of Dominion soldiers in English camps, whilst retaining fifty Y.M.C.A. centres in Canada for the troops still under training. Opinions varied concerning the honorary rank of the Canadian Y.M.C.A. secretary and' whether he could perform his duty with greater success than the British Y.M.C.A. worker who remained a civilian. The rank possessed some compensations mixed with disadvantages. But, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 191> officer or civilian, British or Canadian, the Y.M.C.A. methods remained much the same. Reference should here he made to the con- nexion between the Canadians and the Y.M.C.A. at home. When the first Canadian Division reached SaUsbury Plain the parent branch prepared for their entertainment some of tlic earliest huts used in this country. Their letters for home were written in these buildings. At night they gathered roimd tlie ])iano and sang ■' The Maple Leaf." Far away from shops, they besieged the counter for necessaries, including cough mixtures and oil stoves. By this time the Plain was soaked with the late autumn rains, and they required much ingenuity to keep the bell tents dry and no Uttle persistence and patience to exorcise the colds and couglis that infected abnost the whole division. The Y.M.C.A. hut was the one warm, light and cheery place in the whole camp, and the Canadian appreciated the contrast. Lord Roberts wrote to the Y.M.C.A. on the day he left Englivnd for France — four days before he passed away — as follows : " Lord Roberts hears nothing but praise for what the Y.M.C.A. is doing at the various camps. The latest tribute he has received is from the Canadian contingent, who, when he inspected the men on Salisbury Plain, said that they did not know what they would have done without the facilities afforded them by the accommodation provided by the Y.M.C.A." On behalf of the 13th Battalion Royal Highlanders of Canada the captain and adjutant wrote as follows : " Allow me to express our appreciation of the hospitality shown by the Y.M.C.A. to us as individuals and as a regiment. Many members of the regiment have benefitted by hours spent in your tents, and the accommodation granted us by you has made our weekly church parade possible." By September 1, 1914, 70 to 80 transports were on their way from Austraha and at frequent intervals during the progress of the war continued to arrive. In January, 1915, these troops took part in the defence of Egypt and in April proceeded to Gallipoli, where with the Xow Zcalanders they performed briMiant anfl ilaring feats which brought them deatliless renown. Their own Y.M.C.A. .secretapies wore permitted to accompany the troopships, and later were asked to go forward to Gallipoli, where they experienced similar adventures and dangers to those of the men. Australia and Xew Zealand always encouraged the Y.M.C.A. movement. The large buildings erected in the principal cities and the confidence^ shown in this enterprise by the governing and commercial classes evidenced that the Y.M.C.A. before the war represented something that was more important and essential to the Commonwealth than the Y.^I.C.A. at homo appeared to the British people. Even at the period of the Boer War the Australian Y.M.C.A. secretaries accompanied the troops to South Africa, and during peace times met the needs of the Vohmteers in their annual encampments much in the same manner as in Great Britain. The stay of the Anzacs in Egypt, however, revealed the weakness of the Y.M.C.A. terri- torial divisions diu-ing a great emergency. The Australian and Xew Zealand secretaries, in the absence of mutual arrangements, kept naturally to their own patch until the situation was reviewed in the light of new circimistances. THE Y.M.C.A. HUT AT ALDWYCH. 200 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. From that ju'riotl Ausstralia and New Zealand, thf American Y.M.C.A. at Cairo, and the Hritish Y.M.C.A. joined hands and promoteti u National Y.M.C.A. Coimoil for Egyjjt. This fact indicated the trend of events and proved one of the .strongest arguments for the inter- ilependence and cooperation of the whole Empire Y.M.C.A. movement. When in the beginnuig of 1916 the Anzacs were fighting on the Western Front they enjoyed the hos- pitality of the British Y.M.C.A., who by that time were pushing their huts and marquees nearer to the firing line. Later on thousands came over for training in the home camp.s, and at jilaces like Salisbury Plain found large centres organized for their comfort and recrea- tion as well as for moral and religious assist- ance. During this stage no fewer than 4,000 Anzacs poured into the Metropolis for week- end fiu'loughs. To a gi-eat extent it was an aimle.ss throng with little idea of the where- abouts of notable or historic sights and building.s and yet desirous of seeing something. By com- bination of the honie and overseas Y.M.C.A. staffs, a system of personally conducted tours was arranged, which avoided dangers to the lioalth of the men and worked to their pleasure and advantage. In staff and policy the Indian Y.M.C.A. National Council always maintained a high level. This was due partly to cosmopolitan en- vironment and in some measm-e to the condi- tions under which it commenced operations. It sought, for instance, to influence the highly- educated young Hindus and Mahomedans to an appreciation of Christianity as well as to make provision for the Englishman in the Civil Service or engaged in banking and com- mercial houses. Many of the Indian Y.M.C.A. secretaries were University men who had .studied Indian thought and literature. They engaged in notable social experiments, and whilst remaining true to their primary religious aim endeavoured to introduce improved methods of agriculture, seed -growing, and the better breeding of cattle amongst the agricultural classes. They also sought the advancement of cottage industries and the development of the cooperative credit movement. In these objects considerable success followed their efforts, so that on the outbreak of hostilities the Indian Y.M.C.A. enjoyed a position of c(jnfidenco and appreciation on the part of the authorities. For the purposes of the war the Indian National Council set free some of its trained .secretaries, including Mr. Oliver McCowen, LL.B., who, as already mentioned, took charge of the Y.M.C.A. operations in France aid Mr. Wilson who went to Salonika. Others .served in France, Mesopotamia, and British East Africa. A .section of the men devoted themselves to the social necessities of the Indian troops who arrived in France, having accompanied them from India. This arrangement was niade on the distinct understanding with the authorities— and duly and strictly observed — that prosely- tizing should not be attempted. These Indian Y.M.C.A. secretaries rendered a variety of personal services, such, for instance, as visiting wounded men in hospital, writing letters to their homes, the erection of huts or marquees for games, the arrangement of tea parties — an innocent form of pleasiu-e much enjoyed by the Indian soldier — and similar acts of sym- pathy and hospitality. The depletion of staff" in India which followed, received compensation by the services of Rev. Dr. Moulton of Manchester, Dr. T. R. Glover of Cambridge, and several clergymen, ministers and young Divinity students from England and Scotland. Some of these men delivered lectures on religious and other subjects, with reference to the war and its lessons, for the benefit of the highly educated Hindus and Mahomedans. Others devoted themselves to the ordinary Y.M.C.A. organization. Not the least valuable part of the war contribution made by the Indian National Council was its endeavour to afford the thousands of Terri- torials, sent to India on the outbreak of war, an opportunity of visiting some of its historic sights and of appreciating the material and social advantages of British rule in the Great Dependency. For the most part these Terri- torials were untravelled, and their stay in India, through the assistance of the Y.M.C.A., became educational and formative in its character and influence. CHAPTER CXLIII. THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1916 SECOND PHASE. Survey of the Second Phase of General Brusiloff's Offensive — General Lesh's Advance ON the Lower Styr — The Battle on the Stokhod — General Sakharoff's Advance south- west of Lutsk — The Battle of Mikhailovka — The Battle on the Lipa — The Battle for Brody^The Advance against the Lvoff — Tarnopol Railway — General Lechitsky's Campaign — Its Objectives — -The Capture of Kolomea and the Cutting of the Stanislavoff- Marmaros Sziget Railway — The Fall of Stanislavoff and the Capture of a Dniester Crossing — Count Bothmer's Retreat and General Shcherbacheff's Advance in the Centre -^Changes in the Higher Commands of the Austro-German Armies south of the Marshes OX J line 4 the Russian annies had broken through the enemy Hnes in Volhynia and on the Bukovinian frontier. What the first phase of the great Russian offensive in the summer of 1916 accomplished was to develop these suc- cesses within the districts in which they had been achieved. Lutsk and Dubno were re- covered ; the battle -line was advanced witliin some 40 miles of Kovel and Vladimir -Volynsk, and witliin less than 10 miles of Brody. Almost all the ground gained in Volhynia between June 4-15 was maintained against a most violent Austro-German counter-offensive car- ried on throughout the second half of the month. South of the Dniester our Allies con- quered in not quite tliree weeks practically the whole of the Bukovina, and extended their lines into south-eastern Galicia, beyond Sniatyn and Kuty. These territorial gains were accompanied by crushing military defeats of the enemy ; two Austro-Hungarian armies, that of Archduke Joseph -Ferdinand in Vol- hynia, and that of General von Pflanzer-Baltin in the Bukovina, lost more than half their effectives, and also the other three Austro- German armies operating south of the Pripet Marshes (the Third Austro-Hungarian Armj", Vol. IX.— Part 110. 201 under General Puhallo von Brlog on the Lower Styr; the Second Austro-Hungarian Army, under General von Boehm-Ennolli, on the Brody-Tarnopol, and the Army of General Coimt Bothmer, on the Tarnopol-Butchatch front) suffered very severe losses. The Petro grad official commutuque of June 27 stated that the prisoners and trophies captured by the armies of General Brusiloff between June 4- 23 amounted to 4,031 officers, 194,041 men, 219 guns, besides 644 machine-guns, 196 bomb mortars, 146 artillery ammunition wagons and 38 searchlights. The enormous importance of the Russian victories of Jime, 1916, as a step in the attrition of the enemy forces was patent ; the losses suffered by the enemy on the Eastern front during those three weeks were about equal to those he had suffered at Verdun in 130 days of fighting. Still, all that the Ru.ssians had accomplished so far in the field left more to be done. The Austro-German front south of the Marshes had been pierced, but it was not as j^et broken up to the extent of necessitating a general retreat. In the course of the War both sides had had to learn that where the greatest nations of the world are fighting, it takes much to render a victory final and a '202 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. NEAR THE DANGER ZONE. Russian Officers and peasants watching a battle. decision irreversible. Each side had passed tlirough defeats and recoveries. Was a new recoverj'^ on the Eastern front still possible for the Central Powers ? This was the question which had to be answered by the second and third phase of the fighting between the Pripet IMarshes and the Carpathian Mountains. Generalsliip and available reserves were the factors in its solution. In the first phase of the offensive our Allies had gained two salients — in Volhynia and in the Bukovina. But as much as "nature abhors a vacuum " the strategy of railway and trench warfare abhors salients. \\'as the aj^proximately straight line to be regained by the flattening out of the Russian salients or by a completion of the Russian advance ? The battles on the Lower Styr, on the Loshnioff-Zalostse and the Tlumatch lines, the fall of Brody and Stanislavoff, and finally the retreat of Count Bothmer's Army in the centre svipplied the answer to that question. They constitute the second phase of the great Russian offensive of 1916. Towards the end of June, fovir divisions could be distinguished south of the Marshes : (1) In the extreme north, on the Lower Styr, between the Pripet Jlarshes and the district of Kolki, the enemy front had remained practically intact. (2) Between Kolki and Novo-Alexiniets (on the Galician border), on a stretch of about 80 miles, the enemy front had been knocked in, the line now forming an enormous salient toward the west, in some sectors as much as 45 miles deep. (3) Between Novo-Alexiniets and Visnio- vtchyk, on a front of about 40 miles, the enemy lines were again practically intact, and even in the sector between Visniovtchyk and the Dniester, the regression of the Avistro- German forces was as yet slight. (4) South of the Dniester the defences of the enemy had been completely broken up and our Allies were advancing in full force to the west, against Kolomea and the Carpathian passes. The centre in the Sereth-Strypa sector formed the pivot of the Germanic defences south of the Marshes. It was based on a strong river line, on which like beads on a string one might see num.erous villages and nnanors, each of them transformed into a small fortress. On a stretch of about 50 miles it was connected with the west by no less than four railway lines. Its right flank was covered by the Dniester, and THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 203 althoiig]i our Allies had crossed the Lower Strypa round Butchatch and were approaching the line of tlie Koropiets, Bothmer's position in the centre was not really outflanked as long as he maintained his hold on the Dniester crossings. Below Nizhnioff the difTicult nature of the Dniester belt prevented the Bussiun Army on the southern bank of the river from making its pressure seriously felt in the right flank of Count Bothmer's Army. The left flank of the Austro-Gemaan centre on the line Brody- Zalostse was protected by an exceedingly strong front of hills, marshy rivers, ponds and thick forests. Finally the existence of a series of excellent lines of defence in the rear of the Strj-pa front, along the many parallel northern confluents of the Dniester, allowed Bothmer to hang on to his original positions to the last moment ; he kne\\- that he could always effect his retreat by short and quick move- ments without any danger of being cut off. His position would then resemble that of the Russians in the late sunmier of 1915 when they slowly retreated tlirough Eastern Galicia, fighting stubborn rearguard actions, after they had already been outflanked in all appearance both south of the Dniester and in Volhynia. But as long as the centre held out, all hope of a recovery on the Ea.storn front was not lost for the Central Powers. Their first effort to re-establish their line was by a counter-offensive against the northern flank of the Volhynian salient, in the region between the Stokhod and the Styr. An attempt was made by tho Germans to cut in at its base in the sector where they were still holding the line of the fStjT or its neiglibourhood. A successful thrust across the river in that region would have forced a general Ru.ssian retreat in Volhynia. The German counter-offensive, which was developed and defeated in the second half of .lune, wa.s followed up by the Ru.ssians by an attack against the German positions on the Lower Styr. In the course of Juno the Army of General Lesh had been brought south, acro.ss the ^Marshes, thus enabling General Kaledin to concentrate his forces in the Lutsk .salient. On July 4 General Lesh opened a brilliant advance on both sides of the Kovel-Sarny railway. The line of the Stokhod, in that sector some .30 miles to the west of the Styr, was reached in the cour.se of a few days. The northern flank of General Kaledin's Army was now completely covered. The longitude of Lutsk was passed by tlie Russian troops and the Volhjmian triangle of fortresses ceased to form AFTER THE RUSSIAN BOMBARDMENT. View of the Austrian entanglements showing the effects of artillery fire. 204 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •205 a salient. North of it " the problem of the straight line " was thus settled in favour of our Allies. The enemy was definitely thrown back on to the defensive, and the battle for Kovel now developed on the entire Stokhod line, from Kisielin to Stobychva. The next attempt at a counter-offensive wa« planned by the enemy against the southern flank of the Volhynian salient. Big forces were collected north of the Galician frontier, between the Upper Styr and the Bug. The attack was timed for Julj' 18. It was fore- stalled by General Sakharoff, who on July 16 opened a new offensive against the Austro- Germari lines. In a week's fighting he dashed all chances and hopes of the enemy of being able to regain the initiative in that region. Then, after a few days' lull in the fighting. General Sakharof? opened in full force his own offensive. On July 28 his troops entered Brody. The Lutsk salient was thus being extended to the south, its left wing was moving forward. Then, in the first days of August, followed an offensive against the right flank of the German centre. The Russian troops were approaching the first-class railway leading from Lvoff by Tarnopol to Odessa, the most impor- tant line of communication of Count Bothmer's Army. By August 9 the Russians stood within strilcing distance of that railway. The problem of the Lutsk salient was solved also on its southern flank. A straight line was being gradually established at the expense of the enemy. In the southern theatre of war, between the Dniester and the Carpathian ^Mountains, General Lechitsky continued after the fall of Czemovitz his rapid advance to the west. On June 29 his troops entered Kolomea, on July 4 they cut the Stanislavoff-Vorokhta-Mannaros Sziget railway in the district of Mikulitchin. Then after a month's lull in the fighting,' in the beginning of August, General Lechitsky's Army entered Stanislavoff and captured the Dniester crossing at Xizhnioft". Count Bothmer's Army in the centre was thereby effectively outflanked from the south. Its communication with the west by the so- called Transversal Railway (the line which runs through Galicia east and west at the foot of the Carpathians and is the base of the hnes across those mountains) was cut, whilst General Sak- haroff had got within reach of the Lvoff- Odcssa railway. The retreat of the " German Army of the South " could not be delayed any loiiL'tr. Two days after General Lechitsky's troops had entered Stanislavoff, those of General Shcherbacheff's Army were in posses- sion of the whole length of the Sereth-Strypa front which the Au.stro-German annies had held for the last 11 montlis and which they had defended with the most desperate stubbornness during the preceding 10 weeks of the Rus.sian offensive. With the retreat of the enemy on to the Zlota Lipa the last sector of the original front south of the Marshes passed into the hands of our Allies. A new approximately straight line was estaVjli.shed. North of the Dniester it extended about 20-45 miles east of the original positions ; south of the river the Russian pro- gress reached an average of over 60 miles. As in the Russian retreat of 1915, so also in their advance of 1916, the movements were slowest in the centre in Podolia, more ra|)id in Volhynia, quickest of all in the corridor between the Dniester and the Carpathians. Of the three vital centres liehind the original Austro- German front — Kovel, Lvoff and Stanislavoff — only the last was captured by our Allies. Still, that capture was of capital importance. For during the lull which intervened between the second and the third phase of the offensive, a new Ally joined Russia in the attack against Transylvania. On August 27 Rumania de- clared war on Austria-Hungary with a view to liberating her kinsmen from a foreign yoke. Whilst north of the Marshes the great battle was raging round Baranovitche, and on the northern flank of the Lutsk salient the Germans were exhausting their forces in fruitless attacks against the Gruziatyn-Rozhyshche front, in his own unmistakable style General Brusiloff carried out another offensive stroke. This time the blow wa-s delivered on the Lower Styr, in the southern Poliesie, between the Pripet Marshes and the Volhynian theatre of war. Carefully prepared beforehand, and ex- ecuted with the suddenness and vigoiu" character- istic of General Brusiloff's strategy, the advance from the Styr to the Stokhod, on a front of .35 to 40 miles, and to a depth of about 25 miles, was achieved in four days, across ground wliich before the war would have l>een con- sidered altogether impracticable for big mili- tary operations. In the gigantic drama which imfolded itself on the Eastern front in the simimer of 1916, these operations tended to sink to the level of a minor episode ; before the 110—2 206 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi, THE KOVEL FRONT. iittention of the public had had time to con- centrate on the activities of General Lesh's army, its advance had been completed. And yet this battle in the southern fringes of the Pripet Marshes marks one of the strides of the Russian giant-nation on its path to victory. Only the barest outlines of General Lesh's offensive can be gathered from the Russian official communiques. The Petrograd report of July 4 gave the first intimation of a new battle developing on the Lower Styr. It recorded Russian gains on both sides of the Kovel-Sarny railway, in the districts of Vulka Galuzyiskaya and of Kolki, the one about twelve miles to the north-west, antl the other about the same distance to the south- west of Tchartoryisk. The advanced angle which the . enemy positions formed in this district was thus subjected to a concentric attack. The next day further progress was reported in both directions. " In the region of Violka Galuzyiskaya," says the Russiaii com,m,umque of July 5, "we broke through three lines of barbed wire entanglements fitted with land mines. In a very desperate fight on the Styr, west of Kolki, we over- threw the enemy and took over a thousand prisoners, including 170 officers, together with 3 guns, 17 machine guns, 2 searchlights, and several thousand rifles. The bridging detacliment lent the troops inost useful aid, keeping pace with the fighting units and working close to the firing line." The report of July 6 enumerated further captures of men and material effected in the lighting, which by then had reached the region of Kostiukhnovka in the north, and had extended beyond Raznitse on the southern side of the Tchartoryisk salient. Whilst from the direction of Kolki the ad- vance was carried on due north, the Russian troops which had crossed the Styr below Rafalovka were changing their direction from west to south-west. The Petrograd comm,uni- que of July 7 reported the captvu-e of the villages of Grady and Komaroff south of the Kovel- Sarny railway, and the forcing of organized enemy positions on the Galuzya-Optova- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL '2(»/ Voltchesk line north of that raihvay ; finallj- nii advance of Russian cavah-y resuUinp; in the occupation of the railway-station of Manio- vitche. These operations, carried out on con- centric linos with extraordinary speed and ])recision, led to the capture of thousands of prisoners and of numerous guns (e.g., near N'oltchesk the Russian cavalry took an entire Ivrupp battery of six guns wliich had fired onl>- a few shots). By July 7 the two concentric moveinents resulted in a junction of the forces. 'Pile Russian communique issued early on July 8 nuirks the re-establishment of a straight front fiicing west ; the line mentioned in the report runs from Gorodok and Manievitcho in the north, through Okonsk and Zagarovka to Kolki. Simultaneously with the news of this advance towartls and bej'ond the Kovel-Sarny railway, the first mention was made of another offen- sive developing almost in the thick of the Marshes. As a matter of fact, this was not a new movement ; on the same day on which the first enemy positions had been forced near Volka Galuzyiskaya and near Kolki, our Allies had begiui to advance also on the Yeziertsky- 2sovo Tcherevishche line. These operations now resulted in the capture of Griva and Leshnevka. The miportant road which crosses the River Stokhod at Novo Tcherevishche and leads hj- Manievitche fo Kolki, was now, NM'st of the Stokhod, in the hands of our Allies. " (Jeneral BrusilofTs troops," says the Petro- grad communique i.ssued on the night of July 8, " are approaching the Stokhod, routing the enemy everywhere, in spito of his des[)erHte resistance." In the next few da\s they .not merely reached but even crossed the river. The three days' battle between the Styr and Stokhod was terminated, the sub.sequeut operations of General Lesh's Army merging with those of General Kaledin's right wing and centre into the battle for Kovel. ' The Ru.ssian communique, published on the night of July 8, summarizes in terms of captures the results of General Lesh's advance : " Ac- cording to an approximate esthnate in the course of fighting between the Styr and the Stokhod from July 4 to 7 we took prisoners at least 300 officers, including two regimental commanders, and about 12,000 unwounded men, and we also captured not fewer than 45 guns, heavy and light, about 45 machine-gims, and a large quantity of shells, cartridges, arms, supplies and forage." Xor could the enemj- any longer hide the fact of his defeat. " The angle projecting towards Tchartoryisk, owing to superior pressure on its flank near Kostiukh- novka and west of Kolki was given up and a WITH GENERAL BRUSILOFF'S TROOPS. A halt to examine wounds. 208 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. shorter defensive line was chosen," ."an the BerHn report of July 7 — brief, harsh and un- pleasant. Vienna on the other hand showed terrified courtesy for its allies, more pity for itself, and even less regard to truth. Another Wounded Russians and Austrians waiting for the ambulances. Smaller picture : Lady Muriel Paget working at a field hospital on the Russian front. part of the line which the Germans had left mainly in the care of their Austrian allies was gone ! Their elaborately embroidered version of the three disastrous days in the southern Poliesie ran as follows : " The troops fighting in the Styr salient, north of Kolki, which through four weeks have been holding their own against enemy fighting forces which increased to a superiority of from tliree to five-fold, received instructions yesterday to withdraw their first lines, which were exposed to being surrounded on two sides. Favoured by the arrival of Qerman troops to the west of Kolki and by the self-sacrificing attitude of the Polish Legion near Kolodye, the movement was carried out without any distiu-bance on the part of the enemy." The Russian official reports, in their extreme, matter-of-fact brevity, yielded but the dry bones of the events and even so supplied only parts of the skeleton ; published whilst the struggle was still in progress, they had to be most particular in the choice of information to be given out to the world. Ivnowledge recalling these events to a new life has to be gathered from other sources. THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAIi. 200 In the course of June, whilst General Kalodin was first advancing, and tlion defending his gains in VoUiynia, the army of General Lesh, wliicli had previously stood north of Pinsk, was transferred across the Marshes, taking over from the Eighth Russian Army the sector on the Lower Styr. It was faced by the Third Austro -Hungarian Army of General Puhallo, which included, among others, the army corps of General von Fath and the Polish Legions under General Puchalski round Kolodye. opposite Rafalovka. In the early days of the Russian offensive only feint attacks liad been made by our allies on the Lower Styr, below Kolki. Spring was very late in 1916, and in the first days of June the ground and roads were not as yet sufficiently dry to admit of any important operations in that classical land of birch and pine forests, bogs and marshes. In the few encounters which occurred in it in June the percentage of " missing " was imusually higii on both sides ; most of these were the men, very often wounded men, who found their death in the treacherous swamps. The enemy reserves in the East were never abundant from the time when, in disregard of the reqviirements of the Russian front, the Germans had begun to squander their divi- sions at Verdun, and the Austrians had con- centrated all their available forces on the Italian front. Whatever reinforcements had been brought up after the fiisnstrous defeats in Volhynia and in the Hukovina were used to fill the gaps caused bj' the mass sur- renders or were formed at chosen points into phalanxes for counter-offensive movements. WOUNDED RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS. Russian Cossacks outside a dressing-station waiting for attention. Smaller picture : Austrian prisoners carrying a wounded comrade. . "3 'Ji a: •oe _c "■5) c *u QQ en ji: Q£ 1/3 U c u > Q u. .1. ea o c X ■OC u. < j: H C/3 4> Z j: -s: •OB NH C 3 o: > 21U THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •211 In the first days of July the attention of the German commanders was concentrated on Baranovitche and the Middle Styr. The district on the Lower Styr below Kolki was to some extent neglected. Its reserves consisted of a single Bavarian division ; and even tiie dis- position of whatever forces there were, seems to have been made on a wrong assum[ition. Russian attacks were expected on t\w higher groimd round Tchartoryisk, in the vicinity of the Kovel-Sarny railway. Once more the mili- tary intelligence of our Allies and their skill in masking their own movements and hiding their intentions from their opponents proved superior to those of the enemy, much of the superiority attained in reconnoitring in the Poliesie being due to the self-sacrificing devotion of the Little Russian peasantry inhabiting these regions. Between Komaroff and Vulka Galuzyiskaya extends a wide, low, sandy plain, so flat as to hamper observation, ^\'henever observations could not be made by means of balloons the direction of the artillery fire proved verj' difficult. Across the plain the opposing fronts formed continuous lines, although their organization could hardly be described as equal to the average obtaining under normal topographical conditions. In many parts tlie wet, sandy soil did not admit of deep earthworks and dug-outs. North of the plain traversed by the Kovel- Sarny railway, between Galuzya and Nobel, the positions no longer formed a continuous front, most of the ground being completely impassabl<^ during by far the greater part of the year. " Here in the Poliesie," wrote M. Smnskoy in the Russkoye Slovo of July 17-30, " there is no continuovis front, but merely a series of forts, scattered almost as on a chess-board. And each such fort by itself represents an entire liistory of technical craft, containing a number of ingenious devices calculated to render them strong with the smallest possible use of human force." Eacli isolated fort was dressed in "shirts of iron and steel," surrounded by barriers, obstacles and pitfalls such as no imagination had ever invented in ancient legends of enchanted, unapproachable castles. The forts were naturally placed on higher ground, the only spots capable of bearing human habitations. The tracks leading to them across the marshes were limited in number. The approaclies were protected by strong barriers lavishly covered with barbed wire. In some places even a peculiar kind of net was used, incandescent when cut, and thus at night signalling movements of tiie enemy. As far as weapons were con- cerned, here, as everywhere in the Austro- (ierman lines, matrhine-gims, cleverly placed and carefully hidden, played the most important part. Insi(l«> the settlem<'nts everything had been re-arranged by the Germans, who garrisonccl most of the ground in the thick of the Marshes, so that the Russians should not be able to direct their artillery fire by their previous knowledge of the country. But it was not merely for their .safety that the Germans took careful thought. Nice little gardens. MAJOR-GENERAL PUGHALSKI. pleasure-grounds, and even tennis-courts were laid out in those settlements ; whatever fields there were around, were tilled. The .scattered forts were connected with one another by a well -developed net of telegraph and telephoiie lines, and the whole system had light field -rail waj's for its backbone. Most of the native population had left with the Ru.ssians ; jet a certain number ha<:l remained behind, many of them without the knowledge of the German invaders. They were roaming about the forests, across paths and by means known only to themselves. They were slipping through the meshes of the network of enemy forts ami carrying informa- •21-2 THI'! TIMES II J STORY OF THE WAR. AUSTRIAN PRISONERS Captured on the Galician front tion to the arn\y which was to reconquer for them their homes and Uberate their country from the invader. In some places they formed themselves into bands, conducting guerilla warfare. The services rendered by these men to the Russian intelligence service were simply invaluable. Raids in this district had been proceeding throughout the winter, and some were carried out even in May and June, 1916. Yet the actual Russian advance through the region of forts could only be effected as an operation subsidiary to the main movement across the Manievitche-Tchartoryisk plain, of which the milestones are named in the official Petrograd reports Hot, dry weather had prevailed throughout June. The shallow ditches, rivulets and swamps in the plain were slowly disappearing, filling the air with the awful stench of drying .slime. Everywhere one could see tho.se hot- beds of innumerable swarms of midges, flies and mosquitoes which were feeding on the rapidly -decaying corpses and carcases, and harrying those who dared to live in this visually forlorn region. In the close heat of a July night in the low-lying marshes, our Allies opened their bombardment of the sectors singled out for attack. Striking the sandy soil, the shells raised up a wall of dust ; the sun rose that morning over the battlefield not in the white mist usually spreading above the waters, but in a ruddy cloud composed of dark smoke and yellow, burning sand. It was a live cloud, shaken by the violent explosions of shrapnel and illuminated by fiery lightnings. If ever hell was revealed on earth it was on the battle- fields of the Southern Poliesie. Parapets were razed, villages stood in flames, forests were breaking under the weight of the bombard- ment ; the defence was being disorganized ; in the shallow trenches lateral movements were becoming increasingly difficult, the telephone wires were being torn, different sectors were getting isolated. The living were buried in their trenches and on the old battlefields the dead were raised from their graves. In the forests the trees themselves seemed as if paralysed in the agonizing expectation of death. Not a sound, not a movement, but the fearful screeching and howling of shells and shrapnel, and the sound of bullets hitting the mighty pine trunks. The crowns and branches of the trees were breaking, and a rich shower of their green needles Mas filling the air and covering the ground. Below the dying giants human beings were moving like THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 2113 shadows, inaudible in that cataclysm of destruction. And then, in the midst of that orgy of horrors, the Russian attack began, both near Kolki and on the Rafalovka front. Across the plain afford- ing but scanty cover, and into the forests carefully fortified by the enemy, the Russian infantry was advancing with the usual heroic equanimity of the Slav peasant. What w-ere they thinking, those quiet, kindly ploughmen on that day which saw so many of them die ? Individually, of things which matter only to the individual ; as a mass, they, with their unequalled instinct of the living community and crowd, were dreaming, in the midst of visions of horror, the great mystic, shining dream of their nation. "We stormed a fortified position" or "we broke through three lines of barbed-wire entanglements fitted with land mines " were the short, business-like announcements from Russian Headquarters. How much was there in those events wlaich no reports can ever express ! Before the frontal impact of the Russian attack the Austrian defences broke down, their forces fell back wherever a retreat was still possible. The only troops that held out in their sectors for two days, until outflanked, were the Bavarians near Kolki and the Polish Legions near Kolodye. Their help, it will be remembered, was grace- fully acknowledged in the Vienna communique of July 7, and honours were conferred on the surviving remnants of what once hatl been regiments. ♦' The losses are serious," said a semi- official Polish report, " though one cannot speak of a general catastrophe." As a matter of fact, some of the Polish regiments wore practically wiped out ; thus — e.g., the oth lost almost all its officers, no less than '12 re- maining detui on the battlefield of Kolodye. In the night of July 6-7, the last enemy rear guards were withdrawing to tlii' west, firing in their retreat villages, causeways and forests. A curtain of flames was to cover the defeated army from its pursuers. Under the pale stars of the short summer niglit, across the plain covered with delicate purple poppies, past the treacherous marshes, they were trek- ing towards the distant blue range of hills, where the remnants of the Austrian forces had already found a temporary shelter and com- parative safety. In spite of the curtain of flames and the destruction of causeways, the ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT. Austrian prisoners at work relaying a narrow gauge railway. 110—3 •214 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. FIGHTING BEYOND THE STOKHOD. A party of Infantry advancing in the open. intrepid Cossacks cluing to the defeated enemy, liarassing his worn-out columns. Towards the end of Jime, in the days of the most violent German attacks between the Stokhod and the Styr on both sides of the Rovno-Kovel railway, our AlHes had had to withdraw their hne in several sectors by some four to six miles. That the withdrawal was quite insignificant was admitted even by the German official summary of the Russian offensive published on September 8, 1916 : it tried to explain away " the comparatively small progress made by the counter-offensive." But even that they were unable to maintain. Simultaneously with the advance of General Lesh's army the troops of General Kaledin resumed the initiative, and between July 4-8 regained most of their previous positions on the Rozhyshche-Gruziatyn front, and enlarged their holdings between Gruziatyn and Kolki, capturing 341 officers, 9,135 unwounded soldiers, and rich booty. On July 8 the two Russian Armies under Generals Lesh and Kaledin had reached the River Stokliod practically on the entire front between the Kovel-Sarny and Kovel-Rovno I'ailways. At two points, near Arsenovitche and near Ugly (in the bend of the river between Kashovka and Yanovka) they even forced the passage. At Ugly, Colonel Kantseroff, com- manding the 283rd Pavlograd Regiment, a I\jiight of the Order of St. George, at the head of his troops, crossed the river over a burning bridge. When the fire had been extinguished three German mines were found under the bridge ; by some miracle they had failed to explode In the coiu"se of the next day our Allies extended their positions on the western bank of the Stokhod, capturing practically the entire district within the Kashovka- Yanovka curve, and also carried the bridges near Bogus- hovka on the road and railway leading from Rovno to Kovel. The latter gains seem, how- ever, to have been abandoned in the fighting of the next few days. The forcing of the Stokliod line was certainly to prove neither an easy nor a short affair. The fighting on that front extending roimd Kovel at an average radius of slightly more than 20 miles was the first stage of the battle for that important strategic centre and railway junction. " On the issue of these battles," said an explanatory statement issued by the Russian Staff about the middle of July, " un- doubtedly depends not only the fate of Kovel and its strongly fortified zone, but also to a very considerable degree all the present opera- tions on our front. In the event of the fall of Kovel and its zone, fresh important perspec- tives will open out to us, for the road to Brest - Litovsk, and to some extent also the roads to Warsaw, will be laid bare." No wonder, then, that the Germans were detennined to hold the line of the Stokhod to the last gasp. Kovel was to them what Verdun had been to the French. The defence was decidedly favoiu-ed by the topographical conditions of the coimtry. The Stokliod itself, it is true, is but a shallow stream fordable at many points. Yet its passage is impeded by the wide, marshy areas on both its banks. The coimtry round, except near Kashovka, is completely flat, with a slight tendency to elevation on the western side. Through that low -lying plain winds the slug- gish Stokhod, in the midst of banks of reeds and beds of water-lilies. Artillery, especially THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 215 that of the heavier kind, can approach its beh only in certain sectors, and the conthtions in that respect were especially bad on the eastern side. The defensive positions of the enemy on the left bank had been partly preparod by the Austrians in the autuiun of It) 15. Ever since the Russians had broken through in front of Lutsk, the Germans had been busy converting them into first-class defences ; tens of thousands of prisoners of war and of local inhabitants, pressed for the purpose, were compelled to work imder the direction of German engineers Consecutive lines of trenches were built, land mines were laid, mazes of barbed wire were simk among the thick water growth, under the surface of the slow-flowing river. A very considerable force of artillery was brought up for the defence of the Stokhod line ; according to the best Russian authorities no less than 100 heavy guns and 180 of a lighter calibre were gathered in front of Kovel. Nor was there any lack of men — by now far less abimdant with the enemy than material. Picked troops — Bava- rians, Magyars, Austrian Germans and Polish Volunteers — were facing the Great Russian^ Kiiuiish, .Siberian and Turkestan divisions of our Allies. The numbers of the enemy were oven sufficient to enable him to answer with vigorous and costly counter-offensives the attacks of the Rus.sians. The gathering of troops and material for the defence of Kovel seems to have begun directly after our Allies had resumed their offensive in Volhynia — i.e., in the first days of .July. " Fighting continues in the Stokhod district," said the Petrograd communique of July 11. "The enemy having brought up reinforcements and aclvanced powerful artillery, is ottering a stubborn resistance." A battle more fierce than any that had as yet been seen in the Volhynian offensive developed now on both sides of the Kovel-Samy and the Kovel-Rovno railways, both armies suffering heavy casualties. " Though we are already across the river at several places," wrote The Times special correspondent, Mr. Washburn, under date of July 13, "it must not be expected that the Russians will be able to rush in a few days positions which are unquestionably stronger than any since the enemy departed froin his first line before Rovno. Up to this time the A TYPE OF STRETCHER FOR CARRYING WOUNDED. 21G THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •'^ Bludofr ^GorokhoFF ^viman^ ElizaroFF ZIotchevka ^ \. Lobatchevha o ^StoyanofF Smoliava^ I Radziechofr MikolayoFF o Mikhailovka (Boremel) (^ . - oNpvose/ki Dcmidovka ^ [°Verben \ joP/iashevo \ n- .. erestcchko\ P'ratyn Loshni Sbi Lopaty avczyl- n Gc,: f^'^^o%Lsestratyn Kpemieniets ^Busk 'wekotoFF<''[^^rupets^ WT' / <-' H .°l \i:^J^^^ SopanoFF ^^/^ Dytko vietskie \ \ ^" ,1. J. V N.PotchaiefP .v,JKnodoly N, o VasionoFF ° 1 TofFi^^-^odkamien • r x PieniakJoC. PalikroFF\ '^ Lopushno Mv o- Nushchey'"''^''^^^y3^°P349 \ L>0^^^5:iO~-— ^Trosbsianiets-r\ /-^==^^P^i^ a • RykoFFfi '^TN. /^etyrpmiseox^^Verte/ka i // / \. \ ^^ Nosovtse^ \ 1 :'&/, r emiep Pomorzany ^ ^ . ^oro biy^i/ka^ Yczicrna Scale oF Miles. 0/2345 /O 'M il l =^ M Koniukhy ^Kuropatniki Dolzanka TARNQPOl^ C369T- MAP TO ILLUSTRATE GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ADVANCE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 237 BEHIND A FORTIFIED LINE. Russian officers outside a house in an Austrian rustic village. Circle picture : An altar in the village. enemy has certainly been out -manoeuvred, out-marched, and fairly out-classed in all particulars." Now, however, the fighting re- sumed the character of trench warfare, resem- bling the battles of Baranovitche and on the Somme rather than those fought in Volhjaiia and the Poliesie during the preceding five weeks. A few days after the line of the Stokhod had been reached, about the middle of July, the Russian offensive began to slow do^v-n, our Allies contenting themselves with repelling Gennan attacks. At several places even some withdrawals were made from the exposed positions on the western bank of the river. It seems more than likely that the statement of the Russian Staff concerning the vital iinportance of Kovel, issued at the time of the hottest battles for the river-crossings, was really meant as a blind, to cover the impending offensive of General Sakharoff. It was well known to Russian Headquarters that the enemy was gathering considerable forces on the southern flank of the Lutsk salient. It would therefore have been, to say the least, risky to engage very considerable forces (and such would have been needed for a serious offensive against Kovel) in an advance even beyond the farthest existing salients to the west, whilst Bothmer's army still maintained its original positions in the centre, and fresh trooops were being concentrated on its northern flank, on the StoyanofT-Brody front, for a counter-offensive against Lutsk and Dubno. It was not until the operations on the north- western border of Galicia were reaching their victorious conchision that oixr Allies resumed their offensive in northern ^'olhJ^lia and on the Stokhod. " To the west of Lutsk," said the Petrograd report of July 28, " ovu- troops took the offensive and broke tlirough the whole first line of the enemy, inflicting severe losses upon him. Our troops are now advancing, and 218 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAF. oiir cavalry is pursuing the fleeing enemy. In this district we have captured 46 guns (including (i howitzers), 6 machine-guns, about SU oflicers (inclutling 2 generals and 2 com- manders of regiments), and over 9,000 men. ' On the Stokhod itself the two armies ot Generals Le'sh and Kaledin opened their offensive on .luly 28, at 1 o'clock in the after- noon. The first daj's fighting proved extremely successful, resulting in unportant strategic gains, and in the capture, within the first hour of the attack, of 38 guns, two being heavy and all German, and 4,000 (mostly German) prisoners. In the region of Gulevitche, not far from the spot where the Kovel-Sarny railway crosses the Stokhod, Russian troops, having GENERAL SAKHAROFF, Commanded the Eleventh Russian Army. biiilt bridges, passed to the left banlc of the river, \\here they took up strong positions. Similarly a crossing was again forced in the district of Kashovka. The most important move, however, was made, and the greatest success was scored, in the direction of the village of Ozeriany, along the head-waters of the Stokhod, where the river is less wide. The simultaneous pressure on the entire front round Kovel made it difficult for the enemy to shift the local reserves which he had at his disposal in that district. But " on account of the extraordinary nature of the German defences," wTote, under date of July 29, the special corre- spondent of The Times, Mr. Washbiu-n, then with Headquarters on the Stokhod front, " we must not expect the Russians to run over them in a few days. The results already attained are extraordinary, when the strength of the German positions and the quantities of guns and ammunition are considered. Our lo.sses are incredibly small, viewed in the light of what has been accomplished." Even the Germans had to acknowledge the signal success of their opponents, though they lid so with hardly veiled annoyance. " North- west of Lutsk," sa'd the Berlin report of July 29, " after several unsuccessful attacks, the enemy succeeded in penetrating our lines at Trysten, and obliged us to evacuate the positions we still held in front of the Stokhod." During the following days the successes of July 29 were systematically developed. By noon of July 30 — i.e., within 48 hours from the commencement of the offensive, the niunber of captured guns had risen to 49, that of prisoners to 9,000. A desperate battle was proceeding at Gulevitche. Meantime, the Russian troops which had crossed the Stokhod at Kashovka extended their gains for 5| miles beyond the river, wliilst on the left bank the movement was slowly swinging forward w-ith the village of Perehody for its approximate axis. On July 31 fiu-ther captures of ground and men were made in the bends of the Stokhod. At one point the whole 31st Honved Regiment was taken prisoners by our Allies, together with their regimental commander and his entire staff. As a further illustration of the enemy's losses may serve the fact that in the battles fought during the last days of July the 41st Honved Division was cut to 4,000, and the 4th Austrian Division to 3,000 men. No less hea\^ were the losses of the Germans and of the Polish Legions. And again the Berlin report of July 30 growled out its unwilling, distorted admissions : " Army Group of Von Linsingen. — Enemy attacks in increased strength are reported. With the exception of some sectors, these at- tacks are now being made on the whole front from Stobychva to the west of Berestechko. They all collapsed with gigantic losses. . . . During the night the withdrawal, which had been planned for a long time from the Stokhod curve, which projects towards the east and north of the Kovel -Rovno railway, to a shorter line was carried tlirougli without interference by the enemy." In the first days of August further fighting took place on the entire front — round Stoby- chva, Smoliary, Gulevitche, Sitovitche and Syeltse, down to Kisielin, culminating on August 3-4 in the battle for Rudka Mirynska, Russian engineers repairing bridges destroyed by the Austrians. Centre picture : Russian Cavalry crossing a hastily built bridge. ADVANCE OF GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S TROOPS. 219 220 THE TIMES HISTOnY OF THE WAB. n villaRO on tlioeast bank of tho Stavok (a left- hand tributary of tho Stokhod). Having reached, on Auj^ust 2, tho front Sitovitche- Yanovku within the big bend of the Stokhod, OUT Alhes proceeded to attack the next defen- sive Hno of the enemy. On August 3, before dawn, the Russian tirtiilory opened a heavy bombardment of these positions. About 1 p.m. Turkestan rogin\ents broke tlirough the Austrian defences north of Rudka Mirynska, occupied the hamlets of Popovka and Yastremiets, and reached the Miryn-Poviersk road. Then Rudka Mirynska itself was attacked. The battle developed into bayonet fighting in the streets of the village, which changed hands several times. About 4.30 p.m., tho enemy opened a counter-attack along the entire line. Bava- rians, the Third Brigade of the Polish Legions under Count Sheptyski, and Germans from Lower Austria and Southern Moravia belonging to the army corps of General von Fath, opened an encircling movement against the Turkestan troops holding the village and district of Rudka IMu-ynska. A series of enemy attacks were repulsed. Finally, however, about 3 a.m., our Allies evacuated the salient, which the village was now forming, and fell back 400-600 yards to the east. The battle of Rudka Mirynska closes the second stage of the fighting on the Stokhod. The result of the week's operations consisted in the river line having been forced on almost the entire front. The enemy troops holding the district had thus lost one of their main natural defensive lines, and a good start had been gained by our Allies for an attack against Kovel, should the developments in other parts f>i the line make such a movement desirable. On a level with the greatest feats of the armies of Generals Kaledin, Lechitsky and Lesh stands tho offensive undertaken in the second half of July from the southern flank of the Lutsk salient by General Sakharoff, command- ing the Eleventh Russian Army, and well known frQm the time of the Russo-Japanese War as Chief of General Kuropatkin's Staff. The enemy, in view of the utter failure of his offen- sive against Lutsk, on the Kovel-Rozhyshche line, had decided in July to make another desperate attempt at driving in the Russian salient in Volhynia by means of an attack from the south. A highly developed net of roads and railways radiating from Lvoff in the direc- tion of the Volhynian frontier supported the movements of his forces ; besides the double- track Lvoff-Krasne-Brody line, he had at his disposal the Lvoff-Stoyanoff and the Lvof?- Sokal-Vladimir Volynsk railways. In view of their superiority in communications the Austro- German commanders hoped to be able to effect a sudden concentration of " men and material, and then, by a sharp flank attack against Lutsk and Dubno, to undo the results of the preceding RUSSIAN ARTILLERY ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 221 GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ARMY. A Russian General conducts an attack by field telephone. Smaller picture : The Russian Com- mander consults General Turbln. six weeks of Russian operations in Volhynia. The phalanx of Linsingen and Boelim-Ermolli was to include on this front 20 divisions, and July 18 was the date chosen for the opening of this Austro-Gernian counter-offensive. Our Allies could hardly have assembled an equal force in such short time. The movement had therefore to be forestalled and frustrated bj' an attack whilst the enemy concentration was stUl incomplete. On July 15, south-west of Lutsk and Dubno, the Austro-German com- manders had gathered as yet only some seven infantry and fovu* cavalry divisions Among the infantry divisions were the 7th, 48th and 61st Austro -Hungarian and the 22nd, 43rd and 108th German divisions — the 48th and 61st Austro-Hungarian divisions havingbeen brought up from the Trentino, the 22nd German division from the Dvinsk front, and tho 43rd froni Ver- dun.v riieir front extended from about Shklin, past Ugrinoff, Zlotchevka and Mikhailovka (sometimes called Boremel) to Novoselki on the western bank of the Styr ; on the right bank of the river it stretched across the region of Verben to the Pliaskevka and then in a southerly direction, across fairly high wooded (I hills, to Radziviloff on the Lvoff-Brody-Rovno railway. Four stages can be distinguished in the offensive of General Sakharoff which opened during the night of July 15-16 and lasted for about a month. The object of the first attack (July 15-17) was to frustrate the offensive plan of the enemy by deranging and destroying his preparations. The aim was brilliantly achieved, and the Austro-German forces had to ftdl back i| 0!O«> Till': TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. ENEMY TRENCHES IN VOLHYNIA. On the line of the Lipa (a left-liand tributary of the Styr). Then, between July 20-22, followed the second battle which resulted in the forcing of the Lipa and the capture of Berestechko. The Lutsk salient, of which the enemy had planned to drive in the left flank by means of a thrust from the south, was rapidly extending up the western bank of the Styr. The battle for Brody which opened on July 25 and closed with the fall of that town on July 28 formed the third stage of the offensive. The fourth and last step in General Sakharoff's advance came as the result of an attack against the Brody-Zalostse- Vorobiyovka front. The victories gained on that line brought his forces into the direct neighboiu"- hood of the Lvof^-Krasne-Tarnopol railway, and this, in conjunction with General Lechitsky's offensive against StanislavofT, caused the with- drawal of Count Bothmer's Army from its im conquerable positions on the Sereth-Strypa line. On July 15 a minor engagement was fought on the Sviniukhy and the Ostroff-Gubin front with results favourable to our Allies. On the same day. at 4 p.m., began the Russian bombardment on the entire Bludoff-Shklin- Zlotahevka front. The night which followed was wet and rainy, and as the fire was distributed in equal volume all along the line, the enemy does not seem at first to have taken any alarm as to what was coming. Soon afterwards the Russian artillery commenced, in its usual style, cutting breaches in the barbed wire entanglements. Thus, for instance, in front of a Siberian army corps which had achieved world fame in the battle on the Bzura in January, 1915, and was now to play a leading part in the attack, the Russian guns had cut by midnight 10 avenues, each approximately 20 paces broad. The attack was timed for 3 a.m. The cliief blow was struck from Shklin and Ugrinoff in a due southerly direction. Wading under the machine-gun and rifle fire in water and marsh above their waists, often to their armpits, the Russians crossed the river and forced the Austrian and German positions on its southern bank. At the same time, in the angle between the Styr and the Lower Lipa, an attack was delivered in a westerly direction. In an interview with the Petrograd Corre- spondent of The Times, on July 22, General Alexeieff, Chief of the Russian Staff, made the following comment on the first stage of General Sakharoff's offensive : " General Sakharoff accomplished a brilliant feat of arms on July 16 at the expense of the 48th and 61st Austrian Divisions. Pivoting his army on Bludoff he manceuvred on the enemy's flank. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 223 shepherding the Austrians and driving them in full rout during the night a distance of nearly seven miles ; he badly mauled the 22nd German Division, transferred from the Dvinsk front, and also the above-mentioned 43rd Division, which tried to save the hard-pressed soldiers of the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. The latest accounts show that General Sakharoff is developing his success with extraordinary rapidity and is crossing the two rivers in pursuit of the foe." No less important than from the strategic point of view was the victory on the Mikhailovka front when measured in terms of captures of naen and material. As the enemy had been preparing in that region for a big offensive, Iiis accumulation of stores proved enormous. Every peasant's hut was stacked with shells and small-arm ammunition, while huge supplies were accumulated in all the important villages. Of the three biggest ammunition stores captm-ed by the Rvissians on July 16, one alone contained 35,570 projectiles of different ' calibres, 5,230 grenades, and an enormous quantity of car- tridges, as well as three searchlights, a band, a military tailoring depot, field kitchens, and a large quantity of barbed wire, telephone wire, and other war material. On the same day 317 officers (including two commanders of regiments with one entire regimental staff) and 12,«j37 men were taken prisoners, and 30 guns (of which 17 were of heavy calibre — 4-inch and 9-inch), 49 mixcliine guns and 3(5 bomb and minethrowers were ca[)tiired. Some of the heavy gims were in perfect condition and could almost mimediately be turned against their late owners. The counter-attacks meantime under- taken by the Germans on the western flank, in theZviniany-Elizaroff region, proved of no avail. And again Vienna made its ackno\^l(Mlpment of defeat — with its inevitaljle compliments to the saving Germans and its customary lies con- cerning Russian numbers and the character of their own retreat. " To the south-west of Lutsk," says the Austrian onicial vommunique. of July 17, " the Russians attacked with superior forces. Tiic front sector near JShklin withdrew into the tlistrict to the east of Goro- khoff. Covered on the western flank by a counter-attack delivered by German bat- talions, the allied troops fighting to the south of Lutsk were thereupon withdrawn behind the Lipa without being disturbed by the enemy." WITH GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ARMY. Dawn on the battlefield : Russian and Austrian wounded. 224 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. The hoavy rains aboiit the middle of July tlireateuml to put surious obstacles in the way of a further Russian advance ; the rivers were rising and the marshes were becoming ahnost impassable. Still General SakharofT pressed forward Ixis advance, and that across most difficult ground, at points where it was lojist expected. It was on historic fields that the second battle of his offensive was fought on July 20-22. Previous to the eighteenth century the Crimean Tartars, emerging from the Wild Fields of Southern Russia, used to invade periodically the Ukraina, Podolia and even Volhynia. Crossing the Dnieper at the so-called Tartars' Ford, they followed certain regular paths. One of their main roads — named the Black Route — led past Loshnioff (about half-way between Berestechko and Brody). In 1651 they were advancing along that road as allies of the Cossacks, who since 1648 had risen in arms against the attempts of the Polish magnates and gentry to convert into serfs them, the free peasants of the Ukraina, On the fields of Berestechko their armies were defeated by the Poles under King John Casimir. This time it was a vanquishing army which was advancing on Berestecliko. The Russian attack was carried out on concentric lines, the pincers closing in from the north and from the east, across the Lipa south of Mikhailovka and acrosH the Styr, south-west of Verben. On the Lipa, having once overcome the difficulties of crossing the marshy v^alley under concentrated fire, the Russian troops broke fairly easily through the Austrian front. On the- Styr, liaving dislodged the enemy from the village of Verben and from the organized works south of it. General Sakharoff's troops routed the Austrians, intercepting big numbers of the demoralized enemy. Thus — e.g., between Ver- ben and Pliashevo, on the right bank of the Styr, south of its confluence with the Lipa — the entire 13th Austrian Landwehr Regiment was siuTOunded and captiu-ed. With their moral fallen to such a low level, the Austrians could no longer offer any serious resistance. The Styr was crossed by the Russians on the same day, and after a short fight on the sur- rounding heights our Allies entered the town of Berestechko.* In this battle fell Colonel Tataroff, the conqtieror of Kozin f ; wovmded in the heart by a slirapnel bullet, he exclaimed, " I am kUled," and then by a supreme effort got up, and with his last breath gave the word of corcunand : " Regiment — Charge ! " By the end of the next day (July 21) the defeat of General von Boelim-Ermolli's left * The town of Berestechko was known in the 16tli century as an important centre of the Polish Unitarians, the so-called Socinians. t Cf. Chapter CXXXVII., p. 26. AN AUSTRIAN BOMB-PROOF TELEPHONE SHELTER. THE TJMFS HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 225 COLONEL TATAROFF. The Russian officer, who on the Styr, was wounded in the heart by a shrapnel bullet. Before dying he £ave his last word of command : Regiment — Charge ! wing was complete. The Russians, having captured in these two days more than 300 officers and 12,000 men, were on both sides of the Styr closing in against the Galician frontier. General Sakharoff's offensive was changed in character and direction. All danger of an enemy attempt against the Lutsk salient from the south was now gone, its line was improved and its left flank covered. General Sakharoff's operations which had begun as a movement in defence of the convex Russian line in Volhynia, passed, after the first task had been accom- plished, into a flank attack against the Austro- German centre on the Strypa-Sereth line. The offensive now developed south-east of the Styr, on Galician ground, and was directed against the Brody-Zalostso-Vorobiyovka front. By July 22 the fate of Brody was sealed. The military hospitals were cleared. The Austrian authorities began to evacuate the town. The post office left on Juiy 25. On the same day " evacuation trains " were placed at the disposal of the civilian popu- lation. Stores were removed. In short, pro- fiting from their vast experience in retreats, the Austrians were carrying out this one in a most systematic manner. Indeed, the evacua- tion was so thorough that diu-ing the next days whatever population had remained behind WHS in danger of starvation, as no KvifHcient stores had been left for them. The following is the description given by an eye-witness of the last days in Brody : " The town is empty. Of its 20,000 inhabitants hardly 6,000 are left. Few civilians are seen in the streets, and all traffic ceases early at night. The shops are closed, the public gardens, crowded a short time ago, are now deserted and forsaken. The battle-front is but a few miles out of Brody, and so the roar of the guns L? deafening. The nights are frightful, no one can shivt an eye. There is some kind of new Russian guns of a big calibre ; when these start booming, mirrors and pictures fall off the walls, the window-panes clatter like mad, and the houses shake as in an earthquake. One can also clearly hear in the town the continuous rattle of machine-guns ; the voices of war and the breath of death reach the town and pass even beyond it. . . . " Austrian captive balloons continually soar above the town. Frequently we hear the rattling of Russian aeroplanes, which recon- noitre the entire district ; some of the aviators are French or British. . . " The last two " evacuation trains " left Brody late at night on Thursday, July 27. Of these one passed through Lvoff on Friday at 1 p.m., the other remained throughout the day in a little station on the road, waiting for orders where to take the unfortunate " evacuated." Although the Austrian Government is verj'' particular to carry away all population which might be of any use to the Russians, or show Piaski- ^-^\LoshniofP -:^if.it^^" J - - :_ '\t mIekoboFF; , -^ ^'■^\i. aBer/irt, Y': '^ 7 \\U»« .^^ '\^\ y° nffl .3^^'- SmolnoP Scale oF Miles. 1 Z 3 * ' ■ ' ' -« Heig'JtsinMetres. ■■"■- 354 :;• MAKUTRA'' r' THE BRODY FRONT, '22G THh: TIMES HISTORY OL THE WAIL sympathies for the " ouoiiiy ciiiise," it is nuifh U'ss caroiiil about their future The hjirnieks for CiaUeiau " refugees " at Chocnia will tor all time reuuiiu one of the most out- staniling oxauii)lo3 of the criuiimil indolence and tiiouf^htlossnoss of the Austrian bureau- cnwy. ■■ They are built in a marshy region," writes the Cracow ilaily Glon Narodu of August (i, 191G, "where there is no good ilrinking water available. The barracks were hastily constructed and do not answer the requirements of hygiene. In fact, it is diffi- cult to speak of hygiene wJiou 500 or more people have to live in a dark hut, which can hardly be properly heated in winter, anil wliere vermin of all kinds has taken up for good its abode." The Austrian censor- Bhif) has never allowed the statistics of mor- tality at Chocnia to be published, but it can be learned from a statement made in June, 1916, by Count Lasocki to the Austrian Minister of the Interior, and printed, though with deletions by the censor, in the Glos Narodu of July 3, that 1,300 cases of death had oc- curred in the camp harbouring an average of 5,000 refugees In Jxily, 19 IG, typhus was no longer prevalent, but typhoid and scarlet ftiver and small -pox were still claiming scores of victims. Into that camp hundreds of fresh " evacuated " were moved in the course of the month. The following was the disposition of the enemy defences round Brody on the night of July 24 — i.e., on the eve of the Russian offen- sive against the town : His left flank rested on the Styr, near its junction with the Slonovka (about two miles north-east of Loshnioff). Here it was perfectly safe against any possible attempts at outflanking from the west. The corner between the Styr and the Slonovka is an impassable marsh several miles wide. South of it, on the Upper Styr, between Loshnioff and the Brody-Lvoff railway, stretches a forest, about 15 miles long and about 12 miles wide. This forest could not have been crossed without long and elaborate preparations, and even then, in view of the complete absence of good roads, this could have only been done at a very slow rate. East of the Styr the enemy positions followed up to about Batkoff the line of the river Slonovka (in its upper course, above its jtinction with the Sitenka, called Sestratyn). The wooded FROM THE AUSTRIAN ENTRENCHMENTS. Bursting of a shell: Russian infantrymen taking cover in the long grass. THE TIMES HISTORY Of THE WAR •257 THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE: EXAMINING GERMAN PRISONERS. heights round the village of Butchina,* at the headwaters of the Ikva, formed on the right flank the corner bastion of the enemy positions, which thus stretched from north-west to south- east for about 10 miles on each side of Brody. The positions in front of Brody themselves were very strong by natiu-e. Everywhere the broad belt of dangerous marshes on both sides of the Slonovka-Sestratyn river formed the first line of defence. South of Loslinioff, the entire space between the Slonovka and the parallel stream of the Boldurka is filled by the forest caUed Gaydzisko ; on its south-western flank extend the marshes of the Bokkirka, more than a mile wide. And again, between Height 238 (north-west of the Brody-Radzi- viloff high road) and the village of Gaye D\i:kovietskie t extends ajiother forest as long as, though narrower than, the Forest Gaydzisko. Thus there are only two gaps in this belt of forests, one north-west, the other south-west of Brody. In the north-western gap, about three and a half miles wide, lie the * The Makutra, Mogila, etc. Their average height is about 1,200 feet, and they rise about 400 feet above the ground north-east of them and about 700 feet above the level of the Sestratj-n valley. t The name itself of this settlement — Gaye Dytkoviet- skie — means " the Woods of Dvtkovtse." tliree villages of Shnirof?, Klekotof? and Opariptse, wliich were to be the scene of the severest fighting in the battle for Brody. Between Shniroff and Klekotoff lies a wood called \"olanik. The southern gap, at the foot of the Makutra Height, is hardly a mile wide, and may best be denoted by the name of the adjoining hamlet of ^'ieselova. July 25, 1.30 a.m. Petrograd time — i.e., 3 a.m. Central European summer time — marked the beginning of the battle for Brody. The Russian attack proceeded in tlu-ee directions : against Loshnioff, against the Klekotoff- Opariptse front, and against the Vieselova line. The most serious of the three was the attempt in the centre, striking directly at Brody ; the other two movements aimed merely at outflanking the key of the enemy's positions, the fortified heights of Klekotoflf Wliilst in the centre several hours of bombard ment preceded the infantry attacks, m the sector of Loshnioff the Russian batteries did not open fire until the infantry had reached the southern bank of the Slonovka. Unseen by the Austrians, soon after dark, the Russians had laid a causeway across the swamps among the reeds of the valley, and the first line of Austrian trenches south of Loslinioff, on the left bank of the Slonovka, was carried by 228 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. surprise. By the morning our Allies hael caotiired the fortified village of La-sovo, * in the north-eastorn corner of the forest Gay- dzisko. But inside the forest the Austrians hold strong fortified lines, which enabled thoir beaten forces to withdraw beyond the river Boldurka, though not without heavy losses in guns and prisoners. Only the south-eastern part of the forest, on the line of the Heights 246 and 219, remained in the hands of the enemy. On the other flank, near Batkoff, where the valley of the Sestratyn is very narrow, the first step — the crossing — did not present any serious difficulties, but the further advance was exceed- ingly slow work ; the country round was dominated by the heavy Austrian batteries on the Makutra. In the centre the Russian infantry opened in the early morning an attack against the Opariptse front. The town of Radziviloff and the surrounding forests on the Russian side offered the attacking troops favourable con- * " Lasovo " means the " village in the forest." (litions for approaching the river. Here, however, they had to face most serious difli culties. On the northern side, in front of Shniroff and Klekotoff, the marshes are too wide to be crossed ; and in the more favourable sector in the south almost the entire front is . taken up by the village of Opariptse, which had been strongly fortified by the enemy (Opariptse, and the village of Berlin on the Boldurka north of Brody, were originally German settlements, and are not clustered villages of the Slav type, but are laid out as a single long street of substantial, well-built homesteads. Opariptse is about a mile and a half long.) One Russian attack against Ojiariptse fol- lowed the other ; many of them broke down under the intense fire of the enemy's artillery and machine-guns. Whenever our Allies suc- ceeded in gaining a foothold on the Austrian side, the enemy, with a total disregard of losses, delivered desperate counter-attacks. Many of the best troops of General von Boehm- ErmoUi's army were engaged — Magyar, Vien- THE DESERTED BATTLEFIELD. Austrian trenches and dug-outs captured by the Russians during the great advance. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. '229 FOR CONSPICUOUS BRAVERY. Cossack troops quartered in the late Austrian Custom House, Itskani, Kukovina. The Cossack on the left was thrice decorated for bravery. Smaller picture : Russian soldiers receiving the Cross of St. George on the battlefield. nese, Bosnian and Galician regiments fought in the battle for Brody. Opariptse was not taken until the sixth Russian attack. Yet even tliis success was no more than a first step : our Allies had merely obtained a safe crossing of the Sestratyn. Even now they stood only at the foot of the liills which extend frona Klekotoff to Height 238, and which fonned the main Austrian line of defence. But at this stage help came from the division which had crossed the Slonovka, at Loslinioff, and had been working its way through the Forest Gaydzisko. Advancing step by step, tliey emerged from the forest and captured the village of Shniroff. On the morning of July 27 the Austrian line of defence followed the Boldurka as far as the village of Bielavtse ; from here it extended tlirough the forest of Volanik to Ivlekotoff ; from Klekotofi, along the range of hills facing Opariptse to Height 238, and the forest on both sides of the Brody- Radziviloff road and railway. The Russian infantry continued on July 27 its attacks against the positions above Opariptse, the enemy counter-attacking immediately when- ever any gain was effected. At 5 p.m. our Allies had captured the main positions south of Klekotoff. Still the Austrians 'lid not give up the game for lost. One of the best Magyar regiments was ordered to counter-attack. But whilst this movement was developing, all of a sudden Russian troops appeared on the left flank and in the rear of the attacking INIagyars. Om- Allies had forced their way through the Forest Volanik. The Klekotoff •230 THE riMKS HISTORY OF THE WAIL AFTER GZERNOVITZ. Fire engines from the Railway Station, Czernovltz, being conveyed across the Rumanian frontier. positions were lost to the enemy. About the same time the Russian forces began to emerge from the forest near the village of Gaye Dytkovietskie. These two movements decided the battle for Brody. Throughout the night rearguard actions were still continued by the enemy on the heights and in the forests and villages north of the tow-n. On July 28, at 6.30 a.m., our Allies entered Brody for the third time dvu"ing the "War, after almost a year of Austrian occupation.* " The plan for General Sakliaroff's offensive against Brody," wrote the special correspondent of The Times, Mr. Washburn, under date of July 28, " was laid out on a schedule. I have \\a.tched every phase of it, and it has moved without a single hitch, and Brody has been taken within 24 hours of the exact time jilanned by the General when he began the movement two weeks ago. I think that this represents one of the most remarkable achievements of the war, for even * Russian cavalry entered Brody for the first time on August 14, 1914, but had to withdraw on August 18. Two days later our Allies re-entered the town, and remained there until September 2. 1915. From Sep- tember, 1915, till June, 1916, the headquarters of the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Boehm-ErmoUi were at Brody. the clever Germans have never been able to keep their movements up to schedule time." During the three days of fighting for Brody (July 25-28), General Sakliaroff's troops took prisoners 210 officers and 13,569 soldiers, besides captiiring a great amoimt of arms and ammunition. The total of their captures since July 16 amounted now to 940 officers, 39,152 men, 49 guns (17 of heavy calibre), and an enormous amount of other booty. With the fall of Brody opens the last stage of General Sakharoff's offensive. On a front of about 50 miles his army was facing the Ivrasne-Zlochoff-Tamopol line, the best -built railway in Eastern Galicia, and the most im- portant line of communication in the rear ct Coimt Bothmer's Army. A distance varying from about 10 miles in the region of Zalostse to about 20 miles round Brody intervened between that railway and the Russian troops. To break through along the Brody -Krasne railway would have proved a practically impossible task. Hardly any roads lead across the wide marshes and through the forests which extend round the head-waters of the Bug and Styr. Moving along the railway from Brody to THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. •2:U Krasne, one passes in tlie first 12 iiiiies hamlets, woods, and fields bearing these names : " Near the ponds," " on the islands," " in the mud," "in the hollows," "behind the swamp," " behind the mud," " the great island," "the old pond," " next to the swamp." No wonder, then, that the road avoids that district, antl runs further east past Sukhodoly (" dry valley ") and Podhortse("next to the mountain"). This, the only first-olass high-road running from the frontier of Volhynia and Galicia to the Krasne- Tarnopol railway — namely, from lirody to Zlochol^' — keeps to the north-western side of the ridge which forms the watershed between the Bug, the Styr, and the Sereth — i.e., between the basins of the Vistula, the Dnieper, and the Dniester. The road from Brody, which encir- cles that ridge from the east, has its terminus at Pieniaki. These two roads were the only lines of comniunication at the disposal of General Sakharoff's forces in their advance against the left flank of Count B ot Inner 's Army. Still, even these roads could be used only to a very limited extent. In the triangle Brody - Krasne - Tarnopol all the numerous marshy rivers flow north-west and south- east — i.e., parallel to the Brody-Tarnopol side of the triangle, and all the ridges (except the irregular heights of the watershed) follow the same direction. An attack, cutting tliis series of strong defensive lines at right angle?, was perfectly vmthinkable. Hence General Sakharoff had to adopt a different plan. From Brody he moved his army across the heights round the watershed on to the Podkamien-Pieniaki line (and also for about two or three miles south-west of Pieniaki), whilst in the direction of the Krasne- Tarnopol railway he advanced only as much as was necessary to cover the flank of the forces on the Pieniaki-Podkamien front. The forces on that front stood with their flank to the Krasne-Tarnopol railway, but as this railway cuts the upper valleys of the Strypa and Sereth and their confluents, a movement down these valleys was bound, if successful, to strike at the railway in the rear of Count Bothmer's positions, which faced Tarnopol on the Voro- biyovka-GIadki line. General Sakharoff's strategy seems to have taken the Austro-Gennan commanders by svirprise. They had withstood for many months attacks from the north-east, on the Zalostse-Novo Alexiniets line. Thev did not expect an offensive mo\ing parallel to tlu'ir basic lines. E.specially unlikely did such a niovement appear in view of the obstacles which it had to encounter on the* Nushche-Zagozhe front. A transversal depression cutting the lines of the ridges and .streams marks there the border line between the wooded distric-t of Brody and the more open country round Tarnopol. The hollows in that depression form a string of small lakes ; these are as the base of a trident, of which the three arms are the Sereth on the left, the Graberka in the centre, and the Seretets on the right. Thrt'e streams unite in the lake of Ratyshche, and from here flow as the River Sereth in a south-easterly direction, through the lakes of Zalostse, past Gladki towards Tarnopol. On August 4 General Sakharoff opened his offensive against the Nushche-Zagozhe front. Following tho Graberka from Pieniaki the Russians advanced against the \'illage Zvizhyn. The Austrians offered absolutely de.sperate re.sistance on ground on which, had it been properly fortifled and held, probably any attacks might have been resisted. Our Allies, however, did not leave them the time to repair their mistakes. Their advance was most impetuous ; by the night of August 5 they had carried in bayonet charges the \iilages of Zvizhyn, INIezhdygory, Ratyshche, Gnidava and Chysto- pady, whilst another Russian force l)rok(> through from the eastern flank across tlu; Zalostse line. The victory was decisive. Although the Germans were now tlirowing in reinforcements in great nunibers, they could merely delay, but nexer more reverse, the movement. On August (5 our Allies occupied the villages of Renioff and Trost- sianiets Vielki. The number of prisoners captured by the Russians in the three days of fighting, August 4-6, by itself gives an idea of the size and success of those operations : they captured 166 officers and 8,415 men. Their advance continued past Neterpintse, Nosovtse and Vertelka. On August 10 they reached the outskirts of the village of Neste- rovtse, onlj- about four miles north-west of the Gladki- Vorobiyovka line. The northern end of Count Botluner's positions on the Sereth- Strypa front was outflanked and even turned. The eleventh hour had struck for the retreat of liis army — especially as south of the Dniester General Lechitsky was tlireatening to cut off his line of communication along the Trans- versal Railway. •232 THE TIMES HISTOnY OF THE WAR. THE AUSTRIAN RETREAT: RELICS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. By June 23 the Ninth Russian Ann\- under General Lechitsky had practically completed the conquest of the Bukovina. In the west it had already crossed the Galician frontier, on •the border of Transjdvania it had ad\anced \rithin short distance of the main passes. It was not, however, the occupation of the Bukovina itself, but its further consequences, which were of the greatest account from the strategic point of view. The Bukovinian border is the most open and most vulnerable frontier of Rumania Most of the Bukovina forms not merely linguistically, but also geo- graphically, an integral part of Rumania. In the Bukovinian mountains lie the sources of the tliree most important rivers of Moldavia, the Sereth, the Moldava, and the Bystrytsa. Their valleys are so many gates opening to the south ; important roads and railways lead along these rivers into Riunania. Of all the belli- gerent States, Rumania, if she intervened, would have in proportion to her size and population by far the longest frontier. Hence it was of considerable imjjortance to her that the gates into :\Ioldavia should be secured before she entered the war. ^Moreover, the Russian advance into the Carpathian passes on the north-eastern frontier of Hungary was certain to assist her considerably in her main task in the War — the liberation of Transylvania. Exactly those factors which made the strategic importance of the Bukovina for Rumania deprived it of strategic value with regard to the Galician theatre of war. The face of the Bukovina is turned to the south-west. Its net of roads and railways in no way inter- venes between those of Galicia and Hungary : it can be cut off without any appreciable loss to the systems of communications of the two neighbouring countries. In the spring of 1915 the Russians had occvipied most oi Galicia and had been crossing the Carpatliians without holding the Bviko%ana or even Kolomea.* Could the Austro-Hungarian armies have stopped the Russian advance on the line Chortoviets - Gvozdziets - Zablotoff - Pistyn, the mere loss of the Bukovina would have had no serious direct influence on the position on the Galician front. All the points and lines of • For the Russians, however, the loss of the Novosie- . litsa-Czemovitz-Kolomea line in January -February. 1915, meant more than, under normal circumstances, it would have implied to the Aiistrians. It cut their direct connexion with Bessarabia and Southern Russia. That is why they tried hard to recover it in May and June of the same year. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 233 considerable strategic value in south-eastern Galif'ia lie to the west of Kolomea. They may be grouped under four headings : 1. The Dniester Crossings. — The rix-er can be crossed most easily between Halitch and Nizhnioff. Its banlcs are free from marshes such as surround its upjier course above Halitch, and do not form as yet a deep, winding canon as below Nizhnioff. Two railways and three roads cross the Dniester within the 20 miles between these two towns. The side which holds these crossings can establish a much more effective cooperation between its armies on the two banks ot the Dniester than is possible for its opponents. 2. The Transversal Railway. — There are two big trunk railways crossing Galicia east and west : the Cracow-Przemysl-Lvoff-Tarnopol- Volotchysk line in the north, and the Khabovka- Yaslo-Sanok-Sambor - Stanislavoff - Butchatch - Husiatyn line at the foot of the Carpathians. This latter, called the Transversal Railway, formed for the Austro -German forces in Eastern Galicia one of their main lines of communication with the west. In the summer of 1916 the part of it most directly exposed to a flank attack by General Lechitsky's forces was the Stanislavoff- Tysmienitsa-Nizhnioff sector. 3. The StanislavoJJ-DeUtUjn-Marmaros Szigel Railway is the only line which connected the East Galician theatre of war with Transylvania. The next railway across tlio Carpathians, the Lvoff-Stryj-Munkacs line, runs (iO milds farther west. It is obvious how great was the import- ance of the Stanislavoff-Marmaros Sziget linr for the Austro-German armies in East (jJalieia with a view to supplies, and also for the general coordination of military operations in Galicia and Transylvania. 4. The Yablonitsa and the Pantyr Passes, opening into Transylvania. , At almost equal distances (about 30 miles) from the Yablonitsa Pass, from Stanislavoff and from Nizhnioff lies the town of Kolomea. The "strategic zone" of south-eastern Galicia extends west of Kolomea, the nearest point of it being Delatyn, a station on the Stanislavoff- Marmaros Sziget railway. Both these towns — Kolomea and Delatyn — lie in the Pruth valley, and the distance between them is about 20 miles. Kolomea, the junction of six railways (two of them are local lines leading to the oil district of Pechenizliyn) and of six high roads, is the natm-al base for operations against the " zone " to the west of it. After General Lechitsky'p Army had captured Czemovitz WITH GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ARMY. German prisoners collecting their wounded and placing them in a Russian ambulance cart. 234 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. and secured its left flank iii the Carpathians against a counter-offensive from Transylvania, Koloniea became itj immediate objective. A fortnight had passed since the defeat on the Berdo Horodyshche and the capture of Sniatyn (June 13). The attention of the Russian forces having been taken up by the forcing of the Pruth near Czernowitz and by the conquest of the Bukovina, the enemy troops w hich had \vithdraA\ n to tlie west had had time to take up new positions. Their lines east of Kolomea now stretched from near Niezviska on the Dniester, up the River Chortoviets to the district of Gvozdziets, then down the Chemiava to Zablotoff on the Pruth, and from there towards Pistyn in the Carpathians. On June 28 General Lechitsky's army opened a general otiensive practically against the entire front, whilst a regiment of Cossacks, having swum RUSSIAN CAVALRY. Scouts in South-Eastern Galicia. Smaller picture : A typical cavalryman. across the Dniester near Snovidoff, emerged in the rear of the Avistrian positions on the Chortoviets. The attack of June 28 was a most striking case of a carefully coordinated plan, carried out with extraordinary vigour. Before the impact of the blow the Austrian lines simply collapsed ; they broke in and crumbled like an empty shell. By 7 p.m. the captures made by our Allies amounted to 221 officers and 10,285 men ; near Gvozdziets a Trans -Amur regi- ment succeeded in taking a battery of four 6-inch guns, with their officers, gunners, horses and ammunition. On the next day the Russians entered Kolomea , the panic-stricken Austrians fled, unable to offer any further serious resist- ance. They did not even find time to blow up the railway station and its sidings. By July 2 the Russians were able to reopen it for traffic. The town of Kolomea suffered hardly any damage, as no serious fighting occurred within its area. Only on itb eastern outskirts some five or six houses suffered from fire. But of the normal population of Kolomea, which in peace time exceeded' 40,000, hardly 10,000 had been left after the Austrian evacuation. The further Russian advance to the west proceeded both north and south of Kolomea. An advance due west by the direct road leading through the Pruth valley to Delatyn was impracticable. Several strong defensive lines across it had been prepared by the enemy, and it would not have been possible to force them as long as the hills and mountains south of the road remained in his hands, as from those heights his artillery was able to direct a flanking fire against troops advancing from Kolomea against the west. The attempt to reach the Stanislavoff-Marmaros Sziget rail- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 235 way had, therefore, to !)(> niadf in a south-westerly direction, across the wooded mountains. Meantime, the right wing of (jleneral Locliit- sky's army and the adjoining troops of General Shcherbacheff were pressing forward along both banks of the Dniester. Having broken through the Niezviska lines, they entered the town of Obertyn on Juno 29. On the next day one of the most extraordinary battles of the war developed next to the Niezviska-Tlumatch road, east of Yeziezhany. The Aixstrians were liolding there a strong line of trenches covered by the usual barrier of barbed wire entangle- ments. Without waiting for any artillery pre- paration, a brigade of Circassian cavalry opened a charge against the enemy lines. " The sight was . grand, though terrifying," is the accovmt given by a non-combatant eye-witness. " With'.truly Circassian daring, the cavalrymen ittacked the trenches, carrying sabre and lance in theii- hands, and the- short kindzhal (Cir- cassian dagger) in their teeth. As soon as the riders appeared in the valley the machine-guns started their horrible work. Confusion occurred in the front rank. The wild cries of men and the neighing of woimded horses mixed with tlie rattling of machine-guns and the cracking of rifles. Even more awful was the sight of the riders who perislied in the wire entanglements. Still, with a wild contempt of death, the Cir- cassians started cutting the wire. Many perished, but the road was open for the surviving squadrons. A fresh charge followed, and a real massacre started in the trenches. The Cir- cassians worked with sabres, and kindzhals . . ." Whoever from among the Austrians was able to escape, fled in terror. On June 30, at noon, the Circassian troops entered Yeziezliany. In conformance with the Austrian retreat south of the Dniester, the army of Count Bothmer, on the left bank of the river, had also to witlidraw several miles -to the west, on to the Koro]:)iets line, thus bending back still farther its right wing. In this retreat, in the first days of July, they suffered severe losses • at the hands of the pursuing Russian troops, especiallj" in the district round ]\Ionastezhysha. Had the Russians been able to push forward another 10 miles to the west, and had thej^ succeeded in capturing the Dniester crossings, Bothmer's position in the centre would have become untenable. Their advance had, there- fore, to be stopped by the Austro-German armies on the Tlumatch line, or a general retreat in East Galicia would liave Ix-oonio for them unavoidable. After General \nii Pflanzer-Balt ill's army had })een Ijrokcn up in tiic Bukovina, its main body withdrew into the Carpathians. That part, however, mIucIi had effected its retreat on to StanisIavofT was linked up with the "German Army of the South." Count Bothmer's line was thus extended to the south, and lie was put in charge of the defences of the Dniester crossings. Towards the end of June he received considerable reinforcements, consisting mainly of fresh Prussian divisions. On July 2 he opened his counter-offensive along the southern bank of the Dniester. After a violent bayonet fight in the village of Yeziez- hany, our Allies had to withdraw Ix-fore the superior forces of the enemy. Still, in spite of the most desperate attacks, the Gennans did not succeed in reaching the Niezviska-Obertyn line, and had finally to settle down on the Ycziezhany-Khotsimiezh-Zhukoff front. ''During these battles," wrote the Roman Catholic curate of Yeziezhany, about the middle of July, 1916, " 12 civilian inhabitants of my village were killed and 20 wounded. In the neighbouring village of Issakoff more than 100 people are said to have perished. On July 6 the Germans ordered the complete evacuation of my parish on account of the artillery duel which was proceeding, and which destroyed part GENERAL SHCHERBACHEFF. 236 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR, of our village. About 1,500 people had to leave their homesteads. " On the way to Thunatch, where we were ordered to go, I saw many dead men and horses lying unburied in the fields, poisoning the air. Between Yeziezhany and Zhyvachoff — i.e., between the opposing lines of trenche;-- — they are lying to the present day. " I found Thunatch deserted bj most of the town inhabitants, but filled with peasants who had bePV' evacuated from the neighbovu-ing villages. These people do not want to go any farther, but wish to weather here the storm and return to their farms." For the time being Coimt Bothmer had saved his right flank from complete outflanking. '■' The German troops « hich delivered repeatrd WOUNDED RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS. A novel form of Russian stretcher. Smaller picture : War-worn Austrian prisoners. heroic counter-attacks south of the Dniester," wrote the military correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung under date of July 9, " are preventing further envelopment." But the Austrians west of Kolomea have again " proved unable to make a stand." And then he winds up his remarks in this pathetic, desperate plea : " But in the interests of the whole front it is necessary that the Austrians should stand fast in that district. For even the most heroic valour of our troops cannot realize its aim if the adjoining positions are not maintained " Yet, however keen the Austrians must have been to satisfy their irate allies, they were unable to withstand the Russian offensive. On June 30 the Russians entered Pistyn, about 12 miles due south of Kolomea, and, on the same day, pushed forward against Berezoff, some six miles farther in a west- north-western direction. Continuing their- advance through the mountains they reached on July 3 Potok Charny, oxily six miles east of the Delatyn-Marmaros Sziget railway. On the following day they cut the railway in tbft district of Mikulitchin, due west of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 237 Berezoff, and 10 miles south of Delatyn. Parallel with this movement, another advance across the hills was carried out from Kolomea against Pechenizhyn. Supported by some excellent artillery work, the Russian infantry forced its way into that town, about seven miles west of Kolomea, on the very same day on which the movement had been started. The Avistrians in their retreat were not even able to destroy the bridges at Pechenizhyn. The clearing of the moiuitains south of the Kolomea-Delatyn road of enemy forces enabled our Allies to effect their advance also along that main highway. On July 4 they carried at the point of the bayonet the Austrian positions in the village of Sadzavka (more than half the distance to Delatyn). Finally, on July 9, the Potrograd official report was able to announce the capture of Delatyn itself, which had been effected on the previous day by the army of General Lechitsky. One of the main objectives of his offensive, the cutting of the railway which connects East Galicia with Transylvania had thus been attained, and the second stage of the advance of the Ninth Russian Army had reached its victorious conclusion. In view of the slower development in the north no further advance was now intended Ijy lius.sian Hea<lquart< rs south of the Dniester. In their evening c<.mmunique of .Tul^- 9 they publi.shed a summary of the captures made during the second stage of General Lechitsky's offensive— ?.e., since the conquest of the Bukovina had been completed. " According to the reckoning made by the army of General Lechitsky, in the jx-riod from June 2.3 to July 7 it took prisoners G74 officers and 30,875 men, and captured 18 guns, 100 machine-guns, and 14 caissoi s of amnuuiition.'' / The heavy rains and floods which occurred in the Dniester region about the middle of July rendered the lull in military opera- tions in that district longer than had been intended. The Dniester had risen nearly 10 ft. and the Pruth more than IG ft. The plain south of Stanislavof?, which, on a width of about 18 miles is traversed by some 14 rivers and streams, was becoming impassable. " The overflow of the Dniester continues," was the Petrograd report of July 20, " the valleys situated in the neighbourhood are flooded through the rivulets overflowing their banks. The slopes of the heights are so slippery as to - - * " " "»-• ' i II^H^K^ ' -^|^;~ J?ya^^- -A jJMM^'T^ri? 1 ' '-^^^'^^^^^f^flH^H — -""^ -~!!^^^^^^^^^^^^H ixy 2 ?^ "^^yl^^^l r- RUSSIAN SCOUTS AFTER FORDING A STREAM: CREEPING TOWARDS AN ENEMY POSITION. 2liS TIIH TIMr:s HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL KELLER. Holding an important command in General Lechitsky's Army. be almost xinclimbable. At many points the bridges nave been washed away." Only in the high mountains, round Tartaroff and Vorokhta and in the regions of the heights of the Magura and Capul, were our Allies able to continvie extending their positions towards the Transyl- vanian border. In the first days of August fresh fighting ^^as reported north-west of Kolomea, and also north of the Dniester, where oiu- Allies suc- ceeded in gaining a foothold on the western bank of the Koropiets. On August 7, after a month's interval, General Lechitsky resumed liis offensive, which now entered on its third stage. The first attack was carried out round Tlumatch, on a front of about 16 miles. The •' heroic valour " of the German troops did not prove in this case much different from the " inability to resist," ascribed by them to their allies. On the same day on which the offen- sive was begim the Russians broke through the German front and captured Tlumatch. On the next day the movement extended into a concentric advance from the east and south against Stanislavoff ; at G p.m. our Allies entered the town of Tj-smienitsa, whilst farther north, round Xizhnioff, they captured the right bank of the Dniester. On the next day also the northern bank was reached in that dis- trict by the Russian troops (of General .Slieherbach(^ft's Army), which l)y a vigorous attack against the Velesnioff-Koropiets line liad forced tlieir way across the River Koro- j)iets. Thus the first Dniester crossing had fallen into the hands of our Allies. On August 9 they captured the railway station of Kliryplin, the junction of the three railways which approach Stanislavoff from the south and east (the Transylvanian line, the Czernovitz- Kolomea railway, and the eastern sector of the Trans- \ersal railway). On the same night the Austrian Army Command evacuated Stanis- lavoff. On the next day oiu" Allies entered the town for the third time during the war. Count Botlimer could now no longer delay his retreat. In the north General SakharofE was rapidly approaching the Lvoff-Tarnopol railway, and turning Ms positions on the Gladki-Vorobiyovka front ; in the south his retreat by the Transversal line and his con- nexion with Transylvania were cut by General Lechitsky, whilst the troops of General Shcherbacheff were turning his flank on the left bank of the Dniester. By August 10 they had captured Monastezhyska and even crossed the River Zlota Lipa in the neighbourhood of Nizhnioff. By August 12 the last remaining part of the enemy's winter line of fortifications was captiured by our Allies. The entire enemy centre had to be withdrawn from the Strypa. Suffering severe losses at the hands of the GENERAL VON TERSZTYANSKY, Commanded the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 289 WITH GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S TROOPS. Periscopic work on the field. pursuing Russians, the Austro-Gemian armies fell back on the Zlota Lipa line, though that front had already been passed by our Allies in the direct neighbourhood of the Dniester, where they had reached the River Horozhanka. On the Krasne-Tarnopol line they abandoned even the unportant district and town of Zboroff wliich but a week earlier had been visited by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg. And, again, tens of thousands of peasants from these districts were compelled by the Austrian Government to evacuate their home- steads and trek into exile amongst strangers. For many weary days they travelled in carts and on foot towards the west — a picture of hopeless, unrelieved misery. In the centre the Austrians withdrew to Bzhezhany, the town itself being included in the battle-front. " On August 11," %^Tote an eye-witness, * all the Austrian civilian authorities suddenly left the town. The last train left it on August 13, at 2 p.m. With the flight of the authorities, greater liberty came for the people ; passports and permits were no longer required, and we were free to leave our houses at night ; bread, sugar and flour cards lost their use. Still there is hardly anyone left to avail himself of the new freedom. . . ." Again, the Austrians had carried out their thorough " evacuation." By the middle of August, when a new lull intervened on the Eastern front, the problem implied in the second phase of the great Russian offensive of 1916 had been solved completely in favour of our Allies. The enemy had aban- doned his entire front south of the ^Marshes, having lost in ten weeks' fighting in prisoners alone well over 300,000 men. The total casualties suffered by him in that campaign almost equalled the original .strength of his armies between the Pripet Marshes and the Carpathian ^lountains. Our Allies could watch with amusement tlie changes which, as a consequence of the defeats suffered at their hands, were made in the higher anny commands of the Central Powers — it was now clearly beyond the jiower of any himian being to reverse the veraict of the pre- ceding weeks. It will be remembered that directly after the first defeat near Lutsk and Dubno the Austro-Hungarian armies in Vol- hynia had been put imder the command of the Prussian general von Linsingen Moreover, 240 THI<: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. GERMAN PRISONERS IN A CORNFIELD. Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand, who since the winter of 1914-15 had been in command of the Fourth Aiistro-Himgarian Army, was replaced by General von Tersztyansky ; and General Puhallo von Brlog, who in May, 1915, had taken over the command of the Third Austro-Hungarian Army,* was succeeded by General von Fath, previously in charge of an army corps in Puhallo's army. In the south Count Bothmer's line and powers were ex- tended, and a new army under General Kovess was formed in Transylvania to hold the lengthened front in the Carpathians. It was generally known that as a result of the defeats suffered by the Austro-Hungarian Armies in the first weeks of June their Com- mander-in-Chief, Archduke Frederick, and the Chief of the General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hotzendorf, had had to relinquish their posts. With the possible exception of the extreme " Great- Austrians " no one regretted their fall. The Magyars even rejoiced over it, as these two generals were knowai as enemies of the Dualist Constitution and of Magyar separatism, and were considered enthusiastic votaries of a unified, centralized Hapsburg Monarchy (die Gesammtmonarchie wa? their ideal). Still, * His predecessor, General Borojevic von Bojna was transferred to the Isonzo on the outbreak of the war with Italy. it was a real humiliation to Old-Austrian pride when, on August 2, the Prussian Junker, von Hindenburg, was proclaimed sole commander on the Eastern Front. A few days later a Hapsbiu"g amendment was added to the annovincement. Hindenbiu-g's command was to extend only from the Baltic Sea to a point south of the Lvoff-Tamopol railway, thus including, south of the Marshes, the armies of Linsingen's group, and, moreover, on its right flank, the Second Austro-Hun- garian Army vmder General von Boehm- ErmoUi. The remaining three armies (those of Bothmer, Kovess and Pflanzer-Baltin) were put under the command of a new genius from the House of Austria, the Heir-Apparent Archduke Karl Franz Josef. Bom in 1887, he had received his commission of second lieutenant in 1903, became a major in 1909, and a colonel on July 25, 1914 — at the age of 27. A year later he advanced to the rank of major-general, and in March, 1916, to that of a Field- Marshal-Lieutenant. In May he was put at the head of the ill-fated Austrian offen* sive against Italy, and now he was placed in command of the forces on the Transyl- vanian border — to retrieve in a struggle against Russia, and soon also against our new Ally, Rumania, Austria's fortunes and the military reputation of the Hapsburgs. CHAPTER CXLIV. THE MEDICAL SERVICE OF THE ROYAL NAVY. The Naval Doctor and His Work— Problems of Modern Warfare — Prev'entiov of Disease — Nerve Strain and the Seaman's Psychology — The Naval Medical Department — Dan- gerous Diseases — The Typhoid Peril — Ventilation of Ships— New Devices — The Naval Action off Heligoland — Treatment of Wounded — The Value of Experience — Hospital Accommodation — Hospital Ships and Trains — Medical Work in Minor Actions — The Pegasus — The Emden — The Tiger in Action, January 24, 1915 — The Dardanelles — Naval Mission to Serbia — Royal Naval Air Service — The Battle of Jutland Bank — On Board the Warrior — In the Lion — Honours for Naval Doctors. IN earlier chapters the story of the work of the Amiy doctor has been told. It has been shown how that work fell naturally into two divisions, the work of attending to the wounded and the work of guarding the health of the forces in the field. The latter duty was, perhap.-^, of para- moiuit importance, since upon the mental, moral, and physical well-being of its fighting men depends at all times the efficiency of an army. The army doctor, however, was not the only member of the medical profession into whose hands a great trust was conuiaitted when war broke out ; equally with him the naval doctor shared the heavy responsibility. Disease was perhaps a less instant menace to the fleets at sea than to the troops ashore, but the task of the naval doctor was no whit less difficult, no whit less important than that of his Army colleague. It was, moreover, a task of a special kind, differing in essential particulars from that of the armj' doctor, demanding knowledge of an unusual sort, and presenting many complex problems of a kind not met with in other spheres. It is a tradition of the Na\-y^ to keep silence ; silence, also, is the tradition of the medical Vol. IX.— Part 111. 24 i profession. In the Naval ^ledical Service the traditions were joined, and so little was heard by the world of the great work which these sea doctors accomplished, of the heroism revealed by them, of the sacrifices which they offered. Yet it is certain that the men of the Naval ]\Iedical Service perfonned a task, the value of which cannot be reckoned too iiigli. They themselves were the shield of the " Sure Shield " of our coasts, in that they stood between our seamen and the influences tlireaten- ing their efficiency ; they were guardians of the well-being of our fleets, just as oiu* fleets were the guardians of our national well-being ; beliind the giui was the man, but behind the man, again, responsible for his steadiness in emergency, liis fighting capacity, his untram- melled use of all his faculties, was the doctor. The naval doctor was readj- when the call upon hini came, .so ready, indeed, that within four days from the declaration of war hospital sliips were fully equipped and on their way to join the Grand Fleet. The equipment had been thought out and prepared long before ; had been packed and stored in readiness ; it in- cluded everything which the wit of experienced man could supjiose might be wanted during and after an action at sea. There was only '2A2 Till-: TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAF, ON BOARD A WARSHIP. Passing wounded down to the Sick Bay. to speak the word and to proceed forthwith to the war stations. As it happened, tliis early equipment was not required at once ; the great battle which many expected during the first days of war did not take place, and the calls upon the hosjjital ships were few. This, however, is no reason for minimising the importance of the preparations made, nor yet for for- getting that, in the hour of need, the Naval Medical Service \\as ready just as the Navy was ready, fully equipped, fully trained, in a position to handle the work occasioned by a great battle. Jutland Bank, with its fierce incidents, its terrible calamities, might have occurred in August 1914 instead of in ^lay 1916, so far as the ability of the doctors to cope with it was concerned. The administration at Whitehall had done its work thoroughly in the light of knowledge ; readiness had been its watchword for years. Nor was this readiness destined to become the prelude to a policy of laisser faire while the long days of waiting and watching which followed the declaration of war ran their course. In the Navy, as in the Army, a new conception of medicine had during the years before 1914 become firmly established. Men remembered with glowing pride the gracious figure of the surgeon pictured in attendance upon the dying Nelson. They recalled, perhaps, with wistful thought the fierce setting of smoke and flame in which that pictvire ever presents itself ; they thrUled as the eyes of the hero rose in their minds. But they knew that those old days had passed for ever. The greatest office of their service was still, in a sense, the office of mercj' and of healing, but in a sense only. Naval battles were no longer as the battles Nelson fought ; vast ships carried to sea vast numbers of men ; the Grand Fleet was a town, a city, subject to all the dangers and troubles which beset the health of cities, needing protection from these dangers, depen- dent for its efificiency upon the vigilance, the knowledge, and the devotion of its health officers. This was the new doctrine of pre\'entive medicine ; the doctrine that wliile few diseases are really curable, almost all diseases, certainly all infectious diseases, are preventible. The Naval .surgeon foimd himself faced with a THE TIMES HISTUHY of THE WAI!. 24:\ harder task than healing the wounds of l^attle. He realized that to his care had beenconuuitted the heaUh, the figliting capacity of those higlily trained, irreplaceable men, the gunners, the engine€;rs, the signallers, and all the ratings who go to inake up the strength and eOicienfj- of the Royal Navy. He was the health oHieer of a community in which every man coimted, and in which the value of any particular man was beyond assessment. The conditions of work, too, were not easj'. Much was written at the time about the long strain of waiting and watching undergone by our seamen during those early months, but probably the full extent of the penalty exacted was not then grasped by anyone outside of the Service. On the one hand there was the l^rospect of battle at any hour, on the other the weariness of hope indefinitely deferred. And later came the anxiety of mine and torpedo, demanding a ceaseless vigilance. These were menaces to health without question, for it is an established fact that a man who has been subjected to prolonged mental strain falls an easier victim to disease. "The ut-rvous strain of being undrr slidl- fire day after day, week after week, and month after month might." wrote a surgeon of the Royal Marines in (Jallipoli. "be ex- jiected to cause a large amount of nicntal depression and even insanity amongst th'> troops. The expectation was not realized in this battalion. During the first six months of war on board a battleship in the North Sea I saw many more cases of conditions allied to melanchoUa than I did during my stay on the Penin-sula. Surgeon l^eaton, R.N., whom I had the privilege of serving with in flial ship, found, after an exhaustive inquiry, that the nimiber of mental cases (both severe and slight) was less than 5 per cent, of the ship's company. Though I had neither the time nor the skill he possesses in the investigation of the minf)r forms of mental disturbance, my impn ssion is that in this battalion there were much fewer cases. The mental strain of being under shell - fire appeared to be much less than that of being exposed to tlie hidden dangers of mines and submarines." These observations of Surgeon Beaton, H.X., THE SICK BAY ON BOARD A WARSHIK Showing how the ccts are swung — a u SQ .5 O " '-' I o -S < ^ < -5 5-=- : ■on c '-^ '^- ^\ E ■« S H U .2 „, W t j Z a I z «, I— I (S •a O si en O Z O 3 ■oo s •! e « E u u 244 THE TIMES lilsTOh'Y OF THK WAR. 245 which were published in the "Journal ol iht- Royal Naval Medical Service." were imleiil of a remarkable character as showiiitj one <ide of the great problem whicli had to be factnl. The ship's company whicii formed the material of the investigation was perhaps exceptional. for most of the inen were inarried and ha<l hold, during their shore life, positions demand- ing considerable intelligence and necessitating much self-reliance. Some had had a certain amount of responsibility in civic life. The sliip under consideration lay for a long period at the beginning of the war (over four months) in an exposed position on the East Coast ; next she went to sea for two days ; lastly, she lay six weeks in a protected harbour on the South Coast. Surgeon Beaton com- mented : " Roughly speaking, the influence of the first period was in the nature of a pro- longed and monotonous stre-ss. Owing to the nature of the position the routine demanded was of an extremely irksome type, consisting of continual watches, night and day, daily repeti- tion of the measures for defence and offence possessed by the ship anfl, save for a very occasional route march, giving the men two or three hours away from the ship, nothing to break the monotony or to give some little change to the enviromnent. Recreation, while off actual duty, too, i)resented n^any difliculties, owing to the need for darkening the ship and the shortness of the daylight at the time of the year. There was the always-present possi- bility of attack by submarine or by sliips of superior force, at some times more apparently imminent than at others." A very careful and important analysis was then given of the steps by which a man passes from one mental state to another under this strain. This record presents the situation \\ith deadly clearness and deserves to be studied by all who would learn how much our sailors did and suffered on our behalf : "The man takes up his duties," wrote Siu-geon Beaton, " it may be assumed with more or less eagerness and pleasure, the unplea^sant facts of leaving his home and his ordinary hfe and the possibility of danger in the new sphere being more than counterbalanced by the emotional satisfaction arising out of the grati- fication of his patriotic instincts. Largely influenced by this self-satisfaction, he smooths over his absence from his home ; the life on board ship obtains a certain glamour ; and the liltif diniculties to be eneoimtered do not appear on the horizon. There is also the feeling of returning again to a life belonging to his younger days, of which he undoubt«'<lly recalls inucli that is inviting. He meets a large number of ("ntirely fresh faces, and in the interest to be foimd in such circumstances his mind is fully em[)loyed. " It was remarkable to notice how quickly the men settled down and merged their in- dividuality into the component of the ships company, (.iiven a short space of time the man ha« sorted out the new acquaintances into friends and otherwi.se ; the novelty of the situation has pivs.sed off; the routine! no longer deniands that close attention which was. necessary at first, and there is nothing further to be discussed in the .ship. His mind tlu-n turns to other more remote matters ; the possibilities of the duration of the war, the probabilities of the employment of the shij) and the part he himself will actually play in the war. Such topics are naturally of great imjiortance to him, and consequently they are discussed everywhere in the ship. Pa.ss along another week or so and these matters have be(>n threshed out to the bone ; everyone's opinion has been given many times over. The newspapers do not help by bringing any fresh material as food for discussion, and he is completely in the dark as to any movement on the part of the ship herself. "It is only to be expected that inuler such circumstances discussion of these topics be- comes vmprofitable and highly unsatisfying To a man accustomed to foresee his own course of action, it is very difficult to maintain a state of intelligent anticipation with so little material to work upon. More than that, the effort to maintain it in the face of such difficulties, coupled with the feeling of helplessness in his own destinies, becomes an irritating factor the longer it continues. " As a result it was found that, as a subject of general interest, the war and its personal application to the individual ceased to be heard. Instead, as a defensive measure, the man adopts a condition of more or less unstable apathy to his future, unstable on account of the setting on one side of his in.stincts of self- preservation and self-control " In the meantime, he has been going on, day after day, repeatmg the same evolutions of the routine ; and though, as regards the efficiency of the ship, the automaticity with wliich these 111—2 t>4(; THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Vaiulyk. SIR JAMES PORTER. Director-General, Naval Medical Service, 1908-1913. come to be performed is very desirable, from the individual's standpoint the results are not so happy. Apart from the actual time while on dutjs the man has nothing of importance in the ship left to think about. The effort, too, at maintaining a sufficient interest in so monotonous and trying a routine, becomes a steadily increasing stress as time goes on." The writer then goes on to show that in these circumstances small events tend to assmne great proportions, and continues : "It will be seen from the fact of the underlying stress and the failure of satisfaction of the primary instincts and habits of the man that the emotional background is more likely to be dark than bright. The disproportion will there- fore probably exist in a direction tending to produce a state of anxiety and distress of the mind. It must be remembered that this anxiety, though out\\ardly attributable to the insignificant event, is in reality the outward expression of the general unsatisf action of the mind." The extent of such mental disturbance depends on the cast of the man's own mind, and necessarily varies in each individual. Generally speaking, however, the doctors had to weigh the factors just outlined when visiting the men. " The attendance at the sick bay towards the end of the period under discu-ssion, showed quite plainly the necessity for taking thes« con-siderations into view in dealing with the various minor aihnents and injuries which came under notice. Mild conditions of neurasthenia with hypochondriacal ideas were prevalent. Minor accidents all had a mental sequence of some kind." From this period of writing, the story passed to the second period of active service at sea. It was productive of x^ery striking effects. The relief from the monotony was very welcome, and the patriotic emotions were stirred anew. Against this was the new risk to the individual. What occiurred was this : " By far the majority of the men showed appreciable relief — a general rising of spirits was to be noticed. Work was carried out with an eagerness belonging to the early days of the war — altogether a sense of satisfaction could be felt throughout the ship. In one case, however, a fatal result ensued, the man severing his carotid artery on the second morning at sea. In another, severe emotional crises arose, attributed by the man to an alteration in his home affairs of which he had just heard. In others, the intensity of hypochondriacal ideas in cases under observation became much greater." In the final period the conditions were entirely different ; the men were not continually subjected to the stress of imminent danger, and they could have a little time ashore away from the ship and its discipline. Also they saw new- people. The writer concludes : " It may be said that so far the men have come through exceedingly well. Mental troubles of a really serious natvu"e have occurred in less than 1 per cent, of the ship's company, while the inild neurasthenic conditions amounted to imder 3 per cent, or 4 per cent. The conclusions to be drawn can only be that such lengthy periods as the first fonr months under the conditions which prevailed in the first part of the war are highly undesirable, and should be prevented if military exigencies will permit. All the attention possible should be ^said to the need of change in the mental environment while the men are under the influence of such continued stress, especially as adequate recrea- tion could not be obtained owing to the military THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE 11'.///. i>47 precautions necessary in sucli a situation. That the results were not more regrettable can only be due to the standard of the men and their moral, and of that nothing too good can be s.iid." Here, then, was a lesson learned early in tlic war by the naval doctor. But let there be no illa-^ion ; the le.sson was rot learned by doing nothing and waiting for events to force them- selves upon attention ; these doctors went out to look for their lessons. In their own sphere they were as watchful as the fighting men were in theirs. The minute description of the niental state of the men afforded by Surgeon Beaton shows how carefully ho carried on his investigation, how diligent were his observa- tions^ and how slu'ewd his deductions. The value of the work scarcely needs emphasizing. After all, the good spirits of a great fighting xmit are one of its chief assets ; loss of enthusiasm, of freshness of mind, means deterioration of all other qualities ; every man is then less a man than he was. The di.scovery of the factors which, if given free play, must sap energy and damp interest was no small service; the ability to indicate a better way was a service of infinite worth. Not in vain did the naval doctor constitute himself thus early in the war the guardian of that " jolly spirit " of the Navy which throughout the world has always been it title to lo\e and admiration. But this after all was only a fraction of the great work which the doctor accomplished aboard ship. While ennui and depression and the strain of prolonged expectancy were attacking the minds of the sennen a host of dangers no less threatening were attacking their bodies. For a great city, be it ashore or afloat, is not, as we have seen, kept in health by good luck. Hard work, clear thinking, and strenuous preparation are the only means by ivhich this end can be accomplished. No one knew this better than the heads of the Naval INIedicai Departnient, Sir James Porter and, later. Sir Arthur Maj-. Sir James Porter, who was Director-General from 1908 to 1913, laid the foundations of a great new system of naval health ; to Sir Arthur ^lay, vho succeeded him. it was given to carry the system into execution and to amplify it in accordance with the needs of the hour. The broad principle adopted may be summed up in the word "supervision." Nothing was to be left to chance ; no detail, however SIR ARTHUR MAY. Director-General, Naval Medical Service, in the War. insignificant, was to te overlooked ; no pains were to be spared. It is easy to make light of a policy of this kind ; but it is not ea«y to discount the fact that by the exercise of it a number of men equivalent to the complete crews of two super-Dreadnoughts were presented diu-ing the first ytar of war as a gift to Britain. Before these measures of protection and pre- vention and of inspection were instituted these men were in hospital as a permanent incubus. Had the measures not been instituted they would have stayed in hospital at a time when the need of them was overwhelming ! The object of the^c health measures wa-s expressed in the phrase " to secure for the oflHcers and men in their imavoidably crowded conditions on board freedom from infectious disease, an adequate supplj- of pure air, pure water and good wholesome food." This object was, of course, as old as the Navy itself, and the history of the efforts made to attain it is a fascinating one. All the great naval com- manders, including Anson, Rodney, Howe, St. Vincent, Nelson and Colling\vood, took an interest in work of the kind, and not without good reason. For the Na\y had been fear- 248 THl': TIMES HISTORY OF TIIK WAR. ON BOARD A Method of lowering fully scourged by disease on more than one occasion. Commodore Anson, for example, in Ills famous voyage round the world lost four out of five of his original crew, and in the first nine months 666 men out of 961 who made up the crews of the three ships of war — the Centurion, the Gloucester and the Tryal — tliat succeeded in rounding Cape Horn during tlie worst and most tempestuous period of the year and reaching the coast of Peru. I'izarro, who followed him in pursuit with a Spanish squadron, fared worse ; he failed to weather the Cape and returned with only one ship, the Asia, and 100 men out of an original squadron of six battleships and 3,000 men. Most of Anson's men hafl died of fever and scurvy, while Pizarro's men had died of scurvy and hunger. Some of our expeditions actually failed becavise of sickness, and among these was Sir Francis Wheeler's attack on Martinique ill 1G93. But much later than this, disease was the great eneiny of the sailor. Scurvy was at one time one of the worst of the foes, but a naval surgeon, Lind, killed Hour^•y by his discovery of its origin in a faulty diet. There remained as dangers vip till the beginning of the Great War the ordinary fevers, especially typhoid and cerebro -spinal HOSPITAL SHIP, a man into the wards. fever ("spotted fever") and venereal disease. From the following table, which is taken from an article by Prof. W. J. Simpson in the " Joiu-nal of the Royal Naval Medical Service," may be gathered how steady was the progress of health work in the Navy before the war. Annual Death-Rate IN THE British Navi FROM Disease. Average Rate oj Mortal ihf. Years. 1776- -1780 . . . 1 death in 8 men. 1810-1812.. 30 „ 1830- -1836 . . 72 „ 1885 112 ., 1895 143 „ 1905 256 „ ] 907 29.S .. 1910 311 ., 1913 309 , It was evident that, mobilization having taken place, steps must at once be taken to arrange for the nipping in the bud of any epidemic which might threat>"n An epidemic in the Navy, it must be remembered, no matter how light its character, would have been a calamity which might even conceivably liave assumed tragic proportions. Therefore it was THE TIMEii HiSTOliY OF THE WAIL •2i\) greatly feared, and even- kind of 2)recaution Wiii! taken to prevent it. The Navy for one thing was a vaccinated force. Every man had been vaccinated against small- pox, and inoculation against typhoitl fever was general. It being quite certain, in spite of the declarations of well-meaning faddists, that vaccination does protect against smallpox, the Xavy medical authorities rightly refused to take the risk of shipping persons who migiit originate an epidemic. And so successfid was 1 heir policy that naval men on leave were fre<^ to enter areas closed to .soldiers because of out- breaks of the disease. Xo ill effects were noted. Typhoid fever was always an enemy and the utmost vigilance had to be exercised. The ilanger, of coiu-se, was greater in the INIediter- ranean than in the North Sea ; but nowhere was the danger a negligible quantity. A case w as recorded, for example, in which a particular ship showed a constantly recurring series of cases of typhoid fever. Xo cause could be found in the water or food, and so it became (dear that a " carrier " must be responsible. A " carrier " is a person who has had the fever and made a good recover}-, but who does not cease to harbour the bacillus. A search uas made, the blood of the crew being carefully examined by the tost known as the Widal re- action and l)y other methods, and finally, tlio evidence pointed to a particular man. Imncs tigation proved that this man, who had suffered from typhoid fever 10 years previously, had infected men in every ship in whicJi he had been stationed. In all some 53 jjersons wer»' infected, of whom II dit-d. The following note was made upon the disposal of this man : '' From the naval point of view he was not a safe man to have in any ship w here any number up to 900 men live under cramped conditions." He was accordingly invalided out of the Service, the medical oflicer of health ashore being warned about him. An even more remarkable case, which illustrates how vigilant the naval doctor had to be, occurred in Portsmouth Harbour, in October, 1914, on board H.M.S. Kuryalus. In this case some oysters had been bought from a local fishmonger, and were eaten at dinner, at 7.30 p.m., when most of the olHcers and ward-room servants partook of them. Next day the ship went to sea Within 48 hours of eating the oysters several odicers were attacked, and similar cases ON BOARD A HOSPITAL SHIP. A ward set apart for officers. L'.-jO ////<; TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. occurred uinong tlu* wardroom servants, and witliin the next wtu'k other cases a])|)eared. Finally, typhoid fever was diagnosed in the ease of a litnitenant, a nudsliipnian, and a marine servant. 'J'lie oystt'rs were traeeil to a contaminated beil, .and in several specimens -obtained the bacillus of typhoid fever was found. Unha^jjiily tliere was no law to prevent oysters from this bed being sold in Portsmouth, and as ships were constantly coming and going to the harbour, the utmost vigilance became necessary, since a case of tj'[)ln)id fever on board ship is an exer-jiresent menace. 'J'he efforts made to control typhoid fever met with full success, and except for an occa- sional case the di.sease did not show itself. On the other hand the naval doctors had to cope with an outbreak of cerebro-spinal fever (.spotted fever) which reached the dimensions of 170 cases. A very small number of these cases occurred afloat, however ; ten in the Impreg- nable, an establishn^ent consisting of three ships, used for training purposes, and 12 in .sea-going ships. As the means of propaga- tion of this fever was not known, the outbreaks were ditlficult to cope with, but a solution of a more or le.ss satisfactory kind was found in a careful search for " carriers " and in hygienic measures, the chief of which was good ventila- tion, the prevention of overcrowding, and personal cleanliness. The outbreak, which was a land outbreak. was prevented from going to .sea — a tribute to the doctors who laboured to prevent it, and a tribute to the organizers who had made ready against such a chance. These organizers. Sir Arthur. May and the men associated with liiiii; were kejjt a.s fully informed of the movements of their enemy — disease — as were the admirals of the movements of the German fleet. E\ery week there came to Sir Arthur INIay's desk a report on the health of every unit, every destroyer as well as every super-Dreadnought. In that report exact figures were given, and an average presented. As a general rule, the average of sickness was a jjoint per cent. ; but if it rose for any reason, instantly the chiefs of the Medical Service knew that it had risen. It was as though the foe had been sighted upon the 3. ^— — ^ 4. 1. Cot-carrier on cushioned tressels, showing the rollers and movable tail-boards in their slots. 2. Tail- tail-board has been removed at one end for the purpose. 4. Tail-board replaced and patient ready to be FOR TRANSFERRING SICK AND WOUNDED THE TIMES HIHTOUY OF THE WAli. •2-)! horizon. The decks were cleared for action ; mea-siircs of protection and rnoasnros of offence were initiated until tlie dane;orous rise in the figures had declined again, and the enemy been flriven back. Any case of infectious disease, lucasles or ty])lioid fever or atiy other fc\er, ivas notified when diagnosed, and transferred at once to an isolation hospital asliore. And ail the men who had been in contact with it were watched to make sure that they had not been infected, or that, if infected, they would not spread infection from one unit to another. These weekly health reports from the shijjs, from the North Sea, froni the South Sea, from the Mediterranean, from the coasts of India, were, indeed, inspiring documents. Each of them told of honest work performed in the light of an ever-present sense of duty, a love of the Service and a pride in it, and also in the " doctor-man's " own shij), which nuule the remarkable sick percentage — 0'6 — something more tliari a in(Te triunij)!! of organization. Thanks to these devote<l ship's df)ctors the health of the Navy improvetl (hiring the war in spite of shock and alarm, and the long weari- ness of inaction. In fact, the health of the Navy had never been so good. Writing in the first war number of The Practitioner, Surgeon - General Rolleston, R.N., stated that the health of the Navy had been " much better " in w ar than in peace time, and that the figures given (1 per cent, to 00 per cent.) would have been lower, but for the higher percentage incidence among the men of the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Naval Vohinteer Reser\'e. " In two battleships with a complement of over 1.000 each," he wrote, "which I happened to visit on two successive days, there were only two men in the sick-bays. . . ." Setting aside for the moment the work of inoculation and of inspection, two things undoubtedly contributed in an especial degree to this splendid result : these were improved systems of ventilation and the instruction in health matters given Vjy the doctors to the crews. The latter w as indeed a most important adjunct to success, for it achieved the double pm-pose of enlisting the sjTnpathy of the men, ivnd of opening their eyes to the dangers sur- roimding them. Lacking knowledge, a man is & 6. boards partially removed from their slots. 3. Canvas-cot being passed into carrier on the rollers. The hoisted out. 5. Patient hoisted. 6. Cot and carrier being passed outboard. FROM SHIP TO HOSPITAL: A COT-CARRIER. 00 M ^^ , V} z 3 ■04) o 3 < Q tT B O O (1) OS n: UJ c/: te ^i^ c c o u u « z V < s: s ■CD Qi C u u o S •V < N S o z « NM ^ K Q) u J3 H <i: O ^ ■ec e ^ c v> a> ^ H i62 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 253 apt to chafe under restraints placed upon him by his doctor ; possessing that knowledge, ho gladly accepts them, and may even carry them a stage farther on his own behalf. Sir Arthur IMay, whose policy was ever to encourage the friendliest relations between patient and doctor, both of whom, he was at pains to emphasize, he regarded as brother " sailor men," was an enthusiastic supporter of the lectures on health subjects which were a feature of battleship life. He reajjed a speedy reward, for the nien entered into the spirit of their medical oflicers. They showed their pleasure by taking the advice offered to them, and by spreading it ; the effects were soon evident. The lecturers spoke simply of the great fight with disease upon the issue of which so much depended. They told of the terrible effects of dirt and insanitary condition among men living a life aboard ship in quarters necessarily cramped ; they indicated the dangers of bad teeth, of abuse of tobacco and alcohol, above all of venereal disease. Further, they gave in- struction in first aid, so that dxiring a battle, when the doctor could not be reached, help might be afforded to wounded comrades. The lectures gave the men a new interest, and helped to brighten the monotony of the long winter evenings, and they sowed valuable seed, the fruits of w^hich were gathered during the course of the war. But if this method was important, the work accomplished upon ventilation was revolu- tionary. Ventilation ashore is important, but not perhaps very interesting ; ventilation upon a battleship proved to be often a matter of life and death. A battleship lived by her ventila- tion, for unless the air below decks was kept sweet and pure, disease had an opportvmity ; and in actual combat efficient ventilation was found to mean clear heads and eyes, and so to double the fighting capacity of the men in the gun turrets, the signallers and the telephone operators who were the nerves between brain and hand, between those who planned and those who executed. The ventilation of many of the older ships was notoriously bad, and the crews suffered in consequence. In the presence of the fumes of exploded charges good shooting became difficult in the extreme. On the other hand, a man could not remain in that condition of physical well-being which was so essential to modern scientific fighting if he was being " blown away " by a strong blast of air pumped into the room in wlii<h he worked. The difliculty had always been to fin<l a method of ventilation which would ensure an evenly distributed supjily of fresh air without draughts The air should, it was seen, be " breathed ' throughout the ship, not driven i.i blasts through it. In li)12 a Committee, with Fleet Surgeon R. C. Munday as Secretary, was appointed by the Admiralty to investigate and report on the best methods of ventilating modern warships. It is no exaggeration to say that the work of this Committee was as important in its way as the work of those who devised the huge guns they did so much to render efficient. A new era in naval ventilation was inaugurated. By means of most ingenious devices a free and full supply of warmed air was secured for every part of the ship ; while the ventilation of destroyers was improved to such an extent that even the fastest of them in the roughest sea could have their living spaces supplied with fresh air which might be warmed. INIany men had reason during the fierce hours of the Jutland battle of May 31-June 1, 1916, to bless these ventilation schemes. In the gun turrets lives were saved by them, while down in the bowels of the great ships activities were made possible which other- wise had been stayed from the outset of the engagement. The Battle of Jutland Bank, however, was not the first engagement in which the naval surgeon had opportunities for practising his craft in actual warfare. In a himdred small affairs he was called upon to play his part, and played it as naval surgeons from the great Beatty, to whom Nelson addressed his last brave words, onwards have ever played their parts. At the Falkland Islands, at the Cocos Islands, in the harbour at Zanzibar, off Heligoland, and elsewhere the same heroism characterized this Service, and the same quiet^ brave work was carried on. It is impossible in a chapter such as this to do justice to all these deeds, and some must be passed over in silence ; but a more or less careful survey is essential to a irue under- standing of the work which was acconiplished, for our naval actions were very few as com- pared with the actions of the armies in the field, and each possessed special features in respect of time, place and circumstance. 111—3 Tnr: times histouy of the WAR. [nd: ' \ \ AN AMBULANCE TABLE. The Mono-wheel Stretcher and Carrier devised by the Rev. Bevill Close, Chaplain, R.N. This stretcher was used in the trenches of the Royal Naval Division at Gallipoli. The naval action off Heligoland in August, 1914. stands first in chronological order and offers a good illustration of the state of affairs in the early days of the war. Happily an excellent record of its medical aspect was preserved by a surgeon who played his part in it.* " On 28th August (says this writer) ' action ' was so\inded off. Two cruisers (supposed enemy's ships) having been suddenly observed had caused us to take up ' stations ' somewhat * 27ie Naval Action off Heligoland. By Fleet Surgeon Walter Hopkiii.s, R.N. Journal of the Hoyal Naval Medical Service. tuulii'r than had Ixcri anticipated. It was (|uickly discovered, however, that the cruisers wore our o\\ t». Shortly after, therefore, break- fast was piptvl to eacii watch in turn, and at about 7 a.m. tho enemy's ships were actually sighted. From this tiine on to close upon 2 p.m. successive actions wore fought between \ arious opposing forces in the two fleets. " Tho day was fine and calm, while the sun gleamed through a very hazy atmosphere in which patches of fog shortened up tlie visual distance from time to time. 1 remained on the upper deck during the earlier part of the affair and found it a most interesting and inspiring sight to watch our destroyers and tho Arethn.sa and her divisions dashing at full speed after the enemy, while soon the frequent spurts of flame from their sides, the following reports and the columns of water and spray thrown up by the enOmy's shells pitching short or over began to create in most of us a suppressed excitement which we had not hitherto experienced, telling us that the ' real thing ' had begun, that an action was actually in progress. " Shortly our interest was to multiply four- fold when the order to fire our own guns was given. After a time, shells beginning to dro[) ominously near, I retired to my station, a selected spot just below the waterline in the after bread-room, one of the few available places in a ship of this class where some of my ])arty of first-aid men could be accommodated ; the other half of the party, in charge of the sick-berth steward, being situated at a similar station forward. This period one found trying. For knowledge as to how inatters were pro- gressing we had to rely upon fragments of information shouted down the nearest hatch- way from someone in communication with those on the upper deck. " The rat-tat-tat ! rat, tat, tat, tat, on o\vc sides from time to time as we got into the thick of it told us plainly of shells pitching short and bursting, whose fragments struck but did not penetrate the ship's skin ; it was a weird sound, occasionally varied by a tremen- dous ' woomp,' which once at least made the paymaster, who was reclining near me on a flour-sack, and myself look hard at the side close by us, where we fully expected, for the moment, to see water coming in. As a matter of fact, this shell entered some 40 feet away, btu"sting an entry into the Lieutenant-Conn- mander's cabin, while its solid nose finally THE TIMES HlSTonY OF THE WAR. 255 fetched up in the wardroom where later on it was cliristonod ' our honorary uunibtT.' For this trophy I beheve we have the Mainz or the Koln to thanlc. The wardroom steward found a similar piece of shell in liis hammock that night. It had penetrated the ship's side and a bulkhead before finally choosing its highly suitable place of rest. " The Fearless appears to have borne a .somewhat charmed life — a large niunber of shells pitched just short and ju-t over her — she was hit fair and square by seven, one of wliich played a lot of havoc with middle deck forward and the mess gear there. Her sides showed some 23 holes of varying sizes, and yet her list of casualties was only eight woiinded, none dangerously . . . for suppressed excite- ment and vivid interest I shoukl say that the seeker after excitement could scarcely a.sk for more than a modern naval action." The eight wounded did not give the doctor very much work to do. But the engagement revealed the fact that work in the distrib\iting station of a warship during an action was of a kind to test the strongest nerves, and that many precautions would require to be taken. The doctor was ordered presently to go aboard the Laertes, which had been taken in tow, and there he found some severe cases awaiting him, and he says : " Arriving on board I found the worst case was that of a young stoker in a serious condition from shock and loss of blood. He had sus- tained several shell wounds, one of wliich involved the left tibia and fibula. . . . Arovmd this patient the deck was covered in blood and so sUppery that I had to send for cloths to be put down to enable me to keep a footing. Near bj- were two others, somewhat less severely wounded, lying on the deck, while just beneath me lay two figiu'es covered with the Union Jack." Thanlvs to the skill of their comrades the vounded had all received first aid, but still considerable haemorrhage was going on. From tliis engagement dated the knowledge that in modern naval action woimds were either very slight or else terribly severe. Further, tlie part which burns were to play in swelling the casualty lists became evident. Huge areas of burning were seen, " the whole length of the upper limb from finger-tips to shoulder as well as the face, ears, neck, and upper part of the chest." Many of these bvirns were inflicted by the flash of bursting shells, yet it was interesting to note that the eyes themselvra almost invariably escaped injury by the flame. This happened even in cases in wliich tiie eyebrows and eyelashes had been singed and the skin of the eyelic's badly damaged. It proved that " instan- taneous " as was the flash of the bursting shells, the power of the eye to detect it and protect itself against it was quicker in its action. The eye saw and the brain understood in time to cause the eyelid to shut before the scorching sheet of flame could do its work. These burns were not the same as those caused by explosions in gun turrets which had been hit, and whicli will 1>(> dcscrilxvl l)cl( w AN AMBULANCE SLING Devised by Fleet-Surgeon P. H. Boyden. W •5 u > <- - E 2 o M " Q B - O E - H -OB e O -J « ■eo U o i— I u Z -a O r^ O C W2 1/5 e - u Z ^ o o w 256 THE TIMES HISTOllY OF THE WAR. 257 They wnro usually superficial, and it \va,s to the credit of the naval doctors on board shij) and in the sliore hospitals that in very many instances injuries that seenunl at first siglit to bo irreparable vere so treated that complete recovery took place and deformity \\as avoided. Dressings of picric acid were found to be most beneficial, thougli other forms of treatment had their adherents — notably the method of irrigating by salt sohition, introduced by Sir Almroth Wright during the war and described fully in an earlier chapter.* Of tlie total of 27 cases seen by this doctor there were 5 burns or scalds and 22 .shell and splinter wounds, 10 of the latter cases being Germans. The wounds were mostly lacerated and punctured, deep and shallow, of all shapes and sizes ; several of them involved bones. The men bore their wovinds with cheerful vmconcern. A young sub -lieutenant was found sitting in the wardroom with liis leg, which had a shell wound in it, stuck up on a chair. His only anxiety was to get back to his work. Other men showed the same spirit, and the Germans were not behind their captors — and rescuers — in this. The wounds healed well, but it became clear that the fact of being at sea did not save a wounded sailor from the danger of blood- poisoning — it had been believed that on the sea this danger was small. The problem of the cleansing of wounds wliich loomed so large in the military hospitals of France and Belgium at this time therefore engaged the attention of the naval service also, and solutions of it were quickly devised. This battle of Heligoland was a small affair, then, from the doctor's point of view. The list of casualties, when comparison is made with the Army, seems almost ridiculous. Any street accident might yield as many. But it would be a grave niistake to suppose that on this account the lessons learned were unimpor- tant. On the contrary, they were of the highest importance. They showed the doctors what to expect, and they revealed the fact that in any great engagement, where smaller craft inight be expected to suffer heavily, tiie casualties would be severe. Xew ideas were generated ; new possibilities opened uj) ; new methods called for. The naval medical authorities at Wliitehall profited by the lesson in various ways. A Committee presided over by Sir Watson * See Vol. VI, p. 57. Cheyno was set to \\ork to consider tlic question of the treatment of woumls ; the treatment of burns received attention ; the danger from tlie fumes of bursting shells, which tended to sink down on the decks and penetrate to the cabins below and so to cause suffocation, was con- sidered and the testing of resjjirators begun fortliwith. The.se stejjs were doubtles.s in advance of actual requirements, but on the day of the Battle of Jutland Bank they had their justification. Kxperionce dictated the modification of other arrangements and more especialfy of the arrangements for the safety of the wounded during action. The sick bay was the ship's hospital during periods of inaction, and, thanks to the work of Fleet Surgeon D. W. Hewitt and Fleet Surgeon M. C. Langford, these ships' hospitals were splendidly equipjiod and had been brought to a state of the liigliest efficiency. No pains had been spared to make them as complete as possible, and it wa« easy to carry out any surgical measures required in them. But their position on deck, above the armour, rendered them quite unsuitable for use during a battle, and against this contingency other rooms had been prepared and set apart^ — a precaution the A\isdom of which was shown when a sick bay and all it contained was smashed to j)ieces by a bursting shell. These other rooms were known as di.stributing stations, and were situated one forward and one aft, under the armour. It was essential that the transference of material from the sick bay to the distributing stations should take place at the earliest possible moment after the call " prepare for action," and as action might be imminent at any moment, day or night, it was necessary that all preparations should be so far advanced that little or nothing remained to be done when the order was given. As little gear as possible was, therefore, left in the sick bay. Further, those responsible were advised as to their duties and trained in them. When action was sounded, the water-tight compartments were, of course, closed and inter- conununication became impossible ; therefore mistakes made or omissions committed could not be rectified. A man had then to do the best he could with the material to his hand and he might be situated in very terrible circmnstances for the doing of it. Equipment of the dis- tributing stations was, therefore, of paramount unportance and received careful thought and consideration. 258 THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAli. Tlio (littii'iilty was space. But ingenuity solvetl this and niado it possible to have an operating table fully rigged, dressings, anti- septics, and other appliances always ready, and also to prejiaro accommodation for the wounded. As we shall presently ser, these rooms wore destined to witness some strange and terrible spectacles during the coiu"se of the fighting. For accommodation of the wounded after action, the best available compartments in proximity were used ; by special fittings previously ])repared the wounded could be slung in stretchers from the roof, one tier of stretciiers above the other, and in this way a large niunber could be taken in at one time. Ashore, pre^parations Jis complete as those matle afloat had been instituted, and the wounded from the Heligoland battle were thus soon brought to great comfort in well-equipped hospitals. Some of them came to the Royal Xaval Hospital at Chatham, which they reached within 24 hours ot being struck down. In each case a dose of anti-tetanic serum was given to seciu-e against possible attack by lockjaw and careful operative measures cariied out. An arm, a leg, and an eye were part of the price pairl by the sailors for this engagement, and some of the other conditions were of a terrible character, yet the cases did exceedingly well : the great cheerfulness of the men and their FROM THE GERMAN COMMERCE RAIDER. Prisoners from the " Emden " going through physical drill exercise on board a British warship. Captain Miiller (x), who commanded the "Emden." THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE IT.///. 259 LANDING WOUNDED AT PLYMOUTH. heroic attitude even when suffering tlie most acute paui won the admiration of doctors and nurses alike. The hospital acconimodation at the disposal of the Navy was not extensive when judged bj- Army standards, but of its eflficiency no doubt could exist. There were, in the first place, the three great naval hospitals — Haslar (Ports- mouth), accommodating 1,434 patients ; Ply- mouth, accommodating 1,173 patients ; and Chatham, accommodating 1,107 patients. In addition to these, the Navy had numerous hospitals in the British Isles accommodating some 11,129 patients, and further possessed a hospital for mental diseases at Great Yarmouth. Abroad, there were naval hospitals at Gibraltar and Malta and other points. Nor was private help wanting to add to these establishments. Lady Bute converted her house, INIount Stuart, Isle of Bute, into a Naval hospital, and it was fully occupied from the beginning of the war. It had beds for 125 patients and proved a boon, both on account of its beautiful position and healthy siu- roundings. Lady Nunbumliobne also made generous offers of hospital accommodation, and "provided for Naval patients a fully equipped hospital for 220 patients in a locality where Naval hospital accommoda<:ion was much needed. The British Red Cross Society equipped a hospital for 160 patients at Truro, Cornwall, and the Church Army one for 100 260 THE TTME^ TIJ^TOnr OF THE WAR. Mtmmmmsmgm THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK, MAY 31, 1916: ADMIRAL BEATTY'S: (From plu tagraphs taker.l 1 THE TIMES IIISTOJiY OF THE WAR. •2G1 ^'"■"z,. '^ r TTLE-CRUISERS ENGAGING THE GERMAN BATTLE-CRUISERS. ing the battle.) '2(1-2 THH Tl\U':s HISTORY OF THE WAR. patients at Diinvagel, Lanark. Princess Christian provided funds with which the former bed accommodation at Queensferry Hospital was doubled, and Canadian women generously sub- scribed a sum of £40,000 with which a new block was built at Haslar Hospital. In addi- tion, many kind offers of help flowed in to the Admiralty from all parts of the country, and were accepted. The wounded men reached these hospitals by hospital sliii? and hospital train, though m many cases they were lancled directly by the warship in wliich they had been serving. Weather and FOR REST AND TREATMENT. From hospital ship to train. A train at Toulon with wounded passengers about to start for the Riviera. circumstance were the detennining factors, for manifestly in a gale transferences could not be made at sea, and, again, a ship which had been badly hit might not stay in her rush for port to unload wounded. As a rule the Grand Fleet returned to its anchorages with the wounded aboard ; these were then transhipped to the hospital ships, which brought them to some landing port whence they were removed to a local hospital, or if able to travel comfortably, put on the ambulance trains for transport to one or other of the naval hospitals. The Navy owned 12 of these hospital ships, splendid vessels fitted with every kind of surgical appliance and fully staffed by doctors. Of these 12, nine were constantly employed in home waters and tlu-ee in the Mediterranean. The trains were as well equipped as the ships, and the hammock-like cots gave them a distinctly naval appearance. The system was an admirable one, for it allowed of thorough cleansing and ensured that no bumping should disturb the severely wounded. These trains, like those in use for the transport of soldiers, w^ere hospitals on wheels in a true sense, so that it may be said that from the moment he reached the dis- tributing station on his own ship a man was never out of the doctor's hands or cut off THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAh'. •2G3 from expert attention. As tlie distributinp station was waiting to receive him, in most cases, the moment ho fell, his chances of salvation were excellent. It is not possible to avoid comparing this happy lot with that of the wovinded soldier eking out terrible hours upon the Xo-man's Land, beyond the reach of succour luitil darkness should have covered him. Yet it must not be forgotten that against that the sailor had to face the perpetual peril of mine and submarine and the chance that at any moment Iiis ship might be sunk and all chance of salvation lost — for how should a sorely wounded man fare in the great hazard of the sea ? The naval medical service played its part in handling the great exodus from nelguim in August, 1914, and also in treating the wounded from the ill-starred Antwerp expedition. jVIen from the latter were taken to the Chatham and Plymouth hospitals ; wounded Belgian soldiers were transported across the Channel in the hospital ships Plassy and Magic, and about 2,000 wounded French soldiers from Dimkirk to Cherbourg in the hospital ship China. The medical officers of these ships had their hands very full during the voyages. The wounds seen were of incredible severity in many cases, for at that period field treat- ment was not in the advanced stage to wliicli it came later. Before leaving this part of the subject the directions issued to the medical staff of the Xeptime in 1913 for dealing with wounded may be alluded to. They servo to show how well the difficulties likely to be encountered had been forestalled; they show also how true an esti- mate of the actual needs had been formed. The directions were divided into three parts, those " On Leaving Port," those " During Action," and those " After the Action." With the fir.st two we have already been concerned ; the last provided that as soon as the action was over or there was a lull the stretcher parties would march to the places appointed, as shown by luggage labels attached to the stretchers. They would take first-aid bags of dressings with them and hot coffee or beef-tea and drinking vessels. On arrival they would move the wounded from the turret or other place to the deck and out of the way of the guns. They would render first aid but not otherwise move the wounded. The senior medical officer would then make a rapid tour of the upper deck to estunite the number and condition of the wounded, and give any neces.sary hypodermic injections, attaching labels to prevent the possibility of duplication. At the same time the staff siu-geon would inspect THE SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "NATAL." About to proceed on leave after receiving new kit. 3 O ■* F u < 00 a X E U U 03 o u ^ u *rf w •o Q c (/f (A Q 4> tf) Z 7 .J u Uei i> _; ■hd u (A E •tS H la QQ a< u b. J3 O ^ a u H H .a <: 03 o U tj X 5) H 4) ^ 264 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 265 tho main deck. During a lull the surgeons would .supcr\-ise the removal of the wounded to a place below the armour, where they would remain under care till the end of the action. Of great naval actions in the early days of the war there were few, if indeed we excej)t the battle in the Pacific and the battle of the Falk- land Isles. About tho former there is nothing to be said so far as the surgeons are concerned, for unhappily the disaster which overwhelmed our ships was fatal to doctor and patient alike. Of the latter there is only this to be said — the total British casualties in this great battle were 10 men killed and 16 wounded. This battle, indeed, illustrated the tremendous hazard of naval warfare and showed to what an extent the fate of %hips and of men is deter- mined by gun power and gun reach. But if great actions were very few, there occurred a number of small actions of a deeply interesting kind. Of these the two which com- mand attention most evidently were that be- tween the Pegasus and the Konigsberg and that between the Sydney and the Emden, for these were fights of a special character, each showing relatively heavy casualties and each revealing the naval siu"geon in a heroic light. The action between the I'egasus and the Konigsberg took place of? Zanzibar on the morning of September 20, 19 14. The Pegasus was refitting and was therefore taken unawares, and though a brave resistance was offered, she suffered heavily, being literally battered to pieces. In consequence the sm-geon. Fleet Surgeon A. J. Hewitt, R.X., foimd himself faced with the following casualty list — 24 men of the Pegasus and 1 native servant killed, 8 officers and 69 men woimded. Of the 3 officers and 25 men admitted to the European hospital 2 officers and 4 men died the same day, and sub- sequently 8 more men died of their wounds. When the action began, two coUeotingstations for the wounded were selected, the stokers' mess deck forward on the lower deck below the sick bay and the torpedo flat aft, on the lower deck below and forward of the ward-rooni. The deck of these spaces was about foiu- to six inches below the water-line. The sick berth steward had charge of one station and he was assisted by a cook from the galley, the foremost stretcher party and forecastle party, the other station was in charge of the ship's surgeon, who was assisted by one cook and the after stretcher parties and the poop bearer party. On action being soun- ded the cooks brought with them to their respec- tive stations a " fanny " of hot water and some cold water. Each gun luul been supplied with a canvas bag containing a tourniquet, in case of bleeding, bandages, and other appliances. The.se bags were securefl under the shields of the gims. A similar bag had been supplied to the fore-bridge, and \arious other precautions, which were now fully justified, had been taken. In his report on the action pul)lish('d in the " JoiuTial of the Royal Naval Medical Service " Fleet Surgeon Hewitt .stated that the most re- markable feature of the wounds was the large number of minute superficial woinids and burns looking like the pitting of black po\vd°r, also the small penetrating power of the fragments in open spaces like the upper deck. The danger zone, so far a.s life was concerned, seemed to be confined to a small area round the bursting space, and although the initial velocity of the fragments apj:)eared to be very great, this seemed to diminish rapidly, perhaps owing to the irregularity of their shape. For example, a large nimiber of fragments were removed at a depth of from two to four inches, some embedded in bone and some in the .soft tissues. In two penetrating wounds of the .skull the entrance woimds were of identical shape and size with the shell fragments found, but in neither ca.se did the missile penetrate more than four inches. A leading seaman had his right arm so shattered that a prunary amputation was necessary, but a fragment of the same shell hit the brass buckle of his belt, breaking it but not even bruising the abdomen. " Small fragments " (continued Fleet Surgeon Hewitt) " were also the cause of the loss of four eyes, and I am of opinion that a pair of motor goggles would have saved all these. A case of aneury.smal varix occurred in the right common carotid and jugular vessels caused by a minute particle of shell which probably could have been stopped by a linen collar. In my opinion a coat of light chain armour, or even leather, with a [jair of goggles made from toughened motor screen glass would be invalu- able to captains of destroyers, navigators and others in exposed positions who are likely to encounter ships armed with similar gims." These suggestions were made at a period long before our soldiers and those of our Allies wore helmets in the trenches ; they were reproduced in an article on the need of protective shields and helmets which appeared in The Times in the summer of 1915, and the effects of which were soon evident in France. Thus the 2GG THE TIMES 11 1 STORY OF THE WAR. SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "MAJESTIC," MAY 27, 1915. Eight minutes after the warship was torpedoed by a submarine. experience gained in Zanzibar was destined to help in the agitation which secured for our .soldiers the great additional safeguard which helmets proved to be. Many of the wounds met with in the Pegasus were of a terrible description and showed the devastating effect of naval gunfire. A leading stoker had his shoulder smashed to pulp, another poor fellow had both eyes and the whole upper part of his face shot away, broken limbs and lacerated flesh were seen on every hand. " Most of the casualties," the doctor wrote, " occurred on the upper deck, and the scene that this presented can scarcely be imagined. Yet there was very little noise on board from the wounded, and one was impressed by the death- like silence between the periods of appalling din caused by the salvoes. Although the ship was in harbour and only a short distance from the shore no one attempted to jump overboard and there was no panic. The moral of the men was magnificent." In this inferno the doctor. Fleet Surgeon Hewitt, went about his work according to the grand tradition of the service he represented. The fumes of the higli explosive powder had a stupefying effect, causing a feeling of dizziness ; the bursting of the shells smote the decks with blasts of air which had an unnerving effect ; but the good work was not suffered to fail on that accoimt. Indeed, the awful scene, so far as it affected himself, was dismissed by the doctor in a line : "I personally had been breathing more deeply than normal in assisting a wounded man up a ladder from the after torpedo-fiat where these fumes were particularly dense, and experienced a feeling of nausea and dizziness. For several days afterwards on deep breathing one seemed to exhale the fumes." The wounded were taken from the Pegasus by boats from the cable-layer Banffshire as soon as the firing ceased. All had first aid dressings applied and nearly all the serious cases had had a hypodermic injection of )uorphia. All were landed within an hour. The landing was difficult owing to a rapidly ebbing tide and boats being required to return and stand by the ship as soon as the wounded were landed, for it looked as if it would be necessary to abandon the ship. Probably this action was, individually, the most terrible of the first year of war, so far as the doctor was concerned. Fleet Surgeon Hewitt faced his ordeal single-handed, and splendidly did he vindicate the good name of the medical service. His quiet courage and his ability undoubtedly went far to mitigate a most fearful situation, to save gallant lives, and to relieve the pains of those sorely injured. The action between the Sydney and the Emden attracted the attention of the whole world. The exploits of the German raider had added to her name a romantic association ; her destruction, when it came, was hailed with feelings in which admiration had a large place. The Emden was sighted about 9 a.m. and the THE TIMES HISTOIiY OF THE WAR. 207 battle began shortly afterwards. The doctors soon found themselves busy. The senior medical officer had begun a tour of the guns as soon as the raider was sight ed,to see if the first-aid bags were ready, but before he could retiu-n to his station the guns of the Sydney had opened fire. The Emden soon returned the fire and within five to ten minutes from the beginning of the action the first wounded man was brought below. He had a fracture of the right leg and thirteen shell wounds and was in great pain. Following him came a stream of wounded demanding immediate attention. The .second case had been shot in the chest and the apex of the heart was seen beating througli a hole in the chest wall, ilany of the other wounds were of a dreadful character. At 11.15 a.m. the order "Cease fire" was .soimded. The medical staff had now been working two hours in a confined atmosphere at a temperature of 105^ F. " During the action," \\Tote Surgeon Leonard Darby, R.A.X., in the " Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service,' " the space below was very congested, the tunnel being full of men belonging to the anamuiition and fire parties. At the best of times there is little room here, so the regular transport of womided was con- siderably impeded. All the time we knew not how the fight was going — we could only hear orders for ammunition and the continual rapid fire of oiu" guns. At one time, when we heeled over and the operating table took charge, it seemed as though the ship had been b:idly hit, but we .soon found out that this was only due to a sudden alteration of course." The wounded meantime were in considerable pain and every effort was being made t6 help them. As soon as possible after the action the sick bay was prepared as an operating theatre. This meant hard work, because during the bat tit this room had been flooded with water from the fire mains. Moreover, the task of getting the wounded up to the operating room and dealing with them was not made easier by the continual arrival of new patients in the shape of German i^ailors fished up out of the water, most of whom were in a very collapsed state indeed One man had been in the shark-infested sea for nine hours, but was brought round after some trouble and next day was none the worse for liis immersion. Operative surgery was therefore not begiui in earnest imtil the day after the battle. This was inevitable, for the wounded demanded constant attention at first. Early in the morn- ing of that day (November 10, 1914) the Sydney had reached Cocos Island and shipped the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company's Sur- geon, Dr. H. S. Ollerhead, to help with th>^ German wounded. This addition to the staff was welcome— the Sydney carried two m<-dical officers of her own — and operations began ab once. " Our cliief difficulties " (v\TOte Surgeon Darby) " were lack of spaco and trained SURVIVORS IN BLANKETS AFTER BEING RESCUED FROM THE DISASTER. 268 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 209 assistance, and we hatl iisf>(l up all the sterile towels on the day of the action ; also there was much tlelay in getting instruiu.>nts re- sterilized . . Late in the day we organized a theatre staff from volunteers. They helped to clear up, held basins, handed stores and dressings, and did much reniarkably useful work with a composure that was astonishing, as they were present at many bloody operations to which none of them previously had been iii any way accustomed. Surgeon Wild acted as anaesthetist and Dr. Ollerhead assisted me with the operations." The operations want on all day, the doctors as usual refusing to spare themselves until their patients had been given every possible attention. Next day the Sydney returned to the Emden, wliich was flying signals of distress, and arrangements began for tran.sferring about 80 German wounded. All available stretchers, hammocks and cots were sent to the Emden with a party under Dr. Ollerhead, who did not return till the last patient left the ship some foiu" hoiu-s later. Even then some men who had got ashore could not be brought oS till next day, Noveniber 12. This transhipping was an exceedingly difficult business, as there was a huge siu-f running on the beach where the Emden was ashore 4 the collecting and lowering of the wounded into the boat was attended, imavoidably, by a good deal of pain. The wounded were taken aboard the Sydney in the cots and stretchers by means of davits, but there was no davit available in the Emden. One German siu-geon was uninjured, but he had been iinable to do much, having had 24 horn's with so many wounded on a battered slup, with none of his staf? left and with very few dressings, lotions, or instruments. " The Emden," says Surgeon Darby, " was riddled with gaping holes ; it was with difficulty one could walk about her decks, and she was gutted with fire. The wounds of the Germans who were brought of? to the Sydney by this time, only 24 to 30 hours after injury, were practically all ver\- septic, with maggots \ in. in length crawling over them. Little had been done for them, but now they were attended to by our party and translupped to us as quickly as possible." Tliis fresh rush of cases soon crowded out the wardroom and the sick bay had to be used as a dressing station. Soon there was scarceh^ any room to move, for besides the 70 wounded received that day there were over 100 prisoners and 20 Chinamen from the sunken collier wliidi had been attending on the Emdm. Operations hml thus to be discontinued at noon on Novem- ber 11, but tlicy began again at H p ni. and did not .stop till 4.30 a.m. on November 12— a period of l(»i hours of continuous operating. The Gennan surgeon stood at the table beside his English profes.sional brethren and took his share of the work. "All tills time," Surgeon Darby concluded, " we had to organize and arrange a hosj)ital \\ith its equipment and the feeding and mirsing of patients ; up to now this was turned over to the fir.st-aid and volunteer nursing party, and they received the cases straight from the theatre. In the case of the fiennans we had a party told off from the prisoners to help our staff. We had two large wards, the wardroom and the waist deck, and various special wards, a few cabins being given up by officers. . . . By nightfall (November 12) one could look round with a feeling that some impression had been made on the work, and later that evenintz the German surgeon and myself went rourul sorting out the cases we could send off next day to the Empress of Russia, an armed liner which had been dispatched to help us with the wounded and relieve us of our 230 extra men. It would be difficult," added this gallant medical officer, " to imagine a more severe- test for the medical staff of a cruiser." All credit then to those who faced the test and emerged from it triumphantly. These two isolated actions show clearly ol what splendid material our Naval Medical Service was constituted. Aboard ship the doctors combined with their professional know- ledge a seaman's power of adapting himself to circumstances and of arlapting circumstances to the need of the moment. This spirit was shown again and again, but never more conspicuously than on board the Tiger during the North Sea action of January 24, 1915. The Tiger went into eiction on that day at 7.15 a.m., and at 9.3 the first shot was fired. Fleet Siu-geon Jolin R. IMuir had origin- ally intended to deal with the cases seriatim as they came to him, operating on each one at once ; he soon found that this was an Utopian idea. The violent concu-ssion from a gim turret near by made operation an utter impossibility- and necessitated the use of first-aid methods only. At 10.50 an lu-gent telephone message came down to the doctor from '' Q " turret askina for a medical officer anil an ambidance •270 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. AT THE DARDANELLES. Admiral de Robeck inspecting sailors on board H.M.S. "Canopus." party. The doctor, however, knew that it was impossible to handle men in stretchers through the working chambers and going on deck was not to be thought of. He refused the request and soon found he had done wisely. The wounded readily foimd their way to the dressing stations themselves. About 11.30 a 12 in. shell entered the dis- tributing office on the vipper deck. This shell was very destructive because it exploded upwards. " It blew up the traja hatch in the roof of the distributing office," \\'rote Fleet Surgeon Muir (" Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Ser- vice"), "which communicated with the gun control tower, killed one officer who was standing on the hatch, seriously wounded another, and severely scorched the face of a third, all of whom were in the gun control tower. In its explosion in the distributing office it killed six men and wounded five men. In the port 6 in. gun control the same shell killed a boy and injured a midshipman and two boj's. " An urgent telephone message was received from the gun control tower and an ambulance party was sent off in charge of a surgeon to see what could be done. This party had consider- able difficulties, as the lights had all gone out, the alley way was wrecked and the escape up pa«t the distributing office, which was the only possible route, was blown to bits and tlireatoned by fire from the intelligence office, which was immediately below the, distributing office. Tlianks to the heroism and bravery tlisplayed by a .'sick berth attendant and two boys all the ca.ses nientioned except one, who was discovered after the action was over, were brought down to the forward distributing station. " When they arrived seven were dead or (>x[)ired as they were laid on the floor. The dead were laid on one side as decently and quickly as possible, covered with a flag, and the wounded attended to. . . . There was complete absence of moaning or complaints. The explosion of the shells caused a black, oily; sooty deposit in the skin of nearly all these jiatients. This was readily removed with turpentine, but nothing else seemed to have any effect. Soap and water and spirit were useless." During the summer and autumn of 1915 the naval doctor had opened up to him a new field of operation in the Dardanelles. Through- out the Gallipoli campaign the naval medical service cooperated with that of the Army, FROM THE DARDANELLES. Wounded being landed from a hospital ship at Plymouth. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •271 AT THE DARDANELLES. Transferring wounded from a British warship. rendering most valuable assistance and, indeed, so far solving the difficulty of the transport of wounded from the shore as to convert a situa- tion of grave anxiety into one of comparative seciu'ity. Xaval hospital ships were in attend- ance, and one of the largest of these was the Soudan, of wliicli Fleet Surgeon Trevor CoUingnood, R.N., was the Senior Medical Officer. On February 25 this ship arrived at Tenedos, and in the evening of the same day seven wounded were transferred to her from the Agamemnon, which showed signs of having been hit by a shell. The following day a party of men landed from the Vengeance •272 7///-; riMKs HisTom' of the war. and tlie* Irresistible and inure Nsoiimled arrived. Otiier \vound«'d eaine in, and then, on Mareh (i, two fiiglit olllifers fell from a eon- siderable heij?ht into the sea and had to be succoured. \\'ounded were taken in from time to time until Mareh 22, when the Soudan left tor Malta and landed 113 eases. It is interest- ing to note that there were no eases of gangi'ene and only one case of tetanus, which resulted from shell wounds ; this must be considered somewhat exceptional. This first voyage of the hospital ship took I)laco before the great landing on the beach, and it compares strangely with the second \'oyage, which ended on April 25, when the Soudan appeared again off the entrance to the J Jar danelles. By the evening of that day no fewer tlian 10 military oHieers and 342 soldiers iuul been received ; by 8 p.m. a total of 430 ca.s«;s were a))oard, and the shij) drew off in prder to allow the .staff to work in quietness. They performed munerous operations, and then on April 27 all the wounded were transferred to a so-called '" hospital carrier ship " and taken to Alexandria. Subsequently, in May, 411 Anzac soldiers were treated in five days. During this jjeriod only four naval wounded were receivetl from the Amethyst, which had been under fire at Smyrna — a fact which emphasized once more the difference between sea and land fighting. The hospital ship Rewa also rendered splendid service at the Gallipoli beaches between June and August 1915, during which time she carrieil some 7,000 cases. It was noted by her medical officers that while it seemed to matter little what types of antiseptics they used to clean the wounds, efficient cleansing was all-impor- tant ; and they observed fiu-ther that the length of time which elapsed between the infliction of a wound and its attention on board the ship w as an important detennining factor upon the HEROES OF IHE JUTLAND BANK BATTLE. Wounded seamen enjoying a trip in Surrey. TIIK TIMI':s HISTORY OF THE WAR. 270 resiilt of trcntnioiit The doctors had an interesting proof of thoir view, for thov liad cases sent to them from tliroc different beiu-hes, each one situated at a (Ufforont distance from the ship tliati tlio others. Hellas Beach provided by far the most septic type of case. 'I'lie average time uliicli elapsed between wounding and arrival on board was from 22 to 24 hours, some cases spending as long as tliree days on the journey. The reason lay in the distance of the front-line trenches from the beach and also the exposed character of the intervening territory. These patients too suffered much from insects and were hoisted aboard, in the words of the medical staff, " black with flies," and very soon after the first load or two had been received " the decks and wards are also black with flies." Many wounds \Aere found on arri\al to bo already swarming with maggots. Gas gan- grene came from this beach and from this beach only. The best beach was the Anzac Beach, where the front line of trenches was near the shore, and the average time taken to put men on board after they had been wounded was five to six hours. Also the Anzac soldiers were very fine men physically ; and the flies were fewer. Suvla came between Hellas and Anzac, the time here being between nine and ten hours. This experience corresponded with the general experience of the war and made rapid evacuation of wounded a matter of paramount importance everywhere. It bore out the view stated by Sir Almroth Wright that it was Tiot the wound which killed, but the dirt — bacteria and flies' eggs — introduced into the wound. The experience, however, meant that A\hpn a batch of wounded arrived in this and other hospital ships the staffs had to work, literally, till they dropped. E\ery moment of delay meant so much more danger for the wounded — not merely so much more discomfort. Great as the tasks were which often faced these doctors, they did not spare themselves ; in four trips they actually performed 383 opera- tions of various kinds, and that mmiber does not include a host of smaller measures : for example, easy removal of bullets. \ number of interest- ing facts emerged from tliis huge body of work, not the least of which was that the men as a whole took anaesthetics exceedingly well. The reason was, perhaps, that alcohol had not been consumed in any quantity for a long time. IN A SUBMARINE. Men from the engine room enjoying the sunshine. " Most text-books," wrote one of the doctors, " give tobacco as a reason for anaesthetic difificulties, but this did not seem to be the case, as smoking amongst all of them is finite heavy, especially cigarettes, and indeed a good proportion of them arrived on the table with a cigarette in their mouth." Xursing sisters of the Queen Alexandra's R.N. Niu-sing Service rendere:! splendid help in these hospital .ships which lay off the terrible Gallipoli beaches, and their task was no less onerous and exacting than that of the doctors. Tliey did not spare themselves in any way, and an idea of what they had to do may be gathered from the followmg account written by one of them. Nursing Sister Hilda F. Chibnall ("Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Ser- vice ") : " Our chief difficulties are the endle-ss struggles to get thtin (the patients) properly clean and decently clothed, to endeavour to combat the acute collapse, exhaustion, and mental shock from which many of them are suffering when they reach us^ — especially those from Hellas Beach, who have often been lying out for 24 or 3G hours without food, exposed to the sun and tormented with flics — and the hopelessness of trj'ing to make comfortable the men who are wounded in so many different places that they can find no easy position in •274 THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR. wliiili to rost. Thoy all arrive on board in the clotlies thoy have worn for many weeks or niontlis ; these are usually quite stiff with blootl and sand, alive with vermin, and almost black with flies. . . . The dressings are done under some difficulty, especially in rough weather, and the mast fortvmate people are those who are slightly built and can easily squeeze between the cots ; light wooden dressing tables have been made by the car- penter's crew, easily ctvrried along the gangway but large enough to liold all that is necessary, " Work in the operating theatres is very different from anything we have ever seen before. . . . The patients have had no previous preparation. They are carried straight on to the table and their dirty blood-stained clothes have to be cut right off and the skin scrubbed clean before any actual surgery can begin. " Owing to the tremendous number of dressings done in the ship each day we fird that keeping up the stock is a very big item in our work. There is no time to cut up dre.«sings when the ship is full of patients, but after landing them at a port on our return voyage to the Peninsula we all work hard to make up and sterilize sufficient dressings for the next trip As our numbers are limited only one night sister can be on duty at a time, and with so many cases in the ship her task is not particularly easy. However, on one point we are all agreed — that we have never before nursed men who suffered so much and com- plained so little nor seen patients show so much unselfishness towards each other and gratitude to those who are nursing them." These nursing sisters thus rendered noble service and took great risks, for it is the way of the Navy to discount danger in the discharge of duty and the hospital ships came very close to the Beaches. They were not attacked from the shore, for the Turk fought cleanly ; but the presence of German submarines was an ever present danger, the German being a very different kind of opponent from the Turk. Moreover there was danger from the au'. On one occasion the hospital ship Soudan, to the work of which reference has akeady been made, had a most unpleasant experience. Two trawlers were alongside taking away minor cases when a hostile aeroplane appeared overhead and dropped four bombs quite near the ship ; two of the bombs indeed straddled ' ' her, throwing up fountains of water on explosion. There were no other ships near at the time and the Soudan was lying outside the temporary boom well away from the transports. On another occasion bombs from an aeroplane fell near this vessel and it was considered advisable to have two large red canvas crosses sewn on to the upper surface of the fore and aft awnings in the liope that they might be seen and respected. It is impossible in this chapter to deal with the activities of the jiaval doctor in other spheres than those which have been indicated, but mention must be made in passing of the British Naval Mission to Serbia- and of the heroic work accomplished during the epidemic of typhus which raged in that unhappy country. A. very full report on this epidemic was presented by Temporary Surgeon Merewether, R.N., who saw it for himself and took part in the brave efforts to cope with it, thus incurring the gravest personal risk. Mention must also be made of the work done by naval doctors in connexion with the Royal Naval Air Service. This work was exceedingly interesting because experience soon showed that a high measvu-e of physical fitness was essential to a sviccessful pilot and hence upon the doctor devolved the heavy responsibility of selecting or rejecting candidates for the service. Some curious conditions were also met with, not the least of these being " Aeros- thenia," to use the word coined for it by Staff Siu"geon Hardy Wells. It was found occa- sionally ainong aerial pupils ; the pupil pilot was not comfortable in his flying ; he had not got that self-confidence which was so necessary. He was perhaps too keenly apprehensive lest he might make a bad landing or might get an engine failure over bad landing ground and smash the machine. He went on flying, nevertheless, hoping that he might overcome this feeling. But he did not overcome it ; instead he slept badly, worried, and eventually got into a really nervous state. It was found that there was only one thing to be done in those cases. The pupil had to give up flying ; he was not suited for it. Men of proved courage sometimes suffered from this trouble, and the conclusion was that "it is not given to every man to fly ; and to be left alone in the wide air- world with no one to consult is a strange feeling." Height effects were another type of con- dition upon which the naval air service doctor had to keep a watchful eye. The trouble arose usually through too rapid a descent being THE TIMES HlSTOnV OF THE WAR. Zl.) AFTER THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK. Wounded Heroes in a Hospital Ship. made. In regard to the question of age, it was found that 30 was the highest limit advisable in selecting pilots. At first 23 was fixed as the lowest because it was feared that boys under that age would be reckless in their handhng of the machines, but this rule was later relaxed, and indeed experience showed that lads of 18 and 19 are most excellent material and that Aery few of them were rejected subsequently owing to failure to show aptitude for flying. These many activities gave to the naval medical service a broad and catholic character, but the actual work upon the fighting ships remained the chief claim to honour. How supremely heroic that work was was not revealed imtil the terrible day of May 31, 1916, when the Battle of Jutland Bank, the greatest naval engagement in history, was joined. It is clearly impossible to do full justice to the work of the naval doctors in this engage- ment, but quite enough material is available to justify imstinted admiration and to evoke heartfelt gratitude in every mind. In all the great traditions of the service no nobler record can be found than the record of the men who, in darkness and danger, laboured without thought of self or safety for the benefit of their friends and the honour of their uniform. Of all the wonderful deeds of that great day perhaps those enacted upon the \\'arrior were the most \vonderful. The Warrior be- longed to Sir Robert Arbutlinot's squadron, and at 6.16 in the evening with the Defence ^\as observed passing down between the engaged lines under a very heavy fire. The Defence, flying Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot's flag, disappeared and the Warrior passed to the rear disabled. They had only a short time before been observed in action with an enemy light cruiser which was subsequently seen to sink. The ships' companies of both the Defence and Black Prince were lost, but that of the \\'arrior was saved by the Engadine. On the afternoon of May 31 the doctors of the Warrior were in their dressing stations making ready for the grim work ahead. After the first few minutes of the action, however, a terrible catastrophe occurred which in an instant cut do^^•n their effectives and threw upon those who siu-vived a terrible new burden of responsibility. A shell crashed into the ship and destroyed utterly the after dressing station ; other shells followed, and finally a fire broke out resulting in many casualties. As soon as possible, and while firing was still in progress, one of the surgeons went along the I^H w^K ^^i^^^^^^^^^^M ^^^^^^^^H^^^ln ^^^L V ^^^^^^H ^^^^^^^S^Kf^ I^^^H ^^^^^^^^^^^^^j^^^^^^^^fTa^^B P^^^^^^^^H I^Hp^. ^JH ^^^^^^ V ^I^^R^^^^^^I ^^^^^^^K r^ '^^^^IBl^Lr^^^l '^^^W^^^^^^^H ^^Hl_ -^^^nk^^H ■rr^^^B ^^^^^i^KT^^fe^ii^dtflfei^^^^^^^^^^Ki^c^^^^^^^^^l fc^^ ^H^^^^l IjMHH Wm j^^^^^H ^T^fl^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ■^^^^^^H 27e THE TIMKS HISTOUY OF THE WAR. •277 upper deck and the after part of flio sliip and rendered first aid, and in this he was assisted by the doctor in charge of the wrecked station, who had escaped miraculously. The wounded were carried along the decks from the scene of the disaster to the forward station, and this dangerous work was carried out in most ellicient and speedy fashion. Then, to add to the terrible character of the situation, the electric lights went out and gas and smoke began to fill the mess decks and especially the forward dressing station ; and although candles and an electric torch had been provided it was very difficult to see owing to the dense smoke and consequent irritation of the eyes. These various circumstances rendered the dressing station a kind of inferno. But courage and devotion discounted even so great troubles. As soon as the watertight doors, which shut off one part of the ship from the other parts, were opened, the doctors went forth again with their stretcher parties to collect Avounded from the various parts of the ship and to carry them to the sick bay and forecastle mess deck, which were still intact. Mess tables were rapidly cleared away and the wounded brought to a place of comfort with all speed. But down in the forward dressing station the conditions had meanwliile become so bad that the atmosphere was dangerous by reason of the gas and smoke in it. One of the doctors was actually " gassed," but soon recovered ; on recovery he began his work again without a moment's delay or hesitation, for there was much work waiting to be accomplished. When the wounded were collected all serious cases were placed in beds on deck and in cots in the sick bay. Some of the woivnded died here, but none from bleeding, for efficient dressings had been applied. About 9.30 the Senior Medical Officer was ready to begin his operating work. A bathroom forward of the sick bay was selected as an operating theatre. As soon as it was ready the surgeons set to work, for several men required their attention very badly. All through the long hours they toiled, knowing little or nothing of what passed upon the sea about them, of the position of their own ship, of the chances of personal safety ; perhaps caring little ; toiling with dogged perseverance towards the aim of bringing help and comfort to their fellow sailors. The work went on without a break, and by the light of candles, till 4 a.m. of June 1, when all the wounded luul been attended to and made comfortable. Indeed, at this time many of them were a.sleep. But the work was as yet only half done, for just as the surgeons com- pleted their ta.sk orders came to aliandon th«' ship ; the \\'arrior, which was then being towed by the Engadine, was sinking. It was well that this order camo after a measure of comfort ha<l been restored, and after the patients had recovered from the effects of the anaesthetics administered to them, for there was a heavy sea riuuiing and the ship was moving restlessly as she went to her doom. Fierce was the ordeal awaiting the doctors, who must transfer their tliirty-ono patients in that maelstrom. Yet the task was carried out, in spite of the sea and the rolling and plunging sloips. Life- belts were put on the patients and in cots, stretchers, and sick-bay iron cots they were moved from one vessel to the other. All watertight rooms were then rapidly closetl. The \^'arrior by this time was very low in tlie water, and might sink at any moment ; numer- ous seas swept the upper deck as she lay secured to the Engadine. It was difficult work to prevent the wounded from being soaked tlirough. The stretchers and cots were held up by men, walking on either side of them ; but the naovements of the ships rendered this task exceedingly dangerous and difficult, and imfortunately one man fell o\-erboard o%\ing to the breaking of a stretcher. He was, however, rescued by an officer of the EngacUne, but subsequently died. The heroic character of that rescue between the bumping, plunging ships may be left to the imagination. The injuries received by members of the Warrior's crew were of the most terrible kind. Several bodies were rent in pieces ; many limbs were torn from bodies ; some men were stripped naked. Among the operations per- formed by the light of the guttering candles, \ipon a sinking ship in a gale of wind, were amputations, ligaturing of bleeding vessels, and removal of shell splinters. ]\Iagnificent as was tliis conduct, it was typical of that prevailing throughout the whole fleet ; indeed on such a night of heroes dis- crimination between gallant deeds was almost impossible. Nevertiieless a few other cases may be mentioned in order to show how universal was the response to duty by the medical ser\'ice. In the Lion, for example. 278 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the trouble from pas fumes was experioneefl jiist as it had been on the Warrior. Respirators and anti-gas gopgies were issued to each turret, tonijuxrtnient and mess deck As a result of tliis precaution no case of " gassing " Oi'curred. Nearly all the casualties occurred within the first half-iiour of action. During the first lull the medical officers emerged from their stations to make a tour of inspection. The scones that greeted them beggar descrip- tion. Most of the wounded, however, had already been dressed temporarily. Tourniquets had been applied in one or two cases, and htemorrhage thus arrested. But many of the wounded were terribly mutilated and broken. Happily in this ship the light did not go out — though precaution against this eventu- ality had been taken—and so it w-as possible to get to work in comparatively good conditibns. As usual, morphia was administered at once, and acted like a charm, relieving the terrible sufferings of the stricken men. Thrice during the e\'ening the battle was renewed so far as this ship was concerned, but as each lull came it was found possible to remove the wounded to a place of safety by means of the admirable Neil Robertson stretcher (devised in 1910 by the late Fleet Surgeon Neil Robertson, R.N.) which proved so great an addition to the equipment of the naval doctor. After the action was over the injured were nursed carefully throughout the night, and were supplied with warm blankets, hot -water bottles and hot beef-tea and medical comforts. Some of the men were terribly burned and others mutilated, so that all hope of saving life was vain. The burns, as has already been indicated, were of two kinds, both of which were seen in large numbers in the Jutland battle — burns from exploded gim-charges and burns from bursting shells. The former type were oc- casioned when an enemy shell managed to ignite some of our explosives in gun turrets. In these cases the bodies of the vinhappy victirris were often charred instantly so that they resembled mummies ; it was an instantaneous process of death, and but rarely cases of this kind concerned the surgeon. The other type of burn was due to a shell bvu-sting near the victim, and often involved large areas of his skin. It was, however, a superficial burn and very amenable to treatment. Various forms of treatment were employed, but probably that by picric ■> r < I '-l" • < -rri--- - ;4a. 1 / •t 1 "*—.-- ^h!;.'' 1 _ - ■- - M 113 THE NEIL ROBERTSON HAMMOCK STRETCHER. acid was the most successful. The objection to picric acid, however, was that it adhered, rendering dressing difficult and painful. So a trial was given to the method of using liquid paraffin, recommended by Dr. Sandfort, Medecin -Major in the French Aimy. The preparation was used at a high temperature ; it solidified and formed a coating which ex- cluded the air, stopped pain in ten to fifteen minutes, and afforded painless redressings. Not until 7.30 a.m. on June 1 was it thought safe to bring the Lion's wounded up from below. The Vice-Admiral's and Captain's cabins were accordingly cleaned, dried, and thoroughly ventilated, a process which occupied a considerable time as they were both full of water and smoke, and the Captain's bathroom was rigged up as an operating theatre. By 8.45 a.m. operations began, and 51 cases were dealt with. Almost 50 per cent, of these cases had biu'ns of the face and hands alone, the reason being that the clothing completely protected the rest of the body against the momentary flash of the bursting shells. The staff worked ( ontinuously in the operating theatre till 12.15 a.m. on June 2 — some 16 hours — when all the wounded had been attended to. " The cheerfulness and pluck of the woimded," an observer stated, " were simply magnificent. Content to be alive, they waited to be dressed with a silent patience admired by all. In every case we found that the wounds were TH?: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 279 fur mors severe than we had been led to antici- pate by th3 attitude of the patient." This heroic attitude was conimentod upon by all the doctors ; one of them also told liow on glancing over the side of the ship wlien going into action he saw a raft crowded with '•sailor-men" from one of the simken vessels. As the raft floated by the men gave three lusty cheers, and then began to sing " Keep the Home Fires Biu-ning " until the battleship was out of earshot. These terrible series of operations, coming \ipon the top of the fierce strain of action, were THE NEIL ROBERTSON STRETCHER IN TOPS. the doctor's most severe test. On some of the hght cruisers 10 and 11 hours were spent by the surgeon in disposing of the mass of work awaiting him ; during this period there was no pause, a new case being hurried on to the table as soon as the case just finished with had been removed. Nor was this a mere mechanical exercise. The doctor had to exercise judg- ment upon matters affecting the whole future life of yovmg men in their prime. Upon the answer to the question, ^Ivist this limb be amputated at once or can it be saved 7 depended often the issues of life and death. It is, indeed, remarkable that these men were able to carry out their work witii so great success, and the value of a piece of advice given to his colleagues by one ol the surgeons who bore the brunt of the action is obvious : " It is necessary," he declared, " that ev«Ty Naval Medical Officer should keep himself phvsicallv fit. as the strain of a prolonged night action is severe." It was found that hospital shins could hope to play but a small part in a great naval Jiattle, for those ships which had most woimded aboard were necessarily those which had been most se\'erely handled. Those ships were forced in some cases to return quickly to tlieir bases and there was no time to unload wounded, nor, indeed, any necessity since they could be unloaded in much greater comfort in port. Nevertheless, many incidents of the Jutland fight pointed to the conclusion that " rescue ships " miglit fulfil a useful purpose by picking up men out of the water and restoring them. In the heat of action fighting vessels could not, of course, imdertake this work. The true sphere of the hospital ship, as has already been indicated, was found to lie between the anchorages of the Grand Fleet and the home ports. Many ingenious devices were in use for conveying the woimded from the battleship to the hospital ship (several of which are illustrated in the present chapter). The hospital ships performed splendid service, and to their good equipment and excellent organization it was duo that the horrors of the great fight were not prolonged an hour more than was necessary. Of the men them.selves, the doctors, little THE NEIL ROBERTSON STRETCHER IN STOKEHOLDS. ■1H[) THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. roquirt's to bo said. Tlieir work, indeed, revealed them and was their true mirror. No less was it the mirror of the staffs wlio co- operated with them, the sick berth stewards, the cooks, the firemen. Nor must the surgeon probationers be passed without mention. Medical students, they showed again and again superb quaUties of courage and endurance and much more than justified those who had tried the experiment of appointing them. Finally, the Admiralty surgeons and agents, civil practitioners appointed at naost large and small ports roimd the British Isles, rendered valuable service, one of them treating no fewer than 43 wounded from the Battle of Jutland Bank. There were some 1,122 medical oflficers serving in the British Navy, including 528 entered for temporary service ; and in addi- tion there were 370 surgeon probationers who held the relative rank of Sub -Lieutenant R.N.V.R. In the list of naval honours appended to Sir John Jellicoe's dispatch on the Battle of Jutland Bank the doctors were well represented. Fleet Surgeon Alexander Maclean was recom- mended for promotion because of his gallant conduct when " the medical staff was seriously depleted by casualties, and the wounded and dying had to be dressed vmder very difficult conditions on the mess deck, which was flooded with a foot of water from damaged fire mains." Fleet Surgeon Penfold, though knocked down by a bursting shell and severely bruised and shaken, went on with his work " for forty hours- without rest." Ho also was recom- mended. Surgeon Quine, R.N.V^.R., received mention because of his " assiduous care of and attention to the wounded, of whom he was in sole charge for over forty hours," -the Staff Surgeon having been seven ly wounded. Staff Surgeon Bickford had actually to bo ordered to place liimself on the sick list, and his superior officer declared of him that " though severely wounded by a shell splinter, he persisted in attending to the wounded, only yielding to a direct order from myself." A surgeon pro- bationer who amputated a leg in the dark also received honourable mention. These cases, as will be evident from what has been said, represent the hundreds of others of which no record has been preserved ; they show that from top to bottom the Royal Naval Medical Service, like the Royal Navy itself, was sound, a splendid organization with splendid traditions of service, and with a sense of duty and of honotir which was stronger than death. This grand body of men placed England in its debt a himdred times ; to its Chief, Sir Arthur May, and his staff, the Empire likewise owed her thanks. Upon these men devolved indeed a heavy re- sponsibiHty. They were the guardians of the guardians of the Empire ; day and night their vigil continued, for to their hands had been entrusted the health, the well-being and the happiness, and so the efficiency, of the Royal Navy during the years of its supreme trial. ON BOARD A PATROL SHIP. CHAPTER CXLV. THE SENUSSI AND WESTERN EGYPT. The Western Frontier of Ec;vpt and the Senussi Danger — Tripoli and Cyrenaica — British, Italian a^^d French Objects — The Senussi Sect — Its Part in Recent Wars— Turco-German Conspiracy Against Italy — Italian Operations 1914-15— Turco-Cerman Plans for Senussi Invasion of Egypt — The Kaiser as " Protector of Islam " — Beginning of the Campaign — General Maxwell's Offensive — Analysis of the Operations — The Action on Christmas Day, 1915 — General Peyton's Operations — Defeat and Capture of Gaafer Pasha — Armoured Cars in the Desert — The Crew of the Tara and Their Release — Occupation of THE Oases — Sir Archibald Murray's Command in Egypt— The Pacification of Darfur. THE general position of Egypt in relation to the world war and the first attack, in February, 1915, by the Turks on the Suez Canal have been described in previous chapters. That the Turks would endeavour to invade Egyj^t from Syria was clearly foreseen from the n\oment when, through German influences and the ambition of Env'er Pasha, the Ottoman Empire was drawn into the war on the side of the Central Powers. An attack upon Egj-pt from the west — from the direction of Tripoli — was not, however, anticipated. Therefore when in No- vember, 1915, it was amioiuiced that it had been necessary to withdraw the Egyptian garrisons from the western frontier posts surprise was felt at this extension of the theatre of war. Shortly afterwards a considerable force of Arabs, Turks and Berbers, under the leadership of Sidi Alimed, the head of the Senussi fraternity of Moslems, invaded \\'estern Egypt from Cyrenaica, and were joined by some thousands of Egj-ptian Bedouin. After a campaign which lasted about five months the invaders were decisively beaten, and the danger to Egj'pt from that quarter, if not wholly removed, was rendered nearly negligible. Although it was hardly realized, the danger to Egj'pt from the Sanussi movement had been Vol. IX.— Part 112. very serious — much more .serious than the Tiu-kish attempts made from the Sinai Penin- sula to cross the Suez Canal. General Sir John Maxwell, then commanding the forces in Egypt, put it on record that throughout the summer and autumn of 1915 his principal cause of anxiety was the possibility of trouble on the Western Frontier, for such trouble " might lead to serious religious and internal disorders." No danger of that kind arose in connexion with the Suez Canal operations. A jihid proclauned by the Senus.si sheikh might, however, have met . with a wide response in Egypt, for the order of which he was the chief was the most powerful Mahomedan .sect in North-East Africa, and the only brotherhood exercising sovereign rights and possessing a disci- plined armed force on a permanent war footing. Up to 1915 the Senussi had maintained friendly relations with Egypt, but the position was anomalous, for Sidi Aluned had for many years fought hard to oppose the extension of French authority in the Central Sudan, and he was, when the war in Eiu-ope broke out, conducting a campaign against the Italians in Cyrenaica. Tripoli and Cyrenaica (Bengazi) had, it will be remembered, become Italian possessions as the result of Italy's war with Turkey in 191 1-12. The Turks, however, had never withdrawn the 281 282 THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAB. whole of their troops from Cyrenaica, and these, aided by the Senussi, contimiod the con- flict with the Italians. At the end of 1914 the whole of the interior of Cyrenaica was held bj' the Senussi, and, as the western border of Egypt is conterminous with Cyrenaica, the Jf.enussi had every facility they needed to cross the frontier, where, except along the Mediter- ranean and at the oasis of Siwa, there were no forces to oppose them. Nevertheless, but for Turco-German mtrigvies Sidi Ahmed would not have turned his troops against Egypt. The Turks, as has been indicated, had never loyally attempted to carry out the provisions BHIGADIER-GENBRAL H. T. LUKIN, Commanded the South African Troops, Yeomanry, and Territorial Infantry and Artillery. ElMt 6 Fry MAJOR-GENERAL A. WALLACE, Commanded Western Frontier Force. ' of the Treaty of Lausanne, which closed the Tripoli war, and their endeavours to stir up trouble for the Italians were greatly aided by German agents. Long before Italy had entered into the European conflict the familiar German methods were employed to undermine her authority in North Africa. The efforts of the Turks and Germans succeeded in provoking revolts throughout Tripoli of so serious a character that in view of the European situa- tion the Italians withdrew their garrisons from the whole of the hinterland, and in Cyrenaica they were unable to occvipy that part of the coastline which adjoined the Egyptian frontier. This was an opportunity of which the Germans quickly took advantage when the European War began. Large quantities of ammunition, field and other guns, German and Turkish officers, well supplied with treasure, were smuggled into Cyrenaica in innocent-looking neutral vessels. The presence of these officers, and the arms and money they brought with them, strengthened German influence with the Senussi, and together with the activity, later on, of German submarines off the Cyrenaican coast, finally induced Sidi Ahmed to break of his friendly relations with Egypt. The invasion of Western Egypt was thus the sequel to the campaigns in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and was directly traceable to Turco-German THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 283 influence. Italy's part in tlic war in Africa has not hitherto been told, nor its relation to the invasion of VVesti*rn Egypt niiuie clear. Neither has the 'sipnifioance of the Senussi movement in relation to the European Powers whom it has affected been adequately described. In this chapter, therefore, these matters are dealt with in sufficient fullness to make the whole question intelligible. It will be seen that in the campaign against the Senussi the British, Italians and French were not animated by any anti-Moslenx feeling ; their objects were purely political. The following pages consider first the position of the Senussi fraternity and their first clash with the European nations who had partitioned Africa among then\selves, then the campaign in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and finally the story of the failure of the invasion of Western Egypt — a failure due to the able dispositions of General Sir John Maxwell, to the leadership of Major-General A. \\'allace, C.B., and :Major-General W. E. Peyton, C.B., and to tlie gallantry of the force they com- manded. That force was notable in its com- position as representing almost every part of the British Empire. It included battalions from the British Anny, Indians, Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans, the last- named making their first appearance on any battlefield outside the bounds of the southern half of the African Continent. Tlu' Senussi sect is of modern origin. Its fountler, Sidi or Seyid — i.e.. Lord — Mahommed ben All, was a native of Algeria, and was called es Senu.ssi, after a famous .saitit whose marabout is near Tlem(,'en. He was recognized as belong- ing to the Ashraf or descendants of Mahomet, and in early life was a student of theology at Fez. Attached originally to the Khadirites, \w founded his first monastery in Arabia in 1835. His connexion with the puritan sect of the Wahhabis led to his being suspect by the iihina of Mecca, and shortly afterwards he removed to Cyrenaica (or Bengazi, tv* it was called by its Turki.sh ma-sters), where in the hill country behind the ancient seaport of Derna he built the Zawia Baida, or White Monastery, which for years wa.s his h(>ad- quarters. Es Senussi speedily gained a largo following, notwithstanding the alleged hetero- doxy of his theology. He himself claimed to belong to the orthodox Malikite rite, and sought to revive tlie faith and usages of the early days of Islam». The distinctive tenets of the Senussi it is not necessary to discuss here ; it may, however, be mentioned that to the Prophet's prohibition of alcohol w-as added a prohibition of the use of tobacco. Religious tenets apart, the Senu.ssi fraternity differed from other Moslem brotherhoods in the exer- cise of a steady and continuous political influence. Mahommed es Semissi became the BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. D. T. TYNDALE BISCOE(x) With members of his staff. Z < en < aa < Q E H O z o <: CD u b O O z OS H CD O z 5 <: _) ■CD OS u > 5 Q u H < Z 284 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE 11. 1/.'. •285 virtual ruler of Cyrenaica, so much so that ho aroused the jealousy of the Turks, who re- inforced their garrisons and nuwle efforts to strengthen their position. The White Monastery was inconveniently near the coast antl the Turkish garrison at Derna, and es Sonussi, fearing a surprise raid, moved south — in 1855 — to the edge of the Libyan Desert. Thc>ro in the oasis of Jarabub (now the most westerly jjoint of Egyjitian territory) he built another monastery, and tiierc ho died, some four or five years later. A splendid tomb-mosque marks his last resting-place. He was succeeded by his younger son, known as Senussi el Mahdi, w lio enjoyed his father's reputation for sanctity and greatly extended the political influence of the fraternity. Not only were the Arabs* of Cyrenaica ever ready to obey him, but the Bedouin of Western Egypt embraced the doc- trines of the sect, and a Zawia was established in the oasis of Siwa — the oasis in wliich is the once famous oracle of Jupiter Ammon, con- sulted by Alexander the Great. West of Siwa throughout the Libyan Desert Senussi el ]\Iahdi was tho ackiiowledged sovereign of all the wandering tribes, and from them and from the Arabs of Cyrenaica he drew his standing aniiy. Of greater advantage, however, to Senussi el Mahdi's revenues and prestige than his lord- ship of half a million square miles of the Eastern Sahara and the allegiance of the turbulent Arabs of Cyrenaica was the domi nating influence he possessed over ^^'a;lai, Kanem, and tiie other States of the Central Sudan, from Nigeria in the west to Darfiu" in the east. The power of the Senussi and his reputed hostility to Cliristians led him to be regarded as a source of danger to the European Powers with possessions in North and North Central Africa, while Abdul Hamid, then Sultan of Tiu"key, discerned in liim a possible rival for the Caliphate. The unwelcome attentions of the Pasha of Bengazi, who, on Abdul Hamid's instructions, visited Jarabub, eventually led Senussi el ]Mahdi to retii'e into the heart of the Libyan Desert. The new headquarters of the fraternity were established at Jof, in llie Kufra oases, as inaccessible a spot * It is customary and convenient, though strictly incorrect, to speak of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica as '■ .4rabs." There are genuine .-Vrab tribes among thoni but the majority of the Cyrenaicans are of Libyan (Ber- ber) stock. They are of the same race as the Tunisians, Algerians and Moors, a distinctly white race which has adopted Islam and the Arab language. In Cyrenaica the Berbers are perhaps more Arabized than in tlie other Barbarv States. for iui invader to reach as any that exLsts in regions at all traversable. At Kufni, too, the Senussi sheikh was midway between WaiUii im<l Cyrenaica and was in touch with tho Kgyi)tian Sudan through Darfur and with Kgypt through Siwa and tho string of oast's iyuig west of the Nile from Aswan to Cairo. Many of tho inhabitants of these oases — Dakhia, Baharia, Farafra and Kharga — were Senussit&s. Senussi el Mahdi refused to have anything to do with Mahonunod Ahmed, the Dongol<'se boat-builder who proclaimed himself the Mahdi — i.e.. "tho expected guide" of Islam — and wrested the whole of the Eastern Sudan from Egypt. The Senu.ssi shiekh had already estab- lished friendly relations with Egypt, and his cousin and agent, who lived at Alexandria, was a niuch-courted and wealthy nobleman, lavish in his hospitality to Europfums and Egyptians alike. Senussi's disapproval of the Mahdist movement in the Eastern Sutlan won for him the esteem of Sir Reginald Wingate, and until 1915 the relations between the EgyjJtian and Sudanese authorities and the Senussi continued friendly — no doubt in part because the political anibitions of the Senussi were not directed to the Nile valley. The reconquest of the Eastern Sudan by Anglo- Egyptian forces under Lord Kitchener in 1896-98 did not affect adversely the relations Ix^tween the Seiuissi and Egyjit ; indeed, as illustrating the anti-Mahdist tendencies of the Senussi, it may be noted that the revolt in Darfur in 1888-89 against the Klialifa had been successful because the tribesmen used Senussi's name, though they received no material help from him. To the P>ench Senussi el ^lahdi offered bitter opposition, but his action proved that he was fighting mainly as a temporal sovereign to preserve his authority over the Central Sudan States. All the merchandise from these semi-Arabized negro sultanates which fringe the southern edge of the desert passed north- ward tlirough the Sahara, along caravan routes controlled by the Senvissites. (The merchandise included valuable consignments of eimuchs for the harems of the East, and slaves smuggled into Egypt and Turkey as domestic servants.) The Central Sudan had com'* n6minally within tne French sphere of influene;> as the result of agreements concluded in 1898 and 1899 with Great Britain, and in 1901 the French began to occupy the country. At once they encoun- tered the opposition of the Senussi, the first 112—2 286 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. ' ofC-abes^- •Juggunt ;3 a ^ J JNcrusA V ' <aGhadsmes 4^ HkJimadB el/jo Verna^v-r ^ ^ ^ Jarabub -^g^metel Fayu. / y 'i<^l'"^v \/ i^ e z z a n . 1 o nrjci. oSokna ^ oAujiia \ °s,v^a ^(L i 'b y ^~'-v Dakhlo" Ku;f r a Kharga s e r I 20 -ij--- o Z> e Jor \ ^r orAsben ,^ I, - oBilma Am Ga/3hkaoy^ [■ oWayta^-^ Fayd Tr_,l; Fayd' Dam er*** \ Endi Binder^ ^,Kanem/d^ ,0 < /r/r,c/,er Kordofan \ R '^^ZP^^'^'^^'^^^'^ -^n ' ^^''^\ .rVPTlAl^ SUDAN \5 THE WHOLE AREA OF SENUSSI ACTIVITY. campaign being f^x- the possession of Kanein, a State on the north east shores of Lake Chad. It ended in the defeat of the Senussi in January, 1902, and the loss of Kanem so greatly affected Sheikh Senussi el Mahdi that his death in May following was attributed to grief. He was succeeded as Grand Sheikh of the order by his nephew, who was still head of the fraternity in 1915, Sidi Ahmed-el-Sherif, generally styled in Egypt Seyid Ahmed, or the Grand Senussi. Sidi Ahmed continued the struggle against the French until 1913-14. The conquest of Wadai, diu-ing 1909-10, by the French was a great blow to the power of the Senussi, and the capture in 1913 of Ain Galakka in Borku by Col. Largeau* wrested from the Senussi the last stronghold they held in the Sudan. This was followed by the occupation by the French in July, 1914, of Bardai, the chief town in the * Col. Largeau later on organized the French expe- dition which invaded Camorocn from Lake Cliacl. Koturning to France, he was killed at Verdun. (See Chap. CXXXI.) Tibesti Highlands — a great mountain range stretching north to the confines of Tripoli. Sidi Ahmed was definitely ejected from the French sphere ; into the Libyan Desert they made no attempt to follow him. It would have brought them into the sphere reserved by international agreement to Great Britain. Two facts are noteworthy regarding the long struggle between the French and the Senussi — first, that the inajority of the forces which opposed the French were not the immediate followers of the Senussi, but the troops of the States, such as Wadai, whose rulers were virtual vassals of the Senussi ; secondly, that the struggle against the spiritual head of a widely spread Moslem fraternity did not arouse any special anti-Christian feeling among the Moslems of North Africa. There was no jih'd, no holy war, partly because, perhaps, the true Arabs do not form even a foiu-th of the popula- tion of North Africa, and on the Berbers^the great mass of the people — Moslem doctrines sit somewhat lightly. THJ<: TIMES HISTom' OF THE WAR. 287 It will have been noticed that the final defeat of the Senussi in the Central Sudan occurred in the middle of 1914. jusL before the great war in Europe broke out. During the latter stages of that conflict Sidi Ahmed had also been busily engaged in the north. As has Ijeen shown, relations between the Senussi and the Turks had been far from cordiid. but in li)l(» Sidi Alimed received at Kufra an embassy from the Young Turks, who sought to (Mili.st the sheikh's aid in the l*an-Tslamic ambitions which they took over from Abdul Hamid. There is evidence to show that the Senussi sheikh did not share those ambitions. What- ever may have been the \iew.s of his grand- father and uncle, his j)redecessors in the headship of the Order, Sidi Ahmed, who was well versed in European politics, and, through his many agents abroad, in close touch with the outer world, set at least as much store on his position as a temporal sovereign as on liis spiritual lordship. But when in September. 1911, Italy declared war upon Turkey and invaded Tripoli and Cyrenaica he was moved to action. It is necessary to remember the distinction between these two provinces, the custom in England to include Cyrenaica in Tripoli lieing misleading. 'I'hey formed separatci govern- ments un<ltr tlu- Turks, and remain separate provinces under the Italians.* Though they have many characteristics in coniniun thoy are distinct <'ntities s«'parafed by the (!ulf of Sidra. 'I'ripoli adjoins Tunisia ; C'yrenaica Egypt, and had the fate of Tripoli alone been in (n;e<tion the Seniiasi sheikh might have remained indifferent to Italian action, Tripoli not being directly in the Seuu.ssi sphere of influence. In Cyrenaica it was otherwise. Here, as has been seen, the Senu.ssi were in strength, and it was through its .setiports — Jiengazi, Derna, etc. — that, with or without the permi.ssion of the Turks, they drew their supplies of arms and munitions and pa.s.sed the merchandise coming from the Central Sudan. Through Cyrenaica also the Senussi largely maintained their contuv t with Kgyjjt, along the great limestone tableland, the Libyan Plateau, which forms the land bridge between Egypt and North Africa. Farther south the arid e.xpan.se of the Libyan desert renders extremely difficult any conununication with Egypt from the west. Tne control of Cyre- naica, itself mainly a sterile rocky tableland, * riie coiiuiioii iuiiiit> for Tripoli iiid ('\ rcTinica umlor lluliiiti rule is Libvii. A COUNCIL OF WAR IN THE DESERT, •J.^b Tin: TiME,s iJisTuny of the war. \rns tliorcforo a vital jxiint in Sciuissi policy. Turkish control of the seaport-s was ono thing, but Si(U Aluued knew that Italian control of the eoast woulil bo another, ami for him a lar nioro liisagieeable thing. He had lo.st, or was losing, the Central Suclap to the French ; therefore it vva.s the more needful to keep opi-n his road to the .sea. Little as he loved the Ottomans, in liis owii interests he instructed his adherents in Cyrenaica to help Enver ]'aslia (then Enver Bey), who commanded the 'J'urkish troops in Cyrenaica, and the Arabs formed a valuable part of Enver's army In October, 1912, the threatening situation in the Balkans induced Tiu-key to choose the lesser of two evils, and on the 18th of that month the Treaty of Ouchy (Lausanne) was signed, Turkey renouncing her sovereignty iii Tripoli and Cyrenaica,"- and agree ir'g to with- draw her troops. By a clause which later on gave opportunity for much intrigue on the part of the Turks, the Italians, in accord with their wish to deal fairly with Moslem suscepti bilities, agreed to recognize the religious autho- rity of the Sultan as Caliph. When the Treaty of Oucliy was signed the Italians held in Cyrenaica only the chief seaports, Bengazi, Derna, Bombah and Tobruk. Their authority extended inland nowhere more than tliree or foiu" miles. The position in Tripoli was similar and the energies oi the Italians were directed first to the pacification of that province, whose inhabitants showed less determined opposition to the extension of Italian authority than did * By the Turks, as alreaciy .stated, Cyrenaica was known as Bengazi, after its chief town. Another usual name for the province is Baroa. the Aral)s of Cyrenaica. This task, the occupa- tion and pacification of the hinterland of Tripoli, was completed in August, 1914, the month in which the Great War began. Besides Tripoli proper the Italians had occupied Cihadamos and Ghat, as well as the sub-province of Fezzan, with its capital of Murzuk. This had not been accomplished without consider- able lighting, but the opposition was less serious than might have been expected. By tlie French authorities in Tunisia and Algeria the advent of the Italians was officially and cordially welcomed as putting an end to a state of anarc;hy on the frontier which had caused unrest in the French Sahara. When the pacification of TripoU was nearly complete the Italians turned their attention seriously to Cyrenaica, where, towards the end of IT/ 13, the situation was much the same as it had been twelve months previou.sly — that is, the Italians held only the seaports. General Ameglio was then appointed Governor of Cyrenaica, and a considerable force was placed under his command for the reduction of that province. He had made a promising beginning, when, in view of the situation in Europe, he received orders to suspend operations. Italy was still a member of the Triple Alliance, but she had doubts as to the loyalty of her Allies, doubts that diplomatic revelations proved to be well founded. She therefore determined not to lock up large bodies of troops in Africa when their services might be needed in a nearer theatre of w-ar. Her original rupture with Turkey had been precipitated by the know- ledge of German designs to obtain a footing on the Mediterranean in agreement with the Porte, INDIAN TROOPS IN THE DESERT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. *2H9 TAKING CAMELS TO while her conduct of the war of 1911-12 had been hampered by objections raised by Austria- Hungary to action in Albania and the ^Egean, and she now had to encounter covert intrigues directed to undermining her position in her newly acquired territory. Bad faith on tlie part of the Turks Italy had experienced e\'er since the signing of the treaty vvliich was supposed to have ended the war T-. ipoli. From Tripoli itself the Otto- man troops had been withdrawn, but a con- siderable body of Turks remained in Cyrenaica. There, with the aid of the Senussi forces. th(\v carried on the war. The Italian troops caj) tiu-ed during the year of fighting were not released. For several weeks after the peace treaty was signed Enver Pasha liimself con- tinued to direct the operations against the Italians ; on his return to Constantinople, Aziz Bey took up the command, and held it till the end of .Time, 1913. After the departure of Aziz Turkish officers continued to arrive in Cyrenaica — the ItaUan Government \\as in possession of the names of over 100 of these gentry — and arms and ammvmition reached the Turco-Arab force by various means, chiefly through the small ports between Tobruk and the Egyptian frontier. That the Italian Government acted wisely in ordering the sus- pension of operations was soon demonstrated. In September, 1914, the Fezzani broke out in revolt, and the whole of the hinterland of Tripoli was shortly involved in the movement. Tliis conspu'acy against Italian rule was attributed to the intrigues of (Sermau-iuspired Turkish agents, though at the time the Italians made no charges in public against either Turkey or Germany. The German method of stirring up discontent in the o%-er-sea possessions RAILHEAD, DABAA. of States with which she was at peace hatl been exposed in the French Yellow Book i.ssued just after the war began. It contained a secret memorandum, dated Berlin, March 19, 191. J, in which the writ<>r stated that it wa.s — absolutely nect'ssary tliat wo [Germany] should opi-n up relations by means of well-chosen organizations with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco, in order to pre|mro tlvo measures which would be neces- sary in the case of a lOuropcan war. Of course, in case of war wc shoukl openly recognize these secret allies ; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. Tlie?e aims are (^ai)able of realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired re- lations. Unfortunately these relations were not sutli- ciently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, it will be necessary to make preparations of this kind, in tirdiT to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion. Tripoli and Cyrenaica were not mentioned in tliis secret Memorandum, but the Italians knew that it was idle to expect that German agents would refrain from practising in Libya the methods adopted elsewhere in North Africa. They liad had already proof of the manner in wliich Germany regarded her obligations to her Ally, for in the war of 1911-12 Germaii naval and military men in the Turkish ser\'ice had been ordered to take i)art in the operations against Italy ^iiction which contrasted v.ith that of Great Britain, who during the con- tinuance of the war recalled her oflicers serving in the Turkish navy.* Sincerely desirous, if it could be done with honour, of keeping out of the great war wliich was deva.stating Europ.", the Italian Govenunent ignored a-s far as •Long afterwards — on .Tiily t>. MUli — the (ierinaii Government officially announced that "in the c-v<e of men who by supreme orders took part in the Italo- Turkish war of 1911-12, one year of war is calculated for pension purposes." The text of the order was repub. lished in the Italian newspaper. Idea Xazionale, in September, 1916. z o u Q. ce: o u -J u c z on < OS <: u Q Cd OS D O OS < c/3 OS 0Q O D O u 290 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W'AIi. 291 possible the repeated provocations from Turco- (Jorman sources ; they even passed f)vor at tlic time tlic proclamation of the Holy War apainst the Italians. It was not until August 20, 1916, that Italy again declared war on Turkey. Towards Gennany, for reasons not directly connected witli the situation in Africa, she was still more patient. At the out.set of the war Germany had sought to take advantage of Italy's position to make Trijioli the base of intrigues with the natives of Tunisia and Algeria against the French. The arrest and deportation by the Italians of a party of Arabic - speaking German officers who reached Tripoli and were making for the Tunisian frontier, showed that Italy was loyal to her inter- national obligations. Thereafter the intrigues were directed into what proved a more fruitful channel, the stirring up of disaffection in Tripoli and bringing pressure to bear on the Senussi sheikh to induce him to abandon his friendly attitude towards Egypt. In July, 1915, the Italians, through the .seizure of documents in the houses of Arab notables living in Tripoli city and in Derna, became possessed of many details of the movement conducted by German - inspired Turkish agents, which liad already led to the revolt in Fezzan and other parts of the province of Tripoli. Events in Cyrenaica developed son\ewhat later ; it is nece-ssary to deal first with the rebellion in Tripoli. In the operations for the occupation of the hinterland of Tripoli the Italians employed, in addition to troops from Italy, a considerable lunnber of men from their Red Sea colony of Eritrea, as well as native— i.e., Libyan — partisans. The Eritrean troops are nearly all Abyssinians — excellent soldiers and Christians. Priests of the Abyssinian Church accompanied them as chaplains. Their faith and race dis- tinguished them sharply from the Arabs and Berbers, and their loyalty and bra\ery were vmquestioned. It was otherwise with some of the tribes who had joined the Italian standard. On March 3, 1914, Col. Miani, with a force which was mainly composed of 2,000 Eritreans and 1,200 auxiliaries (Libyans), occupied Mrn-zuk, the chief town in Fezzan, and a coluinn vindor Col. Giannini occupied Ghat — 600 miles from the coa-st — on August 12 following. Thus e\-ery important point in the hinterland was in Italian occupation, and an era of peace appeared to have dawned. Appearances were deceptive for towards the end of September the Fezzani suddenly attacked small Italian garrisons betwe<Mi Mur/.uk and the coast and inflicted serious losses on the Italians. At first the authorities believed that they had only to ileal with a local affair, but the movement sprea*!, and at the end of November the Italian Government directed that Fezzaii should be evacuated. The gallant Col. Miani and his troops fought their way back to the coa-st via Sokna. This withdrawal left the garrison of Ghat isolated, while that of CJhadames was also in a perilous po.sition. Both Ghadames and CJhat are situated in oa.ses of the Sahara on the caravan route from Nigeria to Tripoli ; ancient towns, now in decay, famed as entrepcts for Euro|>ean and Sudanese merchandise. The townsmen were fairly friendly to the Italians, but could afford them no protection again.st the nomads of the desert. For the troops to cut their way north to the coast was impo.ssible, and that reinforcements woukl reach them in time was most unlikelj'. In this extremity the French Government came to their aid, although not yet allied to Italy. In Africa, indeed, the solidarity of European interests was recognized by all the Powers except Gennany. Both Ghat and (Jliadames are close to the French Saharan frontier, and the garrison of (Jhadames with- drew into the Tunisian Sahara, while that of Ghat marched over 200 miles across the Algerian Sahara to Fort Flatters, where they were made welcome. This was in December, 1914, and the generous action, spontaneously taken, of the French was deeply appreciated in Italy. The ramifications of the conspiracy to over- tlirow Italian authority in Tripoli were not then fully known, and General Tassoni, Gover- nor of Tripoli, organized expeditions to re- occupy both Ghadanies and Ghat. After some fierce fighting. Col. Giannini again entered Ghat on February 18, 1915, and shortly after- wards Ghadames was re-garrisoned. The im- provement in the situation was only temporary. In April, in an engagement with the rebels in the Sokna region, the Libyan auxiliaries of the Italians went over to the eneniy on the field of battle, and the Italian and Eritrean troops only saved themselves from complete disaster by a very skilful retreat. This defection led several tribes whose attitude had been doubt- ful to turn against the Italians, and in June, 1915, the Italian Govermnent announced a general temporary withdrawal of all garrisons 292 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. in tho Tripoli hinterland. The w itlidrawal was not carried out without serious loss ; loss which would have been much greater but for the etlective help given by the French in Southern Tunisia. The last place in the interior to be e\-acuated was Gliadames, the garrison crossing the Tunisian frontier on July 19. By a decree of July 15, 1915, General Ameglio was named (Jovernor of Tripoli, while retaining liis post of Governor of CjTonaica. Thus the direction of the affairs of both provinces was concentrated in the hands of one man. Under General Ameglio the coast district of Tripoli was per- pared for defence. During the summer of 1915 rebel forces approached within fifteen miles of Tripoli city, but the measiu-es taken by General Ameglio freed the region to which the Italians had withdrawn from enemies. Tlie reconquest of the interior was a measure post- poned to a more propitious season. One object of the Turks and Germans in stirring up sedition in Tripoli was to create trouble for the French in their adjoining pos- ses.«!ions. In this they failed. The state of anarchy re-created in Fezzan had some efiect in Southern Tunisia, but the great majority of Tunisians remained absolutely . loyal to the French. In September and October, 1915, bands of Tripolitans, led by Turkish officers, and joined by Tvmisian rebels, attacked some French outposts. They were defeated by Lieut. -Col. Le BoDuf in three or four stiff engagements and peace on the Tunisian border was reestablished. In Algeria and the Algerian Sahara the work of German agents remained absolutely iruit'iess. The Tripoli revolt was, as it were, supple- mental to the main plan of the enemy, whose chief energies in North Africa were concen- trated on Cyrenaica, Egypt and the Anglo - Egj'ptian Sudan. In the Sudan the con- spicuous loyalty of the Morghani,* the principa Moslem fraternity in that region, counteracted the efforts of the Turks and Germans, and only in Darfur was there any anti-British movement. The Darfur incident itself was a sequel to the Senussi movement, and is dealt with in its proper sequence. The plots of the Neufelds. Priifers, Hatzfelds and others in Egypt and the Sudan, though backed by the Egyptian " Nationalists," did not have the effect de- signed. In Cyrenaica the Turco-Germans had a inore promising field for their enterprise. The Italians had been willing to come to an arrangement with the Senussi Sheikh, and though negotiations were not officially opened, Arab notables who had thrown in their lot with Italy were allowed to visit Sidi Ahmed with a view to effecting an accommodation. No interference with the Sheikh's religious authority was contemplated, nor did Italy * Sayed Ali, the head of the sect, was in January, 1916 created K.C.M.G. AUSTRALIAN TROOPS IN THE DESERT. THE TIMES JIISTOnY OE THE W.W. 293 BEDOUIN PRISONERS IN THE BRITISH LINES. propose to occupy Kufra or other oases in the Libyan Desert — whether those places would fall eventually within the Italian or British sphere of influence was still uncertain — but an acknow- ledgment of Italian sovereignty was required. The pourparlers failed, for Sidi Ahmed refused, as he said, to accept the position of " a protected Bey." He was master of the interior of Cyrenaica, and even had access to the ^lediter- ranean at various points west of the Egyptian frontier. While he could not dislodge the Italians from the ports they held, nor even prevent them from consolidating their groimd between Bengazi and Derna, he saw that they had withdrawn from Fezzan and Ghat, and, left to himself, he would probably have been satisfied with the situation as it was. Details of his relations \v ith the Turks in Cyrenaica are natm-ally lacking, but his actions showed that he hesitated long to take their advice and commit hunself to an attack on Egypt. Had the Allied Fleets in the ilediterranean been able to prevent any supplies reaching the Senussi he would in all probability not have broken his traditional good relations with Egj'pt. Even as it was, tliroughout the latter half of 1914 and the opening months of 1915, notwithstanding the pressure brought to bear upon him by the Ttu-co-German party, he maintained a correct attitude towards the Egyptian authorities. Signs that the pressure on the Senussi Sheikh to invade Egypt were beginning to take effect were first apparent in May, 1915. In the previous month Gaafer Pasha, "a Gennanized Turk of considerable ability," to quote General Maxwell's description of him, had arrived in Cyrenaica with a large supply of arms and ammunition. He joined Nuri Bey, a half- brother of Enver Pasha, who was the leader of the Turkish party in Cyrenaica. That Turkey and Italy were stiil at peace with one another did not in the least affect the action of Nuri or Gaafer. At what spot Gaafer landed or for ho%\- long Nuri Bey had been in Cyrenaica does not appear ; a number of Turks and Germans gained access to the country by passing them- selves off as Tunisians, Egyptians or Moors. But not all those who tried to smuggle them- selves in succeeded. In June, 1915, the French Ministry of Marine notified the capture in the Eastern Mediterranean of a sailing boat flying the Greek flag, provided with false papets and carrying a party of Turks, whose luggage consisted of valuable presents for the Senussi Sheikh. Other boats were also captured, but it was not vmtil the begirming of 1916 that the Cyrenaican coast was so well patrolled by Allied warships that Nuri Bey and Sidi Ahmed were entirely cut off from over -sea supplies. Among those who reached CjTenaica before the arrival of Gaafer Pasha was a senator of the Turkish Parliament with special knowledge of the Senussi organization. He came, accompanied by Turkish military officers, and visited the Sheikh, then encamped near the Egj^ptian frontier, using all his eloquence to mduce Sidi 112—3 •Jl»4 THE TIMES niSTunV OF THE WAIL AhiiKHl to bivivk with Hgypt tv.id prcK-lahn a jihad. At that time Sicli Ahinod, who was to some extent dependent lor his commissariat upon supphes imported through Solhim, was in eorrospondenco with Lieutenant-Colonel Snow, the British officer then commanding on the Western. Frontier of Egypt, and it was chiefly owing to Colonel Snow's tactful handling of a very delicate situation that a rupture with the Senussi was so long deferred. The Senussi Sheikh represented to Colonel Snow that he held his Turkish visitors as prisoners, and he sent to Cairo as his special envoy a leading member of the fraternity, Sidi Mahommed el Idris, who, on his part, endeavoured to maintain peace between his people and Egypt . The aim of Sidi Idris appears to have been to get a recogni- tion of Senussi autonomy, a matter which, however, could only be settled by agreement between Italy and Great Britain. It may be added here that, wjien affairs had reached a critical stage, Sidi Idris was sent by the British to Cyrenaica " to arrange negotiations whereby the Senussi should get rirl of his Turkish advisers in return for a sum of money." (Sir J. Maxwell's despatch of March 16, 1916.) This plan had obvious merits and had it been tried at an earlier stage it might have succeeded. But it was adopted too late, for the Senussi coffers were already filled largely with German gold. Heedless of his international engage- ments, and of the fact that his country was still at peace with Italy, the Kaiser himself did not tlis lain to make a direct appeal to Sidi Ahmed. In one of the boats captured while endeavouring to carry gifts to the Senu.ssi was found an embossed casket containing the following letter in Arabic, written by William II. in his favourite rols of the protector of Islam : — Praises to the most High God. Emperor William, son of Charlemagne, Allah's Envoy, Islam's Protector, to the illustrious Chief of Senussi. W'e \iTay God to lead our armies to victory. Our will is tb.at thy valorou.s warriors shall expel infidels from territory that belongs to true believers and their commander. To this end we send thee arms, money, and tried chiefs. Our common enemies, whom Allah annihilate to the last man, shall fly before thee. So be it. — William. This was not the only appeal of the kind made to the Senussi Sheikh. Among the documents found in January, 1916, by the Allies in the archives of the enemy consulates at Salonika were 1,500 copies of a long proclamation in Arabic addressed to the " Chiefs of the Senussis." This proclamation, urging Moslems, on religious grounds, to wage war on Christians, was discovered in the consulate of Austria, whose sovereign bears the title of Catholic and Apostolic Majesty. The special correspondent of The Times at Salonika who sent extracts from this document said that it was not signed, but its pseudo -oriental wording clearly betrayed its Germanic authorship. The following are some passages from this precious docimient : — In the Name of Allah the Compassionate and Merciful ! Chiefs of the Senussis ! You have seen that in consequence of the oppression ceaselessly inflicted on your Musulnian brethren by BEDOUINS CAPTURED DURING THE FIGHTING. THE TIMES HIF^TORY OF THE WAR. 295 CONVEYING WOUNDED ON CAMEL BACK. thoir enemies, France, England, Italy and Russia, that the Jlusulmans, who once enjoyed freedom, have been reduced to slavery and humiliation. These tyrannical nations have no other aim but to blot out the light of [slam throughout the world. Of all the instruments Allah has cho.«en for the pro- tection of our religion the surest is the German nation, with its sympathy for Jlusulmaus. These our allies have placed the precious help of their policy at our ser- vice. They have begun to help us in every way in their power to emancipate ourselves from the aflHictions which our oppressors deal out to us In these circumstances we nave realized the imperious necessity of proclaiming a Holy War throughout Africa, the north of which continent has been corrupted by the dissolute morals introduced by France, England and Italy, and dishonoured by t)ie contempt in which Musuhnans are held by those Powers. In all that region the most powerful ruler and the one possessing most authority in the Musulman world is His Excellency The Imaum, the Illustrious Exemplar, the Champion of Isltim in the cause of Allah, who is our Lord and Master, Seyyid es Senussi, the Sure Guide of All Elect. This leader is bred in the truth of the Koranic Law, and his soul, shining with its pure effulgence, has under- taken the task of purifying all corrupt souls antl directing them in the path of life revealed by the Holy Book given to all Musulmans. Your glorious renown. Your grand designs and incom- p vrable bravery. Oh, Chiefs of the Senussis, are kncwn throughout the world. All the Mus\dmans of the earth count on your bravery and noble conduct in proclaiming and waging a Holy War by which the bright rays of I-ilam will once more shine on African soil, and the Musulmans of North .\frica recover the rights of which they have been bereft by tyrannical nations. Appeals to liim as a leader of Islam had less effect upon the Senussi Sheikh than the demonstration that Germany and Ttirkey could afford him material aid. A factor that helped in liis decision to invade Egypt was the appear- ance of German submarines off the coast of Cyrenaica in tlie late summer of 1915, and the success which attended their operations. It was some four nionths after the arrival of Gaafer Pasha in Cyrenaica that the first im- toward incident of importance between the Senussites and the British occurred. On August 16, 1915, two British sulimarines were sheltering from the weather under a headland of the coast of Cyrenaica wlien they were treacherously fu-ed upon by Arabs imder the leadership of a white (? Gennan) officer, casualties being suffered on either side. " The incident," %vrote Sir John Maxwell, " was, however, closed by the acceptance of the Senussi's profound apologies, and of his assurances that the act had been committed in ignorance that the submarines were British " — the Sheikh may have assumed that the submarmes were Italian. Nothing noteworthy occurred for the next few weelcs, but in Novem- ber events happened which placed beyond doubt the hostile intentions of the Senussi towards Eg\pt. The sequence of events in that month showed, too, close cooperation between the action of German submaines and the Ti'.rco- Senussi forces. On November 5 H.M. auxiliary cruiser Tara was torpedoed off Solkmi by the U35 ; on the Cth enemy submarines slielled the Egyptian po.st at Solhuu. and two coastguard cruisers then stationed in its harbour. One of them, the Abbas, was sunk at her moorings, the other, the Nur el Bahr, bemg badly damaged. The next 296 THE TIMES HISTORY UF THE WAIL 297 day. November 7, the l?riti.sh horse transport Moorina was also sunk off the Cyrenaieaii coast ; on the 15th the camp at Solium was sniped ; on the 17th the Zawia (monastery) at Barrani — 50 miles within the F^gyptian frontier — was occupied by some 300 Sonussi regulars ; on the 18th the coastguard barracks at Barrani were attacked ; on the 20th another coastguartl station was also attacked. The long threatened campaign had begun. There is no need to suppo.se that Germany and Turkey, the Powers which had dragged the Senussi into the adventure, expected from it any great military success. They hoped, how- ever, to create such unrest and disaffection throughout Egypt that British action in the Near East would be much hampered. The Senussites believed that even if they could not hold, they would be able to raid, the rich lands of the Nile Delta. The strength of the force at the disposal of the enemy is conjectural ; it was not, however, less than 30,000. It consisted of a nucleus of Turkish troops, with Turkish, Gennan and Arab officers, the Muhafizia or Senussi regulars (a well disciplined imifomied body some 5,000 strong) and a varying number of irregulars, every adult male m CjTenaica being accustomed to arms. The troops were supplied with machine guns, pom-poms and a number of field pieces. There was ample camel transport, and a considerable mnnber of the Senussites were well moimted. The particular in which they were most lacking appears to have been food. Certainly some of the Senussi camps were very badly off for provisions. The conduct of the operations against Egypt was entrusted to Gaafer Pasha (wlio was destined to become a prisoner of the British). Sidi Ahmed and Nuri Bey were also usually with the main body of their troops. AVhatcver the strength of the combined Turco -Senussi anny, a proportion of it had to guard the rear, that is to watch the Italian garrisons at Bengazi, Derna and Tobruk, while another part was detached to seize Siwa n,nd other oases west of the Nile. British troops, the 1/lst North Midland Mounted Brigade, with the Berks Battery, R.H.A., were sent to garrison the Fayum, aid cavalry of the Egyistian Army with a Bikaiier Camel Corps detachment occupied the Wadi Natrun. These were the two oases nearest the Nile. Other measures, such as placing a garri- son at Damanhur, between Cairo and Alex- andria, were taken to ensure the traniiuiility of the Delta region west of the Nile. As to the Bedouin of the Libyan Plateau, mostly mem- bers of the W'alid Ali tribe, all within the sphere of Sidi Ahmed s operations, which rapidly extended over 200 miles of p^gyptian territory, joined his standard. Thus in mimbers his force was more tJian doubled, though its niilitary \alue was not greatly increased. But should the Senussites have gained any striking advantage hostile outbreaks in Egypt itself, where agitation was rife, would have bedh very probable. Even in Al«*xandria the Sciuissi had many adherents, and his prestige was increased by the measures which Gen. Maxwell now ordered, the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons from Solium, Sidi el Bar- rini, and other outposts. Siwa also fell to the Senu.ssi as well as el (!ara (Qara) and Moghara, oases, at the foot of the southern escarj^ment of the Libyan Plateau, on the way to Cairo by the Wadi Natrun. The more .southern oases, Baharia, Farafra, etc., were for the time unoccupied either by enemy or British troops. They too led to the Nile, but the main advance of the enemy was neces.sarily along the jjlatcau which separates the Libyan Desert from the sea. This plateau, known as the Libyan Desert Plateau, rises abruptly above the Mediter- ranean. Its level varies from 300 to 600 foot, it is composed of limestone, and large areas of the surface are bare rock, golden coloured. Other areas are covered with a thin layer of soil and in depressions and dry river beds camel thorn and coarse grass are found. Niunerous isolated hills rise above the tableland. The sea- ward face of the plateau is almost everywhere precipitous. The country receives a fairly heavy winter rainfall, but it has no streams and is therefore only traversable along routes where water can be found in \\ells or springs. From time immemorial the main road across this desolate land has kept close to the Mediter- ranean, and the only considerable centres of population are found along the coast. The chief town is Mersa Matridi, about 200 miles west of Alexandria, and 150 east of Solium. As its name (mersa =harboiu') hnplies, it is a port,* and aroimd it is a fairly large cultivated area, barley of excellent quality being raised. At ^Matruh it.self there is a European popula- tion, mainly Greek and Italian, of about 200. * It replaces the Parsctouiiim of Ptolemaic and Roman times. 298 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Within 12 hours' journey by water from Alex- luuUia, Matruh was chosen as the British base, and to it tlie adNanced garrisons at Barrini and Solliun were witluh-awn — not without the defection of 12 native officers, two cadets arul 120 other ranks to the Senussi. These all belonged to the Egyptian Coastguard Ctiinel Corps, and their desertion was significant of what might happen on a larger scale if circum- stances favoured the enemy. While the sea route to Matruh was the chief means of trans- port, a secondary means of communication was afforded by the railway which runs west from Alexandria. This line, when hostilities began, had reached Dabaa, 85 miles short of Matruh. Thence by Matruh as far as Solium a motor service was ordinarily maintained.* Starting from Bir \\^arr and Mseatl, camps somewhat west of Solium, the enemy rapidly overran the coixntry as far east as Dabaa, but the prompt measures taken by Gen. Maxwell prevented any danger of Matruh and Dabaa being captured. Gen. Maxwell wisely decided that the best way to deal with the situation was by a vigorous offensive. In view * Both railway and road wore built by the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, the railway being generally known as the Maruit line, while the road is called the Khedivial Motor Road. A road, however, was in existence and in constant use in Roman times between Alexandria and Matruh, and along it are many broken wells and cisterns dating from the first to the fourth centuries. of the danger of a rising in Egypt, should the enemy approach the Nile, it was imperative to keep the sphere of hostilities as far as po.ssible west of the Delta. This meant as bold an offensive as was consistent with riot running the risk of a serious reverse. For all that the force immediately available for service was neither largo nor homogeneous. Orders for the formation of a Western Frontier Force, consisting of a Composite Mounted Brigade and a Composite Infantry Brigade, were issued on November 20, Major-Gen. A. Wallace, C.B., being given the command. This force, the best available in I'^gypt at the moment, was by no means well adapted to the task which lay be- fore it. Regiments and staffs had been somewhat hastily collected, and were not well known to one another. The Composite Yeomanry Brigade, to give an instance, contained men from 20 or more different regiments. . . . The composition [of the force] was constantly changing, and it was not until the middle of February that the condition of the Western Frontier Force could be considered really satisfactory. (Sir J. Maxwell's Dispatch, March 1, 1916.) It is interesting to set forth the original composition of this force and to note how it was gradually changed till it came to represent practically every part of the Empire except Canada. On December 7, when Gen. Wallace took up his headquarters at Matruh, the Mounted Brigade, which was under Brigadier- Gen. Tyndale Biscoe, w'as made up of : Three Composite Yeomaniy Regiments (from details ■2nd Mounted Division). A STEAM PUMP IN THE DESERT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE TIM/,'. '299 WATERING HORSES AT A DESERT WELL. One Composite Regiment Australian Light Horse (from details Australian L.H. Brigades). Notts Battery R H.A. (T.F.) and Ammunition Column. Part of this Brigade (five squadrons) was at Dabaa ; the rest at Matnih. Brigadier-Gen. Lord Lucan commanded the Infantry Brigade, which was made up as follows : — 1 6th Batt. Royal Scots (T.F.). 2/7th Batt. Middlesex Regt. (T.F.). 2/8th Batt. Middle-sex Regt. (T.F.). loth Sikhs. There was also a squadron of the Royal Flying Corps. The Divisional Train was supplied by the 1st Australian Division and, no Royal Engineers being available, Gen. Wallace was given a detachment of the Egyptian Army Military Works Department. Besides this newly raised force. Gen. Wallace also had the normal garrison of the Western Frontier. This consisted of a small British force and detach- ments from the Egyptian Army. There were, in addition, a squadron of the Royal Xaval Armoured Car Division, which had been rushed up at the first sign of serious trouble and stationed along the Alexandria-Dabaa railway ; the 2nd Batt. New Zealand Rifle Brigade,* 150 men of the Bikanir Camel Corps (with an Egyptian Army machine-gun section) ; and one armoured tram manned by the 1/lOth Gurklia Rifles, with two 12^-pounders of the Egyptian * A few weeks later the 161st Brigade (54th Division) relieved the New Zealanders on the lines of communica- tion. Army Artillery. Thus Gen. Wallace began his campaign with " a .scratch lot " of Yeomanry, Territorials, Australians, New Zealanders, Indians and Egj'ptians. No " scratch lot " of men rendereil better service than did the original imits of (Jen. \\'allace's command. Only the three Territorial regiments and the Notts Battery R.H.A., however, saw the cam- paign through from sttirt to finish. The commander, it will be realizetl, had many dif- ficulties to meet beyond those cau.sed by the enemy. One of the most serious of these difficulties remains to be mentioned — the lack of sufficient and suitable transport made it necessary for Gen. Wallace to withdraw his troops to ^latruh after every engagement. The first encounter with the enemy occurred on December 11, and on that day and on the 13th there were sharp fights west and south of Matruh, the Senussi holding in considerable strength the Wadi Senaab, which runs south from the coast. Owing to the " bad going " the infantry employed (the Sikhs) could take no part in the fight on December 11, but the Yeomanry, aided by a squadron of the Aus- tralian Light Horse and the armoured cars, cleared the Wadi Senaab, the enemy losing over 100 in killed and woimded. The British* • Here as elsewhere in this chapter the term " British casualties " is used to include all ranks under British oomm.ind— whether Dominion or Indian or the British .Army proper. 300 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE FORT AT SOLLUM. Occupied by the Force under Major-General Peyton, March 14, 1916. casualties were 32. Lieut. -Col. Snow, who, until the formation of Gen. Wallace's force had been in comuiand on the Western Frontier, was killed by an Arab whom he was endeavour- ing to persuade to surrender. He had been 25 years in the Egjqotian Coastguard Service and was intimately acquainted \\'ith the country and its inhabitants, and his death was a severe loss to the force. The column camped on the field on the 11th, and on the 12th rounded up some prisoners. On the 13th, reinforced by the Royal Scots, the column started, at 8 a.m., to engage the enemy at a spot 13 miles distant ; but, on crossing a wadi (the Wadi Shaifa) they were themselves attacked with considerable vigom" by a force estimated at about 1,200, with two guns and machine-guns. Only the opportune arrival of reinforcements from THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. 301 BRITISH CAVALRY IN WESTERN EGYPT. Searching a Senussi encampment outside Solium. (I Matrvih turned the day against the Senussites, who lost 180 in killed alone. The British casualties were nine killed and 56 wounded. The cohuim pursued the enemy till dark and tlie next day retiu-ned to ^latruh. The chief result of these actions on December 11 and 13 was to show Gen. Wallace that he was not strong enough to risk a decisive engagement. He asked for reinforcements and, in the third week of December, was given the 1st Batt. New Zealand R.B., two naval 41 in. guns, and " A " Battery Hon. Artillery Co. Thus strengthened, Gen. Wallace again engaged the enemy, the action being fought on Cliristmas Day, 1915. The main Senussi force was then near Gebel Medwa, a hill some eight miles south-west of Matruh. Gaafer Pasha was in coirmiand, and from air recon- 30-2 THE riMFS HISTORY OF THE WAB. M J: I) I T^ RR^J^JS^Hr^Ei -^^^^ ^Se=E=A^ " S/^y id f*"/"**' wj-'a//w; . y /'b"''* va»^ ■"*rr' LI B Y A N ; Moqhara ' • "•.'■ "-.v^ .....„,.„,„.,.^.,.. ...,.„-'.'„v-' ; CAIR0 p "Ca-t-'-e' a,u .'■-'••!•.....: ' 1 ,' - — ' o-ltfEIGar'a (Qara)' S iwa'-'O asis- " '•■'■'. '■ '• ■ Siwa ^^ ^;. ".:;;-•. \ \ \ \-\ '( ^y-'--- »' •' '■'■•-. ^ .,„, ~ - k :'•■■■ :■; •■•V..- V'; \ Bal-Laria/?;'*^v,-.--, ^ r V, \ \ ■ OasisV •■.;;,•,.,:••• ..•V ':■■ M V ..>;■' .•■^.■',>- 1 .■>.■■.■■...•/■ Miles. IO2O304OS0 60 70 80 Tracks - - - Railways — "~'o ••.••■' 'Faraffai'-.. ,.' vs=». -3^-% FaraFra': Oasis:'-;''' /C/^a/-^^ 0^^/:s- \ ^-^f^^^^^^t I20miles\ ■■'■' Nj / / ("372; MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BRITISH OPERATIONS. naissance and other sources the British esti- mated his strength in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to be about 5,000, of whom more than half were Mahafizia (regulars). Gebel Medwa was within a few miles of the sea, and on the 25th Gen. Wallace arranged with the comjnander of H.M.S. Clematis — which vigil- antly patrolled the coast — that he should support the attack on the hill with gun-fire from the sea; Gen. Wallace, in personal com- mand, moved out from Matruh before daylight on Christmas morning. He divided his force into two columns. The Right Column, under Lieut. -Col. J. L. R. Gordon, 15th Sikhs, included the bulk of the infantry, with the Bucks Hvjssars and a section of Horse Artillery, and its task \ias to advance along the coast road directly on the enemy. The Left Column, under Brigadier -Gen. Tyndale Biscoe, was made up of inounted troops and Horse Artillery, and was directed to make a wide detour round the right flank of the enemy and cut off his retreat westward. As Col. Gordon's column moved out, it came under sharp artillery and machine- gun fire, but by 7.15 a.m., having marched seven miles. Col. Gordon was in front of the main enemy position — an escarpment about a mile south of Gebel Medwa. The 15th Sikhs, temporarily commanded by Major Evans, were sent forward to attack the enemy's right flank, the Bucks Hussars and the 2 /8th Middlesex delivering a containing attack on his front. Meantime the Notts R.H.A. silenced the enemy's artillery (obtaining a direct hit on the largest of the enemy's pieces), aided by the 6 in. guns of the Clematis, which opened "an accurate and useful fire " at a range of about six miles. The enemy fought with resolution, and three companies of the 1st New Zealand Rifle Brigade were sent to help the Sikhs. After nearly three hours' strviggle the Sikhs and New Zealanders cleared the crest of the escarp- ment, driving the white -robed Arabs into a long rocky nullah, studded with caves and .small gullies into which many of the enemy retreated. The nullah was cleared bend by THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 303 bend and the edge of the table-land, beyond which lay tlie enemy's camp, was reached. Here the mounted colimin, which had mot with determined opposition from the Senussi horsemen, could be seen two miles away. \\orking their way towards Col. Gorilon, the mounted troops joined in the assault on the enemy's main positioii in tlie W'adi Majid, which was carried, about 4 p.m., at the point of the bayonet. By that time, however, the bulk of the enemy had made good their retreat along the sea-sliore and the approach of dark- ness prevented pursuit. So hurried had been Gaafer Pasha's flight that he left behind liis office and personal effects.- The British casualties were light — 1-t rank and file killed and 3 officers and 47 other ranks wounded. Over 370 enemy dead were counted and 82 prisoners were taken. -Much live stock, 30,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition and three boxes of gun ammunition were also captured. The honours of the day fell to Col. Gordon and the Sikhs and New Zealanders (the latter under command of Major Avistin). It was the first tin^e these Xew Zealanders (among whom was a Maori contingent) had been in action, but they fought with the steadiness of seasoned troops. Col. Gordon's column bivouacked at Gebel Medwa. The troops (wrote an officer who took part in the fight) slept for a few hours, during which time a volunteer party went back to i-escue certain wounded reported to be in the long nullah. They feared for the lives of any men left behind. Their fears proved only too well founded. No wotmded were found, but some of the dead had been grievously maltreated. The men probed every cave and crevice in the vicinity, and not a lurker there escaped the terrible revenge they took. The light of the burning fodder shone on evidence that we do not box with kid gloves when the punchLig ia below the belt. ••Vt daybreak today (Boxing Day) the column moved back into cuinp, tired out, it is true, with its lon^ march and running Hglil across the saml, and then through boulder strewn ravines, but high in spirits." One result of the Christmas Day fight was the withdrawal of the Senussi main body to Halazinf, 25 miles south-west of Matruh. The enemy had received a severe handling', l)ut was far from beaten, and the last week of I'.Uo and the first half of .Taiuiary, 191G. had to bo employed in clearing out parties of the enemy who were threatening the line of communica- tions between railheatl and Matruh. These operations were interruptetl by torrential rains — perhaps the last thing most members of the Expeditionary Force expected — which lasted a week and turned tlie land into alternate stretches of sand and mud. This work of clearing the rear of enemies was performed by • Morning Post, January 19. 1916. t This place was in the official dispatches at first incorrectly spelt Hazniin. NAVAL ARMOURED GARS AT MERSA MATRUH. X D X. <; < Qi Hi < a. O o ai H Z < z O Q as <( O Q Z ai 3 o o Q a PQ Q Cd Q Z D O 304 THE TIME,^ illSTOHY OF THE WAR. 305 a column undor Lord Lucan, liolpod hy tho Naval Annourod Car Division. jMcantinio, the enemy at Halazin reroived reinforcements. Careful watch was kept over that place by tho Flying Corps. The camp comprised at least 100 European tents and 2'iO Bedouin tents, including that of Sidi Alimod, it being recog- nized by Capt. Royle, the observer. The strength of the enemy was estimated at 6,000, and once more Gen. Wallace awaited the arrival of reinforcements before attacking. At that time the first of tho South African troops raised by the Union for service overseas (the campaign in German South-West Africa had been regarded as a domestic affair) luui reached England and the 2nd Regiment (under Lieut.-Col. W. E. C. Tanner) of the 1st South African Infantry Brigade was sent to rom- force Gen. Wallace. It disembarked at Matruli on January 20 and 21, and at once was given a share of the fighting. On January 22 Gon. Wallace moved from iNIatruh and, marching 16 miles, encamped that night at Bir Shola There he formed his troops into two columns and, at G a.m. on January 23, went forward to engage the eneniy. As in the action on Christmas Day, Col. Gordon commanded the infantrj', wliich formed the Right Column, and had with it one squadron of \eomanry (the Duke of Lancaster's Own), and Brigadier-Gen. Biscoe the mounted men. The action that ensued, the hardest fought of the whole campaign, demon- strated, among other things, tiiat the Senussi army had capable and daring leaders. Among them were German officers. Col. Gordon advanced direct on the enemy's camp, Gen. Biscoe's men being echeloned to the left front of the Right Column, moving parallel to and in close touch with it. Col. Gordon had with him his own regiment, the 15th Sikhs, the 2nd South African Regiment, the 1st Batt., New Zealand R.B., and the Notts Battery, R.H.A. In two hours and a half they had covered about seven milne ; a very trying experience, especially for the South Africans, most of whom had been originally ca\-alry. The advance was made in abnormal conditions. The whole coimtry had been turned by the recent rains into a quagmire, which hampered the movements of the mounted troops and deprived the mfantry of the support of the Naval Armoured Car Division. " Tlirough- out the day," wrote Sir J. Maxwell, "this factor — of mud — played an important and imfortu- nate part." Though it hampered, the mud did not prevent the advance of the troops At 8. .10 a.m. the Left Colimin reported the enemy in sight, and shortly atterwards Bis<M)(<'8 ailvancod squadron of Australian Light Horsu became engaged. Gen. BLscoe sent the Bucks Hussars and tho H.A.C. to support the Aas- tralians and, at tho same time. Col. Gordon's column i)ushed on in attack formation, the indomitable Sikhs leading. After an engage- ment lasting eight hours tho enemy were de- feated and fled. Tho course of the fight is succinctly told in Gen. Maxwell's di.spatch as follows : Relievofl by the advance of the Infantry, the inonntod troops [)r("sso(| on, (Mulonvoiirin;; to work rouiul tho EGYPTIAN TROOP.S. Boarding a steamer at Solium. enemy's right, and at the same time covering the left fiank of Col. Gordon's attack. The hitter, spread over a front of nearly a mile and a half, led i cross ground absolutely destitute of cover, while miraj'e in the early stapes made it impossible for a considerable time to locate the enemy's positions. During this advance the Infantry suffered somewhat severely from artillerj' and machine-guns, tho enemy's fire being both rapid and accurate. Nevertheless, the enemy was gradually pressed back, but his retirement of nearly three miles on to his main positions was conducted with great skill, denying all our efforts to come to close quarters. By 2.45 p.m. the Sikhs and South .-Vfricans, with part of the Xew Zealand Battalion, on the left of the Sikhs, had reached the enemy's main line. But in the mean- time the flanks had not made equal progress, and bcdies ^< »-: X u oi < a X z o oi < > < U CD J i) ^\*^c. t. ; .« H ai en U Q U B H en U cr O s > u E CD Of CQ ^-.4^ .> -^i ■■^•4 306 THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAIL •60'i ot the enemy were working roiiiul Iwth north and south, the line gradimliy forming the arc of a semi-circle. Soon after 1 p.m., so f;reat wa.« the activity of one of these detachm?nts on our rij,'ht, or northern flunk, thvt the reserve Battalion (l/otli Koynl Scots) had to bo put in to restore the situation, but by 2.30 p.m. all danj;er from that quarter wa-s past. On the extreme left, however, by 3.30 p.m. the Cavalry of the Left Column had been forced to (,'ive som,^ ground, a!id with the H.A.('. guns were occupying ii position nearly 1,000 yards in rear of the Field Ambulance. Col. Gordon was called upon to detach two com- panies of New Zealanders to as.sist the Cavalry, who were being pressed. With this reinforcement the threat again.st our left rear was finally repulsed and the enemy driven off. In the meantime the main attack by Col. Gordon's Column had progressed satisfactorily. By 3 p.m. the enemy had been driven from his positions, and shortly afterwards his camp was occupied and burnt, the work of destruction being completed by 4.30 p.m. This account may be supplemented by extracts from a letter written immediately after the engagement by an officer who fought at Halazin, and printed in the Morning Post : While advancing on the enemy's po.sition some hundred Springboks [South Africans] were sent back as unfit to march any further, but when the first gun boomed they halted undecided. Then the wind wafted down their battalion's weird war cry on its wings. Catching up the echo, they "about-turned" with a roar, and, boots carried in their hands, they struggled back to the opening fray, &;id saw it through to a finish — • a likely looking lot these. The enemy contested the day with the utmost deter- mination. For four hours there was a struggle for supremacy in rifle fire whicli rivalled in rattle the old Gallipoli days. These native troops carried a-s many machine-guns as we did, and under Germm (two of them naval men) and Turkish oiTicers, worked them with \alour and precision. Their artillery threw poor- quality shrapnel with more accuracy than liitherto. .A profitable stratagem was brought off by the cavalry screen. When we were more than holding our own a portion of the cavalry on the left retired under orders at a hand gallop. Encouraged by this, the Arabs who had opposed this portion of the line pressed forward in masses, to be blown to pieces by three of our guns just then placed in a new position. Concentrated rifle fire blotted out several of the Senussi's machine-gun crews, including a German captain. Our troops passed through the hostile camp, and found every evidence of European supervision. Oppor- tiuiity had been taken by the enemy during their determined resistance to remove much booty, but a pood deal remained to be destroyed by the victors. Half a mile of Bedouin encampments went up in smoke. Pursuit of the enemy was unpossible ; the cavalry horses were spent and the troops bivouacked two miles ea.st of Halazin, at a spot where the Field Ambulance had stuck in the mud. The supply train had not been able to reach that place, and the night, intensely cold and wet, was passed — few slept — with neither supplies nor blankets. The enemy showed no inclination to renew the combat and on January 24, Cen. Wallace marched his troops back to Bir Shola. It was a trying march in deep mud, all vehicles having to be drawn . by hand and the .severely wo.indvd carried on stretchers by the tired and thirsty infantry, imtil throe miles from Bir Shola the s ipply train was met. The next day, in better weather, the troops reached Matruh once more. The British casualties at Hal i/.in were co.nparatively heavy, 31 killed an I 2!M woundo 1. The Sikhs alone had 13() casualties. The Senu.s.sites had suffered .severely, a conservative estimate put- ting their loss at not fewer than 200 killed and 500 woimded. For the success attainerl, as in the action on December 25, special praise was due to the leading of Col. (Jorilon, who cain- ntanded the main attack, while (Jen. Maxwell drew particular attention to "the gallantry of the Sikhs, the South Africans and the New Zealanders, who fought with invincible dash and resolution throughout the day." At Halazin the Senu.ssites and their Turco- Gennan allies had fought well, but unsucce.ss- fuUy, and their defeat, following the defeat on Christmas Day, disillusioned the Egyptian Bedouins who had flocked to the standard of Sidi Aluned. Visions of raiding the rich lands of the Delta faded ; they foimd themselves instead ill-u.sed by the CvTcnaican Arabs and in danger, too, of starvation. Froni this time many of the Walid AH surrendered to the British ; the peril to Egj'pt appeared to be past. The immobility of (!en. Wallace's force had prevented him, however, from following up his victories, and thus the enemy was encouraged to continue the contest. The period of immo- bility was happily coming to an end ; the Expeditionary Force was at last — in February ■ — supplied with sufficient camel transport. Its composition was again altered. The 15th Sikhs were onlered to India and the New Zealanders left for Europe. Their places were taken by more battalions of the 1st South African Infantry Brigade, with whom came their commander, Brigadier-Gen. H. T. Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O., an officer with a brilliant record. The composite Yeomanry Brigade also vanished, being replaced by the 2nd Mounted Brigade. Lord Lucan still had his tlu-ce Territorial regiments (the 1 6th Roj-al Scots and the 2 7th and 2 8th ^liddlesex Regt.), while, to emphasize the Imperial composition of the force, two sections of the Hong Kong and Singapore Moimtain Battery had joined. The camel drivers, it may be added, were negroes from the Sudan. Gen. Wallace considered that the operations now contemplated — the reoccupation of Barrini 30S THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL and Solium -would, in view of his age, involvo a pliysical strain beyond his powers, and he, therefore, resigned tlio command which he liad held with unvarying success for tJiree montlis. In his place Gen. Maxwell appointed Major-Gen. W. E, Peyton, C.B., D.S.O;, who took over the command on February 9, 1916, when the Expe- ditionary Force, reorganized in the manner stated, was completely mobile and would no longer iiave to return to Matruh after every engagement. Having completed his preparations, Gen. Peyton dispatched a force on February 20, with orders to establish itself at Barrini. Made up of Bucks Hussars, Dorset Yeomanry, the Notts Battery R.H.A., 1st and 3rd Batta- lions South African Brigade, Royal Scots, and Light Armoured Car Batteries, this force was placed under the command of Brig. -Gen. Lukin, who located the enemy at Agagia, 14 miles south-east of Barrini. Gaafer Pasha and Nuri Bey were both in camp, but Sidi Ahmed had left for Siwa, a forward movement of Senussi forces in the southern oases having been undertaken as a set-off to his reverses in the coast region. Gen. Lukin planned a night march for February 25, and an attack on the enemy camp at dawn. But Gaafer Pasha, as on previous occasions, did not passively await attack, and on the afternoon of the 25th he opened fire with field and machine- guns on the British oiimp. The action on this day was unimportant, but it led Gen. Lukin to abandon his intended night march, and it was not till 9.30 a.m. on the 26th that ho moved out with his whole force towards Agagia. Again there •was the long march, but weather conditions were now normal, and the South Africans were in good fonn. About 11 a.m. the 3rd (Transvaal) Battalion, under Lieut. -Col. E. F. Thackeray, attacked the enemy's centre, the bulk of the Yeomanry, with two armoured cars, being on the right flank, and one squadron of Yeomanry and two cars on the left. Gen. Lukin's tactics, based on his South African experience, differed somewhat from those adopted in previous engagements. The infantry were to engage, break the resistance of the enemy, and the moment the foe showed signs of giving way the Yeomanry and armoured cars were to dash forward and complete their rout. Gaafer Pasha kept to his tactics of Halazin ; as the Transvaal Battalion advanced (with admirable steadiness), the Senussites and khaki-clad Turks, moving very rapidly, tried to outflank Lukin's left. This enveloping movement was soon checked, and the Transvaal men came on to within 500 yards of the enemy's position. Gen. Lukin decided to press the issue. He threw his reserve, the 1st (Cape Province) Battalion, under Lieut. -Col. F. S. Dawson, into ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER. In the foreground are Senussi prisoners ; in the background is General Peyton (seated). THE TIMES HISTOnr OE THE WAB. 809 AFTER THE BATTLE OF AGAGIA. Troopers of the Dorset Yeomanry leading their horses back to the base. the fighting line, and brought back the squadron from his left flank to strengthen his right flank, warning Col. H. AI. Souter, D.S.O., of the Dorset Yeomanry, to be ready. Pressed relentlessly by the South Africans, after a two hours' contest the enemj% who had fought with extreme boldness, was compelled to evacuate his position. In exact accordance with the plans, the fight was at once taken up by the cavalry, and the day ended in a memorable charge by the Dorset Yeomanry. About 1 p.m. [said Col. Souter in his official report] I received a message from tlie G.O.C. saying that ho wished me to pursue and to cut off the enemy if possible. It was my intention to let the enemy get clear of the sandhills, where there might have been wire or trenches, and then to attack liim in tlie open. I therefore pursued on a line parallel to, and about 1,000 yards west of, the line of retreat, attacking with dismounted fire wherever the horses wanted an easy. About 2 p.m. I saw for the first time the whole retreating force extend for about a mile with a depth of 300 to 400 yards. In front were the (■(unels and baggage, escorted by irregulai-s, witli their proper fighting force (Miihafizia) and maxims forming their rear and flank guard. I decided to attack mounted. About 3 p.m. I dismounted for the last time to give my horses a breather and to make a careful examination of the ground over which I was about to move. By this time the Dorset Regiment was complete, and as the squadron of the Bucks Yeomanry had gone on ahead and could not be found, I attacked with Dorsets alone. The attack was made in two lines, the horses galloping steadily, and well in hand. Three maxims were brought into action against us, but the men were splendidly led by their squadron and troop leaders, and their behaviour was admirable. About 50 yards from the position I gave the order to charge, and with one yell the Dorsets hurled themselves upon the enemy, who immediately broke. In the middle of the enemy's lines my hoi-se wa-i killed under me, and, by a curious chance, his dying strides brought me to the ground within a few yards of the Senussi General, Guafer Pasha, At this moment Col, Souter was aloiio, except for Lieut. Blaksley and Yeoman Brown, both of the Dorset Yeomanry, wlio liad also had their horses shot under them. Around them were about fifty fit or lightly wounded enemy, and the situation was distinctly threatening imtil the arrival of the machine -gim section decided the issue. Ciaafer Pasha and his staff were then escorted from the field. An officer who took part in the charge •wTote : " Col. Souter led us splendidly in front of the whole regiment, and the regiment rode behind him in line, like a general's inspection — it was splendid." After describing the charge tip to the time when Col. Souter's horse fell at the feet of Gaafer Pasha, this officer added : We rode on through the valley, and then rallied to the left, but as there were so many wounded, and the horses were done, we could not do much more. The men were grand all throu^'h. You never saw such a panic as there was on the faces of the Bedouins. Tamplin (2nd Lieu- tenant) did awfully well ; ho rode li.ke a fury, and acconnted for a lot of the enemy, and then, when the charge was over, ho collected a few men together, and went back twice to pick up wounded. In fact, these splendid fellows of the Dor- set Yeomanry without their officers' control carried on too far — one squadron had been deprived of all its officers, and it was this squadron which suffered most severely. The total of the British casualties was not officially announced — they exceeded 100. The enemy left over 200 killed and woimded on the ground, and besides Gaafer Pa^sha several other Tiu-kish officers were among the 30 iilO TIIK TIMl-:s HISTORY OF Till': WAR. prisoners. It was at first reported that Niiri Bey was killed, hut tlu> rejjort was untrue. After a disorderly fligiit of eight to ten miles, Nuri rallied his forces. He did not attempt to renew tlie fight, but withdrew to the Senussi base camp of Hir VVarr and Msead. in the direction of Solium, where he was in toueli with reinforcements from Cyrenaica. The Turco-Arabs had not yet, in short, quite accepted defeat. (Jen. Lukin after reoccupying Barrini (February 28) prepared for an advance on Sulhun. Barrini now became the British advanced base. Capt. Burmester, R.N., and Com- nuxnder Eyres-Monsell, R.N., M.P., a week ahead of .schedule tin\e, brought to Barrini by sea .stores suHicient to permit Gen. Peyton to mxke the next forward movement. The fine work of the Navy was the more gratifying, as the Australian Divisional Train, which had worked .splendidly, was needed for duty elsewhere. The attack on Bir Warr and Msead presented, however, special difficulties. The land route was more than usually destitute of wells, and necessitated also the jiassage of a narrow defile, while to land at Solium, and thence march inland, involved climbing, in the face of enemy fire, the (iOO feet of cliffs which rise steeply above the bay. Neverthe- less, all difficulties were overcome, the British being heartened by the clever tapping of tele- phonic commiuiication between the enemy camps, conversation which showed that Nuri Bey was hesitating whether to fight or to flee. (It is noteworthy as indicating the controlling power in the Senussi force that the enemy u.sed not Arabic, but Turkish, in their telephone conversation.) Gen. Peyton decided that the advance should be in two lines — one column moving along the tableland, the other, consisting of mounted troops, along the coast road. Gen. Lukin was with the colimn which took the high ground, having with him two battalions of infantry, the armoured cars, his camel corps company, and mountain guns. Gen. Peyton himself took command oi the mounted column. By March 14 both columns were near- ing Solium. At 9 a.m. on that day the air scouts reported that the enemy was breaking up camp. Nuri Bey had in the end decided to fly. The air- men, however, also reported another enemy force some twenty miles to "the west, in the open desert. Now came the chance of the armoured cars. A squadron of ten cars, under Major the Duke of \\'e.-tmin.ster (Cheshire Yeomanry) was sent in pursuit. They raced across the desert — striking the main road to Tobruk, and getting up a speed of thirty miles an hour, the cavalry and camel corps following. As the camp was reached, the cars wore received with a lively fire, but, charging in line over boulders, scrub, and sand, the cars dashed into the camp, which was .soon in their possession. Three field guns, nine machine guns, cases of dynamite, travelling workshops, and a great quantity of small arms ammunition were seized. The enemy lost 50 killed and many wounded, while 40 men, including Turkish officers, were taken prisoners. Some machine guns the enemy destroyed with bombs and petrol to prevent them falling into the hands of the British. It was afterwards ascer- tained that Nuri Bey had also blown up his main ammunition stores. On the same day as this action was fought, March 14, Gen. Peyton reoccupied Solium, which had been held by the enemy since on the previous November 23 the Egyptian garrison had been withdrawn by sea. In the coast region the enemy had now been cleared out of Egyptian territory. To follow them into Cyrenaica was not practicable. One thing, however, was attempted and accomplished, and that was the rescue of the British prisoners in the hands of the Senussi. It will be remembered that the auxiliary cruiser Tara had been torpedoed by U 35, near Solium, on November 5, 1915, the Tara being one of several victims of German sub- marines at that period. They included the Helensmuir, whose crew were rescued by an armed Italian yacht and taken to Tobruk, where they were most hospitably treated.* Not all the crews of the torpedoed vessels were so fortunate. When the Tara was sunk twelve of the crew were killed. The survivors, 92 in number, mostly Welsh, were towed by U 35 into Port Sulieman (Bardia), then in Senussi possession, or, as the commander of the U boat called it, "a German port." This officer offered to take Capt. Gwatkin -Williams, R.N., the captain of the Tara, to Austria, but he preferred to share the trials of his men, and of Lieut. Tanner, R.N.R. Lieut. Tanner * An account of Tobruk, written by the only passenger on board the Helensmuir, is printed in Chambers's Journal for September, 1916. It gives an interesting picture of the conditions in which the Itahans in Cyre- naica lived. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 811 SURRENDER OF GAAFER PASHA, The Turkish General who commanded the Senussi, at the Headquarters of the Western Frontier Force. was the original master of the vessel, which, before the war was well known to travellers to and from Irelantl, being a L. & X.\\'. Rail- way passenger boat — then called Hibernia — plying between Dublin and Holyhead. At Port Sulieman the captors were surrounded by a fierce-looking Senussi guard, and in Capt Gwatkin-Williams's opinion only the presence of Xuri Bey, "an ardent antiquarian," and Gaafer Pasha saved them from being miu"dered. The Tvirki&h officers were unifonnly kind (several of them had themselves been prisoners of war), as were, later on, several Arab officers ; but an Egj'ptian captaui named Achmed. :?I" 77//-; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A TURKISH OFFICER OF THE SENUSSI, W ho surrendered, arriving at the Headquarters of the Western Frontier Force. who ^^■as given charge of the camp, behaved ))rutally. This man, it was ascertained , was a (hsmissed employee of the Egyptian coast- guard, and subsequently he fell into the hands of the Italians. On November 15 the Tara sur- vivors were joined by Lievit. T. S. Apcar, Indian Lancers, with two ships' officers and a Portu giiese cook, of the horse transport Moorina one of the boats sunk by German submarines Lieut. Apcar had been doubly Tinfortunate having been compelled, with his boat's crew^ to land in territory held by the enemy, while the other boats of the Moorina jnade Egyptian territory. Lack of sufficient food and clothing, long forced marches, actual ill-treatment by the Egj-ptian Aehmed, bad and verminous quarters, such was the lot of the British captives. The story of their sufferings may be read in the extracts from Capt. Cwat kin -Williams's diary, edited by his wife.* The men, fom* of whom died from the efi'ect of their privations, were taken to a place called Bir el Hakim Abbyat (the Weils of the White Doctor), a spot over 90 mileo due east of Solium, reached on * In the Hands oj the Senoussi (Pearsons, 1916). November 26. There they were kindly treated by their guards. Capt. Gw'atkin- Williams made an attempt to escape in Feb- ruary, and had got half-way to Solium when he was recaptured. Of the Senussi main forces the captives saw nothing, though Capt. Gwatkin- Williams believes he saw Sidi Ahmed himself. While still at Port Sulieman we were visited by a man we were told was the uncle- of the Grand Seniissi. (I have since come to the conclusion that this was the Grand Senussi himself). He is a powerful man with a greyish beard, and reminded one forcibly of the picture of one of the Elders in the story of Susannah. He carries his whip and gun with him everywhere, and amused himself by firing shots at various objects from the tent door. . . . The Turks treated him with great respect to his face and there was much liissing of hands : but as soon as he had retired they spat violently, and said he was a savage. .4 Turkish surgeon, Dr. Bechie Fuad, " a kindly and hospitable soul," told many stories of the time when, as physician, he had attended the Senussi sheikh. Smoking and drinking are sternly forbidden, but much indulged in, by the Seniissi sect. When the crime is brought home retribution is swift. The punishment for drinking is 1,000 lashes, and for smoking the loss of a hand. The doctor himself had had to amputate hands for this on four occasions. Had he refused his own hand would have been forfeited. At the end of January the captives were THE TIMHS HlSTUliY OF THE WAlL 813 informed that a two-months' annistict^ had been arranged between the Senussi and tli- British at a conference at Solhnii, a pine invention wliich had disastroiLs consequences for the guard of the prisoners' camp, as various circiunstances led the captives to behove tlio report to be true. When on March 14 Gen. Peyton entered Solium, Arab prisoners gave information as to the whereabouts of the captives, and the Light Armoured-Car Battery, under the Duke of Westminster, offered to try to rescue Capt. Gwatkin -Willianis and his comrades. To venture thus into absolutely unknown coimtry, against an enemy of un- known strength, was, in the measured words of Gen. Maxwell, " a feat which demanded great resolution." The expedition left Solium at 3 a.m. on St. Patrick's Day (March 17). It con- sisted of nine armoured cars, 26 other cars, and 10 motor ambulances. Capt. Royle, of the Egyptian Coastguard Service, acted as leader, and with him were two Arab guides — one of whom had not been to Bir Halcim for 30 years. After a time the party began to doubt if they would succeed. The natives had said Bir Hakim was only 75 miles away, antl when they had gone 95 miles and the desert was still bare the Ai-ab guides were arguing as to whether they wore on the right track. 'I'lio mini wild hail not spoii Mir Hakim nince hin lK)y- liood tlioii>;lit tlioy woro wrong ; thf other would nut say much, unil though in the circum»luiiop« ho proved a zculouH guide, ho thought the pace of the cars greattr ihau it n-ally wa.>t. 'I'ho desert was now very Mton.\ . but tho going was fairly hard. One luindrud mile» went by, then 105. That was believed to lx» the limit of the distance, but still thero wa.s not tho faintest Kigii of the prisoners* camp. Helweon 110 an<i llfi milt n tho fear of failun! kept every one silent. A mile farth< r on the .Arabs beeamo animated, and through the mirage u snuill ln-ight could be seen. After a halt, at 2 o'clock, the Duke sent forward the armoured cars to tho attack. They raced up to within 200 yards of tho moinid, tho first ear that of Lieutenant AN'illiam Griggs, tho jockey, who regards tliis an thi- biggest of the " clafwsic " rticof in which he has taken THE SURRENDER OF GAAFER PASHA. The Senussi Commander being assisted on board a picket boat which took him to tiie warship in the harbour for conveyance to Alexandria. Smaller picture : Gaafer Pasba on his way to the picket boat. 314 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. >•- MAJOR THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER, Who was in command of the Armed Motor Cars which rescued the crew of the "Tara," March 17, 1916. part. The prisoners were standing silhouetted against tlie skyline absolutely motionless and as silent as statues, dumb with amazement at the appearance of the rescuers. At last one man threw off a sack covering him and faintly cheered. Tlie crowd staggered forward with the rolling gait of starved men and swarmed round the cars. They could not be persuaded to leave the cars. Meanwhile the remainder of the column, seeing the prisoners leave the mound, started a tremendo-us race to the spot. They ran abreast as fast as the engines would propel them, and the air was filled with the cheers of the crews and the noise of the exhausts.* When the captives saw the first car coming (it was the one driven by Lieutenant Griggs, the jockey) they beUeved that it carried an envoy to arrange peace on the conclusion of the two months' (fictitious) armistice, and when the Duke of Westminster questioned him as to the position of the guard Captain Gwatkin- Williams had no idea that there was still war, otherwise he would have interceded for their lives. As it was when he heard the Maxims splutter he shouted " Save them, they have * From an account by Air. W. T. Massey on informa- tion from officers who took part in the rescue. been kind to us," and, with the Duke, darted up the mound to stop t)jo firing. It was too late. 'J'he garrison (I 8uppo.se nine soldiers) liad been wiped out in a few sfoonds, and I could sec only prostrate forms lying among the desert scrub. Unhappily with them perished many women and children, who had run out with tlie soldiers and could not be dislinguishod from them in the heat of action. Our guards had died like the bravo .Arabs they were, with arms in their hands and " in death they were not dixided." In half an hour the return journey was begun and in just over 24 hours, the cars having travelled 240 miles, were back at Solium. Taken straiglit to the hospital .ship Raschid, the re.scued men — one of whom was very ill and shortly afterwards died — sailed the next day for Alexandria. Two of the party who had left Bir Hakim some days previously under escort, to obtain supplies, were handed over by Turkish officers to the Italians at Tobruk. Few men have had stranger experiences than the seamen who spent 19 weeks as prisoners of the Senussi. While the rescvie of the captives at Bir Hakim virtually marked the end of the campaign in the north the situation in the oases was still im- favourable. As already stated the Senussi Sheikh had left Gaafer Pasha's army in January and gone to Siwa, and on February 11 and 12 some 1,000 Senussites coming from Siwa occupied Baharia oasis, di.stant only 100 miles from the rich and thickly populated districts of Fayum and Minia. Further reinforcements followed and by February 27 Senussi troops had seized the more southerly oases of Farafra and Dakhia. Thus while being beaten back in the north Sidi Ahmed sought to retrieve his fortunes by an advance in the south. The like- lihood of this movement had been foreseen and Major-Gen.' J. Adye, C.B., was directed to organize a force for the protection of the southern provinces of Egypt. This force guarded the Nile from the Fayum in the north to Esna in the south. Meanwhile as a pre- cautionary measiu'e the civil officials were withdrawn from Kharga (or the Great) Oasis. The strategical importance of these oa-ses is (wrote Gen. Maxwell) very obvious, but in view of the uncertainty as to what troops would be under my command at any moment, I considered that any enter- prise distant from tlie Nile Valley would be out of place and I restricted Gen. Adye to purely defensive measures, with, however, instructions to prepare a small mobile column with which he could strike at the enemy should he approach the cultivation. Gen. Adye, holding what lawyers call " a watching brief," was largely dependent on the work of the Royal Flying Corps. From the first the more northern oases, Moghara and THE TIMES HISTORY UF THE WAR 815 el Gara. ha;l Ixmh kept uiidci" observation by aeroplane, and ('a|)t. (th(m I^icul.) \'im Rjnvekl, and Mr. .Jennings Hraiiiley, of tlie Sudan Civil Service, to reduce the distance of flights as much as possible, luul cvstablished advanced depots in the desert. This system was lirst tried by Captain N'aii Hyineld in a great flight over Gara (Qara) oasis, antl by February so regular had the routine become that the airmen were alile to announce the occupation of ]^aharia the very day the enemy reached that oasis. Following this vip, the airmen made continual flights to Dakhla. inflicting consider- able damage witii bombs and machine-guns. It was at this time, March 19, 1 !)!(), that Gen. Sir John Maxwell handed over the mpreme command in Egypt to Gen. Sir Archibald Murray, who.se duty, as far as concerned the Western Frontier, was to guard against enemy raids in the Nile Valley, the stirring up of tribes still inclined to be well disposed towards th(> Senussi, and the creation of imrest in the Nile Delta among nervous or disaffected eleiiients of the population. Sir Archibald Murray, acceding to a request from Sir Keginakl \\'ingate, imdertook, by means of an armed river patrol. to defend tlie reach of the Nile from Aswari to W'adi Haifa, sf) that the western front extcirided over 8»H) miles. The moial of the enemy liad been .severely shaken by the campaign in the north, })ut it was estimated that he had still :5.<MKt troops in the western desert. 'I'he measures taken by the British succeeded in obviating all the dangers fcan>(| ; the Seiui.ssi forces instead of emerging from the oa.so8 and invading the Nile valley, were gratlually pushed back.* They had entered Kharca ojvsis on the withdrawal of the Egyptian oflicials, but on April 1.") aerial reconnaissance showed tJie oasis to be clear of the enemy, and on the IHth a Britisli ff)rce of all ranks, 1,G00 strong, was con- centrated there. This was followed, on April 27, by the occujjation by a British force of the more northern ojisis of Moghara, and, a month later, of Baharia oasis, a lino of blockhou.ses being built across waterless desert subject to frequent and severe sand storms. At Baharia, and at the other oases, the Senussi ha<l at first set up an orderly fonn of go\ernment, but as * An enemy party of four, inehiding ono Turkish officer, were captured 60 miles from the Nile, at Miiiiii. This was the Semissi's '• fiirthe>t east." SOME OF THE SURVIVORS OF THE "TARA." Left to right — back row: Mr. C. W, Birkby, Wireless Operator; Mr. G. W. Manning, Clerk; Mr. Richardson, Engineer. Front row: Mr. Culstead, First Mate; Lieutenant E. B. Tanner, R.N.R. ; Captain Rupert S. Gwatkin-Williams, R.N. ; Dr. Tanner. c -o c 3 o u ■ec c O u u o G « .2 -5 l-l > X ^ u 33 01 o H <: z o u « <: & •a Cil S E E c o 4> o u a O 02 •o o 316 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. 317 their cause grew hopeless they had treated the natives with great barbarity, and the re- establisliinent of British authority was wel- comed by the inhabitants. The military occupation of the more distant oases was not imdertaken, but patrols by the Imperial Camel Corps from Kharga kept Dakhla and Farafra oases under control. Motor-car and camel patrols were also carried out in the north from Solium and Barrini, and in this way communica- tion between the enemy and the Nile Valley and Delta was rendered almost impossible. In short a cordon was established which confined the Senussi in the south to the Libyan Desert, though in the north a small body of the enemy under Nuri Bey was still near Solium. Raids and reconnaissances from Solium in April alone resulted in the discoverj'^ in concealed depots of 287,000 rovmds of ammunition, two German wireless " sets," and a number of rifles. These were either destroyed or brought in. Only on one occasion did a Senussi guard offer opposi- tion. In May the command on the Western Frontier was taken over by Lieut. -Gen. Sir Bryan Mahon, but shortly after his arrival in Egypt Sir Bryan had to be invalided home owing to severe sunstroke, and Major-Gen. A. G. Dallas, C.B., succeeded to the command. In May the Italians struck a blow both against the Senussi source of supplies and the enemy submarine bases in the ^Mediterranean. They occupied Mersa Moraisa and Bardai, the two ports between Tobruk and Solium which had been in Senussi occupation. On May 4 a naval force from Tobruk landed two battalions at Moraisa, and marcliing thence overland, the Italian troops a few days later occupied Bardai. Not only were these places, long the nests of U boats, taken without opposition, but with the active cooperation of Said Hillal, a brother of the Senussi cliief. Sidi Ahmed was now in a somewhat tractable mood, and negotia- tions opened between him and Gen. Ameglio led to an exchange of prisoners, whereby some 700 Italian soldiers regained their liberty, though a larger number had died in captivity. Several influential chieftains also rallied to the Italian side, but in view of the European situation no military expedition was undertaken in the interior of Cyrenaica. A complete settlement of the Senussi ques- tion was, indeed, no longer a matter of urgency. As chief of a federation of desert tribes Sidi Ahmed, in his Libyan fastnesses, was still a power but there was no occasion for either BRITISH YEOMANRY IN THE DESERT. Italy or Great Britain to undertake a new campaign full of inherent difficulties. By liis failure as a temporal leader Sidi Ahmed had lost much of the influence which he had possessed as a spiritual head. Sidi Alimed, too, must have regretted that he had been led by his Turk and German advisers to break with Egypt, for in future there was to be no toler- ance by the British of his warfare with Italy. An anomalous situation was ended by the conclusion in July, 1916, of an Anglo-Italian agreement for common action against the Senussi. This agreement, in the words of the Giornale d'Ualia, deprived the Senussi sect of all hope of ten^poral aggrandizement, while restoring to them their purely religious character. The Italian Govermnent had already publicly announced the entire freedom of religious belief among its Moslem subjects. Within a week of the conclusion of the Anglo- Italian agreement its effects were seen in Cyre- naica. Bj- arrangement between the Italian com- mandant of Bardai and the British conunander at Solium a joint armoured car patrol was ar- ranged, and in the first days of August a raid was made on a party of the enemy who were harassing the peaceably inclined natives. The raid was entirely successful. Itself a 318 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ininor operation, it doiuonstrated to Sidi Ahinod and Niiri Bey that the time hnxl passed when the British authorities ke|)t to a poUcy of non-interference so long as the Senussi confined their operations to Cyrenaica. From this date onward, mutual, constant and systematic action by Italj' and Great Britain replaced two hitherto independent policies. The Turkish and CJorman efforts to stir up trouble in the Sudan had been unceasing, and just as the failure of their efforts in Western Egypt became apparent their intrigues suc- ceeded in getting Ali Dinar, the Sultan of Dar- fur. to defy the Sudan Government. Ali Dinar had been a prisoner of the Khalifa ; he was released by Lord Kitchener, had gone back to Darfur, reconquered the throne of his ancestors, and was acknowledged by the Sudanese Government as Sultan, on the payment of an annual tribute of £500. Though far from being a model monarch, he maintained, on the whole, correct relations with the British, who had the control of his foreign affairs. The Sultan had been kept in order mainly through the influence of Slatin Pasha, who had himself, before his imprisonment by the Mahdi, been governor of Darfur. Slatin Pasha, who, as Lord Cromer publicly testified, " during a great many years gave most loyal and efficient service to the British Government," being an Austrian, was obliged to qvut the Sudan administration when the great war began, and in his absence Ali Dinar assumed a more inde- pendent attitude. Darfur was, moreover, as has been already stated, subject to Senussi influence, and that in 1915 meant German influence. In that year Ali Dinar became more than usually restive. He refused to pay his tribute, and in February, 19 IG, began to concentrate a force on the frontier of Kor- dofan, the Sudan province adjoining Darfur. He had, too, a taste for abusive letter writing, and one lurid communication, to the Governor of Kordofan and <^he Insr ector of the border, was addressed to " The Governor of Hell in Kordofan and the Inspector of Flames in Nahud." The situation created by Ali Dinar's truculence was grave, and unless promptly and successfully handled disturbances throughout the Sudan were to be expected. Wadai, tlie sultanate wrested by the French from Senussi control in 1909-10, adjoined Darfur on the west, and several of its tribes sympathized with Ali Dinar, who, it was definitely ascertained, was in communication with Senussi chiefs. It was plain, said Lord Crewe, speaking in the House of Lords on behalf of the Government, that Ali Dinar had been misled by German propaganda. " It was likely that if delay had occurred, some German emissaries, whose activities there had been occasion to recognize, might have found their way to Darfiu." Fortunately in Sir Reginald Wingate the Sudan possessed a governor whose courage was equal to his knowledge. He did not hesitate to tiike SULTAN ALI DINAR'S HOUSE, EL FASHER, DARFUR. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 819 AT EL FASHER, DARFUR. A gun platform. Smaller picture: Mahmud El Dedingawi, the Sultan's Cavalry Commander. instant action, althougli the season was tlie worst in the year for military operations. As to the consideration of season it had also to be remembered tliat when movement — owing to the scarcity of water — was difficult for the British it was also difficvilt for the enemy. For the expedition against Darfur Sir Reginald Wingate rehed on his own resources, except for the help of a detachment of the Royal Flying Corps vinder Major Groves. All the rank and file engaged belonged to the Egyptian Armj'. The officers were British. A mixed force of all arms luider Lieut. -Col. P. V. Kelly, officer commanding Egyptian Cavalry, was assembled, and in March it entered Darfur after slight opposition. In April, Abaid, a place 90 miles west of El Father, Ali Dinar's capital, was occupied and became the base for fiu-ther operations. On May 15 Col. Kelly set forward for El Fasher. He was well served by the R.F.C., who, from their base at Abaid, made extraordinary flights On one occasion Capt. Bannatjoae was nine and a half hours in the air. The enemy gave battle on ^lay 22, at Beringia, 12 miles north of the capital and fought with all the traditional bravery of the Sudanese " Arabs " — who, in reality, have but a slight admixtiu-e of Arab blood. Besides other troops the Darfiu'ians had 2, COO riflemen, the pick of Ali Dinar's forces. They held a strongly entrenched position, which, however, " the Egj-ptian Camel Corps induced them to leave." The enemy then attacked the Egj-ptian troops "with the utmost rapidity and desperation. The attack was met with withering fire, but some few of the enemy penetrated to within 10 yards of our lines. Our troops then counter- attacked, totally defeating the enemy,'" whose losses exceeded 50 per cent, of his force. The next day Col. Kelly entered El Fasher. Ali Dinar and a large body of horsemen fled. They were chased by aeroplanes, which 320 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL VIEW OF THE BAY OF SOLLUM. freely bombed the fugitives. Lieut. Slessor threw a bomb which fell almost at the feet of the Sultan, and though himself wounded by a bullet in the thigh, returned safely to Abaid. " Lieut. Slessor's achievements," said Sir Reginald Wingate, in publicly thanking the Royal Flying Corps, " wore as gallant as they were dramatic, and I congratu- late him on having administered the final and heavy blow to the Kaiser's latest ally. Sultan Ali Dinar, as ho ignobly fled from his capital, where he had boasted he would bo prepared to lay down his life in support of our enemies' cause." Thereafter Ali Dinar disappears from the scene. A military administration was set up at El Fasher, where a considerable quantity ■of military stores was found, including four field guns and 55,000 roimds of small arms ammunition. (Among other " booty " was a large steam-roller, upon which was Gxed a chair of state. This vehicle had served Ali Dinar, in lieu of a motor-car, for tovu-ing the town.) Many chiefs surrendered, and in a short time Darfur was at peace. For those who, from Sir Evelyn Wood onward, had laboured for over 30 years in the reorganization of the Egyptian Army it was particularly gratifying that the " Gippy " should have stood up to and beaten his once most dreaded foe. The victory, too, was a triumph of organization. Sir Archibald Murray said trulv that the issue of the campaign was " only rendered possible by strenuous and skilful preparations, which have overcome immense difficulties, and by first-class staff work." The Germans had counted much on provoking a rising in the Sudan. On May 8 Swiss papers published what purported to be a telegram from Constantinople saying that the Wolff Agency announced that the " Iman " of Darfur had proclaimed the Holy War against the English ; that he was marching north with his troops and 8,000 camels ; that he was driving back the English — who were in dis- orderly flight— and intended to join the Senussi. Later in the month, when Ali Dinar had been defeated, the fame statement was circulated all over the world by the German Wireless Agency. The Germans were loth to acknow- ledge the fiasco of Fasher. As in Western Egypt so in the Sudan, the approved German method of stirring up sedition among the Moslems tvnder the rule of the Allies had been tried and had failed Equally futile was the second attempt (in August, 1916) made by the Tvirks, under German inspiration, to invade Egypt by way of the Suez Canal. Britain's highway to India and her position in the Nile valley remained as secure as ever. CHAPTER CXLVI. THE INTERVENTION OF PORTUGAL. The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance — Loyalty to the Alliance in 1914 - The Causes of Delay — History of the Republic — Government Instability — The Factors of Internal Unrest- German Intrigues — The Madeira Concessions — Clericalism and Anti -Clericalism — Thic Monarchy' — Parties Under the Republic — The Question of Intervention in the War — Dr. Arriaga's Policy' as President — Political Strug(;les — Hesitaticns of British Diplo- M.\CY' — Expeditions to Angola and Mozambique — Ministerial Differences — General PiMENTA DE CaSTRO's GoVERNTVIENT ThE REVOLUTION OF M.W, 1915 — Dr. MaCHADO, PRESI- DENT — The Seizure of German Ships — German Declaration ok War. OX March 9, 1916, Dr. Rosen, the German ^Minister in Lisbon, called on the Portuguese Foreign ^linister, Dr. Augusto Scares, to intunate that the Imperial Government had declared war on Portugal. Next day, quietly, but with all the formalities of international courtesy, he left Lisbon. The Austrian ilinister. Baron von Kuhn, on March 15, demanded his pass- ports, and left the country. At a special session of the Congress, held on the 10th, the Prime Minister, Dr. Affonso Costa, had annoimced the resignation of his Government, to make way for the formation of a special national War Ministry, formed by the union of the two chief parties in the Parliament, the Democrats and the Evolutionists. The 16th saw the new Govermnent fonned, the Evolutionist leader. Dr. Antonio Jose d'Almeida becoming P'ime Minister and Dr. Affonso Costa, the Democratic chief, taking the office of Minister of Finance Dr. Augusto Soare.s remained at the Foreign Office. Dr. Brito Camacho, the L'nionist leader, elected to remain outside the Government, though pro- mising his support for the national policy. There was a great demonstration in Lisbon on the 26th in support of the Govermnent Vol. TX.— Part 113 . 321 policy. These tnents passed quietly and occasioned nothing of the general excitement which had characterized the outbreak of European hostilities in 1914. Yet the.se days will be memorable in Portuguese history. They fonn the complement of tlio.se spon- taneous affirmations of loyalty to the Alliance and to the Allies made in full Congress on August 7, and again on November 23, 1914. The declarations then made voiced the un- doubted wish of a large section of the Portu- guese nation that Portugal should take her place and part \iith the Entente Powers, as the historic ally of Great Britain and the devoted friend of France. Those declarations were first made in the dark opening days of the war. Belgium wa« llien slowly but doggedly falling back from her frontiers and her fortresses. They were repeated at the very time when Turkey was preparing to throw in her lot with the Central Empires. Portugal, indeed, first of all Europe declared clearly and unitedly for the Allies. Why ? First, without question, because under the old alliance between Portugal and England it was the natural course and policy to follow, although especially since the year 1890 Germany had persistently worked to ;}:>:> THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. PORTUGUESE INFANTRY DRILLING. supplant British interests in Portugal. Like Belgiiun, Portugal wished to live free and independent, and recognized in the British Alliance the surest external guarantee for her national independence and the security of her colonies. Secondly, because, as Republi- cans, the Portuguese saw in this occasion an unequalled opportunity for the establishment of the Republican regime on a firmer basis. To Republicans Germany, with her form of govermnent and policy, was naturally antagon- istic. Though the Central Empires only offi- cially declared war on March 9, 1916, the Republic from its first proclamation on October 5, 1910, had been engaged in a ceaseless struggle for its very existence with a con- federacy of com-ts and currents among which Berlin, Vienna, and Munich had a prominent place. Why, it may be asked, did not Germany declare war before, in view of Portugal's prompt and reiterated declarations of solidarity with Great Britain and the Allies ? First, because Portugal held far too valuable a pledge in pawn in the seventy odd German ships which, curiously enough, the outbreak of hostilities found at anchor in Portuguese ports, or which svibsequently sheltered there. Secondly, because the near neighboiu-hood of the German and Portuguese colonies in Africa made the neutrality, if not the friendship, of Portugal a consideration, the more that the failure of Germany's schemes for the rapid subjugation of Europe early compelled her to stand piu-ely on the defensive in South-West and East Africa. And thirdly, because, with- out doubt, Germany yet hoped, by the pro- longation of a state of dubiovis and dangerous indecision, by actively fomenting party strife and internal unrest, and even by revolution, to render active Portuguese help of the Allies impossible, or to produce the adoption of such a policy of neutrality as, with that of Spain, would have converted all the littoral of the Peninsula, together with the ports of Portu- guese West and East Africa, Madeira, the Azores, Cape Verde, and the Portuguese colonies of Portuguese India, Timor, and China, into so many landing stages and refuges for the Central Empires and cen' res for pro- German propaganda. But this was not to he. " Portugal," in the words of the British Minister in Lisbon, Sir Lancelot Carnegie, "showed herself in this crisis prepared to comply scrupulously with the very letter of her treaties, at whatever risk to herself." "Nor," he added, " wi's anyone be svu-prised at the fact." In view of he history of the two nations and the many and recent evidences of the friendshija subsisting THE TIMFS JIlSTOin' OF TIIF 11'.//?. 323 betweon them, it was, in truth, not to he wondered at. It is needless to retrace the history of the Anglo -Portuguese Alhance from i;}73 to the twentieth century. The world had changed indeed since Englishmen and Portuguese first fought side by side, in the days of the first Portuguese dynasty, to win Lisbon, and later Silves from the Moors, and since, in 1381, the first defensive expedition of English troops entered the Tagus. Many had been the changes since English archers joined with the Portuguese patriots who defended the stockade at Aljubarrota. But these changes liad not altered the real bases which underlay this oldest of international allirn^'es. These sub- sisted still, as they had suosisted 500 years before, in Portugal's long Atlantic seaboard and ports and in her wide and \-\ilnerable land frontiers. For Portugal prized her inde- I)end»>nce above all. Hence it was that she yet looked, as she had ever done, to England, her ally beyond the seas. Tlie relations between tlie two countries during the closing years of King Carlos's reign had been close and cordial. In 1899 Admiral Sir Harry Rawson had paid a sjjccial visit to Lisbon. In 1903 King Edward V'll. had been given a truly royal welcome by the people of Portugal on tlie occasion of his visit, and a similar reception was given by the British to King Carlos when soon afterwards he visited T.,ondon. Then had followed the visits of Qu(^en Alexandra, and later that of the Duke of Connaught and his daughters. The.se visits the Portuguese people had never forgotten. It may be recalled here that Mr. Lloyd George, WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY: OPERATORS AT WORK. 8-24 THI-: riMi':s history of the wah. Mr. Asquith and Mr. .MfK«'nna had all visited Lisbon witliiii recent years. Only in 1909 the young King, Manod, had visited and been welcomed in London. Thither he returned an exile in 1910. On the estjiblishment of the Republic on October u, 1910, the attitude of the Repvil)lican leaders liad been from the first frankly friendly. Dr. Bernardino Machado, the Foreign Minister of the Provisional (Jovernnient, had declared its wish that the British Alliance might be maintained intact, despite the change in regime, and the desire of the Government to do all in its power for the strengthening of tlic ties which united tlie two coiuitries. From the first these advances had been cordially met by Sir Francis Villiers. the then British Minister in Lisbon, who well knew the actual con- ditions of things in the country during the closing years of the Monarchy. Sir Arthiu' Hardinge, who succeeded him in October, 1911, after the first Monarchist incursion, had worked actively to foster Anglo-Portiiguese relations and in supi)ort and promotion of the British Chamber of Commerce in Portugal. The change of regime, however, as was natural, resulted in the slackening of many of those ties which liad hitherto united the two lands. There was much to explain this. The English are a conservative people : they respect tradition, as they respect belief. They were shocked, as was all Europe, by the assassination of King Carlos. They pitied, and rightly pitied, his son. They are a religious people. They heard of religion persecuted, and its ministers treated with scorn and bru- tality. They were indignant, and rightly indignant. They are a loyal and a magnani- mous people, and they heard of loyalty treated as a crime and jiunished by stern privation. They sympathized, and naturally sympathized, with the sufferers. Far from the amazing world of intrigue, of plot and counterplot, which made up for so long the under -history of this little land, and knowing little of the CcXuses that determined that vast war of clericals and anti-clericals which involved all Continental Europe and much of Latin America, the British publ;'"' 'or years watched Portugal with interest and concern, and sometimes with outspoken indignation. Meanwhile the young Republic, beset without and within, was fight- ing its uphill battle against odds of which the British public knew little. To vmderstand Portugal's war policy is not easy. It is impossible without some know- ledge of the history of the country during recent years. But before entering on this there are certain facts which require never to be forgotten. First of these is the condition of clironic governmental instability. A recognition of the enormous difficulties arising from this is essen- PORTUGAL BECOMES A REPUBLIC. The last Royalist cavalry in Vinhacs on their way to surrender to the Republican authorities. THE TIMn:b HISTORY OF THE WAB. 325 PROCLAIMING THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC IN LISBON, OCTOBER 5, 1910. The crowd listening to Republican leaders who are speaking at the Town Hall. tial to any judgment of the country, its policy, and its public men. Yet abroad this has often been forgotten. The condition was not new. It characterized the history of the entire country. Latterly, however, it had been ac- centuated. Thus from 1900 to 1910, diu-ing the last 10 years of the Monarchy, 10 govern- ments came and went. The Republic entered with the Revolution of October 5, 1910, and between 1910 and 1916 there had been alreadj^ 11 govermnents. Now, this perpetual change spells ruin for any regime or any country. It signifies weakness at home, and irresponsi- bility and uncertainty in the nation's policy abroad. This instability had its rise in the destruction of the old political balance maintained for majiy years by tlie two old organized political parties — the Progressistas and the Regenera- dors — which, while they monopolized all poli- tical power, constituted a sort of equipoise. Its immediate cause was traceable to the per- sistently obstructive action of dissentient groups which, powerless to govern, were yet able to make the Govermnent of either of the new and but imperfectly organized parties im- possible. This policy of systematized obstruc- tion, inside and outside Parliament, was adopted originally by rival monarchic groups within the Monarchy — which it destroyed. It was continued mider the Republic by these same groups, with a view either to the destruc- tion of the Republic or to the conquest of power. In this struggle these dissentients united with and worked largely through discontented Republican elements. Fiu-ther, both before the war and after its outbreak, this policy was systematically employed to weaken the regime, and to frustrate all attempts to define and strengthen the national policy — and this on behalf of Austria and Germanj' and Spain, as against Great Britain and France. It must 113-2 320 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. DR. BERNARDINO MAGHADO, President of the Republic. not be thought tliat these remarks apply to the Monarchist party as a whole, as there was a considerable section which, especially after the war broke out, either showed a friendly attitude to the Allies, or at any rate remained passive, v Portugal in the beginning of the century was sliding quietly and, as it seemed, con- tentedly, down to bankruptcy and ruin, and her Monarchy with her. King Carlos, a clever, educated, easy-going monarch, appeared to be either supremely oblivious or supremely care- less as to what the future might hold for either his country or his House. The iziternal political situation was summed up in the see-saw of the two great traditional parties, the Regeneradors (Conservatives), led by Senhor Hintze-Ribeiro, and the Progressistas (Liberals), under Senhor ]>uciano de Castro. These two partiCjS — the " Rotativos," as they came to be called — formed the cdimterpart of the old-world British Tories and \Miigs. They had for the most j)art little connexion with the cities, depending for their strength upon " the country," local electioneering interests, the official representa- tive of the Minister of the Interior for the time being, the old gentry, the illiterate voter, and the Church. Sepai'ated by little except party barriers, they were content alternately to enjoy the sweets of office. And so in a peace broken only by the squabbles of the various would-be successors to the leadership of the parties, the country drifted down towards the aby.«s. Republicanism was still little more than tlie platonic aspiration of professors and medical men, far removed, it then seemed, from the sphere of actual politics, while among the ))ro- fessional jmrty politicians of all schools the Afonarchy and the English Alliance were politi- cal dogmas universally aecej)ted. The only section inclined to look askance at England, despite Lord Salisbury's unforgotten " ulti- matum " to Germany, were the Republicans. They saw — and, as it then seemed, not without reason — in the continuance of the Briti.sh Alliance the prospect of a limitless continuance of the thousand ills and abuses \\ hich threatened the national life. It was the now-forgotten question of the renewal of the Tobacco Monopoly which heralded the downfall of the old order. This question was intimately connected \\ith the financial future of the coimtry, but passed almost im- noticed in England. It ended, after occasion- ing the fall of three Governments and five Ministers of Finance, in the dramatic defeat of Senhor Luciano de Castro, the split-up of his historic party (the Progressist), and the beginning of that period of faction-fighting and political anai-chy which led to the fall first of the parties and then of the Monarchy. -^ It was in March, 1906. that Senhor Luciano de Castro was defeated, owing to the defection of his right-hand man, Senhor Jose Maria Alpoim, and left his place of leader of the Cortes for ever. A Regenerador Government, under Senhor Hintze-Ribeiro, naturally fol- lowed. This party was even less prepared than its rival to cope with the difficulties of the moment. The Government entered on March 20. 1906. By May 18 it had fallen, its chief. ^^^^^^^K. , ^ ^^^^^^1 ^^^H.^^\ .^ j4,^^HH . ^j^iji^fllW ' JL ^^H J^^^ ^ \r ■« -^%Hlli^ DR. A. J. D'ALMEIDA, Prime Minister, 1915. THE TIMES HLSTORY OF THE WAIi. :i27 GENERAL PIMENTA DA CASTRO, The Progressist Leader. DR. BRITO CAMACHO, The Unionist Leader. DR. AUGIJSTOS HK VASCONCELLOS. Prime Minister, 1911. one of the finest orators and parliamentarians of his time, having left office — like his rival — never to return. The ruin of the great parties in Portugal had begun. The five years that followed saw the Progressist party reduced to impotence as the result of organized obstruc- tion, in which the Dissidents under Senhor Alpoim were the leading factor, while the Regeneradors fell into faction, and went down with the Monarchy, whicli their divisions did nuich to destroy. Even before this, during the Regenerador Government of 1904-1900, Germany and Ger- man official agents had made the attempt to secure pohtical influence, alike in the Court and in the Regenerador party, led by Senhor Hintze-Ribeiro. Thus it was during his Gov- ernment, in large measure tlirougli Court influence, and trading uj^on the well-known philanthropic character of the then Queen, Dona Amelia, that the famous Madeira Sana- torium Concession was granted to a German group, of whom Prince Ernst Hohenlohe was the head. Prince Hohenlohe, it should be remembered, was at this time head of the German Colonial Department. By this con- cession it was proposed to construct in Madeira a palace hotel and sanatoria for the special TABLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN PORTUGAL From 1900 to 1915. Senhor Hintze-Ribeiro. Senhor Luciano de Castro. Senhor Hintze-Ribeiro. Senhor Joao Franco. Senhor do Amaral. Senhor Campos Henriques. Senhor Sebastioa Telles. Senhor Wenceslau de Lima. Senhor Beirao. Senhor Teixeira de Sousa. The Revolutionary Provisional Government proclaimed. President : Senhor Theophilo Brag a. Senhor Joao Chagas. Senhor Augustos de V.\sconcellos. Senhor Duarte Leite. Senhor Affonso Costa. Senhor Bernardino Machado. Senhor Victor Hugo de Azevedo Coutinho. General Pimenta de Castro. Senhor Joao Chagas. Senhor Josi£ de C.\stro. Senhor Jose de Castro. Senhor Affonso Costa. Senhor Antonio Josi^ d'Almeida. Presidents. Dr. Arri.\g.a.. Senhor Theophilo Braga. Senhor Bernardino Mach.a.do. IflOO. June 25 1904. October 20 . 1906. March 19 . . 1908. May 18 February 4 . . December 25 1909. April 11 May 13 December 22 1910. June 26 October 5 . . 1911. September 3 November 12 1912. June 16 1913. 1914. January 9 . . February 8 . . December 12 1915. January 28 . . May 15 May 24 Jvme 15 November 29 1916. March 15 1911. 1915. August 24 . . May 29 August 6 828 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. treatuipnt of tuberculosis. The scheme was drafted on;a largo scale The Queen's interest was secured by clauses making provision for a certain niunber of beds for the poor and the appointment of the Cliief Court physician in con - iiexion with the scheme Influential Portuguese «>lements in Madeira and Lisbon were interested in it, and so rapid was the progress made that in less tlian six months the Portuguese local agent could write to Herr Hoffmann, one of the promoters in Berlin, "Madeira is quite in your hands," thanks to the " magic Sanatoria." Then came a liitch. A certain property adjoining the concession came into tlie market. ON BOARD A DESTROYER. , Hoisting the Republican Standard. Tt was bought up by an EngHshman, over the head of his German rivals. The German group fell back upon a somewhat ambiguously worded paragraph of the original deed of concession, and on their securing, through Prince Hohen- lohe, the support of the German Government, Portugal was surprised by a demand for the ex- propriation of the English owner, a reply being requested within a stipulated time-limit of so many hours. This " ultimatum " was at once sent on to England by the Portuguese Govern- ment of the day Germany as a result was given to understand, as later in the case of the French Congo, that, should she take her threatened action against the coimtry, force would be met by force. The result of British intervention was, for the moment, decisive. Germany withdrew her time limit and agreed to leave the matter to be settled by negotiation, and it was relegated to the lawyers until such' time as, on the assassination of King Carlos and the accession of King Manoel, Senhor Wen- c(;slau de Lima, the former Regenerador Foreign Minister, reassumed his post at the Foreign Office. The incident was, however, very far from being settled. What had originally been put forward as a combined commercial and philan- thropic scheme, and subsequently proved a grave political menace, had in 1908 become part of a comprehensive commercial policy. Senhor Wenceslau de Lima was no sooner in office again than there began to be outlined a series of concerted measures, ably planned and far-reaching in their effects, converting the original plan for the domination of Madeira into a systematic scheme for insuring German economic preponderance alike in the country and the colonies. Four years before, the reliance of responsible statesmen of all parties on the British Alliance as the base of all Portuguese foreign policy was \mquestioning and complete. That the reader may be enabled to understand how such a change of attitude in the governing classes could come about in so short a time it will be well rapidly to review the internal situation during these years, which witnessed the ruin of the old parties, the assassination of King Carlos and the Crown Prince, and the short and stormy reign of King Manoel. In 1906 the Progressist Government under Senhor Luciano de Castro, and the Regenerador under Senho • Hintze-Ribeiro, fell in rapid succession. The cause in both cases was the same — the separation from the two parties of dissident or dissentient groups, composed in each case of some of the most capable and influential men in their respective parties. The leader of the one group, which became known as the Dissidents, was Senhor Jose Maria Alpoim, of the other Senhor Joao Franco. The apple of discord in each case was the Ministry of the Interior, which carried with it, under the then conditions, the virtual reversion of the leadership of the party. These two chiefs were similarly placed as regards their political influence in their respective parties, and were both able and both ambitious, but here aU resemblance between them ends. Firing a torpedo. Circle picture: A torpedo ready for the tube. ON BOARD A PORTUGUESE DESTROYER. 329 330 THE TIMES HlSTUin' OF THE WAIl. ^ ^ jj^^LgJ^H L 1 f'ViA ^^^ /^-^-T^B ^^^^^^H ^ ^H lc' m J i ^ IB ^ l^ H^H ■ -A ^i^^^^^^^i ^^^v^ ^^^^1 If i ^^^^^^H ^1*' ^^V - > 1 It DR. ROSEN, German Minister in Lisbon from 1912 to 1916. The old Progressist Prime Minister, Senhor Luciano de Castro, though defeated in 1906, was very far from having lost his power. He was a really great parliamentary and party leader of the old school — a Portuguese Walpole. In- valided and confined to his room by gout, he continued to hold the real powers of govern- ment in his hands, working through his lieu- tenants, and checkmating both the Opposition and the Dissident group who had left hun. His genius prolonged and embittered the party rluel, \\-hich dragged on through the last years of the life of King Carlos and the short reign of liis son. The fall of Hintze-Ribeiro and the Regenera- dor party was far more rapid and complete than that of his rival. On his resignation on May 18, 1906, after only 60 days of power. King Carlos took the hazardous step of calling Jo*o Franco to succeed him. Senhor Joao Franco had left Hintze-Ribeiro, his former chief, in 1901, and in 1903 formed the nucleus of a new party — the Regenerador-Liberal. Bitterly opposed, he had none the less drawn around him a group of able and honest men. though he possessed no political organization such as could compare with those of the two historic parties. Called unexpt'ctedly to power, the new Minister entered upon an a|)parentiy inipcssible task, but faced the position at the; outset with courage, honesty and address. His success threatened the very existence of the old parties. The Ftory of how — as a result of the able, but bitter and un- scrupulous campaign, carried on against him in (he Press, the Parliament and the country, by the old parties. Dissidents and Republicans alike — after some months of useful work and an amazing struggle against his many enemies, he was forced from liberalism into repression, branded as the Dictator, and finally crushed by the simple but terrible expedient of the assassi- nation of the King, who had refused to abandon him, is one of the tragedies of constitutional history in Latin lands. When the time comes to do full justice to Jo3o Franco, it will be recognized that his brief government, despite its disastrous close, was the loyal attempt of an honest man to save his coiuitry, and the Monarchy with it, not by condoning and temporizing with abases, but by ending them. {Vatulyk SENHOR SOARES, Foreign Minister. THE TIMES HISIORY OF THE WAR. 331 VISIT OF BRITISH CRUISERS TO LISBON. Sir Lancelot Carnegie, British Minister in Lisbon, chatting with Admiral Yelverton. JoSio Franco fell, a'< did King Carlos, only because the official Monarchist jjarties refused to be saved by the extirpation of those vices which threatened at once the ruin of the nation, the Monarciiy and their own political power. Practically none of his legislative work was altered. The death of King Carlos affected Anglo- Portuguese relations most ^adversely. He, despite his German blood, had always shown himself a real friend of England and the British Alliance. An intelligent and able man, how- ever greatly his life might appear to belie the fact, he imderstood and sjmipathized in his easy-going way with the free institutions and the liberal trend of opinion which form the distinctive heritage of Great Britain and France. Indeed, it would seem that his calling of Jt ao Franco to power and his determined support of him were due in great part to a sincere wish to break with the corruptions of the former pseudo-constitutionalism by the introduction of a more honest administration "' d inglesa.'' Xow, side by side with this internal party struggle, a wider, deeper and far more potent international factor was introduced by the 832 THE TIMES IIISTOUY OF THE WAR. VISIT OF BRITISH CRUISERS TO LISBON. President Machado (1); Senhor Norton de Mattos (2), Minister of War; and Admiral Yelverton (3), in the Gardens of the Palace of Belem. growing bitterness of the war of clericals and ant i -clericals. King Carlos was no anti-clerical, but clerical he was not. It is notorious that the one great popular ovation of his public life was that called forth, in the words of the Secido, of August 17, 1914, " not by what King Carlos represented for the country, but by the hope which he constituted at that time of a change in processes with regard to Clericalism. King Carlos failed to follow such a course, and never again in his life was that demonstration repeated." The Queen, Dona Amelia, on the other hand, was a beota in the popular Portuguese accepta- tion of the word — an earnest, devout Catholic, we should say — but tm questionably wholly in the hands of the Church and the clergy. ' It was to her influence that the retiu-n of the Jesuits to Portugal under Hintze-Ribeiro was attributed, as also the growing numbers and strength of the foreign religious orders in the country. When King Carlos was dead, and in his place sat the young prince Manoel, retiring, imasser- tive, kindly and, like his mother, deeply religious, the whole tide of Court influence became intensely clerical, in utter opposition to the prevalent anti-clerical feeling of the capital and to many among his Ministers. Hence it was that, diu-ing those disastrous two years, it was the religious question, second only to that of party leadership, which dominated everything. Raised in 1909, by a question as to the right of the bishops to dismiss and to appoint teachers in the State schools without the intervention of the Government, and again in 1910 by a Papal order for the suspension of a periodical (an order given without consulta- tion with the Government, in contravention of the law), the anti-clerical feeling was intensified by the active part taken by the clergy in the elections of August, 1910. In little more than two years, the young King fornid himself forced to flee the country. The King and the Court were clerical to a degree. The Press and the cities were no less thoroughly anti -clerical, as was evidenced by the great demonstration in favour of the Bill for the civil registration of births, marriages and deaths which was held shortly before the Revolution. The King's Ministers in the six Governments which came and went during the crowded thirty months of his reign had many of them no vestige of sympathy with the declaredly clerical tone of the King and the Court. They were for the most part far more interested in the personal question of who in THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE IIJ/?. 333 tlicir respective parties was to succeed to tlio leadership in place of Hintze-Ribeiro or of Luciano de Castro, Personal disputes fur party precedence sum up well nigli the record of these six Governments. JJut from among them, short-lived, sterile and featureless as th(>v were, there is one which stands apart, taking rank, among all the 20 administrations wliic li have come and gone since 1900, as having done more towards changing the coiu-se of tlio national life and policy than any except tlio Republican Provisional Government. This Government, which lasted only some seven months, was that of Senhor Wenceslau de Lima. Short-lived as it was, it succeeded before it left power in carrying, through a well-nigh silent and complacent Chamber, three measures of capital importance, which served to give a fresh current to Portuguese colonial, commercial and foreign policy. And this policy may be said to have been " made in Germany." It was just after the Bosnian crisis in 1908, when, in Prince Biilow's striking phrase. Gennany had decided " to fling her sword into tlio scale," that Count Tattenbach came to Portugal. PrevioiLsly he had been in Morocco, and was the Minister cho.sen to represent the Em|)ire, and its new and definite war-j)repara- tion policy, at thcf Conference of Algeciras. When he came to Lisbon the Count found the Madeira Sanatorimn question still pending, and at once set to work to secure its settlement in such a manner as to ensure the maximum ot advantage to the concessionary group and to his Government. Varioits jjrc^posals were broached, among others that of a jjrivilcged lino of navigation from Lisbon to Madeira. These all gave place to the wider scheme of a pre- ferential Treaty of Commerce. Senhor Wenceslau de Lima had been Foreign Minister under Hintze-Ribeiro and was one of the leaders of the Regenerador party. He had large electioneering and conimercial interests in Oporto and the Xorth, particularly in the Oporto wine business. On the fall and subse- quent death of his chief, the leadership of the VISIT OF THE BRITISH CRUISERS TO LISBON. The head of the British Mission to Portugal on board the Portuguese Cruiser " Vasco Gama." 113—3 331 THI': riMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. party devolved tirst ii|)<)ii Senhor Julio de Vilhena, and later vi|)on Senhor Teixeira do Sousa. Neither seems to have been persona (jratn at tho Court. Senhor VVenceslau de Lpna, as the King's pubhshed letters clearly show, wa-i the one of all King Manoel's many Ministers whom he retilly trusted and for whom he evidenced genuine affection. It was the King's wish, as he himself wrote, to prepare his friend's succession to the leader- ship of the Conservative party. In the King's first Covornnient, that of Senhor Ferreira d'Amaral, Wenceslau de Lima appeared again as Foreign Minister. Under Hintze- Ribeiro, he had sought to inaugurate a series of treaties of commerce, with a view to the davelopment of the national trade. With this end he approached England, but his advances met with no response. He now turned to Germany. In Count Tattenbach he met with a ready coadjutor. In May 1909 he became Prime Minister. Before his Government fell, in December of the same year, there had been hurried through Parliament his new commercial prograiiune and these three measures — the Law of Sobre-Tax, the Madeira Sanatorium Settle- m3nt, and the Treaty of Commerce with Germany — were already law. By the law of Sobre-Tax the Government were empowered to apply a sliding tariff scale for facilitating commercial negotiation. The Madeira Sana- torium claims were settled by the payment to the German concessionaires of 1,200 contos of reis (some £240,000). By the Treaty of Com- merce preferential duties were conceded to Germany up to 33 per cent. Subsequently, in application, these differences in some cases attained as much as 2,000 per cent, as against British goods. These measures, involving fiscal and com- mercial changes of the utmost political impor- tance, were hurried almost without discussion through a dying Parliament, in the last days of the session. The Government fell, but its work remained. The direction of Portuguese trade had been definitely diverted from Great Britain to Germany, and only time was wanting to ensiu-e the political ciu-rent's setting the same way. Meanwhile the Monarchy, dependent as it was upon the warring fragments of the old parties for its existence, was with them tottering to its fall. Two of Senhor Luciano de Castro's former lieutenants, Senhores Campos Henriques and SebastiSo Telles, had already attempted unsuccessfully the task of government. A third, the veteran Senhor BeirSo, after some 20 days' conferring, succeeded in collecting a really promising Government, including many of the younger, better, and abler elements of -the old Progressist party. If anj' Government could' have saved the Monarchy, this might well have done it. But the Dissidents and the Opposition, who by their organized obstruction in the Chamber had already overthrown four Govern- ments in 22 n^onths, were relentless. Their obstruction led the Premier to ask for a dissolution. The young King refused, and by his refusal destroyed his only chance of weather- ing the storm. The " Block," of Regeneradors and Dissidents, tmder Senhor Teixeira de Sousa, entered office, powerless to secure a stable majority either in the Parliament or the country. The Progressist majority, bitterly resentful of the manner in which they had been expelled from power by the King's refusal of the dis- solution, which he had perforce granted to their rivals, when they had for the most part only a,ccepted office with reluctance and at consider- able sacrifice, now looked on with folded arms while Court and Crown were swept away in Revolution. Yet in those last days, before the crash, while the friends of the Monarchy, dimly conscious of impending ruin, were turning now hither, now thither, for support, there were begun certain noteworthy negotiations which were later to bear frviit. Before King Carlos's death, negotiations had been on foot for arranging as to the early marriage of his heir, .the Crown Prince. The tragic death of the latter and King Manoel's accession naturally resulted in directing atten- tion to the question of the succession. At the time of the young King's visit to England, in May of 1910, rumottrs had been rife as to a projected English marriage. But just as Senhor Wenceslau de Lima, disappointed in securing the support of Great Britain for his commercial schemes, had turned to Germany, so now did Senhor Jose de Azevedo Castello Branco, Foreign Minister of the new Regenera- dor-Dissident " Block," the last effort of the dying Monarchy, in the matter of the young King's marriage. Negotiations were already on foot for ensuring German support for the tottering throne when the Revolution of October 5, 1910, put an abrupt end to the Monarchy. The Monarchy fell, and the proclamation of the Republic on October 5, 1910, interrupted Marching through the streets of Lisbon. The Review at the Palace of Belem. BRITISH SAILORS IN PORTUGAL. 335 836 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY. Students presenting themselves to the authorities at Lisbon. those German schemes which would have meant the throwing of the poUtical, no less than the commercial, weight into the scale against the Entente Powers. The Provisional Government of the Republic was noteworthy in many ways. It represented much of what was strongest and soimdest in the new regime. Its work has met with much merited and unmerited criticism. But little allowance has in general been made for the difficult conditions with which it was called upon to deal. Called to reform where reform was much needed, it is accused of excess. This was to be expected. Its anti-clerical policy has been characterized as persecutioYi. It was, as were very many of the acts of this Government, primarily a measure of defence. For the truth is that, from the first week of its existence, the Republic never ceased to be attacked, not only by all those warring elements which by their rival ainbitions had destroyed the Monarchy, not only from within, but from abroad, by a circle of powerful interests of many kinds — clerical. Monarchical, financial, and international. Thus the Republic's first six years' existence were chequered by two armed incursions from over the Spanish frontier, necessitating the mobilization for months together of large military and naval forces, together with a series of industriously fomented internal risings, strikes, and threat- ened military movements, now in the capital and now in the country. The Republic's attitude toward the foreign religious orders, and more particularly the Jesuits, w'as inevit- able. These Orders, with rare exceptions, had entered by Court influence against the law of the land. Tlieir p<jlitical influence was great. Naturally, that influence was devoted to increasing the power of the Throne and of the Church. The clerical question, as has been seen, existed in acute form under the Monarchy. It was no creation of the Republic. In Portugal the decay of the national church resulted in the natural preponderance of the foreign orders. They, relying primarily upon the Court, were from the first the enemies of the Republic, and throughout the world have been its bitterest foes. Self-defence dictated the expulsion of the Orders in the first weeks of the Provisional Government. It is to be regretted that politics rather than policy should have stamped the Law for the Separa- tion of the Church, with which Dr. Affonso Costa followed it later on. Such a measure, involving the entire question of the relations of Church and State, together with the PORTUGUESE OFFICERS In training. THE TIMES HlSTOTiY OF THE WAIi 337 PORTUGUESE INFANTRY IN GAMP. subtle claims of the individual conscience, is one to tax the genius of any statesman. Cromwell, Napoleon, and Gladstone alike tried the task, with but partial success. It is certain that no measLire of the kind would have given content. To Affonso Costa's law, far more than to any deep love for the Monarchy, the Republic owed the second anned incursion, and very much of £he subsequent ojiposition which it inet. Three groups had already begun to take form in opinion, the Press, and the country, before the work of the Provisional Government came to a close, in 1911, with the election of the Congress and the first President, Senhor Manuel d'Arriaga. These three groups centred aroimd Dr. Affonso Costa, the leader of the Democrats ; Dr. Antonio Jose d' Almeida, chief of the Evolutionists ; and Dr. Brito Camacho, tiie head of the Unionists. These three parties, with a few Independents, under Senhor Machado Santos, one of the naval heroes of the Revolu- tion, and one or two Socialists, made up the Congress. This Congress of 1911 was frankly an " amateur " Parliament. From it, natur- ally, the old governing classes were, as a whole, excluded. From its successor, as from the regime, they with few exceptions held studiedly aloof. The first regularly constituted Republican Governments, those of Senhor Joao Chagas, Dr. Augustos de Vasconcellos, and Dr. Duarte Leite, represented only the temporary enforced union of these three groups in defence of the regime, before the organization of new poli- tical parties capable of governing. This \mion was imposed on the Republic by the Royalist incursions, which entered the country from Spain in 1911 and again in 1912. Both met with absolute defeat, as also did the third and " most serious and deeply laid " movement, that of October 21, 1913. This result was due, first, to the political instinct wliich imposed the union of all the groups of the Republic in its defence ; and, secondly, to the new organization of the army begun by Major Baretto, Minister of War in the Provisional Governiiient. Apart from defence, these three Governments are to be reniembered as having continued the honest work of Senhor Carlos Relvas, Minister of Finance of the Provisional Government . He and his successors. Dr. Duarte Leite, Dr. Sidonio Paes, and Senlior Antonio Vincente Ferreira, sought to place before the coimtry the real facts of the financial situation, bad as it was, especially as aggravated by the great expenses entailed by the enforced mobilization for months together of large forces for defence. Tlieir work was followed in January, 1913, 1/3 o < X c« C ai U u O Q 03 o z c/: O OS u > u K D O OS O 0^ 3:}S THE TIMKS HISTORY UF THE WAlt. 330 by that of Dr. Affonsci Costa. tFie Democratic- chief, who entered at the liead of the first organized party Government of the Republic. He found tlie Treasury burdened with an enor- mous debt, the result of the accumulated chronic deficits of a generation. He was liim- self faced by an estimated deficit of 9,000 contos (some £1,800,000). Assuming himself the post of Minister of Finance, he bent all the powers of the State to the task of converting this chronic deficit into a surplus. His adminis- tration during the six months from then to June marks a really great effort to deal with wliat had been the most pressing problem for the nation for 50 years. To have converted the chronic deficit of over a generation into even a problematic surplus was much indeed. His victory at the autinnn by-elections was a foregone conclusion. Hitherto he liad been loyally supported by the Unionists imder Dr. Brito Camacho, the Opposition being formed by the Evolutionists imder Dr. Antonio Jos6 d' Almeida, and the Independents imder Senhor INIachado Santos. ^Fucli hung upon these elections. A Democratic victory at the polls would render Dr. Affonso Costa inde- pendent in the lower Chamber, and would virtually decide the approaching General and Presidential elections, and mean the consequent indefinite exclusion of the Opposition from power. The Democratic victory proved to be a sweeping one, and the Unionists, indignant at the scant consideration shown them by their former allies, joined with the Opposition to force Costa's retirement. The cooperation of the two most capable heads of the Republic was at an end. IMeanwhile Dr. Bernardino Machado, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, and the Democratic candidate at the first Presidential election, had returned from Brazil, where he had repre- sented the Republic. To him was entrusted the task of forming an extra-party Govern- ment. This was in February, 1914. Less daring, decided, and rapid in action tlian Affonso Costa, he was possessed of imper- turbable courtesy, subtlety and patience, great powers of work and of persuasion. Costa made friends or enemies. Dr. Bernardino Machado was prepared to use either. He was as keen and polished as a Toledo blade, elastic and penetrating, if not strong. He was Prime ^linister when the war broke out. He soon became President of the Republic. The outbreak of hostilities in Kuropo thus found Portugal still a Republic, in spite of the numerous attempts to overt lirow the regime by force. Th&se ha<l differed considerably. The first incursion in 1911 had be*'n mainly to reinstate King Manocl. Tlie second was rather on behalf of the Church, and its authors were ilivided, some favouring Manoel, ami others Dom Miguel, the representative of the old Ab.solutist line, who had been living in Austria and was in close touch with the Au.strian Court. This party had continued to gather .strength through the influenc(> of the cU^rical pafty, who ever more whole-heart edly ailvocated German "discipline" and Aiustrian ab.solutisni in Church and State, in opposition to the free Parliamentary in.stitutiorLS of Great Britain and France. They were in close sympathy with the old Carlist — the modern Japiiist — party in Spain, the declared enemy of lotli France and England. The third and most dangerous movement against the Republic— that of October 21, 1913 — was in the main their work. Thus the long duel between clericals and anti- clericals continued, though its character hail changed. Victorious in arms, the Republic had now turned against it the same weapons as had served to wreck the Monarchy. Those self-same dissentient forces which by their campaign of intrigue and suggestion had suc- ceeded in destroying five out of the six (Jovern- ments of King Manoel, and had brought down the Monarcliy itself, were united to foment division among the different Republican groups. In the words of President Arriaga's book, " Na Primeira Presidencia da Republica Portuguesa," ". . . these differences were aggravated by the clever, disloyal and terrible war carried on by reactionaries of all kinds, and principally by the religious reaction, a war of all such as felt themselves wounded in their legitimate or illegitimate rights by the overthrow of the Monarchist r6giine.' This campaign bade fair to be successful. The Republic, which had resisted armed force and continual internal unrest, seemed likely in the beginning of 1914 to fall a victun to the bitter- ness of the contending parties. The Unionists had continued to gather strength during their alliance with the Democrats in 1913, under the patriotic leadersliip of Dr. Brito Camacho, who had nmde it his first aim to combat the Govern- mental instability which had proved the ruin of the ^lonarchy. The election of the autumn converted this party into the bitter foes of the 840 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. FULL SPEED AHEAD! A TORPEDO BOAT. Government. Fearless and able. Dr. Brito Camacho had the faine of a dour hater. He had shown loyalty in his alliance with Affonso Costa. The practical annihilation of his party in the elections was a wound which was not likely soon to heal. It already bore bitter fruit in the bloody Revolution of May 14, 1915. The junction of the Unionist and Evolutionist groups in January of 1914 forced Affonso Costa to retire, and thus it was in Portugal, as in Italy and in Sj^ain, that the Govern- ment called upon to decide the attitude of the nation with regard to the war was an avowedly temporary transitional body, in this case an extra-party aggregation, only called into power owing to the extraordinary rancour shown by the parties, for the purpose of " accalmation " and the conducting of the coming elections. The Government entered office irregularly. In its composition it was as irregular as in the circumstances attending its entrance into power. It consisted not alone of Republicans, but of both old Monarchists and Dissidents. The men composing it were, for the most part, non-party and vmques- tionably able men. No great evidence of division in the Cabinet marked its early months of power. With the outbreak of the war in Europe, there early became apparent the existence of two distinct currents of opinion in the Government, which did much to in- fluence not alone the actual policy of the nation, but the whole trend of feeling in the country. But, it may be asked. What has this to do with the war ? It has everything. Germany had been very busy in Portugal. The outbreak of hostilities came as a shock to all Europe. Yet in those early weeks of August and September which witnessed the invasion of Belgium, there existed a far less vivid realisation of what the war meant in the minds of the average Londoner than in Lisbon. The Englishman shaken out of his cherished peace, yet serenely certain that " we shall win," went quietly about his work — when he did not enlist — and left the necessary steps to be taken to the Government. The Portuguese, knowing well the unresting efforts of the Germans in his own land, as contrasted with the easy indifference of the British, gauged things differently. Great Britain never dreamed of involving other nations, and sought, if possible, to limit the area of the conflict. Portugal, like all the Peninsula, knew that this meant the beginning of a fight to a finish, and, remembering all her past THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAlL 841 history, counted on being called in, and that at once. Now Germany was prepared for this. Not only, as the result of bitter and carefully fomented party strife, was the Government flune; temjjorarily into the hands of a non- coloiu- mixed administration, but in those first days and weeks of the war the barracks were sown with anonymous leaflets against Por- tugal's participation in the \\ar, while it was sought to enlist officers, journalists, and politicians on behalf of a policy of neutrality. What, in this crisis, was the action of the Portuguese Government ? On August 4 Great Britain declared war. On August 7, at a specially convoked meeting of the Cortes, the whole Legislature, following the lead of the Prime Minister, declared for the unconditional support of the Allies, and passed, without one dissentient vote, a motion empowering the Government to maintain order in the country and to take such financial and economic measures as circumstances might demand. The motion, studiedly general and non- committal in tone, as drafted by the Prime Minister, Dr. Bernardino Machado, was ac- cepted vmanimously by an enthusiastic Cortes, as the preliminary step to a policy of active support of the Allies. The speakers, the leaders of all the parties, vied with each other in paying tributes to Great Britain and France. Great crowds marched cheering through the streets to demonstrate before the British, French, Russian, Belgian, and Serbian Lega- tions. The newspapers wrote for the most part with sympathy and many with enthusiasm. To understand what followed, it is necessary to know sometliing of the constitution of the Ministry. Portuguese politics during the first two years of war fall logically into two parts, coinciding with the Presidencies of Dr. Manuel d'Arriaga and Dr. Bernardino Machado, separated by the sanguinary episode of the Revolution of May 14, 191.1, and the brief Presidential interregnum under Dr. Theophilo Braga which followed it. The Government in power when the war broke out was that of Dr. Bernardino Machado. It was, as has been said, a mixed and an extra-party Ministry, its members being dra\\"n front outside either of the recognized parliamentary parties. It had entered on office in February, 1914, but six months before the war. It started as an administration of non-party politicians to maintain a governmental truce, as a Ministry of "conciliation," and to preside over tlie coming elections with impartiality. Its entrance was the direct result of the personal action of the then President. Dr. Arriaga, in conjimction with the Opposition. It wa'^ on .January 24, 1914, that the imion of the Unionists, under Dr. Brito Camacho, with the Evolutionist Opposition, in conjunc- tion with the action of the President, resulted in the resignation of the then Democratic Government of Dr. Affonso Costa. The junc- tion of Dr. Brito Camacho with the O|)position altered the whole political balaiK^e. Dr. Costa had held office since January, 1913, as chief of the first definitely party Govern- ment under the Republic. He had Ixen supported originally bj^ Dr. Brito Camacho, who had consistently supported the previous CJovemments with a view to preventing the continuance of that instability which htul destroyed the Monarchy. The sweeping victory of the Democrats in the November by-elections, coupled with the approach of the General and Presidential elections in 191;), converted him into the Govermiient's bitterest enemy. In the Provisiomil Government Dr. Brito Camacho had proved himself one of the most able men of the Republic. Resourceful, clear-headed, and fearless, his junction with the Opposition altered the whole pohtical balance. Able as Dr. AiTonso Costa's adminis- tration had vmquestionably been, from January to Jime of 1913, it had been thoroughly partisan in character. At the time of his resignation, on January 24, 1914, probably no man in Portugal — not even Joao Franco at the time of his fall — was better hated than was Dr. Affonso Costa. The Monarchists hated and feared him as their ablest enemy. The Chiu-ch hated him as being the man who had expelled the Jesuits and the Religious Orders, and carried through the law for the Separation of Church and State. The capitalist class feared the extension of his social pro- gramme. The Socialists and S\-ndicalists hated hhn for his forced repression of their centres in 1913. His Republican rivals feared his retention of power until the forthcoming General and Presidential elections as meaning their o\vn indefinite exclusion from office. Failing to overthrow the ^linistry in the Cortes, the Opposition now had recourse to the President, Dr. Arriaga. He, led by the vain hope of preventing a yet more serious struggle between the parties, and lured by the dream of » J A Mi THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WALL Z o > Q OS < U O z OS CeS < o z o N 3 o swurinfi; a real and pcrrnanont peace for Lis country, on January 24, 1914, wrote a circular letter to the leaders of the Government and tlie Op[JO.siti()n. In this letter he invited their co- optiration in the formation of a new-Ministry to carry out a special programme, which lie outlined. This aimed at a national pacifica- tion. Its main proposals were throe — a full political amnesty, the revision of the law for the Separation of the Church, and provision for the free conduct of an imbiassed General Election. By the political amnesty the Presi- dent hoped to satisfy the Monarchists, by the revision of the Law of Separation to content the Church, and by a non-party election to l>acify the Opposition. President Arriaga's aims, as set forth in this letter, were undoubtedly of the best. But thus to address an invitation to the leaders of the Opposition to cooperate for the carrying into effect of a personal Presidential programme, not only without the prior agreement of his Goverrmient, but, as in the present instance, against their express advice, was a most serious step to take. It was, as the Prime Minister, Dr. Affonso Costa, pointed out, an absolutely unconstitutional act. Together with certain sentences in the President's letter, it appeared to imply censure on the Govermnent. Dr. Costa, in view of the President's insistence on sending this letter in spite of his remonstrance, tendered his resignation and that of his Govern- ment. Thus it was that on February 10, 1914, Dr. Bernardino Machado, who had been entrusted by President Arriaga with the forma,- tion of an extra-party Government of ' ' con- ciliation," entered office. The new Government began well. On February 10 it took office. By February 23 it had passed a most ample political anxnesty, releasing at once all the Monarchist prisoners who had been arrested in connection with the inciu-sions of 1911, 1912, and the internal movements of the previous April and October. In the words of President Arriaga, in his book, " Na Primeira Presidencia da Republica Portu- gueza," already quoted : Some of the salutary effects of the change were already evident ; greater quiet was to be noted in pohtical debate, both within and without the ParHament. The famovis cordiality of the leader of the Governinsnt. which, not- withstanding the irony with which it has been referred to, can never be too great in a new-born regime where fresh social orders are called upon to take part in the public administration, had been clearly salutary. Then came the war. It has been seen that the decision of the THE TIMES HISTORY OF Till-: WAN. 343 PORTUGUESE MOTOR-TRANSPORT. whole Cortes, led by the Cioverrunent, was taken promptly. How, then, did it come about that not till IMarch, 1916, some twenty months later, did Germany — not Portugal — declare war and recall her Minister V How, too, despite reiterated offers of assistance to the Allies, first on August 7, 1914, later at a second specially convoked session of the Cortes on November 23, and again by the succeeding Government in December of the same year, had the Portuguese attitude re- mained so undecided as seemed to be the case ? First, because the unanimous vote of the Cortes on August 7, 1914, merely signified the general desire of all parties to secure themselves by declared adhesion to the tradi- tional policy of the British Alliance, while it tied no one to the acceptance of any definite line of action, all responsibility being dele- gated to the Government. The Prime ^linister's action in convoking the Cortes was an emi- nently political one. His attitude, deter- mined apparently no less by the internal situation than by considerations of foreign policy, carried with it the approval of the entire Cortes. Unanimous so far as the Republic was concerned, it awoke instant response abroad. The Monarchist leaders, recognising its importance, hastened to offer their personal support to the Government. King Man oel made ofier of his service to King George. The Prime Minister had scored. But the vmity which Dr. Bernardino Machado had apparently evoked on behalf of his pro- AlK' policy was not fated to continue. For the unity which marked the session of August 7 was but superficial, while the roots of division were deep. The political sentiment of the mas.s was pro-British, intellectually the sympathies of perhaps more were actively French — for all the Latin world had learned much of Franco. There the unity ended. The personal bitterness which separated the party leaders was real. Xo line of action which was suggested by one was likely to meet with common support. This the enemy well knew. The Prime ^linister knew well, also, the many currents among which he was called upon to steer. His speech was definitely pro-Ally. The motion he submitted to the vote was studiously non-committal and unprovocative, wliile con- ceding him full ])ower to act. Unquestionably his convocation of the Cortes was intended to arouse such sympathy at home and such a response abroad as should strengthen his hands. It was in a measure successful, as we have seen. The ciu-rent wjvs set definitely in the direction of active intervention on behalf of the Allies. Not on6 voice in the Parliament or the Press was then raised in contradiction. It must be remembered that this was still in the first week of the war. The attitude of Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, and Japan was already kno^vn. The action of the mass of lesser Eiu-opean nations still re- mained undecided. That policy of anibiguous neutrality which injured the Allies only le.ss than war had not yet crystallized into fact. 844 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY OFFICERS WATCHING GUN PRACTICE. Those manifold considerations of trade and material interest which were later to play so great a part in the decision had not yet made themselves felt. All the liberty -loving elements of the peoples in Italy, Spain, Holland, Den- mark, and the Balkans were clearly with the Allies. A lead was wanted, and a clear lead. But that lead did not come. The Allies, Great Britain above all, were militarily unprepared. Diplomatically they were yet more unprepared. It is certain that the crash found the moral sympathy of the world on their side — in part owing to that very fact. That proved to be a great factor. It would have proved infinitely greater had prompt decision grasped the immense value of the moment and of a clear issue. A really national response on the part of Great Britain and France to what was in truth a national lead would have meant much in Portugal and beyond it. Response there was, but tardy and unconvincing. The occasion passed. In Great Britain, as a whole, there existed no rudimentary idea of the vastness and thorough- ness of German preparation in other countries. Nor did politicians realize, in their insular ignorance, that Turkey, Greece, Spain, and the Balkans " mattered " ! Meanwhile, in Portugal, the Government did not content themselves with mere demon- strations. There was no contemporary publi- cation of the negotiations which took place between the two Governments, but everything would go to show that, though much may have been wanting, as was but natural, in the way of preparation and supplies, goodwill to .serve the Allies was not wanting, in spite of all Germany's years of work. The first practical evidence of this was the prompt signature on August 12 of the long- delayed Treaty of Commerce with Great Britain, which only came finally into force on September 23, 1916. The history of the Treaty is that of all British action in recent years. We have seen hew rapidly Germany secured the Treaty which in less than half a dozen years had \A'ell nigh secured her commercial and political predominance in both Portugal and Portuguese Africa. This she got because she knew what she wanted, a desideratum which has been often lacking when Great Britain has been concerned. On November 12, 1914,. a special Commercial Mission visited Great Britain to treat of means for increasing Anglo- Portuguese trade. This Mission owed its initiation to the action of the British Chamber THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAli. 345 of Commerce in Portugal, seconded hy the British Minister in Lisbon, Sir Lancelot Carnegie. Yet more significant was the (Jlovernment's prompt dispatch of niilitary expeditions to Angola and Mozambique. On August 7, the very day of tlie luianimous declaration in the Cortes, the British Imperial Government had telegraphed to General Botha, in reply to the South African Government's offer to release the garrison of loyal troops in the Dominion for service elsewhere. The Home Government then suggested that the occupation of " sucli parts of German South-West Africa as would give them the command of Swakopmund, Liideritzbucht , and the wireless stations there or in the interior," would be ^regarded as "a great and urgent Imperial service." This telegram was reinforced by a second on August 9 lu-ging the captiu-e also of the long-distance wireless station at Windhuk, "as of great importance," while recognising that these objects could " only be effected in reasonable time by a joint naval and military expedition up the coast." On August 10 General Botha telegraphed the decision of his Government to vmdertake a military expedition into German South-West Africa, in co-operation with the British Government. It was not till Septem- ber 9, however, that he publicly announced the decision of the South African Government to undertake this expedition, an announcement followed almost at once by tiie defection of Beyers and Maritz. Meanwhile, on August 17, the Portuguese Minister for the Colonies had demanded from the Minister of War troops for military expedi- tions to be sent to Angola and Mozambique — colonies adjoining German South-West and Cierman East Africa, and on September 11, only two days after the decision of the South African Government had been aimounced, the two expeditions sailed from Lisbon on board the Mozambique and the Durhani Castle. The expeditions were comfnandod by ;Major Rocadas and Major Anaorim, two Colonial officers of high standing. These first expeditions were rapiilly followed up by other forces. On October 1 3.30 infantry sailed on board the Africa to reinforce the garrison of Mossamedes. On October 20 telegrams re- ported an engagement with Gennan troops on the southern frontier of Angola. On the 2nth PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. :M(; THE TIMES niSTOllY OF THE 11.1/.'. [Elliott & Fry. SIR LANCELOT CARNEGIE, British Minister at Lisbon. a battalion of marines was placed at the disposal of the Colonial Office for service in Africa, sailing on November 5 on board the Beira, under the command of C^apt. Lieut. Coriolanus da Costa, for Angola. December 1 saw the first instalment of a further expedi- tionary force of mounted troops leave for Africa on board the Cabo Verde. On December 3 the tliird battalion of the 17th Infantry, with artillery, also left for Angola, on board the sicamslups Peninsula and Ambaca. On Decem- l)er 10 a further battalion of the 17th Infantry sailed on board the Africa, also for Angola. Dr. Bernardino Machado gave in his resignation and that of his Ministry to the President on December 5. On December 11 the Govern- ment left office. To this event it is certain that internal questions contributed, questions particularly connected with the relations of the two Houses of Parlianient and with the comuig elections. But behind these purely internal matters, deeper and more important than all thero remaintHl " tlie English question," and, in- timately connected with it, that of Portugal's participation or non -participation in the war. The truth is that, ever since the first outbreak of hostilities in Europe, this question had in reality dwarf (k1 all else, particularly after the originally decided action taken at the historic meeting of the Cortes on August 7. For that action was no less a direct challenge to Ger- many than a deliberate appeal to Great Britain. By placing themselves and the nation on the side of the Allies, the Government at once drew down upon themselves the unresting attacks of the entire pro-German section of Portuguese society. Everywhere Germany had a definite policy. No administration that had favoured her but had been supported, and had had its way made easier and smoother internally, and often more profitable externally. No administration, on the other hand, dared to favour the Allies but it found itself involved in a maze of internal and external difficulties — strikes, food riots, party rivalries assuming a bitterness and ex- tension beyond the normal. The raising of religious and sectarian questions was de- liberately and persistently employed by Ger- many in every part of Europe, and not least in Portugal. It is not surprising, then, that, in spite of the first unanimous vote, and even by reason of it, the Government early found themselves face to face with grave divisions alike in the country, the Cortes, and the Cabinet. It is clear that Dr. Bernardino Machado sought by the meeting of August 7 to obtain strength from the united support of the Cortes and the country in Portugal, and abroad from the countenance of the Allies. This fact is evident in almost every act of liis administra- tion. We see it in the enthusiastic receptions accorded to the officers of a British warship which paid an unexpected visit to Lisbon on September 28, 1914 — the first visit of the kind since the establishment of the Republic, as all Portugal was quick to observe. So, too, it is clear in the similarly hearty welcome given to the officers and crew of a French warsliip which entered the Tagus on October 4 to compliment the Republic on the anniversary of its institution ; and in the repeated de- monstrations on behalf of the Allies before the various legations. Most evident of all is it in the Premier's adoption and decided if Sappers preparing a trench. MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY: TRENCH CONSTRUCTION IN PORTUGAL, 347 348 THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. :^ MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY. Portuguese Cavalry fording a river. and persistent support of the Democratic policy, advocating the iinmediate dispatch of a special Portuguese contingent to take part with Great Britain and France in the European field of war. This proposal it was that very early gave rise to definite division among the three Re- publican parties in the Cabinet, and — as is evident from President Arriaga's book — be- tween the President and the Prime Minister themselves. However originally proposed, the suggestion was adopted by the Democrats, and, as is certain, by the Prime Minister. This gave rise to rapid and ever-widening differences with the other parties, the Ev-olu- tionists and the Unionists. All claimed to be alike pro-Ally. All announced themselves ready to respond to any lead from Great Britain. But Great Britain gave no obvious lead, and neither of them was prepared to accept that of Senhor Affonso Costa. By the uncertainty existing as to Great Britain's real wishes in the matter, way was opened for endless campaigns and recrimination, and the public feeling wliich had marked the original action of the Govern- ment was dangerously divided and damped, to the sole advantage of Germany. Sincere and disinterested partisans of the Allies, as were Dr. Brito Camacho and his colleagues of the Lucta, becanie the bitterest of opponents of active participation in the war, as forming the central feature of the Democratic pro- gramme. No party dared frankly to oppose any action taken ostensibly on behalf of Great Britain. All, therefore, concurred in .speaking and voting in favour of the Allies. But all the sections, Republican and Monarchist, sought to prevent their rivals from profiting by such support and to frustrate whatever action they might suggest. Thus, long before the three months that separated the passing of the two votes of August 7 and November 23, what had been, despite party differences, something like a national response to a really national lead on the part of the Government had been whittled down into a narrow and bitterly contested party issue. This was fiu'ther sub- ordinated to a multitude of wholly internal and party interests, of which the elections formed the principal. Meanwhile it became clear that the Cabinet was no more united than were the parties. The Prime Minister clearly leaned toward the full Democratic programme for Portugal's active intervention in the war. The Minister of Marine, Senhor Neuparth, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Freire d'Andrade, held that Portugal should await the invitation of her Ally. Thus the Prime Minister's speech on August 7 was for unreserved support of the British Alliance and of the Allies. On the 18th of the same month the Foreign Minister, in company with the Director-General of his Ministry and his Secretary, called personally at the Austrian Legation to compliment the Austrian Minister on the birthday ot the Emperor. Naturally the act provoked criti- cism, as did certain definite orders for luain- THE ■riMF.s UTSTOliY OF Till': MM/.'. :{!!» taininp; noutr.ility pivon by the .Minister of Marino and of the Colonies. Somewhat later a reference by the Foreign Muiister to " two friendly nations," made in reply to a special deputation whicii had visited him with jt collective message of protest against the bar- barities committed by the Germans in Belgium, occasidned even greater offence. This was the greater seeing that without question Colonel Freire d'Andrade was one of the strong men of the Government. His original entrance into the Cabinet had occa- sioned much bitter criticism on the part of the Monarchists, and not a little talk in other circles. It had added much to the prest ige of the Govermnent, for in colonial circles Freire d'Andrade's position was unique. Diu-ing his long-continued term of ofTHce in Africa, as Governor of Lorenzo Marques and later of Mozambique, he had secured the trust of tlie Colony and the Home Government. So much was this the case that, though appointed by Joao Franco in 190G, on the fall of his Govern- ment he had been continued in oflHce through all the six Governments of King Manoel's reign and after the Revolution retained bv the Republic. He had been the negotiator of the Treaty with the South African I'nion. an<l wok held to be British in sympathy. He had won a re|)utalion as a successful colonial adminis- trator, not alone in Portugal, but in bt)th liritish and German colonial circles. The Colonies were also strongly represented in the person of Senhor Lisboa de Lima. The action of the Foreign Minister did miu-h to give colour to the rumours, diligciuly spreiul abroiul, tluit, far from supporting J'ortugal in an attitude of belligerency. Great Britain had from the first favoured her maintaining a policy of neutrality. Tiie question was directly raised by Lieut. Leotte de Rego, a prominent naval f)flicer and one of the leading s])irits in the Revolution of May 14, who, in a series of outspoken articles in the Press, followed by |)uhlic aldresses, con- tinued to urge the Government to adopt a clear and active policy in support of the Allies, and the .sending of a force to France. First cen- sured, he was later imprisoned, by order of the Minister of Marine, for iireaeh of disci|)line. In his imprisonment, as in his projjaganda, he received no support from British circles, which continued to hold themselves as far a-; possible PORTUGUESE CAVALRY NEAR THE TAGUS. 350 77/7-; 77.y/;.s history of the war. PAY-DAY IN THE ARMY. aloof from association with Portuguese political parties. It was during this Government that the proposals for the formation of a Portuguese contingent to assist the Allies in France took definite form. As early as August this had been foreshadowed in the Press. Senhor Jo^o Chagas, the Portuguese Minister in Paris, was credited with being their active advocate. On October 1 an unofficial notice in the Seculo stated that requests for artillery had been received from Great Britain. This the Minister of War, a thorough soldier, objected to sending, except with their complement of men. This had led to the request for the dispatch of a regular force of all arms, which the Government took immediate steps to furnish. Orders for the mobilization were published. On October 1 8 a special Military Mission sailed for England to confer with Lord Kitchener as to the action to be taken. Decrees nominating the Commandant and Staff and fixing the composition of the force had been issued, and on October 19 the Portuguese Minister in Madrid, as the result of telegraphic instructions from Lisbon, had duly intimated to the Spanish Goverrmient Por- tugal's entrance on belligerency, when, on the night of October 20, Monarchist risings in Mafra and other parts of the country occurred. The railway and the telegraphic lines were interrupted and the mobilization was brought temporarily to a standstill. The risings proved absolutely abort i\o, though the interruptions occasioned in Nurioiis parts of the country in evident collusion pointed to a widespread conspiracy. Those directly implicated were in several cases Monarchist conspirators connected with the incursions of 1911, 1912, and the rising of October 23, 1913, among them figuring certain of those only amnestied by this same Government on February 23. Though interrupted in their preparations, the Government, far from desisting, on Novem- ber 23 convoked a second special session of the Cortes, to hear read the definite invitation of Great Britain for Portugal to take part with her in the war. Hitherto it had been generally imderstood that, while France was ready and anxious for Portugal's active cooperation. Great Britain doubted its immediate ex- pediency. That objection was now to be re- moved. A clear call, as later in the case for the utilization of the German ships, would have done much to sweep away opposition and to strengthen the pro-British section of the Republican party for its difficult task. The courteous, but subdued and somewhat ambiguously worded, message was again received with favourable speeches and a unani- mous vote, but the enthusiasm that had characterized the original session had gone, and the vote gave little real strength to the Govern- ment. Orders were published next day for the mobilization of a new division. Again its com- position had been determined and the command decided on, when renewed difficulty in the Chamber and, as it would seem, divergence of views in the Cabinet and with the President led Dr. Bernardino Machado, on December 5, to hand in his resignation. That he in no way drew back from the policy which he had maintained, despite the temporary nature of his Government and the divisions in the Cortes and the Cabinet, is evidenced by the publication on December 7, 1914, of an Army Order of November 23, not only appointing the Com- mandant and Staff for the new Division, but even providing for such details as the identifica- tion discs to be worn by the troops to serve in Europe. So for the second time were the plans for the participation of a Portuguese con- tingent in the war frustrated. On the fall of the Government of Dr. Bernardino Machado all semblance of truce between the parties came to an end. The new Government, under the leadership of Senhor THK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. 851 Victor Hugo de Azevedo Coutinho, the former I'rcsident of the Chamber, was distinr-tly Dejuocratic. On its first presentation to th( Cortes, both the Prime Minister and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Augusto Soares, stated the central feature of their poHcy to be the integral fulfilment of those pledges for active support of the AUies understood to have been given to the nation on August 7 and Novem- ber 23. A message given by these IMinisters at this tune ran : The President and Government of the Republic : The programme of the present Government, as laid before Congress, is essentially national and non-political, consisting of three principal points : First, the firm and efficacious defence of the realm ; secondly, the resolve to carry out the mandate accorded by Parliament on November l.i, regarding our participation in the war in Europe and wherever else we may be called upon to <lefend our territories, or fulfil our duties, according to the conditions of our alliance with England ; thirdly, the holding of general elections as soon as possible. Taking into consideration the present financial crisis, it is noticeable that the financial situation of the country calls for no new taxation, the Government having been able hitherto, without a loan, to face the enormous oxpenses imposed by inevitable necessities. At the present moment, grave for all countries, party politics have been abandoned by the members of the present Cabinet, who accepted office not to satisfy narrow ambitions but loyally to serve the nation. The Govern- ment, inspired by pure Republican faith, hopes to deserve the sympathy and approval of all who desire that the nation under the Republic should now resolutely enter on the lines of order, labour and progress, thus strengthening our internal situation and attracting the goodwill of all nations. Dr. Soares, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, said : The principal aim of the present Government consists in the loyal fulfilment of the Anglo- Portuguese Treaty. That action in this matter, which is considered of the strongoMt and most intOHHe interont and which corn.'HponiU with the sentiment of the Portuguese |K>opl(>. hIkjuM nut te diverted by sectarian questions of internal politics. The Domocrutic Party from which the present Covern- mcnt Wits formed sought by all means the fonnation of a Coalition Cabinet, in which all partieti should »je represented, and only agreed to a.Hsume office when all attempts to form a Coalition Cabinet failed. 'Ihe present Government, however, immediately bound themselves to put aside all reforms and project.s of a politic:il nature irdiorent in its i)arty programme, in order to realize only those mentioned in the Government programme, and tliis will be carried out. Jiut the (Jovenunent was met with hostile demonstrations from its first entrance by tlie entire Oppo.sition. The ten.sion rapidly in- creased. On December 15 the Evolutionists, Unionists and Independents abamloned the Chamber. On the 18th the Unionists col- lectively renounced their seats. News meanwhile arrived of open hostilities in Africa. Before the end of December it was known that, on the 18th, tlu; Portuguese expedition to Angola, under Major Rocadas, had been engaged by a much larger and better equipped German force at Naulila, on the frontier of Portuguese Angola. There had been a foiu'-hours battle, and the Portuguese general had been obliged to retire after con- siderable losses on both sides in killed and wounded, leaving prisoners in the hands of the Germans. A charge by the Portugue.se colonial dragoons, which had suffered much in consequence, had averted complete disaster. Their commanding officer, Lieut. Aragon, was said at first to have been killed ; later he was foimd to have been woimded and made prisoner. INSPECTION OF PORTUGUESE TROOPS. X u < u H D O z o ;x H z < Z en n o H ati O 352 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 858 He was subsequently released by the British forces under General Botha, and returned home in the following August This encounter, like that with Ceueral Grant's column at Sandfontein, proved the Germans to be well prepared in South-West Africa, and in far larger number than had at first been believed. The revolt of Beyers and Maritz had obliged General Botha to put off immediate action in German South-West Africa while he crushed the rebellion. Not till January was he enabled to return to deal with Damaraland. It was during this interval, and when it was certain that Portugal purposed the early dispatch of a division to the European front, that this blow was dealt her in Africa. Major Rocadas, though outnumbered and out-weighted in artillery, had been able to retire with the main force under his command. The natives were incited to revolt, however, encouraged by his repulse. At home the Government hurried on the dispatch of other troops. In Portugal, on January 15, at the Presi- dential palace at Bolem, a meeting of extra- ordinary importance was held. President Arriaga devoted two chapters of his book to it. These chapters are vital to any under- standing of Portugal's policy in the war. The first is the report of an extra-Cabinet Council convoked by President Arriaga to treat of questions connected with the war. There were present the Prime Minister, the Ministers for War, Foreign AfTairs, and the Colonies, together with Dr. Affonso Costa, Dr. Bernardino Machado and Dr. Augustos de Vasconcellos, as former Prime Ministers. The two chiefs of the Opposition, Dr. Brito Camacho and Dr. Antonio Jose d' Almeida, were invited. Neither came, though both sent letters. Dr. Brito Camacho's letter was solely occupied with the internal question. While assurmg the President tliat the Government must count on his attack in all fields, as constituting the one supreme danger to the country, he offered the President his own services and those of his party. Dr. Antonio Jose d'Almeida's letter was not published. The conference, as reported, tm-ned almost solely on the war. In the words of the Presi- dent : " We wished to hear certain of the leading men of our country, both immediately connected and vuiconnected with politics, upon this matter, in \new of the complications which it might involve us in, as the allies of England and friends of two belligerent nations." The President then put two (piestinns to the Council : First, should England call upon us to comply with the und<'rtakings wliich we hjvd contracted with her, would tlie country be able to satisfy militarily the obligations a-ssumed, knowing as they did the poverty of our military resources ? Secondly, ho considered it cowardice to a))andon the place he held ; but it was too much for hun to witness the squabbles of rival jioliticians. Porttigiu'so belligerency being declared, could he coimt upon the cooperation of all in the supreme effort which would be required of the nation to do itself honour ? From the replies it was inferred that, with regard to armament, munitions, and military preparation, everything was wanting, in conse- quence of the expeditions to Africa. The Minister of War trusted tliat " by the end of April and beginning of May (1915), everything would be prepared to respond to the call of England." Dr. Augustos de \'as- concellos (the Portuguese ^linister in Spain, who had come from Madrid) declared it was " his sincere and profoimd opinion that by reason of our expeditions to Africa, however great might be the good will and competence of all the ministers, it would be completely impossible to send any forces to Eurojie. He therefore asked whether it would not be preferable to direct our diplomatic action in such a way that, in accord with England, we might relieve ourselves of obligations with which we could not comply." In reply to the insistence of the President, Dr. \'ascon- cellos further stated that he had received telegraphic orders from the preceding Govern- ment (that of Dr. Bernardino Macliado) to notify to Spain the fact of Portugal's belli- gerency, and that he had done so. Dr. Machado here is reported to have said that there was an error as to such instructions having been given, there having been intended only a notification that I'ortugal was on the way to belligerency. In view of the facts as previously stated, it would appear clear that in October, when the instructions were given, the Government had definitely counted on assiuning an attitude of belligerency, which the Monarchist risings of October 23 forced them to postpone. Most really noteworthy of the declarations, however, were those of Dr. Bernardino Machado ;};V1 TlIK TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ixnd Drs. AlTonso Costa snul Aupusto Soares, us definitely stutiiifi tlie real policy of both the existing Government and its predecessor, as to which much doubt had been felt and expressed on all hands. These declarations, us made in confidence in a private Cabinet Council, and now recorded, not by a partisan of such policy, but rather, as it would appear, a critic, have added value. Dr. Bernardino Machado stated : From the very beginning lie lield that we should not alone render such s^ervico as might be asked of us, con- stituting thus a species of vassalage, but that our duty and our dignity lay in taking our stand beside England, lis expressed in the foruiula presented to Parliament. He wished thus that by our attitude it should be clearly seen that wo formed a nation by cooperation with which Kn;iland might honour \is. The declarations of Drs. Affonso Costa and Augusto Soares, with which Dr. Bernardino Machado expressed his agreement, were handed in in writing, and were characteristically explicit. They ran : 1. That it was well for the Republic to commit itself \ohuitarily to take part in the European war on the side of England. 2. That they should prepare the material which might be considered indispensable, in order that the Portuguese Division start immediately after being called upon, negotiating through the Minister of Foreign Affairs that this call should be made for the first moment in which we might be prepared, and, if it were possible, by the next summer (1915). 3. That belligerency should only be declared in perfect accord with England, without imperilling, however, our free and energetic action in Angola. 4. That the day of our departure for the war in Europe being decided, we might and ought to constitute a National Government, with the end of ensuring the perfect union of all good Portuguese until the Treaty of Peace ; meanwhile the approaching elections, presided over by the existing Government, might aid this end; by PORTUGUESE TROOPS FOR EAST AFRICA. The embarkation at Lisbon. Top picture : Leaving the Harbour. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 355 PORTUGUESE TROOPS. Leaving Lisbon to join the East African Forces in Mozambique. conceding; to each political power its legitimate representation. 5. That for tliis purpose and end, the Portuguese liepublican Party was ready to postpone or suppress all and every political contest, even those in which it occupied a merely defensive position. At the first appeal we were ready to sacrifice all — without reserves or exceptions — for the country and the Republic. Lisbon, January. 1915. Affonso Costa. President Arriaga's comment is : " Our patriotic idea resulted in a new ministerial crisis. With sorrow we record the fact." This may be so. It is none the less true that in just eight days' time, without waiting to receive the Ministry's resignation, he had himself, by letter, on the night of January 23, handed over absolute and exclusive power to his personal friend. General Pimenta de Castro, and all idea of Portuguese military cooperation with the Allies was for the time at an end. It has been seen that the Democratic policy, as set out by its responsible chiefs, was that of active intervention in the war. The attitude of the Government on this matter was clear. Meanwhile, difficulties were being actively fomented in the army, and on January 19 the^e came to a head. In consequence of an alleged vexatious transference of an officer from Lisbon to the country, a movement of protest was concerted among the army officers, where the Opposition counted many adherents. The Minister of War refused to reconsider the matter, and a delegation of officers set out from the barracks facing the official residence of the President to lay it before him. The Government, anticipating this, intervened, and placed the officers imder arrest on board the fleet. More than sixty of their comrades handed up their swords in consequence, and in like manner were placed in custody. This took place on January 19 and 20. On the 20th the new expedition to Africa sailed. But rumours of risings among the troops and in the city were rife, when on January 2.3 there was published in the daily Press an official note, stating that "the Chief of State was detenjiined to hear, in addition to the chiefs of the militant parties, other persons of eminence, to establish V •■■ J s k> • "■ n ^ Q- s) «S 13 . "S o E-S < 5 . o q" u .- ., m»m t; '-« 3 .. •-5 u - o O c j: o "S .S >fc « . u « 4i S ^U 03 *- O ■5 e 4> tta :§< OQ vd J3 ^ S •—4 u C/3 t •• 'w X u ^-s < s-e % -a: (0 IS 2 u 3 rton de or Perei z «: u Ji a< OS u t« <i: c u c« ^ u 3 j: CD •~ c U •- 0: en 3 ;2 3 ^ w H C <M Ctf Foreig ident a. X H CD - CD •a u a .a .C u c « c^S • ■> • Jo 4-* « •- u la 3 «> T3 •- "1 <«* ^ .s '^ 4-* ^ b « S'- 2 S l- 4-1 TJ (O :2::s .2^ 3 -o o* c CO ca -> u ^ 2 « ■Sis C/) S 356 THE TIMES HI.sTOh'Y OF THE WAR. 357 up()?i solid imd patriotic bases the decision to he foine to." In consequence of this note, puh- lished as it was without consultation or accord witii the Government in the early hours of January 24, the Prime Minister, by letter, pre- sented the resignation of the Ministry A few hour-! later, at half-past six in the morning of the 24th, the Prune Minister and the Minister of the Interior waited on the President, at the Palace, to ask for the suspension of the guaran- t<>es, and the placing of the city under martial law. They met with refusal. On the evening of the 23rd the President had by letter lianded over all powers to General Pimenta de Castro. Summoned to the Palace, the President there and then signed the decrees dismissing his Government, and conferring all the posts in the outgomg Ministry upon General de Castro. His letter ot the previous night contained two sug- gestions with regard to the new ^linistry to be formed. These referred to the posts of Minister of the Interior and Minister of Foreign Affairs. For the former, a decisive factor in the ap- proaching elections, he indicated General Pimenta de Castro himself ; for the latter, Major Freire d'Andrade, the recognized leader of the neutralist section in the Cabinet of Dr. Ber- nardino Machado. Thus for the second time had the President by his personal action swept aside a constitu- tionally indicated Democratic Government, at the desire of his personal friends among the Opposition, while he persisted in ignoring the repeated offers of the Unionist leader. Dr. Brito Camacho, as contained in a second letter, of January 24. This second flagrant abuse of power, though committed, as the former, with the best of intentions, was destined to have terrible results. The President's book leaves no possibility of doubt that the question of Portugal's participa- tion or non-participation in the war lay at the root of his differences with his successive ministries. " A capital fact," he states, " one of supreme importance, was the antagonism of the Democratic party to oiir intervention as Chief of State in the grave matters which were being prepared with regard to the war. from which resulted, as will later be seen, the fall of ths Ministrv of Senhor Azevedo Coutinho." There lay, behind mere party hatred, internal disorders and a world ot other pretexts, the real causes of the rapid fall of the Ministry and the substitution for it, not of a responsible Opposi- tion Government, but of an absolutely luiconsti- DR AFFONSO COSTA. ' Windy}!. tutiona! and militarily imposed dictatorship. For Dr. Camacho, however violent in hi.-: opposi- tion to the Democrats and their policy, was beyond question in his sympathies sincerely with the Allies, while General de Castro was not. General Pimenta de Castro entered office, chosen by the officers of the Harrison of Lisbon and by the President, to pacity the country internally, to maintain, as it would seem, " neutrality "' abroad, and to carry into effect that personal Presidential programme which the Ministry of Dr. Bernardino Machado had l?ft but m outline. One hundreil and ten day;? he continued in power. The most contradic- tory opinions have been held as to his use of it. As to one thing alone are all, his supporters and opponents, agreed, aiul that is his absolute ftiilure for the end for which he entered office — as a pacifier. When revolution broke on the morning of May 14, he was foimd to be unsupported, not alone by the Unionists, the na\y, and the city. 358 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 359 but by the very army on which he wliolly counted. The revohition proved short but bloody, when compared with tliat of October 5, 1910. One thing unquestionably the move- ment demonstrated — the continued devotion of the people, the fleet, and the rank and file of the army to the Republic, however strongly influential elements among the higher ofhcer><, the higher commerce, and the bureaucracy might lean toward the old regime. With regard to the influence of General Pimenta de Castro on Portugal's policy in the war there can be no question. He ostensibly favoured " neutrality." His strong personal sympathy with Germany and German methods and his admiration of the Kaiser are placed in lii"^ defence — an extraordinary book was printed in 1915, quite unnecessarily, as it would seem, at Weimar— in direct and intentional contrast with the bitterness and antipathy with which he invariably referred to Great Britain. He entered office on January 23. On the previous December 18 the battle of Naulila had been fought. Portuguese prisoners of war remained in German hands. On .January 17 he himself, acting as his own pro- visional Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent his aide de camp to offer congratulations at the German Legation on the birthday of the Emperor. Asked by the British Minister to continue the furnishing of armament, as arranged with the preceding Governments, he bluntly refused. To this refusal he attributed not a few of his difficulties. Not the least striking feature of these hundred odd da\s was the enthusiastic support and the high praise bestowed upon the General by the British Press. At three o'clock on the morning of May 14, 1915, guns from the fleet gave the signal of revolt. At midday the General telephoned to friends from the Quartel General that the military had the revolution well in hand. He was absolutely mistaken. The force of the movement was in the fleet. Its soul there was Lieut. Leotte de Rego. Before the afternoon, it became clear that the Revolutionaries had with them, not the fleet alone, but the civil element in the city and the mass of the army. The dismissal of the Government was insisted upon by the Revolutionaries. The General, all being clearly lost, sent in his resignation to the President, indicating the readiness of the Evolutionist chief, Dr. Antonio d' Almeida, to accept office, and enclosing a letter from Dr. Hrito farnacho in which, in the name of hi>» party, he declared : " I neither wisli for p<)w«T, nor participation in it. I shall accept whatevi-r you may do with a view to ending rapidly, without the shedding of more blood, the fratri- cidal struggle that is taking place in Lisbon." The Revolution was at an end. Senhor Joao C'hauas had b;-en the I'ortugupse Minister at Paris. T<j him had been attributt-d the original jjropo.-al for Portugal's active participation m tlie war. No man had done more to ensure this. Sumnaoned from Pari.s to take over the Government, he was on the way when one of the leading Evolutionist DR. MACHADO. President of the Republic, entering the Parliament House in order to be present at the reading of Germany's declaration of war. Senators entered the railway compartment and shot him. He was not killed, but his leadership of the Government was rendered impossible. A temporary administration en- tered under Dr. Jose de Castro. This Govern- ment conducted the Elections, which resulted in the victory of the Democrats. Dr. Theo- philo Braga, the President of the Provisional Government, temporarily assumed the place of President Arriaga, who had resigned his post. The Presidential election in August resulted in the appointment of Dr. Bernardino Machado. On November 29, 1915, Dr. Affonso Costa, who had been invalided for months in conse- quence of a serious accident, returned to power, and active preparations began once 860 THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. more to be made for Portugal's active inter- vention in the war. Tilt' break with (Jennany came, as was seen at the beginning of this chapter, in March, 1910. Its immediate occasion was the seizure of the German ships in Portuguese ports. On February 28. 1916, the German steamers in the Tagus were seized, and Germany addressed a sharp note of protest to the Portuguese Government, which explained that it was necessary to effect the seizures wholesale, in order to forestall expected acts of sabotage by the Germans and their agents. On March 3 the Portuguese authorities took over four interned German steamers at Madeira. On March 9 came the German declaration of war. It was acconipanied by the following verbose memorandum : Since the outbreak of the war the Portuguese Govern- ment, by actions which are in conflict with her neutraUty, has supported the enemies of the German Empire. The British troops have been allowed four times to march through Mozambique. The coahng of German ships was forbidden. The extensive sojourn of British war vessels in Portuguese ports, which is also in conflict with the laws of neutrality, was allowed ; Great Britain was also permitted to use Madeira as a point d'appui for her Fleet. Guns and materials of war were sold to Entente Powers, and even a destroyer was sold to Great Britain. German cables were interrupted, the archives of the Imperial Vice-Consul in Mossamedes were seized, and expeditions sent to Africa were described as directed against Germany. At the frontier of German South- VVest Africa and Angola the German district com- mander and two officers and men were tricked into visiting Naulila, and on October 19, 1915, were declared to be under arrest. When they tried to escape arrest they were shot at and forcibly taken prisoners. During the course of the war the Portuguese Press and I'arliament have been more or less openly encouraged by the Portuguese Government to indulge in gross insults on the German people. We repeatedly protested against the.se incidents in every individiial case, lUid made most serious representations. We held tim Portuguese Government responsible for all consequences, but no remedy was afforded us. The Imperial Government, in forbearing appreciation of Portunal's diHicult position, has hitherto avoided taking more serious steps in connexion with the attitude of the Portuguese Government. On February 23 I lie German vessels in Portuguese ports were seized and occupied by the military. On our protest, the Por- tuguese Government declined to go back from these forcible measures, and tried to justify them by illegal (geaetzwidrig) interpretations of existing treaties. These interpretations appeared to the German Government to be empty evasions. It is a fact that the Portuguese Government seized a number of Genniin vessels out of proportion to what was necessary for meeting the shortage of Portugal's tonnage, and that the Govern- ment did not attempt even once to come to an under- standing with the German shipowners, either directly or through the mediation of the German Govemn.cnt. The whole procedure of the Portuguese Government, therefore, represents a serious violation of existing laws and treaties. The Portuguese Government by this procedure openly showed that it regards itself as the vassal of Great Britain; which subordinates all other considerations to British interests and wishes. Furthermore, the Portuguese Government effected the seizure of the vessels in a manner in which the intention to provoke Germany cannot fail to be seen ; the German flag was hauled down in the German vessels, and the Portuguese flag with a war pennon was hoisted, and the flagship of the Admiral fired a salute. The Imperial Government sees itself obliged to draw the necessary conclusions from the attitude of the Portuguese Government. It regards itself from now onward in a state of war with the Portuguese Govern- ment. This document was obviously composed mainly for home consumption — a vain attempt to conceal from the German people the signi- ficance of Portugal's intervention. It showed, as The Times observed, how the wind was blowing among the smaller States of Europe, " and the wind boded no good to the oppressors of the weak and the enemies of nationality " CHAPTER CXLVir. GERMANY'S SECOND YEAR OF WAR. Situation in August, 1915 — Promotion of Peace Talk — "Central Europe "^ — Rn ai. Views OF German Aims — Aoitation against England — The Baralong Case — Controversy aboit Submarine Warfare^ — Tirpitz against the Chancellor — The Fall of Tirpitz — The Chan ■ cellor's "Peace" Speech in April, 1915— Dr. Liebknecht's Criticism— His Imprisonment — The Socialist " Split " — The Chancellor's " War Map " Speech — Pamphlet Scandals — "Junius Alter "- The "National Committee" — Food Troubles^ — The Batocki "Dicta- torship " — Bavaria and Prussia — Finance — Industry — The Press — Public Opinion in August, 19IG. IN an earlier chapter* it has been seen how during the first year of tlie war Germany, in spite of many disappoint- ments and the collapse of her original plan of campaign, steadily developed her great strength and resources, and succeeded, as her military effort grew, in meeting all demands, however great, upon her organization and administration. She had, it was observed. " shown little sign either of war weariness or of political, moral or economic exhaustion." As the summer of 1915 turned to autumn her fortunes seemed to be reaching their height. In the West her line was as firm as ever. In the East she had won Warsaw and conquered Galicia and Poland. The ill-fated Dardanelles campaign was doomed to failure, Bulgaria was about to throw in her lot with the Central Powers, Serbia and Montenegro were about to be overrun. Little wonder that the German industrialists were already mapping out the spoils in West and East, and German states- men proclaiming the inevitable character of " a German peace," in which, as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg said in his speech on August 19, " the English policy of the balance of power must disappear," and the "new Europe " be " liberated from French intrigues. Muscovite passion of conquest, and English * VoK V. Chapter LXXXVI. Vol. IX.— Part 114. 361 guardianship." Could not CJermany's enemies be compelled or induced to conclude peace upon so excellent a basis, rather than face the risk and sacrifice of an attempt to turn the scales ? The military history of the second year of war has already shown the beginning and progress of the disappointment of these hopes. After the German successes of 1915 » winter of comparative inactivity was followed by the disastrous assault on \'erdun, and meanwhile the intense efforts of the Allies, and above all the policy of real .strategical, industrial and jiolitical cooi^eration, immensely aided by the adoption of compulsory military .'service in England, were jjreparing results of the greatest magnitude on every front. So far from pro- ducing any promising response the German jieace talk only strengthened the determination of the Allies. Thus CJennany had to face tin ever less attractive prospect, and her effort at home during the second year of war became more and more an effort to keep iij) appear- ances. While, however, the course of events was clear, progress was .-low. Germany was \ery far from recognizing defeat, or, indeed, from recognizing tlie failure of her largest ambitions, and, in tpite of many difficulties and privations, the spirit of her people still bore the strain. 3()2 THl': TIMES HlSTtfUY OF THE WAR. As will be seen later, the eo()n«)inic strain became increasingly severe, and it must he remtMubered that economic anxieties coloured the whole political situation. But before dealing with the economic situation it is necessary to review the chief political events and di'velopments in some detail. The Allies could contemplate them for the most part with considerable satisfaction. The main feature was this — that, while the Allies were, (piiotly increasing their preparations and ex- panding their effort, and saying little about the victory at which they were aiming except that they were determined that it should be complete, Germany was engaged in incessant discussions about her aims and desires, and in constant debates about the most profitable method of conducting the war. The results of all this discussion were not great in them- selves, but as a whole the domestic events in Germany punctuated in no uncertain fashion the decline of German fortunes. It was shown in Chapter LXXXVI. that from an early stage of the war the Kaiser took care to avoid all appearance of interfering in either strategy HERR VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG. In conversation with Dr. Helflferich ; Herr von Jagow, Foreign Secretary, in the background. THE WAR-WORN CHANCELLOR, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in 1916, or policy. He continued to maintain that attitude, and it was round the person of the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, that all the controversies raged — controversies especially about German " war aims " generally, about the relative importance of aggression in the East and aggression in the West, and about submarine warfare. In December, 191.5, the German Government promoted a great ovitburst o^ " peace talk," and the Socialist Party in the Reichstag was permitted, or rather encouraged, to introduce an interpellation about " German peace con- ditions." The Chancellor opened the pro- ceedings with a speech devoted almost entirely to the intervention of Bulgaria and to the opening of Germany's " road to the East," which he described as " a landmark of history." He carefully denied that Germany had made any peace proposals. But his main statement was that; "if our enemies come to us with peace proposals proper to the dignity, and assuring the safety, of Germany, then we are always ready to discuss them." He could not "enter into details." Bvit "neither in the East nor in the West " must Germany's THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 303 eneinie.s hold " gates of imasion." As to liolgium, he could not define the " guarantees " which Germany would require. The war, how- ever, was " a defensive war of the (Jerniau people and its futuns" and the only possible peace was a peace whicli " secured Germany against its repetition." The speech was received with derision in all the countries of the Allies, and the carefully pre])ared German demonstration came to nothing. During all this period the most interesting feature of the whole discussion about German " war aims " was the concentration upon what was called the Central Europe move- ment. It began with the revival of somewhat ancient schemes for an Austro-German fiscal and economic imion. Stimulated by the liussian retreat from the Carpathians in the early summer of 1915, German professors and German economic societies made a great effort to stampede Vienna and Budapest, and to obtain the rapid conclu.sion, first of an Austro-Hungarian economic pact for a period of not less than 20 years — in place of the short- term '■ compromise," the periodical disputes about which provided the traditional political battleground between Austria and Hungary — and, secondly, of an ocononiic alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany. The main idea which it was sought to popularize was that Germany and Austria-Hungary formed the natural centre of a great political and economic .system, .stretcliing from the North Sea and tlic Baltic to the Alps, the Adriatic, and the Danube, and destined to draw in all the States on its fringe. The new gospel was crystallizetl in the remarkaljle book "Central Europe," by Herr Friedrich Naumann,** which rapidly attracted more attention than almost any other war book thus far jfublished in any country. Outside Gennany the new doctrine was first analysed in The Times of December (i, 1915. Naumann started from the admi.s.sion that all German efforts to obtain a separate peace with France had failed, and from the a.ssump- tion that neither with England nor with Russia was effective cooperation j)ossible. He found in the long duration of the trench warfare in both West and East ground for arguing that " trenches " would become the permanent form of frontier, and he pictured Europe as permanently divided by "two long walls from north to south, one of them running approximately from the Lover Rhine; SELLING FLAGS IN THE STREETS OF BERLIN. 3«;4 T///-; TIMI':s HISTOliY OF THE WAB. to the Alps, and the other from ("ourlaiul to either the right or the left of Riuuania." In an extraordinary passage Nauniann — who, it must be remembered, was by no means a representative of Pan-Germanism, but rather a representative German "Moderate" — sketched ' the inevitable fate of Germany's small neighbours : 'l"lu' smiill peoples hnvo only (he choiee botweon isolation iinil '" linking >ip," and as, within tho space of one j;eneration, isolation will become almost intolerable for them, they must sooner or later decide with which lea^jne they will or can inarch — in geography, production, and intollectvial direction. Tt is u cruel compulsion and a hard fate, but it is the dominant characteristic of tho times, the categorical imperative of hinnan devclop- inant. No resistance or lamentation will avail. What is necessary can be done early or late, voluntarily or luider compulsion, but the world password has been given out and must be obeyed, and he who obeys quickly will upon the whole got better chances for the future. Small States, which cannot carry on a tariff war, but need to import and to export every day, must in future place themselves on the books of one or other of the gi-oat world firms. Meanwhile, however, the " Gennan-Austrian- Kimgarian League " must be " steered safe and sound through the Peace Congress, with ade- (|uate North Sea and Mediterranean ports at it-i disposal, and with attr.chments in North and South in preparation." These views achieved great popularity, [Recording w'ell with the campaign against Serbia, the end of the ill-starred Dardanelles campaign, and the opening of the German way " from Berlin to Baghdad " — which was copiously advertised, especially in connexion with the resumption of direct railway com- munication, by the so-called " Balkan Express," from Germany to Constantinople. " Central Europe " was, moreover, a welcome relief from the sad experiences in the spheres of naval and colonial ambition. It is impossible to trace here either the development of the Austro-German fiscal negotiations, which were the immediate business in hand, or the stimulus which the disclosure of German ambitions gave to the closer economic cooperation of the Allies. But it must be observed that an essentially continental policy by no means satisfied German industry and commerce. Froni all the business centres, and especially from Hamburg w'ith its shipping interests, came cries of warning and dissent. The Prussian Minister of Commerce, Herr Sydow, said in the Diet on February 19, 1910: "We need economic and industrial traffic with our allies, but we need it also with neutrals and with the States that are now hostile*. We shall not in future be able to do without the world markets for our industry and our trade." These views gathered strength with time — ^and with Germany's obvious failure to achieve the military position essential to her proposed dictation to Europe. In June, 191(i, The Times published an analysis of recent expressions of German " business " opinion. It was all to the effect that what Germany wanted most of all was " what she had before " — before she plunged the world in war. A remarkable series of articles in the Frankfurter Zeituncf contained dicta like this : " We hold fast to our world-empire of work. Germany remains ready and willing to buy and to sell. And the others will have to be ready for it, too." " Neither Austria-Hungary nor the Balkans, to which Austria-Hungary forms our bridge, can be a substitvite for the free world -em pi re of buying and selling." " ' Germany lies on the North Sea, not at the Dardanelles.' This sentence contains the whole problem of our relations with England, the shaping of which must determine the direction of our development now and the development of the world in the coming decades. The English will have to decide what they want. If this war brings them at last to their senses, it is not impossible that the gulf may be bridged. But if they stick to their arrogant claims of naval supremacy, sooner or later it must come to a final fight, in which the British Empire will collapse." " The main thing is to uphold the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment." The truth, of coiirse, was that Germany wanted everything at once, and all that she could get. She desired domination and feared isolation, wanted the world and tried to persuade herself that the world's "need of Germany " was a postulate of civilization. While " Central Europe " thus provided a convenient ground for debating the future of German WeJttnacht, there were more im- mediate, although in some respects not less unreal, subjects of dispute. Throughout the early months of 1916 a violent campaign was conducted against the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, on the ground that he was too slow about the tasjc of over- throwing Germany's " chief enemy," England, and too cautious or too sparing in the use of The Dragon, see ! Sclt-iiiterost. Ill divers ways our plamie and pest : Wide over all the land he spreads. And brings no blessing on our heads. THE ENEMY WITHIN. Leagued with oiu' foes, iu sly cabal. He filches from our months their all. And dragon-like his shameless pelf .*<crapes >ip together for himself. Reftrotliiccit from " .'>i'mpWn\^!mus.' Yet lie niisiakes our measure ; we Will worthy of our brothers be. Who 'gainst a world's opposing might AVrest victory out there in the fight. LESSONS FOR FHE HUNGRY. A cartoon denouncing "the Dragon of Usury and Profiteering." 3Go lU-2 86G 2 HI-: ilMES HIS'IOHY OF THE WAR. the woai)t>iis doivrost to tlw. Cjoriiitvii lioait. submiiriiu's and iiirships. Under oover of the '•■en'sorship, mid in view ot the obvious inabihty of the Government to admit m |)ubiic that the chief cause of the faihiie of the famous Tirf)it/. ■■ submarine blockade " of KJlo was tiie cfii- cieney of the Britisli Xavy, the Chancollor'w opponents, who for a long time appeared to incUide all the Prussian Conservatives as well as the National Liberals and prcfessjoiuil " J'an- dermans," agitated for the most "ruthless'' submarine warfare against England and all neutral countries, at the risk, if necessary, of a breach with the United States. The result, in -March, was the fall of (irand Admiral von Tirpitz, after a trial of strength over the '' conc(\ssions " ultimately made to the United States. The disputes themselves were particu- larly instructive as illustrating the heat of (Jerman hatred and passion against Great Britain. Perhaps the most remarkable out- burst of all was that connected with what became known as the Baralong case. In November. 1915, the German Goveriunent sent a Memorandum to the liritish Government in regard to incidents alleged to have attended the destruction of a German submarine and its crew by the British auxiliary cruiser Baralong on August 19 It v\as .stated that the German submarine had stopped the British steamer Nicosiati off the Irish coa.st. and. the crew of th« THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE AND HIS CHILDREN The Crown Prince's third and fourth sons. Smaller picture: the Crown Prince with his "war-baby,' Princess Alexandrine Irene, born April 7, 1915. THI-: TIMES HIsrOh'Y OF THE WAR. 367 Nico-siaii luixiiitj lett th"ir sliip in hoiit.s. was; firing on the Nieosiuii ulicii tlu; HjiniloMg caiiif ii|). flying tlu- Anxorican (lag. Tin- Gennan Mnnorandiiia said tlmt tin; Baralong procpejlcd to sink t\w. C!f>nnan submarine, and that, llic coiniua'ider and sonic ot tlu; iti>\v having sprung overboard, they were shot in the water, wliilo four (Jtuiuan sailors found subsequently in tlu) Xicosian were Uilli-d. The Gennan (Jovernmont " took it for granted " that the British CJoverninent would " immediately take proeivdings for murder/' and demanded to be informetl that " the deed lias been punished bv a -sentence of corresponding severity" ; otherwise they would "consider themselves obliged to t ake serious decisions as to retribution for the un - punished crime." The charges were supported by allegations obtained in the United Stat<'s from members of the crow of the Nicosian. The British Government in its reply, dated December 14. expressed satisfaction at the sudden anxiety of the German Government for the vindication of the principles of civilized warfare, noted that the allesrations could not be accepted as they stooti, and observed that even the German charge against the Banilong w as " negligible compared with the crimes wliich seem to have been deliberately eomraittf d by Gemum officers, both on land and sea. against combatants and non-combatants." As it would be impossible for any tribunal to ♦'examine all the allegations, the British Govern- ment suggested that a tribunal composed of American naval officers might try the Baralong ou^e. together with tliree other incidents which had occurred almost simultaneously — the sinking of the Arabic without warning, the German attack on the stranded British sub- marine E13 in Danish waters, and the sinking of the Ruel by a German submarine and subse- quent killing and womiding of members of the crew when they had taken to their boats. It was observed that it was unnecessary to make any reply to the suggestion that the Britisli Navy had been guilty of inhiunanity. At that time the niunber of German sailors rescued from drowning already amounted to 1,150. On January 10, 191G, the German Govern- ment sent another commiuiicatioii, which in reality was obviously prepared for the purposes of an organized demonstration which took pla<'e m the Reiclistag on January 14. The points of this and the subsequent diplomatic exchanges can be briefly dismissed. Germany expressed virtuous indignation at the very suggestion that PRINCE WILHFXM FRIFDRIGH OF PRUSSIA, KIdest son of the Crown Prince. He was appointed Lieutenant in the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards on his tenth biithday, July 4. 1916. either the German Army or the German Navy ever failed to observe " the principles of Inter- national Law and of hiunanity." The '' proper German authorities " had " investigated rx- hau.stively " the cases of the Arabic, the E13, and the Ruel — and duly explained away those throe characteristic German crimes ! The commander of the submarine which sank the Arabic was " convinced " that his submarine was about to be rammed. The E13 was simk in a '■ fight " — which never took place. The sinking of the Ruel was treated as part of the " lawful " German " reprisals " against the British blockade— and the murderous attack on tnembers cf the crew of the Ru?l after they had taken to their boats was calmly ignored ! The proposal to submit the four cases to an impartial American tribunal was rejected. Finally, having failed to obtain satisfaction, the German Government promised to take its own " repri.sals." 8«)H THE TIMI':s lllsroilY OF TIIH WAR. THE WOOLLEN WEEK IN BERLIN. Boys bringing in wool from their schools. In a reply dated February 25, the ]3ritish Government tore the German contentions to pieces. It was pointed out, in particular, that the German story about the Arabic was con- trary to all the evidence, that the story about the E13 was wholly untrue, that the Ruel murders had never been investigated even by the Germans, and that, as regarded the Baralong case, the only witness whose antecedents the l^ritish Government was able to examine " was not even at sea when the events occurred of which he claimed to have been an eye-witness." P^inally, in what was called a " concluding word," oii July 31, 1916, the German Govern- ment said : In accordance with its announcement the German Government saw itself compelled to take into its own iiand the retribution for the unpunished crime. It, of course, refused to reply to the misdeeds of the British seamen in the Baralong case by measures of similar kind — for example, the shooting of British prisoners of war. But ttie German airships will have 'convinced the English people that Germany is in a position not to leave unpimrshed the crimes committed by the officers and crew of the Baralone. Whereas, formerly, special account was taken of the inevitable peril to the civil population involved in the employment of Zeppelins for military purposes, such considerations could no longer prevail in view of the Baralong murder. Since then tht! airship weapon is — within the limits set by International Law — employed ruthlessly against En;^- land. In every case in which an airship drops its <lestructivo bombs on London or on other Englisli towns which are defended or contain establishments of a military character, let England remember the Baralong case. This official concoction, with its amusing pretence that Zeppelin raids before the Baralong case differed from Zeppelin raids after tln> Baralong case, and its entertaining fiction that, even as amended; Zeppelin raids were confined within " the limits sot by International Law," deserves to be placed on record. But, as has been indicated, tlu; whole liaralong agitation was little Imt a peculiarly un.scrupulous cam- paign deliberately organized for the benefit of German public opinion. The main thing was the Reich.stag debate on January 15, and its main feature was the mobilization of the Socialists against P^nglantl. Their s[)okesnian Herr Nosko. talk<>d about the " flaming indig- nation of the (ierman people," and the " impu- dence " of the British Government in " insulting the soldiers of the Gennan Army and Navy and charging them with criminal conduct in war. ' He " rejoiced tc bo able to state that the German Army and German Navy respect the principles of war and humanity " ; the German warriors " were not descended from Africans, whose fathers ate hiiman flesh." The National Liberal leader, Hei-r Bassermann, went so far as to claim that " the German conduct of war is filled with the spirit of humanity and morality, and stands upon a .superior plane of civiliza- *tion ! " The Reichstag had, in fact, what the Frank- furter Zeitung called " an hour of greatness." For the Foreign Oflice the Under-Secretary, Herr Zimmermaim, solemnly promised the overwrought orators that the Government wovild " find the right ways and means to pvinish sharply and emphatically this horrible deed." A great deal of mystery was made about the awful " reprisals " in store for England — -although, as the lame pronouncement of July 31, already quoted, showed, the Govern- ment had nothing in view but the continuation of crimes which it was already committing to the best of its ability. Meanwhile^ the more genuine controversy about .submarine warfare was coming to a head, i'^arly in February Admiral von Tirpitz and his adhcirents began to issue warnings to politicians and the Press that the Imperial Chancellor intended to yield all the main points that had been in dispute witli the United States since the sinking of the Lusitania. Tlirough all sorts of channels it was indicated that thus policy would deprive Germany of the full use of a ■weapon which was capable of breaking British sea power, and that the policy was really being adopted because the Government was still \mwilling to carry to its extreme hmits^ the " struggle for life " between the German and British Entpires. The Tirpitz party then orga- THE TIMES HlSTOh'Y uF THE 11.1/.'. m\) nizeil a remarkable (li'monstration in xhr I'nissian Diet. The Prussian Junkers promoted a violent debate on foreign affairs in the Budget Committee, whose proceedings were secret, and, when it was over, insisted, in sjiite of all Ciovern- ment protests, in publ