[[ Mirrored from archive.org, with more info at http://www.314th.org/times-history-of-the-war/times-history-of-the-war.html ]] The Times HISTORY OF THE WAR Vol. X PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE. PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES" PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON. 1917 CONTENTS OF VOL. X CHAPTER CLII. Victoria Crosses of the War (I.) PAGE CHAPTER CLIII. The Navy's Work in 1916 ... 41 CHAPTER CLIV. The Battle of the SoArvrE (II.) 81 CHAPTER CLV The Campaign in German East Africa (I.) .. 121 CHAPTER CLVI. The Rus.sian Offensive of 1916: Last Phase ... 161 CHAPTER CLVII. German Air Raids : May to November, 1916 181 CHAPTER CLVIII. The Advance Towards Baghdad ... 201 CHAFPER CLIX. The Russian Campaign of 1915-16 in Armenia ... 241 CHAKrER CLX. Mechanical Transport in War ... 281 CHAPTER CLXI. Prize of War ... :»»:{ CHAFFER CLXII. MuNiTioN-s OF War, I'.iHi :{21 CHAFF KR CLXIII. Dkcxink and Fam, ok the Coalition Government- Junk, 1915, to Deckmbkr, 1916 CHAFrKPv CLXIV. The Campaign in Kahtkkn Kgyit, 1915-1916 CHAPTER CLXV. 'I'hk |{atti>k ok thk Hommk (in.) ,. 405 CHAPTER CLXVI. THE RELIEF OF VERDUN 445 CHAPTER CLII. VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE WAR. - I. Decokatioxs granted durixg Two Yeaks of War — The Army — Captain Grenfell wins the First V.C. — The Great Retrea^t — ^Heroic Stand of " L " Battery at Xery — Le Gateau — Michael O'Leary — ^Potts at Hell 70 — Sergeant Brooks's Inv-estiture — The Austraxians IN Gat.t.tpoli — Lance -Corporal Jacka — The Heroes of Lone Pine — ^A New Zealander — Indian V.C.'s — The Nav^y — Submarine Exploits — Holbrook — ^Nasmith — Boyle — The River Clyde Landing — The R. A.M. C— Martin-Leake — A Clasp to the V.C. — The Canadians — The Air SERvacE— Warneford destroys a Zeppelin — Piper Laidlaw — Rev. Noel Mellish — Isolated Exploits. DURING the first two years of the war 160 Victoria Crosses were awarded to members of the Navy and the Army for valour, compared with the awards of 182 in all for the Inflian Mutiny, 111 for the Crimean War, and 78 for the South African War. In the earlier days of 1914-1.5 the Cross was won by officers and men of the old Regular Army which gainwl lasting fame by its valiant rearguard actions ending at the Mame ; and the dewis were of the .same heroic nature an those which marked the campaigrw in the Crimea, India, South Africa, and many other lands. From t\ui time when the first Victoria Cross was granted to Mr., suVjsequentiy R'^ar-Admiral, Lucas, mate of H.M.S. Hecla, for picking up a live Hheji from the deck and throwing it overboard, until the earlier stageti of the war tlv^re lia^l been but little variation in the nature of the dfwjds for which the greatest anrl most c^jvete<l of all military hrmours wa« given. Th/>re wi-re well d«<firiffi circurriMtarKVH which goverru-d the reconi- ro'Tidation U> rouffr the honour, conditioriH fiUntmt a« unchnnging tw the order of naval warfare which prevailfnl till Rodney broke the Vol. X,— P«rt 118 line ; then arose the amazing and the unfore- seen — at times abnost incredible^develop- ments of the gigantic struggle. A new system of battle on sea and land had come into being and had produced new types of fighters — the ainnan, the submarine man, the bomber, the tronchman, doers of " things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme." The achievements of Shaw, the Lifeguardsman, at Waterloo were overshadowed by the acts of men like Michael O'Leary and Albert Jacka, both of whom won the Cross by prodigies of prowess. O'Leary, single-handed, slew eight Germans and took two prisoners, incidentally capturing a position. That was in France. In Gallipoli Jacka, also single-handed, killed the whole of a party of seven Turks, five by rifle fire and two with the bayonet. 0'I>«ary was an Irish Guardsman, a pro- fessional soldier, who had pn^viously served in the Navy ; Jacka was what might be called a civilian of the New Army, an Australian, and the first of his countrymen to win the CrfJss. And in tliat tonn " civilian " could be found one of the most remarkable (characteris- tics of the conflict. Just as in the days of Cromwell there arosn men who, though not trained as soldiers, and not loving war, yet THE TIMKS HISTOHY OF THK WAR. Pte. E. BARBER. Ist Bu. (iriMiatliur Udii. (Neuve Climielle). Lce.-Corp. D. W. BELCHER. Loiiduii Kitti- KiiKudc (Nfur St. Jiilji'ii). Drummer S. J. BENT, 1st Jin. K. Lhiu's. Uegt. (Near Ia: (ilicer). Capt. E. K. BRADBURY, •']-" hattt'iy, Jt.JI.A. (Nl'o). coiiquored the Cavalitn-s, whom Ood made " as stubble to thoir swords," so thtire flocked to the New Anay the mere civilian — the curate, the lawyer, the actor, the writer, the elementary teacher, the newsvendor, the greengrocer's boy, the physically big and the man of small stature. To many such as these was given the Victoria Cross. To aristocrats and reformatory lads, and to all the ranks and stations that came between these great social extremes, the honour was awarded, and such was the divergence of condition and age of the fighters that the Cross was given to an elderly married man with nine children and a boy of sixteen who, mortally wounded, died at his post in the Battle of Jutland Bank. For amazing exploits on the field, in sub- marines and aeroplanes, for unparalleled skill and daring in getting above and destroying a Zeppelin by bombing — these were amongst the deeds that won the Victoria Cross during the first two years of war. And all these excep- tional acts of heroism were apart and distinct from achievements which in lesser times wotild almost surely have been acknowledged by the award of the same distinction It was stated by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on July 26, 1916, that up to that time — almost two years from the beginning of the war — the total number of decorations issued and in course of issue up to date was : — Victoria Cross, 160 ;* Distinguished Service Order, 1,676 ; Military Cross, 3,851 ; Distinguished Conduct Medal, 6,279 ; A^ilitary Medal, already issued, 2,046, making a tctal of 14,012. Approved, but not notified Ircm the War Office, Military Medals, 8,000. A remarkable feature of the awirds of the V^ictoria Cross in the Great War was the large number gazetted at one time and the great proportion of dead heroes who were honoiued. The very first awards were made on No^•embe^ 16, 1914, and these numbered nine. They were given to officers, non-commissioned officers and men for their " conspicuous bravery wliilst serving with the Expeditionary Force," and they proved that the British Army had been true to its glorious traditions. Ou Xo\ember * The Victoria Cross was instituted in 1856 ; the Distinguished Service Order in 1886 ; the Military Cross on January 1, 1915; the Distinguished Conduct Medal in 1853 ; the Military Medal in April, 1916. ^^ pp wt ^^ r ^^_^. U. ■■Hi Lce.-Sergt. O. BROOKS, 3rJ Bn. Coldstream Guards (Near Loos). Pte. W. BUCKINGHAM, 2iul Leicestt^rshire Kcgt. (Xeuve ChapsUe). Corp. A. BURT, 1st Hert.s (T.F.) (Cuinchy). Pte. H. CHRISTIAN. 2nd Koyal Lane. (Western Kroiit). THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 3 Lce.-Corp. W. R. COTTER, 6th East Rents (Western Front). Sergt.-Maj. H. DAKIELS, 2nd Rifle Brigade (Xeuve Chapelle). 26, 1914, eight fiirther awards were notified, and subsequently there were numerous batches as well as indi\-idual announcements. First of all the winners to be named was Captain Francis O. Grenfell, 9th Lancers, for a double act of gaUantrj' on the same day, AugxLSt 24, 1914. The brief official record stated that the Cross had been given for " gallantry in action again.st unbroken infantry at Andregnies, Belgium, on 24th August, 1914, and for gallant conduct in assisting to save the guns of the 1 19th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, near Doubon the same day." Captain Grenfell wa,s wounded in the legs and a hand and was invalided home. While in London he was received at Buckingham Palace by the King, who decorated him with the Cross. Subse- quently thi-s officer returned to the front. He was killed in action on May 24, 1915. Hi.s twin brother Kiversdale, to whom he waH deeply attached, and who also was an officer in the 9th Lancers, was killed in action, too. Both were nephews of Field -Marshal Lord Grorjfell. Captain Cirenfell was devote<J to his profesHJon and his corps and in his [LafayeUc. Lieut. W. DARTNELL, Eoyal Fusiliers (East Africa). Corp. J. DAWSON, Boyal Engineers (HohenzoUem Eedoubt). will he directed that his Cross should be given to the 9th, ' ' to whom the honour of my gaining the V.C. was entirely due, thanks to the splendid discipline and traditions which exist in this magnificent regiment." To his illus- trious vuicle he paid an affectionate tribute, and added, " I have endeavoured to base my career on his example." "He was mortally wounded while assisting wounded men into shelter " was the conclusion of the brief official record of the act for which Captain Theodore Wright, R.E., was awarded the Cross, one of the first nine. At Mens, on August 23, he tried to connect up the lead to demolish a bridge, and he made the attempt under a heavy fire. He was wounded in the head, but undaunted he made a second effort. It was afterwards, at Vailly, on September 14, while assisting the pa^ssage of the 5th Cavaliy Brigade over the pontoon bridge that Captain Wright received his mortal wounds. Wriglit's gallantry was accompanied on the same day by the act of another Royal Engineer — I.a.nce-Coq)oral Charles Alfred Jarvis — who, in full view of the enemy, and for an hour and a half iindfir heavy fire, succeeded in firing U«at. /. DIMMKR. 2ni\ V.n. K H R.r;. Ba)l«ry-S«rKt.-Ma). DORKKLL. ■ I," IMUry, II M A. (.NiTy). Lce.-Corp. F. DOBKON. ('oldMtrciirii (iuiinlH (('tiuviiniK';. Driver J. DRAIN. :i7Ui Tintt<!ry, U.K. A. (1X9 Cat«au). THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. charges which destroyed a bridge. Half a dozen more Crosses were to go to the Corps : to Captain W. H. Johnston, who at IMissy on September 14, 1914, personally worked two rafts throughout the day, bringing back wounded across the river and returning with ammimition, and so enabling the advanced brigade to maintain its position ; Lieutenant Philip Xeame, for rescuing many wounded men near Neuve Chapelle on December 19, 1914 ; Lieutenant Cyril G. Martin, D.S.O., who on March 12, 1915, displayed great heroism when in command of six grenade - throwers, and, though woixnded, led his party into the enemy's trenches ; Captain L, G. Hawker, D.S.O., for a trivmaphant flying achievement — he had been transferred to the R.F.C. — on July 25, 1915 ; Temporary Second- Lieutenant F. H. Johnson, for the coiirage and initiative he showed in the attack on Hill 70 on September 25, 1915; and to Corporal J. L. Dawson, who, during an assault on the Hohenzollem Redoubt on October 13, 1915, performed many acts of courage, chief amongst them being finding three leaking gas cylinders and rolling them away to a safe place, then firing rifle bullets into them to let the gas escape, and so saving many men from being gasse*^!. Hawker's feat, which should be cre^iited to the R.F.C, was due to his very great personal bravery and skill. While flying alone he saw and attacked in succession three German aeroplanes. The first escaped, the second W8W damaged and forced to descend, the third was assailed by Hawker at a height of 10,000 ft., and was broiight down in the British lines, the 7>ilot and observer being killed. The performance was uncommonly splendid, for the Cifirrnan craft were armed with machine guns and each '* carried a pa.sH<;nger as well as the pilot." " He di'Kl of his wounds." Such was the end of LiauUmant Maurice Jarnos iJoasf?, 4th Battalion The Royal Fusiliers. "Though two or thr«?e times ba^lly wounfled he continued to control the fir*- of his machine guns at Mons, on August 23, until all his men were shot. He died of his wounds." That is all the story, as the Gazelle puhli.shed it ; yet no more sfWendid tribute; was ever paid to a little baufl of iiritish her(t*m. Again^" (He lias sinw flierl of his woiinds.) " That was Captain Harry Hherwr)od Ran ken, Koyal Army Me<lieal Corps. I fere, too, the tale WHH told in few but moving wor'Is :— "For tending wounded in the trenches under rifle and shrapnel fire at Hautvesnes on September 19, and on September 20, continuing to attend to wounded after his thigh and leg had been shattered. (He has since died of his wounds.) " Corporal Charles Ernest Garforth, 15th Hussars, was awarded the Cross for these exploits : — " At Harmignies, on Augvist 23, volunteered to cut wire under fire, which enabled his squadron to escape. At Dammartin he carried a man out of action. On September 3, when xinder Maxim fire, he extricated a sergeant whose horse had been shot, and by opening fire for three minutes enabled the sergeant to get away safely." Sev^en of the first batch of nine awards have been dealt with ; two remain to be described, and this pair concern a deed which thrilled the Empire — the heroic stand of " L " Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, an act which may well be compared with the famous affair of " Q " Battery at Sauna's Post, on March 31, 1900, for which four Victoria Crosses were given. " L " Battery had greatly distinguished itself at Mons, and in helping to cover the retreat fought a heavy rearguard action. On September 1, 1914, the last day of the retirement, in a morning mist, the battery, at close range, unexpectedly came into action with a vastly superior Gterman force. A fire was brought to bear on the battery which was so destructive that only one British gun was left in action, and this was served, until all the ammunition was expond(>d, by Battf ry-Sergeant-Major George Thomas Dorrell, Sergeant David Nelson, Gvmner H. Darbyshiro and Driver Osborne ; all the rest of the officers and men of the battery having been killed or wounded. The Queen's Bays and " I " Battery came to the rescue at the close of the terrible artillery duel and what was left of " L " iiattery came out of action. Dorrell and Nelson received the Victoria Cross and commissions ; Darbyshire and Osborne were awarded the M^daillo Militaire of Franco; it was pul)licly stated, though erroneously, that thfiy also had been granted tlie Cross. The first nine awards contained the brief d«itails of the acts of Dorrell and Nelson. On November 20, 1914, when eight Crosses were awarded, the list contained the following : Captain lOdward Kinder Bradbury (deceased), " L " Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. For gallantry and ability in organizing 118—2 6 TflE TIMES HISTOTiY OF THE WAR, Corp. A. DRAKE, llittu ItrigaUu (La UriquK) Pte. E. DWYER, Ist East Surrc^y ('• Hill 00 •■). the defence of '* L " Battery ugainst heavy odds at Nery on September 1. A detailed atory of the event was told by ( Junner Darbyshiie after the battle. Darbyshire, a man of some yeai-s' service, calm and obser- vant, had kept a record of the principal cu-- cumstaixces, and from this he refreshed his memory as he told the tale, from which extracts are given here : "All through the retreat we had been fighting heavily, and throughout the day on August 31 we fought till fovu" o'clock in the afternoon ; then we were ordered to letire to Compiegne. It was a long march, and when we got to Nery, near Compiegne, early in the evening, both horses and men were utterly exhausted and very hungry. As soon as we got in we gave the horses some food. . . . " Outposts were put out by the ofticeis, and the cavalry who were with us, the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays), were in a small field on the side of a road which was opposite to us. That road was really a deep cutting. . . . " Having made all our dispositions, we went to sleep, and rested till half past three in the morning, when wo were roused and told to get ready to march at a moment's notice. "The durluiess seemed to hang about more than usual, and the morning was very misty ; hut we did not pay nmch attention to that, and we breakfasted and fed the hoi-ses. We «<xpectod to be off again, but the battery was ordered to stand fast imtil further notice. . . , " Sergeant-Major Dorrell thought that this would be a good opportunity to water the lioi-ses, so he ordered the right half-battery to water, and the horses were taken behind a sugar factory which was a little distance away. The horses were watered and brought back and hooked into the guns and wagons ; then the left half-battery went to water. . . . " All was well, it seemed, and we were now expecting to move off Then, without the slightest warning, a ' ranging ' shot was dropped into the battery, and we knew instantly Sec-Lieut. A. FLEMING- SANDES. 2nd East Surrey (HohenzoUern Redoubt). Lieut. W. FORSHAW. l/9th Bn. Manchester Kegt. (T.F.) (Dardanelles). Capt. C. FOSS. 2nd Bn. Bedford Regt. (Neuve Chapelle). Lce.-Corp. W. FULLER, -1st Bn. Grenadier Guards (Neuve Chapelle). that the Germans were on us and had fired this trial shot to get the range of us. . . . " We were taken completely by surprise, and at first could do nothing, for the ' ranging ' shot was followed by an absolute hail of shrapnel, which almost blew the. battery to pieces. . . . " ' Who'll volvmtebr to get the guns into action ? ' shouted Captain Bradbuiy. " Every man who could stand and fight said ' Me ! ' and there was an instant rush for the guns. . . . "The first gun came to grief tlirovigh the terrified hoi-ses bolting and overtm-ning it on the steep bank of the road in front of us ; the second gim had the spokes of a wheel blown out by one of the very first of the German shells, the third was disabled by a direct liit with a shell which killed the detachment ; THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the fourth was left standing, though the wheels got knocked about and several holes were made in the limber, and aU the horses were shot down. The fifth g\m was brought into action, but was silenced by the detachment being killed, and the sixth gun, our own, remained the whole time, though the side of the limber was blown away, the wheels were severely damaged, holes were blown in the shield, and the buffer was badly peppered by shrapnel bullets. The gun was a wreck. ... "As soon as we got Nimiber Six gun into action I jumped into the seat and began firing, but so awful was the conciission of our own explosions and the bursting German shells that I coiild not bear it for long. I kept it up for about twenty minutes, then my nose and ears were bleeding because of the concus- sion and I could not fixe any more, so I left the Corp. C. GARFOETH. 15th Uusaars (Harriiignifcs). Sec.-Lieut. B. GEARY, Igt East Surrey (" Hill 6f) "). seat and got a cliange by fotcliing ammuni- tion. . . . •' When I felt a little better I began to help Driver Osborne to fetch armnunition from the wagonH. I iMfl just managed to get back to the gun with an arrnful of ammunition, when a lydrlite shell exi>Iodf>fi boltind mo, tlu-ow me to the ground, and partly Htunnf>d me. I was on the grounri for what s^jerned to be about five rninutes and thought I was gone ; but when f came round I got up and found that I was unJnjurfKl. On looking rotind, however, 1 Haw that Captain JJrafJbury, who had played a sfjiondid part in gettiriK the gunH into niAJou, h/ul he*»Ti knockofi down \>y the same slioll that floored mty I h>wi l>«H>ri thrf>wn on my face, Captain lira^Jbury hiid been knocke<J down backwards, and he waw about two yards away from me. When I came to my senses I wwit Mp to him and saw that he was mortally wounded. Fte. S. GODLEY. 4th Koyal Fusiliers (Mons). Capt. F. 0. 6RENFELL, 9th Lancers (Tfear Andregnies). He expired a few minutes afterwards. Though the captain knew that death was very near, he thought of his men to "the last, and repeatedly begged to be carried away, so that they should not be upset by seeing him or hearing the cries which he could not restrain. Two of the men who were wounded, and]were lying in the shelter of a neighbouring haystack, crawled up and managed to take the captain back with them ; but he died almost as soon as the haystack was reached. . . ." Such was the end of the^heroic Bradbury, and such was the fight of "L" Battery in the morning mist on the last day of the Great Retreat. The tenth Victoria Cross was announced on November 19, 1914. It was awarded to Lieu- tenant John Henry Stephen Dimmer, 2nd Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps. He served his machine gun during the attack, on November 12, at Mein Zilleboke until he had been shot five times — three times by shrapnel and twice by bullets — and he continued at his post until liis gun was destroyed. In a letter to his mother the modest soldier said that at about one o'clock they were suddenly attacked by the I'ru.ssian Guards, who shelled them im- [ Sec-Lieut. R. HALL0WE8. nil Jii). .Mlddltmix IK «»■. I Ijii/aycUe. Capt. P. HANSEN. «(,li LlncoliiHliIro ((Jallii)Oll). OS . J -^ H -* a: u E O ^ X ^ w z OS ? as u H 0) 4> : o Z ♦. o s z : s « > J <! « Q -c* c Z « < s O u OS .£ c« Q Z a a d" a: 2 X °^ O t> ° i O 2 OS I S « •-^ «» as '^ < SQ THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. mercifully and poured in a perfect hail of bullets at a range of about a hundred yards. Dimmer got his guns going, but the Germans smashed one up almost immediately and then turned all their attention on the gun he was with and smashed that, too ; but before they did so he had been twice wounded, and was finally knocked out with the gun. " My face is spattered with pieces of my gun and pieces of shell," he added, " and I have a bullet in my face and fom- small holes in my right shoulder. It made rather a nasty mess of me at first, but now that I am washed and my wovmds dressed I look quite all right." The next Cross to be gazetted — on Novem- ber 2.3, 1914 — was given to a reformatory lad — Lance -Corporal William Fuller, 2nd Battalion the Welsh Regiment — for conspicuous gallantry on September 14 near Chivy, on the Aisne, by advancing about 100 yards to pick up Captain Mark Haggard, who was mortally wounded, and carrying him back to cover under very heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. As a private. Fuller had been mentioned in Sir John French's dispatches. One of Fullers conxrades, Private C. Derry, gave some details of Captain Haggard's end which showed how hard the fight was in which he lost his life. The affair began on a Sunday, a day on which so many momentous battles took place in the earlier period of the war. The Gerrnan-s were in overwhelming force, yet the " Old Contemptibles " were checking them and holding them in hand. Four officers of the battalion were lost in twenty minutes and men had fallen in proportion. Still the shattered remnant held to its task, fortified by news which ha*J been paHswI along the battlefield of glorious iiH(i<:(}HH«9H. Monday camo and the 2nd Welsh got nearer U> their goal behind a liill crest. They Htniggled on, they got within a score of yards of the crest ; then they were ordered to lie down and Haggard's figure was seen standing in outline on the ridgo. He saw the Germans and shout'wl, " Fix Viayonets, boys ! Here they are I " Tfie r^rder wfvs obeyed. " My brother Emfwt and myself," said Derry, " stood up to hiave a fair pe<»p, but we got it ; he in the left arm and thigh, and I straight through tlio knee joint About tlinHj o'clock in the uftr»r ntK^n, ju>»t fxH our artillery liad got up ready to cover us, th»> Germans found our rariKe with arfjllfjry. and down carne the ' coal -boxes.' .lust n'Wir rne whm lying our bravo oa[itain, mortally wounded. As tlw> sholls burst over us he would occasionally open his eyes and call out, ' Stick it, Welsh ! Stick it ! ' . . . Captain Haggard died that evening." Subsequently, in a letter to The Times, the fallen officer's uncle, Sir H. Rider Haggard, supplemented Derry's account with some details which had been collected from Lieut. Somerset, who lay wounded by him when he died. It seemed that after the order was given to fix bayonets Haggard headed his company in a charge upon the German Maxims. He and his soldier servant overran the other men. Haggard had seized a rifle, and with this he shot and killed three of the Germans who were serving the first Maxim that was reached; then, with the butt of the empty weapon, he was seen " fighting and laying out " the Germans, " laughing " as he did so, until he fell mortally wounded in the body, and was carried away by his servant. Well might Sir Rider Haggard, while deploring the loss of a beloved nephew, add as a thought of consolation to those who had suffered the same bereavement, " that of a truth these do not vainly die." On that " most critical day of all," August 26, at Le Cateau, the day of the " gloriqus stand of the British troops " — both quotations are from^ Sir John French's dispatch of September 7 — when the enemy in overwhelming force was keeping up the pursuit, many acts of valotir and devotion were performed by the British troops of all arms. The artillery, although " outmatched by at least four to one," fought magnificently and cau.sed havoc in the German ranks. In those first days of the war, when the German legions were hurled against the British with prodigal disregard of life, repeated and savage assaults were made upon the British batteries, and so determined and well main- tained were some of tho.so that Gorman infantry actually succeeded in getting to within a hundred yards of our batteries, amongst them the :J7tli Battery Royal Field Artillery. In dense formation the Germans swept in clouds tf)wards the guns of the UTth, and it seemed as if the weapons would fall intf) the hands of the assailants and remain with them as trophies. It was clear that if the guns wore to be saved some imexp<»cte(| moans would have to be dis- covered to get them away. Captain Douglas Reynolds and volunteers rushed up with two teams anrl, in s[)ite of f he withering f»eTTniin fire anrl the f>nemy's desj)erato efTorts to frustrate them, liniberofl xip two gims and managed to save one of (horn. It was an unconimonly 10 THE TIMES HISTUhY UE THE WAB. Bomb. E. HARLOCK. llJt.h lUttcry (Near tVbtubert). Pte. Samuel HARVEY. 1st Bii. York and Lanes. (" Big Willie " Trench). Sergt. J. HOGAN. 2ndp3n. Manchester Regt. (Near Festubert). Lce.-Corp. F. W. HOLMES, 2nd Yorkshire L.I. (Le Cateau). haztti'cluuM ucliiovumoiit, and it was all the rnoitt ilitliuult of uxacution becaiwo our mon wore utterly worn out by prolonged fighting and fatigue, and the outHtanding merit of it was recognized hy th« htwtowal of the CrosH upon UeynoldM, who wiui afterwai'ds severely wounded, and two menibei-s of the battery, Driver Job Henry Charitw Drain and Drivtir Kroderick Luke —three in all, the same as the number of Crosses awarded to " L " Battery. The oflicial record of tliis gallant event was contained in just over a score words : " At Le Cateuu, on August 2<), as volunteers, helping to save guns under fire fnnn hostile infantry who were one hundred yai'ds away." Not a few of the official details at this period were inadequate and did but poor justice to the nature of the acts for which the Victoria Cross was given. Subse- quently there was a very marked improvement in this respect. On that memorable day two more Crosses were given for valour at Le Cateau,'one to Major Charles AUix Lavington Yate, the other to Lance -Corporal Frederick William Holmes, both of the 2nd Battalion The Kine's Own (York- shire Light Infantry). The major and the corporal were fine examples of the members of the old Regular regiments. Holmes had served seven years with the Colours, had been drafted to the Reserve, and a fortnight later was recalled for active service. His achievement was one of several which at that time deeply impressed the public mind, and he was much honoured in his native parish of Bermondsey. And, indeed, there was just cause for all this recognition, for Holmes, under a very heavy fire, had carried a woimded man out of the trenches for a long distance, and after doing that he had helped to drive a gun out of action by taking the place of a driver who had been wounded. For another act of co\u-age and resource he had been awarded, by France, the high honour of the ^MedaiUe IMilitaire. Major Yate's exploit was of the highest order of chivalry and courage. Holmes, in describing in detail his own doings at Le Cateau, said of the major that he joined the battalion and took command of B Company just before tliey went out to the war. At Le Cateau he was in the trenches, not very far from Holmes. On going into action he had 220 men, bvit so terrible was the fire which was directed upon them and some artillery in their rear that he lost all his men except nineteen. Yate was sur- ruanded ; all the other officers were either killed Pte. C. HULL, *2l8t Lance rx. Sec-Lieut. H. JAMES, 4fh Un. Worcestersliirc Kegt . (Gallipoli). Lce.-Corp. C. JARVIS. 57th Field Coy. R.E. (Jemappcs). Sec-Lieut. F. JOHNSON. 73ra field Coy. U.K. ("Hill 70"). THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 11 or wounded, and the ammunition was exhausted. Yet no thought of surrender affected the gallant officer — only on the day before he had declared that if it came to the pinch and they were surrounded he would not surrender, and in the hour of trial he was true to his word. Regardless of the hopeless odds against him, he determined at whatever cost to guard the honour of his regiment. ReljTng on the valour and devotion of the renxnant of Regulai's who were left to him, he rallied his little handful of sur- vivors, nineteen in aU of them, and, as a forlorn hope, hiirled himself at their head in a charge against the foe. It was a noble enterprise ; it merited the crown of victory ; but the odds were hopeless, and when the nosh was over and the fierce, short fight was done, only three members of the brave B Company could be formed up. All the rest had perished or were wounded or had been taken prisoners — though few captives were made that day at Le Cateau. The major was one of them. He had been severely wounded in the charge and had faUen into the hands of the Germans. He was made a prisoner of war and as such he died in a foreign land and in the midst of foes. To the honoiir of his memory, fittingly enough, there was paid the tribute of the Cross. He was a great favourite with his men, " An absolute gentleman," said Corporal Holmes. ' ' He was always in front, and his constant cry was ' Follow me ! ' " Another man who at this period won the Cross was George Wilson, an Edinburgh newsboy who, up to within two days of the declaration of war, was selling papers in the city. He had b€>©n a soMier, and when the call to arms came he rejoined the Army. As a private in the 2nd Battalion The Highland Light Infantry, Wilson won the fJross on September 14, 1914, near Verneuil, for one of Pte. W. KENEALLT, 1st Bn. Lanes. Fus. (Gallipoli). Pte. T. KENNY, 13th Bn. Durham L.I. (Near La Houssoie). those acts which seem to be pecuUarly charac- teristic of the British soldier and appear almost incredible of accomplishment. Accom- panied by only one man, Wilson attacked a hostile machine gun. It was a desperate enterprise, for the odds against the pair were overwhelming. By aU the rules of chance the two reckless fellows should have been swept out of existence ; in fact, Wilson's comrade was speedUy shot down and killed. Undaunted, Wilson went on alone ; he made his way up to the very firing-line of the Germans and there he, single-handed, shot an officer and half a dozen men who were working the gun. Not content with that, he captured the weapon and turned it on the Germans, and, finding a soldier of the King's Royal Rifles who was badly wounded, he picked him up and brought him into safety. Subsequently, having been " gas.sed " and wounded at Loos, and having received his discharge, Wilson resimied selling newspapers in the High Street, Edinburgh. The achievement of Lance-Corporal O'Leary seizerl the public imagination in an extraordi- nary manner. It was at Cuinchy, on February 1, 1915, that O'Leary, when forming one of the ti5«.-Corp. L. KKYWORTH. 21th I5ri. L/jri'i'in l!/K'. ((timnchy). Sec.-Linnit. J. LEACH. 2n'J (in. M;ifich«iit/:r lt<Kt (.Vear Kentubert). \lMfayeUe. Capt. A. MARTIN-LEAKE. It.A M C. (Zoiinflx!ki'). Driver F. LUKE, 37th l(iitt/;ry, Jl.F.A. {\jn Catoau). i Q U Q Z :3 o -i; H OS' u < H O W ai -> u c o C« *3 O L U 3 o P 2 J . «> - -S s ^ V a o . o w <■ is u u J3 a <! J= .H J3 S O Q < o < X OS <: < O Q« OS o u U z < n - a ■a 3 a V u ^ 3 H <: u b O X H <: Q U O X cd S ? 3 B « '■ol « V 3 Si -o ^^ o ■OS « X a '3 a u 12 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 13 storming party which advanced against the enemy's barricades, rushed to the front and himseK killed five Germans who were holding the first barricade. Having done this, he attacked a second barricade about 60 yards farther on, and tliis he took, after killing three of the enemy and making prisoners of two more. O'Leary thus practically captured the enemy's position by himself and prevented the rest of the attacking party from being fired upon — so that he had lolled eight Germans, taken two prisoners and, single-handed, made an impor- tant capture of territory. The intrepid Irish- man was promptlj^ promoted sergeant, and on coming home on leave he was made the hero of a great demonstration in Hyde Park on Saturday, July 10, 1915. Soon afterwards he was promoted lieutenant and went to Ireland on a recruiting naLsson, having visited his native village of Inchigeela, Covmty Cork. During that Irish tour a remarkable incident occurred which cau.sed a question to be asked in the House of Commons on December 6, 1915 Mr. Ginnell inquired why the magistrates at Ballaghaderrin had cancelled permission for the Irish Volunteers to drill, ilr. Birrell, who was at that time the Irish Secretary, answered : " The magistrates acted on their own initiative and on account of the Irish Volunteers hooting a very distinguished Irish soldier, Lieutenant Michael O'Leary, V.C., on the occasion of a recent recruiting visit to Ballaghaderrin." The incident was deplorable, and the conduct of some of his own countrymen contrasted mo.st unfavourably with that of the enthusiastic and admiring crowd which welcomed O'Leary, then a sergeant, a.s he f I rove into Hyde Park in a carriage. The first Territorial to recoivo tliri (,'roHs was 2nd Lieut<mant G«»offrey Harold W'oolley, 9th Ijattalion, The London Regiment, T.F., ff)r his conduct on " Hill OO '" during the night of April 20-21, 1915. Though he was the only officer on the hill at the time, with very few men, he Huccessfully rosi.4t«»d all attacks r>n liis trench, and continued his bomb-throwing and enc<juraging bin rnen until he was relieved. His ';ourage and enduranfjo wore Hoveroly t<!Hted by a c^^ntinuoijM and limivy hIk^II and inachinc-gnn fire and bombing Anoth' rT'rrrifx^rial, Corporal Alfr*«l Alexander iJiirt, iHt Battalion, Tb'; Hertford.Mliin- llngirnr nt, T.K., wa« next award<'l the (Jross fr<r bin \>viivuvy at Cuinchy, on H«rf)ternber 27, 1915. An attack WHS to be made and Burt's con\pany had lined t he front trench preparatory to its delivery when a large minenwerfer bomb dropped in the trench. It would have been easy for Burt to shelter behind a traverse, but he instantly rushed forward, put his foot on the fuse, wrenched it out of the bomb, and threw it over the parapet. In this way he made the bomb harmless and saved the lives of others in the traverse. Territorials, indeed, gi-eatly distinguished themselves. Sec. Lieut. A. V. Smith, 15 East Lancashire Regiment, T.F., was throwing a grenade when it slipped from his hand and fell to the bottom of the trench, close to several of our officers and men. He shouted a warning and jumped to safety ; but, knowing that the grenade was due to explode and seeing that his comrades could not escape, he instantly returned and flung himself upon it. As he did so the grenade exploded and the brave young sub- altern was killed instantaneously. In Gallipoli, on August 7-9, 1915, there was the wonderful exhibition of endurance of Lieut. W. T. For- shaw, another Territorial, 1 9 Battalion, Man- chester Regiment. For forty-one hours con- tinuously he threw bombs ; he shot tliree Turks with liis revolver ; he was gassed by bomb fimies, bruised by shrapnel, and could scarcely lift his arm because of his exertions ; but he never wavered, and by his heroic example maintained a hold upon the important corner called " The Vineyard." The first Yeoman to be awarded the Victoria Cross was Private Frederick \\'iliiam Owen Potts, of the Berkshire Yeomanry. He won Ihe honour by an act which had no parallel, and which stood out prominently even in the many remarkable deeds for which the Cross was given. The trooper had gone out to Egypt with his regiment, and fiom that country had proceeded to (Jalli[)oii, where he took part in the operations near Suvla Bay. On August 21, 191."), an attack was made on a very strongly fortified Tinkish position, a sector stretching from Hill 70 (o Hill 112. I'otts was advancing on that terrible day on Kill 70. The heat was inttirise, th(» country was uncommonly difficult, largely sand and scrub, the scrub being so |:)arched that it took fiio in many places from the sun and frf)m shnll fii'o, and in crossing the hljizing patches irien were wounded and wore liiirned to <|eath. The Yeomaruy wore ascend- iiiK Hill 70 in short s[)iM-tH, making (x-casional liahs. After sheltering in a iiftio gulley the ordor was given to charge, juid I'otts rushed 118—3 14 77/ f; TL\n<:s histohy hf ini<: wau. Pte. J. LYNN. 2ad Lanca. Fus. (Near Vpres). Lieut. E. McNAIR. tttli lloyal iSusiiex. forward with his coiuraden ; hut \w liad not gone more tliaii about a Hcoro yards wluni ht> was shot down, a buliot having entered the left thigh. At this tune Potts was about a quarter of a mile from the top of the liill. He was fortunate enough to be lying in u little thicket foniied of the scrub, and this gave him some sort of shelter and hid him from view. Not long after he fell there crawled towards hiju a fellow-townsman who wtxs badly wounded. Potts recognixtnl him. " Is that you, Andrews ? "" he siiid. The feeble answer was, " Yes," " I'm jolly pleased you've come," .said I'otts ; and Andrews, having draggetl himself as close as he could get — he had been shot through the groin — they lay perfectly still for some minutes, fully expecting that the Turks would find and kill them. \'eiy soon a third trooper who had been wounded made his way to the thicket, and with great difficulty room was found for him. Andrews m;oved his position so that the newcomer could be acconunodated, and he had scarcely done that when a bullet mortally wounded the stranger. He cried piteously for water, but there was not a drop to be had, and the three wounded troopers endured the agonies of thirst throughout an afternoon of intense heat. Mitter ct)ld came with llio night and in(;reased the sutforings of the men. A tull iiKioii luiidit lilt) night as clear as day, and every time u movement was made in the thicket the Turks fired. A bullet grazed Potts' left ejir as he lay flat on the ground, with his face buried in the dust. The woiujded strai'ger survived the dreadful night ; then death came to him as a merciful release, for to the end he nuuinured, " Water ! Water ! " Throughout tlu' whole of the next day the two survivors lay hidden in the burning scrub, not daring to move, tortured by thirst, suffering acutfily from th»nr wounds, and trying, unsuc- ee.ssfully, to get relief by sucking bits of stalks which they managed to pick from the shrubs. Again night canut, and as ffu> only ho[)e of sal- \ation was to got away they began to ci-awl off, Lieut. G. HALING, R.A.M.C. (Near Fauquissart). Pte. W. MARINER, 2iid Bii. K.KK.C. (Cambriii). Potts leading and Andrews following. They lay perfectly flat, and literally wriggled. From six at night — when darkness fell — till three in the morning they dragged themselves, weak and wounded, dust-choked, a distance of about three hundred yards — as Potts calculated afterwards, thirty three yards an hour. A bit of burnt scrub near at hand afforded slight Lieut. C. MARTIN, 56th Field Coy. R.E. (Spaabroek Molen). Carp. S. MEBKOSHA, West Yorks. (Yser). Rev. E. NOEL MELLISH, Chaplain to the Forces. Sec-Lieut. G. D. MOOR. old Bii. Uamnsihiiv Uogt. (Dardanelles). THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. protection ; this was taken, and the troopers tried to sleep, but the extreme cold made rest impossible. When daylight came, some water was obtainable, but only by crawling to men who had fallen and whose bottles could be reached. This dreadful day passed, Potts doing his best to stanch his comrade's bleeding wounds, and the third night on the hill came. The two men tried once more to get away and reach the British lines. Potts attempted to carry Andrews ; but he was too weak and the effort failed. Then, when hope itself seemed to be abandoned, an amazing inspiration came, and it was suggested by an ordinary entrenching shovel, one of many which were lying on the hill. Potts wriggled to the shovel, managed to support Andrews on it, stood up, and dragged desperately — all the more so becaiose as soon Lieut. P. HEAME. R.E. (Nenve Chapellfj. Sergt. D. NELSON, ' L" Battery, R.H.A. (Nery). an he rose the Turks opened fire. Famished and exhausted, he could not do more than pull his burden over the rough ground for about six yards ; then he collapsed. Andrews, too, ha^J suffered severely under the strain ; but as soon as it was dark Potts resumed his forlorn hope. He had his comrade on the shovel, lying flat ; ho supported him as best he could, and Andrews lieKl grimly on to his rescuer's wrists. For more than three hours, in the bright moonlight, down the scrub -infested stony, dusty hillside. Private Potts dragged his helpless burden on the shovel ; then came a sentry's challenge, "Halt!" Inexpressibly joyful was the sound of the British voice to the two poor worn-out Yeomen ; grimly humorous the sentry's question, " What are you doing ? Ai-e you burying the dead ? " No, it was not that. "I've got a chap here woimded," Private Potts explained. " And I've dragged him down the hill on a shovel. Can you give me a hand ? " Give a hand ! Many a willing hand was given that night, by Inniskilling Fusiliers, at the foot of that fatal hill which had been the scene of so much tragedy, yet relieved by the wondrous act of heroism and resource which gave the Cross to the twenty-two -year-old trooper of the Berkshii-e Yeomanry. The right of selection which is authorized by the Victoria Cross Warrants was exercised in coiuiexion with the performance of many officers and men of the 1st Battalion The Lancashire P'usiliers on April 25, 1915. Three companies and the headquarters, while landing at Gallipoli, to the west of Capo Helles, \^ere met by a very deadly fire from hidden machine- guns which caused a great number of casual- ties. The sur\ivors rushed up and cut the wire entanglements, in spite of a terrific fu-e from the enemy, and, after " supreme difficul- ties," the cliffs were gained and the position maintained. This was one of the cases in which many men perform many acts of valour, when, indeed, all participants deserve the decoration of the Cross. Not all, however, could have the distinction awarded to them, and accordingly it was left to the survivors to select the recipients, and their choice fell on a PU. 0. PEACHMElfT. 2r»'l iJfi. K It R.r' (Hiilliich;. Fie. F. POTT& Idt IVtrkH Vcoriuwiry rOalli[K>ll>. Act.-SerKl. J. RAYNES. " A ■• I'.fillcry, HI '.A. f f'oHw 7 il<- H<l|iiini J. Capt. A. READ, I-l llii. Norlli.iiiiptonHlilrcltcgf . (Near Jliilliicli). c tlfi C 09 a 3 a o o a ^ "a CC -oc w ^ ^ ^ >< -J « u - *" E •^ ■* ■*= o ;n *- ^ *-■ c = o u o J" U b Z S ^ O 03 U E ■= .2 !>^ CQ •;; 'c 2 'OB ^ V .Z 03 '^ < >. 03 X 6 t £ z "I <: §•£ z1| u a MS a o O Id "an u > u •o < THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 17 gallant trio composed of Captain Richard Raymond Willis, Sergeant Alfred Richards and Private William Keneally, all of the 1st Bat- talion of the fine old 20th Regiment of Foot. Corporal James Upton, a native of Notting- ham, became known as the " Bantam V.C." Returning to his native city after he had been awarded the Cross, he addressed a ineeting in support of recruiting, and humorously took his hearers into his confidence. " When I enlisted," he said, " I was 5 feet 2i inches. Don't I look bad ? Don't I look ill ? " Upton belonged to the 1st Battalion The Sherwood Foresters (Xottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment), and distinguished himself on May 9, 1915, near Rouges Bancs. He spent the whole of that day under con- stant artillery and rifle fire in rescuing the wounded, and in doing so he went close to the enemy's parapet, ^^^len he was not actuaUy carrying the wounded he was bandaging and dressing serious cases in front of our parapet, exposed to the enemy's fire, and one wounded man was killed by a shell while Upton was carrying him. A singularly touching act was performed by the King in conferring the Cross on one of the recipients — Lance- Sergeant Oliver Brooks, 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards. Brooks won his decoration on October 8, 191.5, by a courageous bombing act near Loos. A strong party of the enemy had succeeded with the help of grenades and bombs in securing a lodgment in about 200 yards of our trenches. Brooks fearlessly led a party of bombers to the attack, imder a constant and heavy fu.sillade, and regained the lost ground. The undertaking was one of extreme peril, and the complete success of the operation was very greatly due to the sergeant's resourcfrfulness and bravery. His Majesty, who had been visiting the front, ha<^l 8uffer*)d his regrettable accident through the Strang*; horse he was riding rfiaring and falling upon him, anfl he was on his journrry homo. It was while in the hospital train, " on the other side," that the King, though lying helpless in bed, rer-olvefl personally to invest lirooks with the Cross. The oflicial details ^taU^d that "The new V.C. was condiieted If) the hoH[)itaI train at — , arifl was taken to the sirle of the \n-<l u|>on which bin .Majesty wan lying. He knelt on the floor of the saloon and Ixmt over the. prostraU; monarch. Even so his .Majesty found that he hafi r)verrated his strength, anfl could not manage to get the pin through the thick khaki. Assistance had to be given before the operation could be com- pleted." For the first time an actor was to perform an act of heroism which was rewarded with the Cross. This was Temporary Lieutenant Wilbur Dartnell, by birth an Australian, who had served in the South African campaign and had become well known as an actor. On Septem- ber 3, 1915, dming a mountsd infantry engage- ment near Maktau, East Africa, the enemy made a determined attack vipon our men and succeeded in getting so clcse — within a few yards — to them that it was impossible to get the more severely wounded away. Dartnell had been wovmded in the leg, and he was being carried away, and could have secured his own safety if he had allowed himself to be removed ; but, realizing the peril of the helpless wounded, owing to the fact that the enemy's black troops murdered any they found, he insisted on being left behind, in the hope of being able to save their lives. It was in making this noble and vmselfish effort that he gave his own life, and his noble sacrifice was recognized by the posthmnous award of the Victoria Cross. Jacka's glorious deed and its recognition were a matter of the deepest pride to all Australians, one of whom, Mr. John Wren, sent him £500 and a gold medal which he had offered to give to the first Australian recipient. Lance -Corporal Albert Jacka, 14th Battalion, Australian Imperial Force, showed extra- ordinary bravery on the night of May 19-20, 1915,— at Courtney's Post, Callipoli. It was there, while holding a portion of the trench with only four men, three of whom were killed or wounded, that seven Turks rushed into and occupied the trench. Jacka, single-handed, instantly attacked them and killed the whole i)arty. There was a break before Australia was again to get the honour, then a batch of no fewer than eight Crosses went to Australians, and New Zealand got its first Cross. An exceptional feature of these awards was that seven were given for tho magni- ficent stand which was mad(! at Lone Pine trenches, in the Cialli|)oli I'eninsula, on August 9, 1915. On that terrible night, when so many glorious acts were done wlii(;h were put on lasting re<;ord, when many men stood onl even amongst tho number who had done HO well, theni were still examples of courage !-> THi: TlMi:s HISTOIIY OF 'UIK WAR. Bandsman T. RENDLE. iHt Itii. Duke of CuriiwitU'it I,. I. (WulveruliJ-ui). Capt. D. REYNOLDS. 37Ui Huttery R.V.A. (I>^ Ctttfiiu). \\ liiih set'intnl almost iiiil)(li«'\al)lt<. Two Austialituis — an offift r and a coijioral gave their Hvt»8 to iluty. Captain Alfi»'(l .lolin Shout, 1st liattalion Australian IniptM'ial Force, with a very small party, charged down some tr»«nehes which were strongly oecupietl by the enemy, and personally threw four bombs amongst them, killing eight of his opponents and routing the rest. On that same day, in the afternoon, from the position which had b(>en gained in th( morning, he resvinied his bombing with so much success that he added to his gains another length of trench. He was all the time in furious conflict with the enemy, at close range. F'inally, he was terribly wounded, losing his left eye and his right hand, injiu'ies from \\hich he died. Companion to that truly valiant conduct was tiie bravery of Corpoial Alexander Stewart Jim-ton, 7th Battalion Australian Imperial Force, in conjunction with Lieutenant Frederick Harold Tubb and Corporal William Dunstan, of the same battalion. These three, each of whoin won the Cross, were holding, with a few- men, a newly captured trench on the centre of which the eneiny made a determined counter- attack. The attackers forced their way up to a sap and blew in a sandbag barricade, of which only a foot was left standing. Tubb and the two corporals did the seemingly impossible — they drove the enemy away and rebuilt the barricade. But the assailant was resolute, ami supported by strong bombing parties he retiu-ned and twice again blew in the barricade ; yet each time the enemy was repulsed and the barricade was rebuilt. Tn doing this Tubb was woiuided in the head and arm, and the gallant Burton, while building up the ])arapet, was killed by one of the bombs which were hailing iipon the defenders. A fourth Cross went to the honour of the Ttli Sergt. A. RICHARDS. lut ]ln. LuucM. l''ui>. (riallipoti). Pte. J. RIVERS. 1st \\n. SlierwcHtd Korebtcrs (Neuve Clmi)elle). for the stand at Lon(^ Pine, this recipient being l.ieut(>nant William John Symons. Early in the morning on the 9th the eneiny made a Nuccossion of attacks on an isolated sap, part of which was lost, after six officers in succession had Ixien killed or severely wounded ; then Symons led a charge, shot two Tui'ks with his re\olver and retook the .sap. He was forced, however, to withdraw a little, as the tlireo sides of the sap were being fiied on by the enemy, and going fifteen yards he got some overhead cover, where he built up a sand barricade. The Turks managed to set fire to the fascines and woodwork of the head cover, but Symons put out the flames, rebuilt the barricade and at last compelled the enemy to discontinue his attacks. Three Crosses were won by the 1st Battalion — Captain Shout's fellow-heroes being Private Jolm Hamilton and Private Leonard Keyzor, both of whom, utterly regardless of personal safety, performed prodigies of valour in bomb- throwing. Hamilton recklessly exposed himself on the parados ; Keyzor not only hurled his own bombs, but he also snatched up two live bombs which had fallen and hurled them back at the Turks, and he held on although he was wounded. That was on the 7th ; on the 8th, at the same place, he bombed the enemy out of a position and was again woimded. He refused to go to hospital, and actually volun- teered to tlu-ow bombs for another company w hich had lost its bomb-throwers. The exploit of the New Zealander — Corporal Cyril Royston Guyton Bassett, New Zealand Divisional Signal Company — took place on August 7 on the Chanuk Bair ridge, Callipoli. In full daylight, luider constant heavy fire, after the New Zealand Infantry Brigade had estab- lished itself on the ridge, Bassett succtxidtHl in laying a telephone line from the old position to a iK^w one on the ridge. That , hi>\vevor. w as but THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. J'J one of his many cool and courageous acts in connexion with telephone work and the repair of lines by day and night in circumstances of great peril. Second Lieutenant Hugo Vivian Hope Throssell, 10th Light Horse Regiment, Aus- tralian Imperial Force, won the Cross by his com-age and endurance in holding to his post when severely wounded in Gallipoli on August 29-30, 1915. Even when his wounds has been dressed he returned to his place in the firing- Une, and only left it when the inedical officer ordered him out of action. Galhpoli gave three more Crosses for the iniddle months of 1915, one to Captain Gerald Robert O'Sullivan, 1st Battalion The Royal In- niskilhng Fusiliers, who, on the night of July 1-2, hurled bombs from a parapet, completely exposed to the enemy's fire, and set an in- spiriting and splendid example to his men until he was wounrled ; another to Second- Lieutenant Herbert James, 4th Battalion The Worcestershire Regiment, who also showed the most resolute courage as a bomb-thrower, under a murderous fire, and after nearly all his companions had been killed or wounded, remained alone at the head of a trench and single-handed kept back the enemy until a barrier has been built behind him and the trench secured. He distinguished himself twice in the southern zone — on June 28 and July 3. Then on the night of July 1-2, also in the southern zone. Sergeant James Somers, 1st Battalion The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, won the Cross for his great gallant /y and coolness as a bomber, iiefoio ruilisting, Somers, a light wiry young man of twenty-two, full of good spirits, was a footman in Ireland. It was told of him that he liad put ."iO Turks out of action with his bombs, juid that opposite his trench 30 Turks were found shot. strong was the tie which bound the Indian warriors to their British brethren and how hopelessly astray the Gemians had gone in supposing that loyalty was lacking in the King- Emperor's native forces. Operations were in progress on September 25, 1915, against the ( Jerman trenches south of Mauquissart. The lifleman was himself wounded when he found a badly woiinded British soldier behind the first-line German trench. The Briton urged the Indian to save himself, but the rifleman reso- lutely refused and remained all day and night with the man who was in worse case than he. In the early morning, mercifully favoured by misty weather, he brought the soldier through the enemy's wire entangleinents and putting him in a coirtparatively safe place retiu-ned to the danger zone and rescued two wounded Gurkhas, one after the other. Not satisfied with this, Kulbir Thapa went back — it was now broad daylight — and brought in the British comrade whom he had so well protected through the weary night. For most of the way he carried him, and for most of the time he was under the Germans' fire. A jemadar at Ypres was next to win the Cross. This was Jemadar Mir Dast, I.O.M., 5oth Coke's Rifle^ (Frontier Force), who, on April 26, 1915, showed uncommon bravery and ability in leading his platoon in an attack. Afterwards, when no British officers were left, he collected various parties of the regiment and kept them under his command until an order for letirement came. Later in the day the jemarhir pei-fonned the remarkably courageous acts of helping to carry, under very heavy fire, no fewer than eight British and Indian officers into safety. Great distinction was to be the fortune of the 39th (Jarhwal Rifles, for two of its members were to win the Cross in Franco, (;no, Naik Darwan At the time oi its [>erfoi;nuiifo there was f rjld* the story of the winning of the Cross by Sepoy Khud;wlad, ffie first member of t do lodiiui contingfJTit tf> he awanled flie liononr. This was early in the war October 31, I!) 14, jiI Holleheke, I'elgjurri. 'I'his heave (>rivafe he- longed to the I29»li l)uke of ( 'f»nriHiight -^ Own lialuchis. A rifleman of the 3rd IQui^iui Alcxandni's <^)wn) Giirk»i Rifl«w, Kulbir Thiipa, was Hwarrled the Cross fr;r an act which showed how • Vol. jr., C.hnj,. Xl.U. I.ilfnirllr. Lieut. 0. ROUPELL. iHt IJn. KhhI Surrey H<'k(. (■■ Mill <M» '•), Act.-Corp. Issy SMITH. Isl (ill. MiiiichrHtir ltc(il. (.Near \ prcM). LANCE-CORPORAL MICHAEL O'LEARY, 1st BATTALION IRISH (RIARUS. Awarded the V.C. for bravery at ,Guinchy, February 1, 1915. He formed one of the storn)in{( party which advance J against the enemy's barricades. O'Leary rushed to the front and himself killed five Germans who were holding: the first barricade, after which he attacked and captured a second barricade after killing three of the enem> and making prisoners of two more. 20 SRCOND-UKUTKNANT JAMKS LKACH AND SHKCJRANT JOHN HCXJAN, Recapture a trench from the enemy near Feitubcrt, October 29. 1914. After their trench had been taken by the f'frofn*, Second-I.ieiiienant I.cach and Scr((eant Ho)Jan of the 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment, worked from traver«e to traverce at clo«e quarter*, and ((radiially nucceedcd in rci(airiin(! po»sc8sion, killin){ ei)iht of the enemy, woundin|( two, tnd takinit •ixteen pri»onerii. Hoth the officer and the iierjjcimt were awarded the Victoria Cross. 21 ').'>. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. Pte. J. SMITH. 3ril (III. UorJer lle;it. (Uoujjeg lianes). Sec-Lieut. A. V. SMITH, I Mi Uii. K. Lilies llo;jt. Lce.-Corp. J. TOMBS, 1st l»ii. Livnrpool Ki'gt. (Kill- (III Uois). Sec-Lieut. A. TURNER. l8t IJii. Koyal Hcrk»liirc ia-gt. (Xcar VeniicUcB). Sing Negi, of the Lst Battalion, noar Festubert, on the night of November 23-24, lit 1 4, and the other. Rifleman Gobar Sing Xegi, 2n(l Battalion, on March 10, 1915, at Neuve Chapelle. The corporal, though wounded in two places in the head and also in the arm, was one of the first to push rountl each successive traverse when the regiment was retaking and clearing the enemy out of our trenches, and this he did in spite of a severe fire, at the closest itinge, from bombs and rifles. At Xeuve Chapelle, during oui- attack on the CJorman position, the rifleman was one of a bayonet party with bombs which entered their main trench, and he was the first man to go round each traverse, driving back the enemy until they were forced to surrender. The gallant rifleman was killed in this furious encounter. Other noble acts were to be put to the account of Europeans of the Indian Army, but the doers of them were not to live to learn how highly they had been honoured. There was Major George Godfrey Massy Wheeler, 7th (Hariana) Lancers, who was killed while leading his squadron to the attack of the " North Mound " at Shaiba, Mesopotamia, on April 13, 1915. " He was seen far ahead of his men riding single-handed straight for the enemy's standards "" — one of the finest sen- tences ever written in the official records of the Cross. Only on the previous day Wheeler had asked to be allowed to lead his squadron in an effort to captiu-e a flag which was the centre-point of an enemy group who were firing on one of our picquets. With the lance he swept upon the opposing infantry, and having done considerable execution amongst them he retired, while the foes swarmed out of hidden ground ; but only to fortu a splendid target for our own hoi??e-gunners Another Indian Army officei Lieutenant Frank Alexander de Pass, 34th Prince Albert Victor's Own Poona Horse — lost his life in an affair which won for liiia the Cross. It was at Fe-itubert, on November 24, 1914, and de Pass was entering a German sa[) and destroying a traverse in face of the enemy's bombs. The lieutenant crowned this very gallant deed by rescuing a w'ounded man who was lying in the open under a pitiless fire. It was a noble day's work ; but de.Pass did not survive to see it recognized, for next day he was killed in niaking a .second attempt to take the sap, which had been reoccupied by the Genuans. On May 13, 1916, the award was announced of a Cross to Lance-Xaik Lala, 41st Dogras, Indian Army, and in the following June another Cross for Sepoy Chatta Singh, 9th Bhopal Infantry, Indian Army, was gazetted. The lance-naik heard cries for help from his adju- tant, who was severely wounded. In the face of what seemed certain death he insisted on going to the adjutant, and when not allowed to crawl back with liim stayed until dusk, having stripped off his own clothing to keep the officer warm. He then returned to shelter, but after dark went back with a stretcher and the adjutant was brought in. The sepoy also left cover to assist his wounded and helpless commanding officer. He bound up the officers wound, and dug cover for him. For five hours he remained with the officer, " shielding him with his own body on the exposed side." Then, imder cover of darkness, he too sought help iind brought the oHicer into safety. The aniazing exploits for which tlie \'ictona Cross had been given to n\embers of all ranks THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 23 of the Army seemed impossible of eclipse, yet it might abnost be said that members of the Xavy occasionally excelled their brethern of the sister service. There were on recortl many instances of the display of sheer valour, the courage for wliich the Cross had been so often given in the days of the Crunea and the ^lutiny, when warfare had but few complications and simple personal bravery ranked high ; but the terrible devices of the war which had come into being at sea demanded for the accomplishment of many naval duties the very highest courage and endurance. It was especially with re- gard to submarine work that these quali- ties were demanded, antl they were promptly furnished. They were shown in connexion with the first naval V.C. to be gazetted, and that was to Lieutenant Norman Douglas Holbrook, R.X., for taking his submarine, B 11, on December 13, 1914, up the Dardanelles ; and, in spite of the very difficult current, diving his vessel under five rows of mines and torpedoing the Turkish battleship Messudiyeh, which was guarding the minefield. Holbrook not only did this, but he also brought the sub- marine safely back, despite gun-fire and torpedo boats and a subn^ersion of nine hours.* There was a notable sequel to the affair on July 24, 1916, when, in the Prize Court, before Sir Samuel Evans, President, there was a motion on behalf of Holbrook and the ship's company of B 1 1 for a declaration that they were entitlofl to prize boimty for the destruc- tion of the Mf^sudiyeh ; that at the time there were 700 pers^jns on board, and that the prize bfjunty at the rate of £.5 a head amounted to £'{,.500. Holbrook liini.self was called, anrl said he received infonnation that a Turkish battle- fthip waM in Dardan Bay, and was being used • See Vol. nr.. Chapter LIII. as the headquartei-s in the Dardanelles of the German Naval Staff. He understood that there was a minefield from Kephez Bay to Kephez Point, consisting of five rows of mines extending the width of the channel. He applied to the senior submarine officer, and obtained permission to make an attempt to get through and under the minefield, and on December 13 he went iip the Dardanelles in charge of the B 11, dived under the linos of mines, and about noon sighted the Messudiyeh at anchor off Chanak. At abovit 800 yards a torpedo was fired at her, and after it had been heard to explode, the submarine put up her periscope and the battleship was seen to be sinking by the stern, her quarter-deck being awash. It was afterwards reported by officers of the Royal Flying Corps that the Messudiyeh was sunk. When the lieutenant had told his modest tale, unique in a British coui't of law, the President observed, " All I can say to you is that you showed splendid covirage." In declaring that the complement of the battle- ship at the time of her destruction was 700, and the amount of prize bounty payable was £3,500, the President remarked, " Nobody can say that I ani wrong, and I hope I am right." Another remarkable submarine feat was gazetted late in June, 1915. The winner of the V.C. this time was Lieutenant -Commander Martin Eric Nasmith, R.N., who, while recon- noitring in the Sea of Mai-mora and in the pre- sence of groat danger, destroyed a largo Turkish gunboat, two transports, an ammunition shijj and three store ships, in addition to driving one ship ashore. When he had safely passed the most difficult part of his homeward journey, he returned to torpedo a Turkish transport. Though Holbrook's was the first of the naval (Jrosses tf) bo gazetted, yet two weeks oailicu' C»pt. i. VALLENTIN. I»». lUl. ■<'ll|t,t, ■^UffH Pl«. A. VICKERS, 2ui\ Itrr li/iyiil Wnrwlckx (Hulluch). Sec-Lieut. C. VICKERS, SlicrvvfXiil I'fin-KfiTH (llolicii/'illrrn lii'ildiilit). Capt. 0. WALFORO, Hoynl Ait.illiry (SiMldiil Itiilir). •n THi: TIMES HISTORY OF THK WAR. a (Imwl ttad bt^oii putfuriiunl by C^uiaiuandttr H. 1*. Kitchie, H.X., which gaiiunl for him tho Maiitu tliiitinutiuu Thin oHicor'ti uxploit (hhi- MicittHl of t'uiiliii^ thtt hai'boiii' of Uur-ois-Stiltuiiii, th» cupitul uf (iiMiaaii East Africa, in thnut tiiuall boath aiul niiikin^ ail tho (jei'iiiaii vtMHuis that wore in it. This task of stnirch and demoli- tion wart ont> of groat hazaril, in viow of tlio Mtubbornno8H of tho onomy's doft)nco, and Ritcliio wan ' Hovoroly woundod. llo ondurod until ho becamo unconsciouH, and by that timo ho htul boon wouniloil no fowor than eight tinws, tho interval botweoa hi« first and last sevtMo wound being about twenty minutes. Holbrook's feat vva.s {)aralleled at the .same perioil by the perfonnanco of Lioutenant-Com- mandor Edward C'oiutnoy Jioylo, R.N., when in command of Submarine E14. Boyle dived his vessel under the enemy's minefields and entered the Sea of Mtirmora, on April 27, 101."), Hero again there were not only tho ordinary risks of submarining to encoimter, but also the perils of strong and treacherous currents, and the constant danger of attack from hostile patrols ; yet Boyle successfully met them all, and ills operations in the narrow waters of the Straits ended in the sinking of two Turkish gunboats and one large military tran.sport. The disappointments and losses which had characterised the operations at the Dardanelles had been softened by these triumphs of junior submarine officers ; further satisfaction was to be afforded in connexion with the famous landing from the River Clyde at V Beach, in the Gallipoli Peninsula, on April 25, 1915.* Here was one of the rare cases that claimed a cluster of Crosses, and three were given, one to Commander Edward Unwin, R.N., one to Midshipman George L Drewry, Royal Naval Reserve, and one to Midshipman Wilfred St. A Malleson, R.X. The commander was in the River Clyde, and seeing that the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore had broken adrift he left the transport. At that time a very dangerous fire was being directed upon the vessel, but Unwin paid no heed to it. He worked on, resolutely attempting to get the lighters into position, and managed by sheer force of will to keep going until he could go no longer, because cold and immersion mastered him so much that he was forced to return to the ship, where he was wrapped in blankets. He was suffering and exhausted, the doctor forbade him to return to his task — yet he went, and he finis hed it. * Described in Vol. V., Chapter XCIV. Hut III ciirryiiig out liis resolution he was wounilod by throe l)ullots and had to return to the doctor for attention. Again he l(»ft the ship, this tinxe in a lifelxjat, so that he could save some woundod men who were lying help- less in shallow water near tho beach. The conunandor continued this heroic task under constant fire, and stopped at last only through sheer physical exhaustion It was a noble display of Jieroism, and was well supported by his subordinates of every rank. Con- spicuous by their conduct were Drewry and Malleson, the former helping the commander to secure the lighters, under the deadly rifle and Maxim fire, although he was woundeil in tho head. Twice afterwards he tried, but in vain, to swim with a line from lighter to lighter. VV'here Drewry failed through complete ex- haustion Malleson succeeded. He took the line, and swam with it to the lighter that it was wished to reach. This line subsequently broke, and Malleson made two more attempts, without success, to carry out the task which he had imposed on himself. Drewry, who was in his teens, had served with the P. and O. Company, and was the first officer of the R.N.R. to win the Victoria Cross. At the time his honour was gazetted there was announced the first award of the distinction to a seaman of the Royal Naval Reserve — George McKenzie Samson, who " worked on a lighter all day under fire ; attending wounded and getting out lines ; he was eventually danger- ously wounded by Maxim fire." With Samson was bracketed Able Seaman William Charles Williams, who " held on to a line in the water for over an hour under heavy fire, until killed." — brief but impressive record of a gallant sailor's death. At this time also the Cross was given to Lieutenant -Commander Eric Gascoigne Robinson, R.N., for a very fine achievement ashore. On February 26, 1915, he advanced alone, under heavy fire, into an enemy's gun position, and having destroyed a four-inch gun he retm-ned to his party for another charge, with which the second gim was destroyed. Tlie officer would not let the members of his demoli- tion party go with hina, on the grounil that their white \iniforms would make them con- spicuous. He took part in foiu' attacks on tho minefields, each time imder heavy fire. That landing from the River Clyde was to give the Cross to the first member of tho Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve to win it. This was Sub-Lieutenant Arthur Waldone St. (.Mair THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 25 PIPHFt DANIKL LAIDI.AW, 7th Hfittalion Kin^t'* Own Scottith Kordcrcrs, at Loon, September 25, 1^15. TiH'Jall. Mf^ro th<in a yoar olajiHotJ botwoon f ho fx»rf<*rTrifinr;o of hin hJ)*h;M w.i arifl thi«» anriounno- rn»>Tit of I ho h«»Htow(il of th« CrfiHH ff>r it, fJm floUy hoin« r;aiJH«)(| hy tho fact that 'I'ihWuII jukI t.h*i iilnUxm iiri'lor hJH orrlorH w#»r<) on fhttnclirid Hfuvico at tlio tiriin uti<l tliut lio whh killod in action on May 0, I 1 dayH aftor Iii.s pillant ronduct in romif'xioti wi(h (Im lunditi^ fioni IIki llivor (/lyd(n In IIjuI vvonddrliil (tntoriJi-iwo thoro worn many iinoxpoctod HifcuatiotiH, many 36 THI<: TIMHS HlSTiJin OF Till': WAIL t^ttlls fi>r help from mmi in pm-il, ami amongHt the iiuttit rutiily tu riinpttuii wu.s I'lhilull. lltuiiiiig wuiuulml iiiHii uii the b«tuoli i-alling for holp he juiii(je(l iutu the wutei-, and (lUishin^^ a boat in front »if hiiii began the task of rewfue. I'nable Mingle -tumdeit to tarry out hirt pur|)OHe \ui Huugttt tielp anil took with hlin on two of hin tripri treading Seaman .Malia ami on other trips Chief I'etty OHiter I'eriing and heading Seamen Unrtifss and Parkin.son. Tisdail altogether uuule four or ti\e trifis between the transport and the ahoie, ail the time uniler a hea\'y and ai'i-urate tire, anil in this way he rescued Heveral wounded men. Of the brave little band who mai-hine-guns and riHes. There was in the i-entre of the obHtnit-tion a dhow anil an at- temjit was made to sink it by gunfire. This effort failed, and (^'ookson ordered the Comet to be [)lai-ed alongside. This dangeious and ditlicult task having been act-omplished, he sprang on to the dhow and with an axe tried to cut the wire hawsers which connected it with the other two craft. In doing this (^ookson inevitably made himself an outstanding figure, and he luid no .sooner jium[)ihI on to the dhow and set to work than ho was shot in several places. Within a ftnv minutes he was dead. NAIK DARWAN SING NEGI, GARHWAL RIFLES, AT FESTUBERT. Awarded the V.C. for great gallantry on the night of November 23-24, 1914, when his regiment was engaged in retaking and clearing the enemy out of the British trenches, and although wounded in two places in the head, and also in the arm, Naik Darwan Sing Negi was one of the first to push round each successive traverse, in the face of severe fire from bombs and rifles at the closest range. helped him Curtiss w^as a few weeks afterwards reported missing. An officer who had already proved his mettle and had received the D.S.O. was to be added to the roll of naval V.C.'s by the perfonnance of one of those acts which seem to be peculiarly associated witli the British fighting man. This was Lieutenant -Commander Edgar Christopher Cookson, R.X. During the advance on Kut-el- Amara, on September 28, 1915, the river gun- boat Comet and other gunboats had been ordered to examine and if possible destroy three vessels forming an obstruction which the Turks had placed across the river. From both banks of the river, as the gmiboats neared the obstacle, a very hea\-y fire was opened on them from Such were the deeds for which, during the first two years of war, twelve Victoria Crosses were announced for na\al officers and men, though there were actually won in that period three more in the Battle of Jutland Bank — by Commander the Hon. E. B. S. Bingham, Major F. J. W. Harvey, R.M.L.T., and Boy John Travers Cornwell.* " If there be degrees of chivalry the highest award should be accorded to the medical pro- fession," wrote Lord Northclilfe in dealing, in The Times, in October, 191(5, with the war doctors' work imder fire . . " For the last three months in the Royal Army Medical • Vol. IX.. Chapter CXL. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 27 Corps alone, I account them, according to the figtires published in The Times from day to day : Officers : Killed . . . . . . 53 Wounded . . . . 208 Missing . . . . 4 N.C.O.'s and men (R.A.M.C. only): Killed . . . . . . 260 Wounded . . .. 1 ,212 Missing . . . . . 3" Those figures, clear and impressive, showed at a glance what the R.A.M.C. was doing, and they were representative of the work of that wonderful band during the first two years of war. First amongst these exploits stood forth the case of Lieutenant Arthur Martin-Leake, R.A.M.C, for to him was given the excep- tional award of a clasp to the Victoria Cross which he already possessed, granted to him for great devotion to duty and self-sacrifice in the South African War. During the strenu- ous and anxious days of the latter part of 1914, in the Ypres region, Lieutenant Martin-Leake rescued " a large niunber of wounded," the rescues being " especially during the period October 29 to November 8, 1914, near Zonnebeke," while exposed to constant firr. Lieutenant Martin-Leake's bar was announced at the same time as OLearys Cross, and these two awards, representing acts which were in some ways of opposite characteristics, pro- foundly moved, and filled with pride, the British public. It was in the neighbourhood of Ypres, too, on the afternoon of April 25, 1915, that an officer of the Canadian Army Medical Service won the Cross by precisely the same conduct as that which ha/l distinguished Leake. This was Captain Francis Alexander Caron Scrim - gor, 14th Jiattalion Royal Montreal Regiment, who was in charge of an advanced dressing- gtation in worn© fami buildings which were Pte. E. WARNER, 1st Bn. Bedfordshire Kegt. (Xear " Hill 60 "). Sec-Lieut. S. C. WOODROFFE, 8th Bn. Kifie Brigade (Hooge). being heavily shelled. Scrimger not only directed the removal of the wounded, despite the deadly fire, but he himself took up a severely wounded officer who was lying helpless in a stable and bore him off in search of a safer place. The effort was too much for him ; he could no longer cany his heavy burden, yet he refused to leave his charge and insisted on remaining until help could be obtained. That noble act was but part of the most courageous conduct which Scrunger had displayed con- tinuously, day and night, in attending to the wounded during the hea\'y fighting between April 22 and 25. Captain Scrimger's act was fit companion to the deeds which gave the Cross to three other fighters from Canada — Colour-Sergeant William Frederick Hall, 8th Canadian Battalion ; Lance- Corporal Frederick Fisher, 13th Canadian Battalion ; and Lieutenant F. W. Campbell, 1st Canadian Battalion. Hall was anotlier of those noble heroes whose lives have been given in trying to save others. While in battle in the neighbourhood of Ypres, on April 24, 1915, he made a resolute attempt to reach a wounded man who was crying for help. His first effort failed, S«3.-I/irat. 0. WOOLLEY. tMIr fin. l/iuiUiU KoKt. (" Hill »/; "). Ue.-Corp. a. H. WYATT. inl Itii ' ColdHf.rRarri (Jiinrd" I llv.ll <' ■ I ry. Mai. C. YATE, '^iid VorkHhirc UuM Infantry (]j: Catcau). Pie. W. YODNQ, Mill iMiyl I.iincH, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 29 and a non-commissioned officer and private who were helping the wounded man were themselves wounded ; then Hall again rushed forward under a deadly fire and was actually lifting up the wotmded man, to take him to shelter, when he was mortally wounded in the head. Fisher, too, gave his life, on April 23, 1915, near St. Julian, for he was killed while showing the utmost courage and resource in getting his machine gun into action. Campbell distin- guished himself at Givenchy on Jime 15, 1915, also as a machine gunner. In his case, as in that of Fisher, heavy losses had been svtffered by the detachment and the situation was one of great peril. Campbell survived that danger and won the Cross by his heroism, but later he was wounded and died. It almost seemed as if the unflinching courage and fortitude of men Uke Leake and Scrimger had become a tradition amongst the " war doctors," for another hero arose in Temporary Lieutenant George Allan ^Maling, M.B., of the R.A.M.C. It was during the heavy fighting near Fauquissart, on Sep- tember 25, 1915, that Mahng worked hard and incessantly, under the unceasing shell fire which characterised the operations in that region at the time. He began his task at 6.15 in the morning, collecting and treating more than 300 paen in the open and exposed to merciless fire. Throughout the whole of that day, during the evening, all through the night, without a break till eight o'clock next morning — twenty-six unbroken hours — reckless of shell and bullet, he held as grimly to his ttisk as Granville did off the Azores in his fight with the one and the fifty-three ; and the simile hoId.s good, for as Grenville fought on though wounded, so this temporary lieutenant in the ranks of the " war doctors " went about his duty of succouring and saving when it Hoemwl impossible that human strength could endure. Eleven o'clock came, then a large high explosive shell burst and did drcafiful havf>c. It killfHl several of hb patients, it woundwl his only assistant, and it flung Maling down and twnporarily stunned him. Yet no sooner Yuui the shock and horror of the sholl- buTHt pfissofJ than Maling pulled himself Utgethw and rosumwi his work. I£ow long ho would have kef<t it up no rnan can toll, but it happenerj that very s^>on a sofxjnd shell came and exploded, covering both Maling and his instruments with tl/'liriH ; yet, even Hf», ho had not finishfHj, lur, says the official record, " his higli courage and zeal never failed him, and he continued his gallant work single-handed." The Indian Medical Service, in the person of Captain John Alexander Sinton, M.B., claimed a Cross to add to its already honourable record. This recipient was decorated "for most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty. Although shot through both arms and through the side, he refused to go to the hospital, and remained, as long as daylight lasted, attending to his duties under very heavy fixe. In three previous actions Captain Sinton displayed the utmost bravery." It was inevitable that some time should pass from the beginning of the war \antil the Allied airmen should be masters of the new conditions of their warfare. There were many serious defects to remedy, numerous deficiencies to make good ; but British airmen lost no time in showing their daring and resoiu-cefulness. The first Cross to be given for an air -bombing enter- prise was won by Second Lieutenant William Barnard Rhodes-Moorhouse, Special Reserve, Royal Flying Corps, for a splendid and successful flight to Courtrai. On April 26, 1915, he started on a bombing expedition. Having dropped bombs on the linos near Courtrai railway station he began his return journey, and in the course of it was mortally • wounded by the enemy's fire. Despite his injuries he managed to fly, at a very low altitude, to his destination, a distance of thirty-five miles. He was able to report the successful accomplislimont of his journey, but he did not long survive his injuries. In recog- nition of his courageous achievement he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. Second on the airmen's roll of honour was Flight Sub-Lieutenant li. A. J. Warnoford, Royal Naval Air Service, who not only per- formed an act of extraordinary courage but also demonstrated the helplessness and vulnera- bility of the Zeppelin when in conflict with aeroplanes. Warneford had been trained in the merchant service and had proved to be a flyer of uncf)mmon merit. On Juno 7, 1915, at dawn, he and two moio aviators started on an expedi- tion the object of which was tr) bomb Zeppelin sheds which had been located at Evere, near Brussels. That raid was successfully accom- filished ; but Warneford was not satisfied. He longed to do more, to carry out an object which was dear tf) his heart, and that was to meet and destroy an enrtiny airship. F«jrtune favoured biiM (irid'juHtifirifl ilio caution' bo luid sbown in 30 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. reierving IxiuibH fi>r Uiu huge proy. Soon after ilaybreak, sweeping thu sky, he saw a Zeppelin at a height <if 8«une aix thousanil feet. The airship was travelUng rapidly and wan about halfway between BruwaelH and the old city of CJhent. Instantly VVarnefortl put his purpose into execution, and with amazing skill and utter fearloHsntsw he got his machine, a M(jran«» monoplane, almost over tlwi enemy craft. Then he descended about fiftfHm yards and flung six bombs. The sixth missile struck the vast bulk in the middle and there was a terrible explosion. "The displacement of the air around mo," to use VVarneford's own words, " was so groat that a tornado seemed to have been produced. My machine was tossed upward, and then flung absolutely upside down. I was forced to loop the loop in spite of myself." By a wonderful stroke of luck the machine was righted and Warneford, whom trouble forced to descend, lantlod safely in enemy coimtry. He was able, however, to restart his engine within fifteen minutes and ascended safely and made off towards his base, which he reached. Meanwhile, the Zeppelin, wrecked, was falling in a flaming mass to earth, watched by transfixed but exulting Belgians. I'nfortimately it crashed ort to a nunnery in Ghent and the building took fire, and loss of life was caused amongst the nuns and children who were in tlio niuincry. The crew were destroyed with their airship, and in their work of salvage the Gennans had evidence of the completeness with which one of their most cherished beliefs had been shattered. The annihilation of machine and men by one British aviator, single-handed and unsupported, was the sinister forerimner of similar disasters over the London area itself. A wave of pride and joy swept through the Empire on hearing of the airman's splendid achievement, and there was universal satisfaction when it was known that the King had telegraphed liis congratulations to Warneford and announced that he had conferred upon him the honom- of the Vic- toria Cross. He was also awarded, on the recommendation of General Jofft-e, the Cross of the Legion of Honotu-. Warneford's well-won glory was short-Uved — in ten days he was dead, ha\-ing met his fate in a shocking accident. On June 17, wlaile flying with Mr. Henry Needham, an American writer, at Buc Aerodrome, Paris, he and his passenger were killed. Warneford had been ordered to fly back to Dunkirk, where he was to resume duty. He had risen to about 700 fe»»t when the maehijie, afttn* wobbling violently, overturned and threw out the two men, both of whom wei-o killed instantly. The story was told that on the day befoi-e his death Warneford hatl been given a bunch of roses in a restaurant, and someone said to him, " What rejoicings theiv will bo when you return to Li)n(U)n and see your mother again ! " To this the yoiuig oflicer answered sadly, " I feel that I shall die before I return home." When he fell ho was wearing his Cross of tho Legif)n of Honour ; and tliis was found embedded in his chest. The body was brought homo and was buriiul at Bronqiton Cemetery, tho mourners including Mi-s. Corkery, his mother, to whom, on October 5, 1915, tho King wrote saying that it was to him a matter of sincere regret that the death of the officer had deprived hinn of the " pride of personally conferring upon him the Victoria Cross, the greatest of all naval distinctions." The achievements of the airmen had been consistently wonderful ; yet there came to light a performance which must doubtless stand for all time by itself — the astounding feat of Squadron-Commander Richard Bell Davies, D.S.O., R.N., and Flight Sub-Lieutenant Gilbert Formby Smylie, R.N., who, on Novem- ber 19, 1915, carried out an air attack on Ferrijik Junction. Smylie's machine was received by very heavy fire and brought down. The pilot planed down over the station and from a very low altitude simultaneously released all his bombs except one, which failed to drop. Having done this he continued his descent into the marsh. With astonishing presence of mind, on alighting he set fire to his machine, having seen the unexploded bomb, and knowing that it would surely destroy the aeroplane ; then he went towards Turkish territory. At this moment he saw Davies descending, and again showed the most aston- ishing courage and resom-cefulness, for fearing that the squadron-commander would come down near the bvirning machine and so risk death from the exploding bomb, Smylie rushed back and from a short distance exploded the bomb with a pistol bullet. The act was suf- ficiently astounding as it stood ; but the drama was not complete. Descending at a sate distance from the bui-ning machine the squadron-commander took up the sub -lieutenant in the very presence of a party of the enemy, and soared away with him in safety to the aerodrome — an unrivalled feat anil one which THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 31 the most imaginativo novelist would scarcely have dared to invent. To Davies, who already had the D.S.O., the Victoria Cross was granted, and to his brave companion in the marvellous adventure there was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Another Cross for a truly splendid flying performance was given to Captain John Aidan Liddell, 3rd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and R.F.C. He was severely wounded on July 31, 1915, when on a flying reconnaissance over Ostend-Bruges-Ghent. His right thigh was broken, causing momentary unconsciousness, but in spite of that he managed to recover partial control of his machine after it had dropped nearly 3,000 feet. Though con- tinually fixed at and in a state of collapse yet he succeeded in completing his course and brought hLs machine into owe Unes, half an hovu" after he had received his terrible wound. The control- wheel and throttle-control were smashed, and one of the under -carriage struts ; and, said the official story, ' ' It would seem incredible that he could have accomplisod his task." One more wonderful deed completes the list for which the Cross was giv^en to airmen. The recipient was Second -Lieutenant Gilbert Stuart Martin Insall, Xo. 11 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps, for con.spicuous bravery, skill, and determination in France on November 7, 1915. Ho wa-s patrolling in a Vickers Fighting Machine, with First-Class Air Mechanic T. H. Donald as gunner, when a German machine was neen and pursued and attacked near Achiot. The Vickers machine was led over a rocket battery by the German pilot, but Insall dived and got to dofio range and Donald stopped the German's engine by firing a drum of cart- ridges. Then the Gorman pilot dived through a cloud ; but InsHll would not lot him escape and followed hirn. Again fire was opened and the onoray machine was brought down heavily in a ploughofl fiokl four milf»s south- oast of Arraw. Instantly tho Gormans scrambled out of thoir rmichino and prepared to fire ; but InHalJ waH too quick for thorn and diving to r/Ht ft. ho onablof! Donairl to fire heavily on thorn. At this tho Gonnans fled, <jno, who wan evidently wounded, being holporl by tho other. More GorrnariH then bog»n a heavy fire, but in Hpito of all frisall tiirnofl again and drop[>rxl an incwidiary bornb on tho onorny rfvu;hirio, which bocarno wreathed in Hrnf)ko. Th'>n th'> lioiitonarit headed west, to get back ovtjT tho ('iftnfoiti trendies ; but being only Squad-Corn. R. DAVIES, K.N.A.S. (Farrijik Junction). Capt. L. HAWKER, R.F.C. Sec -Lieut. G. INSALL, R.F.C. (Near Achiet). Capt. J. A. LIDDELL, R.F.C. (Ostend — Bruges — Ghent). Sec.-Lieut. RHODES-MOOR- HOUSE, R.F.C. (Courlrai). Sub.-Lieut. R. WARNEFORD, R.N.A.S. (Ghent). THE AIR SKRVICES. 2,000 feet up ho dived across the trenches for greatftr spewed, Donakl firing into them as the Vickers passf»d over. The petrol-tunk, how- ever, had boon damaged by tho (Jerman fire ; but Insall managed to land undnr «!(>ver of a woofl 500 yarfls inside our lines. No fewer than 15^) shells wore fired at tho -machine while it was on tho ground, but tho Germans failed to cau.so material flumago. Much damage, however, had boon done by rifle fire ; but tiu's w u OS O ■^ a c ■ u -a ^ i C4 o -s Ui H 4) >• <a u C 'u jQ m « s H - O „ 0) z ■£ o Q Z o s hJ m o a o •at .5 'C 9 ^•^ E Z o <: H H -i: QQ z o Q z o ►J b O >^ H Z O U ^ = . X a o t> ;: V J= >• ^ •= ••= .5 ^ U OS . B E « £ •01 2 o O "a Q 'U « s CD as B ? O S a ■? o OS V J3 o If §^ Q 1 Z ** o "S CJ -^ u « <: •> 3 .s o o «> o « u c u c o THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 83 was made good during the night, behind screened Ughts, and at dawn Insall triumphantly flew his well-named Fighting Machine home, with Donald as a passenger. Musicians shared the honoiu" of the Cross with the men of the actual fighting line. Stand- ing forth amongst them was Pipei- Daniel Laid- law, 7th Battahon the King's Own Scottish Borderers, who repeated the performance of Piper Findlater, V.C., at Dargai — and both unconsciously were copjasts of the Highland piper who in earUer days had rallied his kilted comrades to the tune of '" Up, an' waur them a', Willy." Laidlaw, on September 25, 1915, when an attack was about to begin on German trenches near Loos and Hill 70, and during the worst of the bombardment, saw that his company was somewhat shaken from the effects of gas. He sprang upon the parapet, and marching up and down, played his company out of the trench to the rousing skirl of " Blue Bonnets over the Border " and " The Standard on the Braes of Mar." The effect of the wild music was instant and electrical — the company swept on to the assault and the piper continued playing until he was wounded. The pipes, which were smashed in the fight, were repaired and silver mounted. The Cross was conferred on Drummer Spencer John Bent, 1st Battahon the East Lancashire Regiment, who, on the night of November 1-2, 1914, near Le Gheer, did an extrar^rdinary thing, peculiarly so for a lad in hi.H teens. His officer, platoon sergeant, and section commander had been struck down, and the situation was one which might well have diimfoundwl a soldier of much more - than the drummer lad's experience ; but Bent saw his chance, and he took it — he coolly assumed command and by his remarkable presence of mind h«>ld the position. It was for this rare display of courage and rosourcfrfulness that he was awarded the Cross, although on several occa- sions he had distinguishwl liimself by Ijringing up ammunition under heavy fire and rescuing woiindwl men whf> were lying ex[K>HOfl in the open. 7'hori carne the cuhd of Bands- man 'f'horruis Kdwanl liondlo, 1st Batta- lion 'I'he J>ijko of Cornwall's Light Infantry, U> wYiom the Cross was given for attending wounded under fire at Wulvorghom on S'lVftminir 20, 1914. Ronrlle's af;t, which was fxjrforrn'Hj unfler very heavy shell and riflr> fire, was rescuing rnen from the trenches in which thoy had been buried by the blowing in of the parapets by the enemy's heavy howitzers. The Church had sent lavishly of her sons to take their part in the terrific conflict, and repeatedly they proved that their spirit was the equal of any combatant's. There was the quiet heroism of burying the dead under hea\'y fixe, conxforting the dying in situations of the utmost danger, and of performing many acts which were not expected froro the members of a peaceful calling. The second year of war was to bring to prominence a modest curate who had shown a courage worthy of any recipient of the Cross. This was the Rev. Edward Noel Mellish, temporary chaplain to the forces. His heroic work of rescuing wovmded under fire has been described in Vol. ^^II., Chapter CXXXII. It was impossible to read, without emotion and the deepest pride, the official records of the many deeds which meant the saving of life for which the Cross was given. There were many instances of the simple display of wonderful devotion, apart from originality or resourcefulness. Take the case of Private WilUam Young, 8th (Service) Battalion East Lancashire Regiment. He was in his trench, but on seeing that his sergeant had been wounded he left it, under very heavy fire, to attend to him. The sergeant requested him to get under cover ; Young refused, and almost immediately both his jaws were shattered by a shot. Young had set his mind upon a rescue, and horribly wounded though he was ho carried out his purpose, with another soldier's help Then, unaided, he staggered to the dressing- station — and it was found that he had been also wounded by a rifle bullet in the chest. The Cross was given to him, nor could it have been withheld from such a valiant fighting man. Contemporaneously with the gazetting of Young's honour was the awarding of the Cross to Private Henry Kenny, 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, for going out six times during one day, always under deadly fire of gun. machine-gun, and rifle, and each time securing a wounded man who lay holploss in the open, and carrying him to safety— being himself shot in the neck whilst handing the last man over the parapet. Amongst the gunners was Acting -Sergeant John C. Raynfw, R.?\A., whoso l)att(>ry, at Kosse 7 do BefJiune, on October II, 1915, was being heavily bombarded by armour-piercing and E. BINGHAM, H.M.8. '• Nestor" (Jutland). Lieut.-Com. E. BOYLE, Subiuarine Ell ( l);ir(lanflleB). Lieut.-Com. COOKSON. " Coiiiut " (Kut-el-Amara). J. T. CORNWELL, H.M.8. "Chester" (Jutland). Mid. 0. DREWRY, K.X.K. (Dardanelles). Mid. W. St. A. MALLESON. R.N. (Dardanelles). Lieut. N. HOLBROOK, Submarine BH (Dardanelles). Ueut.-Com. M. NASMITH, (Sea of Marmora). Maj. F. HARVEY. R.M.L.I. (Jutland). Com. H. RITCHIE, HJkl.S. " Goliath " (East Africa). Lient-Com. Eiio ROBINSON. E.N, (Dardanelles). Seaman 0. SAMSON, B.N.K. (Dardanelles). NAVAL HEROES 34 Sub.-Lieut. A. TISDALL, R.N.V.R. (Gallipoli) OF THE WAR. Com. £. UNWIN, " Ki\-or Clj'de/' (Dartlauelles). THEj^TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 36 gas shells. When "Cease Fiie"' was orclere'l Raynes went out into a deadly area to rescue a wounded sergeant, who was forty yards away. He called on two gminers to help him. The gallant men obeyed — both were quickly kiUed ; but Raynes got the sergeant to safety in a dug-out. Then a gas-shell burst at the mouth of the dug-out, and Raynes once more dashed across the fatal open, fetched his own smoke-hehnet, put it on the rescued wounded sergeant, and then, though badly gassed himself, " staggered back to serve his gun." That is only part of the courageous conduct for which the acting -sergeant was awarded the Cross. At Xeuve ChapeUe, on March 12, 1915, Lance -Corporal Wilfred D. FuUer, 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, seeing a band of Germans trying to escape along a commiini cation trench, ran towards them and kiUed the leader with a bomb, and such was the effect of his performance, single-handed and alone, that the rest of the enemy, a round half-htmdred, gave themselves up to hun. On that day, also at Xeuve ChapeUe, Private Edward Barber, of the same battaUon, ran ahead of his grenade company and hurled bombs at the Germans with so much success that a " very great number of them " surrendered on the spot, and when the grenade party reached the grenadier they found him " quite alone and imsupported, with the enemy surrendering all about him." Lance -Corporal G. H. Wyatt, 3rd Coldstream Guards, at Landrecies, on the night of August 25-26, 1914, saved a momentous situation by rushing to a .spot only twenty-five yards away and putting out a dangerous fire which had been started by German incendiary bombs. Second - Lieutenant G. A. Boyd Rochfort, Scots Guards, saved the lives of many men when, at 2 a.m. on August 3, 1915, a German trench-mortar bomb came into the trenchfw betw«!en Cambrin and Jji. iidHHi^:. He Hhouted to warn his mon, then nishe^l at the bomb, seized it, and hurled it over the parapet, where it instantly explorlod. The exploit of J^nce-Cr,rr)f,ral W. R. Cotter, f)th Battalion P^ast Kent li^igiment, was a glorious one. }fe, thf>ug). wounded in both anna, and with his right leg Mown oft at the knefj, cmwl/;fj unuidcrl to a crater fifty yards away, Hi^fuiU^d the men there, carrir>d on for two hours, then, with wounrls but roughly ilnmw^d, endurefl for fourtwn hours longer, and fhmpiUi his Huffering and pfrril. " hml a Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. F. BARTER, Corp. W. COSGROVE, Attached 1st Bn. E.W.F. 1st Bn. Key. Munster Tus. (Festubcrt). (Gallipoli). Lce.-Corp. MICHAEL O'LEARY, Irish Guards (Cuiiichy). Pte. R. MORROW. Sergt. J. SOMERS, l»t Un. lloyallrJKh I'm. Ut Bn. Royal Innls. Fub. (Near M.^KKiiir'H). (Oallipoli). IRISH AND WELSH HEROES. cheery word for all who passed him." Four Wr>undf!d men, one of them severely wovinded, were rescued by Lanco-Coiporal J. Tombs, 1st IJattalion Liv«upool Regiment, on Juno 16, 1915, n«»ar Rue du lioin. Tombs dragged tlK< soverf»ly wounded soldi«ir back by means of a rifle sling, which ho placed round liia own nock and the man's body. 86 THF. TIMtJS HISTORY OF THE WAR. Cuptain I'. H. iliiii««ii, Ailjuttuit of tlm tith Uattaliuit lAiuroliiuhirti liegitiit^iit at Yil^hiii Buriiu, (Ja,lli|n)li, on Augiutt I), lUlo, wlwu 8oniti wuuiuled h»ul Ijtnui left behind in the bunxitt^ ticrub, rwfiiaed to leave them tt) ii ilreailful eiitl, and made ueveral nwheti forward, over exposed ground which wnw swept by a terrific tire, and rescued six men from certain death by burning. The exploit of Captain C. C. Fos8, D.S.O., 2nd IJattalion Bedfordsliire Regiment, was another remarkable one. At Neuve Chapelle on March 12, 1915, he rushed forward imder heavy fire with eight men, attacking tlie enemy with bombs and capturing a most important position and fifty -two Germans who were occupying it. Private J. Lynn, 2nd IJattalion Lancashire Fusiliers, on May 2, 1915, near Ypres, showed the most resolute coiu"age in repelling German attacks with his machine-gun. The assaults wore made under cover of asphyxiating gas, and Lynn died from the effects of the poison next dtiy. At Festubert, on May IC, 1915, Company Sergeant-Major F. Babtie, 1st Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, with eight volunteers, attacked a Grerman position with bombs and captured three oflticers and 102 men, with 500 yards of trenches. Then take the case of Captain A. F. G. Kilby, 2nd Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment, who attacked a strong enemy redoubt. His company charged along a narrow towpath and he was wovmded, but he continued to lead his men up to the enemy. He was shot down and his foot was blown off ; but his courage and determination never faltered, and even then he inspired his men and used a rifle. He was reported missing and his death was presumed. Again, there was the achievement of Second -Lieutenant James Leach and Sergeant John Hogan, 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment, on October 29, 1914, near Festubert. They retook a trench from the Germans, of whom they killed eight, wounded two, and took sixteen prisoners. Private R. Tollerton, 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders, at the Aisne, on September 14, 1914, carried a wounded officer to a place of greater safety. He was himself wovmded in the head, but he struggled back to the firing- line and remained there tmtil his battalion retired. Then he returned to the wounded officer and remained with him for three days, until they were both rescued. That noble spirit of devotion was shown also by the gallant Corporal A. G. Drake, 8th Battalion Rifle Brigade, who, on the night of Novem- ber 23, 1915, near La Briquo, France, went on patrol, one of a party of four, recon- noitring towards the Gennan lines. When near the enemy a heavy fire was opened on them by rifles and a machine-gun, and the otticer and a man were woundotl. The man w»w carried back by the last remaining man ; but the corporal remained with the officer. When last seen he was kneeling beside him, bandaging his wounds. Later, when a rescue party crawled towards the German lines, they found the oflicer alive but unconscious, and Drake's bullet-riddled body. " He had given his own lifo and saved his officer." Such were the achievements of the men who won the Cross in those two years of unexampled warfare, near at hand and far afield, who fought on Flanders' sodden fields, on the piti- less North Sea, in the Mediterranean, in populous and cultivated lands, in the remote and lonely desert. The following is a list of the recipients of the Victoria Cross whose awards were definitely announced dvu-ing the first two years of war. Other Crosses were won in that period, but they were not gazetted until later. When death was officially annovmced it is indicated in paren- theses. In a nvunber of cases promotions followed, the bestowal of the Cross and these are given : Acton, Pte. A., 2nd Bn. Border Regt. Alexander, Lieut. -Colonel E. W., R.F.A. Anderson, Corpl. W., Yorkshire Regt. Angus, Lee. -Corpl. W., 8th Bn. Highland L.I. Babtie, Coy.-Sergt.-Maj., 1st Bn. R.W. Fus. Barber, Pte. E., Grenadier Guards. Barter, 2nd Lieut, (temp. Lieut.) F., 3rd Bn. R.W. Fus. Bassett, Corpl. C. R. G., N.Z. Mil. Forces. Belcher, 2nd Lieut, (on prob.) D. W., 9th Bn. London Regt. Bent, Drmnmer S. J., E. Lanes Regt. Boyle, Lieut. -Commander E. C, R.N. Bradbury, Capt. E. K., R.H.A. (killed). Brodie, Capt. W. L., Highland L.I. Brooke, Lieut. J. A. O., 2nd Bn. Gordon H. (killed). Brooks, Lce.-Sergt. O., 3rd Bn. Coldsti-eam Gds. Buckingham, Pte. W., Leicester Regt. Burt, Corpl. A. A., Herts Regt. (T.F.). Corp. C. BASSETT X.Z. Div. Signal Coy. (Gallipoli). ■ ■■ ^^fl p '^M Wf^H ^^1 ^2it£ id| ^H^^.^Wa L.J Corp. A. BURTON, Pte. J. HAMILTON, TthBn. Australian Imperial Force 1st Bn. Australian Imperial Force (Gallipoli). (Gallipoli). Lce.-Corp. A. JACKA, 14th Australian Infantry (Gallipoli). Pte. L. KEYZOR, 1st Bn..\uatralian Imperial Force (Gallir)Oli). Sepoy KHUDADAD, 129th Baluchis (Hollebeke). Lce.-Naik LALA, 41st Dogras, Indian Army. Lieut. F. de PASS, (Near Fegtuljcrt). Lieut. J. G. SMYTH, LiKlliiatiu SIkliH (KifhfbourK 1,'Avouf). Capt. F. SCRIMGER, Canadian .\ .M.S. (Near Ypn-s). Capt. J. SINTON, Indian ^rodical Service. Lieut. F. TUBB. Sf>c.-Lleiit. H. THROSSELL. Maj. 0. WHEELER. A'Mtralian Im(icrlMl Foff* AiiHtralliui lni|KTlnl t'lini- 7tli (Kariana) Lnnwrn (G>illlp'>li;. rri;>lli|»<li). (MirHO|i»tarnla). V.C, IIHkOKS: THF'- INDIAN AND C:(JL(>NIAI, FORGES. .17 38 'nil<: TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAli. IUjbton, Corpl. A S , 7t»i Uii. Aiw. liif F. (klUml). CArKKEV, Pte. J., York and Laao Rogt. Campbell, Limit. ¥. \\., 1st Canadian Hn. (died of wounds) C!uRisTlAN, I'to II., II. l..anca.stor Kogt. CooKHON, Lieut. -Coiuinandm- E. C, D.S.O., R.N. (killeti). CoaoROVK, Corpl. W., R. Mans. Fus. Cotter, Leo. -Corpl. (Acting Corpl.) W. R., 6th Bn. E. Kent Regt Daniels, 2nd Lieut H., M.C., RiHe Brig. Dartnell, Temp. Lieut. W., 25th (Service) Bn. (Frontiersmen), R. Fus Davies, Squad. -Commander R. B., D.S.O., R.N. Dawson, Temp. 2nd Lieut. J. L., R.E. Dease, Lieut M J., 4th Bn. R.F. (died of vvoimds). DE Pass, Lieut. F. A., 34th Poona Horse (killed). Dimmer, Capt J. H. S , M.C., K.R.R.C. DoBSON, Lce.-Corpl. F. W., Coldstream Gds. DoRKELL, Lieut, (temp. Capt.) G. T., R.F.A. Doughty-Wylie, Lieut. -Colonel 0. H. M., C.B., C.M.G., R W Fus., H.Q. Staff, Med. Ex. F. (killed). Drain, Driver J. H. C, R.F.A Drake, Corpl. A. G , 8th Bn. R.B. (killed). Drevvry, Midn. G. L., R.N.R DuNsiRE, Pte. R., 13th Bn. R. Scots. Douglas-Hamilton, Lieut. -Colonel A. F., Res of Off. Com. 6th Bn. Cam. H. (killed). DuNSTAN, Corpl. W., Commonwealth Mil F DvvYER, Pte. E., E Surrey Regt. FiNLAY, Lce.-Corpl. D., R. Highlanders Fisher, Lce.-Corpl. F., 13th Canadian Bn. (kiUtd). Fleming-Sandes, Temp. 2nd Lieut. A. J. T., E. Siurey Regt. Forshaw, Lieut. W. T., 9th Bn. Manchester Regt. (T.F.) Foss, Bt.-Maj. C. C, D.S.O., Bedford Regt. Fuller, Lce.-Corpl. W., Welsh Regt. Fuller, Lce.-Corpl. W. D., Grenadier Gds Garforth, Corpl. C. E., loth Hussars Geary, Lieut. B. H., 4th Bn. E. Surrey Regt. GoDLEY, Pte. S. F., R.F Grenfell, Capt. F. O., 9th Lancers (killed). Hall, Col.-Sergt. F. W., 8th Canadian Bn. (m.ortally wounded). Hali.owes, Temp. 2nd Lieut. K. P., 4th Bn. Middiesox Regt. (mortally wounded). Hamilton, I'te. .1., Conunonwealth Mil. Forces. Hansen, Capt P. H., M.C., Lincoln Regt. Harloik, Sorgt. E. G., R.F.A Harvey, Pte. S., York and Lano Regt. Hawker, Lieut. (Temp. Maj ) I.,. i\., U.S.O , R.E. HoGAN, Sorgt. J., Manchester Rtigt. HoLBROOK, Lieut. N. D., R N. Holmes, Lce.-Corpl F. W., Yorkshire L.L Hull, Pte. (Shoeing-Smith) C, 2l8t Lancers Insall, Li«»ut. G. S. M., R.F.C Special Reserve. Jacka, Lce.-Corpl. A., Commonwealth Mil. F. James, Lieut. H , Worcester Regt Jabvis, Lce.-Corpl. C. A., R E. Johnston, Capt. W. H., R E Johnson, Temp. Lieut, (temp. Capt ) F. H., R.E. Keneally, Pte. W., 1st Bn. Lanes Fus. (? d.). Kenny, Pte. H., L.N. Lanes Regt. Kenny, Pte. T., 13th (Service) Bn. Durham L.I. Kenny, Drummer W., Gordon Highlandei-s. Keyworth, Lce.-Corpl. L. J., 24th Bn. London Regt. (killed). Keyzor, Pte. L., Commonwealth Mil. F. IChudadad, Sepoy, 129th Baluchis. KiLBY, Capt. A. F. G., 2nd Bn. S Staffs Regt. (death presumed). Laidlaw, Piper D., 7th Bn. K.O.S. Borderers. Lala, Lance-Naik, 41st Dogras, Ind. Anny. Leach, Lieut. J., Manchester Regt. Llddell, Capt. J. A., 3rd Bn. A. & S. High Luke, Driver F., R.F A Lynn, Pte. J., 2nd Bn. Lanes Fus. (died from gas poisoning). Mackenzie, Pte. J., 2nd Bn. Scots Gds. (killed). McNair, Temp. Lieut. E. A., 9th Bn. R. Sussex Regt. Maling, Temp. Capt. G. A., M.B., R.AM.C. Malleson, Midn. W. St. A., R.N. Mariner, Pte. W., K.R.R.C. Martin, Lieut. C. G., D.S.O., R.E. Martin-Leake, Sm-g.-Capt. A., F.R.C S. Indian Vols. (temp. Maj., R.A.M.C.) May, Pte. H., Scottish Rifles. Meekosha, Corpl. S., 6th Bn. W. Yorks Regt Mellish, Rev. E. N., Temp. Chaplain to the Forces, 4th Class. Mir Dast, Jemadar, 55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Foi-ce). Lee. -Corp. W. ANGUS, 8th Bn. H.L.I. (T.F.) (Givenchy). Lce.-Corp. D. FINLAY, 2nd Bn. Black Watch (Knf du Boi-i). 'EKiolt cO Fn/. Maj. A. DOUGLAS-HAMILTON 6th Bn. Q.O. Cameron Hghdrs. (" Hill 70 "). Drummer W. KENNY, 2nd Bn. Gordon Hghdrs. (Near Ypres). Pte. R. DUNSIRE, 13th Bn. Eoyal Scots ("Hill 70"). {Swaine. Pte. H. MAY, Scottish Rifles (»ar La Boutillerie). Pte. 0. WILSO.V, II, LI. (Verneiill). Pte. J. MACKENZIE, lirii) llri. .S'Mjls (iiiardii ( fUdiKes BancR). Corp. James POLLOCK, ."itli r.ti. (i.O. Cameron llKlidrs. (Near HohcnzoUem Redoubt). Corp. J. RIPLKY. I't lit,. hUu.k Wat'li 'Swriine. Pte. H. ROBSON, 2ri'l liri. /i'lyal .HxitB (.N'<'(ir K'liiUiil). SCOTS CiUAKDS AND tfMf'liirlle. 8ec.-Lieul. 0. ROCHFORT. Pte. R. TOLLERTON, Hfotn r;ii;ii.|K l-t l!ii. (^(). Caiiieroii ]lglidr». aninlinr.; (AI»no). SCOTTISH l<K(;iMKNTS. 30 40 THE TIMES HISTORY 01' THE WAH. MooK, 2iul Lieut. Cj. 11 !>., Hampsliiro ll«gt. MoHRovv, I'Ui. R., K. Irish Fiw. Nasmith, Lieut. -Conuatiudttr M E., R.N. Nbame, Capt. P., D.S.O., U.K. Nelson, Lieut. U., K.A. NoBLK, Acting-Corpl. C. R., 2utl Bu. R.B. (died of vvoumls). Nkoi, Ntiik Uarvvan Sinu, 1st lin. 39th tiarh- wal Rifles. Neoi, Rifleman Uobab 8i.\g, 2nd Bn. 3'Jth Garhwal Rifles (killed). O'Leary, 2nd Lieut. M., Coniiaught Rangers. O'SuLLiVAN, Capt. G. R., 1st R. Iini. Fus. Peachment, Pte. G., 2nd Bn. K.R.R.C. (mor- tally wounded). Pollock, Temp. 2nd Lieut, (on prob.) J. D., 8th Bn. Cameron Highlanders. Potts, Pte. F. \V. O., Berks Yeomanry. Ranken, Capt. H. S., R.A.M.C. (died of wounds). Raynes, Acting-Sergt. J. C, R.F.A. Read, Capt. A. M., 1st Bn. Northants Regt. (mortally wounded). Rendle, Bandsman T. E., D. of Cornwall L.I. Reynolds, Capt, D., R.F.A. Richards, Sergt. A., Lanes Fus. Rhodes-Moorhouse, 2nd Lieut. W. B., R.F.C. RrpLEY, Corpl. J., R. Highlanders. Ritchie, Com. H. P., R.N. Rivers, Pte. J., 1st Bn. Sherwood For. (kiUed). Robinson, Lieut. -Commander E. G., R.N. RoBSON, Pte. H. H., R. Scots. Rochfort, 2nd Lieut. G. A. B., 1st Bn. (Special Reserve) Scots Gds. RouPELL, Capt. G. R. P., E. Surrey Regt. Samson, Seaman G. McK., R.N.R. Saunders, Sergt. A. F., 9th Bn. Suffolk Regt. ScRiMGER, Capt. F. A. C, Cape Local Forces. Sharpe, Acting-Corpl. C, Lincoln Regt. Shout, Capt. A. J., 1st Bn. Aus. Imp. F. (died of wounds). Singh, Sepoy Chatta, 9th Bhopal Inf., Ind. Army. Sinton, Capt. J. A., M.B., Indian Med. Serv. Smith, 2nd Lieut. A. V., l/5th Bn. E. Lanes Regt. (T.F.) (kMled). Smith, Aoting-Corpl. I., Manchester Regt. 8.\irrH, Pte. J., 3rd Bn. Border Regt. Smylie, Flight Sub-Lieut. G. F., R.N. Smyth, Lieut. J. G., 15th Sikhs. Somers, Sergt. J., R. Inn. Fas. Symons, Liout. \V. J., Commonwealth Mil. F Til VPA, Rifleman Kulbir, 2nd Bn. 3rd Gurkha Rifles. Thko.s.sell, 2nd Lieut. H. V. H., Commonwealth Mil. F. TisDALL, Sub-Lieut. A. VV. St. C, R.N.V.R. (killed). Tombs, Lee, -Corpl, J., Liverpool Regt, Tollerton, Pte, R., Cameron Highlanders. TuBB, Lieut. F. H., Commonwealth Mil. F. Turner, 2nd Lieut. A. B., R. Berks Regt. (died of wounds), Unwin, Com, E,, R.N. Upton, Corpl. J., Notts and Derby Regt. Vallentin, Capt. J. F., 1st Bn. S. Staffs Regt. (killed). ViCKERS, Pte. A. R., Warwick Regt. ViCKERS, 2nd Lieut, (temp. Capt.) C, G,, 7th Bn, Notts and Derby Regt, Walford, Capt, G, N„ R.A. (killed). Warner, Pte. E., 1st Bedford Regt. (died from gas poisoning). Wells, Sergt. H., 2nd Bn, R, Sussex Regt. (killed)', Warneford, Flight Sub-Lieut, R, A. J., R,N.A.S, Wheeler, Major G, G. M., 7th (Hariana ) Lancers (killed), Williams, Able-Seaman W, C. (killed), Willis, Major R. R., Lanes Fus. Wilson, Pte, G., Highland L.I, WoODROFFE, 2nd Lieut, S. C, 8th Bn. R.B, (killed), WooLLEY, Lieut, (temp. Capt.) G. H., 9th Bn. London Regt, (T.F.). Wright, Capt, T., R.E. (mortally wounded). Wyatt, Lee. -Corpl. G, H., 3rd Bn. Coldstream Gds. Yate, Major C. A. L., 2nd Bn. Yorkshire L.I. (severely wounded. Died as prisoner of war). Young, Pte. W., 8th Bn. E. Lanes Regt. If- CHAPTER CLIII. THE NAVY'S WORK IN 1916. DisTEsrcTivE Features of the Secoxd Year of War — Strategy and Policy of the Belli- gerents — ^Xaval Construction — ^Loss of the King Edward VII. — The Arethusa — The Hampshire — Lord Kitcheners Death at Sea — Submarine Warfare — German Use of Torpedo Craft — Murder of Captain Fryatt — German Raids in the North Sea — British Air Work — ^The Blockade — German Submarine Exploits — ^The Mediterranean — Gallipoli AND Salonika — Loss of the Russell — Bulgaria — Egypt and Syria — The Adriatic — ^The Baltic — ^The Russian Fleet — ^The Outer Oceans — -The Dresden — Campaigns against German Colonies — The Royal Navy's Part in the War. THE duties imposed upon the Allied Fleets during the second year of the war were mainly of a defensive character. No aggressive enterprises of the kind for which Mr. Churchill indicated that vast preparations had been made were undertaken. Offensive operations, for the. most part, were maintained by torpedo vessels and aircraft. During the same period, however, there was continuou-s manifestation of the influence of sea power and of the ubiquity of its exercise. The distinctive featurf>s of naval policy were compression and containment. So far as compression was exerted, the stran- gle-hold of the commercial blockade was drawn tight^jr a'* rcntrictions which hafl bfxm laid upcm thft Admiralty by Ordom in Council wortj relaxed or withdrawn. The pressure of the Alliwl control ujion ovorrtea traffic, as it was mvle rnjrrt stringently compelling, slowly diminishryj the enemy's power cf endurarjce. It wan not to J»e ex[x>cted that naval cornpre.^- sion alone wouM win the war, but. ajxir-t from the deprivation of mat<jrial e4s<jntial for military purp'**e4, th') trouble* caiiseri by a shortage of food Hupplie* pr.>ducod a di-ttinctly oppressive off>';t on the erjonornic life of the Central Powers. Similarly, while the Austrian and Gcruian fl'Wts were left at libert/y to r;omo out of their Vol. X.— Part l\U. 41 strongholds, they were strategically contained — that is to say, measures were taken to force them to fight at a disadvantage if they made the attempt. When the long-continued pas- sivity of the High Sea Fleet was temporarily exchanged on May 31, 1916, for " an enterprise directed northward," Vice- Admiral Scheer's force was promptly brought to an engagement off the .Jutland Bank in circumstances described in an earlier chapter.* On the second anni- versary of the British declaration of war, the First Lord of the Admiralty said of this battle that it would be an error to suppose that it had changed the situation. What it did was to confirm it : Bi:for(! J 111 land, as after it, the German Fleet was iinprJHoned. Thf- battle was an altoinj)t to break the bapH and Imrst the oonfinin}^ gates. It failed, and with its failure I he High Sea Fle<!f sank again into impotence. The o.sAonce of the naval strategy of the Central I'owers may be described as erosion, or attrition- a wearing away of the naval and mercantile resources of the Allies by sallies and raids. Combined with this policy were exhibi- tions ot " frightfulnoss," d(»signod to influence public oi)inion and cause divided counsels. With mine and tor[)e(lo endeavours were made to reduce the prefjonderance of sou lighting strength posstwsed by the Alliens, to whittle away • Chapter CXIi. 4-2 v'///-; riMKs HisToNY or the w \n. THE CAPTURED GERMAN SUBMARINE OF THE MINE-LAYING TYPE— "UG5" Alongside Temple Pier, July, 1916. their commercial carrying power by the destruction of merchant shipping, and generally to deprive thom of the advantages derived from maritime supremacy. The subinarine cani- paign against cargo and passenger ships was extended to neutrals trading with Great Britain, in order to stir up bad feeling, to enhance the price of foodstuffs and other com- modities, and to diminish the tonnage afloat in the interests of Germany after the war. All the movements of the Geiman Xa\'y may be traced to this policy of erosion by raid. If their seamen appeared to be more daring in the second year of war, it was because they hoped, by offering their ships as a bait, to entice the British Fleet into mined areas or over waters in which groups of submarines waited to torpedo them. An exanaple of these tactics may be foimd in the action of August 19 in the North Sea. Other sporadic acts of aggi-ession, such as the Yannouth raid of April 2.'>, might raise the hopes of the German people, but were not attempts to challenge the sea conunand, and had no effect vipon the balance of naval strength. Moreover, the enemy torpedo craft, although they achieved some minor advantages by the exercise of the strategic element of surprise, were far from having a monopoly of success. The destroyers and submarines of the Allies also reaped the harvest of their energy, skill, and enterprise in full measure. The submarine campaign directed against the Mercantile IMarine had developments which were most marked during the later months of the year. Towards the end of 1915, the activities of the " U "-boats, foiled in home watei'S by the resourcefulness and ingenuity of the British seamen, had been transferred to the Mediterranean. In those waters, althougli the war vessels and transports supplied few victims, the cargo boats and passenger ships suffered considerably. INIeasiu'es were taken, however, to cope with. the new form of menace, and as a consequence by the summer it had been fairly met. The hostile submarines then in use had not a large radius of action, and were chiefly dependent upon local sources of supply of fuel for their endiuing mobility. By the establishment of an effective control over the Greek ports and those on tlio coasts of Africa and Asia Minor, the submarines were deprived of their bases in the noighboming waters, and their depredations v\ert> cheeketl. As, too, the raider was harried himself, he was given little tune for harrying othei-s. Later on in tht^ year the campaign assinued a niort- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 43 intensive form. Subniarines of a larger class, in greater numbers, were let loose to prey upon commerce. Xeutrals as well as Allied ships suffered impartially. Mei'chant vessels were constantly attacked on sight and sunk without warning, showing how worthless were all the promises and pledges of the German Govern- ment. Outrages on the high seas were con- tinued without regard to the promptings of law and humanity. A new antidote had to be found. As a demonstration of the long range of the new boats and the disregard of the Gennan Government to the protests of the President of the United States, a special doie of fright- ftdnei? was arranged to take place, and was carried out with dramatic effect, off the Nan- tucket lightship, in the track of vessels to and from New York. On October 8 Conmaander Hans ^Rozo, in U 53 sank six Allied and neutral ships in the presence of American destroyers, explaining that his orders were to make an indiscriminate attack upon all vessels trading with British ports. Similar doses of German brutality wore administered to Norway, Denmark, and Holland, with the object of exhibiting the ubiquity and ruthlessness of the " mailefl fist " in enforcing the " freedom of the seas." The repressive measures taken in narrow waters at home, and those which had proved effective in the Eastern Mediter- ranean, did not have the same success in curb- ing the efforts of those new long-rango sub- marines. It was conclusively shown, however, that they could be countered by merchantmen carrying guns, and vessels so armed in a number of engagements proved their ability to diive off and sometimes to account for their as- sailants. In this direction, and also by the A STOKIi (;l MINKS WASHFU) AbllOKF, ON TMI', DIJICII COAST. Smaller picture: Kauncliinji u (icrm'in Mine. 44 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 45 wider adoption of the system of convoy, relief was sought. The danger of this new attempt to enforce a submarine blockade upon Great Britain was not under-rated, and the actual losses would not have been so serious but for the fact that a very large number of ships were required for the service of the armies. Speaking at Glasgow in September, ^Ir Balfour said that although we owned half the mercantile tonnage of the world, half r.f that half was ear- marked either for military purposes by ourselves or by our Allies for what were practically iriilitary purposes. The President of the Board of Trade, speaking on October 17, in the House of Commons, said : We have actually lost by enemy action and by marine risks no Iesf< than 2,000,000 gross tons of shipping since the war began. That is more than the whole mercantile marine of France, or of Spain, or of Italy before the war. Is it possible to lose all that vast amount of shipping without its creating, along with all the Govern- ment requirements, a most serious shortage ? I sup- pose that comes to pretty nearly 3,000,000 tons dead weight. WTien you come to the Allied fleets, the same has happened there. Heavy losses by enemy action have jx-nalised con^^umers in every part of the world. In addition to the losses of British and •Allied mercantile shipping, the neutrals also suffered considerably. Great Britain was affected in a far greater degree than other countries by the diminution of carrying ton- nage, becaase more than half of her food supply ha/l to be brought oversea. In these circum- stances it was not surprising that The Times should state, in a leading article on Novem- ber 11, 1916, that: ''The submarine monact, which was ' well in hand ' in Augast, 1915, is at least as serious at this moment as it was in the worst periofl of last year " In all the theatres of naval war during the year under review there was a certain amount of desultory fighting and cross-raiding, prin- cipally executed by small craft. Bombard- inontH of the enemy's coast ports, anfl local offensive operations for the support of military movements were also duties which fell to the Navy in its role of auxiliary weapon in con- jimction with the land forces. This most UH*»ful and arduous work was carried out both by shifw and by aircraft, and, although these »;nU)rj>ris*>H were not productive of de<;isivo roHults, their importanC/ft from the point of view (ft the Allied commanders should not Vk> un<lor- estirnatod. The situation in the southern portion of the North Sea, wh«rro the <^iennans hai'i rn;ule Zeobnjgge a yjrot«>';tf)'l bfise for sub- /narines and fJoMtroyers, was typical of that whi^;h obtained both in the higher Adriatic and in parts of the Baltic. In favouring cir- cumstances the torpedo craft on both sides made sallies, and neither side maintained an undisputed command of communications. This state of affairs, however, was confined to strictly localized areas, and in no sense con- flicted with that larger control exercised by the superior Fleet. The mastery of the seas remained unchallenged, and the trade routes practically free of interference for the transport of armies and their supply and reinforcement with vast quantities of munitions — both our own troops and those of oiu" Allies. The im- munity of oiu' shores from invasion was also guaranteed. Thus the supremacy of the Allied Fleets supplied a dominant factor in all the land fighting, and formed the basis of every offensive ' operation. There were many indications during the year that the naval yards and engineering estab- lishments in Germany were being utilised to their fullest extent and capacity. Constructive effort, as far as it was revealed, was in a large measure concentrated upon the production of torpedo craft, principally submarines. It was announced, however, that two battle -cruisers had been latmched, and one battlesliip, the Wilhelm II., was mentioned as having been commissionefl. It may be assumed that all the heavier vessels which were in hand at the beginning of the war were completed during 1916. The later destroyers, which appeared in several engagements during the year, were much heavier and faster than their predeces- sors, and carried a more formidable armament of automatic 4 -in. guns. The submarines, as has been said, had a larger range of action, greater speed on the surface, and carried heavier guns than those of earlier types. But, as Mr. Churchill said in the communique issued by the Admiralty, the Battle of Jutland showed there were no surprises The events of the war, indeed, were of a nature to strengthen opinion in rcganl to the types of ships and weapons which had previously been regarded as essen- tial to the efTicioncy of naval organizati(in. The navies of the Allies, without exception, woro largely increased both in quantity and (juality during 1916. The Petit Pariaien was permitted to state on August 26, 1916, that Franco had n«)t only k(»pt her Fleet intact but had increased it by several fresh units, all perfectly trained. This journal said : Th" Krcrich hiivo only Ioh(, tfio old batlli'Mliip Uouvot, w>iii,-)i wiiH of no riiilitury vulun. Tlif Ji-iiii Hurt, wliich 119-2 46 THt: TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.lli. WM torpt)Uu«cl at I'attaru. wim bpetfdily and carefully ropairtid. The Fletit tiiu been enriched by the addition of five new Drettdiiuughtd, the France, Paris, Bretagne, Lorraine, and Provence — eiuyt of 23,540 toiiH, with ten 13 5 in. gun^. With the Jean Bart, thn Courbet, six battlodhipd of the Danton cla-is, and five of the VArit* and Patrie clauiieci, thia ntakeu a very powerful naval force. * Similarly, Admiial Akiyuma, of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who was tlie Chief uf tlie Japanese Mitisiua to Eiiri»pe, was allowed to state, on his arrival m i'aris in July, lUlti, that at the tune uf liis visit to the Russian Fleet he was surprised to see the considerable pro- gress wliic'Ji had b«<en made in one year. Rus-iia, ho said, luid constructed sliips of all sorts, anil he could state that her Fleet " had boon doubleil." Three of the four battle-cruisers of the 32,200-ton class — the Navarin, Borodino, Ismail and Kinburn — were said to have joined the Baltic Fleet during the previous four months. In regard to our own Fleet, Mr. Balfour, in liis Estimates speech on March 7, 1916, said that the Navy had been enormously expanded since the outbreak of hostilities The personnel for the Navy had, broadly speaking, doubled since the war began. In the Navy Estimates for 1914 the number of men voted was about 140,000 with reserves. In- cluding the Royal Naval Division, it stood at the time Mr. Balfour spoke at about 300,000 and power had bettn taken to raist* it to afjO.OOO Jle also said that as regards the tomxago of the Navy, including auxiliary cruisers and all shi{)s under the wltite ensign «vctaally used as ships of war, the increase was well over 1,000,000 tons since hostilities began. Speaking again, at Glasgow, on Sttptember 0, 1916, Mr. Balfoiu- .said : We Kturtfd thti war iiidi-c |)ow<Tfu tlian any of our enenues ; indeed, more powerful than all our onemieM combined. Since the war broke out the Fleet haH not only increased absolutely in number, in power, and in etliciency, but, to the best of my belief, as coiniiarid with tlie capital hhips of our opponentu, it lias iiicreONed nialivcly also. If we were strong in capital ships at (lie begituiing of the war, we are yet stronger, and in regard to cruisers and destroyers tlicro is al)solut(>ly no comparison between our strength at that time and our strength now. So far as my knowledge goes, there is no part of our naval strength in which wo have not got at this moment a greater supply, and in some depart- ments an incomparably greater supply, tliaii we had on August 4, 1914. The prospect of the sea war imdoubtedly underwent a change in 1916, and the policy of the Admiralty was not imchallongod. But so far as the Service afloat was concerned, it con- tinued with unabated skill and spirit to fulfil its task, novel in character though this was, and imexampled in magnitude. INSPECTION OF LIFE-SAVING COLLARS On a Hospital Ship in the North of France. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR, 47 IN A BRITISH SUBMARINE. An officer of a lubmer^ed submarine scannin|{ the surface of the sea through a periscope. Tho yoar lOlf) op^nofj Hf>Tnf)what inaii.s- piciounly for tho drimd Floot by tho Iohs of ono of its famouH baUloHhips, tho King Edward VI f., whirh tho Ai"lrniralty arinouncofl on Jariiiury 9 Yiful Htnick a rninf> and Hunk. Owing to tho hoavy sea running at tho time tiie vohsoI harl U> Fk> ahanfJf<no'J, and foiindonid Hoon aftor tiio CTow iia^J ixKtn t4*kon off, tho only cfwijaltioH boirig thr»)o rnon injurofi. Tho d<Htrij';tion of thin fino Hhip, whirh fi;ul }i»uJ hop firnt kool- plat« laid by King IMward iiirnnolf in IU02, and iiad boon launchod in tiio following year by Quoon Mary, thon Princess of WaloH, caino as a forcible ronnindor that tho Gorman war of attrition by min<j and Hul>marino would be syHtematically fnirsuod into the third year of tho war. As tho year advanced it became cloar that thoro waH practically no portion of tho soaH around th(j iiritish IhIoh and in tiio Modi- torranoan whoro minoH iiad not boon strown through tho agency f)f submarinoH. Tho em- f)lf>ymont of " U " boatH in this direction 4!^ Till: i I Mils HISTORY (>i 7///; WAll. cr. 03 u ffl 'J O a: u 32 c a X -0£ U OS JC O n Qu o <: u PU w en a Cd » E H u o •■ •a CD V o o D R OS a n E N u w o (/) ^ 3 o S c V ou J= E H H imtunillyjc'oinplicatod tho |)ruljlt(iu ui linaling with what Mr. AHtjuith onco callud "' the iiMircleroiiH munace of tlio miuo," and tho wea- iium again fuiind thnniselves tlu-owu back upon ihnir own rwjoiirtu»fiihaisH to dofoat tliirt now diivolopninnt of tlut ominiy. As nip;anlH tho dostruction of the King K<lward VII., tho (Jorniai»>< chiiniod tlmt tl»i« was brought about by a niino droppod by tho arnaed raidor Mowe, which was statod to Imve laid those raacihines at several points off tlio IJritish'coast. Littlo more than a month later another sliip well known to tho public, the light cruiser Arothiisa, flying the broad pennant of Com- modore Tyrwhitt, also fell a victim to tho mine. Her loss was ofHicially announced on Febru- ary 14. It occurred off the East Coast, and about ten men lost their lives. Tho month of -March also brought its toll of mine victims. On the 10th the Admiralty stated that tho destroyer Coquette, Lieutenant Vore Seymour, R.X.R., in command, and torpedo boat No. 11, commanded by Lieutenant John A. P. Legh, had been struck off the East Coast and had sunk. Lieutenant Seymour and 21 of his men were lost from the Coquette, and, although Lieutenant Legh was saved from the torpedo boat, three other officers and 20 uwn were killed or drowned in that vessel. On March 12 the mercantile fleet auxiliary Fauvette, com- iTianded by Lieutenant -Commander Hemy J. T. Wilson, R.N.R., was also destroyed by a mine of¥ the East Coast, taking down with" her two officers and 12 men. She was formerly in tho service of the General Steam Navigation Com- pany. Tliat the effect of this wholesale scattering of mines — ^serious though it undoubtedly was — did not come up to German expectations was indicated by the exaggerated reports of losses in the German Press. Thus on April 3 the Secretary of the Admiralty found it necessary to deny a statement in the German Wireless Press of that day, circulated on the authority of the Cologne Gazette, that a British cruiser of the " Coimty " class, apparently the Donegal, had struck a mine and sunk in the middle of February. There was no truth whatever, declared the Acbniralty, in this assertion The next casualty of the mines was to be deplored the whole world over, for it involved the death of the distinguished soldier who had held since the conflict began the post of Soort»- tary of State for War. At 7.30 p.m.. on tho night of June 5, the annoured cruiser Hamp- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 49 sliire. Captain H. J. Savill, wasT'proceeding along the west coast of the Orkneys on her way to Russia, which country Lord Kitchener and his staff were about to visit on an official mission. The party included Lieutenant - Colonel C. A. FitzGerald, Lord Kitchener's Personal Military Secretary ; Brigadier-General W. Ellershaw, R.A., an officer who had dis- tinguished liimself in France in the first months of war and had subsequently been employed on special duties at the War Office ; Mr. H. J. OBeirne, of the Diplomatic Service, formerly Counsellor of Embassy in Petrograd and for a brief period in 191.5 Minister at Sofia ; and Sir H. F. Donaldson and Mr. L. S. Robertson, of the Ministry of Munitions. They had bade farewell but a short time before to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe on the deck of his flagship, the Iron Duke, which, with the rest of the Fleet, had returned to her base only three days before from the naval battle off Jutland. About 7.4.5 p.m. the Hampshire struck a mine, and began to settle by the bows, heeling over to starboard. It was at once evident that the cruiser was vitally injured, and Captain Savill ordered all hands to go to their established stations for abandoning ship. Some of the hatches were- opened, for, owing to the very heavy gale which was blowing, with large seas breaking over the ship, it had been necesary for her to be partially battened down, and the ship's company went quickly to their stations. Efforts were made, but without sticcess, to lower some of the boats, one of them being broken in lialveh during the proces-s, and the occupants tlu"own into the water. It was unfortunate that two destroyers which had been detailed to accompany the Hampshire had left her nearly an hour before, Captain Savill being compelled to detach them about 7 p.m. on account of the very heavy wjas. By 8 o'clock, or within 1.5 minutes of striking the mine, the Hampshire went down. Irnraf>diately on the receii^t of tlie news by the naval authorities, destroyers and patrol boats were despatched to the scene, and n«arch (tarties in motor cars wore sent to wf>rk alon;.' the coast. In spite of all the measures trtken, howfjver. Sir John .Jellicoe h»wl to report with d<»ep regret that the only survivors were one warrant officer and eleven men, who wore wanhed ashore '^n a raft,. 'i'hes«> twelve miod were all examined at the ofTicial inquiry. It was Hti\mtHiufmi\y announced that Lord Kitchener did nut l*>ave the ship. He was last seen on the quarter deck, talking tf> two <,! his officers, CAPTAIN CHARLES FRYATT. Commanded the "Brussels." He was alleged by the Germans to have made an attempt on March 28, 1915, to ram the "U33." He was brought before a German Gourt-martial.condemnedtodeath, and shot. and calmly awaiting the preparations for abandoning ship. The Admiralty stated, on the conclusion of the inquiry, that " as the men were moving up one of the hatchways to their stations, Lord Kitchener, accompanied by a nav'al officer, appeared. The latter called out, 'Make way for Lord Kitchener,' and they both went up on to the quarter-deck, and subsequently four military officers were seen on the quarter-deck walking aft on the port side. The captain called out for Lord Kitchener to come up to the fore bridge near where the captain's boat was hoist(«l ; he was also hoard calling for J-iord Kitchener to got into th<> hoat, but no one is able to say whether l^ord Kit«;hener got into the boat or not, nor wiuit «)ccurred to this boat, nor did anyone see any of the boats get clear of the ship." Three rafts, each with about fifty to seventy men, got clear of the Hampsliire, hut from th<t exhaustion, exposure, and cold, those on board them gradually drr>i)pod off or died. From (>mi» raft, with over seventy on it, only six sur- vivofl. Some of the crow evidently i)erishod in trying to land on the rocky coast of the Ork- neys after (Icir long exposiui) ; Horno '((\cii 60 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ditwl after landing. In furwarding the intiuiry report; Sir Juhii Jellicoe baid : "I cannot adequately expreuti the uorrow felt by me per- lionully and by the officere and men of the Grand Fleet generally at the fact that bo dis- tinguiiihed a soldier and so great a man should have lost his life whilst under the care of the Fleet." The employment of submarines to lay mines received confirmation and illustration when one of the actual boats vised by the Germans, UC 5, was captured off the East Coast in April 1916. The occurrence was announced by the Admiralty on April 28, when it was stated that the boat had been sunk on the previous day, and that one officer and 17 men of her crow, on sun-endering, were made prisoners. Later, the vessel was salved and brought into Sheerness Dockyard, where a party of journalists were allowed to inspect her on July 20. She proved to be of a small size, only 110 ft. long, with a difuneter at the widest part of nearly 10 ft. The draught of water, when running awash, was about 9 ft. 10 in., and the measurement from the keel to the top of the conning tower was about 20 ft. On the surface the boat had a displacement of 190 tons, and submerged of 210 tons. In the after part were the two- cylinder Diesel engines for surface propulsion giving the submarine a speed of about six knots ; the electric motors for under- water propulsion being placed just before them." The quarters for the crew were very (jramped, as about one-third of the entire hull'H[)aco was needed for the mines, of which 12 were carried, a full cargo being found when the boat was captured. The mines were spherical in shape, and with the sinking apparatus weighed about 16 cwt. each, the charge consisting of 280 lb. of trinitrotoluene, boats of the character could, of course, be easily multiplied, the various parts being manufactured at engineer- ing works inland and sent to a port, like Ant- werp, to be fitted together. The large number of mines laid in the southern area of the Nortli Sea must have been strewn by them. UC5, for instance, was reported to have made twenty trips before being captured. From July 26 to August 15 the boat was open to public view off the Temple Pier, London, and 302,960 people passed through the turnstile to get a close view of her. A small charge was made in aid of naval charities, and the total receipts wore £3,650 15s. 7d. On July 11, three British armed trawlers were sunk after an action with German sub- marines. The former vessels were on patrol duty, off the Scottish coast, and although they put up a gallant fight with the " U " boats, the heavier guns in the latter overpowered them. As soon as one of the trawlers was seen to be on fire and sinking, the other two en- BRITISH MONITORS IN ACTION AND UNDER FIRE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 51 IN THE NORTH SEA. A British torpedo-boat (in foreground) comes to the rescue of the crew of a schooner. deavoured to retire, but the submarines pursued them, concentrating their fire first on one boat and then on the other, until they were all sunk. It was reported unofficially that the trawlers were called the Onward, Era, and Nellie Xutton, of which the first- named went down with all her crew. In the London Gazette, on October 25, Skipper Charles Angus, R.N.R., was awarded the Distinguished Sei^iee Cross " in recognition of his conduct in an engagement with enemy submarines «»n July 11, 1916, and of the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he manoeuvred his vessel when she was disabled by gunfire, thereby saving practically the whole of his ship's company." The new class of rnine-8Wf-e]:)ing sloops pro- vided another victim to the " (' "boats. On July 4, it ha^l b*jen claimed in a German communifie that one of the submarines ha<l sunk on that flay " an enemy submarine- d»/Htroyer in the wjuthem part of the North .S<;a," but the British Admiralty declarerl tliat it was a mine -sweeping vesw^l which was hit by tlie U)r])f)<l<j fired from the submarine, urid although slightly damaged, the vessel was able to nrtum safely to harbour. On Oct<>b«5r 23, however, the mine-HWf>«!ping hIduji Ofiriista, Lieutenant-Commander John White, was tor- pedoed and sunk. All her officers and 7.3 men were lost, only 12 men being saved. When last seen, added the official annovmcement, the ship was sinking, but was still engaged with the enemy submarine Another useful craft lost in the war of attrition was the destroyer Lassoo, which foundered off the Dutch coast on August 1.3 after being either torpedoed or mined. Six of her crow were missing, including Sub- Lioutenant H. O'B. Thonihill, R.N., and 'two of the engine-room staff, one of whom was Engineer-Lioutenant-Commander Arthur Rice, were wounded. Some wreckage from the destroyer, among which wore two of her boats, was taken into Ymuiden by Dutch torpedtj boats. The Oennan suVjmarines scored again on August 24, when one of them tor- p(!dof;d and sank the armed boarding steamer Duke oi Albany, Commander George N. Ramage, R.N.R. This vessel, formerly in tho railway steamer servifje of the Lancjishire and Yorkshire and the Isforth WesUim Companies, took down with her the commander, IOngin<}er- lieutenant A. O. O. Moskell, and 22 men ; but <lev«in officers and 76 men were saved 5'i Till-: TlMi:s HISTORY OF Till': II. I/.'. ^^*fr^ THE GERMAN BOMBAKUMENT OF LOWESTOFT, APRIL 25, A damaged House. 1916. There was another phase of the war of attrition which was more pronounced in 1916 than it had been in the two previous years. This was the use of torpedo craft in night raids by the Germans. It coincided with, as it was largely dependent upon, the rise of Zeebrugge as a naval base, and although it achieved very little practical result, may have had a value in the eyes of the German Admiralty Staff as a means of keeping alive the offensive sjiirit among the personnel, and of impressing neutrals with the flexterity of German seamen. The fii"st notable incident in this connexion was the destruction of the Ai-abis, a vessel of a new class of mine -sweeping sloops already referred to. In company with three others of her class, the Ai-abis was on patrol duty on the night of February 10, in tlie neighbourhood of the Dogger Bank, when a flotilla of new and well- anned Geniian destroyers came on the scene at high speed. The Berlin official accoimt said that " dming an advance of our torpedo boats, our boats met on the Dogger Bank, some 120 miles east of the British coast, se\-eral British cruisei-s, which at once fled. Our boats pm-sued them, sank the new cruiser Arabis, and hit a second cruiser with a torpedo. Our torpedo boats rescued the commander of the Arabis, two other officers, and 21 men. Our forces suffered no damage and no losses." The only infonnation issued by the British Admiralty was by way of correction of the German version, the " cruisers " mentioned in which were stated to be four mine-sweeping vessels, three of which had retiu-ned safely The doctor of the Arabis, Surgeon-Probationer John Hughes, R.X.V.R., was among those picked up by the Germans, but he died from exposm-e, and was biu-ied witli military honours in the Xaval Garrison Cemetery at Wilhekus- haven on February 23. In the week before the sinking of the Ai-abis, the significant discovery was made that a flotilla of German torpedo craft had been operating within 70 miles of the coast of Essex wit h apparent immunity. On February 2 the Dutch tank steamer Ai'temis was stopped shortly after midnight by four German torpedo boats, about foiu- miles from the North Hinder lightship. Her master Mas ordered by the Germans to proceed at full speed for one horn-, in a direction south by east, and then to ilrop anchor. Arri\ing there, the Artemis was held up by two other torpedo boats, and ordered to proceed to Zeebrugge, lier request for a \n\ot being refused. The captain of the Artemis was THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB, 53 then informed that, having disobeyed orders, his ship would be torpedoed within five minutes. Within this time, and before the lowering of the boats was completed, a torpedo was fired and hit the vessel, wliich listed heavily, and \^ the torpedo craft made off. After spending the rest of the night in their boats, the men of the Artemis returned to the steamer, as she was still afloat, and on the afternoon of the next day were able to bring her to Rotterdam. This high-handed proceeding towards a neutral trading vessel proved to be the forerumier of many outrages committed by the Gferman submarines against Dutch ships, bvit as far as published information showed, the torpedo boats did not repeat their raid into the North Sea for some months, at least not with a successful result. Their next coup occiu-red on June 24, when the Great Eastern Railway steamer Brussels was captured, by destroyers, and taken into Zeebrugge. It was at 2 a.m. on the 24th that some twelve destroyers came up on either side of the Brussels. Armed parties immediately boarded the steamer, one surrounding the officers on the deck, another proceeding to the cabins, a third to the engine- room, and so on. Thirty escaped Russian prisoners were roughly hustled on board one of the destroyers, and the ship was then headed for Ostend, where tht Germans made a trium- phal entry. Thence the Brussels was taken to Zeebrugge and unloaded, the passengers and crew being sent to Bruges. Next day, the women and children were allowed to retiu-n home. There was a horrible sequel to the falling into German hands of tliis steamer and her crew Captain Charles Fryatt, her master, had become known for his coolness and courage in the face of the operations of enemy submarines. On one occasion especially, some fifteen months before, he had saved the vessel and the lives of her passengers and crew by skilfully avoiding an attack, and in recognition of his coolness and judgment the Admiralty made him a presentation. On July 27, this gallant and capable seaman was brovight before a court- martial at Bruges, and condemned to death " because, although hs was not a member of a combatant force, he made an attempt on the TfJK f;KI<V1AN MCiMMAKDMHN T Ol- I.OWHSTOIT. Interior of a Women'* (Jonvalescent House. 119—3 a it «• « .2 ■a b V e u= o * a «> s S « a . 1:1 ^ t a O 1^ C/5 OS Ui e -c Z Ji o S S - To? as » s 2 § ^ = 3 e o _ u gg w O c " s i S *; U 3 ■a e <9C a c c S 3 3 '^ a M THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 55 afternoon of March 28, 1915, to ram the Gemaan submarine U 33 near the Maas lightship. The accused," continued the German official account, " as well as the first officer and the chief engineer of the steamer, received at the time from the British Admiialty a gold watch as a reward for his brave conduct on that occasion, and his action was mentioned with praise in the House of Commons." The sentence being confirmed, Captain Fryatt was shot the same afternoon, and the German statement concluded : " One of the many nefarious franctireur proceedings of the British merchant marine against our war vessels has thus found a belated but merited expiation." Since the execution of IVIiss Cavell, nothing had occurred to stir the indignation of the civilized world so much as this " atrocious crime against the laws of nations and the usages of war," as Mr. Asquith described it in the House of Commons. " His Majesty's Govern- ment," said the Premier, " desire to repeat emphatically that they are resolved that such crimes shall not, if they can holp it, go un- punished. When the time arrives they are determined to bring to justice the criminals, whoever they may be, and whatever their station. In such cases as this the man who authorizes the system under which such crimes are committed may well be the most guilty of all. The question of what immediate action should b« taken Is engaging the earnest con- sideration of the Government.'' Mr. A«quith added that the Government would certainly consider the claims of Captain Fryatt's wid<jw and .seven children to some recognition at the hands of the nation. In other enterprises into the Xorth Sea, the German destroyers captured the steamer JjUHtriH on July 'j ; and the Colchester on Hf>pt*iTn\x)r 21. On the night of October 26, how«;vor, they attemptefl the most daring venture of any when they raided th*; rross- diannel tran-^port service. It was a very dark night, and Hlifjping down the Belgian coast froTn Zeebrugge, they piished tlirough the Dover Straits to the lino from Folkjjstone U) Boulogne Six dnft^jPM whif:h wurti on guard in the Churuiol were .surpri>yHl anrl fjuickly Hunk, arifl the enemy Ix^atH, Un\ in ti\iJn\Hfr of the latent tyf)e, arifj eorrrf/iandefj by CMf>tairi Micholswi, tlion at- tw.ktul lui'i overwhelrnod the deHtroy»>r Flirt, LiHiiUmant K. J'. KelUrtt, a mnnll bout of only 380 UiTtf*, arrn/Kl with one 12-pounrlor and five a fnxindDT guns, and launched in IHUl. 'J'hoy aiSO met, near the Varne lightship, according to the German official report, a number of hospital ships, and finally overhauled the mail steamer Queen, which was sunk after her crew had been given time to leave. The destroyer Nubian, Commander Montague Bernard, belonging to the force wliich tried to intercept the raiders, got into touch with the enemy, but was disabled by a torpedo and taken in tow, and owing to the bad weather the tow parted, the vessel going aground. In returning two of the enemy destroyers were believed to have been destroyed by striking mines. There was a large element of luck for both sides in this affair, therefore, for it would have been more serious had the German flotilla encountered some loaded transports and sunk them, and on the other hand surprise was expressed that the raiders did not pay more heavily for thair temerity. Up to this time, the cross-channel traffic had experienced complete immunity from attack by above-water vessels. In his despatch dated May 29, 1916, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, commanding the Dover Patrol, was able to show that over 21,000 merchant ships, apart from men-of-war and auxiliaries, had passed through the Patrol in the previous six months, of which only 21 had been lost or seriously damaged by the enemy, or less than one per thousand. To effect this security, over four [)er cent, of the patrol vessels were sunk and the lives of 77 officers and men lost to the nation. As regards tha work of the Patrol in protecting the flank of all the sea transport to and from the Anny in France, so thoroughly had this been performed that not one single life had been lost during the sea passage. The A<imiral also recorded that the work of the Deitroyer Flotilla throughout the winter had been incessant and arduous, and thoroughly well carried out Among the lo.sses inciuTod was that of the V^iking, a destroyer of the Tribal class, built in 1910, which was sunk whilst convoying a trooper across the Channel, pre- sumably by a mine, on January 29, 1910 Coimnander T. C. H. Williams wont down with his shi|). Another destroyer lost in the cross • chantK;! service during tlio year was the Eden, of the ilivor class, which the Admiralty announced on June 17 hurl sunk the night before after a collision. Her (iommanding officer, IjcuLenant Alastair C, N. Farquhar, was also lost with his boat, find about lialf the crew. Only <m two occasions during the period under survey {n,\>nvi from the movoniont which loil 5rt THK TIMES HISTORY OF Till: WAli. .•'re. . CAPTAIN PAUL KONIG The German Commander of the under-water liner " Deutschland.'' to the battle off Jutland Bank) did the larger vessels of the Geiman Xavy put in a genuine appearance in the Xorth Sea. The qualifying adjective is necessary because the German Admiralty Stafi constantly reported operations by their "High Seas forces," but what they thought fit to call an " advance " or a " search " was in reality nothing more than a tactical movement within easy reach of the protected waters of the Heligoland Bight, with aircraft aloft to give timely warning of the enemy. On April 25, however, to synchronise with the rebellious movement in Ireland, the German battle-cruiser squadron came out for a cruise, for the first time since the drubbing it had received fifteen months earlier at the hand of Sir DaAnd Beatty off the Dogger Bank. Accom- panied by light cruisers and destroyers, it appeared ofi Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth about 4 30 a.m., and bombarded these places for twenty minutes, when it headed for home at full speed. It was engaged by the local naval forces, of wliich two British light cruisers and a destroyer ^weit* hit, but not Hunk, The (iennanw claimed, however, that the light eiui.ser I'mu loiw wa« dunuigt'd beyond repair, and that a chwtroyer and two patrol )joat« wore sujik, ono i)i tlu» last-naiuttd being tho frawlor King Stt»j)h«n, which a few wooks oarlior had soon the Zeppelin 'J.. ID" in a sinking con- dition in the North Sea, but had refused to^ take off her uum, as they outniunljered her own* crew and could have overpowered thorn.. After tho raiil, Mr. JJalfour received a deputa- tion from the towns which had boon shelled, and outlined to the local mayors now disposi- tions and accessions in our maritime position which onabled us " to biing important forces, to the south without in the least imperilling: our naval preponderance elsewhere." The- Fii-st Lord also referred to submarines and monitoi-s, which fonned no portion of the (irand Fleet, and which were then "available in growing numbers for coast defence." The second occasion of activity on the part of the High Sea Fleet was on August 19, or about eleven weeks after Admiral Scheer's. sqviadrons had been put to flight off Jutland. They came out this time with considerable^ caution, and learning from their .scouts that the British forces were present in force, they avoided an engagement, and returned to port. In searching for the enemy, the British light cruiser screen lost two vessels of the " City " class, the Xottingham, Captain C. B. Miller,, and Falmouth, Captain J. D. Edwards, both by submarine attack. All the officers of the former were saved, but 38 of the crew wer& missing ; of the Falmouth, all the officers and men were saved, but one leading stoker died of injiu-ies. The British claimed that one enemy submarine was destroyed and another rammed and possibly sunk. Another injmy inflicted on the Germans,, wliich later reports showed, however, was not decisive, gav^e great pleasure at the time. This was the torpedoing of the Dreadnought battleship Westfalen by submarine E 23, Lieutenant -Commander Robert R. Tiu-ner. One torpedo hit the German ship, and later on, while she was being escorted by five de- stroyei-s back to harbour in a damaged condi- tion, she was again attacked with a second torpedo, which was believed to have struck. The Germans, in a report on August 23, declared that the sliip reached port safoh-, and would soon be repaired, the second torpedo having missed. On October 25 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 57 Lieutenant -Commander Turner was awarded the D.S O. This cruise of August 19 might be considered as a development of the attrition policy, which, as has been shown, was no more successful in 1916 than it had been earlier A very effective check upon one source of the enemy's power to conduct such a war of attrition was pro\-ided by the work of the British squadron off the Belgian coast, which was well main- tained. Vice-Admiral Bacon said in his de- spatch of May 29, 1916 • Certain opportunities have arisen of bombarding the enemy's positions in Belgium. On these occasions the necessary minor operations have been carried out. In addition to the daily reconnaissance and protective work performed by the Royal Xaval Air Service on the coast, eleven organised attacks against the enemy's aerodromes and thirteen attacks on enemy vessels have been carried out. Xine enemy machines and one submarine have been destroyed by air attack, and appreciable damage has been inflicted on military adjuncts. . . . The advent of spring weather has lately enabled me to take measures to limit the extent to which the subnxarine and other vessels of the enemy had free access to the waters off the Belgian coast. The success achieved ha<<, so far, been considerable, and the activities of submarines operating from the Belgian coast have been much reduced. We have destroyed several of the enemy's submarines and some of his surface vessels. Sir Reginald expressed his cordial thanks to Rear-Athniral do Marliave, of the Fi'onch Navy, for the hearty cooperation he had afforded. An example of the air attacks referred to by Admiral Bacon, may be cited from what occurred on March 20, 1916. In the early hours of that day, a combined force of approxi- mately fifty British, French, and Belgian aeroplanes and seaplanes, accompanied by 15 fighting machines, left various bases and attacked the Gennan seaplane station at Zeebrugge, and the aerodrome at Houttave, near Zeebrugge. Considerable damage was reported to have been done. The machines on an average carried 200 lb. of boinbs, and all returned safely. The British macliines engaged were all naval. This was the largest air raid, so far as the numbers of machines engaged were concerned, reported up to that time. Bombed out apparently by the hail of ammunition which was poured upon Zee- brugge diu"ing this attack, three Gennan destroyers were found at sea off the port later in the day They were brought to action by four British destroyers, and at once turned and ran for harbour. Two of the German THB COMMANDHK Ol THH " U .S3.'* Lieutenant-C^ommander llari« Ho/.e (on left) and two officers of the (<erman tuhmarine. 58 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W'Ali. boaU were obbervtHJ tu be hit, but were able lo make gocal their eucape. Ttiin brief runniiig light wad typical of otlier skintiiiihes otf the ooaiit of Belgiiun. In ttuu loraJity, too, tliere took place, er>pticially during the spring and auiuiuor, a large niunl)t<r of bomb attacks fmni Alliet^l aircraft, which servetl a iLsefui piirpo.se in curbing the enemy's preparations and in hara&iing his personnel. One in particular may be mentionotl for tho incidents connected with its naval support. On March 25, an attack by British seaplanes was delivered upon the tJemian airship shotls at Toudem, in Schlet^wig-Holstein, east of tlio island of Sylt- Commodore R Y. Tynvhitt, with a light cruiser and destroyer force, escorted the aircraft to their rendezvous near the German coast. They got away successfully and flew to their objective, but there had the misfortune to be brought down by the enemy and their five occupants taken prisoners. The others came back to the wai-sliips, which had steamed to and fro off the coast awaiting their return. A change for the worse in thf weather, however, caused the loss of a destroyer from the escorting force, the Medusa, which came into collision with the Laverock, and in the stormy seas which prevailed she foundered. It was then that a tine piece of seamanship waj< displayed by Lieutenant-Coimnander \'. S Butler and the crew of the destroyer Lassoo. Tliat ves.sol was skilfully place<l alongside the sinking Medusa, and e\ery man of the latter's company was taken otT, without a single casualty, a feat which elicitetl the coiumundation of the Admiralty. In the course of the day, a division of British destroyers sighted two Gennan anned patrol ve.sseLs, the Otto Rudolf and Braun- schweig, overlmuled and sank them Four men were rescued from the fomier and sixteen fi-oin the latter. Uliile engagetl with these small craft, the British boats were attacked bvGennan aircraft, but they received no damage of any kind. There was a further exciting incident at night to complete a roimd of unusual ex^jeri ences. The British hght cruisore encountered a division of German destroyers, one of which was rammed and sunk by the Cleopatra, Captain F. P Loder-Sj-monds. It was not imtil a claim for bounty came before the Prize Court on July 17 that the facts of this occurrence became known. At 10.15 on the night of March 25 the Cleopatra was cruising with other ships in the North Sea and was leading the column, when those on board saw sparks, wliich appeared to issue from a coal -burning GERMAN SUBMARINE AND CREW. The ":U;53" atJNewport, Rhode Island, October 7, 1916, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR, 59 vessel close on the port bow. The hehii of the Cleopatra was immediately put over in order to ram, and the'enemy two'destroyers were then seen. Steaming at 20 knots, the Cleopatra hit . the rear enemy boat, cutting her in halves, and the two parts were seen to pass one on each side of the cruiser. It was impossible to rescue any survivors. It was ascertained that the vessel simk was the G194, and the German casualty list showed that 9.3 persons were lost in the sinking of the boat, the prize boixnty awarded at £5 a head being therefore £465. Yet another phase of the Xa\^'s work in or about the Xorth Sea was eomiected with the blockade of Germany. To the London corre- spondent of the BrooMyn Eagle, Rear-Acbniral Sir Pudley de Chair, who commanded the tenth Cruiser (Blockade) Sqriadron from the outbreak of war to March 6, 1916, when he became Xaval Adviser to the Foreign Office, gave a description of the machinery by which all the oversea traffic of Germany was intercepted. The Admiral showed how the blockade was gra- dually p\illed very much tighter than it was at first. The number of patrolling ships increased month by month, until there was a complicated network of cruisers scattered over the Xorth Sea areas, through which it was almost im- possible, he declared, for any steamer, sailing ship, or trawler to pass without coming under direct observation. Usually the cruisers were about twenty miles apart, and as each cruiser was afforded a clear view of fifteen miles to the horizon, no blockade runner could pass between them without being seen by one or both. The type of warship chosen to maintain the blockade was known as an auxiliary annecl cruiser — .usually a converted passenger ship or merchant trailer, anrl the great majority of the blockade officers were drawn from the Mercantile Marine, a« bfjing accuitomed to manifests and ship's papers they were [>f!culiarly fitted for such work. Most of the ships reinairiefj nt sea contiruiously for fifty flays before going int'» port to re- coal and re-provision. The following is the Admiral's picture of a blockade Hhif) at work : You rniixt irruigjn/) im xteaming a hfAtf.n tra<:k up and fi'rwn a bit of op->ri xoa : in total riarknrwn at ni«ht, and during th<- rlay k>-<-ping a xharp look-out for rnirn-M and xribTnariricH of \\if i-tii-juy. Tho wfalhcr in I lie North Atlantic in rnid-wintfr ik vt-ry onvn-, and rno-t of onr shipH rfjuHin at iwia continuously for flfty days b«for« pro'^'<-diri(l; to fK^rt to n-coal and r«'provi«iori. (J'/ro'jtirrj'-n nothing lirtpf»<-nH for 'layn on ••nd. At t-Urvu o'clock »!vcry nii^ht, if our win-U--H 'm not loo hrioy, w« fiink up tho day'i war hiillcliriH from I'oldliu, and thfj KifT«>l Tower, or dorn*! Qnnnasi Mtation. Fioally, on<) day tliwrc i" a blotch of .■mok" on llio REAR-ADMIRAL S. R. FREMANTLE (on right) with Vice-Admlral Sir J. M. de Robeck. horizon. As we keep in touch with our neighbouring units by wireless, we know that this cannot be from the funnels of one of our own cruisers. Word passes that a ship is sighted perhaps attempting to elude our blockade. It is the duty of the patrolling cruiser to investigate. Overhauling the merchantman, the cruiser's gun fires two blank charges to draw attention to the line of signal flags which have been nm up to the mast-head. This is a necessary step, for often there is but one man on the bridge of the merchantman, and he might easily fail to observe us — unintentionally or otiicrwise. The cruiser's signals announce that an officer will be pent aboard to examine the ship's manifests. Accom- panied by an armed guard of five men, the boarding ofTiccr goes ovr-r the cruiser's side, and often at some p-ril to life and limb manages somehow to clambcir up to the tramp's d(^ck. I have often soon the cruiser's dory stove in, and the boarding party thrown into the water. Onr boarding-oflicer interviews the cai)tain of tlie mcrcluintman, wl»o states his port of origin, his des- tination, his cargo, the length of his voyage, and whether or not ho stands in need of any assistance. The crew is sometimfw mustered in siixpiciotis coses to determine whether any German subjects are aboard. Finally, the manifests are carefully examined. In many cases the neutral ship is quite innocent, and is allow<-d immediately to proceed; in fact, whenever there is fair doubt about the cargo, wo arc lenient in releasing our temporary capture. In the case of fishing trawliTH, which hwarm the North Sea, it is possible to examine the cargo imtriediately, and where ships are partly in ballaMt the examination may also be done (|iiickly. I cannot erii[ihaMiMe too ntrongly that it is aKogelher wafer and i.^ori- liiirnane for the iKiilnil to bo examined 60 THbl TlMl':s HlsKfUY ol'' Till': W.IIL ENTRANCE TO A DIVING-BELL. An air-compression vessel, used for laying moorings for battleships, fitted with a diving-bell, the entrance to which is down the big funnel amidships. n"a protected harbour. There seem to be two methods of dealing with a suspected blockade runner. Our method is to take the neutral to the nearest British port for examination. The German method is to torpedo at sight. Between these two extremes, there should be the alternative of examination at sea, but it is obviously quite impossible to discharge an entire ship's cargo upon her own decks with heavy weather likely to develop at any inoment. My experience n^ commander of the North Sea blockade for twenty nvonths is that all neutral oaphwus invariably prefer to be sent into a Britisl» harbour. The delay is reduced to a luinimiun, and the insfn'otioik is accomplished with safety and dispatch. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 61 A TKANSPOKT'S FALSE SPKED. Hr!(ith traniport with a hij){e bow-wave painted on her sides to deceive the German submarines. In an f!ailif;r chapt'-r,* it haH boon Hhown liow "ttih orijfinal rncnfutf-, of tho HiiVjrriarino attack r)n corn/norce wa« »!fTf;f:tivf;ly hanfJI«;d by Dm JJoanl ■ijf A'Jrniralty under Mr. Churohill and Ijord YiHitf.r. In thft autumn of 191. 'J tho Hubniarin«5H • ('impif^T ('XI., jifuff H'i. appeared to have been cleared out of the narrow wators around tho British iHles, but a few of tho newer and larger boats wore at work in tho Mediterranean. On December 30, 1915, tho r. & (). liner Persia was torpedfjod and Hunk off (-'rete, with n lr)HH of about 200 lives, and 77//'; 77.\//';.s' HisToiiY OF Till': win. inHiuMiceit Lty prtniuuM uttiU;k8 of a Bimilar kiiiii, certain fortn^ii htt^umship coinptiiiirs, iiutcibly Dutc-lt ami Japaiu'se, had ducidtvl tu traudfttr their btuaniHrti from the Suez Canal to the Cape route. In tho Hpring of 191U the menace broke out again in more virulent form than ever, and continued fitfully throughout tht« year. No »tati«tifs of Utsse.s wtwe i.ssu«'<l hy the Admiralty, but on Octolwr 17, 11) Ki, Mr. Rimciman amiouneed in the House of Conunons that Grt-at Britain hail actually lost, by enemy action and by marine risks, no loss than 2,0(M),000 gross tons of shipping since the war began. (Lloyd's Register in 1914 showed a gross tonnage of 21,045,049 in the liritish Mercantile Marine.) The numbers of ships destroyed, of com-se, ran into hiuiilretls, and the toll of life was also a heavy one. The Germans advertised a new submarine campaign to begin on March 1, giving as a reason for it a number of alleged illegalities, in arming merchantmen and so on, by the British Government. The pro- vision of guns for merchant ships is, of course, an ancient right, accepted by the nations for many centuries. On March 2 the Admiralty published in full the instructions in force governing the conduct of merchant ships armed with guns for defensive purposes. Another document made public by the Admiralty showed the degree of reliance to be placed upon German promises to abate the virulence of the " U "-boat methods. This was a list of forty British and fourteen neutral ships, all of which were unarmed, but which had been torpedoed on sight by enemy submarines without any warning during 1915. A featvu"e of the renewed submarine campaign in 1916 was the manner in which the enemy craft retm-ned to their old haunts. Ships began again to be destroyed in the English Channel. On !March 24 the cross-channel steamer Sussex was torpedoed, but not sunk, the ship reaching Boulogne with a loss of 100 lives out of the 380 passengers and crew on board at the time. Fragments of the torpedo which struck the vessel were examined by American naval attaches, who were satisfied that it was of Ger- man make, but the Berlin authorities disclaimed all responsibility for the attack, even after the submarine which carried it out had been cap- tured on April 5 by an Anglo-French flotilla, and the French Government were in possession of the commander's name and confinnatory evidence. It was not until May 10 that the Germans admitted having torpedoed the Sussex, and the American Secretary of State then in(|uire<l what punishment would be meted out to the submaritiH conunander, in accordance with a (Jennan promise, but there was appa- rently no satisfactory reply to this. In other cases of wrongful attacks, such as those on the Dutch steamers Tubantia and I'alembang, the (jHrman method was to endeavour to evade responsibility, and at length to i)romi80 to submit the matti«r to an iiiternational court after the war ! In a message on the second annivei-sary of the British declaration of war Mr. Balfour said liiat tim advantage of sub- marine attacks on commerce was that they couUl not be controlled by superior fleet power in the saine way as attacks by cruisers. The disadvantage was that they could not be carried out on a large scale consistently with the laws of war or the requirements of humanity. They made, therefore, a double appeal to Gennan militarism ; an appeal to its prudence and an appeal to its brutality. " What blunderers they are ! " said Mr. Balfour of the organizers of this campaign. " I doubt not their ability to manipulate machines. But of managing men, unless it be German men, they know less than nothing. They are always wrong ; and they are wrong because they always suppose that if they behave like brutes they can cow their enemies into behaving like cowards. Small is their knowledge of our merchant seamen." With improved boats, the submarine warfare naturally — in fact necessarily — extended the area of its operations. On June 21, U 35, under the command of Captain von Arnauld de la Peri ere, arrived at Cartagena, to deliver an autograph letter to the Iving of Spain from the Kaiser, thanking the former for the welcome given to the defeated Germans from Cameroon on arrival in Spanish territory. The submarine, after taking in supplies from the German interned ship Roma, left within twenty-foiu* hours, and having thus established the right of German under-water craft to use neutral ports, proceeded to sink a number of vessels in the Mediterranean. On July 6 the German Admiralty announced her safe return to Germany, and added that in the course of the cruise she had sunk the French armed steamer Herault. Shortly after this another attempt wasmade toestablish the principle of submarines using neutral ports by the dispatch of vessels to the United States. \ On July 9 a so-called commercial submarine, or under-water liner, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 63 ON THE CLaN liners The oflFicers and en|ineers of the "Lindsay." Smaller picture: Captain Miller on the " Macfadyen.'* the Deutschland, arrived at Norfolk, Virginia, with a cargo of dyes, etc., having left Heligoland on June 23. Captain Paul Konig, a merchant officer, was in command. The vessel left on August 1, and anchored in the Weser River on the 2.3rd Her se<-ond voyage began in October, and she reachefl Now London, Connecticut, on November 1 . Meantime, a war submarine, U53, was also dispatchefJ to America, arriving at Newport, Khofle Island, on October 7, unflei the command of Lieutenant -Commander Hans Roze. TTie boat lf>ft in about throe hours, and next day Hank six merchant ships, four British, one iHitch, and one Norwegian, off the Nantucket lightship, in the direct route of the trade to and from New York. One of th» victims, the St*>j>hano, liad f>assengers on bf)ard, including thirty Ajnericaris, s^^rne Ujlmiging to the Red Crow*. The Stephano whh fired ufion without warning, and stofjped when attn/;ked. Her paHsengers and crew took to the boats, arul the vcHHt'] wan lYum sunk )>y gunfire and a torjiodo When the Htef<harK» s*»nt out her wireU-ss call f'>r help, the American destroyer l'«inham left NewfK/ft, and arriv»xJ on the sfjwie as the Hubmarino was about to sink another victim, the Dutch freighter Bloomersdijk. Tho de- stroyer Vioing in tho wayof tho submarine's aim, the Oerman captain asked her to move out of the way. The requr,st was <;ompliod with, and the l'.looniers(lijk was sent to the bottom. An <u THK TI.MKS HISToin' ()F THE II' \li. V ICE- A DM 1,. KANIN. Late Commander-in-Chief of the Kussiaa Baltic Fleet. VICR-ADML. D'ARTIGE UU I OURNKT. The French Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. VIGE-ADML HUH. THE DUKE OF THE ABKUZ/I The Italian Commander-in-Chief in the Adriatic. officer of the lieiiham eonfinnod tliis in an interview. On Octoiijor 31 it was officially announced from Berlin that the U 53 had roturned safely to (Jonuany. Matiy diplomatic iind legal questions were raised by these throe exploits — the visit of the U 35 to Cartagena, the treatment accorded to the Doutschland, and the destruction of shipping by U 53 off the American coast, but this aspect of the matter need not here be dealt with. Their naval signifi- cance was not great, a.s it was merely a matter of engineering development, and the endurance of the crews to make voyages across the Atlantic In addition to their submarine warfare, the Germans made at least two attenipts early in 1916 to place cruLsei-s on the trade routes. The first of these, which proved successful, was made with a converted fruit trader, wliich was renamed the Mowe. Commanded by Captain the Bur- grave Count von und zu Dolina-Schlodien, this vessel took advantage of a dark, squally night towards the end of December, 1915, to rush the British patrol. By the irtiddle of January she was operating in raid-Atlantic, where she inter- cepted the Elder Dempster liner Appam, put a prize crew on board, and sent the sliip to the United States. Fourteen other \essels, twelve of which were British, were sunk, including the Glan MacTavish, wliich, being armed with a small gvm for defence against submarines, put up a fight. On ^larch 4 the >Mowe returned to Germany. Her dai-ing feat liad resulted in the destruction of 50,000 tons of Allied shipping, and had disturbed the floating trade o\'er a wide area. It was evidently the German inten- tion to maintain a succession of such blockade- runners, for on February 29 a second raider. the Greif. was overhaui(«l in the North Sea by the auxiliary cruiser Alcantara, Captain T. E. W'ardle A duel ensued, in which the German \()ssel was di.sabled, but before sinking she managed to get off a torpedo which destroyed the Alcantara. The latter, however, liad by then been joined by the Andes, another auxiliary cruiser, which assisted to complete the destruc- tion of the Greif. After this event, no further attempts of the kind were reported, and the Germans xesumed their submarine warfare with redoubled energy There were no events of decisi\e naval importance in the ]Mediterranean theatre of war diu-ing the first ten montlis of 1916. Although the Dardanelles expedition had been abandoned, there was still the Salonika and Mesopotamia undertakings in hand, and the protection of three thousand miles of sea transport was no light task for the Navy, especially as the enemy submarines made the most of their opportunities in this connexion. On February 23, 1916, Mr Balfoiu- was asked for infonnation relating to the Allied naval commands in the ^Mediterranean, and he replied that it would be inadvisable to describe these in detail, but the general command was in the hands of the French Commander-in-Cliief, Acbniral d'Artige du Fournet The cormnand of the Adriatic and its approaches, added the First Lord, was in the hands of the Italian Commander-in-Chief, H R.H the Duko of the Abruzzi, and other local commands wei"e assigned to British officei-s. " The best general indication," said Mr. Balfour, " of tlie work performed by the Allied Fleets in the Mtxliter- ranean is the successful transport of large THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 65 military forces to Salonika, Valona, and Egypt, the successful evacuation of the Allied expedi- tion from the Dardanelles ; and last, but not least, the transportation of the Serbian Army from Albania — a result chiefly due to the ability and energy displayed by the Italian Fleet." The complete evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninstda was effected on January 8, 1916, and Sir Charles Monro acknowledged that the successful accomplishment of this most delicate and difficult task was due largely to the in- valuable assistance rendered by Admiral de Robeck and the Royal Xa\-y. The cruiser fire from the left flank was mentioned as being most accurate The French embarkations were carried out by their own Xavy, and the French seamen also greatly assisted by embark- ing some of the British animals. From this time, a patrol was still inaintained off the peninsula, to prevent the establishment of submarine bases by the enemy, but the centre of naval interest shifted to Salonika. Here the nature of the work demanded of the Fleet was somewhat different. Ships were not needed for bomVjarding purposes, to provide artillery support to the troops, but the protection of the communications by water was very similar, and as at Gallipoli there was the submarine peril to be guarded against. The operations of the " U "-boats in the waters forming the approaches to Salonika lefJ to the seizure of the forts of Kara Burnu and Kiira Kale, on either side of the bay, in 7anuary% 1910, the occupation being announced on January 31 as having been effected without C incident. Apparently by way of a reprisal for this precautionary movement on the part of tlie Allies, a Zeppelin appeared over Salonika in the early morning of February 1 and dropped sixteen bombs on the town and har- bour. On the next occasion when such a raid was made, the airship making it was brought down in flames * The counter-measures necessitated by the submarine menace in the Mediterranean were of a far-reacliing and complicated character. They involved the occui^ation of several strategic points for xise as bases by the small craft flotillas engaged in hunting the enemy boats ; the searching of many miles of coast - hne and nvunerous islands for possible sources of supply ; and other work which it was not possible to make known. The island of Crete became one of the chief centres in this anti- submarine war. Towards the end of March,^ 1916, an Allied squadron proceeded to Suda Bay, and on April 18 it was announced from * See Vol. VIII., page 192. I'AKf Ol fllF', AIJ.IHIJ M.F.HT Oil SAI.AMIS. i'rench vc<if)clii in (lie forcfiround. 66 THt: TlMl'JS HISTOIiY OF THE WAR. Athens that the British Minuster th«'rt> htid coiuiiiuuicated to th« CJi-mik i'lvmitir tht« readuiui for the occupation of thih liarbour. Sunultanuoiuly, the ihitiiih Conuul at Canea notitied the new fegulationti which had biten ilrawn up in connexion with the etitabliMiuaent of a naval batte at Suila Bay. The AlHed Miniwtei-H at Athens al«o infui-nu«d the CJreek l*reniier of the intention of their (Jovernments to land forces in Cephalunia, especially at the harbour of Argostoli, and to create naval bases at certain points in the Ionian Islands and the -Egean Sea. Tliis measure was declared to bo dictated by urgent necessity, and would in no wise infringe the sovereign rights or the terri- torial integrity of GrtHJCe. Certain territory which for other reasons had been temporarily occupied by the Allies also had a value in connexion with the suppression of the subma- rines. The island of Castellorizo, for instance, had been seized by French troops on December 29, 1915, when it was reported that the object was to facilitate Allied action against Adalia. Then on January 11, 1916, French troops landed at Corfu to prepare for the transfer there of the remnant of the Serbian Army from Albania. The Legations at Athens of the Allied Powers issued a declaration showing that their Govern- ments " deemed it an obligation of humanity " to transfer to Corfu that portion of the Serbian Army which was then in Albania. The task of revictualling these troops would thus be simphfied. The Powers took this step in the belief that Greece would not feel compelled to oppose a measure that would redound to the benefit of her Ally, and would in any case be of brief duration. Among the buildings utihzed for the Serbians was the Kaiser's villa, the Achilleion, which was converted into a hospital for the wounded. To turn now to the effect of the submarine war on the fighting fleets, the principal loss to be recorded is that of the battleship Russell. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sydney R. Fremantle, and commanded by Captain W. Bowden-Smith, this vessel was reported to have struck a mine on April 26. She sank with a loss of 12-4 officers and men, but the admiral, captain, commander and about 700 officers and men were rescued. In Germany it was asserted that the Russell was not destroyed by a mine, but by a submarine, as there were no mine- sowers at all in the INIediterranean, the laying of these macliines being very difficult on account of the depth of the water. However, within a week, confirmatory evidence of the use of mines theii< was forthcoming when the Admiralty, on May 1, announceil the loss of the armed yacht .^gusa. Captain T. P. Walker, ll.N.H. (retired Vice-Admiral), and the mine-sweeper Nastur- tium, Lieutenant-Commander Robin W. Lloyd, R.N., both of which sank after striking mines. Seven men were lost from the Nastuitium and six from the .^gusa. The latter was formerly Sir Thomas Lipton's yacht Erin. There had been earlier losses from submarine attack among the Allied warships in the Mediter- ranean. On February 8 the French cruiser Amiral Charnier was struck, and sank within a few minut<'s, off the coast of Syria. There was a doubt about the agency which caused her destruction, the Germans claiming to have torpedoed her, but the statements of the one survivor rather pointed to a floating mine from the Dardanelles having blown her up. The vessel foundered very quickly, and the one seaman saved was picked up from a raft on wliich there were foui-teon others, all of whom had died. On February 26 the French auxiliary cruiser Provence II, temporarily engaged in transpoi-ting troops and equipment to Salonika, was torpedoed in mid-Mediterranean, with the loss of 1,000 lives, the ship going down in fifteen minutes. On March 1 the Primula, a British mine-sweeper carrying out patrol duties, was tori^edoed and sunk, her crew, except three men, being saved and landed at Port Said. Another warship loss shortly afterwards was that of the monitor M.30. This was one of the smaller vessels of this novel type engaged in watcliing the Gallipoli Peninsula and blockading the Straits. Vice-Admiral de Robeck reported that on the night of May 13 she was struck by the enemy's artillery ; and, taking fire, was subsequently destroyed. Two men were killed and two wounded. The M.30 was commanded by Lieutenant-Commander E. L. B. Lockyer, R.N., who as first and giuinery lieutenant of the Carmania was present in the action witla the German raider Cap Trafalgar in September, 1914, and was awarded the D.S.O. for his services. Nearly three months elapsed before another loss was reported from the Mediter- ranean, and then on August 3 the auxiliary mine -sweeping vessel Clacton was torpedoed and sunk in the Levant. The casualties reported in connexion with this loss included five missing, including Engineer-Lieutenant F. E. IMortimore and Engineer-Sub-Lieutenant C. J. McKelvey, both of the Royal Naval I'.KIIISII IKOOPS I,ANI)IN(; A I SALONIKA. 07 68 lilt: TI.MKS niSTOUY Ol'' Tllb: WAR. COKFU, Where the French troops landed, January 11, 1916. Reserve. On the 25th of the same month the Admiralty announced that the armed yacht Zaida, which had been on detached service in the Gulf of Aloxandretta, destroying petrol stores, etc., was reported considerably overdue A recent German communique had stated that a patrol boat had been sunk in those waters, and the Admiralty said that this information no doubt referred to the Zaida, as news had been received through Turkish sources that four officers and 19 men of her crew had been taken prisoners. There was no information as to the fate of the remainder of the crew, two officers and eight men, and it was therefore assumed that they were lost. In Lloyd's Register the Zaida was shown to have belonged to Lord Rosebery. There was a batch of ships destroyed in the early part of October by the submarines On the 2nd a German submarine fired two torpedoes at the small French cruiser Rigel, said by the enemy to have been " built as a submarine-destroyer," and sank her. The first hit was scored about nine o'clock in the morning, and seriously damaged the vessel, one of her stokeholds being flooded and tliirteen men killed or blown into the sea. In spite of this, the vessel showed fight, and shelled the submarine each time the latter appeared on the surface An hour and a half later two French trawlers on patrol came on the scene, and the submarine disappeared, but at 1.30 p.m. the " U "-boat fired a second torpedo at the Rigel, which, carried away the greater portion of the vessel abaft, and killed four more of her crew. The^ Rigel remained afloat, however, and continuetl to fire at the submarine whenever the wake of the latter was seen. On October 4 there was a double submarine score to the enemy, when the French transport Gallia and the ex-Cunard liner Franconia wer^ sunk. The Gallia was an auxiliary cruiser in use as a transport, and had on board about 2,000 French and Serbian soldiers, as well as a large crew. In all, about 1,374 men were saved. Of the officers! all but one perished The torpedo caused an explosion in the powder magazine, and the wireless installation was smashed instantly, thus isolating the cruiser, and it was not until another French vessel came upon some rafts and boats next day that news of the loss was obtained. Two boats were reported by the Ministry of Marino on October 9 to have reached the south coast of Sardinia. The Franconia was likewise employed upon transport duty, but was carrying no troops at the time. Twelve of her crew were missing, and 302 were saved. When Bulgaria entered the war against the Allies in October, 1915, she was soon made to feel the power of the guns of the combined fleets off the Macedonian coast, and of the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea These bombmdmonts THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 09 were continued at irregular intervals whenever occasion demanded. On January 18, for instance, five Allied warsliips, including the Italian cruiser Piemonte, bombarded Dedeagatch and Porto Lagos, and it was reported that a detachment landed for reconnoitring purposes at the latter place. In the Bulgarian official report twenty-four luiits were mentioned as having appeared of? Dedeagatch and sixteen off Porto Lagos, these figures doubtless including the auxiliaries and sweepers, etc. On February 2 it was reported from Sofia that attacks from the sea were of almost daily occun-ence along tliis coast, the Bulgarian batteries replying. When the Biilgarians, in spite of their pro- mises to Greece, entered Kavala on August 25, 1916, they were again quickly harassed by the Fleet. On the same day two British monitors and a cruiser bombarded the foris in the town which the Bulgarians had seized, and on Augvist 28 it was further announced that British moni- tors had bombarded enemy forces, the presence of which had been reported at the mouth of the Struma. The district behind Kavala was also raided by British naval aircraft. In the first week of the Bulgarian occupation eight attacks with Vjombs were reported officially by the Admiralty. Simultaneously with these operations in the air, the Allied Fleet was reported by the enemy to be cruising daily along the ^gean coast before Kavala and Electheran, in the Gulf of Orfano. The ships also had a part to play in the offensive undertaken from Salonika. On several occasions during September, and afterwards, they shelled the enemy in the neighbourhood of Xeohori, at the mouth of the river, with satisfactory results. On September 20 it was amiounced that the Admiral Commanfling the Allied Fleet had notified the existence of a blockade between the mouth of the Nestos and the village of Chaiaghizi, which, of course, included the GuK of Kavala. As off the coast of Macedonia, so along the Egyptian and Syrian seaboards naval effort was called for on more than one occasion during the year to assist military operations. On May 18 a squadron of ships, in conjunction with aircraft, attacked the towTi of El Arish, an important post on the enemy line of communications from Syria to Egypt. The fire of the warships was believed to have redviced the fort to the south- west of the town to ruins, and both the ships and aircraft returned safely. There were frequent bombardments of Smyrna. On March 31 forts St. George and Sandjak, with other coastal defences, were reported to have been reduced in an attack lasting tliree hours by a British wai-ship, to which the Tmks made no reply. Add to this the occasional shelling of ^ - i^ui! HiENcji rRor)i's i,ANf)iN(; fN (;kkkc:k. f'lai(« erected on the coatt indicated the point of dinemharkatlon for eucli company. 70 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Sadd-ul-Dahr and other points in the Danla- nelliJH, and it will be ueen ttiat, taken all roiitui, the work of tiie Koyal Navy in the Mediter- ranean wa8 conuiderable in extent anil diverse in oliai-aoter. In the Adriatic Sea no naval operations of first-class iuiportance took place, as the Aiistro- Hungarian Fleet remained in its protected anchorages, and only the small vessels and air- craft of the enemy iintlertook operations of an offensive character. In the capture by the Aiistrians of Mount Lovtchen on January II it was reported that several warsliips partici- pated. The forts and mobile batteries of the Bocche ili Cattaro naval base had shelled the height for several ilays, as had some cruisers in the hay, but it was also reported that two of the Austrian Dreadnoughts were brought into action, the tire from their heavy giuis being of great assistance to the enemy. A few of the chief incidents in the war of attrition, both by sea and air, may be enume- rated On January 13 the French submarine Foucault, working with the Italian forces in the Lower Adriatic, torpedoed and sank an Austrian cruiser of the Xovara type in the neighbourhood of Cattaro. On September 17, 1916, the Foucault herself was sunk off the enemy coast after an attack by Austrian sea- planes, her crew being saved by an Austrian torpedo boat. On FeV^ruary 6 a British cruiser and French toipedo boat, engaged in covering the retii-ement of the Serbian Army met four enemy destroyers, but as soon as the latter were fired upon they fled towards Cattai'o. Next day the same two Allied vessels were attacked by submarine off Dm-azzo, but the torpedo missed its mark. On February 27, the Austrians took possession of Durazzo, after having been kept back for a little time by the fire of the AUied ships. In spite of bad weather, the Italian Fleet kept the coast roads vmder fire until all the Italian troops which had been sent there to cover the evacuation of the Serbians were embarked without mishap and taken to Valona. Not a single Italian gun was left behind at Durazzo. On March 18 the French destroyer Renaudin was torpedoed and sunk by a hostile submarine ; and on May 4 an Austrian destroyer was likewise accounted for by the French submarine Ber- nouiUi. On June 9 thf) Italian transport Principe Umberto was sunk by submarine in the Lower Adriatic, with the loss of about half the troops on board, the number of whom was not revealed. On July 10 the Italian du- fetroyor Impetuoso was torpedoed and sunk by a Hubmarino in the J^owor Adriatic, nearly all her crew being saved. On August 2 the Austrian torpedo gunboat Magnet was tor- pedoed in the I'pper Adriatic by an TtaUan submarine, but was able, according to the enemy report, to reach liarbour. Next day the loss of the Italian submarine Ciacinto- I'ullino was ollicially reported So the guerilla warfare proceeded, with no apparent advantage on either side, the relative position of the opposed fleets being much as it was before. The Austrians wore not able, however, to gain much from the immense advantages which Nature had conceded to tlie Dalmatian coast for such operations. With its numerous bays, gulfs, islands, and deep waters, this seaboard presented opportunities for torpedo- work denied to the Italians. As Rear-Admiral Mazzinghi wrote in describing the work of the- Royal Italian Navy : The chain of islands which extends along the Dalmatian coast permits the Aastrian ships to leave from that point of their own coast nearest that portion of the opposing- coast which they wish to attack, to arrive in less than three hours at the point designated, and in another three hours to be secure in thoir own base. . . . Nor is it necessary that the enemy ships return to the same points of the coast from which they set out. Ships that sailed from Sebenico, for instance, may re-enter by a large number of different routes, or they may go to Pola,. Spalato, Zara, in the Quarnarolo, or put themselves in safety behind the Curzolari, orenter at Cattaro. Instead, our ships can only go out or come in from Venice or Brindisi. It is clear how all this constitutes a very great advantage for Austria, a real disadvantage for us^ Should we wish to lay snares for the enemy ships, we should be compelled to disseminate mines and submarines on every point of the enemy's coast. Austria, with ai much smaller number of these arms, can strongly threaten the movements of our ships. And we have already said how much more easily the submarine can lie in wait on our coasts than on those of our enemy. Evidence of the daring and skill of the Italian seamen was afforded by two raids into the- enemy's bases. On May 28 an Italian torpedo boat approached the entrance to the port of Trieste, which must have necessitated a strong mine belt being negotiated in the Gulf of Trieste. Penetrating into the harboiu*, the boat torpedoed and sank a large transport. The Austrians at once turned on their shore searchlights, but failed to detect the raider while she was within range, and the torpedo boat returned without a scratch. The second' raid was even more bold in conception. On the night of November 1, said the Italian official statement, some toipedo boats, after having successfully crossed the mine zone, ami razed with admirable coolness the solid obstruo- I THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 71 PKOTECTION A(;AINST SUBMARINE MENACE. Ciuns in Lin^ra. iorw <lt\i-n<liti(^ tho FaHarm StraitH tJio ap- n-ofUiYi from th»> north to f'ola— HUCO<H!flf'fl in Tit^Ting t,h« ijHual anchioragf? of part of fJifi ^liHthan ^■|f»*^f,. Two tory>f)fio»!H w«;rr5 ffn-n dJH- har((#xl a((;ajnHt ori*> of tho largo fmriiriy unifcH, >ijfc thoy w#jro fWieri U> b« caught in tho v»!Hh«)1'h orjj'xlo n*rt«. P'or two hourn th»! iorju-ili, hoatH n^inainffl rcfoniioiti iiig a fow hnndrod yards from t})o f)owf!rfiil fortw of J'ola. only rr^tiririg aftor having accompIiHluHj a v«(ry <l«»licato rniHHiftn. In tho samo announcomtmt aH tlint in wliicli \,\ni forogoing exploit was rovcalofj, mention wan mado of a ourioim oncount<;r h«)tw<!«'n an annonrod train and 73 THE TIMFS HISTORY OF THE WAU. VICE-ADMIRAL A. V. KOLCHAK, Russian Commander-in-Chief in the Black Sea. thrt^' Austrian destroyers. The latter appeared before Sant Elpidio (south of Ancona) at dawn on Xovember 5 and opened fire on this tract of coast. An Itahan armoured train was rushed to the scene and compelled them to retire, two desti-oyers being hit. The only British warship losses reported from the Adriatic during the fii-st two years of war were two drifters employed on patrol dvities. The British Admiral reported that on July 9, 1916, the Austrian cruiser Novara came upon a group of such drifters, of which the Astrum Spei and the Clavis were simk and the Frigate Bird and Ben Bui damaged, but not suffi- ciently to prevent their retvu-ning to port. The crew of the Astrum Spei were made prisoners by the Austrians, and among the other boats there were ten killed and eight woimded. On August 2, 1916, the Italians sustained a serious misfortune when their Dreadnovight battlesliip Leonardo da Vinci was destroyed by fire and explosion in Taranto harbour. The warship was moored in a position sheltering her from all possibility of hostile attack, when fii'e broke out near the aft magazine, and although the flooding of the magazine pre- vented the entire destruction of the vessel, a serie.s of explosions occiu-red, and she foundered in about tluee-quarters of an horn-, about 2o0 lives being lost. In the Baltic the year 1916 was less eventful than its predecessor. There was no renewal of the German amphibious operations in the Kigu sector, and tlie Allied siibiuariiies, liaving called down upon themselves the feverish and frantic* efforta of the enemy, were h«sw able to score against liis waiships or comniercial vetJselH. The Uiissian Flet»t, liowever, fiil- (illed completely all the tasks demanded of it, and, as already stateil, its sti'ength was aug- mented. In the course of an interview which was quoted at length in the Ilussian Supple- ment of The Times on March 25, Vice-Admiral Kaniii, then ( 'onunander-in-Chief of the Russian Baltic Fleet, said that tho fundamental strategic picture was amply clear, his Fleet Ix'ing a continuation of the extremes flank of the /\j'my, protecting it against (envelopment by the Cierman Fleet. As Paris was saved on tho Mame, so in the Riga Gulf the stiuggle for the approaches to Petrogi-ad terminated in favour of the Russians. " What would be the situation of the Amiy," asked the Admiral, " if the Germans now occupied Riga and the entire Gulf of Riga ? " Vice-Admiral Kanin also connnended tho services of the Biitish submarines, and remarked on the excellent bearing and coolness of their officers. There was an indication that winter condi- tions, which, of course, precluded a good many movements in the Baltic, were passing when it was reported on March 19 that British sub- marines were going through the Cattegat on their way to the Baltic. One of them on this day stopped the Norwegian steamer Kong Inge, off Falkenberg, and put a prize crew on board her — the first time, it was understood, that an under-water craft had adopted this method prescribed by the law of detaining and searching a ship for contraband. The steamer was ordered to Leith for examination in the Prize Court, and arrived there on the 22nd. On INIay 16 three steamers were sunk by a Russian submarine, the Hera, Kollga, and Bianca, all trading from Haiubvug. On the 22nd three moie steamers, the Pera, Hebe, and Woims, wove reported sunk. On IVIay 17 the German steamer Trave, from Liibeck to Norway with coal, was torpedoed off KuUen, in the Cattegat, by an Allied submarine, her crew being saved, as were those of all the other vessels destroyed. The extensive use of mines by the Germans, in their efforts to c\u"b the submarine aetixity, led to international questions aa-ising \>ith the Scandinavian Powers. In the middle of February the enemy began to lay a new mine- field along the Falsterbo iVef, and several THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 73 Swedish vessels suffered loss or damage in con- sequence. On March 15 it was reported that a minefield was to be laid clown to the south- west of the Drogdens lightship, at the south end of the Sound ; and in the following month Norwegian journals stated that the German Xa\-y had stopped the international passage south of the Sound, not merely by the usual mine obstructions, but also by steel nets designed to entrap submarines going through to the Baltic. Danish torpedo craft were set to watch that the obstructions were not placed in their territorial waters. In the main, the naval operations in the Baltic divided themselves into three phases — the work of the submarines on either side, those of Germany including minelaying in the Gulf of Bothnia and elsewhere among their activi- ties ; cross-raiding by the opposed naval air- craft ; and the assistance rendered to the armies in the coast region. In all three cate- gories there were no events of exceptional importance to chronicle. The Russians proved their efficiency in all respects. On July 2 certain of their ships, including the Slava, supported the right wing of the Army near Riga, shelling the enemys lines to good purpose, in spite of aircraft attacks. Early in Scpffi.ibfr. too, the Gennans reported that Russian vessels had bombarded the north coast of Courland. There were two events in Jime which came outside the ordinary work just referred to. One was an action on June 30, fifteen miles off Landsort, between Russian and German light craft antl destroyers. The Russians annoimced that a detacliment of se\-eral of their cruisers and torpedo boats, searcliing for enemy forces between the island of Gothland and the Swedish coast, discovered no big naval vmit, but at daybreak they were attacked by a flotilla of torpedo boats, which were easily driven off. Attacks by German submarines were likewise unsuccessful, and the Russians returned to their base without loss and without having been damaged. The affair was thus of an indecisive character, but demonstrated afresh the capable handling of the ships by the seamen under Vice-Admual Kanin. In October it was revealed that this officer had rehnqviished command in the Baltic. He was appointed a member of the Council of the Empire. He was succeeded by Vice-Admiral Xepenin. The second occvirrence referred to was a daring attack on a German convoy on Jime 13. The convoy consisted of thirteen or fourteen merchantmen, and was escorted viKW Of- nfi-: iiAf<i{onF< of- iki'.hi/ond, Showin|( Kijttian ^hipll biiJ captured 'I iirkitli vcsicIh. 74 THK TIMh:s HlsroilY OF THE WAR. CAPTAIN CYKIL FULLER. Awarded the D.S.O. for distinguUhed service in (^ameruon. He aUo ceived the C.M.G. re- LIEUT. H. FIKMAN. Killed in a gallant attempt tu ^et thr(>u}<h with a re- lief ship to Kut-el-Amara. [l/ealh. VICH-ADMIKAL SIR R. WEMYSS. Mentioned in Sir Percy Lake's dispatch, Persian (]ulf. tie gave much useful advice and cooperatioa. by the auxiliary cruis*er Herrinarui and some torpedo boats. The cruiser aiid four of the torpedo boats were destroyed, as well as four or five of the merchantmen, the rest taking shelter in Swedish waters. The Germans, in admitting the loss of the Herrmann, said that she was attacked by four Russian des- troyers and set on fire, when her own crew blew her up to avoid capture. About one-third of those on board were rescued and made prisoners. In the Black Sea the Russian Fleet fully maintained the ascendency it had established over the naval forces of Tmkey and Bulgaria, In the few encounters which took place, mostly between small craft, the enemy's vessels were invariably outclassed and frequently suffered loss ; wliile in the advance of the Army of the Caucasus, vmder the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Fleet cooperated very effectively along the coast, and by turning the eneiny's flank made possible the capture of Ti-ebizond. The Goeben made occasional appearances, but her menace had been considerably reduced, and she caused no interference with the movements of the Russians. Oiu" Ally's control of the waters of the Black Sea made itself increasingly felt upon the economic condition in Turkey, and viewed broadly the covirse of events was an abvmdant demonstration of the value of sea command. The chief naval events were undoubtedly those connected with the support of the Army of the Caucasus. From about the beginning of February the Russian ships began a close search of the Asiatic coast, and at frequent intervals bombardments of the Tm-kish positions were carried out. The comnumications over- sea having been made doubly secure, troops were transported to Atina and landed there on March 4, under cover of a heavy fire from the ships. This place is some sixty miles east of Trebizond, towards which the Turkish Army was falling back. Simultaneously, a flotilla of torpedo boats raided the shipping at Trebizond. During the next few days the cooperation of the Fleet proved invaluable. As the Petro- grad Correspondent of The Times wrote on March 7, " the able coordination of the naval and military operations, in which the Fleet turned the Turkish flank, conferred on the Rvis- sians a big advantage, resulting in the enemy's discomfiture." The ultimate sequel was the capture of the important seaport of Trebizond, on April 18, in announcing which the official report stated that " the successful cooperation of the Fleet permitted its to effect the most daring landing operations, and to give con- tinual artillery support to the troops which were operating in the coastal region." As in other theatres of naval war, mines and submarines were actively employed by the enemy, but to little or no purpose. The chief victims of the submarines were two hospital ships, the Portugal being simk on March 30, and the Vperiod, which had replaced her, on July 9. From the former 115 persons were lost, including fovirteen ladies of the Red Cross, and about fifty sm-geons or doctors. As the Russian official statement showed, the cir- cumstances of the attack absolutely precluded all possibility of any mistake having been made by the submarine. The Portugal was proceeding to the port of Ofou to embark wovmded, and was lying stopped in the vicinity of Cape Fathia to enable one of the small craft that accompanied her to effect some trifling THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 75 Tepairs, when two torpedoes were discharged ^t her, one of which took effect. The Vperiod -was Ukewise on her way froni Batum, unes- corted, to take wounded on board. She had all the \asual distinctive marks, in spite of wliich she was sunk. A few casualties from mines were also caiosed, chiefly to merchant shipping The Russian torpedo craft — both surface vessels and submarines — in addition to assisting in the sweeping away of Turkish maritime trade, made several attacks on the enemy as occasion demanded. It was evidently due to their alertness and efficiency that the wanton attacks of the Turkish cruisers on undefended coast towns — such as the shelHng of the Crimean health resort of Eupatoria, thirty miles north of Sebastopol, on May 7— were not more frequent. As in the Baltic, there was a change in the ■chief coEomand of the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea during the year. Early in August it was announced that Vice-Admiral A. V. Kolchak had been appointed Commander-in- Chief in succession to Admiral A. E. Eberhard, who was placed on the retired list, for reasons of ill-health, and appointed a member of the ■Council of the Enxpire Admiral Kolchak was stated to be the youngest admiral in the Russian Navy. He was bom in 1874, entered the naval service in 1891, and on April 10, 1916, was promoted to Rear -Admiral and confirmed in a high independent command in the Baltic. He particularly cUstingui-shod himself at the defence of Port Arthur. It remains to deal with the operations in the outer oceans in which the Royal Navy was concerned. These were all connected with military undertakings, either for the conquest of German colonies or for maintaining British interests and defending our territory against the Turks. The last of the German commerce raiders had been cleared off the seas in 1915, and with the exception of the cruise of the ilowe, already described, each attempt to re\'ive this species of attack failed. The last of the regular warships employed in destroying commerce to be accovxnted for was the Dresden, which was caught and sunk off the island of Mas-a-Tierra, in the Juan Fernandez group, on March 14, 1915. After the Falklands battle on December 8, 1914, the Dresden was pursued by the Bristol, but had got a good start of her. The Dresden apparently went to Sandy Point, in the ^Magellan Straits, and there violated Chilian neutrality by coaling for a second time in Chile within three months, and by remaining longer than 24 hours. For the next three montlis the vessel hid herself in the labyrinth of inlets and channels of Southern Chile. The Santiago (Chile) correspondent of The Times, in a message dated March 2 1 , said that : During this time slie was being sought by the Kent, Glasgow, Bristol, and Carnarvon, and the armed trans- ports Orama and Otranto. Though from time to time it was reported that our ships knew where she was, yet they were never able to catch her outside Chilean waters, and she was able to take advantage of the uninhabited nature of the country in which she was hiding to evade any attempts made by Chile to notify her that she must go out or be interned. On one occasion when our ships had markc-d her down the Chilean Government sent a I HI', CONOUHST Ol' CAMI'.KOON. Nldtr'ta troops lunding from transport. 76 IHH TIMES lUS'H)Uy (>!• THE WAU. miui-ui-war tu uolily her, but hy the tiiuu th« ludu-of- war ftrriveil <>ht) httil been able to luuve eUewhtirti. At the bugiiuiing of Manh, simnltatiuuiwly with activity on the part of several interiieil Genuan uteajueiti on the ooatit, the Dresden came uut of hilling, anil on the Uth she sunk the iuei'(;hant .-ihiii (\>nvvay Castle with her curgo of grain near Juan Fernanilez. The cruiser reticheil the latter place^ — i*o well known for its associti- tion with " Kubinson Crusoe "-— short of coal antl was stated to have called for supplies from the steamers interned at N'alparaiso, two of which, the Alda and Sierra Cordoba, lift soon afterwards. On March 14, however, the Hritish cruisers Clasgow and Kent, with the auxiiiury cruiser Orama, coramandetl respectively by Captains John Luco (Senior Officer), John 1). Allen, and John R. Segrave, sighted the Dresden in CiunVjerland Bay, in the island of Mas-a- Tierra, and immediately opened fire upon her. Within five minutes the Dresden hauled down her colours and displayed the white flag, sending a boat to inform the captain of the (Jlasgow that he was violating Cliilean neu- trality. Captain Luce was reported to have said that it was a matter for diplomacy to arrange, and the Dresden must surrender, which she did. After she liud boon burning for some little time, her uiagazino exploded and she sank —the (Jermans claiming to have destroyed her themselves to avoid capture. The Oemaan crow wore interned on an island called Quiriquina, in Talcahuano Bay. On March 26 the Chilean Minister in London protested to the British (iovenunont against the infringement of (Jhilean territorial rights by the British scpiadron, iimi on the 'Mtli 8ir Ivhvjird Urey, in \'iew of the delay that would have been involveil in clearing up the facts, and of the tenas of the Chilean Note, whicii was friendly in tone, offered a full ai)ology for the incident. Tlio correspondence was issued for pid)lication on April 15, 1915. The (ierman Minister at Santiago do Chile sent to the ('hilean Minister for Foreign Affairs a note replying to the facts set forth in the British Note to Chile in regard to the Dresden, but he was informed that, in view of the fact that the (ionnan Uovernment had not yet (June 19, 1915) answered the Chilean Note protesting against the previous activity of the Dresden off the Chilean coast, no opinion could be expressed on the latter question. The expedition of the Anglo -Indian force ON LAKE NYASSA. The s.s. "Queen Victoria" on the way to Abercorn. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 77 THE CAPITAL, GERMAN EAST AFRICA. Dar-Es-Salaam and Harbour. which in the autumn of 1914 was dispatched to Mesopotamia — to secure, as Mr. Asquith said, the neutrality of the Arabs, to safeguard our interests in the Persian Gvdf, to protect the oilfields, and generally to maintain the authority of our flag in the East — is a story in it.self . The Navy's part in it was of an important and diverse character, and shed lustre on the trarlitions of the Service. In particular, the heroic sacrifice of Lieutenant -Commander Edgar 0. Cookson, V.C, D.S.O., in his attempt to cut through the Turkish river obstructions ; and the gallantry of the mon in the relief shij) ./ulnar, wliich end^mvourerl to get thrfjugh to Kut-el-Amara under the cornmiiiid oi Lieu- tenant H. O. B. Firman, stand out as glorious de*xls in an unfortunate enterj)rise. The S<jriior Naval Officer of the flotilla on the Tigris was Captain Wilfrid Nunn, to whom Vico-Aflmiral Sir Kichttrd I'eirse, Conunandei- in-Chi«rf in the East Tndiw, said in his riispatch (A January 10, 1910, that much credit was due for having effected the retreat from Ctowij^hon in the f<w;e of a much superior forf;«i with so little loss. The abari'lonrnent of the Comet and i'irefiy [»aid the Ad/uiraiJ wa^ unavoidtthlo, and wuh accomplished in a highly seamanlilie manner under heavy fire. Sir Richard Peirse was succeeded during the year by Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn E. Wemyss, to whom, as well as to Captain Nunn and Commander C. R. Wason, Greneral Sir Percy Lake, in his dispatch dated August 12, 1916, said he was indebted for much useful advice and cordial cooperation. These and other officers of the Royal Navy had " afforded us the able assistance which we have become accustomed to receive from them." The successful campaign against Came roon, which terminated with the capitulation of the Connan ganison at Mora on February 18, 1910, WB/S also contributed to Vjy the French and British Navies. Captain Cyril T. M. Fuller was the senior Naval Officer throughout the campaign, and in the London Gazetle of July 2S, 1910, he was awarded the D.S.O. in recognition of the ability and success with which he orgu- riize'l the naval oi)orations. He had already l>e<ni awarded the C.M.G. on January 1, 1915. A hlrjckjulo of the coast of Cameroon was enforced by tiie Kranco-liritish scjuadron from midinglit on April 23 24, 1915, to midnight on Ff»l>ruary 29-March 1, 1910. Hel|) of luiothoi- cliaractor was also rendered by naval guns on 7« THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAh\ uhortt. Oiiw hmi\y iihnhI whh|hhi whs traiis- portud 700 mile-i ti) tho «iit:*gH of (iania h spluiiilul ftiiit ot skill and uittiuraiu^o. 'V\\i>* ((iiii was in ctiargt^ of UtnitHnant Louis tl. K(<|i|jtil t{Hiailton. K.X., who IukI |)roviou«ly coui iitaiultHl the livHi- fiotii.lla wliicK ilrove thu (»t»i- ni ins out of Dnhanw at thn nad of Dortmihor, iyi4. His dHtacliniHnt with tht» heavy gun transport tnl it lUO niilns up tho lowwr i«a(ht»s of the Niger river, thence 4S0 miieis up tht) Benue river, and tiO miles hy land, and con- tributed in large measure to the success of thc» operations which culminateii in the surrender of (Jarua on June 10, linr>. Lieutenant Hamilton was awai'ded the D.S.O. on Septemher 24, 1915. After tho fall of Cameroon there roin\ined only one other tJennm colony still uncon- c[uered, German Etist Africa. In the success- ful operations against this territory the Royal Navy had, if anything, an even larger share than against Cameroon. A blockade of th(» coast was established as from midnight on February 28-March 1, 1915. On August 11), 1915, two whalers under the commind of Ccmmander the Hon. R. O. H. 15ridg('m\n, penetrated into Tanga harbour and endeavoured, though subjected to a heavy and accurate fire, to carry out their orders and boaiil tlie s.s. Markgraf. In awarding the D.S.O. to Ccmmmder Bridge man the Admiralty said that the manner in which this attempt was made " was worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Nav-y." On April 11, 1916, two whalers under Conaminder H. D. Bridges proceeded into Sudi harbour, and remained imder fire in a very hot corner, spotting the fall of shot from the cruiser Hyacinth to enable her to destroy a storeship which was in the harbour. In order to reach the requisite position, the whalers were obliged to run up a narrow harbour, where they were confronted with a heavy fire frcm 4-in. guns at close range. Commander Bridges received the D.S.O. (on July 14, 1916, the sam3 time as Ccmmander Bridge-man) for his servicer on this occasion. In tho advance of General Snxits the Navy cooperated with well-arranged rmvem'^nts, tho ports on the coast being captvu-ed frcm the sea as the amay advanced. Tanga was occupied on the morning of July 7, 1916, and Sadani on August 1. On August 31 it was reported that " in the coastal area columns are moving on Dar-es-Salaam in cooperation with several ships of the Royal Na\y, which have be tu engaged witli the <«eimin coast tlefences about Konduciii (noilli of Dar-es-Salaum) and in tlm vicinity of the cajjital itself." 'The outccjue of this was the report, telt^graphed fn m Zanz-iliar on Septem- ber 4 by Rear-Admiral bl. F. B. Charlton, Comm mder-in-Chief on the ('ape Station, lliiit Dar-tvs-Salaam surrendtM'ed at 9 a.ni Our naval forces, in cooperation with our troops from Baganiojo and Satlani, are now engaged in occupying the town, the former seat of (joveinnunit and capital of the (ierman Pro- tectorate." Later details show(»(l that at daylight on Sejitember .'{ a close attack was begun by the naval forces, in whalers, in con- junction with a heavy bomV)ardm'nit of the enemy's positions north of the town and the advance of the troops from the direction of Bagamojo. Landings were effected at Kon- duchi and Msassani Bays (to the north). The enemy troops then evacuated the town, which was occupied by combined naval and military forces. The obstructions placed in the channel of the harbour were then removed. On Septem- ber 7 naval anel marine forces, with military landing parties, occupieel the ports of Kilwa Kivinje (about 140 miles south of Dar-es- Salaam) anel Kilwa Kissiwani (twelve miles farther south), which were surrendered unde ■ the tlireat of a naval boinbarelment. Our Portuguese Allies renelered effective help in the conquest of Geiman East Africa. An official telegram frcm Lourenco Marques an- nounced that a naval force frcm their cruiser Adamast()r landed on May 21, 1916, with two 1^-in. guns and two machine-guns at a point on the Rovuma River. They attacked the Geiman positions on the left bank of the river, the enemy fortifications and the native huts being burnt. The Germans retired without fighting. Closely connected with the East Africa operations was the gunboat fighting on Lake Tanganyika. The enemy was reported to have four aiTued steanaers on this lake, and to destroy thena a naval expedition was organized and equipped with a fleet of specially-con- structed armed boats sent out from England. Until the arrival of this flotilla the Germans practically dominated Lake Tanganyika. They could transport at will war material of \-arious kinds from the railway terminus at Vjiji to various points along the Congo -Rhoelesia- Nyasaland frontiers. The presence of the British gunboats altered this state e>f things completely. On December 26, 1915, tlu> THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 79 German aiined steamer Kingani was attacked by two British motor-boats, and forced to surrender after an action lasting ten minutes, the prize being brought into port in a sinldng condition. All the German officers, inchiding the captain, who had formerly belonged to the Konigsberg, were killed. The captured boat was renamed the Fife, and in company with the Mimi, one of the British motor-boats, she fought and sank the Hedwig von Wissmann, on Wednesday, February 9,1916. This German vessel was manned by a crew of fourteen, including nine from the Konigsberg, and twelve sur\-ivors were afterwards picked up. It was reported that the Belgian gunboat Alexandre Delcommune assisted the British. A third enemy vessel to be accounted for was the Graf von Gotzen, which the Belgian Ministry of the Colonies announced on August 2, 1916, had been surprised on the morning of July 28, while dLsembarking troops, by the Belgian gunboat Xetta, commanded by Lieutenant Lenaerts. The von Gotzen was destroyed after fifteen minutes' fighting, without any loss to the Belgians. She was the largest vessel of the German lake flotilla, and her destruction marked the end of the enemy fleet on Lake Tanganyika. Dispatches from Sir G. Smith the Governor of the Nyasaland Protectorate, covering military operations there from August, 1914, to October, 1915, were published on Augu.st 3, 1916, in a supplement to the London Gazette, and showed that in tliis remote region also the British Navy had been represented in the fighting In March, 1915, a naval detacliment under Lieutenant -Oonamander G. H. Dennistoun, R.N. with naval guns, reached the Protectorate, and as reports were received that the Germans were repairing the German steamer Hermann von A\'issmann — which had been cUsabled wliile on the stocks at Sphinxhaven, Lake Nyasa, at the beginning of the war — a joint naval and miUtary force, under Captain CoUins, went to Sphinxhaven, on May 30, 1915. The enomys position was captured, and the steamer completely disabled by djTiamite charges Lieutenant -Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, com- manding the troops in Nyasaland, requested that the services of Lieutenant -Commander Dennistoun might be brought to the notice of the Lords of the Admiralty. " In addition," ON IHI', HIVI'.H ri(;i<IS, I'HKSIAN (JULF. The Turkith ^{unhoat " Marmariii* " after the Turks had run her a|(roun(l and descried her. 80 THh: TIMUS HisroIiY OF TUK WAR. TORPEDO BOATS IN THE NORTH SEA. said the Colonel, " to the admirable manner in which he carried out the expedition to Sphinxhaven on May 30, 1915, his cordial cooperation at all times has been invaluable in overcoming difficulties." In the course of a message on the second anniversary of Britain's entry into the war, >Ir. Balfour, in a review of naval work, said that the German Press bade the Overman public to take comfort from an attentive study of the map. " See," they said, " how much enemy territory both in the East and in the West the armies of the Father- land occupy ; see — and take heart." The amount of comfort, however, which the study of maps is capable of convejring 'depends partly on the maps you choose, remarked Mr. Balfour : Even the map of Europe shows an ever-shrinking battle-line. But why look only at Europe T Germany for twenty years has advertised itself as a great colonial Power ; and it was to conquer and maintain its position as a great Colonial Power that German fleets were built. Let us, then, choose a map which contains her oversea Empire, At the beginning of August, 1914, Germany possessed colonies in the China Seas, in the Malay Archipelago, in the Pacific Ocean, in West Africa, in South-West Africa, in East Africa. All have gone except the last ; and the last whilst I write seems slipping from her grasp. The Navy has not conquered them ; in the actual fighting by which they have been or are being acquired the Navy has taken a very important, yet not the leading, part. But without the British Navy to contain the German Fleet, the operations which bid fair to strip Grennany of every one of her oversea possessions could not have been successful — could not even have been attempted. CHAPTER CLIV. THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (II.). July 10, 1916 — ^The Attack on Majvietz Wood — Its Capture by Welsh Troops — ^Tr5nes Wood — ^The French South of the Somme — Gerivian' Prisoners — British Mastery of the Air — Strategic Position on Juxy 13 — General Jacob and General Bird wood — The Great Battle on July 14 — France's Day — The Two. Bazentins — South Africans at Delvtlle Wood — Capture of Ovxllers-La Boisselle — Franco-British Cooperation — Battle of July 20 — The Attack on Pozi^res — Work of the First Anzac Corps — "The Windmill" — Capture of Pozi^res — Results from July' 1 to July 26. CHAPTEPv CLI. took the narrative of the Battle of the Somme up to the preparatory measures for the attack on Mametz Wood. It was on July 10 that the expulsion of the Germans from this stronghold began. The garrison obtained some help from their artillery farther back from the Quadrangle and from a machine-gun emplace- ment near Acid Drop Copse, but otherwise liad to depend on their own exertions. The German gimnors in the background were deceived into believing that the eastern edge waa most in danger, and consequently the barrage of German shells was sent down between it and Marlboro' Wood. But our real attack wan delivered from the south and also against the Qiia^lranj^le position. So long as the redoubt at the east end of the Quaflrangle Support Trench was not won, an advance up the northern part of Mametz Wood would bo very difficult, if not iijripoHsible.* It wfis, tlwjrefore, n*>w>HHary to take it, and all day long ilfmpfT&U) fighting for its posseeaion went on. fjy nightfall it was in the poHsessifjn of Welsh troops. Our artillery pr»;parfHJ the way by a devas- tating fire dir«x;t*jd on the wood, anrl kf>i>t f;Hr«rfij||y ahea/j nf the fuJvancing infantry, which c^iuld !>♦> M<»»)n moving forwanl in scattered * Hfiti Mrnall rnap, Vol. IX., p. 493. Vol. X— Part 120. parties towards the southern edge. The Greiinan macliine-guns at that point were destroyed or buried, and our artillery lifted their range on to the northern edge of the enemy's second line and positions beyond it. Gradually the garrison, or rather what remained of it, with- drew to the upper part of the wood, followed by our ardent and cheering infantry and by the Pioneers, who wired and entrenched the positions immediately after they were taken. At sunset the Biitish lino ran along an open dri\e and the railway which lan through the wood. During the night the enemy vainly counter-attacked. How the contest was re- garded by the Germans may be fairly imagined from the entry imder July 10 in Colonel Bedall's diary already referred to • .July 10. — Thoro was very heavy fighting in the Mirni'tz Wood in wliich No. 1 Hection of th<i machine- gun compuuy of iho 16th Roginnont KiiffiTcd Iho oxwp- tiofially groat Iohh, by a dimct hit, of 15 nion and one platoon commander killed and 12 men wounded. Towardn evening a furious Htnigglo h)'gan in Mametz Wood. ThiH lasted the entire ni^;lit until the morning. The 3rd HiUtalion of the 10th Kiginient and the 2nd Multalion of the Lehr Kegiment were heavily engaged. To-day a draft of 300 men arrived from the recruit hattalioii. Kaeh halt alicui received 100 irien to make up for loHM<w. Hazentiii-je-Ciniiid wa*4 rep«'atedly Hhelled to-day, but during the night IrwH ho than usual. At br«iak of day (July II) the four Welsh battalions in Mametz Wood pushed onwards to ••ast, north-east, north and south-west Under 81 82 THE TIMKS UlSiOliY iH' T1U< lU/.'. AUSTRALIAN TROOPS BRl the hottest fire from Minenwerfer, machine-gims and rifles our rfien got within 50 yards of the edge. Yet the narrow strip could not be passed except at the price of too great losses. Ordei-s weio given for a retreat to the drive and railway trenches, and our artillerymen were requested to concentrate their fire on the position, which had stopped our advance into the open. For half an hour the northern and north-eastern edge and eastern edge of the wood seemed to be convulsed with struggling men. That any- thing could live in this inferno seemed im- possible. Nevertheless, at the north-east and north-west angles, machine-gunners remained entrenched, and when the British once more went forward through the fallen timber they were met with a haU of bullets. Xot until 4 p.m. was the north-east corner, with its Minenwerfer and machine-guns captiu-ed. Later in the day the north-west corner was secured, and by nightfall nearly every German in Mametz Wood was Idlled or a prisoner. We were within less than 300 yards of the GJerman second line position. The bulk of the prisonei"s taken came from the 3rd Reserve Division of the Prussian Guard and the 16th Bavarian antl 122nd Wurtemburg Regiments. The Wurtem- burgers had been brought from the Russian front. They had arrived four days before and lOffic NGING UP A HEAVY GUN. c omplained of the bad weather and of the poor food now supplied to them. " What sort of a time have you had in Contalmaison ? " inquired a war correspondent of a German soldier who, in (for him) happiei- times, had been a cabinet-maker in the Totten- ham Court Road. " Hell, perfect hell," was liis answer. " The artillery fire was terrific. I never thought you English could do it." The last sentence revealed the dominant feeling of the nation -in -arms which had been taught for two generations to regard peaceful projects with contempt and peace as merely an interlude in a perpetual warfare for existence. That British men, mere cricketers and football playei"s, should, in under two years, have been made into warrioi-s more than a match for the pick of th? German Army ; tliat the manufac- turei-s and chemists of Gi-eat Britain should in the same period have mastered the gunner's craft and surpassed the skill of Krupp was quite incredible. The Germans had fought bravely and even stubbornly, but they felt themseh-es beaten at their own game. The centi-e of the German first line luul been broken. To the north and south of Contal- maison and the Mametz Wood the btvttle con- tinued to rage. In the neighbourhood of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 83 Ovillers, a shapeless mass of ruins, its chalk foundations tunnelled and honeycombed with deep dug-outs, the Prussian Guards still held out. The road from Ovillers to Contalmaison hatl been secured by, among others, a battalion of a South Country Regiment, which had been relieved on the 9th. Diuing the two jai-eceding days it had been fighting in a quagmire of yellowish- white mud, so tenaciovis that the very boots of the men stuck in it and had often to be wrenched off. The German soldiers, if not the oflficei-s, who appear to have remained in the background of the battle, had jDroved tough opponents. "These fellows," observed an officer, ' ' fight like blue glory. I can't tliink how some of oiu" people at home have got it into their heads that we are up against old men and immature lads. All the men we have fought have been fellows of fine physique. There have been exceptions, of com-se, but the old Boche is still a sticker and stands a lot of beating before he will hand in his checks." As The Times Military Correspondent had remarked, it was a tribute to the quality of our troops that some of the finest fighting material in the enemy's armies had been detailed to stem the British advance. Against a^less tenacious foe thev would probably luive succeeded. But our men were made of sterner stuff. One of them, for example, carrying bombs, had crawled up to a machine-gim emplacement and blown up gun and crew. The captain of another regi- ment hafl continued to lead his company after being hit in the heel, thigh and arm. Finally he fell pierced through the chest. Of deeds like these there were many. Two and a half miles to the east of the Mametz Wood, away to the right of Montauban, [HjjKtal plinlographx. BF.MINF) IHi; LINES. Trench-mortar ammunition. Smaller picture: Takinj; the ammunition up to the trenches. 84 THE TIMES lllsrOlfV OF THE WAR, more etiff fighting hatl taken place. The Tr6neH Wood, through which lay the dirtH5t route to the iin[)ortunt fortified area of l.,on- giioval, in the (Jennan «econd line, had been elaboratt*ly prepared for defence. At an enonnouB expense of labour, a labyrinth of inttn-laeing trenches and redoubts had bo«m constructed. Oiu* troops Imd ontortxi this nest of machine guns, and fierce had been the rttrugglcH tlioro. Time after time they had luul to meet and repel determined charges. On the evening of the 10th it almost seemed as if they woiJd bo expelled from their dearly-won trenches and driven down the slopes to- wards Hardecoui-t. But fortunately the bull dog coui-age of the British, never better dis- played than in such a crisis, did not dofiert tliem. They hung on through the night to the skirts of the wood, and on the 11th once more took tho offensive. At 8.30 p.m. the British General Headquartei-s Staff reported that we had gained the whole of the wood with the exception of the northern end. Up to this date we had captured 26 field guns, one na\'al gun, one heavy howitzer, an anti-aircraft gun, and over 7,600 prisoners. That the " Archibald " was not an insignificant item in the booty was apparent from the fact that, worsted, as a rule, in aerial duels, the Gennans were more and more inclined to pin their faith on such artillery. While General Haig was driving his wedge through the German first line between the Ancre and Hardecourt, General Foch had not been idle south of the Somme. Peronne lies in a slight depression. To its west is the plateau of La Maisonnette, facing, on the opposite side of the Somme, the dominating hill of Mt. St. Quentin north of the town. During the night of the 9-1 0th our Allies, in the Barleux region, captvu-ed the trenches between that village and La Maison- nette, together with 950 prisoners, some of whom had been taken on the previous day. On the 10th, in the outskirts of Biaches, a redoubt with 103 men and 10 officers in it fell into the hands of the French. More important than this, after a desperate struggle Hill 97 and the Maisonnette Farm on its simi- mit were at last carried, together with most of a copse to the north of the farm. Tlie disingenuous German account of this action is worth quoting. " South of the Somme," it ran, " a strong attack made by French black troops against the La Maisonnette Height was THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 85 BRITISH BIG GUNS GOING UP TO THE FRONT. [Official photograph. met by overpowering fire. A few coloured troops who penetrated into our lines fell at the point of the Gerxnan bayonets or were taken prisoners. " The German General Staff forgot to add that the " overpowering fire " and " German bayonets " had not saved the hill and farm from capture. The next day the Germans were entirely dislodged from the copse, and some communication trenches between Estr6es and Belloy, in which parties of the enemy still lurkod, were occupied. Foch hmi sftcured nearly the whole of the loop of the Somrne, and was within a few yards of the suburbs of P6ronne. On the 12th Sir Douglas Haig was able to announce that, despite the des[>orute efforts of the enemy, the whole of the Mame,tz Wood was in possession oi tlie British, and that two German attacks against Contal- inAiHon iuvi broken down undfir our fire 'i'lif; rnornerit approached when the German secfuid line would be breached. We luid smashed f)ur way to varioiw deptbs of from 2,000 U) 4,000 yards, redijf;ed five stifujgly fortifie<l villages, H large number (>f extrfv^rdinnrily strong r^yJoubts, ao'l numerous heavily wired and entrenched woods. Aitogethe.r the Allies fiud taken over 20,000 prisoners, a hundred gims, besides many machine-guns and bomb- throwers. The special correspondent of The Times wrote of these events as follows : " The prisoners are constantly passing through both the French lines and ours in batches, being kept for a while in paddocks enclosed with barbed wire, for the necessary examination, and then, as rapidly as possible, to the rear. Every time that one visits one of these depots one finds it full of a new lot. And they vary extraordinarily Many are fine, robust-looking men in the prime of life. As many others are woody and poor, some old, some very young. And it is by no means the ' best ' regiments which are now composed of the best material. I have seen none who looked under-nourished, though many had plainly endured great privations imrnfjdiately before their capture. " Ah for the guns, one meets them on tho higli roads and being dragged back from tho battlefields, and they are b<nng parked for exhibition i)ur7)oses about Corps and J^ivision ami I'>rigade H•^adfjuarters. At a certain i£ea«JqiiarterH there is quite a museum being 120—2 86 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. acciuiuilHtt'il on th« luvvii, which iiiehulttH alreuily a variety of dtMigiiu of (iuniiau treiiih luurtai'b tiiut tho hku anil a row of Mtnenwerftr luuilo tihaost eutinily of wtiOil buiinil witli wirn, with thu hollciwed wootlt u- blocks to take the recoil and tlin iiij^onious siuuliiil hke titand of light iioii barn to which thuy are braced forward to prinont them kicking over on disirharge. 'I'lio whole thing iti «o light that two men can easily carry it about ; and tht y mala*, at practi- cally no cost, very useful weapons. "A gentleinan who has just returned from a visit to the French Army tells me that German prisoners tliero said (what wo liad in ettect heard lutre before) that they all thought that what they liad to do was merely to overrun the new JiritisliArmy — which they would do as soon as thoy tried conclusions with it to have tho war won. I was with the I'Vench Army myscflf 10 days ago and 1 know how uttejiy unlike a beaten army it looks. J lu \'er saw an army gayer or more evidently fit and confident. The Gennan prisoners seem to bo utterly as- toundotl and disgusted by what they see ther(» ; and their spiiits are not raised by what they hear of what has been going on with the new British Army. The whole thing, including the fact that the French could hit as hard as they have hit and that our new armi(<s weie made of the stuff that lOJftiiid pMogra phi GETTING READY FOR ACTION. A howitzer and its shell. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 87 FROM THE BATTLEFIELD. Wounded coming back from the Somme. they have shown themselves to be made of, has evidently been a complete surprise to them. " By this time I have had the opportunity of familiarizing myself with the events of the earlier days' fighting on the front of practi- cally every brigade in the whole of our line. A few days ago I wa.s very careful to report that at one point the Germans had shown humanity in allowing us to recover our wounded and in taking those of our wounded within their reach back into their trenches. I am sorry to say that this was most excep- tional. The contrary (which I have alsr) reported) was the rule. In general, they have bayonetefl our wounded anri have playfyl machirif;-guns over the fields when; the dea^l and wounded lay together t(j make sure that nonrj would fight again. Tlic evidenf;*) comf>s authrmtntively from too many quarters to mlmit of doubt." Another innUinw) of doniiixn briitaJity was reporfxl by a French paper, the Journnl : Hix tA th* Mol'lion Wt bohind wnro fakon prixonorn. Th«) Oorrriarn k'pt Wuin in an »/Jv»»nc«r'l tronch without Hivmn th«r/, \nUi or »iip, Hovoral firnm a day lh<'y w»fo hoiiit««l on to th»i pnrapAt and thiw miuin tho livinjc target for ball .ir.d Kh»-ll. /md om t}i.,ir l,|r,„d fl',w.:d lh«ir captorn would app^o.^*:^l \h,,,u ,„,i\ t.iiint thorn with ((iben about Ifio mnalit thny ha*l not had. Of the Hix unliappy men throe died on the fifth day- Of the othorH who Hurvivod and wore roHCuod by thoir cornradoH ono han Hinco succumbod. Prisoners and woundrwi weio brought over to England sliortly ufLoi- the gjoat advance, A writer in 7'/i« Tirncs gave a drumatic account of a Mi««<«ting of two trains near Soutliampton iJocks, tli'i one filled with woundfd returning from France, the other with reinforcements going out to make good I lie Iohmis : A lonK Hi'd ('roHM train, jiint filled from end to nnd from ono of tho hoHpital nhipH- -oiiHuallioH from the pritMont offoiiHivo in Krarico, wan pulling Miowly out THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 89 for its run to London. Almost every window served to frarn? an outward-gazing soldier, officer or man, in ragged, bloodstained, m.uddy khaki. These were the sitting-up cases, nearly all with heads bandaged or arms in slings. Just near the dock gates the hospital train met another equally long train coming in, and packed frona end to end with fresh troops bound out for France from some Englis-h depot camp. Each of its windows framed not one, but two or three men in khaki, red, lusty faces, well sun-browned, looking out over the close-cropped heads of their mates ; full of eager curiosity and expectation and fresh clean robustness. For 50 yards or so, and at a foot pace, the two con- trasting trains of King Greorge's solciers glided side by side in an uncanny silence. The writer watched them from an office window overhead, and could plainly see in the faces of the untried troops their eager interest, their profound respect for their comrades who had been tried. A strange, dumb kind of promise shone out from many of the eyes in those fresh faces. The assured pride, the eeisy fearlessness of the man who has proved liimself in the very teeth of death ; this was marked in the faces of the wounded. But no man spoke a word. Silent and inarticulate, the man to be tried gazed into the faces of the men tried as they were carried past. Suddenly then, in a rather quavering voice, most singularly vibrant with emotion, a very young lance- corporal, whose right arm was in a white sling, and whose head was swathed in bandages, cried out, in all the sunny silence : " Are we downhearted ? " And then the tension snapped. It seemed that hundreds of these brave fellows — coming home and going out — heaved long sighs. All had wanted to give expression to the powerful emotions inspired by the chance juxtaposition of thof>e two trains ; and none had known how. Here was a way. The music of the roar which rose now from the cabined hundreds of both trainii was something to penetrate the vitala of a Briton ; to touch with magic of some kind the least impressionable mind in all this realm. Those wonderful rising and falling waves of sound I shall never forget. It wa« only when the two trains were divided by a gap of fully 200 yards that the music of it died away, slowly in the foft summer air. Incidents like this showed the spirit of the New Army The progress of the Allies to July 12 had bef>n conHiderable and continuou.s. It had also, in c^^ntraHt with earlier operations, been f;arried out with losses whieh, upon the whole, may be descrilKxi as comparatively small. For this there were thrf?o reawjns. In the first place the cfKjfKjration IxjtwfHm the artillery and infantry alrea^ly dfjscribed htul bf>como more and more prrfeet as the fighting went on. S*»<;f<ndly, the aircraft had berjome the close alli»>s of l>oth the foot soldiers and the guns. Thirdly, the operations of the Allies were care- fully and skilfully planned, and fully adajjted Ut m»»et the situation. The intimat4» relation - shif) l>etwe<5n the artillery and infantry was not only shown in the way the artillery prepared for the (ulvanc'i of the infantry, but evrm more in tJie alMolute unis«>n of effort l>etwe«uj the giinners and the infantry during the attack. The positions of the German guns were known by means of the aircraft observations, and they were carefully battered, reducing many of them to silence and always diminishing the value of their fire. While this was the task of part of the Allied artillery, the rest overwhelmed the trenches with a fire of great severity so that they could hardly be manned. The guns also put a barrier of fire behind the position attacked, to prevent remforcements coming up to the threatened points, to keep down coimter- attacks and protect the flanks of the attacking units. Step by step, as the infantry advanced, the artillery changed its target to suit the situation. The Flying Corps had, as the war progressed, taken a constantly increasing share in the operations. In the first place the boldness of their flights had enormously impressed the German airmen. The latter could no longer roam over the British lines, while ours con- stantly went over the German, bombing impor- tant points, destroying stores and supplies, railway stations and railway trains, even coming down to low altitudes and using their machine- guns in support of our infantry attacks. The proof of the audacity of our flyers was clearly shown by the increasing numbers of casualties among them. Yet these losses had been justified and more than justified by the gains. They had blinded the enemy's observers and increased the range of their own observations. How their activities were regarded by the enemy may be surmised from the statement of a German prisoner describing the bombard- ment of St. Quentin on July 10 : At the end of Juno tho 22nd Reserve Division, to which my regiment was attached, was sent to rest in the neighbourhood of St. Quenfin. An order canio to us on July l'( to proceed to the SoTume front. About three o'clock in tho afternoon tho first battalion of tho 71st Itcw(;rve Regiment and tho 11th Reserve Hattulion of Ja«'gerH were in St. Quentin Station ready to entrain. Wo had placed our arms and equipment in tho carriagoH. At this moment soino British aeroplanes appeared and dropporl bombs. Ono foil on a building full of arnrriiinilion and caused a violent exploHioii. Thi^re were 20tl aiiiTftunil ion wagons in the station iiiwl 60 exploded. The n-inaiiider were only sav<'<l with diffi- culty. Tho train whieh was to have carried tho troops, together with all the equipment and baggages wan (loHtroyefl, in adrlil ion to a largo quantity of war irtali^rial stored on the i)lalfoniiH. Tho men, seizrrd with panic, fled in all direclionH. A hundred men of tho Tlst Regiment and 80 riioii of tho 11th Jiu-gers were killed or woiifided. It was not before several hours that it waM p'liMiblo to reassemblo I lie battalion of the Tlst Regiment, whieh was Hunt to rest, and the tir>xt day it 90 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. aatr<tiii<d At another Htatioa ia order tu be 'outirtily r)-aqLiip,3 )U. A(lurward<i the btittalioii wax ueat to Pdruauu, whttre it wan pliicttd ia ruburve before going lutu action. The oiu-my'ri aviattjis hail butui thoruiJ{4hly doitiiaateil, ilnftttittHl euntinuouHly in coinhat anil thtiy began to appreciate tlie lludibraatic saying : H«< who fightti and runs away May live to fight another day. But h» who is ia battle slaia Will aever live to fight again. The German airman'ti opinion of our airmen is well shown by the following incident related by a member of our Flying Corps : "Did I tell you the Huns dropped u note yesterday, ' Please give yom- bloody Flying Corps a rest ' ? We give them no peace now, and we do offensive patrols vip and down their lines." Crude in form, but graphic. The Gennans liad devoted much time to improving their second lino of defence, whicli was thx-eatened by the impending attack. One of their divisional orders of the early part of July which was found by our troops ran : "The convei-sion of villages into strong points is of the greatest importance. Such villages are Pozidres, Contalmaison, Bazentin-le-Petit, Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval." ContaJ- laaisonwas lost, bi4t the othur villages men- tiuneil in the order w«ue still held. The working parties of Boldi»us hud been strengthened by forced labour, and French and Belgian men, hikI women too, liad been com- pelled to work at defences from which their coimtrymon were to bo shot down. The first advance, although considerable in extent and still more considerable in the moral effect it had produced on the Gemian soldiers, had had little or no influence on the average (Jerman citizen not in immediate contact with the fighting line. This was due to the always garbled and often mendacious accounts given in the German n( wspapers. Thus the Kolniache Volkszeitung of July 13 published the following remarks : Notwithstanding that the battle was very severe' — for the enemy attacked in very groat superiority and the individual Knglishinan is a bravo and resolute man — our relatively weak infantry fias porformed superhuman deeds and inflicted losses on the enemy which ho will remember. ... As is natural in a brave army, British losses in officers are also very groat, 'but some educated ones who are able to form an idea of the war said " that cannot hinder us from making ever-renewed attempts to vanquish the Germans," for the hopes of tfieir whole country are bound up with this thought. Serious as every German became in spirit when we leanit that the armed millions of the Entente were rushing on us in storm attack on all fronts, that the BRITISH ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS ON THE WESTERN FRONT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 91 ON A BOMBING EXPEDITION. A French aeroplane photographed from another aeroplane while in full flight above the clouds. Rtt^isiaas sought to overwhplm the weak places on our East front with their ma-ses, that the Avistrians had retired in Italy, and that the Anglo-French flood swelled up against us in the West, the course of events haf) hitherto shown that in this greatest, most mighty moment of the great war our enemies' plans have been brought to naught by the steadfastness, joyful self- sacrifiws and conscious strength of our nation in arms. They fell on us simultaneously in order that we should not throw our troops like shuttles on threatened points — now East, now West. Things have gone all right without that. Imfxrrishable is the heroism of these gr»;at days. Li utf^nant Alfred Dambituch, who was wouridf;d on tlio Sornmo, gave a description in tho VoHHindie Zeitung of tho Alli<«' tacticH in their pr»«*jnt offensive. He described the various weapons introduced during the war, such as liquid fire throwers, gas attacks, and »ul/iriarines, and alt^jgether gave a good idea from the Oerrnan point of view of tJic Urilinh and French operatioriH : In this r»!«p ;ct tho j»r.:-.<rit French (lud Urilili off.-n »iivi9 id th'j l»<t word. The aim of any offensive in m'>l-'rn warfare is the destruetion of the enemy. Thi>< in th« object of Ifie present f/ffensive, the idea being to enr;lo<e us in a tiMitieiil ring by (-imullfineous bom b^rdm'Ot with long-r/ing<i guns from tlie front and th*) Tf.fiT. Accordingly tho grtjedy f>«^a«t began eating at the b;ick lines of tlie Oerniari front. First of all our third ari'l H*trjnul trenches were incesMantly bom- bnrde'l, mostly by heavy artillery, of which the enemy tifi eon'!"ntr»t»)d iinpree^idente*! trnu<Ki-H in tlm seetor of attack. It was dug-outs which had to be battered down, so that at the moment of assault all the defenders, except a few survivors, and all tho machine-guns might be buried. Our second and third trenches ware bDrabarded in order to prevent our bringing up reserves. For tho same reason all the communication trenches leading from the rear to the front position were kept under incessant fire. On the Somme every one of our columns had a good communication trench which led from th3 h?adquarters of the battalion to tho front trench. But thi) attaek against our front from the rear extended still further. All the m'lin and side roads and all the cross-roads wore kept under fire so that approaching troops, munitions, supplies, and provisions had to pass through several lines of fire. Bombarding villages and [lUwies behind the front where the various reserves are supposed to be quartc^n^d is an old trick of tho British and Freiieh, but this time tho principle was carried out more consistently and recklessly than ever. All pl(u;es up to a distance of 10 mikis behind the front were brought under incessant h'lavy artillery boinbitrdnient, which often sturl(<l actual fires, thanks lo th') incendiiiry sliells used by the enemy. The battering down of our advanced trenches was iilmost exr:lu.-*iv(!ly left to the heiivy artillery and trendi fi.ortars, ojiecially the latti^r. The Kreneh liiive made great ini[)rovernenls in this weajioti lately. For the d'lHt'ruetirdi of our trench ts th'>y exclusivi;ly employed those of tho heaviest calibre, and th ly now throw their mines with greater acciinuiy anil over longer ranges than form'Tly. Oppo^ito my company not fewer than six mortars were jilimed. They were workird uninterruptedly, throwing hundreds of aerial torpedoes on our positions from th i first to the third trenches. They tore up our wir.i ritntacl is fro/u 111) ground, jioloH and all and thr.iw (hem all over tin [ilace, crushing 92 THtJ TIMt:S HISTORY OF Till': WAli. [Ktliott &■ Fry. LIEUT.-GENERAL G. W. JACOB, C.B. In command of the Second Army Corps. the dug-outs if they fell on them, and damaging the trenches. In a verj- sliort time great portions of our trenches had been flattened out, partly burying their occupants. This fire lasted for seven days, and finally there came a gas attack, also of an improved kind. Although the offensive was made by great masses of infantry and had been prepared with all the latest improvements of the science of war, the attempt to break our line completely failed. Our front is no longer in any danger. Though the attacks still continue we are prepared to meet them. Even to-day, when war is so largely a matter of mechanical contrivances, the old truth still holds good that in the long run it is always the men who are the deciding factor. The deepest impression left on me was not a feeling of horror and terror in face of these gigantic forces of destruction, but an unceasing adnairation for my own men. Young recruits who had just come into the field from home, fresh twenty-year-old boys, behaved in this catastrophe ploughing and thundering as if they had spent all their lives in such surroundings, and it is partly thanks to theni that the older married men also stood the test so well. July 13 had been tineventful, mainly given up to the preparations for the advance pro- jected for next day. But there was consider- able artillery activity on both sides and some infantry fighting by which we made appre- ciable advances at various points, in addition to which we captured some German howitzers with an appreciable supply of ammvmition. South of Ypres and also of the La Bassee Canal raids on our trenches attempted by the enemy were easily driven back. The strategic position on^this date was as t'ulluwti. The It'll wing of tlit> AllioH from Gommecourt Mouthwurd.s to tlie Ancre had inudu little progrtw.s. 'I'he centre, botw«)en the Aucro und the Somnie, had carried the enemy's front-lino and parts of his secood-line position. South of the Soniine tlie right wing of the Allitnl line fonat'd by the Frendi who were on tht> left bank of the river had piwhed into tlio loop of the Somme and was almost at the gates of P6ronne, thus menacing the communica- tions of the Gennans behind their line of trenches. The Anny Corps engaged at the b«»ginning of tlio Battle of the Somme were stated in Chapter CLl., pages 489 'JO. Sulwequently there were brouglit into front line the llnd Army Corps (Lieut.-Gen. C. W. Jacob, C.B.), which ultimately took Thiepval, and, as will be seen later, the First Anzac Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir William R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.). Tlie (liniculties in the path of Haig and Foch will be the better appreciated when it is remem- bered that, under .somewhat analogous circum- stances, the Kaiser and Falkenhayn had failed LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM R. BIRDWOOD. K.C.S.I., K.G.M.G. In command of the first Anzac Corps. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 93 [official photograph. ANZACS ON THE WESTERN FRONT. Within the Australian lines. tojpierce the Allied line in the First Battle of Flanders, although it had not been supported with any^but the slightest trench work. More recently the Germans had failed before the elaborate defences of the French at Verdun. Yet the^British and French, undismayed by the formidaVjle character of the works they had to attack, j>ropo8ed to pierce them, relying on the capacity of their troops and the greatly in- creased artillery at their flLsposal. By their efforts during the first twelve days of July considerable progress had been made, and they were now ready to continue the pressure forward to gain more ground towards the Thi6pval- Longueval side. The next step forward, thfjrefore, was towards ContalmaJHon, the two Bazentiris, Longiieval, Delville Wood and VV'uUjrlot Farm. The night of the 13th was very warm and calm Oloufls olwcured the sky, biit tlirough thfjrn the rno^m and occ»iHif)nal stars were at times visible. Suddenly an arc of flame ap- f*oared on the horizon from Contalmaison Villa if) VVatf>rlot Farm. An ariHwering ring of fire round our trenchfjs W(u* the iinm'xjiate reply (A the Oermans, and the deafening combat of the two artilleries l^egan. The region of Ovillers — ^la Boisselle also was so dosed with shells as to give it the appearance of a volcano in eruption, while, far ofi on the right, a fainter curve of flame showed that the French artillerymen were busy. About 3 a.m. on the 14th the moon set, and a faint light from the east crept over the battle- field. Half an hour later the illumination from the explosion of our shells somewhat died down. Our fire was being lifted and only the German artillery continued firing. The moment had come for the British movement, and the men leaped out of their trenches and moved steadily forward to assault the German position. At 4 a.m. aeroplanes mounted into the air, and kite balloons ascended through the low hanging clouds. Tftri minutes ]ut<;r a red ^low at the edge of JJelville Wood, from which flumes shot up, indi- cated that ammunition stores and " dumps " in Jjongueval had been set on fire. Dense clouds of smoke, rent in places hy the blast of bursting shells, rolled over the ground. As the Trories Wood extended south of the British right it had, of course, to bo ta' en. iSo long tin it rfimained in German hands Ijonguoval, if captured, could be attaciked by 120—3 < > C Z o < Q£ U X H c i o U u u a B u M H B 09 "5. le V J& a •o « u o V u ai 4) a T3 I— i c OS <" ^ s u> O OZ >,- ■o* O u< ^ o 03 uo lg O _- 'Si « 2 S« V •o Q OS O S ie u W c c 9 o o .2 03 Q u u S3 u E o THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 95 the enemy from below, and it would also bo difficult to reduce Waterlot Farm and Guille- mont. Out of the Bernafay Wood and from south and east of it the English infantry, which included men of Sussex, dashed forward. Machine-gun fire forced them to crawl forward on their hands and knees to approach the enemy line. In groups of two or three they slowly got to the edge of the tangled heap of felled trees which now constituted Trones Wood and set about turning out its defenders. WTiile thus engaged some of our men heard shouts in English from ahead of them. They came from a handful of West Kents who, with some Lewis guns, had been maintaining them- selves on the eastern edge of the wood, which they had entered two days before. Separated from our lines by a barrage of shells, they and their captain had dug them.selve3 in, captured 3.5 prisoners and put out of action some 150 Germans. Aided by this heroic band, our troops step by step drove the Germans from the whole wood, and by 9 p.m. Sir Douglas Haig was able to report that the Trones Wood was at last entirely in our possession! From the Bernafay Wood and the trenches north and east of Montauban a body of Highlanders, preceded by pipers playing " The CampbeEs are Coming," crossed the 1,200 yards of " No Man's Land." Under heavy shell and machine-gun fire, and amidst the smoke created by German smoke-bombs, they charged for the blazing wood -encircled ruins of the village. Thoy were following, as it were, at the heels of a line of bursting shells discliarged by the British gunners on the German first-line trenches in front of Longueval. What the shells had not actK^mpUshed, the bombs and bayonets of the Sc^jts now achieved. Forcing their way into the dug-outs, they a^;counted for most of tho dofontiors who hud ewiaped shrapnel and high explosive. The few wlio escapwl ran off panic-strikon. Our giins wore now dealing with the second of the enwny'H trenches ; then once more thoy lift«xl and the scone wan repeated. One-third of this trench ran through Longueval itself, and the fighting which ensued was partly in tho village. From a dug-out sfjrang a German ofTiwr, an axe in Fiis hand. " I surrender," hf) criwi in P^iglish U) a kilt^KJ sergf»ant, at whom, however, he treacherously aimwl a blow. The aim rninHed tho hwwl of the Horgeanf-, who pr«^/Tnf(tly bayoneVKl him. From one building six mitrailleuses continued firing until it was entered and the Germins bombed. Down in the cellars of the house the Germans fought with the desperate courage of trapped animals. Where the village joins on Dolvillo Wood a redoubt with two field-guns and several machine-guns had been built. There tho fighting was especially severe. Reinforcements were hurried through the enemy's barrage of shells, and, after their arrival, the Highlanders entrenched themselves on a line running east- ward through the top of the village, across the south-west corner of Delville Wood, then south by the western edge of Waterlot Farm to Trones Wood, where they connected up with the English infantry. The redoubt, with its field-guns, had not been captured, but a counter- attack of the enemy had been repulsed. Upon the Highlanders descended a very deluge of projectiles. An officer and his orderly were hit by the shrapnel. A few moments later four gas shells burst hard by the wounded men. The officer may be left to tell what followed : I tried to move, but the shrap. had got me in the right thigh rather badly, and, apart from that, I felt all the sap trickling out of me as I breathed in the gas. It was like struggling against chloroform, and the last thing I remember was feeling that sleep and stillness were best. I should have slept allright, and been dead in a very few minutes. You'd never guess where I next found myself. I was wedged in the forked brancho s of a little tree, on the highest ground near, and on the ground bolow me was my orderly, unconscious, and bleeding a good deal from tho flssh wounds in his arms and shoulders that he'd got from the same shrap. that hit the rest of us. That little chap had carried me 300 yards, over the roughest sort of going, with any number of bullets flying round, and himself running blood from half a dozen flosh wounds. Ho'd been taught, you see, to make for high ground when gas was about, so before ho fainted ho'd planted me in that little tree. How ho managed it I can't think, bocause I must bo nearly twice his weight, and he's small all round — except in the matter of his heart. I guess that's something over standard in size and quality. Yes, he's all right now, thank goodness. His wounds were none of thorn Horious^— splinters, you know, and ho might have boon doctor<<d on tho other side ; but I spacially askod if he might como across with mo, and he's hero now, on this ship. I want to go and seo his poopio with him when I can got about again ; and I rnoan to see his old employer, too, and lot him know what sort of a man he's got in J . Ho gave up o job in which ho was oiiniiiig £.3 lOs. a wook, and joined up boforo tho end of August, 1914. His grasp of tho throe R'h is pretty weak. Ho tolls mo ho never used to road even tho papers, except to got a bit of news about cours- ing. Ho'h got a wife and throe kids at homo, and when ho joined ho had to givo up whi[)piil,H l.ha(. wore moro to hirn than his stublo is to any owiior of a string of racohorsoH. Wo wont out to Franco in May, 1015, and J hoM boon onco homo on leave. All tho rest of the time Iio'h boon in and out of tronohos with mo, and undor fire most of tho time, Ho'h never known whoro his next raeal'H ooming from, and an orderly of mino has a (»rott.y thin time in tho mill (,or of sloop, I oan toll 96 THE TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. you; fur I'lti u{j and duwii the irtmchi-b till night, mid over the purupci tt good deal, luukiiig after wiring jobd ttad ihttt Bort ut' thing. That uhap'n carrit-d hi.-i hfo ill hia hand all the tiiitu, and never knuwa ao iniuh uomfort in the laet 14 munttu an the average working man in Kngland geta every day of hiH life. He wati due tor leave beture thin Punh, and indeed he wan recalled from the railway citation when leave waa btopjx-d. But nobody's ever heard hini utter a word of coin- plaint ; two in the laurning or two in the afternoon I've found him always the name smart, cheery, willing soldier, all the time, and alwuyn with t-yeb in the back of tiia head. I wish you could tell the people here at home about men like J . I tell you this New Army of ourn is full of them. He hardly knew what I was talking about when I tried to thank liiiu for what he had done for me and praised him a bit for his general behaviour. Honestly, you could see he wondered what I was getting ut ; half suspected I was chipping him. Ho was just doing his job. Of course, he does his job. Thai's the way he looks at it ; that's the way all my lads look ut it. Makes you think a bit, doesn't it, when you remember they none of them knew anything about soldiering a couple of years ago ; and, mark you, nobody told J he was to enlist or ought to enlist. I often used to wonder what our chape thought out there, when they got hold of a newspaper, in billets, and read about conscientious objectors — and objectors who haven't any conscience. Queer position, isn't it, when you come to think of it ? Mind, I'm not talking about the few genuine cranks, or whatever you call them. I'm talking about chaps who never believed in anything much, except the main chance, and having a good time. And what about the exemptions ? Why in the name of common justice should exemption be given to eligible men who have stayed in the background for 20 months, while nien, often less eligible, have been facing death to protect them all that time ? These exemptionii and able-bodied chaps going round after soft jobs in the rear — the toleration of them is an insult to men like my orderly ; and the voliinlurily enlisted New Annies are made up of tliis sort. Towards iiiglitfHil the TliglihiiidorH stormed tho rodoiiht, hut tho fi«ld-giuiH had boon with- ilruwii by tho (iormuiiH. 'J'ruiios Wood, Longue- val and tho Hoiithern outskirts of Dolville Wood wore won. The two onomy tronches (convorging out- wards in tlio centre) between Longueval and liazontin-le-(j!rand had, except in the middle, boon Htrip[)od of thoir barbod-wiro entangle- ments. A shallow road in front afforded sonae I)rotoction to tho a.ssailant. Our troops rapidly carried the eastern and western ends of the trenches. In the centre tho uncut wire and six macluno-guns hold up tho advance. The Gorraan garrison was now attacked by a Scottish regiment from the direction of Longue- val. Our men dropped into the trenches and bombed the machine-guns ; and soon the whole of the trenches from Longueval to Bazentin-le- (Irand were occupied by the British. Bazentin-le-Grand had in the last twenty minutes of the bombardment received no fewer than 2,000 shells. It had been pulverized, and the few Germans left offered little resistance to [OjffU-utl phctOsrapH. A HIGHLAND REGIMENT ON ITS WAY TO THE TRENCHES. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 97 I Official photographs. IN A FRONT-LINE TRENCH. >^ Lewis gun in action. Circle picture: Machine-f^unners, wearing gas- helmets, firing against a German trench. the Irish attacking it. In a large cellar under one farm a considerable number of German wounded were taken. Some heavy howitzers also were secured. From Bazentin-le-Grand westwards a trench zigzagged round the exterior of Bazentin-le- Grand Wood to Bazentin-le-Petit. Two belt.^ of wire entanglements were in front of the trees. A second trench 150 yards back, with a wire- entanglcrnent \xiloT<i it, ran through the middle of the Wood and in front of iiazfintin-lePoti''. But the British bombardment bar! obliteratofl trenchf« and entanglements. At 4 a.m. our troops on the right entorcMj the Wood anti began to clear it of machine-gunners and snipers, Hf>Tnn of whom were ensconced in the tops of trfj*«. To their left, a little after 4 a.m., Irish and other troops forced their way intfj I'azentin- lo-Petit, now reduced to a mass of battcnd ruins. A captain who was engaged in the capture of thiH village gave the following picturesque fu^fAHint of the figliting there : I l'«t t'/ijch wrilJi my fnllowM, afu-r I K"t (x-ppcnid in th« thi((h, in tho (xi((inniri(( of fho vill(i((>i fi((htiri((. But ffiy i,ri\fjr\y Ht«yn/1 with rri<i, ami w<i 'lifl ii bit of arruitr-iir first aid. Wo dressed a bomber and two other fellows, not of my battalion, in quite professional 8tylo. The bomber still had seven bombs, and the others had rifles and bayonets, and I had my revolver and trench dagger HO a« there was still a good bit of kick in u-s wo started on the prowl. The bomber was a sportsman. There was one place where wo could see a Bocho machine-gun Boction at work in the cellar of what had boon a cottage. There was nothing left but cellar (hen. The rest was level with the ground. There must have be(»n twelve or fourteen Boehes round that gun, bobbing up and down, you understand, as they wanti^d cover. Wo crawled on and on till wo wore no more than twenty paces on their left flank, while they w(!re blazing away like one o'clock, quarter right, at our cha|>H. Our bomb(^r was rather badly wounded in his l<^ft shoulder, but he bowled w<ll with his right, I can tell you. Jle lobbed tw(j beauties right on tho Bocho typewriter. They Hoomed to put the gun out of action all riglil, but for some reason I neviT sliall underHtaiirl thi^y only killi'd »ne nuiri of the bunch and wourirlxd a couple of others. And just then four in- 06 THU TIMKS HISTOUY Ub' TllK WAR. Ave more Boch<w caiutt bcuttlmg into that cellar truiit ttuiuewherti in rear, nu th«rt) they wt-re ae (hick au beeti. Would thuy burreiidfr T I thought I'd try tlu-iu. " L'oiiio on, lad ; we've got 'em I " I bhouted ; and, tu thd BochtM. " Handu up!" Thotie Buchea dropped their rifluB at> though their harid^ hunied. V[> went their haniln, all except one chap, a. m-rgfant, and he let tly at lue. But i ducked. It wua the I'uiinitnt thing. The sergeant wati a boldier, all right, ile wa» cursing hi.-i men for all he wan worth, and as he cursed the habit of di^scipliiie told, and the Bocheti pick'd up their rifles and btood on guard. Then the muineiit I nhowed up again down goeu every rifle, up go all the hands, uiul (he aergeaat letu fly once more. They were like inarionetteij on wires, thone Bocheu ; up and down according ati I showed my head. Only one real man in the lot, you .-see. But it ueemed rough luck for him to have to be killed, beeaime he wax a man, so I gave the tip to my oripple.s ; and we made a daf>h for that cellar, and while the rest of the bunch wa.s bailed up by my orderly and the wounded bomber I fairly jumped on the sergeant. I didn't want him to notice my right leg wuh pretty help- less, so I embraced him round the neck with one arm and shoved his chin up with the other hand, while one of my crippleK got his rifle ; and so wo got the bunch. They're not hard to handle now, once you can get them away from their X.C.O.'s. As for their officers, they seem to be busy taking care of number one and keeping well to the rear. I liked that sergeant, and he made a regular doctor's job of my leg for me, bandaged it most beautifully, and got two of his men to take it in turns carrying me on their backs on the way down to our dressing station. By 5.30 a.m. the whole village was in our hands, and though a few ruins in the north of it were recovered temporarily by the enemy, by 9 a.m. tho liritish liud dug thentselves in on a line which went through the ceiuotery east of the village to the cross-roads above Bazentin- le-Grand. During the afternoon they pushed up the open slope under shell and machine-gun fire and broke into High Wood, half of which they Ho<!ured. This rtchii'vt»iaent was accom- ptmied by another gallant deed unexampled in the western theatre of war since October, 1914 A regiment of the Dragoon Guards and one of Deccan Horse liad been ordered to follow up behind the assaulting infantry ready to take advantage of a sudden collapse of the German forces. In the late afternoon dcftaclunents of those regiments proceeded amidst the wild cheering of our infantry to the bottom of High Wood, and with sabre and lance charged the German infantry in some cornfields. The story of this extraordinary event, in which our horse- men were aided by machine-gun fire from our aircraft, may well be told by an officer of the Deccan Horse engaged in it : At 6.30 we started our famous ride into the enemy country, every now and then coming under heavy shell fire — shrapnel and high explosive. No one can believe, without .seeing, what a state the ground is in ; there is not room for a table-cloth on any part of the ground there without some part of it touching a shell THE 'FLYING PIG/' ON THE SOMME. Loading a Trench Mortar [Official photograph. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 99 INDIAN CAVALRY AFTER THEIR CHARGE. [Official photograph. hole, so you can imagine the regiment galloping over it at full gallop, barbed wire — well cut by shell fire — old trenches, dead bodies, and every sort of d&bria lying in every direction. Words fail me to describe it. That wski for about three miles ; then full tilt down a steep bank like the Haggard field, but steeper, into a very famous valley, where the shrapnel got worse, as we were spotted by one of their sausage balloons. This was soon driven down by the fire of our batteries, which just smothered it with shrapnel. Here we went through our infantry, who cheered us madly an we gallo|>ed by, all wishing us luck. On we went, paAt the remains of guns and everything — tons of ammunition and abandoned material and dead Huns everywhere ; and we passed here an enormous gun they had left behind, so really I suppose it was we who took it. We were under cover here for half a mile, but sud- denly, corning out of the valli-y, we had to turn sharp to the right up another little valley, and here wo came under terrific, but rather inaccurate, rnuchine-gun fire from two directions. I cannot tell you anything about ea-iualtie^, hiit it wh.h h<-re tny chestnut man- was killed. We went about a mile up this valley, (ind then got some cover under a bank — by " we " all this time I mean the regim»;nt and our British regiment. Here we stoppi-d for ten minute", and then we got orders f(»r our hfpnidron to go on UA a'lvanc'- guard in a certain dirrrclion. It was now ahout 7..'{0 in the evening, and tluTc were 24 a/;roplan>w hovering over us, and one monoplane cam • down to about 200 feet, and fired hi« rnuehino gunx on the Huns just over us — going round and round — -the flri<-.t light I have ever «<r«!n. Well, we movd out under a h'-avy fire, and g'it ofi about half a mile. Inuring this advance we rounded up eigtit prisoners, while between Um and the Hrilixh regirn'^nt, I suppose, we stuck with •word and lanco about 40 of th<-rn — a glorioiix sight. Our rrt<-n Wf.fi xplen'iid ari'l 'lidn't want to tak<i any prmonerx, but. th'-se eight ha<J ehiieked awiiy lh<-ir arms, «o we couldn't very well do them in. Th( y wuro (<imply tfiTT\i\»^\, and oiw) clung on to my leg and kept calling '* Pity I I'lty I " hJH eyeH starting out of his head. Poor devil, I piti'd hirn. and we xtnl hiro hiM.'k to tlie regimont. We dismounted in a little hollow then and went on foot through a damn good crop of wheat full of shell holes and dead Huns. Of course, we were creeping on our tummies all the way, as the fire was very hot. At last, after going a quarter of a mile, we got to the flat top of the hill, driving them before us. Here we had to stop, as the ground was being swept by rifle and machine-gun fire, and they were now shelling us heavily. We got our Hotchkiss guns into action, and set to work. By crawling slowly forward we got a field of fire, and could see the Huns plainly and a battery about half a mile ahead. We plugged a few here, and then it hap- pened to got dark, and we had to retire about 300 yards to a better position and dig in for the night. This we did all right, the Huns making a feeble charge as we did it. I was alone at the time with a message, so I let fly six rounds at them with my revolver, and they all lay down I However, it was not a healthy spot, and I hud to crawl buck, and rejoined the squadron. We got our horses, and came back and rejoined the regiment. One shell landed in the middle of us as we mounted ! These tin hats are damn good I especially for shrapnel. Well, we got back, and dug in like blazes. They made two weak attacks during the night, and shelled us all the time, and the star sheila they sent up all night were like a firework display — a weird sight. One Boelie crawled up to one of our llsdwilng posts in the (lark, and we shot him, brought him in, but he died soon after. We hung on there till 4 o'clock, put up wire in front of us, and our battery helped us well. Infantry relieved us then ; they had just got up. You see, our job was to push on as far as we could and hold the lino to give " the feet " time to get U|). So we did our job all right. Wo tlien rode back — " but not llie six hundred. We were treated to tear shellH on tho way back — awfu I sore on tho eyew, and my good chestnut ImrHo has both eyes bunged uj) to-riay. Saw more wondi'if ul sights coming back. We got water in the viilley we started from, and then rode on back to this field, where we eamo first from our old camp. Terrible work to-day with the horneM, and going lliroiigli their kits. The divisional general ca/ito round lust night and congratulated us. 100 THt: TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR WITH THE BRITISH ON THEj SOMME. Bringing in the wounded across No Man's Land. [i.ijfi(.tat phiAueruph. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR, 101 WiTII Till', I KI'NCII ON THR SOMMR, The crater <>t a minc>expl<)Hion. 102 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Uncial jjhUugtaph. RED GROSS MEN AT WORK. Carrying in wounded near Tbidpval. and to-day we got congratulations from the Army CominandtT. Of course, we are all very bucked and proud. We slept sound last night, I can tell you, on the bare ground under the sky. Thank God, it is fine I Meanwhile Bazentin-le-Petit Wood had been gained by the British. Through it ran the hght railway line from ^Nlametz Wood and three trenches. It was defended by numerous machine-giuis and dug-outs, in one of which, 40 ft. below the ground, was the Colonel of the German 91st Regiment, who had sworn to " stay in the wood to hold it to the last." Be- tween the wood and the British a trench ran from 50 to 75 yards in front of the trees, protected by two wire entanglements. Our artUlery had made short work of trench and wire and our troops, suffering from machine-guns in the vicinity of Contahnaison Villa, were speedUy scrambling into the wood.- Soon after 7 a.m. they were at the top of it, Tliree hundred prisoners, including the Colonel aforesaid, had been captured. He had realized his intention, but not in the way he hoped. From the wood the troops on the right entered the top of Bazentin-le-Petit, where 200 more prisoners were seciired. Away on the left fierce struggles went on round Contahnaison Villa. At night- fall our men were north of it, and the sun set on a great victory for British arms We had broken back the German second line of defence over a length of four miles and captvu-ed several strongly fortified locahnes As a young wounded officer who took part in the fighting of the 14th said : We all knew it was France's Day, and I can't help thinking our chaps borrowed something from our French Allies on Friday, as a sort of tribute to the French nation. They showed a great deal of the sort of sparkling Han, the rushing dash and gallantry, which we have come to associate with the French troops ; and they backed it all the time with their own inimitable doggedness and steadily pushful indifference to enemy fire. A young second lieutenant, who had his right forearm badly smashed by a bomb in the attack on Bazentin- le-Petit, niost gallantly led his platoon in the storming of the German front trench there. A German bomb landed at his feet, a few yards in front of the Boche parapet, when his platoon sergeant and three of his men were close at liis elbows. Without an instant's hesitation this young officer stooped, picked up the bomb, and flung it back at the Boche trench. It exploded when halfway between himself and the German trench, and a large fragment of the spring and casing returned, boomerang fatihion, into the thrower's arm. But his action saved several lives. These details were extracted from the platoon sergeant, who had a bullet wound over the left knee. The officer himself was much too full of the exploits of his men to say much of his own part in the affair. We're pretty keen on our French pals, he said, in our battalion. We were down at , you know, alongside the French, before ; and my fellows can parley-voo like one o'clock. Well, they all knew about " Finance's Day," you know ; and " La Belle France." and " Vive Fran^ais." were our cries on Friday. Must've puzzled the Boche quite a bit, you know No dovbt JIa^ter Boche did give a pretty hot reception to the first two platoons and mine. There weren't many nun of mine reached their line unwoundtd. But the tplendid tlung was that, excepting a few — who'll never move again (the boy's voice dropped sadly here) — t>xcepting a few the fellows who'd been hit came on witli the others. Some of them got there, yelling, with tvs many as thrtH> separate bullet wounds ; and half of 'oni at least juniptnl into that Boche trench without a weapon in their hands. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 103 Then was the sight. I was out of it, so far iis fighting went ; but I saw it all : and never saw anything firer in nay Ufa. Never was such a splendid scrum ! They took no more notice of Boche bayonets than if they'd been the spray of the sea — you know, when you're running in at low tide, and it's a bit parky, just at first ; and you're all shouting like the devil, on kind of short breaths, because it's cold. Well, as I say, they just jumped straight on to those Boches, and I tell you the Boches fought well. And — there's a point that struck ree — the Germans fought well, without leadership. Devil a sign of an officer did I see. And I was in that line for a good many hours. No, I reckon their oflScers keep out of it all they can. Queer, isn't it ; I don't know what our men would make of it if we did that sort of thing. To see those chaps of mine tackling the Boche with their bare hands was worth li\'ing for — or dying for. It was meat and drink to me. They just tore their men down : and wrenched their own rifles from them. One big section commander of mine was just like a terrier with rats ; except that he didn't wait for killing. He was too busy. He went for his men like a blooming lamplighter ; smashed 'em down ; grabbed 'em by the slack of the breeches and the neck, and chucked 'em back over the parapiet, to roll down into the remains of their own wire. " Fall in there ! Fall in ! " he kept yelling, and goodness alone knows what he meant by it. But he put them out of business all right, and I sort of rounded 'em up from the little shell-hole where I lay ; and in a way they did fall in, in a cluster, lying on the ground. They were docile enough ; mostly stunned ; and I'd my revolver in my left hand. And then my lads cleaned out the dug-outs, mostly using German bombs. We left nothing alive in that trench ; and I don't believe the Kaiser's got a platoon in all his Prussian Guard who could have lived in the face of those chajjs of mine, with their bare hands, on Friday. It was a great do, was " France's Day," at Bazentin ! The 14th July was the Feto Day of the Re- public, the hundred and twenty-seventh anni- versary of the Fall of the Bastille, the typical bulwark of the Ancien Regime, as life-crushing a Government as that of Modern Prussia. This anniversary had ever been celebrated with considerable fervour since the institution of the Third Republic, and in Paris there had always been a great military spectacle. While the British and French Allied armies had been celebrating it by fresh victories on the field of battle, it was marked by a spectacular incident which distingmshed it from all other past occasions. For the first time in history soldiers of other nations fresh from the battle- field took part in the ceremony, and their presence was rightly interpreted by the French people as a visible sign emphasizing the pledge of the Allied Powers to fight together until complete victory should have been gained over Teutonic tyranny ; to teach the German people for all time that treaties are sacred, not scraps of paper to be torn up at wUl ; that military brutahty would be stamped out, and that the attempt to gain the hegemony of Europe would be replied to by crushing to the ground the statesmen and people who insolently dared to seek it. BKITISH IkOCJi'S AT WOKK HHIilNI) A .SMOKH ATTACK. [Uffiiiai photograph. 104 THE TIMES HISTORY OF/ THE WAR. 105 It was indeed a solemn occasion, which spoke in direct and unmistakable terms to the whole world. The troops were marshalled in alphabeti- cal order in accordance with diploniatic usage, the Belgian guests leading, next the British (Grande Bretagne), followed by the Russian, and then the soldiers of France. A Belgian band came first, followed by their infantry, then the machine-guns with their ammunition carts and cychsts. Next came the Belgian standard, received with deep emotion by the crowd, closely followed by a troop of Belgian lancers, all alike received with sympathy. As the last of these filed past the sound of the pipes broke on the ear. It was the band of the Scots Guards with their stalwart pipers at the head. Behind them came the representatives of the British Empire from England, Scotland, India and the realms of Britaiu beyond the seas. Great was the welcome they received from the cheeiing crowd, from the enthusiastic girls who showered flowers on them or pressed them into their hands. Xext came the Russians moving in sections of 16, the fine men making a great impression as they went by singing their marching songs. Last of all marched the home troops, the beloved representatives of the nation in arms, with their bands playing airs which all the people know, the noble " Chant du depart," which particularly appeals to Repub- lican France with its old memories, and the no leas celebrated " Mourir pour la Patrio " They had a warm reception, which spoke straight from the hearts of the multitude and showed the love which France bfjars towards her soldiers. Toward.s the end of the French procession came reprf^jntatives of the French colonial troops from Africa and Asia, and hist of all thr FuHiliers Marina, those gallant troops who had fought so bravely and loflt so heavily at Ypres and JJixmiide. Their bravery recalled the regiment to which Xupolfjon gave the proud title of " One against ten," and of ilu-in France miglit aJHO Hay an the Emjjfiror fJifl of the .'{2nd : " i ha/1 no anxiety ; I knew the .'J2nd were thierfj.' The reception given tf; tlio " 7. 'is " wa*» &\Hf> groat, for the people felt liow rnuch they owfxi to the magnificent field guns which ha^i f>layf,d w, grout a part in the battles. Nor rnu«t it be fora/itUm that if the inaterial was good, no loHH (xirfeet wfw the Hcif>ntific training which h»a<J tmahUxl the French artillerymen to get Hii/;h great nmultn Iroin their weaponn. Tfifty ha/J «/»t an exarnfdf) tn the handling of gUJiH which hud bemi followed by all Furoi**). One of the most interesting scenes in Paris was the bestowal by the President of honours wlaich had been earned on the battlefield by fallen heroes, and were handed to their bereaved relations, to each of whom a certificate was given. The 14th of July was also kept as a day of ceremony in England and in the Dominions beyond the seas. Queen Alexandra, who was the Patroness of the Croix Rouge Frangaise, Comite de Londres, had started a movement to raise fvmds for the benefit of French wounded. In a little paper called France, which ap- peared specially for the day only, the following message from Her Majesty was printed : To that glorious nation of France which has endeared itself to all Britons I send a heartfelt message of friend- ship and sympathy. This anniversary of the National Day of France is to be marked by a collection of offerings for her gallant wounded, the fund< being administered by the Croix Rouge Fran^aise Comite de Londres, of which I am Patroness. I warmly commend this noble enterprise of mercy to the people of the whole Empire. May their generosity forge yet another link between the sister nations. All over Great Britain collections and demonstrations were held ; the Mayors of provincial boroughs enthusiastically responded to the call of the Lord Mayor of London, the Treasurer of the Fund, and a widespread system of collection brought in large sums to the treasury. In London the results exceeded all anticipa- tions ; flags, favours mounted on swords as pins, souvenirs from the trenches, little articles manufactured by the French soldiers from pieces of German shells and relics of every description, were offered and wore eagerly bought. Many wore the stoiies of ladies who received in return for a small flag a folded slip of paper in which notes, and in some cases cheques, were enclosed. Between seven and eight iriillion emblems were distributed from the chief depot at Knightsbridgo by voluntary assistants, many of whom used their own motor- cars. Altog< th(!r a large sui:i was collected, to which our Colonies contributed in no mean ineaHuni, the total exceeding £100,000. The iJritish Aimy, th/ongh Sir Douglas Haig, forwarded the following ineHsago to the Frerif.h I'rosident : 'Villi Unlit h Army, fighting by thn Hi(Jo of llio bnivo HoldioFH of Kriinco in tho biltfir Hlnigglo now pro- ceding, iiXpriiHHdH on Iho occnHJon of tiiiH grcal, uiiiii- vcrniry itt ii'iriiinit ion for tfio rctnilH n(;hi<iv<'d by Iho l''r> nr ti Ailny (irjd ilK iint tinkiiblc ciiifldr-iico in Iho Hptu-tliy rcnliKat ion nf our common Iiiijiih. IOC THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Official photograph. CAPTURED GERMAN GUNS. M. Poincare replied : — I thank you ray dear General, for the good wishes which you have expressed towards France, and beg you to convey to the brave British Array rayhvely adrairation of the fine successes which it has just achieved and which only this morning have been so brilliantly extended. Th3y have produced a deep impression on the hearts of all Frenchmen. Those of your magnificent troops who have to-day paraded in the streets of Paris, in company with those of our Allies, received throughout their raarch a striking proof of the public sentiment. I am glad to have this opportunity of sending you — to you personally and to your troops — my warm con- gratulations. The Tsar sent President Poincare a congratu- latory telegram repeating liis full confidence and good wishes for the victory of France and her glorious Army The President replied thanking him for having authorized the magnificent Russian troops to take part in the National Fete. He added that France, like Russia, had an active and resolute confidence in the final success of the Allies. Saturday the 15th was spent in consolidating and extending the British lines. Between Fricourt and Mametz the Germans were forced back to their third line of defence. Over 2,000 prisoners were taken in twenty-foiu- hours. Oui* troops pushed forward to the outskirts of Pozieres on the left and cleared the last of the Germans out of the Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, penetrated farther into the Higli Wood and captured the whole of the Waterlot Farm. In the Delville Wood troops from South Africa greatly distin- guished themselves. What they performed there between the 15th and 18th was told by the soldier-father (himself on the Headquarters Staff) of a South African soidier killed in the fighting : The dead lying in Delville Wood were still unburied when I was there (because burial was impossible under the fire going on). Men lie in layers. The South African heroes lie underneath. I wonder whether history will do them justice. Will it tell how, ordered to take and hold the wood at all costs, they took it — and then began one of the most heroic defences known in the history of war ? For three days (July 16-18) they were subjected to con- tinuous bombardment by guns of all calibres. They held on with very little food or water. Over and over again they were attacked by overwhelming enemy forces. The gallant fellows fell fast under the terrific bombardment and attacks, but not a man wavered. Finding them immovable, the Germans, at last, on the 18th, concentrated a terrible bombardment for seven hours on what was left of these splendid men, and then, about 5 or 6 p.m., launched an attack by three regiments, on the survivors. The front trench was attacked in front and on each fiank. My son's trench was attacked from back and front. Our gallant, splendid men, reduced to a mere skeleton of what they were, beat back the Brandenburgers. It was during this awful time that my dear boy fell. They died, our noble South Africans, but they held the wood 1 Thank God, they held thf wood ! and thank God thoy kept up the traditions of our race I And ray splendid boy helped. He took no inconsiderable part either. I want our South Africans to get the credit they deserve. If you have any friends who can spread the news of what thoy did, let it be told. I resign n\y dear son, who was very, very dear to nie, into the safe keeping of ray Maker, who gave him to rae. It ia very hani to part with him, but I glory in his glorious end, n\y THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 107 splendid chivalrous boy ; and if his example inspires others he will not have died in vain. Use this letter as you like in order to let the world know what the South Africans did. I want these heroes to have some (they can never have all) of the honour due to their glorious memories. What a theme for some painter's brush or some poet's inspiration ! Enraged at their defeat by the British on the 14th, the German Higher Command endea- voured to counterbalance it by a \-ictory over the French south of the Somme on July 15. Under cover of a hea\-y mist large reinforcements were brought to the left bank of the river, and La Maisonnette Farm and the village of Biaches were violently assaulted. Both were carried, but the French quickly organized counter- attacks, and the Germans were deprived of their hard-won gains. On the next day (July 16) there was a hea\-y bombardment on both sides all along the line. Our troops from the east, on a front of 1,200 yards, made their way to within 500 yards of the village of Pozieres, while the Royal FusHiers — recruited chiefly from the Stock Exchange, Lloyd's, the Baltic and Com Exchange — drew nearer to Pozieres from the south to south-west. Five more heavy howitzers and four 11 mm. (4.3 in.) guns fell into our hands together with a large amount of war material. During the night our troops were engaged in consolidating our positions, covered by a detachment in High Wood, which was afterwards drawn back into the new trench line. On July 17 the long defence of Ovillers- La Boisselle came to an end. Like Carency in the Battle of Artois (May, 1915), the village had been gradually isolated, and the Prussian Guards of the 3rd Reserve Division found them- selves in sore straits. The barrages of shells prevented both food and ammunition from being brought up in any quantities to the defenders. Water was scarce, and the spirit of the hungry and thirsty garrison, now greatly reduced in numbers, was much broken. Sir Douglas Haig decided to use one of his northern divisions to complete the conquest. At dawn a tremendous bombardment opened when the guns lifted their rain of shells from the shattered heaps of masonry which now repre- sented all that remained of the once flovuish- ing \Tllage of Ovillers-La Boisselle, and the British infantry from their side advanced to the attack. The first line started out of the 0\Tllers Wood. From the vaulted cellars and from behind wrecked ho vises the machine-guns and infantry of the Prussian Guards turned a terrific fire on the assaulting troops. Men fell and were left behind, but ever onward moved the British infantry until their goal was reached. Once the Germans' front line was gained the Grenadiers set to work to bomb the dug-outs and destroy their occupants or force them to siurender. As progress was made the sudden cessation of all fire from the various CARTINC; AWAY A CAPTUKHn (;kkman (;un. [i>ljuial f>lnit'ii;r,iph. 108 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Uiittiai pliolo^tapn. SEARCHING PRISONERS. To make quite certain that nothing dangerous is being concealed. points showed they had been won. The fight was a hard and prolonged one. One machine- gun, snugly placed in a ruined cottage, managed to maintain its fire after the rest had been conquered. A gallant officer, whose arm had been shattered by a bullet, led a party of liis men against and killed the gun's crew. He was then led off to an ambulance, whistling " Tip. perary." At about 10 a.m. all resistance was over, and the worn-out remnant of the Prussian Guards surrendered. In one of the cellars 25 Glermans, who had exhausted even their emergency rations and had not tasted food for two days, were captured. Of the German garrison in Ovillers-La Boisselle only 126 survivors remained. The entry to the village by the Bapaume road was defended by two strong field works. Round them alone were strewn some 800 corpses. Some of the captured had lost their reason, and many were dying of enteric. " You English fight like devils," remarked one German, " and we gladly svu-render to such men as you are." A party of prisoners were placed under a subal- tern's guard. Among them were two officers, one of whom is said to have unpinned the Iron Cross from liis breast and offered it to the subaltern. " Take it for having done what we considered to be impossible," said the German ; "I give it to you." The subaltern shook his head, and explained that it was not a custom of ours to deprive prisoners of wha I they had won by their own valour. Tht) following captured documents are of interest^ as showing the very heavy casualties which the enemy hud sufforod in the recent fighting : From a company of the 3rd Battalion lOtli Bavarian Infantry Regiment to battalion commander : Severe enemy artillery fire of all calibres up to 28 cm. on company sector. Company Mtrongth, one officer, 12 miiii. Hog urgontly hpoetly relief for the conipany. What remain.s of the company is bo exhausted that, in cu-se of an attack by the enemy, the few totally ex- hausted men cannot bo counted on. From another company of the same regiment : Very heavy intense enemy fire on company sector. The company has completely lost its fighting value. The men loft are so exhausted that they can no longer be employed in fighting. If heavy artillery fire con- tinues the company will soon be entirely exterminated. Kuliof for the compmiy is urgently requested. From 2nd Battalion to 3rd BattaUon 16th Bavarian Infantry Regiment : The battalion has just received orders from Lieut. -Col. Kumml that it is placed under orders of the 3rd Bat- talion 16th Bavarian Regiment as sector reserve. Bat- talion consists at present time of three officers, two non-commissioned officers, and 19 men. In the local actions which took place on this day we captured some more prisoners, and the total of unwounded German prisoners taken by the British since July 1 was 189 officers and 10,779 other ranks. The Gorman losses in artillery proved to be even greater than at first reported. WOUNDED GERMANS Being assisted by British' troops. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 109 GERMAN PRISONERS. Lined up on the road after they were taken from the German trenches. Smaller picture: Convey- ing a wounded German on a stretcher. The captured armament collected by our troops now included 5 eight-inch howitzers, 3 six-inch howitzers, 4 six-inch guns, 5 other heavy guas, 37 field guns, 30 trench howitzers, 66 machine-guns, and many thousands of rounds of gun anununition of all descriptions. This was exclusive of many guns not then brought in and of the numbers destroyed by our artillery bombardment and abandoned by the enemy. Before passing on to the subsequent fighting, let the reader see Ovillers-La BoLsselle through the eyes of a Times correspondent who visited the scene of carnage three weeks later : A.-! far OH La Iioi,H-.<;ll<i it-»-If you can tak»- your motor- car along the raain Alhx;rt-Bapaurne road, though you will have the road to yourneJf when you do it. La Boi^elle on the right of the road in nothing more than a flat layer of pounded gr<-y Htonew and rnortar on the ban- fof^ of the earth. Of anything like a village or in- dividual hiiildingii there ix, of courwe, no nemhlance, On the I»jft of the road the ground dipn uteeply down for .V) yardx or ho, then nlowly nxi-H to what in called '>viller«-La Boix-elle, t><-caii)-e that wa« where a villa(;e iH that riarne nttxni until a few week« ago. To-day, if La Br/ixMell<9 in almost obliterated, Ovillern-La BoiHW'lle id non-exifit«nt. Htanding on the e(lg», of the right roarl in the ((Iiiring ^iunxhine, with the roar of our own ginm behind ofi<! and the oth«r gun« ahea'J, one fe«rl»i on«welf the only landmark in A whmUi. The wholn earth'x xurfaf^s before and around, iw torn with tilK-ll-hoU-M and neanu-d with lim-H of Irenchex, all whit^!, ^x;caii>ie the noil here in chalk. Much land AH tli/:re m l»elwe«n, un><earrecj, ih almr>Mt bare of vfgfftstion. with only here and th<re a thin coat of nickly gr««<i or « duMty tuft of cornflower, rnallow, or white '•amomile. OpfKmitf, crf/wning the gentle mIoj,*^ hxfore you, a few raKgol atuiii;iM, f r»t(Tri<'ritH of tree trunkH «orne JO ft. higli, with bit« of Hpliril« red lowf^r branchcH • ticking frorn thern, otand gaunt againut the xky and mark wh'-re f>viller« u«e»l to l»<i. Heading for Ovillers, we — for an ofTlcer was with me — left the road and went down acrrws the torn and bloKted earlli to the white line of what was once the German front line trench. It iu a trench no more. It was not much of a trench by the time our guns had done with it at the b>-;(inning of thin b>tltle. Afti-r that, it waw jiouiided (liiy iiiid night lhrou>{h uil the dchperate fighting wliich went on for the poHHCHHion of OvillerH. Hince then the enemy has devoted a certain number of HhellM a day to knocking the poor remtiantH of it about a little more. It in a futile occupiil ion, becmiNC no one, ex<'ept an inr|uiHitive viKitor like iiiyHelf, would dream of walking along it. Tim |>arapet Ih moMtly Hlrewn all over the grourul. In pliiccH it Ih mixed with, and fillH up, the trench, ho that you go on the level of the ground Then a fi-w yardn may be (Iccently intact, ho that, half- choked with rubbiHh hh it Ih, it given you Hheller, piThapH, waiHt high. It, and the groinifl around, are littered with erpiipment. (Jartridj^eH, UH('d or ununeri, and unexploijeil bonibH and biln of nhellH, or wlioln Hhelln, " iIikIm," are everywhere benealli your feet. In the ill) nil': TIMKS UlSTDliY OF Till': WAIl. hot Hiin the chalk in iiitoiiiiely wiiitu uii*l tlii< iicut bttate liack cm you t'niiii ihii liakt^d t^artli, and tlic air i.s thick with till) dnadliil Miirll whicli hiloiigs to battli-ficlds and with tlio buz/iiig of rtiew. It iii truly a vilo placi*. At lawt you come to a parting of th« way, where an old (icnnan >iign »till sticks up from Ihe (ire btup of tlio trench, one hand of it pointing " Nach l'ozie6rK." You turn where it tells you and go on — in the trencli or behide it, it does not matter — till you pasH the ragged bits of tree trunkx, and you are in OvillerM. You would not know it but for the tree fi-iigmi-nth, anil, wln<n you look, you see that there is a quantity of broken brick and stone mixed up with the kneaded earth, and also you come to a hole in the ground which being square un<l lined with brick, is obviously not a isliell-hole, but must be a cellar which oiu!ii had a hou^e above it. By this time i have seen a good deal of ruin, but I have talked to experts who have seen more than I, and tht>y agree that Ovillers is more utterly destroyed lliau any other villagi' in the battle area. No village could bo more destroyed, because there is nothing left but the cellar which I have mentioned and two or Ihroo others like it, mere holes in the ground and minus quantities, so far as they are buildings at all. Of suj)er,structure to the earth there is none. One point there is whicli those who go there speak of as a place to take your bearings from — a sort of Greenwich in this sea of desolation — and it is called " The Church." Uniloubtedly a church once was there, because the maps say so, and there is still one fragment of a wall which may have been part of a church, and by it two graves. Why these survive it is impossible to say. If it was not for them no spot in Ovillers above ground would bo diitercnt from any other. Underground it is different. You have already heard how it was estimated that the dug-outs hero could hold, and did hold, 2,000 Germans. It is doubtless true. One fears from the smsll that they hold many yet. We wont down into several, though the entrances to most are battered in by shells, and groped about by the light of matches among the litter and the darkness. There is one great dug-out — I mentioned it f lon^ hearsay at the time — where eighty dead Germans were found, the place, it is supposed, having been used, in the last days of desperate fighting, as a kind of vault into which the dead were hurriedly thrown with the intention some time of wrecking the place or sealing it up, or otherwise making it into a tomb. Another large dug-out there is which the Germans used as a dressing station. It is admirably constructed, and has, besides the main entrance from the trench, another opening for exit which gave upon a road where ran a tramway line by which the wounded could be taken from the very door of the dressing station back behind the lines. On through Ovillers we went by the winding trenches, not knowing when we left the village behind any more than when we entered it. And here one does not climb out of the trench to look. One cannot put a periscope up without its being shot to bits. Close at hand the rifles spat continuously and machine-guns stuttered and growled, and we had trench mortars at work, which heaved projectiles into the air so slowly that you saw them sail majestically to where the enemy was hiding in his trenches, there to explode prodigiously. For short ranges they are as serious as any shell of their size from a great gun. To our right, close by, we were assured, was Pozidres, though I confess I saw nothing of it, and to our loft, a little farther oft, was Thi6pval, wliich also, though I have seen it from other places, I did not see from heiv. And ahead was Mouquet Farn^. Aiui all around was heat, and noise, and an almost intolerable atmosphere. During the night of the 17th ami 18th further substantial progress \v»vs mtvdo on a 1,000 yards front of Ovillers-La Boissollo, six THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Ill [Official photograph. A PATROL Crawling up towards roachine-guns and several prisoners being captured. While the Prassian Guard prisoners were being removed from Ovillers-La BoLsselle, our troops away to the east approaiched Pozieres. They stormed a double line of trenches from Bazentin- le-Petit to the south-east of the village, a distance of 1,500 yards. The trenches when captured were found U) be actually fille<l up with dea^l and woundofj. From the upper part of High Wood, lying over the crest of the heights, and therefore directly under the fire of the Cjterman guns, our patrols were, however, withdrawn and our line straightonefl out between Pozi6refl and Longuo- val, which could now bo attackrxl from two sides. Hf)\ith of tho Sommo, on Monday, the 17th, it was tho turn of the Gorrn ms t<j take the offensive. From midnight t<j tho laU) afternoon battalion aftf^r battalion chargwl up the La Mais^^mnett^j Hill. Met by the rafales of the " 76 " guns and by withering raar;hino-gun fire, the wavf« of Germans re^iwled. In the rrt'>mirig soino of tlie enemy fHinetrateri into tho ojtHt end of iii<u;hoH, frf)rn which, hfjwever, thoy were H/xui exfiellofj by French bombers' Whwi the Mtjn wa« setting, and during the night, the Germ>vns renow«Hi their atbusks Ix'twwrri Biaf;heH anrl I^i .Maiw>nnette Fann. Th»fy were uriHur^iesHful at I.ia Mai>K>nnette, but mwfie part-i«>H wound Mmir way alrmg the canal UNDER FIRE, the German trenches. into houses at the eastern end of Biaches. They were driven out the next day. Xear Biaches there had been a savage struggle for the fortified work in front of the village called Biaches Fort. A battery of machine- guns, hidden cunningly in a marsh, prevented a frontal attack. Fire had not sufficed to drive out the defenders of the work, though it had been severely damaged, and sterner measures were needed. An infantry officer volunteered to capture it by surprise, along a communica- tion trench wliich, he had found, led into the fort. With a small party consisting of himself, a sub-lieutenant, three non-commissioned officers, three dismounted cyclists and a bugler, he crept up tho trench into the interior of tho redoubt. Tho (iermans when he arrive<l were urulorground. I£earing steps, some of them cautiously emerged from their cellars and dug- outs. Tliey found the French in their midst. Before they could recover from their astonish- ment, the French captain, firing with his pistol at the leader, who fell in a heaj), shouted " Kn avant ! " His m »n darted forward and tlio Gennans above aii<l holow ground surrendered, i'risoners to the number of 114 and three MUK-hine-guns were takon. In a few nninutes the galljint Frenchmen had secured a fort wliich for twenty-four houix luul kept our Alli'w at this point in chefiki 112 THI'! TIMES HISTORY OF TIIK WAIt. Th« iiMXt muniiii^ (July 18) CJeiinml Ftiyullo, before tlie (Jtinmiiis hiwl rocovtiiwil from tho ropul.SH of their six litittiilioiis on thti slo[)t»n of La Mtiitjoiiiiette Hill, iauiKrluKl a fresh offensive north and south of the Soinine. The French tine now exteniUnl from lUaehes aitcl the La .\hiisonnette plateau tlirough Barleux to Ustrees. In the course of the forenoon five miles of (Jtirman trenches from liarltnix to Soyecourt were secured. Xorth of the Sommo, on a frontage of four miles from the point where the French joined up with the British south of the captured Trones Wood, our Allies overran the Genmin fortified area and reached the Combles-Ci6ry narrow-gauge railway. Thick mist and incessant rain had inter- fered with the French, as they did with the British operations on the 18th. At 5.30 p.m. the enemy, preceded by clouds of poison- ous gas and pioneei-s carrying Flanimen- werfer, attacked the British positions in the vicinity of Longueval and Delville Wood, where they formed a salient. The attack was heralded by a heavy fire of shells of all kinds, and was delivered by a whole division. One column of the (Jermans made for the copse, two other columns for the sides of the salient. The north side and Longueval were lost by us and so was a part of the wood. The garrison of the Waterlot Fann, midway between Longue- val and Guillemont, however, resisted the German pressure, and our artillery promptly played upon the Germans in Longueval and Delville Wood. Reinforcements were hurried up, and preparations made for the necessary counter-attacks. According to the German report, the Magdebiu-g 26th Infantry and the Altenburg Regiments had particularly distin- guished themselves in these engagements, and ■we had lost 8 officers and 280 privates taken prisoners. The fighting went on through the night and into the next day. At 9.30 p.m. of the 19th Sir Douglas Haig reported that most of the ground lost in Longueval and Delville Wood had been recovered, and that a large body of Germans massed for another — the fourth — attack on Waterlot Farm had been dispersed by our fire. South of the Somrae that day the French seized some trenches south of Estrees and took about 60 prisoners. The Battle of the Somme, it must always be remembered, was but part of the British operations against the Germans in France and Belgium. To remind the reader that the long line of trenches and redoubts from the east of Albert to the north of Ypres was constantly agitated by bombardments and locuil attack let us, at tho risk of digression, relate an incident which happone<l south of Armentieres on the lyth. At this [mint uii Australian division, exposed to a shell fire heavier than any they had ever experienced in the Gallipoli Peninsula, followed up a heavy bombardmttnt of the Ger- man position, which, howevtir, had not succeeded in destroying or biuying all the defenders' machine guns, by a deterniined attack, aided by a British division on their left. They carried tht* front line trenches, but were held up by those in tho rear. Farther south — in the centre — the whole fortified area was stormed, and the Australians emerged into more or less open country. On the right their comrades had to cross a wide space between the front and rear lines of tho system. The Germans here held a very strongly fortified salient. At places the Australians scrambled into tho enemy's works, but the Germans by diverting streams of water into the captured spots made the position difficult to hold. After enduring a tremendous bombardment for II hours the order was given to retire. The British Engi- neers had constructed communication trenches along which this movement could be carried out. 200 prisoners and some machine-guns were captured, but our losses had been severe. " I hop^," had written a German soldier of the 190th Regiment, captured at Contalmaison, " this awful business will soon stop." A prayer which we may be sure was cordially re- echoed by many of his fellow-countrymen. During the night of the 19th- 20th our bombing parties made a substantial advance east of the Leipzig Redoubt, which was one of the main obstacles barring approach from the south of the Thiepval plateau. Away to the right beyond Pozieres, in the vicinity of the Bois de Fourneaux or High Wood, round Longueval, Waterlot Farm, Delville Wood, Guillemont, and thence to the banks of the Somme, a continuous fringe of exploding shells showed that the German artillery was bom- barding the British and French positions, to which our gunners were not slow in replying. The noise was deafening. The sky was lit up by the bursting shells. Sir Douglas Haig had replaceni the Western and Eastern Divisions and the Highlandei"s by South-Count rymon and Lowlandtrs, and the enemy artillery, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 113 yifjiiuU I'liuli, lira I'll. (:ai<kyin(; w(HJNiii':n on io a iiosimiai. uai<(;|';. Hi THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. autici|iatiiig nn at tack, v\u.s raining duwii tihuwera i)f projectilen on the Hpots whore it was iuiagiueii our troops wero uidsoiubled for th» attack. The " Jack JohiirtonB," which had bi-en but sparingly iuit<d by the Gtuinans since tlie Battle of Yprea, were again in evidence. " They came over," said a Devonshire lad after- wards, relating his experiences, *' as tliick and fast as liand -grenades " Cratertt often 40 ft. across aiiil half as deep were formed by the explosion of their shells. West of this scene an occasional shell was flung into the captiued Tioncs and liernafay Woods and against Montauban The French " 73's," the chatter of the macliine-gims and a dropping rifle fire added to the sounds of pre- paration and showed that all arms were paitici- pating in it. Meanwhile, in their dug-outs, staff otticei's, telephone in hand, waited for the news of what was happening to the north of the Bazentin- Longueval position, where oui* men were again topping the crest and descending into the High Wood, moving up the rising slope of ground between that and Delville Wood, while through the broken branches and over the fallen trimks a South African contingent was making its way northwards and eastwards. The northern houses in Longueval, the l^ligli Wood, the intervening space and J)elville Wood, with the village of Cjuillemont, just east of the Tr6nes Wood, had to be carried before our hold on the plateau would bo secure. Th(! rain, which had inipodud operations for so many days, had now ceased, but had left a dark and heavy atmosphere, through whicli our soldiers fought. Many of the (Jemians, the bonds of discipline b<»ing loosened in the night of fighting, scuttled back or surrendered, but enough remained to put up a strenuous fight. At 5.30 a.m. (Jenoral Fayolle, anxious to assist the British on his left and suspecting I'ightly that the Gennan reserves were stationed north of Guillomont, launched from Hardecourt and its environs an attack on Hardecourt Hill towards Maurepas, and the narrow gauge Combles-C16iy lino. The Germans, alarmed at the new and unexjjectod attack which threatened their flank, brought southward several regi- ments from the British front, too late, however, to prevent the French from capturing by 9 a.m. several trenches between Hardecourt Hill and the Sormne and from crossing the railway at various points. Prisoners to the number of about 400 were taken by our Allies, whose [OJfit-«Vi; photograph. MEN OF THE LONDON RIFLE BRIGADE. In a reserve trench, waiting to advance to the front line. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 11; [OJJiitai photograph. A MINE CRATER ON THE SOMME. attack had appreciably lightened the difficult tabk of the British. The sun had by now dispersed the mist which had covered the field, when it first rose, and illuminated the whole battlefield. Over it th're were still the intermittent clouds pro- duced by shell explosions from the powerful artilleries of both sides firing with theii- utmost energy, while overhead were seen circling th'^ aeroplanes, r'-'und which the numerous white piiffs showed that they were the target for anti- aircraft guns. Our troops which had been continuously engaged in this part of the ficM wer'; now withdrawn nrid .•fi>laced by others. Well and ardently had they fought, the men from the west and east of Englfind and from Caledonia, and they wore now to be giv(;n a rest, their places at the front lj<'ing taken by fresher men. As the day wore (jri (iuillonirjiit receiv<il «ip«*citti attention ivotn our artilletymen, and mt heavy was the fire that '^he jjlace seemed af;tually to shrink away under it. Tim d*>»truction wrought by th«) Allies that day WOM not confine<l to the battlefield. Ovir the Oerrnan IJne«, jwiroplanes, flyirig HJrigly, or in Hfj I uulroriM, attacked the ruilwayM.twiiodro/iieK, InitmentM and other objective^,, drojijjing on fhern tnu<i of uxplrMives. About (i.\r, [mii. ff;Mr of our aiTr^pluri'-s ftneouiit(w<'l four Fokkers and two biplanes, and the fight went on for over half an hour. One Fokker was destroyed, a second badly damaged ; the rest of the German machines fled. None of ovirs had been injured. Between 8 and 9 p.m. four more of our machines met eleven of the enemy's, which included L.\'.G.'s,* Kolands and Fokkers. The leader of our patrol made for an L.V.G., which hastily retired from the scene, and then drove down a Fokker. Attacked by a Roland, he was equally successful, forcing it also to descend. Meanwhile a second machine put out of action anc^ther Roland. Two Fokkers, when about to attack, nearly collidefl and had to draw off. The third of the British pilots, ut a lower altitude, also disposed of a Roland, whicli r<ll ill ti "spinning nose-dive," but his own (jngine being hit by a shot from a Fokker, he descended in a ste(^p spiral. The fourth |)ilf)t dived to his rescue, engaged the pur Huer at a height of 1,000 feet, and the Fokker was observed to fall to the gn)un<l in (lames. Eventually all tli(^ liostilr aeroplanes were diM[)rTH<id. A French pilot the snrne <lay brought down a German machine east of I'errmnc. These successes more than eounter- balunci^d the loss of the foiu' Mritish tnucliines which since the 10th had failed to return to their aei'odromes. • Tfm L.V.Ci. WBM a two-MculiT liijtIaiKt, 116 THE TIMES HlSTOliY OF THE WAR. -^^-v.- ^•■ima.i'^^' iUjficial photograph. FRENCH CAVALRY PATROLLING. At 10.55 p.m. Sir Dougla? Ha'g was able to report that north of the Bazentin-Longueval .ine we had advanced 1,000 yards ; our front now ran from the bottom of the High Wood to Longueval, through the middle of Delville Wood, then turned south by Waterlot Farm to a point between Trones Wood and Guillemont. Heavy fighting still continued in the northern outskirts of Longueval and in Delville AVood General Fayolle this day had also w^on a considerable success north of the Somme. To the south of the river the French on the 20th had not been idle. Our Allies had advanced in the preceding fighting almost up to the gates of Peronne ; they were at the bottom of the loop of the Somme. To enlarge this pocket southwards towards Chaulnes and the railway Chaulnes-Peronne was the next step to be taken. From the western outskirts of Barleux to Estr^s their Une ran back almost at a right-angle. Consequently the troops south of the Somme below Peronne were in a dangerous salient. To drive its southern face southwai-d and thus enlarge the salient was Foch's object The French Colonial troops were, employed or the purpose, and in the morning of the 20th a terrific bombardment of the German positions south of Estrees opened. Their positions extended from Estrees through the park of Deniecourt, the chateau of which had been converted into a formidable imdergi-ound fortress, to Soyecourt, defended by formidable trenches, to the Bois de I'Etoile and Hill 90, situated north-west of Vermand-Ovillers, near which was a redoubt on the road to Lihons. If the French could capture Vermand-Ovillers they would be within easy distance of the Chaulnes junction, where the Amiens-Peronne and Roye-P6ronne railways met. As the Roye region was the pivot of the German right wing in this part of the theatre of operations, the importance of the Chaulnes junction is obvious. When the bombardment ceased the colovired troops of the French advanced. The Soy6- com-t labyrinth, the Bois de I'Etoile and the redoubt on the Lihons road near A^ermand- Ovillers Faixn were carried. By nightfall Soye- coiut was surroimded on three sides. Thirty officers and 2,870 privates, 3 guns, and 30 machine -gims had been captured. A German counter-attack near Soy6coiu-t delivered in the late afternoon by a battalion was sevowly repulsed by the French artillery and machine- guns. Such was the Battle of the Somme, of July 20. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 117 BRINGING UP THE 75's IN THE GREAT ADVANCE. [Ogictal photograph. To deceive the German people and their friends outside Germany, the German Great General Staff issued the following fabrication : On both Hides of the Somme the enemy yesterday, an wan expected, prepared to deliver a ntrong attack, but it failed. After the HtrongeKt preparation on a front of about 26 milcH, attacks were made south of Pozi6res and to the we«t of Vermandovillere. More than J 7 divisionfl, comprising more than 200,000 men, participated in the«e attack.^. The meagre retiult for the enemy iH that the fimt line of a Gerrrtan division along a front of about IJ miles BOuth of Hardecourt was pr«'.sMed back from th'- (ulvanced trenches into the next lino of trenchen lying 800 yards to the rear, and the enemy divisions penetrated into ii nalient in the little wood of Vermandovillers, On the whole of the rernaindfrrof this front llif crji-niy's wild orixlaughts w«;T); broken to pieces against the dr-ath- defying loyalty of our troop*, with extraordinary lONsefi for the enemy. So far 17 officer-' Hnd 1,2"0 men have b'^en captiir»'d. That, 80 far an riumb*;rH wore conceme*!, the l^attlo wa« on tho large ncale cuBtoinary to th^ifto operationH may Yh^ ailmitt^nl. Other- wiiw the German fiction bore no relation to actual fact Tho AllieH were not HucceHHfuI at every point, but they rnaile coriHiflfsnible ^airift and Buflerfsd no rovorwH of any moment. During tfjo night of the 2f>th-2lMt the enemy, nfU'T an iiiUfTiHH bombardment with gHH HhellM, fiiUTf^\ High Woo'l, and recoverefl tfie northeni part of it. The next day (July 21) the battle continucfl spasmodically from the Leipzig Redoubt to the Delville Road. A German bombing attack against the northern edge of our position in tho Redoubt failed. Taking advantage of the fine weather, our aeroplanes bombed important points behind the Gemian lines, and in the evening there was a good deal of aerial fighting east of them. , An official account of our aerial activity that day may liero be quoted : Much successful cooperation with artillery was carried out : 92 targets wore engaged with aeroplane observation and 2.'* with kite balloon. Several direct hits on gun ernplrtceinciitH were obtained, (ho ammuni* tion in one continuing to explode for over half an hour. One of our machines engaged on photographic duty, was attacked by a Roland, which camo level and then dived and attacked under the tail of our aoro- plani'. Our aeroplane Hide-slij)ped till level with tho Roland, and then fired threo drums into it at 40 yards. The Roland fell to the earth near Louzo Wood. One of our imroplanes, whilst on artillery patrol at 4,00() ft ., saw r'iglit hostile aircraft at a h(<ight. of 9,000 f t . It climbed to I his height and was joined by five of our fighting machines. At this juncture the enemy were joined by flveL.V.O.'rf and two Fokkors. AllourmachineB attacker! the somewhat scattered enemy formation. A section of thri-e of our ma<;hines dived on to one party, from which one Kokkcr pluiignd to earth from a height of 7,000 ft., and two other infu^hines were forced to land. Another machine wa« seen to fall out of control into a village, and yt another fell headlong to earth in a field. The fighting hftf (I over half iin-hour, when the renniining eireriiv mdcliiiie- fjiw off in I wot and threes. 118 THE TIMES IIlSTOTtY OF THE WATi. The total of hostile machines brought du»ii mi this day wtu nix, tinil at leo^st thrco luui'o were clriNfii iluwa diuiuigod. South of the AiiiieiiH-ChauhiiiH railway, in the Maueourt region, the (iermans tried tu riwh the French lineM, but weru ivpul.sfd with the bayonet. •Saturday, July 22, wuts u comparatively uneventful tlay. The Cieriuans boiiibarded our lines with gas anil laclu-ymatory shells, while we prepareil for a fresh advance in which the AiuitralianM were destinetl to distinguish theju- selves. At Berlin thti Higher Cominanil aflectefl to be supremely confident. " In the Sonuno Boctor," ran the communiqui issued that ilay, "after their defeat of the pre\ious days . . . our eneimes liad to abandon their great imitcd attacks." However, all Ciermans did not agree with theii- leailers. For example, a German officer, interviewed by the Vossische Zeilung of tliis date, is reported to have said : The English fought very bravely, notwithstunding enonnoiLS losses. I don't know how great their reserves are, but upon this will ilepeinl the leiif.'th of the offen- sive. Our positions were brtdly knocked about, but the dug-outs and shelters held out verj^ well, which is lucky for us. Besides this, the Higher Command knew what to expect about the attacks, and hail taken the necessary measures to resist them. Finally, rain\ weather came at the right moment to help us. Herr Max Osborn, writing tor the same journal, observed : We are ^hHktM by a burning pain at, new streams of (iermaii bloodarcllowiijg.and we reeogiUKe oiirjxiwerleHH- ness over what eannot be changed. After two yearu of war the angel of destruction is passing through the ranks of (ierman arms with a fury and mereilesNness as if the ileath dance of battles bad only just begun, (iermans are critical, clear-headed, and strong enough to look ihe truth in the face. Whilst the enemies Hufter fearful losses, wo do not blind our eyes to the new moumitig which ba« come to us, nor over Ihe serioiiMness of tint late of this dei-isive battle whic-h is raging on all Ihe fronts. We .shouhl be unworthy of the stupendous task we have to fulfil, and of the scarcely comprehen- sible sacrifices which our heroes make, if we were not able to understand the whole fury and burden of these weeks. We feel as two years ago the raging storm of the united power of the enemy. It is now a question of not less than everything for the life or death of our nation. We stand differently now from what we did in August, 1914. Unexampled deeds of fame lie between, but still the concluding point has to be reached, and everything is in the balance of death or life. Everything between the Somme and the Ancre was, indeed, '" in the balance of death or life." On the evening of Saturday, July 22, the British artillery incrtased its fire on the German lines from Pozieres to Guillemont. Here the Australians were about to play an important part in the Battle of the Somme. The force engaged was the 1st Anzac Corps (Lieut. -Gen. Sir William E. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.). 'A large sector of the horizon," said Mr. C. E. A\'. Bean, the official Press Correspondent with Ihe Austrahan Imperial Forces, "was lit LOADING A BIG GUN. [Offtital phoicsrapk. ^1 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 119 up not by single flashes, but by a continuous bank of quivering light." The sweet heliotrope scent of German tear shells pervaded the air in the \-icinity of Pozieres. Shells containing poisonous gas whistled towards and over the British lines. Projectiles wliich burst liigh up and came down like flaming torches descended among the crouching Australians and Terri- torials. A torrent of our artillery fire was turned on Pozieres, the fortified ^^'indmill behind it, the Unes of trenches before the village and the barbed-wire entanglements. Suddenly, about midnight, the British guns lifted and the Austrahans rose to their feet, At once rockets rose into the air, and bursting ht up the 500 yards or so of crater-jjitted ground between them and the first German trench. The Austrahans, in the glare of the rockets, xinder a rain of shrapnel, moved steadily and rapidly forward. On their left Territorials — mostly Londoners^— made for the west end of the v-illage. The first German trench had been recently dug ; it was shallow, and the enemy there offered httle resistance. Digging thenxselves in, the Australians halted, while our guns played on the second trench, a deep and weU-built one beyond the tramway running about the outskirts of the village. There the Germans put up a better fight, but were all bayoneted or taken prisoners. Having improved the second trench, the AuHtralians, crossing to others, made their way through dumps of woods and orchards inU) the village itself. Two redoubts were captured on the way. Meanwhile the Terri- torials ha<l on the left got above Pozieres and were attacking it from the north-west. From daybreak onwarri the w<irk of f;learing out the Gfrraans from the ruins of the village went on. At 11.. 'JO a.m. t\u: Gf^rrnans, strongly reinforced, counter-att»u;ked. They lijwi been riofjtjd witli ether and chargfxJ like a t rf)0[> of m>idnien. in a hf>rrihJe hand-to-hand 'on/lict weapons of every kin<J wcTf) emjjjoyed and some of the Germans UHfyJ spiked r,\\iim wliieli }i;i(| hoen specially ma^le for this warfare. Hm;kwards anri for- wanls swayed the infuriated combatants. Hut by 4 (>.rri. our troof)s gained the iiuiHi'^ry and ify nightfall thrfxi-fjuartei-s of I'ozieres w»is won. I>«H suee^»sHful was the atf^irnpt to stonn Guillerrif^nt at the southern end of (he s«K;tor. Htrvtiral barlxxl-wire entanglements covering the fKiHituiti \tfu\ not he«?n destroyed. K^aked \r/ rn/u:hine gun fire and (;harg«^l hy the (ier- Tfimi reserviw, the British, who h»i<l affeeted a lodgment in the village from the north, were obliged to withdraw. Between Pozieres and Guillemont there liad also been fierce encounters. At one moment our men had expelled the Germans entirely from Longueval, but by the afternoon they had regained a footing in the northern houses of the village. On the French front there had been an artillery duel, and south of Soyecourt a German attack had been repulsed. On the 24th the battle for the ridges north of the Somme continued, but nothing decisive occmred. The Austrahans and the British made some progress in and around Pozieres, where six German officers and 145 men were captured,^ and the French south of the Somme carried at night some strongly fortified houses and a stretch of trench between Estrees and Vermand- Ovillers. The next day (July 25) the situation changed. For a week no rain had fallen and the gi-ound had dried, which was favovu-able to the Allies, still the atmospheric conditions had been bad for our artillery observers, whether in the forward observing positions or high above the ground in aircraft. For it was hazy and the smoke of battle lay heavy on the earth. As a consequence, battery after battery of the heavy German guns which had been hastily dispatched to the Somme front were safely placed by their detachments in various suitable positions behind Flers, the next village which would have to be stormed on the road through Longueval to Bapaumo. During the 26th the increased vohune of shell fire from the Geraian side plainly showed the British that more guns had been brought into action against them. At the same time the strong reinforcements of infantry which had also reachetl the Gei-man lines commenced a series of formi(hiblo counter- atta<;ks. One of these in the afternoon was dinjcted from the north-oast against Pozien^s, most of which village was in the hands of tlie Australians or Territorials. The cemetery on the north-west side had been taken by our men, but to the north-oa.st the comi)lication of trenches in front of the summit known as the Windmill on the ridge behind i'ozieres still Imid out. To rescue their comrades still lurking in or near the village the G(»rmans swoi)t down on bol h siflfts of the rozieros-Bapailtne road from the dinictioti of the Windmill. It was a bnive but fruitless att«)ra|>t. Sufih <;hargeM, aln>ady pn»|)OHterous at the First battlr» of V[)reH, had, in fae.e of the gigantic ac(!unjulation 120 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. of guiut uud dlmlU, now bttuoiuu uiiiuidal. Cuitght by a ilulu(ju of uhrupiiul, thb Otii'iaaius liutsitatod, ^talttnl, and tiiou i-au back, loaviug behind theia tho ground littorwd with the duad aiul dying. Aliaost simultauboiwly with this oliargo another in the region of Liuilloiaont mot witli the 8axne fate. At otfier points parties of oui' infantry progreewod. To the 8outh of Eatroes the French reduced Home strongly fortifieil houses and farther west expelled the enemy from trenches north of Vermand-Ovillers. The salients created by the Allies north and south of the Sonuno were being gradually flattuninl out. Night fell but biought no rest to the com- batants. There was no moon and the only light on the battlefield was that caused by explosions of the shells or the occasional lights and rockets thrown up. About 3 a.m. on the 26th the Ctennans, undeterred by their losses of the previous day, coimnenced a counter-attack on our position between Longueval and Pozieres. A flight of rockets shot up and great patches of ground became visible, betraying the enemy's ad- vance. At once the trench mortars on oiu* side began to fire, and the sound of macliine- guns and of rifle-firing was heard, wliile our batteries behind poured a devastating fire on the assaulting troops. The attack was beaten back and a second also ffkiled. When dawn broke, " No Man's Land " was heaped with ghastly results of the British fire. It was on July 26 that Pozieres was finally ' captured and the second phase of the Battle of the Somme endeii. The Territorials and Australians had penetrated the main German lino just below the cemetery, where numeroui> |»risoners wore taken. Thence the British worked eastward along the trench to the l\)ziures-Bapaiime road and advanced against the positions guarding the high ground, north- oast of the village. Mos; of the prisoners captured belonged to tho 22nd llegiment, brought down from the Ypres region, and to the 157th Regiment. Every building, ovory copse, wood, deoUvity in the ground had been utilized by the German engineers for defensive purposes, and vast underground dwellings liad been constructed to house the garrisons in safety. Ample suppUes of arms and ammunition were at liand for their troops and careful arrangements had been made to bring a powerful fire on the works themselves in case they should fall into the hands of the British ; in short, the whole resources of military art had been exhausted to render this position impregnable. But, battered to pieces so far as the above -gi'ound constructions were concerned, the nerve- shattered garrison had been unable to resist the determined assaults of the British and Australians. The process of clearing out the dug-outs was, as an officer remarked, something like drawing a badger. But it was done, and Pozieres remained in the hands of our gallant troops. Since (July 1 some 24 square miles had been seized by the British. They had advanced eastward on an average 7,000 yards on a front averaging between 9,000 and 10,000 yards. A VIEW OF POZIERES AFTER THE BRITISH ATTACK. [I'ifi.-iji (>hiMcsraf>h. CHAPTER CLV. THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA (l). Area of Operations — Sketch of Events 1914-16 — The Country Described — History of the German Colony — Dr. Schnee's Governorship — Anti-Moslem Policy — The German Forces — British East Africa at Outbreak of War — Xative Loyalty — ^Troops from India — Lettow- V'orbecks Plans — The First Fighting — The Tanga Disaster — Work of the Royal Navy — Bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam — The Konigsberg — British Reorganization and Commands — BuKOBA — The Western Frontier — Xyasaland — Northern Rhodesia — Review of Opera- tions IN 1915 — General Smuts Takes Com>iand. AT once the largest and the most im- portant of German over-sea posses- sions, German East Africa was also in a more favourable position both for offensive and defensive operations than the other German colonies. The commander of the forces, Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, proved to be an able soldier, and for the first 18 months of the war he kept practically intact the terri- tory committed to his charge. Throughout the great^tr part of that period he maintained an offensive on all his lanfl frontiers. This he was able to do as the combined result of the unpre- panMlnesH of his opponents and of geographical The region known as Ciennan East Africa lies hntwf^m Portugufjse East Africa on the .south and Jiritish K<iHt Africa on the north West- ward it extends to th<; great lakes of (Jentral Africa, and indufl'-s parts of all those lak(^ — Nyasa, Tanganyika, Kivii and Victoria Nyanza. It is l>orrlered north -w»;Ht \iy f.hf) L'ganrJa Prote<;t';rat<-, w*:Ht by Belgian ('ongo, and HOUth-w»!«fc by N'f^rlhem Rhodesia «,n<l the Xyasalan'l ProteetoraU;. Its lanrl frontiers are over 2,200 miWrs in lengtli. In relation to it« neighl^Kjurs it occupi<« a central position with >ihort*'r and U!tt»r lin<»s of eommunif«tion. Of Vol. X.-Pakt 121, 121 this circumstance von Lettow-Vorbeck took full advantage. On the Indian Ocean the German protectorate had a seaboard of about 450 iniles, with several good harbours. But from the naval standpoint the value of the two chief ports, Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga, was diminished owing to the proxi- mity of the islands of Zanzibar and Pcmba, which are a British protectorate. In the event of hostilities these islands form convenient bases for operations against the mainland — a circuin- stanco of considerable importance, but yet a poor consolation in th(! Great War, for the price paid for Zanzibar by the Anglo-GeiTnan agreement of July, 1890, was the cession of Heligoland ! The value of Zanzibar as far as East Afiica was eoriC!ernr;d was demonstratrnl at the outset of the (utnipaigii, two cruisers sailing across and bombarding I)ar-(»s-Salaani (August 8, J 914). The initiative at sea rested witli t.lir British, but it was momentarily challenged. 'I'lie cruiser Konigsberg was in the Indian Ocean whr-n war was de.clared, an<l on S(»pteinb«!r 20 if, dr»Htnjyed the I'ogasuH in Zanzibar roadstead. .\lf;antime, oo August 15, (Jerman forces had invaded British Kast Africa in thi; Kilimanjaro rr^gion and hnd seized Taveta. A combined 1-2*2 rHt: TIMES nrsTORY of the wau. laud and sua attack un iMoiulia»a wau then planned. The land force got within 25 miles ol° that port, but tiie Koni^hberg intiteud of being able to help was clxaweil by Britinh war- aliipti and eventually came to an inglorious end in tlie shallow wateiti of tlie Rufiji river. lr» December, 1914, Dar-ea-Salaam wa« again bombarded, and in February, 1915, a blockade of the coa.st of German Ea.st Afiica wan in- stituted. From Taveta, and Iroiu other places on the frontier, the Germans made raids on the Uganda Railway,* but tliey failed in their endeavours to capture Nairobi, the capital of British East Africa, and to seize the governoi'. Early in November, 1914, troops from India attacked Tanga from the sea. The attack failed, the British casualties being 795. A COLONEL VON LETTOW-VORBECK. simultaneotis attack on the German positions north of Ealimanjaro also failed. In January, 1915, Indian troops garrisoned Jassin, a small post within the German frontier, but in the same month they were compelled to sur- render to th^ Germans. There followed many weary months of frontier fighting. In April, 1915, Brigadier-General Stewart was superseded in the command of the troops in British East Africa by Major -General Tighe, who also had * So called because it leads to Uganda. The official title is the Mombai^a-Victor'a Nyanza Railway, and it is wholly in British East Africa. chaige of the operations on the western Uganda frontier, when* them was considerable Hghtuig. In June, 1915, a combuied hind and lake attack on Bukoba, the chief German port on the west side of V^ictoria Nyanza, was com- pletely successful. The only armed German boat on the lake had been previously disabled The strength of the British in l-^ast Africa was DR. SGHNEE, Governor of German East Africa. largely increased early in 1916 by the arrival of an Expeditionary Force from South Africa, and in February of that year General Smuts took over the command. General Tighe had already initiated an offensive movement against the enemy, and in March, 1916, General Smuts swept the Germans out of the Kilimanjaro area. On the Congo frontier the war began with the bombardment — August 22, 1914 — of Lukuga, a Belgian port on Tanganyika, of which lake the Germans held command until the close of 1915. The operations against the Belgians, especially in the region of Lake Kivu, were on a comparatively large scale, but the Belgian commander. General Tombeui-, kept liis opponents in check while engaged in raising a force strong enough to begin a serious offensive. The Belgian colonial army — Congo natives — struck its first big blow in April, 1916. Next, however, to their efforts against British East Africa, the German offensive in the early montlia of the war was directed mainly against Northern Rhodesia and Nyas»v- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 123 Main Roads Other „ GENERAL MAP OF GERMAN EAST AFRICA. land. On I>ake Xyaaa itHoIf thf-y were power- Iphs, th»; Britiwh hiaving riiHablf^d the only ^J^'iman Htparn*-r on tho lake on August 13» J1>J4. OutHtariding events in the campaign were the defeat on September 9, 1914, of a determined attempt to twjize Karonga, a Briti.sh port on I>ake Xyewa, an<l the HucceHHful defence by an Anglo-Belgian force of th*; jjost of SaiHi, juHt within the IthodcHian frcjntier Mune-AuguHt, J9J5}. Jn September-Xovember, 191.5, reinfoniernentH from Krjuth .Africa remhcil .N'yaHftlanfl, but it wa« not until .May, J 9 1(5, that an invaMimi of Oennan terriU^ry from that prot<ir.'torat»! wan undertaken. .Meantime, in March, I91f}, Portugal IumI joined in the war and her trfiopH had occupied one or two phu^eH on \.\vi JM^utfiern front,i<r of the Oerman proteo German Ea.st Africa had an area of over .'{80,000 square miles — that is, it wjis nearly twice as large as Germany. At its greatest length — S.E. and X.VV. — it extended for a distance of 1,000 mikw. Although in tho tropics, this terri- tory contains several areas which, owing to their elevation, are suitable for settlement by Euro- peans. These areas probably do not (»xc<'<mI (iltogf^ther .'»0,000 square mih'S, and in the rest of the country the climate is unh<'nMhy for wliite rac«Jtt. Little mineral wealth hail been fliscovored, but in sylvan, agri(;ultural and pastoral resources the country is imuKUisoly rich, an<l it is the natural avenu<( of trade foi- a considerable [)aii; of Central Africa. Moreover, judged by African standards th(! continent is V ery spars<'ly pr)|)ulated its native inluibidmts, who numbtn* abr)Ut K, 000,000, are fairly ill Till': TIMKS HlsroiiY Ul' TllK WAR. ON THE BORDERS Rhodesia!) troops numerous. Many Ai-abs antl Indians dwell in the coast lands. The physical features of the country are on a grand scale, the principal draw- back being the lack of navigable rivers. Of noil -navigable rivers there are many, some of imposing length. The major part of the coimtry is a tableland, 3,000 to 4,000 feet in average elevation and with an undulating surface. Parts of the tableland are barren, but for the most p&ic it is covered with OF RHODESIA. on the march. forests or elephant grass. Big game is plentiful in many regions. The lion, leopard, buffalo, giraffe, antelopes of many kinds, the " rhino." anfl tlui " hippo." are all there, and snakes, many \enomoiis, abound. Crocodiles infest the rivers and the tse-tse fly — and other pests — many districts. The soil is nt>arly everywhere rich and abundantly repairs culti- vation. The eastern escarpment of the table- land is nuich broken, forming rangt^s of THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 125 mountains which run parallel to the sea. The coastal plain, sometirhet! sandy, but mostly mangrove swamps and dense jungle, is from 30 to over 100 miles wide. Owing to their fertihty'the majority of the European plantations were in the coastal plain and in the mountains facing ii. Thei-e were two principal areas of settlement, in the hills around Mrogoro, west of Dar-eg-Sa!aam, and, farther north, in Usambara, where the highlands come nearest the sea and reach to within a few miles of the frontier of British East Africa, Besides the tangle of moimtains forming the sea -ward wall of the tableland, several isolated summits mark its eastern edge. Of these Mount Meru (H,950 feet) and the majestic, glacier-clad, volcanic cone of Kiliman- jaro (19,321 feet, the highest mountain in Africa) were within the German frontier. The southern slopes of Kilimanjaro and ]\Ieru are among the best watered, most cultivated, and most healthy regions of East Africa They are In the south-west Nyasa — 350 miles in length — lies 6,000 ft. below the unbroken line of tho Livingstone mountains ; duo west is Tangan- yika, a rock-bound ribbon of water 30 to 45 miles wide and over 400 miles long. North of Tanganyika, framed in mighty mountains, lies Kivu, a pigmy among its giant neighbours, for its length is only 55 miles, but the most pic- turesque of African lakes. And north of Kivu is a land of wonder and mystery dominated by the lofty cones of a series of very active vol- canoes, the Mfumbiro Mountains. Eastward of Mfiimbiro, and comparatively shallow, for it lies on the tableland, not in the Rift VaUey, is the vast expanse of the Victoria Nyanza, with an ai*ea nearly as great as Scot- land. About a fourth of the waters of Nyasa, half of Kivu, and rather more tliau half of Victoria Nyanza, together with part of the Mfumbiro Mountains, were in the Grerman protectorate. The watei-s of Tanganyika, out- side the three miles limit, were international. IJAH-ES-SALAAM. conveniently adjacent to the L'.sambara high- lands, and have in Tanga an «;xcellent f>ort. Much of the interior in unattractive from the Bcenic point of view, but few regions of Africa rival in grandeur and l>«;auty the w<mUtni fring'- of tius proU'cUiralt}. Her'; the tableland in cleft by a huge choHin, known hh tho Great liift Valley, and in the chaHrn, of ifnrnenwt deptli, lie lakes NyaHH, Tanganyika and Kivu. Tlie walin of the choftrn tower Hheer above the lakrn. ati free to the British, who own its southern shorf'H, and tho Belgians, to whom Ix'Iong if>? eoHtcrn coawt, as to the Gennaiis. Inime diatc!ly eoHt of Kivu is tho mountainous and thickly [populated district of Ruanda, a feudal State Htill governed by its own Sultan in I ill 4. though Gonnan sovereignty was acknowledged. Iluanda is farned for its countloBs herds of fdttle and its healthy climate. It also contains the most remote oi tho li<;ad-streumH of the 121—2 V26 THE TIMES HISTiiliY (>E THE WAN BRITISH WATER-SUPPLY COLUMN. Nile. These gather iiito one and, as the Kagera, flow into tlie Victoria Nyanza just within the bounds of the Uganda Protectorate. It was one of the ironies of the partition of Africa that this central region of the eastern Imlf of the continent fell to Gennany, for in its exploration and early development they had had scarcely any part. The first Europeans to hold sway over the seaports were the Portu- guese — some vestiges of their rule still remain. In the nineteenth century the Arab Sultans of Zanzibar had succeeded to the sovereignty over the coast of the neighbouring mainland. It was one of these Sultans, Seyyid ]\Iajid, who first recognized the advantages that the per- fectly sheltered harbour of Dar-es-Salaam (Arabic for the Haven of Peace) offered in contrast with the open roadstead of Zanzibar. To the Zanzibar Arabs was due also the first authentic knowledge of the interior. In quest of slaves and ivory these Arabs penetrated inland to Tanganyika, and even across that lake into the heart of what became Belgian Congo. Leaders in this movement were the family of which Tippoo Tib was the best-known member. Starting from Bagamoyo, opposite Zanzibar, the Arabs formed a caravan route to Tanganyika, They founded on the open table- land the town of Tabora as a half-way house between the sea and tlu- lakes. Ujiji, midway on the eastern shores of Tanganyika, where occurs one of the rare breaks in the line of pre- cipitous cliffs forming the eastern wall of the Great Rift Valley, was their lake port, and there they ruled as sovereigns and lords. Rumours of the existence of vast seas in the heart of Africa presently reached Europe. It was the age of great explorers in Africa, and Burton and Speke made an adventurous journey from Bagamoyo to Tanganyika. First of white n)en at LTjiji, in February, 1858, they gazed vipon the waters of that lake — the longest fresh-water lake in the world. Next to ex- plore Tanganyika was David Livingstone, and it was at Ujiji that he was " fovmd " by H. M. Stanley in 187L Speke, besides his share in the discovery of Tanganyika, was the first white man to see the waters of that nyanza wliich he named after Queen Victoria ; and to Speke and Grant and to H M. Stanley was duw the opening up of the route from Bagamoyo to Victoria Nyanza. Speke likewise was the first European to see Mfumbiro. Kivu alone owed its discovery to a German, Count Gotzen. Hard on the heels of the explorers came the missionaries — British missionaries — and those carried on desperately hard work with imceas- ing devotion. Much of their effort was directed to combating the Arab slave tradei-s, and % THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 127 believing that one of the surest methods of accomplishing their object was to develop legitimate trade, they launched the first steamers placed on the waters of Tanganyika and Xyasa. After the missionary came the trader — British and British Indian — and after the trader the pohtical agent. As early as 1877 Sej-yid Bargash, then Sultan of Zanzibar, had offered to British merchants extensive rights in his mainland dominions. Seyyid Bargash. Hke his predecessors, was in close relations with the CJovemment of India, and British influence was predominant in Zanzibar, where Sir John Kirk was in the critical period of partition the British Agent. In 1877 the British merchants proved more timid — a re- markable exception to the general rule — than the British Gtovemment in assvuning responsi- bility, and Seyyid Bargash's ofTer was not accepted. In 1883-84 the rivalry of Germany began. The notorious Karl Peters, whose subsequent exploits earned for him among the natives the title of " The Man with the Blood- stained Hand," with two companions, landed clandestinely on the mainland near Zanzibar in Xovember, 1884, and concluded treaties with chieftains in the Kilmianjaro and other regions, upon which a little later the German Iinperial Government founded claims of sove- reignty. For action of this kind some of the British interested in the development of East Africa had been prepared, and a short while before Karl Peters reached Zanzibar Mr. (afterwards Sir) H. H. Johnston had made treaties with the chiefs of Taveta and other native potentates in the Ivilimanjaro region. It is not necessary to set forth the diplo- matic struggle which followed , the resvilt was that through the complaisant action i)isi'Arf:»f-KM>j.i< f:i<(>ssiNf; an ivii'kovisi'.d hi<ii)(;h. 128 THE TIMES HISTOKY OF THE WAIW MEN OF THE KING'S AFRICAN KIFLES. of the British Foreign Office, which then wd- comed Oerman cooperation in the work of civihzation in Africa — Germany secured the rich region which had been opened up by British enterprise, while to the British fell an unknown land, believed to be worthless, save as affording a route to Uganda and the Upper Nile. It had one good harbour — Mombasa — and that in 1885 seemed to be the beginning and end of its advantages. It fell to Lord Salisbury in 1890 to sign the agreement which ^settled the boundaries of the German protectorate. The Germans in characteristic fashion had intrigued to secure Zanzibar Island, both because of its com- manding strategic position and its value as chief entrepot for the trade of Central Africa. In the end they acknowledged a British pro- tectorate over Zanzibar — but they got Heligo- land in recompense. Fvirther, Karl Peters had conducted a filibustering expedition into Uganda with the object of obtaining for Germany a footing in the Upper Xile basin. Lord Salis- bury insisted that the whole basin of the Nile should be left in the British sphere, and carried his point. But again the price paid was some- what heavy — it was the sacrifice of the scheme, associat.ed chiefly with the name of Cecil Rhode.s, for an " all -British " route from the Cape to Cairo. Sir Harry Johnston, Mr. A. J. Swann and others had in the region between 'iani,'ttnyika and ITgandu made treatioH with HKtivB potentntos wliich would have achiev^tl the desired object, but (ionrinny objected to havt) the British as neighbours in the west as well us iji the north and south, and by the 1890 agreement the limits of the German pro tectorate wtuti made conterminous with the eastern frontier of the Congo Free State (now the Belgian Congo).* Apart from this main issiu* two other noteworthy incidents occurred in fixing the frontier. They concerned rival claims to mountains, Kilimanjaro and Mfum- biro. The outcome of the negotiations may be told in the words of a correspondent of The Times -. To Kilimanjaro the British had the best title, aiid the Ht raight line whicli it wa- proposed slioiild f onn t he Anglo- Gennan boundary would have carried (he frontier across the mountain and left the highest peaks on the British side. Lord Salisbury, however, was told — the story was current at the time, though it does not appear in the diplomatic documents — that the Kaiser (then Prince William of Prussia) greatly desired that Kilimanjaro, first sighted by a Gennan.f should become German territory. Lord Salisbury was complaisant, and the frontier was deflected to meet the wishes of the Prussian Princf — though the Taveta district foil to Great Britain. The story is characteristic, and it has been an undoubted point of satisfaction to William 11. that the German flag should float over the highest point of Alrica. The partieularpeak wliich rises a few feet above its neighbours is called the Kaiser Wilhelm Spitze. Among other things, the Kaiser had expressed great interest in " the flora and faunn " of KilimanjaiO and this was remembered when the diplomatists came to fix the western frontier, where -Mfmnbiro was situated. The straight line then favoiired for international boundaries would have placed Mfumbiro (as was supposed) within the German sphere. The chance glimpse which Speke obtained in 1861 of the magnificent volcanic region led, however, to the saving of a portion of that territory for Britain. Kilimanjaro had been gracefully given to Germanj', and Lord Salisbury claimed Mfumbiro in return. "Tell the Emperor," Alexander Bruce, one of the founders of the British East Africa Company, and a son-in-law of David LiNnngstone, is reported to have said, " that there is a Scotsman in Edinburgh interested in the flora and fauna of the mountain." The Germans, more than half believing that Mfumbiro had only a mythical existence, agreed to Lord Salisburj''s demand. Later on Speke's Mfumbiro was found to be full 20 miles west of its supposed position- and was claimed by Belgium to be in Congo territory. [Eventually, after years of negotiations, the Mfxmibiro region was divided between Britain, Genuany and Belgium.] *When in 1894 the Rosebery Administration tried to get through the Cape to Cairo connexion by obtaining the lea*ie of a strip of Congo territorj-, Germany at once inter- vened and the proposed lease wa-s abandoned. t Johannes Rebmann (in 1848). Rebmaiui was a Wurteniburger, a missionary in tlie service of the Church Missionary Society. 1 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 129 For a number of years the Germans did lifetle towards the development of their protectorate. The administration had to meet Arab revolts on the coast and to subjugate many native tribes in the interior. Their methods were in general very harsh ; the efforts of one or two enlight- ened governors, such as Major Hermann von \^'issraann and Count Gotzen, could not change the whole spirit of the administration. For years, too, the public services were starved by the refusal of the Reichstag to vote the sup- plies required. The Usambara HigWands were developed by private enterprise, part of the capital employed being British. It was not until the appointment, in 1907, of a business man, Herr Dernbiu-g, to the German Colonial Office that the protectorate was given ample means of development. The Uganda Railway, which reached Victoria Xyanza in 1901, had proved highly successful and was drawing to Mombasa much of the trade of German East Africa. The lesson was not lost on Herr Demburg. The railway from Tanga to the Usambara Highlands was continued to Xeu Moshi, on the slopes of Kilimanjaro, and 18 mUes west of the British frontier. More impor- tant was the completion of what is called vari- ou-sly the Central Railway and the Tanganyika- bahn. This trunk line, from Dar-es-Salaam to Lake Tanganyika, was begun in 1905, but in 1907 had not got beyond Mrogoro. After Herr Demburg's visit to East Africa in that year construct if>ii went forward rapidly, and in February, 1914, the rails reached the lake — a distance of 780 miles. Owing to an altera- tion in the level of Tanganyika Ujiji was not chosen as the lake terminus, a land-locked nattiral harbour, Kigoma, being available foui- miles farther north. With the building of the railways the number of plantations increased. In 1913 the value of exports from the protec- torate was £1,777,000, an indication of the volume of trade which would follow the pro- vision of cheap transport. In 1912 Dr. Albert Schnee, who had held posts in London and the South Seas and who had married a New Zealand lady, was appointed governor, and he was in office when war broke out. Towards the coast Arabs and the British Indians (who were among the chief traders) he followed a conciliatory policy ; he also took some steps to secure reasonable treatment of the negroes by the planters. In view of the roh of Protector of Islam adopted by the Kaiser it is noteworthy to find that Dr. Schnee, months before the war broke out, was engaged in an anti-Mahomedan crusade. A circular signed by him was sent, in October, 1913, to all District Comm.i.ssioners on the subject. A copy of this precioiis document was discovered by the British in the archives at Moshi in March, 1916. It read as follows : All military stations. You are requested to send within three months from date of receipt a report stating what can bo done by means of Government servants and Government teachers t o counteract effectively the spread of Islamic propaganda. INDIAN ,vi(;i;ntain (;IJN IN AcnoN. im THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAIL TRAINING SCOUTS FOR THE BRITISH FORGES. D.) you eoiLsider it possible to laake a regulation prohibiting Islam altogether ? Possibly a riilo miglit be enforced by which teachers would not bo allowed to perform circumcisions or act as preachers in the mosques, etc. The same prohibition might also be applied to other Government servants. The encouragement of pig-breeding among natives is recomnaended by experts &•< an effective means of stopping the spread of Ishim. Please consider this point also. " Expert opinion " recommended pig-breed- ing as a preventative to the spread of Islam — a fine example of the profundity of German thought. But when the war began Dr. Schnee changed his tune. By his authority a proclama- tion inciting the Moslenas to a Holy War was distributed broadcast. The Germans did more. They entered into direct negotiations with Moslem notables, subjects of the Allies, and endeavoured to seduce them irom their alle- giance. A choice specunen of the way in which they went to work to effect this object is afforded by a letter addressed by Count Falken stein, the officer commanding the forces on the Xyasa frontier, to a ]\Iahomedau who exercised great influence over the large Moslem population living on either side of the Anglo- Portuguese border near Lake Nyasa. The following is a translation of the principal passages of Count Falkenstein's letter : The Mfihomedans together with the Germans and tho Austrians are fighting with English, French, Italians, St»)'bians, and Japanese. The enemy cverj'wliere are defeated. ... In Morocco the French are completely cleared out. ... In Afgh«nistan and Baluchistan the English have run away. -Now the children of Padisha liavo entered into power. . . . French and Russians are practically fallen and the I'-iiglish not quite yet, but many of their soldiers are killed outright, very many of their battleships are sunk. Of their steamers more than 500 have sunk. Here in East Africa soldiers [ ? our] have reached close to the English railway at different places. The English railway, its roadway, our askaris [native soldiers] have destroyed. . . . The Belgian askari have everywhere been defeated, many have died, many taken prisoners. Furthermore, here in Nyasaland there are many German askari. Many Mahomedans and we ourselves will make a great " business." And now all Mahomedans are knowing when they die. Furthermore, they are dying for God. He has seen their flag of holy war with His own eyes. And you do not fail to bring news to me immediately and the names of those .A.ngon [a tribe of Zulu origin living in British Nyasaland], wo are wanting their " marks " and their chieftain. Ask them quietly. Dispose clever men well for the hiding of our secret and yoxi will be happy in the Govern- ment together with your people. — Falkenstein, Captain. The new attitude of the administration towards Islam had its effect on the Moslems living in German East Africa, and among the stoutest of Colonel von Lottow-Vorbeck's troops were Arab volunteers. Nominally the combined strength of the military and police forces in German East Africa when war began was some 2G0 Germans and 2,500 natives. The North German Gazette of March 25, 1915, claimetl that in East Africa, as in Soiith-West Africa and Cmueroon, ■' the military organization consisted at all times solely of police troops designed oxolu- sively to assiu'o stu'urity against native revolts but not against an exterior onen\v." Although I THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 1:31 this assertion was not true, the forces in German East Africa at the beginning of August, 1914, were not sufficient to enable Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck to take the offensive imme- diately. But he speedily raised a compara- tively large army. All German resident* of military age in the protectorate, some 3,000, were called to the colours, as well as the native soldiers who had passed into the reserve. It also happened that in August, 1914, there were at Dar-es-Salaam a nimaber of non-resident Germans. It had been arranged to open at that port on August 15 an exhibition in cele- bration of the completion of the Tangan- yikabahn. Many visitors, including several anny oflicei-s, had arrived. They had no chance of returning, and together with the crews of the steainers in harbour were available to reinforce the ranks of von Lettow-Vorbeck's anny. Most of the German missionaries in the country also joined the ranks ; as already stated, mmibers of Arabs volunteered, and lai'ge nmnbers of natives were impressed. By October, 1914, the German force was three (;HI<MAN hast AIKICAN NAIIVI', ikooi-s. 18"2 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. tiiutfn >!,» lur^H tM its Moiniiml HtrHii^tli in thu piuviouti Augiutt, uiul ut itH inaxiiiuuii (Jolonul von Lettow-Vorbeck liuil uucImi- hin cuiiunuiul 4,000 KurupeaiiM unci 30,000 nutivtw. At tho beginning of 1916, tiuit is after allowing for the uerioiui caHualtien the enemy liail ah-eady wuf- ferretl (not fewer than 4,000), (Jeiutral Smuts t«timateil the (ituinan force at ltj,000 men, of whom 2,000 were white, with 60 guns and 80 machine guns. This was either un under- estimate or ilid not include the (iemnans operating in the Tanganyika and Nyasaland regions. The tJei-man troops were organized in companies varying from ITjO to 200 strong, with 10 per cent, of whites tmd an av(»rage of two machine guns pt>r compjiny. They were plentifully supplied with auuuunition. All the principal Goveniment stations were fortified, and were connected with one another and with the railways by well-made roads, mostly suitable for motor traflic* Tabora, at which town many of the main roads meet, was especially well defended, as was also Kigoma, the harbour of Ujiji. The " military organi- zation to assure security against native revolts " had certainly been thorough, and Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck was able to contemplate the immediate military situation with much greater equaiu'mity than could the British and Belgian commanders opposed to Iiim. He was, it may be added, a man of experience in tropical Africa, for before taking up his command at Dar-es- Salaam, in 1914, he had been commander of the troops in Cameroon. Though the local situation in East Africa was favourable to Gennany it speedily became apparent in Berlin that the naval supremacy of Britain left them without means of succour- ing their colonies. Thus it came about that on August 23, 1914, the Berlin Foreign Office made proposals that such of the African possessions of the belligerents as were within the conventional basin of the Congo should be neutralized. The German manoeu\Te has been dealt with in the account of the Cameroon campaign, and need not again be discussed. How far the German Government's action was disinterested may be judged from the fact that German troops, while Berlin was still in wireless communication with Dr. Schnee, had invaded British East Africa and Nyasaland, and had bombarded (entirely without provocation) a * Apart from these main roads there were a few secondary roads, but in tho greater part of the country the only means of communu ation were bush tracks. Belgian port on Lake Tanganyika befon* the Goi-man Foreign OHico lii-st made ilH proposals for neutralization. Those proposals wore rejected. When ntnvs tliut war was dt>clared reached th*f British protectorates in East and Oentral Africa there was an immediate rally of the whit(( settlei-s to the colours. Tho native communities proved equally eager to serve the British cause, and the pn^paganda of the Gonnans among them met with no ros[)on8e. There was a small rising in Nyasaland in January, 1915, but it was the work not of the (iermans, but of a native Seventh Day Ad- ventist, who proclaimed that the Millennium would come wlien Nyasaland had a black king. Tlie rebels, receiving no support, were easily crushed. They in no sense rejiresented the native Christians. The Mahomedans gave ample proof of their loyalty. Of all the declarations made by Moslem rulers none was nxore significant than that of the Sultan of Zanzibar, for the Zanzibar Arabs had had practical experience both of German and British methods of rule. In a letter to his representative at Mombasa the Sultan wrote : Let no consideration or promises from German.s prevail upon you to change your allegiance from the mighty Empire of England. Remember that England has ever been a true friend and protector of our interests and religion, and I commend to you and all Arabs that your attitude now be of unswerving loyalty to Great Britain. Lei me warn you against believing lies coming from Germans. Remember how the Germans behaved during the reigns .of Seyyid Majid and Seyyid Bargash respec- tively. The amount of outrages and violation of the local Government's rights and forced intervention in our religious concerns committed by them at that time, even entering tlie mo>quos with their shoes on, not even regarding the sacred rights of the mosques. . . . The German Government is harsh and cruel, and they have ever shown themselves scornful and despising Mahome- dans. Do not believe their words, for they lie to gain your confidence, and then they will crush and ill-treat you and our religionists. The Arabs responded to the Sultan's appeal and not in lip-service only, nor in munificent donations to war funds. Arab volimtet>rs rendered valuable help in the critical fii-st months of the war. Pagan tribes were likewise eager to help. The warlike Masai were among the first to offer their services and many Masai acted as scouts to the British East African force. Fears of unrest among the natives, which for some weeks haunted the minds of the British settlers in E&st Africa, proved groimd- less. On receipt of the news of the declaration of war, which to the British in East Africa came. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 133 in the words of a resident, " almost like a bolt from the blue," the Governor, Sir Henry Beifield, proclaimed martial law in British East Africa and Zanzibar. The situation was precarious ; no preparations had been made to guard against invasion from the German frontier. The East Africa Protectorate Force, which was under the command of Lieut. -Col. L. E. S. Ward, D.S.O., consisted of the 3rd Battalion King's African Rifles and part of the 1st Battalion of the same regiment. It num- bered about 1,200. Many of the rank and file for service against the Germans. They were in Jubaland, maintaining order among unruly Somali on the borders of Italian Somaliland.* They had to be brought from distant stations, embarked at Kismayu, and thence taken by boat to Mombasa : and it was not until Sep- tember that they reached the front. Mean- time volunteers were called for from among the European population of British East Africa. The appeal was made to willing men. Within a fortnight over 1,000 settlers were under arms, and one troop had already taken SO.MAIJ SCOUTS Al A CAPTUKKI) (;HKMAN OBSKKVATION POST. Native huts on either side. wore Yao«, a virile tribe living in NyoHaland, but firnong them w«5re nura^^>rn of other tribes — iSu«larif>H<j, GalliiH and Aby.ssiniunH. Highly trained, daring to n fault, endiiring, no finor ^x>dyfo^ cam[>uigriing in Africa could bo found. They were led \>y ofTicern weconded fro/u Britixh regimentH. \i<muitm this very oflicient but very Kin<^ll body there waH a Hemi -military fxjlic« forf;*> in iiritiwh Ea^t Africa n.\)<>\tt 2,000 Htrorig. F<iw of th»>He fjould be Hpatfxl frr>rn their normal dutiew, and in Augii«t, 1914, not even tlto rriajonty of tlio K.A. liiflen were available the field. Two regiments were formed from the ranks of the settlers — the East African Mounte<J Rifles and the East African Regunent (infantry). The Hour Volunteoi's were enrolled in a separate company under (Japt. Wossols. Lieut. A. J. H. VVavell (Special Reserve, The Welsh Regt.), a man with an intimate know- ledge of IhIiuh, ono of the few Europeans who * Ttio Hoffiali living in tho iiioro Hultliid purl of tho l'ri(tc<:lor(ili) woro al»4(>lii(.i^ly Iciyul. Many volunloorod |i»r Miirvi'in imd nndiT win Id liiKlnivliip ( lin iSomiili iS<^<)utH did ^O'lrl work. 121—3 ISI THh: TIMES iiisroiiY < H' nil-: win. hail visited Morca, obtained permission to recruit aiaung tlio tenant Arabs, and " Wavoll's Arabs " suun narneil distinction. 'I'Jui Kast African vi)luntot>rs wwe excmnlingly kutin, liartl, sturdy mt»n. Many had seen service in Soutii Africa, nearly all were expert shots and accustomed to the busli. The majority brought their own horstts and eijuipment. Among the volunteei-s was Lord Delamerc, tlu» hrst st>ttlt»r in thitish East Africa, whose exijeri- ence was utilized in the Intelligence Depart- ment. Another of the earlitwt to volunteer was Mr. Charles Grey, brother of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. While the resources locally available might suttice for the moment largo nMuforceinciits LIEUT. A. J. B. WAVELL. were needed, and orders were issued for troops from India to go to East Africa. The first regiment to arrive was the 29th Punjabis. With it came Brigadier-General J. M. Stewart, who took over the command of the troops from Colonel Ward. At that time two enemy cruisers were in the adjacent waters, the Emden and the Konigsberg. But the transport of troops went on unhindered. The British ships in the Indian Ocean chd more, however, than convoy transports. They took an active part in the fighting, and in fact struck the first blow in the campaign. On August 8, 1914, two ancient cruisers, the Astraea and the Pegasiis, appeared off Dar-es- Salaam. The Astraia (4,:{»iO tons) ranked as a second-cla.ss cruiser and carried two (J-inch and «'ight 4.7 guns. Hut she was 23 yoai-s old and could steum no more than 18 knots. The i'egasus (;{,(K)0 tons) was slightly younger, scarcely 20 years old, Imr principal luiuiuuont being eight 4 -inch guns. At Dar-es-Salaam there were no heavy guns and the (^erman navy was repres(»nted only by the lO-year-old sur- \eying ship Mowe, of OiiO tons, which caiTied nothiitg more than three 1 -pounders. 'J'his vessel ai\(l the floating do(!k the Britisli ships sank by gunfire. Landing parties destroyed the (newly erected) wirelo.ss station and dis- mantled the ships in the harbour. It was not a l)ig affair, but as Dar-es-Salaam was not only the chief ])ort of entry in thc> (^ennan protectorate, but the seat of the government. Dr. Sclmoe received a valuable lesson as to what supremacy at .sea meant. Howevei', the Germans were heartened a few weeks later by the arrival of tlio Konigsberg, a cruiser of 3,400 tons, launched at Kiel in December, 1905, which carried ten 4.1 inch guns and had a speed of 24 knots. On September 20 the Konig.sberg surprised the Pegasus as that vessel was lying at anchor in Zanzibar roadstead cleaning her guns and re- pairing her machinery. The Konigsberg with her long-range guns completely disabled the Pegasus, which was unable to reply, and lost 25 killed and 80 wounded out of her crow of 234. The German cruiser also sank the two small guard-ships Cupid and Khalifa. This success led the Germans to plan a combined land and sea attack on Mombasa. Up to that time there had been no very serious fighting on land. The frontier between the German and British East Africa protectorates ran mainly through desert regions. Only at Kilimanjaro was there any considerable area under cultivation close to the boundary. Here on the German side was the post of Moshi, and on the British side, 25 miles distant, the post of Taveta. Moshi (or, strictly Neu Moshi, a mile or two south-west of the government post) was the terminus of the railway from Tanga, and thus the Germans had an easy means of sending troops thither. Taveta, however, is 75 miles from Voi, the nearest station on the I^^ganda Rail^-ay, and most of the intervening country is a waterless desert. On August 15 a German force, about 100 strong, crossed the frontier and occupied Taveta, its " garrison," consisting of a District Commissioner, his Goanoso clerk ami 25 natives, retiring. Although it did not appetu" at fii-st THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 135 MASAI WARRIORS AS BRITISH SCOUTS. to affect the general situation the occupation of Taveta was of importance. It guarded the easiest if not the only route open from Britisli East Africa for an invasion in force of the Ger- man protectorate. Col. von Lettovv-Vorbeck also took steps to guard Kilimanjaro from the north, where the branch line from the Uganda Railway serving the Magadi soda lake reaches to within 30 miles of the German frontier, its terminus being aboiit 90 miles north-north-west of Kilinxanjaro. Somewhat nearer Kilimanjaro than Maga<^Ji, and a mile or two on the German Bide of the frontier, is an isolated mountain called Ixmgido. There the Germans established a strong military post. Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck now began to develop his plans for an offensive on all liis frontiers. An regardcnl British East Africa a l*>a^Jing object was tlie destmction of the Uganda Railway. From its starting jjoint at Mombasa on the Jnrlian Oc<'an as far as Nairobi (tho capital of the i<rotect<jrute), a distance of .327 rnilfTS, this railway is nowhere more than Ht> miKrH from the Gennan frontier. l""iofii Tavfjta, Ixingido, anrl other points rairiing f»arties wwo mmt out to dmriage the line At the same tirn/j an wlvanee waH m>ide along the coast from JaMHin. GVfwsing tlie ( 'mba river the (itmtuittn m<i/jA Vanga, which was "garrisoned " by one British officer anfl seven native soldiers. Up to the rnid'ile of September they h/id nr^t iwlvanced far l»«»yond Vanga, but. on the sam»> day — H«>[»te/riber 20 that the Konigsberg destroyed the Pegasus at Zanzibar the Germans began to march on Alombasa, which is only 50 miles from Vanga. Their striMigth was esti- mated at from 1,000 to 1,500, and they had several machine guns. Infonnation received f)y the Uriti.sh led them to believe that Septem- b('r 29 had been fixed b*y the Germans as the (lay for the fall of Mombasa. The Konigsberg was to bombard the port and occupy the island on whi(;h it is situated, while the land forcci was to (hfstroy the railway brirlge which connects .Mombasa with the mainland. As a pre- cautionary m"aHiM'o the wonuui iiinl children, the rolling stock and spcjcio were sent up cotuitry fr<»m Mombasa by the Uganda Railway. On land the British had selected a locality calK'd .Majiirnni at which tf> ineet the en«>iriy. It is s(Hith of (ia/J, a small j)ort, 25 miles from Mombasa. Here Lieut. Wavell was in oom- jntiiid (if his Aral) ci.Miixiny \'M) strong- jukI a few scouts. A bloc^khouse had been built., iukI the cami), which stood in a (tlearing in lat; riir: tjmI':s histoky or 'nii: wau. THE GERMAN CRUISEK " KONKJSBERG." a maiigiuve swsimp, was entrenched. The general cliaracter of the country along the coast is not exaggerated in the following account written by one of Wavell's cyclist scouts : Now the road is one of the vilest paths pos.siblo to imagine. In one place, some seven miles in length, the sand is from 8 in. to 9 in. thick, in others the road has been dug out at the side and thrown up in tho middle, to a varying height of 8 ft. to 10 ft., and only 13 in. wide. In other sections it winds through 8 ft. or 9 ft. high elephant grass, a narrow, winding little footpath, which one finds only through the datnage done to the grass- blades and stallcs through negroes passing through, then over swam])s galore, wading through small, slimy streams, reeking with malaria, through long stretches of mud which clogs one's boots and bicycle, and finally over huge extents (five or six miles) of mangrove swamps and wonderful African jungle, great ferns, cactas, creepers, and impenetrable scrub.* On September 23 the Germans attacked Wavell's camp. After a very stiff fight lasting from daylight till 5 o'clock the enemy was beatftn off. Lieut. WaveU was severely wounded in the left arm. Four days later Wavell's Arabs were reinforced by a detachment of the 1st Batt. K.A. Rifles, which had arrived from Jubaland, and on October 2 by Jind Infantry. The Germans continued their attacks, but these were all repulsed. Meantime the Konigs- berg, chased by British warships, had fled, and in October her captain, to escape capture, ran her agroiuid in the shallow waters of the Rufiji river, to the south of Dar-es-Salaam. All anxieties as to Mombasa were ended on October 8, when the Germans were routed at Gazi. On that day, to quote the Colonial Office report, " a force of the enemy, estimated at 500 native troops and 30 Europeans, with six • Yet in this region were a number of European plant n - tioas — mostly sisal. maxim guns, attacked our position at Gazi at several points. A sharp fight ensued, but upon our troops delivering a cotmter-attack — made in face of heavy fire at close range — the enemy were beaten back and forced to retire to the frontier. The Germans lost four Eiu-opeans killed and four wounded and captured, besides several native casualties, and they were com- pelled to leave a considerable amount of arms and ammunition behind them." Captain (temp. Major) G. M. P. Hawthorn, who was in com- mand of the British, and the three other officers of the K.A. Rifles were wounded early in the engagement. " Col.-Sergt. Sumani, K.A. Rifles," Wrote a correspondent, " quietly took charge and led his men as if notliing had hap- pened. He gave the order to charge, and the enemy broke and fled." As the Germans had failed to take the field in any strength before the beginning of Sep- tember, 1914, they had lost the advantage they would have gained had they attacked in the first fortnight of the war. All through September reinforcements from India arrived at Mombasa, and the slender British posts were strengthened. There was, however, one sharp engagement in Augtist. It was on the 26th, between a detachment of 80 men of the East African Mountain Rifles guarding a frontier post and a German column of 100 natives and 30 whites, with two maxims. The fight took place in thick bush, the Germans being driven off. In the same month a small enemy party, consisting of white officers tmd nati\'es, made their way across the desert from Taveta with the intention of blowing up the railway at THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 137 Mavingu, a little south of Voi. The party, which had suffered much from thirst, was broken up by a British patrol before it could do any damage, and all its dynamite and outfit was seized. Two white officers were captured. Shortly afterwards the Germans began to send stronger parties into British territorj-. A favourite route, as affording water, was from Kilimanjaro down the valley of the Tsavo river. These parties had a double object — ^the blowing up of the railway bridge spanning the Tsavo, and a raid on Nairobi. Interesting particulars concerning the project for the seizure of Nairobi became known through papers found on the body of a Grerman officer killed in one of the fights in the Tsavo valley. These papers contained instructions that he should proceed to the Uganda Railway, destroy the bridge over the Tsavo river — ^thus isolating Mombasa and the British forces in the south — and then go on by rail to Nairobi, occupy that town and capture the governor and officials.* There were three stiS fights in the Tsavo region in September. On the 6th, 2.50 men of the 29th Punjabis and K. A. Rifles defeated a * A naval officer .serving in British Ea.st Africa wroto stating that as an inducement to their native troops to take Nairobi the Germans offered them the white women in the town. stronger enemy force advantageou-sly placed. The Punjabis charged several times with the bayonet, clearing the enemy off three successive ridges and capturing a number of prisoners. The British casualties were Lieutenant G. C. O. Oldfield and an Indian Subadar killed, and about 35 rank and file killed or wounded As soon as the fight was ended the wounded were collected. The bringing in of the wounded at the first possible moment is an urgent matter in tropical Africa, for the helpless are exposed to a danger absent from the battlefields of Europe — that of being devoured by wild beasts. The bodies could not be buried that night (wrote an officer who took part in the fight) as they had enough to do to bring in all the wounded. Even some of these were missed in the bush, with the result that they spent a most horrible night surrounded by hons, leopards and hyaenas. As it wa-:, many of the dead bodies were almost entirely eaten. All available hands were called upon to bury the dead at daybreak next day, and I was amongst the party who set out. It wa& the most gruesome job I have yet undertaken. We buried Lieutenant Oldfield w^here he fell. His body was pierced with 18 bullets from a German maxim gun. [Mr. Oldfield was the first British European to be killed in the campaign in East Africa.] At dawn on September 19 a German force attacked a post held by the K. A. Rifles in the Tsavo valley. After two hours' rifle fire they were beaten back and retired in scattered parties, leaving 13 dead on the field. In this engagement Lieut. A. 0. H. Foster (Hampsliire A MKIIISH MOUNTAIN r.AIII'KY IN OI'.KMAN KAST AIKICA. lay THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE Win. Regt. aiiti 4th Batt. K. A. UifleH), wlui was in cuiiuutiuil i>t' tht< pDtit, WAS killml. A W(H<k Itittw th« tmeiay tiguin atttirketl tit tlto Tsavo <ILstii(t — this tiitu' at M^iitia post, whicit was held hy K. A. Riflt« uitiler Capt. A. O. Saimdefs. Th»» assailaiitH were several htiitdi'eil stroii^, the Hqiiadi'oii threw the enemy into confusion, but tlu'y lallitxl, and when thoy j^ot their ittaxiitis to woik lh»t Btitislt rutifod on their l)ase caittp. Tlie (jierntait column was so shaktMi tliat it retreated to J^onj^ido. The casitalties in " C " s(|ua(h'oii were eijj;lit killed aitd four RECEIVING WOUNDED FROM THE " PEGASUS " ON BOARD A HOSPITAL SHIP. Kuropeans alone nunibering 50, and they had with them six maxims. The attack shared the fate of the previous attacks, the enemy being thiven off. Besides these actions in the Tsavo region there was a gallant fight near Longido, in which 30 men of " C " squadron of the East African INIounted Rifles distinguished themselves. It happened on September 25. The ^Mounted Rifles were iinder the command of Capt. Paul Chapman, and were watclaing a water hole by wliich it was expected an enemy column might pass on its way to attack the Magadi branch of the Uganda Railway. In the dense bush the Germans, 150 to 200 askari, with 30 or more Europeans and two maxims, passed the squad- ron without either force seeing tlie other. Scouts inforniing Capt. Chapman of the pre- sence of the enemy, he advaiiced in open order through the bush, and siu-prised the Germans as most of tht^ir officei's were break- fasting. Opening fire at close range, the wounded. A correspondent of the Times of India at Nau'obi, whither the wounded were taken, wrote that " C " squadron on retiring were met by " D " squadron, and when it was found that 10 men were missing, our troops hurried back to the scene of tlie encounter. On arrival they found that eight of our men were killed, and an examination of their bodies showed that some of them after being wounded had been killed by bayonet thrusts and revolver shots. This was the first occasion in the campaign on which the Germans in East Africa were charged with breaches of the laws of war. In the following months many instances occurred in wliich they showed a flagrant disregard of the rules of civilized warfare. After the failure of the attempts to seize Monabasa and Nairobi the Gernaan offensi\'e on tlie British East African frontier came to a standstill for a time. At this period, mid- October, 1 91-1, it had indeed been decided by tlie British authorities — on wliom tlie ivsponsibility i-ested for the decision was lu^t THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 139 made knowTi — to make an effort to conquer Kilimanjaro and the Usambara Highlands out of hand. The plan adopted was simultaneously to attack the Germans in the Kilimanjaro region and to capture Tanga, the port of Usambara. Tanga was to be seized by an expeditionary force from India which was to be landed under the protection of warships. Tanga, said an official communique, " was reported to be weakly held." The execution of the plan was timed for the beginning of November. General Stewart reorganized his command so as to have a force ready to strike the blow at Kilimanjaro as soon as the over-sea expedition arrived at Tanga. The Tanga Expeditionary force, as it may conveniently be called, sailed direct from India to Tanga. It was commanded by Major- for reinforcements, and a considerable number of troops — ^including at least 1,000 Europeans — arrived from Moshi by rail. They were well provided with maxims and pom-poms. Early in the morning of November 2 General Aitken's transports arrived off the harbour. " As it was an open town and reported to be undefended, it was apparently deemed right to give notice of the intention to occupy the place and to summon it to surrender before commencing a bombardment. The summons to sm-render, made by H.M.S. Fox, was refused." * On the evening of the same day (November 2) one and a half battahons were landed at Tanga Bay, within two miles of the port. This small force advancing through dense jungle, became heavily engaged just outside the town, and as the enemy were in much superior strength it was compelled •i^t&i^ ■* m. » * mAiMi*. h '^ M MACHINH C;UN COVHKINC; Gfrifral A. E. Aitken, and left Bf>rnbay in th(5 latt'ir [lart of October, Tt wan made up nf liritiMh, fririinri, arnl Irnj>oriHl Sei-vice troojis, its total Htreriffth Ixjing abfjut fJ.OOO. 'I'he informa- tion that Tanga wiih not held in strength w»i« af;curat*», and hii<\ the attfu;k Inytn nuwle un- f'XfHwjtedly the placo might well have bemi caf<tur»'d. I'ut the Ger/nariH were warned in time. A Gerrrum ofTif;er taken j)riHoner in tho figFiting H<iid that they got an intimation of an intended attfu;k by the npfieararK^e of firitiHJi warnhifw off the port taking HoundingH. Tlie ofhct^r in eornrnand at Tanga thereupon aaked AN IMANTRY ADVANCE. to fall back and await reinforcements. The main (ittu'k was mad(» on Nov-ember 4. \t failed. Three weeks later (November 23) (Im Secrfitary of State for India issued an account of tlir) fighting which, after noting the events of Noveinlxr 2, r-ontinued : Al 1 1 H.iri. on Ihii 41 li tlii< iittiick wiih ronowc^cl. \\'li('ii witliiii 800 yanin of ( tio poHilion llm t roopH ougiij^cil ciiriK" iiiulcr viTy heavy firr'. On (hn left flank, iVi npili' of tii-avy rtitMiiallifw I hn IOIhI. ({ri'midiiTH actnally cntiMid tlio town null crowHcd l)ayon(>tH willi llio enemy. 'I'lie N'. Lan(:u«hir<i Jle){l. [2n<l Jiatl.Jand Kiixliiuir llifleH on I he riKlit fiUHtir-rl on in HUp|>ort iindor vory heavy fli'o and • I'ionfer .Mail, l).<eriil,.i IH, 1014. 140 THE TIMES HISTORY (W THE IT //.' al«u ruitchtiil tlio tuMii, bul tuuiiii theiii^elvuH oppotitid by titiTb ot tirii from ihtt liuustxi, aii>i were evuntutilly com- pullbil to ftill bock tu cover 6UU yttrdb t'roiu the eiieiny's ponitiuii. Thu lutiHttH wuru bo hetivy and th» position hu btroiig that it wuLii ooiusiiltirt^tl iiielfna to rmitiw the ullutk aiul tht) t'ort'tj r«-uiubark»<i and roturned to itu bnnu to prttpiiro tor future operation^..* The total oaEtualtieu in this uiLsucctibfiful opttration wure 795, including 141 British oftiotirii and nmn. Thu wounilfd are nioKtly doing well, and many are eonvaleecent. Accounts of the engagement from ollicera who took iJOi't in it «how that the fighting was of a desperate character. All round Tangu the groimd ia covered witli dense jungle in which are many closely cultivated plantations, and the advance — Tanga town was a mile and three-quarters from the landing place — had to ♦The statement that Gen. Aitken's force " rotmiicd to its base " was misleading. His force had come direct from India. The facts were more accurately stated in a War Office communique issued on April 24, 1915, in whicli, for the first time ollicially, it was stated that Ucn. Aitkeii was in command and that the force had come from India, This April communt^^, after recounting the fa lure of the attack on Tanga, addetl "The force from India, therefore, re-embarked and proceeded to Momba,sa, and thus became a part of the British forces engaged in the defence of the British East African Protectorate." he made against an invisible enemy on well prepared and concealed positions. And in bush fighting the (iennans showed that they possessed both skill and res(»iirce. Home of the devices employed to delay the British advance wore thus described by a correspondent of The Tirnea : Hopes were hidden under sand and brushwood and itretchi-d acrosM pallia and, when trodden on by our trooj),s, brought down Hags hoisted in the trees. By this means the ranges were accurately marked. The fall of the flags was the signal for a heavy fire from sharjj- ^hooters, and sometimes from machine-guns, which had been hoisti-d into trees farther to the rear. Another device, which woukl almost seem to have been suggeisted by Kipling's tale of how an invading pack of " Red Dogs " was destroyed by the "little people," was resorted to by the enemy with some success. Jlives of wild bees, partially stupefied by smoke, were placed under lids in the busli on each side of narrow tracks, along which our troops must advance, some hours before the attack began. Wires or cords' concealed in the sam(f manner as those attadu'd to the range-finding flags, lifted the lids when touched by the advancing troops, and swarms of infuriated bees, recovered from their temporary stupor, were let loose on the attackers. The failure of the attack at certain points is said to have been due as much to this onslaught of the "little people " as to the German rifles and machine-guns, many men being so horribly stung in t he face or hands as to be'temporarily blinded or rendered incapable of liokhng their weapoiLs. Over 100 stings were extracted from one of tlie men of the Loyal North Jjanea> hires.* Owing to the density of the jungle it had been decided to attack without the aid of the guns, which, however, fired at such targets as could be seen from the deck of a transport moored in the outer harbour. It was not until 3.30 p.m. * Death from bees' stings is not an uncommon occur- rence in East Africa. A safari always gives a wide berth to a hive of .wild bees. TANG4, AND ITS MAIN STREET. I THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 141 tliat the fight became general. Most of the British casualties were caused by machine-gun fire. An officer who took part in the fight wrote home : "Gott strafe the German maxims ; they are the only thing we really disHke." The 101st Grenadiers, one of the five infantry regiments of the Indian Army engaged, the 2nd Batt. N. Lancashire Regt., and the Kashmir Rifles, after they had fought their way into Tanga, did not receive the support which might have enabled them to hold the town. The dense character of the bush had, it was stated, led to a too extended disposal of the troops. Other ca\ises would seem to have contributed to the want of success, for Sir Henry Belfield, in con- gratulating the N. Lancashire Regiment on their " consummate bravery and exemplary disci- pline," added, " You set an example of steadi- ness and pluck to some other units of the force which would appear to have been much in need of it." At nightfall the action was discontinued, the British withdrawing to a camp near the shore. One of the regiments engaged had lost 30 per cent, of its total force. The next day (November 5) the troops re-embarked, un- molested by the enemy, whose losses had been heavy. Their casualties among Europeans alone were estimated at 400. " The brilliant victory at Tanga," said the Kaiser, in a message to Dr. Solf, who held the thankless office of Colonial .Secretary, " ha-s pleased me greatly. I heartily congratulate you upon this glorious deed of our colonial troops. . . . The Fatherland is proud of its sons." As the attack on Tanga had failed, so also did General Stewart's attempt to capture Longido, the position defending the approach to Kilimanjaro from the north. Longido was important not orJy because of its natural strength but a« containing the only permanent water in a largo area. From their base camp in the Magafli region the British had to marcl) l.'j rniles across country without any watfjr. The force was some 1 ,.W0 strong, made up of .%0 of the E.A. Mount^^d Kiflfw, 800 of the 29th PunjabiH, and 400 Imperial Sftrvico troops, with the 27th In'lian Mountain Batt*>ry. After a night march the (iorxwui lirK»s Wf)re aHHaulUni at daybreak on November 4. 'J'lie enemy, fully efjual in nujnb«T U> their Jissailanf h, f/fferwl u Htiihborn resistarKje. The Volnnto'<rH **xhi\>iUitl conspiciJoiiH gallantry, and the I'urt- jabiM U)f)k Hiicr;*>H«ively thrr>e of the enemy's outp<^rf»tft. A <'i')rm/in counter-attack wixh re- ((IiIm'hJ and fxmHifJerable ground gained. Thf> fight (iftntinund till l.'iO f).m., when, owing to BRIG-GENERAL J. M. [F.IIiott & Fry. STEWART, C.B. the lack of water, the British, not having cap- tured the enemy's main position, retired in good order to their base. The story of the attempt was neatly summed up by the officer who wrote, " We marched all night, attacked at dawn, fought all day, and then, having failetl to turn the Germans out, came back here, as wo had no water." Tlu; British casualties were 52, 10 of the E.A. Mounted Rifles being killed The enemy casualties were reported as 38 Europeans and 84 natives. Although they had beaten off tlio attack the Germans a few days later evacuated Longido, which on Novem- ber 17 was occupied by General Stewart's troops. It wius held, however, simply as an outpost in German territory against enemy raids in the directi(Hi of Nairobi, and some months later the British garrison was with- drawn. In conjunction with the attack on Longido uri advance had been made against tint (ieanans in thf) Taveta region ; it also was unsuccessful. Thus endnd the first iiritish offensive against Gernuvn lOast Africa, and no attem))t was raafl<> to renew it until araj)le forces had boon ass(»m- bldfl. I'.iit in the coast region of IJritish East Africa vigorous o[)erationH against the enemy 14'2 Tin: TIMES HlSTOliV OF lllE WAR. wtji-e rwsimititl m Decfiiiber. Aitor tlunr ilofeat tit Uuzi un Octubor 8 tlku l<ermuiu> huil it^tirtKl nuuth, but utill rtitimiiiud iii Mntistt ttn-ritury. The Vaagtt Fi«ltl Force, us it waa cullftl, wan now brought up to a Htrength of l.tMJO, buiug eompoHCtl of King'H Afrit-an Uiflti« and Indian troops, with Ught fitild artilitMy. By Christmas the \tinga Fi«lil Force htid iln\'en tlio t<nt*iny out of Hritish Fast Africa, and with tl»o help of the Navy occupietl the valley of the Uraba river. On January 2, 1015, the Hritish capturetl the CJemxan town of Jtissin, ntar the coast and two miles south of the frontier. Three companies of Indian Infantry, in all about 300 men, under Colonel litigljir Singh, garrisoned Jas.sin. On January 12 the Cennans made a sur[)rise attack on the po.sl. i<e|>ulsed, they collected a larger force -2,000 troops with six field and n\any machine-guns — and renewed the attack on January 18. The Indians met the a.ssailants with tlm utmost resolution, wliile from th»« Hritish canifj on the Umba river, 10 milt^s away, a body of K.A. Rifles were sent to their reli«»f. TIk* African troops failed to get through, but the Indians held out all day and all the night. On the morning of the 10th their anununition being used up and Colonel Ragbir Singh killed, tli»< little garrison was forced to siu'render. Hut one party, con- sisting of 40 Ivashniir Rifles, which had been stationed at the Jtussin sisal factory, though without ammunition, cut its way through tiie Nqon^ MagcuU^ <K.VIROBI agadi. Junction. 'Xitui ,V t / oMutha /.BRIT I S H J 1 >^''/»^ /• L '^ — :v^- - - 7 D e s e r t EAST WASONCALENI 'r^^Tiro Moei ,'V* '^ (l/nara ff/rimilftt ™. AFRICA -^^^'^'''^w luyu I •LolKfssalc^J^g rj,- .-■> NguruVrgani ' ^, ■«>. .v. , . .M' <r. Lossogonoi &' *. - - Plateau tif ^"'fP'^44;'"•^^^-i.«^ ■••^••••■■" ■-■ MOMBAS^ 5 Mkumba^aW^Mlll^^^Iilstal - '9iiwoa^EE^E£7:^^Eht^ O- "|\ft 'J^ombo.Pfltf/ri'fti///- ' "" "'V if""^J==^ Mas ax AFRICA Steppes 1 vf\%. Scale of Miles O 10 20 30 4-0 so 60 70 80 90 100 :d9o.) Railnays-'^ Roaas == - - o Kiniarok ^V*^ V^ ■^'I'^l'^. li^"^' \\ Amani " ^ a. ^^' J^ clMfanaata „^PEMBA l> MAP ILLUSTRATING EARLY OPERATIONS IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAH. 143 enemy lines and reached the camp on the Umba, losing 19 men on the way. The total casualties on the British side were one officer killed, one wounded and four missing, 19 rank and file wounded and 242 missing. The Germans admitted losing 7 officers and 11 men killed, 12 officers and two staff surgeons wounded, 22 men wounded and two missing. river by the Navy was part of the continuous service rendered by the squadron under Vice- Admiral King-Hall to their comrades ashore. In the first half of December, 1914, Dar-es- Salaam was again bombarded. On this occa- sion the old cruiser Fox (4,320 tons) was sup- ported by the Goliath, a battleship of 12,950 tons, completed in 1900, and some auxiliary aTcKX THREADING THE JUNGLE. Three of their maf;hirie-giinH were smashed by the Indian mountain artillery with direct hits at 300 yarfls range. A little incident, re- corded in the Nairobi fmf>er, the East African HUimlftrd, may be quoted aw illuHtrative of the spirit of the native wAd'wm : A rrinri in th'; K.A. Kifl's-t (itt(M-(i>-(l to ii rriiicliiiw^^iin - h«! wao aChrixtinn »ri'l cnllcl h\in:-fi-\i (JtmrlcH Miitth<!W«* - — wa« nnga((';d in the 8tt«Tnpt<rd r«;li«?f of tho pcmt. VVhoii the attack faiUrfl hn t\ur,cj-i:)\f^(\ in hrin(^in(( iho ^^\^u away with him. Amvfl at th'! rtiain r:arrip h<! ti-\>iitU-i{ liiin- M»!lf, Mtat<:fl that h<! htwl hroiighl away tjm K"". "'"' it\><>\i>fii-^i-i\ i>TiiiiiHf\y \iiT having Ml tho trijiod hi'hiinl. As a roHiilt of tho recapture of JaHHin by the GermanH the Vanga Field Force withdrew from tfie (-'rriba river toward-t Mfjinbasn, ntid (Im Gennarw again rjceupifxi Vanga. Tlia aid givfm the land force in the I'inba • I'rohiihly a rolativf of ifi*- rnan of tfi/i Harti'i narnii who Wiv% ori« of lAv\i>myi)tn-'i>. followoFM and aftcrwdrd-i h<-ld n •trfiall pfmt in Oov»Tnnvnf H»rrvicn, small craft. The primary object of the visit was the destruction of Gennan steamers which had taken refuge in the harbour. A lively account of what happened, written by an officer of one of the ships, appeared in tho Morning Post. This narrative shows that the Germans were guilty of deliberate abuse both of the white flag anrl the Red Cross flag : On arrival (writoH thin ollicor) wo Hisiit in (<> parl«y with tho Governor, who namo out. VVo told him what oiir intt-ntion whh, and I tial if any rosiHianco wofo ofti^rctl ih'i town would l)n hoinhardcd. lie Haid that ho would ooinrniinif^ato witli tho oointnandinK ofTioor of lh((ir froop-t, and a^kod iin if w<t di<l hoinhai-d lo Hparo (ho hoMpital and a mixMioiL Mtation, to whioli our p{>o|)lo H^rood. VVhilo fla^^ hoinj,' lioiKtrd on mIioi-o, our hoatH Hiartod, our (,'ofninandor lioin^^ in ohargoi ][<» Hont partioM on hoard Iho Mhips to fliHahlo tlioir onginoH, hlow up a orano on Hhoro, otc, Ihiw hoinK dotio noino ditttanco up. M'-anlirno a lioat from tho oniiHcr wiih (jrod on frotn ironchrm itriniorliiili'ly undor a flagMdilf flying (ho wliil,(! (I.ig. Olio man wa.> killod and Mom« m-ri woinidod, iiImo 144 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W IR. tkii officer Very (ittii^«<i'i>iu>ly. Our siuji^ ii|R<tit!(i tirv at uiioc) i a Bhell or iwu trom um nut firti tti the Uuviriiiikttiit Huubtf. wbiob luadu a tium blaza ; other tirtM broke out in tha town, anil, of courbf, wu bhulleil the points front which llify hrt^d. Our biiata up htirbuur had a livi-ly time. They hitd to run the gauntlet of nearly point-blank range of niachine- gunii, maxinu, and rifle fire. Our CoinnianderV olever- netsti ill seizing two lightera and taking them one on each side of hl» pinnace, undoubtedly aaved her. As it wa.> she waii well {v-pptired. Alti>gether wo (that is our lot )had two office ro and eight men hit,&oine of them several timeo. Of the party sent to disable the shipij, which they did, three officers uiid some men are missing — prisoners, we hope — one being one of our surgeons. The party brought back some 3U or 40 prisoners, one a fat German engineer, slightly wounded in the back by his own side. The GennaiiM are foul fighters. Wo could see them retiring with their guns to the hospital, and they fired rom the mission station as well a.s from beneath the white flag to entrap the boat« coming out. They acknowledged 411 casualties. After this bombardmtnit Dr. Sclun't' found the climate of Dar-es-Salaam unhealthy, and he removed the seat of government to Mrogoro, a pleasant hill-town built in the European bungalow style, and 140 niiles inland on the Central Railway. Eai'ly in January, 1915, cruisers convoyed troops from Mombasa to Mafia, an island of considerable A POINT OF VANTAGE OCCUPIED BY BRITISH NATIVES. GOVERNMENT BUILDINCJ, DAR-ES-SALAAM. size opposite the estuary of the Rufiji. Mafia was oceupietl with slight loss, the German garrison surrendering unconditionally on Janu- ary 12. During that and the following month the Astraea, Hyacinth, and other ships bom- barded several German ports, and on P'eb- ruary 28 a blockade of the whole coast of the German protectorate was declared, the main object being to prevent the smuggling in of amis and ammunition. The Germans adopted many stratagems to get munitions to Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck. In some instances suppUes did get in, as was indirectly admitted when in October, 1915, a communique issued at Nairobi stated that the enemy were " beheved to have completed the re-arming of their native troops with modern smokeless rifles." One of Vice-Admiral King-Hall's most diffi- cult tasks concerned the Konigsberg. She had, it will be remenabered, run hei-self aground in October, 1914, in the Rufiji river, and the stream was too shallow for the ships available to follow and engage her, whilst constant watch had to be kept lest she might get afloat and escape. With the warships on guard the captain exchanged pleasantries by wireless telegraphy. Assured that he would have " a hearty British welcome " if he came out, he rephed that he was " always at home to visitors." Small vessels reconnoitred up the Rufiji ; one of them, the Adjutant, a steamer captvu-ed from the Germans, ran aground in February, 1915, an officer and 23 men being taken prisoners, and its gims removed by the Germans. The Konigsberg had naounted some of her gmis ashore at the mouth of the river, and she concealed herself in a mass of greenery. Eventually the Acbuii'alty sent out two monitors, the Se\'ern and Mersey, which, owing to their shallow draught, were able to ascend the river. With tlio help of aero^ilaties THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 145 to spot the position of the German boat and to direct their shots, the monitors succeeded in setting the Konigsberg on fire (July 11, 1915). The Germans, however, saved their ten 4'1 in. guns, and these and the officers and crew of the ship joined the German land forces. The naval guns Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck distributed in various parts of the protectorate — they were the heaviest ordnance he possessed. Part of the crew were sent aboard the steamers on Lake Tanganyika. In the region of Victoria Nyanza,* and on that lake hostilities began in September, 1914. An inland sea, the nyanza has a breadth of armed steamer, the Mwanza, but the Britisli boats (the Clement Hill, Winifred and Kavi- rondo) were unarmed. Troops and machine guns were put aboard them and they went on their business. The Winifred embarked at I^siunu two squadrons of the E.A. Mounted Rifles and sailed for Karimgu, a British port near the German border. On entering Karunga Bay on September 15 it found the place in the hands of the Germans and the Mwanza in port. The Mwanza opened fire from 17 -pounders and maxims and the Winifred was obliged to retreat. There had been some stiff fighting on shore. Starting from Shirati, a few miles within their own frontier, a German column estimated at AN OX-TRAM HAUI.IN(; A FIELD CJUN IN GF.KMAN HAST AFRICA. 240 miJeH, a length of 250, and its deeply iridr;nt<xJ cofwt line oxc<->edH 2,000 niiJes. It is noted for its Hudden and severe storms, and soon aft^jr the war broke out the British steamer Sybil was wrcckwJ on the German shores of the lake by one of these stonns. The railway from Momba.Ha ren^;hes the nyanza at KiHiirrm in KavironrJa Gulf, an ejistern arm oi the lake, ami the Uganda Railway Marino ha<l several utoamers on the lake. T^io Germans hiul one •It in iuiiim-iil ill A^it-aU. of haki; Vicloriu Nyitiixit. Nyon-.a in » nativn (Karit.ii) w'>r(l for a luko or Inrgo «h*>«t f/f wotor. Cf. th«i Arubio ftahr. 400, iiichjdijig 50 Europeans, occupied Karungu, on September 9, and the next day took the post of Ki.sii. The few officials at those places could offer no opposition. Two Customs House men escaped from Karungu in a canoe. They woki (jicked lip on the 10th by the Clement Hill, which wn.H racing across the whole width of the nyanza with 240 of the K.A. Rifles on board, bound for Kisumu. A few hours later the CIernf»nt Hill rescued two District Commis- sioners who had escaped from Kisii. On reaefiing Kisumu tho steamer took aboani .30 ])u\\v.i\ a (idid hospital and port,erR, and at i4»; 77//.' 77W/';n HlSTDliY OF THE WAIi. 5 a.m. on .^niiijubt'i 11 had lumleil the foix'n at Kuiuiu Hay, no enemy bein^ pnwent to interfere. The column, leiM tlian IIUO .strong all tolil, with 8ix wliite oHiceiii, utarcheil to KiHii, 2S miled away, which wae> reached by 10 a in. on September 12. They attiicked the (JermanH at 11 a.m., ami fought till 7.15, when, Hhort of anununition, they i"otired to Kendu. A study of this time-table shows the wonderful pcjwers of enihuanco of the King's African Itifles and their readiness to imdertake any task requireil of them by their white otticers. In tlirte days [Lafayette. VICE-ADMIRAL KING-HALL. the men had travelled 300 miles by steamer and had marched 28 miles and on the fourth day were in action for over eight hours. As in many similar engagements the fight at Kisii ended in both sides retiring. In scattered fighting in tliick bvish it was frequently difficult to know which side had won. The British, as stated, withdrew to Kendu ; the Gennans fell back to Karungu, leading on the field 10 dead and six woimded Europeans. These and 28 bodies of askari were found the next day when the British returned to Kisii. Four maxims and several thousand rounds of anununition had also been abandoned by the Germans. On the British side Captain E. G. ]\I. Tliorny- uroft was killed. Temp. Lieutenant Charles Grey brother of Viscount (Jrey -severely, and Lieutenant K. L. Mus.son slightly, woundinl. The casualtitts in the native ranks were six killed .mil 11 wounded. Ou the 17th the Winifn-d, reinforced by the Kavirondo, returned to Karungu to find that the German troops, and tlu< Mwan/a, had /led. It was not until .January, 1915, that the en(uny displayed any f ml her activity in the Karungu ihstrict. When news of movements of troops from the Gonnan ports was received l)y the British they took the initiative and captured Shirati on Januaiy 9, with trifUng loss. Tliis port was not retained and in March ( Jennan troops again entered British territory. In an action fought on the 12th of that month betw'jcn iShiiati and Karungu .300 of the enemy under Capttiin Haxthauson, with machine guns, were driven back in disorder well beyond tlio frontier by a body of K.A. Rifles and E.A. Moimted Rifles, commanded by Lieutenant - Colonel Hickson. In the meantime the boats of the Uganda Railway Marine had been properly aiinod and given naval ratings and on ]\larch G the Winifred drove ashore and disabled the Mwanza. British supremacy on the lake was established, though the Germans still possessed some armed dhows. Their command of the lake enabled the Uganda Marine to send a party to the wrecked Sybil, which was re- floated and safely docked. After the recapture of Jassin by the Genmans in January, 1915, thei-e was Uttle change in the situation along the sovithem frontier of British East Africa for nearly a year. Apart from raids on the Uganda Railway, the Germans devoted most of their energies to strengthening their position around Taveta. They fortified a hill called Salaita (El Oldorobo)* and pushed their outposts to Mbuyuni, 17 miles from Taveta, on the road to Voi. Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck was preparing obstacles for the next British offensive. He had presently to deal with a new commander of the British forces, which were at this period further reinforced. On April 29, 1915, it was annoimced that Brigadier-General M. I. Tighe, C.B., D.S.O., Indian Army, had been appointed Major-General to command the troops in East * The first recorded attack on the German position at Salaita wa on March 26, 1915, when the British had 21 casualties besides losing two machine guns through tlio flight of native porters. In July a British r< connaissanoe in consido ablo strength gained valuable information concerning the defences of Salaita. I THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 147 Africa. Brigadier-General Stewart remained in East Africa, and served under General Tighe. The new troops sent to Mombasa included the 2nd Rhodesia Regt. (a volunteer body raised in Southern Rhodesia) and the Legion of Frontiersmen (25th Bn. Royal Fusiliers), among whom served, with the rank of Captain, the veteran hunter-nattu-alist, ilr. F. C. Selous. His intimate knowledge of equatorial Africa enabled Mr. Selous to give invaluable help, and his work as scout was the admiration of the whole force. General Tighes main task was to prepare for the coming offensive. But the situation on the German-Uganda border called for imme- diate attention. The kingdom of Buganda,* the most important part of the Uganda Pro- tectorate, Kes mainly on the north side of Victoria Xyanza, and only a fragment of it was the scene of hostilities. The Baganda, about half of whom, like their Kabaka (king), were Christian, offered to raLse a levy for service outside Uganda. They were asked instead to help in the defence of the southern frontier of the Uganda Protectorate, lying west of Victoria Nyanza. This they did, releasing some of the • Buganda is the correct name of the country popularly known as Uganda. Officially and conveniently Uganda is the name of the whole protectorate, which includes a great deal more than the kingdom of Buganda. The natives of Buganda ca'l them.'^elves Baganda (sing., Miiganda) and their language Luganda. regular troops in the coimtry. Moreover, under the inspiration of Sir Apolo Kagwa, K.C.M.G., the Prime Minister, the Baganda seized a strategic line a little south of the British frontier — that of the Kagera river. On November 20, 1914, the British positions on the Kagera were attacked. The Baganda held their ground at all points save one, where they aban- doned Kyaka Fort, situated on the south bank of the river. From that time onward the Germans exercised continuous pressure on the Uganda border, the natives suffering a great deal from their raids — generally for cattle. General Tighe decided to relieve the situation by destroying the enemy's base. This was the port of Bukoba, on the west shore of Victoria Nyanza, about 25 miles south of the British frontier. Here the Germans had a fort and a wireless installation, and had accumulated war- like stores of all kinds. General Tighe arranged for a simultaneous advance on two sides — one column starting frona the Kagera river, while the main body would come across the lake. Brigadier-Gteneral Stewart was given command of the lake expedition. It was made up of detachments of the Legion of Frontiersmen (under Colonel DriscoU, after whom the Frontiersmen were known as " DriscoU's Tigers ") the Loyal North Lancashires, 29th Punjabis, 3rd K.A. Rifles, Machine Gun Co., and complements of artillery and engineers. IHH IJfiANDA KAH.WAV STHAMI'.KS "CIJiMF, \l HIM." AND " WINIIKF.D" ill Kiwiimii, Victoria Nvan/.a. 148 THt: TIMES IIIS'H)1{Y iw rilH WAR. KrKin hea(li|uarturM at Nairobi it jourimyml hy rail ti) Kibuiiui (237 mihiM), and on Jim« 20 uiabarktHl mi HtttaiaerH of the Uganda Kuilway M<iruu«. I'lui laku paMuagH was una of 240 luiltia, an I to time hia arrival oil" liukoba at the precihe moment when the Kugura ctjliunn could coo[)*>rato was a task of no small difli- oulty for (.Jonmal Sttiwart. The Uganda oolumn had only 30 miles to cover, liut it was a mai'ch tluough enemy territory, and surprise had to be guarded against. Moreover, the country was a mass of swtunps covered with dense vegetation. Nevertheless no liitch occurred, and on June 22 the Uerinans at Bukoba were surprise]d. They offered dotormined resis- tance, the British troops bearing special testi- mony to the bravery of the Arabs in the enemy ranks. During the action the German commandant received reinforcements, which brought his strength up to 400 rifles, but for once in those early engagements the enemy was heavily outnumbered. In the end the Germans wore decisively defeated. The follow- ing description of the engagement was issued from headquarters at Nairobi : The bulk of our forces, including our mountain guna, weio Uiidcd uboiil thiv.. inilub iiurlli <,l Uukcbu ut duuil, tt hoatilt) j)iukol bi'ing hurprised mid dnvcn off. At day l>ii uk I hi. fi(/|it wits opened by tJio «n«niy nmking un ttltuck on our nglit ontre, cloNely suppoiKul by machine-gun tire, which gave u.s conhid..ra|jl« Iroublo in the den^e banana planlalioiw, (ill our gun.-i finally located II and hdnncuj it. All was ivady for a final advance when a drenching raiiustonn. obscuring all view and • lepriving wi of artillery huj)p()rt, held u.s up till 9.15 a.m. About 11 a.m. the enemy atiempicd to withdraw their gun, but a diiucl hit from one of our mountain guns torced them to abandon the attempt, and the gun lay at our mercy on the road south of liukoba, whence we recovered it and brought it aboard our convoy. By an oversight it was not securely liuslied and in the rough weather on the lake slipped overboard into several fathum<^ of water. By 12.30 p.m. our right had made good progress and the enemy commenced to retire, and tho Fusiliers, advancing in quick time over tho open, carried all before them, tho K.A.K. remaining on tho heights to guard our right and rear. The Lancashires entered th > town from the west. The enemy, by now thoroughly d(>moralized, broke and fled in a di.sorganized rabble, and were not seen again. The cnjmy's verified casualties were 16 killed and 29 wounded, but they are in all probability considerably higher. Our lo.sses were much less than the enemy's. Tho British casualties, 10 men killed, 2 officers and 25 men wounded. We destroyed or captured one field gun, two machine guns, 32,000 rounds small arms ammunition, 144 rounds gun ammunition, 40 cases petroleum, 15 cases lubricating oil, one motor launch, three small boats, several stan- dards, including a Mahomedan flag, and a quantity of explosives. As it was not our intention to hold Bukoba, re- BUKOBA: THE GERMAN FLAG HAULED DOWN AT THE COMMANDANT'S HOUSE. On the right is Col. DriscoU ; next is Lieut. Dartnell, who pulled down the flag : and the other officer is Capt. Lock. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 149 embarkation corrunenced at 6 p.m. on June 23, and, except for our covering pickets, was complete by 2 a.m. on the 24th. a bright moon and the entire ab.sence of the enemy faciJitating matters. Owing to the enemy selecting his gun positions at mission stations some damage may have been done to these buildings, but it is believed that no shell touched a mission building. The Moslem standard captured was found not on the field of battle, but in the house of majok.(;eneral sir michael j. TlfJHH, K.C..M.G. the German ConMnandant, and it was of European manufacture. Many valuable docu- ments were also seized by General Stewart, who before leaving Bukoba destroyed the fort and the wiielfi8.s apparatus. For their " signal succetts " General Stewart and his troopH ref;eived the wjngratniation.s of Lord Kitchener. Hoitih time aft^srward.H the German.s re-occupied I^nkoba, and for a con.Hiderable period they refrained from further a<^jtion on the Uganda Iwrder. On the WDHti-ni frontier, where for over .W) rnilf'H tliM l><-lgian Gongo joins Gennari GaHt Africa, there were three sphereH (»f activity: (1) /..ake 'I'anganyika, (2) the plain at the northern end of tlmt lake, and (3) the narrow Htretch of |r>wland by the northern nhf^re of i^oke Kivu. "I'anganyika was chiefly iMefuI to the (ierrnanH aw a rri'-anH o! com rniinication. '/'h»iy could fiardly undertake an invft«i')ri of tin- l'til(/iun Gongo by landing force* on the liel^^inn H\ii>nm ot th" lake, aH great cliff.s rise almost unbroken from (or within a mile or two of) the water's edge, The chief break is in the centre of the lake where the Lukuga, through a narrow valley, carries the overflow of Tanganyika to the River Congo. At the mouth of the Lukuga valley the Belgians had a port also called in 1914 Lukuga, but since known as Albertville. It had been selected as the terminus of a railway which, starting from the navigable waters of the Upper Congo, should give a continuous steamer and rail rovite from the Atlantic to Tanganyika. The railway was under construction when the war began, and was completed in March, 1915. Whether on account of its prospective importance or because it was the enemy port nearest Ujiji, Lukuga was the first spot in Belgian Congo attacked by the Germans. On August 22, 1914, the steamer Hedwig von Wissmann bombarded Lukuga, killing two negroes and wounding two others. At frequent intervals during the next 16 months the Hedwig von Wissmann and its sister ship the I^ingani steamed up and down the western shores of Tanganyika, bombarcUng the various Belgian stations, and occasionally landing raiding parties. They did not always succeed in their efforts. Thus in February, 1915, the Hedwig von Wissmann, while convoying troops to the south end of the lake, was fired at from the Belgian shore, was struck three times and so damaged that it took several weeks to repair. But about the middle of 1915 the Germans laimched at Kigoma the Gotzen, a twin-screw steamer 220 ft. in length, the largest boat placed upon the lake. Tlie British had then no boats on Tanganyika, and the Belgian gunboat A. Delconmnme had been disabled at the beginning of hostilities. In the closing days of 1915 the situation was altered by the arrival of two British anned motor-launches, which had been brought overland across Central Africa by bluejackets. As set forth in (Chapter CLIll., the British boats, with Molgian liolp, speedily captured the Kingani anrl sank the Hedwig von Wiss- mann. G(»nnan supremacy on Tanganyika was at an end. The Gotzen, however, by keeping mainly in harbour at Kigoinii, escaped dftsLruc- tion until August, 19l(i. fossession of tJm plain iioitli of Tanganyika (once a part of the lake) wjuh stoutly contested. Frontier fiosts were l)Mil(, on eithfir side of the Husi/.i, which, traversing the plain, enters 150 THE TIMES lllSTOllY oE THE WAR. TROPHIES FROM BUKOBA. German Hags used as decorations for the railway coaches. the lake. Tlu> most notable ongagement was fought on September 29, 1913. Beaten in previous attacks on the Belgian post of Luvungi, the Germans on that occasion brought against it a large force provided with ti(>ld artillery and machine-gims. The action was of a most obstinate character and lasted fourteen hours. It appearetl to be indecisive, but under co\er of night the Gennans retreated, leaving behind 68 dead, two of whom were Gennan officers, besides a large quantity of munitions and stores. After this the Belgians established themselves firmly on the German side of the frontier. In the Kivu sector no question of naval power was involved, for there were no aniied vessels on Kivu, immediately north of which rise the 3Ifiuubiro mountains. '" There is a very narrow stretch of lowland along the north side of the lake, and here passes a road which on the Gennan side gives access to the rich region of Ruanda. The Belgian frontier post, Ngoma, and the German frontier post, Kissenji, are bmlt on this road, being only two miles apart. Both posts are domi- nated by moiuitains over 8,000 ft. high."' * Kissenji had been made by the Gennans their chief base in the district between Tan- ganyika and Victoria Nyanza. A niilt> or two from the govermnent post they had a strong fort, just completed when the war broke out. At the end of August, 1914, the ♦ Geographical Journal, Apiil, 1916. garrison of Kissenji captur(>d Ngoma. From tliat date until the month of May following there was a bitter struggle on the narrow strip of land by the lake side. (Fighting in the mountains was out of the question ; the great cones are volcanic, generally in a state of semi- erujjtion, and between them extends a vast and scarcely traversable lava field.) The Belgians towards the end of 1914 recaptured Ngoma and took the post of Ki.s.senji, but not the fort. Early in 1915 the Germans, reinforced, drove back the Belgians, but in a later engagement were thenxselves once more compelled to seek the shelter of their fort. The conimander of the Belgian troops at Ngoma determined to reduce tlie fort. This officer was Lieutenant Puck-Chaudoir, a man already with a record. An ex -soldier and African traveller, he had served in the opening weeks of the war in the civil guard of Liege, and afterwards in the Belgian cavalry, where he earned both the Cross of the Order of Leopold and the Legion of Honour. His knowledge of Africa had led to his being .sent to the Congo. In May, 1915, he made a surprise attack on Kissenji fort, took it by storm, and completely destroyed its works. The Belgians continued to harass the enemy in tliis i-egion, keeping open the door through which their ad\jwice in force was made in 191 6. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, whose frontiers between lakes Nvasji and 'I'anuan- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 151 yika adjoined Gennan East Africa, were exposed to a comuaon danger in August, 1914. Neither country was prepared for war and defence measures had to be improvised. Xyasaland was fortunate in possessing in. Sir George Smith a governor of marked ability, a man in whom the whole community had con- fidence. He acted with energy and prompti- tude, and one source of danger to the pro- tectorate was disposed of at the outset. The protectorate owned a '" fleet " and used it. Its " battleship " was the twin-screw steel gunboat Guendolen of 350 tons, which mounted four 6-pounders and four machine guns, had a length of 136 feet and coukl steam ITG knots. The boat was named in compliment to Lord Salisbury, who had made Xj^asaland a British protectorate, after his daughter Lady Guen- dolen Cecil. It was sent out to Africa in sections and was launched in December, 1898. The rest of the Xyasa " fleet " con- sisted of the Pioneer and Adventure, 35-ton gunboats built in 1892. On August 8 — four days after war was declared — the Guendolen (Commander E. L. Rhoades) started to search for the Hermann von WLssmann, a boat of about her own size and armament, and the only German steamer on the lake. Sphinxhaven, where, correctly as it proved, it was reported that the Hermann von Wissmann was imder- going repairs, was reconnoitred. Sphinx- haven is a snug little natural port, and very unobtrusive ; it was not marked on the Ger- man maps, though they labelled a neighbouring islet New Heligoland. On August 13 Com- mander Rhoades found the German boat on the stocks at Sphinxhaven, and captured the crew. He could not refloat the Hermann von Wissmann, so he removed her armament and the important part of her engines and sailed away. * With no fear of interference from the enemy the troops in Nyasaland were brovight by boat from Fort Johnston, at the southern end of the lake, and by August 22 the field force had concentrated at Karonga at the north- west end of the lake, and 18 miles from the German frontier. An enemy patrol had crossed the Song^ve (the river which formed the frontier north of Nyasa) two days before, and the Germans quickly established themselves within British territory. Capt. C. W. Barton, * When reports came to hand that the Germans were repairing their boat another visit was paid to Sphinx- haven (May, 1915) by the British. On that occasion the Hermann von Wissmann was completely disabled. AT JUJKOHA IKOOI'S A I KI.SI Al TI'.K Till': FI(;HT 152 TUK TIMF.S lllSTDltY OF 'I III': \VAI{. o o a: O OS O z < < Z z z o Q W On Pd > z X D.S.O., NorHuiinptoriHJurfj Hegt., was in commaiid of thu HritiHli foroo. It wtw of vtuy MUiulI duiMJiiHiouH puit of Llio iHt Hutt. King'H Afri(!uu iliflea, uomu roBorviwtH of tliH same gallant tiorps, and European volimteoi-s. 'I'horK wjis no (pieHtion of com- |)ulsion in the protectorate. The Nyatialand N'oliinteer Reserve reprewented practically the whole of the fJritish of military age in the country. As the total vvliito population in tlu) Protectorate, ni<tn, women luid childntn, barely exceedtfd 800, tho numerical luilp that tlie planters could give was not groat. A first contingent of 56 men reached Karonga at (h(3 beginning of September. Nyasaland is reckoned a »mall territory, though it is five tinies the size of Wales, but it runs to length, and throe -fourtlis of the Europeans live in tho Sliiro Highlands, a region south of the lake, so that the Volunteers had a journey of nearly 400 miles before they reached headquarters. Strengthened by the presence of the Volun- teers, Capt. Barton resolved to attack Kapora, an outpost of the enemy some twelve miles noi'th-west of Karonga. Leaving a garrison of 10 Europeans and 50 natives at Karonga under Lieut. P. D. Bishop, Capt. Barton began his advance on September 8. Early (7 a.m.) the next morning an enemy company was met. A double company of the K.A.R. crossed a river (the Lufira) to attack, but the enemy retired. Shortly afterwards (8 a.m.) the sound of gunfire from the direction of Karonga created alarm, for the small force at that place (where there were three white women — two nurses and the doctor's wife) could not be expected to hold out long. A singular situation had arisen. Both sides had taken the offensive simultaneously, and while Capt. Barton was marcliing north, a German force imder Baron von Longenaer was marcliing south, close to the lake shore, to attack Kai'onga. The German main column — 400 strong, with two light fieid pieces and thi-ee maxims — had passed east of Capt. Barton's colmnn during the night %v'ithout being detected. The rest of the tangled story is best told m the words of the official despatch. The narrative is taken up at the point where Capt. Barton became aware that Karonga was in danger. A double company with 1 maxim, under Capt, A. H. Grififiths, 1st K.A.R., wa^- ordered to >narch wth tho utmost speed to relieve Karonga. The ivmainder of the force w-ith the transport, as soon ivs the ilouble eompanj' from the" north bank of the Lufira Imd rejoined. foUiAved towards Karonga. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 153 The enemy had stacked Karonga at about 7 a.m., and a continuous fire was kept up from 400 yards range against the post by about 350 rifle.s and three maxims ; a few shel s were also fired by two field gun ; (1'4-inch). Capt. GrifStlj< arrived on the scene at about 11 a.m., completely surprising the 'enemy, whom he put to flight, capturing two maxim guns. In the m 'antime, our main body, hampered by trans- port, was slowly returning towards Karonga ; at about 11 a.m. it met half a company of the enemy, which was quickly routed. At about 1 p.m., when crossing the Kasoa Stream, the force came into contact with the enemy, who had re-formed during the retirement from Karonga. After a sharp action of two hours' duration the enemy was completely defeated and retired in disorder towards the (Jennan border, losing two field guns, a quantity of small arms, ammunition and stores. Baron Longenaor was reportod to have died during the retreat. Among the British wounded was Capt. Barton, and the command of the Field Force was taken over by Capt. H. W. Stevens. As the Germans could without diffi- culty reinforce their troops on the Nyasa fron- tier and as there was no immediate hope of reinforcements on the British side, Capt. Stevens did not pvirsue the routed enemy ; he decided to put Karonga in a state of defence. The Germans did not renew their attack and with the advent of the rainy season at the end of THE NAVAL EXPEDITION TO LAKE TANGANYIKA. Cierman prisoners from the sunken " Hedwig von Wissmann." Th«* nruimy hfiving \>»-*-t> f:omplct<rly KCttttcrcd, our force wan again conr^-ntrat'-d ul Karonga. I/i thifl brilliant affair, whioh 9ave<l Nyasaland from invawion, thf) cuHuultirjH wen; Iwavy. The BritJHh UjwutH w*5T«-, amoufi, Kxirfrp*:tuM, 3 olTiccrrH kili';d and 3 wounded, '» VoUiiiUn'.rH kill<»d or died of woiifids, 4 othon* wound(;d and one tfiinMirt(^. In th*^ nativ«; ronkH 8 m*»n were killed and 42 wouride<J. 'Vin- <Tne//iy loft on the field 58 dead, f/f whom 7 w* ni 0>rrnttnH, and 72 wounded or unwounded Wfrre ma^ie priHonorH, of whom .'{ wero <U^nnnn oflicorn — J 30 n\U>- K"th'T. A^K<lJf 40 other wounded, i/ir;hifiirij/ the C'trnxnandHrit, tli») 'iiwny took uwuy NovomlKir the roj^ion of the Songwo Valley herame imyinvctieal)]*) for operations. VV'lint tho rainy .4««uson means in a " wot " area of tropif^al Africa may ix) judged by \\w fall in the Songwe diHtrict — nejirly 150 inchoH btttwoc^n th«' end of Novombt^r and the early part of May. Ila[)pily, Karonga was nr)t in the " wet " area — in the H^ime [)eriod itH rainfall wtw< only 30 inch<tH ^and tluH fJi(f<iren<.<- ^n-atly fnvoun>d the Britinh troo[m in the matter of health as com- panxl with those of the, enemy. In I)e<M!mlx»r, l!»ll, Lieut.-Col, G. M. T. Hawthorn arrived in NyaHaland and took over tlu« eommund on the 2(M/h of that month. He 154 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. came from British Kast Africa, wlmrti it will b«« rt-membfitj'.i lie tiad l)eeu WDUndntl in tlm early fighting near Gazi. On January 23, 1U15, u revolt of natives occiu-recl in the Shir6 High- iantld. It was quickly suppressed, tlit- loader bfing killed in action on February 3. A double ciiniptvny of K.A. Rifles, under Capt. H. G. Collins — which marched 80 miles in 47 hours — was sent from Kaionga to restore onler, but the rebel force hail meaittime been deftiated by 4U l^ritish V^olimteers and 100 K.A.H. ivcruits, under Capt Ij. E. Triscott. The revolt (wrote a correspondent) was engineered by one John Cheleinbwe, a negro, who, after beinp; trained as a teacher by the American Baptist Mi:s.-iion, was sent to the United .States anil there took a Univ(U"sity course. On Ilia return lio built a church and preached "Ethi- opianiHin " (roughly, Africa for the negro). His followers, who numbered about 500, were chitfly Aiiguru, recent immigrants from Portuguese territory. In the evening of January 23 they attacked Magomere, the property of the A. L. Bruce Estates, Magomere having been bought by Mr. Livingstone Bruce, grandson of David Livingstone. In the houses attacked were Mr. and Mrs. Livingstone, Mr. and Mrs. Robertson, Mr. Fergus- son, Mrs. MacDonald, and five children. Mr. Livingstone was killed by a blow from an axe and decapitated in tho prosence of his wife. Mr. Fergusson and Mr. liobortson were also killed, and the women and children carried off. Helped by her native servant, Mrs. MacDonald, however. escaped in her nightdrebs and barefijoti d, and ran llirougli the jungle to anotht^r planter's house and gave the alarm. The rebels took Mr. Livingstone's lieail In John Cht-lendiwo's church — which was strongly biull and intended to be used an a citadel — and (.'hel4-nd)we preached a sermon with thtt head stuck on (iio jjulpil. Forty-eight hours aftei-wards the women and chilili'en carried nil had been rt^scuetl. Later Chi'lembwe's church was blown lip. About 20 rebels were hanged and 400 imprisoned. Owing to the prompt sii[)pression of the revolt the military situation was not affected. hi June, 1915, tho GernrjanK strengthened tluur forces en tho Nyasa border, and from that time onward there wore many skirmishes but no serious fighting. The enemy's tmergies were at that period bi'iit chiefly against the Khodesian sector of the frontier. In September, 1915, the danger to whicU Nyasaland had been exposed owing to tho paucity of its defence force was removed by the arrival at Karonga of the Imperial Service Contingent (1,000 strong) raised in the Union of South Africa. These troops reached Nyasaland via Durban and the Zambesi, a toilsome route (1,(>00 miles) involving ocean, river and railway transit, as well as a march of 130 miles on foot, before reaching THE NAVAL EXPEDITION TO LAKE TANGANYIKA. Some ot the officers and men in the bush, with their motor transport. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 155 SOUTH AFRICANS BRINGING A GUN INTO ACTION. Lake Nyasa. Yet it was the quickest means of conveyance. Within a week of their arrival at the front the South Africans were in action. When the war began Northern Rhodesia was in almost as defenceless a condition as Xyasa- land. The native police, commanded first by Major Stennett and later by Col. Hodson, were the only trained force in the territory, and their numbers were few. A volunteer corps, the Northern Rhodesian Rifl«iH, was formed by the settlers, but, as the total white population of Northern Rhodenia, a region six times the size of England, was barely .'{,000, this corps was also nec<*SHarily small.* Its coinmander waH Major Boyd (Junninghame, a noted big- game hunt?r, a^Iministrator anrl transport exp<.Tt. This last qualification was invaluable;, as the nearest railway was 400 miles away. Three or four hundred Hriti'di lived near the b<^rder of CeiTnan East Africa, in the high land b<!tween Nyasa and Tanganyika. Fairly good roa^Js connect thow' lakes. The ({ennan road ran from liismarckburg, on the south-east • Northum Khodtwin f«;r'l<r<<l on lh<; norlh-wfnt \h)i Hirift ')! 0<rrrri«fi H'»iitfi-W<Mt Africu wliu.li Hln^irUiil i-unt to th" Xnrnittm nnd w»w known an ttm Ciiprivi Finj^nr. A*i .Vorthiim Khodmia ijn<l«<rtook (and k«'pt itn undiir- »»kinj() fo oc/nipy ttiJM Htrip of (iirrnnn lurritory, Hh forro AVAilaM's for tho Kii«J Afridn fronlKT wiim Ihiix wt-nkniuul. shores of Tanganyika, and kept close to the frontier till it reached the northern shore of Nyasa. The British road — called after its projector and first builder, the Stevenson road — starts from Karonga, on Nyasa, and passes through Fort Hill, Fife and Abercorn, and ends at Kituta, the Rhodesian port on Tanganyika. At all these places were police pos«^s, and at them lived a few whites, while others dwelt on neighbouring farms and cattle runs. In view of their defenceless position, the settlers and missionaries were ordered, at a day's notice, to remove their wives, families and cattle 200 miles from the frontier, and the available police and volunteers manned the British posts against attack. Almost from t ho first the Rhodesians harl the help of the Belgian (native) troops on the Congo side of their frontier. In all, (o guard a frontier of 1 .'50 milc!s long, the Ithodesian- Belgian forces mny have t(/tallcd .'{,000. Coneral Fdwards, commanding the; Rhodesian forces, had control of the opi^rations. The princijjal Belgian officers were Major Olsen and Major do Kf)nniek. Early in September, 1914, the Hedwig von Wissmann and tlu; Kingani sailed from Bis- marckburg and after bomburdinu Kituta landed parti«;s, which df)fea(,«'fl tlu? small gajrison (commanded by a Brlgian oflieer) and looted 156 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. RHODESIAN POLICE CROSSING A RIVER BY A NATIVE BRIDGE. the place. Next day a British column arrived, but the Germans had gone, taking with them £30,000 worth of goods. On September 5 Abercorn, which is 10 miles from Kituta, was attacked. It was held by Mr. Bisset, the post- master, and 40 police. Mr. Bisset worked a machine-gun with excellent effect ; during the fight reinforcements, 130 strong, arrived, and the Germans were beaten off. The severe de- feat sxiffered by the enemy at Karonga on Sep- tember 9 checked their activity on the Rhodesian frontier also, and during the ensuing rainy season only minor operations covild be under- taken, the chief event being the repulse of another attack on Abercorn (March, 1915). This gave the British and Belgians the oppor- tvmity of bringing up reinforcements. What the difficulties of transport were may be seen by following the fortunes of one column — a column wliich later on greatly distinguished itself. On December 5, 1914, Major J. J. O'Sulle- van, in command of the 2nd Mobile Column of the Northern Rhodesian Police, then stationed in the Caprivi Finger, was ordered to the Tanganyika front. The first stage of the journey was to the town of Livingstone on the Zambesi, just above tiie Victoria Falls This was a 90-mile stage. Major O'Sullevan himself covered it in exactly 24 hours, 60 miles in a dug-out on the Zambesi and 30 miles on foot — all in blinding rain. But the colunm, which had difficulties with its wagon transport, took 11 days on the journey. F'rom Livingstone the column went by train to Sakania in Belgian Congo — a distance of 508 miles. Thence to Abercorn was a 430 miles' walk, done without a single officer or man falling out. (En route one of tlie officei-s shot an elephant.) This march, said Major O'Sullevan, was accomplished in hea\-y rains ; swamps had to be corduroyed, and several bridges had to be erected daily to got the mules over the swollen rivers. The 43(1 miles was done in 20 days, averaging about 21 miles per day. It was a fine record, and the column fought even better than it marched. It was sent by Col. Hodson to Saisi, a farm near a full of the same name, tlirough which, a few hundred yards from the German frontier, the Stevenson Road passed. Here, 30 miles from Abercorn, Major O'Sullevan, whose command included Belgian troops, built a fort, cutting down the long grass ( 10- 12ft. high), trees and other cover. Early in June, 1915, the Saisi force n\ided and burnt an ent>uiy camp, capturing a large convoy of supplies (includhig "some excellent wine ") THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 157 and a number of native levies. Saisi, in short, became an annoyance to the Gei-mans, who determined to capture it. Their first attempt was made on June 26 with a force of some 70 Europeans and 400 natives, with three maxims. Just after daybreak the enemy tried to surround the position, and the fight lasted all day. Com- pletely foiled, the enemy retreated to Lake Tanganjoka, leaving their dead (including 10 Europeans) on the ground. While bvu-ying them the British noticed newly dug " graves " on the German side. They were opened and found to contain ammunition biiried by the enemy in convenient spots for future use. South-east of Saisi the Germans made repeated attacks in the direction of Fife. They received a check in May, when Lieut. Bremner, with 50 [r.niolt & Fry. MAJOK J J. O'SULLEVAN, D.S.O. Northern Rhodesian Jiiflos and 2'> police, cap- tured a stockade in a brilliant little action. The Htocka^Je con.siHtefl of a double row of logH, 10 ft. high, surrounded by a trench staked at the bottom and sides by sharpened [x-gs a couple (jf fe^jt long. Lieut Irvine was tnfjrfaJly wounded in lea«'Jing the attack on the stockacio gate. Few of the *;neray escaf>*!fj, anrl the 32 survivors wore TOtulf; prisoners. In the following month Major Boyd fJunningharno had a very brisk engage- ment with the enemy, who alinoMf rushed the camp at Fiff. In July, HH.'j, the '^ierrnuns made a deter- mined aft^-mpt to oeeiif)y north -e<istern Jiho- <le«ia. '/'heir inain attfu;k was again directeri against Saisi. Mut f he Mritish intelligence staff was well informed, and for three w*;eks before the dfjTjnnun atffwked the native troops and .^H; c.nrritjm ha^l Uien busy strnngth*ir)ing their <U-1'-iK'AiH. At 7 (i.rn. on .Inly 21 tlifi otK-my [Br courle<iv of the African Socielv. EMPLACEMENT OF GERMAN GUN FROM THE KONIGSBERG. surrounded Saisi. Their force, strong in Euro- peans, was estimated at 2,000 and they had 12-pounder guns and ten machine guns. Against them were 20 British and Belgian officers and men and 450 Belgian and British native soldiers, a 7-pounder, a 4-pounder, and two maxims. The enemy had trenched close up to the water supplies, and the only means the besieged had of getting water was by stealing down to the rivers at night and bringing water back in bottles. On some nights they failed in their quest ; " so we remained thirsty till the next night." In such conditions, against odds of four to one, the defenders beat off the Germans. Firinp coiitiinied day and iiiglit for four days, said Major O'Sullevan, and all our mules and oxen, besides the bhoop and goats, upon which we depended for food, were killed by shrapnel. On the fifth day the German officer in command sent in u parlerncntaire with a note asking mo to surrender. He stated that ha had captured a large convoy of supplies, and had also beaten back our relief forces, that ho knew wo had no water, and so on. I replie<l that under no conditions whatever would wo surrender. . . . That night they attacked in force by t he light of a fairly bright moon, and came on braviOy , but they could not get actually to our trenches. 'L'lie / III,- \ In, nil • iNii':i<ioi< ()i nil', (;i;n EMI'LACI'.MI'-NT. 15« THE TIMES HlSTOnV OF THE WAR. INDIANS REPAIRING THE UGANDA RAILWAY. littacking force were about 1,500, a large majority being European-s, but though wo hoard them encouraging tlio Arabs and native troops to charge they could not get them to do so. The attack lasted an hour and a half. Various ru<:ps were adopted. They blew the Belgian "Cease Fire," and ours aLso. Firing ceased for a few minutes on our side, but was resumed, and we afterwards ceased bugle calls. . . . Fighting went on until August 3, when the enemy had eaten up all his supplies and all ours. He then retired to Lake Tanganyika, embarked for Ujiji and also marched off by road to Bisraarckburg and Neu Langenburg. We were too done up to go after them, and were relieved by a battalion of Belgian troops after a few days.* For the gallant defence of Saisi Major O'Sullevan received the D.S.O. The casualties in his command in the period June-August were about 80 ; the Germans who attacked him suffered much more ssA-erely. They lost (50 dead in Europeans alone. Early in Sep- tember Count Falkenstein again concen- trated a force near Saisi, but it was dispersed by the Belgians. There was no other con- siderable engagement on the Rhodesian fron- tier in 1915. Before the year ended the British forces had been increased and the Belgian soldiers were released for service on their own front. The troops in Nyasaland and Rhodesia then came imder one command, that of Brig.-Gen. E. Northey, A.D.C. While keeping the enemy employed Gen. Northey elaborated plans for an invasion of German territory at the beginning of the dry season of 1916. • Journal of the Afriran Society, April, 1916. On the British East Africa side a condition resembling stalemate was created in the closing months of 1915. Col. von Lettow-Vorbock still maintained an offensive, but at every point he was met and checked. The German com- mander was well aware that Gen. Tighe was engaged on the task of organization, concentra- tion and preparation for offensive measures, and he endeavoured to disarrange the British plans by renewed attacks on the lines of com- munication. Gen. Tighe's foresight and energy were conspicuous, notably in overcoming the difficulties presented by the waterless desert be- tween Voi, on the Uganda Railway, and Taveta. With Taveta still in German hands Gen. Tighe pressed forward the building of a railway towards it and took it to Maktau, within a few miles of the enemy outposts. A water pipe was laid down from the Bvu-a Hills (near Voi) which provided the force at Maktau with 40,000 gallons daily, about half the supply needed, and the balance was made good by railway and storage tanks. This work was carried out by Lieut. -Col. C. B. Collins, R.E., and his staff. The persistent efforts of the enemy to blow up the Voi -Maktau and Uganda railways were uniformly futile. They maintamed an advanced garrison of 500 to 600 rifles whose duty it wivs to send out parties with dynamite bomlw to blow up the railways. Favoured by the tU>use bush small pai'ties succeeded now and again THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 159 m reaching the Uganda railway undetected, and between April and November, 1915, trivial damage was done to the line on some 10 or 12 occasions. Thrice trains were derailed, but in each instance there were no casualties. Once at least the raiders were hoist with their own petard. A bomb exploded prematurely, fragments of the bodies of a German officer and two native soldiers being found near the line. Apart from efforts directed against the railways the Gtermans continued to maintain themselves in force on the Umba River ; they still held Vanga and patrolled the coast region thence to the neighbourhood of Gazi. As General Smuts said. General Tlghe " had to be constantly on the watch for the next move of his active and enterprising foe " ; his troops were in touch with the enemy at many points along the 600 miles of land frontier he had to guard. The result was many small actions and no big engagement. In places where the condition of the roads permitted their use the British employed motor cars for reconnoitring purposes. On one such occasion when a general officer was in the car, the covering party of 15 BaluchLs suddenly encountered a Cierman patrol 100 strong. " We mvLst attack to let the Sahib get away," cried the Subadar (Ghulam Hardar) and the 15 Baluchis charged the enemy. The Subadar, mortally wounded, died the next day. In the middle of September, when a German patro^ was ambushed near Maktau, the patrol, 60 strong, ran into a trap .sot for them by a party of E.A- Mount*jd Kifles and Baluchis. Charged with the bayonet the enemy fled, leaving :J2 dead on thie ground, one a European. iJeut. Wilflraan, of the Baluchis, who led the charge, was killed, the total British BRIGADIER-GENRRAL E. [Elliott &■ Fry. NORTHEY. casualties being 4 killed and 11 wounded. With affairs hke this 1915 ended and 1916 began. In a skirmish on January 6 in the New Year, Wavell, of " \Vavell's Arabs," was killed. He had recovered from his wound received at Gazi in September, 1914, and had been promoted to the rank of Major. His death was a loss to Oriental learning and to geography, as well as to the Amiy. As soon as CJeneral Botha had completed the conquest of South- We.st Africa — July, 1915 — suggestions wore made that the Union should send troops to East Africa. Recruits for East Africa were enrolled at Cape Town in September, and in November the Union Government (.hUMAN IKOOI'S AI IJAK-lvS-SAI-A AM. loo THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE NAVAL SUCCESS Native stretcher bearers imdertook to raise a brigade. The response to Gen. Smuts's appeal for volunteers was so satisfactory, and so many of the men who came forward were trained soldiers, that the 2nd S.A. Infantry Brigade was formed before the year was out, and early in February it reached Mombasa. A month later the 3rd S.A. Brigade had disembarked. Gen. Tighe had already formed the infantry of his original command into two divisions, the 1st E.A. Division, under Gen. Stewart, and the 2nd E.A. Division, under Brig.-Gen. Malleson. Gen. Stewart's division was posted on the Longido side of Kilimanjaro ; Gen. Malleson's at Maktau. The long period of preparation had come to an end, and all was ready for an immediate attack on the Kilmianjaro position. In view ON LAKE TANCJANYIKA. waiting for German wounded. of th(^ magnitude^ of the forthcoming operations, and the part South African troops were to play in it, the command was offered to Gen. Smuts. Owing to the political situation at the Cape he felt himself obliged to decline the offer. Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was then appointed to the command, but while in South Africa on his way to Mombasa ill-health compelled Sir Horace to resign the post. Again appealed to. Gen. Smuts accepted the post, assuming command on February 12. He received, for the first time, a commission in the British Army, being given the rank of Lieut.-General. Gen. Smuts reached Mombasa on February 19, and on March 5 began his forward movement. Henceforth the theatre of war was transferred to German territory. NAIROBI : THE MAIN STREET. CHAPTER CLVI. THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1 916: LAST PHASE. Extent of the Russian Advance June -August, 1916 — The Austro -German Commands — Co>IPLETION OF the GeR>IAN CONTROL ^XeW DISTRIBUTION ANALYSED LlftHTED POSSIBILITIES OF THE Offensive — Count Bothmer's Retreat — Bzhezhany — Russian Offensive on the Zlota LrPA — ^Fighting in August and September Described — The Intervention of Rumania. THREE stages can be distinguished in the great Russian offensive of the summer of 1916. It began on June 4, with the piercing of the Austrian lines in the district of Lutsk and in the Bukovina. The following month saw these tactical achieve- ments developed into strategical victories. Two Austro-Hungarian armies, one in Volhynia and the other south of the Dni<?ster, were involve^! in irretrievable disast'-r, and the parts of the front held by thern caved in. This was the first pliawi of the offensive and an account of it was given in Chapter CXXXV'II. The second phas*;, which formed the subject of Chapter CXLIII, was inainly concerned with the fate of the other throfj Austrian armies holding the line l>etween the Pripet Marches and Riiinaniu, and of their fronts, as yet practically intact. Was an a[i|jroxiiriateJy straight line to bi- regainefJ by the flattening out of the HuHsijin Hali<;ntH or by a completion of the KusHiiui advnnct: ? By the middle of August, on l,ii<- troops (d Count Bothmer evficunting the last remaining wctors of t\v original front, this fjueMtion wii^ d»Tfinite|y solved in favour of our Allies. 'I'he r/iain probl»:rn r»f th*- third and conrJudinK ptiiuMH (li the Hurnrn'T r/ffensive, wliieli is th»- Kubjefrt of this chaf>ter, was whether i( wtn fK^sihle U> make any further advance nt this Vol. X. I 'art 122 |r;i time in the Podolian centre — i.e., between the Lvoff-Krasne-Tarnopol railway in the north and the Dniester in the south. The answer proved on the whole negative. Although considerable tactical successes were gainetl towards the end f)f August and in September, no stiatogic advance was achievetl, whilst meantime the centre of the fighting on the Eastern front gradually shifted to the Rumanian theatre. The moving battle on the Russian fi-ont in 1916 is thus practically encloscui in the two first phases of the offensive. The map given on page 16:{ illustrates the results as shown in gains of territory and in the captiu-e of mcii and material. Tli) figures there shown covei- exclusively the ten weeks of advance fiom June 4 to August 12 and nre given .s(!paratt'ly for r-ach of the four annies which had begun the offensive south of the Marsh(5S ; th(» Arniy of (;l(5neral Lr-sli, which did not come into jietion within that theatre until the beginning of .July (Old then eiuried out the advance from the Lowei Styr to the St,okhod, is iruiluded in l,hn|. of <Jr-nenil Kaledin within whose urea it. operal<ed. The victories of (ji>neral Briisilorf's Armies, best illuHtruted by the ca|)tun< of 7,707 olTieers and :W),M^> men, of AO^t guns anrl I.:J26 machine-guns, left little of the Austro- lliiiit'diiiin armies which had held the front in Hie first days of June. Still lens was Nifl. of their lG-2 77//-; TIMI':S HISTORY OF THK WAU. C/2 O z o H < a: < leaders — the Gemians naw to that. Once more tlie oiitiro luanagemont of th<» Eastern Front passed into their hands, but whilst in the winter of 1914-15 and during the following suimner campaign they lind supplied merely a "stiffen- ing " to the Austrian anuios, disorganised by the defeats of the first Llaliciun campaign, they had now \o provide very largo reinforcements to fiU the gaps in the depleted ranks of their ally. Some of the changes in the superior Austro- Germjxn conunaiids were mentioned at the end of Chapter CXLlll. On August 2 the entire Eastern Front liad been put under Field- Mai-shal von Hindenburg. A few days later, as the result of urgant entreaties from Vienna and Techin — the Headquarters of the Austro- Himgarian General Staff — a nominal command was conceded to the Austrian Heir-Apparent in the southern area, between the Lvoff- Tarnopol railway and the Rumanian frontier. Tlie intervention of Rumania in the War caused a new change to be made in the delimita- tion of the two areas. The remaining part of the line in the Galician plains was transferred to the northern command, whilst the entire range of the Carpatliians, from the foothills on the Bystritsa, south of Stanislavof?, to the Iron Gates of Orsova on the Danube, was comprised under the southern command. In other words, the Eastern Front now fell into two clearly marked divisions widely different in topo- graphical structure, the one extending over morfc than 600 miles from the Gulf of Riga, across the plains of Lithuania, ^^'lute Russia, the Poliesie, Volhynia, Gahcian Podolia and the valley of the Dniester ; the other, about 400 miles long, in the Transylvanian arc of the Carpathian Mountains. For .simplicity's sake they may be distinguished as the Russian and the Rmnanian front. This, of course, is not meant to imply a clear-cut national distinction on the side of our Allies. The northern sector of the Carpathians arc is inhabited by Little Russians, and Russian armies soon reinforced tho Rumanians, e\'en on the whole extent of the Transylvanian frontier. Yet the division between the two ai-eas was based on the most primitive facts of strategy and topo- graphy and it made itself felt on the side of our Allies as much as on that of the enemy. About September the Army of General Lechitsky, which had conquered Czernovitz, Kolomea and Stanislavoff, pjissed definitely into the (."ar- ♦ THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 163 MAP SHOW ING EXTENT OF THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE, JUNE 4.AUGUST 12, 1916, AND NUMBER OF PRISONERS CAPTURED. pathian area and gradually extended its lines to the Moldavian front, whilst the Army of General Shcherbacheff, which operated in Podolia, took over the Dniester region. Thus at the conclusion of the shufflings of 1016 on the enemy side the entire Galioian frofit had Ijeen joinerl under one command with the (if.nnan lines north of the Marshes. Yfjt it is clear that on a frf>nt of more than 6^)0 rnil^rH the pfsrson of the eliief commander in the field is of minf>r importance. The main, crjrnmon V^usinesH of armifw extended over such a vfvMt line couM Ix* settled in IJerlin as well BM, if not l>«;tt,*!r tlian, soinewhcre near the front. The supremo commander in the field Ixjcame a mere figure-hefwl. When in tlio l««t days of August, the twins in f:omriiiuid. Hindenhurg anfl f^uderi'iorff, succeeded Kal- k'Tiliayri at the head of the G<'nrian Geneml Httiff, I'rince I>-opold f<f Mavaria, nominally at K-fwt, took up If iridcfiburg'rf inheritance. In the southern area the more showy part remained reserved to the Austrian dynasty. When, towards the end of November, 1916, the Heir-Apparent succeeded to the throne of his grand -imcle, Francis Joseph, Archduke Joseph was appointed his successor in the Transylvanian theatre of war. That appoint- ment was meant as a compliment to Magyar national feeling ; Archduke Joseph was a descendant from what might be described as the Hungarian branch of the Hapsburgs, and had commanded for almost two years the Seventh Austro -Hungarian Ariny Corps, which consists mainly of Hungarian regiments. Thus even the honorific functions received a German- Magyar tinge ; still more so the realities of command. To understand the transformation it is necessary to realise the changes which had taken place in the organisation of the enemy armies on the eastern front since, say, March, 1915. The eastern front was then divided between the German and the Austro -Hixngarian Supreme Commands. Directly under these commands came the different armies, \isually consisting of about four army corps. It was of course impossible to preserve perfect regu- larity. Here and there, as necessity arose, a new formation called the Army Group made its appearance. An " army-gioup " meant an incomplete army — -i.e., say, one and a half to three army corps under a joint command. Below the army corps came divisions endowed as yet with little independence. This organi- sation changed gradually by a natural evolu- tion which it would take too long to trace step by step. Few of the changes seem to have been thought out beforehand, and it usually took some time before any of them received ofilcial acknowledgment. A glance at the north -eastern front in September, 1916, dis doH^.'S the following arrangement : As pre- viously stated, the office of Command(»r-in- Chief in the field — ^itself a product of the flevelopments of 1915 — has by the end of 1910 b(5Come purely nominal. T'he first real autho- rity in the fi/ikl is the commander of ea(!li grouf) of annies (not to be confused with the army groups). There are two of thorn between the I'ripet Marshes and the Car|)athians ; they iriay bo roughly described as the Volhynian anfl the (ialician group. Their existence is now hardly receiving the satn') aeknowledgirient which this new foriiiatioii had in the late Humrri'T of 1915, when ofJiriial cornTnuni(/v<!(i If'.t 77/7-; TIMt:s lllSTiHlY OF '111 hi WAIi. GENERAL LUDENDORFF, Hindenburg's (]hief of Staff. openly spoke of tlie groups of Hiiidenburg and Mackensen. This reticence is observed in deference to Hapsbiug vanity. The leaders in these two areas are the Prussian von Linsingen and the Bavarian Count Bothiner ; their power is real but not avowed. Late in Sej)- teniber the Austrian General von Boehni- EiTnoUi receives the command of the Galician Group. Then for the fiitjt time it is mentioned m oflicial reports. Next come tlie armieB, liut bt'low them stand no longer army corps ; these ai-e now a <(uitci exceptioiuil formation. 'I'lu' dioiuion is now tlu« unit in the H(»ld, and between the Army command and the division stands a new formation — the gioup of divisions Thus the new arrangement is as follows : Group of annies, armies, groups of divisions ami divisions. The two new organisations, tlie groups of armies and the groups of divisions uithin the armiets, have deprived the inter- mediary formation of aimies of most of their previous importance. And one is hartlly astonished to find that in iSoptember, 1916, the conunanders of armies are still Austro- Hinigarian generals sandwiched in between Germans at the top and German commanders of the groups of divisions, ranking below them. In September, 1910, the front between the Marshes and the Rumanian border wo,s still divided between six annies — von Fath in the Poliesie, von Tersztyansky in Volhynia, von Boehm-Ermolli in north-eastern Galicia, Count Bothmer in the Podolian centre, Kovess von Kovesshaza between the Dniester and the Carpathians, and Karl Baron Kirchbach auf GENHKAL BKUSlLOiF, Chief Commander of the Southern Group of Russian Armies. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 165 GENERAL KOVESS VON KOVESSHAZA, Commander of an Austrian Army. Lauterbach * in the Carpathian Mountains. But these armies, though always cited in the Vienna communiques, very seldom appear in the German reports. There one hears, e.g., of General von Clausius (a German) commanding on the Lower Stokhod German and Austrian troops within the group of General von Bem- harrli (General von Fath — a ^lagyar — their nominal commander, is passed over in silence). Or again, when in October, 1916, internal troubles broke out in the Polish Legions which had attained the honour of fighting under the notorious Bomhardi, General von Fath's person never appeared. It was with Linsingen that the decision restf;d. And when they were leaving the Stokhod front an evjn more characteristic incident occurred, illustrating the mutual relations of the Gennan and tho Austrian offic^Ts. General von Kneassl, of the Eleventh Bavarian Division, published a fanrwell order to the J^gions which had evi- dently b<.-<5n under his comrnarid, though they th«jm>W!lvf?H formed consi'lerably more than a divisioQ — in fm:t, Yuul recently b'H^n given thii standing of a (.'orj;s- — and were commanded by a regular Austrian genrjral, von i'liehalski. In Volhynia it was von der Marwitz, von IJtz- mann and Hehrnifit von KnoU-lndorff, all of th<Tn Gennans, who really eonduetf-d the battleM of 8he|vf»ff and Kftrytnitsa, not Tersztyansky. Or, again, during tho Septem- ber fighting round Zboroff, little was said by the Germans about the Austrian Army com- mander, von Boehm-ErmoUi. It was the Prussian General von Eben, at the head of German and Austrian troops, who was the real man on the spot, and General von Molchior on the Graberka and von Wilhehni on the Zlota Gora. In Podolia, where the name of the army had always been German, and • Ht Hin-.r^^xUil fHiiri/jr-Unhiti in 8«)pt«!mb«ir, J0I6 ; h« Wdrt An AiiMlriAri,cinrl ounht nof, to f>») fionfiiHcrl with th« dfirmmn (inupirnl von Kirchb«u:h, wh'wo umih, in kru/wn itmn thn fl|{''' "K "" •^"' W<«f<irn front. GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDl, the notorious Prussian writer, Chief of a group of divisions. where German and Tuijiish troops were now brought up to save the very critical situation, the Aastrians had not been able to preserve even as much as an appearance of indepen- dence. In thd Carpathians tho position was slightly diflferent. Tho nature of the gi-oiuid did not atlmit of largo groups : each moimtain or valley formed a unit in itself, and here and there veteran Austrian corps and divisions, or even large detachments like, e.g., that of Colonel Papp in tho Yaeobeny-Mesticanosti region, still rf»tainod some individuality of their own. Little can bo saitl abcnit tho national dis- tribution of tho troops just because it was so variefl. (Jennans were to be found every- where. 'I'll' re wrns e.g.. Bavarian and Sile- sian regiments on the Stokhod, troops from Vowin, Brandenburg, Kast Prussia, Baden, and Alsace- F^iorraine in \^)lhyMia, IVussi(ui crack Higiments in I'odoliu, HeHsians in the iJniestei" valley, and again i'nissians and Bavarians in tlie (Jarpathians. A most intorcwting occeti- Kion, wfiich deserves notice, was no doubt the Turkish Anny (%)r|)s, which apixiared in Galioiu 122 2 166 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. in the muiittt (if Augiuit. Oiiu of its divuiioiiti, which took up its positions south uf i^zhtizliany, wati coiiuuan(itx.i by Me(uned Shefrik Bey, and liad fought at Yaniiia during thn Hulkan Wars, and at Ari iiurnu in C4alli[)(>li. It conHiHttul mainly of regiiut^ntti rttcruittKl in Auia Minor, ruimd Smyrna and Bruusa, with a hiuuII sprinkling of Driwes anil Arabs, unii was now ;. GENERAL VON EBEN AND PRINCE LEOPOLD OF BAVARIA. used by the Germans in the defence of the most exposed sector on the Galician front. Finally, among the remaining Austro -Hun- garian troops one could mark a new and sig- nificant regroupment by nationality. The Magyars, though by no means all, were shifted to Transylvania, leaving in the northern area mainly Austrian Germans and Poles. Ever since the Russians had again started hammeiing at the north-eastern gates of Transylvania voices had been raised in Himgary about the " iniquity " of using Magyar troops elsewhere whilst their own homes were exposed to invasion. When in the fii-st days of September, the Rumanians were < lossing the Carpathian range, a cry rang out in Hungary for their return. " On foruign soil, under foreign com- mand," said Count Michael Karolyi in the Hungarian Parliament on Si^ptember 5, " the Huiigarians fight for the frontiers wliich are left luulefended at home. . . . We do not aak, wo demand, that the Hungarian Honveds be brought hojue at once from foreign countries ! Wo demand that the frontiers of Transylvania be protected by Magyar soldiers ! We demand that Hungarian soil be defended by Hun- garian soldiei-s ! " About the same time a jnoclamation was secretly circulated among -Magyar soliliors at the front calling upon them to dt-mand their rctm-n to Hungary. Hero and there these circulars proved efTective and mutinies broke out. These were quelled with a fti-m hand — e.ff., in a Magyar rt>giment near Brody no less than 30 men were shot. Yet the feelings of the most enthusiastic and best fighters iii the Au8tro -Hungarian Army and Magyar opinion in Hungary could not be (hsregarded, and gi-adually the Magyar regi- ments were withdrawn to the south. *' For more than two years," said the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hotzondorf, answering the Magyar argmnents, " we have defended Hungary on Galician and Russian soil. Wbat our brave troops have done there has been done also directly for Himgary. ... I can understand it, that the soldiers, especially the Szekels of Tran- sylvania desire to take their revenge for the invasion of their own land. In so far as it was possible to take account of that wish, it has been done. It is, however, impossible beyond a certain point. . . ." With the Magyar the last really efficient element was disappearing from the Austrian ranks in Volhynia and in the Galician plain, and by the force of circum- stances both the burden and the command of the defence passed more than ever into German hands. It goes without saying that the Austrian officers, e.specially those of higher rank, and most of all those hanging about General Head- quarters at Techin, bitterly resented the increasing dominion of Germans, their undis- guised contempt for their allies and the famous Prussian manner. But in what light did the rank and file of the Austrian Army consider the change in its leailersliip ? A pictm-e of the mixed feelings with which it was received can be gathei-ed from a large and most valuable collection of lettei's from Austrian soldiers mtide at the front by one of^the special war-coriv- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 167 fipondents of the Russkoye Slovo, M. Oblonskiy, and published in the issue of September 17. The new (Jerman chiefs showed both foresight and brutality, neither of which the Austrian soldiers had experienced in an equal degree from their own officers. Especially when once the defeats and the retreat had disorganized warm food once daily," etc. Orders and counter orders : "It very often happens : we are entrained for some destination, but within an hour the opposite thing is done . . ." ; " Our officers have completely lost their heads. No one knows anything. . . ." Or, again, in another letter : " None of us can CCL. HOFFMANN. Chief of Staff to Prince Leopold of Bavaria. GfNFFAL BAFON KAhLVON KIRCH- BACH, who succeeded General von Pflanzer-Baltin. the Austrian staffs, there was no trace left of foresight or order. Most letters of those dates complain about it. Bad commissariat : " we stop at one place and our kitchens at another . . ." ; " we are far from getting p^ 1 ■ 1 ^^B r i ■ B^' kJ 1 3 1 31 GENERAL BARDOLFF. Chief of Staff to General von Boebm-Ermolli. LIEUT.-GENERAL VON CONTA. Con-inanding troops in the Carpathians. UKirr .<;p,N»M<Ai. sf:HMii)r von KNOIUM.SrJOKI . Tranitferred from Wettern to Hatlern Front. understand what has happened to our generals and officers. Sometimes they absolutely don't know what they are doing." And then bltmders occur, most galling to the depressed and weary soldier. " You would not believe," wrote one soldier in a letter whir^h never reached its destination, " what enormous distances they make us inarch nowadays ; twenty-five to thirty miles is nothing. . . Yet this is war and we should bear it. The worst, however, is that very often they send us about for nothing, once in that direction and then back again. . . . And some time ago wo marched the entire, weary day along a railway line. ' Why do wo march ? Why don't t.hoy entrain us ? ' ft-ikod some of the soldiers. The officers and inilway officials answered that there were no curH. Anfl in tho meanti/no several trains passed us with empty cars. . . ." All that changed with tho coming of tho 'ifinnans. "When (he commanders are Ger- mans wf <lf> not suffer hunger!" "The 'Jtinnans," writes anothor soldier, "are quite a (lifffiront affair. 'J'liey never lose their heads ami work like n machirie. It does not hap[)en with tlioni, as with tis, that several deta(;h- irieritH go for tho night into one tiny village, nor is f)no under their (;f)rnrnarid sent about for nothing. They calculate everything with MiHtlif rniilieal afciinify." ". . . They look b(>ttor aff.er us tlmn one ouii oHirrerH. . , ." 16S THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. i but nut fur rttdHuuci of sentiment. *' Aitt wo in tlu)ir eyes human buingn ? No, wu uio beatitti tu be sent to slaughter, if tticy need it. . . . Wlien it IS necesHary to attack, wo go in front. When enough of ns are killed, thu Cjituniana adsance luul^r cover of our dead. Oh, if you could only know how I hate those tlear allies of ours for their cold cruelty ! " " T wish," is the conclusion of another letter, " that the Germans could ln» made to exix^rience what we are going through ! " Yet it was this German combination of perfect order and callous brutality which stayed the Austrian debacle in the sununer of lUlG. On Juno 13, 1916, wliilst people, impressed by the splendid initial victories of the Rus.sians, were talking of the capture of Kovel and Lvoff as of imminent events. The Times pub lisht'd a warning against such excessive optim- ism. It was pointed out that an advance from Rovno against these two centres would have had to proceed along divergent linos. The Russians had therefore to make it their first concern to secure the flanks of the Lutsk salient. When they had reached the Stokhod in the north and lirody in the south, their position within the apex of the triangle Kovel-Rovno-Lvolf was safe, j'et the diHiculties of an advance against tho centre of its base round V^ladimir- V'ulliynsk or against its two corners at Lvolt' anil Kovel remained very considerable. The most feasible strategic movement against Lvoff seemed now to be an advance from the south-east, especially aftt^r Count Bothxner had been forced to abandon the powerfully fortified line of the Strypa. It is a very con- siderable advantage both for speed and safety in an oftensivo movement to have one flank protected by a natural cover so as to bo able to pursue a defeated force without having to wait for developments in the adjoining sectors. The Dniester offered such a cover to an advance directed against Lvoff from the south-east. Moreover, that movement did not lead the attacking forces against any lateral railway, which would give the enemy a chance of quick manti'uvring, but was aimed along three converging railway lines. It seems to have been the Russian plan to pivot on Brody and to advance against Lvoff along the railways leading towards it from Zboroff past Zlochoff and Krasne, from Podhaytse, past Bzhezhany } RUSSIANS WITH PORTABLE KITCHENS CROSSING A RIVER. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 169 HALITGH. and Pshemyslany, and from Halitch past Khodoroff. Oiir Allies made a splendid be- ginning towards the carrying out of that scheme. They got within a distance of about a mile of the two important centres of HaUtch and Bzhezhany, they reached, and even crossed, the River Narayovka. But then, by bringing up enormous reinforcements both in men and guns, the Germans were able to prevent any further advance, and oven to retain their hoM on those two t^jwns. Another offensive was started by our Allies in September in Volhynia, in the district of Shelvoff and Korytnitsa, This movement, carrifMl out in very difTicult conditions, could only have had 8trat<;gic resulta if the attack from the south-east in the region of Bzhozhany had succeeded in piercing the enemy lines. Then the advanc<3 frorn Volhynia inight liave de- velop*'d in a concentric movement against Lvoff. Ah things turned out, the forces gatherfxJ in Volhynia could do no more than help by frwjuent atta/^;ks to relievo t\ui fjerrnan pnjfJHure on liurnania. Gradually, as Ruinunia wa» bfjcor/iing the muLn theatre of war in the East, all fighting on tlie north-ea«tem front di*yl down. Tlwj Kuiwian offensive of 1910 reached itn concIuMton in the first half of Oct<*l»er, and only minor '-ngagfTrnentH of a local clwinM;t<>r c<jn- Galician plains. Also in the Carpathians the Russian offensive ceased about the middle of October, when a joint concentric movement against Transylvania had become iinpossible and Rumania had to be helped in her struggle against the invasion by superior Austro- German forces. About the middle of August, 1916, the army of Count Bothmer had evacuated its positions on the River Strypa and on the hills round Kozloff, Tsebroff and Vorobiyovka, and was retiring on to the next defensive position — namely, that of the Zlota Lipa. For about 1.5 miles to the oast its retreat led across an open high plateau. The average level of that tableland excfH-ds 1,000 feet, and only in very few parts insignificant streams cut its even surface. North of a lino drawn from Dobro- vody to Bobulintse not a single forest inter- venes between the Strypa and the River Koropiets. West of the Koropiets and still more beyond the Zlota Lipa the landscape changriH con8i<l<'rabiy. Ranges of hills, broken by niiMierouH stniams and covered with dt^nse forests, extend f(;r tens and scores of miles, from the neighbourhood oi B/.he/hany and Podh/iytse, past Ifalitch and Rohatyn, to about Hobrka and Mikolavoff — i.e., within short •listance of fAoff. This region^ of hills and tiiiMhtl U> break tlw lull in Volhynia and the foroHts wdH'novv ho Iw^tdirio the scone f)f fighting, 170 THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAR. On AugiiMt 13 thu troo[)H of CSeaertil ShehHi*- bttcliet) in thiur pui-uuit of the rt^treating enemy reached the village of Tuenioff, nurth- east of U^hezliany, and approached the Zluta Lipa near Zavaloft'. in the extreme Houth, close to the Dniester, where their niovementu were supported by the previous quicker advance of General Lttchitaky'u Army south of tliat river, they broke on the same day across the Zlota Lipa, near Toubtubaby, and captured the village of Mariampol, at the junction of the Zgnily Potok with the Dniester. von Klxin, forming the extreme right wing of the Second Austro-llungarian Ai'niy. North of the village of Koniukhy and of Hill 404, at the eastern edge of vast oak-forests which in tliat region border on the I'odolian steppes, began the line of the " German Army of the South." At Koniukhy, on a small stream bearing the same name, its front reached the system of tho Zlota Lipa : it followed from here tho stream Koniukhy to the River Tsoni- ovka, and the Tsoniovka to its confluence with tho Zlota Lipa. Next to the confluence REPAIRING A BRIDGE BLOWN UP BY THE AUSTRIANS. Two or three days later a short lull super- vened on the entire front. The defeated army had received considerable reinforcements and a new balance was established. The front of Cotmt Bothmer's Army now extended for about 50 miles from south-east of Pluhoff to Halitch. Its centre lay round Bzhezhany, which since the autumn of 1915 had been the headquarters of General Count Bothmer, but now lay only* a few miles behind the front. It was soon to find itseK actually in the firing Line. The Zlota Gora, the key of the enemy positions in the Pluhoff-Zboroff district and also the hills south-west of the Zlochoff-Tarnopol road were held by the group of divisions under the GeiTnan General of these two rivers lies the important railway station of Potutory, the junction of the Lvoff- Podhaytse line and the railway running from Tamopol to Halitch and Khodoroff. The Tseniovka, which runs between high wooded hills rising about 300 feet above the level of the valley, is lined with marshes, difficult to cross especially during a wet season such as was the summer of 1916. The most convenient passages across it are covered by the villages of Byshki and Kuropatniki in the north, the village of Shybalin on the Tarnopol-Kozova- Bzhezhany high road, and that of Potutory on tho liigh road loading from I'otlhaytse by Bzliezhany to Lvoff. On the wtvitorn b*uik of the Tseniovka, between it and the Zlota THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR., 171 Lipa, a range of high hills formed a defensive wall in front of Bzhezhany, the most important strategic centre between the Dniester and the Lvoff-Krasne-Tamopol railway. The average height of these hills amounts to about 1,300 ft. Some of them are covered by forests ; in most cases, however, the summits of the hills are aaked, decaying rock, and below them open steep slopes covered with grass. The Lysonia height, near the jvmction of the Tseniovka and the Zlota Lipa, dominating both valleys and the crossings of Shybalin and Potutory, was the key to the positions in front of Bzhezhany. Bzhezhany itself is an interesting old town. [t has for many centuries held an important place, both as a centre of commerce and as a ink in the chain of Podolian fortresses, which iefended Red Russia against the Tartar nvasions. In the sixteenth century it was me of the main settlements of the Polish Armenians, once the chief merchants in the jorderland of Poland, Little Russia, and kfloldavia. Only very few of them are now AAf OF Tfll', DISfHICT FROM /LOCIKJl I TO TUB nNFKSTKK. GENERAL VON GEROK. German Commander on the Narayovka. left in the town ; having grown rich, these families acquired landed property and changed into Polish country gentry. The Armenian Street and the old Armenian Chvirch are the only surviving monuments in Bzhezhany of that once considerable settlement. The southern suburb of Bzhezhany is inhabited by the descendants of another exotic race, the Tartars. These men, who arrived as invaders, and remained as captives, have lost both their language and their religion, and only their Mongol features distinguish them from the surrounding Little Russian pea.santry. By a curious coincidence the Russian forces which were now attacking the town of Bzhezhany included many Armenian and Tartar regiments from the Caucasus. Next to the old Armenian road which approaches Bzhezhany from the direction of Shybalin, not far from. where the River Zlota [j|)a emergoH from the small Bzhozliany lak(», Htands the old castle, once an importnrit fortroHH and thf) seat of one of the riclu!Ht aristocratic families of Poland — the Sioniuw- skiH. The last of that family was a faithful afJherent of the I^eague which in the (irst quarter oi the eiglitecnth century oppowcd ('liarl*»H XH. of Swt)don, the 'I'urks, and the if\)til (.'oHHackH of Maze[)a, and JJzhe/.hany hiicamo the uoene of an iini)ortant battle in that war. Through the only daughter of the l/iHt HieniawHki, the god-child of Peter the 17-2 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 173 Great, Tsar of Russia, August II., King of Poland and Saxony, and Rakocsy, Grand Duke of Transylvania, the estates of Bzhezhany passed into the hands of the family of the Czartorj'skis, who now for the first time rose to historic importance. But the magnificent old castle was abandoned for a more habitable countrj' house, and a century later, under Austrian rule, like so many of the finest old Galician castles, was changed partly into iniUtary barracks and partly into a brewery. Only the old family chapel of the Sieniawskis remained intact. On the western side the town of Bzhezhany is dominated by the Benedictine ^lonastery founded by one of the .Sieniawskis towards the close of the seven- teenth century. For about 15 miles south of Potutory the broad, flat, marshy valley of the Zlota Lipa formed the dividing line between the Germanic and the Russian armies. This was compara- tively the least interesting and least eventful sector of the front on which the forces of General Shcherbacheff faced those of Count Bothmer. Huge forests cover the ranges of heights on both sides of the river, and not a single important line of communication crosses it within that area. Zavaloff is the first point of considerable strategic importance which one reaches moving down the Zlota Lipa. Its position is analogous to that of Burkanoff on the Strypa, and of Hal itch, Jozupol and Nizhnioff on the Dniester. It lies at the point at which the marshes lining the upper valley of the Zlota Lipa cease and that river enters a deep, winrling canon. In the intervening district, at Zavaloff, whore the river-bed on the Zlota Lipa in narrow, but not yet <lf>f>p, the inost important highroad approaching Ifulitch from the ea«t crofiw.-H the river. Zavaloff ha*l fonned in tho last stage of Count Botlirner's retrr;at, in the firHt luilf of Aiigiwt, the Houth»)m buHtion of the line <>i the Zlota Lipa and the pivot of his extrome right wing. Near Zavaloff the retreating anny lia<l retained on the east^jm bank of the river H<!veral irnpf^rtant heights, which covorfMl the s\ppr(>fu:Yum U> the crosHing. Farther south, not ev»!ri the line of the Zlota Lipa roinained in thfiir poHH*j«Hiori. Hrnall canons in which the river itnelf d'xrH not form a Herif>uH (AmUu-Ui (aw <\(i*in, e.g., the DnieHter) are no cover to a re- truftting arrny. Their winding coiinw* nuiders t\tfi front diHproporti'jnately long ; the different loofrtf, the varioufi levelit and the fiiirncrouH terraces on its sides make it easy for the attack ing army to force a crossing somewhere. The range of hills extending west-south-west of Zavaloff past Horozhanka and Deleyoff and Lany to the Dniester proved a much stronger and much more^convenient defensive line for the Austro-German armies. These hills, at- taining an average height of 1,200 feet, are covered by dense forests and protect against the south the Zavaloff-Halitch liighroad. Be- GENERAL PETER HOFMAN, Austrian Commander at B/.hezhany. tween^^Mariampol and Jezupol, Count Bothmer's new front touched the Dniester. About the beginning of June, 1916, the so- called " German Army of the South " of Count Botluner included only one Gennan division (the 48th Reserve Division) and six Austrian divisions. Then in July the 10.5th Gonnan DiviHif)n was brought up from the Balkans, an<l the 119th (iennan Division from the Riga front. The 9.5th and 199th Gennan Divisions came to i'odolia in August, and were followed by the 19th and 20th Turkish Divisions. Still further roinforcements wore brought up about the midrlle f)f Hf>pteniber, whori the ] 2.'{nl (iennari i>iviHiori anived from the Aisno and the 208th from tho Somme. Moreover, frag- mentH were added of the First Reserve Divisi(jn and (if thn Thiid I'niHHiiiii (^inii)! Division, which IwuJ originally b<<longod to Coiuit Both- 122-8 174 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. COSSACKS COLLECTINC; PKlSONbKS. nier's army, but_had been sent to Verdun in March, 1916. On the other hand, of the original six Austrian divisions two were with- drawn, one of them, Hungarian by nationahty, proceeding to the Rumanian front. Three other Austrian divisions of Count Bothmor's army had been completely destroyed in the fighting. In their place two and a half fresh Austrian divisions were brought up, so that about the middle of September, 1916, the German Army of the South consisted of seven complete German divisions and fragments of two other Gterman divisions, three and a half Austrian and two Tui'kish divisions. It is true that the German divisions were now smaller than they had been earlier in 1916, each division consisting of three instead of foiu- regiments. Even so, however. Count Bothmer's army was now considerably stronger than it had been in Jime, though its front was only slightly longer August 29 marks the renewal of the Russian offensive on the Zlota Lipa. The first blow was directed against the centre of General \on Gerok's group of divisions in the salient near Zavaloff. The important artillery positions on Hill 413 were captm-ed and the enemy was compelled to retire beyond the Zlota Lipa. On the following day (Avijust 30) the fighting was extended towards the south-west ; soon the battle had spread over the entire front from Zavaloff and Nosoff on the Zlota Lipa to Mari- ampol on the Dniester On September 3 the struggle reached its cvilminating point. In tlie morning of that day our Allies, operating on both sides of the Dniester, captured the town of Jezupol and its surroundings, including the wooded heights which dominate that town and the crossing of the Dniester, on the Stanislavoff- Halitch railway line. Meantime, farther north, the advance had begun against the Dryshchoff- Nosoff front. It led across steep hills and through thick forests, and was necessarily slow. Especially obstinate was the resistance of the enemy in the forests between Horozhanka and Dryshchoff, these positions being held entirely by picked German troops. Three successive Russian attacks were repvilsed. However, later in the afternoon our Allies, by an advance through the forests north of Byshofi, succeeded in turning the right German flank. The enemy now tried to withdraw, but the Russian barrage prevented all retreat. At 6 p.m. the Russians forced their way into the forest, and most bitter hand-to-hand fighting developed. The enemy did not surrender, nor were the Russians in a mood to spare him. By the end of the day the four square miles of forest were strewn with German corpses. With the piercing of the Nosoff-Deleyoff front all further resistance on that advanced line was rendered impossible. In the ensuing German deroute the Russian cavalry played a brilliant part. INIore than 4,000 Austrian, German and Tm-kish prisonere were captured. On the following day (Septem- ber 4) the advance from the south-e»\st was reinforced by a concentric movenxent from tht> east, across the Zlota Lipa The difficult rixer- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 175 crossing between the village of Voloshchyzna on the eastern and Bozhykoff on the western bank was captured, and the Turks who held that sector were completely routed. On the same day the Russian advance was pressed across the wooded heights west of the Zlota Lipa witliin a few miles of the Halitch-Podvy- sokie railway. IVIeantime, at the southern end of the line, the Russians had completely cleared of the enemy the eastern comer between the Dniester and the Gnila Lipa, had captured the railway between Vodniki, Siemikovitse and the railway station of Halitch (on the northern bank of the Dniester — the town itself lies south of the river), and were crossing the Gnila Lipa. On the night of September 4-5 the miUtary stores of Bolshovtse were set on fire. The new front of the enemy now ran from the Dniester north of HaUtch along the Narayovka to Lipnitsa Dolna. This part of the line was held mainly by German troops, Brandenburgers and Pomeranians. From Lipnitsa Dolna the front extended to the east across the wooded hills south of Miechyshchoff to about Saranchuki on the Zlota Lipa. This most exposed sector, which in the following weeks was subjected to frequent Russian attacks, wa.s assigned to the Turkish troops. They had to cover the southern flank of the district of Bzhezhany which now formed a pronounced salient. The district of Bzhezhany itself was hold largely by Austro- Hungarian troops, comprised in one of the few surviving Army Corps, namely that of General Hofman. It consisted of Poles, Germans and Magyars, and also of Czechs and Rumanes ; these last two nationalities remained, of course, under " police supervision," the Germans from Bohemia and Magyars from Transylvania being only too glad to play the part of spies and hangmen of their " fellow-countrymen." The districts of Halitch, Bzhezhany and Pluhoff were now the chief objectives of the Russian attacks. They were the three bastions of the enemy centre in East Galicia, on a line which had already been laid bare of its fore- works and offered the last defensible connected positions in front of Lvoff. Of these three bastions the most important was Bzhezhany. Whilst round Halitch and Pluhoff the Germans might yet have maintained an unbroken front, even if the wings had been bent back still farther, a piercing of the line of the Zlota Lipa round Bzhezhany would have resulted for them in an immediate loss not only of the district of Pluhoff. but also of Zlochoff and Krasne. Then a concentric movement by General Sakhai'off's Army from the direction of Brody would have become possible, and the road would have been opened for a direct blow from the east against Lvoff. The battle in the region of Bzhezhany began on September I, round the village of Shybalin A MHI.D WAK CCJUNCIL. 170 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL on the Kozova-BzliezJiany road, and extended on tliH following day to the south, beyond Potutory down to the hill called Dzikie Lany (near tliis hill was the junction of the Austrian and the Turkisli linea). The Lysonia range in the corner between the Zlota Lipa and the Tseniovka, which dominates tliat district, wan one of the main objectives of the Russian artil- lery. " The Russian batteries are skilfully placed and masked," wrote the military corre- spondent of the Hungarian Pester Lloyd from the enemy headquarters near Bzhezhany, " and even our flying men find it diflicult to discover them. Very often the Russian batteries suc- ceed in directing the most destructive form of nre against our positions, namely cross-fire, and sometimes they even outflank us. . . . Since the beginning of the autumn fighting much heavy artillery — -of 15 and 18 cm. calibre — is employed by the Russians. In the last few days (beginning of October) a hugi; Russian gun, presumably a 28 cm. howitzer, throws its enormous shells into ovir trenches. ... The quality of the Russian soldiers is still always very good. It is true, different ages, varying from 19 to 40, are represented among them, and their training is less thorough than it vised to be, but in general they are excellent soldiers. Their equipment, clothes and boots are perfect." So was also the leadership, and if the results of'the liattle were not such as th«» previous nionths had produced, the reason for it was that the enemy, in view of the extreme importance of these positions, had spared no pains in strength- ening th»nn in every possible way. In the afternoon of September 2 the Russian artillery began to bomVjard the range of heights in the corner between the Zlota Lipa and the Tseniovka. The nature of these hills favoured its work ; the decaying rock and the brittle chalk was breaking and crumbling vmder the heavy artillery fire. " After some time of hurricane fire — ^I can hardly realize whether it lasted a second, a minute, an hour or a day — our trenches were obliterated," wrote a Polish officer serving with the Austrian anny in a letter to his parents. " We remained without cover. Whistling and screeching, shell followed on shell, and shrapnel on shrapnel. . . . The earth was opening below vis and the trees were falling on top of us. We now made for the first time the acquaintance of the new Japanese explo- sive, shimosa. . . . Its force surpasses anything we had seen previously. Small shells filled with it can be shot off from light guns. The effect is gruesome : there remains only one mass of mangled human flesh. . . ." On the next morning (September 3) at 5 a.m. the Russian infantry, which had been gathered under cover of the forest above Zolnovka, opened its attack RUSSIAN PEASANTS RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 177 across the Tseniovka valley and against the heights on its western bank. Most of the enemy- batteries on the Lysonia had been silenced, and soon our Allies came to gi'ips with the infantry. " Only now I believe," writes again the Aus- trian-Polish officer, " that there can be such a thing as a heap of corpses .... that corpses can form high, defensive walls. The battle- scene simply defies all description. Those distorted, inhuman, terrible faces, black with smoke and dust, with shining white maddened eyes, and wide, gaping mouths, from which south-east of Bzhezhany, including the Lysonia. But meantime the enemy was gathering power- fvil reinforcements. Bavarian resei-ves were brought up to restore the perilous situation. They began the counter-attack against the tired Russian troops under cover of the morning mist, at 4 a.m. on September 4. The Lysonia Height was lost, but the extreme end of the triangle, Hill 348 near the conflvience of the rivers, and the crossing of the Tseniovka re- mained in the hands of our Allies. " In the region of Bzhezhany our troops forced the pas- AUSTHIAN F'HISONKHS ENJOYINC; THEIR MIDDAY MEAL. flows one c<^>ntinuouH howling cry ! Oli, that howling ! It ban nothing human in it, it muHt be tho cry of rnafhiinn or damned soiibj. But I alw) howlfnl in tho Hame way, I continufKl to howl aft/!r I had Ixn-n woiind«'d, I howlofl all ihnt tirno until tfio panjhfd lipn find th'» Horri tjiroat got fix'xl in tho cry. Why did wo howl ? J don't know. But »»vorybody did it, the hoM'k-th a^lvancin^ along with mo, and tho KuHHianH MaHhing into our fryfjH with t.h«ir blood-covond bayonotH At first I folt foar, arigor, horror, fury thon I grow iriflifforont. Ono I oHfVi all »<5nHibilit.y." Tho battio ooniiniiod all flay nml througli Iho following night. Tho UuHsianH carried tho hills sago across the Tseniovka . . . and carried tho hostile position, taking prisoners 80 oflicers and 2,04 I inon, and capturing 6 machine guns " was tho short and torso announcement of tho Russian ofTicial communif/ui! of September 4. Tt is only from oyo-witrK'ssos and war cornwpondontH (among whom osp«ioially those of tho RvHakoye Slovo wore distingiiishod for tho fullness and accuracy of their reports) that detailed know- ledge ()[ the battle can bo gathered. Tho battle round Bzhezhany continued with varying success throughouttSoptombor; positions wcif- takon, lost and rotak«'n. It was exlronioly crodiJahlo U) our Allios that in all this lighting thoy spared tho town and its historic menu- 178 THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. lumitb, thuugh ttto uaeiiiy wan uuiitg itu liuiglitti and towerH for purpoaeH of military observation. A further important advance waa achieved by the KuH8ianti in the laut iluyM of September and tlie tirat daya of October, when they extentled their ground on tlie hills and laptured the villag»> of I'otutory below the coidiuonce of the rivers. Yet IJzhezhjiny remained in tlie hands of the enemy. Between September 5-7 the first battle wa.s fought for the Halitch positions. Our Allies consolidated their hold on the wostei-n bank of the Gnila Lipa, and the enemy evacuated the northern bank of the Dniester opposite Halitch, blowing up the fort.s and the brulge. From Halitch itself the stores were removed and practically the entire civilian population left the town, ttxcept the Karaites. Tliis most lonely fragment of a tribe, stranded here by some unknown liistorio tragedy, refused to leave the only street wliich it inhabits in the entire Ua[)sburg Monarchy.* After the line of the Narayovka and of the Dniester had been reached on September 7, a lull ensued in this region, which lasted until September 15. When the battle recommenced, the severest fighting took place on the Nara- • Tim KuriiiloM are a Jowiwh Hect, whicli mjoclH the Tahnudic truditiun. Thui<' chief humu iu in tlio Crimea. They were Mettled there together with the Tartars and speak a Tartar language. Tli(«y are niOMtly |)(^aKant8, du nut mix with the other JewK and do nut understand Yiddish. Outside the Crimea they have settlements only in Halitch and in ono or two Lithuanian towns. They uIdiic of all Jews enjoy in Russia full civil riglits. RUSSIAN WOUNDED BEHIND THE LINE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 179 yovka, at the southern end of the village of Svistelnild, below Lipnitsa Dolna. Here our Allies had gained a foothold on the western bank of the river ; the salient held by them was about three miles long and two miles deep. They had captured the forest of Svistelniki, Hills 345 and 310, the fortified positions of Piakova, and the village of Skomorokhy Nove. The Rxissian forces holding that salient included the 41st Russian and the 3rd Finnish di\-isions. Opposing them were picked Prussian troops — part of the Third Guards Division, Fusiliers of the Guard, and Pomeranian Grenadiers — under General von Gerok and Major-General von Gallwitz. In the battle which now deve- loped it is almost impossible to say which side took the initiative. Attacks and coimter- attacks followed on one another, the Russians trying to enlarge their foothold on the right bank of the Xarayovka, the Germans en- deavouring to push them back across the river. In this fighting, which with varying intensity lasted for about three weeks, neither side secure 1 any marked gains, thoufh each at one time or another scored considerable successes. " In the region of the River Xara- yovka," read the Riissian official communique of September 17, " fighting continues. The enemy has already suffered great losses in killed and wounde^J, and has left in our hands 3,174 prisoners, 34 of them officers, all Germans. We also captured 20 machine guns and two trench guns." " German troops under the command of General von Gerok counter- attacked on both sides of the Xarayovka," ran the Berlin answer two days later. " The great/;r portion of the ground lost the day before yesterday is again in our hanrls. Besides hfiHvy loH8<;s in killed and wfjunde<i, tluj enemy If^t also '.i,:j()() priHoriers and 10 machine guns." Towards the b<^ginning of Octobf^r the two armies were still facing one another on ap- proxirnat*?!y the same linnH which had l>eon reached a month earlier, neither of thern able U) overcome the resistarice of its opponent. Another battle, (;qually desperate and ecjualiy ndeciiiive, was fought during the month of 8epternlx)r and during the firnt half of October in Houthem Volhynia, ««per,iully r^jiHt of 8viniukhy, on the HhelvofT-KorytnitHa-J'uHto- inyty front. ll«»re the 4th Hiberian arifi the 4f>th fiuHMian Arrny (.'orf^M, iriclu'lirig the " Irrm X^ivi>ji<;n," the KiiHHJtiri (iiinnl iirnliT Germral Hamuli ^ ^,,n ^•'MncRASGt'^^''', / ., TRA NS YL VA NLA '^ " """'-^''"^ 'RODNA P. /J4C:Ci '^^'^obeny ^i^ ■ Doma Vatra^ BoRGOP.jClW - <^^^ f^ . Scale of Miles. Blstl'ltZ O 5 ig ZO 30 M\P ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS IN THE CARPATHIANS. Gurko and a division of Orenburg Cossacks, were fighting Xorth-German troops under Generals von der Marwitz and von Litzmann, and Magyars and Viennese regiments under General von Szurrnay. The scene of the most important operations extended over hardly more tluin six miles, and included the villages of Shelvoff, Bubnoff and Korytnitsa, stretched across the marshy valley of the Lug and two fon^sts, one known as tlie " Devil's Wood," the other, on account of its peculiar shape, as the "Three Fingers Wood." Tho first im- j)ort(ir»t engagement took place on August 31 - iSof)t<tiiif)er 1, and resulLod in some gains of ground for our Allies. With interruptions tho fighting continued throughout the follow- ing six weeks, culmiriating in a pitched hattl(» about September 20, when the Russians f;a[)tured about three miles r>f (jeririan trenches Ah, hr»wever, the stratogi*; advarxie from the ZIota Lif)a luid ru>t developed Hudiciotitly, the atteiript in Volhynia lost in strategic importance, and a lull again supervened on that front. IbO THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. THE TSAK KKV1EW1N(; INFANTRY AT THE FRONT. Towards the end of June the Ruissian troops • under General Lecliitsky Imd once more reached in tlie Hukovina the footliills of the Carpathians. In July they extended their Carpathian front from the Cheremosh to the Yablonitsa Pass, and advanced deeper into the mountains. It was, however, only after the entry of Rumania into the war, and in view of the Rumanian invasion of Transylvania, that this front acquireil considerable importance. General Lechitsky now directed his main forces against the Himgarian frontier ; it was here that the three Russian army corps commanded by Generals Zhychevski, Count Baranoff-Krusen- stern and Count Keller were fighting. On August 15 our Allies captured important positions in the Yablonitsa (sometimes called also the Tai1;ar Pass), and on August 29 the village of Rafailova, south-west of Nadvoma, and the Pantyr Pass. On a front of 90 miles — between Mount Pantyr and Doma Vatra — they stood close to the Hungarian frontier and to the main Carpathian crest. The battle for the chief mountain groups, which average in height 6,000-7,000 feet, had already begim. Each of them formed almost a separate theatre of war, the absence of tactical cohesion being perhaps the most characteristic feature of the operations on this front of liigh momitains and pathless forests. In the first days of September fighting took place almost in every sector of the Car- patliian front ; round IMount Ploska, near the Pantyr Pass ; round Mounts Kukul and Khoverla, south of the Yablonitsa ; roiuid Moimts Stepanski, Kreta, Ludova, Baba Ludova and Pnieva between the two Cheremosh rivers ; round Mounts Vipchina, Kapul and Cimbroslava, in the village of Luchina, and on the Tommatic range in the Kirlibaba sector; and lastly, round the road from Yacobeny to Doma Vatra on the Rumanian frontier. It is impossible to enter into the detail of this fighting, where in the many separate battles successes and reverses closely followed on one another. Of the more important captures by our Allies may be mentioned that of Mount Ploska ia the first days of September, of Mounts Kapul and Pnieva on September 11, Mount Smotrets on the 19th, Movmt Koman on the 27th. Each of these successes brought with it a considerable haul of prisoners. The operations on this front were, however, necessarily only supplementary to those in Transylvania, and when the Rumanian invasion had failed, a luU followed on the line between Mount Pantyr and Dorna Vatra. CHAPTER CLVII. GERMAN AIR RAIDS: MAY TO NOVEMBER, 191 6. Improvement of Air Defences — Aeroplane against Airship — Lighting Regulations — The Darkness of London — German Fictions — Zeppelin and Schutte-Lanz — Raids in July AND August, 1916 — Visit to Scotland — Raid of September 2 — A Sch€tte-Lanz brought DOWN at CuFFLEY LIEUTENANT RoBINSON, V.C. CaPTAIN ScHRAMM'S FuNERAL ZePPELIN Destroyed ln Essex on September 22 — Loss of Life est London — Zeppelin Destroyed at Potter's Bar on October 1 — ^Two Zeppelins Destroyed in the North Sea — A Seaplane over London. 7*^ HE air war over the United Kingdom followed in its earlier stages certain clearly marked Lines. At the begin- ning there was general scepticism among British authorities as to the possibility of a serious aerial menace. It was considered doubtful if Zeppelins covild cross the North Sea, gave at great risk of wreck from storm, and every confidence was felt that if they did so our aeroplanes, travelling fa«ster and clLiiibing higher, could easily deal with them. Thi« belief found expression in Mr. Churchill's oft-quoted phrase about " a swarm of hornets " which would ta<-;kle and destroy the inva/lers. During the first year of the war nothing a<lequate was df>ne in the way of aerial <lefenc«j. The anti- aircraft guns were far too few in number and of tt)(} small a calilue to produce 8atiHfaet<jry refJultH. There was no proper syst^jrn of com- munif^ating warnings. Our protective methods lacke^l both a^lequaoy and co-ordination. The reliance upon a<5r')planes as the principal weapon for defence wan based uj>on the asHum[)- tion that th^j Zef)[x;jirm would attack in daytime. VVlien the ZepjxiJinH attiw;k«;<l at night, the di/fi- aultintt, tor pilotM inexperiericd in m'ght flying, of me*»ting tlM»m with Jieroplanes became evid*»nt. Numberrt of gallant young airmen attempted to attack in the dark. Some received more or less serious injuries. The inadequacy of our defensive methods was finally and conclasively shown on the night of Septem- ber 8, 1 9 1 5, when several Zeppelins hovered over London, dropping bombs almost at leisure and ignoring our feeble gunfire from below. From that night the authorities regarded the matter more seriously. There was still a ten- dency to deprecate any outside attention being <lrawn to the reality of the menace. A number of public men, utterly mistaking the nature of the danger, scolded those who urged greater preparations, charging them with cowardice and selfishness. The nation was assured that it ought to be glad to share in some small d(»greo the dangers of the soldiers in the treiuihes. The* great raid of January 31, 1910, when Zepi)elins travelled over the Midlands and reached the West of England, revealed the fallacy of such argiunents. It proved beyond question how necessary an aderpiate a(»rial def(»nco of England was, not rnorely for the [)rotection of individual [iiivate citizens, but for the safo (operation of our grftat industrial and military works. During the months that followed steady pro- gress was iruulo. It was recognized that the a.eroplune, once tho dangers from night flying 181 IH'2 Tilt: TIMKS HlSTOliY OF THK WAU. wvivi iliiiiiiiiuluiil, wud th» idtiul anti-airHhip wwapoii. It wtth much fuwtm- tluin a Zopp* liii ; it oould eliiab lugher ; it |)rt>rttjnt»Ml a vwry aiiuill object for attack, aa agaiiiut tlio miormouw vulnerable aui-face of tlie aii-wliii). It could sut'k out Uie enemy wherever he was or could pui-aue Hud ovei-take liiin. It coat comparatively little and could be quickly constructed. Hy the HUiiuner of lUlO the training (»f pilots in night flying and the recognition of the moat auitabli* macliinea and weapons for attacking Zoppelina iiiiil greatly improved the prospects of the country's anti-aircraft defence. A conaiderahle degree of co-ordinntion had been attained. A much more abuiiHant supply atonea of the atnieta. This had certain draw- backs. It caused a great increase \i\ the number of atrttet accidents, and it tended to give every place an aspect of gloom after dark. Hut it de[)rived the enemy of one of his diief means of finding his way. Zeppelins were now ilriven. to at'om[)t to discover their whereabouts by looking for rivers. " The Knglish can darken London as nmch as they want," boasted Conunander Mathy, one of the moat rodoubtabh) of the Ze[)polin com- manders ; " they can never remove or cover up the Thames, from which we can always get our biuu-ings and pick up any point in London wo desire." Hut this method of picking up ^/■>o»j " The Aeroplane," by permission. STEM AND STERN VIEWS OF A ZEPPELIN Showiog construction. of anti-aircraft guns had been manufactured. The plan of throwing the country into darkness, so as to give the enemy overhead a minimum of guidance for direction, was made by degrees more and more strict. By the early winter of 1916 gi-eat cities like London presented a remarkable spectacle after 5 o'clock in the evening. Every house and shop had its windows carefully shaded with dark curtains, and the street lamps had been reduced in number and obscured so as to gi\'e no more than a glimmer of light. The illuminated advertisements had long since disappeared and the headlights of vehicles were reduced in power. The darkness was such that it was often impos- sible for the wayfarer to distinguish the kerb- bearings was of very doubtful success. Time after time the German official accounts showed that the Zeppelin commanders had almost ludicrously misjudged their whereabouts. Houses, factories, railways, electric trams, furnaces were all brought under regulations tending to increase the general darkness. Even in the worst days there was never any general feeling of panic concerning the Zeppelins. The damage inflicted was com- paratively so small that the public imagination was more impressed with the Zeppelin tis a great spectacular display than as a death- dealing instnunent. The mei-est rumour of the approacli of Zeppelins brought people crowding into the streets to catch a sight of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 183 From " TJie Aeroplane" by permission. COMPARATIVE DIAGRAMS OF THE PRAM EWORK OF A ZEPPELIN (OF ALUMINIUM) AND THAT OF A SGHUTTE-LANZ (OF WOOD). tthem. The very children clamoured to be billowed to sit up at nights " to see the Zeps." Little girls playing in slxim streets had their ■own game of " Zeps," invented no one knew fcow, in which the Zeppelin crews made figures tfor mockery similar to the Guy Fawkes of an earlier generation. In one leading orphanage (for young girls around which bombs had fallen on several occasions, the children would promise their dolls, as a crowning reward, that " if they were very good they might sit up And see the ZeppeUns come." The attitude of children and adults alike was one of curiosity rather than fear. The Gennan authorities never, of course, believed the fantastic tales of the destruction •of whole districts in London and elsewhere that were carefully circulated throughout the world by their official agencies. These fables «erve<J possibly to hearten the civil population ■and to cheer soldiers fighting on the Western front. They knew that the original hopes tliat the Zeppelins would terrorize Englisli peofjle ■or produce widesprf^ad destruction had failed. They had succeeded in divortiri]^ a certain nurnl>er of British guns and men from the Western frf^nt to the defence of Englanrl. Apart from that the material damage they had <Jorie was sfj small compared with the effort involvwl that it must have been a profound •disappointment U> all responsible for it The Gerrnans eni[)loyod two types of airships in their attacks, the Zeppelin and the SchiitUj- Lanz. The irnf)rov*!d Zeppelin was about 080 feet Jong and liar] a ifiaximurn diameter of 72 fe*!t. Ifc« franK.'work was cornposefl of girders of a very light and strong aluminium alloy, the same rnat'trial (>«)ing largely uwid in the construction <<f the gonrlolas. Inside its envelope were 18 or \',i gas hallonets, hr>lding two million feet <A hydrogen gas. It had six «!ngineH, each of 240 h.p. Jt carri'Hl an annainent of sev<!ral machine gunx, and p>oMHibly one or two small light guns fixing shells. It carried also sixty bombs. The captain directed and controlled the ship from a cabin in the foremost gondola. He released the bombs by means of electrical devices. Levers and wheels enabled him to control the speed and alter the direction of flight. In an adjoining cabin in the same gondola sat the wireless operator. Behind him, still in the same gondola, were an engine and two mounted machine guns, the engine operating a propeller. This gondola was connected by a " cat-walk " inside the keel with two central gondolas containing engines and machine guns, and /■ . A . litkcii, I'hdlo. A PUOl'HLI-hK Ol A ZEPPELIN. those in turn were connected with a large roar gondola whi(;h also contained engines and guns. There were in addition gun (n)plac(ments right on top of the envelope. Two thoiiKand gallons of petrol W(;re carried as fuel, and llio total crew numhered twenty-two, incltjding eai>tain, wireless f)perator, machinc-gtm men, and mechanics for <(i<li <iigin<'. 'IIk' Zeppelins could travel at a speed of COCO mile h mi lioiir. The in)prov«d (ype of Rchiitte-l.iii;/, niinliip was about 500 frr-t. lf)ng, and cfHtif d threr gondf)laH, containing eiigincH, in iiddition to a little navigating cabin forward. It dilT< n d from 1S4 THH TIMb:s HISTORY OF TllK WAR. the Ztippuliu cltitiHy in the fact that itts frame wan iiiaile, nut of ahuniniuai, but of wood with wire wound arouml it. From May 20, ID 10, vvlien a seaplane droppetl some bombs on the eatit coast of Kent, until early in July there was a pause. On the night of July DlO a seaplane visited the Isle of 'I'hanot, but was inuutaliately pui"sued by naval aircnift, and made off without dn)pping any bombs. A se(;ond seaplane visited South-East Kent, ih'opping seven bombs, but inflicting no damage beyond breaking a number of windows. There were no casualties in either raid. A German CAT-WALK OF A ZEPPELIN. convnuniqui stated that the coastal works and port estabUshnients of Harwich and Dover had been visited. The raid on Harwich was entirely imaginary The Germans took advantage of the ideal sunimer weather at the end of July and the beginning of August to carry out a series of four raids on the Eastern and South-Eastem Counties and on the Thames Valley. Large num*bers of incendiary bombs were scattered among ripening fields >i corn, and farmers believed that a serious attempt was being Ukade to fire our crops. The bombs failed to do any widespread <lamage to the crops, despite the favourable summer conditions. 'I"ht» first of the ruitls was on the night of July 28-29, over Norfolk, Uncolnshire, and Yorkshire, A heavy fog hung over the coast \ 4 M-JJM^ ' ' ^^^1 HIH^^^^^nHHHH^I [Hy permi^\ivn,from "h'light." THE POR'l SIDE (JONDOLA OF L 33. at the time, making observation difficult both for attackers in the air and defenders on the ground. The Zeppelin pilots lost their way. They believed, according to the official German statements, that they reached the mouth of the Humbor, destroying a lighthou.se there, and that from there they went inland to Lincoln and Norwich, and then on to Grimsby and Immingham. Actually, many of their bombs fell into the sea, and a large proportion of the others on agricultural land. In Lincoln- shire the casualties wore reported as one calf, one rabbit, and five thrushes killed. A hay- stack was set on fire, two bombs fell on the side of a raUway, and eight bombs, evidently aimed at a village, fell into fields and roads, doing no harm. When the airships approached certain im- portant points, they were met by heavy fire from anti-aircraft guns, and sheered of?. From the British point of view the defence was not satisfactory. On July 31 the Zeppelins came again. This time they spread over a wider field, including the Thames Estuary, Kent, Lincoln, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Essex and Huntingdon. The enemy pilots claimed that they reached London, a claim promptly denied. The air- ships sailed very high and were aided in ap- proaching the coast by a thin mist, which gave them some concealment. They reached England at ten, before it was quite dark. They were warmly received. Our ships fired on them at sea, they were picked up time after time by searchlights as they passed over the Ifvnd, and whenever they came within range of the British defences they were heavily bombarded. They showed special activity in scattering incendiary THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 185 bombs among growing crops. Apparently little damage was done by either side. There were no casualties among the British population. One Zeppelin was beUeved to be hit, but got away. One very curious incident was reported by the Secretary of the Admiralty. A British aeroplane was reported to have pursued and attacked a Zeppelin 30 mUes off the East Coast. " The pUot had fired over two trays of ammuni- tion into the Zeppelin when he was temporarily incapacitated by a portion of his machine gun flying off and stunning him. The Zeppelin was nowhere to be seen when the pilot regained consciousness, and he was therefore forced to return to the station."' On August 3 a fleet of Zeppelins hovered over the North Sea, attacking trawlers, and soon after ten at night crossed over the land, visiting Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex. On this occasion the Zeppelins did not attempt to go far inland. They dropped bombs over a large area of the coast and were engaged at different points by anti-aircraft guns. Xine horses were killed and three injured. The futility of this raid could only be explained by the assumption that the airships lost their way. They wandered about with apparent vagueness. Flying at a great height they succeeded in keeping out of the range of anti-aircraft guns, but were unable to bomb any important centre, nearly all their missiles falling on vacant land. Once more the Germans claimed that London, Harwich and important IVI'K.AI. I'.XAVICI.I'.S (>]• IMF, VVOKK <>!• I I II'. i/l'l'l'l I .INS. In ibe hou«e reprc«ented in the l(»wcr illiintriition ii woman, a (jirl and a boy were killed, and •everal persons wtre injured near by. 1H«; 77//<; TIMES HISTORY OF Till': W'Ali. L O W t K UtitM^ HOCK •1 «.-^ »0*> u>'OfPIH« FKOM IJU>INI. industrial establishments and "railway works in Norfolk had boon attacked. It was firmly believed by many observers that one of the Zeppelins had been struck, and seriously damaged. It showed every sign of being crippled as it made off eastwards, and a search was undertaken seawards to discover if it had fallen there. As the Zeppelins returned home they crossed over Dutch territory and were fired upon by Dutch batteries. On August 9 the fourth attack was made ; it was by far the most serious. A nvunber of hostile airships visited, singly or in pairs, a wide area in the South-East of Scotland and the North-East and East Coasts of England. This time the enemy showed more boldness, directly attacking various towns, and evidently aiming at the indiscriminate destruction of property. The German armies were being severely pressed on the Somme, and it was apparently desired to be able to report great damage to England in order to divert the attention of the German people from the Western front. In Scotland the raiders were hampered by thick weather, and their bombs, reported to be of an unusually powerful kind, fell harmlesoly on fields and roads. In several towns on the North-East Coast the anti-aircraft guns drove the enemy oil. A Zeppelin came over from westwards, hovered at a height beyond the reach of the guns, and dropped a number of bombs over a residential district, doing considerable damage to piivate property and causing some loss of life. Tliree people died of shock, seven were killed, and a number injured BUMB-IJKUI'1'INU AI'I'aKaTUS The Gennan official report confirmed the opinion that unusually powerful bombs were employed. Apparently the invaders were un- aware that they had reached Scotland, as they laid no claim to it. " Powerful explosions were observed at the iron works and benzol factories- in Middlesbrough, and large fires were seen in the harbour establishments of Hull and Hartle- pool. The good effects of the explosions were also observed in yards on the Tyne, and fires were caused in the industrial establishments of Whitby. Strong effects were seen at the railway establishments of King's Lynn," said the Ger- man report. This statement was dismissed by the British authorities as being " the usual perversion of truth." From the British point of view the way in which the series of raids was met could not be considered wholly satisfactory. It is true that, with the exception of one town, the enemy had been driven off without inflicting any material damage, and oiu* anti-aircraft guns had demon- strated their ability to compel the enemy to fly at great height and to avoid many important centres But it was equally true that muubers of airships had come over British soil, had remained in many cases for hours and had returned in safety. There was a growing feeling that our defence would not be effective until the invading airships were attacked by other aircraft, in the air. Two hostile seaplanes visited Dover on August 12. They made at great speed for the town, flying seven or eight thousand feet high, dropped their bombs, turned ami THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 187 OF A GERMAN AIRSHIP. fled. Anti-aircraft guns immediately opened fire on them and aeroplanes rose in pursuit, but the attackers, having the advantage of altitude, got clear away. The attacK only lasted a few minutes. One officer and several men were slightly injured, and some windows were broken. The enemy, keeping to their usual plan of waiting for moonless nights for airship attacks, did not visit England again until August 24, when six Zeppelins raided the East and South Coasts, and one succeeded in reaching the out- skirts of London. Attacks were made on two seaside towns, one on the East and the other on the South-East Coast. In Vjoth cases the enemy were driven off by gunfire, one of the Zeppelins being obliged to empty all its bombs in the sea before it made away. In the district outside I^jndon that was attacked there were a number of narrow (ififJij>*iH. One bomb fell in the roadway in a street of shops which was of average; width. It expkxled with great force, making a big cavity in the strw^t, and Hmashing winflows for a considerable distance round. A block of granit<> fjfJging of the footymth was carried iif) by the ioTC*) of the explfjsiori iuto a first-flftor b*jdrfK>rri. A rjirU^r with a van and two horw>H ha/1 pulled up at a coffee stall in the street, and was talking U> the stall -keejH-r wlien the bomb burst quite clow* U> him. TIk! two honw:H were killed, and the two men wrjre knocked over but rmly slightly injured. Thrjse were the only r->iHuultieH at that sjiot. Another b';mb droppefl in a yard befiinri a (/roup ot abnshouses, where about 80 old men and women lived. Every window in the alms- houses was broken, but no one was hurt. Another bomb blew down part of the iron railings of a railway station, but did no fiu-thor damage. The number killed in this district was seven. A bomb fell on the roof of two small new houses, and destroyed them. In one of the hoiises a worker, his wife, and a daughter aged 22 months were killed, and another child was slightly injiu-ed. Thoy were evidently trying to get downstairs when the bomb landed and the falling debris killed them. In a hou.se in a different locaUty another man was killed, with his wife and a daughter aged 11. The house was wrecked, with the exception of a staircase, on which the body of the man was found, half -dressed. The body of the wife was practically in two, while both aims and one log had Vjeon torn off the child. A young woman occupying a[)artments in the house was killed in bod. The bomb had blown the floor away, causing the bed to fall on to the next floor, when the vvalls had (;ollap.sed on it. y\nother victim who was fatally injuiod f)n the hf»ad and chest was a switchboard atten<lani at an electric works. tn one .S(juth-I<]»iwt (Joast village tiio iippor floors of two fwijoining houses were conipletoly wrecke<l. In one of these a father, inoUior »i,iid cliild \vi-ii« killed, iind in another sevei'al [)eople wore serirjusly injincd. A wonum of 70 WHH killed while in her room. 'I'lio first returns (^avo tlir- total killfid as eight;, and the injured IHH THE TIMES HISTifliY OF THE WAR. a<i 21 ; but lattn' iiiforiiiHtiuii uhuvvud tliat tliu total (it thtt woiuiileil uiitl killtnl wuii lat'i^ur tliau at tirat tliuught. 'I'tut authoritiHS uuni- plaiutul that |uh>|)1u vvoulil gathor in tlut strtfot to hut) tliu airHhi|)s, ami ileclaruil that sovural ca80M of injury would liavw |je«n avoiiUul but for thin. A captain in tho Koyai Flying Corps aot out from an aorotlronie on thu Stiuth-Kaat Coast in pursuit of one of the aii-ships. He reached it and maintained a riuuiing fight with it until the coast of tht* Coiitinent was reached, |>iuuping A ZEPPELIN ON FIRE NEAR LONDON. Seen from a distance, one of the burning airships appeared as a rosy-red glowing mass, revealing its shape distinctly. nearly two di'ums of aiuminiition from his macliine gun into it. I'aced as he was by the powerful armament of the Zeppelin, his venture was one of great daring, but lie escaped un- scathed, and was given an enthusiastic reception by his fellow airmen on his return. Thenight of Saturday, September 2, witnessed the most formidable airsliip attack made upon England, and witnessed also the initiation of new methods of defence which immediately proved their ef?ectivenL-iS. Thii-teen aii-sliips crossed over the North Sea into the Eastern Counties, making for the .Midlands and London. New lighting n^gulations had come into force shortly before, greatly reducing the visible illumination tlu'oughout tiio area of air attack. It was soon seen that thes** were effective, compelling the airships to gropt* about trying to find their way. Most of the raidoi-s wandenid over East Anglia, droj)ping bombs indiscrimi- nately. Three succeeded in reaching the out- skirts of London. Two were driven off. The third was brought to the ground in flames by an attacking airman — Lieutenant William Leofe Robinson, of the Worcester Regiment and Royal Flying Corj)s. It was tho first (Jerman airshii) destroyed on British soil. The (iglit took place within view of hmxdreds of thousands of i)e()ple, and even the dullest could not fail to realize that here was a spectacle of profound significance. ].,ondon, like the whole of the rest of the coimtry affected, was lying in almost complete darkness. Faint flickering lam[)s in the streets and shaded lights through the curtained windows of the houses were alone visible. The news that an air attack was impending had spread over the town. The hospitals were ready for possible emergencies : at every fire station the engines waited, prepared to respond to any call ; at every police station surgeons and nurses had come on duty, and ambulance men, with stretchers, were waiting. Every special constable had been called up. Lawyers and merchants, veteran civil servants and elderly shopkeepers, men most of them engaged fully during the day in their ordinary tasks, they were voluntarily giving their hours for leisure and sleep to the nation. Li many homes the young children had been taken to the lower floors, and put to sleep on extem- porised beds there, so as to minimise their risk should a bomb strike the house. Some people gathered on the roofs of houses ; multitudes flocked into the streets ; every vantage spot was crowded with spectatoi-s anxious to miss nothing of what was happening. The searchlights were exploring the dark, star-Ut, partly clouded sky. There were dozens of them, beams showing from every part of London and the outer subm'bs and sweeping the sky section by section. Now half a dozen lights wovild play on one spot ; now they would move their rays rapidly across the entire heavens. On this night the full strength of the lights was on, and such brilliant illiuninatioii had never been witnessed by London before. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 189 THE BURNING Near Cuffley, Sept. 3 [yiuAo by H. Hcott Orr. AIRSHIP. 1916. Spectators could not but realize the amazing beauty of the scene. Soon there came the sound of distant gims and bursting bombs. Then shells could be seen bursting in the air. The lights were now concentrating northwards, and a thrill passed through the crowds as the shape of an airship became visible. It was moving southwards and westwards. It paused, dodging apparently to escape the lights and the bursting shells, chianging its altitude and turning. Some signals of no significance to the watching crowds were momentarily seen. The airship disap- peared from view, behind a smoko screen which it had created. The searchlights wore suddenly cut off and the gunfire ceased. What had happrned ? What was about to happen ? men aukfxl one another. Then carne a little ruass of flame, which instantly kinrllod into a grf;at blazing body, an illumination such as f^ondon had never witnfsssed before. Twenty miles away men couJd see to road their newHf)apers. Not that anyone wante<l to read. Tlio/e were no ey»;H save for this one thing Strangers r«ught one anr^tlier f>y the arm in tiuiiT touati excitemr;rit. 'i'hf; uirHhip liad caught fire ! It waf» blazing from stem to stem ! The gr<?at maiw of fiames came hurtling oartliward.s. The crowds started to cheer, hard cheers, stern cheers. The messenger of death had come over them, and had himself met death on his way. At first it was thought that a shell had struck the airsliip. Soon the truth became known all over London that it had been brought down by a young British flying man, who had engaged the monster in a duel in the air. Several airmen had gone up to meet the invader. One of these, Lieut. Robinson, caught sight of her, after long searching. He was then aboi;t 8,000 feet high ; the airsliip was 2,000 to 3,000 feet higher. He made straight for the German . The search- lights were cut off, and the gunfu-e ceased. The airman, in searching the heavens, was naturally in even greater danger from our own shell fire, untU it ceased, than he was from possible attack from the enemy. The gminers on the aii-ship saw him and opened fixe. They were too late. He delivered iJ'hiiliitiv II. Scott Orr. ITNAL FALL OF THK CUFFLRY AIRSHIP. his attack on the great monster. The hydrogen gas in the ballonots caught alight and then all was over. One of the most detailed accounts of the fight in the air was given at the time by an ofticor of the Royal Flying Corps who was among the airmen (engaged : Two othf^r luTopliiiioH, ho naid, w< rn at lluit (imo i'ii(li-fivourin(< to uiigiigo lh(^ air.'^lii|i, wliicli wiih milking k X o J O S u. H O I? i 8 190 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 191 f rantic efforts to get away, at the same time firing with machine guns. The Zippelin was travelling at top speed, first diving and then ascending, and apparently Lieutenant W. L. Robinson anticipated the manoeuvre. The commander of the airship threw out tremendous black clouds of smoke which completely hid him from our view, and in which he managed to rise. A few seconds later we saw the airship a couple of thousand feet above us, and at the same altitude was Lieutenant Robinson, although perhaps half a mile away. Imme- diately Robinson headed his machine for the raider, and, flying at a terrific speed, it appeared that he was going to charge the monster. As the Zeppalin took fire a second airship was seen approaching, and this now occupied our attention. The commander of that craft, however, seeing the fate of the first Zeppelin, turned tail and scurried off as fast as his engines would enable him. I am told that German aeroplanes accompanied the Zeppelins, but of this all I can say is I saw non? on Sunday morning, although other officers claim to have done so. The great mass of wreckage fell still blazing oa a field at Ouffley, a little village near Enfield, to the north of London. The bodies of the crew of sixteen, burned almost out of recognition, lay all round, and even those who felt most bitterly about the brutaUty of raids upon unarmed civilian populations could not refrain from pity at the sight. At first the airship was supposed to be a Zeppelin. It was called so in the fi.r3t official dispatch, which somewhat naively remarked : " The large amount of wood employed in the framework of the Zeppelin ia startling, and would seem to point to a shortage of aluminium in Germany." Experts, however, quickly recognized it as a Schiitte-Lanz. The news that the airship had been brought down by an airman was not allowed to be published until the following Tuesday, when it was formally announced that the i^ng had been gra^nouily pUiaHud to bfjstow the Victoria Cros.s on Lieiitenant liobinson for inost conspicuous bravery. " He attacked an enemy airship unfler circuiastancos of groat difficulty and rlangfjr," the official communique declared, " ami Hont it crashing to the ground as a flaming wreck. He hari bf>en in the air for more than two hours, and lifvl provioiisly attacked another airshiip, during his flight." LieuU^nant Kobinson wjah a national hero, *)Vf>n before thuj formal annriuncement was made public. He wa8 only twenty-one years old and was a grand-Kin of a Chief N'aval Constructor at PortHrnouth iJockyard. Horn in India, and •j'luoat'jd at St. Been School, Cumberland, he enter»>*l Sandhurst in August, 1014. In the following Dwjernber he w»w gazett<ni to the Woro'jHtor I'.egirnont and joined tlie lioyal Flying CorpH t%n an olwerver in March, 1015. Wounded on May 9 that year, by a shrapnel bullet in the left arm he returned home and soon afterwards qualified as a flying officer. His successful fight brought him not alone great honour, but large monetary prizes. Various rewards had been offered for the first airman bringing down a Zeppelin in the British Islands. Among these were £2,000 from Mr. Joseph Oowen, £1,000 from Lord Michelham, and £500 from Mr. WiUiara Bow, the shipbuilder of Paisley. It was strongly felt in Army circles, however, that the offer of outside monetary rewards for British officers was undesirable, and a regtilation was passed shortly afterwards prohibiting it in future. The name of the German commander was subsequently given in the German casualty lists as Captain WUhelm Schramm. When it was announced that the airship crew were to be given a military funeral, some protests were raised, on the ground that no honours ought to be paid to the remains of those who had come here to attempt the slaughter of unarmed women and children. This protest caused resentment among members of the British flying services, who declared that the Germans were brave men who, in attempting to bomb London, had only obeyed orders, who had run great risks, and who had earned their right to the last token of soldiers' respect. The funeral was carried out under the direc- tion of the Royal Flying Corps, and a contingent of our flying men attended. Six officers of the Flying Corps with bared heads carried the body of the commander from the motor lorry to the graveside, and each other coffin was carried by men of the corps. There were also present six more officers and about fifty men ; among them wore several who had earned decorations for conspicuous bravery in the air war. Two graves had been dug, one for the commander, and a large grave for the fifteen men. On the coffin of the officer was a simple inscription, his name not then being known : AN UNKNOWN GEHMAN OFFICER KILLED WIIILK COMMANDINQ ZKl'i'KLIN L.21, 3KD SEFTCMUISK, 1016. At tlu; concluHion of the funeral service two buglfTS sounded the " Last Post," while the Hfjidiors stood to attention. One other airshi[) w»w badly injured during 19-2 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. I the ruiil, ultttuu^h it iiuiiiu^ml to gt>t away. A part uf a Zoppolia was |>i<-ki<cl up in Kast Anglia, whiuli pruveti uii exaiiiiiititiou to bu an ohsurva- tion oar, made uf aluuiiniuin, and elaborately fitted for an obaerver to be lowered a conHider- able distance below the Zeppelin, to watch the country underneath, and to telephone what he «aw to the conunander above. The caHiuvltieB reporttnl for the raid of September li were Hurprisingly few consitlering the number of shipn engaged, one man and one woman being officially recorded as killed, and II men and women and two cliildren injured. A seaplane visited Dover on September 22, dropping three bombs and inflicting no damage. [Heath. FLIGHT COMMANDER W. L. ROBINSON, V.C. Two nights later another big airsliip raid was attempted. Twelve Zeppelins crossed over the East and South-East Coasts. This time their main destination was London. They were received as they approached the shore with what they themselves described as " extraordinarily heavy fire with incendiary shells." Some of the airsliips made for Lincolnshire and the Eastern Counties. Two made for London from the south-east and one from the east. One Zeppelin fell in flames in Essex, every man in it being killed. Another, so damaged by the British shell fire that it could not get away, came to earth by the Essex coast. The commander and crew blew it up, and then marched along seeking someone to whom they »!(»uld rtiurender themselvMH. A special constable heai'ing tim noise outside went along the road to I'nirn what was the matter. Jle mot a group of twenty men. One, the commander, asked hiui liow far it was to a certain town, and on learning that it was six miles turned, after some talk with his nien, to the special constable. Another of the |)arty voluntettred an explana- tion. " Zeppelin," he said. " Wo crew — prisoners of war." Tin* men showed some anxiety to bo placed in the hands of the military, possibly fearing violence from mobs. Some more special constables and police came up and the crew were taken away. Daylight revealed a wonderful sight. The framework of the Zeppelin, a tangled mass of wreckage after the explosion, glistened like the scales of some prehistoric monster. Its size amazed all who saw it, and visitors exhausted themselves in adjectives to convey their im- pression. One man described it as like " a Crystal Palace in ruins." Close on 700 feet long, over three score and ten feet in diameter, even though crushed in, it still gave an over- whelming impression of greatness. The ex- plosion had not succeeded in totally destroying the ship, and enough was left to enable the British authorities to learn full details of the newest type of German airship. The end of the airship set in flames in the sky was well described by a Special Constable, writing in The Times : I watched one of the Zeppelins under fire for some minutes ; in the searchlight beams she looked like an incandescent bar of white-hot steel. Then she staggered and swung to and fro in the air for just a perceptible moment of time. That, no doubt, was the instant when the damage was done, and the huge craft became un- manageable. Then, without drifting at all from her approximate place in the sky, without any other pre- liminary, she fell like a stone — first horizontally — i.e., in h^r sailing trim — then in a position which rapidly became almost perpendicular, she went down, a mass of flame. The nation did not learn the nanie of the airman to whom special credit was due for the destruction of the first of the Essex Zeppelins until early in October, when it was announced that the King had been pleased to bestow the Companionship of the Distinguished Service Order upon Second Lieutenant F. Sowrey and Second Lieutenant Alfred de Bath Brandon, both attached to the Royal Flying Corps. The decoration was given in recognition of then gallant and distinguished service in connexion with the successful attack upon enemy airships. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 193 Mr. Sowrey, who was 23 years old, was a son of a Deputy Chief Inspector of Taxes at Somer- set House. He was studying for the Indian Civil Service when the war broke out, and was then granted a commission in the Royal Fusi- liers. He was wounded at Loos, and afterwards at Ypre ;. Joining the Royal Flying Corps in January, 1916, he took his pilot's certificate in June, and had been night flying since. He was with his friend Lieutenant Robinson when the latter brought down the airship at Cu£3ey. ]VIr. Sowrey had been fljTng some time on the night of the raid in Essex when he picked up the Zeppelin. He at once climbed and attacked it. The Zeppelin replied vigorovisly, and an amazing fight in the air followed, each manoeuvring for position. ;Mr. Sowrey out-manoeu\Ted his giant oppo- nent, attacked him, and caused the gas to ignite. Mr. Brandon, decorated at the same time, was a New Zealander, 32 years old, and was a barrister in practice in Xew Zealand iintil the war broke out, when he retiuTied home. He joined the Flying Corps and distinguished him- self, not by the destruction of any partictdar HHMrjVIN(; A MAfJIINf. (;nN AND A HKOKf'.N I'KOIM'll.liK Wf<HCKAf;H Ol IHR CUFFI.KY AIKSHIP. FROM THH 194 THt: TIMES IIISTOliY OF THE WAR. Zuppuliii, but by luurkoil gtiUaiitry and devo- tion to duty. He \uul taken cunupicuuuti |)ttrt in beveral of the biggetit air fightti in Kugland, and liad Htiared in the dtnitructiun of the Eaaex Zeppehn. Tiie tale of liis doingH wan fainiUar to most iniUtaiy airmen, and hid decoration wad universally regardeil as thoroughly well denerved. One ol the raiderti on the night of Sep- tember 23 reached outer London from the «outli, dropping bombd at irregular intervals. Its activities striking'! v rovonlod tho ii.sst»ntial destroyed. In another outlying East London district another Zeppelin dropped bombs in a poor quarter and killed or wounded some more folk, but the outrages affected London as a whole no more tlian a pin prick would affect a liealthy man. Most Londoners knew nothing of what had happened until they read about it next morning in the news- pa|)ers. The main current of life in the metro- polis was not so much affected as it would be by a stoppage of traffic at Ludgato Circus for half an hour. It became clear that to affect London as a whole, not one or two but a hun- liod raiders, allowed to work their wiU freely, would be necessary. The individual sufferings of the few families concerned aroused natural pity. But in London, whore a man often does not know THE OBSERVATION CAR FOUND IN EAST ANGLIA. Interior and Exterior. futility of this form of attack against the population of a great city. In one way the Germans were able to claim a certain amoiuit of success. Some of the bombs fell on houses — small, two -storied suburban homes — and destroyed them. A certain nvmiber of the inmates of these houses and of people in the streets were killed or mutilated. One bomb fell in a front garden and killed or wounded people. The pecuniary total of the damage "did not, it is true, amount to a fraction of the cost of the two Zeppelins the name of his next-door neighbour and would not recognize him by sight, there was no sense of common suffering such as accompanies a tragedy in a smaller district. A retired shopkeeper and his wife lived in a villa facing the main road. Aroused by the noise they came to the front door to find out what was the matter. A bomb dropped in the garden in front of the house, and killed both of them. A man was found standing dazed outside his house. He declartni that a bomb bursting in the roadway had blown him THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 195 out of the front window. He helped to carry his daughter, a girl clerk, out of the house, and then the two were taken to hospital. Both died, the father from injvuy to the abdomen, and the daughter from shock and injury to the spine. A tobacconist's manager left his wife standing by the front door of the shop and went upstairs to see after the children. As he bent over their bed, the ceUing feU down on them. A bomb exploding near by had wrecked the house and started a fire. The father was unable to make a way downstairs, and so carried the clul^dren out of the front window and along some ledges to time." An hour later he was dead. An in- surance clerk was decapitated and could only be identified by his clothing. The age and callings of the victims can best be judged by the cases in the first day's inquests. The age of each is given in brackets : French polisher (58). Window cleaner (67). G.P.O. sorter (55). Two men (31 and 45). Insurance clerk (23). Stevedore (43). Carman (20). Carman (53). Casual ward attendant (41) Married woman. K.R.R.C. private's wife. Barmaid (19). Carpenter's widow (63). Baker's widow (71). Sluiceman's wife. R.F.A. gunner's wife (20). Their daughter (13 months). Engineer's son (4). FUNERAL OF CAPTAIN SCHRAMM, COMMANDKR OF THE CUFFLEY AIRSHIP. another Hhop. When he caino Vjaf^k to whore his wife ha^l ^»en ho found her horribly mutilated — dead. The bornb ha/l exploded right in front < f her. A wf»man, the wife of a variety pei-fr>rTner, WHH carin(5 for the four-year-old child of a friend, on the way home from Houtli Africa. Jjdf/rw from an explosion fell on them and crunhed and BiifffKiat^xJ Jxjth. A f>ririt<!r'H r<!a<ier, hearing the noi«« of the }>orfil/H, went to wsek hin two dau^hfcorH. They foiiri<l him lying in the roa<l- way. '■ I don't feeJ very miieh hurt," he declar^xJ bravely. " Vou ran tak(» f»lerif,y of 'J'here were tales in plenty of quiet heroism. A d(x;tor went to one woman, injured about the head and fa<;e. " Don't bother about me," she murmured. " Attend to the others who are more seriouHly injured." A girl of 13 was sitting uf) waiting for luir pnn^ntH to come home A \><)tn\) biirst near by, blowing the whole side of the houHe in. The child, recovering her senses, reniemlxtred her baby brother uf)HtairH. The Htairs were broken and Home of the steps knock«Mj out. Hho climlxHl u[) them, j)icked the Ijaby out of bed, and carried it into the dark Htreet. il»r<i for the trminerit her heart shook. 196 THE TIMES niSTUHY OF THE WAIi. ROLLING UP WIRE FROM THE CUFFLEY AIRSHIP. and kneeling down on the roadway she prayed tor help. Then she took off her dress and wrapped it round her charge. A special constable coming along told her to take shelter. " I knew I must take my baby brother to a hospital," she afterwards said, and she took him along. There it was found that she herself was wounded. The little maid some time afterwards received the Carnegie Medal for bravery. The official retiu'ns gave the casualties due to this raid as 140 — 30 killed and 110 injured. Of these, 28 were killed and 99 injured in the metropolitan area. Fourteen bombs were dropped on a Midland town, killing four persons and injuring seven. On the North-East Coast, Zeppelins attacked by land, while submarines attacljed fishing boats by sea. The submarines were far more successful than the airsliips,'for they sank 12 Grimsby trawlers. On the following Monday night there came another attack, now by seven Zeppelins. This time some industrial centres in the North were aimed at, and a nvimber of small houses, the homes of working people, were destroyed. The aii'ships approached various important centres but were driven off them by heavy gunfire. In one place a Zeppelin reached a congested working class quarter and dropped bombs on it. A chapel was wrecked, 40 small houses damaged, and a number of men, women and children killed. Thirty-six bodies were recovered from the ruins in two days. The flunsy houses afforded no protection, and under the force of the heavy explosives most of the victims were buried in the ruins. In one house alone, father, mother and five children were all killed. In another town in the North Midlands 12 bombs were dropped and 11 persons killed. The known losses from this raid were returned on the following day as 36 killed and 27 injui-ed, but it was feared that there were still more tp be accounted for iinder the ruins of some of the houses. It was reported from various quarters that not a factory or place of any military impoitance had been touched. On the same evening an airship visited the Southern Coast but was discovered by searchlights and quickly i-etreated before heavy gimfire. The Germans claimed on this occasion " to have bombarded lavishly, with explosive and incendiary bombs, with visibly good result, the British naval port of Portsmouth, the reinforced places at the mouth of the Thames, and industrial and railway installations of military importance in Central England, including York, Leeds, Lincoln and Derby." The thu'd of these attacks, in some ways THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 197 ;he most formidable series yet launched against England, was on the night of October 1, tvhen 10 Zeppelins crossed the East Coast and nade another attempt on London. The scone ivas in many ways a repetition of that a month before. The anti-aircraft guns around London irere actively engaged. One Zeppelin was seen ipproaching shortly before midnight, and was bombarded. The searchlights caught it, lost it, and caught it again. The gunfire was jlearly very effective. Suddenly it ceased and the searchhghts were cut off. A sudden jlow came in the sky, first a crescent of fire kvhieh grew with almost incredible rapidity to a round ball, and then to a great, long sheet of lame. To some gazing at it, it was as though ;he sword of the Angel of Wrath was stretched )ver London. Then the line of flame fell, "aster and faster. As it descended it broke n two, and the main gondola separating 'rem the hull fell stiU more rapidly by itself. \s it reached earth with enormous momentum. It Potter's Bar, the crowds assembled at I thou-sand points started singing " God Save the King." The spectacular fall could -)e clearly seen from Tunbridge Wells on one side to the end of the Home Counties on the other. Millions witnessed it, and men i-ealized that the worst menace of the Zeppelin was now over. They might come again, doing even greater harm. But at least we had weapons and men to fight them. The credit on this occasion was mainly due to Second Lieutenant Tempest, of the Royal Flying Corps, one of four soldier brothers, 26 years old, and a son of the Chairman of the Pontefract (West Riding) Magistrates. ]\Ir. Teinpest was shortly afterwards decorated with the Distinguished Service Order. As the biu-ning airship fell to the ground, several of the crew fliuig themselves or were thrown from it. Their bodies were scattered over the ground, a sloping meadow, and pre- sented a hideous sight. It was found on exami- nation that the commander of the airshiji had been no less a man than Mathy, the best known of all the Zeppelin captains. In an interview given to an American journalist some little time before, Mathy declared that he had taken part in every raid on England. When asked about danger from aeroplane attacks, he ridi- culed the notion of danger from solitary planes. ['AF<r oi- niH wi(H(:ka(;j', oi a zhim'Hmn. 198 THE TIMES IIISTOUY i>E I HE WAIL ^"^v^ WRECKAGE OF THE BURNT ZEPPELIN BROUGHT DOWN IN ESSEX, SEPTEMBER 24, 1916. " 1 am not afraid of thern," he said then, " I think I could make it interesting for them, vmless there was a regular swarm." It was to an aeroplane that ho owed his entl. " Our revenge must be brutal ! " the Leipziger Xeueste Nachrichten declared, when lamenting the loss of a Zeppelin. " It is not known how the disaster occmTsd, but one thing seems to be certain — that the English anti-aircraft service has become better and therefore more dangerous for our men." Critics in America began to talk of the Zeppt^lin as an exploded instrument of war. The British authorities, however, by no means adopted the view that the danger was over. With a long line of coast to defend, it was recognized that Zeppelins might on any favourable occasion make a way through un- defeniled gaps, unless the gi-eatest care and watchfulness wore exercised. Therefore, defen- sive air preparations of every kind were still further pushed on. There came a pause, la.sting over some weeks. Then on the night of November 27 a number of airships approached the North-East Coast of England. On this occasion, London was care- fully avoided. The North -East Coast was prepared for them. The German official state- ment admitted, " The defence was extraordi- narily powerful." The night was unvisually still. As one Zeppelin drew near, it was 2nd LIEUT. W. J. TEMPEST, D.S.O. 2nd LIEUT. F. SOWREY, D.S.O. FLIGHT COMMANDER A. de B. BRANDON, M.C., D.S.O. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 190 WRECKAGE OF BURNT ZEPPELIN BROUGHT DOWN AT POTTER'S BAR. located by the searchlights, which could not be shaken off, however it dodged and twisted. There followed the now familiar spectacle. A ball of brilliant light appeared in the hull of the vessel. It quickly became a mass of flame, lighting up the country for 40 miles around. Then the nose of the airship dropped straight to earth and it began to fall, splitting into two parts before it plunged into the sea. The great armies of spectators sang the National Anthem; as their fellow-countrymen had done earlier around London. A second airship travelled over the ^lidland counties dropping bombs. At six in the morning, when the first signs showed them- selves across the sky of the coming of dawn, it drew near the Norfolk coast. Aeroplanes were still attempting to attack it, and it was firing on them. The Zeppelin moved slowly like a badly wounded bird making for home. It was clear that it had suffered much in the fight. The crew evidently effected some repairs, for as the airship approached the land defences it rose in the air to a height of 8,000 feet, and suddenly jDut on high speed. It seemed for the moment as though it must escape. Nine miles out at sea four machines of the Royal Nava THE NOSE OF L 33. Air Service attacked it, and an armed trawler opened gunfire. Soon a glowing spot appeared on its side, and spread fore and aft, and the ship, blazing from end 'to end, also fell into the sea. Throe ofhcei-s of the Royal Naval Air Service were decorated for their work during this raid. The Distinguished Service Order was bestowed upon Flight-Lieutenant Edward L. Pulling ; and the Distinguished Service Cross on Flight -Lieutenant Egbert Cadburyt 'IMF, IKAMHWOKK Ol 1,33 IN A IIEII) IN F,SSHX. •200 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR THE WRHGK OF 1. 33. Showing the great length of the airship. antl Flight Sub-Lieut€*nant (Jeranl W. R. Fane. The Zeppelins had inflicted littlo damage. Over a hundred bombs were dropped, but the effect was surprisingly small. In one town 15 houses were seriously injured. One woman died from shock, and five men, seven women and four children were injured. The same morning, while England was re- joicing over the defeat of the Zeppelins, a fresh blow was struck at London. For over a year experts had anticipated that attempts would be made to attack London in daylight by aeroplane. On Tuesday, November 28, a German aeroplane, taking advantage of a slight haze, made for London, flying at a groat h(»ight. It was unobserved until its bombs b«»gan to fall. iSix bombs in all were sent down, and nine persons were injured. The raiders quickly turned back. That afternoon, at a quarter past two, the French at Dunkirk brought down the plane as it passed. It carried two naval lieutenants, and with them was a large-scale map of London. What did the incident signify ? Was it the bogimiing of a new era in the air war against London, when the Zeppelin was to be abandoned and aeroplanes take its place, or was it merely the incidental activity of some adventurous German officers ? FLIGHT-GOMMANDER BRANDON'S AEROPLANE. Presented by the Gaekwar of Baroda. CHAPTER CLVIII. THE ADVANCE TOWARDS BAGHDAD. Operatioxs IX WixTER OF 1914 Rec.axled — -Lord Hardinge at Basra — Movements in January, 1915 — Actions at Ahwaz and Shaiba — ^Attitude of the Arabs — Conditions of Campaigning IN Turkish Arabia — Sir John Nixon's Command — Prospects of an Advance — Battle of Barjasiya — ^The King's Message — The Position at Kurna — Problem for Government of India — The Decision to Advance^General Xixon's Dispositions — General Gorringe — General Townshend's Operations — Occupation of Nasrieh — ^The Battle of Kut — General Townshend's Victory — ^The Decision to Advance on Baghdad — General Townshend's Views — Mr. Asquith's Speech — The British Repulse — Battle of Ctesiphon — Causes of Failure — Withdraw.ax to Lajj — Retreat to Kut — -Kut Besieged — The Question of Responsibility. AX earlier chapter, entitled "The Invasion of Chaldoa," * gave an account of the hostilities between the Turks and the BritLsh forces at the head of the Persian Gulf during the winter of 1914. The chapter began with a description of this great inland sea, and showed how from the earliest ages its lonely waters and arid shores had borne an innportant part in the history of the Eastern World. The conditions under which the control of the Gulf fell into the hands of drf^&t Britain three centuritjs ago were fully explained, and it was made clear that ever since that time British influence had been used for the extirpation of piracy and slavery, for the maint^nan^M) of order, and for the freedom of trade. The chajjter went on to recount the steps taken by other nations with the ohjr;ct of under- mining the British position- <;H[)ecially the efforts of the Turks to push forward along tli" Wf«t*»rTi shortM of the Gulf, and the attempts of the Germans during the last 20 years to obtain a footing in this part of the world. It was pointed out that the main object of Goniiuny • Vol. III. CUiif.ur r.lf. ~ Vol. X.— Pari 123 201 had been, not to get a share in the Gulf trade in pearls and wheat and dates, rich as that might become, but to establish herself on the Gulf as a political power. Supported by the Turks, and having at her back a German railway through Western Asia, with its terminus at the ancient port of Basra, she would then have gained a position from which she could man- oeuvre after her way against British supremacy in the East. Finally, it was shown that Great Britain had gained a new interest, and taken upon h«'rself a new responsibility, by the acquisition of a valuable line of oil wells in Persian territory near the Turkish frontier, the oil being dostinf)d for the use of the British Xavy. The chapter closed with a brief review of the military operations. This narrative showed lliut, before Turkey had declared hor.self, the Government of India had sent a brigade, uiidf^r Brigadier-General Delamain, to the island of I'xihnin, in the Gulf ; that immediately after the declaration of hostilities this small force had seized Fao, at the mouth of th«) Hfiatt-al- Anib, and pushe<l on sonm miles further up the river ; that it hud then been joined by two 'HYl rut: TiMKs msTDHY uf Till': wail [M.lliotl & Iry. MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES V. F. TOWNSHEND, K.C.B., D.S.O., Who commanded the British Force beleaguered in Kut-el-Amara. more brigades ; that in the course of the next few weeks the combined force, now a division under the command of Major-General Sir Arthur Bari-ett, had after one or two sharp fights occupied (November 23, 1914) the port of Basra itself, and (December 9, 1914) the town of Kurna, nearly 50 miles farther north, at the confluence of the Eujjhrates and Tigris ; and that by the capture of these points the British troops had established themselves in a position not only to protect the oil wells, but to control completely the lower course of the combined rivers, thereby blocking the German railway scheme. In February, 1915, the Viceroy of India, Lord HarcUnge of Penhm-st, paid a visit to the headquarters of the force, which was under the control of the Indian Govermnent, and inspected some neighbom-ing points. He had come, he told the people of Basra, to see local conditions for liimself, in ordei' the better to judge what measures were necessary. His conclusions were, of course, not made public ; but all then seemed fairly satisfactory. The Turks had offered no very stubborn resistance, £Uid though it was known that some Turkish forces, supported by Arab tribesmen, were still holding the country beyond our outposts, it was generally believed that at this distant extremity of the Turkish Empire the enemy would ^e unable to develop any great show of strength. The British force was supposed to be fully capable of holcUng its own and doing the work required of it, for no large scheme of territorial conquest had then been put forward. jMoreover, the Arab tribes whose territory s\n-- rounded the positions held by oiu- troops, and stretched for many hundred miles inland, were believed to be disaffected, if not hostile, towards the Turks, and some were on friendly terms with the invaders. Even so. Lord Hardinge, who before the war had been rightly opposed to the despatch of a force to safeguard British interests in Southern Persia, must have left the Gulf with the feeling that the protection of the oil wells and the blocking of the German rmhvay had ahtuvdy involved an expedition which must prove a sensible burden on the military i-esources of India, already heavily drawn upon for Eiu'ope and Africa. But this could no doubt bo borne if no further advance was contemplatetl. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 203 Unfortunately, as all history shows, it is not easy, when part of a foreign Asiatic country is invaded and occupied, to set limits to the forward movement of the invading force. It is generally found, whatever the intention may be, that as soon as the advance ceases reports of hostile gatherings begin to come in. The natural tendency is to regard these gather- ings as a danger. It is felt that if they are allowed to make head unchecked the effect upon the surrounding country may become serious, and that, for the peace if not the security of the invading force, they must be broken up. When this has been done in one case there is soon news of another gathering farther on, and so the theatre of operations tends to expand, and with it the size and cost of the force employed. Such small advances are like the growth of a coral reef, and are apt to result in the building up of great dominions. It is largely in this way that the Russian and British empires in Asia have gone forward, a step at a time, until, separated originally by vast tracts of territory, they have at last become practically conterminous. The probable result of the invasion from the (;P,NF',I<AL SIR JOHN NIX(iN, K.C.It., A.IJ.C, (General C^ocnmandint Indian Kxpcdilionary I'orce until the hc|iinnini( tf the cpcrationt for the relief of Kut. 'nn THE TIMES HISTUHY OF THE WAIL ONE OF THE DOUBLE-ENTRIED GATEWAYS OF ZOBEIR, NEAR BASRA. Persian Gulf had been foreseen. An official of Indian exp)erience, speaking in London earlier in 1914, made the following remarks regarding a possible expedition to Southern Persia : The occupation of Southern Persia by British troops might involve a very serious development of military :5trength, and put a considerable strain on our Indian army. Nothing could be worse than sending an insuffi- <ient force, as we did before, and a .sufficient force will be a large force. Nor can we assume that the occupation would be temporary. All experience points the other way. Considering all the possible eventualities involved, I feel that our Government will do well to be very cautious in committing the country to such a move. The supply of British bayonets is limited. What applied to a British expedition to Southern Persia applied with greater force to an expedition which was to include in its scope a landing on the coast of Turkish Arabia. Events soon showed that the forecast had been correct. Already, in the latter part of January, 1915, it had been thought necessary to push out a force from Kurna in order to break up a hostile gathering to the northward, and there had been some fighting. One officer. Major M. H. Anderson, of the 33rd Cavalry, was afterwards brought to notice for having on this occasion " led a successful charge against the enemy with conspicuous gallantry and resolution. He had two hoi-ses shot imder him." Another, Captain H. E. Scott, of the Indian Medical Service, " displayed great devotion and courage in attending wounded in the open, in face of rifle fire at comparatively close quarters." In the end the enemy were pressed back, but the gathering was not really broken up. It was known that a considerable mmiber of Turks and Arabs remained in this direction, and at a point from which they could threaten alike the British position to the south and the line of oil wells to the eastward across the Persian frontier. This incident had occurred actually before the Viceroy's visit, so that the whole state of affairs must have been well known to the Indian Government. Little tnore than a month later it became clear that the enemy meant mischief. A British brigade had been sent up not long before to garrison the town of Ahwaz, in Persian territory, close to the main point of the oil wells. Receiving news of a gathering to the westward, the commander of the gaiTison sent out a reconnaissance in force to ascertain its numbers and disposition. The enemy was found to be 12,000 strong, including two or three regiments of regular Turkish infant rj^ and a contingent of Arabs ; and though the British force consisted of troops of all arms it found some difficulty in effecting its retire- ment, the enemy making repeated efforts to cut it off. Five British oflfieors were killed, and the losses of the Indian troops were con- siderable — nearly 200 in all. The nature of the fight may be gathered from a tlispatoh after- wards sent in by Sir Artbur Barrt>tt, bringii\g to notice the services of several officei's. Cap- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 205 tain W. M. Hunt, of the 23ril ^Mountain Batteiy, had " cUsplayed conspicuous coolness and bravery in repeatedly checking the enemy with his own rifle, although severely wounded, and thus enabling his section of the 23rd Mountain Battery to withdraw at a most critical stage of the fight." Second Lieutenant H. J. Baillie, 2nd Battalion Dorset Regiment, had " displayed conspicuous courage. With a handful of men he gallantly checked the advance of overwhelming nmiibers of the enemy, and was thus instrumental in saving many of our wounded from falling into their hands." Captain A. R. Thomson, 7th Rajputs, had at a critical moment " displayed great initiative in collecting as many men as he could and holding a position to cover the retirement. He next gallantly led a bayonet charge against a party of the enemy who were blocking the road to camp, and succeeded in clearing them out." Lieutenant R. H. Sheepshanks, 12th Cavalry, had been conspicuous for his gallantry and skilful handling of a small body of cavalry. " Reforming his troop he repeatedly charged the foremost lines of the enemy and inflicted heavy loss on them." The total losses of the enemy wei'e afterwards estimated at 000 killed and very many wounded. However this may be, it was evidently a shai-p action, in which the enemy showed consider- able fighting power. On the day that this encounter was taking place to the extreme east of the line of positions held by the expeditionary foi'co another encounter took place at the opposite end of the line, 100 miles away to the west, beyond Basra. There, on reports of a gathering at Nakhaila, 25 miles or so up the Euphrates, a cavalry reconnaissance was sent out to ascertain conditions. As the British force withdrew it was followed up by a body of 1,500 horsemen. These were skilfully drawn on to a concealed position occupied by infantry and guns. They suffered heavily and fled back to Xakhaila, but iiot imtil they had inflicted some loss on oiir people. Four British and two Indian officers were killed, and the enemy reached Shaiba, a point only five or six miles from Basra itself, for, in Sir Artluu* Barrett's despatch before quoted, two officers were brought to notice for good service at this place. These were Lieut. -Col. C. S. Stack, 33rd Cavalry, who was " severely wounded while displaying great personal gallantry and handling his regiment in a most skilful manner," and Captain H. C. West, S Battery, R.H.A., who " at a critical moment of the operations, when the teams of a gun and a wagon were down iiiH Ar;i<Hi< c:i<F,F',K ai mask a. 123—2 1 ' C/3 w K H Z o < Qi < CQ at, < Ui Z CO CQ o N fa O U E H fa o K H S H 2Ub THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 207 displayed conspicuoios coolness and courage in keeping the enemy 'at bay with his revolver, whilst he enabled his helpless'drivers to escape on foot." These two small fights at the two ends of the British front have been noticed in some detail because they had a considerable significance. In themselves they were not important. A reconnaissance, as its name impUes, is. an operation where the main object is to recon- noitre, not to beat the enemy, and the force sent out is intended to return to the point from which it started. But when the enemy receives a reconnoitring force with such active opposition, and follows it up so shrewdly, it becomes evident that he is in strength and in a fighting temper. There is not much prospect vmder such con- ditions of a foreign invader being left ion- molested in possession of the grovind he has occupied. Therefore, even in the month of March, 1915, the Turks and AraVis confronting our expeditionary force had given proof that it was likely to have more work in front of it before it could hope to settle down in peace. And here it may be desirable to touch upon some of the circumstances in which, if further trouble occurred, the British troops wovild have to fight. It has been said that the surrounding country was held by Arah» tribes, tliat they were believed to be disaffected towards the Turks, and that the Turks themselves were thought to be lonlikely to develop great strength. But it had now h(iCf)Tne known that the Turkish regular troops were in some numbers, and that they had, in fact, been joined by largo bodies of Arabs. The Arab perhaps was not a very formidable enemy at close quarters. Bravo enough in occasional instances, he was, bm a rule, a marauder rather thian a srjldier. But, for all that, in his own (•x>nntry hn was not an enemy to be despised. Light arifl well mount*id, and oftfm well ai-med, he could, on his sandy plains, ride all round our h^jftvily-weighted cavalry, and ho cfjuld harass a British forr;** by day and night with continual " sniping." A blow at hirri was a l>Iow Hpent in the air, for hix Hwarrns Hcattered as Hoon nn they were attacked, an'i di8/i[jp*;ared in the distunfie, p*?rhap»i vanishing 'uiU> the magic trrn-s anrl lakes of his d'jwjft mirage. And though there WHH no love Umt betw<M;n him and the Turk, who ha*i usurfKHi bis heritage and occiijjied tlie cjkf/iUil of his KhalifH ; though many of liis f,ril^-H h*ul even, in long j<aHt days, helri the faith of the Christian invader ; after all, the Arab was now a Mussulman, and in his own eyes the very aristocracy of Islam. Had not the Prophet himself been an Arab of the Arabs ? Therefore, when his country was invaded by the Infidel, it was only natural that the Arab should, as a rule, side with the Mussulman Turk. And liis swift bands of horsemen formed the most valuable support which the Turkish troops could have. In their hour of defeat the Arab might, and did, turn upon them, robbing and murdering their wovmded ; but so long as they seemed to be in superior strength he rendered them efficient service, bringing them information and covering their columns. At times he even fought gallantly by their side, helping to fill their trenches and pouring his rifle fire into the advancing line of bayonets. Moreover, the coiintry did not all consist of arid plains. At certain seasons of the year the Tigris and Euphrates came down from the north in flood, and all about their lower course they spread over the flat land, forming vast marshes, never wholly dry, where the Arab alone was at home. There his villages were miniature islands, rising only a few feet from the waste of shallow waters, or even clusters of light huts borne on floating rafts of reeds. In such a country the half-naked marsh Arabs, with their swarms of narrow canoes drawing a few inches of water, were almost as mobile and elusive as the horsemen of the desert, who scorned them as web-footed savages. And in March, when the British fought the'r two actions at Ahwaz and Shaiba, the floods were already out. For some months to come they would remain and increase. So long as our troops confined themselves to the positions they then held, on the deep channels of the Shatt-ol-Arnb and its Persian tributary, the Karum, where the vessels of the Royal Navy and Inflian Marine^ and the merchant steairuM-s, could svipport and supply them, and there was dry ground on the banks, they were nrulcr coinfmratively favour- able conditions ; but directly they attempted to move forward they were sure to fintl themselvoB at a disadvantage, with difTi(rulti(<s of transport anfl Hii[)[)ly incn'awd tenfold, and little solid grf/und to figlit on. Meanwhile the British pul>lic, ignorant of all l.hcHo conditions, and wholly absorbed in the progress of the dosperato fighting in Kurope, could spare littl«» thought for the brave men, English and Indian, who wore serving in this diHtarit field. 'I'lio War Ofllco, looking upon 208 Tui-: TiMi:s iiisToiiY OF Till-: ir.-i/.'. thu ux|)t<iition an one ot tlu' iiidiua etunpaigiiH which it hrtil hetui accuHtoiutnl to trtmt uitli 8L-aiit attuutiuii, gaw ikj ntnvH ut° thtiir iloingH. No wondt-r lluit the Hiitiuh |>urtion ut' tht-in, at all evmiti*, It-It at timos that tlu'y were forgotten l»y their coiintryiiimi. Thoy were apparently not even regarded an nharing in the Gi"eat War, and an oHietir wrote with pardonable indigiuition from Kurna : " Yon Haiil you were yhul 1 was not going to the 'front.' 1 thijik the 'front' we are getting out Imre is (juite enough for most pepole." Anil ho went on to descriljo a typical attack upon the Turks in tlu'ir entrenchments, with guns in position, such as the force had already had to make more than once. "Not a scraj) of cover of any kind, absolutely flat and unbroken, no cover for the guns or infantry advancing, no cover for hospital or wounded as we advanced — notliing ; simply a witle, flat, sandy plaui. . . . The Arabs smite (snipe ? ) us every night. . . . Give the troops out hero their due, because they are ' einpiie building ' in a country whore no white troojis have ever been before . . . digging and fighting all day and outpost all night." He niigjjt have said much more ; might Imve given sojne description of the tejrible heat at tunes, when the thtM-mometer rose to 12U deg. in the hospital t«*nts, and at night the weary men suffered from tJie umeasing attacks of moscpiitos and biting flies, uJiich gave them little rest. In truth camjiaigning in Turkish Arabia was hard imd somewhat thankless work. In April, I'Jlo, Sir Arthur Uarietl handed o\er the conunand of the expeditionary force to General Sir John Nixon, and took leave owing to ill-heaUh. Tliis date mniked the beginning of a new period in the history of the exptulition. Until then, after the landing and the subsequent occupation of Jiasra, Kurna, and Aliwaz, the Jiritish Force had remained, as far as possible, inactive. 'J'hoy had done some fighting • but the two recon- naissnaces of March had betni oidy recon- naissnaces, and theic* liad been no advance. From the time when Sir .John Nixon took command one advance followed another, until before tlie end of the year our troojjs had fought a battle near Baghdad, more than 4 THE COMMANDER OF THE 18TH INFANTRY BRIGADE. Major-General C. T, Fry (x) and the Staff of the 18th Brigade, which captured Kurna and the Turkish garrison, including the X'ali of Basra. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAh'. 209 500 miles by river from the shores of the Persian Gulf. It remains to tell the story of this memorable campaign. Sir John Xixon was a cavahy officer of distinction, who had served many years, and had both in India and South Africa made a name for himself as a brave and capable soldier. He had some hereditary connexion with the country in which he was now serving, for his father, also an officer of Indian Cavalry, had been British Resident and Consul-Gen'^ral in Turkish Arabia, with headquarters at Baghdad. The new general, therefore, may be supposed to have entered upon his command with exceptional interest, perhaps with some exceptional knowledge. It has been said that up to this time no further advance from the tract of country occupied by the British force appeared to have been under contemplation. Yet it is to be observed that during the winte^r or early spring the Expeditionarj' force seems to have been augmented by some 14,000 men. If there was indeed no intention to push forward, the increase Ls not altogether easy to explain, unless the Viceroy's visit to the Persian Gulf had convinced him that the original force was too small for the comparatively modest role of securely hoMing the country already occupied. However this may bt, there was now a much larger number of troops in the country, and it had been found possible to collect at Shaiba, west of Basra, where the action of March 3 ha<^l hcum fough*^, a force consisting of two infantry brigades and one hriga/Je of cavalry, with two batteries of field artillery and a riioiiiitain battery. One of the infantry briiradfrs was commanded by Brigarlier-General Delainain, the other by .Major-General C. I. Fry. The cavalry commander was Briga<lier-<^ieneral H. Keruierly. T\ii- whfjie force was under the commafid of the Hi-Tiior officer, ('ti-iicrn\ Vry. It irK-liidfij two bnttfiliorM of British infantry the 2nd Dfjnwts and th<t 2nd .Vorfolkw. On April II, only two days aff,<r Oi-miid Nixon ha*l taken f»v<T charge from Sir Arthiii Barrett, General Fry ri-port/««d that hoMtile ea\alry and infantry had oceiipi«<d prdnts within H f»-w rnilcH of Slidilm ; that h<- ron nidered th'Tfi U> l>e the advanced i^iiard of the fTtffny'n main forc^w, anfl that a HerifjUM cfigagc- rrj<-nt whh probable within n dny or two. ThJH forcCHHt j>rovef| U, he »-x(ut. for on f.hr' morn inu of Afiril 12 an efwtny forro cHtimaU-d Bam el I. MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES J. MELLISS, V.C, K.C.B. Commanded the 30th Infantry Brigade. at 12,000 Turkish regulars and 10,000 Arabs attacked the British ])osition with much da.sh and persistence. They were repulsed, but they had workeil round the position from north, west, and south ; and duiing the night they continued to molest our force by sniping and desultory at- tacks. These were not pressed home, though the enemy tried to cut our wire entanglements anrl showed at times a threatening front. Meanwhile, late on the evening of A[)ril 12, .Major-CJeneral Sir Charles J. Melliss, V.C, C.B., arrived at Shaiba fioiti I'.asra, with a siiihII icint'orcfiinnt <>( tlir 2U\\ rnnjahis, tuid, being senior to Major* Icnc rid l''ry. toitk coui- rufind of (lie Shaiba garrison. Sucli was the state of tlu' <-oiintry thai (jlenend .Melliss an<l his (h'tachmetit had to come in native* boats or ■ Ixllums," which wen^ punted across (»ight miles of ssfiU-r. On A|iril ]'.', (icncnd M(»lliss el(<'ucd llii» neighbourhood of tin- rinii|t, after Hom< lighting, in the course of which tin- IJritish captiuod 400 «»f thr" r»nemy an<l infiicli-d conHid(<nibl(> Ioshi^h. The night (»asH(!d (|uiflly; but ur^xt morning it was fonriil that the Turks had taken up a strong [jOHition sonn' llm-n miles in lentil li iiX I >iirjaHiya, lo the soul 1 1 of Slinihii, and Inu I I here entrenched t lieniHelveM, This |iosil.jon Cieneral o < ai Ui Qu O < H O O en lU X H U H <: H (« O H <: a: Cd Z cd O 210 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 2I] lellLs proceeded to attack. After a long and omewhat severe day's fighting, dui'ing which he British troops were much hampered by lirage, which concealed the enemy's trenches, hese were stonned and the Turks broke and ed. The British loss was not small. Lieut. - lolonel H. L. Rosher, commanding the Dorsets, 7as killed, Lieut. -Colonel E. S. Cleeve, com- landing the Artillery, was severely wounded, nd the casualties altogether amounted to 700. Jut the losses of the enemy were much heavier, robably four or five thousand, and there is no [oubt that he was thoroughly beaten. Dtu-ing lis retreat the Arabs turned upon the fugitive ?urks and did them much evil. When the wholly inactive at other points of the British front. Both at Kurna, in the centre of the long line, and at Ahwaz, on the right, they had made some tlireatening demonstrations. But at these points there was no serious fighting, the enemy confining hijiiself to threats and artillery fire. The first month of General Nixon's command, therefore, closed quietly, and it may be said that, so far, his action had been limited to a vigorous offensive defence against the attacks of the eneniy. The real advance had not begun. Possibly it had not been contemplated. That this was the view taken in England may perhaps be gathered from the King's message to Sir John Nixon, though the closing words BRITISH TROOPS GOING ON PICKET DUTY. •etreat waH over, many miles to the rear, the memy commander, it is said, assembled his )fificerH, and, after denouncing the treachery of ,he Aralw, shot himself. While the land fight was going on, a flotilla of irrncd launches, small steamers, and gun barges, ivhich had b*!en organi/erl for service on the •ivers and flooded land about Basra, was able io do gofxi service by pushing up to and beyond Srakhaila in the enemy's rear. Lieut.-Colonel ft. P. Molesworth, K.Cj.A., wh') eoMiriiarid<fd the flotilla, rec*)ived valuable assistance in this >f>';ratiori from Lieutenant A. d. Sciyrnour, It.N., ){ H.M.S. Ksfjiegle, arifi other oflifiers and men ;f the N'avy. Supfiiies were interc<!pted, native >K>ats f^i[<ture<l, and the enemy's njtreat leverely harnHs<;d. I>uring th*»se HucceHsfuJ and ereditabW) o[»eni- bions by land an'l water the Turks laid not been might bear another meaning. The message ran as follows : " I wish to express my admiration for the gallant manner in which the naval and military forces cooperating under your command have so successfully overcome the repeated attacks of an enemy sujKsrior in numb(^rs. Please con- vey to all ranks rny ajjpreciation of the spirit and endurance' they have shown during the past month. At borne we all watch with pride and intenjst the work and [)rogress of your column." If the officers and men of the expedition were inclined to think (hat (hriir doings had been rivorlookfid by the War OHiee and the British public, this warm and timely message must have gone fur to remove the feeling. But. real advances were now to begin, and it seems deniral>le at this point to examine the position in which Hir John Nixon found himself •2 1-2 77//-; TIMES HISTOltY OF Till': II. I/.' ABANDONED TRENCHES ALONG THE TIGRIS. before his troops received the order to go forward. As the British force under his command, now consisting apparently of two divisions, con- fronted an enemy based on Baghdad, and the Turkish provinces beyond Baghdad, it was facing north-west. Its own base was the sea, lying to the south-east, from which supphes and reinforcements could reach it by the deep- water channel of the Shatt-al-Arab, running up to and beyond its headquarters at Basra. The left of the force consisted of the garrison holding Shaiba and perhaps Nakhaila. In front of the centre was an advanced detacliment at Kurna. On the right was a brigade at Ahwaz in Persia. Tlie position may be cona- pared to an irregular fan, of which the handle was the Shatt-al-Arab, and the points of the open spokes, going from east to west, were Ahwaz on the Karun, Kvu-na on the Tigris, and Nakhaila on the Euphrates. The enemy had a force at Nasrieh on the Euphrates, facing the British left, but at a distance of 70 or 80 miles. The size of this force was not known, but it was believed to consist mainly of the troops beaten at Shaiba, and to be incapable of much mischief. Facing the British centre at Kurna, and close by, was another Tiu-kish force, consisting of six battalions and ten guns, with a gathering of Arab tribesmen. Facing the brigade at Ahwaz, on the British right, was a third Turkish force — «iglit battalions and eight guns, with 10,000 Arabs. This was in Persian territory, and not far from Ahwaz. Along almost the whole front, from Nasrieh on the west to beyond the Persian frontier on the east, the spring floods, said to ha^e been the highest known in 30 years, formed, to us(^ General Nixon's words, " an inland sea of water and reeds varying from two to six feet deep," and having a breadth of something like a hundred miles. If the British force was to operate to its front before the floods began to subside about the end of July it woidd ha\e to operate over this area, making use as far as possible of the comparatively practicable channels of the Euphrates and Tigris. And these channels were by no means a satisfactory highway. They admitted of the advance of \essels of con.sider- able draught for a few miles above their junc- tion ; but, beyond that, only country boats or very small steamers were of anv use 'I'he banks THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 213 of the rivers were here and there Hned by belts of dry or comparatively dry land, but these belts were intersected at right angles by numberless irrigation channels, and were not easy for an advancing force. In their upper waters, moreover, the rivers, especially the Tigris, made their way by very tortuous courses tlirough the flat plains and offered many opportunities for effective resistance. How flat the plains were may be judged from the fact that Baghdad, 560 miles by water from the mouth of the Tigi'is, lay at a height of only 120 feet above the sea. It was easy to luider- stand the formation, in such a country, of the vast marshes, with their swarms of buffalo and wild pig, and " web-footed " Arabs. Having regard to these facts, the Govern- ment of India, which controlled the expedition, must, it would seem, have considered with care the question whether it was necessary or desirable for General Xixon to make any further advance at all. The question was not one for the conunander on the spot to decide. If, as was generally believed, the objects of the Government of India had in fact been attained, by the securing of the oil wells, and the blocking of the Gennan railway, then, prima facie, there was nothing to be gained by undertaking frefih operations which were sure to involve further losses and further expenditure. It would doubtless be annoying for our troops to sit .still^while the enemy lay confronting them, but this was not sufficient reason in itself foi sanctioning a forward move. Except on one condition, that the neglect oi these enemy forces was held by the general in command to threaten the security of his troops and of the military position, an advance seemed un- desirable. Forward operations without a definite objective can rarely be justified. Of course, if the security of the British force was endangered by leaving the enemy unmolested, the Indian Govermnent could but sanction any action necessary to avert the danger ; indeed, it was the duty of the general in com- mand to take such action on his own respon- sibility. Otherwise the Government of India, warned by many examples in past times, must have asked itself whether the annoyance ought not to be borne, our troops perhaps striking at times a swift blow at an enemy column which came within their reach ; but, that done, return- ing to their position. No doubt if there wns a clearly -defined objective — if, for example, it was held by His Majesty's Government that an advance, say, to Baghdad, would sensibly affect the course of the Great War, then the case was different. But, so far as is known, no scheme of that kind had then been proposed. A KIVHK (UlN-nOW AM) MO I OH-LAUNGH ON IIIH II(;HIS. 123—3 •J14 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 5 C/2 z "T" H z o O u CD en 03 iirul thouRli tho British force had been aug- inontod, tho incrHUso Ktuiratul Imnlly on a scalo to Huggtirtt that any operation of kucIi niagni- tmlH was in view. I'liat being the case, it is not easy to see wliat c-onhl be tho aim of the Government of Inilia in ordering or sanctioning an advance. And, whatever the aim, would not any attemjjt to close with onr ehisivo enemy bo merely following a will-of-tlKt-wisp across those wide and treacherous 'marshes ? However this may be, the decision was to advance, or, in (ieneral Nixon's words, " to take active measm-es against tho enemy detachments on the Karun and on the Tigris." The die was cast. Whether the Government of India intended it or not, (Jreat Britain was committed to an invasion of Mesopotamia — committed to a great military operation the scope and end of which no one could foretell. It is diflicult to overrate the iinportance of the liecision which was now to be carried into effect, or the manifold interest of the country which lay before the British invaders. The inuiK^nse plain between and about the Tigris and Euphrates is teeming still with ruined cities and monuments, aqueducts and irri- gation works, the remains of past empires. Its wealth had in recent centuries boon des- troyed by the Turk, who had misruled it, setting tribe against tribe, and making a desolate waste of what should be one of the most fertile and populous countries of the earth. It was the cradle of civilization and the arts, perhaps the cradle of the human race. In thinking of it, one calls up of necessity in- numerable scenes and naines of bygone days, some historical, if anything in the East is historical, many dim with the mists of count- less ages. Haroun al-Raschid in his golden prime, Xenophon's Ten Thousand setting out upon their march, "Roman emperors and their legions, Nebuchadnezzar and his golden image, the Writing on the Wall, the splendid capitals of the Greek and Persian monarchs, far to the north " Nineveh, that great city," angry Jonah and his gourd, Abrtiham and Lot mai'cliing oxit with their flocks and herds from Vr of the Chaldees, the Tower of Babel, even — if the Arab legend be true — the Garden of Eden in the fork of the two great rivei-s, and the cherubim with their flaming swords. Into that wonder- fid plain, so full of all that can appeal to the imagination of man, a British army of tho twentieth century was now to march, with its machine-guns and telegraphs, motor-cai's adu THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 215 aeroplanes. Where Babylon and Nineveh had fought for the mastery of the East, Turk and Arab were now to contend in battle against the soldiery of England and India. General Xixon decided to deal first with the gathering in Persian territory on the extreme right of his long line. A division was concentrated at Ahwaz, and placed under the command of Major-General Gorringe, who was instructed to drive the enemy back across the frontier into Tiorkish territory. General Gorringe carried out with skill and success the work entrusted to him. The Turks on his front had already begun to fall back on hearing of the defeat near Shailia, and as he moved out westward from Ahwaz they retreated across the border, making for Amara on the Tigris, where another Turkish force had MA.IOK-GHN. SIR CHAHI.HS V. F. TOWNSHF-NI), K.C.H., [).S.O. From a photO|(rHpli rsiken at tin observation pout in Metopotamia. MAJOR-GEN. SIR GEORGE F. GORRINGE, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Who directed many operations in the Mesopotamian campaign. been assembled. The operations of the British division extended over a period of seven weeks, and included not only the pushing back of the Turks to Amara, but the piuiishment and subjugation of certain Arab tribes which had joined them. The work was arduous, for the heat was already severe, and the troops had to begin by effecting the passage of the Kharkeh, a river 250 yards broad, with a deep and rapid stream. The attack on th(» main Arab stronghold was carriefl out when the temperature in tents stood at 120 dog. " Among other intr(»pid deeds," fionoral Xixon afterwards wrote, " was the ox[)l()it of Subadar-IMajor Ajab Khan and 20 incn of tlin 2()th Punjabis, who Hwairi th(* rixcr iiinlci- licuvy firi^ and Iddiight hack H bout, in which troops were ffrrriod across." 'I'lio phice was then cap- tiucfl. The gorn'tJii n^sult of the short (ranipaign was to clear tlio enettiy out of the Arab dis- tricsts of J'cjrsia and to enforce the HnbtiiJHsion of tlm tribes, thus allowing I ho pipn line of tlin oil cotnf)any to ho repaired, and normal Oiinditiotis to bo rosuirmfj at (h(» oil (ioidH. Tlio lino had been damaged and set on lite by the triboHinori. (ieiioral (iorriiit^e's itiovemonts also inateiiallv aHHisted the advance) of anotlujr < H Oi < O O < X u. O u U p. O Q Z o •T3 C o o u S z o z o or J Z u O 216 THE TIMKS HISTOIIY OF THE WAR. 217 British force, which was made about the same time. This advance up tlie Tigris from Kurna was, in fact, the main operation of the simuner campaign. It was one of exceptional difficulty, for it had to be carried on across the flooded tract already described. " Owing to the limited amount of the river transport available at that time, the movement and collection of ti'oops was a slow and difficult process, and the flooded country romid Kurna presented many problems, which required careful consideration before operations covdd be commenced. ■' Bellums, long marrow boats of the country, were collected and armotu-ed with iron plates, to be used for carrying infantry to the assault of the enemy's positions ; troops were trained in punting and boat work ; various types of guns were moimted on rafts, barges, tugs, and paddlers ; floating hospitals had to be unpro- vised ; and many other details of construction and eqioiprnent had to be thought out and pro- vided for."* By the end of May, 191.5, all these prejjara- tions were complete, and a division numbering, perhaps, 14,000 men, under the command of Major-General Sir Charles V. F. Townshend, C.B., D..S.O., was ready to advance. General Townshend, like General Xixon, was a cavalry officer, but had chiefly distin- guished himself during the memorable siege of Chitral, where he commanfled the little garrison. He had made many campaigns, from the Gordon Relief Expedition to tin- South African War, and had also served as -Military .\ttache in Paris He had the reputa- tion of bemg an ambitious soldier, and one who devoted every available hour to the scientific study of his profession. An officer who luvl known him for many years wrote of him: " He wax always luird working, cheerful, and amusing . he li;i.s workfid OH few men have in the anny, and he knov)» his job from A to Z." He was popular with the trfKjfw, and s^xnned in all Uiivs well fitftrj for a difficult f^unmnml. Thf) Turkish force waw f-nfrenched a f<-w miles to the north of Kurna on two grfiiifjH of iMlands, one group three miU-s in rear of the ot\i>:T, Htanding out from the surface of flie flood. The p'/Hition wi%n f)ne of soifie Ktr«ni.'t)i, and, fm General N'ixon wrot*-, nec»;sHitat<'d "a carefully ort:ani/,<''l nttwk in sufViessive • OfK-ml Sixtm'n flf\inU-ii <i( .Ituintiry I. I!»|ti. CAPTAIN AVILFRID NUNN, C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded H.M.S. Comet. phases by combined naval and military operations." On the early morning of May 31 the attack began by a heavy bombardment from Kurna and the floating batteries ; and then the infantry advanced to the assault in a flotilla of " bellums," supported by the fire of the guns. A brigade under Lieut. -Colonel Clime, 24th Punjabis, made a frontal attack, while the 22nd Punjabis and the Sinnur Sappers and Miners sf^ized a point on the enemy's left, and .'iiflladed their line. "Norfolk Hill," the first objective of the frontal fit tack, was carried at the point of the bayonet by the 1st Battalion Oxford aiul Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, " after poling their boats for over a mile through thick reeds, and landing waist deep in water." Hohind the assaulting infantry came the naval sloops and anned tugs, preceded by a line of mint' sweejMTs ; and their fire, combined with tlidf of tli<t Jioyal ArtilN'ry, asliorn and afloat, was more than the enemy could bear. By noon the first group of islands was in British luinds. '["he sef!ond grou[), wliitrh fonued the main position, was not ocrMipied that day ; but on the infjrning <jf .Iiinf I an aei'oplami rreon- naissanco discovered tlint the Turks luid evaf!uaf,«irl it, and were in full iftmat m\> (Iio Tigris. Tlw rinviii flotilla. I.'d by II. .M.S. l*3Hpiog|*» ((/'a[>tain N'lnin, I' .\.), \mmI '>m irt 218 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A CAPTURED TURKISH GUN AT NASRIEH, Occupied by tlie British on July 25, 1915. pursuit, followed by the shipping and troops. Next day the water was found to be too shallow for further pursuit by the larger vessels, but the Naval armed tugs were still able to move, and on Jime 3 General Townshend in H.M.S. Comet, a vessel of light draught, with tliree of the tugs, pushed on to the town of Amara, 87 miles above Kiuua, and nearly 200 miles from the sea. It was a daring thing to do, for a Turkish force Mas still in the town, but happily the Turks laid down their arms and 700 men became prisoners. On the following morning the infantry of the British force began to arrive, led by the 2nd Battalion Norfolk Regiment, and the town was secui'ely occupied. They were more than welcomed, for the population of the town were beginning to recover from their stu-prise, and trouble might have occurred. In the course of this well -planned and well- executed operation the British force took 17 guns and nearly 1,800 prisoners, also cap- turing or sinking several steamers, among which was a Turkish gmiboat. Owing to the superior power and skilful handling of its artillery, the British loss was small. Not long afterwards the advanced guard of the Tiu-kish force driven westward from the direction of Ahwaz by General Gorringe was suiprised and dispersed by General Townshend, with the loss of some prisoners and two guns. Among the prisoners taken at Amara, over 2,000 in all, were three Germans. These were the remainder of a party of six, the others having been killed by the marsh Arabs. The Germans, it is said, freely cursed the Turks, who as freely cin-sed them in retm'n. Having thus disposed for the time of the enemy troops confronting him on the east and north. General Nixon proceeded to complete the advance by striking at the force which held Nasrieh on the west, close to the Biblical Ur of the Chaldees. This operation was on- trusted to Major-General Gorringe, who had done so well on the eastern front. It was, like the advance to the northward, an amphibious operation, to use General Nixon's term ; and with the help of naval officers and men under the command of Captain Nunn, it was equally successful. General Gorringe's force was con- centrated at Kuma during the month of June, and on the 27th he pushed out across the flooded lands to the westward. Before the middle of July the flotilla and troops had overcome all obstacles, and forced their way up the Euphrates to the neighbovu'hood of Nasrieh. They had some hard fighting, with nuich trouble from mines, '['h(>rn\<'ri>ft launches THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 210 AN ANGLO-INDIAN British sailors on a carrying " pompoms," deep creeks, and stretchas of mud, over which the boats had to be dragged by men. The heat was great, especially in the iron vessels, for the thermo- meter rarely stood below 115° in the shade, and the glare from the water was almost intolerable. Some five miles short of Xasrieh General Gorringe found the Turks entrenched in a for- midable position, or series of positions, on both sides of tho river, with their flanks resting on marshes, and their front covered by deep inigation channels. They were said to have with them several German oflficers and gunnerp. After one un.successful attempt at turning the enemy's right flank, the British troops remained for some days facing the position and making preparations for a docisivo attack. On July 24 it was delivered, and in «pite of a stubborn resistance line aftf>r line of entrenchment was carried by storm, a battalion of tho West Konts greatly distinguishing itsfslf. Hut not only the W'jsfc Kents, ff>r Firitish and Irididn solrliers vied wiiii one anothf»r in tho ardour of their aOMaults, while the Navy coojjerate<l with closes range fire from small gunf)oatM and ofchf?r v(mv.]H. The Turks los* heavily, ROO dead being left in the trenehes. HevenU»en guns arirl 1,000 pnV>ners were captnn-d. Tfie IJritJM}) loss was VICTORY AT NASRIEH. captured native vessel. under 600. On July 25 Nasrieh was occupied without further fighting. Tho importance of this victory was con- siderable, as Nasrieh was, to use General Nixon's words, " the dominant place on this flank." It was, he said, the base from which a hostile force threatening Basra must start ; it was the centre from which influence could be exercised among the powerful Arab tribes on the Euphrates ; and it was the headquarters of the civ-il administration of a largo part of tlie Basra Province. Moreover, it stood at the southern end of the Shatt-ol-Hai, a channel joining the Tigris and Euphrates, and open during half the year for traffic between the two rivers. By this charmol the force which attacked Shaiba in April had come down. During certain months, when there was a good flow of water from the Tigris, the Shatt-ol Hai was in fact tho usual lino of communication from north to south. It is paid to have been at one time tho main channel of tho Tigris.* General Nixon had now jjuhIuhI forward his lirif) along both Tigris and I'^upUrates to a distance of 100 miles or so from his former advanced post at Kuma. His foremost troops • Th" larRo rolonmd mnp whirh formK (he front i^pi^ce of Voliiriio VIU. kIioiiIiI he coiiHiiltcd regarding thif mid olh<tr ((iiogrii|ilii('>il jxiintH. '2-JO THE ri.MHs insnutv OF rill': war INDIAN TROOPS CAPTURE AN ARAB STRONGHOLD. Destroying the treacherous Beni Turuf Arabs' stronghold after two days' bombardment, during which a Subadar-Major and his party swam the Kharake river, and, seizing the only undamaged enemy's boat, brought it across stream. The Indian troops were then ferried across. on each of these rivers were nearly 200 miles from the sea. The outemiost points of the great fan were now Alwaz, Amara and Nasrieh. It might have been supposed that tlie stretch of country below these points was already large enough for two divisions to hold with comfort, and certainly large enough to cover securely the future tenninus of the German railway and the line of oil wells. But this was not General Nixon's view. While he was dealing with the Euphrates flank he heard that strong Turkish forces THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 221 Tffh DOKSKTS AT THF', HATTLH OF KUT-EL-AMAKA, SKPTHMHEK 28, 1915. The Itt Battalion, Dorset Regiment, 117th Mahrattas, and 22nd C:ompany Sappers and Miners captured a redoubt and trenches on the enemy's extreme left, inflicted heavy losses and took 135 priNoners, iin^J'ir tin: cxmnnand of Niir-<-r|.l)iri, " fcho U^ht of fho Fnith," ha*l aonrj^ntrfiU^l nt th<i fcf)wn <if Kijtw;|.A/riara on tho TigrJH, ahoiit 140 miloH by riv<»r »Fk<vo AmArH, t/<warflK whif;h thoy h»i,(l pijMh«'d out mnnh 'loiru-hntf^ntH. It waw at, nnat) (Uu;ulfA that tho Mofoat of Niir-orl-Din anfl f h(5 ocfMipation of Kut-cl-Amara wor»< nf?cosflary, anri tlio <lay aft(tr NaHrioh waH H«)ciin-<l Oonoral N'ixon f»<'gari tranHforring troopH from (Joiioral (Unriun*i'H command on the loff, of tlw fan f,o Cfiimrnl TownHhond'H in tho centre. 'I'lm reaHon given for this fiirtlirir advance was that •l'2-2 THE TIMES HISTOIiY OF THE WAR. THE BATTLE OF KUT. Kut-el-Ainara lay at the northern end of the Shatt-el Hai, and that it was therefore, hke Nasrieh at the southern end, a strategic point. With both places in British hands effective control of the northern part of the Basra district would be secured. It is said that General Nixon wanted nothing more than Kut-el-Amara, but that this much he con- sidered necessary. The Govermnent of India apparently acquiesced in his view, for with the telegraph between them General Nixon would hardly have decided upon so large an operation without sanction. Indeed, he would hardly have undertaken the three advances which led up to it. It may be pointed out here, incidentally, that the original objects of the expedition — the protection of the oil wells and the blocking of the German railway — were both lmp«nial rather than Indian 'objects, tliough the latter object (leeply affected India. In these circum- stances it seems that the British Governnutnt also miglit naturally have had something to say to the whole course of the expedition from beginning to end. On August I the further advance began, a detaclunent from General Townshend's force, with a Naval flotilla, pushing up the river and ■occupying Ali-el-Gharbi, a point about halfway between Amara and Kut-el-Amara, which place, to avoid confusion, will for the future be written Kut. 'At this point the whole division was gradually concentrated, until on Septem- ber 1 2 it was ready to go on. There had been some difficulty and (l<»lay in bringing up the troops sent from Nasrieh. Beyond Amara the banks of the Tigris werjO dry enough to admit of an advance by land, while the shallowness and winding course of the river were un- favourable to the use of the water route, except for the flotilla and supply vessels. The force accordingly marched up the bank, the flotilla following. The march was trying, for even now the thermometer stood at 110° or more in the shade ; but there was practically no opposition, and on September 15 General Townshend reached a point 15 miles from Kut. Here he halted, for news had come that the Tiu-ks were occupying an entrenched position eight miles further on, and intended to make a stand. The next ten days were spent in careful reconnaissances, in which the work of the Flying Corps was of the greatest value. When complete knowledge of the enemy's GENERAL TOWNSHEND AND HIS STAFF. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 223 THE BRITISH HEADQUARTERS, KUT-EL-AMARA. dispositions had been gained, and some rein- forcements had come up from Kuma, the attack was delivered. The position held by the Turks was exceed- injjly strong. Their force consisted of 8,000 n-gular infantry and a large contingent of Araljs, horse and foot, wliich made their total number larger than those of their assailants. Home said twice as large. To quote General Nixon's account, the Turks " occupied a Jino naturally favourable for defence, which during thr*3*5 or four months of preparation had been converted into a forrniflable position. " On the right bank the defonces <;xt<iid<;(l for five miles southwards along sonm mounds which commanrl<u| nn ext^msive field of fire The river was blocked by a boom compwed of barg»« and wire cables conunanrled at close range by guns and fire trenches. ()u fhe left Ijank the »JTitrfynehmentH »:xtonfl'-d for seven miles, linking up the gaf>s betw(M;n th*» river and three marshes whidi stnrtched away to tho north. The defonees wer«i well deHJgnerl and concealfxl, Cfimman'Jing flat and ojx ri nfHiri,w.ii«m. They were elaborat^-ly idu- structed with a thorougliness that missed no detail. In front of the trenches were barbed- wire entanglements, military pits, and land mines. Behind were miles of communication trenches connecting the various works and providing covered outlets to the river, where ramps and lantling stages had been made to facilitate the transfer of troops to or from ships, while pumping engines and water chan- nels carried water from the river to the trenches. " Nur-ed-Din's army held this position : one division being on each bank, with some anny troops in reserve on the left bank, near a bridge above the main position. A force of Arab hors«5men was posted on the Turkish Icsft flank ; most of the Turkish regular cavalry were abscnit during the battle on a raid against our communications." On September 26 General Townsheml ad- vanced to witliin four miles of the Turks, and there eomplefed his plans. His idea was to de- ceive them by feints against their riglit, south of thn Tigris, and then to envelop their left with dm main body of his troops, and if possible destroy the whole. 'I'his i<lca, a very bold one 224 Till': TIMES ihstohy of the war. H D \^ Q oi < O H o z u z > Q < > < u z Q Z THE TIMES'' HISTORY OF THE WAIL 225 considering the leiigtli of tlie position and tlae consequent separation of force involved, he proceeded to carry out with striking success. On the morning of the 27th the British force advanced along both banks of the river, the main part of it by the right or southern bank. On tliis side a feint attack was made upon the Turkish trenches, bvit was not pressed home further than was necessary to attract the attention of the Turks and bring about a concentration of their troops upon the southern end of their line. Meanwhile the British force on the left, or northern, bank pushed forward to within 3,000 j^arcLs of the enemy, and there entrenched itself. Wliile these movements were being carried out a bridge was thrown across the river by Captain W. S. Oldham, R.E., and carefully " strewn with gorse and mud to deaden the sound." \Mien darkness fell the main body of the British force was brought over by this bridge from the southern to the northern bank, and deployed opposite the enemy's left flank. This operation was tiring to the troops, for the heat was great. It was also a hazardous one, invoh-ing, as it did, a march across the front of an enemy well within striking distance, and at night, when delay and confixsion might easily arise. But with well-trained and eager troops such manoeuvres may no doubt at times be properly risked ; and no night attack being made by the enemy while the rriano?iivre was in coiuse of com- pletion, all went well. On the morning of September 28 the British force moved foi-ward to the final attack. The trfx>prt on the .southern bank made only such dernon.stration.s a.H were sufficient to keep their enemy in front of them ; and on the northern bank, cUmn to the river, a brigade under Major-General Fry ma/le a " pinning " attack with the same object ; but further north the main bf>dy fell \t])<ni the enemy's left with fiery energy. This main body consistecl of two brigade-i oi infantry under Hrigadir<r-fien<nil JJelamHin and a cavalry brigade. One of the infantry i>ri(iwUrn, under tlif direet eoniinimd of (>flamain, carrierl out a frontal attu'k upon >M>me Turkish trench*^ which lay between two vitr»'tch»'« of riiarHh ; the other, under Itriga/Jier-fieneral ffougliton, witli the <!avalry and Hoine firmed motor-<!arH covering itn right, inovefl wide round the enemy'M northern flank, and earne down upon liim fiom tint n'ur. The TiirkM nmJMted bravely; but the I-«t Battalion of the f>orsef ^hin- li«*ginieiil , LIEUT. COMMANDER E. C. COOKSON, D.S.O., V.C. Awarded the Victoria Cross for gallantry during the advance to Kut. He was shot dead while attempting to cut a wire cable securing enemy barges which formed an obstruction across the river. with the 11 7th Mahrattas, and the 22nd company of the Sappers and Miners, stormed a redoubt and its neighbouring trenclus on their extreme left ; and then the two brigades joined in a combinefl finslaught, under which t lie resistance broke down. After hard fighting and several counter-attacks the enemy's left WJiM completely enveloped and beaten, and by two o'clock the whole northern end of the pfjsition was in Biitish hands. A scorching wind, with dense clouds of dust, hafi swe[)t the des(Mt during the whole day ; utid th<< long fight in this heat, comuig after the night march, liad exhausted General helanuiin's troops, who w<tre suffering severely from thirnt, th«t marsh water being undrink- able. lie was therefore obliged gi\« to theni a short rest. Then he set tiiem m inolion again, and |)reMHed on to complete the victory. His first intention nnlimdly was to sweep down the Turkish trenches from north to south, and t*. strike in fliuik nnd rear the force op|)osed to ( letiend Kry's brigade; lull III IhiH jiinrliire htron^' hostile roserves ■39r> THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. appoarwil to the Houth-wetjt, in tliH direction of the Turkinh hriilf^e, and (Jeneral Dehiumin, at oiu;e cluuit,'iag front, attacked tiie freish enemy. HiH weary troops, forgetting tlieir thiiitit and fatigue at the proHpect of a hand- to-hanil tight in the open, swept forward with magnificent dash, ami thongh tiie Turks fought well tliey weit) overthrown anil routed, the fall of night alone saving them froui destruction. The victory was complete. During the night the Turks evacuated all the trenches they still held, and their whoh^ force fell back along the river. They had lost fourteen guns and 4,000 men, of whom over 1,100 were prisoners. The British lo.ss in killoil and wounded amounted to 1,2."{3. Though fought some distance below Kut, the battle was given the name of the Battle of Kut. While the land attack was in progress the naval flotilla had been supporting it by attack- ing along the river, and late on the evening of the 28th the flotilla made a gallant attempt to force the boom. Under " a terrific fire from bot'i banks at close range," the little Comet, Lieut. - Commander E. C. Cookson, R.N., rammed the boom but failoil to break through, and the brave young officer was shot dead while trying to cut a wire cable connecting the barges. During the summer of 1915 little had been heard in England of the doings of the iNIeso- potamia force, and toward the end of September some impatience had begun to be shown by the British public at the silence of the authorities. This found expression in a leading article in The Times of September 22, which gave an account of the exploits of the troops concerned. The article pointed out that the campaign in Mesopotamia was " the only one in which the Allies can claim continual success from the outset, unmarred by a single failure," and it commented upon the spirit of " red tape " in which the War Office had acted in concealing these successful exploits from the nation. A few days later the news of the fight on Septem- ber 28 was received, and it became known that the Mesopotamia force had added to its ex- ploits a fresh and striking victory. The public satisfaction was great. If only the British advance had ended at this point satisfaction might never have been turned into sadness and recrimination. But the Fates had other things in store. Kut was occupied by General Townshend's troops on September 29. It has boon dt*scribed by Sir Marks Kykes, who saw it at this tim<s aH " a dirty, tumbledown, insanitary little town," but with a minaret and decorated portals as perfect in design and line* as the best work of ancient days. It lies in a loop of the Tigris, about 340 miles from the sea, by the river route, and contains about (i.OOO iidiabitants, largely Arabs. There is fertile ground about it, which might be greatly doveloi)ed, but, except for its position on the northern (»nd of the Shatt-el-Hai, it has no special importance, and it will owe its place in history solely to its connexion with one of the outlying ejjisodos of the Great War. When General Townshend Inul made his entry into the town his first care was to re- establish order. Owing to the confidence ' reposed in the British throughout Asia this was not difficult. The late Turkish Governor had, it is said, been maintaining his prestige during the last week by daily hangings and shootings. EiitcT thn victors ; within an hour the woJnen were chaff ring milk, dates, and sweet limes, the merchants were off.TJng contracts, policemen wore patrolling tlie dirty streets, a governor was establislu-d in an office, tired troops were standing in the sun while billets were sought for them, and, most unbelievable of all, the Arab cultivators were dropping in to complain of a certain horseman who had ridden through a crop of beaiLs, and of a supply and transport officer who had parked his belongings in a garden. The writer, Sir Mark Sykes, added : — " It must not be supposed that our coming evokes enthusiasm, nor our justice gratitude, nor our discipline admiration." That, perhaps, was true, for " East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." But it was not the whole truth, as the Writer himself clearly recognized, for he went on : If the British soldier leads, the Sepoy has not been slow to follow ; and to see the wounded Indian soldier stiffen himself on his stretcher, and sit up to salute an unknown British oiificer, gives one a glimpse of that spirit of loyalty, pride, and glory in th> profession of arms that no windy intriguer can dispel, and j-ears of patient justice and devotion of forgotten generations of Englishmen have evoked. That also is true, and it is worth remembering. The white man's burden is not borne in vain. And it is borne not mainly or even largely by Governors and Viceroys and Secretaries of State, good as some of them are, but by obscure soldiers and civilians who give their whole lives to the East and are unknown to their country- men " at home." A remarkable consequence of the Turkisli defeats, which throws some light upon the methods of the Turks in Mesopotamia and upon THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 227 HE-f'<MBAI<KATION ()]■ HKI TISH TI<(K)PS ON THE TK;RIS. thf;ir relatioriH with tho pooplf% tnuy, porhapH, bo rii»;nt,ionf;d fujro, \ot, far from Unghilnd nm wivornl HhrinfiH iirUl Hacn;rJ by tho groat Stiiah Ht-ct rif MiikiiI- rnarifl, and vi«it«d by inriiirnorablo pilgriiriH frorn PfjrHia, TrKlia, anrl rj^hfir countrifjH, Th»iJM> nbri/ioH, f!«p*!f;ially Korbf-Ia and N«'j"f, an* alw* iiichI aH pla<;*^H 'if burial, firi'l rnnriy 'U'ad aro f>roiJ«bt yoarly to bo inU>rno(i in tboir holy oarth. Tin- 'J'lirkH are Sunnis, and rogaid the ShiahH aH horoticH, ))iit tlioy havo alwayH toloratod thoHo nhrincH, partly IxtcauHo th<> iiuihh of tlio Aralt triboHiiion of tJio country aro SbiahH thotriHoivoH, and partly, no donbt, on arcoimt of tlio rovi-niK! to bo dorivod t'lom tint pilgfirnH, who am Hubjoctod to variouH irnpoHtH, n-f^nlar and irroj^iilur. Hfiortly aftiT tlioir dofoat at Hhaiba, porhapt* 228 THH 77.V^:.S' HISTORY OF Till': W'All. AN INDIAN MACHINE-G exasperated by the treachery of their Arab allies, but doubtless in real difficulties to raise money and supplies for the war, the Turkish authorities began to oppress the inhabitants of the Holy Places, extorting from them money, valuables, and foodstuffs, and impressing men for military service. It may be doubted whether the Turks were not within their rights in calling upon these people to bear a share of the burdens of war ; but their methods were apparently as irregular as Tiu'kish methods of govermiient usually are, and serious abuses occurred, homes being raided at night, men seized, and women molested. Finally, at Xejef, the populace, perhaps a somewhat tm-bulent one, rose in revolt and barricaded the streets. Thereupon the Tiu-ks, who had sent a regiment with artillery to hold the place, turned their guns on the rebels and damaged some of the minarets of the shrine. There was some angry fighting then, the result of which was that the rebels got the upper hand and disarmed the Turkish troops. The Govei-nment buildings were burnt and the Governor expelled. This revolt was followed by outbreaks at Kerbela and other places, and, in tlie end, the Turks were everywhere ch-iven out. How far the Turks were to blame it is not possible to saj% but the able and judicious Resident in the Persian Gulf, Sii- Percy Cox, who was serving as political officer with the British forces in Mesopotamia, evidently considered that the Tm-ks brought the revolt upon themselves. In any case, the whole incident seemed to show that their authority in the Holy Places wat. a very precarious one. UN SECTION IN ACTION. and that the Shiah population was by no means disposed to serve them with enthusiasm against the British invaders. It was possibly in connexion with these outbreaks that not long after the occupation of Kut a circular letter was issued by order of General Nixon to the tribal chiefs of the Arabs on the line of the Tigris, in order to reassure them about the objects of the British Government, and, if possible, secure their neutrality in the war. This letter informed the chiefs that Great Britain had been forced into the war imwillingly, by the intrigues of the Germans, who incited the Turks to acts of hostility against her ; that the British enter- tained the most friendly feelings towards the religious authorities of the coimtry, the inhabi- tants of the Holy Places, and the Arab tribes- men, none of whom would be molested ; and that the Arabs should therefore " refuse to be misled into abandoning an attitude of aloofness and neutrality." This letter has been quoted because it is an excellent example of the " political " work which, with the help of special officers attached to the troops, British commanders in Asiatic wars have to take upon themselves. Such appeals to the inhabitants of iravaded countries are not unknowrr in European warfare, but the conditions in the East, where Governments are often composed of foi-eigners ruling an alien if not hostile populatitm, rraturally lead to attempts on the part of aix iuxading force to detach the people from their- rulers. In the opinion of most soldiers such attempts art^ THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 229 rarely successful. Probably the bulk of General Townshend's officers, if they read the letter at all, read it with somewhat contemptuous amusement, feeling sure that the Arab chiefs concerned would receive it, and any cash presents or robes of honour which might accompany it, with grave politeness, and would then proceed to " snipe " the infidel, according to custom, whenever they got the chance. Too often that is the only result of such overtures to unciviMsed tribesmen, and the "political" is a person who does not, as a rule, command warm sympathy in a British force. In old days, when he was wholly independent of the British commander, and apt at times to take too much upon himself, he was regarded, with a measure of reason, as a dangerous nuisance ; and some soldiers, if their words were to be beUeved, would without deep regret have seen him hanged. But that bad system has long been abandoned, and now that the ''political" is a subordinate like any other, some generals who know how to use him find him of more or less value in collecting information and supplies. There are even times when his efforts bear real fruit in disarming opposition and bringing about good relations with the people of the country. The long-standing friendliness between the British and certain Arab chiefs in Southern Persia afforded an instance of this, and gave some reason to hope that the Arab of Mesopotamia might be not found wholly impervious to diplomatic suasion. Order and confidence restored in Kut, General Townshend's next care was to think out his plans for the prosecution, if there was to be a pr secution, of his victorious campaign. The first question to be decided was whether any further advance at all was necessary or desirable. It is by no means obvious that this w^as the case. On the contrary, there seemed to be many reasons why the opportunity should now be taken to put an end to the forward movement. Granted that it had been necessary to go on as far as Kut, a very large concession, there could apparently be no need to go farther. The original objects of the expedition had been amply attained, and after the victory just won there could now be no reasonable doubt that the British forces were able to beat off any attack and hold the territory they had occupied. Why should they try to do more ? Unless there was some clear and important object in view it was surely luinecessarj^ and imprudent to undertake fresh operations, calling for renewed labom- and losses on the part of our troops, and lengthening the already long line of communications behind them. The answer is that there was now a clear and important object in view — the capture of Baghdad, which it was hoped would be, both on military and on political grounds, so heavy a blow to the Turlcs that it would have a sensible effect upon the fortimes of the Great War. Who first put forward this idea was not known, but it had evidently by this time gained a hold on the imagination not only of the soldiers on the spot but of others. It was probably the natural outcome, if, indeed, it was not partly KUr.HI.-AMAKA IKO.VI Till'. KIVI'.K. 23U 777/7 TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR A WATER-HOLE DUG IN THE DESERT. the cause, of the decision ta,ken in April. And, provided that the British forces available were strong enough, there was much to be said for it. Baghdad was an ancient and famous city — the capital of the Khalifs, and therefore in a sense the spiritual centre of the Turkish Empire. Its fall would on that accomit undoubtedly have a great effect all over the MusvUman East, and perhaps throughout the world. Moreover, it was an important strategical point — the military base of Turkish Arabia, and so situated that the occupation of it might even conceivably affect, in spite of great distance, any Turkish projects against Egypt, or operations against the Russians in Asia Minor. To save it the Tm-ks would probably draw troops from these or other fields. A threat to Baghdad wovild no doubt be a valuable diversion, if nothing more. But if all this were conceded, the practical question before General Townshend, and all concerned with the Mesopotamian campaign, was tlie question whether the British forces in that part of the world were, or could hope shortly to become, strong enough to undertake such an operation with reasonable prospect of success. Baghdad was 227 miles from Kut by water. The distance by land was much less, indeed not half as great, but the force at Kut was organized for the water route, and had little land transport. And it was a small force. Its original numbers had never been stated officially ; but after its losses in action, and the greater losses due to the wear and tear of a campaign in gi-eat heat and unhealthy surroimdings, it was now reduced to loss than 10,000 effectives. The British battalions had been brought do\\Ti to half their original strength, and the drafts which were being received from India to fill up the Indian regi- ments consisted of raw recruits. The garrisons in the rear could hardly be expected to spare any large number of men for the force in the front. The Turks had, it is true, been repeatedly beaten, but they had not fought badly, and it was impossible to form any accurate estimate of the numbers which they and their Arab supporters would be able to gather for a final stand. Moreover, the occupation of a city containing a population of not less tluui 150,000 inhabitants was in itself a serious matter. Finally, it was quite possible that the Turks, who now seemed to bo hokiing the Dardanelles without great difficulty against the allied attack, might have alivady sent largo reinforcements to Bagluhvd. Indeed, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 231 General Townshend appears to have received information that they had done so. In such circumstances it was at least possible, if not probable, that he might find himself opposed to greatly superior numbers ; while he would have behind him a very long and precarious line of commmiications through country held by hostile or at least doubtful Arab tribes. To push forward one small di\Tsion on such an errand seemed rash in the extreme. Even if it got to Baghdad it woiild be a mere handful, too weak to do much more than hold the town, and liable at any time to be surroiinded there, out of reach of support. The whole project was too fvdl of risk to be soTind, and so on consideration General Townshend decided. It is true that before the battle of Kut he had contemplated an advance on Baghdad in case of victory. To use his own words : "I told Sir John Nixon pre\'ious to the battle of Kut that not only did I hope to defeat the Turks in their position at Kut, but also, as at Kuma, to rout them completely, and that if I saw the chance, as I did in May at Amara, I should take the risk of pushing on into Baghdad at the heels of the rout." Apparently Sir John Nixon had made no objection to this proposal. But the action at Kut, though a victory, had not resulted in the complete rout of the Turks. They had retired rapidly ; but, at all events after the first confusion of defeat, they had retired in fairly good order, covered by a strong rear- guard with infantry and guns ; and by October 3 General Townshend knew that they had halted and taken up a fresh entrenched position at Ctesiphon, across the Baghdad road. All <3hance of riding into Baghdad at the heels of the rout was over, and the question had to be regarded from a fresh point of view. General Townshend, pressing on in pursuit with part of his force, had then reached Azizieh, " 30 miles from Ctesiphon " by land, about 100 miles up river, and from there he sent to Sir John Nixon, or liis Chief of Staff, a telegram which seemed to show that in existing con- ditions he considered it dangerous and un- desirable for Mm to march on Baghdad. The I CAPTUKKI) riJHKISM KM'I.HS And a portion of ii mnchinc-iiiin hc)n|( Korted hcffire ncndinft to the bane. •lal THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. telegram was L-iinou-ily wonlml, l»ut it was coiu- preliHasililu utu>ugh, tiiul it wart ho iiaportaut t luit it luiut be given iu full. It run na fulluwH : Oiitobor 3, 1915. Tu Major-General, General Htiin, Kut. By avtatur's report you will wee he hail just left for Kut, and that the chance of breaking u|) th>- retreatin^ Turkish forces, which have by now taken up a po^^ilion at Snlliuun I'ak,* no lon)^<-r exists ; thut positioit is ait rule the Haj^hdad road and the Tigris, and is Mtimated to be >>ix niileH of entrenchinentrt. It in also probable that Baghdad ha.s sent them reinforce- luentt. See report by aviator, which gives 6 barge.-., 3 more steamers, 1 mahela, 105 bell tents, etc., also many men and many stores, etc. ; another steamer five mile^j west of Suliman I'ak. My opinion, if I may be allowed to express one, in that up to the battle at Kut, our object has been to occupy strategical position of Kut, and to ooasolidate ourselves in the vilayet. t Ctesiphou is now held by the defeated Turkish Forces. Should it not be considered politically advisable by Govermuent to occupy Bagh<hid at present on account of doubtful situation at Dardanelles, and possibly of -our small force.s being driven out of Baghdad by stronger forces from Anatolia, which would conapel us to retire down a long line of communications teeming with Arabs, at present more or less hostile, whose hostility would beconte active on hearing of our retreat, then I consider that on all military grounds we should con- .solidate our position at Kut. The sudden fall of water, which made our advance in ships most (UtHcult, slow, and toilsome, upset our plans of entering Baghdad on the heels of Turks while they were retreating in disorder. If, on the other hand, it is the desire of Government to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great ri.-k is to be run, it is, in my opinion, absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut by road should be carried out methodically by two divisions or one army corps or by one division supported closely by another complete division, exclusive of the gtvrrisons of the important places of Xasiriyah, Ahwaz and Amsra. It is now quite impo.ssible for laden ships to go up. The gist of this telegram, expressed in a few words, appears to be : '■ On all nailitary grounds it is undesirable to advance oti Baghdad at present, and we should content ourselves with consolidating our po-iition up to Kut, which has hitherto been our object. If, however, it i.s the desire of Government, on political grounds, to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great risk is to be run. it is absolutely necessary that the force ordered to do so should consist of two divisions or one army corps, or of one division supported closely by another complete division, exclasive of the garrisons of important places below." In face of this telegram General Nixon, who was himself at Kut, did not press (ieneral Townshend to move forward, but left him at Azizieh ; strengthening him as time went on by such reinforcements as were available in the country, which amounted to a brigade of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a battery of artillery. On October 24 it became * Ctesiphon. t The province of Basra. known that two iiun'ci divisi(jiis wcrti btting sent to Mesopotamia from Francti, and this held out a pros[)ect that if thern was to bo an advance on I^aghdad it would be pussiblt) to make it in the Htrength considered by General Townshend to be " absolutely nttcesnary." Thtui, on some date unknown, but at .some perioil iu October long before the arrival of the divisions from France, General Nixon seems to have expressed to the Indian Govern- ment, or dir(fct to the Home (iovernment, either of his own accord or in answer to inquiry, an opinion in favoiu- of an advance ; the Goveriunent of India accepted it, and H.M. Goveiiim(»iit diil likewise. Upon this General Nixon gjive General Townsliend the word to move forward, and he did so. On Novem- ber 11 his advanced troops, the cavalry and a brigade of infantry, broke up camp at Azizieh, and a few days later the whole of the foice was in march for Baghdad. It was still a small force for such an luider- taking, perhaps 12,000 men all told ; but General Townshend made no protest as to its inadequacy, regarding his telegram of October 3 as " all that a subordinate commander could do " in this respect ; and General Nixon assumed, rightly or wrongly, that he no longer thought himself too weak. Indeed, after some personal commiuiication between General Nixon's Chief of Staff and General Townshend, it seemed to General Nixon " quite clear that the final confirmation of the coming of two divisions from France had satisfied him (Townshend) that the conditions he men- tionfd at the beginning of the month were fulfilled." How this can have been the case, when the two divisions were still in France or on the high seas, is not easy to luiderstand, for General Townshend's division was certainly not " supported closely by another complete division." That, however, was a matter between the two soldiers only, for General Townshend's telegratn of October 3, being the telegram of a subordinate, had not been sent on to the Government of India. Meanwhile the campaign had been attracting much attention in England, and on November 2 the matter came up in the House of Commotis. The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, then took upon himself the duty of explaining the situation. He announced that Sir John Nixon was within measurablt> distance of Baghdad *' I do not think," ho sjvid, " that in the whole course of the war there has been a series of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 233 WAUINC; THKOlKiH Indian troopH advancint^ lo (he f»[X!raiioriH irioni iiin-fully contriv'*^!, inonj hrilli»riily (uituUicU-d, Hn<l with a bettor |>ros- fxjct of final HiiocoMH." TJio Hoii««» chiM-n-d, and tho infer«nc« <lrawn from thJH Hpotcli hy tho «;<junfry wjim that hritinii trofjjw would w^ori b<t in orciipatirjii of tlio fanioun <'ity. <inu*;ra,\ 'I'owiMhmnd'M Hiil>H<)fiii»!rit advarico from Axizi'ili w»i« th'iniforo mj/anlcd with <;hffrful- n»5MH, and it wan confid<-ntly hopod that th*- hl';w Htnu-k at tho 'I'nrkK in thin fjiiart«'r would \tn w»rn«! '!f*rn(>»inHatiori for the ^|■l•ni. Iohwm and di-ia[;|>ointiii(tniH f<f th<t ludiappy vcntiir*! in THE MAKSIIIiS. support of a Hritish attack. tlif J)a!<luiii-liis. Tlitif liopt!, (loul)ll<'ss shiircd by tho (lov«!rnni«ait, and pn^suuiably th(^ real cauHt! of the advance;, was lioightened towai'ds file end of Xovi'nibcr by roportH of a victory yaincd by (Jcni-ial TownHhcnd williiii 20 miles of Maghdad, a,nd it .so(Mnod aH if tho con- fidence of tin. I'rimo Minister was on 1li<^ poitd of being fully justified. Then the blow fell. The first rc|)orfs of tho victory, though leaving some room loi' doubf, had been giuierally HHtiHfactory. A few days later' it was Htated by (hrj India Ollicfi that 231 HE TIMES lUSTUUY OF THE WAR. Cittiittrul TuwnHhend had " witlulruwn hiu furce to a puHitiua low or down tlu) livur," which looked oiuiiioub. Finally, on December 6, it was known that the victory liad been turned into a repulHe, and tliat the liritiHh were in lull retreat down the line of the Tigris. A " Heveie check " had been achniuistered to the exjwditionary force, whose record till then had been one of uruuarred success, and there was to be no speedy capture of Baghdad. It was a deep disappointment to the nation, already saddeneil by the gloom which hung over the Dardanelltw. General Townshend had in truth suffered not a defeat in the open field, but still^a repulse ■ (BRITISH ^ CAMP' ScaleofMiles. ° ' f ■? ? ^ .3571 THE BATTLE OF CTESIPHON. which made it clear that his small force had shot its bolt. The story of that repulse and its consequences is honourable to him and his troops, who did all that men could do ; but it is none the less a melancholy one, and there was some reason to fear that political reasons might in this instance, as so often before, have been allowed to override military con- siderations. Advancing by both banks of the Tigris, with little opposition, while the flotilla of war boats and transport followed closely by the river bed. General Townshend's division was concentrated on November 21 at Lajj, a point nine miles from the Turkish position. Information had reached him that this was held by his old opponent, Nur-ed-Din Bey, with 13,000 regular troops and 38 guns, besides Arabs ; and there were reports that large Turkish reinforcements were about to join the enemy. The truth of these reports could not ba ascertained, but, in case they should be true, it WHS eviilently desirable that Nur-ud-Din should, if possible, be uttacktul and beaten before his nunforcemonts came up. General 'J'ownshond therefore decided to attack at once, and, leaving his shipping at Lajj, he marched on the night of the 21st, arriving before daylight in front of the Turkish lines, which liad been thoroughly reconnoitrtid by his airmen. Ctesiphon was a place of deep historical interest. It hail in ancient times been the capital of the Persian kingdom of the Chosroos ; and thirteen hundred years before the date on which it fii-Kt heard the sound of British guns it had been the scone of memorable warfare between Moslems and Infidels. In the year G3G A.D., soon after the death of the Prophet, when the Arab tribes, swarming from their desert sands in all the ardour of a new-born faith, had boldly thrown down the gauntlet to the two groat powers of the world, " Rum " and Persia, the host of Islam, marching from victory to victory, finally drove the Persians back to their capital on the Tigris. At that time Ctesiphon extended to both banks of the river and included Seleucia, the former capital of the Alexandrian kings There the Arabs were checked, for the walls of Seleucia were too strong for them to storm, and their rude engines of warfare made no impression on the ramparts of sunburnt brick. For months the Persians held their assailants at bay. Then, at last, worn out by famine, the garrison evacuated the town in the night, and crossed the river to Ctesiphon, taking with them all their boats. For some weeks longf-r the Arabs remained in sight of the city and of the palace of the Chosroes, with its graat hall of white marble and stately Aich, already one of the wonders of the world. Their efforts to collect boats proved unsuccessful, and it seemed as if, after all, their army of 60,000 men would have to raise the siege. But, when hope had almost left them, a deserter told then of a ford where, with some swimming perhaps, their horses might get across the rivtr. It seemed a desperate venture, for the stream was swift, and on the rise, but, after some hesitation, they decided to put their fortunes to the hazard, and a body of picked horsemen plunged into the flood. They reached the farther shore, and driving back a few of the enemy who opposed their landing, secured the ford. The Persians, taken by surprise, fled panic-stricken, and the whole city fell into the hands of the conquerors. The spoil was of priceless value — millions in coin, with countless vessels of gold and silver. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 235 and a great store of jewels and wealth of all kinds, including the regalia of the Persian Empire and the sword of the Chosroes. The Arab leader took up his residence in the loyal palace, and the Great Hall was turned into a House of prayer for the woi-ship of the God of Islam. A huridred years later, when the Klialif of the day had chosen Baghdad for the site of his future capita], he resolved to demolish the palace of the Chosroes to provide material for the new city. [Much of it he overthrew and carried away, but not all. " The noble Arch, hard as iron,'" says the historian of the Khalifate, " withstood the pickaxe," defying all his efforts. '■ And there on the river's left bank still stands the grand monvunent in majesty, while all around is now a bare and sandy plain.'" It was to look down, after twelve centuries more had passed, upon the grim struggle in which British and Turks, backed by their Indian and Arab aUies, contended for the mastery of Mesopotamia. From the British lines at I^ajj, on the evening of November 21, it had been aeen standing out against a blood-ied sunset sky ; and in the morning the British soldier awoke from his uneasy sleep on the chilly moonlit plain to see it facing the sunrise, with the Tui-kish host gathered aljout it. Tradition lives long in the East, and perhaps the Arabs who confronted the invader of their country found encouragement from the great mass that towered above them, a silent witness to the ancient conquests of their race. It may even be possible that some feeling of its kind had its influence in leading the Turks to fix upon this spot for their last stand in defence of Baghdad. More probably their German-trained officers found other reasons for the choice, but senti- ment and superstition have a strong hold on the Eastern mind. Nur-ed-Din and his troops had taken up a position somewhat siinilar to the one from which they had been driven at Kut. It lay astride the Tigris, and consisted of two lines of carefully prepared entrenchments strengthened by re- doubts. The first line was about nine miles in length — six to the north of the river, three to the south. The second line was roughly parallel to the first — five miles behind it on the south bank, two miles behind it on the north bank. In rear of the second line was a bridge connect- ing the two wings of the army. Close beside the RUINS OF rilK (;HHAr I'AI.ACH OF THH CnOSKOFS AT CTF.SII'IIONJ?^ , t23»j TtlH TlMI':s lIlSTOliV OF THE ll'.l/.'. river ou ihti uurtli riiil*', ami luiilway butwotMi tht) two lintiH, rituoil the (iieat Aivh. Ad at Kilt, (ieiuM'al 'rt)wii8lienil attankud the let't ot the eiieiay'x poiiitiun, and after a tuniM-e hght the front line of trencheti was Htonned with "a riirfh ami a rtwir of iheerin^^." The 4.')t}i Tiu'kiiih iliviiiion, whii-lt lield tlitMii, watt practi- cally debtroyed. It lorit 1,.'{0() prihonern, aii<l the trenches were choked with tload. The attaekin)^ force then |)reb8ed on, acroHb a Hat, bare desert, towards the second line, losing heavily from the artillery ami rifle tiie of the Turks. Nevertheless, aiKaneinj^ by short rushes tiiey at last reacheil the line, antl, fighting fiercely, ctirried a portion of the tienchcs, with eight Turkish guns. Hut there the success of these brave troojjs ctinie to an end. Bringing up strong reinforcements of in-sh men, the Tiu-ks maile one counter-attack afttr another ; the tide of battle swayed Ijackwards anil forwards ; the captured guns changed hands time after time ; ammunition ran short, all the mules having been killed by shrapnel, and at last, as night fell, it was seen that ovir people could do no more. Leaving, sorely against their will, tJie guns in the hands of the enemy, they were withdrawn to the line of trenches they had first taken, and there they spent the night. It was far from being a night of complete rest, for the Turks, emboldened by then- success, seemed dis- posed to attack in the darkness the line they had lost. But their attacks, if, indeeil, they ever ineant to attack, came to nothing, and in the morning our weary troops still held not only the first Turkish position but some groimd beyond. Daring this day, November 23, General Townsliend reorganized his force in this position, and collected his nvunerous wounded, but no attempt was made at a fresh advance. " Owing to heavy losses in killed and woiuided it was inadvisable to renew the offensive." The Tui'ks understood, and throughout the following night they made repeated attacks all along the line. They were beaten off with great loss, their advancing masse:^ being dispersetl in every ca;e before they got to close quarters, and when day broke our cavalry were well foiward. All about the base of the Aich was " the gallop and glint of horsemen wlio wheeled in the level sun."' It was believed that another advance would take place without delay. But no oi'ders came to move forward. November 24 was, like the 23rd, a day of com|)arative inaction, spent in removing to l^ijj the wounded and prisoiters, now amounting to 1,()5U, and a thiid night was passed in the same position. During tiiis ni^ht the Turks did little to molest the liritish force, and on the luorninif of the 2i'ith it was still ho|)ed that they went al«>ut t(t aban<lon the hard-fought battle- field, which was covered with tin ir dead and wounded. This hope was soon at an end. More Turkish reinforcements came u|), and during the afternoon it was seen that large columns were moving down to turn both of the British flanks, while bodies of cavalry began to threaten tlie i»»ar. Fac(«l by fresh troops greatly outiunnbering his own, perhaps in tlie proportion of three or fom- to one, and encum bered by thousands of prisoners and wounded, the Biitish comman<ler recognized tiiat another attack could not succeed. To remain where he was would be to incur the danger of being cut off from his base. During the night of the 25th he withdrew to Lajj, whore his Ijoats and supplies had remained. The advance on Baghdad was over. The Arch of the Chosroes had proved the liigh water mark of invasion. J^jj, where General Townshend halted during November 20, was not a place at which he could make a poinianent stand. " A position so far froin bases of supply," General Nixon wrote, "with a vulneiable line of conununica- tion along the winding shallow river, was unfavoiuable for defence. It was necessaiy to withdraw farther down stream to a more secure locality until conditions might enable a resmnption of the offensive." The place selected was Kut, which had already, to some extent, been supplied and prepared. There the retreating force might hope to be joined before many weeks hael passed by rein- forcements from below. Kut was far in rear — 210 miles by the river and 70 or moi'e by road — but the decision seemed sound. On Novem- ber 27 the i-etreat began, and for about half the distance was not much molested. But the Tiuks had no intention of letting their enemy escape luiscathed, or escape at all if they could help it. Their moimted troops were pushing down the river round the Biitish flanks, and, as Townshend had foi-eseen, the Arabs of the neighboming country were hostile. ^lany of them had joineil what they now believed to be the winning side, and it was evideiit that the British might soon find their retreat iiitercepted. Enemy horsemen wero reported even below Kut. Impeded as they were by THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 237 the necessity of keeping within supporting distance of the naval flotilla and boats, which were constantly grounding in the loops and twists of the river, the retiring troops could not pash on as rapidly as they might have done ; and this gave the enemy time to overtake them. The position was one to cause grave anxiety. On November 29 the cavalry under Brigadier- General Robeits drove back some enemy horsemen who were attacking a stranded gunboat. The 14th Hussars and 7th Hariana Lancers made a successful charge, and killed a column which tried to envelop the British right flank enabled General Townshend to break off the fight and retire. But the enemy's attacks were resolute, and he reported that only " the splendid steadiness of the troops and the excellence of his Brigadiers " had allowed him to extiicate his force from its difficult position. It had been in serious danger, and though the Turks weie shaken off for the time their superiority in the field was now manifest. On December 3, without fvirther fighting, the British force was " installed at Kut," and the liKITISH TROOPS (iETTINC; or woundod 140 of thern. But the Turks were still advancing, and on the following rlay Gonoral Townshend was lorcad to halt at Umm-el-Tubal ber^auw) the shipping was in trouble owing to shoaJ water, the gunboat Shaitan having grounded. Ifer guns and stores were removwJ by the Firefly anrl Shushan under heavy snipintr fro;ri both banks, but the Shaitan could not }><• refloated, anfi had to be abarifioned. 'i'lie delay was Cfuisid'M-able, anrl during the night of the .3(M>h the whole Turkisli forf;*> earne up. At fjaylight on Decernbor 1 th'ry atta<;ked in great strength, anrl a h»ir(i fight OTUiued. Tho Turks lost heavily from the British artillery iini, and a sufeessful attack irift/\i- by the f;avalry brigad'j agdinsf A GUN OVER A "BUND." r(;treat was at an end. Though closely pressed. General Townshend had brought in with him the 1,650 prisoners takf^n at Ctesiphon, and thc^re had never be<3n anything approaching a rout. Nevertheless, the losses of the force during the battle and retreat had been severe — 4,567 men — and the naval flotilla had been obliged to abandon not only the Shaitan, but also the Firefly and Goniet, wliich had grounded during thr- fight of Ddcninlxtr 1, and b«!en surrounded by thf) onfimy. Their crews were taken off with gr«!at difficulty by the Humana under close and hciivy t'lvci. "Throughout these operations," General Nixon wrote, " Captain Nunn, Lieu- f,onant Krldis, wlio was wouruled, ti.nd all f)flif;ers and men f)f thri navnl flotilla bohuved 238 Till': TlMl'IS HISTOUY OF THE W ATI. MAJOR-GENERAL M. GOWPER, G.I.E., Head of the Administrative Staff at Basra- with great coolness and bravery under most trying circurcstances." Once the retreat was over, General Townshend set to work to strengthen his position and prepare to stand a siego luitil rehef should arrive from the south. Reinforcements for Meso- potamia were known to be coining from over- seas, and it was hoped that with the foice already under General Nixon's command there would soon be troops enough not only to relieve Kut but even to resume the interrupted advance. Meanwiiilu the first tiling was to got rid of all HUperfluous men and animals. The aiimeruus sick and wounded, and tlio Turkish prisoners, were sent down to Hasia hy water. On J>oi»Miiljer (1 the cavalry, who coukl bo more iis»»fui outside, and a convoy of transport animals, marchtnl down the road towards Amara. All uiuiecessary shippuig was also sent away. Those measm'es were carried out just in time, for on the day the cavalry left Kut the enemy closed in upon the north«>rn front of the [xjsition, and on tlw* following day the invost- m(*ut of the place was complete. As before stated, Kut lies in a loop of the Tigiis. Tiiis loop lias the shape of the letter l', with its open end pointing about north-west. The town is at the opposite end, near the spot where the Shatt-el-Hai flows out of the Tigris. Th(» loop is about two miles in length and a miU) in breadth. Across the open end had been constructed a line of defences, which were now strengthened. The line terminated at its eastern exti'emity in a redoubt, close to which was a bridge of boats across the river. Two detached posts were thrown out on the right bank of the river, one to cover the bridge, the other opposite the town. The siege now began. On December 8 the enemy bombarded heavily from three sides, and Nur-ed-Din called upon General Townshend to siu-render. On the 9th the Turks attacked the detachment on the right bank covering the bridge, and it was forced to retire. The bi'idge was now useless, if not dangerous, as the enemy held the right bank in such force that an attack upon him would have been impracticable, and General Townshend decided that the bridge must be demolished. His orders were success- fully carried out, with little loss, by a party under Lieutenant A. B. Mathews, R.E., and Lieutenant R. T. Sweet, of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Gurkha Rifles. Then followed several days of continuous bombardment, varied by attacks which were beaten off with severe loss to the Turks. In one such attack, on December 12, General Nixon reported that their casualties were estimated at 1,000 killed and wounded. After this the emnny settled down to regular siege operations and confined themselves to sapping and mining. Two or three successfvil sorties on a small scale vvex'e made by the garrison, who were in good heart and in no difficulty about supplies. Nothing perhaps did more to kt>op up their spirits than the example of their ct>mmander. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 239 always cheery and confident and almost boyisli in his love for fun. So matters continued until Christmas Eve, when another attack, and this tune a formidable one, was made upon our works. The point selected by the enemy was the redoubt pre\'iously mentioned, at the north- east comers of the defences. This redoubt was heavily bombarded during the night of Decem- ber 23, and throughout the morning of the 21th, the parapet was breached, and then, beUe\Tng their time was come, the Turks swarmed out of their trenches, a hiuidred yards away, and suddenly ritshed to the assavdt. Their onset was at first successful. They got through the breach, and for a time it looked as if they might maintain their hold. Their success was shortlived, for a strong counter-attack was launched against them, and, after a hand-to-hand-fight, in which the Oxford Light Infantry and Norfolk Regiment were conspicuous, they were driven out, leaA-ing 200 dead in the redoubt. This first failure did not discourage them. Under cover of dark- ness they returned to the assault, fresh troops pouring in to fill the place of those who fell, and at least once they again succeeded in effecting a lodgment. But they were again expelled, the garrison fighting with desperate resolution and though the struggle lasted throughout the night, 8unri.se on Christinas morning saw it at an end. It had resulted in a bloody repulse for the assailants, whose dead lay heaped in and around the redoubt. They had been driven not only out of the defences but out of their fore- most line of trenches, and the garrison were left to pass their Christmas day in peace. From then until the close of the year no further attack.s of the kind were delivered. A large number of the enemy marched round Kut and took up a position some miles down the river, to block any attempt at relief, while the THHt of hJH troops kept the garri.son closely l>e8eiged ; but, for the time, any chance of the sfifjefly fall of the pla^^e twHimefl to Ix; o\'er. Thus ended the arlvance from which so much had \n^m hoped. Hinee the landing f)f the expeditionary force, it iiKjntliH earlier, the Turk« liad been repeatedly beatfni on their own grrMinrl, and a large Turkinh province h(i<i Uw'n conquered. Kinally a body of JiriflHli troofw had marched uj> ahowt to within sigliL of iJaghflad, T/iore than /500 mileH from the mm. Then, after a gallant anri j>artially-Huc- C4:nnt>i\ attempt to Htorm a utrong entrench* < I position held by greatly superior nuiuliers, the advance of the British force had been checked, and eventually it had been obliged to fall back to a point 200 miles down the river. But it had gone back fighting steadily, and bearing off with it a large number of prisoners wrested from the entrenchments of its enemy. The attempt on Baghdad had failed, but un- questionably the balance of honour and advan- tage still lay with the invaders. They w;ere still in possession of a great tract of Ttu-kish territory, and they had shown again and again that British troops, and Indian troops led by British officers, were more than a match for an equal mmiber of Tm-ks, even when the Turks were trained and cUrected by German officers, and held strong positions. British and In- dians ahke felt that they were the better men, and not discouragement but a spirit of pride and confidence was the result of the year's fighting. Nevertheless the blow at Baghdad had failed ; and the British nation, sore at its disappointment, now demanded to know who was to blame. It was felt, as further informa- tion came in, that General Townshend's force JUIiiill 6r l-ry. (JKNKKALSIH HHAUCHAMP nUJ'F, CJ.C.B., Coinmiinder-in-(Jliicf in Indiu. •24(1 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. liuii btMui ftir too Hiurtll for the work nxpoototl of it. Thtirti wwrM, moreover, reports that the provuion luticle for tha transport and inediual rt»quireiuent8 of tlie force hail been ileplorably inauttiuieiit, ami tlmt our troops, ewpecially the Hick anil wounded, had been exponed to wholy unneceHsary Hufferinw'*- A veheiniMit fetiling of iutlignation tvroso, and grew Htrongei tUy ljy ilay. Time would doubtlenri show wlio wius in fact reHpon«ible for the reverse sustainetl by our arms. The first, and jn'rhaps natural, inclination of the British public in such cases, has always btnui to throw the blame on the military commander. But military reverses have not always been duo to the soldiers in command. Any reader of Fortesiiue's " History of the British Army " mast have had it brought home to him, if he did not know it already, that too often the reputation of British generals and the lives of British troops have been wan- tonly sticrificed by the incompetence or selfish- ness of statesmen and politicians. When the case came up for judgment, on full knowledge of the facts, the question for decision was not which general blundered, but what authori- ties, military or civil, were chiefly to blame. His Majesty's Govenunent and the Govern- ment of India were both concerned in the invasion of ^Iesopotan\ia and the march on Baghdad. They might have been wholly free from fault in the matter; but they might have been not only in fault but primarily and chiefly in fault. They could not be absolved at the expense of the soldiers on the spot unless it was clearly proved that the soldiers misled them, and that they neither took the initiative in urging the unfortunate advance nor could properly have forbidden it. It was possible that this could be proved. The military commanders might be shown to have erred from over-boldness, and to have pressed their views upon their Govermiients in such a way that those Govermnents could not decline to accept them. This seemed the less milikely from the fact that the military commanders had been trained in a school where boldness of action was steadily inculcated. For many generations, ever since the foremost of our Sepoy generals, Arthur Wellesley, Against the mj-riads of Assaye Clashed with his fiery few and won, it has been the tradition of the Indian Army that an Asiatic enemy can best be met by bold attack, and that nothing is so dangerous as any show of backwardness. That tradition is based itn countless wai"s. Clive, long before Wollesley's day, liolxnts and many others in later times, have helped to found or establish it. If on raw occasions in our Asiatic history over- boldness led to defeat, it led, times without numlK<r, to victory against almost hopelees odds. It wjis the veiy foundation of our Indian Empire. Therefore it did not seem altogether improbable that the military com- manders in this campaign wore over bold, and that they pressed their views on their Govern- nionts with a c<jnfidence which was hard to resist. liut tliis was not yot proved. General Townshend's telegram of October 3 seemed to throw much doubt upon it, and to suggest that the advance on Baghdad was made on political rather tlian on military grounds. In the House of Lords, on December 8, Lord Crewe declared that " the early capture of Baghdad would have been a gi'eat stroke both from a military and a political point of view." Ho was then generously defending the man who actually carried out the advance. " It was a complete error," he said, " to suppose that this was a rash military adventure undertaken by General Townshend on his own initiative. The advance on Baghdad had been contemplated some months ago." He went on to say that " a sufficient force had been collected to carry out the operation, the whole proceedings having be?n thought out by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Xixon." But he did not show, or allege, that the initiative was Sir John Nixon's. It seemed not impossible that His Majesty's Government, anxious to have in the capture of Baghdad a set-off against the evacuation of the Dardanelles, themselves suggested or pressed the advance. As to the alleged breakdown in medical arrangen^ents, and in other respects, there wtis undoubtedly strong ground for the feeling of the nation that the matter demanded thorough investigation, and the sternest apportionment of blame for any avoidable suiTering inflicted upon our brave and patient soldiery, who imder the best conditions would have suft'ered much. On the facts as reported the nation did well to be angry ; and it was expected that sooner or later it would pronounce an xmsparing judg- ment. The times are gone for ever when the soldier could be safely neglected and left to die in misery for want of liis country's car© CHAPTER CLIX. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN OF 19 1 5-16 IN ARMENIA. The Early Operations in the Caucasus — Position in Summer of 1915 — ^The Grand Duke's Command — Preparations for the Offensive — Turkish Strength — The British Operations IN Mesopotamia — General Yudenitch's Great Advance — Fall of Erzerum, February 16, 1916 — Capture of Mush and Bitlis — Feeling in Turkey — Fresh Russian Advance — Naval Assistance — Fall of Trebizond — General Baratoff in Touch with General Lake — I^ast Phase of the Russian Campaign — Some Turkish Successes— Fall of Erzinjan — Turkish Strategy — Situation in Auoust, 1916. THE opening moves of the campaign in the Cauca-sus have already been described in an earlier chapter.* The Turkish advance, which was believed to embody in a special degree the aims and the skill of Enver Pasha and his German advisers, began at the end of November, 1914, with a brilliant dash across the Russian Asiatic border over a wifle front, and came to an inglorious conclusion at Sarikamish in the first week of the following January. The plan was the plan of Berlin, but the hands were the hanrls of Constantinople, and the invasion failed utt^jrly in its main objective — the captun; of Kars, which harl been lost by Turkey in 1878. At Sarikamish, which may b*> called the Turkish Tannenberg, Genorul Yudenitch, the Russian commander, with an army inferior in nnrnlKsrs and erjuip/nrjnt, practically annihilated the main Turkish force and captured Tkdan Pasha with the whole of his staff, together with thr> Genn>iri oflieers attacri/jfl. " Tl»e 'lUrks have their German friends to thank for this," was the comment attributed to a high KusHian olYicer on hearing the news, and the whrWe (ulvance rnovornont was an ♦ Vol. HI., Ch«.f.. LI. Vol. X I'art, 124. excellent illustration of the danger of attempting to carry out a complicated series of operations without the thorough army training necessary for its success. On the extreme left wing, indeed, in the Chorok valley, a small Turkish force, fighting in the old dogged way, made a con- siderable advance and kept up a troublesome resistance for many months : so that althoiigh the campaign as a whole was over with Sari- kamish on January 6, 191.'), it was not till April 8 that the Russians were in a position to announce officially that the Turks were " completely ousted from the districts bor- dering on Batum and Kars." Meanwhile there was much jubilation in Pcitrograd, and some writers, with the incurable optimism of the amateur expert, began to talk of the speedy appearance of a Russian aiTny " under the walls of Constantinople." But wo may he sure that Count Vorontsoff- Dashkoff and General Yudenitch cherished no such illusions. Russia's br^st troo[)H were far away on h(!r western front, and th<» Army f>f tho (Jaiieasns, s|)len<li{lly as it had acquitted itself, was crimparatively small in nuinhors arul mainly (iornpoHcil of seciond linct troops. Thrjr** ensued, therefore, a long period of waiting and of fMiofnl pre[»arati()ti before 241 242 THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAli AFTER THE DEFEAT AT SARIKAMISH. Turkish stragglers making for Erzerum. anything like a general advance could even be thought of. And the Russian force in Persia, which has alreatly been mentioned,* was in a difficult position at Tabriz, while troops from the Caucasus were required to maintain the prestige of the northern empire in that direction. By patience, energy, and skill all these difficulties were in time sxirmounted, and it is our task in this chapter to tell the story of the great advance — one of the most brilliant and successful of the whole war — in the course of which Russia's victorious stan- dards were planted successively in Erzerum — Turkey's " impregnable " citadel in the East — in Trebizond — her leading Black Sea port, the gateway of trade for Eastern Asia INIinor and Persia — in Erzinjan-^a hundred mUes inland- — and in Mush, Bitli-;, and Van, still reeking with the blood of massacred Armenians. The whole coimtry is one of extraordinary difficulty for military operations. All Switzer- land, with its mountains, could be dropped into the vast complex of momitain land stretching froiu the plains of Russia far into Asia Minor and Persia without producing any remarkable variation in its rugged outline Elbiu-z and Ararat would stiU tower unchal- lenged over Mont Blanc and the Matter horn. For centuries — since Ivan took Astrakhan, ♦ Vol. III., p. 79. since Peter took Azov — the eyes and the heart of Russia have been set on this mighty barrier that stretched between the two seas and closed to her the gates of the south. To obtain possession even of the northern ranges, Russia, as General Kuropatkin* pointed out ten yeare before the Great War, fought two wars with Persia and three with Tiu-key, only to find at the last that the south was guarded against her " not only by the Turks but by the Germans." " The task of preserving our position on the MecUterranean from the Black Sea," he added prophetically, " has passed to the twentieth century." The Russian War Minister was, no doubt, speaking primarily of the Balkans, but the Baghdad railway and all that it meant for Asia JNIinor was also in his thoughts, for he recognized that in Europe Russia had no land frontier with Turkey, whereas in Trans-Caucasia Russia marches for 325 miles with Turkey, and for 465 with Persia. " The frontier fixed in 1878," he said, " gives us an advantageous rovite by which to advance on Erzerimi, the most important point in Asia Minor, and the only fortress of any strength nearer than Scutari." The Caucasus campaign seventy years earlier, in which Engletnd and Russia foimd themsehes on opposite sides, was illuminated * The Buasian Army, by A. N. Kiiiojiatkiii, Xol. 1. p. 33- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 243 by one incident characteristic of the relations that existed between chivalrous foes in the days before war had been degraded by Prussian brutality. The defence of Kars, then a Turkish outpost, was entrusted to General Fenwick Williams, a Canadian by birth, who held out for over five months against the repeated attacks of Muravief? and the encroachments of cholera, famine, and cold within the walls. As no relief was possible and the garrison was exhausted, Williams was compelled at the taineers of varied nationality — Circassians, Georgians, Losgians, Tartars, Kurds, Armenians, and so forth — to produce something like peace and order in what is now a Russian province. " It is," says Mr. Douglas Freshfiold, " an ethnological museum where the invaders of Europe as they travelled westward to be manufactured into nations left behind samples of themselves in their raw condition." Once across the Caucasus proper, Russia found her- self confronted with a pretty solid population CJKNEKAL YUDENITCH. He is photographed Ntudyin^ a tactical problem. end of Xovombor, IS.'i.'i, to ask for terms. Miiravieff, all of whose assaults had b(K;n hurled ba^;k with great Iohh, and who respected a gallant foe, reaiiily concodfsd Williams's claim to U5 permitt<;fj to m/irch out with tin; honotjrs of war. " You havfj rnado yoursolf," hn wrote, ** a narnft in hintory, and jjostority will stand amazed at tho enrlurance, tho courage, and the diwiipline which this Hiege has calUid forth in the rernainK of an army." ft took KiisHia sixty-two years of almost conntant warfare with the (Jancasiari rnoun- of Armenians and Kurds, with the Persians still some way off on the southern shores of the Caspian, and the Turks in a corresponding position on tho Black Sea. Reference to the coloured maf) which forms tho frontispiece to Vcjiume Vlir. oi this History, together with till) explanation given on page 77 of Volume 111., will make a very complicated Hiti"iation as clear as is possible. Hut the state of iii'fniis on either sifle of the Turco-Persian frontier in this quarter had been one of practical anarcliy for sevenil yr^ars past. •244 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Ruuuii l^d,kti N'uii, tiiul (111 tu tliu woHtuni hIiU) uf I^ku L'riiiut acrodti the I'tHHiaii Iroiitit^r, KuriLs uiul Ariutiiiiaiui ure intixtrictibly iiiiii|{ltHl tognthm*. This statu ctt" atfiiiis luul always proviilml ttiu Turlu with an o|)put-tuiuty and a pretext fur a iiiasHacre of Arineuiaim an often an their fears pronipted tlieni to auspect any- tliing in the natiu'O of clisatt'ection, the Kurds acting as willing instriunents whenever called on. The massacres of April-July, 1915 — the niOHt systematic, widespretiil and ruthless of a long series ha \e already been descriljed at length.* It is only necessary here to remind readers that the Turkish defeats in the Caucasus tuined mainly with the view of koe[)ing occupied Haliti IJey and the remnants of his army and [ji'e venting tliem frtuu reinforcing the Turkish troops at Maghdad and down the 'I'igris, where the iiritish force was advancing from the Persian (Julf. At the beginning of May quite a notable little \i(tory over su|)eiior nuitibers was gained by the Hussians at Dilman, to the north-west uf Lake Urmia. Meanwhile the Turkish army hud to some extent reorganiz<t<l itself aft»*r the disaster of January, with ilui aid of reinforcements from Anatolia and from Syria, but neither side was sufliciently sup- ported from headfjuarters to ))e in a j)osition MACHINE GUNS CAPTURED AT SARIKAMISH. and on the Suez Canal (February, 1915) and their failure to make good their plans for the conquest of Western Persia impelled them to assert the supremacy of their race and their reUgion in the Eastern liigMands. They did it in wholesale fashion, and they resumed tlie process at intervals afterwards, a message from Baku in November, 1916, annovmcing the massacre at Sivas of 5,000 of the 6,000 Armenians left alive at that place. During the rest of the suimtier of 1915 nothing of military importance occurred or was reported from the main front in the Caucasus. Russian pressure in Western Persia was still inain- * Vol. VIII., Chap. CXXXIII. to think of resuming operations. The British force continued its successful advance in Mesopotamia ; Egj'pt and Arabia still detained considerable forces, wliile the landing on the Gallipoli peninsula, with its direct menace to Constantinople, caused very real anxiety in the Turldsh capital. All tliis time Russia was fighting for her life on her western front from the Baltic to the Carpathians, and. hampered by a desperate shortage of gims and numitions, was being driven back with imbroken front in Poland and the Baltic px'ovinces, as well as in Oalicia. In August, 1915, the Tm-lcs, having finished for the time their sanguinary exploits in THE TUJES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 245 THE TSAR INSPECTING HIS Armenia and the Van-Urmia district, and the Rassians having reoccupied Van (August 17), again showed some activity in the coast region, -where the army that had offered such stub- bom resi.stance in the Chorok valley still con- •stituted a menace to the frontier. Even on the Black Sea Turkish vessels began to show them- selves, and to throw troops and provisions into Trebizond for the defence of Erzerum. In the third week of this month the Russians struck back vigorously, and on August 27 they were able to announce that the Turkish attempt to take the offensive had again completely broken down and that many of their vessels had been ^unk. At Olty also, and at the confluence of the Olta and the Chorok, there was some sharp fighting, the Turks Vjeing again driven back. All thewj movements, however, were only of the nature of an intensive reconnaissance, and had no further military purpose or effect. It was in the h>eginning of September that the great news came that was to transform *he Trans-Caucasian campaign. On Sej)- ternber 't the 'i'piar issued the Army Order announcing thiat Im had himself taken over the supreme command of the sea and land iorcjiH of the Empire, with Ooneral Alexeieff an bin Chief of Staff, and on the same day he issued a rf!seript to the (irand iJuke Nicholas afipoiriting him to the cr»rrirri»irid in the (!iiuc)i- ARMY OF THE CAUCASUS. sus. The Imperial Rescript was in the fol- lowing terms : At the beginning of the war I was unavoidably prevented from following the inclination of my soul to put myself at the head of the Army. That was why I entrusted you with the Commandership-in-Chief of all the land and sea forces. Under the eyes of the whole of Rassia, your Imperial Highness has given proof during the var of steadfast bravery which caused a feeling of profound confidence and called forth the sincere good wishes of all who followed your operations through the inevitable vicissitudes of the fortune of war. My duty to my country, which has been entrusted to ino by God, impels mo to-day, when the enemy has penetrated into the interior of the Empire, to take the supreme command of the active forces and to share with my Army the fatigues of war and to safeguard with it RuHsian soil from the attempts of the enemy. The ways of Providence arc inscrutable, but my duty and my desire determine m<' in my resolution for the good of the State. The invasion of the enemy on the Western front, which necesHitalcH the gnatcst possible concentration of the civil and military authorities, as well us the unification of the command in the field, lias turned our attention from the southern Iront. At this moment I recognize the necoHsity of your assistance and counsels on our southern front, and I appoint you Viceroy of the Caucasus and Coniinandcr-in-Chief of tho valiant Caucasian Army. I express to your Inipt^riul Highness my profound gnililudi- ami lliat of (he country for your labours rluring the war. (Signed) Nicholas. The references to the Orand IJuke's bravery as a soldier and to the confidence with which ho had inspirerl tho country and tho army were as well placed as Uiey were gracious ; for h<- liarl conducted the inevitable retirement 124—2 246 77//<; TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. PRIESTS SPRINKLING RUSSIAN TROOPS WITH HOLY WATER. of hisj'armios from position to position, through weary months, with raro skill and fortitude, and it was no ordinary achievement to have kept up as he did the discipline and the con- fidence of all, and to hand over an unbroken army at the end. Of even more interest, however, from the point of view of the Armenian command, was the admission that the anxieties of the western campaign had during the summer di\erted the attention of the liigher authorities from the situation on the southern front — that is to say, in the Caucasus. There had, as we have seen, been no lack of dash and energy in the local command in that quarter, but there was evidently no one at Tiflis, the seat of the provincial army administration, with sufficient influence and vigour to make his demands heard at the War ^Ministry in Petro- grad. The Grand Duke Nicholas, both as an Imperial Prince and as a soldier of forty years' experience, who had held the highest com- mands, was in a very different position from that of Count Vorontsoii-DashkofT, and the new impulse soon began to make itself felt throughout the Caucasian command. As usual when luider German instruction, the Turks endeavoured to meet the threatened fresh Russian offensive by forestalling it. No sooner was the Grand Duke's appointnnent amiounced than they began to tissiune the offensive at various points on the front. Fighting had, to some extent, been carried on all the summer in the Lake Van district, and also at Olty, in the Chorok valley, and in the coast districts. In all these directions increased activity was shown, although without much vigour or success. In the six months or more that had elapsed large numbers of reservists and fresh troops had arrived and a considerable army had been assembled along a front which began in the north thirteen to twenty miles west of the Russian frontier, and passed south and west to Lake Van. It was estimated, on good information, that the enemy's forces were distributed approximately as follows : North of the Chorok were placed eighteen battalions — all that were left — of the First, Second, and Fourth Corps ; forty-two battalions of the Tenth and Twelfth Corps, and seventy battalions of the Ninth and Eleventh Corps were in the centre ; forty battalions of the Thirteenth Corps were on the Euphrates, north of Lake Van, and thirty battalions of the same corps, with Kurdish irregulars, south of the lake. This force of two hundred battalions, con- stituting the Third Turkish Army, should, if it had been up to full strength, have possessed a decided superiority over tlie forces of the Russian Army of the Caucasus, and its offensive at that period would have been a serious matter. Tint it was obvious that the Tin-kish army was deficient in everything — mt>n, food, clothing, and numitions. The etticient watch of the Russian cruisers had prevented sub- TEE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 247 stantial reinforcements from arriving by Samsun and Trebizond, whilst the deficiency of railway transport — the nearest railhead, Xisibin, on the Baghdad Railway, being over 200 miles, and Angora, on the Anatolian line, over 400, from Erzerum — complicated matters still further. By the time the Turkish troops reached the front, according to the reports of the correspondents of the Petrograd papers, their uniforms were tattered and their boots worn out. And when winter comes on the cold on the high Erzerum plateau is terrible. Organized transport of food and clothing there was Uttle or none, and the massacres and plundering of the summer had left the country bare of everything. As one corre- spondent reported : " During last year's campaign the Turks were much better off in every respect. In the prosperous frontier vil- lages, inhabited by the indiistrious and thrifty Armenians, the Turkish soldiers used to find everjrthing they needed. Xow all the villages are destroyed, the Armenian merchants and contractors butchered, and there is no one to supplement the irregular Government supplies of the Turkish Army." Only constant reports of a revolution in Ru.ssia, manufactured with untiring industry by German press agents, added the correspondent, served to keep up COUNT VORONTSOFF-DASHKOFF. the spirits of the starving and shivering Turks through that cruel winter. Meantime preparations for the coming campaign were energetically pushed forward on the Russian side. The details of the Grand Duke's new Caucasus army were not published, RUSSIAN ANF; Ai<MKNIAN OMICK.'tS RI'.STIN(; ON Illli MAKCH. •248 THE TIMES til STORY OE THE 1 1. 1/.'. GENERAL MAP OF but tu the last he was still probably somewhat inferior in numbers to the combined Turkish strength, the best of the Russian first -line troops being still detained on the European front. On September 28, 1915, the British Army oa the Tigris had defeated the Turks at Kiit- el-Amara, and was advancing on Baghdad. To facilitate this important move and to relieve Turkish pressure in that direction increased Russian activity was displayed in Persian territory. South of \'an the Turks were attacked from the Persian side on December 1, and driven in disorder out of two fortified positions, whilst ten days later another Russian force carried the Sultan Bulak Pass and again opened the road to Hamadan, a body of Turkish and German mercenaries being routed with great loss. The Russians next took the Persian towns of Hamadan and Sultanabad, 80 miles to the sovith-east, and on the road to Ispahan, intercepting the telegraph wire connecting the German headquarters at Teheran and the Turkish troops in Mesopotamia. By the end of Februarj^ General Baratoff had reached Kermanshah, 100 miles south-west of Hamadan and in the direction of Baghdad. The British advance on the Tigris, however, had in the meantime iticeived an unwelcome oheck at Ctesiphon when almost in sight of TURKEY IN ASIA. Baglidad, and at the end of November it was compelled to fall back on Kut. At the same time Serbia was being overrun by Germans and Bulgarians, and, worst of all, the Anglo- French force had to admit the failure of its attempt on the Dardanelles and evacviate the Gallipoli peninsula. This released a large Turkish Army, composed of the flower of the Ottoman troops, and some of these were cer- tainly sent to strengthen the army in Armenia. But it was mid-winter, and even at the best of times six or seven weeks wovild be required to get the first of these reinforcements to the front. In these circumstances the Grand Duke decided to strike at once. In the coastal region, on their left wing, the Turks were still impleasantly close, and at the beginning of the year steps were taken to occupy the lower valley of the Chorok and the Tortmn district. This was successfully accomplished, and the way clear for the main advance. The evacuation of Gallipoli took place on January 9, 1916, and on the 16th the march on Ei-zerum had begxm. Kiamil Pasha, who was in command of the Tm-kish Army, appeai-s to have bt>en com- pletely taken by sm-prise by the suddenness and ^■igour of General Yudonitch's advance, although their experience of just a year befoit> ought to have taught the Turks that the Russians could fight in winter. A eai^fxil THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 249 AHMED FEVZI PASHA. The defender of Er/.erum. calculation was made by a military corre- spfjrifk-nt of the Sovoye Vremya at tliis time. According to this, the First, Second and Fiftli Turkish armies were in the Constantinople dis- trict, .Aflrianople and Smyrna, and of these some 2(X),(H)0 were n-leascd by the abandon- ment of the Danianelles eainjjait^n. The Third Army, amounting to from I2(),(KM> to 1.50.000 men, was in North AruKiiia under Kiuinil. Two anny corps were in Mesopotamia. Tlie rest of the Turkish stren{,'fh was in Syria, Arabia and Suez, the design of an invasion in force of Kgypt not haviri}^ been ^iVen ilp. Kiamil, as we have s<,*en, fiad <listributed his men ho as to Jiohl a line stretching from the Ulack Sea flown to the sr»ulh of I<ake Van. Thf; main point of riefene*-, »»f course, was Kr7>-nim. 'J'his threat fortress was <-ommaiid((l by Ahmed l''ev/.i, who had rcecntly >.u«<««<lcd the (ierniari, I'ossell I'asha, uruler whom all that (>erman skill could do had been done to render th(; position impre^^nable. Kr/x-nun is one of lli<- hi);hesl placed of citioi- H,(HH) feet above the sea and it is fic- fjuently snowlK)Und for six months in the year, yet it lies in a hollow and is surrounderl by hi^li mountain peuks. Many writers have ex- hHii<tt(^d their jxiwers in a rles«Tiplioii ol Hie sublimity of the situation, but the best account for present purposes, because the plainest and simplest, is that given by tlic late Mr. Lynch* in his masterly and exhaustive work on Armenia : Wliat the basin of Lake Van and the plain of Mush are to the southern districts of Turkish Armenia, are the plains of I'asin and Erzerum to those on the north. They represent depressions of the surface of the table- land, and constitute arteries of communications between the east and the west. . . . An invader coming from the East and desirous of forcing his way westwards will find all his roads converging on either one or other of the two strings of depressions. The block of lofty tableland seared by the action of ice and water, and covered for the greater part of the year with snow, causes them to bo deflected as by an impassable obstacle, though it is by no means impervious to an army during summer. . . . Pasin is one of the principal links of the chain of depres- sions which connect the extremities of Western Asia and facilitate intercourse between east and west. From the narrows of Khorasan to the fantastic parapet of the Deve Boyun it has a length of no less than 44 miles. . . . * H. F. B. Lynch, Armenia : Travels and Studies. Vol. II., p. 200. (.I.NI'.KAI, nAKAIOM'. l<u*>Niiin lender on I'cmiiin frontier. 250 THE TIMES HISTURY OF THE WAR. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 251 The height of the Pass (over Deve Boyun) is not more than 500 or 800 feet above the level of the adjacent plains. But the ridge is defended by a line of modern forts, and if these were captured the invading army would find itself enclosed within a space which can be swept by the fire from heights on the north and heights on the south. These positions, which have all been fortified since the last Russo-Turkish war, rest against the slopes of the parallel walls of the mountains, confining the depressions on either side. And it was this great fortress, unapproach- able in winter and believed impregnable in summer, " by far the most important strate- gical position " in Asia Minor, recognised and strengthened by Posselt Pasha, with an outer Melazgert just north of Lake Van. Before the Turks were well aware that the campaign had begun in earnest Yudenitch had advanced 20 miles, and had struck with irresistible force against their main central position at Koprukeui, where the main road from Kars to Erzerum crosses the Aras river. The result was a striking victory, which soon developed into utter rout for the Turks, who fled, leaving behind them guns, munitions, and supplies of all sorts. This was on January 19, and on the 20th, the victors were already at Hassan Kale, 10 miles farther on the road to Erzerum, and ON TUB WAY TO EKZERUM : THE breast wf)rk of ff»rts on tlic eastern hills and with an annurrierit, it was claimed, of over four hundred modem Krni)j) giuis, not to speak of mountain guns, that was taken by General Yudenitch in flu- depth of a terrible winter, and within i'mtr weeks of the opening of the campaign I IJttle woiifler that Itussians spoke of Yudenitch as the one whr< " invariably gives his Fatherlarifl f.niy victories," and that the ikildJcrs wfHiIrl willingly ff)llow him anywliere, for " neither dinieultieH of a<'<ress nor cruel cold and hU>ttt\h, nor the stiiblx>rn resistance of the enemy, could stop the imi>etiJosity ol our Jwlvancc." Tlw; great Ilussian forward (nove was spread over an unusimlly wirle front, extending from I/Hkf 'I'ortiirn on the north to a i)oinl near MAKCH THROUGH THE SNOW. only 30 miles distant from the " impreg- nable bastion " of Asia Minor. " The enemy have sustained heavy losses," wrote a Russian corTesi)ondent, " and have left in our hands all their stores and artillery. . . . The dis- orderly retreat of the Turks shows that they have not simply retired to the shelter of the Erz-enun def(;nccs, but fled before our irresist- ible j)ressiire. Evidently the German ollicers could not cure the Turks of inclination to panic. Brave and manly fighters as they are in battle, once they lose faith in their resistance abject I>anic possesses them." Mcanwhih- ^'iidcnilcirs left wing was i)ressing thf 'I'lirks buck on Mush, and his right was driving the force oppr»sed to him into precipitate retin iiicnt in IId' north. At Hassan Kulc, 252 nil': TIMt:s III SI (>!{)' OF THE Will. CHNFKAI SHi.NAl.SKV. Commanded the Hussian tight wing at I'.rz rum. well situated for defence, the Turks niutle no stand, but continued their llifjht for the shelter of the ridge of Deve Boyun. On the 2(ith Yudenitcli was before Erzerum with a force equipped only with mountain and field Kuns ; in a country swept by conslanl mi(,w- stornis and with a t<-ni|)( ratuic <»l 21 dcg. below /ero. "The Northiin Colunin," wrote till- Sjuiiiil Correspondent of the Rioiskuije Sluvo, " iiad to dray tlu-ir yuns IheniKelves while driving the enemy with the bayt)net from a series of fortified heights situated above the clouds." In this (|uarter the Turks (Tenth Corps) fought with desperate \al(<nr. They were pressed from Tortum to the ( horok valley by the Russian right under (Jeneral Shevalsky. Shevalsky then |)ushed on over the mountains, made his way into the valley of the Kara Su, or Western Euphrates, at Kara (iolK'k, and so threatened Kr/.erum from the north. Similarly the Icll wing, working through a roadless country, completed the movement by forcing the ridges of Palandoken, whose sunmiits attain the height of 10,0(M) feet and conunand the fortress from the south. Such daring movements might have been regarded as insane imder ordinary circumstances, but Vudenitch drew his own conclusions from the confusion in the Turkish Army, and with the true instinct of a commander decided that it was a time to " let everytliing go in." He sent back to his base for howitzers and heavy guns, moved his headquarters right up into POSSELT PASHA (the third from left) AND THE GERMAN OFFICIALS WHO ABANDONED ERZERUM. i THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 253 \ THK AriA(.K ON KKZBHUM: RUSSIANS UKAGGING UP (JUNS THROUGH THE SNOW. fh<; fit'fifirn; lirif, find whs tr» hf scmi cvtry- wh»r*; i\\r<<Mi>n rMovcriuiils |><THniially. Tli*' riorlli-wcstfrn rnoiirilain raii(^<*, corrfsporulirin fo rjilj'.rulok*ri in \]u- Hoiith, was Kar^aba'/.ar. Thi«, too, was in HiiHsiari haiuls iM-forc llic yvrc.k was <»ii> . On lh<^ fiiKliI "I .Jaiiiinry Z*i (((iiil iniii'il llic KjH'ciiil i-.iirrf^ffiinU'iit. )ii th<- lluHKknyt; Sloroj llic h'lld h-ti-hI d) KAr((»(»i/,sr >«<'-((An, aii'l Ihn KiiiHi»ri Iroojn Hiicox'di >l in ToncMiin^ \\)f MiUninit in faro of a Itliiidiiif; snovvslrdiii (j-iifl iiilcriHO <;(il(l. |{y ii kiml of iiiiraclc (tlio wliolc storm of Kr/.f^nun wuh a iniraclo) Ihcy rvcn dranK'"'! "I> ""' liioiiiilain ^{iinK, buf field k""" ! (Jaliicis I raiiKporlcd hIk'IIm for Ihri k""«. togf^thrir with ciirtridgorf uiid food. On llir'Mo " imwircMHiljIo " Imi^^lilH also arrived the flying Ited C'roMH detar:htiieiilH and t Jio ti'ii-rooins of tho Miinii'i|iid UnioiiH. On February 10-14 Slu^valsky's fliinkin^ forcr was alilf lo join hands wilh tlic force 124 -3- 254 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. from Karyuba/ar at Fort Tafta in tin- valK-y uf the Kam Su due iiurth uf Er^t-ruin, and us Palandoken was surmounted on the 15tli, the lines north, east, and south were complete. On the 15th nine of tlie inner ring «>f forts hud been stunned, itnd on the Itith Knu-rum itself was eaptured, tlie Turks in their retire- ment going west or scmtii as they euuld find an o|H-ning to etscupe from the Itussian guns. The city was nearly intact, and as the con- querors gazed on the triple ravine, the high walls and the three rings of forts bristling with guns, they may well have belie\'cd that such an acliievement in such a time was little less than miraculous. and route«l, but there was still the possibility of further resistance to the north and t(» the south, for the nuich-needcd rcinforcciuenis were coming up from Const ant iiio|)le as speedily as the conditions of roads and weather per- mitted. No time was lost by Ceneral Yudeniteh , an alIllo^l simultaneous stroke being delivered in the direction of I^ake Van, where, on Febru- ary 10, Mush and Aklet were captured. Mush was one of the centres of the Armenian massacre of the year before, and its delivery from the Turk was thus doubly welcome. The place is, next to Bitlis, the most important in the Van district, the two being commonly spoken of as guarding the gates of Mesoi)otamia. The RUSSIANS AWAITING THE ORDER TO ADVANCE. Yudenitch's crowniing \ictory at Erzerum was so sudden and so overwhelming that the Grand Duke Nicliolas, whose labours at head- quarters had been invaluable, was not in time to come up for the final triumph. He received the great news at Tiflis, where he was enthu- siastically acclaimed by the people in the palace square. It was more than compensa- tion for all the disheartening retreats of the previous year, and he hastened to send the following message to the Emperor : God has granted the brave troops of the army of the Caucasus such great help that Erzenim has been taken after five days of unprecedented assault. I am in- expressibly happy to announce this victory to your Imperial Majesty. It was a veritable debacle of the Third Turkish Army, whose v'entre was driven in clearing of the right flank followed, and with the aid of gunboats from the Black Sea Fleet the Turks were pressed back along the coast to the left bank of the Buyuk Dere river. Anot her portion of this northern force marched up the Chorok valley and occupied Ispir, forming a connecting link across the mountains with the coastal force wiiich was to make itself heard of shortly. Thus protected, the central army continued its pursuit in most difficult weather, the men being often breast deep in snow. " Our troops," said one enthusiastic correspondent, " are pursuing, not the defeated army of Kiamil Pasha, but the WTctched renmants of what was a great army some four weeks ago. After the capture of Erzerum only the wreti'hed THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 255 -ONE OF THE GATES OF ERZERUM. remains of the army retreated in a westerly direction. Many battalions lost in killed, frozen, and prisoners as many as 90 to 98 per cent, of theii- effectives. We have seen batta- lions of which only a few dozen men were left. In one of the rearguard actions two Tui-kish battalions, one of gendannerie and one of engineers, took part. The nominal strength of these was 2,000, whilst in reality they num- bered only 100 bayonets. At another place, according to the statements made by Turkish prisoners, the Turkish rearguard consisted of the 11th Army Corps and portions of the 29th Division, nominall : 30,000 bayonets and 40 guns, but in reality of only 3,000 men and eight guns.' These contemporary accounts by eye-witnesses, however, although valuable as conveying impressions, have always to be regarded with caution where figures are concerned, and it is probable that the total losses in man power of the Third Army in these disastrous weeks did not^exceed .30,000. General Yudenitch, the leader ^ of this Napoleonic campaign — in which the captures of Trebizond, Baibm-t, Gumushkhane, and Erzinjan had yet to come — was not a " lime- light general." He did not figm-e largely in the telegrams, and little appeared about him in the Western European papers. " An old A STHHKT IN I'.KZF.KIJM AM; I HI'. HOAI) I HKOUUH I HF. CIl Y. •J5f) THE TIMES tllS'lOEY OF THE WAR. AFTER ERZERUM: THE TURKISH ROUT. Caucasian " who had served under him wrote thus of his chief in the Xovoye Vremya : Whoever has had an opportunity of closely watching the activity of this general, whoever has examined even superficially the Cauca-«ian operations, will never say that our successes are onlj- an affair of chance and the fortunate trend of circumstances. It is not by chance that the Caucasian army, at the necessary time and on the necessary spot, always proves superior and always beats the foe. It is the result of creative labour : it is military talent of the first order. General Yudenitch is oi medium height, a conapactly built, strong man, with long reddish, drooping moustaolu- — the type of old general of the times of the conquest of the Causacus. But this is from the outside. Under a stern exterior lies a rarely delicate and soft heart. He is lunisually responsive. And everybody who hiis had anything to do with him, who ha.s gone to him without idterior motives- — he is a great reader of character and divines men — unfailingly speaks of him as a n\au sur- prisingly simple and accessible. There is absolutely no affectation about him. Those maiks of spt>cial ivsjHH-t wliieh are paid to him by immotlenUely polite gt>ntlemon weary him. His closest co-wovkcrs never feel aboxit them the presence of a " grt>at " general with tremendous authority. Among them he is just such a worker as tlioy — persevering, concentrated, and deeply penetrating THE TIMES HISTOEY OE THE WAR. 257 into overy detail. Prolonged work and effort have not erased the colours from his mind, which has preserved its youthful freshness, gloss, and acute receptivoncss. In his relations with men he has never yet said a harsh and offensive word to anybody, although he loves to make fun and quickly seizes the comic side of every- thing ; but his laughter does not sting. Himself sensitive, and even perhaps shy, he spares other people's s»-lf-esteem. The Turkish method of dealing with the disaster- was characteristic. The Russians had intercepted wireless messages from Kiamil to Enver Pasha implorin : assistance, and warning him of the fall of Erzerum, but Enver and his German colleagues and advisers endeavoured to hoodwink Constantinople with bulletins of could not be transported." " As a matter of fact," they went on to say, " Erzerum was not a fortress at all, but is an open town, and had not the least military value." This was too much even for Berlin, which protested that Turkey had a right to learn the truth about the loss of " the sole fortiaed camp in the gigantic region of northern Asia Minor," and " strategically and politically an important basis of operations." Two days later the Russians published the oflficial count of the booty : Nine standards, 323 guns, a Turkish fortress of the first class, large depots of arms, munitions supplies, signalling, telegraph and THE RUSSIANS Cossacks on guard and civilians goi Hiipffr-Teutonif; mendacity. IJf) till two days h»;for»! the fall of Kr/.<TU(ri they ignonnl tlic fact that their grfsat oitudr;! in the (;aHt was at itH UiHi gaHp, or had even been approached. " Fighting bfstween aflvancod poHtH towanlH thn centro of the line," in which " hoHtilo attftckH woro Htopijeri by coiinier-attarikH," waH all they had to report froin t h*; frorit,. On iIk- day , fier the diwiHter there waH " rif)thing U, eport." It wan not fill February 22, ntiarly >i week after the «)V«!rit, that they caHiuilly mentioned that " for military reuHfuiH " tliey had " withdrawn wif,hf;ut Hnffering K)hk from rirzenim to a ponition to Mir; went of Mie city," >ift,e loiviri,' dcHtroyerl " ,"»() old j/imih wliicli IN ERZERUM. ng about their business unmolested. telephone stores ; and on the last day of February the story was completed by the fol- lowing statement from tlie HuHsian General Staff : The fortrcHH of Kr/.enitri was the only forlifie<l point in th(^ interior of A-^iti Minor, protecting W<!Ht(rrn Anneiiiii and Anatolia and cotnrnanding all the best roads of TranMcaiicaHia and (ho inUfrior of Asia Minor. For many yf^tirn pawt great improvemontH had been carried out in the workii by the Tiirks, with t)i(! iiHHiHtance of I hi> OeniianM. 'I'lie terrain in front renderi'd it. Tiatiiriilly Mining, wtiilo it wiih (covered on i In- IhinkH by inouriliiin itoiHMeH inOHt didieult of iippiniii h imd w ith llieir pithsew protected by pow(^rfiil fortK. Hiieh was tlif; foririidnble liiirrier on the path of our' i»fT<-iiBi ve, with eiiornioii-i diliriNive advantdgeH on th<' north-oaMt and ouHf. I)iiijii^' (In- live dayw' iicFaiill the fortreHH wwh d''fenrlcd by I lie 'I'lirkH with a Ht ubboriin(>HH to which (he <'tioniioiiM quunlity of killed and frozen 258 THE TIMES HI STORY OF THE WAR. oorpueti tpvtM tetttiluoiiy. Tht* Ctiuoa»iici Army ttuccettdtid in uunauuiitiiig titeop lauuiituiiLrj prutecitt^d not unly by frutit but by wire enttiiiglfiutiiitii ttiid utiier dtift^iutets, uiut thttjaullntl thti fortruiiH utter uii urtillcry prfpttrttlton. Tht) unHULilt oil thct furtu uiul the priiifipul pOnltlUlt Itt-ittid from Ffbruary 11 till February 15 inclusive. After w« hail takuu the furtb on the left flunk i>f the priiiuipul Turkisih line uf defence, extending ulioiit 27 mileri, the fate uf the fortH in the centre tmd on the ri^ht fliiiik, and, after them, of the becund line furtis and the principal defeiuive putsition, waH decided on February 16 after uhort attacks. ThebO fortifications, which Were full of Turkish dead, reiuaim-d in our pobsebbion. During the assault on the fortress severul Turkish t'egimentti were annihilated or made priboners with all thnir otHcers. On the line of forts alone we took 197 pifi-r'M of artillery of various eiilibres in ^ood condition. The t^jioat Hu8Hian advaiico west of P^fzerurn came to an end only with the exliaiiHtion of tlte piirHiiers, In th ' Hoiith, MiiHh, aw wt» Jiave Keen, liad ah-eady Itilhui on Februaiy 19, and on Marcli 1 thu KtihHiaiiH wei'tt at Ktirnak, only seven uule« noi-th-ea8t of BitliM. On tlie fol- lowing day IJitliH itself was taken, the mountain pass opening up tlie whole of the Tigiitt valley, and otily 100 inile« from the Tiirkiwh rail-head at Nisihin, thus coming into the poHseHsion of the \ ictorious invaders. Here again the Russians found themselves con- fronted with terrihie obstacles owing to con- COSSAGKS AT A MEAL. In the defence works of the central fortress we took another 126 pieces of artillery. In the fortified region of Erzsrura we took a large number of depots of various kinds, wliioh have already been mentioned by the Headquarter Staff. The exact mimher of Turkish prisoners is 235 officers and 12,753 men. It is possible to estimate the force of the blow which W3 dealt the Turkish Army, whose demoralized remnants are now withdrawing in disorder towards the west, if only by the fact that some Army Corps of three divisions now only number from 3,000 to 5,000 men with a few gu:is. All the remainder have either fallen into our hands or perished in the fighting, or from the cold. According to latest information received, Turkish officer and soldier prisoners, who were captured in the fortified district of Erzerum and in the course of the pursuit, complain bitterly that th(nr Headquarter StafI was concentrated in the hands of tJermans. The latter during the assaidt on the foitress of Erzerum were the first to abandon the fortified positions, causing a panic and disorder among the already shaken Turkish troops. tinual snowstorms and severe frost at an altitude of nearly 5,000 feet. Bitlis had beeix an important Armenian centre, but there were few of the oppressed race left to welcome their liberators, the Turks and Kiu-ds, under Djevdet Pasha, having massacred some 15,000 of them in the previous June.* With this success the whole of the Van region passed into Russian hands, and the connexion between the Turks in Anatolia and their forces across the Persian frontier and south of Lake I'rmia was severed. " What is more," wrote one correspondent, " the Russians have completed another st*vge of the difficult journey, whose ultimate goal » Vol. VIII.. p. 380. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 259 TURKISH STANDARDS CAPTURED AT ERZERUM. is Mesopotamia and a junction with their British allies." A study of large-scale maps and of the position of the contending forces would, unhappily, have shown how far from probability or possibility was this sanguine forecast. The Rxossian right wing was not less energetic than the left, and here, as we have already seen, they were assured of welcome support from the Black Sea fleet. The lower Chorok valley had now been cleared, and on March 4 the Turkish troops, pressed westward by the coastal force, suddenly found themselves taken in the rear by a new and formidable force of ANOTIU'.K HJKKISH STANDAKF) CAPTUKF-D AT HKZIiKUM. ■jr.i) IHH TIMKS IIISTDIIY di' Till': WAli. RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENTS. Russians laiuletl from the fieet under heavy giui fire. The Turks were compelled to evacuate their positions and to endeavour to escape southward over the hills, losing prisoners and guns in the process. A similar operation drove the Turks from ^lapavra, and ulti- inately, on March 7, the important position of Rizeh, only 40 miles east of Trebizond, was taken. The Chorok force at Ispii" was now a :)le to cross the high mountain pass between the Chorok valley and Rizeh and thus join hands with the coastal force. The combined forces then resiuned the westward advance, and by March 8 the Turks were thrown back across the Kalopotamos, this bringing the Russians witliin little more than 30 miles of Trebizond. The doom of Turkey's chief Black Sea port now seemed sealed, and preparations for the evacuation of the civil population were hastily undertaken. As will be seen, however, more than a month was to pass before the fall of Trebizond. From the mouth of the Kalopotamos, on the Black Sea, to Lake Van Russia was now in complete possession of western Asia Minor and the AiTiienian plateau, and a deep wave of depression passed over the Bosphorus as the news spread of reverse after re\-erse in rapid succession. As remarked by a Russian writer already quoted, the Turk is a brave and manly fighter vip to a point, but if he comes to believe that fate is against him his resistance gives way. If the Young Turk officials and their German masters had only told the truth the situation was not so bad, for the Grand Duke's army — a small force considering the miracles it had wrought — was quite unprepared for a serious advance either on Baghdad or on Con- stantinople. Trebizond, Gumushkhane, and Erzinjan were still to fall, but with the occu- pation of that line General Yudenitch would be pretty well at the end of his tether without large reinforcements. And the supports from the Dardanelles and from Smyrna that were now coming up to the Tiu'ks were much greater than any that were within sight of the Caucasus. But the Turks did not know this, and they had been lied to so systematically by Enver Pasha and his clique that they were now prepared to believe the worst. There had always been an anti-German and jinti- Enver party at Constantinople, and the feeling that they had been tricked into the war for the benefit of Germany found many t>xponents. The murder of Prince Yussuf, the Turkish Heir- apparent (February, li>l(>). robbed Eii\tM' of his THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. 261 best-hatod riv^al, and the evacuation of Gallipoli gave natural satisfaction, bvit the disastrous collapse of the Armenian campaign, which had been mitiated by Enver himself, reduced his popularit • to the lowest ebb. Talaat and Enver were jealous rivals, and the Germans retained their supremacy by playing one against the other, and the Old Tm-ks against both. The delay in sending urgently-wanted rein- forcements to Armenia was another cause of difference in Constantinople. After Gallipoli some 60,000 troops, of the best in the Turkish Army, had been sent to Adrianople, where the Germans wanted them, instead of to Erzinjan, where their arrival might have turned the scale against the Russian Army, weakened by its terrible and unceasing exertions since the middle of January. Xor did the Turks of any group regard with satisfaction the growth in power and importance of Bulgaria, especially having in memory the terms of the Kaiser's Nish speech {.January 18), with its references to the coming glories of King Ferdinand. With the " con- quest of Egj'pt " a hopeless fiasco, with Arabia in rebellion, and Syria inclined to follow her example, while all Armenia was lost, and Meso- potamia bound sooner or later to go the same way, it was little consolation to any patriotic Turk to know that the Sultan's best troops were being concentrated to fight Germany's battles in Russia or on the Danube. A Con- stantinople correspondent of a Cairo paper, the Mokattam, was responsible for the statement that deputies were at this time sent secretly to Switzerland and France to discuss a separate peace for Turkey and empowered to make large concessions. Enver and Tdlaat, wrote this correspondent, have lost their popularity and bombast. Formerly, when Enver drove about, the people would line the streets and salute him as the hero of Turkey, but now, especially since the death of Prince Yussuf, he drives at full speed and unacknowledged. Talaat, who used to boast that his life was perfectly safe, recently had three shots fired at him, which missed, but killed his secretary ; now he only rides fully escorted. The population is furious with the Committee and the Gennans, and the narrator instances the most recent Friday sermon in Santo Sophia, when the preacher ended his prayer for the preservation of the Caliph with the invocation: '■ Vengeance on the Germans and the Committee." A British entry into Baghdad, coming on top of the events in Armenia, Egypt and Arabia, would have turned the scale and shortened the war in its Eastern developments, but Kut fell at the end of April, and the Tiu'co-German regime in Constantinople received a fresh lease of life. In Petrograd, naturally, the elation was in proportion to the depression in Constantinople, and rosy dreams were again formed of an early march on the Bosphorus and Mesopotamia. One Russian journal confidently expected " very soon to see our Cossack horses drinking the waters of the great river," whilst another fDKKISH I'KISONI'.KS IN A CONCHNTKA I ION CAMIV 262 Till'! TIMES HISTORY OF Till': WAR. n L A C K y S E A Batun 1 \ '% Jl^. W. '<e-. 1 */>)i. A/' .ii^ ^mmMm^A X . ..- 'ortMr-F.^ V;'#^ ^??r5e/^//( -- ■ :-'7,,, i:,*,0_ J'WV 'T^'W^^d ''cJu S^ MAP OF THE APPROACHES TO TKEBIZOND. expounded an elaborate programme which in- volved the abandonment of the Salonika campaign, and the landing of an Anglo-French force of 250,000 men at Smyrna, a step which woiJd not merely help the Russian army in Asia Minor, but afford it a now base. No matter liow much we strengthen further our Caucasian Army, an independent advance on Con- stantinople would present for it almost insurmountable difficulties in view of the great distance of the operating base, the great length of the lines of communicntion, and the lack of good roads. The sea line of communication with South Russia could only play an auxiliary part. The situation would be quite difficult if a strong Anglo- French force were landed at Smyrna, etc. It is clear that with the appearance of our troops at Sivas, and a strong English landing-force at Smyrna, all the material resources of Turkey would be paralj-sed, and the further development of our operations against Constantinople would be greatly facilitated. For the present, however, the Grand Duke Nicholas and his generals had to cut their coat according to the cloth, and be content with possibilities. Trebizond, the sea -gate for all Armenia, Kvu-distan and North Persia, was the first point to make sure of. The remnants of the main Turkish Army had fallen back be- liind Ashkala and Mamakhatun in the direction of Erzinjan, and were endeavouring to make a show of defence for that important town, scarcely second to Erzurmn in its strategic value for western Asia Minor, and almost equidistant from Sivas, Diarbekr and Tre- bizond. Halid Boy, who had shown himself a gifted and resourceful commander, was still holding out with a force estimated at ten battalions in the Upper Chorok valley to the west of Ispir, in the direction of Baiburt. Along the coast the Turks were sending forwaid all the reinforcements that reached Trebizond by road with a view to stopping the Russian advance, now only 30 miles to the east. At the same time an almost desperate attempt was- made to reinforce and revictual the city from the sea. With the mystery of the condition and whereabouts of the Goeben and Breslau still vmsolved the Russians could not claim the absolute mastery of the Black Sea ; and one of the exciting incidents of these eventf\il spring days was the sudden reappearance of the Breslau, acting as convoy to a number of Turkish transports and grain ships destined for Trebizond. The Tiu-ks claimed to have simk two Russian transports, and endea\-oured to bombard the Russian positions on the coast,, but, on the other hand, the Russians sank and burned a considerable munber of Tiu'kish vessels^ and compelled the Breslau to retire. According to a correspondent of the Xoi'oye Vronya : Not expecting a long resistance by the doomed fortr«<ss» the Turks resorteil to the help of tho Breslau. This. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 263 imperfectly repaired cruiser, running a serious danger of sinking, paid a short visit to Trobizond, but boing in no position to lend material help to the Turkish land forces, merely showed her speed and qviickly sought shelter under the cover of the land batteries. Although the Breslau escaped with impunity, the harmless demonstration proved very helpful for our Fleet. Our patrol ships now know the real value of this patched-up cruiser and its place of refuge. The Turkish-German stafi have hitherto carefully kept in the dark the degree of preparedness of the Breslau, and only their desire to cheer up the Turkish troops by a show of naval strength made them disclose their cards. The endeavour to stop the Russian coastal advance on land was as ineffective as that at sea. In the upper Chorok valley and on the coast repeated attacks were made on the advancing columns, but they all failed, and April 7 saw the Turks attacked on the right bank of the Kara Dere, little inore than 16 miles from the doomed city. The valley of the Kara Dere, which means " Black Torrent." " After Kara Dere," said an exulting Russian message, " our troops no longer marched on Trebizond — we raced there." The advance was so rapid that it was recorded that General Liakhoff, in command on this wing, had to change his headquarters three times within 24 hours, moving each time several miles farther west with the fighting line. It was evident that the dashing spirit of General Yudenitch had inspu-ed his subordinates. Meanwhile, however, the Fleet was not idle. Having materially assisted at the crossing of the Kara Dere, it steamed westward to Platana, a port ten miles beyond Trebizond, and effected a fresh landing there. Taken between two fires, the Turkish resistance broke as at Erzerum, and the whole defence collapsed with startling suddenness. Some of the Ttukish troops, it was said, never came into action at all, so bewilder- TRR is, we are told, locally known as the Valley of Hell, owing to its wil<l and turbiilrmt character, and it was eight or ten <luy« later before the KuHsians were safely across. The Turkish lin';» had been strongly fortified rliiring the two months that had elapsed siricf! the fall of Kr/.erurn with works carefully constructed under Cjlennan guidance, anfl at least /50,()()0 frenh rnen itnd bfien brought up froiri f'ori- Htantinople to garrison thern. In all, it was fialculatfxi that rfif>re than two army <',<)r\)H hiui h*^in collected for the dcfrrice of the Tre- \)i'M>wl district. On Afnil Id the HuHMJaiiH forced the crossing of thfi Kara Deny, after a fierce) and Htubbf)rn action, sufiport'd by the guns from the Fleet, the Mrcsbui iK^in^' hrilplcwH U> fjrevfjrit this, anri retiring prf;r;ipil,alcly on the apfwjaranwj of the battlesliip Imperatrits^i .Maria. BIZOND ing was the simultaneous attack from the east, from the west, and from the sea ; and before th(^ ev-ening of the 18th the Russians wore in full pursuit along the Ciumushkhano road. The garrison having departed, the Russian general was received at tluf outskirts of the city by H deputation of citizens, headed by the Ainfirican and CJreek Consuls. In a brief and energetic spiiech the general assured them that if order were maintained UUi and property would be safe. " Normal life in the city," he add<r(i, " must resume at once. Let the shops f)pen and tlii' l)akerieH resume work. Anyone guilty of |)illage will moot with capital punish- ment."* [{uf, vvlml, (if l.lio unfoitunute Moslenis ? Mr. Lynch liiid estimated the po|)ulation at 45,000, cornf)OHi)d of (ireeks, Arnutnians, and ♦ /{u/mkoye Slovo, April 22, ll>l(i. *MS4 nil': iiMi'is iiis'ionY oir 'I'll!': w.iii. GENERAL LIAKHOFF. 1 he victor of Trebizond. Moslems. And Trebizond, it will be remem- bered,* had been the scene of one of the most • Vol. VIII.. Chap. CXXXIII., p. 382. iiori'ihii* jiiiil cold-bloodfd iti llic iims.sacriis (if the previouK Kiininier, batcheH of hoi|>l(ms and unarmed ArnHMuans, nicii, womt'ii and cliildrtm, being driven on board saiiing-boatH in l.\u> liar- bunr, (aknn out into the Hiac-k Sea, thrown over- board, and ciiibbt^d or shot an they drowned. 'I'bore wan naturally Hoin«t danger of ruprisais iin lite pari of llu* now triuniphanl ChriKlian populace, such as had occurnnl in some places in the \'an district when the liberating Jinssians arri\ fd. \o Moslems had joined in the deputa- tion no doubt they were in hiding or iiad fled— but the general assured the representatives of the city tlmt his warnings (extended to Moslems as well as to Arnuinians and (Jreeks. The persons and property of Moslems, he said, should be protected as well as those of the Christians. He gave instructions, added the correspondent fioin whom we have already <l noted, that a committee shoukl be formed to organize the civil guard of the city, half the members of which should be Moslems. When some of the deputation demurred, .sayhig that there were no Moslems left in the city. General Liakhoff retorted severely : " Moslems must be found." This tolerant and humane attitude of General Liakhoff, which, indeed, was typical of the THE SURRENDER OF TREBIZOND: THE WHITE FLAG. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 2C>r> actions of the Russian coinniand tliroughout the Ai'inenian campaign, is the more worthy of notice in view of the fact that, with the taking of Trebizond, there came to hght for the first time some fuller details of the official partici- pation in the massacres of Armenians there. An experienced and trustworthy Times cor- respondent* wrote that it was now possible to lift the veil of mystery that shrouded the fate o' the Armenian population of Trebizond : The deportation of the Armenians, which began in June, was carried out here as elsewhere in accordance with instructions from Constantinople. The leading cally the same programme was carried out. The proceedings, which began in the tniddlo of May, were inaugurated by the arrest and imprisonment of 400 young Armenians. Many families, after being expelled from their hoases, were kept waiting for several days in the streets before being taken to their fate. At the entrance to the town the processions of exiles encountered tax-gatherers, who insisted on the payment of arrears of taxation, although the imfortunate people had left all their property behind them. Only a few artisans, who were required to work for the Army, were allowed to remain in the town. By the beginning of August the whole Armenian population had disappeared from Erzerum. Only the Bishop remained. On AugiLst 5 two police officers appeared at his house and communicated the order of departure. The Bishop had taken precautions to secure some horses for the transport of his effects. THE RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO TREBIZOND. farnilif^ wn: tho first to nuffcr. Some .300 of these r<-c'-ived the '>riU;r to pri-pnn- for einignition and pur- i-tiHMi-.d a numtxrf of wagonM for the tr(iriHj)ort of their propfjfty, but four days after their departure all th(! wai^oni< were brought back to the town. The emigrantH hntl hff.ti ma-<Httered and their property pluiidiTed. ()thi;T groii[»s, i;iu;ii of neveral hundred fumili'ts, fol- lowed. Thin jiTorj'iHH went on for HOtne time, but even- tually new metho<J« were adopted. The poliw; enfnred the hoiweH of the remaining ArmonianH, forcibly exp riled , tfi/;Tn, 'Iffive therri through th<! Htr»u-t><, anrl locki'd up the hou«<'x. Th»: wh'>le Artrwnian pO[>iilutioii of Trebi- zond, fiiirrib'Tiiig HOine 10,000 houIh, wa« thus extermi- nated. It, in hofX;d, h(;wever, that KOine hundredH of f»;THf/nn limy yet )n; found Judder' in the village« in the n/jjghbourhood. At KrwTUTn, where tfj<) Arrnenian pofiulation wft« o.fmx'uU-.rattly gmntcr, being eMtimated at 3r>,000, prB<;»J. • Thf Timex.yiny 22, 1010. but these wore now stolen. He tried to purchase others, but at the last moment he was infonned that ho was not allowed to take anything with bin). Ho was then removed to an unknown destination. German officers stationed in the towns and ( lii' (Jernian f'onsul manifested open approval of these j)roeeedings. Among the spoils which fell to the Turks wf^n- several Armenian girls, and a share in this living booty was concrtded to the Germans. RuHHia'H now conquest was even inQro striking and inspiring than that of Kr/.enun. That great fortress, grim and forbidding on its snow- clarl heights, was a Hyrnbol of forfeited power ; but T(()bi/,ond, apart ftoiti ita importance as a port and a ttmrt,, [)rr)sentod a scene of Medi- terranean beauty ntid luxiiriancti. " Nowhere !t>f; 77//'; 77A//';.S' HISTORY Of THE WAR. else," bays Mr. Lynch, " w thu (luvvii more ttHMentuilly th« ' loay-ftiigtuwl,' or the hhh »it bUUiiHe the ' glurta green.' . , . I'he Hcene in the Mttitie that hroiight tears to the eyeu of Xenojihoii, and wa« asrioc-iated in the iniml of the Kiiiperor Hadrian witli his first view of thib sliore anil «ea." Tlie iiixiiriunfo and variety of the vegetation are reniarliuble. The uutooiue of ihtioe (natural) eoiulitioiiH is- Jhn hiiiuiltaiit'iiii.-< cxubtTancu of the trtuw and jiluiit.-- whiirli fluuritih iijioii tfie coaetH of tlie MeditKiruncuii and ot the leafy giantti of our northern wuoUm. Side by t>ide with bhady thicketrt of chestnut, elm, oak, and hazel, j^rovcs of fyprtis, laurel, and olive grace the hliore. The wild vine haiijifH in festoon** fnim the braiicheh, and iiihheltered places the orange, the lenton, and the pomegranate thrive and yield their fruit. . . . In the middle of the Meventeenlh century we are told of upwards of 30,000 gardens and vineyards inscribed in the city registers, and at that time the slopes about Boz Tepe were com- pletely covered with vines. Coming to topographical details, Mr. Lynch* gives some idea of the city itself : One sees a city which, in spite of the modern aspect of certain quarters, has lost little of the romance of the Middle Age. The earlier imprint on its buildings is that of the era of Justinian ; their actual appearance is due to the Grand Comneni. A great sleep lias bridged the interval to the present time. Yet the life of the place, such as it is, pursues the old chatmels and the * Armenia. Vol. I., p. 32. throng in the Btreets U to-day not less heterogeneous than It waH four centuries ago. Strings of Huctnan camels may bo seen in the sifeets, about lo start on (he long stages which separate the seaport from Kneeruin and Tabriz. The peojiles of Asia and Kurofje still nmel in I he bazaars. Trehizond is older than Konio. It was already ancient in 401 n.c, when X«»nophon reached it with his Ten Thoiisand aft(»r their long retreat front C'ynaxa, and the place is still shown at the month of the I'yxitis where he pitched his cam{) and whertt he rested for '.M days and celebrated the gyinnic games. Long afterwards it was a Roman colony, and Tladrian is claimed as the builder of the harl)our. From the foui-toenth century to the middle of the fifteenth it was the capital of the Empire of the Conineni — " Emperors of the Romans, Lords of all Anatolia, Georgia, and the Trans- marine." With the coming of Mohammed II., in 1462, its ancient glori(»s departed, but not even the Turks could altogether destroy it as the Black Sea gateway of commerce for the East, and the coming of the railway to the northern coast of Asia Minor, under Russian auspices, will doubtless do something to restore its importance. As in the case of Erzertun, the Turks were coy FLAGS OF FREEDOM IN TREBIZOND. The scene at the bouse of the Vali on the entry of the Russians. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 267 LOADING CAMELS. in admitting the extent of their disaster at Trebizond. Two days after they had aban- doned the city they issued a bulletin stating that the fighting in the Chorok valley and " on the left wing of the Lazistan coast sector " was "assuming a violent character." The enemy's attempt, it was cheerfully added, " has cost him heavy losses and has been foiled by our counter-attacks." The episode of the Breslavi and the coast landings was dealt with as follows : " The enemy, profiting by the fortified town of Bat'om and by the intermittent fire of his warships, has repulsed our coast recon- naissance detachments in LazLstan." And on the following day, April 21 — still harping on LazLstan — they continued the story : Our dctachmontH entnLHt'rd with tho hup«;rvi.^iori of thf. coast in tho Lazifttan nifctor Hinco April 11 have ofl(;r»;fi fiXiTu/) nil nary roHintance to the rep«at(;d attackx of riurnnrically Huporior military and naval for<x* and df,-f<!ndftd hU'P by Hffp overy inch of ground which it wuM in any way p'/HMJhlo to di-f»;nd. Our annies worthily attained thfj propfw<:d aim. Finally, on April 1 8, af t«!r lh<-y had forced I ho enomy to fight a hattio which ha<l bloody rcHuItn for hiia, they withdrow in a';cordanc<) with inxtnictionM on to a «cclor wh<^r«) th'-y will hav*; a now ta-k to fulfil. .Siri';*) in accordance with concluxiorjH drawn from tho itittiation of th« war th« result of th« op<!ration in the untiKt HcnUiT could be iiiri-Mi;nn, the town of Trebizond ha'I n.\rt;fu\y \)fi-i\ eva/juated by ma, 8ix 6-in. gurm of an old patf-»!m, which ha'I rccyintly berm Htatio/ied ifi the envpfotiH of the Icrwn, v/iTO left behind after In-iiig C(rrnpUzlJ^\y destroyed. A» a rriHtt'ir of f»u;t, although the bority wa^ nothirif^ like no j^r'^at an at Krz'Tiirn, thri Russians captured at Trebizond eight mounted position guns, fourteen 6-inch guns, and a large quantity of rifles, ammunition wagons, supply trains, and other war material. This triumph was unhappily followed within 10 days by the news — inevitable and long ex- pected — of the surrender of General Townshend and his gallant little force at Kut-el-Amara. This rendered futile all the chivalrous efforts that had been made alike by the extreme left wing of the army of the Grand Duke Nicholas and by General Baratolf's force in Persia — not indeed, as already explained, to approach or to capture Baghdad — but to relieve the pressure on Kut and the Tigris valley by threatening some part of the Turkish communications, and creating a diversion on their flank. This great service had been very effectively rendered, the Russian loft wing being dangerously extended for th(! purpose, and now the release of the very considerable force that had been besieging Kut and protecting Baghdad made necessary increased vigilance and activity on tho part of the Russian generals. Witliin a few weeks after the capture of Tre- bizond General Haratoff, advancing from ilainadan tlu-ough Kennanshah, had readied Kasr-i-Shirin, near the Turkish frontier, wluire Im foiifid himstilf confronted by a considerable Turkish force at Khanikin, on f he other side of tho frontier and in tho direction of liaghdad. The situation at that time was very clearly put by a JviiHsiari inilitary writc'r, wlio, oven •2t)8 THE TIMES HISTOHY oF THE n'AH, o > z o u u u z < D oa u en CD O u THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 269' after the Kut disaster, still clung to the idea of an early British advance on Baghdad : The distance between Kut-el-Amara and Baghdad is about a hundred miles, roughly the same as between Baghdad and Kasr-i-Shirin, where our advance guard is at present. Our troops are now seriously threatening the Turkish Mesopotamian Army, which has not suc- ceeded in bringing up its main reinforcements to Baghdad. The Mesopotamian Army, basing on Baghdad, is limited ill its manoeuvring, and cannot advance from Kut-el- Amara direct towards Khanikin. The Turks will have, therefore, to parry General Baratoff's energetic thrust by bringing up from their southern front via Baghdad the forces which have been released by the surrender of General Townshend. This will faciUtate the Englisli advance along the Tigris through Kut-el-Amara on Baghdad. In reality General BaratoS's spirited advance was no more than a demonstration, which had lost all its opportuneness by the long pause now rendered necessary in the British operations in ^Mesopotamia. If we had reached Baghdad the Russian light troops would possibly have been able to join us there. In fact, by an extraordinary feat of dash and daring on the part of a detachment of Cossacks under the command of Sotnik Gamaly, General Baratoff did succeed in getting into touch with General Lake in the third week in May. The exploit, we are told, was " the talk of the Caucasian army." Gamaly set out with his sotnia with the simple order to " get into touch with General Lake at all costs," route and everything else being left to his own judg- ment ; and his laconic and formal answer was, "Can." He chosfj the southern route, which was an extraordinarily difficult one, covering at least 150 miles, but it had the advantage of being free of the enemy, and the enterprise was suc- cessful. It led to notliing, of course, but it was a demonstration of wluxt could Vx; done in such a country by enterprise and resource. It is pleasant to add that the three ofTicers of this gallant little Cossack force were awarded the British Military Mf)dal, whilst from their own Sovereign tlmy received the Vladimir Order. The rank and file were decorated with the St. Gcfjrge's ('fohh. Kut liaving fallen, and the Hughd^id advance U^ing at an end ior the time being, tliero w,ih no further- object in the extreme lengtlusning of tlw) KijHsian lines either on the I'ersian frontier or wjuth of the Van district. Siimil taneously with the Kfisr-i-Sliirin advance another iiijHsian movement Hguijist the Tiukinli flank had taken place a<;roHK thrj Persian frontier Ui JiowandiiZ, 80 miles north of MohuI (tlw) ancient Nineveh), unrl 200 inileHnortli ot f'aglirlii,d. Til''. KiiHHJar) forces were every- where successful, in spite of repeated attacks from Kurds and regulars, and the movement on the Persian frontier had been, on the whole,, a most successful achievement ; but, for the reasons already stated, the Russians halted, and, in the Hamadan-Kermanshah district, gradually fell back in readiness for the counter- stroke that was sure to come. West of Erzerum also, on what may still for convenience be called the Caucasus front,, preparations had also to be made for a vigorous Turkish counter-attack. The Russian position at Trebizond was a peculiar one, and by no means entirely satisfactory, depending, as it did, on the command of the Black Sea, and not on the land communications in the direction of Erzermn. The only road along the coast was also controlled from the sea ; and the Russian command of the Black Sea was not altogether complete, as there were still several Turco -German submarines unaccoimted for, not to speak of the Goeben and the Breslau. The work of the Russian Fleet throughout was beyond praise. It patrolled over 2,000 miles of coast line, forwarding the passage of Russian supplies and preventing the passage of Turkish suppUes. It bombarded Turkish camps and dispersed bodies of troops, and finally it effected the two important armed landings that were absolutely essential to the captiu^ of Trebizond. But its command of the sea was not unchallenged, and so long as a good portion of the road between Erzerum and Trebizond was in the hands of the enemy the situation could not bo regarded with complacency, especially in view of large Turkish reinforcements. The captiu-e of Baiburt and Gumushkhane, 60 and 100 miles w(;st of Erzerum respectively, was the first essential thing, and this was now taken in hand. The Turks, however, were the first to assume the offensive, and that in a slightly different direction. The road from Erzeriun runs duo west till near Ashkiila, about 30 miles off, and then forks, one route going north-east across the inoiiritains to J3aiburt and Garnush- kliurie, tlie oiAicr continuing westward down the valley of the Kara Su, or Phrat, or Western l']uj)hiat<)H, as it is variously culled, to Marna- khatun and Krzinjan. The main Turkish rein- forcements in this quarter apiMiar to have In^cii dircfifcd (it first to Krzinjan and J>ia,ibekr. Korgfitfiil of thcii- previous statennnl (liii,( i270 Till': TiMns fiisT()ii\ or 'iiih: win. FORT OUTSIDE THE CITY OF VAN. Erzeriim was an " open town " and " had not the least military value," the Turks now declared that it was the key to the situation ; that it must be retaken at all costs, and the Russians thrown back across the frontier. The Russians, as already stated, had taken Ashkala, and their outposts were at Mama- khatun. On May 11 fighting was reported to the south-east of Mamakhatun and south of the Tusla river, the Turks claiming tlie victory. Two days later the Russian bulletin stated that : " In the direction of Erzinjan detach- ments of our regular troops, in conjunction "with our territorial reserves, following a merci- iess night attack, powerfully organized by the enemy, on the lofty range which dominates the whole adjoining region, took prisoners 30 officers and 365 solcUers of the Turkish infantry. Our troops forming the advanced guard easily gained the better of the enemy offensive in the region of Mamakhatim, half- way between Erzermn and Erzinjan." But on the following day it was admitted that " in the region of Ashkala in the direction of Erzin- jan the Turks, after assembling very large forces, took the offensive and after a furious battle, which lasted the whole day, succeeded in forcing back our advanced posts in places, but they were then compelled to cease their offensive owing to the < stremely severe losses they had suffered by our fire." Obstinate fighting continued, and, finally, on June I the Russians admitted that they had withdrawn from jMamakhatun in face of sunultaneous attacks and a threatened outflanking move- ment. The Turks contented themselves with saying that their offensive had been " success- ful," and that the operations surprised the Russians, who were obliged to retreat without offering serious resistance. A few days later the Turks claimed to have occupied positions east, north-east and south-east of Mamakhatun, and to have passed on to within five miles of Ashkala. Here the much-heralded counter- stroke came to an end, and the campaign in that quarter resumed the form of sporadic and in- effective raids, while the Grand Duke steadily prepared for the next advance. We must now endeavour to estimate the strength and position of the contending forces at the opening of this, the final Armenian operation of the smnmer, which, like the rest, ended, on the Russian right wing at least, in complete victory and further ad\'ances by the forces under GJeneral Yudenitch. At the opening of the year, it will be remembered, Kiamil Pasha's forces — the Tliird Turkish Army — consisted of about 130,000 men spi-ead out along the Caucasus fi'ontior from the Black Sea to the south of I^ake Van. The fii-st movement ended in overwhelming defeat at Koprukeui and Erzerum, the Russians thivwing the Turks back'in confusion, captiu-inglErzonun, THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE' WAR. 271 Miish, and Bit lis, and the Van district to the east, thus occupjang the whole Armenian plateau and holding its mountain gateways to the west and the south. In the north, however, Halid Bey still held out with a respectable force in the Chorok valley, tlireatening the Russian right flank and blocking the way to Trebizond. In spite of -a steady stream of Turkish reinforcements, Halid was forced back to Ispir and beyond, and a junction effected between the Russian Chorok valley army and that advancing south-westward along the coast from the direction of Batum. These two columns, supported by the Black •Sea Fleet, then advanced and took Trebizond. The RtLssian hne then extended from the Black Sea, ten miles or so west of Trebizond, through Ashkala to Mush and Bitlis and across to the neighbourhood of Lake Urmia. Opposed to thLs force, according to the best Russian calculations at the time, there had been -assembled the shattered, but now reinforced, remains of the Third Army, with some 150,000 further troops of the best quaUty brought up from Gallipoli Round Trebizond, in the upper Chorok valley, and between the Russian force at Trebizond and that holding Erzerum and Ashkala, there were six divisions, amounting in strength to about 100,000 men. In the Kharput-Erzinjan district there were about 10 divisions — -the pick of the Turkish Army in Asia Minor. Thi*eatening Mush and Bitlis, which after the fall of Kut do not seem to have been held by the Russians in serious force, there were about 40,000 men, the greater mmiber south of the important pass at Bitlis. Some of these had possibly come up from Mesopotamia, where, between Mosul and Bagh- dad, there were still at least 60,000 men, not to speak of swarms of Kurdish irregulars. Tills gives about 40,000 men free to act against General Yudenitch"s left wing and 60,000 to hold the Baghdad-Mosul line and to threaten the Persian frontier. Opposite liis centre and right wing General Yudenitch had a nominal 300,000 to dispute his advance on Baiburt and Gumushkhane, Kelkid and Erzinjan. Ashkala, Erzinjan and Gmnushkhane may be regarded very roughly as indicating the three angles of an equilateral triangle, the latter place pointing north towai-ds Trebizond. The country is very rugged and mountainous, but there are good roads from the fork near Ashkala, north-west to Gimiush- KUKUISIl SOMJIHKS IN TIIH TURKISH AKMY. 272 rHE TIMHS HISTOIIY OF Till: M'AR. BAIBURT. kluiitu ami w»<.st to Ei/mjiiu Tu couiph'to the list of Turkish forco.s in Asia Minor, it was cal- culated further t hat there were jit least two Army corps in South Syria with designs on Egypt, and one in Arabia and in the direction of Aden The general conmiaiuling against General Vutlenitch's front, west of Erzeruni, was now V'echtib Pasha, who had taken over the com- mand of the defeated anny after Erzerum. At that time its existence was cliiefly on pajwr, but, as we have seen, it had since been brought up to quite respectable dimensions. It is always to be kept in mind that the armies enmnerated above were not necessarily up to anything like their normal strength. In the first tlisastrous days of the retreat before Erzerum the ninth, tenth and eleventh army corps had lost more than three-quarters of their personnel and nearly the whole of their artillery. Such losses are not readily replaced, especially in the case of a Turkish army hun- dreds of miles from railway communication and cut off from the sea. Large reinforcements, however, wei-e on the way even before the fall of Erzeriun, and within a week of the close of the operations in that quarter the first echelon had begun to amve via Smyriici and Haidar Pasha, a more or less steady stream being kept up afterwards. And it need hardly be pointed out that a retuing army always has this advantage, that as it falls back it shortens its lines, while its opponent, until a new base is fully organized, has to transport all its requirements over an ever-lengthening line, not to speak of the men left behind as necessary to garrison every point gained and to guard connexions. It is doubtful whether tlie ( Irand ^Duke Nicholas ever had under his command more than 200,000 men, whilst Vechtib Pasha was abb- to dispose of probably 300,000 on his main fi-ont. During all this time of pi-eparation and calculation the Turks continued a somewhat spasmodic offensive at various points. At Trebizond, towards the end of May, a series of attacks began without leading to any very marked result, and the Russians countered by an attack in the direction of Gumuslikhane,. which dislodged their opponents from a well- organized position on the northern slopes of the coast range. IJaiburt, between Gumush- khane and Erzeriun, and Oghnut to the soutli of Erzerum on the Kharput road, were the real points of interest. Baiburt is at a sharp- turn in the upper Chorok valley, and had long been a source of danger. Here some very vigorous fighting took place in the first week in June, the Turks attacking with " important forces," but being repulsed and their ranks broken with gunfire. This point is the key to the whole situation between Erzerum and Trebizond, but the Turks gained nothing by their effort. Meantime, the Russians had also- to deal with the offensive from Oghnut in the Kargabazar direction. The force employed here was estimated at 40,000, and at first it met with some successes, but the end was failure. The intention obviously was to break tlirough between the Russian centre and left, and interrupt coimnunications between Erzerum and Bitlis. It was a carefully organized and dangerous tittack, and the Russians most positively asserted that the Turks had the assistance of a large number of German, Aus- trian, and even Bulgarian reinforcements. It was the first indication of a definite strategic plan on the part of the eneniy with the object of gaining a position from wliich they could tlu-eaten the flank and ivar of the Russian forces at IMush anil Bitlis, aniK indii-ectly, tie up their advance on the Erzerum -Tivbizond road. THE TIMES HISTOh'Y OF THE WJh'. 273 Meeting with i\o success in the centre and south, the Turks again directed their effort against the Trebizond position in the extreme north. On June 1 1 they developed a strong assault on Platana, the port to the west of Trebizond, where the Russian fleet -landing in April had thrown the Turks into such confusion and brought about the collapse of the defence. Repeated Turkish attacks were, however, repulsed with great losses, 100 dead being left in front of the Russian trenches. Fighting continued froin time to time in this region almost till the time of General Yude- that they should not claim it. On the other, the Russians made no mention of fighting anywhere else about that time, and the Turks themselves never alluded to the matter again, as they would certainly have done if a sweep- ing victory of the kind had really been won. A range of mountains separates Jevizlik from the Chorok valley where the Turks place their battle. The following is the Turkish bulletin for what it is worth : Caucasian Front. — On the left wing our offensive continues against the enemy positions on the northern reaches of the River Chorok. These positions are 15 to 19 miles south of Trebizond, on a lake as well as on a RUSSIAN CAVALRY IN THE CAUCASUS. nitch'H great advance ; and about a fortnight after the fimt Turkish aHsault the struggl*; here was keen and fairly evenly contested. On June 23 the Turks drove thf^ RusHians from a fortified convent at Jevizlik, 17 miles south of Trebizond. They were driven out a^ain by a KuHhian count«!r-attack. On the name day as the final liiiMsian bulletin (Juno 25) th'! TurkH ttUo mado a stateiuerit r;laii(iirig a great victory, but the locality was ho vagu<'ly given that it in inif<oHHible in Hay whether thJH wa« inUjnded Ut refer to tlw? Harne event. On the one hand, having gained a real »ucc(!hh, if a U'.in[X)rnry one, at Jevizlik, if was Htrunge chain of moiwitaiii.s over 9,000 feet high running from (uiHt to WBHt, in a region where the riv<^r« have their source which divide the two places. In an oflonsivo, which has continued for two days with the groate.Mt violonco, our troops have conducted thern-clvcK with the greatest bravery, especially in hayon(!t fighting, in which thoy havo proved themselves superior in all respects. The rout of the enemy, who at certain points left their onoampniiTitH behind, nnido our Holdit^rs forget all their fatigul^H. Without awniling the ordf^r to pursue, they joyfully began the attack on tho remnants of tho enemy, and thus oxtciidc<d the sector they occupied. , In this battle wo scfrured rir'h booty, consisting of all kinds of armaments and war material, including 1} million cartridges and seven ttiiKthine-giins, which ar<< now used against the enemy. We eii[)tur(!d (i5iJ prisoners, including seven officers. In npite of the diflitiill nut ore of llie groui:d, wliicli 274 THt: TIMES HlSTOIiY OF THE WAR. W<W I'avuurttblu tu lh« uiieioy, hin lusatxi ure ttatiiittttt^il at at Itiiiat 3,uou liuttU. Our loci«tt» wer» relatively very >iuall. The only reftntiuce to tightiiig in the Hubtfiun biUletiii, itisued on the fuUuwing (lay, was to th« effect that they lutd repulsed by giuifii'e, " ami in many places by liand grenades," attacks *' in the regiunu of Platana and Jevizlik." Wlien next we hear of Platana it is to leani that the KassiaiLS were advancing well to the west of it in the direction of Tireboli. We were then just on the eve of the great Anglo-French advance on the Somme as well as of that of General Yudenitch on Erzinjan. But in the meantime hope long deferred was having its inevitable effect and producing a certain feeling of depression and of impatience n Russia. What were the Allies doing ? The Russians themselves, it was true, were making a tremendous and victorious push on the Styr and on the Dniester, but elsewhere the outlook seemed gloomy. Desperate and almo.st continuous attacks were being made on Verdun : the Austrians were advancing in thy Trentino : Baghdad and the Dardanelles had ended in failui-e : notliing was being done at Salonika : the suggested scheme for a change of base and an advance from Smyrna had come to nothing : the Turkish pressiire all along the Armenian front and with superior forces was vexatious : in Pei-sia General BaratofT was being compelled to fall back : Lord Kitchener had been lost on his way to Arch- angel. A leading Russian newspaper openly expressed its chagrin about the Armenian situation and the attitude of France and England : The great battle developing on our south-western front, where the fate of the summer campaign is being decided, has completely obscured the events taking place in Asia Minor. But, as a matter of fact, tha strategic situation there has undergone a radical change, and, we must say, not in our f avou r. After the abandonment of the Dardanelles and Thrace, Enver Pasha transferred his troops to Armenia and Mesopotamia. It has been found in many parts of our Caucasian front that the Turks are facing us in superior numbers. This is a great achievement, con- sidering that the means of communication in the rear of the Turkish Army are very poor. The advantage of quick transportation of troops and supplies is all in favour of England and Russia, and, with a few exceptions, the Allies have to traverse only 70 to 140 miles of roads, whilst the Turks have to cover from Angora some 550 miles. Moreover, the sea frontier of Turkey is every- where open to attacks. If then, the Turks are ever3rwhere allowed to make attacks, it must be accounted for by the fact that England and Russia are looking upon the Turkish theatre as a secondary theatre of war, and refrain from sending adequate reinforcements. Meanwhile, the more the world-war develops the morf .-Jear it becomes that the Turkish theatre is of the greatest importance, for a decibivt) stroke in thici theatre would alter the generak riituatiou III Kuropti. We wutild, theriifore, like to helit-ve that the delay iii sending reiuforceiiieut« is pur-ly temporary, and that our troops and those of the liritii^h are confined to their present ta.ik on account of the advernn cliinitijc iMiitlitions in Musiipotainiii and Asia Minor. Tile r>'ul siliiutiou in I'erhia is cloaked with darkness. We know definitely that Halil Patiha has left only a screen at Kiit-el-Ainara and traiLsferred his iiiaiii force, no less than live divisions, to Kliiiiiikin. ... A farther advance on Baghdad has become impossible for Generaf Bdratoff's army, both on actcount of the adverse climatic conditions and on account of the British army in Mesopo- tamia having assumed a waiting attitudx. Earlier in the day, about the middle of May, Halil Pasha opened an offensive with three divisions and our troops retired farther and farther into the mountaiits. Wo were invariably wuccessful from a tactical standpoint in all the rearguard actions, but wo had to retreat before the superior forces of the enemy. The first definite news of the advance of Greneral Yudenitch was issued on July 12, although the new movement itself appears to have begun on the 2nd of the month. On the 8th a handful of Russian scouts captured a height on the Baiburt road and took some macliine-guns. The bulletin of the 12th speaks of " appreciable progress " between the 2nd and the 8th, apparently on the same road, with a capture of 1,800 prisoners and 10 machine-guns. The Turks were stated to be in retreat, throwing away arms and ammunition. Later on the same day came the news that the loss of Mamakhatun on the Erzinjan road was avenged, the place being retaken by assault. The great advance on Erzinjan and Gumushkhane was now in full swing, and promised to be as swift and as irresistible as that on Erzerura and Trebizond. The Turkish bulletins began to talk of " enemy counter-attacks which were repulsed throughout the whole sector," but the move- ments were not counter-attacks and they were not repiilsed anjrwhere. It will be remembered that west of Erzerum the main road forks, one branch going north-east to Giunushkhane, and the other due west to Erzinjan. Each place is distant about a hundred miles from Erzenma. On the 15th Baiburt had fallen, the Turks retiring in headlong flight, destroying their stores and setting fire to the town. On the Erzinjan road the demoralization seems to have been quite as great. The Kerban Cossacks in their pm-suit at one point suxrounded a detachment of the 49th Infantry regiment, which promptly surrendered. The haul here consisted of an aide-de-camp, 20 officers, and 232 men, with several machiite- gvins, the regimental records, and stores ami THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR 275; ammunition. The advance from ^lush was at first equally successful, a whole Ottoman division newly arrived from Europe abandoning its equipment and tents and retreating towards Diarbekr. On the 17th, the day after these striking events, the Turkish bulletin, which had already admittsd " fighting without any decisive success for either side,' spoke of " enemy attacks in large masses which were all the way for a little to Ti-ebizond, a f'^w miles nortli, but with the clearance of this district, the route was open and the whole district of operations put into direct connexion with, the sea over what was described as " the best, metalled r"oad in Asia Minor." So long as Russia retained command of the Black Sea, the possession of tliis road and of the port, of Trebizond would enormously simplify the RUSSIAN WOLNIJRI) TKANSPORTRD IN A BAKGE. fru.strat«*i." Kighi, an important junction of road and river between Erzinjan and Oghnut, wa8 takon on tho 18th, and a few days later K'^Ikifi, to tho north of Erzinjan, also came into Pvii.-tMian luindH. Th«j f;aptiire of .Mrirtokoli quickly followfxl, and left thf roafj clear for tho final advance. Meantime, on the Trebizond rf>ad, OurnuHhkhano had followefl liaiburt, and with the occupation on July 22 of Ardasa, whero the routfj takr^H a Hharfj turn to thf» norih-eaHt in tho direction of Trf;bizond, tho whole of the road fiom Krzinjan wjih open. Th*) high groun<l near the convent of Jevizlik, where there wan a niount.nin pnsH between ft,000 ;.rid 7,000 fc-h »ii(/fi. iiu<\ v^l,<•|•<■ hu,.!, wjVfre fighting hud lakcn pUui- (,n .June 2.'J-2i> ■ lending fo very (■(,fif\i(<iitu. bullctiny- \)\<,<ki-<l task of mainttiiuing hei* armies in Western Asia Minor. From this time forward even tlut Turkish bulletins cease to speak of the figliting in the tho (Jhorok valley, where since the begin- ning of tho campaign a most intrepid and resourceful rfwiHtancf* had been kept^'M' by a small Turkish foi-ce. No details''are'^avaiiable of tho Inst scenes in this wonder'fui struggle, but once I'xiihml luid fJumushkbane were taken tfi<! M liolr» valley whs definitely " stopped " from till! wch(,. TIki Tuil<iHt,iui troops wlio luid' •J7r. ////<; 77A//<'N msTOHY OF Till': WAR. THK OLD TRANSPORT: A CAMEL CONVOY. been opt<rating on the Russian side and gradually cleariiig the valley had complettnl their task when they reached Haiburt and (cuinushkhane, although it is possible that jsonie of Halid Bey's fine fighters made their way to Jevizlik and assisted in keeping up the resistance at that point. After this we read constantly in the Russian bulletins of fiequent fighting '"west of Guniushkhane," the Turks being the assailants, indicating a vigorous And effective force still in being in that quarter and in the Kelkid valley, which in some degree corresponds to the Chorok valley, running west and parallel with the coast for about 200 miles. Here the Russians appear again to have come to a halt, although along the coast they continued to push westward step by step. On July 23 they were at Fol Bazar, 25 miles west of Trebizond, which place they carried by storm, capturing many prisoners and a sacred green flag. Eleu was next reached, and finally Tireboli at the mouth of the Karshut river. The point here ainaed at was evidently Kerasun, from which post there was a practicable road over the Gimibat range to Karahissar and Enderes, the posses- sion of which would materially help in the farther advance westward from Erzinjan to Sivas. The last stride on the road to Erzinjan has still to be mentioned. With the Russians in possession of Mertekli, almost within sight of the town and the mountain passes to the north and the south, there was nothing left for the Tui-ks, following the example of Erzerum and Trebizond, but to beat a hasty retreat. which they difl, throwing away rifles and packs in the utmost disorder. On Juno 26 Yudenitch, the ever-victoriou.s, entered Erzinjan. The town was practically undamaged, and as it was the headquarters of an army corps, with extensive barracks and military factories, the booty was very considerable. The Russian bulletin was brief : " On Tuesday detachments of the brave troops commanded by General Yudenitch occupied the town of Erzinjan, thus completing the conqviest of Armenia." It was a message worthy to rank with that of Murat to Xapoleon after his march across Germany from Jena to Limbeck : — " Sire, le combat finit, faute de combattants." In three weeks General Yudenitch had carried the Russian front 70 miles to the east and had added two or three thousand square miles to his conquests. A well- inf oi-med writer * explains the situation at this point : Erzinjan (i-n the Phrat or Western Euphrates) was a place of great military importance to the Turks. It, and not Erzerum, was the headquarters of the Turkish troops in the north-eastern part of their Empire, being chosen probably for the purpose a« lying farther from the frontier than the fortress. A glance at the map will show that with Erzinjan and the Trebizond Chauss^e firmly in their hands the Russians are secure from any serious menace to their right flank for a long distance to the west. The valley of the Phrat (Western Euphrates) is separated from that of the Murad (Eastern Euphrates) by a range of almost impassable niountains from the south of Erzerum to a point farther west than Erzinjan. These effectually guard a force moving west from Erzerum from any serious attack from the south. On the north, however, it is otherwise. On this side lay the old Roman province of Pontus, formed of ndg«> after ridge of mountains nuining generally from south to north from the vallev of the Phrat and, farther w»\->t. * The Xiar A"a^^ October 2l>. H>10. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 27^ of the Kelkid, down to the Black Sea. Wli.^n tho time comes tho advance on Siva.s, rather le!?s than 150 miles due west, whsre the climate in winter is much less rigorous than on the high plateaus to which tho operations have hitherto been confined, can be undertaken under much less hazardous and arduous conditions than our Ally encountered in the opening of the campaign. At Erzinjan the Russian advance was, as at Mush, Tiflis, Baibiirt, and Trebizond, on the scene of one of the most horrible centres of Armenian massacre and outrage. Erzinjan, in fact, acted as the clearing house of the \dctims who were being driven west, as Trebizond did of those driven north — the clearing house to death ! It will be remembered* how the con- verging convoys passed through the district along roads flanked from one end to the other with the corpses of their fellow-Christians who had fallen by the way. At Baibiut the pro- ceedings opened with the hanging of the Bishop and seven other Armenian notables and the brutal massacre of many others, and then the " deportation " began. The extraordinary feature of the fall of Erzinjan was that the bulk of the Turkish forces based on that town did not retire westward towards Sivas, as was expected. In.stead, they swept south-eastward towards Lake Van, in the hope of falUng upon the Russian left flank or of cutting the line of communications ; and eventually portions of these Turkish troops penetrated far into Persia. The consequence was that in the • Chap. CXXXllI., p. SS'J. south-east and the east on the Kighi Oghnut- Bitlis-Mosul line, the winding-up of the Armenian campaign proved a much more prolonged and compUcated business than in the Erzerum-Trebizond-Erzinjan triangle, wliich had been brought to such a speedy and trimnphant conclusion by General Yudenitoh And the story has for the present to be left incomplete. Kharput and Diarbekr were mucl i better situated for the forwarding of reinforce ments from the Levant coast by the Aleppo Nisibin railway than Sivas or Erzinjan, and from this quarter the Russians were all along in serious danger of attack on their left flank. In July they occupied Kighi as part of their advance on Erzinjan, but at Oghnut, 30 miles off, the Turks continued to hold a strong and menacing position from wliich, and from Diarbekr in the south, Mvish and Bitlis were under constant menace. The danger zone, indeed, extended much farther east and right up to and across the Persian frontier, the district in wliich frequent fighting had already been recorded. It is also necessary to point out again that the British withdrawal in Mesopotamia, like that from the Dardanelles^, greatly increased the difficulties of the Russian armies by releasing Tm-kish troops. The best account of the district is that given by the writer in the Near East, from whom we lia\e already quoted : From Rowan In/, westwards the country west of Lako Van is a mass of high and difficult mountains, crossed AH.MOUKKfJ CARS IN ASIA MINOR lJNI)HI<(;OIN(; UI'-I'AIKS. XI o S o a a <X3 8 o a o o a .2 w Xi in e c ca o s « U a ^ « x: s Q a eg Oi N » o a X H O H 278 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 279 only by rough tracks. This region is well known to the traveller, and has of recent years been regarded with some interest as the headquarters of the Chaldean Christians ; but it is wild and rugged and unsuited for the advance of large armies. The first practicabk' pass is that at Bitlis, where a narrow and beautiful gorge, through which the Bitlis river flows, leads down from the plateau to the plains. At its lower end the pass can be approached from either Jezireh and Sairt to the south — approximately the route taken by Xenophon and the Ten Thousand — or from Diarbekr to the south- west. The town of Biths Ues at the upper or northern end of the pass, and it was necessary to guard agaiftst the risk of Turkish troops debouching from the pa«s on to the tableland above. Fifty miles north-west of Bitlis lies the town of Mush, at the farther end of a large plain once covered with prosperous Armenian villages. Mush can be reached from Diarbekr by difficult but not impracticable routes, and 50 miles farther west the Murad (Eastern Euphrates) which flows through the plain north of Mush is crossed by the main route from Diarbekr to Erzerum via Oghnut. Xo direct advance by the valley of the Murad was to be feared, but from Palu and from Kharput routes lead to Kighi, some 35 miles west of Oghnut. It was along this line the Turks prepared and delivered a powerful counter-stroke to the Russian advance on Erzinjan. The fighting on and across the Persian frontier may first be dealt with in a few words. General Baratoff's daring and successful adv^ance from Hainadan to Kermanshah and to Kasi-i-Shirin on May 10, 1916, where he came to a halt in presence of a superior Turkish force at Khanikin on the Baghdad road, has been decsribed. It was from some point on this route that he sent a sotnia of Cossacks on thoir splendidly adven- turous ride across the mountains to join touch with Cieneral Lake on the Tigris. After Kut the Russians fell back, and in August they were attacked by the Turks at Kermanshah, and again at Hamadan, wliich place the Russians abandoned on August 11. Afterwards the Turkish advance seemed to have exhausted itself. Bulletins during the autumn spoke from time to time of fighting with varied fortunes in the Hamadan district, but with no marked result either way. About the same time as the capture of Kasr-i-Sliirin, another Russian force ctohwuI the Persian frontier 200 miles farth*;r north in the direction of iVjwanduz, and there threatened the Turkish communications at Mf«ul, but nothing came of this move, which might have proved liighly imp<jrtant in the event of the English capture of f'Ughdari and an a<lvance farthrjr north. The Tiirks delivered a count^jr-stroko from yitfHu\, and the iiuHHiuns fell hfUik. It was Uf guard ugaifwt H\ir]>n»tm from the fKiuth afl we.ll OH to prot*!ct tlu> Anneniana and to divert Turki>4h trooj^H from Baghdmi that the left wing of the Grand J>uko'g army mmle its fine sweep into the Lake Van district at the beginning of the campaign. It was entirely successful in its immediate objects, but as time went on and the Turkish forces increased the position in that quarter became a very pre- carious one. The Russians, however, remained practically unmolested in South Armenia till the great Turkish cotinter-offensive was de- Uvered towards the end of July and the begin- ning of August. There was obstinate and sanguinary fighting round Oghnut and Kighi, and on August 3 the Russians claimed to have captured a Turkish position near Oghnut and to have taken guns and prisoners. Three days later they made a further advance and captured some heights. But the great blow was being delivered farther south, and there was an ominous ring in the two lines at the end of the btilletin of the 6th, in which it was stated that " In the region of Mush -Bitlis the enemy as- sumed the offensive, but is being held back by our fire." The Turkish version was that they had taken the Russian first line of entrench- ments, capturing two officers and 20 soldiers A day later the Russians spoke of " desperate assaults " on Mush, and on the 9th they admitted that " heavy fighting " was pro- ceeding " in the region of Mush, Bitlis, Van, Urmia, and Sinneh, as well as between Ker- manshah and Hamadan." " In the region of Mush and Bitlis," it was added, " we fell b£ick under enemy j^ressure towards the north." As a matter of fact, the Turks had retaken both Mush and Bitlis on the 8th, and on the 11th the Russians admitted the loss of Hamadan, in Persia, " under Turkish pressure." After this the fighting till the end of the month was rather confused, and the bulletins contained very little information. We hear of " fierce battles " west of Diarbekr, and on the same day, August 20, of Russian troops success- fully crossing the nearly inaccessible chain of high mountains west of the Bignol Dagh — troops apparently hastening from Erzerum to the relief of the situation north of Mush. Thanks to this timely lielp the Russians on August 24 re- entered Mush, wh(!re they took some prisoners, but no details of the fighting were furnished by either side. On the same day, " in the direction of Mosul," and tmar the Persian fnmtier, tlu-y " dispersed " the 4th TurkLsh Division, took prisonerH the whole of the 11th liegimont — including the oonunandor, 50 oflicei-s and 1,000 rank and file also " nearly all the renuiants of 280 THt: TIMES HISTORY OF Till': WAli. tlu) luth Htigiiaent, with twi) Httift" i»Hu;«)rs uiul 050 aolditirM." Tlie Hiui«uui.s ulst) cluiuit'd to bt> driving buck the TurkM in thn ilirectiun of Ogluiut, vvliere their lotitieu vvert* very heavy. Fttik Pautia, eoininander of the 2nd Anny ('orp8, was seriuubly woiindeil, and tlie commander of the 30th Turkisli Division killed and the com- mander of thti 12th Division woiukUhI. At Bitlis also the Kiissians were attacking, wo that by the end of August the Turkish counter- stroke might be regarded as liaving exhausted itself. " Now that the chief peril has been ex- haustt»d," wrote a well-placed correspondent in Russia, " there is no harm in admitting thivt at one time the situation had assumed a grave complexion. The Turco-Ciennan offensive was ably planned by the young German Major-General Gresmann, atul was based mainly on a rapid advance northward from Mush and the rupture of our centre east of Erzerum, whereby it was intended to force the evacuation of that stroiigluild, liurl back our riglit wing on tlie Hlaek Sea and our left on Lake Van. .Simultaneously the Turkish right wing pursued the offensive on a wide front from Van to riowanduz, apparently with the objtiot of diverting a large portion of our forces from Erzerum." Only at IJitlis could the August counter-offensive of th<i Turks be rogard«td as securing a definite advantages the Uussians having a[)[)ar(»ntly had no immediate intention of attempting to drive them from that important pass. The Turks at Bitlis constituted a menace to the Russians at Musli and in the whole Van district, as well as a very obvious l)arrier to any connexion between Erzerum and the Tigris valley at Mosul— a matter destined to assume importance in the event of a resump- tion of the British advance on Baghdad. It was obvious that the first Russian move in a new campaign would be directed to dislodging them and thereby securing a free gateway into the Mesopotamia plain. CHAPTER CLX. MECHANICAL TRANSPORT IN WAR. Introductiox of Motor Traction— Subsidy Scheme — Mechanical Transport Branch of THE Wab Office — Mobilization fob War — Supply and Reception of Vehicles — Personnel — Accessories and Spare Parts — Tire Store — Organization fob Repairs — Motor Ambulances — The British Red Cross — Heavy Tractors — Armed and Armoured Cars — Land-ships or " Tanks " — An Unsolicited Testimonial. FROM an early stage it became a common- place to say of th ; war that it was an "engineers' war." Probably most of those who employed the phrase had in mind the fact that it was on its engineering workshops and mechanics that the country had to rely for a due supply of guns and shells but they would have been equally justified had they been thinking of the part played by mechanical traction in the transport of men and material of every kind. The petrol motor was, indeed, ubiquitous on land ; and the rnotor-omnibuses moving large bodies of troops rapidly uf> to the jioints where they were required, the hrjavy wagons delivering food and ammunition to the men in the firing lino, the vans of the light delivery type carryirig smaller loarlfl, the ambulances removin.? the wounde«l to hioHpital, the arrnourwl cars bringing anti- aircraft guns to bear on raiding Ze, polins, tha " touring " cars convoying officers to thoir dutif«, tho rnotrjr bicycles of tlio scout and the dii4pat<^;h rider, all alike roliwi on its power, not to mention moU^r kitchens, motor wiroless Htfitions, travelling repair shops, motor bm;U»rio- logical laboratories, and other rnisfr^IlanofjuH applicutioHrt, Onh of tho Burprisi^H nf fch*> war was tho oxtrit of tho terrain over whif:h mechanical tranwfiort was fmnployofl. Whothor in tho Vol, X.— Part 125. plains of Mesopotamia, the jungle of East Africa, the deserts of Egypt, or the roadless country north of Salonika, motor ambulances, cars, vans, and lorries carried the wounded and conveyed the stores and ammunition for the Armies. To this must be added the haulage of guns. The majority of the siege artillery batteries were mechanically drawn, and the ingenuity of the officers responsible was taxed to its utmost by the exigencies of the situations with which they found them- selves confronted. Two outstanding examples of the value of motor transport may be given, although, striking as they are, they must rank as com- paratively insignificant beside the aggregate of the services it rendered in the daily rovmd of warfare. The first is tho " taxicab " army wliicli <locide<l the Battle of the Marne in September, 1914, when General Joffre hurried out his rfworvos from Paris in motor vehicles and drove tho fJormans from tho gates of the city back upon tho Aisno. Tho second is to be found at Verdun. In tho early days of that mighty battle tho French, since their railways hu'l Ixiori (lostroyo<l, Imd to depend solely on motor vehicles for siipplyin'^ a quarter of u million men with food and ammutiitif)M. it was said that by this means an entire army corfis was iriovf«l up in 10 hours, and one town 281 •2y. THH TIMUS lUSToliV OF Till': H.I/.V A MOTOR LORKY AS TRACTOR. Bringing up a howitzer on an improvised track. [ojJ'uKil photograph. in the rear of the lines used to see 5,000 siicli vehicles pass through its streets every day, or nio e than thi-ee every minute. Although in the first Balkan War a few motor units had been employed, and Italy had used some light lorries in her Tripoli campaign, the Great War was the first in which mechanical t -ansport was of any consequence. In the last war in which Great Britain had been engaged — that in South Africa — a few steam t actors had been tried without any great success, but the petrol vehicle was out of the question, as it had been " emancipated " only three years when hostilities began, and had not reached a stage of development at which it had the least chance of standing uji against the rough usage of the field. Yet even at that period a Gorman officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Otfried Layriz, realizing that the deficiency in means of transport had been one of the difficvdties the Germans had encountered in 1870, foresaw the ado[)tion of mechanical traction on an extensive scale, not only for carrying food to armies so large as not to be able to live on the country, but also for bringing up the heavy guns required to overcome the frontier forts which barred the way to a rapid advance into the territories of neighbouring States. A few years later the great European nations were taking measures to ensure themselves a supply of motdr vehicles for use in the event of war. For each army to maintain as part of its estab- **^?!ft!BiK- ' \OSkuil pMosriipM. A MOTOR LORRY CONVOY. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIL 283 lishment the large number of vehicles that would be required was seen to be impracticable, and, accordingly, arrangements were made whereby the vehicles — or a pioportion of them — ordinarily employed by private users should be available for the piu-pose. To this end subsidy schemes were adopted by Great Britain, France, and Germany, the principle being to pay an annual subvention to owners whose vehicles, held at the disposal of the Government in case of need, were of an approved type and were found on periodical inspection to be maintained in proper condition. It may be petrol lorries and other vehicles were introduced into the military organisation. The question of standardization naturally arose, since the difficulties of dealing with a heterogeneous collection of vehicles of different design and construction were obvious, and in 1911 the Mechanical Transport Committee took up the matter vigorously in connexion with the subsidy scheme. Ultimately two types of lorry were settled upon, one carrying a net load of 3 tons, and the other one of 1| ton. As these loads excluded the weight not only of the body. NATIONAL MO Inspection of cars by General Sir noted that Great Britain was able to jiniingc this Hnbsifly on the lowest terms, Kranec coming next in this respect, and Gennany followinj( third. In Cri-nt liritain a permanent Mechanical Tr;iriHport (-'onuriittee was fonnerl at the War Oflice Hoori after the end of the South African War. The first mechanical transport corri|jany wan fjHtablishwl at Chatham, whence its head- quarters were rernovfHl to Aldershot in l!HM. At first attention was devfitwl to stoarn tractors, hut ultimately thf«e were fliscarded in favour of vehicles driven by ]>i-A,r,,] eriKiricH because of thf» undue visibility of the f^xhauMt stream in c«!rtain conditions of the atmosphere and because of tfieir nwfd for frequent refdeninhnient of th«>ir Hufjplies of water. Gradually thf> Army, like the rmt <A the world, took to motor rars, and TOR VOLUNTEERS. Francis Lloyd at Wellington Barracks. but also (jf the men on the driver's seat, with their kit, tools, and spare petrol, the vehicles nearly corresponded to the four- and two-ton lorries of commerce, and, in fact, their total w(»i.dit laden was about 7 J tons in the one case and .'> tons in the other. Standardization was insisted upon, so far as possiblf>, not only as <'on(rei'ns the controls, such as the position and throw of the clutch and brake jjedals, but also in regard to details of construction, such as the position of the radiator and 1 lie provision of ball brjarings and grease cuj)s. Transmission of t he power of the ftngine to \,\ui diiying wheels by fhaiiiH was barred, the live axle systetn whh propfOler sliaft being rerjuired ; and it, was Hti[(ulatr!d that all moving |)arts should be adequately protetittxl from dust, and that the vehicles hIiohM I»c nble to pass through water a 284 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. toot tiuep witliuut danger of Htopping owing to tho 8pla»hiug i>f watt*r iijum tlu>ir ignition syuteiikH. For the heavier veiiiclea tiie niaxiinuni road dpeeil wari to reach I ti inileH an hour, anil for the tighter 18 miles ; they were to be able to climb a gradient of 1 in 6 fully loaded, and theii- petrol conuiunption wan not to exceed 1 gallon per 40 grOHH ton-mileH. The diameter selected for the road wheels, which wertt to be of Htet»l, not wood, wa« larger than was usual in ordinary com- mercial vehicles — 1,050 nun. for the heavier tjrpeand 1,030 nim. for the lighter — the object inclusion of vehicles which did not fully attain to the standard laid down. In addition, ofluMns were stationed in \ariouH parts of the countiy to take note of such suitable vehicles as were introduced into their respective districts, and by this means lists were compiled of the vehicles that were available in case of emoi-gency. The drivers wore enlisted in a Special Reserve, and this arrangement, while it could not always ensure thut a particular driver accompanied the vehicle to which he was accustomed, in many cases had that result. Plans wore also drawn up for allocating the voliides, whether subsidized ARMOURED ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN AND AMMUNITION CAR. being to take advantage of the fact that large wheels tend to reduce the tractive effort required for propulsion, while lessening shock and vibration. Rubber tires were required, for although steel tires are cheaper and last longer, their whole width does not come down evenly on an uneven road surface ; this puts excessive strain on the axles, and also is apt to be destructive to the roads. It was realized that with strict adherence to these conditions it would not be possible quickly to ensure a sufficient supply of vehicles, and an auxiliary and temporary subsidy scheme was instituted which, with corresponding reductions in the amount of the subvention, permitted the or merely listed, to tmits of the Expeditionary Force on mobihzation. Down to the outbreak of war this work was carried out by the Trans- port Branch, under the Director of Transport and Movements in the QuarteiTnaster-General's Department of the War Oftice, but in August, 1914, there was a rearrangement, and it was transferred to the newly constituted Mechanical Transport Branch, luider the Director of SuppUes and Transport. This Branch was entrusted with everything connected with mechanical transport, except tliat supphos of petrol were obtained through another branch, and lubricating oil and giease tlu-ough tho Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores. THE TIMES HIS20RY OF THE WAR. 285 Brigadier-General A. R. Crofton Atkins* suc- ceeded Major-General S. S. Long* as Director of Supplies and Transport in March, 1910, and the Assistant Director at the head of the Mechanical Transport Branch was Lieut. - Colonel H. X. Foster, who had been associated with the subsidy scheme since its inception. When war was declared the subsidized vehicles and their drivers were mobilized first, and then, since theii" numbers were insufficient to meet the needs of the Expeditionary Force, the balance was obtained by the impressment of the vehicles that had been previously listed and of as many more as were required. Thus it was that in the early days at the front the familiar red omnibuses of the London streets- were to be seen mingled with the brightly painted vans of well-known commercial firms and the motor chars-a-bancs which had formerly ministered to the pleasure of trippers at favourite seaside resorts, though later the brilliant colours gave place to khaki or dull battleship grey, at once more serviceable and less conspicuous. Drivers were obtained by asking the civilians in charge of the impressed vehicles as they arrived at the port of embarca- tion to enlist and accompany the units overseas, and officers, especially those of whom an expert knowledge of motor machinery was required, • Portraits of thf-se officers appeared in Vol. iv, p. 290. LIEUT.-COLONEL H. N. FOSTER, Assistant Director of the Mechanical Transport Branch. by granting commissions to civilian motor- engineers. But while the immediate reqtiirements of the Expeditionary Force were thus satisfied, it was necessary to look forward to the future, when there would be immensely larger forces in the field, and to arrange not only for obtaining HHI.f;iAN AKMOJJKHI) CAU M r I lU) Willi SF.AKCIII.KJH 1. 126—2 •i8U Till': TiMKs iusroitv of mi': n.i/.'. I U' a lit I 1) (ir Kecorch. A CATERFILLAK TKACTOK MOVlN(; HEAVY (JUNS. g.eatly mcreased numbers of vehicles, but also for receiving them, dispatching them, supplying them with tools, spare parts and accessories, aiiaintaining them in running condition, and carrying out repairs. The first step was to requisi- tion the whole output of such British makers as were considered able to produce suitable machines, and here it must be remembered that a niunber of these were already turning out subsidy models, while others were making a near approach to so doing. Of course, it was necessary to permit some deviation from the standard patterns, but aided by this relaxation the factories responded well, and theii* efforts resulted in a very substantial weekly outpxit, which grew larger as time went on. But although, owing to her greater development of the use of motor traction for commercial purposes, Great Britain was probably in- a better position for production, at least as far as heavy vehicles were concerned, than any other belligerent, the demand was still ahead of the supply, and it was necessary to place orders in America. This, thovijjh unavoidable, was regrettable, if only for the reason that each new make introduced meant an increase in the complexity of the organization for the supply of spare parts. The task of those responsible for mechanical transport in the Amiy would have been enormously simplified had it been possible to have one standard model for every class of motor vehicle, to which every vehicle in each class should confoiin absolutely in every particular. The output in Great Britain was facilitated and accelerated by the efforts of the staffs of inspectors stationed in the different districts in which th^ vehicles were manufactured. In addition to their duty of inspecting the machines in course of production and on completion, these officers helped the makers to obtain new materials and component parts, the absence of which was delaying the progress of the work. If, for exarhple, a fiLnn in district A gave notice that it was not getting delivery of material promised by a contractor in district B, the inspector attached to the latter district was informed, and at once took action with the object of ascertaining and removing the cause of delay. Possibly he found that the contrac- tor could guaiantee delivery by a certain date ; in that case the manufacturer was so informed, and in the light of this definite knowledge was often able to arrange his work in such a way as to prevent his men from standing idle or not working to tlioir full capacity. Infonnation was also obtained which enabled labour to bo distributed to the best advantage, a sui'plus at one factory being used to make up a deficiency at another. For the first year of the war the main depot for the reception of the vehicles as they cmne THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 287 from the makers was iii South London, but as the accommodation there soon proved in- sufficient, a tract of land wliich in pro- war days liad served for the display of animal transport in the shape of racehorses was secured for the purpose of mechanical transport in the western outskirts of the city. A great deal of work had to be done imder rather difficult conditions to fit it for its new uses. The wet grass land was so slippery that the hea\'y vehicles could not grijj it with their wheels, and in the rainy weather which prevailed the area became a muddy morass out of which they had to be hauled by teams of " foiu"- wheels di'ive " tractors or by caterpillars. One of the fii-st tasks of the Army Service Corps on taking possession of the ground in October, 1915, was to provide reasonably firm areas for parking purposes, and with the aid of ashes procured locally the lorries and men of the Corps quickly obtained a satisfactory result. A considerable mileage of roads of access hail also to be made. The various buildings of the racecourse were all turned to good accovmt in providing for the accommodation of the .small army of men who had to make their temporary home there. The Royal luncheon room formed an admirable officers' mess ; one of the public refreshment rooms served as a flining hall in which all the men at the depot could be served with meals in the space of an hour, the cooking being done on gas stoves ; the stables, supplemontiKl with huts, provided sleeping acconunodation ; one of the public stands was converted into a store for accessories The covered ways leading from the railway station were found to be of just the right width to shelter scores of vehicles, and, in addition, the officer commanding, Major T. R. P. Warren, with the assistance of the Royal Engineers, erected with unskilled labour alone long lengths of sheds with corrugated iron roofiiig, supported by steel columns embedded in concrete. A stable was transformed into a workshop for carrying out the running repairs on the motor lorries required for what may be called domestic purposes, and the electric power for driving the tools in it was obtained by coupling to a dynamo the engine formerly employed ' for pumping water upon the course. For the amusement and recreation of the men in their leisure hotu's there were reading and billiard rooms, as well as facilities for cricket, football, lawn tennis and boating, and a very creditable illustrated magazine dealing with the corporate life of the place was published monthly. Apart from caterpillars and "tanks," all the motor vehicles of whatever class used by the British Forces passed through this depot, and on occasion it contained as many as 3,000 A MKITISH AHMOIJKHD CAK. •288 rnt: timi:s Hisioitv or hie wak. veliii-luri. l)u ari'ivitl truia tlio niukoiH new vetuclnH wero rugititui'ttii, ami llitir purticulaiw afterwarclH uuturuil in a runt iiulttx uitti u aeparate t-arcl lor eath ; tlioso eurdtt, Ijeiuy written up fruiu time tu tiiau, unubluil tho whole history of any particular vohitltt to ho aMcertaiued iiiuuotliately ilowu to the time when it was tteiit orx active Borvico. The Hurne pi'oceclure was followed in regard to the re-issue of old vehicles which hail been damaged in France or elsewhere, and returned to England for ropaii-. The products of British makers American \ehicles were parked in a separate area by theniselves, and there one could pass along an avenue exactly a mile long with ranks t)f lorries and chassis on either side. The supply and training of tlu» | orsonnel was another important problem that had to be solved. In the earlier days men whoso z(!al outran their attauimimts occasionally found their way into the ranks of the drivers, with results that were bad for lamp-posts and even buildings ; but tho employment of incompetent men came to an end when a large depot was A BRITISH NAVAL ARMOURED GAR IN BELGIUM. reached the depot complete with bodies, but those from America were in the form of bare chassis, and thus entailed an extra amount of work, since they had to be sent away to coach- builders to receive theu" bodies, and then checked in again. It was the function of the depot to equip the vehicles, according to fixed schedules, with tarpaulins, lamps and other accessories, ready for the road, and at any time there might be seen in different parts of tho ground rows of lorries, 15 cwt. vans, touring c rs, and ambulances standing in a condition to be dispatched at a minute's notice, with their petrol and oil tanks full and even their radiators chirged with an anti-freezing liquid. The established in the south-east of^^London with ample facilities for the technical and military instruction of both officers and men, and when the passing of strict tests was insisted upon as an essential preliminary to active ser- vice. The question of military training for mechanical transport dri\ ers and mechanics was at one time rather a \exed one, and it was argued that such men need not bo trained as soldiers, or even armed. It was decided, however, that at least the rudiments of military training and discipline were a neces- sity, and these were imparted at this depct The technical instruction given there was not designed for utter no\ ices, but. on tho THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 289 other hand, the Mechanical Transport Pection had to take many rec iiits who were innocent of the most elementary knowledge of inotor vehicles. For the benefit of these a subsidiary depot or school was established in the west of London, and there they were taught driving, largely by a staff provided by the London General Omnibus Company. As many as 1,500 or 2,000 men were under instruction there srmviltaneously. When motor vehicles had to be despatched from England, whether as part of the original matter as it may look at first sight. They started at definite distances apart, and then- speed was supposed to be strictly limited. But the leaders, with a clear road, were apt to push on rather too quickly, and then a sHght mishap to, say, the twentieth, might delay those behind it for a few minutes. When the journey was resumed, it only required turn- ing to the left-hand instead of the right at a fork in the road to tlirow the whole fonnation into confusion, and by the time an excited motor^ bicyclist sent back from the head of A TRAVELMNC; KKPAIK-SHOF. transport equiinuont of a fighting unit, or as "spares" to replace casualtieH, the necessary men wore drawn from the t"aining depot awl Hent to the reception depot where they joined their lorries or cars or ambulannoH, as the cafw^ might be. They then <irove to the main rriobili/.Jitiort depot, wlmnee after anotlier inHpection to Mtn tliat the equipment of tlie vehieleH was corrij>lete in every detail, they [ aKHed on to the port of ernbareation an the ofTicer eornrnandirig tlie ineehariical tranHf)ort depot there gave notice that ho had HliijjK uvailable to take them to thoir destinatioriH ovorHoaK. The convoying of a large batch of heavy )f»rri*"H - Hay, 100 in not ho eaHy_a th(! (-ohimn had retrieved those that had gone astray, there might easily l)e a gaj) of 10 miles between the two sections. But the task of obtaining complete vehicles and forwarding them to the points where they were required was simple in comparison with tliat of maiixtaining them in running order and (iroviding for their repair in the inevitable cast* of injury or serious breakdown. The individual parts composing u motor vehicle are to bo fiumbenid by the thousand — in one car used tfiere were about 5,000 — and the moro quantity required in view of the tens of thousiuids of vehicles emjjioyed by oin- forces on the various fronts would have formed an imposing •290 Till': TIMHS HlSTOltY ol' IIIK W'AlL totul, tn t^ii if all the curu liuil been of the hhiiu) type, turiitnl out by the muiuh factory. Hut so fur from thin being the cane, there were inuiiy :-laHtfert of vehicle lierving tbrtureiit |)iir|)08en, anil of each cUhh there were many different varieties and models prodiictid by many different factorieri. Now, though tliere are many fittings tliat are common to practically all cars, and some of the parts may I e interchangeable between all the models maile by one factory, the probability that a particular piece of, say, the engine of one maker's car can be 8ubRtitiiti>d m the e\ ent of faulty or inailt*(juatc (htscription ; and constant watchfulness was needed to stn* that the stock of any particular jjiece did not run out- even to the extent of ic(juiring a maker whose vt>hi(des went no longer acc(*i)ted to continue tlu^ manufacture of spare |)arts U> meet the n<(|uircments of those ho had prtuiously sup|)lied. The organization for the supply of accoHsori«<K luid spare parts had its lutadquarters in London, and occupied four large stores, in addition to offices for the extensive clerical staff r(((iiir((d FRENCH VICTUALLING CONVOY. for a piece bearing the same name and perform- ing the same function in another maker's engine is somewhat remote, and certainly cannot be accepted without careful enquiry in any system aiming at certainty of results. Hence dupli- cate parts had to be provided, not only iii quantities coirimensurate with the nimiber of cars in service, but also in variety corresponding to the multiplicity of their types, sizes, and makers. Even this was not the end of the problem. The various accessories and parts had to be so stored that each of them could be f oiuid easily and surely ; precautions had to be taken to ensure that tlie part asked for was actually supplied and to establish its identity to deal with the issue of material and the placing of orders with manufacturers ; the latter function was at first carried out directly, but later through the intennediary of the ^Ministry of Munitions. Three of these stores were tlevoted to accessories and spare parts, and the fourth to tires. EveryAvhere there was orderly and methodical arrangement. In the spare parts store, for example, the pieces, varying from a small pin or screw up to a con\- plete engine imit, were grouped imdcr the names of the makers of the veliides, and placed, w ith the exception of the hca\it«st and largest, in stacks of bins, all niunbered and labelltMl. The bins were made of wood, with steel supports. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 291 and the partitions were removable, so that the size of each box could be varied to suit the article it had to contain. The construction was as cheap as possible, but at the same time perfectly serviceable. Inwards goods were unloaded at the ground level and distributed to the different floors by a lift, and when they had to be sent away the process was reversed, the loading bank to which they were brought being on the opposite side of the building. The con- tents of the cases in which the parts arrived were carefully compared with the lists enclosed with them, and the need for this precaution is e\'ident from the fact that there were discrepan- oies in about 40 per cent, of those coming from one source which need not be particularized. The staff had access by one entrance only to the different floors on which stores were kept, and this was guarded by a storekeeper who could thus turn a watchful eye on their comings and goings and detect any unauthorized removal of material. A card index enabled the state of the stock of any part to be ascertained in a moment. There was a card for every part, and these cards, arranged under the names of the makers of the cars, showed the dates and nimi- bers of the parts received and similarly the dates and numbers of the withdrawals, the difference representing the number in hand. Another entry showed the number on order and the date when the order was placed. Large, however, as were the numbers of articles to be seen in the stores — sparking plugs alone, for example, might run into the hundred thousand^they did not represent the full total dealt with. The Home Depot was not, jjhysi- cally, a clearing house through which passed all the motor accessories arul parts required by the Hritinh forces at home and abroad. 'l\i<- authorities in cliarge of it had no desire to add to the congestion of the railways or encumber the roa^ls — and incidentally bring themselves into disreput*j owing to delays in delivery— by inHisting that articles inwle, say, in Hinniiigham and required in South Wales should travel hy way of London ; arid a<;corflingly rnucrh material was H*5nt fiirect from the jjroducers to the usen* or to the port of shipment, the Home Depot directing its movements withrfut ever actually tiandlingit. Many n-quisit<?H for American lorries, for exam{>l<-, wen- Htor«-d at the port at whi(^h they were landerl and distributed thfjnce straight U) the pla^jes where they were required. There wan anoth'^r method by wliich the uniount oi juaU^rinl ar;tiially han(ll<<l in London was reduced, or by which at least space was freed for dealing with articles which it was necessary to store in London. Gradually the system prac- tised, for instance, by the Post Office, of "Stores at Maker's" was introduced, according to which the stocks of spare parts, though the property of the Government, were actually kejit by the manufacturers. The Home Depot was always informed of the amount and character of the material thus held, and could draw on it at will or direct it to be sent where required. To begin with, the store in London held spare parts for aU the vehicles in use, both British and American, but by adopting the " Stores at ^Maker's " system for the British parts it found room to meet the increased requirements in respect of American parts, the stock of which was, of course, more difficult to maintain pro- perly, owing to the uncertainty of the ocean crossing. If the stores of accessories and parts were striking on account of the complexity of their contents, the tire store was impressive rather by reason of its magnitude, for one tire looks pretty much like another, and thus the eleinent of variety was somewhat lacking. Placed entirely imderground, it covered an area. of 2i acres, and was divided into blocks like an American city by means of nmnbered avenues and cross streets. It was beautifully clean and brilliantly lighted by electricity — in both of wliicli particulars its condition was differeiit from what it was when, before it was taken over, it was used as a beer store. It contained every sort and size of tire used by the Britith Army — solids piled horizontally, pneumatics standing vertically, and outer covers hanging on racks. T)ie blocks afforded an easy means of locating gcognipliically the stocks of each make and size, and their contents were all carefully numbered and described. Railway sidings on the surface along each side enabled the tires to be readily delivered and despatched. Each of them, not mer«!ly one out of a batch, wa< individually teitfid on reception to see that it was not deffictive in any way, and any chance of d«!t(;rioration through long storage was avoided by a system \vh(*r<l»y the (ires in stock wore sent away in regular rotation according to age. Tir»)H wear qui«;kly (enough even on good roads, hut witli motor vehicles moving under tlio rough conditions of war iti [)lac<!S where the roads had Ijoon cut t(j pieces, or p(trha[m did not exist, the wastage was enormous, and, actiordingly, it is not surprising that the turno\'<'i- at (his 77//-; 'ii.\n:s iiisTnin of 'inh: wail «lH|)i^t wuH HDiiiHtiiiu'rt to \>f iMt'HSiirfil ill scorns i>t' wti^oii Umds (luily. Aa regHriU tha inaiiittMiaiiisH and rt-paii- of vehiclt^H, t^ach Coiututiiul at lutiuH urgaiiizi-d itH own garages and I't^paii'HliopH insiicli miiiiiIicis and positions as could di-al most eonveni<<ntly with the vehicles whicli it employed. These repiiir Hhoi)s were usually hired, not purchaseil ttutriglit, so that the State might have the less left on its hands at the end uf the war ; and they were supervised by one or more District Inspect(us of Mechanical Traction for eatih Imtch <tf vehidtm was sent overseas, a supply of spare parts was also sent for them, ac(!ording lo a fixed schedule, in proportion to thoir iniiiil)ii. To l)t')^Mii wilh, this sch(>dule was calculated on n 10 per cent, basis tlml is, ID comiilete engines for every 100 vehicles, but, subse<|uently, a 3 per cent, basis was found to be sudicient. Tools special to meclianical transport were also obtained through the Home Depot, but those of a gtMieral character wore supplied, like ordinary stores such as clothing, through tim Army Ordnance Department. ii-reiich Official photograph. A TIRE AND ACCESSORIES STORE IN FRANCE. Coniinand, who in turn were supervised by a Travelling Inspector. Abroad there were depots of two classes — advanced and base — for maintenance and the supply of parts, not heavy repairs. The former were of the nature of retail shops which kept a small stock of parts ; they received indents from the units in the field, to wliich they issued material direct, relying for the replenislunent oi theii- supplies on the base depots. These were big receptacles for stores and accessories, and were replicas on a smaller scale of the stores at the Home Depot in London, to which they sent their demands direct To a certain extent they were supplied automatically, for when a For the smaller repairs, motor workshops, fitted with a lathe and other tools, were atached to each imit, or if the unit was too small to possess such a workshop of its own, arrange- ments were made by wliich it could requisition one to attend to it on the spot. If the damage was greater than could be I'emedied in this way, and the victim was unable to move of itself, it was towed by a salvage unit to a railway station, and taken to one of the largo base repair shops, wliich were fully equipped with macliinery for heavy repairs. These obtttined their material from the base store depots, and could deal with several hundred vehicles at a time. If they were too fully occupied, or other THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR 293 reasons rendered it desirable, the daimaged \'ehicles were sent back to England, although this course involved the objection of double trans- port across^the sea. In England there were two large repair shops for such cases, and sometimes also the dereUcts were returned to the factories of their makers ; whether this was done or not depended partly on the amount of work in hand at the Government shops, and partly also on the price asked for the job by the private firms, for a careftil watch on the costs of repairs enabled the advantage or disadvantage of any offer to be pretty accurately gauged. Large numbers of motor vehicles of all sorts, as weU as of motor bicycles, were repaired in England and sent back as good as new for a fur- ther spell of service at the front, though those which upon inspection were not found up to the mark were retained for use at home. In what has been said so far, the functions and organization of the Mechanical Transport Branch of the ^^'ar Office have been described mainly as regards the provision of means for moWng troops and conveying their supplies of food and ammunition. But as the general purveyor of motor vehicles to the fighting forces it was interested in their supply for two purposes which deserve special mention — the succour of the wounded and the active attack of the enemy — or, in other words, motor ambulances and anned motor cars. The inotor ambulance may fairly be called a product of the Great War, for though it had been a familiar object in the streets of London for some time previously, the great part .it would play on the battlefield was apparently not foreseen. But the inabihty of the old horse ambulance to deal quicldy with the huge numbers of casualities produced by the intensity of modern warfare soon became obvious. The first tentative steps towards the change were KI'.l'AfK-SIIOl' OJ" AN AUSTKAIJAN UNIT, {'^xlerior and Interior. 125—3 294 THE TIMKS HISTOUY OF Till': WAR. MR. E. M. CLARKE, Director, Motor Ambulance Department, British Red Cross. taken about five weeks after the declaration of war, when a few members of the Royal Automobile Club put themselves and theii* cars at the disposal of the British Red Cross Society, and were permitted to go to France and help in the task of searching for the wounded and missing ; and soon the nucleus of the first motor ambulance convoy was collected at Paris, by the same Society. At the beginning of October, 1914, The Times opened its appeal for finids to enable the Society to provide such ambulances in greater numbers. The result was amazing. Withui a week money had been received sufficient to pay for 143 ambulance cars, costing £400 each, in a fortnight for 372, and in three weeks for 512 — and this although the first modest estimate was that 200 would " suffice to meet immediate needs." By the end of January, 1915, the Red Cross had sent 446 motor ambvilances to various centres abroad, and a number moi-e had been despatched by the Order of St. Jolm, which had joined forces with it in October. Toward^. the end of 1915 there were some 650 Red Cross ambulances in France alone, and a year later tlie number there exceeded 1,300. There were also others in other portions of the battle area, notably in Italy, MeHopotuiiiia, whum in<l<nHl thoy wero tlu» only motor ainl)iihin(;<'s (Muployod, and in Knnt Africa. Nor was this all tliat voluntary t'rtort accomplished. Each convoy sent abroad not only contained, in accordance with War Oflico n'gulations, 50 motor ambulances proper, hut was also accompanied by a complement of motor store lorries, motor repair shops,, ordinary "touring" cars for the staff, and motor cycles for dispatch riders. Many motor ambulances wi»re also distributed for use at lioine, and in connoxioii with these thei'o were cars for doctors and nurses, for consultants, lan-rying from case to case, and for the officers ill charge of hospitals, not to mention lorries for the conveyance of stores and medical com- forts. Thus it was that at the end of 1916 the total number of cars of all kinds supplied by the Red Cross for the service of the wounded and sick approached 2,500. But it must be remembered that the Rod Cross, in this as in other respects, only sought to be an auxiliary to the Army organization, and that the War Office provided great numbers of ambulance* and other motor vehicles for the use of the Royal Army Medical Corps. Though the bodies constructed for the first few motor ambulances were not a success, the principles of a satisfactory design were quickly established. The War Office standard specifi- cation provided for the accomodation of four l^atients on stretchers placed two on each side of a central gangway, so that a nurse or orderly could sit inside. In an older type there was. no gangway, and therefore the width of the veliicle was less — an advantage in passing through narrow or crowded thoroughfares. The canvas awning in tliis type could be rolled up at the sides, but in the newer pattern was fixed. On the other hand, in the latter an ingenious- contrivance permitted the frames carrying the stretchers, when these were not required, to be folded away so as to provide eight seats for patients. ]\Iany of the cars were fitted with a device which enabled the intei'iors to be com- fortably warmed by njeans of the exhaust. In some cases special modifications were introduced to meet special conditions. Thus the Red Cross cars for East Africa were fitted with an electric fan and movable louvres or shutters to- give as much ventilation as possible, and others, made for the Admiralty were arranged to take cots instead of stretchers, the latter not being used by the Nav5\ The piu'poses to which the motor ambulances- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 295 ■■ ■^^^^^M ^^^■i^^^^^^" "'^ A CONVOY OF MOTOR AMBULANCES Waiting for inspection by the King. were put may be divided into two main classes. In the first place they passed the wounded collected by the field ambulances on to the casualty clearing stations, and on occasion they advanced still nearer the front into the firing zone, extending themselves into the area of the field ambulances. In the second place they were employed to take the wounded from the ambulance trains which had brought them down to the coast from the casualty clearing stations and convey them to the base hospitals, and again from the latter to the hospital ships. The Red Cross in 1916 had five full c^^mvoys on the front lines, and these, like the one in Mesopotamia, were staffed by Army Service Corps drivers. The Army found petrol and lubricating oil, and carried out the running repairs ; Vjut the Red Cross maintained the convoys at full strength, and had to effect the heavy repairs for itself. The convoys at various bases in France, where the Red Cross undertook, at the request of the Army, th«" duty of keeping a sufficient supply of ambu- lancjs and men U) cop*j with the fullfrst demands that tho available number of hosjdtal ijeds could make, were staffed, run, and repaired '•ntirely Vjy its own men. At one baw! alono a double convoy was kejjt always in refuliness in the great garage on the (JIuai, the ambulances l><!ing divided into five ■wjctions, each under a section leader. On the arrival of a boHpital train at the station the P^mbarcation .VIridical Officer t«5lep}ioned i<> the garage for the numU;r of cars requin-d , tlifwe were on th<-ir way in a minut<i df two, and ^^o^e the first stretchers liad been taken from the train would be lined up in the station yard on the other side of the harbour. As soon as a car was loaded the driver was told which hospital was his destination, and went off at a slow pace to reduce jolting, returning again and again till the work was finLshed. The later Red Cross ambulance cars were fitted with a gear-ratio that enabled them to be throttled MOTOK AMBULANCE FOR NAVAL USE, Fitted fi)r cotK instead of stretchers. down If) run slowly on top gear, thus saving tlie occupants the discomfort of the grinding of the gears ; their chassis being obtained from one Am«>rican maker, the homogeneity of the con- voys could be readily fircworved, iiiid mainten- ance urid r<'i)HirH were Hiniplified. Owing to th<> need for carrying uuL its own rej)uirH, tiie li<-d (Jross liad several worltshops of its own. 'I'he largest Wfis at a ccirtain port ia •jyti THt: 'ii.Mt:s nisroh'Y of rui': ivah. MOTOR AMBULANCES FOK EAST AFRICA With ventilated roofs and sides. Fmiicti alongsidti the garage, and incliuled three buildings, with an area of abrmt 2,400 square yards. Two of these were used as rejjair shop-i, while the third was fully equipped with machine tools. Such operations as cutting and hardening gear wheels and boring cylinders were regularly carried oiit, with results as good as could be obtained in large works at home. There was a blacksmith's shop, with smith's forges, brazing furnaces and case-hardening furnaces, and also a tinsmith's shop, with tools for the manufacture and repair of radiators, panels, mud-guards, and similar parts. Some 90 men were employed, and the nmnber of cars under repair at one time was about 50. On the average, about five thoroughly overhauled cars loft the works daily, with about seven that liad required minor repaiis. In regard to the \mrt played by motor vehicles in connexion with direct attack on the enemy, reference may first be made to the motor tractors employed for hauling heavy guns into position. For this purpose two types of machine were used by the British Anny, one the F.W.D. (four-wheels drive), and the other the caterpillar. In the former, as its name indicates, not only the rear axle, as in an ordi- SCOTTISH WOMEN'S X-RAY CAR. THE TIMES HISTOnV OF THE WAR. 297 nary car, but also the front axle was connected to the engine by a propeller shaft ; in this way, all the wheels being driven, the whole weight of the machine was utilized for adhesion and the tractive power was increased, so that heavier loads could be coped with. The caterpillar ran on a track which it laid for itself as it proceeded. The general principle of its construction was that there were two endless chains or bands, one on each side, passing over sprocket wheels at the front and rear of the machine. The links of which these chains were composed carried on the touring cars for offensive purposes was to fit them with machine guns, and it was not difficult to protect their vital parts with thin stool plates without detracting seriously from tho speed and mobility which perhaps formed their best safe- guard. In the early days of the war the Germans employed many cars lightly armoured in this way for scouting purposes, tho only armament, however, being the rifles of the occupants. Later these improvised arrange- ments gave place to completely armoured cars of various kinds, in which the occupants were well iffl KHn CROSS KHP At a base ontfr Hiirf>t*;eH pwls or feet whif;h rf»Htfv| on tho ground. The Hprocket whfiOJH hh thuy wfiro rotate*! by the engine iMillcd the chainH round, anrl while the ffjet in the centre were hr^ld firmly U> the ground \>y the weight of the traetrtr, thoHO at the l<a/;k nme off it one hy f)ric iind rorre- »[>onfling oneH worn laid flown ni)on it ut the front. Th«5 whole wfight wnn avnilahlr) ff)r a/lheHion, anrl na it wan fiiHtrihnted over u largo HrnH, th»> rn<u;hine could travel over wjft ground irnpaMM'ihle by vehicloH with r>rdiruiry wheolH hriwever wide their tiroH. An f>bvioiiM method of ntili/Jng ordinary AIR WORKSHOP in France. protected from bullets, and the machine guns w«!re carried in a cupola or turret. Anti- aircraft guns were Hiiuihuly mounted on annoured chaHsiH of Huflfioient powor to give high Hpced, and with a supply of anunuiii- tion arrangofl in lof^kerH. Heavier guns were occaHionally iiiHtnlJcd in wagrjus of tlio lorry tyf)e with Holid tirtjs, a coiiHidernhlo thicknoHS of arnir>ui' |)rotfH;tion boing provi(le<l. Ah an exani|)l(i of tho havoc that inight btt wrought l>y an iirinouri;d far vvil/h machine guiiH, )in in('id<!iil< in llm (Ii^rrniui iriviiHion of VVallaeliid umy Ixi ((uotcd. According 398 Tilt: TIMES lllSTOliY OF Till'! \\'Al{. \^,^. 1 CATERPILLAR TRACTOR. [Official photograph. to a Gennan report, one Gennan car, after surmounting the Szurduk Pass, advanced to \'aleni, and, catcliing a Rumanian battalion vinawares, mowed it down in less than a minute at a range of 100 yards with three machine guns, kUling 300 and wounding 150. It then attacked the fortifications which were being constructed east and north of Valeni, and, taAing the enemy under a flanking fixe, forced him to retreat. But such armed motor cars did not always have it all their own way. Some- times their end was sharp and sudden. The armoured cars of the kinds referred to were, however, at the best suitable only for skirmishing or outpost action, and, no doubt, the possibiUty of constructing more formidable instruments of war, able to " lie in the line," or even go out beyond the front, occurred to more than one mind. The realization of this idea was seen in the Battle of the Somme on September 15, 1916, when Sir Douglas Haig reported the use, for the first time, in a success- ful attack on a front of six miles extending from Bouleaux Wood to the Albert-Bapaume road, of a " new type of heavy armoured car which has proved of considerable utUity." These new weapons were known officially as " tanks," the name having its origin in the fact that the department which was concerned in building them called itself the " Tanks Department " in order to draw a veil of secrecy over its proceedings. According to an official explanation given in the House of Commons, the idea of such machines was suggested to officers of the Royal Naval Air Service by their experience of the naval armoured cars in Flanders in the early days of the war, and after various experhnents by them, Mr. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, the Director of Naval Construction, was instructed to under- take the design of a " land-ship " capable of carrying out certain definite performances. The officers at the Admiralty primarily concerned were Commodore Sueter, Wing-Commander W. Briggs, and Squadron -Commander T. G. Heatherington, and while the principal credit for the design rested with Mr. d'Eyncourt, the latter acknowledged the valuable assistanoo rendered by Mr. W. O. Tritton, of Mossre. \N'. Foster & Co., Colonel E. D. Swmton, R.E.. Major D. G. Wilson, Mr. P. Dale Bussoll. of the Contract Department of the Ailn\irjvUy. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 299 Lieutenant-Colonel Stern, Captain Symes, and Mr. F. Skeens. Construction was begun at the end of the summer of 1915. Major H. Knothe, A.S.C., was responsible for the repairs of these machines. The details of the " tanks " were closely guarded, but in time some information was allowed to be published concerning them, and, finally, illustrations, from which it was obvious that they were constructed on the principles of the caterpillar tractor, made their appearance. The special correspondents at the Front exhausted their vocabularies in efforts to find descriptive names and epithets for them. Thev were monsters, mammoths. i'iiiir Leviathans, hybrids between Behemoth and the Chimaera, toad -salamanders, echidna-dragons, mastodons, pachyderms. They were the Terror that walked by noonday, as incredible as a nightmare or one of Jules Verne's most fantastic imaginations — huge shapeless bu ks like vast antediluvian brutes which Nature had made and forgotten. Bigger than an ordinary motor-car, but smaller than a labourer's cottage, they resenibled in general contour a toad rather elongated towards its hinder end. They waddled and they ambled, and, limbless and wheel-less, they went with a movement as smooth as that of a snake, but majestic and deliberate as a giant tortoise — a mixture of pantomime and j3ure horror. Their armament was of the machine-gun type, their guns being able to fire in all directions, and against their armour-clad sides, painted in venomous repti- lian colouis to render them invisible, bullets merely struck sparks. In woods they trampled their way through the undergrowth, and climbed over or broke do\^Ti barricades, contemptuous of machine guns and rifle fire ; neither the brick walls of an ordinary house nor a tree of moderate size was much of an obstacle ; and lesser obstructions were merely pleasing incidents in the journey, which they climbed over, as a MACHINK (iUNS MOUN IHI) ON LIGHI iMOTOK VliHICI.HS. 3U0 THE Tl^dES HlSTOliY OF Till'! WAIi. B a o J3 < a. w C o CQ u Q ' H o u o OS OS o B u 3 o - j: U5 *- , «> O ^ (S z « ^ 'I < 2 <; -s « >: W CI THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 801 FRENCH ANTI-AIKCKAH MOTOK-GUN. slug cliinbH over a pebble, or squaHhofl by thoir weight arifl pa88e<l on. Thoy crawled labori- ouHly but ceawjlewBly over trench, barbed wire, anrl Hhell crater, and sometimes they would seat tliernwjlvfjH complacently awtrido of an enemy trench, and HWfrop it in bf»th clirections, and all the ground beyond, with their machine guns. Like a ship, ea«^;h bore a name — Deljihine anrl iMphne, r,'ordon Rouge and ('rcrne do Menthe — and the men call«»<l them \V'illi(<K, lUiinoH, ('roc<xlile«. Humming- binlH, and rather Ichs f|«f;orouH namcH. KntruHt«yl with tfie purchaMe, at firHt direrf, from the manufmrturerM but aftervvards thrr>ugh the Ministry of MunitionH, f)f huge numbers of rnotf»r vfihides of rfiariy diffrtrerit cIuhhch iind fcyp«"H for the Army and Navy, and charged with the duties of maintaining them in ruiiiiing order and supplying them with spare parts (which had sometimes to bo brought from ono continent overseas and sent to another), the Mf!chanical Transport Branch would have been more than human had it never made a mistake. i3ut th(» observer who was pennitted to see something of the internal arrangements of its dept'ts and stores received tlie impnwsion <>f a carefully thought-out organization imbued (iverywhere witli a spirit of keenness and hard work. The of1ic<^rs, many of tliem engineers and accountants in civil life, certainly did their best to df>s«!rve success, and their systems of working and methods of control werc! worthy ot llic best-managi^d (■oiniri<'r-ci)i-l (ir'ms. The following uns«)licited t«-stimonial re((i\ed -3(C2 77//-; TIMtJS HISTORY OF THE WAR. ■by the ttuthoritit^ri from a, private in the M.T.t A.S.C., may bo of interest in tliis -ooonexion : An n lairly lar^jti tiiiipluyt^r of labour I often won(lere<l, bti(ort) voliuitnoriiig juy jservicrii ami joining }li.s Mijtwly's ForctJd a^ a Toiniay, wh«ther thti Anny niethotLi w«ire ad up-tu-iiate and et)u-it>iit ais the average coinini-iruial finu. and I am afraid that I had what i& probuhly the prevttihiig opinion that the comparison would not hn favourable to the Anny. However, after going througfi the evolutioiw necesbary to be placed in the por>itiun for which a man is meet fitted, I can assure the taxpayer that I have been astonished at the extruordinury efficient method they have in the M.T. of placing the right man in the right place. Of course, the first few days are trying to the raw recruit, coming from com- fortable homeo and feather beds, but in u few days they get settled down, and make tlie best of it with that good ■ camuraJerie and wonderful spirit that our nation possess such a superabundance of. But it is the question of organization that will appeal to the business man, and when I see, a^ I do daily, tiie large numbers joining uj) as drivers of light cars, heavy lorries, and steam wagons, mechanics, turners, fitters, electricians, coppersmitlLs, blaclcsmiths, body builders, and numbers of other tradesmen, all sorted out for their various tests on tho ■day of their anival, clothed, fed, billeted, I marvel that more is not allowed to be written so that every resident in this country may realize what is being done for the nation's future welfare, and an abundance of skilled labour assured, for the tests are most exacting. An expert at his particular trade is over ouch Department, and as the men pass through liis hands he gives them certain work to do, they are then graded on their merits ; if a man is genuine and passes his test, he is transforrt d to his unit aa fit and prepared for work in his particular branch or section. Hut this is what will [ilettse tho business man of the country most : n emits who are not quite efficient, but show promise of being good work- men, pass before tho M , who questions tluni once more an to their experience and ability ; they are then pliu-ed on instruction for a sliort time, under the most bkilliHl craftsnien, and are thus brought up to that pilch of excellence so necessary to bring about a succesi-ful lennination of this war, besides giving us after the war an abundance of the most skilled men it is possible to obtain, uiul the inilastries of this country will benefit ai-cordingly. No basiness man need fear giving a jjost to any man that haw passed through liis Aimy lestp, for this is tlie hall-mark of « flicioncy, und although I iiavo been in the trade for iniiny yc-ars, and have long experience, both practical and theoretical, 1 can truly say the experience of passing through has been most instructive and valuable, for there are always new methods being brought forward, and iindouble<lly tho M.T. has the very latest. I am sure that if only tho taxpayer could see and realize the wonderful organiza- tion that deals with sudi large mimJx'rs in such an ortlerly and scientific method, placing each man where he will be of the most use to the nation, t.hey would bo more than satisfied that their money is being well spent, and instead of a sigh of regret at parting, they would have a smilo of grim satisfaction, knowing that it is helping to make tho bite of tlio British bulldog deeper and harder than this world has ever realized. The wi'iter, who before ho enlisted in the Army was the principal of a firm of engineers, evidently came prepared to curse but remained to praise. ?anailia'i U ar Records. A "TANK" IN ACTION. CHAPTER CLXI. PRIZE OF WAR. History of the Prize Courts — Foreign Practice — ^The Constitution of British Courts — The Prize Law — Some Famous Cases — Prize Money and Prize Bounty — Cases in the Dominion Prize Courts — Condemnation of the Chile — Sir Samuel Evans's Judgments — The Case of the Kim — The Roumanian — The Ophelia. THERE is no more romantic aspect of war than the long record of captures at sea which go by the name of Prize of War. All the glamour which attaches to the toils of the earliest adventurers in the Mediterranean, to the deathless stories of the Spanish Main, to the wonderful battling of privateers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in later days of the Chesapeake and Shannon and of the Alabama, rise into the mind as the phrase " Prize of War " is spoken or written. The valour of adventirrous sea ranes, the moving accidents by flood and field, the racing by wind and water from clime to clime, signify everything in the history of Franco and Holland, England and America, Spain and Portugal. And no wliit of the adventurous spirit was dead when the Great War of 1914 broke upon Europe and the v^fjrid. It will be convenient as a footnote to the history of the (iront War to consid*c the question of the Prize Courts, their f»ractice and their significance, both as a matter of tiistorical evolution and as an element of the first importance in tlio <;arrying on of a naval war of tlio first mag- nitude and for the fiurpose of reflecting the vorisimiJitu'le of that war. In reviewing tho history anrl the current practi<;(i of tlifjse Courts it irt necessary to ke,ej> in mind the fact that the I'riw' Court has always been the judicial ofTicer, ho to speak, of the Royal Navy, and has phu;ed upon a legal arid unirnpugnubli^ basis its action in dealing with the merchandise f)f the worl'i in time of wnr. The work of the Prize Court supplements the sea toils of ships of war. Dr. Coleman Phillipson, in his volume on International Law and the Great War, summarizes the long early stirring history of the Prize Coiirt in a few sentences : The Prize Court is an institution of long standing. Its sources may be traced back to the later centuries of the Middle Ages. In order to secure protection agaiiLst pirates merchantmen associated themselves under an elected chief, called the "Admiral," and sometimes their respective States sent out armed men to put down piracy. The piratical ships thus seized were divided among the captors according to the decision of the Admiral. In the thirteenth century an attempt was made by the European maritime Powers to police the seas. Later the expeditions of those armed vessels came to be conducted under the authority of letters of marque granted by the sovereign of a maritime country, who assumed jurisdiction over the captures effected. This jurisdiction was further regularized by the establish- ment of a board, designated the "Admiralty." In England the Court of Admiralty appeared in the middle of the fourteenth century ; the first recorded case of a jiidieial enquiry before tfio Admiral occurred apparently in 1357. In Franco the office of Admiral was created in the latter part of the fourteenth century, and in .Scotland early in the fifteenth. With the gradual development of llie law of nations it became customary for thrj Admiralty of maritime belligerents to sot up a spricial Court to investigate the legality of captures miwlo by their warships or privateers. In this country an Order in Council of 1589 required all prizes to be submitted for adjudication to tlio High Court of Adiniralty.* • It may bo noted licri> I lint the early P'lcncli praetieo is to be found in I'isloye and Duncniy's Triiiti den I'riaea Marilimea. A FrencJi Prize Court was eslab- lished at Bordeaux in September, 1914, and in March, 1915, lliis was rr!mov(^d to Paris. The Russian Prize liigulatioiiH wf!re issued on August 22, 1914, in the liulletin of Laws. The .Juiianese Prize licgulalions are Ml Vol. II. (page 410) of Kussian and Jupaii<mo I'rizo iMiMiH, but they are slightly varied by an Imperial Ordi- riaiieo (\H'A) of Hi'|)leiiil.<T 10, 1914. An lliiliiin Prize SO.'} S04 '////■.' riMHs uisnuiv or 'lui: wmi. The HtateiiitMit ^im^m u goiuMitl idou ot tho pobitioii, thiuij^h it roiilil bu largely Mupple- nieiiteit. lii Knglunil, in the fuurteerith century, there were Adniirnlw of tlie Wewt, the Bouth, ami the North; tho King'H Hhi()H were tew ; thenier- ehaiit Heet was the cliief reuerve of veHHels of war, ami thtwe fleetn as called up pasHod iindur the control of thirt or that Admiral. A perpetual Htate of aea warfare against pirates, or coast town against foreign coast town, obtained even in time of i)eace, and the carrying in of pirate prizes was common enough. But we must not confuse the I'rize Court with the Admiralty Court. In 1782 Lord Mausfiold in the case of Linda v. Rodnei/, ex])lain(»d the whole practce of jurisdiction. In that case the facts were that on February 3, 1781, Sir George Koiiney and Ceneral \'aughan seized the island of St Eustatius, with everything thereon, and the question was raised in the English Court whether the goods being taken on land, though in consofiuence of a surropder to ships at sea, excluded the British Prize jurisdiction. The question of that jurisdiction had, therefore, to be considered. Lord ^Mansfield pointed out tha,t the jurisdiction in matters of prize, though exercised by the Judge of the Court of Athniralty, was quite distinct. To constitute the authority of the Prize Judge in every war a Commission imder the Great Seal issued to the Lord High Adinii-alty (now, of course, represented by the Board of Admiralty) to will and requii-e the Coiu"t of Admiralty, and the Lieutenant and Judge of the Court, his surrogate or surrogates, and they were thereby authorized and required to proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizm-es, prizes, and reprisals, of all ships and goods that were or should be taken ; and to hear and determine " according to the course of the Admiralty and the Law of Nations." A waiTant issued to the Judge accordingly. The monition and other proceedings were in his name with all }\is titles of office, rank and degree, adding emphatically, as the authority imder which he acted, the following words : " And also to hear and determine all and all manner of causes, and complaints, as to ships and goods seized and taken as prize, specially constituted Court was established in June, 1915. By a Convention between Great Britain and France of November 9, 1914 (acceded to by Russia on Marcli 9, 1915), a mutual arrangement as to Prizes was arrived at, granting (inier alia) the right of adjudication to the country of the capturing vessel, even if under the orders of the naval authority of an ally. See The flritish Manval of Emer- gency Legislation, Supplement 3, pp. 499, 501, 575. ami uppointtid." 'I'he Court of Admiralty was called the Instant-e (/'ourt, the other Court the Prize Court. " The numner of [)roceeding," said Lord .Mansheld, " is totally dilferent. 'I'lin whole system of litigation and jurisprudence in tlie I'rize Court is |)oculiar to itself : it is no more like the Court of Admiralty than it is to any Court in Westminster Hall." Prize is n.tither a civil nor a marine (uiuse, and the appeal from the Prize Coiwt lay to Coininissioners con- sisting of the Privy Coimcil. Lord Mansfield, in the sp<»cial case before him, held that the goods captui'ed were condenuiable as prize*. The practice of landing from ships for pur[)oses of reprisals had been used by ilooke at Vigo, N'ernon at Portobello and Carthagena, Anson in the South Seas, Pocock at the Havannah. It was the practice in the case of the Elizabethan privateers to have Commissions authorizing goods to be taken by land as well as by sea. In 1745 there was sentence of condemnation to the king where "several purses of money and jewels, amounting to £30,000 and u[)wards, taken and seized as plunder in the town of Peyta, being a town in the Spanish West Indies, in the kingdom of Spain, from the enemies of the Crown of Great Britain, were rightly and duly taken by the officers and mariners of His Majesty's sWp," and many more recent cases of singular adventure confirmed the judgment. The practice indicated by Lord Mansfield obtained throughout the Napoleonic Wars and diu'ing the first half of the nineteenth century. Since the Crimean War no Prize Court had sat in England imtil September 4, 1914, when Sir Samuel Evans first sat in Prize. The question of Prize Courts and jurisdiction had, however, been dealt with earlier — in 1864, in 1891, and 1895 ; by section 4 of the Judicature Act of 1891 the High Covu-t in England was declared to be a Prize Court, and all causes and matters within the jurisdiction of the High Coui't as a Prize Court were assigned to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of that Court. On the hearing of his first case — the Chile — Sir Samuel Evans began his judgment with these words : 1 am sure we all ilt plore llio cau^-os which render it necessary for a Prize Court to sit again within these realms after the happy lapse of about 60 years, and as you, 'Mr. Attorney-General, Iiavo said, in times piust, and particularly during the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century, tho English Prize Courts pronounced judgments and gave decisions which commanilod general confiileuce, anil received the admiration of all ciJuntrios inteivstcd in the law of nations. Our predecessors luvve set splendid THE TIMES HISTOBY OE THE WAB. 305 A SITTINC; OF THH PKI/H COURl, J , .,,6 Presided over hy Sir Samuel Kvans, G.C.H. tixa,mp\i-H and MtahliHhf^l hiKli tradiHoiiH, hikI iIh- I'r y.rr C.intrt III fhf) pn^iorit 'lay, witli fji'> HMsiMtaiice of tin- Hut, will rJo jtH boit — it cannot do tnorn— to follow thixe «xaTnpl(« an<J iiphoUl xhonn iraHitiorm. fri ifio fHHO r>f ffio CorHifan I'rinf;<;, rm Fohnmry 22, 1915, Sir Saniurjl Kvann t(j)lH iis Horrif!thin(( rnoro about tho cl»irHc<<;r of tlio liritiwh J'rizc CJoiirt. TJio J'tizo (.'oiirt Kiilfw havo aJwayH bwsn frarnfxl oHpfffiially for tho Court ari'J rna/Jo by ih<; I'rivy (^'onricil in rcciini, yttnrn iiri'Icr fhr, I'ri/.o O.iiH.h Art, IS!>4, uri'l not liy llio Tlulo C'oniinittoo which frames iiic rules for (lid Hi^^li (Jourt,. HuIch wcirci issued ,on Aufrusf r>, 11)14, ftHKiniiialing tlio foim ol tlic pcocccdinj^s to (lie courHO of a civil iicliou. Hut \vh(!ii (horo aro no ruinH tho practico ol llic old UjKh Court of Aflinirnlty, or Kuch oMior prMftico an tho PrrjHidont directs, is followed. 'I'Ik? I'oworH of tho Court aro sot forth by -Mr. JuHti<"f Story fwho, said Sir Samuel I'AanH, "as an exf)oii<nl, on treatisoH nnd judf^^nentH 30t> THK TlMI':s UlSToliY (>F THE W.IH. OVHKllAULINt; A NKUTRAL MEKCHANTMAN. of mattoi-s relating to prize law is hartlly second to Lord Stovvell huuself ") in his notes on "The Principles and Practice of Prize Coiu-ts." He telU lis : When once the Prize Court has acquired jurisdiction over the principal caase, it will exert its authority over all the incidental. It will follow prize proceeds into the hands of agents or other persons holding them for the captor, or by any other title. ... It may also enforce its decrees against porsonii having the proceeds of prizes in their hands. . . . The Prize Court has also . . . exclusive authority as to the allowance of freight, damages, expen.ses, and costs in all cases of capture. Sir Samuel Evans went on to deal with the long line of legal authorities, American and English, that establish the position of the Prize Court, the Court which deals with claims in accordance with the Laws of Nations, and not merely in accordance with local or muni- cipal law. In the Corsican Prince the Presi- dent appUed his wide jurisdiction to the case of settling questions between the owners and all questions between them and the Russian Bank and the Societe Grenerale. Xo better instance of the large jurisdiction of a Prize Court could be cited. Some reference to two or three early cases will show the Prize Court fasliion of the great days of privateers and men-of-war. Tlie first is a case that raised the question of the person or persons entitled to the proceeds of Prize. In March, 1758, when the Seven Years' War was in full blast, in Lat. 48° X., off Cape Finisterre, a French ship, the Pacifique, was taken by H.]\LS. Windsor, commanded by Captain Lane Falkner. The sliip was condemned in the Admiralty Court on May 6, when leave was given for Sir Edward Hawke, who claimed one-eighth a3 Admiral, to appear. He had been appointed by the Lords of tlie Admiralty commander of a squadron of men-of war to be employed in Channel soundings orwherever else his Majesty's Service should require. Annexed to his com- mission was a list of the ships of the squadron, which included the \\'indsor, cruising between Cape Ortegal and Ushant. Sir Edward flew his flag on the Ramillies. Captain Falkner alleged that his commission was direct from the Admiralty, and that he was directed to cruise between Lats. 48° X. and 60° N. till he should get 120 leagues to the westward .and to stretch off Cape Finisterre and ciuise between Capo Ortegal and Ushant, taking care to retiu-n to Plymouth Sound within one month. He took the Pacifique on ^larch 13 and brought her into Plymouth on March 26, and then received liis orders from Admiral Hawke, who had sailed from Spithead on March 11. The Judge of the Admiralty pronounced on May 13, 1761, for the Admiral, and declared that he was entitled to one-eighth of the prize, but on July 28, 1764, the Loixls Commissioners oi Appeal reversed the decision. This case raised the question of prize money. It had been dealt with by the Prize Act of Queen Anne, passed in 1708. That Act ordered for the better and more effectual encouragement of the sea seirvice that if any ship of war, privateer, merchant ship or other vessel should be taken as prize by any of H.M. ships of war or privateers and adjudged as la^^•f ul prize in any of H.M. Comts of Admiralty, the flag officer or officers, tonunander or com- manders and other officers, seamen, and others who should be actually on board such ship of war or privateer so taking such prize shouKl after such condemnation have the sole interest and property in such prize without fiu-thor account, such ship to bo sold and the procet^ds THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. SOT distributed according to the shares of the officers and crew declared by Royal Pro- clamation. The Proclamation issued in pur- suance of this statute provided that the captain of the capturing vessel should bo allowed three-eighths of the proceeds, but went on to say that if any prize were taken by a ship under the command of a flag, the flag-officer, being actually on board, should have one of the eighths. The provision created some dissatisfaction, and on the breaking out of war in 1740 a fui-ther Proclamation was issued gi\-ing the flag-officer or comiiiander-in- chief one eighth of the prizes taken by ships and vessels under his command. It was under this rule that Admiral Hawke made his claim. It. may be noticed here that vmder the first Proclamation the fourth one-eighth was divided between the marine captains, sea lieutenants and master : another eighth between the marine Ueutenants, boatswain, gunner, purser, carpenter, master's mate, surgeon, and chaplain. A sixth eighth was divided between the midshipmen, car- penter's mates, boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, corporal's mates, yeomen of the sheets, coxswain, quarter -master, quarter-master's mates, surgeon's mates, yeomen of the powder-room, and sergeants of marines ,- while the reinaining two-eighths were divided between the trumpeters, quarter gunners,, carpenter's crew, steward, cook, armourer, steward's mate, cook's mate, gimsmith, cooper, swabber, ordinary trumpeter, barber, able seamen, ordinary seamen, volunteers by letter, and marine soldiers. Here we have in brief epitome the eighteenth centuiy in sea warfare ; the very names give us the fashion and manner of the sea battles that raged through the eighteenth century, and carry the echoes of those battles into the- earlier conflicts with the Dutch and the later conflicts with the French. The yeoman of the sheets and the yeoman of the powder-room are names that compare with another seven- teenth century office, the yeoman of the mouth, to wit, the land cook. In vision we see these fighting seamen with Byng off Cape Passara- in the summer of 1718, when the trumpeter trumpeted to good effect. In the winter of 1739 we see them under Vernon taking Porto- bello. We see the war of 1756 in which the English Fleet became one of the great factors of the balance of power. In the old Greenwich Hospital Cemetery there is a great square of grass beneath which lie the bones of some^ A HRITISH fJf'.STKOYF.K HXAMININ(; A DUTCH STEAMHR. 308 77//-; TlMt:s illSlDUY OF 'lUK \\ AH. tKrea ttiuiLsaml seaiuaii who hhi-vu*.! in thurtH wars of th« eightueiitti ctiiitury that ewtab- lishml (as a tstoiio recunU) the naval KuprtfUiai^y of (irtuit Uritaia. . ThoHt* were the men who " dieil the honoured ret-ipieiitH of her gratitude " and who with their ofhceirt liad been shtu-eix ot Prixe of War. The ease of th»* Ni»niwe ^'l■ie^d^ehnp* is a THOMAS PEMBERTON-LEIGH, BARON KINGSDOWN. 1793-1867. For 20 years from 1844 was a leading member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and from 1854 at Lord Aberdeen's request took special charge of appeals in Prize Cases. second instance of an old case that illustrates the law of prize. When war broke out between Holland and England in 1781, Ciu-a^ao wai full of Dutch merchantmen, including the America (which was captvu'ed on March 7, 1783, by H.M.S. Dolphin), the Goede Hoep, the Nieuwe Resolutie, and the Nieuwe Vriendschap. The last sailed from Amsterdam on October 16, 1780, and delivered her cargo at Curasao, and war having broken out, there she dallied, tcvking in cargo of cotton and other goods between May, 1781, and January, 1783. Her master, Bernhardus Ivnuttel, was j^art owner of the ship and the lading. He was a Dane by birth, but Dutch by domicile. Wliile liis ship lay at Curasao he was informed by one of liis co- * Journal of Comparative Leeislation, N.S. Vol. XV., p. 156. The Case of the Nieifw o Vriendschap, by J. E. G. do Montmorency. owners tliat in July, 1782, the ship had been sold to a merchant of Ghent for a fair piice. lit) actjuiesced. No money, liowever, was paid ; payment was to take place on the safe ntturn of the ship. Such wa.s the wisdom of this mer- chant of (Jii»»nt, a subject of coui-se, of tlio German Emperor and a neutral. Mtumtimo, Knuttel, liaving little to do at (.'iwacao, became also a biu'ghor of Ghent and a sul)ject of the I loly Roman Empire, and having achieved tliis distinction, he hoisted, on January 11, 1783 the Tmi)orial colours and sot sail for i'jiulfu iu Prussia, whither his cargo was apparently safely consigned. All wont well till about four in the chilly and dusky afternoon of luibruary 21, 1783, about 150 Dutch miles W.S.VV. of the Scilly Isles. At that fateful spot and moment the Nieuwo Vriendschap was suddenly brought to by gunfire. Commander (Jeorge Barnewell, of the privateer or letter SIR JOHN PATTESON. 1790 1861. " One of the very best and ablest judges that evtr sat in Westminster Hall." ot marque the Vigilant, of the Port of London, had acted vip to the name of the ship and detected this floating presentment of the Hoh' Roinan Empire. Ivnuttel was a cautious man, and sm-rendored, and he and his ship and the alleged Dutch cargo were carrieii into Portsmouth. On July 6, 1784, Sir Jan\es ^Marriott condemned the ship and cargo. This decision of the Prize Court stirred the souls THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 309 of the Iiupeiial Coixuiiander and his con- signees, and thoy appealed to the Lords Com- missioners of Appeals in Prize Courts, who sat to hear the cause in the Cockpit at ^Vhitehall, on March 7, 1786. The Lords Commissioners were Lord Camden, Lord Grantly and Sir Lloyd Kenyon, the Master of the Rolls. Our interest in the case is that WilHam Scott, afterwards Lord Stowell, who was destined to lay the foundations of the Prize Law of the world, was one of the counsel for the Crown, while he was opposed to that mightiest of all advocates, Thomas Erskine. Scott contended that " ships and cargo, being DR. STEPHEN LUSHINGTON, M.P. Was judge of the Admiralty Court 1838-1S57 and took over the jurisdiction of the Prize Court. in the Hituation that this ship and cargo are prove<l to have been, could not legally lie purchased by a neutral ; and the attempt lo purchase thrjm under such circumstances, in ordf;r to rescue them from the danger of capture, must be considered as a departure from their neutrality and a violation of the acknowlfjdged rights of war." Hf) further con- tended that even if such a sale were legal, in fact the gale b<jforo the Court was not a real sale. The Court wjw shaken by Erskino's counter- argument, and only decirled against Erskine, not on the law, but on the ground tlmt it was not a bona fide, cale. .Scott himself ff)lt the 'JifTicuIti»»s of his position, and in 1807, when he heard the case of the Minerva, a/lmitted that there could be ciuwm where merchant flhips locked into f)ort, by fbrj enemy could bo Hr)ld, Hut be wtiH doubtful, anfi the point in 19l.'> wa« not really clear, »w the cjis*) of the J)iu-ia Nhowed. iiut this in<iy be said, thaf: a sale to be upheld must be absolutely bona fide and contain no fraudulent or non-neutral element. A third case may be briefly noted as in- dicating the trials, trovibles and wiliness of the men of the sea a hundred years ago. The Eliza and Katy sailed with a cargo of sugar and coffee, pipes, staves, and cotton from Phila- delphia to Rotterdam, which she long failed to reach for two reasons. First, she was seized by the Polecat, a nimble privateer, with a just and not very clever commander. Mr. Claasby, the master of the Eliza and Katy, was a deter- mined seaman, who when the Polecat appeared fraudulently concealed his fraudulent papers and determined to resist captvire. " If the wind had been favourable we should have clapped a stopper round the arins and feet of his honour the prize master, and have carried him carefully to a French prison in Holland." As it was, the commander of the Polecat let him go, and then (the second reason) on September 23, 1805, H.M.S. Ariadne took the Eliza and Katy in hand. The master did not surrender till several shots had been fired, and '' he would not have brought to if he had known that the boat of the Ai-iadne had only three rounds on board." The ship was brought in for adjudication, and Sir William Scott justified the second capture under all the circumstances of the case in view of the fraudulent state of the ship's papers, but the cargo was not suspect and was restored and reached Rotterdam after all on payment of the captor's costs. In 1804 the Naval Prize Act placed the whole question of prize on a new statutory footing. The High Court of Admiralty and every Court of Admiralty or of Vice-Admiralty or other Court exercising Admiralty juris- diction were to be Prize Courts. The appeal from these Courts lay to the Judicial Com- mittee of the I'rivy Council. Every ship taken as prize had forthwith without bulk broken to be delivered to the Marshal of the (Jourt, and the case was to be heard Jiccording to procedures prescribed by the Aot. The (juestion of prize bounty was specially dealt with. I'rize Iwunty at the rate of £5 for each person on board the enemy's ship at the begiruiing of the engagement was to be granted by I'roclamation or Order in Coun<;il to olTicers and crew of a ship of war actually present at the taking or destroying of any armed enemy vessel. It was a sub- 810 77//"; Ti.\ii:s HisTDitv or rm-: win. titautmi t«iu-oi>rHt<tiiiient. An Ordtir in Cuiiac-il «ttH.:ldring tlie iittt^iitiiiii of His Majesty to ^raiit I'ri^e Hoiiiity to otlict'iH and cievvM of >liri .Majtwty'h Mhi|M of war \\&n puhliHhtKl oii March 2, 1915. A ease of the greatest interest an to Prize liounty or '" Head Money," Jn the. Matter of the Battle, oj the Falkland Islands, was ilecitle«l by Sir Samuel Evans on December 22, 1916, when he held in the Prize Court that H.M.S. L'anopus was not cntithMl to share in the siun of £12,000 whidi ho hatl awarded in August, 1916, to the Squadron of Athniral Sir Fretlerick Sturtlee for the destruction of the Scharnhoiiit, Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Xiirnberg in the battle of December, 1914, She was not '" actually present " at the des- truction though she probably hit the Cneisonau. By a Hovrtl Proclamation of ^lay 19, 1860, the distribution of prize money (which i-«, of course, different from prize bounty, being the proceeds of sale of a prize) was placed on a new footing. The flag officers were to have one-thirtieth of the net pro- ceeds arising from captured prizes in certain proportions ; one tenth of the remainder was to go in the case of single captures to the officer in command of the capturing \-essel, OP one-tenth of the whole if there were no flag. The remainder of the net proceeds were directed to be distributed in ten classes " so that each officer, man, and boy composing the rest of the complements of our ships, sloops, and vessels of war and actually on board at the time of any such capture, seizure, etc., as aforesaid, and everj'^ pei"son present and assisting shall receive shares or a share accord- ing to his class, as set forth in the following scale " ; these classes included the cliief gunner, the chief boatswain, the chief carpenter, and their mates, the master-at-arms, the chief yeoman of the signals, the captain of the fore- castle, the captain of the after-guard, the coxswains of the barge and pimiace, the captains of the main-top and the fore-top, the armourer's crew, the lamp trinuner, the fifer of marines. By a Royal Proclamation of September 17, 1900, Her ^lajesty Queen Victoria regulated according to a scheme referred to in the Proclamation the distribu- tion of tlie net proceeds of prizes captured from the enemy and other captm-es. On August 28, 1914, it was decided by Order in Council to cancel tliis scheme and substitute a system of Prize Boimties or gratuities for more general distribution to the officei-s and men of t!i»» Naval forces, and the Admiralty was ordered to give the necessary directions to bring this uito elh-ct. With the exception of seiziu'iw of pirates and slavers, cases tlmt did not come before Prize Courts, the j)rize |)rovi8ions had no significance between 1864 imd 1914. On August f) of that year the law relating to I'rize Couit Procedure was amended and an Oriler in Council was issued authorizing the Commissionei-s for executing the oflico of Lord High Admiral to require the con- stitution of a Prize Court with respect to the wai' with Germany, and tliis was repeated in the case of Austria -Hungary on August 20. Tliis was followed, on September 30, by an Order in Council conferring jurisdiction in mattei-s of prize on certuiii ]3ritish Courts in Egypt, Zanzibar and Cyprus, and authorizing the Admiralty to require the constitution of Prize Com-ts under the Naval Prize Couits Acts, 1864 to 1914, including the Act of Sep- tember 18 relating to Egypt, Zanzibar and Cyprus. Under the Prize Court Act of 1864 (which made provision for the formation in case of need of Prize Courts in British possessions oversea) Rules had been made by Orders in Council of July 18 and October 20, 1898, These wei*e by an Order of Council of August 5, 1914, repealed and new and elaborate Rules and • Orders, known as the Prize' Court Rules, 1914, came on that day into force. These Orders regulated the procedme in prize proceedings and settled also the procedm-e in questions of prize bounty and the distribution of prize moneys. It was under these Rules, supple- mented by the ancient practice of the Court of Admiralty and by the decision of the President in doubtful cases, that the procedure of the British Prize Courts was regulated during the Great War. These Orders were varied in certain particulars from time to time during the war by Order in Council. By a Notification of October 8, 1914, issued by the Colonial Office, the constitution of Prize Courts in the Dominions oversea was announced. These Courts were to sit, if necessary, at Sydney, jNIelbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Albany, Hobart, Nassau, Hamilton (Bermuda), Georgetown (British Guiana), Belsize (British Honduras), Quebec, Halifax, St. John's (Nova Scotia), Victoria (British Columbia), Chariot tet own (Prince Edward Island), Colombo, Stanley (Falkland Islands), Suva (Fiji), Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Kingstown (Jamaica), Antigua (Lee\\m-d THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. HU THE "GERMANIA." Herr Knipp von Bohlen's Racing Yacht, condemned in British Prize Court, October, 1915. IslanrLs), Valetta (Malta), Port Louis (Mau- ritias), St. .John's (Xewfoundlanfl), Dunedin, Wellington, Chri.stchurch, Auckland (Now Zealand), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Capetown, Durban, Singapore, Port of Spain (Trinidad), St. Lucia, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi, Rangoon, Aden in the Rod Sea. It was a noble li»t, a sonoroas tribute to the sea power and the world power of an empire that wears in its dia<^lem the Seven Seas ; this list has a Miltonic note, rolling out, in rnultituflinous syllables of every tongue and race, the liistory of sea-toil, sea-sorrow and sea triumph through thrwf centurifrs of time, ea<;h name recalling tlic endless a<lventurf« by sea and land tliaf, IukI ma/le and wore making the P^rnpire of tlie X'jrtborn ThI*?. In this pl»u;e it will be useful to rc.inr U> .sf>nii' of the I'ri'/Ji Cf>urt, <lecisions of the JJorninioriH.* Thus th« case of the Hirllas, a Cerrnan l>(irf|iic loa^'ling r;argo in a Canudifui pr»rt (port- I'imon- ski) at the outbreak of war and sfiized on August .'», KM 4, w»iH heard in the Kxchef|urT Court of Cariftfla (in Prize) by the Prfisident, • H'-f llrilinh find Colonial Prize fntM, ndilfd \>y K. fJ. M. Tr'-h'TrK'. Mr. Justice Cassels, on December 15, 1914. Mr. Newcombe, K.C., appearing for the Crown, said that this was the first occasion for one hundred years in wliich a Prize Com-t had sat in British North America. The ship and cargo were detained until further order, and the claim of a Portuguese subject, who alleged that the >)arque had been transferred to him before the outbreak of war whilst she was on the higii seas, was dismissed, as the necessary conditions f)f such a sale had not been complied with. On January G, I'JIT), Cator, J., and (Jniiu, .1., sitting at Alexandria in H.B.M. Prize Court lor f']gypt, fonrnl that the Enteufels of lircsmni was an tmemy ship that liud been |)ro|)crly seizwl as prize by H..M.S. VVar-iior after having ef)me ont of Port Said by eonipulsion. On October .'{0, 1014, Chief Justice CoUer, in (ho lloyal (Jourt of St. Lucia (in Prize) condemnnd thf) Norwegian s.s. Thor for the uimeutral service of waiting to coal a (iorinan cruiser. Whilst on this service she was captured by If .M.S. Berwick. On November 20, 1914, Sheriff, .1., Ingham, ,]., and Hlu(;k, .)., sitting in I'rizd in tlio Snprome (Jourt of Hermuda, con- demned tho Leda, captured on voyage fronii 812 THl'! TIMI'IS lllSTOltV OF THE W AH. THE WARNING SHOT. Rotterdam to Baton Rouge by H.M.S. Suffolk. On December 14, 1914, Parvis, J., sitting in Prize in H.M. Commercial Coui-t for Malta, condemned the Erymanthos ; on December 16, 1914, Acting Chief Justice Gompertz, sitting in Prize in the Supreme Coui-t of Hong Kong, released the Hanametal, captui-od on August 21, 1914, by H.M.S. Triumph; in March, 1915, in the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements, released the Pontoporos, which had been captured by a German cruiser and recaptured by H.M.S. Yarmouth. JNIany other ovei-soas cases might be cited. It is sufficient here to have indicated the world-wide character of the British Prize Court system. As a matter of record it is of interest to state ■:i Acting Chief Justice Woodward, sitting in Prize briefly the facts as to the first British prize THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 313 case after the Crimean War. On August 4, 1914, the German sailing ship or barque Chile, out of Bremen, arrived without cargo in the East Bute Dock, Cardiff. She was detained next day by the Collector of Customs in con- sequence of the declaration of war and a writ was issued by the Procurator-General for her condemnation. Sir Samuel Evans held that the vessel was properly seized, but reserved the question of condemnation in view of the first article of the Hague Convention, 1907, No. 6. If under that article Germany had granted any days of grace to British ships in German ports of Dordrecht, and the mortgagees claimed to be paid off out of the proceeds. But Sir Samuel Evans would not listen to the claim, and said that he would not have listened to it if it had been made by a British mortgagee. '" The truth is that capture of enemy vessels at sea during war would be a hazardous and almost worthless right of belligerents if the captors were confronted with such claims as are put forward in this case, or if mortgages gave to mortgagees prior rights to those of the captor." The learned President discussed the position in the light of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which was S.S. "OPHELIA." Equipped as a German hospital ship, but also provided with signalling apparatus of exceptional capacity, the " Ophelia" was seized by the British in October, 1914. It was shown she had never received any sick or wounded, and sl.e was condemned as lawful prize on May 21, 1915. similar days would be granted by the British Government and the ship would not be con- demned. The Gorman Govorrunent, with cliaraotori.Htic savagery and want of foresight granted no such dayn, with the rfwuit that the Chile anfi other vfjHsels were condomned. A more int*)rf;sting case was that of the Marie Giaeser. On August I, 1914, this steamship, of the port of lif/stock, pjut out from Bristol, bound for Archangel in ballast. Three days later she ran into Barry ff>r coal arul left f ho same day, 10 hrjur.H beffjre tlio drjclaration oi war took offoct. Tlvj next <lfiy, at about four in the after- noon, she was captured ut sea by H.M.S. Gibraltar, and the master, Albert Schroeder, w>iH informed of tJie ffu;t of war. A j>ri/,f) crew wfiH put on board and the n«)Xt day the .ship was taken into Ghisgow arifl prize f»rof;eedirigs wr»re l;egun against tfut owners and [mrties interested. Now it Hf) h/vppfined that, though tho ship was owne/J by a German limited liability company, it wan (hon/i fidp,) mortg/igrxl to a F>utch r;orri()ariy and is binding law on the British Prize Com-ts. The Declaration stated that " neutral goods not contraband of war are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag." The declaration did not deal with ships or interests in ships at all, nor has any Prize Court in any war ever held that the Declaration applied to ships. But there was another ground for refusing tho claim of tho mortagoos. "The fact that the vessel was sailing under the German flag, with papers entitling her to do so, and navigatcfd by a German master in the commerce of the (<erman Emf)iro wr)uld be fatal to their claim." This view had brten asserted by \)\\ Westlake before tho war and was applied in this very obvious CJise. Thf> cases of tho Tornmi and the Rothersand raisfid a different and a veiy interesting issue. 'i'he (Jfjrman sailing ship Tommi, belonging to the Nordfleutsche Kraftfutter (jesellsfihiift, of Hamburg, sailed out of Dantzig in .July, 1914, witJi mr)lasses, and after calling at 314 THt: TIMES HISTOUY OF I'HK WAK. Ciixhavtiu oil July 28. urnvdtl ut C4i'iiveuuiiU oil AiigiLst 5 and whh (lutuiueil hh |)rizu. Oil tho .saiiiu ttuy tlut iiothei'HUiKl, htilong- iiig tu thti saui» coinpaiiy, whm Hiniilarly tlHtaiiuul at Kirkcahly. A very inturehting littlo istury id atitiueiated with thuiie Hailing shipH. Ttie CU'iinan owiims were norvoas and hy wir« on August i utt'orod to hoU thtwe Khips to tho Sugar Foddor Company, of Miiivvall. " Tho (ioi-nian company had control of tho English company," and when it offered to sell the English company had to buy ; ao Mr. (Junther, repreHonting tho Knglish company, cabled hi.s acceptance. Now on August 1 war bctgan remained (German whips. liut even if tlu* pro- perty had passed, if tho transfer had been valid, the caHo was not concluded. 'I'lie J';nglish com|)any was a mere creature of the (ierman company, which owned nine-tenths of the sharoM of the Knglish company, a company that, moreover, did not contain a single sharehold*«r of British nationality. " VVhetlmr u comjiany consisting entirely of aliens can own a ship is a question which probably luis never arisen, and it has therefore ne\'er b*«n decided." Sir Samuel Evans wa« not prepared to say that under such circumstances those vessels could not be regarded as (ierman vessels. His view has since SIR EDWARD CARSON, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1916. [Elliott & Fry. LORD FINLAY. Lord Chancellor, 1916. [Elliott &Fry. SIR JOHN MELLOR, K.C.B. H.M. Procurator-General and Solicitor to the Treasury since 1909. between Germany and Russia, and, said the President in delivering judgment of condemna- tion, " I have grave doubts whether there was not an apprehension in the mind of Mr. Gimther — I have graver doubts whether there was not .an apprehension in the mind of Mr. Schrader, in Hamburg — as to the imminence of war between Geraaany and this country at that time." But in any event, the transfer was made in order to defeat the right of a belligerent. " Russia, or -anj'' other Power wliich became a belUgerent, would have the right to capture the \essels at sea if they remained German sliips." Could such a transfer with such an intention be rightfully made ? Sir Samuel Evans, after an elaborate •consideration of the cases bearing on the subj ect and the provision (57) of the Declaration of London, came to the conclusion that the alleged transfer was not valid, and that the ships, for all ^purposes connected with the Prize Court, been upheld, and very emphatically upheld, by the House of Lords in the Continental Tyre case. We now turn from molasses to fish, to the very interesting coast fisheries case associateil with the name of the German cutter the Berlin. The British Fleet was pretty busy on August 5. 1914, and there were not many German sea- going ships that were missed. In the fore- noon of that day H.M.S. Princess Royal, a hundred miles from the British coast and some five hundred miles from Emdon in Prussia, fell in with the Berlin, of Emden, a drift fishing boat, with barrels empty an»i barrels full of tho pleasant herrings of the North Sea. The Be>'lin was handed over to the s.s. Ailsa, and carried into Wick in the early morning of August G. She had been busily fishing or trawling in tlu' mid North Sea. The question before tiu> Couit was THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. :n5 SIR SAMUEL THOMAS EVANS, C.C B., Jud^e of the Prize Court. whothor nhf) was immune from capture as a coast fixhing vfjH.sel. The subject had long b'jon one of extraordinary interc»st to inter- national lawyers, and the history of the sub- ject was reviowfxl at great length by Mr. ./liHtice Gray (f.S.A.) in a case arising out (»f the Hpanish/Vrrierican war of IH'.iH. Sir .Samn<l Evans Uirl flown the doctrine and practice of the law of nations tliat " fishing vesH«;ls plying their industry near or about the coast (not nfK;*»Msarily in territorial waters), in and by which the hardy per>ple who man them gain their liveliho'>d, uri- ;iot [»ir)perly subjects of capture in war so long as they conduc them- selves to the peaceful work which the industry properly involves." But the learned Presich^nt held that in fact the Berlin was " a deep-sea fishing vessel engaged in a coinmercial entor- |)rise which fonned part of the trade of the eni-my country, anfl, as such, could be, aiifi was, properly captured as prize of war." One of the most important cases that came before the I'rize Court (hiring the war was tJie case of the Kim, tlie hearing of which lasted more than a fortnight during the months of .July and August, 191. '>. T'ho case dealt with no fewer tlnui four- ships, the Kim, the Alfred N'obel, tlio r.jornsfjeme Bjciinson nnd the »i 81t) Till': ri\ii':s iiiswiiv of thi<: wah. Fritlla,utl, all ul which vvtut) in tli« samn cuto- gory. Nearly 40 coimsol wwe oiigut^n I in tlw great Huit ; Sir Ktlwanl Carson lod for th« Crown, and Sir Kohttrt FinUiy (who hucaniu Lord (-'hanuMllor in lUlO) appoarod for certain parties. The Kim v\^u,s a Norwegian 8hip under time charter to an American company controlled by Germans. It sailed on Novem- ber 11, 1914, from Now York with a great cargo of fats and foodstuffs, rubber and liides, consigned to Copenhagen. Tht» Kim was captured on the high seas on November 28, 1914, and its cargo was seized on the ground that the food was contUtional and the rubber absolute contraband. The other ships were in a similar case as to conditional contraband. Tho total cargoes of those ships amounted to 73,237,790 lbs. in weight, including 19,252,000 lbs. of lard, or thirteen times tho qutxntity of lard normally imported into Don- raark in tho course of a year. Tliis was part of a far larger operation. In October and November, 1914, the amount of lard .sent to Scandinavian Eui-ope was nearly 60 times the amount sent in the same two montlis in 1913. It was an overwhelming inference that prac- tically the whole of this lard was intended for or would find its way into Germany. Direct imports into Germany had practically vanished, while in 1913 Germany had imported nearly 70 million lbs. Much of the food in these sliips was of the type supplied not to civilians but by the same American firms to British troops in the field. These American firms were pleasingly neutral. They were prepared to supply tho sinews of war to both armies. Now Copenhagan was a convenient spot whence to transmit goods to Germany, and the chief trade between Copenhagen and Ger- many was shown in this case to have been through Liibeck, Stettin, and Hamburg. Lubeck was a German naval base ; Stettin was a garrison town, and the headquarters of an army corps. " It has," said Sir Samuel Evans iia his judgment, " also sliipbuilding yards where warsliips are constructed and repaired. It is Berlin's nearest seaport. It will be remembered that one of the big sliipping companies asked a Danish firm to become nominal consignees for goods destined for Stettin. Hambui-g and Altona had ceased to be the commercial ports dealing with commerce coming through the North Sea. They were headquartrrs of various regiments. Copenhagen is also a convenient port for com- munication with tho (itirmau naval arsonu 1 and fortress of Kiel and its Canal, an<l for all places reached through tho Ciuial. Those ports may properly be regarded, in my opinion, as l)a.sos of supj)ly for tho enemy, and the (;arg(Jos destined for those might on that short ground bo comlomnod as prize. But I prefer, especially as no jjarticular cargo can definitely bo said to bo going to a particular port, to deal with tho cases on broader grounds." Sir Samuel Evnns, after a masterly survey of tho history of the doctrine of Continuous Voyage as applied to contraband, stated that he had no hesitation " in jjronouncing that in my view tho doctrine of coJitinuous voyage, or transportation, both in relation to carriage of contraband absolute and conditional by sea and overland, has become part of the law of nations at tho commencement of the present war, in accordance with the principles of recognized legal decision, and with tho view of the groat body of modern jurists, and also with tho practice of nations in recent maritime warfare." Was, then, Copenhagen merely an ostensible destination, and if so, was it possible to ascertain the real destination, in legal fashion, of those vast stores of goods ? First of all, the test should be applied as to whether those stores were intended to become part of the common stock of Denmark. That was a test a century old. There was nothing new in it. Again, were the consignments " to order or assigns " ? If so, it would be a circumstance of suspicion. Sir Samuel Evans had no difficulty in finding that the cargoes were on their way at the time of captiu'c to German territory as theii" actual and real destination. But were they intended for Governmental or military use ? They were suited to such use and " even assiuning that they were indiscrimately distributed between the military and civilian population, a very large proportion would be used by the military forces." But could cognizance of this be brought home to the sliippers ; had they the intention of supplying the armed forces of the enemy ? It was certainly the " liiglxly probable destination." Such a destination satisfied Lord Stowell on the question of intention, and it satisfied Sir Samuel Evans. It was clear to liim (and to everyone, even tho shippers, we may presmne) that tlie cargoes were not only on the way to Germany " but also to the German Govermnent and their forces for naval and military use as their real ultimate THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. 317 destination. To hold the contrary would be to allow one's eyes to be filled by the dust of theories and technicalities and to be blinded to the realities of the case." Consequently the cargoes (save such part as was for use in Scandinavia) were condemned as lawful prize. It was a prize that would have rejoiced the heart of Drake or any other man who ever sailed the Spanish main in search of golden galleons ; perhaps the greatest prize that ever sailed the seas, these Falstaffian galleons of lard. A reckless decision of the Hambiirg Prize master had conversation with the customs officer. Early next morning he weighed anchor and proceeded under way for Granton, eight miles farther up the Forth, and on this voyage was captvu-ed by H.M.S. Ringdove in territorial waters. Was the ship captured at sea or in port ? It was urged that the ship was captured in port, and was therefore only subject to detention. The President allowed the owner to claim the benefit of the Hague Convention on the subject in notable words : The practice should conform to sound ideas of what is fair and just. When a sea of passions rises and rages SHIP'S CUTTER ON THE WAY Court in April 1915, the ca«o of the Maria, in which wheat 8hippe<I before the war to Ireland from the United State« on a Dutch ship wa« f;ondernnfKl, wa,s quoted in the cawe of the Kim by Sir Surnuel Evanw " a8 an example of the atute with which a Prize Court in Germany ' har:lat it« way through ' bona fide commercial tranfiactionx when dealing with foodHtiiffs carried by neutral voHBelH." The ca«f) of t?io Mciwe, a German merchant Hailing nlup of the port o! PJianderrnoor, wuk of a conHi(J<;r»ible intonwt. Ifor mantor an^l owner JvuJ brought hfjr out of Xordoney br>und for iJo'mjHH in the Firth of Forth. liotwefin 7 and 9 rif the clock on the evfining of AuguHt 4, KJH, the whip Hrrive<l near MorriHon'n Haven and anchoffxl n mile off the ck^^U, nnd the TO EXAMINE A MERCHANTMAN. as a natural result of such a calamitous series of wars as tho present it behoves a Court of Justice to preserve a cftlrn and cquuhle attitude in all oontrov<Tsies which come before it for decision, not only when thi-y concern neutrals, but also when they may affect enemy subjects. In times of peace the Admiralty Courts of this realm are appealed to by people of all nationnliti(\s who engage in commerce upon the seas with a confidence that right will be done. So, in the unhappy and dire times of war, the Court of Prize, as a Court of justice, will, it ift hoprrd, show that it holds evenly the scales between friend, neutriil, and foe. A merchant who is a eitizr^n of an enemy country would not unnaturally i^xpict that when the State to which he belongs, and other Htates with which it may unhappily bo at war, have bound thejaselveH by formal and solemn conventions (Iciilirig with a t-tiilf^ of war like thosrt fomiiihitid at the ifague in 1007, he Khoiild have the benefit, of the provi- NionM of Huch international compacts. (The Law Reports.) Henco the TVesident held that " whenever an alien enemy conceives that he ifl entitled to any prot<x!tion, privilege or relief under any of the iilS THE TIMES niSTUHY OF THE WAR. ON PATROL DUTY. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 319 Hague Conventions of 1907, he shall be entitled to appear as a claimant or to argue his case before this Court." The privilege did not, in fact, help the master of the Mciwe. for the word " iDort " was held by the Court to be used in the Convention in its popular and not its fiscal sense, and that, therefore, the vessel was " taken at sea " and was condemned as lawful prize. The story of the Roumanian is of considerable interest and importance. This large tank steamship, o■w^led by the Petroleum Steamsliip Co., Ltd., of London, and under charter to the Deutsch Petroleum Verkaufs Co., of Hamburg, put out from Port Arthur, Texas, before the outbreak of war with a cargo of over 6,000 tons of petroleum, the property of the Eiu-opaische Petroleum L'nion Gesellschaft, of Breinen. Hamburg was the port of discharge. The Roumanian safely reached the EngUsh Channel, when the owners, on the instructions of the English Admiralty, signalled from Prawle Point that the ship should go into Dartmouth for orders. There she was directed to proceed to the Thames. Having reached Gravesend, the Channel pilot informed the master that the owners had directed him to proceed to Purfleet and discharge the oil into their tanks there. This was done by means of connecting pipes on Augast 21-24, and while the task was in progress the chief officer was informed that the cargo was under detention. In November the Crown applied to the Prize Court asking for the condemnation of the whole of the cargo as lawful pris^e, being enemy property. The Court held that it was clear that the oil remaining on Vjoarfl at the time of the order for detention was confiscable as prize. The Hague Convention, Xo. 6, was not applicable, though the oil was in port at the time of the seizure, since Germany had never asrtonted to it. But were the 4,800 tons alrfsady dischargerl confiscable as prizes and flroits of the Admiralty ? Was the oil " on land " or still " in port," and if " on land " was it immune from wjizure ? The old practice was certainly to seizf) enemy property on land, but a t*5ndericy was o[»erativo at that <late to save frf>rn confiseation juivnUi jirofjorty on land All en<rrriy profjorty — ships ns w(M as cargo — may be captun;d jure belli on the s^>a or in rivers, ports and harbours of the captnrin>^ belliger*-rit. Now the oil was enfjiny cargo arul as such liabl»> to s^jizure. CotiM that right bo evffled \)y Mie simple device of racing to tho enerny country and landing the cargo ? " Wh/it right of entry had it into the country ? What right had it to expect protection in this country at someone's care and expense, for the sake of its owners. . . . The oil came into port as maritime merchandise of the enemy subject to seizure, and, in my opinion [said Sii- Samuel Evans], the whole of it remained such tintil it was actually formally seized on behalf of the Crown on August 22. I cannot see how or by what process the portion of it which was at one end of the pipe in the tanks on shore had ceased to be seizable enemy cargo any more than the portion remaining in the ship at the other end had. In my opinion, the view that one part was seized in port, and the other on land and not in port, would be pedantic and erroneous." This decision was affirmed by the Privy Council in November 1915. In 1805 there had been a similar case. When hostili- ties broke out with France on May 16, 1803, there was lying at Ramsgate for repair in the yard of John Friend a ship called the Marie Anne. Parts of the cargo had been warehoused. Mr. Friend, a shrewd fellow of excellent judgment, suspected the ship to good purpose and made up liis mind that she and the cargo alike were French. He managed to secure the papers and documents relating to the ship and cargo and carried off the master of the Marie Anne to Deal for examination in order to obtain adjudication. The ship and cargo were condemned as droits of Admiralty and realized the net sum of £2,667 Is. 8d., of which sum Mr. Friend, to his great satisfaction, secured the sum of £400 as a reward. It is an entertaining case, and the action of Mr. Friend helped to settle the fate of the Roumanian more than a century later. All the oil seized in the Roumanian was, therefore, condemned to the Crown as prize in the Crown's rights as droits oi Admiralty. It should be explained that all captures in port are droits of Admiralty and belong to the Crown, and not to any captor. It is interesting at this point to notice in a few lines the position of English or neutral persons interested in enemy ships or goods at sea. Thus, as wo have seen, with the Mario Gla«»s»!r it was <lecided that no mortgages, liens or charges upon tin enemy ship could be set lip in an English Prize CQurt against the r;a[)torH. Again, in the cas(js of the Odessa and the Cape Corso it was hold that a Vri/A^ Court does not recogniz() the rights of ])l<fdgc'es of cargo. Tlio J'rizo ('ourt hufi novor in tliis matter distinguished Ijotweon enoiny ship aiid a-jo THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. cargu. "In my jiulgiatiut, th« only bufe- guai'ding [jrinciplo in U> uucurtain who uru the lagul owneru ut' the cargoes ; unil if the goudu are found to be the property in law of an enemy to conden^n them ; or if thuy are the property of neutralti or Urititth subjects to release them, as was done in the Miramchi." In that case a cargo had been shipped on a British vessel to a CJerman firm by a neutral under a C.I.F. contract before the war. In such a case the property in the goods had not passed to the enemy, and so in the prize proctHKlings that followed capture in Sep- tember, 1914, the Crown was unsuccessful. In thtit case it was argued that an the cargo was in a British ship it was not capturnblo, although it was enemy property. The President re jected this new proposition in Prize law. " In my view it is abunilantly clear that enemy goods carried in British ves.sels are subject to seizure in port and captui-e at sea in times of war." The case of the Ophelia is one that affords the student of German metliods peculiar satisfaction. This German steamship formerly traded between London and Hamburg, and belonged to the Kierstein Company, Hamburg, and on August 3, 1914, was in the port of London. On that day she was directed by the German Government to proceed to a Geraian port on military duties, and here begins the romance of a German hospital ship. She sailed at noon on the fateful 4th of AugiLst with 344 passengers. On August 5 she was directed by a torpedo boat to go to Heligoland, and thence she went up the Elbe and reached Hambiug on August 10. There (her log stated) she was refitted as a hospital sliip, and on Augvist 13 was piloted down the Elbe, passed through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal into the Baltic and to Iviel, and (so said the log) fitted as a liospital ship. By Sep- tember 5 she was at Cuxhaven, on September 12 at Brxm^sbuttel in the North Sea. The pre- vious day she received her certificate for use as a hospital ship. On September 18 she leaves Brunsbuttel Koog and passes down the Elbe to Cuxhaven, the open sea and Heligo- land, where she loiters for three weeks and then moves to Wilhelmshaven roadstead and wanders up and down the German coast, is at Heligoland again on October 16, and, resuming her wanderings, readies the coast of Holland. On October 8 submarine D 4 had her tmder special observation. Shu was jjaintod as a hospital ship, but flew no national flag. On sighting tlie submarine she hoiwted the llttd CroBs flag, and fled to escape search, sub- sequently hauling down the lied Cross flag. ''There was nobody in the neighbourhood, and nobody for a hospital shij) to aid. With the exception of a Gennan submarine, which I saw about 20 miles farther west at 10.30 a.m. on the 7th, and a Zeppelin at about 2.45 p.m. on the 7th, I saw nothing besides the Ophelia on the 7th, 8th or 9th. The German 8ul)marine dived as soon as she saw me. She appeared to be outward bound to sea." The heutenant- conunander of the Biitish submarine had no doubt that the Ophelia was scouting. The log of the Ophelia seemed to confirm this view. H.M.S. Meteor on October 18 stopped the Ophelia, searched her, dismantled her wireless, and canied her into Shoornt'ss. The British Government were anxious if the innocence of the ship was proved to restore her to her rightful status. The case was argued at immense length on May 3, 4, 5, 6, 1915, and eventually on May 21 the President held that she was on' the evidence lawful prize, having forfeited the protection of the Hague Convention by the fact that she was not used for the special and sole purpose of affording aid and relief to • the wounded, sick and ship- wrecked ; that she made no real effort to render such service ; that she was well equipped as a signalling vessel, and had used her equip- ment for this purpose without satisfactory explanation. The case of the Ophelia was a striking lesson in the abuse of the Hague Con- ventions by the Germans. It is not necessary here to deal further with the nvmierous cases that arose in the Prize Courts of Great Britain and are fully reported in The Law Reports, The Times Law Reports, and other law reports. Suflficient has been said to indicate the enormous importance and wide range of this branch of law ; the extreme value of its historical associations, and its significance as a link between many nations as the only Court which administers in entirely judicial fasluon the Law of Nations without fear or favoiu*. It was fortunate for Great Britain that at the appointed time there ai'ose in Sir Samuel Evans a judge who could cany on in adequate fashion the great work that Lord Stowell performed in the Napoleonic wars. CHAPTER CI, XII. MUNITIONS OF WAR, 1916. National Factories — Octplt of Explosives — Gun and Small Arms Ammunition — " Prema- tures " and " Blin'ds "" — Manufacture of Guns, Machine Guns and Rifles — Labour Supply — ^^'r)■'.rKv in Munitions Factories — Industrial Fatigue — Welfare Work. MR. JOSEPH PENNELLS pictures of war work may be regarded as KjTnbolical of the mighty effort jjut forth by Great Britain for the protluction of shells and ammunition after the fonnation of the Ministry of Munitions in May, 1915, ami therefore they may fitly be accom- f)anied witli a brief account of the results of tliat effort down to the period of the Battle of the Somme, with which they wer<', roughly, 'ontemporaueous. It has already been told (Chapter XC^IIl.) how prompt were the m«;asur<'s taken by Mr. Lloyd rjeorge, the first Minister of Munitions, to iriobilizf the engineering resources of the <;oijntry, and how, with tin- cooperation of tlic great armament firms, a .secure of national muni- tions factories had l>f;en erected by the follow ing ■mUiiun, while arrangfunents ha<l been made to ^it up 1 1 others. Ix-ss than a year later there were 95 national factories working for the land S*jrvice. Among these were 22 concerneij with the manufacture of exjjlosives and the raw iriat<;rials for them ; 18 for filling gun and trench mortar amrfiurutif>n, ojk' of which was dealing with nejirly twice »is mudi as \V(jf)lwi(li Anwmal, which for the first IS months of thf war <;arried pra<-ticilly Hie whole burden ot completing anunimition ; Mix »!m|>lf>yr!fl in turning out curtrirlges nnd ciirtridg*! cases ; '.',2 Hhell fa^ftories managrid by loc;il brjards of munag'^ment under the supervision i>( tlir' Ministry; and 12 projectile factrjries rtngagfrd, under the iiian>ige»nent of inrge engineering llrtim MUf;<TviHefl by the Ministry, in fimUin;.' Vol, X. I'art I2'». heavy shell in buildings all ordered, planned and built by the Ministry. These last were in various stages of completion, but though they had developed barely half of their full productive capacity, they were already tiu'uiiig out 25 |)er cent, of the heavy shell produced in the country. I'heir buildings covered an area of 70 acres, and the bays of w liich they consisted, with an average breadth of 14 feet, liad a total length of 15 miles. They contained 10,000 machine tools, driven by 17 miles of shafting with an expenditure of 25,000 horse- power, and their daily output would fill a train a mile long composed of 400 wagons. Thi' results yielded by this vast array of niaiinfaeturing capacity may be exhibited by means of a few comf)arative figures. To take explo>ii\ cs first, for every ton used in SeptfMuber, 1014, th(!re were ;J50 tons uso;l in tlu! following .Inly. At the latter date th(^ new factories were only in their initial stages, but as t ht;y gradually got into wf>rkirig order (he effect is apparent from the circumstance that in .July. I!) Hi, I ho corr<!sponding figure was 11,000 to 12,000. If tlu? average amount of (-xijlosive used in chaiging shells in one wetfk in .lanuury, lOKi, be taken as 100, tlie fijiure had risen to ISO in April. 5!M) in .July, 020 in October iui I 1,120 in Xo\ cnih.T, h'or trench mortar aniniuuil ion iui'l grrimi les the consumption of ex[)losives itKiniaseil, on the basis of 100 in ,March, l!)H>, to 121 in .lune. I l*i in September and 151 in IS'ovembi^r ; at the IfiMt date indeed the production had reacdied a point l)e\ond which it s(^ar<'ely seemed iiecc-isary to go. In t ln' yeac en ling .May. I!) 10, ;i2i ////'. riMEs iiishh;) or rui: w m. thti iiiiiiilMir lit ltitiiiti>^ was iiiiiltiplifl '.i'.i tiiiws, ami 111 the ^.iiiu- |itiri<><i tlu' wtu^hl ot th«i ux- ptoHtvi^ iriiittiiiiiei ill tliiMik iiK rtni.st<il 1.10 tiiiitM 111 Dim yt'ur th»' niit|iiit «it ritln ami rf\<»l\i)r curti'iilgtM WHH iifitrly lrt4>le(l, for i-alliii>{ (lit- wiHtkly pntiliiit It'll 1(1(1 111 ,)imc, |!l|.">, it \mi^ 2HU ill th»i ioiliiuiii^ .liimi ami 2{)(> in NovKiiiiirr, lUKi. Similar »uivaiictis witrn niiuli' in aiiiiUi\ aiiiiiaiiiitioii. It tli« average \vet*kl^ |ii'ii(liicti(iii at the ttiiii (it° June, 1915, btt taken as 1, tluwi Ku* ISpoiiiulers it was iik <m the average tor I lie BueeeiM^liiig year, 17^ in th«' last week ot .lime. 191G, ami 41? in the week ending N'ovomher 2.">. For 4o-inch fieUl howitzers it increased trom a wooklv axerage represented on the same bcisls as 8 in I'Jl.") Hi, to 27 at the end of .lime, and to -in in November. The improvement iu ammunition for iiuMliiim guns and howit/.ers was (At'n mori' m;nlvid, tiie <u)rres[)onding figure for tiie weekly uveragi" rising to '.ii\ at the end of .lune, 1910, and to (ili in Xo\ ember. as compared vvitli an average of 7.1 in 191")- Hi ; while the supplies for heavy howitzers (aboxc <>-inch) grew in a not less striking manner, from 22 in 191.1-lU to 94 in .Inly, l!)l(i, iiiid to 32:i hi the following November. The matter nuiy be put in a still more gi'iiphic way, by stating the time needed near the end of 1910, to produce a number of shells equal to the whole output in the (irst year of the war, from August. 1914. to .\ugust. 191."). For IS- pounder shells this was 8.1 days, for Held howitzer .shells 8 days, for shells for medium guns and howitzers 5i tlays, and for projectiks for heavy guiis and howitzers little more than one day. The progress made during tin- autumn may be gauged from the fact that, speaking in the House of Commons iu the middle of August, .Mr. Montagu, then the Minis- ter of Munitions, ga\(5 the equi\-alent figures a.s three weeks, two weeks. 11. days and fom- days for the same four classes of ammunition. Intleed towards the end of 1910, the 'weekly output of 155 mm. shells was tlu-ee times, of 200 mm. shells five times, and of 230 nun. shells three times as great ivs the production during the whole of the first year of the war ; and in one week in November the number of shells completed or filled was about 30 per cent, greater than the stock of munitions held iu reserve at the outbreak of war. This increase in t{uantity was accompanied by an improvement in (juality. Every maker of shells has to steer between two dangers — to avoiii theScyllaof " prematures," whi(^li burst as tliey are being fired and damag.i the gun, and the ('haryiulis of "blinds" or 'duds,' whieli either do not e.\plode at all or <'\plode .so lati , perhaps after they have buried themselves in the ground, as "to do lit lie or no hurm to the enemy. I'lvery army, the (Jerman included, had experience of failures of both the.se kinds At the battle of Loos, as Mr. Lloyd (.'eorge informed the House of Commons, our ■pre- matures " wtwe so bad that we had to give up liring such high explosive shells as we ha«t. The (iermans and the i''icii(li g.iiiKid their experience of such shells in Kebriiary and Mareli, 191"), but ours cam*' montlis later, be(;au.se we (ired .scarcely any high explosives till late in t h it year. Then we in turn had to l(^arn how to eliminate the dangerous tilement, and wi; were so sueees.sful tfiai .Mr. Lloyd George was able to declare in I Im middle of .\iigust, 191(), thai oiii- ■■ |)fematun;s " iiad become .so few a.s to bt! almost negligible. .Vt the same time he stated that the number of "blinds" was gradiiall\' and steadily decreasing with im- provements in the j)roces.ses of manufacture and in the fuses and filling. In this connexion a great |)art was playe<| by tlie inspectors antl examiners whose duty it was to see that the shells and fuses complied strictly with the specifications laid down. The staff available for this pur[)ose was exiguous at the beginning of the war, and had to b(; gradually built up to keep pace with the growth in the output of aiiimunitioii. There was a sinali body of artiller\' officers who possessed the necessary knowledge and experitmce, and with their aid a large number of engineers were specially trained at the Ordnance College to act as inspectors and assistant inspectors all over the eoimtry. The examiners who, under the supervision of the inspectors, handle the gtiuges and carry out the actual operations of inspection had also to be found and trained. In August. 1910, the staff employed in the Inspection Department umnbered about 30,000, of whon\ 14.000 were women. To turn from anmiunition to artillery, when the Ministry of Munitions came into existence, the output of the factories equipped for tlie mauufactiue of big guns was uuxstly ab-sorbtni bv the Na\y, and the armament firms had m>t sufficient plant to undertake more than a mere fraction of the gun progranuue of the .\rmy. It therefore became necessary to pro\id»< them with \erv large extensions, equipped with new THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAli. 823 inacliiuery, ami tliis task \\a« iiii<lertokeu so vigorously that in little more than a year new buildings occupying an area of 1,000,000 square feet had sprung into existence, with over 2,500 new machine tools at work in them. In ad- dition to the armament firms hundreds of other engineering concerns all over the country- were engaged in contributing a share to the carrying out of the programme, by constructing gun-carriages, ammunition wagons and the various accessories and spares required for artillery. The coiLsequence was that if the niunber of guns manufactured durmg the first year of the war be called 100, then in the second year the production of 18-pounders was 240, of 4o-inch pieces 654, of medium guns (60 pounders and 6-inch) 1,848, and of heavj- guns (above 6-inch) 623. But the.se figiu-es did not by anj'^ means repre.sent the limit of productive capacity, and the output continued to grow, at least for the natures of which an increase was needed by the armies in the fiekl. Thus for the first four months of the third year of the war the output of medium guns wa.s represented by 1,200, and of heavy guns by 363, these figures being equivalent, even sup- posing the rate not to be increased, to 3,600 and 1,089 respectively for the whole year. That the output of 18-pounders and 4'5-inch howitzers showed a diminution in the four months period, the figures for them being 45 and 1 04, was accounted for by the fact t hat the equi|>ment of the Hritish Army in such field pieces ha/l become approximately complete, so that the plant which had been employed for their manufacture could be utilized for othei- jjurjKWf*!. But the production of medium and heavy calibres continued Ut grow, and if the average number of them turned out monthly in the first y«*Hr of the war b<- taken as 100, then the output of the former in the five weeks ending Dwrernber 2, 1916, was 4,100 and of the latt^if 1.250. About machine guns and rifles the .same t^il'- has to Ik! told. 'I'aking 100 to represent tin- t^jtal number of machine; guns deliven^fl to llie Army in the first year of the war, th(! corres- f>onding fii^un; at the enri of the w^eond yeiir wa*« 1,250 and 2,000 on December 2, I!) Hi, an<l Ihft wti*^U.\y firoduetirni in Novemfur, 1016, was more than four times gnrater than in Novern- \ifr, 1 911 The supfily of riflr-s is r>artir-ulitrl\ imfH»rtnrif mnee they are the chief fiu.-tor' limiting the ti\in\\H;T of men that can \\f pnt in the fielfl, while af the name fiinc terhnirnl manufacturing reasons leuder it an especially dinicult matter to increase the output of them ; yet we succeerleil in furnishing from home sources all the rifies, and also all the machine giuis, required for the equipment of our Armies overseas. The Royal Small Arms Factory, which assisted and coordinated the other factories, deserved the credit for this achieve- ment, and it was largely through its efforts that for every 100 rifles made per week iu luiie, 1915, 160 were made in the following June and 173 in November, 1916. In addition hundreds of thousands of rifles were repaired and re- sighted, the number which it was thus possible to return to .service being about equal to lialf the total production of new ones. But to build all these factories — which in .some cases completely transformed the ap- pearance of manufacturing to^vns. while in others they changed remote country districts into busj'^ industrial centres — and to fill them with machinerj- and tools was only half the battle ; labour had also to be found to work them, and that although large nmnbers of the skilled mechanics of the country had left the bench for the firing line. By inducing the trade unions to abandon the restrictive rules and customs which throttled production Mr. Lloyd George did much to increase the efficiency of the skilled workers who remained, and by the process known as '"dilution" this skilled nucleus was supplemented by the intro- duction of .semi-skilled and luiskilled workers, many of them women. The women indeed ro.se to the occrasion magnificently, and after some training in one of the \arious centres provided for that purpose proved themselves able to unflertake work which formerly- was regarded as the preserve of men, and often of liighly skilled men. Of some 500 proc(\sses in mnnitions manufaettire upon which uonu'n were engaged, two-thirds had luiver been per- formed by a woman before the war, an I in sonu^'of the national fatttories woman labour anionnted to as nmch as 95 per cent, of the whole. At th«! f-nrl of the .second year ol iIk; war some 400,000 wonusn were employed under tli<- .Ministry of Munitions, and they were not nicTcly attending to automatic mat;hin(!s u hi<h go on pnjducing ref)etition work so long us they are fed with new material, but wore als(» carry- ing out the uwrr intricate operations of the machine-shops. In some vmm'h mechiuu'cwil iip|>lianc(;s enabled ihem to rieal uilli \\ei;^dilK (snith MM 9'2-inch shells) which in general might S-J4 ////. ii.MHs ms'iDHY or' riir: wur ttti MuppuHuil to bu 1m.)^uui1 their htreui^lli ; iiL'UuicI, the 12 natitiimt |>M>jt)c;tiie t'ac-torim rulrrrtnl to tthovo ui-rc hirj^itly updratml by uoiikfii, uii>l Mr. Montagd .stattul in August, l!»l»>, that abuut 15,000 were ah'oatly I'mployctl lit tluMii. They also fouiul tht-ir way into tin- heavier branches ol j^ceneral engineering work, an<l oix*^ engineer, who was not singular in his opinion, went so far as to declare that when they had had two gears' more I'xperionce he et)uld huihl a battleship fonipleto from keel to •lerial entirely with the aiil of their labour. The extensive employment of women was largely responsible for lht< fact that the Ministry of Munitions took special measures to iiujuire into questions of indu-<trial fatigue and the influence of hours of hdicmr upon outfjut. In the earlier days of the war the expedient of working long hours for seven days in the week was atlopteil rather indiscriminately, but it came to be realized that tliis was not the way to got the best out of the workers, who required reasonable periods of rest and recreation to maintain their productive capacity at its fullest. A Health of ^Munition Workers Com- mittee was appointed to consider and advise on matters of this kind, and one result was that Sunday labour was abolished .so far as possible in works umler the Ministry <>f Muni- tions. The establishment <>f a Welfare I)e- paiiiiienl at the Ministry, charged, under tiic dire<-tion of W-. H. S. Kowiitnu-, with a wide range of duties ooneerning the social and other conditions under which the employees worked, was a lei-ognition of the close relationship that exists between good industrial eii\ iroiiment and industrial efliciency. VN'omen wi^ifare super- visors with a roving commission as regards the indiLstrial wcll-l)«>iug of the girls wc^n- made obligatory in all the national faetorios, their functions being to assist in selecting employees suitable for particular work, to investigate urievances and ca.ses of dismissal, and to advise ill coiuH'xion with such things as the pro\i.sioii of hygienic conditions, canteens for the supply of proper food, recreation rooms and lodgings. It was fuuiid that attention to matters of this sort, as well as to conditions of defective lit^lit- iiifi;, luMting and ventilation, had a berK^ficial influence on both (puility and (luantity of out- put, and tended to improve the relations hclwi'cii tiie management and the workers. The ?iotes w/iic/i face tJie pic- tures are from Mr. PeJUielT s 0W71 descriptions of his work. Plate 1. MAKING PIG IRON: THE BASE OF THE BLAST FURNACES. Across the great work avenue, halj filled with plots, not of flowers but patterns of cooling metal, are other furnaces seen amid rising smoke and steam. Plate 2. ^-^-^- Plate 2. FROM THE TOPS OF THE FURNACES. A subject like one seen from the top of a sky-scraper — only that is soundless, this is endless sound. From the sky-scraper you look do'uon on little dots of men ; here on trains and cranes. And as you look a charge is emptied into the furnace — and ct whole place bursts into flame, trembles, roars, then sighs and dies away. Alzvays down below the little figures ivJieel barrows and push carts. Plate 3. Plate 3. THE GREAT TOWER: PIG IRON. From the blast furnaces the iron is brought to this yard, and carried by the cranes to the floor, to be seized by the great tongs and jaws and thrust into the furnaces and turned into steel. a. Id Plate 4. " BOTTLING" THE BIG SHELL This shop Ik) as an old factory where a big press had been set up. The walls had all been whitewashed, and against them the press and the figures told stunningly. The crane which was to carry the big shells from the furnace to the press zvas not ready, and the ivork zvas done by men. In these zvorks it is seldom you see " the man power!' Wh-' IS. % ■=^v »• «f Plate 5. THE SHELL FACTORY. One of tlie shell faclories that have (frozen tip all over the country ivithin the last year. Plate 6. hj^. Plat4 6. FINISHING SHELLS. Iikl ^^Kt~i--. Plate 7. CUTTING AND TURNING A BIG GUN. The big gun stood on a great trestle, and all the while the great lathe or plane kept turning and turning at the end of it; once in a zcJiile a man would look at it, or do sojiiething to it, or pick up steel shavings, but all the zvhile the machine kept turning, and all the zvhile nothing seemed to happen; it was all silent, ceaseless force. Plate 8. THE GUN SHOP. J/VhcJi the guns arc forged, cither whole or in part, they are brought into the gun shop, bored and planed. They conw in silently, high in air, and then are lowered in place, lie in rows, in ^iles, in masses, ivaiting their turn to be finished. Plate 8. - ^ \^. -^ Plate 9. \m Plate 0. THE NEW GUN PIT. The nczv pits arc like tJic old, only they arc in a great hall, and instead of monstrous furnis, there are marvellous effects- suggest ioJis in mighty, lofty vagueness. Plate 10. BRINGING IN TEIE GUN. On one side zuas the river, on the other "the bank" ; betzveen, the glass and iron palace, where the great Jiirret zvas being built. Then the engine dragged in a gun to be fitted in the turret. Plate 10. '^^ oi f^^V' -i^f --t^^^**'^*?^'*?;'**'*^?**?**^'^' t''^rf?sfr"i*.--fe^>'a'^'rvi - A.'ati,,<-,7-,--- '■. ^-■.e!rH»^— .- — :-:T' Y-'SfiT iiiib'ia''--'" ■•^r . *.-<i^ -.;^.-- 'v Plate 11. BUILDING THE GREAT TURRET. Storey above storey, all glass ajid iron, rises the shop zvhere the great turrets are built, and below the floor in deep pits their bases stand. This is the other end of the shop in the previous picture. The open part of the turret made a design — the Pediment of War and Labour. Here was the Greek idea carried out by British i\jorkmcn, and no British artist has ever seen it. But from something of this sort in Greece, Greek artists got their scheme of decoration when they were building the earliest temples. Plate //. Plate 12. FITTIXG GUNS IX Tll^RETS. T/icsc sinci/lci' i^'inis u'c/r hciiii!; /if ted in a turret in another shop. They air put in ami then the turret is tiied. Piatt 13. THE OLD SHIPYARD. Here were merchant ships being built. The ships just grew, and the cranes came and helped to build them. w Plate 14. THE GANTRY. A mcrcliant shipyard. The gantry ivas more like those I have seen in Germany. J I ^y-^ Plate 15. THE GREAT CRANE. Plate 15. ^r- ^-^ ■'^««^:' f^-"^ Plate 16. THE BALLOON SHED. Around and about, all over the plain, the birds and bugs lie at rest, their wings making zvonderful lines against the sky, ivonderfid colours on the grass. Then they stir and hum, and skim over the ground, and roar, and rise into the air, and sail azuay, and only the huge empty shed remains, and the long box on a lorry zvhich, too, is leaving, with the sign on it: " Mesopotamia via Cardiff^' zvhither another air machine is being shipped. It CHAPTER CLXIII. DECLINE AND FALL OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT: JUNE, 19 1 5, TO DECEMBER, 191 6. Chaeacter axd History of the Coalition — Its Early Achievements — Finance and Thrift — Food Problems — Control of Wheat Supply — Promise of a "Food Controller" — Munitions and Labour — ^The Clyde and South Wales — Size of the Cabinet — A War Com- sottee — Conscription — Ireland— Mr. Hughes's Tour — ^The Paris Economic Conference — The Parliamentary Register — Reform of the General Staff — Air Policy — Pensions — The Urgent Problem of Man-Power- — Admiralty Changes — ^The Crisis — Mr. Lloyd George Acts — ^The History of Seven Days — Mr. Asquith Resigns— Mr. Lloyd George Prime Minister — ^The Xew Government — Mr. Lloyd George and "Peace Talk" — ^The New Policies. IX earlier chapter.-! an account has Vjeeu given of the circum-stanoes which led up to the formation in May-June, 1915, of a Coalition Government, of the gradual failure of voluntary recruiting anrl the adop- tion in Great Britain of compulsory military service, and of some outstanding episodes in domestic history, of which the most momentous was thf Irish R^jlx-llion of .Af)ril, I91(>. It is now necessary to review the chequensd career of the Coalition Government, to tracfs the courwi of its du'lining fortunes, and to show how, in l)<:(M;m\xr, I'.iKi, Mr. Lloyd George succeeded Mr. Asquith as Prime .Minister and converted tlwi Cabinet into a small war execu- tive, which was U> Ix; supported by in w Minis- tries for the control of food and shifjf)ing, for la^KJlJ^, fx-nsions, and the air, and with exfjerts ill [>\fu:i; of f>oliticiariH at the hrad of some of the mf«t imfjortant def>artments. Tli*» Coalition Cabinet, as w»ih r:xf)lHinr'd in des/;ribing its formatif>n, " marked a definite and trumt rie*;eMHary stage in thf proeeHs of n7filru;ing part,y Government by a Government ffif War,'" It Wfis "undoubtedly Htrongr-r " Vol. X.— Part 127. 32C than Mr. Asquith's Liberal Government, but it was " too much to expect that it would show itself permanently more efliciont than its pre- decessor." For its membership " was limited to the politicians, and party considerations were still the basis of its composition," and " it was likely to suffer, oven more than its predecessor, from its own unwieldj' bulk, which necessarily hampered the swift decisions required of a Cabinet in time of war "* Those I>redictions and fears were more than justified in the event. For eighteen months the Coali- tion Government proved in almost every sphere of war direction and war administra- tion that it was stronger than its predecessor, but not strong enough, that it atitcid more swiftly, but yet acted too late, that its measures wr^re In^tter H<lapted to t]ui needs of the time than the measures of the; first yc^ar of war, but yi^i were almost invariably only half measures. Hy fur- the most remarkable success of the wliole period was the Hueeess of the policy which took shape in the establishment of the Mini.stry of Munitions and lh(! passing of tho • Vol. v., |). nzo. 3'2r, THE TIMNS UISToltY OF Tlli] WAR. Munitioith of Wav Act. It will bo nunmulmn-d that tlu> ilisflojjurnH of The. Times in May, lUlo, hhovviug tlmt, ill thu IJritish attacks at Fro- uiflloM atul Kiclioliourg, '" tim want of an iiii- liiuittHl supply of hi^h expiosivos wtw a fatal htir to our aiicceHs," rually gave the Ijist blow to the tottering LilitM-al Ministry. Tlie wliolu uituation was transfonned under the Coalition Government, with Mr. JJoyd CJeorge as Min- ister of MunitioiLS and suhse<(uently as Minister of War, anil a year's work i-ulniinat«>d in the Battle of the Sonum. Yet the life of the the cost of whatever sacrifie(*s, and evt^i- more intolerant of the flovernnu-nt's conduct of blockade policy, air pt)li(ry, labour i)olicy, food policy, shipping policy, and t*ven naval policy. Again and again Mr. Asipiitli waa urged to reduce his unwie]dy Cabinet of 23 — a Cabinet many of whoso nienibt^rs were suffering from pliysical «».\haiLstion— and to place th<t real conduct of affairs in a few able hands. But the situation dragged on, until at last the Coalition died, as it woiv, a natural death. 'J'here was some talk of intrigue, but in MR LLOYD GEORGE, MR. RUNCIMAN GOAL-OWNERS Coalition saw disappointment after disappoint- ment — the comparative failure of tlie Battle of Loos, the Balkan fiasco, wliich ended in the overthi'ow of Serbia and Montenegro and the opening of the German road to Turkey, the withdrawal from the Dardanelles, the tragedy of Kut, the second Balkan fiasco and over- running of Rumania. It took the Coalition a wliole year to proceed from the taking of a National Register to the passing of the second Military Service Act, and even that legislation was of such a kind that in less than six months there was no more urgent problem than the problem of Man Power — and meanwhile a host of other problems were accumulating. Public opinion became ». 'k^er more insistent in its demand for vigorous conduct of the wai-, at AND MR. HENDERSON AT CARDIFF. MEET THE reality the end had long been inevitable, and wlien it came it was hailed with ahnost universal relief. ■' There was little tUsposition, either in the country or in the House of Commons, with its party lines now obliterated, to criticize the Coalition Government in the first month or two of its existence. In a speech on June 15, 1915, in which he asked for a new Vote of Credit of £250,000,000, Mr. Asquith enlarged upon the repugnance with which he had undertaken the task of reconstruction. Ho spoke of the " upheaval " wlxich he had " brought about, for the time being," of " this ti-ansformation of the normal conventions, the inveterate traditions and the well-settle«l practice of our political m ^H Ov 1-^ ^ ^^ f\J >* nJ D <—> . fc to Q •OH OS "u <: •a u "js u 4> H a <(; 'e en J3 OS 4-1 Z o 4-( ^H S u i. en T3 U ►J <i; ^ a a B o H m D 3 .C O «rf en a •** U 4> S 3 H 4<4 o a <U z T» 35 en a Cd as a Q TJ Q 4-1 <: (d 3 •OB U 3 o s Di - O « o Q >^ O 327 328 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. u ■ec u O It u •o o 12 s Ov OS a CQ H u C J3 4J« « .3 o H H CT U o: O Z o u z o z u a <: OS u X H b C o z z u O X H r .-2 u V — u a p. U OS a u 03 O. t >. M "a v.- V c J3 O r c a o U THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 329 life " *' The word ' coalition,' " he said, " has not a pleasant savour in the vocabulary of British politics," and he gave instances in which the name recaUed " ill-assorted, and in the results more or less ill-starred, arrangements which, with the best intention?, were proved by experience to be lacking in practical efficiency." He added : It is a great, and, as many people consider, a hazardous experiment that none of us would have chosen. . . . Our friends in the country on both sides are, as everybody knows, doubtful, suspicious, bewildered, perhaps pained. But the truth was that, to all but irre- deemable party politicians, to whom considera- tions of persons, of place, and of votes are as the breath of their nostrils, the change was welcome as giving rise to hopes that the war would henceforth be prosecuted in the more vigorous and enlightened spirit which events h^d shown to be in-gently needed. For a time the new combination showed more energy than its predecessor in the work of mobilizing the nation on a war footing. Before Parliament adjourned at the end of July Ministers had certain achievements to their credit. The National Registration Bill, which was passed after some opposition from those who .saw in it the thin end of the wedge of conscrip- tion, had for its object the rliscovery of the present occupations of every person in the country between the ages of 16 and 65 (with certain exceptions) and whether he or she was skilled in and able and willing to perform any other than the work (if any) at which he or she was at the time employed, and if so, the nature thereof. So far as it went, the Registration Law was a u-seful, if belated, preUminary to national organization. On June 22 a second War Loan was issued, which, introduc^jd without warning and backed by a great outbiirst of advertisements, had, by July 10, wlien it closed, produced a sum of about £000,000,(»f»(). Tlw) War Ijctan was followed by a so-called campaign for thrift, to the vital necessity of which the atUsniion of the fJovemrnent had b»M;n cr>ntinually directed by The Times. This campaign, so far as the Oovemrnent wen- concerned, wjis inaugurat<rd by Mr. Asquith, who, in a spe,e,ch at the fiiiilfjhalt, on June 20, urged the importance of reducing pernonul exf>«nditure and incroai'ing savings. " If you save more," he said, *' you can lend the State more, and the nation will he |<roportioruAte1y enabled to pay for the war out nf Hh own pockfft. If you syjond less you either reduce the cost and volume of our imports or you leave a larger volume of commodities available for export." But the force of this appeal was considerably modified in the eyes of the public by the fact that the Government themselves set a thoroughly bad example. Not only the Admiralty, the War Office and the rest of the Government departments were squandering money without stint, but the expenditure of local administrative bodies was proceeding unchecked. On July 8 Lord St. Davids invited the Government to appoint a departmental committee to consider suggestions for the improvement of the public service during the war. Lord Crewe threw lukewarm water on the proposal. He held out no hopes that the Government would adopt it. But before the end of the month a Retrench- ment Committee had been appointed. While it pursued its investigations, the neces- sity for saving continued to be urged upon the public by the Parliamentary War Savings Committee, who sought to bring home to women especially the part which they could play in reducing expenditure and waste. Their exhortations fell, for the most part, on deaf ears. Money, the result of high wages, was plentiful, and women, with their more primitive instincts, preferred rather to put it on their backs than in the banks. Food, mainly im- ported from abroad, had " risen " less than wages and was also plentiful, and the average housewife's ideas of economy were mdimentary. Economic arguments were useless in the face of pubhc extravagance. Nothing short of compulsion could suffice to produce serious results. By November Mr. Asquith was able to report that certain recommendations had been made for reform in expenditure on Army rations, but he showed no inclination to take st^'ps in the direction of enforcing general economy. Mr. McKenna, the Cliancellor of the Exchequer, did indeed announce the incubation of a new scheme for making a i)Hrticulrtr form of thrift more attractive, by (enlarging th(i facilities for investing in War Loan Stock, but when, in December, ho addressed a conference of (irganized labour <m the subject he found tliat he liad mischosen his audience. There (ixiHt«-d in tnuny sections of the working classes — and of oth«T classes as well— a desire to " make liay while the sun shines," and this tend(>ncy was in ri') way discouraged by Mr. Asquith's point- hiank rtifusal to reduce Ministerial salaries. Ministers afjparently lacked (iie vision and 127—2 330 THK TIMKS lUSTiUtV OF Till': WAli. THE AUSTRALIAN Ox-teams arriving enthusiasm to realize for themselves the effect of an example of self-sacrifice. Wliile private local effort ilid much visefiil work by house-to- house visiting on a comparatively limited scale, the Government tlid nothing to warn the public tliat the sun would not shine for ever. At Christmas, 1915, The Times urged that a list should be published of " a few of the main articles in which saving is most needed in the national interest," wliile a number of the best- known men in the City reinforced its arguments with a manifesto in favour of economy. They pointed out that " the nation's energies must be completely concentrated upon the production of all really essential things," and that the production of all non-essentials must be wholly stopped. They further urged that " not only must the nation avoid the consiunption of all non-essentials, but must even restrict the consumption of essentials to the limit of efficiency." It was not until the end of January, 1916, that the Home Secretary, Mr. Samuel, in a speech in which he admitted that the Govern- ment appeal " had in the main fallen on deaf ears "' (though he did not mention the irue causes, namely, the Government's failure to combine exaiuple with precept), declared that *' he doubted very much whether anything WHEAT HARVEST. at a railway station. short of severer taxation and more rigid re- strictions in the supplies of articles of un- necessary consumption would really have the desired effect." At the same time Mr. Rvm- ciman. President of the Board of Trade, an- nounced that restrictions or prohibitions would be imposed on the importation of certain bulky commodities. Thus tardily the Government were awaking to the situation. They further took steps to carry out the recommendations of a committee appointed on December 7 to consider the best means of obtaining contri- butions to War Loans from the " small investor" and the working classes, wliich included a scheme to create voluntary local organizations all over the country for stimulating savings and bringing them to the Exchequer. By the middle of July, on the occasion of a War Savings \\'eek, organized by the National War Sa\'ings Committee, The Times was able to say : The spirit prevuiliiig to-day throughout the country is very different from that of a year or six months ago. The foohsh eotnphicenpy wliich too long encouraged the indolent and s.'If-seeUing has been changtd by itc« nt events [the Battle oi the Soinnie] into a juster appiveia- tion of the national trial. Men who at one time seetned only concerned about their own "rights" now avow their readiness to make any sacrifice for the good of tite war. And that sj)irit hius been shown in the tnatter of war saving, too. Closely allied with tlie nu(>stiou of fmaiioial THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 331 economy were the questions of food economy and supply. The war was gradually resolving itself into a trial of endurance, in which the food problem was to assume an increasing im- portance. By the middle of June, 1915, The Times was urging upon the Government that it was high time to think about the country's food supply, and demanding that the new President of the Board of Agricultiu-e, Lord Selborne, should take action and give the required lead. In Lord Selborne had been chosen a man with first-hand knowledge both of farming at home and of the resources of the Empire overseas. Without delay he appointed a special committee, under the presidency of Lord Milner, who had as his colleagues Lord Inchcape, one of the first authorities on ship- ping and freights ; Mr. A. D. Hall, Mr. Rowland Prothero, and Mr. Edward Strutt, all pioneers in practical agricultural management and research ; Sir Harry Verney and Mr. Acland, representing the Board of Agriculture, old and new ; Mr. Charles Fielding, a well-known business man who had made a special study of the question of food supply ; and Mr. J. A. Seddon, representing the interests of labour. A few days later a similar committee was appointed for Scotland. In exactly a month Lord Milner's committee presented an interim report in which they recommended that farmers should be encouraged to grow more wheat by being guaranteed a minimum price of 45s. a quarter for the four years following the harv^est of 1916. The Scottish Committee considered and rejected this proposal and the Government decided against it. The main reason given by Lord Selborne, in announcing this decision towards the end of August, was that " the navy have the submarine menace well in hand." He added that the area undei wheat had already been largely increased and that very large crops were reported from Canada and Aus- tralia. For these reasons the Government were not prepared to incur the additional financial Uability involved in the guarantees. But he warned farmers that they were going to have great difficulties in getting labour and machinery, and outlined a large scheme of organization and cooperation, in which the County Councils would act as a medium between the farmei"s and the Board of Agriculture. His forecast as to difficulties about labour was soon to be fulfilled. A discussion in the House of Com- mons in the Spring of 1916 revealed a very TUF', AUSTRALIAN WHFAT HAKVFST. Shipping wheal sil Adelaide. 38'i rut: riMKs history or riii': wah. uiudittutactory utute of tliiiigu. Owing to tint lauk of Uboiir, tliuru wtw no hupe of luuiutain- iiig the level of production of the previouH year. Kturinera were uoia[)ltiiiiing of the lack of luhour btifore the war, and the withdrawal of a quarter of a million men for the Army hatl not heen compensated for by the reg4Mt<»ring of 35,000 women for farm work. It was noccsHary to (JomntiHHionerH, with Lord Crawford a« chair- man, with full power to purchase, sell and control the delivery of wheat and flour in the United Kingd(jm, and to take Huch HtepM aB might soom desirahle for n»aintaining the su|)ply. The popular outcry causiul by the riso in prices at thi.s ptu'iod, bawd larg<»ly on the belief that undue profits were being made, was A TYPICAL SOUTH WALES re-employ soldiers stUl in the preliminary stages of their training. The employment of prisoners of war, of interned aliens and of ■' conscientious objectors " to military service was naturally suggested, but at the time met with little support from the farmers themselves. It was not tintil October, 1916, that the Government decided to control the wheat supply. There had, indeed, been a Cabinet Committee on Food SuppUes since a very early period in the war, which had repeatedly arranged for the purchase of large quantities of wheat and their gradual sale in the covmtry. In April, 1915, the Government decided not to make any further purchases of wheat, on the ground that their operations had had the effect of restricting normal trade. But at the end of the year arrangements were again made for the accumulation of stocks, and a joint inter- national policy of wheat purcliase was arranged with the French an<l • Italian Governments. \Vhat the Government did now was to appoint MINING SCENE: TREHAFOD COLLIERY. met by a Report of the Food Prices Committee and by a statement in the House of Commons by Mr. Runciman that there was no evidence of exploitation. It has been seen that the Government had decided in August, 1915, that the submarine menace was " well in hand," and that therefore no action was necessary on the proposal of the Milner Committee to guarantee a minimimi price for wheat. But in November, 191G, the submarine menace, so far froin being " well in hand," was at least as serious as it had been in the worst period of the preceding year. The Government had gambled on the hope that the war would somehow or other come to an end in 1916. But meanwliilo the lack of tonnage, partly due to the renewed submarine activity, was contributing fo a fiu'tlier riso in prict>s. There was an uneasy feeling in the country that the submarine menace might be moi-e serious than was admitted and that the Ad- miralty was not sufficiently alive to it. A oiy THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W4B. 333 went up for the more efficient arming of merchantmen. On November 15 Mr. Runciman made a speech in the House of Commons which showed that the Government had at length made up their minds to "do something." Apologising for the drastic character of his proposals, though the only complaints made of them were that they were not drastic enough, he announced the appointment of a " Food Controller " with extensive powers. The Government also pro- posed to take powers iinder the Defence of the Realm Acts to proceed against persons who wasted food ; to prescribe the purposes for which articles of food might or might not be used ; to regulate the manufacture of certain articles of food, and particvilarly of flour ; and, if necessary, to regulate the sale and distribu- tion of food and to regulate market operations and " corners." Mr Wardlo, who welcomed the proposal, in the name of the Labour mem- bers, pointed out that Mr. Runciman's con- fession that he had been forced to enter upon a course which he was reluctant to take involved a condemnation of the inaction of Ministers in the past. The new regulations were published on November 18. But even now, to the astonishment of the country, which was only waiting to be controlled, no Food Controller was forthcoming. The truth was that INIr. Riuici- man's promise had been made without any measiires having been considered for carrying it out, and it does not appear that the Prime Minister ever gave his consent to the new appointment. The most important of the early achieve- ments of the Coalition Government was the passage of the Munitions of War Act, introduced by Mr. Lloyd George, the newly appointed Minister of INIunitions. This Act, which, among other provisions, svispended trade union regulations restricting output and limited the profits of employers, raised hopes that the f:MANr;iNG shims at f-ontypkidd. Inset : A ((roup of miners' wivcn and children at ('oed \'Ay.[ 834 THl': TIMKS HISTOHY OF THE WAli. luitjatinfactury ivIutioiiH 8till uxmtiug hetwtHin miipluyeru and tuiipluywl vvoiild he plac-tnl ui)ua a. morti healthy ba«in. 'I'hwbe huptM wert* iiulely hhatterud hy th» South WaleH cual iniuM'H, to whom, art han btniii ilnHcribeil ill VoIuiuh \'., C'lmfJter XC, Mr. Lloyd CJnorge was ohligt'il to luaku huiiiiliatiiig coiu-uHHionrt. The trouble, as 7'Ae TiineH pointed out, arose from the attempt to maintain the onlinary peace relations in war time. The men liad never been convinced Meanwhile the laboiu' situation could not but fill the (jovernment with anxiety. The Trades l^nion Congress at Hristol in Septenibor gave Ml. I.liiyd ( leorge an opportunity for a candid and courageous declaration of the failure of the working njan to carry o\it his obligations and of the inevitable ilisastiir which must follow unl»»ss he reformed his ways. At a confemnce of the Miners' Federation of Great 1 Britain in October a scheme for a triple alliance between WELSH MINERS AT THE MINE-HEAD. This well-clothed crowd contrasts with the men in working clothes on the preceding page. either of the necessity of an uninterrupted out- put or of the good faith of the employers. Nor, in view of the inertia of the Government and of the pettifogging attitude of some of the em- ployers, can it be said that the men were greatly to blame. The activity of a small section of irreconcilables, fostered, as was believed, by German propagancUsts, unduly influenced the main bulk of the miners, who in their hearts were no less determined than any other sec- tion of the working classes to win the war. Notliing but strong action by the Govern- ment could have any effect, and this was not to come vmtil the war had U»sted for over another year. minei-s, railwaynien and transport workers was adopted imanimously. In the following Au gust this alliance was to make demands upon the Government upon questions connected with demobilization after the war, to which Mr. Asquith had little difficulty in replying. The deficiency of skilled labom- greatly hampered the operations of the JNliiiistry of Munitions, which by November 8 already controlled 1,070 works antl factories. A nmnber of great new national factories were approaching completion. • There were nearly 1,000,000 workpeople em- ployed in establisluncnts where there were no profits, or only limited profits, for the pri\ate employer. One of the achievements of the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 335 Ministry had been to centralize the purchase of all materials for all the Allied Governments Another had been to place all the important tool-makers under Government control. But iinless fresh supphes of skilled men could be found large numbers of semi-skilled and vm- skilled workers, both men and women, who were offering their services could not be ade- quately utihzed. Further, there existed in some districts complaints that employers were taking advantage of the Munitions Act to treat their men harshly. To meet the emergency, Lord Murray of Elibank was appointed to act temporarily as Director of Recruiting for ^Iiinitions Work, while in the matter of grie- vances the messages brought back by parties of munition workers who had visited the front and seen for themselves the urgent need for in- creased output did something to make the workers at home realize the truth about the war. By December it had been found neces- sary to amend the Mtuiitions Act in such a HOTBI. MF.THOPOLE, LONDON Taken over by Ministry of Munitions in 1916. rriann<;r hh to remove inoHt of tho gri(»vunceii arit«in^ from itn working. .Mr. Lloyd (iforgo waH indofatigabic in addreHHing d(!putution.s and rne^jtingH of workpeople on th« riocesHity for thoroiighgoing dilution of labour — a point on which, r«!gardK'HH of th • .MiinitionH Act, the extrwnfj H«ctionH oi the inon hud rernaiiiod obdurato, and which whh not Hcfct.lod in the Clydo diHtrict until the following Juno. In un eloquent and prophetic speech to trade union officials and Glasgow he said : I wonder how many people realize the magnitude of the war and the tremendoiis issues that depend upon it. Sometimes I fear that they treat it as a passing shower — heavy, drenching perhaps, but transient — soon the sun will shine again and quickly dry up tlie puddles, and we can once more walk along the same old roads in the same old shambling way. But this is not a passing shower, it is not a spell of bad weather — it is the deluge it is a convulsion of Nature. If you will carefully watch GREAT CENTRAL HOTEL. Another of the large buildings early commandeered by the Government. what is going on in the belligerent lands you \vill find that this war is bringing unheard-of changes in the social and industrial fabric. It is a cyclone wliich is tearing up by the roots the ornamental plants of modem society and wrecking some of the flimsy trestle bridges of modern civilization. It is an earthquake which is upheaving the very rocks of European life. It is one of those seismic disturbances in which nations leap forward or fall back generations in a single bound. All this chaffering about relaxing a rule here and suspending a castom there is out of place. You cannot haggle with an earthquake. . . . If the truth of these words had been taken to heart by the Coalition Government, it would have been better both for them and for the country. By January 1, 1916, a total of 2,422 estab- lishments had been declared as controlled under tho Munitions Act, and by March 27, .'5,.'1.'J7.* Tho Hotel Motropole, in Northumbor- iaiid Avenue, was taken over by tho Ministry of Munitions — the first of a ruimber of great public and private builduigs in London to be " commandeered " by tho State. Tho Govern- ment dealt with unwonted firnuiess with a Htrik«) in the (Jlydo area in April. Tho Hymi)athy of tho great majority of tho workmen was agaitiHt the agitators, as to whom Mr. Arthur Hentlerson, J'roHident of tho Board of Education • By August, 1910, there wnr« more than 4,000 con- troj|r-(| i!Htiibliu)iineiitH atul ().'> niitioiuil fiicturioH. Tho lattur wero working entirely for tlii' Army. 886 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. tuui Ctmirtiiuu of the Natioiml Advisory Com- luittuu ot" VV'Hr Output, dttflarmi vvitli great trutti that " thuru were thuHu cuuut)ctud with iudubti'ial ht'e ati there were with puhtical artairrt wlio, after 20 luontlia' uiiinec«»dented tightiiig, faileil tu roahze either the gruv e nutui'o of the potiitiuii i>i' the luagiiitude of the task wtiich thiti coiuitry and the AliieH had in hand." For Huch ii.s tlieae the pontpouenieut, by agreement, of the W'hitaiuitide holidays — the reuult of hohdays an UHual at Eanter had been to rtuluct* thu output 'of numitiojis by avoidable abiienteei»ni, ehtiniatod to represtrnt a shortage of output of 15,000,000 Bbsential tons a year, called forth from Mr. Awquith an appeal which wan not without effect. The main caurio of blackncKH among the minoix waH the belief that the owners alone profited by any increase in the coal raised. To the demand of the South Wales miners for an advance in wages of 15 per cent, the owners replied with a demand for a reduction of 10 per cent. In November, just 16 months since the last controversy had compelled the A CROWD OF CLYDE STRIKERS ON GLASGOW GREEN. one-half for a fortnight — had doubtless an educative effect. An appeal to postpone the August Bank Holiday was also, for the most part, patriotically observed. June saw a recrudescence of trouble among the South Wales miners, and in August the National Union of Railwaymen put forward a demand for an all-round increase of 10s. a week in wages. After prolonged negotiations an agreement was reached on the basis of an increase of 5s. on the war bonus of 5s. which had been granted by the railway companies in October, 1915. But the coal question remained grave, and the large amount of Government to intervene, matters reached a climax. The miners flatly refused to believe the contention of the owners that the increased cost of production had cancelled the advantage to them of the rise in prices, and they demanded a joint audit of the costs of production, which the owners refused, on the groimd that it involved " a departure from the customary method of procedure.'' Suddenly, on No^•em- ber 29, the Government took over the Welsh coal-field — a step wl\ich, though it came as a surprise to the men, was welcomed by many of them as a move in the direction of that nationalization of the whole mining industry THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 337 MR. HUGHES PRESENTED WITH THE FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF LONDON. MK. Mi'f;Hi:s iNsi'HcrriNf; the (.uard of honour of Australians IN the rjUILDIIALL YARD ()n the occasion of hi* reccivlnfj the I'recdom of the (^ity. 127—3 888 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. MR. HUGHES AS LL.D. OF EDINBURGH. One of the many honours conferred on the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth. which they had long demanded. It was, indeed, one more instance of the SociaHstic influence of the war, illustrated in the State control of railways, food, and other matters, and destined to leave its mark upon the industrial organiza- tion of the covmtry for all time. A few days later the Government granted the men's demand for a 15 per cent, advance, subject to the report of an independent auditor. The main defects of the Coahtion Govern- ment were variously attributed to the size of the Cabinet, its composition and the character of the Prime Minister hinself. That the Cabinet was too large was imquestionable, and was admitted frankly bv members of all parties. A body of 23 men of very vmequal degrees of ability, tiretl hy their dopartniontal laboujs, iiiid nietiting every few days for a couple of huuiH, was, indeed, an iiupoHsible machinery lor uiukiiig war. Ah early aw Sopteuiber, 191. 5, 'J'he Timea wuh urging tlie necessity of substi- tuting a smaller Cabinet, nineting every day. The result, it said, of the size of the Cabinet was " postponement, want of grip and pr«»- virtion, superficial and ill-considered i)lans, a failure to ' see the war steadily and see it whole.' " It added : For the j)iirf)08es of the war wo need a far Kiuallor Cabiiiot, fortiHi'd by a proper Goiioral Staff, and assisted (not dorninali'd) |jy lus many Spi^cial CoinrnittooB as may bo reqiiinul. Its ini'iiibor« should bo rohovod as far as poHciible from departmental detail, and thoy should moot every day for as tnany hours as may be necessary to take prompt, considered, and effective action. On November 2, 1915, Mr. Asquith, in a speech in which ho admitted the differences of opinion existing in the Government on the question of compulsory service, announced that it had been decided to create a War Committee for " the higher direction of the war." Ten days later the names of its members were given. They were to be the Prime Minister himself, the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Minister of Munitions, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Committee was to have the assistance of naval, military and diplomatic advisers. It will be seen that this Committee was still open to the objection that it was composed of heads of departments. It was welcomed, however, as a step in the right direction, and with the reconstitution of the General Staff and the prospective formation of a common War Cotincil among the Allies, there was reason to hope for a more efficient prosecution of the war. The formation of the War Committee was immediately followed by the resignation from the Cabinet of Mr. Winston Churchill, who, not being on the Committee, felt that he " could not accept a position of general responsibility for war policy without any effective share in its guidance and control." Mr. Churchill was doomed to discover that his services could very well be spared. The Cabinet had been more seriotisly weakened by the resignation, on October 12, of Sir Edward Carsoii, who pro- tested against the " gyi-ations " of the Govern- ment's policy in the Balkans These resignations were bvit the outward and visible signs of the internal dissensions- THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 339 which manifested themselves in the Govern- ment as each fresh problem arose for solution. There were months during which the Cabinet, while withholding from the public the realities of the situation, appeared incapable of arriving at any decision whatever. It is needless to recall the delays and hesitations which marked the introduction of compulsory military ser- vice, and the conflicting influences which revealed themselves in the half-hearted efforts of the politicians to adjust their ideas to the new conditions and the nation's need. The extraordinary' situation produced at the end of the year by Mr. Asquith's " pledge " to the married recruits has been fully described in Vol. \'III., Chap. CXXVI. That the tragic failure of the Dardanelles Expedition did not lead to a popular explosion was evidence not of the coiuitry's confidence in its leadei-s, but of its amazing self-control. Meanwhile the aberrations of the censorship exasperated and misled public opinion alike at home and in Allied and neutral countries. The year 1916 opened with the Coalition Cabinet faced by a verj' serious state of things. The Government had decided in the last week of 1915 in favour of compulsorily enUsting the large number of single men who had not attested voluntarily mider Lord Derby's re- cruiting scheme. On New Year's day it was announced that Sir John Simon had resigned as a protest against this decision. The new policy was embodied in a Bill which Mr. Asquith introduced into the House of Com- mons on January 5. As was shown in the chap- ter above cited there was at first considerable opposition from the Labovir Party, who decided to withdraw from the Coalition, and from the Xationalists, who voted in a body against the first reading, although Ireland was excluded from the operation of the measure. But public opinion was so unmistakably in favour of the proposals that the opposition steadily dwindled into insignificance. The three Labour Ministers withdi'ew their resig- nations on Mr. Asquith's giving a guarantee that the Bill would not be used as a weapon for industrial compulsion, and the Nationalists exchanged their first attitude of hostility for the more logical one of neutrality. With the passing of the first Service Bill on January 27 the Session came to an end. The new Session began on February 15, and in a short time the question of military service MK. JnJGHf',S'S VISIT TO TUF I'l.KKT He it Keen »peHkin^ (o a Khip'ti company. 2 a u Z 2 3 - X X « b S Ci] Q < Z o u u z u OS u Z o u en OS Qm M K H la u ■o '3 a a u a w la b a oa 340 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 341 again became the chief pre-ocupation of the country. The first Service Act had not long been in operation before it became clear that the number of single men provided by it was not sufficient to meet the national require- ments. A Cabinet crisis was postponed for a few days by the introduction of Mr. McKenna's Budget, which set out to raise the unpre- cedented revenue of £500,000,000. But no sooner was this out of the way than the situa- tion in the Cabinet became acute. On the eve of the Eeister recess Mr. Asquith announced that there were still " material points of dis- agreement in the Cabinet, and if these points are not settled by agreement, the resvdt must be the break-up of the Government." He added that the Cabinet was united in be- lieving that such an event would be national disaster of the most formidable kind. The matter was settled by a compromise, at which the House of Conunons, more states- manlike than the Ministry, refxised to look, and the intended Bill, which would have appUed compulsion to boys and old soldiers while leaving masses of unattested married men free from service, was never actually introduced. The Cabinet now decided to take the plunge. The second Service Bill, ex- tending the principle of compulsion to all men of military age, was introduced, and with its passage into law on May 25 the long re- cruiting controversy was closed, so far as the main principles of service was concerned. Meanwhile, the Government had been con- front<;d with the situation in Ireland, wliich appeared, for the moment, the gravest of all the grave fliniculties with which the Coalition iiad had to contend. The full history of the Irish rising has }>een given in Vol. VIII., f^hafw. C XXXIV. and CXXXV. It wUl be remembered tliat efforts were then made to bring n\xiiit a solution of the Irish questirm. It is only necessary to say here tliat the failure of the negotiations, although it might not b" final fis regarded Ireland, was a fresh blow to the prestige of the Gr^vemment, which was held U} fiave given another exhibition of help- I'nisnesH and lack of cohesion and driving power. At the F^egjnning of March, 1916, the iVime Minister of the Aiistralian Commonwealth, .VIr. W. -Vt. Hugh'js, refwjhod England on a visit which btsted lintil .June 24. I'assing tlirough Cana/la on his way, he hivl taken part in a (yabinet meeting at which rpiestions of war organization were discussed. He had also recently had a meeting with the Prime Minister of New Zealand. He came, therefore, with fresh and exceptional knowledge of the views of largo proportions of the Empire. On March 9 ho attended a meeting of the Cabinet — a land- mark in Imperial development for which the only precedent had been in July, 1915, when Sir Robert Borden had done the same. There- after he delivered in various parts of the country a series of astonishing speeches, which for their vigoiir and directness contrasted very favour- ably with the hesitating utterances of most English pohticians. His principal topics were the necessity of clearing British commerce from the aUen and hostile influence which German intrigue had everywhere woven into its fabric, the vital interconnexion between a nation's economic poUcy and national safety, and the urgent necessity of devising a policy for the British Empire as a whole. The following are typical examples of the idea which for many weeks he laid before enthusiastic audiences : I want to make ono thing quite clear, that what I am advocating is not merely a cliange of fiscal policy, not merely, or even necessarily, what is called Tariff Reform, although this may, probably will, incidentally follow, but a fundamental change in our ideas of government as appl'ied to economic and national matters. The fact is that the whole concept of modern statesmanship needs revision. But England has been, and is, the chief of sinners. Quito apart from the idea of a self-contained Empire there is the idea of Britain as an organized nation, organized for trade, for industry, for economic jastice, for national defence, for the preservation of the world's peace, for the protection of the weak against the strong. That is a noble ideal. It ought to be, it m\ist be, ours. . . . When I spteak of our Empire and the great destiny that opens before it, I do not speak of territorial expan- sion nor of increase of wealth, but of wider opportunities for the development of the institutions of free govern- rricut and of such ceonoinic and social conditions as are worlliy of a gr<:al people, compatible with the integrity of the Empire, and which will ensure the peaceful nations of the I'Hfth absolute s(!curity from all who seek to disturb the world's peace. Mr. Utighes's visit coincided with the meeting in Paris of an Economic Conference of the Allies. This Conference aroused grciat anxiety in English Radical and Free Trade circles, whif;h Hupposful that France was seeking to lure England into some kind of Protectionist airibush. Mr. Asqiiith hastfined to assure these persons that the British reprosentativi^s would return fntm Paris uncommitted to any specific m*»asures, and that nothing would bo said by thein which would in any degree f(^ttor the free action either of the (ioverninent or of the House of (JoniMions. But an incident wliieh oeeurn-il at th») Manchester (Chamber of 342 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. MR. LLOYD. GEORGE AT THE FRONT WITH M. Commerce, the citadel of Free Trade, con- firmed the belief that the country, as a whole, had definitely made up its mind upon certain In'oad principles of England's future trade policy. A split having occurred over an attempt made by the directors of the Chamber to commit the Chamber to the maintenance of the policy of free imports, and a memorandum of the directors having been rejected by a large majority, an election was held to fill the places of the directoi-s who had consequently resigned. Of the 22 elected, 18 were definitely pledged against Free Trade with Germany after the war, while two were in favour of it and two were not committed either way. In fact, as Mr. Herbert Samuel, the Home Secretary, declared, " there was undoubtedly at this moment throughout the nation a widespread and intense feeUng that after the war we should not be able to enter again into friendly equal trade relation- sliips with those who were now our enemies." It was therefore with much satisfaction that the country learned that Mr. Hughes was going to be present at the Paris Conference. To the French his participation was especially grati- fying, for they recognized in him a tiuer representative of British opinion than were some of those who had been loudest in the : DISCUSSING THE SHELL QUESTION THOMAS. expression of their views about the desirability of the Conference. The Conference met on June 14 at the Quai d'Orsay and sat for four days. Besides Mr. Hughes, the British delegates were Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Crewe (in the absence of Mr. Runci- man, President of the Board of Trade) and Sir George E. Foster, Canadian Mini ter of Com- merce. The result was a comprehensix-e agreement, not merely upon the financial and economic measures to be taken against the enemy as military weapons during the struggle and during the period of reconstruction to follow it, but a'so upon the main lines of the common policy on these subjects when the period had come to an end. The resolutions of the Conference were published on Juno 21, and on June 23 Mr. Bonar Law, speaking at a dinner given to Mr. Hughes by Australians in London, declared : — " I am certain that those resolutions will be adopted not only by the present Government but by the pi"esent House of Commons, and that they may be t«ken as representing the settled policy of the Britisli Government." It is not siu'prising, in \iew of the qualities of the Government, that doubts were ne\-ertheloss expressed whether, after tlu^ departin-e of Mr. Hughes, who had contributed THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 848 much to the passing of the resolutions, and who had been one of the few men during the war to display a really great Imperial conception, these extensive ideas would not be submerged in the welter of party poUtics. In view of the General Election, which, although once more deferred by the extension. on Augiist 1 7, of the life of the existing Parliament for a period of seven months — i.e., until April 30, 1917 — ^must inevitably be held sooner or later, there was a strong demand among members of all parties for a new register of electors. The question of registration had been the subject of pledges and assurances and " earnest con- sideration ' ' ever since the previous prolongation of ParUament in January. It was now further complicated by a movement in favour of extending the franchise to soldiers and sailors on active service. The Gk)vemment failed to agree, and attempted to shift their responsi- bihty on to the House of Commons by pro- posing that the whole matter should be referred to a Select Committee. But the House refused the proposal, and the Government had no alternative but to try again. This time they fell back upon their usual compromise ; a Special Register Bill was introduced by Mr. Asquith on August 15 wliich, while making no funda- mental change in the franchise law, would in fact have added to the register a large number of soldiers and sailors who had not been quali- fied to vote before by the presumption that their process of qualification had not been interrupted by their engagement in miUtary service. This scheme, however, failed to secvu'e general assent and the BiU had to be withdrawn. It was not until October that a Conference of members of both Houses invited by the Speaker, who had consented to act as Chairman, met to examine the whole question, including the reform of the franchise, the basis for the redistribution of seats, the reform of the system of registration, and the method of elections, and the manner in which their costs should be borne. The Conference had not reported when the Government fell. The administration of the War Office under Lord Kitchener did not escape the general criticism of indecision and delay to which the whole proceedings of the Coalition Government were exposed in ever increasing measure. The MR. f.I.OYn CHOHC.H IN A CW'UlUV.l) (W'.KMAN TRENCH IRONT IN FRANCE. ON THE HRITISH a44 THE TIMES HISTOUY OF THE WAR. lUUiiitiunH criiiiH whicti Imtught ilown thu Liberal Ciuvtinuiit^iit iTouttnl, us Iuih bmui 8ti«ii, tlu^ Minititry of Munitiuim under Mr. Lloyil Cioorgo. That \va« thti firat large on- crttaclinient upon the jjowersanil n^sponsibilitioH of the overburdtmetl Secrt'tiuy of State for War. Lortl Kitchener's great public prestige remained, and luifortunately his colleagues remained at all tiineti ready to shelter behind it. Hut more antl iiiore the war outgrew the possibilities of an organization the central feature of which of the (iovernment in regard to military i)|)erationB." 'i'hi.s meant tlitiL Sir William Kohertson would enjoy far greater powers than the chief of the Cleneral Stal? had possessed hitherto, and that orders to commanders would go out in his nanm and no longer in that of tijo Secjetaiy of State for War. Even so, the centialization at the War OHico remained the subject of severe criticisni up to the eve of Lord Kitchener's tragic death at sea at the beginning ot .June. MR. LLOYD GEORGE AS SECRETARY FOR WAR, IN CONSULTATION WITH M. BRIAND, THE FRENCH PREMIER. was concentration of responsibility in Lord Kitchener's own hands, while every day in- creased the necessity for delegation of responsi- biUty. At last, just before Clxristmas, after Lord Kitchener had retmned from the visit — a preface to the evacuation of Gallipoli — which, "at the request of his colleagues," he made to the Eastern theatre of war, the Imperial General Staff was reorganized with Sir William Robertson as its chief. Subse- quently it was laid down by an Order in Covincil (Jan. 27, 1916) that "the Chief of the General Staf? shall be responsible for issuing the orders When Lord Kitchener died Mr. Lloyd George became Secretary of State for War, being succeeded as Minister of Munitions by Mr. Montagu. The question of the country's position with regard both to home defence against the raids of aircraft and to the supplj' of suitable and sufficiently abundant aeroplanes for otlensive purposes at the front was at times the soiu-ce of considerable public anxiety — ivn anxiety wliich the reticence of official communiques and the unsatisfactory answers of the lender Secre- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 345 )i ^^^*V1IHHH|^^H| "^^iW^ THE CALL-UP OF "COMBED- tary of State for War in the House of Coinmons tended rather to increase than allay. The raids themselves, as is shown in Chapters CVIII. and CXXVIII., while they caused a nvun- ber of casualties among harmless men, women and children, signally failed to produce either the material or the moral effects intended by the enemy. But while the pubhc never regarded them otherwise than as an inconvenience — as time went on the restrictions with regard to street, shop and house lighting grew more severe — the difficulty of discovering exactly who was responsible for anti-aircraft defence produced a marked sense of irritation. This OUT" MEN, JANUARY 1, 1917. led in some cases to demands for reprisals which, whether they wovild have been effective or not, were excluded for the simple reason that, at the time, machines suitable for the purpose of long distance raids could not be spared from the urgent needs of the various fronts in sufficient nvimbers to produce a serious effect. Nevertheless, some raids were made on Zeppelin sheds, and by the middle of ' February, 1916, the duties of home defence had been definitely divided betwpen the Navy and Army, the former being responsible until hostile aircraft reached the coast, and there- after the latter, under the direct control of tSbnL2M!ffffiStk/Stf^ ^^^^^^^^^KF^^^^Mm^^^^^^^^^M ^^'^^r V '^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bf.^rW ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^H ^^^^^^^^^^^H WIVES AND SWKI'/mEAKrS OF THE " r:(>MMEf)-OUT ' MEN ACCOMPAN VINf J TFD', KECUUITS. a , "^ a is C/3 z o - • >! a ° •s-s on U . . a ^ a a o §-^ U oa u O u D O X u H a 3 20 b . . a «u O 4> Z a ^ O OS ts < Qi H ^ Z fl M P J3 O 09 u 3 2 N '§T3 C« — vug a c S S8g ■" 1: >T" •o « 12 = § -.2 •- >.a. - Q X u z b O ^ u u s .— • V e °) J< .S »- a ^ ** Z V a . 3 U 3J6 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 347 Field-Marshal Sir John Freiich, Commander - in-Chief for Home Defence. As the output of the factories increased, it became possible greatly to increase the supply of anti-aircraft guns, and with increased practice at night- flying and improved methods of attack highly satisfactory results were attained in the destruction of six hostile airsliips in September — November, 1916. By that time the authori- ties had learnt a lesson which The Times had been incTilculating ever since the raids began, and had reahsed that nothing but good resulted from permitting full, though of course, duly censored, descriptions in the Press. The efficiency of the administrations and command of the Royal Flying Corps was a further question which gave the Government much trouble in the first six months of 1916, There had long existed a feeling, based, indeed, for the most part, on ill-informed assertions, that the authorities were not fully alive to the growing importance of the part played by air- craft in the war, and were more concerned in inventing ingenious replies to criticisms in the House of Commons than in " thinking ahead " on the lines of a large policy. Matters were brought to a climax by some dramatic speeches by Mr. Pemberton Billing, M.P., in which, in addition to serious complaints regarding the Royal Naval Air Service, he charged the Royal Flying Corps authorities with criminal negli- gence, mainly in caxising Army pilots to fly unsuitable machinea. The Government rephed by appointing a Committee of Investigation, which, between May 18 and August 1, hoard .")4 witnesses, and which issued two Reports (August and December). These reports showed that the allegations, largely depending on hear- say evidence, were, as regards the charge of criminal negligence, flevoid of foundation, while the heads of the Royal Flying Corps, in the general matter of >inpreparedn(;HH and errors in judgment, were found to havo made, in very difficult circumstances, extraordinarily few mistakes, and those of no vital importance. In any case, the magnificent work of the Royal FTying Corps at the front, in spite of such terfif)or»iry di.sad vantages us the occasional production of exceptional machines by the onerny, wont far to ffwtore to the public the confidence which it had failed to derive from the ofTieial explanations r,f the Government. The K/iyal Naval Air Service escaped invest! - giitioriH for the time bein^. Meanwhile, the vexed 'jueHtir>ri of the organi- zation of the Air Service as a whole, and the problem, amidst the growing competition for materials, machinery and labour, of recon- ciling the claims of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, revived once more the suggestion that a Minister of the Air should be appointed. Although this idea never found favour with the Government, the advantages of entrusting construction, experiment, and materiel generally to one body were vaguely admitted. A halting step in this direction was made in the appointment of a Joint Air Committee, but inter-departmental and inter- Service jealousy and the absence of any real power soon led to the resignation of the chair- man. Lord Derby, and Lord Montagvi of Beau- lieu, and the Committee's collapse. It was suc- ceeded, in May, by an Air Board, with Lord Curzon as President. This Board, although it did good work within its limited powers, suf- fered from the same defects as the Air Com- mittee. Commenting on its appointment. The Times remarked : " Frankly, we regard the Board as one more stop-gap, which can only succeed by a miracle." The miracle did not happen. The refusal of the Admiralty to fall in with a scheme which would in any degree ' rob the Royal Navy of its independence led to incessant controversies. No proper co- ordination existed with the Ministry of Muni- tions — the body ultimately responsible for the materials and labour required. Mr. Balf oiu- was immovable ; the air was full of resignations, and a deadlock appeared to have set in, when a greater crisis supervened. The question of pensions for disabled officei's and men, and of allowances and grants to wives, widows, children and other dependants, proved a very thorny one. For over two years, <luring which the matter became steadily moie complicated and chaotic, the Government sought to rely upon voluntary effort rather than to place the business under the immediate control of the Stage. When the war broke out the only official organization in existence tor t luj Army was the Commissioners of tin* Koyal Hospital for Soldiers at Cholsca. who had to udrniniHter the payment of the flat-i'ute j)C!nHions and allowances laid down by Royal Warrant. Nc^t only wore these so inadequate ill tliomselves as to require supplementing troiri volunlary sources, but, owing to the great variety in the circumstances of the ofiicers and men in the new Arriiies, a very elaborat.o 348 Ttlt: TIMt^S UlSTOHY OF Till': [VAli. THE ENTRANCE TO THE HOSPITAL. investigation into individual cases was needed to bring the total received into a proper proportion to the necessities of the recipient or his dependents. The work of investigating the cases and supplementing the flat-rate pensions was in the hands of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society and the Royal Patriotic Fiind Corporation. By November, 1915, these voluntary so- cieties had been simply overwhelmed by the growth of the Army, and much dissatisfaction was expressed at the inequaUties, overlapping and anomalies arising out of the pxuely volun- CHHLSRA HOSPITAL. tary system of supplementing the pensions granted by the State. Nmnerous conferences and a vigorous Press campaign finally led to the appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons, which recommended a revision of the scale of flat-rate pensions and the establishment of a new central body which was to represent not only the three voluntary societies above mentioned but the Goveriurnent as well. The siun of £1,000,000 was to be given to this body by the Treasury to form the nucleus of a fund (which was to be mainly voluntary) for the pui-pose of supplementing the flat -rate pensions. A Bill was introduced and after a somewhat stom\y passage became law on November 10, 1915. The Naval and Military War Pensions, etc., Act, as it was called, set up a Statutory Committee of the Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation, consisting of 27 members with the Prince of Wales as Chaiiman. The acting chairman was Mr. Cyril Jackson. The duties of the Statutory Committee were mainly to supplement existing pensions, grants and separation allowances, and to make grants or allowances in cases where no separation allowances or pensions were payable otit of public funds. They were also to make pro\ision for the care of disabled officers and men after they had left the Service, including provision for their health, training and employment. Their first task was to establish local committees all over the country to assist them. But a keen controverey had raged throughout as to whether volimtaiy fmids should enter into any Govornmeixt scheme, the view being lield, especially in THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 349 Labour circles, that as a supplement in itself im- plied the inadequacy of the flat-rate, the State should shoulder the whole burden. And now the question arose whether the Statutory Conuiiittee should take into account, in arriving at the amount of its supplements, the grants made by local funds to local pensioners. The acute differences between the Statutory Com- mittee and the holders of these local funds postponed for a time the coming into operation of the local committees upon which the Statu- tory Committee was forced to rely. Never- theless, much good preliminary work was done under great difficulties, and by October, 1916, after much negotiation, in the course of which ]Mr. McKenna promised to increase the nucleus fund in the hands of the Committee to £6,000,000 and to revise once more the flat -rate scale, an agreement was reached between the Statutory Committee and the Lord Mayors, Mayors and other local au- thorities. By this time the number of cases to be dealt with had become altogether unmanageable. The chief authorities involved were no fewer than six in number — namely, the Admiralty, Greenwich Hospital, the War Ofifice, Chelsea Hospital, the Statutory Committee and the Civil Liabilities Commission. There was also the Central Army Pensions Issue Office, which was responsible for making the actual payments. Among all these bodies there was naturally a certain amount of overlapping and considerable delay and friction due to the incessant need of reference from one body to another. In consequence, it too often hap- pened that, while the confficting authorities were composing their differences, the unfortu- nate discharged soldier or his dependants were left penniless. The commonest case of hardship was due to the practice of the War Office of stopping the separation allowance on a man's discharge, instead of waiting untU the matter had been dealt with locally — ^with the result that the man might be practically destitute for months. These and similar cases amounted to a public scandal, which was boldly and successfully exposed by Sir Frederick Milner. The only remedy was obviously some central controlling authority, and early in October a Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to THE f;RF,AT WWA. OF CHHI.SF',A HOSPITAL. U«etl by the in-pentionem as a recreation-room. • lifiO Tilt: TlMh:s HISTOKY OF TllE WAli. inquirti into the whulw qiu'ntiuu. 'i'li<« iJoiuiiiittttti recuimiwudt^il the iiiHtitutiou <it a PenHicjiw Board with n, MiiiiHtt^r rnwpou- bible to I'tirlmiiitiiit ut it8 luud, tho chief fuiictiou of thw Boanl bttiiig to co-ordiimte thf work of the existing bodiea. Mr. Arthur Henderson, who had buen acting us Ohairiuan of the Clielsea Conuni-sHioners, and had been working energetically to accelerate their operationa, was indicated as Minister. As President -designate of the new Department he explained tliat the Board would concern itself exclusively with military pensions (not benig service pensions, which woidil continue to be administered by the War Ottice) and that the Admiralty was to be let out of the scheme. The Bill was given a very unfavourable recep- tion in Parliament. It was described by Mr. Hayes Fisher, Parliamentary Secretary of the Local Government Board and one of the Govern- ment members of the Statutory Committee, as " a half-way house towards unification," and on November 27 Mr. Hogge moved an amendment wliich completely changed the structure of the Bill and established a single centralized scheme with a Minister and no Board. Tliis was accepted by the Government under extreme pressure, and on November 30 the Government themselves proposed a nimiber of amendnients carrying out Dilv. Hogge's purpose. The powers and duties of the Admiralty in respect of pensions other than service pensions were handed over to the new Ministry and the Statutory Committee was retained to exercise its original duties, subject to the instructions and control of the Minister, The Bill was passed on December 22. It remained to be seen how far the experiment of a political Minister would prove desirable. There were many who feared that it carried with it the disadvantage that pensions might become the shuttlecock of parties. As the autumn of 1916 wore on, the Govern- ment was seen to be faced by a whole series of grave problems, all directly connected with the war, and all overripe for solution. Most of the issues have already been described. But last and by no means least there was the problem of man-power, which, in spite of the reluctant and belated ^Military Service Act, ogged Mr. Asquith's footsteps to the end. It wdl be remenbered that the main difference between the second Military Service Act and the first was the application of com- liul.-sioii to luuined us well uh unnmrried men, uxid tliut the second Act, pussed in Muy, 1916, closed somi< of the worst loopholes for e\ asiiJii of military service. But the system of local tribunals and the network of exemptions, exceptions and reservations remained, and it was soon discovered that tlie system even as amended by no means represented the " com- |)lete and rounded policy " of which Mr. Asquith had boasted. The technical defects of the Military Service Acts were obvious to all who were acquainted with conscription in other countries ; it remained to be seen whether the (iovernment would repair the defects by skilful and determined administration. But in the event the administration of the Acts under the Coalition Government proved to be one long story of departmental wrangling and official inertia. The processes of " combing-out " and '■ debadging " were slow and inefSective, and when the Government fell the number of exemptions of men of military age still numbered millions. " There must be a great tightening up,' said Sir Wilham Robertson in a stirring speech at the beginning of October. " We have adopted the principle of National Service in theory. We must see to it that we put that principle into practice. We want men, more men. We want them now, and in due course we shall want aU men who can be spared." The Oxief of the Imperial General Staff said that the question was " always receiving constant and most careful attention from the Govern- ment." But, although the Government survived for two months more, its " constant and careful attention " bore httle fruit. What a contrast to the methods of Germany ! There, too (a letter subsequently published from Marshal von Hindenburg to the Imperial Chancellor was dated September 27), the Chief of the General Staff was calling attention to the urgent need for men. But there the result, precisely within these months of October and November, was the invention, adoption and application of the Auxiliary Service Law — the most remarkable extension of military conscription ever con- ceived. For a time it was even feared in some quarters that the Government would prefer to raise the military age rather than deal dras- tically witli the administration of the Service Acts. It was clear that they would not face the application of conscription to Ireland. The very suggestion produced a speech from the Nationalist leader, Mr. Retl- THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 351 J. \ ■^JSL. MR. LLOYD ( rnond, at Wttt'Tford, on Oot<^Fifjr 6, in wliioh lio hLf/rracAl, iriflocfl, that " it would bo a fli.sgraco U) Ireland if iriHiitm-ti who an? fij^htirif^ at th.s front worn U;ft in tho hirch and if IriMhiimn did not (uunn U) tJwsir aHHiHtanc*', " but talked about th« " HiniHt*5r awpect " of tho " conHcription thr»3«t," which ho callf;rl " a bano political d'^viw;." Mr. li<;drnonda<ld';d : I c»ririf/t tf:\ii;vi) lti»il th») Oovcrnrnffil, will b<> iimiirio tittfiiigfi to r;hnlW)rig(i a oofiflict with Iri'littid jn tlin miittor \ Copyright of J. F E. Grundy, 4, Adam Street, H'.C. ;rorc;b in 1916. of (:oii.H(;ri[)lii>ii. CoriKoriptioii in Inilaiid, ko far from h(tl|)lri;{ tli'i Army mid forwiinJiug \\\t\ iiitonwtH of tlio wur, would bo tho mowt fata,! thing tlmt could hajjpon. It would b<> rt'HiHlcd. Evory iniin in Iroluiid known tho Irulli of what I Bay. It would bo roHiHted in every villuf^o in Ireland. I(h ii.t (crnptcd miforci^niont would bo 11 HCundal which wmild ring round tho wholn civili/.<^<l world. Tho Oiivcrnmcnt thon concentrated itH enorgicH anrl built i<H r-hief hopoH on " combing out." Towardn tho end of iSeptember tlioy aj)pointod a " Man-Power DiHtribution Board." 852 THE TIMHS HISTORY OF THE WAR. coiiMWtiiig uf Mr. AuHten Cluiiuberlain (('Imir iiitiii), V'uscoimt Midloton (Vice-Ctiairiimn), Mr. A. Bttlfour (of Shertielil). Mr. G. N. Hurn.is, Ml', and Mr. Stophnn VVulrth, M.R, Thn widH • lutit'H ji.s,sigued tt» tho BohiiI wero " to determine all (|UHKtum,s jirLsiiig butweoii (loveriuntint l)«|.<u-tiii.'iit.s iiliitiii^/ to the uIlooHtioii or GENERAL SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON. Chief of the Imperial General StaflF. economic utilization of man-power for the purpose of the successful prosecution of the war, and, in order to give effect to its deter- min