[[ Mirrored from archive.org, with more info at http://www.314th.org/times-history-of-the-war/times-history-of-the-war.html ]] The Times HISTORY OF THE WAR Vol. XIX PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE. PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES" PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON. 1919 CONTENTS OF VOL. XIX CHAPTER CCLXXV. page Italy, 1917-1918 : Austria's Last Offknsive . . I CHAPTER CCLXXVI. The Campaign in German East Africa (IV.) . . 37 CHAPTER CCLXXVII. Second Battle of the Mabnb : July, 1918 . . . . . . 73 CHAPTER CCLXXVI II. The German Retreat FROM THE Mabne : July-August, 1918 109 CHAPTER CCLXXIX. The Battles of Amiens and Bapaume : August, 1918 . . 145 CHAPTER CCLXXX. The Conquest OP Syria . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 181 CHAPTER CCLXXXI. Austria-Hungary: July, 1914-\ovember, 1916 .. 217 CHAPTER CCLXXXIl. The Air Arm : Last War Years . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 CHAPTER CCLXXXIII. The Allied Advance : August-September, 1918.. .. .. .. 289 CHAPTER CCLXXXIV. Victoria Crosses OF THE War (VIII.). . .. .. .. .. .. .. 325 CHAPTER CCLXXXV. British Politics : 1917-1918 361 CHAPTER CCLXXX VI. The British \rmy in France: August, 1914-December, 1917 . . . . . . 397 CHAPTER CCLXXXVII. The Allied Advance CoNTmnBD : September, 1918 . . . . . . . . . , 433 CHAPTER CCLXXV. ITALY, 1917 1918: AUSTRIA'S LAST OFFENSIVE. Fau, of Boselli Government, October, 1917 — The Orlando Ministry — Political Situation AND Italian "Moral" — Austria, the Chief Enemy -Anxiety about Allied Policy — ■ Srri^ATioN in Spring or 1918 — Thi: Controver.s\- between It.'vly and the Yugoslavs — The London Agreement and Italian Claims — The Pact of Corfu — The Pact of Rome and its Meaning — Military Situation at End op 1917 — Some Minor Successes — Bombs on X'enice AND Padua — Austrian Offensive in June, 1918 — Failure in the North— Austrians Cro.ss the Pia\e and are Defeated — Importance of the Italian Victory WHEN the Italian ['arliainent resumed its labours, on October Ui. 1917, the situation of the Boselli Cabinet was very uncertain. It had barely weathered a crisis four months pre- viously (the details have been given in Vol. XV, Chajjter CCXXXIII), and in the interval events had occurred which had weakened its position still further. It had very few real friends, for there was a general feeling that it had failed in energy and foresight. There was still some reluctance to upset " the National Ministry," which stood for as much vmity as could be expected in a covintry where political passion hail run very high, both before and after the entry into the war. This reluctance, togethei' with the known wish of Baron Sonnino that things should continue as they were, had saved the Government in June. When Parliament met there was a chance that the same feeling might prevail. But there were new elements in the situation. Or perhaps it ought to be said that some of the old difficulties had become aecentuated. Keen debate was expected over the question of the food supply and the policy of the Ministry of the Interior. The two ques- tions were closely connected, for lack of food was. a powerful assistant to the arginuents of Vol. XIX.— Part 23.5. the Official Socialists, who, like C few of their brethren in England, and more in France, seemed at first sight to have only one wai' aim' — peace, inunediate peace, peace at almost any cost. The Official Socialist Party had given a warm welcome to the Papal Note of the pre- vious August, claiming that Benedict XV. " spoke the language of Kienthal," and they had adopted as their slogan the declaration of one of their leaders, Signor Claudio Treves : " This winter no one must be in the trenches." It was said again, as it was said four months earlier, that Signor Orlando had not shown sufficient finnness in dealing with " defeatist propaganda," and critics could point to various disquieting symptoms in support of their con- tention, notably to General Cadorna's renewed protests, and to the serious riots which had taken place in Turin towards the end of .August — riots which seemed directly traceable to the incitement of the Official Socialists. It seemed certain that the Minister of the Interior would have to meet a stronger attack than before. But if there was discontent with the work of individual Ministers, the feeling was still stronger against the Cabinet as a whole. The Government seemed to be afflicted with inertia, vagueness, lack of cohesion ; and the fault was THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. laid by many at the door of the aged Premier, who was coiisidei-ed to be unequal to the task of leading the Ministry and the Chamber. It was felt by those who made this criticism that new methods were wanted, new blood and a new leader, if the organ of govermnent was to fulfil its duty to the country. But criticism took another form. Tt had long been alleged by the (ioveriiinont's eiieiiiit»s, hikI also bv some of its SIGNOK NITTI. ' In control of the Treasury in the Orlando Government, 1918. supporters, that the Cabinet was not sufficiently' in contact with Parliament and the country. This complaint had been made of the Salandra Government, and it was now said that its suc- cessor piu^ued the same lines. On the eve of the re-opening of the Chamber a group of 47 deputies was formed, which declared its intention of pressing for a fuller recognition of the right of Parliament to be informed of, and to help with, the problems of government. The group rapidly secured many more adherents and rose to a strength of over 100. In view of the various currents which were setting against it the Government had ju-st one chance of safety, the fear of " something worse " which had saved it in June. It began badly. The Chamber to«)k umbrage over a matter of form in regard to which it considered that the Premier had failed to pay due resfiect to the rights of Parliament. The attitude of the Government would have caused no offence under normal conditions, the more so as the protagonist in the attacking movement was Signer Modigliani, one of the extreme Socialist leaders. Yet, though the Government obtained a large majority, its fall was practically certain From tliia moment. The atmosphere of the Chamber altered. Instead of being hesitating and imeertain, it became definitely hostile. It- still adopted a waiting attitude, but its mind wa« made up. It waited in order to hear the declarations of various political leaders. For though the Government was doomed, the right of succession seemed still uncertain. One fresh name, however, was already assured as a pillar of the new Government. Signoi' Nitti, who liad been Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry in the last Giolitti Governnient. had taken no part- in the polemic regarding Italy's intervention in the war ; but he had often bc^en classed among the " Neutralists," together' with all the old Giolittian supporters, save those who, like Signor Orlando, had become openly and definitely identified with the war. Signor Nitti had remained silent till the autumn of 1916, when he delivered to his constituents in Basilicata the fullest and most reasoned statement of tlie necessity and justice of Italy's intervention in the world-war that had yet been pronounced by any Italian politician. It dis- ])layed at once a wide view and a practical mind. This speech signified Signot Nitti's return to the political arena, and a few months later he was appointed a member of the special mission which was sent by the Italian (tovei-nmeiit to the United States. On his return he immcdi- BARON SONNINO AND A BRITISH GENERAL. ately fount! a place in politics reatly for liim. He coulfl piobably have overturned the (Joverii- ment in .June, but he preferred to wait. It was certain, however, that the delay would not be long, and that his ideas and energy would ensure him one of the chief posts in the Govern- ment whicl) should succeed that of Signor THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Boselli. When Signer Nitti clc^clared that li(v and his friends would vote for the Ministry on this occasion, but that they considered that the Government had put the Chamber in a humilia- ting position, it was generally felt that he now meant to assert himself. The crisis came slowly. The policy of the Ministry of the Interior was discussed at length, and if there were those who accused Signor Orlando of weakness in his general policy, he was furiously attacked by the Official Socialists When Signor Orlando rose to defend himself against his critics, a week after the opening of the Chamber,' it was generally felt that he had a difficult task. On the one hand, he hafl to show that ho would not tolerate th<! attempts to undermine the national resistance, and on the other hand he had to make it clear that maintenance of order did not mean reaction. His speech was a very able parliamentary effort. He admitted frankly that the Turin riots were in a sen.se the result of his liberal GERMAN CAVALRY RESTING IN for the stern methods adopted in Turin to quell the riots there. These attacks gave rise to two declarations from prominent inembers of the Ministry. Signor Bissolati, the Refonnist Socialist leader, turned upon his old comrades as they carped and coinplained, and cried : " To defend the Army from stabs in the back, I myself would fire upon you." Signor Bissolati knew the harm done by the insidious propa- ganda of the extreme pacifists, whose pro- gramme, while it seemed to be peace, was in reality revolution. The Socialists protested violently, and their protests were renewed when Signor Orlando, in answer to a tamit from the Extreme Left, sprang to his feet, and said that he, too, would adopt the hypothesis of Signor Bissolati. The Socialists made an uproar, but the bulk of the Chamber applauded loudly. [From a German photograph. A PASS ON THE ITALIAN FRONT. policy, but ho scored an undoubted point wlien he asked whether any other policy would have ensured so great a freedom from internal troubles. He claimed with truth that the people of Italy had shown a remarkable degree of patience and self-discipline, and at the same time he pointed out that the repression of the Turin riots and the measures taken subse- quently showed that he did not shi-ink from the use of force when it was necessary. He did not think that it was wise to abandon his j>olicy of conciliation. He stood by both sides of liis policy. He would use all the necessary force ' to uphold the State, but he would not infringe constitutional liberties. Signor Orlando's speech was very well received, and it was felt that he had strength- ened his claim to be Signor BoselU's successor. 235—2 < Bl X H z o -J o si r- < a. H S Z z THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Two clays later the Government fell, after Signor Boselli and Baron Sonnino hart both received the hearty clieers of the Chamber, and the Minister of War, General Giardino, had also been wannly applauded when he made the amiouncement that the expected enemy offen- sive had begun, and that the High Command were confident of the result. The applause which greeted Signor Boselli's valedictory state- ment was in the nature of a personal tribute to the veteran who had surrendered his ease to fill a post wliich at the moment none but he could have filled so well. He had played his part, and now he was to go, but it was felt that he had deserved the thanks of Parliament and the country. Baron Sormino's account of his stewardship met with the applause which signi- fied agreement with his policy and support for himself. One passage only of his speech was to meet with opposition and keen criticism (except of course, from the Official Socialists, who criticized everything). This was his downright language in regard to certain passages in the Papal Note. He spoke very strongly regarding the marmer in which the Note merely included Belgium among " the possible exceptions " to the general principle of mutual condonation and renunciation of indemnities and put the martyred covintry on a level with all bther cases of invaded and occupied territory. He claimed that the case of Belgium was totally different from any other, and said plainly that the Pope's treatment of the question seemed to suggest " German inspiration." Baron Sonnino's manner of dealing with the Note was strongly resented by the Catholics, both in the Chamber and in the country, and it seemed as though they might take a definite stand against the Foreign Minister and so narrow the basis of the future Government. For it was already clear that Baron Sonnino would continue to hold his position, unless he gave it up volun- tarily. The Boselli Cabinet fell on October 25, 1917, and next day came the news of the reverse at Caporetto. Each of the following clays brought worse news from the front, and under the shock of disaster party differences and party feelings faded for the time. Signor Orlando was entrusted with the duty of forming a Govern- ment, and his list of Ministers was published on October 29. The new Cabinet was as follows : — Signor Orlando, Premier and Interior. Baron Sonnino, Foreign Affairs. Signor Nitti, Trecisur;'. Signor ni?solati, Civil Assistance and Penaoas. Signor Meda, Finance. Signor Foro, Posts and Telegraphs. Signor Saoohi, Justice. Signor Bcrenini, Public Instruction. Signor Dari, Public Works. Signor Miliani, Agriculture. Signor Kiecardo Bianchi, Transport. Signor C'olosinio, Colonies. Signor Cintelli, Coramerce and Industry. General ATieri, War. Admiral Del Bono, Marino. General DaU'Olio, Arms and Munitions. The new President of the Council took up the reins of government at a very critical moment. The front had been, broken and the Italian armies were in full retreat upon a defensive line which meant the abandonment of a wide tract of Italian soil. The grave problems which had loomed large a week before were all forgotten for the moment, save one only — the question of the policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior. Signor Orlando had defended himself successfully in the Chamber, and practically established lois claim to the premiership. And then disaster came, for which many people held his methods of ad- ministration largely responsible. There was a very strong feeling indeed against the premier- ship among many who had worked hardest for Italy's intervention and for a vigorous war policy. In Milan especially the criticisms of Signor Orlando and resentment at his succession to Signor Boselli 'found wide expression, in conversation at least ; the Press realized the necessity of showing a united front. Signor Orlando's first move was to appeal for the support of all parties and groups, and the answers which he' received showed the mettle of Italy. Only the Official Socialists held aloof, as a party, though several of their leaders showed that the doctrines of the Inter- national had not completely overridden the instincts of patriotism. There were some who felt themselves Italians still, and at the moment of crisis worked for Italy. The country as a whole was magnificent. For many months Italy had been beset by every kind of insinuation, to which no adequate answers had been given. Pacifist propaganda of every kind had been spread tlu-ough the country, and it had given rise to many ques- tionings. Now, under the shock of disaster, Italy pvit her questionings aside and answered the call of the tragic moment. From north to south, from Piedmont to Sicily, the same voice spoke. In political circles the little differences that seemed great differences were for a time forgotten, and the mass of the people, who THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. were suffering from severely straitened circum- stances and had shown signs of war-weariness, tightened their belts and stiffened their backs, determined to resist. The Austro-German offensive no doubt had for its main object the GENERAL ALFIERI, Minister of War. crushing of Italy's moral resistance. The spies and agents of the Central Empires had reported that the spirit 'of the people was unsatisfactory, and that defeat would lead to an utter breakdown. The military success of the great offensive certainly surpassed all expecta- tions. Its failure as a solvent of Italian mora! was complete. Instead of riot and revolution the enemy victories brought only a hardening of resolve, an increase of the will to sacrifice. There were some, of course, in Italy, as in all the co\intries at war, who were found wanting under the trial, who lost their nerve and would have accepted the results of present defeat through fear of worse disaster to come. But on the essentially sound organism of Italy the shock and the threat worked like cold water on a healthy body. There was a great reaction to the stimulus. During the first weeks of the new Govern- ment party passion did not show itself, but when the military situation improved, when it was clear, moreover, that all parties except only the Official Socialists stood for resist- ance, the strife in Parliament revived. The movement in favour of closer cooperation between the Government and Parliament, which had been set on foot before the fall of the BoseUi Ministry, was quickly resvuned. At first it seemed to meet with wide approval, but when it became evident that to press the matter would lead to a conflict with Baron Sonnino, the situation changed. The movement had taken the form of a demand for the institution of parliamentary commissions on the French model, and the innovation was urged for foreign affairs in particular. It should have been obvious that Baron Sonnino's habit of mind would not accept such a change in the method of conducting foreign policy. He had often been accused, with justice, of keeping his ministerial colleagues in the dark. It was not likely that he would admit the " interference " of a commission of senators and deputies. The promoters of the movement had foreseen this, and hoped that Baron Sonnino's refusal might end in hLs defeat and retirement. Some of the later adherents may have hoped that he would GENERAL ALFREDO DALL'OLIO Minister of Arms and Munitions. yield to the pressure of opinion. But Baron Sonnino was inflexible, and he carried his Cabinet colleagues with him. It followed that those who pressed the movement declared themselves as an Opposition, and, in fact, the Parliamentary Union, as the group was now called, came to be regarded as the real Opposi- tion, though it did not always insist on op- (josing. Its enemies said that it was biding THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. its time, and that it included too many of tlu^ " old majority " — i.e., Giolitti's majority — for its actions to be above suspicion. This accu- sation was probably unfair, but it was natural that tho Oiolittians should remain under suspicion, the more so as their old leader had made little response to Signer Orlando's appeal for unity of effort. He had left his tent, indeed, and spoken in the Chamber, but he seemed still to hold aloof, and some of those who were closest to him iii?od language that which followed as the Fascia. Its aim was to counter the manujuvres of tho Parliamentary Union by open fighting and hard hitting, and a curious situation arose. The new group was composed of deputies from nearly every quarter of the Chamber, from the Extreme Right to the Reformist Socialists. It stood for a stronger internal policy and the closest cooperation with the Allies, in every field. Included among its number were those who had been most outspoken in their criticism [itttlian oljtc-iat pnotogTupn. ITALIANS STRENGTHENING A TRENCH ON THE PIAVE. appeared to confirm the hopelessness of ex- pecting his real cooperation. The Parliamentary Union was the nucleus of a strong Opposition, and it could always count upon the Official Socialists to support it in any vote against the Government. Signer Orlando and his Ministers, on the other hand, had no marshalled array of followers, thovigh they were assured of strong support. A more definite backing seemed to be required, and the opening days of the December Session — Parliament had adjourned after one sitting in November — saw the formation of another new group, the Group of National Defence, Fascia di Difesa Nazianale, which was known throughout the months of Signor Orlando's regime at the Ministry of the Interior, and it seemed stiange that these should join together for the express purpose of supporting his Cabinet. Yet the reason was simple enough. They believed that Signor Orlando would take a much stronger line if he were assured of this definite backing than if he had to secure parliainentary support by a policy of bargaining and arrangement. The new group was pledged to vote according to the decisions of its " directorate," and thLs meant a nucleus of some 150 votes, which was certain to attract to itself a large number of other deputies who preferred not to commit themselves definitely. The Fascia offered its 8 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. solid support to Signer Orlando, conditioned only by his adoption of an uncompromising " war policy." And Signor Orlando desired nothing better. This did not mean that he abandoned his policy of conciliation, or the hope of maintaining a large degree of national concord. But it did mean that he had greater freedom of action, that he was much less hampered by " parlia- mentary exigencies." After some anxious moments and some very turbulent sittings, the December debates closed with the Grovernment firmly in the saddle. Nor did the Fascia confine ADMIRAL ALBERTO DEL BONO, Minister of Marine. its efforts to parliamentary circles. Branches were established all over the country, and an attempt was made to reach the people and provide some antidote to the Socialist propa- ganda which had hitherto been left almost unanswered. The end of the year, which saw the battle-line held firm in the mountains and along the Piave, found also a stronger garrison and better leadership upon the home front. Throughout the winter of 1917-1918 there was a continuance of the peace-talk which had been begun by the German proposals of a year before. Fortunately, Grerman action belied German words, and Brest -Litovsk illumined many minds which otherwise might have con- tinued to suffer from the illusions that were evident in many countries. Many people refused even to learn from Brest-Litovsk, but on the whole, expressions of belief in Germany's good faith were confined to those who had lost their nerve and those who dreaded a German defeat. What Germany stood for was cfear to all who could and would looli facts in the face. Illusions in regard to Austria-Himgary persisted a little longer. In Italy, of course, there were no such illusions, except in a very limited circle. For Italy, Austria-Hungary was the inrunediate enemy, as Germany was for England and France. But Italy reahzed, what her Allies were very slow to understand, that Austria- Hungary was bound hand and foot to Germany, and tliat the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire was a necessary preliminary to the establish- ment of a just peace that should have a chance of enduring. It was long before this point of view commended itself to Italy's Allies. On various occasions the apparent tendresse of Britain or France for Austria-Hungary load caused uneasiness in Italy, and this uneasiness was greatly increased by the statements of " war aims " made by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George early in January, 1918. Both of these statements seemed to confirm the old impression that Britain and the United States had different standards of enmity towards Germany and Austria -Hungary, and were con sidering the possibility of coming to terms with the lesser enemy. Such a programme could not commend itself to Italy, and Italian poUtical circles were gravely preoccupied by the apparent tendency of the declaration^ made on behalf of Britain and the United States. Two quotations from newspapers representing very different shades of political opinion, and linked only by the fact that from the first they had lu'ged the path of war, are sufficient to indicate the uneasiness which prevailed. The Corriere della Sera, after observing that the only modification of the Allied pro-war policy which appeared from the speeches of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George was a tendency to show greater favour towards Austria- Hungary, explained this tendency by showing that " the material and ideal interests of America, France, and England depend in great part on the result of the war with Germany rather than of that with Austria." " It may be permitted to us, therefore," the Corriere continued, " to add that Italy and the Balkan Allies represent an element of equilibrium in the crisis of European distribution, their material and ideal interests depending more on the result of the war with Austria than of that with Germany. An anti-Gterman programme THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ITALIANS CONSTRUCTING which restores Alsace-Lorraine to France, and to the Polish State Posen, whose borders are so near the German capital, we perfectly under- stand and have loyally accepted. We, there- fore, count on the good will and sense of justice of Allied public opinion when we request greater consideration for the anti-Austrian programme." Here was a reasoned, serious plea that put the Italian case, and that of Serbia and Rumania, with sufficient clearness, and so went to the root of the matter far more than most other comments, which were in the main on the lines of the brief but pertinent complaint in the Socialist Popolo cP Italia, which found inexplicable " the silence or reticence of some of our Allies, w-ho, whenever they have to touch matters concerning Italy and Austria, seem preoccupied by one idea only — not to be excessively hard upon Austria-Hungary." Italian opinion was both anxious and puzzled. Some blamed the Government for its apparent inability to sustain Italy's cause with her Allies ; some criticized the Allies ; some did both. The worst of the situation was that the British and American references to Italy seemed to confine recognition of her claims to something not greatly different from what was proposed by Prince Biilow to Signer Giolitti before Italy's entry into the war. The old supporters of neutrality were not slow to point this out. [Fre'tch offcia! ' A MILITARY RAILWAY. and Signor Orlando's position was made very difficult. His programme, and that of his newly-pledged supporters, was that of a firm war policy and close coooeration with the Allies. Yet within a few days of his victory in the Chainber two of Italy's Allies took a step which seemed to moderate the demands upon Italy's chief enemy, and showed that there was still a remarkable lack of cooperation and coordination of ideas upon the political front. There were many questioning minds in Italy during the first weeks of 1918, and it will be admitted that the speeches of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George were hardly calculated to strengthen Italian opinion against a peace offensive. But Count Hertling and Count Czernin were sufficiently uncompromising in their declarations to do away with any hope of influencing " moderate " opinion in Italy or elsewhere. There was a good deal of discussion in the Italian Press regarding the apparent difference in tone between the utterances of the German and Austrian spokes- men, but the general impression was that the difference was superficial, and only the Clerical newspapers found in the speeches any sort of basis for a discussion that might lead towards peace. It was felt by most people that Count Czernin's milder language was induced by the hope of confirming, for the time at least, that 10 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. [Italian Naval ofjiciul photograph. TRANSPORTING ITALIAN NAVAL GUNS. comparatively benevolent attitude towards Austria-Hungary which had seemingly been indicated both by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd' Greorge. The comments of the Epoca, a newly established Roman daily which was in close touch with Signor Orlando, may be quoted as giving not only the official view but the general public opinion of Italy. The Epoca thought that the speeches gave " a new example of compact unity," and said that the attitude of the two speakers was substantially the same, in spite of Count Czernin's less defiant tone. It emphasized the definite " No " given to all suggestions which did not fit in with the aims of the Central Powers, and concluded by saying ; This dangerous conversation on the subject of peace, which helps no one but the Oontral Powers, must abso- lutely be cut short. But not before the Allies have replied in a Note which we a^k shall be collective, and would like to be de6nitive and simple, so as not to lend it.oelf to doubtful interpretations ; a Note that we should Uko to see free from any relic of the old diplomatic policy. There was keen anxiety in Italy for a collec- tive statement on behalf of the Entente Powers, for clear evidence of the closest possible union among them. It was felt rightly that any appearance of divergence was so much en- couragement to the enemy. Italy had already suffered from the absence of close and continu- ous cooperation in military matters. She felt it hard that Fate had made the way to Versailles lie through Caporetto, and it was not yet evident that the further road to complete unity of command had to pass through St. Quentin. She had paid more heavily than anyone else, so far, for the long failure to realize the idea of the single front in its literal sense. It seemed to her now that her interests were further threatened by an equal failure to establish and maintain the single front in its political sense. The breakdown of Russia had not only affected the situation on the Italian Front. It had changed the political position. It meant that for a time at least the Hapsburg Monarchy had only one inevitable enemy in the ranks of its opponents instead of two. Both in France and England there was an influential body of opinion which still believed in the necessity of " a strong Austria," and hoped that the offer of " reasonable terms " might detach Austria from her association with the chief criminal. Though Italy agreed that Germany was the chief criminal — popular opinion had no doubt at all in the matter — it was unpossible for Italy's leaders to overlook the more immediate menace from Italy's neighbour. Italians, moreover, were firmly convinced that Austria- Hungary, or at least the Hapsburg Empire, could only exist as an instrument of Germanism, that the game of using the Hapsburgs against the HohenzoUerns and what they stood for had long ago become impossible. Even assuming, however, that Austria might be detached from Germany, Italy could hardly welcome the prospect. To detach Austria meant offering THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 11 thvj Hapsburgs terms that were worth taking, meant therefore the survival of a strong Hapsburg Monarchy whicli would of necessity be liostile to Italy. . For a strong Hapsburg Monarchy could hardly avoid looking with a revengeful eye upon an Italian Trieste and an Italian Pola, however it might be reconciled to the loss of the Trentino. Italian opinion had moved a long way since the spring of 1915, when the idea which animated Italy's leaders, and almost all those who attempted to provide for the future, was the necessity of facing a beaten but still power- ful Austria-Hungary, which would remain in close alliance with a beaten but still more power- ful Grerman Empire. Even at that date there were men in Italy, as in England and France, though few enough in any of the three countries, who saw farther and clearer, who saw that the aims of the Liberal Powers should be the I'e- fashioning of Eiu'ope, the liberation of the op- pressed peoples, that from the great evil of the German aggression this great good might come. They were few who saw in the early days that the war was not only a war for this or that national victory, but a true revolution, a struggle between two moralities. A " drawn war " might have come easily in 1915, but for the fatal C/5pii of Gtennany and Austria. But as the tale of suffering lengthened, and the list of crimes, the resolve grew and hardened and spread among the Allied Powers that nothing less than the remaking of Europe would servo as leward for victory. In Itivly, as elsewhere, there was reluctance to accept the wider vision. In Italy, as else- where, there wore those who urged the necessity of being practical, and of adapting ends to tho means in sight. If was maintained, among other practical arguments, that Italy, tho weakest and the poorest of the four great European Allies, could not take the lead in advocating an extreme programme which the others might not follow. That seemed a sound position for Italy's rulers to adopt, the more so as they feared accepting commitments which might impose too great a strain upon ItaUan resources. But the force of ideals gained ground. Once more the truth was to be proved, that the real " movers and shakers " are the " dreamers of dreams." The spring of 1918, which was so critical a period for the Western Powers, and which had begun with an apparent weakening of the will to complete victory (a weakening clearly hinted bv the British and American nttitude towards BRITISH BILLETED IN AN ITALIAN HOUSEHOLD. 235—3 12 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Austria), which saw moreover the final down- fall of Austria's greater enemy, was marked also by a new gathering of anti-Austrian forces, and by the uncompromising declaration of the formula : Delenda Austria. The movement was not new. From the beginning of the war dis- ruptive forces had been at work within the Monarchy, and if the Governments of the Entente Powers had seen farther, success would have come sooner. But the wider vision was denied. .Or, if they saw, they could not agree on common action. Or they feared too great commitments. Or they clung overmuch to the well-established idea of checks and balances. WTiatever the motive of his speech, it was after three years of war that Mr. Balfour could decline to state the aims of the Allies in regard to " that ancient monarchy " Austria-Hungary. Nearly six months later Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George seemed to hold out no greater hope to those who asked for a pledge that would strengthen their efforts after freedom ; and later still, Mr. Lloyd George sent General Smuts to Switzerland, to talk with Count Albert Mensdorff, formerly Austro -Hungarian Ambas- sador in London. Official France had given no clearer lead. In France, indeed, there was a very strong party which planned to strengthen the Hapsburgs at the expense of the Hohen- zoUerns, to pit Catholic Germans against Protestants, South against North — to lop off some of the ancient Empire, indeed, but to avoid the break-up tliat the subject-peoples and the cause of freedom demanded. Russia, while she existed under the Tsar and had a voice in the councils of the Allies, supported the Soutliern Slavs, though not to the full extent of their efforts towards unity, but her attitude to the Polish question was a definite bar to conirnpn effort on the part of the Poles. The Italian Government followed exactly in the footsteps of Italy's more powerful Allies. So it was that Poland, unhappiest of all the oppressed nations — for the enemies to her free- dom were in both rival groups, so that brother fought against brother, and all her lands were laid waste by the marchings and counter- marchings of contending armies — had little enough inducement or opportunity to combine her forces for liberty. So it was that the Southern Slav leaders who worked for unity and complete independence of Austria were hampered in their efforts, while the Rvimanian movement was long retarded. Only Bohemia, stronger than the Southern Slavs by reason of her history as an independent nation, stronger [Official photograph. WITH THE BRITISH IN ITALY: A DUG-OUT IN THE ROCKS. THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR. 18 BRITISH HUTMENTS ON THE ITALIAN FRONT. lOgictai pkalograpk. than Poland by the fact of her actual unity under one crown, sure, moreover, that at least she had no opponents araong the Entente Powers, planned and organized her revolution, and showed the way to the other subject- peoples. Li the sense that has been indicated, Bohemia's task was easier than that of Poles or Rumanes or Southern Slavs, but in another sense it was far more difficult. The Czechs and Slovaks were completely surrounded by enemies. Between Germany and Austria they lay as between the upper and nether millstones. The Entente Governments hesitated to com- mit themselves, but in each country there were groups of men who worked for the larger pro- gramme. In Italy, froiu the first, there were some who did not hesitate to proclaim the necessity of accepting the greater commitments and of talcing a different view of Italian interests than that which was strictly limited by the claims of naval and military " exigencies." The main point of difference between them and those who held what was often called the practical view lay in their attitude to the Southern Slavs. When Italy entered the war, her Government and most of her leading men had two main practical objects in view : the " redemption " of those Italians who remained under Austrian rule, and the acquisition of satisfactory defen- •sive frontiers. It was unfortunate that the full realization of both the.se aims was in clear opposition to the interests of one of Austria- Hungary's subject-peoples, the Southern Slavs. On the eastern side of the old Aiistro- Italian frontier, from Gorizia to Fitime, the distribution of Italian and Slav populations was such that the tracing of a new frontier on a racial ba.si? was quite impossible, while in Dalmatia there was a similar conflict of interests. On the pvirely raoial basis Italy's claims to Dalmatian territory were shght. Taking an extreme estimate, the Italian population formed no more than 8 per cent, of the whole. This popu- lation, moreover, was scattered along the coast and in the islands, forming everywhere except in the town of Zara small isolated minorities in the midst of a compact Slav population. These Italian communities were described by Mazzini as " the remnants of our colonies," and this they were in fact, the remnants left of the Italian centres of administration and culture and trade which had flourished during the long occupation of Dalmatia by the Venetian Repub- lic. Even in Maziiini's day they could be described as " remnants," and since that time they had fought a gallant but losing fight 14 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. AUSTRIANS REMOVING THEIR against the natural encroachment of the Slav and the deliberately anti-Italian policy of the Austrian Government. This anti-Italian pohcy was of comparatively recent date, and the niunbers of the Italian population had greatly decreased since 1880. At that time no doubt the official figures of the " Italian " population included a greater proportion of Italianized Slaxis than they did 35 years later, but there were other reasons for the great diminution. There was little chance of a career in Dalniatia for an Italian who held fast by his nationality. The easier way was to go with the tide, or to leave home for the parent country, or for the Americas, North and South. It says much for the attachment of the Italian elements to their culture and traditions that they were able to survive at all. il'rom a uennan photogtttph. WOUNDED ACROSS THE PIAVE. Italian claims in Dalmatia had a basis in history and in sentiment, but it is obvious that the controlling factor in deciding the actual programme put forward by the Italian Govern- ment and accepted by Great Britain, France and Rvissia in the London Agreement of April. 1915, was the argument of strategic necessity. This is not the place to discuss the terms ot the Agreement at length. It is enough to say that, while in some slight degree it was a com- promise on the question of the racial difficulty, for Fiume was not included in the Italian claim, or the small communities in Southern Dalmatia and certain ot the islands, between half and three-quarters of a million Slavs — Slovenes, Serbs and Croats — were includeil within the boundary traced for the enlarged Italy. The claim to the northern part of the ■jf'^v^m ITALIAN TROOPS ARRIVING AT ANCONA. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. lu Dalmatian mainland and to tho numerous islands which fell to her under the terms of the Agreement was based on the necessity of im- proving the Italian naval position in the Adriatic. It has often been said that tho two keys to the Adriatic are Pola antl Valona, but Italy's security would not be guaranteed by the possession of these two bases, important though they ai-e. They are too far apart, and the fact of the distance is emphasized by the nature of the waters and the coasts that lie between them. The western, or Italian, shore of the Adi-iatic is without an adequate harbour all the way from Venice to the Straits of Otranto, while the Dalmatian coast and islands form a continuous series of harbours and channels that makes Dalniatia one great potential naval base. And the narrowness of the Adriatic makes it impossible to protect the open Italian shore by forces based upon Pola and Taranto. This was the argument which doubtless determined the extent of the Italian claims in Dalmatia. Again, this is not the place to discuss whether it was necessary to demand such an extensive area in Dalmatia, though the necessity was contested by many naval authorities, and the wisdom of the step was naturally criticized from the ixiilitary point of view. For the increased length of land frontier meant a large increase in military commitments, the more so as it included a large population of the same race as those beyond it. This new boundary was chosen for strate- gical reasons, with the prospect in view of the old enemy lying in wait beyond the frontier, brooding revenge. But from the first, or as soon as its general terms became known, the Acreement gave rise to a keen polemic. On the one side were those who believed in the possibility of breaking up Austria-Hungary, the creation of a Yugoslav State, and the establishnient of a cordial agreement between Italy and the new State. On the other side were those who doubted or deprecated the break-up of Austria-Hungary, and argued that in any case Italy could not reduce her demands, which were justified by reasons of history, sentiment, and strategical necessity ; for there was no guarantee, or even probability, that the successors of Austria-Hungary on the eastern frontier and in the Adriatic would be any more friendly to Italy than the Monarchy itself had been. It was urged that the " Croa- tian," the traditional instrument of oppression in Northern Italy during tho Austrian occupa tion, and the bitter opponent of tho Italians in Fiume and Dalmatia, could not change his spots. In this way a vicious cu-clo appeared to bo established. The Italian demands were backed by tho contention tlint the Yugoslavs were essentially, or at least potentially, hostilea Thi3 Yugoslavs certainly displayed hostility to Italy, but their leaders and their friends in Allied countries maintained that tliis hostility DALMATIAN FISHERMEN. was due to Italy's demands. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Italian extremists had their counterpart among the Slavs. If the extreme Italian progi-amme included between 600,000 and 700,000 Slavs within the boundaries of an enlarged Italy, the Slav extreinists were insistent vipon the inclusion of more than 400,000 Italians within the borders of Yugoslavia. Tho British and French champions of the Yugoslav cause long iiiaiiitnined that Yugoslav " imperialism " was 16 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. [Jia'iian Naval ojju iai plujtograph . ITALIANS UNLOADING STORES AT VALONA. an Italian invention, arising from the wish to justify Italy's demands. But the utterances of various Yugoslav leaders disproved this contention. A further complication was the long differ- ence of opinion among the Yugoslav leaders themselves — Slovenes, Croats, Serbs of the Monarchy, Montenegrins, and Serbians. Each section naturally had its own ideas as to the future State, its constitution, its boundaries, its general programme. This was most natural. Each branch of the race had its own particular interests to consider, and cared much less about those of the other branches ; and it must be remembered that the various branches had never been united in history. The consti- tution of Yugoslavia was a matter of keen dis- cussion, and the question of its boundaries did not command agreement, especially in view of Italy's \mdoubted claims. The Slovenes, for example, claimed Trieste, Istria, and all the lands east of the Isonzo, as essential parts of Yugoslav territory, and cared comparatively little about the Middle Adriatic. For the Croats the important points were Fiume and Dalmatia. Thoy did not press the question of Trieste — ^no doubt they realized that the Yugo- slav claim to Trieste had just as much and just as little justification as the German claim to Antwerp — and it was a Dalmatian-Croat suggestion, made in the summer of 1917. that a surrender of Italian claims in Dalmatia could be compensated by the Bocche di Cattaro, To the Serbs and Serbians, who seemed to care relatively little about Trieste and not very much more about parts of Dalmatia, the Bocche di Cattaro were as the Ark of the Covenant. These difficulties and differences were in the nature of things, and when it is remembered how recently the bitter struggle between Serbs and Croats in the Monarchy had died down, the unification of sentiment which had been accomplished must be regarded as very re- markable. On the other hand, these difficulties and differences did certainly give a large measure of justification to the many Italians who were honestly sceptical regarding the force and unity of the Yugoslav movement. It was all but three years from the outbreak of the war when the Yugoslav leaders finally came to an agreement regarding their pro- gramme, and proclaimed it to the world in the Pact of Corfu. The Pact of Corfu, which was published on •July 20, 1917, was signed by representatives of the Serbian Government and Parliament and of the Yugoslav Committee, which had authority to speak for the Yugoslavs of the Monarchy. It was signed by M. Pashitch for the Serbian Government, and by Dr. Trumbitch for the Committee. This published declaration proclaimed a now State, which should be called " the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." In this new State the various branches of the Yugoslav race were to be THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 17 united under the Karageorgevitch dynasty. Italian opinion responded immediately to this indication of Yugoslav determination and Yugoslav unity. Many people still doubted whether the Yugoslav Committee really repre- sented the opinion of the Yugoslavs of the Monarchy, for it must be remembered that the Yugoslavs had practically cut themselves off from Italy since Italy's entry into the war. With some reason, it must be admitted, but none the less most unfortunately, their repre- sentatives looked upon Italy as definitely hostile, and took up their quarters in London and Paris. Italians were very inadequately informed regarding the progress of the move- ment within the Monarchy, but many had worked steadily on the principle that an agreement was necessary, and the proclamation of the Pact of Corfu at once gave a spur to their efforts and point to their arguments. Five days after the proclamation of the Pact of Corfu, on July 25, the Corriere delta Sera published the first of a remarkable series of articles advocating an agreement with the Southern Slavs, and the other great Milanese newspaper, the Secolo, which had always shown itself favourable to an agreement, took the same line. A month later, during the sittings of an Entente Socialist Congress in London, the representatives of the Italian Reformist Socialists, headed by Signor Berenini, Minister of Public Instruction, were put in touch with the Yugoslav Committee and heard their opinions as to the territorial question. From an exchange of views it seemed as though a compromise might be possible without ^doing A CROATIAN MARKET-PLACE AND CROATIAN PEASANTS. 18 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. violeneo to the interests of either side, and the movement in Italy thus gained further definite adherents. In the meantime discussions were going on in Switzerland between a number of Yugoslav exiles and a group of Italians, whose idea it was to form two committees, Slav and Italian, to prepare the way for agreement and compromise, and for an actual congress. The SIGNOR AGOSTINO BERENINI, Minister of Public Instruction. deliberations progressed very slowly, and at the end of October came the disaster of Caporetto. It was often said that the Italian movement towards agreement dated only from the hour of Italy's iU-fortune. The facts given above are sufficient disproof of the allegation. In point of fact, the Caporetto disaster retarded the movement for a time. There were many Italians who felt that Italy could not make renunciations in the hour of misfortune which she had not considered when her arms were successful. It is not too much to say that it was the other side to the controversy which first reaUzed that agreement was more urgent then ever. The Yugoslavs knew very well that the complete and final defeat of Austria- Hungary was much more necessary to them them to Italy. For Italy it was immensely important. For them it waa a question of life or death. The defeat at Caporetto, following upon the collapne of Russia, opened the eyes of many Yugoslavs to the imperious necessity of composing their differences with Italy. But an agreement with the Yugoslavs was only a part of the programme that was now prepared. The situation clearly demanded the close alliance of all anti-Austrian forces and the adoption of all anti-Austrian weapons, within and without the Monarchy. An Italo-Czech Committee had existed for some time. The PoUsh Committee in Rome had established cordial relations with influential circles, though the policy of the Consulta was not encouraging in this case any more than in those of the other subject-races. Italian sympathy with Rimnania was traditional. Various groups in Italy worked to prepare the way for agreement and cooperation, but the actual arrangements were carried out by an Italian Committee which was formed on February 15. This Committee, which was entitled " Committee for the Entente between the nationalities subject to Austria-Hungary," consisted of a number of influential politicians and journalists. An Executive Committee was appointed, consisting of Senator Ruffini, an SENATOR FRANCESCO RUPFINI, Of the Committee for the entente between the Nationalities subject to Austria-Hungary. ex-minister and the great authority on the life of Cavour, the deputies Signori Torre, Barzilai and Area, Signer Maraviglia of the Idea Nazionale, and Signor Amendola, Rome corre- spondent of the Corriere delta Sera. Immediately after the formation of the committee Signor Torre left Rome for Paris and London as the delegate of this committee, charged with the duty of entering into nego- tiations with the representatives of the various subject-races, and especially with the Yugo- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 19 Slavs. Moanwhilo tho Italian " Intervention- ist " Socialists had formed themselves into a group known as the Italian Socialist Union. Tho ropresontativos of this group at the En- tente Socialist Congress hold in London in February (20-24) proposed to the Congress that its statement of war aims should include the "dismemberment" of Austria-Hungary. The Congress found the proposal too blunt, ami took refuge in a formula which declared that " the rights of independence claimed by Czechs and Yugoslavs could not be considered as questions of autonomy *ithiu the Dual Monarchy." More important, however, than these efforts, for it gave an official sanction to the movement for an agreement between Italians and Southern Slavs, was an interview between Signer Or- lando and Dr. Ante Trumbitch, President of the Yugoslav Committee, wliich took place in London at tlie end of January The inter- view was cordial, and seemed to serve as a foundation for the work of the next few weeks. However, when Signer Torre arrived in London and endeavoured to trace a fonnula for agree- ment with Dr. Trumbitch, it was found with difficulty. The crowning manifestation of all these efforts was the Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary, which was held in Rome, in the Capitol, on April 8, 9 and 10, 1918. The Italian delegation, in addition to the members of the Executive Committee mentioned above, included representatives sent by th(! Italian Committee for an Italo-Yiigo- slav Entente, which had grown out of the negotiations in Switzerland, by the Italo- Czech Committee, and by various groups wliich had interested themselves in the work of forming the specifically anti-Austrian Alliance, among them several of the best-known Na- tionalists. The Congress was closed after three days' discussion among the various committees into which the delegations were divided, by a ple- nary sitting, in which declarations were made by M. Lupu and Senator Draghicescu on behalf of the Rumanians, M. Benes for the Czecho-SIovaks, Dr. Trimibitch for the Yugo- slavs, and M. Zamorski for the Poles. Speeches were also made by M. Franklin-Bouillon, Mr. Wickhani Steed, M. Albert Thomas, Signer Barzilai and Senator Ruffini. The work of the Congress was embodied and proclaimed in a declaration read by the Vice-President, Signor Torre, which included three separate docu- ments ; a series of three resolutions unani- mously voted by the Congress ; a special agreenient between tho Italian and Yugoslav delegates, which was a re -affirmation of tho terms agreed on between Signor Torre and Dr. Trumbitch in London, and a separate resolution put forward by the Polish delegates, who, while adhering to tho general declaration of tho Congress, wished to place on record their expression of tho fact that the Polish SIGNOR ANDREA TORRE, Delegate to Paris of the Committee for the entente between the Nationalities subject to Austria-Hungary. problem was not confined to Austria-Hungary The general proclamation ran as follows : The representatives of the nationalities subject wholly or in part to the dominion of Austria-Hungary, Italians, Poles, Rumanians, Czechs, Yugoslavs, agree in affirming as follows the principles that shall inform their common action : 1. Bach of these peoples proclaims its right to consti- tute its own nationality and State unity or to complete it, and to attain full independence, political and eco- nomic ; 2. Each of these peoples recognizes in the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy the instrument of rjernianic domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realiza- tion of its aspirations and its rights ; 3. This a-sserably recognizes n^eanwhile the nece-ssity of a common struggle against the common oppressors, so that each people may win complete liberation and conipleto national unitj in a free State unity." The Italo-Yugoslav Agreement was in these terms : 1. In the relations between the Italian nation and the' nation of Serb^, Croats and Slovenes known also under the name of tho Yugoslav nation, the representa- tives of the two peoples recognize that the unity and independence of the Yugoslav nation is a vital Italian inferest, as the completion of Italy*s national unity is a vitHl interest of the Yugoslav nation ; 2. They affirni that the liberation of the .Adriatic Sea 20 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. THE CONGRESS OF THE OPPRESSED NATIONALITIES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AT ROME, APRIL 1918: RUMANIAN AND SERBIAN DELEGATES. and its defence against every enemy, present or future, is a vital interest of the two peoples ; 3. They pledge themselves to settle in an amicable manner, ja the interest of future friendly and sincere relations between the two peoples, all particular terri- torial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and the right of peoples to decide their own lot. in such manner as not to injure vital interests of the two nations, which shall be defined at the moment of peace. 4. To those nuclei of the people which should have to be included within the frontiers of the other shall be recognized and guaranteed the right that their language, their culture and their moral and economic interests shall )>e respected. The Polish declaration was as follows : The Polish nation, which in tho struggle for its unity and independence desires to liberate the Polish terri- tories actually in possession of Austria, considers Ger- many as the principal enemy of Poland. The future of Poland, therefore, depends entirely upon the result of the struggle against Germany because the principal aim of German poUcy is to prevent the unification of Poland and the creation of a powerful Polish State which would be ftn opponent of German domination over the whole of Kastern Kurope. The Poles, associating themselves with the peoples of the AiLstro-Hmigarian Monarchy in their struggle for national unity and independence, see in the free action of all the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe one of the principal conditions of their independence of Germany. The labours of the Congress were finished, and its proclamation made to the world, on April 10. Two days later the delegates were received by Signer Orlando, and his speech to them put the official seal upon the resolutions proclaimed from the Capitol. The Italian Premier was able to quote various utterances of his own to show that both he and the Govern- ment of which he was head were at one with the spirit which had animated the Congress. Specially noteworthy were his references to the differences between Italians and Southern Slavs. He claimed that it was " the traditional cun- ning " of Austria which had " unchained the racial passions of the oppressed nationalities, inciting the one against the other in order to dominate them the more easily." He urged that each race should think rather of the com- mon sufferings and common aims of both, and that they should " examine loyally and sin- cerely the respective conditions that must govern the existence of each race and the reciprocal sacrifices which would have to be made in the case of certain national groups existing in those ' gray zones ' near the frontiers." There was no real cause for discord if such an examination were made, and if " just guarantees were given to those foreign elements which the mutual necessities of exist- ence would inevitably allot to one or other of the two different political entities." The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities and its solemn declaration, which came to be known as the Pact of Rome, consecrated the alliance of Austria-Hungary's irreconcilable enemies, and laid down a basis for their coinmon action. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 21 It did not, hovvevor, resolve the acute differ- ences between Italians and Yugoslavs. It deliberately put on one side the practical diffi- culty of a territorial settlement. The fact was stated with the utmost clearness in Dr. Trum- bitch's speech at the last plenary sitting. The President of the Yugoslav Committee said : We ars nc;roed that all the controversies between oxir two peoples (Italian and Slav) nnist be resolved on the basis of pilnciplos doterniined by us, in the eonviction that the practical solution of these controversies lies outside our competence to-day and must await tlie moment of its ripening, and in the conviction, more particularly, that to-day the chief preoccupation of all — a preoccupation which surpasses all otlier interests — is that of obtaining victory over the common enemy. Although private conversations seemed to indicate that an accord would not be difficult, given good will on both sides, many of those who had followed the whole movement realized that the terms of the Agreement left plenty of room tor misunderstanding. The Italian Nationalists did not give up their hopes of " redeeming " some part of Dalmalia. How the Pact was regarded by one section of the Yugoslavs may be proved by the utterances of Father Koro- shetz, President of the Yugoslav National Council, and Dr. Wilfan, leader of the Yugoslavs of Trieste (both Slovenes), on May 30. 1918, seven weeks after the proclamation of the Pact of Rome. Dr. Wilfan claimed for the Yugoslavs all territory east of the Isonzo, without excep- tion. Father Koroshetz claimed that both Trieste and Fiiime were necessary to Yugo- slavia, and addressed an eloquent apostrophe to the city of Trieste, which, he said, " sits throned as Queen in our thoughts." It was evident thus early that the Pact of Rome was an unsure foundation for a settle- ment of the territorial question. While the poUtical world was busily occupied during the winter months, there was breathing space upon the Italian front. It was on CViristmas Day, 1917, that the Austrians finally ceased their efforts to break through the moimtain line, ar^d it was nearly si.v months before any further action on a large scale took place. During tWs lime however, there were various local actions of considerable importance. The first of these was a brilliant attack by tho French troops who had taken over the Monte Tomba sector (see Vol. XV, Chap. CCXXXIII). After a whirlwind artillery preparation, which THE CONGRESS OF THE OFFKESSEU NATION ALIIIES OF AUSTKIA-HUNGAR^ AT ROME, APRIL 1918. Representatives of various countries, including Great Britain and France. 22 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 28 wns opened on the morning of December 30, that part of the Monte Tomba-Monfeneca ridge which was still held by the enemy was stormed with great dash and very little loss, the defend- ing troops being for the most part completely dazed by the extreme violence of the artillery fu-e, in which both British and Italian batteries joined those of the French. This action was admirably carried out, and nearly 1,500 prisoners were taken, while the losses on the French side were verv slisrht indeed. It hart a sidera1)le success. The first was little more than a raid on a large scale. Down by the course of the Old Piave, among the lagoons and marshes, the Italians made a surprise attack to the east of Capo Sile, rushing a system of trenches and taking 50 prisoners. The enemy reacted quickly and energetically but could not recover his lost positions, and only added largely to his casualty list. On tho mountain front, between the Brenta and the Piave, the operation imdertaken was French official photograph. PRISONERS OF WAR TAKEN BY THE ITALIANS ON MONTE TOMBA. sequel, too, for a few days later the enemy withdrew from the northern slope of the Tomba ridge, abandoning all the ground between the ridge and the Ornic torrent. The year finished well, and the new year began well. On January 1, 1918, the Austrians who had crossed the Piave at the Zenson bend in November, and held, although they could not enlarge, this useful bridgehead, were driven back across the river as the result of steady pressure which had been going on for some days. Nor was there loiig delay before further proof was given that the Italian Army, so lately tried to the uttermost, could do more than act on the defensive. On January 14 two attacks were launched, in two different sectors of the front, nnd both met with con- much more ambitious. An attempt was made to retake Monte Asolone, which had been captured four weeks before, and was the farthest point reached by the enemy in his attempt to arrive at the plain by this route. The Italian effort was not entirely successful. Monte Asolone was stormed by a very fine infantry attack, though the men had to go tlirough deep snow to the enemy trenches. But the summit was not held under the storm of shell which was concentrated upon it. Trenches to the right and left, however, were maintained against repeated counter-attacks, and some 400 prisoners, including a colonel, were captured. The Third Army, on the Piave, had shown its offensive spirit. The Fourth Army had 24 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ITALIANS ON THE SUMMIT tested and punished the Austrians in the Grappa sector. It was now the turn of the First Army to take a hand, and win a very notable success. The scene of the fight was that where Marshal Conrad's offensive had been finally checked on Christmas Day, the heights of Col del Rosso and Monte di Val Bella; west of the upper Val Frenzela. An attack was launched against the line which ran from Monte Sisemol across the Frenzela Valley, but the main objectives were Col del Rosso and Val Bella. As a result of the first day's fighting (.January 27) Col del Rosso and Col d'Echele were both captured and held, while on the other side of the Val Frenziela, in the Sasso Rosso sector, the enemy Une was breached in various places, and a number of prisoners were taken. After a lull at night, the fight was resumed the next day by a furious Italian attack on Val Bella, which was entirely successful. The way had been paved by the first day's fighting, when the Italians had broken clean through between Monte Sisemol and Val Bella, and had also outflanked the latter height from the east. More than 1,500 pri- soners remained in Italian hands at the end of the first day, and next morning, when the attackers swarmed up three sides of the Monte di Va' Bella and finally took the summit. OF COL D'ECHELE. more than a thousand Austrians were cap- tured. The enemy did not acknowledge defeat readily. A very heavj' artillery fire was directed against the captured positions, and repeated counter-attacks were made, which failed with heavy loss. Two enemy divisions, the 21st Schiitzen and the 106th Landsturm, were so roughly handled that their remnants had to be withdrawn from the line, and two others suffered very heavily. In these divisions were three specially trained mountain brigades, which were hit specially hard, among them the First Kaiserjager. Such troops are not easily replaceable, and the Austrian losses meant more than their mere numbers would signify. Six guns fell into Italian hands, many trench - mortars, a hundred machine-guns and several thousajid rifles. It was a very useful victory. Important positions were taken, which improved the rather cramped situation of the Italians, and the enemy suffered serious loss. But more important still was the proof that the Italian Army could not only resist — that had been shown by the wonderful stand after the long retreat — but could already hit back hard and retake from the oneiny very strong positions which had been in his hands for over a month. The recovery from the long trial was very THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 25 qiiick ; and it was of special significance that the brigade which took Col del Rosso and held it against all the furious counter- attacks of the Austrians was the Sassari Brigade,* which had belonged to the Second Army and come through the worst of the great retreat. All its old offensive spirit and all its old tenacity were shown again, and there were other units with similar experiences which now showed themselves refreshed and undaunted, eager only to win back something of what had been lost. Among these was the Fifth Ber- • See Vol. XV, Chapter CCXXXIir. saglieri Kegiment, which, with two of the recently formed assault detachments, the Fourth Bersaglieri Brigade, and, of course, several Alpini battalions, won special honours in this mountain fight. Early in February the weather broke and snow came in considerable quantity, though the fall for the season, which had begun so late, remained well below the average. Th(!ro was much mist and heavy cloud, and visibility was poor throughout the spring. Though this seemed to have little effect upon the air service which was very active on both sides, there were A BRITISH NIGHT RAID ACROSS THE PIAVE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. no infantry operations of any importance until the summer. There were infantry raids, in which British units on the Piave distinguished themselves, and air raids and artillery demon- strations, but both sides were waiting, pre- paring for the serious trial of strength which everyone knew would come with the long days and the dry weather. Throughout the winter and spring there was more airwork than there had hitherto been on the Italian front. Both sides wei-e reinforced, the Italians by British flying men and a few French, the Austrians by German bombing squadrons, which soon showed that they had two main objectives, Padua and Venice. The first raid on Padua came at nine o'clock on the night of December 29, and the raid was repeated the two following nights. On the first occasion 13 people were killed and 60 wounded, but no buildings of importance were hit. On the second visit of the German 'planes, although more than 20 bombs were dropped and great destruction was caused to a number of buildings, there were only three killed and three wounded. The Church of San Valentino was hit by an incendiary bomb and set on fire, and the tower of the Carmine Churcli .was partly . destroyed. The third raid lasted six hours in all, from 9 p.m. on December 30 till 3 a.m. on December 31. Again there were only a few casualties, five wounded, but the damage done to buildings was serious. The fa9ade of the cathedral was partly destroyed, and the basilica of St. Antony, the famous chiu-ch of " H Santo," suffered considerably. It was curious that out of the comparatively small number of casualities there should have been three women of Austrian birth. During the following weeks Venice and Padua and the little towns of the Venetian plain were repeatedly attacked. The worst raid was that made upon Venice on the night of February 26. Venice had already been attacked more than 40 times, but on this occasion eight hours passed from the flist appearance of the enemy to the dropping of the last bomb, and over 300 bombs were dropped in all. The machines came in waves, and each no doubt made more than one journey, for Venice was very near the Austrian lines. In all 50 machines took part in the raid, or series of raids, and the damage they did was considerable. The Royal Palace >vas struck, 38 houses were smashed, and three churches were da,maged — SS. Giovanni e Paolo, San Giovanni Crisostomo and San Siraeone Piccolo. Yet the sum of loss was amazingly small considering the thick cluster of treasures that makes up Venice. The escapes were extraordinary. Fifteen bombs fell near the Doge's Palace, all of them, fortunately, in the water. One only just missed the Bridge of Sighs, and bombs fell all round the Ponte di Rialto. It was a miracle that the finest jewels of Venice all remained imtouched on this occasion as on others, though a bomb fell within five yards of the doors of St. Mark's in an earlier raid, and there were other escapes as narrow. Yet there was damage done that is irreparable, for to countless people there is hardly a stone of Venice that does not at least give something to the setting of the rarer jewels. And it was all sheer wantonness. No military purpose could be served by the attacks on the treasures of Venice, and both Port and Arsenal lay far enough away from the things that matter to refute the defence of confusion of aim. The air activity displayed by the Italian and British airmen was of a cUf^erent kind. It was confined to military operations, and it was very successful. Many destructive raids were made upon aerodromes, railway junctions, and encampments, and air fighting became commoner on the front than it had ever been, imtil the enemy once more grew shy, and showed himself as rarely as during the previous summer before the Italian retreat. At that time the Italians had established a complete superiority in the air, but they had lost much material during the retreat, and the enemy were now reinforced by German fighters as well as by German bombers. These turned out more daring than the Aiistrian fliers, for most of whom the Italians had little regard,, but they suffered heavy loss, the British fight- ing machines in particular doing very useful work. The Italian speciality was the big bombing machine, and it did admirable service, while several long-distance flights were made by Italian airmen, the most remarkable of which was the 500-mile journey to. Friedrichshafen and back, which was made by two Italian aeroplanes early in June. As the winter passed in preparation, there was frequent interchange of British, French, and Italian officers, especially in the artillery arm. General Sir Herbert Plumer reported that the British ofiicers made every effort " to illustrate the value of counter-battery work, the value of which we had learned by experi- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 27 •ence in Franco, but which the Italians ha<l not hitherto fully appreciated," and he noted the anxiety of the Italians " to profit by any •experience we coukl give them " It had not ■been easy for the Italians to test for themselves the value of counter -battery work, for there had never been enough shells for the purpose» or enough guns for simultaneous barrage and •counter-battery fire. But guns and shells were becoming more plentiful, and every •advantage was taken of the experience of the He was left with five Allied divisions, three British and two French, but the Italian corps which he had lost was a strong one, consisting of 50,000 men, and the French divisions were relatively weak, the entire French force in ItsJy totalling le^ss than 30,000 men^ While it was evident that the Austrians would n"jake an offensive as soon as the weather served, the Italian command considered the possibility of anticipating this offensive, not V)V an attack on the grMiid scale, but bv " nn BOMBED BUILDINGS ADJOINING THE RIALTO BRIDGE. British and French in this as in other new •developments of warfare. The spring came, and minds were turning -to the prospect of an early offensive by the Austrians wlien the .storm burst in France. KJwing to the German successes and the con- sequent critical situation, thi'ce French (hvi- -sions and tv»o British were withdrawn from the 'Italian front,* and they were followed by the Italian Second Army Corps under General Albricci, which wtis also dispatched to tliicken the line in France. Tliis meant a serious weakening of the forces under General Diaz. • General Plumer had left when it became evident ♦hat the first enemy cflort of the year would not bo in Italy but in France. His departure was very greatly regretted by the Italians, with whom he had Koon • established the best possible relations. Fortunately he ;Ieft a worthy successor in Lord Cavan. action of minor scope," which should at once improve the Italian positions in the Asiago- Brenta zono, and threaten the Austrian com- munications between Feltre and Trento. * During April it was clear that the enemy was planning an offensive on both sides of the Brenta, in the Asiago uplands and in the Grappa sector, but liy the middle of May, a fortnight before the date chosen for the Italian attack, it had bo- come evident that a much more ambitious scheme was being prepared by the Austrians. The offensive astride the Brenta was to be combined with a straight drive against the Italian lines on the Piave. New Austrian divisions were arriving on the front, and increasing the numerical superiority of the * See General Di;iz's Report. 28 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. onemy. The Italians had to change attack into defence, but special measures wore taken to ensure that the defence should be PssentieJly active — that it should be ready to develop at once into a strong counter-offensive. The Italian forces were disposed as follows. [French official photograph. FRENCH AND ITALIANS WATCHING TOGETHER ON THE PIAVE. On the extreme right was the Third Army under the Duke of Aosta, which was aligned along the Piave up from the sea so as to cover both Venice and Treviso. Next came the Eighth Army under General Pennella, which held the Middle Piave, including the Montello sector. On its left again was the Fourth Army under General Giardino, occupying the mountain sector between the Piave and the Brenta. Next lay the Sixth Army under General Montuori. This army, which held the line in the Asiago uplands, or rather the whole stretch between the Brenta and the Astico, was a composite army, Italian, British and French. It had been decided early in the spring that the Brit'sh contingent should be transferred from the Montello to the mountains for the summer months, and by March 29 the troops were established in their new positions. The transference of the French from the Monte Tomba sector took place about the same time. The right of the Sixtli Army was com- posed of Italian troops, who held what might be termed the Val Frenzela sector. Then came the French XII. Corps, then the British, who held the hills which face .Vsiego and Canove from the so\ith. The left wing of the anny was Italian. Next the Sixth Army, from the Astico to Lake Garda, tv-as the First Army, and beyond, from Lake Garda to the Swiss border, the Seventh Army But these two armies were not engaged in the great battle upon which Austria-Hungary staked so much. In April, 1918, the 56 divisions under General Diaz (51 Italian, 3 British, and 2 French) were faced by 60 enemy divisions. When the expected blow was struck at last, the number had been increased to 71. And the Austrian superiority in artillery was calculated at 25 per cent., mainly in medium and heavy calibres. The number of enemy guns employed in the offensive was estimated at 7,500. The weeks of waiting — April, May, and the first half of June — were very anxious. The course of the fighting in France and Flanders seemed to prove that a resolute offensive, con- ducted on German methods, could almost count upon iinportant gains at the outset, even if it were finally brought to a standstill. It was already realized that the way to kill an offensive of the latest German model was to dispose the defending troops in depth, with the front lines comparatively lightly held, the " battle posi- tions " well back, and ample reserves behind them. A great part of the front held by the Italians was unsuitable for these defensive tactics. There was no depth in the positions, little room to yield and come again. Between the Piave and the Brenta especially they were fighting very near the edge of the mountain country. Nor was there far to go from the Asiago uplands to the Venetian plain. Hero was the weakness in the Italian situation. The defenders could not afford to give much ground, for a comparatively slight retreat would have brought them down from the mountains, which fall very steeply to the plain. It follows that a comparatively rigid system of defence was necessary. The defenders had this advantage, however, that the nature of the ground in the mountain sector did not lend itself very well to the tactics which had been so successful in France. Communications were difficult, and, above all, speed was difficult. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 2y When April passed without the expected offensive in the mountains, the most interesting event of the month was the first appearance among the Italian troops of the soldiers of a new Ally, the Czecho-Slovak State. It had been decided to form a Legion from the Czecho- slovak prisoners in Italy, and while the men, to the strength of a division, were being organized and trained, advance detachments were sent to the front to try and get in touch with their brothers who were still with the Austrians. They were splendid men, and, look- ing at them, it was impossible not to be moved by the thought of what they faced in the hope of freeing their country. Others who fell into enemy hands had the right to fair and kindly treatment, though in this war that right was seldom respected by German or Austrian. But for these men, if they were taken, the gallows waited. April came to an end, and May drew on. About the middle of the month, as has been said, signs showed that the Austrian offensive would be on an even more ambitious scale than had at first seemed probable. There was to be a double battle, on twq wide fronts. The news from France was still far from reassuring. Whenever one German offensive ceased to gain groiuid another attack was launched, and on each occasion important progress was made. There was grave preoccupation in all circles regarding the forthcoming Austrian drive, and it was generally felt that the enemy would probably win a considerable success, though there was no misgiving as to the final issue. He would be checked ; the line would not be broken though it would be pressed back. But the plain was near the invaders in the moun- tains, and Venice was near their armies on the Piave. The outlook did not seem very encouraging. While expectation was striuig high, the Italian Command suddenly threw in two *lmir- ably conducted attacks towards the extreme ends of the long front. The first attack was in the Adamello sector, already the scene of extra- ordinary fighting, but farther north than the previous actions, near the Tonale Pass. On the morning of May 2.5, Italian Alpini advanced upon the rock fortresses of Cima Zigolon, Cima Preftena and Monticello The two former are both over 10,000 feet above the sea, and Monticello is about 1,300 feet lower. The Italian guns made it possible for the Alpini to do wliat seems on the face of it impossible. For the Aiistrian positions, or many of them, were [OSicialpholograpli. VIEW FROM A BRITISH POSITION ON MONTELLO, LOOKING TOWARDS CORNUDA so THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. inaccessible to anyone bnt a good climyjer, and to the onlooker it might have appeared that th^ defenders could repi'.lse their enemies with stones. Bnt the guns made it difficult for the Austrians to leave their caverns, and the indomitable Alpini had a slender chance. They took it, of coiu-se. Once more they did what apparently could not be done. Roped together, climbing slowly, laboriously, tirelessly, thoir haversacks full of bombs, these matchless mountain fighters reached their enemy, itself a feat, and then beat him. The struggle lasted throughout two days, and did not stop during all the moonlit night between, and at the end of the second day they were in possession of the .peaks mentioned and the basin of the Presena Lake, together with nearly a thousand prisoners. AN ITALIAN OBSERVATION POS I ON MONTE ADAMELLO. 12 guns, 14 trench-mortars, 25 machine-guns, and several hundred rifles. The second of the two actions, which took place near Capo Sile, was in every way a con- trast to the first, except in its successful result. The first was carried out in a wilderness of glacier and eternal snow, broken by black rock ridges so steep that snow cannot lie there, and it was drawn out over two days. The second fight was fought in a fiat gi'een land of ditches and lagoons, where the soil barely oinerges from the water, and the roads are causeways. The attack was over in a few minutes ; the enemy counter-attack failed badly, and the Italians were left in possession of their objective, with 440 prisoners, foui- trench-mortars and 10 machine-gnns, besides several hundred rifles. These were heartening actions, which gave confidence for the trial which all knew was imminent. There was a time of anxious tension, when all the infonnation gained from prisoners told of great preparations and an early move, and finally the Italian Command was able to forecast the coming offensive even to its details: On June I'l, which was marked by heavy fire from the Austrian gvins all day, the army was ordered to be on the alert for an attack early next morning. The attack came at the hour expected, preceded by a very violent bombardment, with inuch gas. But the Italian guns had opened first, with a short but furious barrage on the trenches and certain points of assembly, and heavy counter-battery fire. The enemy's shooting was clearly handicajjped by this im- expected move. His fire was exceedingly intense, but it was not very accurate. Though smoke and gas were freely employed, the defending troops were now all equipped with the British mask, and were not greatly dis- turbed. Austrian attacks were launched on the western part of the front, near Riva and in the Adamello district, which resulted in the temporary occupation of two moimtain posi- tions, the Dosso Alto in the first-named sector, and in the second the Corno di Cavento, the " House of the Wind," which the Alpini had taken from the Austrians exactly a year before. The whole front was on fire from the Val Lagarina to the sen, but the real offensive developed as had been foreseen. The two fronts of attack were from south-west of Asiago to east of Monte Grappa, a distance of nearly 20 miles, and from the Montello to below San Dona di Piave, more than 25 miles. There were three main tlrrusts, the first on both sides of the Brenta valley, the second against the Montello front, the third lower down the river, from Fagaro, just north of the Treviso-Oderzo railway line, to below San Don&, di Piave. The first sector was the centre of the northern attack, which had been entrusted by the enemy Generalissimo, Boroe- vitch, to Field-Marshal Conrad von Hotzen- THE TIMEa HISTORY OF THE WAR. 31 dorf. Conrad was the specialist in the Trentino region. He had made two great attacks, in May and June, 1016, and November and December, 1917. Each time he had tailed to get througli, but each time he had gained much ground. And now he was very near the plain. ' On tlie western side of the Asiago plateau ho was starting where he came to a stop two years before. On the eastern side, and across the Brenta, the attack was launched from the lines that marked the limits of the advance in the winter of 1917 In that fierce struggle Conrad had only commanded the troops west of the Brenta, Krobatin directing operations between the Brenta and the Piave. Now, in his third attempt to reach the fat plains of the Veneto, Conrad had charge of the entire offensive on the mountain front The attack across the Piave was conducted by a group of armies tmder Boroevitch himself, the Arch- duke Joseph commanding opposite the Mon- tollo, and General Wenzel von Wurm, with the old Isonzo Army, directing the thrust between Ponte di Piave and San Don&. The attack in the mountain sector was a resounding failure, so great a failure that it was broken off, after three days' fighting, without any important alteration in the line of the front. In the first rush the lines of the Italians and their Allies were penetrated in variovis places, and an anxious day followed. During the morning the enemy made fair progress on both s'dss of the Brei^ta. The old Val P.ella-Col del Rosso salient, from whose battered rocks the Italians had withdrawn all but a thin screen of infantry and machine- gunners, fell before the advancing waves of the enemy, and Costalunga, to the west, was also takrti. Troops penetrated eastwards of Monte Melago, by the ruined houses of Sasso, and attacked the Pizzo Razea, only a mile and a half west of Valstagna and the Brenta Valley. But north\^ard, across the Frenzela Valley, the Alpini were innnovable. Tiiey were tucked up mider the crests of the hills that rise steeply from the valley, the Sasso Rosso and the Colic di San Francesco, but the enemy coming down on them from above could make no impression upon them. Three successive attacks all failed completely. Shells rained upon the rocky slopes, and the defenders suffered very heavily. On the ridge of the Comone, under Sasso Rosso, little isolated posts kept back the enemy with machine-guns and bombs until the reserves could come into action. At one critical spot all the defenders were killed or disabled with the exce[>tion of one nian, but that one man held/ off four enemy attacks with his machine-gun until help came. North of the Frenzela Valley, where the enemy must have expected to have an easy task, he gained practically no ground at all. And farther west his early successes were soon countered. By GENERAL WENZEL VON WURM. Commanded an Austrian Army on the Piave. midday the Italians were coimter-attacking in force. Costalunga was soon regained, and the enemy troops who had taken Col del Rosso were checked and even pushed back a little. For three days this region was the scene of a fierce and uncertain strviggle, in which the enemy strove in vain to widen and deepen the slight advance he had made. A desperate fight raged round Pizzo Razea, which was taken and retaken several times, but finally, at the end of the third day's fighting, was definitely re-occupied by the defencl"rs. It wfts torn from the enemy by an assaulting column of Bersaglieri and infantry of the Parlua Brigade, who also v.'on back the ruins of Sasso and the cemetery which lies on the edge of the steep fall to the Frenzela Valley The cemetery had been turned into a nest of machine-guns, but nothing could stop the advance of the Italians. Tlie night of June 17 32 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. saw the definite fiulure of the Austrian effort west of the Brenta Valley. Meanwhile the Fourth Italian Army, or rather the left of the army which lay between the Brenta and Monte Grappa, was going tliroiigh a very similar experience to that of the right wing of the Sixth Army. General Giardino had kept his main forces well back, as far back as the lie of the ground would allow him, and the enemy, attaclung in mass, swept through the advanced Italian positions in front of Col Caprile and Monte Asolone. Nor did their success end there In spite of the gallant resistance of the second line of defenders the Austrians gained ground both to west and south. Col Mosehin was taken and the enemy looked down into the Brenta Valley. Pushing south, detachments reached Col Baniero*, so that the greater part of the plateau west of Grappa was in Austrian hands. Both north and west of Moscliin, on the very edge of the valley, the Italians hung on stub- bornly ; and the enemy advance towards the plain, along the ridge that nms southward, parallel with the Brenta, was held up at Col Raniero. By midday on June 15 the Italians were counter-attacking with success. Reserves were thrown in at the right moment, and the enemy began to give back. Soon he was holding only Col Mosehin, having lost all his gains to the south and east. In the afternoon a storm rose, a hurricane of wind and rain and driving cloud that hid all the mountain ridges. The Italian guns pounded the enemy on Col Mosehin, and towards evening the counter- attack was made. Troops of the Basilicata Brigade, a brigade which had distinguished itself greatly in the desperate resistance on Monte Tomba seven months earlier, went forward in an irresistible rush. In half an hour Col Mosehin was in Italian hands again. Next day the enemy did not even attempt to continue the attack. Perhaps he was waiting for the result of the fighting on the other side of the Brenta, waiting, like a di^^s•on which was lying in the Brenta Valley, for the successful action which should open the \vay to Bassano. Conrad had failed to get through in his first rush, and it almost seemed as though he made up his mind quickly to cut his loss. For it was only in the Frenzela region that he made Any attempt to push his offensive after the disappointing results of the first day's fighting. Probably he was well ad- • Also known as Ool del Gallo. vised. His . attack was really smashed on the first day. The attack immediately east and west of the Brenta seems to have been the main operation, but both farther east, against the Solarolo salient, and farther west, against the .sectors held by the French and British, determined attacks were made. In the last-named sectors the Austrian aims were very ambitious. In his attack against the Solarolo salient, the enemji succeeded in occupying the Porte di Salton, the ridge between the Ornic and Calcine torrents, but before the day was over he was pushed back to liis point of departure. The attack in this sector was probably in the main demonstrative. There was no advantage in incurring losses here, when the main operations were staged to the west and south. It was different on the right of the attack. W hile the main drive was in the centre, it was hoped to break down the defence all the way from the Astico to the Brenta. In the British sector, for instance, captured maps showed that the enemy objectives for June 15 included Monte Pau and Cima di Fonte, which lie some three miles behind the slopes where the British were in line, and about the same distance from the plain. The story of the fight in tliis sector can be told very shortly. South-east of Asiago the French troops lost a few outlying positions which were retaken when the reserves came into action. Next the French were two British divisions, the 23rd and 48th, which were attacked by four enemy divisions. The attack against the 23rd Division failed completely The enemy were partly aided by mist, but they had to advance over a considerable stretch of open ground, and never really threatened danger. They were stopped for the most part with rifle and machine-gun fire, and their losses were heavy. On the left, against the 48th Divi- sion, the enemy had the advantage of the cover supplied by the valley or depression along which runs the Asiago-Schio railway ; their attack was in some sense a surprise, and at first they made considerable progress. They occupied the British front line on a front of some 3,000 yards, and subsequently penetrated to a depth of about 1,000 yards. The defenders fell back on a series of switches, but the situation looked serious for a little. The reaction came quickly, however, and the Italian 12th Division on the left lent valuable assistance both with infantry and artillery, which, in the words of Lord THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 33 Cavan's dispatch, " was largely responsiblo for bringing the Austrian infiltration to an imnied'- ate halt." Advancing on to the switch lines, the Austrians found themselves in a kind of triangular pocket, where they were very uncom- fortably situated. They hesitated, and were lost. All their subsequent efforts failed to enlarge their gains, and an isolated handful of British troops, who . were still holding out nished an admirable target for British and Italian artillery, which hammered them with cruel effect. Both British divisions attacked the enemy, taking full advantage of their disorder. Various positions were temporarily occupied, and over 1,000 prisoners were brought back, with 7 mountain guns and 72 machine-guns. It was calculated that the enemy casualties were close upon 5,000. IN THE ITALIAN FRONT LINE ON MONTELLO. 1 Itu'iun ujj'u ull I ^uipk. though they were surrounded, gave them a good deal of trouble. They could gain no more ground all day. During the night, under the pressvire of various British attacks, they began to give back. In the early morning of the next day they were driven completely out of the original British positions. They Icfet order, and, instead of retreating by the comparatively sheltered valley from which they had attacked, they retired o\'er the open ground, and fur- The northern half of the double attack, the drive wliich was to push back the Italian Armies in the mountains on to the flank and the line of retreat of the armies in the plain, had failed completely in less than two days. The southern battle was to last longer, but was to end in a failure no less complete. On the morning of .Tiuio l.o the Austrians succeeded in crossing the Piave, undor 34 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. cover of a very cleverly managed smoke barrage. Crossings were effected at various points, but thi-ee main bridgeheads were formed, and the subsequent efforts of the enemy were chiefly concentrated on extending or maintaining tlie ground won at these three points. The right wing of Boroevitch's Army Group, the Sixth Army under the Archduke Joseph, attacked the Italian Eighth Army in the Montello region. The Montello is an iso- lated hog's back, some eight miles long by three wide, running from 400 to 800 feet above the plain. It runs nearly due east and west, and the Piave flows beneath it on the north and east, making a right-angled turn at the north- east comer of the ridge. It is partly culti- vated and partly covered with httle woods. There are a number of farms, and the whole mass is crossed from south to north by over a score of roads, as nearly* as possible parallel. The Austrians made their first crossings from Falze di Piave, at the right angle mentioned above, and at Nervesa, below the south-east corner of the Montello. They overran the Italians in the front lines, and the two columns quickly established touch with each other. When they had once joined hands, reinforce- ments came over very quickly, and the bridge- head was rapidly extended. Their left wing was promptly held up. The end of two days' hard fighting found it still • resting upon San Andrea, a bare kilometre from Nervesa, but the centre and right had made good progress on the Montello and along the river bank to- the north. At the end of the second day's fighting the Austrians held about two -thirds of the Montello, the battle -lino running from Ciano, on the river bank, near the north-west corner of the Montello, across the ridge in a slanting direction, passing over the sunmiit and thence eastwards to San Andrea. This was the term to the enemy's advance. His pressure was met by a constantly increasing counter - pressure from the Italian reserves,. who fought with the utmost determination and slowly gained the upper band. The Austrian gain in the Montello sector was con- siderable, but it fell very far short of expecta- tions. According to the plan of attack,, numerous copies of which fell into Italian hands,. the objective for the first day was the railway- between Treviso and Montebelluna, which was to be reached by the troops who crossed at Nervesa. , The crossing next below Nervesa was made some five miles farther down, by way of the long shoal island known as the Grave di Papado- poli. The enemy came over very early in the morning, some hours before the attacks to the north and south, and it is clear that this was a. demonstrative action. A footing was estab- ishod on the right bank, but an Italian counter- attack at daybreak drove most of the enemy back to the island, and took about 600 prisoners TRANSPORT OF BRITISH GUNS FOR THE OFFENSIVE ON THE FIAVE FRONT, THE TIMES HISTOnV OF THE WAi;. «-) ROYAL ENGINEERS ON THEIR WAY Vaiious other attempts were made to gain ground in this sector, but the A\istrians, although they reached the right bank several times, could not maintain their hold, much less make any further progress. The third and fourth crossings were between Candelu and Kagare, north of the Treviso-Oderzo railway, and at the Zenson bend, south of the railway. These two crossings were the f5rst move in the second of the main operations on the Piave, the direct push for Treviso, which was to be reached at the end of the first day's fighting. 'J'reviso is about 10 miles fron^ the river, and it was only after four days' hard struggle that the Austrian Fourth Army Corps succeeded in ))utting any ground between themselves and the river. On June 18 they progressed about a mile iistrifle r,f the road and railway between the river and San I'.iagio, but an Italian counter-attack began to push them back the same night, and next day they were back in their old positions, pressed up against the river. Farther south again, astride the Mestre- Portogruaro railway, from P'ossalta to Musile, the Austrians succeeded in establishing an ample bridgehead, but their gains never amoimted to more than a briflgehead. Between the railway and the marshes west of the Old Piave tliey reached the Fossetta canal, a distance of about five miles from Musile, but they could I ot cross it. North of the railway, where the lOJ/icuii pHolograph. TO WORK ON THE PIAVfc, l-KONT. canal is nearer the river, they crossed it and reached the village of Losson, but this was the farthest point of their advance. For several I lays the battle swayed backwards and forwards, and the nature of the country made the fighting very confused. It was enclosed country, with masses of trees and bushes broken up by very numerous roarls and paths and ditches. The enemy was doing no more than holding his own, and was already giving ground in some places before the fiu-ious counter-attacks of the Italians, who hammered at the hard-won salient from west and north, when the rising waters of the Piave finally quenched the hopes that were already burning very low. Even before the river rose the Austrians had maintained their bridgeheads with difiiculty, for the ItaUan coimter- attacks were most determined ; the Italian artillery kept up a devastating flLre on the river- crossings, bridges, and boats, and Italian and British airmen made the task of bringing men and food and amnnniition to the front still more difficult It was on .June 19 that the flood watei-s of the Piave began to interfere with the Austrian l>ridges, and by that time the offensive was quite obviously held. By .Jime 20 the enemy was making no further attempt to attack. He was stubbornly resisting the increasing weight of the Italian counter-prf)Ssure, but he was obviously in grave difficiilties. Two ilaya 86 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. lati-r, on the night of June 22, he liegan to withdraw his troops. By this time the quick - risen flood waters had fallen as quickly, and it was owing to this fact that tlie Aiistrians were able to conduct a fairly successful retreat. Their losses were heavy during this operation, for the Piave was still an obstacle of some * importance, and the Italian shells rained mercilessly along both banks of the liver and on the bridges. If the sudden rise of the Piave handicapped the Austrians, its sudden fall saved those who had cros.sed to the right bank. The Italian coiuiter-offensixe was not fully imder way. Another day would have seen the Austrians faced with the choice of surren- diT or of being forced into the river. As it was, the Austrian losses in the doubk battle were enonnous. They were calculated V)y the Italians at from 180,000 to 200,000 men, and it is probable that the figure is close to the truth. The Italian losses were 90,000. Hardly another single week thi-oughout the long struggle of the war saw more blood shed than the week which put an end to the last Austrian hopes of a victorious peace. The fortnight which followed was marked by various local offensives on the part of the Italians, wliich completely restored the few positions in the moimtains which had not been won back in the early counter-attacks, and finally pushed back the Austrians from the positions they had occupied between the Old and the New Piave. This meant a gain of some three miles in depth, which gave a little more breathing-space to Venice. In all these attacks prisoners were taken, and the total number of captures from the beginning of the Austrian offensive was 523 oflficers and 23,911 men. The captures of material were 63 guns, 65 trench-mortars, 1,234 machine- guns, and nearly 40,000 rifles. In addition the Italians recaptured 72 of their own guns \Ahich had been taken by the enemy in his Hist aihance. Most of them were luidamaged. The Austrians had been too hard pressed to destroy them. Their air service also suffered a very severe defeat. During the week June 15-22 95 aeroplanes and six balloons were destroyed. After Jime 22 the Austrian air- craft remained on the ground. The June battle on the Italian front, which is generally known as the battle of the Piave, from the more extended of its two phases, was of extreme importance. It had a threefold significance. It showed that the Italian Army was in splendid fighting trim, with all its old moral and with increased skill, and it smaslied the offensive power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The two facts taken together hud an immense effect on the general military situation. And there was a third significance This was the first Allied success of the yc^ar, and it followed upon a series of German victories which had tried our powers of resis- tance to the utmost. In the message which he sent to Signer Orlando in the name of the British War Cabinet, Mr. Lloyd George showed his realization of the truth. " This great siiccess has been a deep source of encourage- ment to the Allies. Coming as it has at the most fateful hour of the whole war, it is a good augury that the alliance of free nations will ere long free the world once for all from the military domination which has threatened it so long.'" The Italian victory on the Piave was indeed auspicious. It was the turning-point. It came at the end of a long series of defeats. It was the first of a succession of victories that led unbroken straight to the final triumph. CHAPTER CCLXXVI. THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA. (IV.) The Campaigns of 1917-1918 — Difficulties of the Rainy Season — General Hoskins re- organizes THE Forces — Van Deventer in Command — German Strength and Re.sources, June, 1917 — Enemy spying out Portuguese Territory — The Chase op Naumann — Germans MURDER British Officers — Van Deventbr's Strategy — Northey's Operations — Kilwa and LiNDi operations begun — The new Belgian Campaign — M.ihenge captured by Major Bataille — The Main Offensive — Von Lettow's Narrow Escape — Colonel Tafel surrenders — Sltfferings of British Prisoners — ^Ten Months' Campaign in Portuguese East Africa — Enemy Success Near Quelimane — Rapid Enemy March North — Germans in Northern Rhodesia — Von Lettow Surrenders. EXCEPT for East Africa the Gemians had lost all their colonial possessions by the early part of 1916. In East Africa,, chiefly owing to the skill and resolution of the commander-in-chief. Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck — who won the Order Pour le M6rite and the rank of Major-General — enemy troops were in the field to the close of hostilities. Previous chapters have described the early fighting, the Kilimanjaro campaign and the subsequent operations of Generals Smuts and Northey and of the Belgians. Evilly two-thirds of German East Africa was conquered by the Allies between March and September, 1916. By that time the enemy was confined to the south-east and south central parts of the protectorate. In January, 1917, General Smuts began a new campaign in the Rufiji region. But before the month was out General Smuts was summoned to London to attend the Imperial War Cabinet, and he handed over the command to Lieut. -General Hoskins, who held the post for three and a half months. In May, 1917, General van Deventer was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and he took up his duties on Maj' 29. Operations, which had been Vol. XIX.— Part 236. interrupted by one of the wettest seasons on record in East Africa, began again in June, 1917; Belgian troops once more gave valuable a.ssistance, and by the efforts of the combined forces of Generals Deventer and Northey and the Belgians, under Colonel Huyghe, the rest of the protectorate was cleared of the enemy. Mahenge, the German point d'appui in the south central plateau, was cajjtured by the Belgians in October, 1917. There had been meantime fierce fighting between the British and the Germans in the coast areas near Kilwa and Lindi. In November the enemy was hard pressed in every direction. On the 28th of that month Colonel Tafel with some 3,500 followers (including cariiers), all that was left of the Mahenge force, while marching south in an endeavour to join von Lettow, was trapped and surrendered. The troops imder von Lettow, as the only means of avoiding imme-" diate disaster, had abandoned German East Africa three days prcs'iously, crossing the Rovunia into Portuguese territory. A small mobile force of veterans, well armed, and still well supplied with machine-guns, von Lettow's troops, overpowering several small Portuguese posts, made their way south, and 37 38 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE" WAR. columns liad to be organized to deal with them, Hvistled, but not brought to decisive action, von I^ttow reached the neighbourhood of Quelimane, where many plantations were ravaged and much loot obtained. Turning north, and once more evading the net spread to catch hun, in September, 1918, he recrossed the Roviima, and moving parallel to the east shores of Lake Nyasa entered Northern Rhodesia. He was by the Cliambezi river when the armistice was signed in France. On November 14, he and his whole following, 1,300 fighting men and many carriere, sur- rendered at Kasama. Shortly afterwards von Lettow, Dr. Schnee (tlie ex-Governor), and all the Europeans of his force were removed to Europe. Chapter CCVI. carried the narrative of events up to the first campaign of 1917. One object General Smuts had in view when that campaign was begun, the envelopment of the enemy forces on the Rufiji, was not attained. Attacked first on the Mgeta river front, the Germans extricated themselves from flanking columns, and then at Beho-Beho while retiring to the Rufiji, though severely handled, inanaged to •slip away. It was in this engagement that Mr. F. C. Selous, the famous hunter-naturalist and explorer, was killed. Von Lettow next took up positions north of the Rufiji, but at the beginning of May 1917 evacuated the valley of that river. General Hoskins showed, in his dispatch of May 30, 1917, how great were the difficulties with which he had to contend when, on January 20, in the luiddle of the operations, he was called upon to succeed General Smuts.* The lower Rufiji, it may be recalled, runs parallel to and some 70 miles south of the eastern section of the Central R.ailway. The Nigerian * It- is related that when General Hoskins was asked to come and see Smnts in reference to taking over tlie com- mand he was at Kibata. He rode some 20 miles through the hills, then motored into Kilwa, whence he finished his journey by a 180 miles flight in ail aeroplane. See an article by Colonel G. M. Orr, D.S.O., in the NnJional Review, Dononiber; 1!)1K. SOUTHERN GERMAN EAST AFRICA. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 39 CAPT. F. C. SELOUS IN CAMP, CHRISTMAS 1916. Captain Selous was killed in action January 4, 1917. Brigade and othor forces were pressing von Lettow from the north, and he was also threat- ened from the south, the southern column of the British being based on Kilwa, a seaport 60 miles south of the Rufiji delta. Farther west was the Mahenge force of the enemy — with General Northev on its left (western) flank and the Iringa column on its north-west. The Iringa column was based on Dodoma, a station on the Central Railway. The British operations proceeded favourably up to January 25,* when heavy rain began to fall and in two days the whole aspect of affairs was changed. Not only was the maintenance of oommunico - tions rendered almost impossible, but great sickness was caused among the troops. The coast belt is always unhealthy, but now malaria was rife among the Europeans and Indians, while even the African troops suffered much from dysentery and pneumonia. The cliffi- * On January 24 Gommandant Grawert, with 40 Ger- mans, 200 88l:ari, a field gun and two machine-guns, surrendered to a detachment of General Northey*s (orce. oulties of supply were so great, especially in February, that many of the troops were frequently on half rations. It is perhaps hard to realize (wrote General Hosldns) the difficulties which the rainy season in Bast Africa entailed for a force acting from such widely separated bases, with several different lines of eonnnunieation running through every variety of difficult coimtry and necessitating in some c€ises as much as 130 miles of porter transport. In the Mgeta and Kufiji valleys roads con* structed with much skill and labour, over which motor transport ran continuously in January, were traversed with diltioulty and much hardship a month later by porters wading for milea in water above their waists. The Dodoma-Iringa line of communication crossed the Groat Ruaha in the dry weather by an easy fctrd ; when the rain had really set in, supplies had to be transported not only over a flooded river but also a swamp on each Ride of it 6 ft. deep and as many ihiles wide. Consider- able anxiety was caused by this extensive flooding across the Dodoma-Iringrt communication [a full 100 ntiles in length], and every effort was made to cope with this. The Iringa Column was kept as small as possible, and special flat-bottomed boats were prepared, but even- tually it became necessary to switch on to a new lino along the road which runs south from the railway at Kilossa. The valley of the Rufiji ami its various tribu- taries became a vast lake, in which the true courses of the streams wore often only discernible with difficulty, if at all. Patrol work had to be carried out for some time in canoes, and the men found themselves making 236—2 40 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. fast to the roofs of houses which had lately formed their quarters. That the Germans also suffered from the same causes as did the British is true, but tlioy did not suffer to the same extent. The wliitos suiiong them were more acclimatized than the British ; their native troops — unUke the British African troops — were all indigenous to the coimtry, and in two and a half years of warfare THE MGETA VALLEY. their ranks had been thinned of weaklings. The enemy also had the advantage arising from the possession of interior lines and of being able to rely on the country both for food and labour. The food of the natives was seized without compunction or payment, and all who could handle a load, men, women and children, were pressed into service as carriers — to be left to die when worn out, or else sent into the British lines in a starving con- dition. Operations were not entirely abandoned during the rains,' and by the end of February, largely as the result of the activity of the Nigerian Brigade and the Oape Corps, the Gcnnans had abandoned the country north of the lower Rufiji. From that time onward a regular river transport service was organ- ized. The survey of the Rufiji, especially among the mangrove swamps of the delta, was an arduous task. It was successfully carried out, and in a remarkably short time, by Lieut. - Commander Garbett, R.N.— one of the many services rendered the Expeditionary Force by the Navy. By the end of May, " partly from the pressure of our forces and partly on account of floods and exhaustion of food supplies the Miemy had given up practically the whole area north of the Matandu river," that is, von Lettow had retired south some 70 miles from the Rufiji. Except that another considerable slice of territory was freed from the Grermans, this withdrawal of von I-ettow was hardly a gain to the British. The rainy season was over and the enemy was now strongly posted in dense bush in the Kilwa area, notably at a place on the Ngaura river, 20 miles south-west of Kilwa port. Here patrol encounters were of daily occurrence. In one affair a detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment distinguished itself by ambushing an enemy force three times its strength, inflicting 40 casualties. Skirmishes apart, there was one considerable action. On April 18 Major Tyndall, with 400 of the 40th Pathans, 200 King's African Rifles and two mountain gvins of the Gold Coast Regiment attacked an enemy force to the south-west of Kilwa. The enemy were in strength, and after an engagement lasting several hovirs, in which both sides suffered severely. Major Tyndall retired. But in that direction the eneiny's aggressive action ceased. The Germans had nevertheless advanced to the coast, and of this fact the people of Kilwa- Kissiwani (which is on a small island) were made vinpleasantly aware one day — May 5 — when a gun hidden in the mangrove swamps of the mainland suddenly opened fire on a ship lying at anchor in the harbour. With the Navy's help the enemy was driven off and a British post established to guard against a repetition of the audacious action. In the Lindi area, a hun- dred miles farther south, the Germans were also close up to the coast. They held the hills south of Lindi harbour, and on April 24 made an attack with two companies (about 250 men) on the small British post at Sudi Bay, which is some 25 miles south of Lindi. The Germans had an affection for Sudi, for it was here; about a year previously (in March 1916) and at a time when they were " running short of ammunition, and contemplated the necessity of surrender on that account," that a blockade runner had THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 41 brought them most welcome supplies.* Possibly they may again have expected aid of this kind ; certainly the German Government was en- deavouring to send more supplies, but the British Navy was now very much on the alert and had a shorter coast line to guard. In any case the attack on Sudi Bay in April 1917 * Reference to this blockade running at Sudi Bay is made in Vol. XII., p. 83. Tho following details may be added. They are extracted from tho narrative of Brigadier-General Crowe, who in General Srnuts*s cani- paigti wai> in command of tho Royal Artillery. After an ancount of the .surprisinj; adventures of tho Rubens, the first blockade runner, in April, 1915, General Crowe says : — *' There was one other successful blockade runner which made her way into Sudi Bay. near Lindi. This wa? the Maria, which arrived in tho middle of Slarch, 1916, after a three months* voyage. She had found it necessary to oome ma South America, then wont to Kast Indian waters, and eventually made Sudi Bay. tio Madagascar. She was a German boat, built at Flens- burg, [Tho Rubens was an English ship, seized by tho Germans at Hamburg at the beginning of the war.] She brought with her a battery of 105 cm. (I'l inch) howit- zers, two batteries of mountain guns adapted for mule transport, 5,000,000 of 98 and a quantity of 71 small- arm ammunition, 12 machine-guns (with telescopic sights), a quantity of equipment and clothing, both for troops and for tho German women in East Africa. She also had a quantity of stores and provisions, medicines, etc. She was discovered about April 10, and tired into by our man-of-war. Having completed the discharge of her cargo, the Germans succeeded in repairing the damage done by the shell, and she was shortly afterwards heard of in the Dutch East Indies." {General Smul^'s Cam- paign in Eait Africa, London, John Mvirray, I9I8, pp. 37, 38.) was a failure, tho enemy being driven off after a . sliarp engagf-inent. Much of General Hoskins's time was taken up by a reorganization of the force. It had been liogun by General Smuts. Realizing that the climate of the country in which future operations wore to be conducted was particularly unhealthy for whites, he had, in the closing months of 1916, sent back some 12,000 South Africans. But neither the state of the troops nor of the transport was, 5,3 indicated, satis- factory. Sickness among the remaining South Africans and the other wliite troops — including the 2nd Battalion of the Loyal North Lanea- shires, and the 25th Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers — had assumed such proportions that General Hoskins found it necessary to withdraw as many as possible to recuperate. They were sent to the Capo early in March and brought back at the end of May. Unfortunately the demands -on the services of the Royal Engineers. Technical troops and Road Corps — among whom the wastage was high — -was so great that none of these could be withdrawn for rest. The wliite troops were not alone in needing a change. For nearly three years the brunt of the fighting and the hardships of the cam- paign had been borne by some Indian units CAPE CORPS (coloured troops) KNTRENCHEU. 42 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. LINDI. and by the King's African Rifles — a fact which <les£'rv(?s remembrance — and these, notably the Indian troops, had suffered much from sickness. The units were so weak, however, that it was found impossible to give any of the Africans a rest, but some of the Indians wore sent to healthier grounds for a time. Without new blood the force would have been too weak to assume the offensive after the rains. " Steps were therefore taken largely to increase the King's African Rifles, to reinforce the troops from West Africa, to bring the Indian battalions up to strength by drafts, and, if possible, to make some exchanges for new units." West Africa and India sent trained men ; the nien for the new battalions of the King's Afiican Rifles had to be taken raw- General Hoskins, who, as an old Enspector- Gtenoral of the K.A.R.'s, spoke with authority, said : — It Is not generally understood that the African native takes a long time to train. Those of good fighting tribes are of little use before they have had fully a year's training with officers conversant with local conditions, and even then they mtlst be used with care. Tliose recruited from inferior tribes take considerably longer, and all African natives require to be handled by white officers and N'.C.O.'a who understand them and who can speak their lauguaare. As, however, the need for the employment of more African troops had been foreseen, the organization and training of the new battalions ha<I been begun months' previously, and when General Hoskins inspected the men at NairoV)i and Tabora he was satisfied with the results. This was dtie in large measure to the patient and valuable work of Brig.-General E. H. Llewellyn, the Commandant of the King's African Rifles. The provision of adequate transport was a problem of great perplexity. Animal transport — donkeys, cattle, horses, camels — which had more or less served Gteneral Smuts in the north, sickened and died at an alarming rate in the deadly climate of the south-east And the heavy motor lorries first used had not been a success, as, indeed, might have been foreseen. The transport henceforth had to be chiefly by porters and light motor lorries. The lorries were sent, though not as many as were wished for, from England, South Africa and India, an 1, "as we had by now gained considerable experience of the rapidity with which motor drivers fall sick in this country," a large increase in the number of drivers was arranged. The provision of porters gave greater trouble. The northern part of German East Africa was now under civil administration and settling down under the firm control of Sir Horace Byatt. It was thus able to furnish some carriers, but the groat majority came from British East Africa and Uganda. In those protectorates a Compulsory Service Act was put in force in March, 1917, and an experienced THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIt 43 offloial, Mr. (Inter Colonol) John Ainsworth, supervised the collection and transportation of a Carrier Corps. The men were drawn mainly from the coast regions of the Victoria Nyanza, as being best fitted to witlistand the climate of German East Africa, and most of them had to journey about 2.000 miles from thoir place of enlistment to their place of service. This corps soon proved its value, and not long after its arrival a marked improvement took place in the feeding of the troops. The Deventcr) bore no relation whatever to the numbers of men actually available in the field ; and a brigade that could put 1,400 rifles into the firing line considered itself aingularly fortunate." This applied to the troops on the coast ; Iringa and the Ubena-Songea area (the latt«r the line east of Lake Nyasa held by General Xorthey) were more health.y. " and Northey's troops, though war-worn, were far fitter than those on the coaat " At this period, the beginning of June, 1917, A PATROL OF KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES. Baganda rendered furtiier service by raising an African Medical Corps to provide personnel for carrier hospitals and trained dressers for the King's African Rifles. This corps did excellent work. General Hoskins did not remain in East Africa to reap the benefit of the excellent work of reorganization he had undertaken. That work, indeed, was incomplete when Hoskins was called upon to take up command in another theatre of the war. When, on May 29, General van Deventer took over the command the British force was still weak and svifTering greatly from malaria. " The ■ paper-strengths ' (wrote Sir Jacob van the G'etmans were still in two main bodies ; a Western force, now commanded by Colonel Tafel, based on Mahenge, and an Eastern force, under Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, in * the coast area facing the British at Kilwa and landi. According to General van Deventer, Tafel had between 2,000 and 3,000 fighting men with him, von Lettow between 4,000 and 5,000. These were later on seen to be too conservative estimates. The total German combatant force in the field in June, 1917, was over 9,000, and of these more than L800 were Europeans. The Germans had also about 20 field guns— the largest 4'1 inch — over 70 machine-guns, and plenty of rifles and small 44 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. arms ammunition — tlie ammunition largely home-made (like the " U-boat wliisky," wliich, in the earlier days of the war, a Goniian merchant at Dar-es-Salaam had put on the market). Moi-eover, at this time the G«rnians still occupied territory over 300 miles square This German occupied region extended in the west in some places to within 40 miles of the Central Railway, and both in the west and in the east they held the country right down to the Rovuma — that is, to the Portuguese frontier. Within this area von Lettow was supreme, the couiitry being imder strict military rule. The GSovemor, Dr. Schnee, appears to have spent a good part of 1917 at Massasi, which, up to October of that year, was remote from the scene of operations. The place; — a mission station — was south of the Lukuledi river, about 60 miles south-west of Lindi, and not more than 25 from the Portu- guese border. The Gei-mans impressed hero, as elsewhere, the fundis (skilled workmen) of the mission, and occupying the mission buildings made themselves comfortable. At Massasi were also prisoner of war camps. The condition of these camps was disgraceful — notably that in which the Sepoys were confined. Some Indians, captured unwounded in August, 1917, when seen by English prisoners of war in tl^ October following were " apathetic whining heaps." What had been fine stalwart Sikhs were then fearfully emaciated, and, save for a loin cloth, naked. Yet both Dr. ^leixner, the Principal German Medical Officer, and Dr. Schnee were at Massasi, which in that month — October, 1917 — -was chiefly a hospital; the church was used for European patients. Ndanga, another, mission station in the Massasi region, was used as a sanatorium, and there lived a large number of German women. These gained local fame for their toffee, honey and biscuits, and especially for a preserve which was called Ndanga jam. Chiwata, another station near the Portuguese frontier, had also its amenities, except for prisoners of war. The prisoners' camps, the hospital, and the soldiers' camps were all close together. Thus life went on in this far-away southern region ; in the fighting area things were somewhat different. The headquarters of Tafel at Mahenge and those of von Lettow in the Kilwa district were about 200 miles apart. Communications between them were mainly by way. of Liwale, which is south-east of Mahenge and south-west of Kilwa. Liwale appears to have been von Lettow's base, being conveniently situated for GERMAN LIGHT PETROL-DRIVEN ENGINE CAPTURED AT KILWA. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 45 reinforcing either the Kilwa or the Lindi fronts. At Liwale, too, was a prisoners of war earnp. About 35 miles south-east of Liwale, at the spot where the track from that station to Massasi crossed the Mbemkuru river, was Nangano, a place which- von Lettow occasionally usoti as headquarters. At Nangano there was abundant water, grass, bamboo trees and shade, while neighboiu:ing lulls afforded good positions for defence. The hospital for Europeans here was, on the testimony of prisoners, ideally situated and had a big vegetable and fruit garden. But adjoining the hospital were the Ordnance, telegraph, supplies and other depots " all liberally sprinkled with Jied Cross flags." Every German fighting unit was .self-con- tained, and the organization was good. The native soldiers were treated as a privileged caste and always had their women with them in camp They were of tougher metal than many of the Gtermans, among whom war- weariness was marked " Von Lettow has done enough for glory," they said, and inquiries of British officer prisoners as to whether or not Alimedabad was a healthy place showed the trend of their thoughts. The Germans had at Nangano and other places receiving wireless apparatus and by this means picked up various messages — usually in a mutilated form. Ver- dun, the Germans twice announced in Septem- ber, had fallen ; it fell again in October ; Japan had joined Germany and was holding India; London was destroyed ; Japan had gone to war with America. This was the kind of " news " they professed to have received. On the strength of some such news Dr. Schnee sont out a letter in July, 1917, announcing that " peace was in sight." Another official, a Captain Schutta, announced that any prisoners who escaped, if caught, would have six months' imprisonment after the war The enemy had however, already adopted the plan of releasing white prisoners on their consenting to sign a " neutrality paper," that is a promise not again to fight against Germany in the war, and to give no information as to the enemy resoiu'ces in East Africa, h'ev/, however, were found willing to sign such a document. As to the German resources they were still considerable, though they ha<l lost their railways, nearly all their plantations, and had been driven from all places which could properly be called towns. But they were now in what was practically a huge game reserve, a reserve also in many parts well stocked with fruit trees and edible plants. Of food thoir was no lack. Water, however, was either too plentiful or altogether absent : — Tho Germans had [ wrote one of their captives ] bananas, sweet potatoes, mangoes, cocoanuts, lenion«, chillies, mohogo, spinach, tomatoes, cabbage, lettuce, beans etc. A circular was issued to tho troops telling them how to distinguish and prepare wild fruits and roots DR. SCHNEE. Ex-Governor of German East Africa. On Safari they carried with them fowls and pigeons and were rarely without egg.^. Thoy also carried elephant- meat extract in hollow bamboo sticks, the ends of which were plugged with wax. Wild honey was plentiful. Sugar they got from canes, and there was a herb from which thoy made " tea." " Coffee " was made from maize, freshly roasted and ground. They made good soup from elephant trunk, and hams of smoked wart- hog. Vdffl, a porridge made from mealie flour, was good. Bread made from wheat, potato and rice flour was excellent when spread with elephant fat. Rhino fat was another substitute for butter. Biltong of buck or raw liam was most appetising. Rice and honey pud- dings, fresh water fish, custards flavoured with almonds, and honey syrup wore hospital delicacies — apart from tho " medical comforts " sent through by the British — which occasionally were allowed to reach their destination. The only shortage vraa milk. Von Lettow said that he could not sanction milk and beef tea for wounded prisoners. " It was demoralising to his men to see the British get them, but he would allow them if tho British would let him purchase milk and beef tea for his sick." Be-ides antelope of many kinds the G<!rnians eat monkey, lion, elephant, giraffe, zebra and other strange meats, and also crocodile eggs. They had native pepper, and potash salts. The bark of the quillaia was used as a soap substitute ; candles with cotton wool wicks were made in tens of thousands out of beeswax, which was poured into bamboo moulds. They manufactured ink, and instead of blotting paper used sand. Paper was \pry scarce, and messages were written on bamboo slips. They had minted coins at Tabora up to the fall of that place ; afterwards they made brass and copper currency out of cartridge shell cases — their latest notes were typed on yellow packing paper. Pipes were made with ivory 46 THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAB. BRITISH ON THE ROVUMA RIVER. mouthpieces and a cartridge band ; the tobacco was native grown. Indeed, in overj-thing they showed ingenuity; for instance, aeroplane bombs wer.! turned into land mines. This ingenuity was specially noticeable in their new buildings. Thus the hospital at Nangano, which accommodated 80 patients, was built without a nail. It was made of tree trunks padded with grass and bound with strips of soaked bark. Such were the conditions and resources of the Germans in the territory they still held in the middle of 1917. The supply and transport difficulties which so greatly hampered the attack were almost non-existent on the German sfde, and by destroying the food suj)plies of the regions they abandoned they put another obstacle in the way of the British. And " the small band of heroes," as the Kaiser called them in his 1917 birthday message, were throughout overmastered by the spirit of von Lettow : — Lettow, the one-eyed (wrote Captain R. V. Dolbeyl, indomitable and ubiquitous, has kept up the drooping spirits of his men by encouragement, by the example of great personal courage, and by threats that he can and will carry out. Wounded three times, he has never left the army, but has been carried about on a machela to prevent the half-rssistance that leads to surrender. . . His black askaris are not discouraged and, in this war, the black man is keeping up the courage of the white. These faithful fellows . . . will stay with him to the end." • Von Lettow had oontomplated the possi- bility of a retirement into Portuguese territory ever since he had been driven south of the • Sketches of the East African Campalin, London, 1)18. Central Railway by General Smuts, but it was a part of the Mahenge force which first crossed the Rovuma to spy out the land.* For the time lieing von Lettow was sure of his ability to remain in German East Africa. As already chronicled (Vol. XIIL, p. 122) Major Kraut had in February, 1917, made his way from Mahenge tc> the Portuguese border. Towards the end of April two enemy colurrms, mainly made up from Kraut's fprce, entered Portuguese territory. Under command of an officer named von Stuemer they crossed the Rovuma in the Tunduru district — over 100 miles east of Songea — and overran the comparatively fertile region between the Lujenda river and Lake Nyasa. Having built fortified camps in this area von Stuemer sent advanced parties to Lake Shirwa, and his patrols penetrated into the British Nyasa- land protectorate at a place some 20 miles from Fort Mangoche. These patrols were, however, quickly driven back. In view of what happened later the following passage from the dispatch of General Hosldns concern- ing von Stuemer's raid shows that he had a clear idea of von Lcttow'.s intentions : There were reports of a contemplated German advance •In 1916, in the frontier section nearest the sea the Portuguese had made an advance into Gennan terri- tory, had been driven back, and had been followed up a short distance across the frontier by the enemy. The story of this fighting is told in Vol. XVII, Chapter COLVIII. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 47 in force at Lako Shirwa, aiifl even to Quilimauo on the Bea coast ; but it would appear more probable that the enemy were either niiming through the country to see its 3upply possibilities, or even making preparations for the eventual retirement of their forces into Portuguese East Africa. Thoy also exploited the country on the banks of the Lujenda River, where food was collected iiod stored, some being sent northward tt> Massasi. This was written in May, 1917 : six months later the " eventual retirement " of the German forces into Portuguese East Africa took place. Meanwhile General Northey had dealt effectively with von Staemer, sending against him the l/4tli K.A.R.'s, under Lieut.-Colonel Shorthose. Half the battalion marched nor h from Fort to abandon Port.ugue?e territory. Following von Stuemer close up, the l/4th K.A.R.'s on the last day of July crossod the Kovuma on rafts near Sassawara. Shorthose then, by an advance north-cast on Tunduru, blocked one of the routes by wliich the Germans n)ight again seek to escape. With the comparatively weak British forces available it had been dopided by the British Government early in 1917 again to seek the help of the Belgians. Shortly after their capture of Tabora in September, 19l(>, the bulk of the then Belgian Force, which numbered FIELD WIRELESS OUTFIT WITH Johnston, at the southern end of Nyasa, the other half landed at Mtonia on the eastern shore of the lake and advanced eastward. On July 6 MwemVje was occupied by Colonel Shorthose after slight resistance, and three weeks later the Germans had been compelled * The part of German East Africa occupied by the Belgians was administered by them with consideration for the rights of natives and Europeans alike. There were no " reprisals " for the brutal manner in which the Germans had treated Belgian prisoners at Tabora and other places. That the Germans anticipated no harm was proved by the large number of civilians and '* sick ** military who remained in Tabora when Colonel Olsen occupied the town. Among the civilians were several wdmen and children, including Frau Schneo (a N ew Zea- lander), the wife of the Governor. Tn marked contrast to the fondnet of the Germais in Belgium, who at once GENERAL NORTHEY'S FORCE. about 10,000, returnee^ to the Congo, where the men had their homes. A few troops only were left at Tabora, Ujiji, and the other places in Belgian occupation. General Tombeur and several of his lieutenants hail returned to Belgium.* But to the renewed appeal for installed themselves in the otlioia! re.sideuees of the Belgian Ministers, General Tombeur rcfiused to occupy the Governor's house at Tabora because Frau Schnee was in residence. It was in '* reprisal " for the " ill- treatment ** of these civilians, w-ho were at their own request taken to Europe, that the German Government in Juno, 1917, arrested 23 prominent Belgian citizen*- and placed them in Holzroinden internment camp — one of the worst in Germany. Harsh treatnient in the Journey across Africa was alleged ; in reality. Frau Schnee and her companions wer.> treated with mark'^-d courtesy and the whole journey was perforn-ed by -nil or steamer. 2:w— 3 48 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. their help the Belgian colonial authorities had readily responded ; a convention was concluded, and in April Greneral Hoskins had gone to Tabora, where he conferred with General Malfeyt, the Belgian Royal Com- missioner, and with Colonel Hnyghe, C.B., appointed Belgian Commander-in-Chief. Satis- factory arrangements were made, the Belgian troops were aided with supplies, carriers, and equipment, and towards the end of May Colonel Huyghe took the field. The first BRITISH 9- * Miles so loo zoo »ioed THE TRACK OF NAUMANN. task the Belgians were a^iked to undertake was the pursuit, jointly with a British brigade, of the Wintgons column, and the fate of that column may be given before taking up the account of the main operations Its early adventures — ^it broke away from the Mahenge force in February and turned north — have been told with some fullness in Vol. XIII., chapter CCVI. After the capture of Major Wintgens himself on the night of May 23 by the 6th Belgian battalion, the German column fell imder the command of an officer named Naumann, whose substantive rank was that of lieutenant oiJy. At the beginning of May Brigadier-General Edwards had been placed in command of the British forces in pursuit of Wintgens, succeeding Colonel Murray, released for service in the west. During June, Naumann was chased both by Belgians and British, from June 26 to the end of July by Belgians alone. Major Bataille and the Belgian column, which had kept up the pursuit for 300 miles, were then recalled for more important operations in the south and the final rounding up of Naumann fell to the British. The trouble this roving band of 600 armed men caused is very evident from General van Deventer's dispatch of January 21, 1918. There is 6is much about Navunann in it as of the main operations " It was very necessary to get lid of Naumann " (June), " The force engaged in pursuing Naumann was too large " (June again). " It was never possible to forecast his intentions, as his detach- ment . . . was completely mobile and small enough to live on the country." " Naumann . . . threatened to prove a serious nuisance " (July). " He succeeded in evading our troops ... by night marches through thick bush " (August). " One of his raiding parties held up a train near Kahe [Usambara Railway] " (Sep- tember). But by September the end of Naumann was in sight. As early as June van Deventer had realized that the quickest way to deal with him would be to employ mounted troops, and at his request a regiment was raised by the Union Government for that purpose. It was known as the 10th South African Horse, was commanded by Colonel Breytenbach, and began to reinforce the pursuers of Naumann early in August. Native horsemen were also employed — the King's African Rifles Mounted Infantry — who " clung close to the enemy throughout," Naumann had marched, at a moderate esti- mate, over 2,000 miles between May 27, when he crossed the Central Railway east of Tabora, and October 1, when he surrendered. He traversed almost the whole of the northern part of German East Africa and got, in June, as far north as the neighbourhood of Victoria Nyanza. On the 28th of that month he captured Fort Ikoma, a small post east" of the Nyanza, garri- soned by a few irregulars. The Belgian pursuing colunin reached Ikoma the next day, and Naumann was forced to accept battle. After a sharp engagement, in which his losses were comparatively heavy, Naumann succeeded during the night in making good his escape to the east. He then moved towards the Magadi Lake, on the borders of British East Africa, next turning south to Kondoa Irangi, near which place he narrowly escaped capture. " After threatening Handeni he was next heard of near Moshi. [He seemed to have had a desire to visit the places best known in Smuts's campaign.] Finding our troops ready for him there, he doubled back on his tracks, recrossed the Kondoa-Irangi-Handeni road and was finally brought to bay." The last stage of the pursuit was carried out by a column imder THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 49 Colonel P. H. Dyke, consisting of the 1st Batta- lion Cape Corps (Lieut. -Colonel Morris), the K.A.R. Mounted Infantry, faint but still pui-suing, and the 10th S.A. Horse. During the last weeks of August and the first week of September minor captures from Naum.ann's force had been frequent, but he still had a full third of his original strength. Towards the end of September he had taken up a very strong natural position on Luita Hill (75 miles S.E. of Kondoa Irangi). " The 10th S.A. Horse occupied all surrounding water holes and kept Naumann's force in play until the arrival of the infantry. Naumann was then closely in\-ested and surrendered on October 1, together with 14 other German whites, 165 askari and many porters." A detached remnant, the last of Wintgens's original force, consisting of three whites and 53 askari surrendered the next day. Thus ended [wrote Genera! van Dovonter] a remark- able raid. The force which carried it out was composed of first-class askari, well led. . . . Such a raid could, perhaps, only have been carried out in a country like German Kast Africa, where the bush is often so thick that two considerable forces may pass within a mile, unaware of each other's pre.scnce ; and where a ruthless leader of a small force can nearly always live on the country. " A ruthless leader," like von Lettow him- self, such was Naumann, though he may not have been responsible for a foul murder which stained the record of his raid. General van Deventer officially brought the crime to the knowledge of Dr. Schnee, in the following communication : — At the attack on Ikoma on June 29 [J Juno 28] an officer of the British force. Lieutenant Sutherland, was seen to be taken prisoner by the force under Lieutenant Naumann and to be escorted inside the boma, appa- rently unwoundod, or at most very slightly wounded. When the boma was subsiKjuently occupied by us, this officer's body was found buried with the head absolutely smashed. This was not the only deliberate murder of British soldiers by Gentian troops in East Africa. The doing to death of a trooper of the 2nd ' South African Rifles by Germaiis under Count Falkenstein in circumstances of peculiar barbarity has already been recorded (Vol. XIII, pp. 413-414) ; General van Deventer gave the following particulars of another crime : — After the fight at Ewehl Chini on September 22, when ground which had been occupied by the German troops was regained by our troops, the bodies of two officers who had been left on the ground wounded, and had so fallen into the hands of German troops were found stripped, and there could be no doubt that these two officers also had been murdered. The origiral wounds which disabled those officers were in one case in the arin and in the other in the leg. When their bodies were found, the head, in one case, had been smashed by blows, and, in the other, a rifle had been fin?d through the neck with the muzzle almost touchmg. The chase of Naumann had deprived General 160 ram. GUNS FOR THE DEFENCE OF ALBERTVILLE, TANGANYIKA. THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. van Deventer of troops whose services woulil liave been very useful in the principal theatre of operations, where von Lettow was endeavour- ing t<i prolong his i-esistance nntil the coming of the next rainy season should bring him another respite. H© would not risk a decisive GENERAL van DEVENTER (right) and Staff Major. engagement if he could help it, but he never gave ground without a struggle. The country suited his strategy, being admirably adapted to defence and rearguard tactics, while his veteran askari, backed by numerous and well-handled machine-guns, were " worthy opponents for the best troops." For his part, van Deventer's strategy was expressed in the formula, " find the enemy and hit him hard." With the possible exception of Mahenge and certain food areas, there were [he wrote] no strategical objectives Buch as had been offered [in the 1916 can\paign] by the Moshi area, the Tanga and Centra] Railways, Tabora, or Dar-o'.-Salaam. I'he country now held hy the enemy wa^, for the tnost part, wild and inhospitable [never- theless there were extensive fertile regions]; roeans of comiminication were practically non-existent ; and even the batt«r known places, such as Liwale and Maasasi, were, from a military point of view, mere geographical expressions. It therefore became obvious to me, at a very early stage, that our true objectives in the coming campaign must be the enemy forces in the field, and that the completion of the conquest of German East Africa conld only be brought abotit by hard hittinLS and plenty of it. For General Northey's force the plan adopted to 8M;hieve the hitting-hard process was, on paper, simple. From its lines, parallel to and extending north of Lake Kyasa, it had to exert steady pressure on the western side of the Mahenge force, while Colonel Shorthose, who, as has been stated, had followed von Stuemer across the Rovuma, had to exert pressure from the south. The rest was not so siii\ple, even on paper. The Mahenge force might be attacked from the north by one or two routes, namely the Une Dodoma-Iringa and the line Kilossa-Kidatu, while either of these routes might be chosen for the main advance. (There was a tliird, but hardly practicable, alternative of advancing on Mahenge by the Rufiji.) Then I'rom the east van Deventer had the choice of striking inland from Kilwa or from Lindi. Of tliese alternatives Lindi haii the 'greater at traction as, \inless a line was pushed inland from Lindi along the valley of the Lukuledi uiatil a jimction was effected with Colonel Shorthose, the escape of von Lettow into Portuguuse East -Mrica could hardly be pre- vented — tmless the Portuguese forces on the frontier were strong enougli to bar his passage. (Tliis apparently was believed to be the case.) But the harbour of Lindi is poor, while tliat of Kilwa is very good. Moreover, the strongest of the German forces was near Kilwa. Taking all the factors into consideration General van Deventer decided, rightly or wrongly, to make his main advance first from Kilwa, and only later on from Lindi, while also operating both from Dodoma-Iringa and Kilossa-Kidatu. Van Deventer's plan differed little from that which Hoskins had contemplated. Gteneral van Deventer had the help of many able lieutenants, though nearly all the South African commanders had been withdrawn. General CoUyer, who had been Smuts's chief of staff, had left East Africa, his place as chief of staff was taken by Brigadier-General S. H. Sheppard, C.M.G., D.S.O., who had previously commanded divisions in the field with much skill. The Kilwa force had been under Brigadier- General J. A. Hannyngtor.s C.M.G., D.S.O. (in succession to General Hoskins), but at this time Gteneral Hannyngton was seriously ill, and did not resume his command until September His place was taken temporarily by Brigadier- General Beves, whose haiadling of the 2nd South African (Infantry) Brigade had won the unstinted praise of General Smuts The Lindi Force was under Brigadier-General H. de C. O'Grady (" who has shown great q>.iahties as a fighting commander " ). Brigadier -General THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 51 F. C. CunliHo was ooraiuandaiit of the Nigerian Brigade. Colonel H. C. Tytler commanded the Triiiga column. General Northey s column commanders were all men who ha<l figured in the earlier stages of the campaign — Lieut.- Colonels G. M P. Hawthorn, D.S.O., W. J. T. Shorthose, B. E. Murray, D.S.O., and C. H. Fair, D.S.O. June and July (1917) were spent mainly in preparatory work, but this preparation involved some severe fighting on General Northey's side. A force, under Colonel Hawthorn, advanced north-eastward along the road leading from Songea to Liwale. It consisted of two battalions of the K..A..R.'s, the 1st South African Rifles, and a section of mountain artillery. By the end of Jime it had reached and occupied Likuju The movement had been skilfully condvicted, and the strength of Colonel Hawthorn's column was unknown to the enemy, who on June 29, having brought up some 600 men, opened fire on the British camp with a field-gun. Speedily realizing the strength of their opponents the Germans beat a hasty retreat On July 3 Colonel Hawthorn moved out of Likuju along the Liwale road, and on the 7th drove the German rearguard from a position covering the junction of the ioa<l^ to Liwale and Mahonge. The enemy, instead of falling back on Liwale as had been expected, tiurned north towards Mahonge. Colonel Haw- thorn followed up for 60 milos. " This advance continued steadily, the enejny force of about five companies, though offering a stubborn rearguard resistance in difficult country, being driven- from position to position, until at the_ end of the month [July] Colonel Hawthorn liad reached a point a few miles south of Moonda.".." Fartlier north, from Lupembe, Colonel Fair, with Northern Rhodesian Police (who through- out rendered very good service) and other units, had by July 2(5 driven the enemy companies holiling the front south-west of Mahenge over the Buhuje river. In the north-west Colonel Tjrtler had moved forward from Iringa, and by July 7 had secured a crossing of ttie Ruipa river. This was a noteworthy feat, for the enemy held strongly entrenched positions on the Ruipa : — Tytlor's column first (July S-5) drove the enemy over the river, then during the night of July 6-7 established covering parties on the farther bank and at once began building a bridge, wliich was completed on July 8. Against constant rearguard opposition Colonel Tytler had bv the 15th secured all the Ruion entrenched A LIFT IN A MOTOR.LORRY. 52 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. positions. Hi^ advancA was then resumed, but transport difficulties rendered it slow. However, on July 29, the enemy was attacked in the new position he had taker* up and compelled again to retreat. Tytler had one ad van • t.a;;e in that his line of supply, Dodoma-Iringa, unlike all the rest o£ van Devonter's routes, was free f roip " fly," and therefore available for animal transport. These were the first tuid very promising stops in the concerted movement to corral Colonel Taffl at Alahenge. They caused Tafel to draw in his forces from outlying districts not yet directly threatened. In the north his the estuary of the Lukuledi river, some 70 miles north of the Portuguese frontier. The surrounding country, which is covered with unusually dense 'bush, afforded good positions for the Germans, whose force in the neighbour- hood of the port numbered about 700 rifles, with field and machine-guns. " It was very desirable," ' wrote General van Deventer, "to clear a larger area round Lindi in order ' to secure a better water supply and to prepare THE BOMA OR FORT AT LINDI. outposts began to fall back from the neighbour- hood of the Central Railway to the lino of the Kuaha ; in the east the forces on the middle Rufiji were brought back, and the garrison of Madaba, in the Kilwa direction, was weakened. Tafel, however, retained free communication with Liwale and Massasi. In the Kilwa area General Beves was in close contact with the main body of von I^ttow's command. Here the Germane at first showed no disposition to yield ground. Towards the end of June, however, von Lettow, learning that a fairly large force had been concentrated against him, decided on another retirement. On June 27 and 28 he evacuated all his a,dvanced positions except that at Kimamba Hill, which is on the coast adjoining the harbour of Kissivani (Kilwa Kissiwani), and from that he was driven on the morning of Jime 29. At Lindi, ever since its occupation in September, 1916, the force there had been practically " bottled up." Lindi does not lie on the coast, but on the northern shore of the main exits from the town and harbour " in view of the operations which would have to be made later on. The Lindi Force included the 25th Royal Fusiliers ("the Legion of Frontiersmen "), the 5th Light Infantry, and a. company of the 61st Pioneers (both Indian troops), a section of the famous 27th (Indian) Mountain Battery, a section of the 3rd Battery South African Field Artillery, inachine-gim seiction and trench mortars of the 2nd West India Regiment, and two battalions of the K.A.R.'s — the I /2nd and 3 /2nd. The force moved out of Lindi on June 10 in two columns, one under General O'Grady, the other under Lieut. - Colonel Law (2nd West India Regiment), and in three days it cleared the enemy from the shores of the Lukuledi estuary. The 25th Royal Fusiliers captured two machine-guns. Under cover of the fire of warships a surprise landing was effected on a creek on the south side of the estuary. The German detachment, which had mounted a naval gim by the creek, made good its escape, retiring over 20 miles. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 58 The area abandoned by the enemy waa occupied by General O'Orady. At the end of the month there was a shai-p Httle engagement in which the British suffered a reverse. It is thus described by General van Deventer : On June 29, the offio^T commanding at Naitiwi (Lieut. -Colonel Wilford, D.S.O., 5th Light Infantry) hearing of a small enemy party near Liitende, some eight miles north of hi? post, moved out with 150 rifles of hi.s battalion to attack it. The enemy camp was rushed at dawn o^ the 30th, three white and several ■ black prisoners being captured. Our force was, however almost immediately counter-attacked by three enemy companies, whose presence had not betni suspected, and surrounded. Colonel Wilford was mortally wounded , early in the engagement. Captain Hall took con^nxand, and, after a gallant fight against very heavj odds, Anally broke out with some 50 men and reached Naitiwi.* Operations on a larger scale were under- taken in July in the Kilwa area, while in the Lindi district the month passed uneventfully. For the Kilwa operations a (comparatively) strong force had been gathered, consisting of Sotith Africans, Indians, King's African Rifles and the Gold Coast Regiment, all under com- mand of General Beves. Its composition and division varied a little from tin^e to time, but the following list gives its formation in the middle of July : No. 1 Column (Colouel Orr). 8th South African Infantry (less two companies). Gold Coast Regiment. 33rd Punjabis, 2/2nd K.A..R. 27th IJtountain Battery. No. 2 COLCIIN- (COLONKL RiDGW.tY). 7th South African Infantry. I/3rd K.A.R. 2/3rd K.A.H. 22nd Mountain Battery. No. 3 Column (Colonel Taylor). 8th South African Infantry (tv;o companies). 3/3rd K.A.K. (less one company), 40th Pathans (dctachxnent). • The task assigned General Beves was to drive the enemy south of the Kiturika Hills, which lie south-east of Kissiwani, and are crossed by tracks leading by Mtshakama and Narmigombe to Liwale. It was hoped that this would load to the discovery of Von Lettow's intended line of retreat ; that is, whether he would fall back on Liwale or make south to Massasi. As in the last resort he intended to retreat into Portuguese East Africa, von Lettow was more likely to retire towards Massasi than Liwale, but of that there was no certainty on the British side in July, 1917. The Germans * Among those taken prisoner was Captain H. Stokes, R.A.M C. (5th Light Infantry), who was hit while attending wounded in his dressing "station, upon which the German oskari had deliberately fired. did not give up their posts in the hillR lightly. But in fifteen days' hard fighting, with severe losses to both sides, they were driven out of them. The tulvance began on July 5 with a converging movement, the first objective being a place called Mnindi, between Kilwa and Mtshakama. Colonel Orr's and Colonel Ridgway's columns **^M1 ^a^mu*^ '^;.m>»^ m>m ■ ^ 'f^^^^^^^HIP^T'rVM wm IbmMHk^^l r-^ s >^1-^^^Sj%. ^ \ .-.■*• " ■'•* 'v "•'■•■ ".••'■■.■ ^^ ' k- GUN OF AN INDIAN MOUNTAIN BATTERY. started from Kilwa, while Colonel Taylor moved out simultaneovisly from Wungwi, on 'the shores of Kissiwani harbour. Colonel Orr on the right attacked from the north-east, while Cotonel Ridgway, in the centre, worked round to the west of Mnindi. The enemy was well entrenched on both fronts, and there was sharp fighting throughout July 6. Towards the evening the Germans made a heavy counter-attack on Colonel Taylor, and though they lost rather heavily they gained ground, reopened the road to ■ Mtshakama and retired during the night. The left cohunn (Colonel Taylor's) with the centre column then advanced direct on Mtshakama, while Colonel Orr dealt with some enemy colunms on his flank. The 54 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Germans did not await attack at Mtshakama, but fell back south on Narungombe. Rear- guards wore left to dispute the progress of the British, but by nightfall on July 18 Colonels Ridgway and Taylor liad reached a point two miles north of Narungombe, and it was arranged that Colonel Orr, on their right, should join them in an attack on that place the following day. It was hold by the Germans in force. The fighting which developed is thus described by General van De venter : Hiirly on the 19th No. 1 Column [Colonrl Orr] gained touch with the eneni_\ and ongnged him in front, while Nos. 2 [Colonel Ridgway] and 3 [Colonel Taj lor] Cohirons moved against his loft and right flanks respec- tively. The enemy was found to be strongly entrenched and the fighting was partio\iIarly severe. In the centre the 33rd Punjabis and Gold Coast Regiment succeeded in capturing the enemy trenches in froet of No. 1 Column, but were heavily counter-attacked, and finally compelled to evacuate them after a stubborn resistance. On the left bush-fires greatly interfered with the move- ments of No. 3 Column. The enemy took advantage of this to launch heavy counter-attacks against No. 3 Column, and the detachment of the 40th Pathans on the extreme left, which quickly lost all its British officers killed or wounded, was forced back. . The remainder of the column,* which was in imminent danger of being rolled up, was compelled to give ground. Meanwhile on the right No. 2 Column had gained a position well round the enemy's left flank, repelling three counter-attecks, and by the afternoon was pressing the enemy closely. In order to relieve this pressure the German Commander made another strong counter- attack, which was stopped and in turn counter-attacked by the l/3rd K.A.R. under Major Durham. The enemy was driven back right through the trenches on his left flank, which were taken and firmly held. This suecesf? decided the action, the enemv evacuating the whole of his position at dark and retiring towards Mihambia. His losses had been heavy. The 22nd and 27th Mountain Batteries and Gold Coast Battery gave close support throughout the day to the attacking infantry, whose gallantry and enduiance were most marked. The casualties, particularly amongst officers, had been considerable in nearly all units ongoged. Mihambia, to which place the enemy with- drew, is 40 miles south of Kilwa, on the direct track to Lindi. The operations did not fully effect van Deventer's object, as von Lettow retreated neither to Liwale nor towards Massasi, but reinforced his KUwa ifront. It had been found, too, as the British commander ]iut on record, that " the enemy's capacity for resistance had not been in any way weakened by the rainy season, and that the moral and training of his troops remained high." Deser- tions from the ranks of his carriers were, it is true, becoming numerous, and no doubt caused the Germans some trouble. The carriers, however, were mainly local natives, almost always anxious to escape from the slavery imposed upon them, though from their ranks occasional recruits for von Lettow's fighting force were obtained. While the Germans had received a hard blow, the British Kilwa Force had been depleted by sickness, as well as by losses in the field. It needed rest, rein- forcements and better communications be- fore it could again take the offensive. These processes occupied nearly two months, and it may be doubted whether any substantial. ANCIENT FORT AT KILWA KISSIWANI. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 55 A CAPIURHU GERMAN FORT. advautagu acciued to the British from an offensive which had exhausted itself iu a fortnight, when -the great need was for con- tinuous hammering at the German positions. However, by mid-September, when the Kilwa force was again ready, the Lindi force was also prepared for a continuous advance. In the inte'-\-al the Lindi force had not been simply marking time. Here, at any rate, local and limited operations were justified, for it was essential to obtain sufficient elbow room for the intended advance on Massasi. General O'Grady began, on August 2, a move- ment wliich led to very stiff fighting. The objective of the left or main column (2i"»tli Royal rusiliers, 259th Machine Gun Coinpany, S/4th K.A.R.) was the enemy'.-; right flank ou Tandanmti Hill [over- looking the Lukuledi Estuary]. Hero very stubborn resistance Was encountered, the centre of which was a concealed redoubt, the existence of which was not previooslj' known. Despite repeated efforts this redoubt could not be taken, and in consequence tho main column was brought to a standstill. The centre column (.tOth Punj.ibis) became thus unsiipported in its advance, anil on being heavily counter-attacked by the enemy's reserve was compelled to withdraw with con.=iderabli loss after the whole of the British olficers had become casjialties. The engagement ended by our troops entrenching on the ground gained and organizing for a fresh advance. This began on the 10th by a turning movement south of Tandamuti Hill, which wa< heavily ' bombarded bv the navy with the object of deceiving the enemy as to the point of attack. The movement was *^uccessfu] in causing the enemy to abandon his ground and fall back to another strong position at Nurunyu. General O'Grady followed in ptirsuit, keeping in close contact with-:the Gtermans, thougli now he was hindered by heavy rains. On tlio 18th the enemy, who had received considei-able reiaforcement,s from von Lettow's reserves, was closely engaged, but remained in po.ssession of his main lint^ of defences, the British force entrenching opposite the enemy. The opera- tions were not further presised for the time. In the western or Mahenge area, meanwhile, operations were being carried on relentlessly. It will be recollected that by the end of July General Northey's columns were pressing back the Germans from south and west, and that Colonel Tytler from Iringa was pressing them from the north-west. Colonel Tafel had the choice of presently to accept action which would be decisive, or, after a series of delaying actions, to retire south-east and endeavour to join the main force under von Lettow, who in August was jiromoted by thg Kaiser to the rank of ^lajor-General. And if ho (Tafel) delayed too long he miglit finil liimself surrounded and left without choice. During August both Colonel Hawthorn and Colonel Fair were very active ; on the last day of August in t)ie Mpepo area — 40 miles eosf by south of Mahenge — Colonel Fair scored a neat success, killing or capttuing 95 of the eneiTiy, of whom three were Europeans. Colonel Hawthorn reninined in the vicinity of Mpondaa " engaged in a constant struggle, in the most difficult ravine country, with an enemy of equal strength, who received frequent minor reinforcements." i'ar away in the south Colonel Shorthose occupied Tunduni 56 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. on August 23. This place, wliich is about midway between Lake Nyasa and the Indian Ocean and 45 miles north of the Portuguese frontier, was of importance as being the centre of a district whence the enemy obtained food supplies, and hitherto it had been held by them without molestation, save for a bombing raid by British airmen in June. The Iringa column under Colonel Tytler on August 26 crossed the Ideta river and pushed out patrols towards Ifakaras, which lies north of the important Ulanga (Kilombero) river and 50 miles due north of Mahenge. At this time, the Iringa column was no longer wholly British — it had been joined on August 10 by Belgians, and on the 28th the British troops were entirely withdrawn! and the Mahenge operations left in the hands of the Belgians. Colonel Huyghe carried out the work he had undertaken with complete success. His plana had been made in consultation with General van Deventer, who on June 18 had a consultation with the Belgian conunander at Dodoma on the Central Railway. It was then arranged that two Belgian columns should operate against Mahenge. One, known as the Northern Coliunn (under Commandant Hubert), marched from Dodoma to Iringa. It was originally intended to go to the Mpepo front, but Colonel Fair's progress rendered that unnecessary and the Northern Column was deflected to Colonel Tytler at Ideta. Meanwhile, a second (the main) Belgian force, known as the Southern Column, commanded by Major Bataille, was concentrated on the Central Railway at Kilossa (east of Dodoma) and at Uleia, a little south of Kilossa. This column began an advance south on Mahenge on August 15. Colonel Huyghe's task had been arduous, and it had taken full three months to prepare for the Mahenge campaign. The troops had to be brought back from the Congo, medical and transport services had to be reorganized, munitions end supplies brought up (in all these things the British gave help), roads had po be made, and telegraphic communication with van Deventer established. The country in which the Belgian operations were conducted, though more healthy than the KilwaLindi districts, was e>:ceedingly difficult. Between their base and Mahenge was a wide stretch of broken coimtry, numerous small streams and two large rivers, the Ruaha and Kilombero (the latter bordered by extensive marshes) and the Kalemoto-Madege hills, 15 miles across. Mahenge itself lies on a healthy, though bleak, plateau, 6,000 ft. above the sea, in the midst of a fertile agricultural district. And for fully a year the enemy had been diligently preparing their defences there. Major Bataille, who had already proved his soldierly qualities in the Tabora campaign, moved rapidly, driving in the opposing roar- guards at Kidoli, 50 niiles south of Kilossa (August 18) and again at Tope (August 19). On the 21st Bat.aille crossed the Ruaha un- opposed, and three days later the Sanga river. Here he had a brush with the enemy, who lost four whites and a machine - gun, while six British prisoners were released. On the 28th Bataille effected a junction with Tytler and Hubert at Ifakaras, having covered 97 miles in 14 days. The enomy, wrote General van Deventer, had retired south of the Kilombero river, which was a formidable obstacle, but the rapidity and skill with which the Belgian columns acted deprived the enemy of any advantage he might have gained from this. By September 6 the Belgian columns had secured crossings at two places, and by the 8th the whole of the Belgian Southern Brigade was across a!id moving against Mahenge. Four enemy companies had been posted to oppose the passage of the Belgians at the expected crossing place, but while some detachments made a feint attack at this place, two other detachraent-s secured the passage of the river at a spot 10 miles away. The defenders, finding themselves threatened in rear, then gave way, and the Belgians, undisturbed, bridged the river. I'he Germans had fallen back on a defensive system in the Kalimoto- Madege txills with a front of 15 miles, and roughly 20 miles north by north-east of Mahenge. Here the Belgians opened an attack on September 9, exactly a year after their entry into Tabora. Strong resistance was encountered and the fight lasted for eight days. The Germans in the hilly, densely bushed country disputed every foot of the way. An encircling movement, however, settled the matter, and on September 16, beaten on the Luri, the Germans gave way — retiring to an inner line of defence, some seven miles only from Mahenge. Major Bataille gave the enemy no rest and, though his progress, owing to the difficult country to be traversed, was slow it was steady. Slow progress was una\'oidable also from another cause — the long tenuous lines of communication which made the supply of the force a puzzling matter. It hal been hoped THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 57 LEWIS GUNNERS PRACTISING IN A DRIED SWAMP NEAR LINDI. that the resources of the country would have been of some help, but the Germans in thoir retreat destroyed practically all food they could not carry away. In a fight on September 22 the Belgians seized an enemy post, capturing or killing 43 askari and three officers, together with two machine-guns and a large store of amm>mit,'oii. By the 28th they were in touch with the last defences of Mahenge, a ridge of hilh extending north, east, and west of the town and defended by ;{50 European and 2,000 native troops. Some days were spent in reconnoitring the positions ; by October 4 the Belgians were in active contact with the enemy, and on October 7 a general attack was begun, in front and on both flanks. But Colonel Tafel had no intention of fighting the issue out. He resisted as long as it was safe to do so — as long, that is, as he had a way of escape. The Belgians pressed hard, and when, on October 8, both his riglit and left wings gave way. Colonel Tafel ordered a general retreat. Major Midler, commanding the right flank of the Belgian force, entered Mahenge on October 9, capturing .20 wliites in the last posiiion held by the enemy. In Mahenge itself were found 92 German soldiers and 242 askari, " sick •' in hospital. (Not all the German " sick " were ill or wounded — many were worn out with fatigue and others frankly stayed behind to be captured.) The Belgians also liberated at Mahenge several British and 58 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. BELGIAN NATIVE INF Belgiaa native soldier prisoners, and one British officer. The first and main objective of the Belgians had been attained " most successfully and skilfully," and the high moral of the Congolese troops once more demonstrated. They still had their work to finish. After the capture of Mahenge a detachment, onder Major Gilly, vigorously pursued the Gtermaiis, who had split up into various fragments, though Tafel had with him still over 1,000 men. Finding that Gilly could not be shaken off, the enemy turned, on October 13, some 20 miles south of Mahenge, and attacked him — unsuccessfully. Three days later another small Belgian force sur- prised a Gennan • detachment convoying prisoners of war, dispersed it, and rescued the prisoners. Meantime, on the 18th, the Belgian right had established contact with Colonel Fair, and a little later they were in liaison also with Colonel Hawthorn. On October 24 the 3rd Belgian battalion engaged and defeated an enemy force at Saidi. In this fight Captain van Danune fell at the head of his troops. Again, for a few days it seemed that the much-desired decisive action might be forced, so: far as Tafel's force was concerned, by the combined action of the Belgians and of the Lupembe (Colonel Fair's) and Songea (Colonel Hawthorn's) coliunns. Colonel Hawthorn, reinforced by the 2/4th K.A.R. from the dis- membered Innga column, renewed his offen- ANTRY IN ACTION. sive on October 16th, but the enemy at Mproii- das avoided his blow, and, having destroyed his two guns, retired nortli along the Luwega — that is, in the Mahenge direction. Colonel Tafel was ima tight comer, and deserters from liis force had begun to surrender to the Belgians in large numbere. He retreated to the south- east, the only route not blocked, while the force in front of Hawthorn also now turned eastward. Circumstances favoured Tafel's escape. Heavy rains might bo expected in the Mahenge area by the middle of November, and once they set in the roads south from the Central Railway would become impossible, at least for mechanical transport. The Belgians had had no opportunity to build up a food reserve, and supplies by way of Nyasaland or Rhodesia, owing to the great length of the route, could not be expected. Captain V. J. Keyte, who was responsible for the supply of all food to the African troops and carriers of the Nyasaland Force, worked strenuously and successfully, but with lines extending 1,000 miles there were obvious limits to the numbe.' of men who could be fed. In the circum- stances General van Deventer (October 27) asked Colonel Huyghe to leave only two battalions in the Mahenge area to cooperate with General Northey's troops, sending the rest back to Kilossa. The whole enemy front on the western area gave way, and it was only the very great THE TIMES HltiTOliV OF THE ]yAR. 59 difficulty in supplying the Anglo-Belgian forces at the end of their long lines of communication which prevented full ailvantage being taken of the situation. Nevertheless by November G Colonel Fair had reached Kabita Mtoto, where 142 Germans and 140 askari surrendered ; on the 6th 82 more askari gave themselves up to the Belgian columns. A day or two later the Belgians fomxd that Tafel had got beyond their reach — their line of supply had reached the breaking point. But the Mahenge area was clear of the enemy ; Tafel's one endeavour now was to break south and join von Lettow, while von Lettow himself by the middle of November was in a perilous position. The fate of Tafel and the final part played by the Belgians in the campaign is bound up with the operations which opened in September in the Ililwa region Since the capture of Narungombe by the Kilwa Force, on July 19, preparations for a renewal of the offensive had gone on steadily. The tram-line, or light railway, which ran from Klwa was extended towards the south,* • The railway administration under Colonel Sir William Johns, O.B., laid down in all 115 miles of track in the Kilwa and Lindi areas. The requirements of the ariuy were also niet by petrol-driven tractors and trailers. roads were improved, transport (largely meclianical) collected and supplies accu- mulated in forward areas. The bulk of the Nigerian brigade — one battalion had been sent to give a hand in the chase of Naumann — was brought to Kilwa, and there also were landed welcome reinforcements from India — the 25th Cavalry, the 65th Rifles, and the 127th Baluchis. They were all at Kilwa by the end of the first week in September, and General HMmyngtou was back in command. The Lindi force was also strengthened and organized in two principal columns. " By the middle of Sep- tember the situation," wrote General van Deventer, " was ripe for the main advance. . . . Sivfflcient motor transport was by this time available for the whole force." It had taken van Deventer tliree and a half montlis to arrive at this happy stage ; part of the delay was due to the difiiculty of meeting all his demands in view of the exigencies of the situation in France and, the Near East. Van Deventer now undertook a coicbined movement, his forces advancing southward from Kilwa and south-westward Ironi Lindi. He went himself to ndvanced headquarters at BELGIAN NATIVE TROOPS IN TABORA. 60 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Kilwa on September 10 and nine days later the real main offensive was begun. And from that date, September 19, the operations continued without a pause until the middle of December At Kilwa General Hannyngton had now the major part of his force in two columns, under Colonels Orr and Ridgway respectively. The Nigerian Brigade under General Cunliffe on the extreme right moved by a circuitous route IN THE BUSH. to try and cut oft the enemy. The 25th (Indian) Cavalry was sent on a special mission to destroy the enemy's food depots at Nangano and other plewjes in or near the upper Mbemkuru valley. Advancing over an area almost water- less at that season, and covered by dense bush through which roads had to be cut, the infantry on the 19th drove the enemy from his advanced position, and then after a smart action with Colonel On's column the Germans evacuated Mihambia. In falling back to the south-west the Germans unexpectedly found their passage barred (September 22) by two Nigerian battalions. The enemy fought hard, making repeated and determined attempts to break through. Finally the Germans broke into small parties and, scattering through the bush, escaped, leaving over 100 dead on the ground. The piu'suit continued, the Germans making for Nahunga Hill, a strong post near the ^Ibem- kuru river. Here on September 26 Colonel Orr weis closely engaged all day, the brunt of the attack being borne by the 2/2nd K.A.R.'s, supported by the 27th Mountain Battery — which knocked out one of the enemy guns. The next day Cunliffe's Nigerians joined in the attack. Under cover of darkness the Germans evacuated Nahunga (Se])tember 29), at which place the 25th Cavalry arrived on September 30, having successfully accomplished its mission, including a raid on the much-prized Nangano. It was now clear that von Lettow was not going to fall back on Liwale, but southward towards Massasi. Hannyngton's two columns and the cavalry were therefore directed to pursue the enemy np the ATbemkuru, while the Nigerian Brigade was sent south to help to cut off the enemy line of retreat. Cunliffe left Nahunga on October 4 and after a trying march through most difficult country — which caused it to be three days late in reaching its objective — gained touch with the Lindi Force on the 11th. In the interval Orr and Ridgway had driven the enemy from the Mbemkuru. " While Ridgway's column now contained Lettow towards Ruangwa [south-west of Nahunga], Hannyngton sent Orr's column by forced marches to Ruponda, an important enemy grain depot, which it reached on October 10, thus completely severing the main enemy communication from Mahenge to Massasi via Liwale " (Colonel Orr). Von Lettow had sensed the danger to Ruponda and he got away by an alternative route, which his foresight had provided, connecting with the Lindi -Massasi road. When these operations had begun to take effect the Lindi Force, then under General Beves, moved out (September 24) to bar the German retreat. Its immediate objective was Mtama, 22 miles south-west of Lintli. Mtama covered Nyangao, a mission station on the Lukuledi where converged the most practicable tracks connecting the Lindi area with the Mbemkuru . valley. The advance, though strongly resisted, made good progress, and von Lettow fully realizing the serious character of the offensive hastened south with his reserves, concentrating a considerable portion of his force at Mahiwa, to the south-west of Nyangao. To that station the enemy had. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 61 OX-DRAWN FIELD GUN on October 15, retreated from Mtawa. There ensued in the middle of October some of the severest fighting seen in East Africa. The Nigerian Brigade, which was on the right, was given the task of cutting off the enemy retreat from Nyangao and Mahiwa, while in the centre and south two other columns, commanded respectively by General O' Grady and Colonel Tytler, advanced on and parallel to the main road to Massasi. All day on the 15th and 16th von Lettow succeeded in holding off the Nigerians, and he compelled the 1st Battalion, called up in support, to fall back. On the night of the 16th he abandoned Nyangao station to take up a position on a ridge about two miles to the south, behind the bed of the Nakadi river. Here, on the 17th and 18th, he offered desperate resistance and succeeded in holding up the British. Von Lettow was playing for time to get the bulk of his force away south. Colonel Tytler advanced from Nyangao at daybreak oix the 17th, and at once gained touch with the enemy. The 3/4th K.A.R. attacked, supported by artillery fire, and by one o'clock had taken part of the position. General O'Grady had meanwhile come np on the right of Colonel Tytler's column, the Bharatpur Infantry attacking with I/2nd K..\.R. in support. Opposition to this attack increased steadily, and both battalions were soon fully engaged. At four o'clock a deteririned counter-attack wan n\ado against both colutrns, and the whole lino was pressed back, but again advanced and regained part of the lost grouAd. Darkness .set in with the engagement still proceeding. On the morning of the 18th the action was resumed. Colonel Tytler's column pressing the enemy vigorously in order to enable General O'Grady's column to effect a junction with the Nigerian Brigade, which it succeeded in doing at 8 o'clock. Colonel Tytler's attack was at first successful, the 30th Punjabis driving tbe enemy from their trenches and occupying them, while part of the 3/4th K.A.R. and of the 259th Machine Gun Company came up on the Punjabis' left to strengthen that flank. The enemy was, however, in force, and delivered a strong counter-attack on the left, which eventually compelled our line to fall back to the- river bed. This position was maintained during the afternoon, several counter-attacks being repulsed- General O'Grady meanwhile attacked the enemy'" left flank and forced it back for some distance, the 3/2nd K.A.R. leading, while the 25th Fusiliers (from Colonel Tytler's column) filled the gap between the attack fronts of the two columns. On this flank also the enemy developed a very strong counter-attack, gaining some ground, and it was found necessary to restore the situation by bringing up the 3rd Nigerians from reserve to the left of General O'Grady's column. Tha enemy pressure continued until dark, but without further result, and on the morning of the 19th he was found to have retired to his o-iginal line. Much of the fighting in this four days' battle, for such it was, had been at close quarters. The German losses were heavy — 53 Eviropeans and 268 askari killed, 241 Euro- peans and 677 askari captvired. The number of wounded was unknown. The British casual" ties were also severe. After this action a brief pause in the advance was essential. It did not greatly advantage von Lettow, for he now found himself compelled to detach troops from Mahiwa to meet a threat to his left flank. Colonel Orr from Ruponda raided (October 19) Lvikuledi Mission Station, only 10 to 12 miles north of Ma.ssasi, towards which he recon- noitred. On the 21st a counter-attack on Orr was repulsed, two machine-guns and some prisoners being taken. Orr then returned to Ruponda. Three or four days previously Colonel Ridgw-ay had driven the enemy rear- guards from- Ruangwe. The enemy's Kil\^'a front was crumbling. At this time General Hannyngton was rein- 62 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. forced by Belgian troops sent from Colonel Huyghe's reserve by the Central Railway to Dar-es-Salaani, and thence by boat. The Bpeoied mission of this Belgian and Kilwa force was to help in the rounding up of Colonel X«fel, and its objective was Liwale. That place was entered on October 29 by a raiding BRIG.-GENERAL F. G. CUNLIFFE, C.B. Commanded the Nigerian Brigade, and later the Lindi Force. party of Northey's force, under Major Haw- kins, which was sent forward by Colonel Shorthose from Tunduru. Hawkins held it for five days, when (November 2) Liwale was taken over by the Belgians. The Belgian contingent was under Commandant Herion, and consisted of the 9th Battalion and Cyclists, reinforced some 10 (lays later by the 4th Belgian Bat- talion. Tafel was then endeavouring to break through to von Lettow. The only forces in his direct path were those of Shorthose and Hawkins. From the north- west Colonel Murray, with 400 Rhodesians, pushed on to their help ; from Liwale Commandant Herion sent 200 rifles with the same object These reinforcemeuts could not, however, arrive in time to assist Shorthose and Hawkins in stemming the enemy movement to the soutli, which they most gallantly attempted to do on the 16th wlien still separated from each other by some hours' march. Eaeh of their small forces put up a determined fight, and inflicted con- siderable loss on the enemy before being compelled to withdraw towards Tunduru in face of great odds [Tafel had some 1,800 rifles.] The Belgian column Bucceeeded in overtaking the enemy's rearguard company 'ind captured a maxim and some prisoners, including the company commander. Tafel in going south towards the Rovuma was marching into a hornets' nest, ior after their brief pause both the KUwa and Lindi Forces were again going foi-ward and Tafel found between him and von Lettow troops whom ho could not break through. Here it may be added that the Belgian force, its mission accom- plished, was shortly afterwards withdrawn to the Congo. General van Deventer paid his allies no more than their due when, in thanking Colonel Huyghe, ihe said "the Belgian troops- are splendid fighters, keen and reliable, and their participation in the campaign has been of the greatest value to the Allied force." What was virtually the final stage of the campaign so far as German East Africa was concerned began on November 6, 1917. Ta be sure of complete success Portuguese aid was required. Nine months before General Hos- kins had discussed with the Portuguese Com- mander-in-Chief feasible methods of coopera- tion should "von Lettow try to cross the Ro- vuma. The Portuguese were very willing, and they sent a large force to Mozambique— some 8,800 men (see Vol. XVII, page .347). Troops had been posted along the Roviuna and recently had even made incursions across the frontier General van Deventer now suggested to Colonel' Rosa that he should dispose his force in a manner to bar von Lettow's retreat, and to this- coiu'se the Portuguese commander readily assented. One of van Deventer's suggestions was that a strong Portuguese detachment should be stationed at Ngomano, the point where the Lujenda river joins the Rovuma. It was felt to be not improbable that von Lettow might make for that spot if he evaded the British columns, and that was precisely what he did do, and what Tafel tried to do. But in the end it was touch and go. On November 6 the Lindi Force, now under General Cunliffe, renewed its attack on Mahiwa with the Nigerian Brigade, and General O'Grady's and Colonel Tytler's columns. The bulk of the fighting that day fell to General O'Grady's column, which got to the enemy's right rear; while in turn the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 63 Germans attacked O'Grady's flanks and rear. Mahiwa itself was taken by Indian, troops — the 5th Light Infantry — of ColonelTytler's column, the infantry being well supported by artillery fire. During the night the enemy retreated across a 20 miles waterless track of country, Cunliffe was ordered to pursue the foe, No. 3 column (O'Grady's) being brought up to a strength of 2,000 rifles for this purpose. The Nigerians and the Cape Corps (the coloured South African troops) were engaged on Novem- ber 8 in clearing a way for General O'Grady. They were stoutly opposed by rear guards and reserves had to be brought up before the enemy gave way. In this action the Cape Corps rushed a machine-gun which was annoy- ingly active on the British flank, killing or cap- turing the whole of the gun crow. O'Grady moved out at dawn on the 9th. Von Lettow put up many delaying actions which caused liim considerable loss, including the last ser- viceable 4'1 inch gun of the Konigsberg, which he was compelled to abandon. He fell back from Mahiwa to Nangoo, and thence to Chiwatn. O'Grady, notwithstanding the great difficulty experienced in supplying his men with water^ did not slacken in his effort, and by the morn- ing of November 14 had seized a commanding position overlooking Chiwata. General Hannyngton, from the Kilwa direc- tion, had moved simultaneously with the LincU Force. Hannyngton had noA" the help of the 10th South African Horse, which after the capture of Naumann was brought south. and a. mounted column w.os fonnpd, composed of the 10th S.A. Horse, the 2.')th (In.lian) Cavalry and a K.A.R. Mounted Infantry Company, the whole under command of Colonel Breytenbacli. . The throo Kilwa columns, those of Colonels Orr, Uidgway,.anil Breytenbach, all moved to the Lukulidi valley, and crossing the river a detachment of the Mounted Colunvn occupied Massasi on Novem- ber 10. The bulk of the Germans there, including Dr. Schnee, had already fled, but 57 German whites and 142 askari were taken prisoner, while a damaged 4'1 inch Konigsberg gim was discovered. On the same day Colonel OiT, farther east, occupied Ndanga mission Gtation, after some opposition, capturing 04 Europeans — men and women — and 129 askari, Including sick. A couple of days later Orr entered Mwita, which lies south of Chiwata- The junction of the Kilwa and Lindi forces was effected, and the cordon was being drawn clo.se round von Lettow, who had by now brought the whole of his command into the Chiwata area, which for some days hiul received tno constant attention of tlie British airmen, the " Schvvein der Luft," as the Germans called them.* Von Lettow realized that he could no longer hope to hold any part of German East Africa. WithTafel's force he had lost toucli for weeks — * When the ainiien came, wrote a British officer, the prisoners of war walked into tho bash. Five aero- planes came together one day— their total " bag " was a I'at killed in an officer's banda. Often however, the airmen had better Inek. PETROL DUMP AT A BRITISH BASE. 64 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. DISPATCHING GERMAN WOUNDED TO THE BASE. and Tafel nuist be left to his fate. For himself and his force the one hope now was to move rapidly south-east to the RovuJna, and get awi>y into Portuguese territory Ijefore the British surrounded him. All sick and wounded, all the war-weary, and the prisoners of war must be abandoned. Von Lettow translated his hope into action. A small lighting force was left at Chiwata with orders to put up a fight, and then " live for bush," while he and his force retreated. By November 14 Chiwata was waiting to be taken. Van Deventor, anxious that nothing should go amiss, had that day arrived at Ndandt*. On the l&th General G'Grady's column met with some resistance froin enemy rearguards on the heights east of Cliiwata ; the next day Colonel Ridgway and the Nigerian Brigade entered the place, after trifling opposition. Here 1'21 prisoners of war were found and released, 71 of them being Europeans. Ninety-eight German whites and 425 askari (including sick) surrendered. The licspital was found to be full of " funk holes," they were round the operating theatre, in the v/ards — everywhere. " Why are they here," nekod a British officer prisoner, " you would not fight so near a hospital." " Well," replied the German medical officer, " if we objected Lettow would say, ' T.ako down the Red Cross flags and hold the hospital.* " Chiwata had been abandoned, but von Lettow was not yet safe. He was immediately pursued, and had constantly to fight strong rearguard actions to prevent himself from being hemmed in in the Jjutshemi valley. His route was along the edge of the Mkondi Plateau. " The country was extremely broken and difficult, and progress [of the British columns] was slow. . . . The extreme thickness of the bush madf it impossible to surround the enemy completely, and during the night of the 17th-18th his main force retired south-oast towards Simba's by an unsuspected path." Von Lettow had " shed " nearly a third of his force in this retreat. At Lutshemi camp, occupied by the Nigerians, General G'Grady's and Colonel Orr's columns on the 18th, some 300 Germans and 700 askari, were captured and 32 European officer prisoners of war released. On the same day Colonel Ridgway's column captured a patrol sent by Colonel Tafel to get in touch with von Lettow. Tafel had then arrived west of Massasi, near the Bangala river, and von Lettow was also making for that river. He had at last got the news of Tafel's whereabouts and was trying to join him. The mounted column was accordingly sent towards the confluence of the Bangala with the Rovuma. Voji Lettow now " by very rapid marching swept southward through Nevala to the Rovuma, leaving hundreds of sick and wounded in his trail; keeping along the north-bank [of the Rovuma] he crossed the Bangala on the 24tli, going west. Attempts to catch liim with Orr's column and Breytenbach's mounted troops, first at Nevala, THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 65 and then on the Baiigala, failed by a few hours at both places in spite of hard marching." (Colonel Orr.) While the speed of von Lettow's movements prevented the stern chase of him from succeed- ing, the speed of the British movements pre- vented the junction of Tafel and von Lettow, though at this time their forces were only a comparatively short distance apart. Finding the pace too hot for him von Lettow now abandoned German territory. He crossed the llovuma on November 25-26 at the spot where it is joined from the south by the Lujenda river, before Colonel Ridgway's column and the Nigerian Brigade, coming from Massasi could reach it. Colonel Rosa, the Portuguese "commander, had placed a force at Ngomano, at the Lujenda confluence, but the attempt of the Portuguese there to delay the crossing was not successful. Von Lettow's force at that time numbered about 300 Europeans and 2,000 to 2,200 black troops, with three or four times that number of carriers and followers. He was very short both of rations and ammuni- tion, and was a few days later followed across the Rovuma by the 25th Cavalry and the Nigerian Brigade. " He could not," said General Northey, " have held out for more than two or three days, but luifortunately the Portuguese at Ngomano surrendered to him [they were greatly out -numbered], and he was thus able to replenish his failing stock of food and ammunition." Moreover, the rainy season sotting in early in December, further pursuit by the cavalry and Nigerians was rendered impossible. Thus favoured, von Lettow got clear away up the Lujenda valley. Colonel Tafel was not as successful 08 his chief. Von Lettow moved with such rapidity that Tafel had turned towards Nevala two or three days after that station had been aban- doned by von Lettow. On November 25 he appeared on Colonel Orr's line of com- munications, and discovered his mistake. On the 26th Tafel had a sharp engagement with a cavalry patrol and the 129th Baluchis (about 150 rifles strong). He forced back this weak detaxihment and turned south, endeavouring to get out of the net into which ho had run. Colonel Orr's column, wliich had turned back from following von Lettow, now went in pursuit of Tafel, who had reached the Rovuma. But cut oft from von Lettow, foodless, and in an unknown country, he decided to surrender. On November 27 a party of 37 Germans, 178 askari, and about 1,100 followers marched into a British post and gave themselves up. Colonel Orr was to march the next day to intercept Tafol's main colimin, but in the evening a message was received from Colonel Tafel stating that he intended to cease hostilities. " A meeting was arranged and at midday on FIELD AMBULANCE. 66 THE TIMES HISTORX OF THE WAR. November 28 [1917] Tafel suri-endered uncon- ditionally with 19 officers, 92 other Europeans, over 1,200 askari, and some 2,200 other natives." Not a single enemy ci^mbatant was left in the protectorate, and the conquest of GJennan East Africa was complete. It was a liard-won conquest, and nearly two yeai-s had passed since the British offensive opened. During that period the Germans had lost in killed or captured over nine-tenths of their total force ; between ^lay and December, 1917, the enemy casualties were 1,618 whites ind 5,482 blacks ; they had in the same six months lost 14 gims and 73 machine-gims, besides rifles and military stores. The British casualties in the six months were also high. Without reckoning the sick roll and deaths from disease, they were close on 6,000 in action alone. The large majority were wounded, who recovered, and over 1,000 of the 6,000 casualties were suffered by carriers and followers. These men often deUvered ammunition right into the firing line, and attention has already been drawn to their devotion and courage. The losses from disease were serious, as may be inferred from the figures of the South African contingent for 1916-1917. Of their 1,800 dead, 1,200 succumbed to disease. The Germans also suffered mxich from the climate, and in the last lialf of 1917 their medical stores were running low. A remarkable effort was made to re- plenish them. It is alleged that von Lettow " sent word by wireless that unless a supply of quinine reached him by a certain date he would be unable to carry on." Von Lettow certainly had then no wireless capable of com- municating direct with Berlin, but there were indirect methods of making known his neces- sities ; while the British War Office reports bore testimony to the large number of German sick in hospital. Aware of von Lettow's needs, the German Government tried to send him supplies by air. The man chosen for the task was von Butlar, one of the best of the German air pilots, and he made the attempt in Zeppelin L 59. His intention wa-s to fly over Egypt and the Sudan to East Africa, and the starting point chosen was Jamboli, a town in Bulgaria. But there were delays, and when, on November 16, von Butlar .started, the sands were alretuly running out in German East Africa. Moreover, the " Balkan Terror," as L 59 was called, had only got as far as Smyrna when it was so heavily fired upon by its friends, who mistook it for an Allied airship, that it was obliged to land. The enterprise was not abandoned, and vqn Butlar started again from Jamboli at 5 a.m. on November 21. This time it looked as if he might succeed. Flying without a hitch L 59 crossed the Mediter- ranean, the eastern edge of the Libyan Desert, and very early in the morning of November 23 was nearing the latitude of Khartum. It then, at 2.45 a.m., received a wireless message from Nauen saying, " Return ; East Africa occupied." Von Butlar, who had gone more than half-way to his objective, accomplished his return journey in safety, and landed at Jamboli at 10 a.m. on November 25, having flown over 4,500 miles without a stop. L 59 had been observed while passing over the oases in the Libyan Desert, and fears were entertained at Cairo that its objective might be the great Assuan Dam. Such measures as were pcssible were at once taken to meet the danger. Von Lettow's medical stores were low, but they were by no means exhausted, and he augmented his medical staff by detaining R.A.M.C. doctor prisoners. His own staff were able men ; among them was Dr. Taute, who had worked with Sir David Bruce on the Sleeping Sickness Commission. On the whole the German M.O's treated the wounded prisoners decently, but they were much ham- pered by the instruction of von Lettow and Dr. Schnee. Badly wounded men were carried on grass pallets, and improvised bark dressings were used, as well as locally-made drugs. The wounded men were repeatedly made to go on long safaris, and the lot of the unwounded was even worse, so that a very satisfactory feature of van Deventer's advance was the liberation of the prisoners of war. During October and November over 150 European prisoners, British, Belgian and Portuguese, were released, together with a larger number of Indians and Africans. Among the whites were men who had been posted as missing, for von Lettow did not report the capture of officers or men unless they were seen to be taken. The lot cf the prisoners had been one of unnecessary privations, dangers and shame, if not quite as bad as that of the prisoners who had been rescued at Tabora in September, 1916. There was generally (wrote a correspondent) good faro for tho men in hospital, but the rations of the unwounded prisoneifs were totally inadequate. Neither meat nor salt wa.s given to the black prisoners. When we [wounded British] were at Nangano three other prisoner camps* came in. Among the men were Nyasa- land Volunteers and South Africans, Sepoys, Gold Coast Regiment N.O.O.'s and Portuguese askari. One camp THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 07 was known oa the "old men's " as it consulted of pri- Boners taken in 1914 — two wore survivors of the fight at Tonga. These " old men " had been co:utantly Bbifted about, and presented a strange spectacle. Tiioy had been given no clothing or utensils by their captors. Some were dressed in bark clothing and wore lion skin sandals. They had washing basins mended with wax end wore boiling their rice in small jugs. At Chiwata a naval ofHcor who was placed in charge of all the pri- soners' canxps often appeared dressed in a complete suit of bark. Blackwater fover, dysentery, and other diseases carried off many of the prisoners — others went mad. One olficer who had been left for dead at the Rufiji estuary, and was at tho mercy of the tides for days, survived, and was released at Chiwata. Here, when they saw the end coming, tho Germans issued decent rations, and at the last the Sepoys were givon had got clear away, African troops were almost exclusively employed. Tho Imperial, South African and Indian combatant units were re- leased, except the Indian Mountain Artillery and the Engineers (Imperial and South African). In February, 1918, tho Nigerian Brigade was sent back to the West Coast ; later on the West India Regiment and the 2nd Cape Corps were alsoreleased, tho last-named being sent to Pales- tine to join Gieneral Allenby. The bulk of tho fighting in 1918 fell to the King's African Rifles and the Gold Coast Regt. (which remained in East SWAHILI WOMEN COOKS. salt and rice. (At Nangano those who had money had been able to buy suiflcient food through tho German guards.) At Chiwata there were some alleviations in the lot of tho otlicer prisoners. There were books to read ; they had, it was said, been the collection of an elephant hunter ; there was a Punch Almanac for 1916 ; an ingenious officer had made a pack of cards — it required an effort in honesty not to read their backs. Sing-songs were given, plantation songs alternating with -Moody and Sankey hymns, while we had operatic selections from a gifted performer on a bamboo flute. All sorts of people weri* represented at the mess, the profes.sional soldier, travellers, journalists, men of science and letters. Some of the officers learned German during their cap- tivity — one, a Belgian, devoted his time to a study of Bivntu and other African languages. For the pursuit of von Lettow in Portuguese East Africa, as soon as it was realized that he Africa till August, 1918), though the Portuguese- force which cooperated with the British con tained a considerable proportion of Europeans. Von Lettow when he crossed the Rovuma marched with great speed up the valley of the Lujenda and supplemented the ammvmition, rifles and food he had seized at Ngomano by the further capture of isolated posts. For three weeks the 25th Cavalry and the Nigerians gave chase,, but when on December 19 the cavalry patrols reached Nanguare, a post on the Lujenda, some 50 miles south of Xgomano, it wee only to find that von Lettow liad already cap- tured the Portuguese garrison there and was gone away westward. The Lindi force thu» 68 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. lost touch with the Germans, and it was clear that further operations would constitute an entirely new undertaking. The prospect was not encouraging, especially when the character of the country over which von Lettow and his veterans were free to roam was considered. The portion of Portuguese Kast Africa bounded by the Roviima and Zambesi rivers, Lake Nya^a, and the sea, is but little s-maller than France (wrote General van Deventer). Much of this vast area was a terra incognita to Europeans, and no accurate maps were available. In some parts the natives were a.* yet unsubdued, while in others they were in more or less open rebellion. There were but few roads, and rio railways except 30 miles of 3 ft. 6 in. gauge starting from Lumbo, on the mainland west of Mozambique. . . . The central districts {which the enemy would naturally make for) were reported to bo well elevated, healthy, and fertile. In fact, Portuguese East Africa appeared an ideal theatre for the operations of a commander of a compact and mobile force, tied to no base, independent of lines of communication, and adept in the art of " living on the country," whose aim would probably be to avoid encounters with superior forces and to remain in being 9S long as possible. In his new plan of campaign General van Deventer (who had been made a K.C.M.G. in recognition of his services in the 1917 cam- paign) set before himself two objects, " to prevent the enemy returning in any force to German East Africa and to get to grips with him as S09n and as often as possible." Given the known character of the enemy commander and the known difficulty of forcing decisive action, the campaign had " perforce to be one of virtual extermination." No time was lost in getting to work, and the new campaign was initiated while the 25th Cavalry and the Nigerian Brigade were still engaged in their fruitless chase. Von Lettow had made, as was foreseen, for the central region between Lake Nyasa and the sea. Before December was over the German force was spread over an area extending 200 miles east and west, from Unango, 50 miles east of Nyasa to Medo, some 130 miles west of the Indian Ocean at Port Amelia. They were at once attacked from both sides. General Northey landed the 2nd Cape Corps at Mten- gula, on the eastern shores of Nyasa, and on December 19 it started for Unango, while ISBURY : qOfLiaiMt^ Miles. ' >^®^ ^ 100 200 300 "^ -'J^'TXjp^A, UiUELIMANE >7"^^^^^°''')Sr^',.o NORTHERN PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. oy A TRADER GIVES Colonel Hawthorn, who had been transferred by boat to the south end of the lake, was marching north-east towards the Lujenda river. For the eastern operations the Gold Coast Regiment under Colonel Rose was sent to Port Amelia. By the end of December it had begun to move towards Medo and was soon afterwards joined by the 4/4th K.A.R.'s and a section of the 22nd Mountain Battery. Thios, while with the aid of Portuguese troops a barrier was formed against von Lettow's return north, the British forces were at the beginning of January, 1918, closing on the enemy simul- taneously from east and west. Operations were to continue as far as possible throughout the rainy season, which had then begun. Of the 15 companies into which von Lettow's force was formed 11 were at that time between the Lujenda and Lake Nyasa, von Lettow's head- quarters being at Mtarica, 140 miles east of Mtengula. Between those two places he had forces at Mwembe as well as Unango, and further south at Luambala, on the upper Lujenda, were three-German companies. Despite heavy rains the Cape Corps — 750 rifles — pushed on, occupied Unango, and, on January 21, entered Mwernbe, whence the enemy had fallen back on Mtarica. To Mtarica the Cape Corps pushed on, February 3, but von Lettow had gone, leaving only a small rearguard, whose opposition was quickly overcome. Mean- time Hawthorn (with some 1,300 rifles) had occupied Luambala, and by the middle of INFORMATION. February General Northey had completed the clearance of the west bank of the Lujenda. " The enemy's opposition had been constant, but not severe." Von Lettow had retired south-east to the Msalu-Nanungu region, in the very centre of the coxuitry, and at the greatest distance possible from either Lake Nyasa or the sea. The difficulties of supply, especially for the Nyasaland forces, were consequently largely increased. But no pause in the operations occurred ; Colonel Rose pushed steadily west from Port Amelia, and General Northey's columns as steadily advanced oast from the Lujenda. In addition, a column of 1,500 Portuguese troops was got ready to move from the north, and for the better co-ordination of the movements of the troops General van Deventer assumed command of the Allied forces. Shortly afterwards a K.A.R. battalion was sent to Mozambique, whence it advanced to support the Portuguese force round Nam- pula, south of Colonel Rose's column. Colonel Rose had in January pushed his advanced troops to Pamune, 50 miles south- west of Port Amelia, and had occupied Meza, whence, in February, they reached to within 30 miles of Medo. The Port Amelia force was now strengthened and formed into two columns under General Edwards, with Colonels Rose and Giffard as column commanders. At Medo an enemy force of six companies held a strong position on Chirimba Hill, a rocky ridge over 70 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. a mile long. Here, on April 12, there was a hot engagement, the Glermans counter-attack- ing Colonel Giffard, who was endeavouring to turn their position. For four hours the fighting was heavy and close, and casual- ties were serious on both sides, but all the attacks were repulsed. On the approach of Rose, who had taken Medo, the enemy broke off the fight and succeeded in getting away. On April 17 the enemy wax found in an entrenched position some 18 miles west of Mode, and fightini? oontinuod all day, the enemy retiring during the night. The country was exceedingly difficult, the jungle being no thick that roads were mere tunnels through bamboo thickets and elephant grass, while long stretches of track appeared more suitable for boats than for motor transport. Successive positions flanking the road had to be cleared, and progress wa3 slow. Both General Edwards and General Northey were now closing on Nanungu. Mahua, south- west of Nantmgu, had been taken by Northey's troops on April 5. On the 9th a detachment of the 2nd/lst K.A.R's, tmder Captain Deben- ham, accomplished a smart piece of work, completely dispersing an enemy company and capturing both its machine-guns. On May 4 Colonel Barton (3rd/lst K.A.R. and halt 2nd/lst K.A.R.) engaged an enemy company about five hours west of Nanungu. The enemy were dis - persed and retired eastward^. Colonel Barton pursued, and, on May .■> his leading company surprised and most pluckily attacked a large enemy camp west of Nanungu The enemy [who were commanded by von Lettow in person] immediately counter-attacked vigorously, with a force of from four to five companies. Sharp fighting at close quarters lasted throughout the whole day, the enemy finally withdrawing under cover of night, over 30 Germans and 100 askaris having been killed and wounded in this engagement. Colonel Barton was also wounded, and Lieutenant Colonel Griffiths took over command of his column. Forces were sent north to Msalu to prevent the Gierraans breaking back, and their main body was forced to Korewa, 24 miles south-west of Nanungu, and east of Mahua. Here, on May 23, severe fighting took place among rocky hills and thick bush. Colonels Giffard and Griffiths attacked the enemy, who was roughly handled, losing 11 whites and 49 askari (killed or captured), besides several hundred porters, a field and a machine-gun, stores of ammunition and the complete baggage of four companies. A few days later an enemy hospital, with 9.3 patients (15 of them whites) fell into the hands of the BritLsh.* Von Lettow now made his way south, and by the last day of May he was on the Lurio river, near Vatiwa. Thence • When inconveniently hampered bysick and wounded von Lettow simply loft them behind for the British to pick up, " a considerable advantage to the enemy,'' said QeneraJ van Deventer. through extremely difficult country, " where rugged heights rise in almost every direction out of a sea of almost impenetrable bush," he continued south through the Namule region by Malema to Hie. He was pursued from the north, a combined British-Portuguese column advanced from the Mozambique direction, and other dispositions were made to overtake liim. They failed, and "so rapid had been the enemy's movements that he capttired valuable stores and supplies [in his march on Ille] which the Portuguese had not been able to remove in time." During June General Edwards moved his base from Port Amelia to Mozambique, while, towards the end of the month. General Northey left, having been appointed Governor of British East Africa. Colonel Hawthorn, with the rank of Brigadier-General, took over Northey's command. Meanwhile von Lettow had reached the coastal area in the region of Quelimane, and was gaily raiding some of the richest prazas the Portuguese possessed in East Africa. The whereabouts of his main force was unknown, and it was necessary to guard Quelimane itself, where British and Portuguese marines were landed. For further protection a mixed British and Portuguese force, under Major Gore- Brown, was sent to Nhamacurra, 25 miles north-east of Quelimane, and the terminus of a tramway line running from the port to- wards the Licungo river. It guarded a rich sugar factory. Reliable information was extremely hard to obtain a-i the enemy had suborned many of the native chiefs and headmen by lavish presents of cloth and other goodg captured by them between Alto Molocue and Liigella, Thus the enemy not only denied inforniation to us, but was able to depend on early and accurate news of our movements. The same difficulty was experienced by us during the whole time that the enemy was in the coastal zone. Our columns were doing everything possible to get to grips with the enemy but were frequently led astray by false reports. , . . They were occasionally completely out of touch with their headquarters, and with one another, as the rapidity of their movements made it impossible for cable parties to keep up with them and paek wireless has a very small and uncertain range in thick bush. The difficulties of concerted action, always great in bush country, were thun very greatly enhanced. On the afternoon of July I a sudden attack was made on the Western sector of Nhamacurra by three enemy companies. . The enemy had undoubtedly received accurate information about the position, as the attack was pushed straight in between the Portuguese Western flank and the river. The garrison of about 500 native troops was surprised ; and, though the Portuguese officers and N.C.O.'s fought bravely, the whole of this sector of the defence, including two quick-firing guns (one rendered useless), was in the enemy's hands within a very short time. The enemy consolidated his position, and the Portuguese garrison of the centre sector retired THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. n by order to the British position on tho cast, which wus now lu'ld by ubout 300 K.A.K. Tho enemy atlndted on July 2 and again on the 3rd, but was repulsed. At 3 p.m. on the 3rd, however, fire wms opened from one of the captured guns, seconded by a large number of Maxims, mider cover of wliich a determined assault was pushed in, which carriet^the defences on the north- cast face. The garrison then retired, maintaining good order, until they found themselves penned in an angle of the river, when a considerable number were drowned in crossing. (Van Deventer.) Von Lettow was not able to take full ndvnn- the Ligonha and Meluli rivers, and was raiding in every direction." The whole of this district was practioally in I'eljellion, and in return for lavish presents from phindered Portuguese stores the natives gave the enemy every help in food and guides, while the attraction of loot was very strong for the Gorman askari. How- ever, they could not stay long in these sea- board areas, for British coliunns were drawing CARRYING THE SICK. tago of his success, in view of the approach of several British columns. An attempt to pin the enemy between Xhamacurra and the sea failed owing to false information given by natives. The Germans retired, parallel to the coast, crossed the JSIelela river on July 13 and attacked and overpowered a small British garrison of about 100 men covering road -making parties. The garrison held out for two days, most of tho defenders being killed or woimded. By the beginning of August von Lettow, going towards ^lozambique, " had established himself near Chalaua, in the rich country lying betwoo:i near. These columns closed in, but only to find an evacuated camp. Von Lettow was then marcliing west to lUe, though with many twist- ings to evade his pursuers. On Avigiist 30 his main body, which had turned north, encountered part of General Hawthorn's force ; after severe fighting it was driven back, and next day the Germans were in turn attacked at Lioma, in the Malema district. Tt was hoped tliat the enemy might have been cor- nered, but the niiiged coimtry and thick bush made operations very difficult, and he finally broke away to the northward. Inthe two days' fighting the eiteiny lo^t 17 whites killed and 1 1 cauturod, while several more were 72 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. known to have been wounded. Hia known loss in askari was about 200. Nearly 100,000 rounds of ammunition, much baggage and store.s, and a small hospital fell into our hands.* Attempts to head off the enemy were made, and on September 6 he was severely mauled, while in the Upper Lurio valley. Ho was not, however, cornered, and for the next two months appears to have completely outdistanced, his pursuers. Covering over 200 miles in three weeks, at the end of September he succeeded in recrossing the Rovuma towards the Nyasaland side. He then made towards Songea, but was turned aside by a detachment of Northern Rhodesia Police. Von Lettow next marched north parallel to Lake Nyasa. Preparations were made to bar his progress, and besides other measures adopted a force was dispatched from Nyasaland. But two steamers conveying troops to the north end of Lake Nyasa broke down, and the force did not arrive in time to intercept the enemy; Von Lettow was ex- pected to make towards the Tabora region, where most of his askari had been recruited. Foreseeing that in that direction he would find the British in strength he, however, turned north-west, entered Northern Rhodesia, and on November 2 attacked the garrison of Fife. Repulsed, he now turned fairly west, as if making for the Cape to Cairo railway, in the neighbourhood of the Broken Hill mine. He did much damage as he went, and on November 11, the day the Armistice was signed in France, • The known German casualtie.-j since they crossed the Rovuma on November 25, 1917, to this date, Sep* tomber I, 1918, were 140 white and 1,100 askari. was on the Chambezi river (thn most distant head stream of the Congo), 50 miles within the British border, and near Kasama, one of the chief stations in Northern Rhodesia. There was a good deal of criticism in South Africa that it should have been possible for the enemy not • only to return to German East Africa but to penetrate with such impunity into Rhodesia. • Nor was there evidence that von Lettow was yet at the end of his resources. News of the armistice reached the enemy on the 12th, and, somewhat to the general surprise, von Lettow at once complied with its terms, tendering his submission on November 14 to ISIr. H. C. Croad, the magistrate at Kasama, and throwing on him the burden of feeding his force. The formal surrender was made to General Edwards at Abercorn, near the south end of Lake Tanganyika, on November 25, and was a ceremonious ailair. His askari having been drawn up in a hollow square, von Lottow, after saluting the British flag, took out a pocket-book and read from it in German his formal statement of surrender. Having re- peated his statement in English, he called upon his troops to lay down their arms. The force surrendering included Dr. Schnee and Major Kraut. It numbered 30 officers, 125 other Europeans, 1,165 askari, 1,516 porters, 482 Portuguese natives, 282 followers, 13 headmen and 819 women, with one field gun, 24 Maxims, and 14 Lewis guns. General Edwards formally accepted the surrender in the name of King George. The German flag had disappeared from Africa. CHAPTER CCLXXVIl. SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE : JULY, 19 1 8. Minor Operations at end of June, 1918— Americans and Australians — Success of the Tanks — The Strategic Situation — Germans attack East and West of Reims, July In- complete Failure in East — Germans cross the Marne — End of German Advance, July 17 — German Comment — July 18 : Foch Strikes between Soissons and the Marne Great Allied Success — The German Retreat Continues — Fighting in the Air Raids into Germany — Operations on Other Sectors — The Turn of the Tide. AFTER the events described in Chap- ter CCLXXIII. there was an interval of comparative rest on the Western front. The German movements ap- peared to be held up for a time and counter- efforts were executed by the Allies against them on a somewhat larger scale. On June 28 the 5th Division under Major- General R. B. Stephens and the 31st Division commanded by Major-General J. Campbell, which occupied the ground between Vieux Berquin and Merville, with the little stream known as the Plate Becque about 1,500 yards in front of it covering the approach to the Nieppe Forest, attacked the Germans along a line of a little less than four miles eastward from the Forest. The troops attacked were commanded by General von Bernhardi and comprised the XV. Corps. They held a line west of the Estaires-Cassel Road. The object of the movement was to push back the Ger- mans and occupy the line of this stream, which gave a better position to the defences protecting Hazebrouck in advance of the wooded ground which was constantly being shelled with gas ; Hazebrouck, it will be remembered, was only about five miles in rear of this line. The assault was undertaken Vol. XIX.— Part 237. 73 without preliminary bombardment and was successful from the first onset. The hamlets of L'Epinette, Verte Rue and La Becque were taken. The enemy's trenches were cleared without difficulty by our' troops, consisting of imits from Yorkshire, Lancashire and the Northern Counties, with some southern English units cooperating. Prisoners were taken to the number of 450, including 9 officers, also 30 machine-guns and two field guns. The prisonere comprised Saxons from the 32nd Division and Prussians from the 44th. It was a successful action of considerable value, and a complete surpri-se to the enemy. At the same time the Australian Ist Division captured some hostile posts west of Merris, just to the north of Vieux Berquin, taking 43 prisoners, 9 machine-guns and 2 trench-mor- tars. It was a curious little affair. A patrol of South Australians in No Man's Land abiut 6 o'clock noticed that the enemy in front of them had a distinct disinclination to fight. They therefore rushed the enemy post and captured the whole garrison. Some of the prisoners then pointed out the position of the next post, where- upon another Australian patrol captured that also ! The operation was repeated, and thus in this impromptu fashion four or five other 74 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE TIMES HlSTOliY OF THE WAR. 75 <meiny j)osts were taken possession of one after tlie other, and the i)osition was consolidated by the capture of a strong dug-out position a little to the south of those already taken. This advanced our lino west of Merris for 300 yards or more, on a front of half a mile, with hardly any loss to our men. The enemy made no attempt to recapture this ground until Juno 30, and was then repulsed with loss. On June 29 the French made a surprise attack on the German positions between Ambleny and the north side of the forest of Villers-Cotteret, which was completely success- ful. The advance, on a front of five miles, was begun without any special preliminary bom- bardment : there was merely the ordinary interchange of artillery fire. It was covered by a strong barrage. The object of the attack was to win the eastern side of the ravine through which a small stream runs past La\ersine and Anibl(^ny to the Aisne. This ravine had steep banks, the eastern of which overlooked to some extent the French positions back to Mortefontaine, especially from the high plateau near Dommiers. Moreover, the (luarries on the sides of the ravine afforded good shelter for German troops close up to the French lines in j)ositions which it was impossible to reach by .artillery fire. At Laversino the Ger- mans held a post on the western side which was a good centre for observation and for patrols. The attack was directed up the gully between Laversine and Cutry and also against the high gro\ind between Cutry and Dommiers, the troops being directed round the flanks. It was greatly aided by the action of the new ligtit French tanks and was very successful, the Gennan lines being penetrated to a depth of over a mile. Finally the French established themselves along the ground which ran from Fosse-en- Haut, a mile to the north of Laversine by Cutry, Hill 102 and back by St. Pierre-Aigle to Mont- gobert, thus transforming the re-entrant form (if the trenches to a blunt salient penetrating the German lines. Over 1,300 prisoners were taken, of whom 20 were ofliccrs. The result was a great improvement of the French posi- tion, as it gave them a strong situation in the German lines, outflanking any attack to the north of it and also against the eastern side of the forest. The same date marked an advance by the French on the south of the Ourcq between I-a Ferte-^Iilon and Passy-en-Valois ; they gained ground to the extent of half a mile on a front of rather over a mile and captured 275 prisoners. On July 1 the 3rd Brigido of the 2n>l American Division seized tne .village of Vaux, supported by the 4th Brigade, just west of Chateau -Thierry on the road to Paris. On the other side of the road they took La Roche Wood, close to the village. On this occasion the French acted on the right of the Americans. The action was thoroughly successful, the whole of the points desired being taken. On July 3, as the result of small local opera- tions near Autreches and Moulin-sous-Touvent, DUG-OUT IN A QUARRY ON THE MARNE. the French considerably improved their position, biting into the Gorman lines for about half a mile on a front of nearly two miles, taking 457 prisoners and 30 machine-guns. The enemy's works hero had been under the usual artillery fire the three previous days, but the intensive artillery fire was only begun at 7.25 a.m. after the gvins had been silent for an hour to lull the enemy. It lasted for two minutes and then the French infantry went forward covered by a barrage. In 10 minutes the first line of German trenches,som.e500 yards away, was reached, and an engineer company which had accompanied the attacking troops, who were mostly Bretons, \)egan to join up the old with the new position by a communi- cation trench. By half -past eight the French 237—2 7G THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. {French ofj ciai photograph. LA FERT6 MILON: REGULATING TRAFFIC ON ONE OF THE BRIDGES. were thoroughly established, and when, three- quarters of an hour later, the Germans made a counter-attack, it was completely defeated before it could get up to the new line. In one dug-out the French captured the whole Staff of a German battalion, together with the telegraph, telephone and amb\ilance sections. The Americans marked Independence Day (July 4) by aiding the Australians in a con- siderable success on the south side of the Somme. The American contingent consisted of four companies from their 33rd Division. The combined forces captured ground a mile and a half deep, including the village of Hamel and Vaire Wood, and took over 1,500 prisoners, more than 100 machine-guns, some 20 trench mortars and an anti-tank field-gun. The Germans also lost heavily in killed and wounded, while the total casualties on our side were under 500. The attack commenced shortly after 3 a.m. under favourable atmos- pheric conditions. The Australians, as we know, had been griadually progre.'ssing forward north of the Somme towards Morlancourt and had already recaptured ground to the extent of about 3 miles in front of the point to which we had fallen back at the end of March. On the south side of the river also considerable progress had been' made beyond Vaire, and the object of the operation now being described was to straighten out the line on the north and south sides of the river. Before the attack commenced the German lines were subjected to intensive fire over a much wider front than that which was actually assaulted by the infantry, and the Gemians appear to have been completely surprised by the movement. Sixty tanks accompanied the advancing in- fantry, which was also covered by a smoke screen and the usual barrage, while in the air pilots flew over the ground to be attacked and dropped bombs on many im- portant points. One thing which added to the surprise of the movement was that the German trenches in this part of the field had been recently treated to a considerable bombardment of gas shells, and as this was continued during the artillery preparation, the Germans appear to have thought that nothing more was intended At any rate, when our men reiiched the enemy's lines, they found the Germans wearing their gas masks and not expecting an infantry attack. Our guns practically held the enemy batteries, and consequently our men suffered but little from them. The efficacy of our artillery fire may be judged from the fact that, when the Germans commenced to put down their barrage, it fell on our first lino trendies, which were then practically empty, our men having by that time reached those of the enemy ; they had been so dominated by our fire as not to have noticed THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 77 our infantry advance. The main attack was foiii' miie8 long, and on the north and south of it small raiding operations; wero also carried out ; thus on the Villers-Bretonneux road a successful raid took (iO prisoroi-s and killed many Germans. Other similar expeditions at Ville-sur-Ancre and another below Morlancourt were also successful ; the former had a special object, viz., the capture of a point which made a material improvement in our line. This was successfvjlly taken and held. The American troops that took part in this action were new to the work, but all behaved with great gallantry. They appear to have been engaged more especially round Hamel and Vaire. There is no doubt that the success of the operation was very largely due to the able and efficient manner in which the tanks were handled. All succeeded in going over the German linos except five, and of those only one was sufficiently injured to be put out of action, being struck by a shell. When the fighting ■.'.as over, they were of gi-eat utility m bringing back the wounded. As usual the front line of the Germans consisted practically of machine-gun nests only, and it was against these defences that the tanks were so useful. Moving up and down behind our barrage they shot down the garrisons or crushed them and their weapons into the earth. Some few of the German gimners took refuge in their dug-outs, where they were trapped and com- pelled to give themselves up to our infantry In one case a tank which was 200 yartis in a<lvance of the infantry disposed of a nest of six machine-guns which refused to surrender. The tank went over them like a roller, crushing all the. guns and most of the crews, and shooting down others who tried to escape. Another nest of foiu" was similarly disposed of, three being snuffed out in the first attack ; then turning round on the fourth, which still kept in action, the tank passed over gun and crew alike. Many more instances might be given of this use of the weapon. On one occasion a tank destroyed a post of five machine-guns ; the crews then went out, took the weapons into the tank and brought them back. Against a point whence a good deal of fin; had been coming a tank went forward to locate the exact position. It was an irregular luun- mock on the top of a low rise of ground, and roimd this the tank went. It had no sooner got behind it than some 40 Germans sprang up with their hands in the air and ran back as hard GERMAN PRISONERS TAKEN BY IHE AMERICANS AT VAUX. Marching to a prison camp under French escort. 78 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. as tliey could away from the tank to surrender to the infantry behind. There were one or two points where tanks could not be used, and liere the attack was carried out by infantry fire and bombing [A vsfralian official photcgraph AUSTRALIAN INFANTRYMAN WITH FIELD KIT. When the position had been captvired, the tanks patrolled the front, keeping down the German machine-gun fire. From a cornfield a considerable amount of sniping took place from men whose position could not be exactly located, and against them a tank went forward ; as soon as it got near, German infantry were seen bobbing up in all directions, bolting back ; many of them were shot down as they went. One of these little incidents was extremely typical of German ways. An officer, after having surrendered, shot an American sergeant in cold blood with his pistol ; neitlu r this officer nor other Germans who came across the Americans in this part of the field failed to suffer for this dastardly conduct. There were small counter-attacks, but no serious effort to regain the |)osition the Allies had captured, and on July the Australians advanced once more and pushed their line another 400 yards forward to the south of Hamel and east of Vairo Wood over a front of a mile. The bold captui'e of this wood and the ground beyond it was a great advantage, as it commanded the ground which sloped down thence towards Warfusee. On the edge of the eastern slope there was another wood, about 250 yards wide from east to west and some 1,300 yards long from north to south. In this there was a Gorman machine-gun post which gave some trouble to our men after they had * captured Vaire Wood. It was disposed of in a very gallant manner. One man crept cautiously forward, and so imposed upon the garrison with his rifle and bombs that 12 privates and one officer surrendered to him and were brought back to our front line. In Hamel itself there were several dug-outs, and these were dealt with one after the other until all surrendered. Finally, under some con- siderable machine-gun fire an Australian officer climbed to the top of the most prominent ruin in the village and planted there the French tricolotir. In all tliese operations the British and French aviators played a prominent part ; besides doing their ordinary work of observation and distant bombing, . they accompanied the troops in their advance, dropped many tons of bombs on the enemy, exploded his ammunition dumjjs, and constantly brought machine-gun fire to bear on his troops. Our superiority was shown by the fact that we accounted for 21 German areoplanes and one observation balloon against only four of our own machines missing. This intimate co-relation between the air and the land services had now become a matter of routine. During the month of June we had put out of action 1,235 of the enemy's aeroplanes. On the night of July 7 -8 the Australians again advanced their line slightly, capturing several prisoners. Farther north our troops also raided the German lines south of the La Basste Canal and also east of Hazobrouck. The THE TIMES HISTORY uE THE WAIi. 79 result of the Australian advance was to cause gri^at artillery activity on the part of the Germans, but their efforts were limited to gun-fire. The French south of the Aisne and east of Villers-Cotterets attacked on a front of two miles and took some 370 prisoners. During the day the French also attacked the enemy's positions south of the Aisne in front of the Retz Forest, north-west of Longpont, on a front of two miles. They made good for about three-quarters of a mile, and captured Chavign', and the ground north and south of that point, t.aking 340 prisoners. On the next day the French made a further advance between Montdidier and tVie Oise. The attack was begun at 3.30 a.m. on a front of two and a half miles to the west of Antheml. Tanks supported the infantry attack, which carried the line forward a little over a mile, capturing the Porte Ferine and the Ferme des Loges — the Germans themselves admit this success — with 530 prisoners and 30 machine- guns. The position was held in spite of counter- efforts by the enem3'. The Germans also attacked in the region of Chavigny Fann, but were driven off. There seems to have been on this day more or less activity along the whole line of the Western Front, but nothing of any moment except what has jiist been noted. On July 9 the German artillery fire in the neighbourhood of Villers - Bretotmei x wa.s more inton.se than usual, and it was followed by some loctd attacks, Vjut all of these were driven off. We also ha*! a successful little raid in the neighbourhood of Merris in the northern section, where, in addition to some prisoners, we captured nine machine-guns and two trench mortars The small attacks by which the Allies consistently and constantly gained ground continued. On July 10 the French captured the village of Corey north of the Ourcq and took 50 prisoners. The next day, onco more near Merris, the 1st Australian Division gained a con. siderable advantage. It was of a very interesting character, extended over a front of more than 2,000 yard?, and succeeded in carrying our line to within 500 yards of Merris. At first only OQe small patrol of ours wa« concerned, but it succeeded in roxmding up between 30 and 40 prisoners. The enemy's line, which our men attacked, formed an awkward salient projecting into our lines, and consisted of a chain of fortified posts, but with no connected regular line irrimediately behind them. Those seem to have been dealt with in detail, a few being ENTRAINING FRENCH TANKS. U'rench opctal pnologiapk. 80 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. captured, which involved the loss of others, and so the successes spread along the line, our original force being joined by other patrols from the 1st Australian and also the British 33rd Division. The process was continued the next day. The net result of these small operations, wliich were conducted in broad daylight, without any special artillery assist- ance, resulted in the capture of 223 prisoners and 15 machine-guns and gave us a new line of posts well in advance of our former line. considerably strengthened their position against a further German advance against Amiens. On tluly 14 the British line in the north wa5 advanced east of Dickebusch Lake over a front of 2,000 yards near Ridge Wood, and 300 prisoners were captured. On the night of July 17/18, Australian troops made a successful advance in the neighbourhood of Villers-Bretonneux, two miles south of the Somme. They made good on a distance of some 600 yards on a front of over LOADING "BUNTY." [OSicialpholcpaph. The French pressure against the Grerman lines in front of the Forest of Villers-Cotterets was also continued. On July 12 the village of Longpont, south-west of Soissons, and .lavage Farm, north-east of Favorolles, were taken. In the evening the ^French made a still more important gain south-east of ^Vmiens and immediately west of the Avre. The front of attack measured three miles between Castel and north of Mailly Raineval. The village of Castel was captured, also Anchin Farm, and several strongly organized posts were captured. A considerable irruption into the enemy's lines was completed arid in some points a depth of over 2,000 yards reached, in addition to which 600 orisoners were taken. This was an im- \>orta,nXt rectification of the Allied lino which a mile, capturing one officer, thirty-three men, some machine-guns, and two field guns. To the south-west of Arras, at Hebuterne, we also made a successful raid to the south of the village and drove off a hostile raiding party south of Bucquoy. During .July 18 Yorkshire troops made a successful raid in the afternoon south-east of Robecq. The operation was carried on with very little resistance from the enemy. On the same date the Germans shelled the neighbourhood of Ypres and the hills towards Kemmel with considerable \'igour. Prisoners taken from the enemy at this time showed great interest in the fighting on the Marne, and stated that the battle was meant to end the war. On the next night the Germans attempted to raid in the Villers-Bretonneux THE TIMES HISTORY OV THE WAR. 81 and Morlancourt regions, but in each case they were driven off. On the other hand, our troops made successful attacks in the noighbourhoo<l of Bucquoy, Willerval and Locre and captured some prisoners. July 19 .saw a successful operation carried out by the 9th Division under Major-General H. H. Tudor near Hnilloul. It was directed against Meteren which stood on high ground close to the British line, and it was therefore <lpsiral)le to deprive the (ierinaiis of it. Tlii-t posed of Scottish troops, with whopi were South Africans, the Australians also advancod and extended the success to a front of alwut 4,000 yards, including a group of buildings to the south-west - of Meteren. Kxcept on the left of the attack the enemy offered _but little resistance, and our' objectives were quickly gained and over 350 prisoners taken, with 10 trench mortars and 50 machino- guns. Xiunerous raids were also undertaken whieti pniiied iis slij.'lit nilvn!itiin''«. iid'I \vi' [O^iotat photo^raj-n. BUNTY" SPEAKS. village had, indeed, seen a good deal of fighting ; both sides striving to capture and hold it. The Germans gained a footing there on the morning of July 16, bvit in the evening we counter-attacked and drove back the enemy ; however, it would seem that our line was still kept to the west of this point, and it was not imtil the operation about to be described was successful that the village was taken and held. It straightened out our line and diminished the sharpness of the salient about Bailleul. The combat was sharp but decisive, and our troops carried the line forward to an extreme depth of 1,300 yards on a front of about two miles. Tliey captured the village of Meteren, taking over 300 prisoners, with a number of machine- guns. On the right of the 9th Division, com- completed a busy week by a raid ujion the enemy's positions in Aveluy Wood on July 20, in the course of which they destroyed several dug-outs and strong points. The operations in the Meteren region were completed by the capture of Merris on the night of July 28/29 by the 1st Australian Division, which greatly improved and strength- ened our line. English troops pushed forward on a front of about a mile, south of H^buteme, on the 19th, and the operation was continued the next day (July 20). The enemy was also compelled to withdraw from the Rossignol Wood between H^buteme and Bucquoy. This advance con- siderably improved ovir position. There was again a little fighting during the night of July 20 82 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. south-west of La Bassfe and in the Merville and Dickebiisch. segments. The aggregate result of all these small affairs was to improve our front consider- ably. Incidentally they sliowed that our troops were superior to the Germans in hand-to-hand fighting. • With the exception of these minor operations, the front had be^n without Gterman enterprise for nearly a month, and what energy was dis- played was entirely on the side of the Allies, but it was known that concentrations wen- taking place which pointed to a farther effort 818 soon as circumstances were favourable to the enemy. The weather at this time was bad, and that possibly postponed his attack. It is said also that the ravages of influenza had something to do with the delay. It was ascer- tained at the beginning of July tb.at the group of reserve divisions about Douai and Valen- ciennes was still intact, but there were also indications which led the French General Head- quarters to believe that a further attack would be made in strength east and west of Reims, and might even be continued still farther to the east, thus involving a wide length of the French positions. The object of an advance in this direction was plainly to intercept the main line of communications between Nancy and Paris by Vitry. Were it successful, it would much facilitate the advance by Chateau- Thierry on Paris, and would cut the eastern French forces, fro:n Verdun to Nancy and downwards, from those which were facing directly north. Moreover, if the attack were extended to the Argonne, as at one time seemed probable, and if it were possible to push down to Vitry-le- Frangois, Lorraine would have been out off ; while if the attack could have been pushed down east of the Argonne to the salient of St jNIihiel, Verdun would have been isolated. It is evi- dent, therefore, that such an attack offered great possibilities. It was really a reversion to the same strate- gical plan that had dictated the double attempt to turn the Allied flanks in 1914, both on the left and on the right. The latter has been alkided to recently in Chapter CCLIV, pp. 207-8. The attacks on Verdun were all made in pur- suance of this idea, and just as the far wider effort of the early part of the war had been narrowed down to aji attack on Verdun, now this was still more to be shortened by the attempt to advance from Reims Huge as were 1 trench official photo^rapk. A BATTERY OF 7Sinm. GUNS ON THE' MARNE. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 83 REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVING BETWEEN DORMANS PIPERS. the German forces employed in the war, their grandiose plan of campaign had always been in excess of their available strength, and they had come down to much more concentrated and less ambitious efforts than those which had fomied the general idea of the 1914 offensive. In no one of the four attacks which he had undertaken had Ludendorff been really success- ful. The advance on Amiens had been held up. He had managed to widen the wedge he had then made to the south of the Oise, and he had added on to this by the offensive on the western side of Reims to Soissons, but the whole of this advance was indeterminate, and, although offering possibilities, had notliing decisive about it. Li the north, too, the German advance had been definitely held, and an advance in this direction offered but little prospect of any striking success. It was natural, therefore, that any further attempt should bo made more in connexion with the bigger irruption in the neighbourhood of Amiens, an extension of which offered greater possibilities of a striking result. Marshal Foch thoroughly understood this, and his view wa.s confirmed by the knowledge that the Germans were concentrating in great strength round Reims. At the beginning of July, to meet the coming attack, he transferred the whole of the French forces, amounting to eight divisions, from Flanders to the south, to the threatened French front. He also asked Sir Douglas Haig for four British divisions, two AND REIMS, HEADED BY to be placed in areas south of the Somme and two in position astride that river, to ensure the connexion between the French and British Armies about Amiens, and to enable him to remove fo\ir more French divisions from this portion of the theatre of war to a more eastward position to strengthen the French right flank. Sir Douglas Haig agreed to this proposal. Thus, in addition to the troops he liad already in reserve, Foch had now available 12 further divisions to meet" the coming attack. On July li, he reqdcsted that the four British divisions might be placed luu-eservedly at his disposition, and that four others might V)e detailed to take tlieir place. This request was also agreed to, and the XXII. Corps, uutler- Lieut. -General Sir A. Godley, consisting of the 15th, .'lltli, 51st and 62ud British Divisions, was accordingly sent down to the French front. The Allies wore theU; prepan'd to meat the German offensive in the neighbourhood of Reims. On July 7, General Gouraud, whose troops were stationed on the eastern side of the town, issued tlio following order : — " To the French and American soldiers of the Fourth Army. We may be attacked at any moment. You must all feel that never was a defensive battle entered on under more favourable conditions. Wo are warned and we are ready. We have been powerfully rein- forced in infantry and artillery.- 237—3 84 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. "■ You will fight on groiind which your leadei-s have made into a redoubtable fortress, wliich will be unconquerable if the approaches are well held. The enemy's bombardment will be terrible, but yoii will sustain it without yielding. The attack will be vigorous, through a cloud of smoke, dust and gas, but your position and your arms are formidable. " In your breasts beat the strong and brave hearts of free men. There must be no thought of recoiling. You must be animated but by one thought — kill as many of them as you can until they have had enough of it. Feeling you will do so, your Gteneral tells you that you will crush the assault and that it will be a jireat day when you do it." It was a prophetic utterance, and it is a proof that, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, the whole Army felt the confidence due to adequate preparations to meet the situation. On July 16, the expected attack was begun GENERAL VON MUDRA. Commanded a German Army operating ea»t of Reims. both on the east and west of Reims. The attack was made on a front of 50 miles, and was divided into two parts by the town of Reims, which thr- assault of June 18 had failed to take. South and east of Reims was the forest- covered height known as the Montague de Reims, difficult to take, but south of it the country down towards the camp of Chalons was for the most part flat, and the Suippe and the Vesle were the only natural defences north of the Mame. The defects of the ground had been ciade good by elaborate deff-nsivo prepara- tions and it Ixad been tiu"ned into a veritable fortress with lines of great depth so that to break through them all would have been a costly undertaking and one which would have required great time. Moreover, it must he GENERAL VON EINEM. Commanded the German Third Army, remembered th.at so long as the Montagne de Reims was imcaiitured it formed a dangerous position on the flank of any German irruption on one or other side of the town. The First German Army under Genoral von Boohn operated on the west of Reims, while on the east, the German Third Army, imder General von Einem, formerly Pnissian Minister of War, was strengthened by a new army imder General von Mudra, consisting of troops brought up from Lorraine, and the whole force was nominally (though of course not really) under the command of the German Crown Prince. The Allied troops opposed to these forces were the Fourth Army east of Reims, under General Gouraud, immediately south and south-west of the town to the Mame, the Fifth Army under General Berthelot, and the Seventh Army, commanded by General de Mitrv, which extended the line from Venteuil to Fossoy. With this force was the 3rd American Division between Fossoy and Chateau-Thierry, while English and Italian troops were near the Ardre river. North of the American troops about Chateau-Thierry was Degoutte's army up to the Ourcq, and north THE TIMEfi HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 85 «f it in front of the Retz Forest was Mangiii with the Tenth Army. General P^tain was in general command of the whole front. Mangin, who appeared for the Hecoud time in this part of the country, had been criticizefl t'op his conduct in the April oifcnsivo of 1917, GENERAL DEGOUTTE. Commanded the French Army between Marne and Ourcq. but the result of the enquiry exonerated him, and General Foch appointed liim to the com- mand of the army he now held. Like General Gouraud, he had had considerable experience in Colonial warfare ; he was appointed to the command of a brigade in 1913 and at the out- break of war he was at the head of the 8th Brigade in the region of Dinant. During the first battle of the Marne he commanded a division and greatly contributed Vjy his personal efforts to the success of the fighting. At the end of March, 191(J, he was at Verdun, and recaptured Douaumont and afterwards Vatix. The Allied plan of defence was to hold their defence line, in accordance with their latest practice, by a series of small infantry groups anned with machine-guns, and it was expected that these should give notice to the defences farther back the moment the real infantry attack of th*. Germans commenced. These posts formed indeed a series of forlorn hopes, and the men who occupied them knew it. But at no point along the whole line did thoy fail in their dcMperata task. Behind these posts, and separated from them by a cleared space, there were a number of strong points power- fully armed and protected by strong ?,ones of barbtiil wire. It was the duty of these defences to hold and break up the assaulting waves of the enemy. Throughotit the period of waiting constant little pin-pricks of raiils had been carried on against the German lines to prevent them localizing the defetusive d'stributions, while at the same time every necessary step had been taken to strengthen the position. Ranges had been measured with the greatest care and with a minimum expenditure of slioll-fire so as not to attract attention. German troops had been brought up in large numbers and on .July 13 there was a large in- GENERAL MANGIN. Commanded the Tenth French Army. crease of traflfic on the narrow ways from the Suippe towards Epoye. The roads to the north from the Suippe were also full of wagons march- ing from the noi'th towards the south, and on the morning of July 1 1 t hese were seen returning, which showed that the previous night there had been a large provision of ammunition taken up. The aviators had const intly brought in news of the Gtorman concentration. The numero\is little raids had taught the sohherj 86 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. that this was occurring. As eai-ly as 'July 6 it became plain that tho attack was about to commence. On July 10 it was known that it would t-ake place on July li or 15, and that the front would affect the Fourth Army from [French official photograph. PHOTOGRAPHING THE ENEMY'S POSI- TIONS FROM A TRENCH. Mont Teton .to the east. The evidence went on accumulating during July '11, 12 and 13. On July 14 a [raid, 'siicces.=;fal!y carried out, shelved that it was only a question of hours, and it was known that the artillery prtjparation would commence at 12.10 a.m., and at4.15 a.m. the infantry would move to the assault, covei'ed by a moving barrage. The front line of the German attack con- f:isted of some 15 divisions with 10 others in support. These, it is true, over-ran the advanced defences, but made very little further progress and never reached the French main line, which ran from Prunay in front of Prosnos-Souain-Perthes and Massiges, where it joined the French line as it was before the attack of Jime 9. So certain was General Gouraud of the im- pending attack that at 11 p.m. on July 14 he ordered the commencement of the courlter- batt<>ry fire — i.e., 70 minutes before the German artillery preparation commenced. Except for the artillery, the French troops sat quiet in their positions of readiness. As soon as the first lines of German infantry were seen to be coming on rockets were sent up from the French advanced posts notifying that tho attack had commenced, and tho artillery barrage was at onoe put down against the attack. All went like clockwork. The resistance put up by the Fnmoh advanced posts was an extremely tenacious one. As happens on all such ■occasions, posts were siurroundod here and there, but still went on fighting. This front livio held up the Germans for at least three hours, and even then, when parties of them tried to .slip through tho interv.ils, many still held on, fighting desperately, One instarice may be qvioted as showing an interesting- development. A post kept up its resistance till six in the evening, when it appears to have been relieved, and it was able all the time to send baclc information by means of wireless telephony, giving jnost important information as to the progress of the battle. Eventually, when their ammunition was exhausted, the men were relieved and made their way back through to the French line behind. But although the enemy had these few successes, r-n the whole they made no great progress. It is curious to note that, in accordance with the iisual prpjCtice of a distinct time-table laying down exactly what the artillery was to do, the German gun-fire was directed totally without regard to the progress made by the infantry ; thus, the second line of infantry came on though the first had not done its task, and behind them a<lvanced artillery batteries and ammunition columns. These were all seen by the French artillery, for the day was fine, and they suffered terribly. The hecatombs of "slain, the mounds of dismounted guns and destroyed v/agons, bore t«rrible testimony to the firo of the French artillerjTnen. There is little doubt that the progress the German front line made over the French advanced posts deceived them as to the amount of resistance they were likely to meet with, but they received a rude awakening when they came across the line of works which formed the real main line ot works ot the French position. An amusing sfory is told with regard to this. An officer commanding five Gorman tanks was writing a report at 5 a.m., which ran as follows : " The five tanks have all crossed the first line of the enemy and are contimiing to advance towards the Wardberg, where the enemy has a number o* machine-gun nests I am going to Somme-Suippe to continue the THE TIMES TIJRTOTtY OF THE WW. 87 AN ISOLATED FRENCH MACHINE-GUN POST. Holding up an enemy attack. pursuit of the enemy and I shall return im- mediately." Unfortunately, just as he finished this dispatch, which he was writing on the hill of Tahiire, he was captured, and conducted back to the point wliich he had determined on as Ills immediate objective, where he was pre- sented to the General Headquarters. At 7 o'clock, the position was as follows : The French still held their line of strong posts. In the centre the enemy had progressed somewhat beyond it. On the left the pressure was .severe between the Marquises Farm and the Maison du Garde. To the south-east of Primay the Gern\ans had gained the Roman road which runs from Reims to the Argonne, and the wood ; but by noon the attack was dying down. At Prosnes and at Perthos-les-Hurlus they gained a momentary footing, but were at once turned out. The result of the day's fighting was that on the east of Reims no progress of any moment had been made and the Gennans suffered very heavy losses. Nor was their succe.ss much greater on the west of the town. The most violent fighting hero took place between Donuans and Fossoy on a 88 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. front of about seven miles. The Germans nia-le mftny desperate efforts to cross the Alanie betwe^in these points, especially directing their attacks towards Conde-en-Brie. Strenuous efforts were also mode at Chateau-Thierry, where the Americans held the ground. At C a.m. a vigorous att^^mpt was made r>n Vaux, but it was quicldy repelled by the Americans, who captured the German officer in charge of the operations. On the eastern side of Chateau- Thierry, covered by smoke clouds, the Gernio.ns crossed the Marne by inefiiis of pontoon bridges nt IS iK)ints under the cover of severe artillery fire. The first troops crossed in canvas boats, eacli of which held about SO men, and when a footing had been established on the southern bank they proceeded to lay down pontoon bridges. At first the Americans fell back and IX)uredahailof shell and machine-gun fire, under the effect of wliich bridges were swept away and^ boats sunk. The right bank of the river was somewhat higher than the left, and thus the AUiea troops had little cover from the ground, and it was found difficult to bring up resi^rve ammunition, of which a good deal was necessary owing to the enormous expenditure of shells in witlistanding the attack. The number of bridges thrown by the enemy was six in all. Two of theso were destroyed by tl\e French bombing squadrons. Low clouds somewliat interfered with their work, but, when they could not see the river itself, they bombed the naasses of infantry concentrated in the woods north of Dormans and Fossoy and inflicted heavy casualties. So heavy were the losses that a message taken from one of the enemy's carrier pigeons which fell into our hands described the passage of the river as " worse than hell." However, they did succeed in crossing and drove our advanced posts a little back, but later in the day a counter-attack of the Americans drove them in turn on to the river bank and in many places back over it. To the south of Dormans the fighting was particularly severe round the villages of 'Reuilly, Courthi6zy, and Vassy, and also north of the river from Chatillon-sur-Marne to- Bouilly. Here were stationed some of the Italians fighting with the Allies, and these, with the French immediately on their right on the western slopes of the Montagne-de-Reims, on a front nmning from Bouilly to Marfaus. and then west to Cuchory, to which they had with- drawn from the front line of posts, held firmly- to this line. I'rcmh o/Jicia! phoiog.aph. THE MARKET-PLACE, EPERNAY. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 89 The extreme points reached south of the river were St. Agiiau and La Chapj'lle-Mon- thodon on. the road whicli runs on to Coude, but no further progress was made beyond these points. More to t^le east, on tho north side of the Marne near Chatillon, the enemy got no farther than the forest of Rodemat. It will thus be seen that west of Reims the advance had produced no great results and was indeed limited to a point in the direction of Condi', and the hridge-head (the river here was about SO yards broad) thus gained was not extended enough to cover any large number of troops, nor to allow them to deploy from it to capture more ground on the left bank <jf the river. On the east the success was even smaller, for, v.'ith the exception of the capture of tho heights round Moronvilliers, that old point of contest, the Germans had gained nothing of moment. Fourteen German divisions ajipear to have been engaged on the west side of Reims and about the same number in reserve. Documents captiire.l show ttiat the enemy had jneant to reach the line P^pemay-Montmirail on the first d.iy, and on the second day Chalons. The airmen played a considerable part in tliis battle. They kept up a constant supply of information as to the points at v/hich the enem.y were tryi.ig to cross the Marne, in spite of the clouds of smoke with which the Germans tried to conceal their movements, and they helped greatly by boinbing collections of troops and spraying them with macliine-gim fire. The Gorinan report of the fighting does not differ much from that given by our own side. They claim to have taken 13,000 prisoners, but that was a gross exaggeration. Naturally where they overran the advanced machine-gun posts they captured some, but nothing like the number they claim ; nor did they take many weapons ; east of Reims, GSeneral Gouraud's men did not lose a single gun. During the night the fighting was intermittent, and in some places of extraordinary violence, the enemy attempting to push on south of Dormans, but they only succeeded in reaching tjie southern edge of the forest at Bouquigny, and the French maintained their hold on Mareuil on the high ground behind it. On the second day of the battle General Gouraud issued the following Order to his Army ■- — " During the 15th you have broken the efforts of 15 German divisions, supported by 10 others. According to their orders they should have reached tho Marne by the evening, but you stopped them dead in the position from which we had determined to give battle, and we have gained it. You have the right to bo proud, infantry and machine-gunners of the advanced posts, and you aviators, who flew over the ON THK CHEMIN DES DAMES: A FRENCH lELEPHONE STATION. enemy, battalions and batteries which have crushed them, and the staff which prepared with such care the field of battle. It is a hard blow for the enemy and a great day for France. I know you will always do the same, every time that the enemy dares to attack you. As a soldier I thank you from my heart." On July 16 the fighting was uneventful. The Germans made several attempts but made scarcely any gain. On the eastern side of Reims, five separate attacks were made on Gouraud's army. Between the Vesle and the Suippe, the first assault was delivered at 10 a.m. and a second at 1.15 p.m. ; both were repulsed with loss. To the east and the south they attacked three times, and on each occa-sion were repulsed in disorder. During the morn- ing, after an intensive artillery preparation, an 90 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. important attack was made to the south of Maisons-de-Champagne, but only succeeded in getting through the outpost position at a few points. West of Reims the French regained ground in the hills south of Dormans. The Germans, however, managed to push forward a little farther in the direction of Epernay, reaching the \dllages of Montvoisin and Chene-la-Reine, but were driven out by counter-attacks. Later in the day they came FRENCH AND ITALIAN GUARDS ON A MARNE BRIDGE. on again and took the first -named point. They also made strenuous efforts to drive back the French from the crest of the hills north of St. Agnan and la Chapelle Monthodon, but made but little progress, the Allied main line being firmly held. During the night of July 16-17 a CJerman attack towards Beaumont-sur-Vesle> south of Prunay, was beaten back. On July 17, on a six-mile front towards the Montague de Reims in the wooded country laetween Reims and the Mame, the Germans once more attacked, and, after severe fighting, forced their way forward as far as the villages of Nante and Pourcy, but from the latter point they were driven back into the Ardre valley by the Italians stationed at this part of the line. On the whole the day was favourable to the Allies. The German atteicks were no longer made in force, and consisted of half-hearted local attempts. An important point was that they had been unable to bring up their artillery across the river in any strength to aid a further advance, and the guns were still firing from the positions they had held before the attack commenced. It was evident that the offensive spirit of the Germans was dying out. The flood of the German irruption tide had been reached. The fact that over 50 German divisions should have been used with the usual vigour, not to say recklessness, should have been brought up and their progress stopped in 48 hours, demands some consideration. How was it that on this occasion not even the initial success which had been obtained in March, April, May and June was in any way equalled ? The troops were as good ; they consisted very largely of the special " storm " organizations, carefully trained and wrought up to a high pitch of enthusiasm ; they had been informed that it was the " Peace " assault [Friedenssturm). Even the German papers looked on the coming battle as the beginning of the end, if not the end itself. Thus the Frankfurter Zeitung of July 14, remarking on the coming battle, said " the only doubt on the subject is whether the necessary strategical preparations have been brought to such a point that the next attack wiU be the main blow or whether further pre- paratory battles are necessary for the final success of the campaign." The Kaiser himself had come up to witness the victory (as indeed he had on many previous occasions). Writing from the battleSeld nortJi-eost of Reims on July 17, the well-known correspondent Karl Rosner reported : The Kaiser, who desired to participate in the battle from its very beginning, in the midst of his fighting troops, went on the night of July 14 to the region of the impending fighting and spent the night in an advanced observation post. There he listened to the terrible mneic of our surprise fire attaclc and watched the unparalleled picture of projectiles raging over the enemy position?. A few minutes after our bombardn'-ent, which burst forth at 4.50 a.m., ho had in his hands the first reports of tho good progress made. From then on till nightfall , denying himself even a moment's rest, he remained with his troops, and again all day to-day ho stopped on the battlefield, facing the contested ground, and received the news of the fresh and fine successes on the Mame and to the south-west of Reims. Let us look at tho troops opposed to General Gouraud from Prunay to Massiges. There were the 16th Bavarians, the 3rd Guards, the 26th Division, the Ersatz Division of tho Guard, the 199th Division, the 239th Division, the 1st Division, the Dismounted Guard Cavalry Division, the 2nd Bavarian, the 88th, the 7th THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAT?. 91 [From "lllustrirle Zeilung." THE KAISER ON THE BATTLEFIELD. He is in the act of instructing Hindenburg and Ludendor6f where they should attack. From a painting by Felix Schwormstadt, German official artist. Division and the 33rd Reserve Division, with others in reserve, amounting to 25 in all. They had not against them in the front hne much more than half these numbers, and it was the first lino troops only of the French that were engaged. Reserve corps which were ready if needed were not employed, and yet the German troops were so cut up that they were perfectly incapable of going on beyond the line they occupied at the end of the first 24 hours. The French, on the other hand, suffered but little. A number of their advanced posts were overrun. A certain number of men were taken prisoners and a certain number of machine-guns captured, but there was little else to show for the enormous losses the Grermans had sustained, and not one single gun was captured, showing that they never penetrated any depth into the French •position. The real reasons for the failure were that the French positions were scientifically defended, and their troops better handled and more enthusiastic. Nximerous stories are told of the enormous losses sustained — up to 60 per cent, of many of the units. It was not overcrowding which produced these losses, for the front of attack of each division appears to have been from a mile and a half to two miles. . Nor were dense formations used, for the units wore arranged in line after hne in depth, and all those who led the attack had only been brought on to the front either the night just before the attack or at the most 24 hours earUor. It is quite true that the French -fought splendidly, and so .did tlie Americans who were associated with them towardii the left flank of Gouraud's arnay. The plan of attack of the Germans was most carefully thought out. The right flank of the enemy consisted of two groups imder Lindequist and Gontard, each having three specially trained divisions in the front line intended to push forward obliquely to the "south-west across the Veslo, reach the Mame and envelop Epernay. In conjunction with the Germans operating west of Reims, it would cut off from Dormans the Montagne-de-Reims. In the centre Use's group, consisting of the XII. Corps and the I. Bavarian Corps, pushed straight down on Chalons, while on the left, the 88th and 7tli Divisions with the 33rd Reserve Division were to move obUquely down on St. Menehould and ■ cut the railway line. Judging from various Orders which were captured, the object of the first day was to reach the south of Verzy, Villers Marinery-Livry-sur-Vesle, Bouy, Vasle- nay, Cuperly, la Cheppe, Bussy-le-Chateau-La Croix-en-Champagne, Somme, Bionne, Hans, 92 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Dommartin. The Recond day Reims, Epemay, Chalons were to be captured. It is plain that the idea was to intercept the remaining straight line of railway to Lorraine and to advance the German Une until it straightened out due oast from Chateau -Thierry to Chalons — i.e., to capture the whole of the Marne river line. The most meticulous arrangements had been made for carrying out the advance. Thus, when various localities were captured, the troops were not to occupy them, but to proceed forward, only guarding the issues, and adminis- trative officers were then to arrange for carrying off the booty captiu-ed. No individual pillage was to be permitted. The supply of magazines which was known to exist at Chalons was to be taken over as ^ quickly as possible. Unfortunately this scheme, carefully organized as it was, failed in the most important point. It did not obtain even the smallest success In face of the splendid French resistance it failed, and it was the bravery and resolution of our Ally which brought it to nought. The situation, then, on the evening of July 17 was that on the east of Reims Goviravid had beaten off the army of von Einem and was holding a line roughly that of the Roman road. To the west of Reims, General Berthelot, with whom were some Italian troops, had stopped the advance of Mudra (who about this time seems to have replaced von Bslow) and held a line from Pourcy through the Bois do Courton and the Bois du Roi back to the Marne at Reuil. On his left, on the south side of the Marne, General de Mitry, with his newly formed army, carried on the line to the American troops round Chateau-Thierry. It will be remembered that in front of the forest of Retz the French held a line from the Aisno in front of Villers-Cotterets (Retz Forest) down to the Marne. From the Aisne to the Ourcq^ was Mangin's army, while;, Degoutte's army held the lino from the Ourcq down to Clignon, where he joined on to the Americans, who continued it to Chateau-Thierry. Thus there was a re- entrant line formed by Gouraud, Berthelot and de Mitry on the south side of the angle, Degoutte and Mangin on the side -which ran from it towards the north. Into these pincers the German General Staff had pushed its forces, and they leere now about to reap the -conse- quences. No such favourable opportunity had occurred to the French since September, 1914, when Maunoury, on the flank of Kluck's army. SOME OF THE BOOTY ASSEMBLED AT VILLERS-COTTERETS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. GENERAL GOURAUD. Commanded the French Fourth Army, to which Americans were attached. combined with the frontal attack on the Marne, drove back the Germans to the Aisne. The second battle of the Marne, then, reproduced the main feature of the first, and was destined to bring about the same consequences. Foch was ready, and had waited until the situation floveloped as he hoped. Now he saw his opportunity and proceeded to take full advan- tage of it. On the night of July 17-18 the orders were issued for the counter-attack. The German General Staft had of course understood that an attack might come from- the west against their exposetl flank, and they had thrown up works which extended from Soissons to the south, but although they had' done this, they seem not to have believed that Foch had troops sufficient for any important movement from this direction, nor do they seem to have anticipated the attack at the- time i't wa.s made. It was impossible, however, for the Gfermans not to admit that their own attack hod been 94 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. [French of/rrial photoi{rafh* A LONG COLUMN OF GERMAN PRISONERS ON THE MARNE, held up. The war correspondent of the Vonvarts on July 17 wrote with regard to the operation : Two things aro conspicuous here : first, American infantry are supporting the French troops in their defence ; secondly, the French aro adopting a new method of defence. While in the March, April, and May offensives they stoutly defended their first posi- tions, yesterday they evacuated the ground between their first and second positions almost without, a blow or opposition, and then defended their second line Ktubbornly. This naturally weakened the efieot of the German artillery. These defensive tactics, which the French learned from Hindenburg and which Foeh tried in the recent battles near Compi^gne, will naturally have the result that a new method of attacji must bo Applied, which will not be long delayed. There is no doubt it was a somewhat rude •wakening to the hopes once niore raised of a decisive battle. Von Ardenne in the Berliner TmjehlaU, on July 18, said : It will only be possible to perceive the strategic intentions of the German Army Command from the further course and extension of the battle. . . The victory is as yet no complete one, but tho Homeland has the right to hope that it will become so. The Cologne Oazelle of the same date was of the opinion that The Entente, by its immense propaganda, can keep the entire Continent under the impression that the Kntente is vietorioas. Germany's only antidote is deeds. On this idea retts the decision to start again a fresh, big attack to compel tho Entente finally to admit' that Oenuany is invincibls, ard that the con- tinuation of the fighting can have no other issue for the Fntente than the further loss of land, money, and men. Of course, there were the iisual attempts to discount tlie possibility of an Allied victory. The Vossische Zeitimrj stated : " The new attack was, as a matter of fact, a complete and entire surprise for the enemy. He had taken some steps to deal with it, but he had not established a strong position, nor had he believed that the blow was about to fall, and it came with startling suddenness on him." As a matter of fact, the attack was fully expected by the French, and was not in the least a surprise. Possibly one reason wliy tho Germans thought this was the bad weather. It had been for some little time uncertain. There was rain on July 14, but the next day, when the German attack began, was fine at first, though later a thunderstorm of great severity swept over the north of France. July 16 was again bad weather, and on the night of July 17-18 there was once more severe rain. The counter-stroke of the French was delivered first of all by their left wing on a line some 27 miles rumiing from north to south from Foiiteiioy, north of the Aisne, some six miles west of Soissons, to Belleau, five miles north- west of Chateau-Thierry. A severe THE TIMKS HISTORY OF THE WAR. 95 tiiimdcrstorm and fiirio\is rain favouroil tho operations, for a large number of tanks were employed in it, and tho noise of tlio thunder completely covered their movement to the points of concentration before the aivani*- There was no preliminary bombardment. The surprise was not on the French side, but on tlie German. Especially would it seem that Mangin's concentration had not been observed. Let VIS now examine the object of the French attack in the direction in which it was delivered. As we have seen, the original idea of the Ger- mans in going down to the Mftme was to enlarge the salient they had already made and give thomsolves more ample space for man- ceuvre in the direction of Paris. They seem to have thought that there was no fear of an offensive return from the French, which is merely a tribute to the intelligence which Foch had displayed in carrying out his com- binations. A reference to the rnap shows that as long as Reims held out and thus prevented a flattening forward of the Germans' line, the western front of the salient they created by their advanced movement was always open to attack, and that an attack coming in a very dangerous direction, for it struck right acrjas the linos of supply down to tho Marne and also tlu«atened two main lines of railroad — the one from Oulchy beuik through Bazoches, while an ailvauce beyond Soissons struck at the junction of railways jr.st east of that town which led up to the north and also to the east. It successful, tlie Ger- nians were bound to retreat behind the Aisne, because the advance eastwards past Soissons threatened tho whole of the roads used for supply from tho north towarfls tho south, and, in addition, endangered the railroads which, gathering together near Soissons, formed the main supply linos of the Germans. It seems incredible that the Gorman Supreme Conmiand should have run the great risk they did in such a light -hearted fashion, and it would be entirely incredible liad it not been a fact that they had committed precisely the same error in the autumn of 1014. The country over which the advance took place can be considered in two parts : tliat to the north of the Oiu:cq, and that to the south of that river. North of the Ourcq the ground ;a comparatively clear of wood, and with only gentle undulations : it was country extremely well suited for the action of tanits. South of /■Vf-vtr/i ojii-tai pkoivgtapit. FEEDING A GROUP OF GERMAN PRISONERS. .9ii THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the Ourcq the (jround is much more cut up by small streams, big roads and railroads. The Aisne itself ruHS through a steepish valley, and is a difficult river to cross except at per- manent bridges owing to the steepness of its banks. It was on this fact that Napoleon dejiended so much in 1811, and tho defection of Moreau, who yielded up Soissons without an effort, enabled Bliicher to escape across the river and join on to the Russians coming down through Belgium. Nesir Soissons, about a couple of miles to the south-west, is a Ml known as the Montagne de Paris, which not only dominates the town, but also enables ai-tillery fire to be brought upon the railway junotion to the east of it. These considerations show that the first elfort of the French would evidently be directed along tho ground imnie- diately close to Soissons — that is to say, at the northern extremity of the attack ; and it is striking proof not only of generalship, but also of the fighting capacity of the French soldiers, that at the outset ol the battle this position was cairied almost at a rush. At 4.35 a.m. on July 18 all was ready for the advance, and the artillery fire opened. It was a complete surprise to the enemy — in fact, the most complete surprise that had happened in tho whole course of the war. The •Germans were quietly resting in fancied security when the assault fell on them like a whirlwind. A heavy moving barrage was put down ; behind it came the tanks, and on their heels the infantry, and at first there was hardly any opposition. Village after village was captured. In the neighbourhood of Soissons the hill ground which dominated the town was occupied, including the Montagne de Paris. Berzy-le- Sec was captured by cavalry ; and the horse- men even got across the Soissons-Chateau- Thierry road, making it impossible for tho enemy to use it. In this fighting one French regiment with colours flying charged the enemy with the bayonet, singing the "Chant du Depart," and east of Donmiiers a mixed regi- ment of Zouaves and Tirailleurs Indigenes swept on through the German positions, cap- tured 1,500 prisoners, and, going on, met and defeated a column of German supports, drove it before them and reached Chaudun, having penetrated to a distance of five miles. Chaudun, Vierzy, Villers-Helon, Noroy-sur- Ourcq, Chouy were taken. Behind Chouy, the wood called Buisson-de-Cresnes, on the edge of the VillersCotterets forest, which was strongly held by machine-gun detachments, held out after the general line of battle had passed on beyond it. About 10 a.m. a unit of American infantry was brought up to clear it out. They did this and killed and wounded the whole IN TORCY. il-i Click ojlicial pf;olo£raph. . THE TIMES HH^TORY Of THE WAR. 97 OULCHY-LE garrison except 29, whom they brought in as ■prisoners. On the south of the river by 9 o'clock the line was pushed forward to Haute- vesnes-Bussiares-Courchamps ; all along the •lino of the French attack many prisoners were taken. The Americans, too, made rapid pro- gress. The attack commencing about 5 a.m., Torcy was taken in 15 minutes, Belleau fell at 8 20 and Givry was also captured, and. the advance continued. The point of junction of "the French and American troops appears to "have been Courchamps, and hero 18 guns were • captured. In some cases prisoners were sur- prised when resting asleep in their dug-outs, and men were caught setting out to harvest the •rye crops. The cavalry also took a part in the •advance, for the opportunity was a favourable one, the Germans falling back withovit offering much resistance. By 7 o'clock in the morning the weather cleared \ip, and this enabled the French heavy guns to bring a good deal of fire -to bear on the rear areas of the German posi- tions, carrying confusion among the German reserves and their supply and ammunition trains. ^V'hile this severe counter-stroke was being •delivered against the Gei-man flank, the direct advance of the Allied troops from Chateau- Thierry was not neglected, and the pressure thus exercised, combined with the more active attack, sufficed to reverse the whole German .position. Instead of advancing, they now began to retreat. Von Mudra fell back from «the wood of Courton and on the Ardre, where J-nn^ h oijw lui photograph. ■CHATEAU. the mill fell to the Italians. Von Boelm, who, it will be remembered, had part of hLs troops on the south of the Marne, abandoned Mont- voisin and retired to the borders of Oeuilly, probably with a view to covering the bridge over the re-entrant angle of the Marne there. Higher up, the Allies attacked near La Poterno and Pourcy and forced the Germans back for over 1,000 yards. Here the Italians fought with the French, and between them they took nearly 500 prisoners and captured some guns. During the night the Germans made an attempt at a counter-stroke, chiefly in the region of Oulchy-le-Cha'eau, bringing up for the purpose numerous reserves, but very little success was gained, and, generally speaking, the French held the line they had captured. All along the line the progress was extremely rapid, so much so that in many cases guns were taken before the gunners appreciated that the French were on them. When night fell, the advance of the French left averaged over five miles and on the south over one. Soissons was dominated, the lines of rail leading from it were under French artillery fire, and far away to the rear the roads by which food and ammunition were being brought up to the advanced Gferman troops were under such fire as to render those near the front of the French left wing almost useless. It is not to be wondered at that the Germans at once began their retreat to the Aisne. July 19 saw a continuance of the victorious movement. The Grermans brought up supports 98 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. to stop Mangin's progress, but in vain. They woro thrown back, and the French left con- solidated its position in the neighbourhood of Soissons, while Mangin's right moved forward a mile and a half east of the line Villers-Helon- Xoroy. Jlore to the south Licy-Clignon was captured, while in the centre Neuilly-St. Front was taken And a considerable advance made CHATEAU-THIERRY : RUE. LA GRANDE from Oulchy-le-Chateau and towards Fere-en- Tardenois. The enemy's retreat still .went on, and along the whole 80 miles of battle-front from the Aisne to Massiges they were being pressed by the Allies. They were driven back on the west of Reims, while General Gouraud on the right riveted their troops to the ground they held. General Degoutte reached the line Neuilly-St. Front-Courchamps. To the north-east of Baisleux in the direction of Reims British troops of the 51st and (J"2nd Divisions* of the XXII. Corps wore employed on both pides of the Ardre in conjunction with French divisions on the left and right of them. The position here was occupied in great strength by the Germans, as it was necvssary to hold it to guard the left flank of their retreat from the Mame to give time for tlicir troops in the centre to retire. The ground near the river was open, with steep wooded slopes at the sides. Numerous villages and hamlets, for the most part intact, gave excellent cover to the enemy, Ihe British arrived on July 19, expecting at first to be on the defensive, but the general • Tho other two divisions of the XXII. Coips were with Hvigin'g force on the left. attack of the French changed the situation, and it was necessary to press onward against the left flank of the retreating enemy. They took up for tho evem'ng a position in the woo.ls on tho west slope of tho Montajne-de-Reims behind the Italian division holding the Allied line at this point. The next day they advanced to the attack. The 51st Division made good progress and reached the western edge of the Courton Wood south of Nappes, the (i2nd Division being on their right. The resistance offered was very vigorous, and they were unable to advance beyond a lino some .oOO yards short of Marfaux between the Courton. and Reims woods. On the other side, the right half of the latter division took Courmas and also Bouilly, a little more to the north, capturing 500 prisoners. The advance was continued on July 21, when the 51st Division captured Nappes and the Yorkshiremen occupied Bouilly The progress on this day was somewhat slowed down, as the Germans were receiving reinforcements and were fighting har.i to cover the retreat of their troops from the Marne, but still sonie advance was made, and in the evening the general line was advanced as far as Ploisy Parcy-Tigny-St. Remy-Blanzy-Rozet-St. Albin- Priez, north-east of Courchamps. On the right of Degoutte, the Americans had won the higher ground of Etr^pilly north of Chat-eau- Thierry, and thus dominated the line of retreat of the Germans from this point. This position forced the .eaerny to abandon this town during the night of July 20-21. Bert helot also made progress between Reims and the Marne, and by this date over 20,000 prisoners had been taken, with more than 400 guns. Eight German divisions had been compelled to retreat behind the !Marne, and a much larger force in reserve had been driven back on an average depth of between five and six miles along a front of more than 20 miles. Large quantities of stores hao been captured and very heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy. A good proportion of these was due to the fact that the Germans experienced gn.'at difficulty in retiring across the river. The temporary bridges which they constructed were constantly shot away, and, practically, tho troops on the left bank of the river hafl uotliing but mountain artillery to support them, for the wheeled guns had been unable to cross to help them. The retreat of the enemy retiring from Dormans in the direction of Reims was not only menaced by the French and American} THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 9'J follo\ring them up directly, but the position of the British flivisions on the left flank of tlio German force threatened them with further disaster When the Germans retreated from Chateau- Thierry they completely sacked the town ; such inhabitants as wer& in it who were not hidden in collars were forced into the church and kept there duriag the night, and when they emerged later on, they saw the wagons laden with the spoils of their houses being taken back by the enemy. But this was not all. The town had been in posses'iion of the Germais for some weeks ; when they saw they were about to bo turned out, they proceeded to carry out their n»ual vile practices, carting off all they could, destroying all they could not. In the larger houses and mansions everything was destroyed. Tapestries were hacked to pieces, pictures slit from corner to comer, the leather and other chair coverings ripped from their frames, all the delicate marqueterie and the irreplticeable examples of the crafts- manship of past centuries smashed. Legs were torn off tables and used to further the work of destruction. There was not a mirror which THE FATAL MARNE : THE SECOND DISASTROUS CROSSING BY THE GERMANS. 100 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. had not been broken ; the glass and cliiiia filing at them were lying in pieces on the floor beneath them. Statues and .statuettes in marble and ivory were dismembered with hammers, and a pickaxe was used to destroy a wonderful grand piano, which must have cost hundreds of pounds. In one house a valuable collection of books was torn to pieces or their bindings ripped off. Vengeful fury had been carried even to the extent of smashing the nurseries and dolls' houses. The dolls were trampled on and torn to pieces, a rocking-horse was cleft with an axe, cradles were flung out of the windows, and all drawers and cupboards were ransacked and their contents ripped up, burned, or besmirched in a manner worthy of loathsome lunatics.* The retreating troops were followed up by French ca\-alry and armoured cars. The rapid retreat of the Germans was due to the fact that they had placed themselves in a position in which the slightest interruption of a victorious offensive brought them within measurable distance of dLsaster. General Foch had brought about the great object of strategy, concentration of superior numbers at the • Taken chiefly from Renter's telegram published in the Mominri Foat cf July 29, 1918. decisive point. General Gouraud's determinedi defence on the eastern side of Reims had stopped the German advance there. This had reduced their forward movement on the western side of Reims to a comparatively feeble effort with no great vitality in it. The line of the Marne, if not completely held, had at any rate afforded so much resistance as to take the " go " out of the German forces, and exactly at the moment when this object was attained the counter-attack was delivered by INIangin and Degoutte in the most favourable direction,, parallel to the German lines of advance, which ran north and south from the Aisne to the Martie along the roads. The railways ran east and west, and their utility for the forward' movement was therefore very limited. Some portion of the success was doubtless duo to the free use of tanks, to which the nature- of the ground over which Mangin's force especially advanced, was very suitable ; particu- larly was the part played by the new light French tanks of great importance. The French; like ourselves, had found that a lighter and more rapid machine was a desideratum, and the- Renault car was the outcome (see fig.) It differed materially from our light tank inasmuch as it only contained one weapon, either a [French official photos tipK A GERMAN BARRICADE IN THE RUE CARNOT. CHATEAU-THIERRY. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 101 machine-giin or one of the automatic 37 mm., or occasionally a 75.* The car itself had the form of a long and narrow box, from which rose a species of turret. This, in the case of the care armed with the machine-gun or 37 mm., was capable of revolution. When the armament was of the field-gun type, it was fixed. The car or tank was about 13 feet long and 5 feet 6 inches wide and about 6 feet 8 inches high, constructed of a special resisting steel which varied in Movable Turret,_ Gunner. Machine Gun— Change-Speed Le\/er^ Steering Leyer-^ Entrance s hollow or trench. The tank manrpuvred with great facility and wa.s capable of revolving on its own centre. Its total weight was alx)Ut 7 tons and on level ground it attained a speed of 6 J miles. It could climb up a slope of 50 degrees and run through 2 feet inches of water. It was capable of flattening out wire entanglement, and could boat its way through a Id-inch brick wall. By this time, too, the French bad their uew Emergency Door ' ^Petrol Reservoir l/entilator-- -Radiator , Motor Change Speed Gear Brake Pedal ^^Starting Handle DIAGRAMMATIC SECTION OF A FRENCH LIGHT s Oil Reservoir Fly Witeel and principal Qotch Steering Clutch and Bralte (OR "MOSQUITO") TANK. thickness from about one-quarter to six-tenths of an inch, sufficient to stop bullets and splinters of shells of small calibre. The turret itself was originally formed in the same manner, but in the latest patterns was maflo of a special cast steel. The crew consisted of two men, one sitting in the front part of the tank, guiding it, while behind him was the gunner who sat on a higher level. The gun projected out of the turret over that portion of the tank where the steerer sat. The motor was in the rear part of the tank, and was divided from the front part by a parti- tion. The driving method used was two caterpillar chains, one on either side of the car, wliich could be independently driven for steering purposes. The tanks were rested on the cater- pillar chain by two liogies. The system of movement was analogous to that which the Germans employetl in their large tanks described in Vol. XVI II, pp. 47 and 49. To facilitate the passage over ditches or trenches, there was a tail in the shape of a broad flat ^pade attached to the rear part, so that the end of the tank would not drop down when crossing ovei- a ♦The 37 mm. a shell weighed about 1 Ih., the '75, 16 lbs. arrangement of artillerie (V accompagnenienl — i.e., artillery specially told off to accompany the infantry attack — which was composed of auto- matic 37 mm. guns or the new Joulandeau- Deslandre, a lighter weapon which fired a similar shell to the 37 mm. But the great point in the success was strategical, for so soon as the road from Soissons to Chateau-Thierry was dominated an impor- tant line of communications was interrupted by the Allies, and roads farther back had to be made use of by the Germans. Thus the western- most troops of the enemy were, as the French advanced, perpetually threatened with being cut off. The failure to beat Gouraud made the German advance insecu-e. They made desperate efforts during July 19 and 20 by counter-attacks to hold back the steady forward movement of Mangin and Degoutto with his Americans, but the position was getting every moment more difficult because, from July 20, when Chateau -Thierry was taken, the retreat from the Mame became necessary, while on the right flank the British troops, acting in cbnjimction with Berthelot's 10-2 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BRIDGE AT CHATEAU {French official photograph, THIERRY DESTROYED BY THE GERMANS IN THEIR RETREAT, army, struck towards the left rear of the German forces engaged in the Marne attack. On July 21 further progress was inade, and by the evening the Allied line ran from north- west to south-east beyond La Croix-Grissolles- Bezu-St. Germain down to the Marne at Mont St. Pere east of Chateau -Thierry. Opposed to HOW THE FRENCH SCALED THE • BROKEN BRIDGE. thom were the rearguards of von Boehn and von Below, their object being to stave off the French attack and give time for the with- drawal of the artillery and supplies beyond the Vesle. Majigin's left was somewhat behind ; he held BeJleii ami Bu/.ancy, but his centre was at Hartin and Taux, so that the Soissons- Chateau-Thierry road was held down to this point, and liis troops were also at Le Plessier- Huleu. Degoutte, south of the Ourcq, was on the Chateau-Thierry road in front of La Croix and Grissolles, while the two American Divisions held Be/.u-St. Germain-Epieds down to Charteves on the Marne. Berthelot's army, which had followed ' up over the Aisne, and was in a position roughly from Chatillon by Baslieux to the foi-est of Conrton with the Italian Division and Godley's force on the Ardre was attacked in great force, Berthelot held his own, and Godley made some progress tip the Ardre, taking St. Euphraise with his right and part of the Bois do Reims with his centre, but on the left the British were held up about Mai-faux. Later in the day they com- pleted the capture of the Bois de Reims and, as already narrated, took Bouilly and advanced in the valley of the Ardre towards Bligny and Cliaumuzy.* The Germans were now clearing out as fast as they could from the too-advanced positions into which they had been thrust, losing heavily in prisoners, guns and munitions. * According to Field -Marshal Haig's dispatch Marfaux was not tak(*n until tho 23rd. Apparently, therefore, the British Divisions advanced on tho north-cai^t side of the Pourcy-Chanibucy road. There was probably nothing but a small rearguard force of Gcmians in Marfaux, which was neglected. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 103 On July 22 the advance was continued. Mangiii's right wing pushed on as far as Montgrii on the Ourcij ; wliile, south of tlie river, Degoutte captured tlio Cliatelet wood and arrived at Brecy, wliile on the south the Americans captured Jaiilgonne. But there was still a good deal of resisting power in the Germans opposite Degoutte's centre, and, lato in the afternoon, they re-captured from him Epieds. On the right of the Allied attack, the French, Italians and British pressed forward about three-quarters of a mile in the Vrigny ilirection, thus still more threatening tlie retreat of the Germans. The French also crossed the Mame at Chassins and Passy, near Dormans, and on the east of Reims General Goiiraud moved for- ward and re-occupio'.l all his old positions between the Suippe and Massiges. It is interesting to note the German view of the last few days' fighting. Their official i-eport runs as follows : " Between the Aisne and the M.T.rne the battle continues with undiminished violence ; in spite of his heavy defeat on July 20, the enemy, bringing into action fresh divisions and tanks, again advanced and violently attacked our lines. His assaults broke down. Prisoners confirm the enemy's heavy losses. Yesterday's fighting [i.e., July 21] again resulted in a complete success for the German arms. Between the ^Visne and the south-west of Hartennes, in the early morning, the strongest drum-fire preceded infantry attacks by the enemy. South-west of Soissons and of Htwtennes they broke down in front of our lines. North of Villemontoire some of the enemy pushed forward tem- porarily over the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry road. Our counter-attack completely threw them Viack again. Villemontoire and Tigny were also foci of the battle, which o>ir counter- attacks brought to a favourable conclusion In the evening renewed enemy attacks south- west of Soissons were checked at their starting point — where they were carried forward they broke down with heavy losses. On both sides of the Oiircq, in the forenoon, the enemy in vain freijuently advanced against our lines. After bringing up fresh forces, he returned to the attack in the afternoon. After heavy fighting the enemy's assault on both sides of Oulchy- le-Chateau was defeated by counter-attacks- North and north-east of Chateau-Thierry our detachments which had been left in the fore- field hindered the approach of the enemy to our now lines. It was not till the evening that he succeeded in launching strong attacks here, which broke down with heavy losses." A more complete travesty of what actually occurred it would be impossible to write. If the Gonnan account were correct, no Allied gains had been made at all, whereas we know they had been very considerable. The position of the enemy on the main field of battle was now, a dangerous one. On their GENERAL BERTHELOT. Commanded the Fifth French Army. right flank they had the armi§3 of Mangin and Degoutte. On their left were French, British and Italian divisions. They were being followed up straight by de Mitry's and Berthelot's men, while on the eastern side of Reims they were held by Gouraud. They were Vjringing up reserves to help to stay the retreat, but ditl not succeed in doing more than slow down the rate of progress of their opponents. Up to this date the Allies had taken over 20,000 prisoners and 400 guns. On July 2.3, Degoutte, south of the Ourcq, reached Brecy and American troops north of Jaulgonne took Epieds and entered the forest. De Mitry's troops, crossing the Mame, were moving up north. Beyond these movements there was little to record on this date. The enemy's counter-attacks, which he had delivered the day before, seemed to have exhausted liim ; the weather was very hot ; all the troops on both sides had now been fighting without 104 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. MACHINE-GUN DRILL, IN GAS t cessation for six days. Still the Germans continued to hang on to Oulchy, which was an important point on the railroad back to Fcre- en-Tardenois. On July 24 the Allies continued to press the retreating enemy. During the previous night there was considerable artillery activity in the Court<5n and Roi woods, and about 9 o'clock in the evening the Germans made a counter- attack in the neighbourhood of Vrigny, but this was easily beaten off, and the French held their positions. Between the Ourcq and near to the first-named river, the French renewed their attacks, which were successful throughout the day. South of Armentieres, Br6cy and the Chatelet Wood were captured. The French and American troops advanced some two miles in the region of Epieds and Trugny, and Epieds, which had been recaptured by the Germans in the evening of July 23, fell once more into American hands. The advance was continued beyond Courpoil. To the south of this considerable progress was made in the forest of Fere north of Chartevfcs and Jaulgonne, while ground was gained in front of Tr^loup and Domians and the southern comer of the forest of Ris was taken by de, Mitry's troops. Considerable booty was also captured, including five 15 cm. guns, about [Offiiial photograph. MASKS. BEHIND THE LINES. 50 machine-guns and a considerable amount of material. Between the Mame and Reims there was not much more than artillery action nor was any progress made beyond the points reached the day before. In the north despite the vigorous resistance of the Germans, who felt how vital it was to hold back the French advancing along the south bank of the Aisne, Mangin's troops carried the village of Ville- montoire, and Oulchy was also captured. Thus the road down from Soissons to Chateau-Thierry was completely in the hands of the French. By the 21st the development of the situation had forced the German Press to change its tone somewhat. The Vorwarts stated : — There ie no doubt that we are approaching new and energetic attempts on the part of the Entente to regain the initiative, possibly on otlier fronts also. Even on this occasion, Foch's ultimate aim was not gain of ground but the disturbance of German plans as a whole. It mast remain our main BAW. not to allow the initiative to be wrested from us and not to sacrifice troops uselessly, but to k^ep in view with strong nerves the military aini once it is recognised as right. Unless all signs are deceptive, the decisive pha,se of the world war, which both adver- saries are seeking with all the means at their disposal, is beginning. 7he victories hitherto attained in attack and defencg justify the Gorman people in further strong hopes. On the other hand, these days and weeks which the Western front is now passing through are well calculated to bring to reason those who pictured the German summer campaign of 191 S as a grandiose military THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 105 pronienarle, at tho end of which wiw the unintorrupt«d annihilation of tho enemy. Despite all her victories, Germany is still as over fiphtini; against material and mimorical .'Miperiority. Therefore, the military initiative miiit every day be fouRht for and obtained anew, and the hydra heads of tho Entente reserves daily struck off. All our victories are the victories of a defender. This is a somewhat different view to that which had brouglit the Kaiser down to see the victorious onsweep of his troops towards their goal. The egregious von Ardenne indulged in some of his cryptic and platitudinous utterances : — That commander will ultimately win the game •who still has the best trumps finally in hand. Both .\rmy Commands will, therefore. endeaVonr confidentially commimicated its intention beforehand. The object which the forcing of tho Mame had in view was attained, and, therefore, it did not appear dangorou;* to retreat locally in order to save losses which seemed unnecessary. It does not explain what had been the object of crossing the river ; apparently it was to advance at great cost and be beaten back at greater. It is impossible not to contrast these very much quieter lucubrations with the arrogant ai-dour which characterized the GSerman utter- ances during the earlier period of the great offensive. The detailed historv of the recent French ogiciul photograph. FRENCH ENGINEERS REPAIRING A MINED ROAD. to concentrate as many troops and guns as possible on the decisive point, which momentarily remains between the Aisne and the Marne. The German Army Command, therefore, has resolved on a step which cannot have been ?asy for it. It has voluntarily given up the territory south of the Marne, so bravely fought for and so toughly held from .I\i!y 15 to 19, and in the night of July 20 withdrew the troops there, unmolested by the enemy, to the northern bank. The enemy will jubilate about this and reverence the Marne even more than hitherto as their "sacred river." The strategic move of the German Army Command has, however, its full justifica- tion, and its effect will soon make itself felt. The Cologne Gazette of July 21 informed its readers : — The withdrawal of our troops to the northern bank of the Mame came as no surprise to well-informed circles, because the Supreme Army Command had fighting shows a distinct falling off in the moral of the German troops and a less decided handling by their leaders, whereas with the Allied troops there was a complete confidence which the rude trials of the previous month had in no wise diminished. A not unimportant item among the factors which led to this mental condition was the ever-increasing supremacy of the Allied airmen. The long- distance raids into Gennany were beginning to tell, and the fact that both on the battlefield and in the areas immediately behind it our aviators were constantly harassing the German troops on the march and in bivouac, constantly 106 THE T1MB:S HlbTORY OF THE WAR. bombing troops iiiarcliing to the front and the columns of supply for their maintenance. The tide ^yas indeed begitming to turn. The mastery obtained by our aviators enabled the air forces to carry on their work of observation and photographing in a way which was quite impossible for the enemy to eqvial, and enormously added to the efficacy of our artillery fire. . Numerically we were far superior in the air, and the number of machines FLIGHT-LIEU I . QUENTLN ROOSEVELT Killed in aerial combat, July 17, 1918. employed, the number of raids made and the amount of bombs dropped was far in excess of the German performance. The most striking point of all was perhaps that the fighting in the air was habitually carried on behind the Gennan lines, which meant that the German aviators did not care to advance beyond the security afforded by their anti-aircraft service. On the night of July 11/12, and again in daylight on July 12, sviocessful distant raids were made against enemy aerodromes, and on the last date the railway sidings at Saarburg were attacked, all our machines returning in safety. Then came a few days of bad weather, which prevented the distant work, and espe- cially damped down the ardour of the enemy. On July 14 we accounted for 16 of the enemy's machines with a loss of only three to ourselves ; we also dropped 19 tons of bombs on hack areas. In the next two days Offenburg and Thionville were successfully bombed and good biirsts were pbserved on each occasion, while all our ma- chines came back without injury. On July 16/17 our aviation service played a brilliant part in the battle, attacking without cessation the Marne bridges, dropping five tons of explosives, and thus hampering the passage of the German troops. The latter, attacked by machine-gun fire and bombs when they were on the northern and southern banks of the river, were constantly compelled to scatter to seek safety. A bridge thrown over the river at Dormans was destroyed, and the waggons which were crossing by it sank in the river. Twenty-one tons of explosives were dropped in these operations, and a further 14 tons during the night. Violent explosipns and fires were caused at the station of Maison Bleue, at Coucy, Les Etapes and Bazoches. Our aviators also accounted for 29 German machines and five captive balloons. During the night of July 16/17 more raids were made into Germany, and works at Hagen- dingen north of Metz and the Burbach works near Saarbriicken were bombed, and also a German aerodrome. During the day on July 17 our machines successfully attacked the railway sidings at Thionville, in all cases without loss. On this day Lieutenant Qiientin Roose- velt, the youngest son of Colonel Roosevelt, was brought down in an aerial combat. He was an able and successful aviator, and his loss was much deplored. The Germans did not do very much in the way of retaliation for ovir aviators' exploits, but they succeeded in bombing a camp of Gennan prisoners, 30 miles from the front near Troyes, killing 94 and wo\inding 74, besides two French guards. The Benz Chemical Works at Mannheim were again the object of attack during the night of July 18/19, as also the station at Heidelberg and the blast furnaces at Burbach and Wad- ga,ssen, near Saarbriicken, in all cases with considerable effect ; also two trains were hit by bombs, brought to a standstill, and then sub- jected to machine-gun fire. The powder factory at Oberndorf, 40 miles south-east of Strassburg, was also attacked, and bursts were observed on various buildings. This was the first time that THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 107 this place and Heidelberg had been the objec- tives of British airmen. About eight. tons of bombs were dropped on the Mons-Valenciennes railroad and six more on the railways at Courtrai, Seclin and Lille. The weather was very bad on this occasion, and two of our machines failed to return. The activity of our air service was con- tinued during July 19 and 20 in the imme- diate area of fighting on the Mame. British and French bombing machines paid special attention to the crossings over the river ; in many cases they hindered progi-ess consider- ably, and in some completely stopped the enemy's supply service, while they attacked with vigour both with machine-guns and bombs the concentration of troops which 'the enemy was preparing for his counter-attacks in the endeavour to stop the advance of the Allies' flank attack. At Oulchy-le-Chateavi, Fere-en-Tardenois, Fismes, Bazoches, and in- deed along the whole rear zone of the battle, 24 tons of bombs were dropped during the day and another 28 tons during the night, thus harassing enormously the enemy's lines of communication and the movements of both troops and convoys. A violent fire broke out at Vouziers, and fires were also seen at Fere, at Fismes, and explosions were noted at I.iaon railway station. Besides all this, British and French low-flying planes fought in close combination with the infantry. On the night of ifuly 21/22 distant attacks were again carried out by the Independent Air Force. The railway sidings at Lunos, south-east of Mezieres, were treated to a ton of bombs. Maiuiheim was again attacked, and the Badische Anilin und Soda B'actory was also attacked, as was a factory south-east of Zweibriicken. Low-flying aeroplanes attacked and hit five trains, bringing them to a stand- still, wliile the anti-aircraft defences of search- lights and guns were also attacked and great damage done to them, and this without any loss to our own men. On July 22 the very important powder factory at Rottweil, on the Neckar, was attacked and a severe explosion catised, a fire breaking out which could be seen 60 miles away, and this without any loss to our own men. This brief account of the aeroplane work will show what a large part it now played in the operations. The air service was becoming more and more an integral portion of the fighting services. The successful counter-stroke of the French was a hard nut for the Glermans to crack, but SAND-BAG PROTECTION FOR AEROPLANES. (Jtticialpholonrr.ph. 108 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. they did their best to explain it away. Thus, the Kdlnische Volkazeitung said : The place and time of Foch\* counter -offensivo wore proscribe<l for him by the measures of tlie German Am^y Command . The 1 ime and place must have appeared «o far favourable to Foch in that his counter- offensive was conducted here against the right flank of the German attack on the Mame at the mon>ent when he might believe that the German reserves were held south of the Mame by his strong counter-attack there immediately before. His attack, which was again carried out with the aid of a very strong squadron of tanks, had the preliminary success which a strong masked offensive thnist usually obtains. Hvon if the attack had been expected by the German Command, the momentary surprise necessarily succeeded locally to a certain extent, so that in some places penetration was possible. But the penetration never amounted to a break-through, this being prevented by the tough resistance of the German troops in the line, and also by the intervention of our reserves, which were not, as Foch perhaps believed, employed on the Marne, but remained at the disposal of the command on this front. . . . The next few days will show whether Foch will continue his counter-offensive or whether it is a passing oplf'ode, leaving no great traces behind. Another excuse, made in a Berlin telegram to the same newspaper, was that the Germans were betrayed by their own troops. We have, now that we know it positively, no ground for concealing the fact that in the ranks of the German troops there were deserters to the enemy who utilized their knowledge of our plans for base treacherv to the Fatherland and their comrades in arms. They informed the enemy of the German plans, and the French in consequence naturally bad a certain advantage. It was also, seeing what had occurred, necessary to look upon the great march on Paris as no longer a certainty. It cannot be the object of every military operation in all circumstances to attain definite ends. The victorious' military operations of thp third week of July aroused various presumptions among the popula- tion not warranted by the actual conditions, not to speak of those who on July J 6 were absolutely certain that Hindenburg would carr\- out an attack on Paris. Our military command is prudent enough, in every case acting after consideration of the actual conditions to attain its decisions. It adds : West of Reims our attack on the ?outhern bank of the Marne had quite a definite object. It was to extend our battle front. The attack succeeded, although the enemy was forewarned. But from all parts of the neighbouring Western front the French Commander drew troops xipon troops to undertake an attack on a grand scale on the Gorman positions, Ke thereby compelled the German trooi>s to make a partial retire- ment. No one can study the record of the war during the month of August without seeing that all along the line from the Yser to the Somme the situation was becoming more and more favourable to the Allies. CHAPTER CCLXXVllI. THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE MARNE: JULY-AUGUST, 191 8. Gebmans in Retreat — Capture of Oulchy-le-Chateau — German Comment — American and British Assistance — The Ourcq Abandoned— ^F6be-en-Tardenois Occupied — French Reach the Crise — SoissoNS Captured — Retreat Beyond the Vesle — Americans take Fismes — German Withdrawals in Somme and Anore Areas — Minor Actions — FicHTiNa in the Air — Marshal Foch's Plans — Haig's Offensive Opens, August 8, 1918 — His Dispositions — Results of the First two Days. ON July 25, 1918, General Gouraud advancing some 1,000 yavds on a front of 13J miles beyond the line St. Hilaire-le-Grand-Souain-Mesnil, regained the wliole of the Main-de-Massiges and reoccupied the positions which had been held before the German advance of July 1.5. In this operation 1,100 prisoners, 200 machine- guns and seven guns were taken. On the other extremity of the French line Mangin occupied a line from the west of Sois- sons to the east of Oulchy-le-Chateau, having retaken during the day Villemontoire and captured Oulchy-la-Ville and Oulchy-le-Cha- teau. The fighting at Villemontoire was very violent, the numerous grotto houses in the sides of the hill forming strong points from which it was difficult to drive the Germans. The German resistance was now beginning to stiffen up. A new Cierman army under von Eben was thrust in between the armies of von Hiitier and von Boehn, and other divisions were hurried up until thirty were added to the original thirty which had been engaged between Chateau -Thierry and the Argonne ; of these at least forty were on the portion of the field between Soissons and Reims. At each ex- tremity of the French line on the western side of Reims the Germans were making desperate efforts to maintain their ground. Counter- Vol. XIX.— Part 238. attacks were made and two small successes were obtained about Vrigny, while on the Sois- sons-Chateau-Thierry road the railway station of Le Plessier-Hulen was retaken by the Ger- mans. But all these gains were of no real utility, as they were soon submerged beneath the ever-flowing tide of French success. Still, the additional forces employed and the energy with which they were used made the advance of the AlHes moi'e difficult. Especially was this the case north of the Ourcq. Here an advance of Mangin's troops along the Aisne had to be held off to save that portion of the troops which had been engaged in the German thrust towards the Marne. It was also difficult for the French, because from the lieights on the northern side of the Aisne their troops advancing south of it along the river could be taken in flank. The forward movement of the Freiicli south of the Ourcq on the previous day had been very vigorous, but had been held on the left near the river by German artillery near Nanteuil-notre-Dame and Bruyeres ; these positions were evidently clung to so as to hold back the French from Fereen-Tardenois. which was an important railway station on the German line of commu- nications. More to the south, however, the opposition was not so gi'eat, and they expe- rienced but little artillery fire, which showed 109 110 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Ill tliat tlu> German guns were being moved baek- wards for fear of capture. Fere-en-Tardenois )iad been under distant artillery fire for the last two or tlu-ec days, and it was evident that this point was also being abandoned, as largo fires from burning stores were clearly seen ; other depots near Oulchy-lo-Chateau were also fired. The advance was now being opposed almost entirely by squads of machine-guns, carefully ensconced in holes or in the borders of wootls and sometimes up in trees. Their capture involved delay, for to have carried them directly would have resulted in heavy losses, and it was therefore necessary to outflank them and take them in rear. This was done, but it naturally slowed the rate of the forward movement. The untouched chareicter of the woods in this district was a great advantage to the Germans, as they afforded cover from aeroplanes and also good rearguard positions. As the villages were retaken, the usual tales of brvitality, pillage, and violence were recounted by the few in- habitants. Such acts as these did not tend to make the troops when they captured Germans merciful in their treatment of them. On the south of the Ourcq Degoutte's ai-my with the Americans crossed the Nanteuil brook, taking the village of Coincy, and the greater part of the Tournelle wood, advancing through the Fere Forest up to a line extending from I.«-Charmel to Beuvardes. De Mitry's army continued in part on the south side of the Marne between Reuil and Dormans, while part of his troops penetrated into the forest of Riz, thus making a line in connexion with Degoutte. The Germans delivered a strong counter-attack in the region of Dormans, and succeeded in occupying for a time a small wood about a mile north of Tr^loup, and also the ^'illage of Chassins, but they were speedily driven out by a counter attack ; while farther east, Berthelot, fighting hard, pushed up both sides of the upper valley of the Ardre, especi- ally between St. Euphraise and Vrigny. It was at tliis point that the Italians were acting with the French of Berthelot's army. This attack, protected by General Gouraud's advance on the east of Reims, was becoming very dangerous to the left flank of the German wedge. Up in the north the Germans were holding tight to the lines which ran frorn Ville- montoire to the Aisne. Especially important for them was it to cover the railway over that river which they had constructed between Missy- sxir-Aisne and Sermoise, to connect the single line running along the north bank of the Aisne with the double line on the south bank going to Reims, which greatly facilitated the bringing up of supplies to the great dep6t at Fismes. This point was situated in the centre of the country into which the irruption of the Gonnans had taken place, and it was therefore a fairly easy task to supply the troops from it by wheeled carriage, the most distant point being hardly 10 miles from it, but once Fisme.* GENERAL VON EBEN. Commanded a German Army on the Marne. were lost, road transport liad to be used right back to the Aisne. It will be seen, therefore, how important for the supply of the Gennan troops was the railroad which led from Oulchy baek by Fere-en-Tardenois through Bazoches and thence towards Reims, while the line from Bazoches to Sermoise across the Aisne, which enabled this line to be fed, was also of great moment to them. The ill-considered move- ment of the enemy had led to liis thrusting out forces which were in themselves insufficient for defence when vigorously attacked, and the consequence was that, to save these troops from disaster, large reinforcements had to be brought in. This involved an overcrowding of the area, because, while the exhausted troops had to be "relieved, others had to take up the defensive to cover their retreat, anfl the conse- quence was that the roads were occupied by the marching to and fro of men and by long 238-2 112 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. IFraick official photograph. PRESIDENT POINCARE AT GHATEAU-THIERRY. supply columns. These were particularly open to attack from the air, and the Allied aviators acted vigorously against them. The capture of Oulchy-le -Chateau was of great moment, as it dominated the crossing of the Ourcq along the Chateau-Thierry road and closed the river valley and the rojd going from the west towards Fere. It had, moreover, been one of the German advanced depots, although not so important as Fere, where many roads met, which, radiating out, served to supply the German forces from Chateau-Thierry to Chatillon-siu'-Mame. The situation of the German advanced troops was becoming more and more hazardous. The whole country from the front back as far as the valley of the Vesle was now coining under French artillery fire, which rendered their road communications, .at no time very good, still more precarious. Fresh fires and ex- plosion-s were seen, which showed that they began to appreciate that " the battle to win peace " was not going in their favour. Gradu- ally the Allied troops were converging on Fere, and it could not be long before it fell into their hands. Notwithstanding the many counter-attacks made by the Germans the position of the Allies on the western side of the German salient continued to improve. They were now within four miles of Fere-en-Tardenois, and a considerable advance had been made through the forest of Fere and the Forest of Riz, and more to thei east the troops were still advancing. From Epornay the enemy had withdrawn and Reuil had been abandoned. The capture of Chateau-Thierry made this town valuable as a supply centre for the French troops, which greatly facilitated their progress. On the other hand, the fact that Fere-en-Tardenois was practically useless for the Germans was very detrimental to them, as there was no other station available as a rail- head in the country in which they were operat- ing, and the supply of the large number of troops that were concentrated there was be. coming more and more difficult, being depen- dent on road transport. The inherent mistake of the German advance was bearing full fruit. They had undertaken a movement which had not sviflficient breadth and which was open to attack on both sides. They had refused to believe that the French had sufficient numbers available to attack them on their right and had to suffer the consequences. They had lost 25,000 prisoners, and their casualties amoimted in all probability to not less than 120,000. The official bulletins on the German side. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 113 of course, admitted no failure. On July 23 wo were informeci that the Allies in the early morning, after summoning their reserves, con- tinued their mass attacks. " General von Boehn's army had completely defeated many enemy thrusts. The French and Americans agaftn suffered very heavy losses. Between Noyant and Hartennes the enemy stormed five times in vain. On both sides of Villo- montoire the enemy temporarily gained some ground, but our counter-attack drove him back, re-captured the village, and the dense masses of the enemy when retreating were fired at by our artillery. " North of the Ourcq our annihilating fire smashed enemy attacks. Tanks which pierced our lines were shot to pieces. Troops fighting between the Ourcq anil the Marne repulsed strong enemy attacks. We drove the enemy back by a eoimter-thrust from the height north-east of Rocourt and from the Chatelet Wood. " South-west of Reims heavy combats lasted during the whole day. The enemy in four violent partial attacks advanced repeatedly in vain. North of the Ardre the French, besides white and coloured troopp, also threw Itnjiani) and British into the fray. The attack of the Italians only feebly developed and was rapidly crushed." But notwithstanding all these fa- vourable official reports although this battle' was to have been the final blow the German newspapers were now beginning to take a less optimistic view about the situation. Major Endres in the MUnchner Neueste Nachrichten, writing on July 21, said : " War is a hard tratle and the strategic - tactical results of every single operation, as of the whole; is bound up with assumptions that with the best goodwill do not always materialize. . . . The more the country learns that France is still very strong ; that America has more than half a million soldiers in France, and that by the U-boat war alone she cannot be prevented from continually sending material and trans- ports to France ; that, finally, the English Army is in good condition, and with strength made up stands prepared for battle, the more will the country appreciate the magnificent perfor- mance of our troops, and all the more will it be in a position to look things in the face as they really are, with iron determination. It FRENCH ENGINEERS SALVING THE PONTOON BRIDGE THROWN ACKUSS MARNE AT CHATEAU-THIERRY BY THE GERMANS, And which' had been cut adrift by them in their hasty retreat. IHK 114 .THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. never Iiiirts an efficient people to see clearly the difticulties of thi^ position. Here in the west it may be weeks before the initiative that General Foch has seized comes again to our side. In this situation any undu^ haste would be amateurish and dangerous, and therefore will certainly be avoided ; and any nervous- Vf^C riii-wiiWfiwn'tt-ffVTr-iT.Tf ■-'■Ti,r>'»» ^•■- rKtNCH MINES LEFT BY THE (JERMANS AS TRAPS FOR TANKS. ness at home would be useless and also un- necessary." The fatuity of these comments must be evident to every reader. There was evidence, too, that the retreat was having a discouraging effect on the Gorman population. The Cologne Oazette on July 23 said : " Gteneral Foch's attack has caused pessimism in Germany, The dismal ones are going round with their heads bowed, uttering lugubrious cries and endeavouring, behind the concise statements of the official reports [of which examples have been given above] to discover all kinds of bad suppressed events. . . . People who have not learned in four years of war to accept the enemy's official reports with the sharpest criticism, ought to regard with equal distrust all rumours which emerge whenever hard movements occur. . . . Field-grey soldiers of the most varied ranks competed with the cjvil population in the streets, the tavern or the railway, to announce quite openly what every one of them had heard, and professional spies only needed to keep their ears open in order to obtain im- portant hints. They gave their employei-s timely information. Statements from perjured traitors were added. The consequence was that the enemy east of Reims evaded [!] our attack, which could not come to full execution " What apparently rankled most in the GcM-man mind was that " General Foch's whole offensive was in many respects a surprise,, owing to the statements made by prisoners taken from many detachments of troops, in whose view no Entente attack was planned on this front." This shows a credulous state of mind which one would hardly have attributed to so expert a body as the German General Staff, and also shows that their Intelligence Department was singularly at fault. " It was also a surprise owing to the employment of masses of 1».nks which had cover from view during their approach in the high cornfields. Thus, the first days of battle brought the adversary, besides a gain of ground, prisoners and booty. His losses then begin to incre^e frightfully, and it may be assumed that he has now more dead than we have had in all the offensives this year together." One can only express surprise that the Cologne Oazette did not say that we had more dead than living on this Front ! Gieorg Wegener wrote : " The enemy ruthlessly em- ployed every means known to modem warfare — shells of all calibres, gas, airmen's bombs, infantry attacks prepared by artillery fire and supported by battle air squadrons ; even cavalry ; above all, tanks were assembled in enormous number, and advanced disregarding all volley firing by our artillery." How extremely wicked of the enemy to use such dreadful means of war ! Frederick the Great remarked, when he had found the futility of asking his men to attack without firing, that it would be as reasonable to expect them to assault with broomsticks as not to use their muskets ; no doubt Herr Wegener would have liked us to make use of. the former. On Jidy 27 the arrriies of Degoutte and De Mitry followed up the retreat of the German forces, which on this date became more pro- nounced ; in fact, our outposts during the night of July 26-27 had already reported that a definite retreat had begun. The Germans still fought rearguard actions, but the pressure of the Allies against them was too strong for them to attempt to maintain any definite position. With no specially marked incidents all along a THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 115 \Frfwh official pht*lnsraph. GERMAN SOLDIERS' GRAVES OUTSIDE DORMANS. line of over 20 miles from the valley of the Ourcq to the south-east, from Oulchy-le- Chateau to the Ardre, above Bligny, the retreat was general, to a line extending from Bruyeres Villeneuve-sur-Fere — Coiirmont — Passy-Grigny — Cuisles — Neuville-aiix-Larris to Chaumuzy. The Germans were falling back unit by unit, by alternate companies or machine-gun squads, followed up closely by our advanced guards reinforced by tanks. The weather was cold with heavy squalls of rain, and this, com- bined with the fire of our airmen, who not- withstanding the unpropitious circumstances still managed to keep the air, threw them into a good deal of confasion. The whole line of the Marne was now in our hands, and the valley of Oulchy-le-Chateau enabled the troops to push still further through Coincy and the forest of Fere towards Fere-en-Tardenois, from which point the French were only three miles away at Villeneuve and Bruyeres. In the centre, from the Marne between Chatillon and Dormans, the Allies pushed forward through Reuil in the one direction and from Dormans in the other, while on the Ardre the British troops pushed through Marfaux to Chaumuzy, and this still more threatened the left flank of . the German salient. The entire forest of Fere was now in the Allies' hands, and the retreat of the Germans was sufficiently dis- organized to allow the French cavalry to press hard on the heels of the retiring troops, who suffered very heavily in the fighting which ensued. Our aviators, flying over the enemy's front line and over the communications along the Donnans — Fere road and the Chateau Thierry — Fismes road, and that which led from Dormans to Ville-en-Tardenois, reported that the whole of the German rear was in a state of confusion ; that the high road to Fere was blocked by lorries and troops for 1 1 hours, which gave the Allied aviators a magnificent target. It may here be remarked that between July 15 and July 22 the French air squadrons dropped along the battle front over 182 tons of bombs in daylight operations, and over 102 tons during the night. The tanks also had proved to be a great success. Each tank section on an average accoiuited for 15 to 20 German machine guns, and in some places whole batteries of field guns were captured. The ground through which the forces were now advancing was ' difficult, consisting of woods, thick forests, and slopes crowned by commanding plateaux which gave excellent positions for machine-gun detachments to fire along the line of approach. There was but little artillery fire, as the Ger- mans seemed to be withdrawing their guns for fear of capture. South of the Ourcq, near Villeneuve, a very pretty engagement took place bet^veen the American and French troops and the Germans defending the front of Fere-en-Tardenois. ■ German guns were in action on the Butte-de- Chalmont above Oulchy, a high bare hill just north of the Ourcq, which commands an extensive view over the country to the north 116 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. and east, and others oii the high ground of Seringes, which swept across towards Villeneuve, but Mangin's troops north of the Ourcq threatened the guns at Oulchy and com- pelled them to retire, and this enabled the French to bring up more artillery to the high ground about Villeneuve after they had captured Bruyeres, and thus to overpower the guns at Seringas, while Fere was brought under REMOVING THE FUSE FROM AN UN- EXPLODED GERMAN SHELL. fire from a range of little more than two miles. East of Reims progress was also made, the French taking Mont-sans-Nom and 200 prisoners. The whole ground down to the Ourcq was, thtis dominated by the French fire, and gradually the enemy withdrew to the other side ot the river. Fere-en-Tardenois was occupied on July 28, while Berthelot's troops pressed on towards Olizy et Violaine and An- thenay. It will thus be seen that in the centre and on the right of the Allies considerable progress had been made, but on Mangin's extreme left no great success had been at- tained ; still, the position into which the Germans had been forced left their line at a dangerous angle to the position which the French Tenth Army occupied. On July 28 Mangin struck with great vigour and rnaiie a considerable advance, in which the two British divisions, the l.'ith and 34th, he had with him played a notable part. They had already participated in the fighting on July 23, acting on the left of Mangin's troops and assisting in the capture of Berzy-le-Sec and Parcy-Tigny. According to a French account they again fought most brilliantly, and when Mangin's forward movement began they acted as a flank guard while the French crossed the brook in front of Cugnj' and ad- vanced on the Butte-de-Chalmont. On this day the resistance met with was chiefly of a rear-guard character, consisting of machine-gun detacliments, and the French took the hill with very little loss ; this was doubtless due to the fact that the Germans were conscious of the pressure that was being made against their left by the troops advancing in the direction of Fere-en-Tardenois. On July 29 the principal attack was delivered by the British, thoir objective being the line of heights beyond the village of Grand Rozoy. Here they met a determined resistance, as it was still the object of the Gernaaiis to keep back the Allied left, and they had concentrated in this part of the battlefield a considerable number of guns, while the infantry held on with determination to the village and woods in its neighbourhood In the early morning the attack went forward, and in spite of all the German efforts the British carried the points aimed at, while on their right the French carried the ground to the south-east of Beugneux between that village and Corb^ny farm, and also captured the Butte-de- Chalmont. But Beugneux itself, which the British attacked, was very strongly defended and the attack was held there. A.t 2.30 p.m. the British again advanced up very difficult open ground and made some progress. The attack seems to have come to a standstill at nightfall. Meanwhile the French took the crests of the heights looking down on the valley of the Crise, but the resistance of the Germans became greater, and the advance was in consequence slower. Nevertheless the British 15th Division in front of V^illemontoire took the Chateau and Park of Buzancy on the 30th. On the upper Ourcq the Americans took Sergy and Ronchores, and still further to the east towards Villers-Agron. The main road from Dormans to Reims was thus inter- rupted. The fighting round Sergy was of a very bitter character, and the village changed hands no less than four times. After the Americans had captured it for the first time the 4th Guards Division, composed of fresh troops that had just come up, attacked with considerable vigoiu", but were eventually driven back. On re-entering the village after one of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 117 order. Thore is no doubt that the Germans made a great effort to penetrate our advancing line iti this direction, but the united efforts of the Americans and British, combined with the French troops, stopped them, though not without severe fighting. The Ourcq above Fere was now completely in the Allies' hands, and in the centre generally considerable progress was made though on the extreme flanks the Germans still clung to their ground with great tenacity ; especially was this the case in the valley of the Ardre, these counter-attacks, the Americans found that their wounded had been bayoneted. The Germans here had placed machine guns in the church and also in a building which bore the Red Cross flag. The fighting was continuous and violent throughout the whole day. The Germans made attack after attack, in which they sometimes made a little progress," only to be driven back by counter-strokes, and hand-to-hand encounters took place on many occasions, but at the end of the day the Guards Division was finally beaten and had to retire. The Germans had also massed troops behind Seringes, with a view to extend the attack they made on Sergy, but they were observed by the .Americans, who brought a heavy fire of artillery to bear on them and drove them back in dis- Q'rcnch official photographs. FERE-EN-TARDENOIS. Above : The Old Market House. In centre, a main street after the recapture of the town. IJelow : The PUoe de la R£publ!que. 118 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. where indeed it was vitally necessary for them to hold on to prevent the cutting off of a con- siderable portion of their troops. July 30 and 31 brought no important modi- fication in the position. On the formei date the British on both sides of St. Euphraise were counter-attacked by the Germans, but they failed to capture the village. Further efforts of the Germans round Sergy, to the east of Oulchy^ and to the north-east of Fere were also in vain, and the Americans took the village of Seringes. A great deal of the fighting, as has been seen, took place in woods which were practically in an uninjured condition. The Germans had foreseen this and had issued special instructions for the conduct of their troops in their fighting in the forests. It was pointed out that the dense woods would be defended by the French on the borders ; those of less dense character would be defended in depth by sections. Reserves would be found along the roeuls near open spaces and in rear of the woods, and guns and machine guns would be posted in such a way as to sweep down the roads and rides leading through them. Com- passes would have to be made free use of, to keep the direction of attack correctly. Maps were to be marked with minute accuracy show- ing meeting-places and cross-roads where units could be re-formed. Grenades were forbidden ; the reason for that is evident — they would, at such close quarters among ti'ees be as dangerous to the usei-s as to those they were thrown at. Light trench mortars and machine guns, rifles and pistols were all to be used. Lachrymatory shells were to be employed, but they were not to be used for an hour before the attack. The infantry advance was to be made in a thin line with machine guns, but such a formation could only be employed in thin forests ; when the wood was dense, the troops were to remain on or near the roads, while the borders and flanks of the wood should be swept by macliino guns from favourable ground. Small local reserves should be kept in readiness to move forward along the roads behind the advanced line of infantry. Attempts should constantly be made to outflank the enemy's posts and to circle round the woods. When the rear of a wood was reached, drums should be beaten to show the enemy he was svirrounded and to inform the German troops of the position of the troops encircling various points. Guns should always be kept muzzle forward ; this would, of course, involve man-handling to get them forward. ,/ .,<ii ', '<jji< Mil (yhotogriph. PRBNCH TANKS AS SLEEPING QUARTERS FOR THEIR CREWS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 119 J-riHch ulju-ial photvaraph. ARRIVAL OF ITALIANS ON THE FRONT IN FRANCE. The same orders contained also interesting remarks on the necessity for concealing the movements of the GSerman troops. They were informed how important it was that every soldier should do all in his power to prevent the presence of his unit on the front being suspected. Any infringement of the regula- tions was liable to draw fire and imperil the life of the man himself and his comrades. Troops were to obey scrupulously all ordei-s given them by sentinels. They were ordered to take cover from aeroplanes by remaining motionless, hiding in the shade, or lying down, and no one was to move unless it was impera- tively- necessary. The men were instructed, when the bombing aeroplanes were about, never to I'emain in large groups, but to scatter over the ground and, as far as possible, to remain in the shade. They were urged to close cooperation in all cases, particularly in helping vehicles in distress, and clearing roads, etc. By doing this they would facilitate the push forwartl and so inijirove the situation. It will be observed that the failure of the Germans, at any rate, was not due to the want of careful instructions and training. The taking of Oulchy-le-Chateau on July 25, with Villemontoire on the same date, opened the way to the capture of the plateau of Hartennes, which could now be attacked Doth from the south and north. The German situation here was rendered more precarious by the capture, of Buzancy on July 30 and of Grand Rozoy and Beugneux on August 1. This made it easier to take Hartennes, which was carried on. the evening of the same date. It was attacked on three sides by Franco- British troops, and although at first the Ger- mans resisted with some tenacity, they were unable to withstand the direction ot the a-ssault, which threatened to cut off their troops holding this point, and they fell back towards Droizy and Launoy. They were closely fol- lowed by the French, who rapidly reached the valley of the Crise. Conflagrations seen during the night, and the noise of explosions, showed that the enemy were destroying stores they could not remove. August 1 saw an important advance of ilangin's troops. British, French, and Ameri- cans joined in the movement by which import- ant gains were made north of the Ourcq, in front ot Grand Rozoy ; Beugneu.x, Cramoiselle, and Cramaille being taken, and south of the latter Raperie and Saponay ; also 600 prisoners were captured. A little farther to the north, on the Chateau-Thierry road, Taux was seized, and the general line was advanced. 238-3 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. {French official photograph, AMERICANS HAULING A BIG GUN ON A NEWLY-MADE RAILWAY. connecting up between Beugneux and the ground in front of Hartennes and Taux. South of the Ourcq De Mitry pushed on beyond the Meuniere wood to Goussancourt and Coulonges, and reached the southern portion of the wood in front of Vezilly Still farther to the east progress was made in front of Roinigny and a mile north of Ville-en-Tardenois. On the extreme left of the Allied line the Germans still held out to protect the line of the Aisne, but more to the south the general advance was wheeling up and pressing the Germans all along and back to the north. The general line of the Allies was now 6 to 7 miles in front of the Marne, from which the enemy had been completely driven. The advance had not been made without severe fighting, more especially in the centre between Seringes and Cierge, where the Americans were opposed by Bavarians, Prus- sian Guards, and Jagers, but -still the progress was steady, and it was becoming plain that the resisting power of the Germans was steadily aecreasing. The general line they now held ran from the valley of the Crise in the north along the crests of the plateau to the north- west of Fere, and to the southern edge of the forest of Nesles by Sergy and Roncheres to the liill of Sainte-Giemme, and then up by VUle- ea-Tardenois, thus leaving a somewhat pro- nounced salient at Sainte-G«mme, of very cut- up ground, and in many places covered with wood. This salient seemed to indicate that the German Supreme Command had not yet given up completely all idea of a further advance, because it is plain that to keep this point projecting out and liable to attack on all sides was wrong, luileas it was intended to advance from it. But notwithstanding this apparent contradiction, it was plain in fact that the offensive spirit was dying out of the German Army, and the next few days was to see a complete abandonment of any further offensive idea towards the south. The number of prisoners taken by the Allies on the battle front of the Marne and Champagne from July 15 to July 31 was 33,400, of whom 674 were officers. Soissons had now (August 2) to be captured. General ViHemont's brigade of Chasseiu-s-^- Pied broke through the German lines at Mercin, two miles west of the town, and drove back the garrison, although they were aided by a considerable artillery force. By four o'clock Mercin was captured, and the Chasseurs then advanced through the suburbs of St. Jean and St. Christophe and took possession of the ruined town which had been set on fire in many places, while the Germans made a last but vain attempt to hold a position in the Faubourg St. Vaast, on the north of the river. The Chasseurs, following up the retreating Germans, reached the village of CufHes, about two miles vip the Soissons — Folembray road. Two hours later General Mangin was able to telephone to Paris the news of a complete victory. His troops had established them- selves in the town, and the bulk were then moving on eastward. The taking of Soissons was a most important gain. It gave to the French the power of transference to the northern bank of the Aisne, interrupted the railway lines running to Reims, rendered nugatory the connection made between the north and south lines on the banks of the Aisne between Missy and Sermoi.se, and tiu-ned the whole of the German positions on that river. Already to the south of the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 121 Ourcq the pressure on the Glermans had become severe, and now the upper portion of their right flank was threatened by tiio lOtli French Army. The ground over whicli the advance had been mdde on the southern bank of the ALsne near Soissons was very cUfficult, and the long-range guns from the northern bank of the river were able to bring fire to bear on the flank of our troops' advance eastward from the town, and thus it was that until the advance of the more southern portions of the Allied lino began from the Mame, and they were compelled to retreat to the river, then Mangin's forward movement, with the chjiture of Soissons and Buzancy and the progreasion beyond, pinched off still more of the territory which the Oemians held and diminished the number of passages over the river, and therefore rendered a retreat still more necessary. By the evening of August 1, the position which has been indicated was plainly a very threatening one to the German right, and hence it was that thoy apparently gave up all intention AMERICAN MILITARY POLICE ESCORTING PRISONERS. to bring pressure on the Germans and compel the troops in the angle between De- goutte and Maiigin to retire, the latter was not in a position to bring a flank attack to bear against the Germans south of Soissons. When they had to fall back they left the town an easy prey to the French advance. Generally, it may be said that the forward movement of the armies of Berthelot, De Mitry, Degoutte and the right flank of Mangin north of the Ourcq was constantly narrowing the ground which the Germans could occupy, and when at the end of July this inovement had pressed the Germans well back o£ a further oflfensive and abandoned Soissons the next day. General Mangin's left flank then swept up the valley of the Crise, and during the night on to the high groimd to the east of it, and with the British divisions and his own troops he continued the advance eastward. Degoutte pushed towards Fismea up the valley of the Orillon, while De Mitry and Berthelot, advancing over the road from Dormans to Reims, threatened Ville-en-Tar- denois and the ground to the west of Reims. Farther south, the Dole road was reached, and the French were well vip the valley of the Orillon beyond Coxilonges. Farther east, the 122 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. line of Vezilly — ^Lhery was reached, while to the east of these jjomts Gueux and Tliillois R-ere attained, and thus the Vesle in the neigh- bourhood of R«inis was reached. The fighting of the two British divisions, the 15th and 34th, is worthy of more detailed account, for it was some of the hardest that }iad taken place in the war. Our troops w-ent forward on July 28, when they formed a flank guard to the French attacking the German line more to the south. They advanced on Buzancy and the high ground beyond it, and by midday the front line of the Scottish Division was through the village, and a number of prisonei's were taken. The position was by no means an easy one to hold, for the high ground on the Aisne enabled the German long-range guns to bring an enfilade fire to bear on the village ; it was found impossible to hold it, and our troops were therefore compelled to fall back. The French on their right reached a position which was very strongly held by machine guns, and were imable to advance. The Scottish troops, -therefore, who had taken the village, were compelled to abandon it, and take up a defensive position on its western outskirts, but the next day they went on again and com- pleted the conquest of the enemy's works. They were continuously engaged, and on August 1 carried the dominating country between the Aisne and the Ourcq. Their conduct gave rise ,t« the following " Order of the Day " addressed to them by General Mangin : " You came into the battle at its fiercest moment. The enemy, defeated the first time, brought vip agaihst us his best divisions in numbers superior to our own. You continued to advance, foot after foot, in spite of his bitter resistance, and you held on to the conquered ground notwithstanding the violence of his counter-attacks. Then, on August 1, side by side with your French colleagues, you carried the height dominating the country between the Aisne and the Ourcq, which the defenders had been ordered to hold at all costs. Having failed in his attempts to retake the height with his last reserves, the enemy was compelled to retreat, pursued and harassed for a distance of seven miles. All you English and Scottish troops, both the young soldiers and the victors of Flanders and Palestine, have shown the magnificent qualities of your race, namely, indomitable courage and tenacity. You have won the admiration of your brothers-in-arms. Your country will be proud of you, for to you and to your commanders is due in large measure the victory which we have just gained against BRITISH TROOPS STARTING ON A DAYLIGHT PATROL INTO ALBHRT. THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. 123 SCOTS ON the barbarous enemies of all free peoples. I am happy to have you under my command, and I thank you." On August 3 still more progress was made, and by evening the line of the Aisne and of the Vesle as far as Fismes was reached, the Americans facing the last-named point. To the east of Fismes the Allied troops were on the high ground which dominated the river, while their outposts were pushed on down to the southern bank. In 24 hours the French had advanced over more than six miles, and retaken 50 villages from the Germans. North of the Vesle, close to Fismes, the Germans had thrown up a strong position wliioh was held by two divisions On the next day, August 4, the Allies threw three bridges and secured them with bridgeheads, at La Grange Farm, above the town of Braine, at La Venteux Farm, east of Fismes, and a few miles farther east at Jonchery. The Americans moved forward against Fismes ; they had to watle across the Vesle west of the town under machine-gun fire from the heights above ther river and of artillery fii-e frorn the heights higher up. A direct attack was also made on the town itself, and here the Germans fought with considerable tenacity THE MARCH. until the outflanking movement of the Ameri- cans, which brought them down against the northern side of the roads leading northwards from Fismes, threatened the capture of the whole garrison ; and when the Germans appre- ciated this they broke back in disorder, and as they fled frorn the town towards the Vesle they were played upon by machine guns, and lost heavily. This little town was not com- pletely taken until the next day, for here and there small posts still held out. On the west of Reims the Vesle was also reached, and in spite of a lively resistance parties managed to cross the river between Muizon and Champigny, while more to the north our line was taken on to the outskirts of La Neuvillette. On this date the Germans also com- menced to retreat in the Montdidier region behind the Avre and on the British front behind the Ancre on both sides of Albert. These were both positions calculated to favour an offensive from them, which shows that the fighting oa • the M-arne had begun to take effect on the whole German line. The withdrawal to the right bank of the Avre between Montdider and Moreuil was on a front of ten miles. The French held Hargicom-t and Braches, and were in tha out- skirts of Courtemanche. On the British front. 124 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. iOjffictat photograph. A REGIMENTAL FIKST-AID POST. in retiring behind the Anore, the Germans had surrendered the villages of Hamel, north of Albert, and Demanoourt, south of it. On the Marne the rate of progress on this day was becoming slower. The weather was bad. The troops were tired with their tremen- dous exertions, and the difficulty of movement along the cut-up roads necessarily diminished the rato of arlvance. It was evident that the enemy had not completely given up the idea of standing between the Vesle and the Aisne, because he had artillery in position on the watershed between the two rivers. He was £klso in a more favourable position for opposing the advance of the Allies. His line was now much shortened by giving up the extension to Soissons, and therefore capable of greater resistance. But there was still the disadvantage of the French holding the passage of the river at St. Vaaet and also farther west at Pommiers, and hence the right flank of the enemy's forces was still exposed to attack. Nor could the position between the Vesle and the Aisne be looked upon as a very advantageous one. It had very little depth, and the Aisne, while forming; a good obstacle to a frontal attack, was an extremely bad one to have behind a defensive line, being difficult to cross except at the bridges, which would be under fire from the French guns when they had won the water- shed. On the whole, therefore, it was fairly evident that it would be prudent for the Grermans to retire to their old position on the Chemin-des-Dames. From there they were still in a position to threaten Reims, as their line turned southwanls towards Berry-au-Bac and Nogent-l'Abbesse. Believing that their successful advance was a certainty, they had accumulated huge masses of stores and ammunition quite close up to the front. So great was the number of shells that an American officer declared that it seemed impossible for any army to have had the number the Germans had abandoned in their retirement. A good deal of these were now falling into the hands of the Allies, and were used against the enemy, still more were being destroyed by the Germans themselves. Ex- plosions of ammunition dumps and burnings of stores were daily and nightly visible. The Giermans had now begun to admit that they were falling back " according to plan," but in the Deutsche Tagezeit'itig, commenting on the beginning of the fifth year of war. Count Roventlow wrote that it was " marked in the Germ-in pr-jss by reflections showing an act of deepest resignation and melancholy and even of protest. The trait of defeatism which in these THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 125 days tuns through German public life has a pronouncedly weakening effect, and the more so because in those wiio are affected by it an underlying conviction may be perceived, or is even expressly stated." The Cologne Gazette, at the end of July, remarked that "a true offensive spirit against oiu- eneniie«i is lacking at home. In this connection there is no more instructive comparison than that of our arch- enemy — Great Britain ; for Britain's home front has no loopholes and no weak spots. On all points of real vital importance to Great Britain no party and no class will make any concessions in our favour." There can be no doubt that by this tiiiie the enemy was in a depressed frame of mind. The perpetual assertion of victories which had not been gained ; of prisonere who had not been taken ; which statements the troops themselves knew to be without foundation, were beginning to have their effect. The per- petual promises that the submarines were going to end the war were also found to be imtruet and the German soldiers were beginning to appreciate real facts. A letter written by a man in a trench-mortar company, dated July 21, shows that even then the situation v.as pretty accurately jvidged. It ran as follows : " You will be back in the thick of the mist now. Shirk it as much as you can ; don't be stupid ; we are risking our lives for the bigwigs. Our regiment is nearly wiped out, but we didn't push on very far. This war is becoming the greatest massacre that ever was. What is going to hap()en I don't know. -Germany is slowly crumbling to pieces." At the end of .July it was officially stated by the Germans that they had taken since July 15 more than 24,000 prisoners. It was plain and palpable that this could not be true, because, except on the first day of the fighting, the Germans were absolutely imsuccessful, and unsuccessful troops do not reap large captures. This comes out quite clearly from the state- ments of Ludendorff and Hindenbvug. Even Ludendorff, on August 2, was constrained to admit that the German strategic offensive plan had not succeeded. " Its result was limited to a tactical success. The enemy evaded us on July 15, and we thereupon, as early as the evening of July 16, broke off operations. It is always our endeavour to stop an undertaking as soon as the result is not worth the cost, because I consider it one of my principal duties to spare the blood and the strength of our soldiers." Field-Marshal Hindenburg on the same date said : " Our troops have accustomed them A GERMAN HOWITZER CAPTURED BY THE AUSTRALIANS 126 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. selves to the Americans just as quickly as the black Frenchmen. Thev had to leave many of their own men strewn in front of our positions, whereas we were economical with our soldiers. RUINS OF SOISSONS CATHEDRAL. This ciroimstance and supply considerations decide our measures. We transferred the fighting to more favourable ground in order to facilitate the fighting and vital condition of our troops by better supplies." Field-Marshal Ilaig's Special Order of the day, dated August 4, the anniversary of our entry into the War, was a far more accurate suirunation of the situation than any of the German statements :^- " The conclusion of the fourth year of the war marks the passing of a period of crisis. We can now with added confidence look forward to the future. The Revolution in Russia set free large hostile forces on the Eastern front, which were transferred to the West. It was the enemy's intention to use his great numbers thus created to gain a decisive victory before the arrival of Amer- ican troops should give superiority to the Allies. " The enemy has made his effort to obtain a decision on the Western front, and has failed. The steady stream of American troops arriving in France has already restored the balance. The enemy's first and most powerful blows fell on the British ; his superiority of force was nearly three to one. Although he succeeded in press- ing back parts of the fronts attacked, the British line remained unbroken. After many days of heroic fighting, the glory of which will live for all time in the history of our race, the enemy was held. " At the end of four years of war the magnifi- cent fighting qualities and spirit of om- troops remain of the highest order. I thank them for the devoted bravery and unshaken resolution with which they responded to my appeal at the height of the struggle, and I know that they will show a Hke stedfastness and courage in whatever task they may yet be called upon to perform." On August 5 the Germans admitted that their rear guards, in accordance with ordei-s, liad withdrawn to the north bank of the Vesle. and along the whole of the front from Soissons they coiitinvied to fall back. The weather had turned execrable and the Vesle itself was in flood. From this day the position that both sides occupied from Soissons to Reims may be con- sidered as fairly settled. There was now a coi n - parative lull in this part of the theatre of war. On August 6 General Foch was created a Marshal of France, a promotion which he had most certainly earned by his masterly conduct of the war since the date on which he first took over the supreme direction. The following telegram, dated August 7, was sent to Marshal Foch, Commanding-in-Chief Allied Forces, by Field-Mai-shal Sir Douglas Haig : — " Please allow me, my dear Mar^chal, on my own belmlf and that of all ranks of the British Armies under my command, to send you our very heartiest congratulations on your attaining to the highest military rank. It is a fitting recognition of your magnificent work for the Allies ever since the commencement of the war, now so gloriously crowned by this second victory of the Mame. " It is especially pleasing to me, personally, who have been associated so intimately and so continuously with you ever since October, 1914, to be able to congratulate you to-day on this great distinction which we all take to be a happy augiuy for the future." On August 7, between Braine and Fismes, French and American troops crossed the river and established positions on the northern bank which they held against two determined attacks made by the enemy. German attacks between the Oise and the Aisne between Vailly and Tracy-le-Val were repulsed. To the north of Reims, the French advanced again between the R6thel and Laon railways, and conquered some ground. Returning to the region of the Somme, and to the north of it : on July 23, on the line of the Avre, the French attacked at a point some THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 127 seven miles north of Montdidior on a front of about four miles, and took the villages of Mailly-Raineval, Sauvillers and AubvillerH. These three villages had been in the possession of the enemy ever since the offensive at the end of March. The main object of the attack was the big plateau of Sauvillers, which, when gained, commanded the ground towards the river. Aubvillers and Mailly-Raineval formed, as it were, two flank guards to the central part of the position. It was strongly fortified with an almost continuous line of trenches covered by numerous machine-guns nests in the woods, while in the villages thomselve.s of July 26, and the Germans were cleared off the high ground back to the valley of the Avre. It had always been the object of the AllieH to stop the German advance on the western side of the Avre, and this new attack effec- tually put an end to any hostile efforts in this direction, as it established the French firmly on the western bank of the Avi-e in a position which greatly supported the line of trenches down that river and protected the flank against an attack over the Doms brook between the Avre and Montdidier. It was a successful operation, and resulted in the taking of 1,850 prisoners, including 52 M. Clenifnceuu PRESENTATION OF THE BATON OF A MARSHAL OF FRANCE TO GENERAL FOCH. the cellars had been improved into strong points of resistance. The attack was pre- ceded by British tanks, which did very useful work and disposed of a large number of machine- gun positions. The assault was a complete surprise to the enemy, and he did not begin a counter-fire of artillery till it had been some time in progress, with the result that it inflicted very little damage on the troops engaged. The result of this action was that the centre of the German line on the western side of the Avre was penetrated, and thus their troops on the north were separated from those on the south of the French ingress. West of Morisel a wood was occupied on the morning officers, among whom we're four battalion com- manders, in addition to which four 77 mm. guns, 45 trench mortars, and 300 machine-guns ' were captured. The French losses were only about one-tenth of the number of prisoners they took. On the next day British troops carried ouu a sucoessful raid near Bucquoy, midway be- tween Arras and Albert, captiuing IS prisoners, and a few more were taken by another raiding party north-west of the latter point. There was also a considerable livelines-i at the northern end of our line in the Scherpen- berg area about this date, where the Gtermans indulged in a considerable amount of artillery 128 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. MACHINE GUNS AND RIFLES [French official photograph. CAPTURED AT MAILLY-RAINEVAL, SAUVILLERS, AND AUBVILLERS. fire, to which we reph'ed with equal vigour. A similar action occurred on our side of the Lys in the B6thune area and to the south of it. The country round H6buteme was also svib- jected to considerable bombardment, to which we replied, and the New Zealanders on July 25 pushed their line farther forward under its cover. The German troops in the front line on the Ancre, and also at Aveluy wood, near Albert, where they were on low ground, had suffered greatly from the artillery fire. The wood was taken. Against Villers-Bretonneux the enemy indulged in a severe gas bombardment, but our troops were prepared for it and suffered nothing much more than inconvenience. On July 26 the Srermans attacked our posi- tions about H6buterne, and also in the Fletre- Meteren ai-ea, but on both occasions were driven back after sharp fighting, as also were raids attempted against our posts in Aveluy wood and at Vieux-Berquin. The attack at this point was of a more serious character than the others. It was preceded by a heavy bombard- ment, and followed by an infantry assault, executed by six companies, two furnished by each of three different regiments of the 12tli German Division. Their idea was apparently to reach and hold the line of roatl south-west of Meteren towards Strazeele, probably as a jumping-off point for a farther advance ; but it was completely unsuccessful, except at one point, where they succeeded in penetrating the line, only to be turned out at once by a counter-attack. The harassing fire of our artillery in the Ypres portion of our line inflicted considerable loss on the Germans. Their troops had to lie out in the open fields before Meteren, and got very little cover ; moreover, the heavy rains had seriously affected them. Between the discomfort and the casualties, a considerable moral effect had been created on the German infantry. On July 27 there was a certain amoimt of raid- ing activity near Albert, Arras, and Lens, and on July 28 about Arras, Locre, and Givenchy. Early on the morning of July 29 the Germans made another advance in the neighbourhood of Morlancourt between the Somme and the Ancre. It will be remembered that from early in May our troops had been constantly pushing on and thrusting back the Germans from their close proximity to Amiens. Vaire Wood and the village of Hamei had been taken south of the Somme and north of the river the villages of Treux and Ville-sous-Corbie had been captured. These little affairs had varied from mere raids to operations of some magnitude, and now the object was to gain the high ground south of Morlancourt, where the Grerman lines ran over the ridge across the Corbie- Bray road. Two successive lines were captured, 143 prisoners and 36 machine-guns were taken. The whole depth advanced was 500 yards along a front of over two miles ; very little opposition was made by the Germans. This gain strengthened the position and made another obstacle to an advance on Amiens. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 129 On the same date the Canadians carried out two successful raids, one on the north and the other on tlie south side of Oavrelle, north-east of Arras. Three counter-attacks were easily beaten off. Shortly after midnight patrols from the Au.stralian First Division enteretl the enemy's positions about Merris, east of Haze- brouck. The \illage was surrounded and captured and Ki!) prisoners and a number of trench mortars anil maehine-guhs taken. During July 31 hostile artillery developed .a lively fire against Merris in the Kemmel sector ; othei-wise there was nothing of importance. There was still a good deal of minor fighting on the north of the Somme towards Ypres, and on August 3 our patrols in the neighboiu-hood of Albert made further jirogress, and the greater part of the ground previously held by the enemy west of the Ancre river was captured by us. A hostile raid against our line south-east of Hebxiterne was completely repulsed. By Sunday morning (August 4) our patrols had reached the river Ancre between Dernan- court and Hamel, and a hostile raid to the south of Arras was driven back without further loss. The result of this constant harassing of the German front led to an important resvdt, for, on August 4, as already mentioned, the Germans abandoned their front line positions on the Ancre section of the British front, over a length of 12 miles from Beauniont-Hamel to Demancourt. The retreat extended to a depth varying from IJ miles to 2 miles, though occa- sionally it was deeper,'and it showed that in this portion of the front the enemy had given up all idea of a further advance towards Amiens. The offensive of the end of March had not enabled the Germans to push across the Ancre and up the western slopes to the high ground, which, indeed, they hajl reached at very few points, being definitely held from H6buteme to La Signy Farm, and they were thus prevented from occupying the dominating hill south-west of the latter point. They were also thrust back at Auchonvillers, though they managed to cling to the eastern edge of the plateau near Beaumont-Hainel, and also by Mesnil to the northern rim of Aveluy Wood. The position they held was an unfavourable one. They had no command of view westward, and the swamps of the river valley lay immediately behind their backs. Similarly, to the east of Bouzincourt, they were beaten back, and only retained a precarious footing on the eastern edge of the summit. The position was too dangerous to be adhered to unless they made further progress ; but as the continual pressure exercised by the British troojjs against them [French oB'Cialphaogtaph. MAILLY-RAINEVAL SET ON FIRE BY THE GERMANS. 180 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. prevented this, they made the best of a bad •job, and now retreated from their front line, which was fully exposed to our artillery attack, and was also severely dealt with by our aeroplanes. The result of this combined treat- ment was that the Grerman troops scarcely dared move by day, and even in the darkness had to come by by-patlis and winding tracks so as to avoid the bombing of the aeroplanes. On the north side of Albert, above Aveluy, there was one place where the only means of access was a causeway across the 500-yards wide marsh of the valley bottom. Along this all troops and supplies had to move. Unceasingly pounded night and day, supplies and vehicles could not cross at all, and even the troops had to run across it at a rapid pace. The retirement actually began on the night of August 1-2. On that night a patrol of Yorkshire troops raiding the enemy's line foiuid it occupied only by pioneers who had come up to destroy the dug-outs and other military works as soon as the infantry had retired. On August 2 our troops began to move for- ward, and by the afternoon of August 3 had reached the Ancre all along the line aimed at. Here and there a few machine-guns were left, but with this exception the lines were aban- doned, and the Germans had retired to the east side of the Ancre from Demancourt to a point near St. Pierre-Divion Altogether, during the month of July, the Brit- tish captured 4,503 prisoners, including 89 offic- ers, this being the total along the general front. On August 5 we made further small advances in the neighbourhood of Neuville- Vitasse, south- east of Arras, and also at Pacaut Wood, east of Robecq. There was also considerable artillery fire along the whole front. There had not been much fighting on the northern part of the Allied line, though on July 27 and 29 there was some increase of artillery fire against the Belgians, and the latter captured some prisoners to the north of Dix- mude and in the Merckem area. In front of the French on the Avre the Germans were also retiring, the French follow- ing up closely on the retreating troops. Strong outpost lines were left ; but the distance to which the main line was taken back was con- siderable. The retirement was largely due to the threatening position the Allies occupied on the Luce. The way in which our aviators aided the advance has been alluded to in describing the operations, but a very important part of their duties was carrying the war into the enemy's [I'fench official photograph. BRINGING UP AMMUNITION FOR THE FRENCH GUNS AT THE FRONT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 13) country by long-range bombing expeditions, treating the Germans in the way in which they treated England and France. We only differed from them in one detail — whereas for preference they selected vmdefended towns or hospital areas, we confined our efforts to military objectives. The bombardment of the important powder factory of Rottwoil on July 22 has already been alluded to. On the afternoon of the same day the station at Offenburg was also hit, and many long-distance reconnaissances were completed during the day. The next day but little flying was possible ow- ing to wind and rain, which, as we have seen, also affected the German retreat from the Marne. On July 24, in spite of the weather, which, however, was not so bad as on the previous day, a considerable amount of bombing was done behind the German lines. Towards evening it cleared, and there was some sharp fighting in the air, in which we accounted for 18 hostile machines, with the loss of only three to our- selves. Two trains were hit, and thousands of rounds fired from machine-guns at various targets. All our night-working machines re- turned in safety. During the night over 24 tons of bombs were dropped on the railways at Valen- ciennes, Seclin, Courtrai, and Armentieres. July 25 saw an improvement in the weather, though there was still a high wind. Visibility was, however, so much improved that more' work could be undertaken. In addition to the usual work close up to the Army, three large ammunition dumps behind the front, the docks at Bruges, and numerous villages used as billets by the enemy's troops were bombed. In spite of the fact that the strong west wind favoured the enemy, as it enabled him to escape from our aviators while they had to fly back home against it, 21 of their machines were dealt with and a hostile balloon was also shot down, but on this occasion we had to pay the penalty with 15 of our own. After dark our night-bombing machines again attacked the railway at Courtrai and Seclin and dropped over 300 bombs on rest billets. All our machines returned safely, but one of the enemy's night-flying aeroplanes, which had attempted to go behind our lines, was brought down by anti-aircraft fire. The French also were very active on this date. They brought down seven German machines and dropped over 38 tons of projectiles by day and night — on railway stations, lines of communication, dumps, etc., behind the front zone of battle. During the night of July 26-26 successful' attacks were carried out on the station and factory at Pforzheim in Baden (north-west of Stuttgart), the factory at Baalon, 25 tnilea north of Verdun, and the station at Offenburg ; at the latter point two fires were seen to break A GERMAN BOMBER. out. Four hostile aerodromes were bombed and attacked with machine-gun fire, besides which trains, anti-aircraft batteries, and search- lights were also fired upon with the machine- guns and in spite of all the Germans could dO' the whole of our machines returned unscathed. During the next two days the weather put almost an entire stop to daylight operations and there was but small activity on our part at night. On July 28, in spite of low clouds, our air- men did good work. Ten tons of bombs were distributed over various military objectives in the neighbourhood of Douai, Armentieres, Bapaume, and Chaulnes. There was some fighting in the air, in which we brought down nine hostile aeroplanes and two balloons with a cost to ourselves of four only. The night saw our men again at work with great energy, and various back areas were bonibotl, all our machines returning in Safety. On the night of July 29-30 our Independent 132 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. Air Force attacked the railway stations at Offenbiirg, Rastatt, and Baden. Stuttgart and Solingen were also attacked. Solingen is a small town between Karlsruhe and Pforzheim ; Rastatt — at one time a fortified towii of con- siderable strength— and Baden are respectively 13 and 22 miles south of Karlsruhe. OfTenburg lies to the south-west of Stuttgart. On the morning of July 30 Offenburg was again attacked and good results were obtained. The station at Lalir, not far from Strasburg, was also bombed. On tliis road three enemy machines were crashed and another driven down out of control. Only one of our machines was missing. The work of our machines more immediately in connexion with tlie troops, although some- what interfered with by ground mists and low visibility, was very active on July 29, many tons of bombs being dropped and 14 Gterman [Official photograph, R.A.F. PHOTOGRAPHIC OFFICER SHOW- ING A PILOT THE AREA TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED. mawjhines destroyed with the loss of only two to ourselves. The French were as active as ourselves on July 28 and 29 and did a good deal of excellent work in the immediate rear of the German forces. On the night of July 30-31 the Independent Air Force was again active. Stuttgart was once more visited and some two tons of bombs were dropped on the Bosche-Magneto works, the Daimler works, and the railway station, where a fire was seen to break out. At Hagenau the station and barracks were also bombed and a heavy explosion was observed. Remilly junction and two German aerodromes were also attacked with bombs and macliine-gun fire. At 7.30 a.m. on July 31 one of our squadrons attacked Coblenz station. Clouds prevented the observation of results. The station and factories at Saarbriioken also received two attacks on this morning. Our first formation was met by a considerable number of hostile scouts before reaching their objective. In the fighting wliich ensued fom- of our machine.-! were shot down. They succeeded in bombing their objective, but on the return journey were again heavily attacked and lost throe more machines. The second attack was completely successful, bursts were observed in a factory and although attacked by hostile scouts all machines returned in safety, from which it may be deduced that the Germans had had enough of air fighting when they met our first squadron. On the night of July 31 German aeroplanes attacked Rouen and Havre. There were no casualties at the first town ; one killed and four slightly injured at the second. An interesting detail was revealed on this ' day by two British airmen who were forced to land at Valkenisso near Walcheren. They were obliged to come down to earth because the water-tank of their machine was injured by a fragment of shrapnel when they were at a height of some 14,000 feet, but they ascertained that the Zeebrugge Canal was still completely shut off by our sunken ships and that great damage was done to the locks durjng the recent bombing. It was also learned that a fortnight previously some of the bombs dropped at Bruges fell among 400 German marines who were drilling, causing a large number of casualties, while others blew up an ammuni- tion dep6t situated at the land end of Zeebrugge Mole. During the month of July the number of German machines destroyed or captured by the British airmen or gunners on the Western front was 316 ; in addition to which 36 balloons were accounted for. The French claim 184, besides 154 which were seen falling out of control ; also they destroyed 49 German captive balloons. Of our aeroplanes 117 failed to return to their aerodromes, 14 of which belonged to the Independent Force. In addition to the definitely ascertained casualties, 98 enemy machines were driven down out of con- trol. German balloons to the number of 48 were shot down by the Allied forces. Against THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 138 RETURN OF BATTLE-SCARRED BOMBER. these successes the Germans claim to have accounted for 316 machines and 19 balloons. On the morning of Augvist 1 a squadron belonging to the British Independent Air Force started out to bomb .Cologne, but finding it enveloped in cloud, turned and dropped their bombs on the factories of Diiren, half way between Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle. A fire was seen to break out. All our machines returned in safety. A second squadron at- tacked the railway workshops at Treves with some success. They were heavily attacked by a large number of German machines, of which they destroyed three, losing only one ; thus the two expeditions were executed with only one casualty against three inflicted on the enemy. The German account, with its usual veracity, reports that six of our big battle- planes were destroyed by six of their machines before they dropped any bombs, and out of the second squadron one British aeroplane was brought down. Evidently the German ob- servers had been unable to see through the clouds which covered Cologne frona our men. On the same date the French dropped some 24 tons of bombs on various objectives behind the German lines, and in the ensuing night a further 10 tons of bombs were distributed on railway lines, stations, and aerodromes. These results were obtained with a loss of only two machines, while 17 of the enemy's were ac- counted for. The next day the weather was very unfavour- able and at night no flying was possible. On August 3 the weather was again un- propitious, but, some work was done, and although the night was very dark, five tons were dropped by us on the stations of Fives, south- east of Lille, and Steenwerck. August 4 and 5 were almost without incident in the air, but the next day there was some recrudescence and 24 tons of bombs were dropped by us and five German machines were accounted for. We lost none. On the morning of August 8 our machines carried out a successful attack on the explosive factories at Bombach, north of Metz. Good results were obtained without any casualties to us. These results must be regarded as very satisfactory, and show that the Allies had now obtained a distinct superiority in the air. The active operations, so far as the Crown Prince's armies were concerned, came to an end on August 5. They were driven back to the Aisne. They had suffered heavy los.ses in men and material, but there was no dissolution of the organization of the units and on the whole the 134 THE TIMES tiliSTOU^ OF THE WAR. retirement took place in fair order, which was tlie more remarkable as they had lost heavily in prisoners, killed, and wounded and day after day had also to abandon a large amount of material. The Gennan Army had now made four great efforts and one smaller to penetrate into the Allied lines and had been brought up ill all of them.* They had in these efforts u.sed up a large proportion of their reserves. imdergone their bapteme-de-feu and had proved themselves to be good men. Marshal Foch had from the time he took over the command impressed a definite character oi) the operations of the Allied Armies. His plan was ably conceived and had been well carried out by the Allied Commanders. It was no light task to devote himself at first in difficult circimistances to a patient and obstinate defen- sive and to keep in suspense any counter move- AMONG THE CLOUDS. and had no means of replenishing them. On the other hand, the Allies were becoming stronger day by day. The French had re- placed a good proportion of their losses, and the fresh troops which had come over from England in the late spring and early summer had by now been incorporated into various units and properly trained. The British Army was ready to assume the offensive, and consider- able access of' strength was now being gained by the rapidly growing nximbers of trained troops in the American Army. Many of these had • March 21 against our Third and Fifth Annies. April against the British and Portuguese between Armenti^res and La Bass6e. May 27 against the French at the Chemin-des-Damps. June 9 against the French from Montdidier to Noyon, Binaller alfnir. July 14 against the French east and west of Tleims and down to ttie Marne. ment until the circumstances were absolutely those which were required for its success. His apparently passive attitude was not allowed to pass without criticism. Many amateui-s of the closet thought he might have attacked before he did ; but he knew better ; he measured the pul e of battle accurately. He waited until its beats slowed down, an<l when the Crown Prince's army by its wild rush to the Marne exposed its right flank in the way that the French leader rightly foresaw it very likely would, he turned on it and attacked with concentrated vigour. The result of his action has just been described. This preliminary campaign was an earnest of further successes, more especially as circumstances wore continu- ally becoming more favourable to him. On July 23, by which time it was quite plain THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 135 thatr the Soissons^Reims attack of the Germans was a failure, a Conference was held, at which were present the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the leaders of the British, French and American Armies. Marshal Foch asked Field- Marshal Haig, General P6tain, the Commander- in-Chief of the French Armies in the north and north-east, and (Jeneral Pershing each to prepare a scheme for local offensives to be begun at once with certain definite objectives •of a limited nature. So far as the British Army was concerned, its main object was to be the tlirusting back of the German front so as to free the Paris-Amiens railroad, and for this purpose it was necessary to attack the flat .salient occupied by the Giermans from Albert down to the Oise. The French and American Armies were to free other strategic railroads for operations farther south and east. It was also desirable to put an end to the threat on Hazebrouck and through this town to the northern French ports. This involved the recapture of Kemmel Hill and the general pressing back of the salient which the Germans had won at Kemmel earlier in the year, combined with an operation in the direction of La Bassee. If this could be successfully carried out, it would greatly im- prove the British position at Ypres and put an end to all fear of a Gferman break-through down to the ports which were important bases for our supplies. It would, moreover, ensure the safety of the Bruay coal mines, which were ■of enormous importance to the north of France and Belgium. • Field -Marshal Haig had carefully considered the different operations open to the British Army and 'had discussed them with Marshal Foch. Ultimately, after much thought, he had come to the conclusion that the Amiens ■direction was the most proR.«!ing and the most promising in immediate results. To pre.ss back the Germans here was to intensify their defeat •on the Mame, and would completely relieve Paris of all danger and put an end to any hoj)e •of separating the British from the French forces. The more northern operation could wait until this was successful. Tlie general idea of the operations to be imdertaken arrived at was, after dealing successfully with the more pressing require- ments in front of Amiens, that the British forces should attack the line St. Quentin-Cambrai, while the French and American Annies wovild converge in an attack on Mezieres If this combination was successfully carried out, the communications of the Germans, which ran back through the line Maubeuge-Hirson-Mo/.ieres and by wliich line their forces on the Champagne front could be supplied and maintained would be threatened, if not interrupted. Once Maubeuge was occupied, a forward movement of the Allies on Mons and towards Brussels would threaten the main line of communication between Belgium and Germany on which the supply and maintenance of the troops in the former country depended, and this of coiu^e would have been a powerful adjunct to any A CAMOUFLAGED GERMAN SEARCH- LIGHT. direct advance on the Grerman Armies between Brussels, Antwerp, and Ghent. The Germans were quite aware of the vital character of any advance between St. Quentin and Cambrai. This was clearly shown when General Byng hat! made his successful advance, in November, 1917 ; his unexpected irruption had caused the Gtermans to accumulate every available man they could against his army. It was unfortunate that lack of numbei's had prevented the operation being the ' brilliant success it might otherwise have been. This part of the German front was defended by the great organized zone to \<;hich the general name of the Hindenburg line may be applied. The main Hindenburg line ran down from Lille, past Le Catelet to La Fere-Laon- Vouziers-Verdun, through the St. Mihiel salient to Pagny. Part of the line from about the Aisne to the southern end was known as the Bruiuihilde ; somewhat in advance of it very near Lens were the Wotan, the Siegfried, and Alberich lines running to Reims. Beliind the 136 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE OF AUGUST 8. 1918. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 187 main line was another fortified system running from Douai by Mezieres-Sedan-Montm6(ly down to where the Bninnhilde line terminated about Pagny. An additional reserve system was under construction, which ran from Valen- ciennes to Givet. It does not appear that this was ever completed. But at any rate, the lines were extensive and formidable, and their capture could scarcely be calculated upon W'ithout very serious resistance. The special idea so far as the forces en- trusted to Sir Douglas Haig were concerned was the attack on the German positions from Albert and Villers-Bretonneux back to the Hindenburg line between St. Quentin and the Scarpe, and behind them was the Hindenburg line of defences. To strengthen the British force, the French First Army xmder General Debeuey was placed at Sir Douglas Haig's disposal, and to strengthen his attack, which was to be conducted mainly by the British Fourtli Army, he added to it the Canadian Corps and the two British Divisions (from the First Army) which had been held in readiness astride the Sohime as has been previously described, ante p. 8.'5. On the evening of August 7, along the line from which the attack was to be made, the following were the dispositions : Between the Ancre and the Luce from Albert to Hangard the Fourth British Army, under General Sir Hefiry Bawlinson, was faced across the Somme by nine German Divisions belonging to the Second German Army imder General von der Marwitz. From Hangard to Courcelles, south- east of Montdidier, was the First French Army, opposed by von Hutier's Eighteenth German Army ; south of the First Army was the Third French Army under General Humbert, pro- longing the front to the junction of the Matz with the Oise. The situation was in some ways a repetition of that which had taken place on the jSIarne. There Mangin and Degoutte had been on the right flank of the German salient. On this occasion the Third French Army would, when the frontal attack by the British and French directly facing the Germans had sufficiently developed, strike against the left flank of von Hutier's Army and help to drive it back. Sir Doxiglas Haig was placed in command of the First French Army as well as the British troops, and he was responsible for its move- ments. Humbert, with the Third French Army, would enter into action at the moment considered by Marshal Foch to be favourable. The plan of operations designed by Sir Douglas Haig was to strike in an easterly and south-easterly direction, using the river Soninie to cover the left flank of his troops, aiming in the first instance at the line >)etweRn M('"ricourt-Hur- RUSTIG QUARTERS IN THE HINUEN- BURG LINE. Somme and Le Quesnel, so as to push back the Germans and render more .seciu-e the railroad from Paris to Amiens. The next step was to be the captm-e of Roye and the important railway junction of Chaulnes. The advantages to be gained frona the capture of the latter point are evident. In the case of Roye the great object was to cut the railway connexions of the Grcrmans in the country between Lassigny and Montdidier, and this object wovdd be eventu- ally made easier by the action of the Third French Army striking up in a northerly direc- tion from its initial position. As early as July 13 General Rawlinson had received instructions to be ready to attack to the east of Amiens at an early date, and the Canadian Corps and the two British Divisions from the Somme were added to his armv. On July 28 138 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the First French Army was definitely placed under Sir Douglas Haig for the proposed attack. Elaborate prepturations were taken to mislead the enemy and to lead him to think that no movement was intended in the direction in which it was to be carried out. For this pur- pose considerable preparations were made to lead the Germans to think that the British attack would be made in Flanders. Canadian battalions were put into line on the Kemmel GENERAL VON DER MARWITZ. Commanded the German Second Army. front so that the enemy might recognize their position there. Headquarters for various Army Corps were prepared and casualty clearing stations constructed in positions where they could be easily observed by the Grermans in the Sonune area. Great activity took place on our wireless stations on the First Army front, and arrangements were made to lead the enemy to suppose that a great concentration of tanks was taking place round St. Pol, all this pointing to the main attack being in the direction of Ypres. In that area, too, combined training operations with infantry and tanks were carried out on days on which the enemy's long-distance reconnoitring and photographing aeroplanes were likely to work behind our lines. The consequence of all this activity was that the Giermans thoroughly believed that a large and important operation on the northern front was about to begin, and during the course of the actual movements definite evidence was obtained that such had been their belief Final details for the combined British and French attack were ready early in August and the morning of August 8 was fixed as the day on which the attack was to commence. The line held by the Australian Corps on the right of the British Fourth Army was extended southward so as to include the Amiens-Roye road and the Canadian Corps was brought up by night behind this portion of our lines. There was to be a large collection of tanks, but their concentration was put off till the last moment and carried out as secretly as possible. We have already seen that the enemy had during the early part of August drawn some- what backward from the positions he had held west of the Avre and Ancre rivers, which was of some advantage to our troops, though scarcely affecting the general position, but the Grermans seem still to have had some notion of attacking towards Amiens, and a strong local attack was launched by them on August 6 south of Morlancourt, which fell on the III. Army Corps on the left of General Rawlinson's Army. This added to the difficulty which this unit had when the attack com- menced on August 8. The operation undertaken by tlie Germans at 4.30 a.m. on August 6 was made by fresh troops of their 27th Division and was preceded by considerable artillery fire and heavy gas shelling. The ground chosen for attack was that which the Australians had taken and consolidated on July 28-29, south of Morlan- court. It was to a great extent successful, the advanced positions along most of the front being captured and held by the enemy during the day, but the next morning our troops counter-attacked and drove him out of the captured position and practically re-established the original line of our front. As a set-off against this temporary success of the Germans, the French troops progressed on the same date, made a further movement to the Avre, seizing the left bank between Morisel and Braches. The German raid to the south-east of Montdidier broke down completely. It is possible that the Morlancourt incident was the commencement of a further important attack by the Germans, and this is somewhat borne out by the statement of von Ardenne in the Berliner Tagehlatt of August 6, which runs as follows : It is clear that the defensive battle now being fought by our retreating troops will not be continued indefinitely. The German ofjensive has suffered an unpleasant inter- ruption, but it will certainly be resumed. A fact which will contribute to such a resumption of the offensive is THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 139 that our armies botwopii the Aisno and tho Marno were able to carry out thoso operations witli their own reserves, without being obliged to tiraw upon thoso army reserves the unrestricted use of which secures the initiative to the German Supreme Command. Apart from other factors, the happy confidenco of our anny leaders, which has recently been described by our war correspondents, guarantees that this freedom ol initiative will, at the right time, bo utilized. It may here be remarked that the " freedom of initiative " was henceforth to remain in the hands of the AUies vintil the armistice. There was no old-fashioned preliminary bombardment which only served to warn the enemy ; but at 4.20 a.m. on August 8 the massed British artillery opened a devastating fire against the whole front of attack, com- pletely crushing the enemy's batteries, some of which indeed n^ver succeeded in going into action. General Rawlinson's attack was made on a front of over 11 miles from the south of the Ainiens-Roye road to Morlanootirt inclusivOk On the left, north of the Somme, was the m. Corps under Lieut. -General Sir H. K. Butler, who had the 58th and 18th Divisions in front line and the 12th Division in support. On the right of this and in the centre general line came the Australian Corps under Lieut. - General Sir J. Monash, with the 2nd and 3rcl Australian Divisions in the front and the 5th and 4th Australians in support. On the right of the line was the Canadian Corps, under Ijeut. -General Sir A. E. Currie, with the 3rd, 1st, and 2nd Canadian Divisions in front line and the 4th Canadian Division in the second. The French First Army under Genera! Debeney was on the right of the British Fourth Army on a line of between four and five miles extending down to Moreuil inclusive. As the Allied troops progressed forward the right of the French attack was to be gradually ex- tended southwards until its southern extremity would be opposite Braches. General Debeney was to move forward an hour later than the opening of the British attack ; the idea no doubt being that this would be favourable to an outflanking movement. The British Cavalry Corps, consisting of three cavalry divisions, under the command of Lieut. -General C. T. McM. Kavanagh, was behind the British front, while the special mobile force of two motor machine-gun brigades and a Canadian Cyclist Battalion, under Brigadier-General Bnitinel, was ordered to follow up the success along the line of the Amiens -Roye road. Shortly after the artillery fire opened, the British infantry with an important force of tanks advanced to the attack. The ground GERMAN PRISONERS PASSING BRIUSH ARTILLERY. [OffieinI pMotrapM. 140 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. ■was covered with a heavy mist, which aided tlie operation, and the first objectives on the line Demuin-ilarcelcave-Cerisy, to the south of Morlancourt. were quickly captured, the enemy being completely surprised. This attack was well into the first line of the German defensives and represented an advance varying from a few hundred yards to over a inile. The barrage (vhich our guixs put down was so powerful that it reduced the German reply to comparative impotence. This was no doubt^ to some extent due to the mist, which operated in our favour precisely in the same way that it had operated to the German advantage in the advance against General Gough's Army on March 21, that is to say, while our men knew exactly where to put down the shells on certain fixed points the Germans could not see where to shell effectively our moving forces. The tanks played a great part in the advance, going on ahead of the infantry in many parts of the line, smothering the machine-gun nests. Very hard fighting took place just at the point of junction cSf our line with that of the French. Here, beyond the windings of the river Luce, the ground rose up steeply to the edge of , the plateau intersected by many gullies, with the woods known as the Dodo Wood and Hamon Wood on the upper slopes. The attack here was greatly aided by the tanks which had been brought over the river during the previous night. The infantry advanced behind the tanks, while the barrage cut off all German support? from the points attacked, coming down like a curtain behind the woods. These were quickly cleared by our men, and a considerable number of prisoners taken. To the north of this point, above Hangard, there were three small woods known as Hangard Copse, Wren Copse, and Cemetery Copse, and here the Germans offered a more strenuous resistance. In the atteck on Marcelcave and Aubercourt the tanks were of great utility, going on in advance of the infantry where the enemy machine-guns were strongest, and destroying the nests in which they were ensconced. Our aeroplanes did what they could to help the attack, but the misty weather and consequent low visibility much impeded them ; but they had the air completely to themselves, and not even one German observation balloon was to be seen, although ours went up quite early in the action. North of the area referred to, where the raillroad runs from Villers-Bretonneux to Chaulnes, and on the Somme itself, the ad- vance was carried out with extraordinary rapidity, and our men suffered extremely small losses, and took some 2,000 prisoners. Immediately along the northern bank of the \ Somme the advance was fairly successful. Towards Chipilly the advance was also rapid, and part of the wood which covered it to the north with the aid of ,the tanks was cap- tured, but the village itself remained in German hands. In the Morlancourt region the Germans offered a greater resistance, and here our troops made but little progress ; they did not succeed in capturing the village, and the machine-gun fire from the heights north of it distinctly held back our attack. Between Morlancourt and Cliipilly, on the Bray-Corbie road, our advance was held up for some time, although our troops had extended a good bit to the north of Morlancourt. The artillery followed up the operation with great celerity, and our men, when they occupied the advanced Grerman positions, soon found themselves svipported by the guns. Opposite the area attacked by the British there were some eight German divisions — viz., the 27th, 43rd, 13th, 41st, 109th, 25th and the 14th, while, near Marcelcave, the 117th had come up during the previous night From all these divisions a considerable number of prisoners were taken. As the attack progressed, our cavalry and armoured cars and motor machine- guns pushed on ahead and played havoc among the retreating Germans. By nightfall the British south of the Somme were in possession of the line Morconrt-Harbonnieres-Caix ; this represented a bulge forward into the German line varying on the left from 3J miles to 6 miles on the right. On the right of tlje attack, Le Quesnel was still in the hands of the Germans, but this was the only point in their outer line of defences which remained in their hands up to the south bank of the Somme. Field-Marshal Haig reported on the brilliant and predominating part taken by the Canadian and Australian Corps as being worthy of the highest commenda- tion. The British cavalry was also of the greatest use. The three divisions under Lieut. - General Sir C. T. McM. Kavanagh had com- pleted their assembly behind the battle front at the points of concentration by a series of night-marches, and on August 8 they advanced 23 miles from these points, and by the dash and vigour of their action, aided by the tanks and motor machine-guns, rendered most valuable THE TIMES HISTORY OF. THE WAR. 14] and gallant service. Passing through the line of infantry, tliey carried confusion into the retreating Germans, captured numerous con- voys, and altogether greatly added to tha successes of the day. The whole clay's fighting showed the admirable manner in which General was sent against the Malard arid Oreasain Woods, and another tlirected against Chipilly The first-named wood we contyived to capture and hold for a time, taking 500 prisoners witb some field-giuis and two howitzers, but when the attempt was made' to advance on, Chipilly BRITISH CAVALRY CLEARING UP Rawlinson had carried out the preparations for the advance, and the success of the movement was largely due to him and his staff. North of the Somme our progress had, as wo have seen, not been so great. Here the Germans were well established at Morlancourt, and on the heights to the north of it. One brigade GERMAN MACHINE-GUN NESTS. it was brought to a standstill. The ground here, was full of dug-outs and machine-guns and there was a complete absence of cover in front of the village, where on the river bank the ground was flat and open. The mist also had prevented the proper co-ordination of the various units, and especially was this the 142 THE TIMES HISTORY OF -THE WAR. caso with the tanks, which had gone too far to the north. The result was at the end of August 8 we had only got to the ground west of the village ; the latter was still in GJerman hands. The captures of the day were significant of our success : 13,000 prisoners, between 300 and 400 guns, very large nivmbers of machine- guns, and vast quantities of ammunition and stores. By nightfall it was evident that the Germans themselves felt they had received a severe blow, because, behind the line captured, explosions and conflagration? showed that they were engaged in blowing up and destroying ammunition and supply dumps. The roads, heavily encumbered by their wagons retreating eastwards, formed excellent targets for our airmen, who rained bombs and machine-gun fire on them. A great deal of our wide-ranging success was due to the cavalry and the tanks ; both were fearlessly used and results gained which could hardly have been counted on. Nightfall did not stop their progress, and the Germans were attacked in places so remote from the front line that the surprise in them was complete. One armoured car met a German transport column coming up, which tried to turn and escape. Four German mounted officers came up to see what was the reason which had stopped the advance. They were all shot down by the car, which then proceeded to round up the column. At many places the cars caught both mechanical and horse-drawn transport, took the personnel prisoners and shot down the horses. One car attacked a train on the railroad and wrecked it. At another point a village was entered, in which the German troops were peacefully sleeping unaware of the approaching danger. The car went through the street, shooting at the windows, and in one place found an officers' mess enjoying a meal which the arrival of the British bullets soon put an end to. Near Framerville another car happened on a Corps Headquaxters. It shot down many of the Corps Staff and poured bullets into the different hvits. Then it was rumoured that some part of the Staff had escaped along the road toward P6ronne. At once the crew started off after them ; came up on the fugitives and literally hiuited them, killing many and forcing the others to scatter from the road and take refuge in the woods. Among the harvest of prisoners there were one or two interesting cases. A regi- mental commander was captured and was seen to be hiding some papers by thrusting them into his breeches down to the knees. Tlie bulge they made betrayed their presence and he was at once overhauled. He denied that there was anything there at all, but the men who had seized him, having a proper apprecia- tion of the Germafi officer's notions of honour, proceeded to search him, which was done courteously, while he swore horribly all the lojj^cmi piioto'^utphs. CHIPILLY, AND ITS BRIDGE DESTROVED BY 1 HE GERMANS IN THEIR RETREAT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 148 time, reviling the coarsetiess of the brutal English nation and their utter lack of courtesy to a distinguished German officer. This from a member of the race which had treated our own officers with habitual gross and vulgar insult is not only characteristic, but amusing. Amongst other notable items captured by oiu' men was a whole train, which was intercepted as it was coming up to the front and 500 Saxons were taken piisoner from it. The battlefield south of the Sommo over which the centre and right of Oeneral Rawlin- son's Army advanced, and to the south CJenerai Debeney's I. French Corps, is known as the Santerre plateau and consists of a wide expanse of rich farm-land, and like most of the country in this part of France, is without hedges, the buildings being confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the farms. It was covered with crops of wheat, oats, and barley, which were ready for the sickle, and here and there good crops of potatoes. The whole flat expanse being covered with growing crops, hid to a great, extent the works which the Germans hatl newly constructed. These do not appear in most places to have been of a very formidable character, nor were the wire entanglements of the usual broad and strong construction, and it was perfectly evident from the results observed that our artillery fire had been far in excess' of that of the eneiny, for over the whole field was spread a vast and complicated mass of equipment which had been abandoned in the hurried retreat of the Germans. Amongst the booty captured was a box of 450 Iron Crosses sent up. for distribution to a certain division, which went to form welcome " souvenirs " for those who captured them One agreeable deduction made from the perambulation of the battle-field was the undoubted fact that our casualties bore but a very small proportion to those we had inflicted on our adversaries. The centre of our attack was, as we know, feebly opposed, and one Australian division had only 300 casualties and took 1,600 prisoners, besides inflicting a large number of casualties in killed and wounded on the troops opposed to them. South of Sir Henry Rawlinson's attacks. General Debeney, in accordance with the arranged plan, moved forward at 5.5 a.m. His attack was a complete surprise to the Germans. This may have been to some extent due to the fact that the British attack had commenced nearly an hour before. To the south Morisel and then Moreuil were quickly captured and thus the passage over the Avre secured. Pressing farther onward, Fresnoy and Plessier were captured and touch was gained with Brutinel's forces on the Amiens- Roye road, a little to the west of Le Quesnel, while farther south i]\o Avre \vn« n'_';iiti iki -icd [tJtiott ir try^ MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HIGGINSON, Commanded the Twelfth Division. at Pierrepont ; 3,350 prisoners and many guns and machine-guns were taken by our Ally on this day. The whole day represented a most brilliant strategical success. Our line had been carried forward a long distance from the Avre at Pierrepont to the Somme at Morcourt. The German command must have been conscious that their position from Montdidier eastward was now being threatened, and the only consolation they had was that they had held us on the north flank of the Somme. To use Sir Douglas Haig's own words, " the keeping character of the success which in one day had gained our first objective and dis- engaged the Paris-Amiens railway opened a clear field for the measures of exploitation determined upon to meet such an event." The attack was continued on August 9. From the First Cavalry Division, commanded by Major-General R. L. Mullens, the 8th Hu-ssai-s advanced and took Meharicourt at a gallop, while the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, imder Major-General T. T. Pitman and Major-Goneral A. E. W. Harman respectively, passing tlirough 144 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. our infantry, pressed on the enemy, captured many prisoners and gained a considerable amount of ground. That night south of the Somme we held Bouchoir, Rouvroy, Maucourt * and Framerville, and reached the western edges of Lihons and Proyart, being thus within striking distance of Cliaulnes, the junction point of the railways by which the supplies for von Hutier's Army were brovight up. North of the Somme the attack did not start till late in the afternoon, when the 12th Division, under Major-General H. W. Higginson, and a regiment from the 33rd American Division, which was commanded by Major-General G. Bell,, advanced to a line east of Chipilly, Morlancourt, and Dernancourt. " Chipilly was an extremely difficult point, as we have before seen, and although on the previous day we had succeeded in capturing Gressaire Wood, we were compelled to give it up owing to the heavy fire which was brought to bear on it from the height above. Malard Wood was also captured, which may thus have • The Dispatch, para. 18, calls this place Morcourt. This is obviously a mistake ; Morcourt is on the south flank of the Somme and was taken, according to para. 17 ou August 8. allowed the Germans to suppose that the assault would not be prolonged to the south of it. Le Quesnel was taken aboiit 6 a.m. and later the general advance was continued. At first there was . considerable opposition on the line Beaufort-Vrely-Rosieres-Framerville, and also in the neighboiu-hood of Chipilly. Gressaire Wood was taken, but it was only after hard fighting that Chipilly was entered by our troops at 5.30 in the evening. When this was done the enemy appears to have lost heart in this neighbourhood and to have retreated precipitately. We had now gained possession of the high ground which ran back from Morlancourt in a north-easterly direction parallel to the Somme, and Morlancourt was in oxu' hands. On the 9th Defceney's Army advanced to battle at 9 a.m., deploying on the line from Beaueourt down to Montdidier. The progress at midday was very rapid and by the afternoon the troops had gained the line Ai-villers-Hangest and back to the Avre about Pierrepont. Altogether, in the two days' fighting, the Allies had gained a signal victory. CHAPTER CCr.XXIX. THE BATTLES OF AMIENS AND BAPAUME, AUGUST, 191 8. Battle of Amiens Resumed — Work or the Cavalry and Tanks — Defensive Tactics : Ludendorff's Order — Humbert's Attack towards Lassiony — Allies Reach the Line of 1917 — King's Visit to the Front — German Damage to Amiens — Lassiony Captured — Enemy Withdrawal on the Ancre — German Comment on the Fighting — British Dispositions — Opening of the Battle or Bapaume— Progress of the Attack — Work in the Air — Fall of Albert — Thiepval Ridge Carried — Air Fightinq in August. WE liave seen in Chapter CCLXXVII. that the Germans had been de- feated in tiieir advance to tlio Marne. They had not retired from their advanced positions without carrying with tliem souvenirs of their visit. On the present occasion several of these were quite unique in character. Tlius at Arcy, a Major von Titzch stole from the shrine of Ste. Restitue (6J miles south-east from Hartennes) a golrl shrine, valued at some £500. He also stole lead from the coffins and plate and other valuables at the Chateau of Miu-et at Muret-et-Croutte (3 miles north-east of Hartennes). Letters which were taken show that the robbery of the French was calculated and systematic. We have seen earlier in the war how the Ger- men women asked for watches and jewellery ; some of them wei-e now proposing to set up shop on the ill-gotten gains of their menkind in France. This is shown by two lettere dated July 11 and 13, of which the fii-st is reproduced below : Dear .Toskph.-^You say that I only write wheii 1 want .something. If for every letter or card I 5;ent you I got a shirt, skirt, or pair of trousers in return I should to-day be able to open shop. For three months I've been impatiently waiting for the tobacco for H . Don't forget the address. Kvery day I ask whether there are any parcels for me, but there are never any. Are the dresses ■ you've got pretty ? Examine them Vol. XIX.— Part 239 weJI to .see there are no holes in theni. You must hold them up against the light, and you'll soo at once. Anna was very grateful for the little slippers. I told her to send you her warmest thanks. Willy promises to pet her a eloak. Get ine one, too, aiui don't forget a good French woollen coverlet. As the policeman says, any- thing you can put on your back or use in any way -should bo carried of!. The second letter was in a similar strain, l^vit apparently haberdashery wanted supple- menting by a supply of Hnen goods, which was asked for in it. It is perhaps not extraordinary to find that people who were guilty of acts of this kind also robbed one another. Lotto Brandt wrote from Neu Koln on Jtme 24 a letter to a soldier at the front as follows : According to your letter of Juno 20 the parcel contains all sorts of loot (schnafte Sachen), Mamma and I will certainly gladly give some marks to the soldier on leave. We also badly want a purse. You say Uncle ilax can choose from what you've sent. What is he to have ? Write and let as know if you mean a pair of shoes, ajid tell as which. It is quite natural you should keep the best pipe for yourself. I am delighted over the ear- rings and bracelet. Four days later the soldier on leave arrived, but the gentle Lotte Brandt had a bitter dis- appointment. She writes : To-day the person came, but I mu^t tell you, you've been taken in by a rogue. Yesterday we wont to his house, but he was out. To-day Emma went with him to Potsdam Station, but the parcel waa not there. He has simply pinched (geklaut) the parcel and done a stroke of 145 146 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. ^ -V-"^'' ^,s?=**^'"*<8iiireJ?^^(AV"^»\ ■.■:■■■ BATTLE llNt Dawn AUGUST Q.»- •- AUGUST 23j-- o Wanquetin oGouy iaiiittulval ■' 'j''^'''^ Blairviile lf\j\r.;^^A ' five ■» jTy*- '-' Nfunlle- '■ °J^ .-»■ ^\ ij4(enin oSocnbrin oSeuit; o Crouches '^ '^^'"f^ofK Fonqucvillcrs "■ non '2 Miles ■-■" '• CourcslleS'^'^' Serf e # Pulsic.x-j W(»7V f^reuil *t^ icheuxV flcheuxN ■ ^'srennes ° >'Bapaume« Flesquikns Marcoinq t' Trescault 'uyaulcourt Neuville-5(jof/o''W W/X "^.0 .0» IJF ° ^^, «... IrtfirtdCUJl "(5 Ir^^/Z/Ts '/sir/ ^ Manancou'rt 5^ — -^ .^itFfnS. £M«i/ "CulslBm Epehy *^ Amiens 4 Miles rl jUurluj/ WC/'/a/ns/T Li'r'V"'- // Ronssoy GeMles Marcelcave ^"'«ie;^<' ,,P^^":'''if;% ^-^^^^ „ ^,, 'S'QuenCin 4 Miles-* ^t,.,.?<;#J04 isoflJ Mailly- Uinevjln /ilfersJS ubtgny firjy ouvroy® '**'9''e?cL°ri ' ^^''/'^° ^5 o Hanqest .BdhcfioiJ^ ^^ u.r.t\'^ /Liancourt "'^ ^OTCM^t" ■■.V;^i, Gucroijny villerS,''^"^*'^ / Av..«^., Balalr, e^^^,^ ^Esmcry Kalian | TBrouchy f**f"^f/l=.R9uicres Marquiv;ilers .o<raj/«si«^ RoioliS^ '■ ;3Iontdidi ° oncjy Cf^H. Q> cflrffl . ^/tf^y yyilleselve* ^ / /%;tsl d jl , "Seaumont Uger °r™oy,^ ^ imppei 11 * "• xr^. Carlepont o'?' Jt •' "VNampcel •V^ \\ Aufi^fticourt \\ THE BATTLES OF AMIENS AND BAPAUME. THE TIMES ■ HJRTOEY OF THE WAR. 147 THE CHATEAU DE MURET. busiiioNs. When you see him hit him ovor the ftiee with your rifle-butt. May the first shell be for Inm ard blow him to bits that will go where the things are. We could not sleep all night, we were so angry. I see red when I think of the earrings. What were they like ? Even if I never got them I should like to know what they were like. Good-bye ; that dirty thief, that cursed hound, has quite upset rae. We left off with Field -Marshal Haig's offensive on August 9. The first two days' fighting may be looked upon as the first act of the drama, and had been very successful. Seventeen thoii.sand prisoners had been taken ; 400 guns, inchtding a pun on a railway tnount- ing of heavy calibre, and trench mortars and machine-guns innumerable ; vast quantities of stores and material of all descriptions, including a complete railway train and other rolling stock. The guns came in especially useful. The ammunition supplies captured by us were enormous, and these served for employment in the captured artillery against the troops they had formerly belonged to, among whom thiey created very heavy casual- ties. The good work done by our cavalry has been nlludod to. but a few more dotails niav be WHAT WAS LEFT BY THE GERMANS OF THE CHAteAU DE MURET. 239—2 148 THE TIMES HISTORY OP THE WAR. interesting. So well did they come to the front that by 11 o'clock on August 8 a cavalry brigade operating with the left of the Canadians was pushing through the infantry from Marcel- cave to Wiencourt and Guillaucourt. Coming BRITISH, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN AMIENS. out from the latter place, it was received by heavy machine-gun fire, but taking advantage of the low grotmd on the right, worked on to the German advance line, rounding up a number of prisoners on the way. A brigade operating with the Australians on the other side of the Chaulnes railway line reached their objectives by 1 o'clock, having taken numbers of pri- soners and some guns and other booty. Both on the north and south the cavalry held the line they had reached till the infantry came up and took over at 7.30 that evening. Dra- goon Guards on the same day had captured Vauvillers with a rapid dash and Dragoon Guards and Hussars together rushed into the big woods south of Cayeux at a gallop and took 200 prisoners, then, pushing on, they held the high ground to the south of Caix. On August 9, Hiissars distinguished them- selves greatly near the village of Vr^ly. Here machine-guns and some cavalry which had tried to approach the place from the westward found the enemy's fire too strong for them. The Hussars then galloped round north of Rosieres, and then wheeling back, galloped into M6haricourt, four miles to the east of Vr^ly before the Germans were aware that they were on them. They cleared and held the wood, pushing out patrols to hold positions still farther east towards the " Halte " on the north near Lihons and Maucourt on the east. The in- fantry then came up and seized Vrely. The cavalry pushed forward to the south-east, but fomid themselves brought up near Fouques- court, where there were some old entrench- ments covered by wire and held strongly by machine-guns. The total number of prisoners taken by the cavalry was over 2,500. They captured the big gun on railway mountings in conjunction with a tank which fired into the engine and 'brought it up, and also a large periscope. The Canadian Cavalry, in addition to their work on the Roye road, near Dam^ry, took Beaucourt in most gallant style, acting first as cavalry, and then dismounting and clearing out machine-gun nests. Tanks, as we have seen, also played a very large part in the fighting. On the French front the Avre had to be crossed by then before they could be brought into battle line this slowed down the progress of the French at first, and limited their front. The Avrf had to be bridged, and this had to be done at many points before the troops could cross in sufficient numbers. At the beginning of the battle the line was only 2 J miles from Asnidres to the Hourtes-Roye road on the west of Morisel, but was afterwards widened to include the whole valley as far as Hargicourt, a length of 6 J miles, and by the end of the day the deptli was 8f miles. In these two days of the Allied offensive when the tanks got across in fair niunbers, the effect was immediate, and the extension of the French line of attack was largely due to their action. Heavy patterns were employed, as well as the " Whippet " tanks, and tlie former were extremely useful in dealing with buildings. At one point the French had some difficulty with a village which was heavily defended with machine-guns, many of which were in the upper stories, which held them up for a time. Five of the heavy tanks were brought up and proceeded to demoli-sh the houses from which the fire came. In this way 10 houses were dealt with in succession. The tanks butted into them and literally went through them, bringing down bricks, joists, floors and roofs, machine-guns and machine- gunners in one confused and helpless mass. They emerged from their task covered with the debris, but the job was done. The Frencli infantry were enabled to come on and gather up the fragments which remained. At Treux, north of the Sommo, a tank which had come up in that direction was asked to THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 14;» help an advanced post. When it arrived there, the Commander asked the Tank Commander to destroy a small post in the opposite line wiiich was amioying him very much. Ho asked for some infantry to help and 12 men went on with him. Straight into the post went the tank, ck^an over one of the machine-guns ; the rest of the German garrison then, thinking discretion the better part of valour, came out into the open with tlieir liands in the air, and the tank and the 12 infantrymen, all imwounded, escorted back seven oflfi(rers and 200 prisoners. character which our tanks performed, both with the French and also with our own troops, would take too long. Suffice it to *ay that many of the light natiu-e cooperatect with our acroplani-s in raiding the lines along which the retreating Germans were hurrying to safety. Th«y supported the cavalry in similar efforts and did enormous service in crushing out small machine- gun nests, scattered about the battlefield. These would have been costly to take with infantry, but fell without any casualties to speak of into our hands, though with great losses both in A GERMAN 280mm. GUN FOR THE BOMBARDMENT OF AMIENS. Captured by the Australians and exhibited in Paris. The range of this weapon is about 20 miles. A little incident near Mareelcave formed a typical example of what cavalry and light tanks working in unison are capable of. In a small wood to the south-east of it, near the road from Villers-Bretonneux to Denuiin, the Germans with their machine-giuis held up our advanced cavalry. Sojne light tanks went off, going roimd to the south and attacking the wood from that side ; the Gennans, beheving this to be the main attack, ran out across the open to escape it. The cavalry, who had been held back, then saw their cliance and charged into the bolting enemy. A good many were killed with cold steel ; the rest promptly surrendered, 700 prisoners being taken. To recount all the deeds of, a special machine-giuis and the men who manned them to the Germans. There seems little doubt that the Germans had acquiesced in the efforts to thrust them back over the Avre, which have already been described, because they tUd not want to meet the tanks on the open ground above the river, nor indeed to fight with this obstacle behind them The military critic of the Vienna Neue Freie Presae early in August gave as his opinion : — That the tank in its improved form is doubtle-:s a factor seriously to be reckoned with, all the more when it appears in great masses. Hitherto tank squadrons containing hundreds of tanks have been employed. If part, even half of them, are destroyed, it is the same as when hunmn tightera 150 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. fall, who have helped the survivors and therefore have not fallen in vain. It is oorjceivable (he says) that the enemy and the world*s almost unlimited war indu.-:try may produce this (Irro in unprecedented masses. As human shock-troops advance in waves, solid tank waves might also advance. This may seem fanta-^tici but sober reflection will admit that such wholesale pro- duction and employment are not outside the bounds of possibility, witness the analagous increase during the war of guns of all calibres to a colos<«al extent. The flight service is also an instructive example. The writer urges the further construction of tanks and special defence artillery. Readiness (he says) is everything ; the tank has a future. The Grermans indeed admitted their value. The Deutsche TagezeUung stated that the with- drawals of the German troops on the rivers Ancre, Avre and Doms were made in order to relieve unfavourable local conditions, and to create a situation tactically more favourable to the Grermans. The plain to the west of Jhe Ancre is lower than the eastern bank of the river and the conditions on the eastern side of the Avre and its tributary, the Doms, with their improved possibilities for observation, facilitated defence. In these sectors the Ancre, the Avre and the Doms form extremely favourable natural barriers. The Essen Allge- meine Zeitung described the retreat as a strategical meastire to spare troops, and added : " Summing up, we may say that, thanks to our leade and the bravery of otu: soldiers, all the enemy's plans have been frustrated and the Army Command now, as before, retains its freedom of action." This was quite evident in the next days. The Gennan leaders were quite at liberty — to go backwards — which they did, ptu'sued by the Allies with much vigour. It is plain from what has been written that for some weeks past the Germans had felt it necessary to adopt a pure defensive ; this was no doubt due to the heavy losses they had had in men and material. An order signed by Ludendorff and dated July 6 is a clear proof of this. It runs as follows ; The principles expounded in the secret circular No 0960 of June 25, 1918, still require completion as regards defensive fighting. The repeated -recent enemy attacks and the unhappily large number of prisoners lost in them show that our occupation of first lines is always too dense on defensive actions, and that the depth of our advanced zone-is insufficient. The enemy is imitating our surprise use of artillery, and by means of it is achieving stjccesses similar to ours. We must oppose him vigorously. Defensive actions require very special attention — first of all, very active reconnaissance on our part, and especially correct tactical principles. An advanced zone of one to two hundred yards is not sufficient, and can only be contemplated when one holds a well organized position and is strong in artillery. It should b<* between 600 and 1,000 yards deep, or more, if there are no good positions and there is only weak artillery. The relation between the depth of the advanced zone, the organiza- tion of the artillery, and the strength of the artillery is still not realized by some officers. The weaker the arf.il- [i-rettih ouii^tut pliuto^raph* A FRENCH TANK. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 151 lery is, and the more the organization of the ground it* inferior, the greater should bt' the depth of the advanced zone. The advanced zone need not have a garrison with very deep echelons. It should rather have the form of patrols, sentinels, and small outposts. Echelons of the garrison, properly so-called, begin at the principal Hne of resistance. By the principal lino of resistance one should understand not merely an organized position, but the whole line of defence that cornmponds with the plan of defence that has been decided on. It can only be determined on the actual ground. It is certainly easier to trace it with organized positions than in open country after an attack. It is the mission of the Com- mand to overcome the inevitable difliculties. Advanced posts must be supported by fire from the grotmd, but the fear that the Entente might force us to fall back several miles is quit« without justification, for they have as few men as we for such attacks. We can only be glad if the £ntente should attack. It usually does so in deikse lines. We can ask for no more favourable occasion to inflict losses on it. The command and the troops should be prepared, and should cause losses to the enemy without sustaining them. Clearer tactical conception is decisive here as elsewhere. It is only by this means that uncertainty will disappear. Leaders and troops must know what they have to do. If the way in which the enemy attacks leave it in doubt whether the garrison of an advanced zone would do better to retreat or hold, it should b<! decided to retreat. That will always be better than sufffrii-j lopses by defending the advanced zone. A BRITISH TANK DESTROYING A GERMAN MACHINE-GUN POST. principal line of resistance. Rifles, light and neavy machine-guns, light mortar«, and batteries, posted for defence of the advanced zone, must be methodically used for this purpose. Even stoaatruppen may be left in front of the principal line of resistance. Sniall actions can in this way be fought in the advanced zone. When it is a question of repelling strong patrol attacks the line of resistance m\ist always give considerable support ; sufficient strength must bo engaged, and miLst dastroy the enemy elements that have penetrated into the advanced zone. In such cases barrage fire will always lose its eff ct, the more so the weaker the artillery. Artillery must deliver destructive fire on the zone of combat, follow the fluctuations of the battle, and be as mobile in its fire as the infantry in fighting. Such defensive tactics naturally imply the absolute necessity of instructing the troops, especially the infantry and artillery. In the case of an attack methodically prepared by artillery fire, it is necessary, equally mi»tho- dically, to give up fighting to retain the advanced zone. It is far better to evacuate it. It may be necessary later to draw up a fresh line of resistance in the event of our destructive fire not preventing the enemy from establishing himself in the advanced zone and not driving him out of it. It is obvious that we shall lose Another Army Order of Ludendorff's of July 10 marked " Secret '* drew attention to the great scarcity of horses. One of its para- graphs runs as follows : " We must take care of our horses as they cannot be replaced. The men must thoroughly understand that this is absolutely necessary in order to continue the war luitil victory is reached." As emphasizing this scarcity, the statement of a prisoner captured in the middle of August is worthy of record. He said that 900 remounts received at one depot 14 days before were nearly all riding horses which had been taken from officers. It had been known for some time that the German cavalry was now very badly mounted, and this confirms the information we had received. August 10 saw a fresh strategic movement in 152 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ftccordance with Marshal Foch's plan. Hum- bert's army struck upwards. During the previous night, the French First Army con- tinued their offensive movement towards the right, carried the village of FaveroUes on the east of Montdidier, on the railroad to Roye, and Assainvillers on the south-east. Mont- didier was therefore almost surrounded and the retreat of the Germans from it so seriously threatened that it was abandoned, and nothing but a few machine-gun posts to act as [French o^icial photograph, THE CHURCH OF ORVILLERS-SOREL. a rear-guard was left oh its borders. What proportion of the garrison eventually reached safety there is no evidence to show ; it can but have been a small one, as the whole of the centre of von Hutier's army had been forced back in the direction of Roye. The retreat of the troops in this direction was closely followed up, and then came Humbert's blow on their flank. At 4.20 a.m., the French Third Army ad- vanced rapidly to the attack without any artil- lery preparation, though, of coui-se, there was the usual moving barrage which covered the actual advance of the infantry. The attack took place on a front of over 10 miles from Rollot to Elincourt. The villages of Rollot, Orvillers- Sorel, Conchy-les-Pots, Ressons-sur-Matz, Neu- ville-sur-Ressons, Roye-sur-Matz, Elincourt, were quickly reached and taken, and by the evening the enemy had been driven back over five miles, the Thi6scourt hills were taken, the high ground about Lassigny was nearly reached, and considerable progress made towards Roye. It seems pretty certain that the Germans had not expected General Humbert's attack any more than they had expected General Debeney 's. As soon as the French troops began to advance, the German front trenches sent up rockets asking for reinforcements, but the French advance was so rapid it is doubtful if any of them arrived before the front line of the enemy had been driven back, leaving nothing but nests of machine-gunners to cover the hurried retreat. The strongest resistance was made near Marqu^glise in the wood north of that village, where the high groimd of the Thi&court height began, but the French were not to be denied, and pushing over it, they attacked in succession Mareuil-Lamotte, Lamotte, Gury and La Berliere. Operating on the right of the British troo)js, the French First Army progressed beyond Ai-villers and captured Davenescourt on the Avre, whilst south of Montdidier between Ayencourt and Le Fr^toy they had, as mentioned above, taken Rubescourt and Assainvillers and reached FaveroUes. After a number of fights for localities, a line from Fresnoy-les-Roye — i.e., only half a mile from the railway line from Chaulnes — to Roye was won, and farther south, the right wing, advancing from the Montdidier direc- tion, captured Fescamps, Bus, and in the evening, the height of Boulogne-la-Grasse. Thus Debeney and Humbert were in touch south of the Avre, and the line of the Allies was in complete unison well to the north of the Somme. The fighting on August 10 was very severe where the Australians were in line opposite Lihons. It was natural that the Germans should resist there as long as possible, for they could not be expected to allow the important railway junction of Chaulnes to fall into our hands without a determined struggle. During the night of August 9-10 the Germans brought up fresh troops from Cambrai and hurried them into the trenches on the rising ground round Lihons. At 8 a.m. on August 10 the Australians advanced again, marching directly on the German position at Lihons. The fighting was very severe, but the situation was considerably relieved about an hour later when the Canadians advanced with a consider- able number of tanks on the right of the Australians. Queenslanders and Western Australians attacked the woods near Grand Manoir on the north of Lihons, pushed through on to the hilltop, and captured some German artillery. About midday, a considerable rein- forcement of artillery was brought up, which dealt effectively with the German guns, and by the afternoon the Australian line had got THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 158 a footing well on tlie ridgo to the west of Lihons, covered by the British artillery. About 6 o'clock the Germans opened a severe Donibardment on the wood and high ground and, covered by it, their infantry attacked, but they were unable to make any progress. On the same day other troops of the 4th British Army reached M6haricourt on the south of Lihons and Proyart to the north-west, while in the evening, north of the Sommo, Morlancourt had been captured and the heights to the south-east anil the borders of Etinehem were attained. The Germans blew up the bridge at Bray to impede as much as possible the connexion between our troops north and south of the river. Avigust 11, after three days of unarrested victory, the Allied Armies had reached the position in which they had been from the Autumn of I'OU to the Spring of 1917. Here the enemy still possessed some of the defensive organizations which he had formerly held, which strengthened his position. Moreover, the advance of our line had taken from us the two existing advantages to be derived from flank attack. This was of course inevitable, because the enemy was wise enough, when he saw what was threatening, to remove himself from the pincers before they closed on him. During the morning of this day, the Oennans delivered further attacks with fresh divisions against the British positions at Lihons and to the north and south of that place ; but all their efforts were in vain. They were beaten ba<;k with heavy losses. At one point immediately north of the Ancre they succeeded in penetrating one of our trenches and indeed reached the westera side of the village, but they were then counter- attacked and driven back, fighting fiercely, to the east and north of the village, arul our line was completely restored and Lihons definitely held. Roye they still clung on to with tenacity. During the night of August 10-1 1, our troops gained the high ground between Etinehem and Demancourt, and there was also a certain amount of night fighting south of the river, especially by the French Army, which reached the outskirts of L'Echelle-St. Aurin. From the Somme southwards, the German line was now marked out by foui* points : Braye, Chaulnes, Roye, Lassigny, anil during the afternoon of this day, thei-e were combats in which fighting went on along all the roads leading to these points. The position on the Somme was com- plicated by the difficulty of progress on the northern bank so long as the Germans held the {French ojflciat pHotograpn. THE CHATEAU OF BOULOGNE-LA-GRASSE. 154 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. high ground about Proyart and Chuignolles, as it took in reverse and flank our troops when endeavouring to press their way against Bray. During August 11, however, affairs developed more favourably tor us. The Australians att-acked in the afternoon. The fighting had swayed to and fro during the day, but at half- past eight in the evening a determined attempt was made to take the ^wood north of Proyart known as the Germaine Wood. At first held back by strong machine-gun Are from this wood, our troops under the cover of dusk appear to have advanced tliroiigh the village of M6ricourt and also to have turned Proyart by advancing along the ridge which led from Rainecourt towards Chuignolles, and eventually Proyart fell into our hands. The enemy lost heavily in killed, wounded and prisoners This enabled us to make more progress ; on the north of the river Etinehem was occupied, and more to the north British troops advanced across the plateau extending north-east from Morlan- court to about Meaulte. Debeney's troops had also somewhat severe fighting near Dam6ry on the 100 m. Hill between Andechy and Dam6ry. The German position here was part of their old trenches and was a strong one. Our cavalry had endeavoured to piish forward, but were held up by machine-gun fire, and the British troops on the north and the French on the south both had a severe struggle, and the battle became stationary. This, however, led om- gims to come forward, and the advent of the artillery enabled a strong fire to be brought' to bear not only on the trenches in question but on the ground behind them. The result was that we were enabled to link up our posts east of M^ricourt with our lines east of Etinehem on the north bank of the river. In the neighbourhood of the Roye road and east of Fouquescourt, a little more than a mile west of the Chaulnes-Roye railway, further progress was made and prisoners taken. Troops of the French First Army captured Les Loges 4 J miles due south of Roye on the single line which ran up to Roye from the south through Ressons-sur-Matz. They also made further progress north of Roye-sur-Matz and north of Chevincourt. There was also artil- lery fighting by Marquivillers and Grivillers — the latter point was on the Montdidier-Roye railroad. It will thus be seen that between L'Echelle-St. Aurin and Les Loges, there was still a pocket of Germans left. Obviously they could not remain long where they were, as the French position to the south from Fescamps-Bus back to Les Loges threatened them in flank. Once more King George came to France to see his armies. He arrived on August 5, and as usual put in strenuous work ; during the whole seven days he was at the front, from [.! usiralian official plotcgrapk. IN THE SOMME VALLEY- SLOPES TAKEN BY THE AUSTRALIANS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 155 BRITISH HEAVY GUN Monday afternoon on August 5 arrived, till Tuesday afternoon, August 13 when he left France, there was not a moment of his time that was not occupied in visiting his troops and taking a personal interest in all connected with the armies. On Tuesday he motored up to the north of our line, where he was met by General Plumer, whom he invested with the Grand Cross of the Bath, and gave the Victoria Cross to two officer^ and a sergeant. On the same day he visited a brigade of the Royal Air Force, and proceeded to a large training ground whore a considerable body of troops was under instruction. On August 7 he visited the Forestry Schools and saw the work carried on there, and then went on to meet President Poincar^ at a luncheon given by Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. On August 8 a good deal of the day was spent with the American troops, and after- wards he visited a Casualty Clearing Station. Sir Julian Byng was the next to receive a visit from His Majesty, who on August 9 inspected a School of Instruction. Here he saw in progress battle -practice at different ranges, scouting, obser\'ation, sniping, mus- ketry and revolver shooting. The remainder of the day His Majesty spent calling on various Corps Commanders of the Third Army at their respective Headquarters. The early part of Saturday was devoted i.to the tanks. The various natures were seen at their work, and His Majesty watched with great interest the many astounding feats which these war chariots performed, upsetting walls, bowling over trees, and moving over [Australian ojficial phviv^raph. IN ACTION BEHIND THE AUSTRALIANS. when he ground full of shell-holes. From this he went on to an aerodrome of the Australian Flying Corps, and afterwards lunched with General Sir John Monash, who commanded the Australian Corps. The back areas, which had been heavily bombarded, and where occasional shells were still falling, were next visited. The Labour Corps, with its cosmopolitan contingents, was next inspected and the Portuguese Division visited. On Sunday the King went once more to visit Sir Herbert Pliuner> and here a special inter-denominational service was held, and after church was concluded he held a review of various troops. When this was finished. King George motored over to the Headquarters of the King and Queen of the Belgians and hmched there with them. In the afternoon, attended by Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, he proceeded to visit a squadron of the Royal Air Force which had done good work in attacking enemy submarine lairs. The last day, Monday, August 12, wag devoted to a tour round the back area of the Fourth Army, in the course of which the King visited Amiens and Villers-Brettoneux, and on the next day he motored to a Channel port and embarked for England. The visit was well timed, coinciding as it did with the great victory gained by the Allies. The kindly and personal interest which the King took on this occasion, as indeed he did whenever he visited the troops, aroused the greatest enthusiasm among the men not only of his own Anny but those of our Allies, and it was a happy augury 239—3 166 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. for the future that the visit should have coincided with so iinportant a gain as was laade by the Allies between August 8 and 13. August 12-13 were comparatively uneventful. The CJennans continued to make attacks in the centre about Lihons and down to Fouquescourt, but one and all were failures. We made n little progi"ess on the north side of the Somme, improving our position, and also a little near Lihons. On the right of the Allied line, the French First Army still continued its pressm-e. They were now beyond Les Loges and Roye- sur-Matz, and on August 1 3 held the line from the south corner of the Bois des Loges, close to Fresni^res, and this pushing forward of the right centre of this army effectually stopped a German counter-attack in the direction of Thifacourt. The plateau north-east of Mai-euil was cleared by the French and their position finiily established at Ecouvillon. Canny-sur-Matz was still held by the Gennans, but here again it formed a salient point which was threatened on the south, north and west. These latter points were reached by August 13, and thus the French lines now passed down by Belval to the farther side THE KING ENJOYS A JOKE OF GENERAL PLLIMER'S. [Ol/icial photu^rttpk. Echelles-St. Aurin to Armancourt and Tilloloy, while the left of the French Third Army pene- trated into the eastern edge of the Bois des Loges. The centre of this force had now- arrived at Canny-sur-Matz, and progressing through the wood of Thi6scourt reached Belval, a short distance from Plessis-le-Roye and close to Mont P16mont, which had been the scene of so much hard fighting in March and June. Humbert's right was to the north of Machenion t. Farther east, to the south-east of Ecouvillon, his extreme right was a mile to the north of Cambronne. Further progress brought his line from near Courcelles on the south of Laesigny in a north-easterly direction to of Ecouvillon straight to the Oise. On August 14, Rib6court was captm-ed. The division which took Ribecourt had greatly distinguished itself in the fighting of the past two years. On August 12 the main body of the division had pushed up on to the high groimd of Thiescourt and reached the edge of Ecouvillon, the regiment on its right wing taking Cambronne, less than a mile from Ribecourt. The next day, after an intensive artillery bombardment, the division had rushed the heights of Antoval just beyonfl Cambronne to the north, from which Ribe- court could be seen in the low ground below. At 11 a.m. on August 14, the Divisional THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 157 Commander a«ked the Colonel in command of a dismounted cavalry battalion if he could takt^ the town before the evening ; and in the iifteriioon, when General Hutnbert had come up to congratulate the men on what they had already done and was at the Diviwional Head- ((uartcrs, news was received by carrier-pigeon that the village had been taken. On August 15 the Alisch farm was captured on the ground beyond I^ Hamel. The effect of this victory following close on the defeat of the Glermans on the Marne had depressed the latter and encouraged both the British and French Annies. They lookeil forward to delivering further and stronger blows against the already shaken enemy. The advance of the Allies had now freed Amien.'^ from all tlanger. The unfortunate city had undergone a sad experience since the opening of the German offensive on March 21. On the night of March 24-25, the German aviatoi-s bombed the city very severely, causing much damage and some loss of life, and on thf! following moi-ning, it was considered desirable ior the civilian inhabitants to retire. The movement was conducted without panic. Large munbei's left by train ; others marchefl out by the roads with their belongings on all kinds of vehicles. The object of the Germans had evidently been primarily the large railway yards towards Longeau, for Amiens was an important railway centre, and at the part in ipiestion there was a large collection of sidings anil workshops. On the evening of March 27, the first shells began to fall in the suburb of Rivery, and a very heavy bombing by aero- planes took place during the night. The centre of the town formed their especial target : for instance, the cliief hotels about the Place Ren6 Goblet and the densely populated area from the Cathedral to the Place Gambetta and on the Rue de la Republique. All night long the bombing went on, the damage done was very considerable, and a good many lives, too, were lost. On March 26 and 27 there wei-e various rumours that the German cavalry and armoured cars were pushing on towards Amiens. On March 27 it was stated that they were already on the city side of Villers-Bretonneux. By March 30 few were left in the town but soldiers and the anti-aircraft organizations. By the end of the month almost every night was marked by an attack from the air ; in addition to that, the guns, which were now witliin ramie of the town, commenced to do their worst on the Cathedral, but except for the gratification of their natural vice, the Germans gained no advantage. They inflicted an immense amount THE CHATEAU OF PLESSIS-LE-ROYE. of injury on the hou.ses, however, and it was calculated that one house in seven had l)eeii more or less damaged by bombs or shell-fire, and one in 27 completely wrecked. The Hotel de Ville was scarred and damaged by the shell - fire, but was not wrecked. The Prefectiu-e, however, was totally destroyed by a bomb, and the Museum had one wing badly damaged. A good deal of inj ury was inflicted on the Cathedral, but with the exception of valuable stained gla.ss, the injuries were all repairable. The heart of the business town, along the Rue des Trois Cailloux, close to the Place Gambetta, was almost totally destroyed — large business build- ings were wiped out and an immense amount of damage done. Some of the finest residences in Amiens had been badly hit and many of the churches and other ancient buildings more or less seriously damaged. On the night of August 13, the situation on the right of the Allied attack was becoming stationary. The pocket occupied between the Avre and the Oise by von Hutier had been cleared out and the British and French occupied a position 12 miles in advance of the line from which they had advanced. The ai'ea which now lay before the troops was the general 158 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. I0l}:cial}lioloi:rafl<. A STREET IN AMIENS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE BOMBARDMENT. line of the old Roye-Chaulnes ■ defences and gave the enemy a strong position for defensive fighting. Crossed as it was in all directions by tangled belts of wire, covered by the vegetable growth of two years, full of shell holes and old trench lines, it formed a most excellent position for machine-gun defence. The attacks made by the Allies on August 13 had shown the strength of these positions and also that the enemy was very strongly reinforced. This determined Field-Marshal Haig to break off the battle on this front and transfer it from the Fourth Army to the sector north of the Somme, where it did not seem that the enemy expected attack. His intention was to advance in the direction of Bapaume, so as to turn the old line of the Somme defences from the north. South of the Sonune the pressure was to be continued by the French First and Third Armies, the former of which now ceased to be under the British Commander-in-Chief. On August 15 Fransart, Parvillers and Dam^ry were all captured by Canadians, fighting in connexion with the French on the left of the First French Army. Many counter- attacks were delivered'' by the Gtermans at 5.30 in the evening, but all were beaten off, and the Canadians alone reported that in the fighting of the previous 24 hours, 260 more prisoners and some machine-guns had been captured and 1,300 casualties inflicted on the enemy. The Germans, however, did not seem inclined to give up Roye, for they still hung on to Fresnoy-les-Roye and Goyencoiirt. On August 16-17 these places were subject to a continuous and powerful artillery fire, but to no infantry assault, which would have been a very costly operation. The French were chiefly concerned with Goyencourt, our troops with Fresnoy ; meantime, Debeney's troops had pressed on towards Roye and had captured Caesar's Camp immediately we?t of the town, and St. Mard-les-Triot, a suburb, and Lancourt, a little village to the south, and were within 500 yards of the station on the north-western outskirts of the town. La Chavotte, between Fransart and Fresnoj', was taken by the Canadians on August 17. The (Jermans still held a strong position about Hattencourt, which was now being bombarded. Immediately north of the Sormne the position was not materially changed. Beyond the killed and wounded, which were very numerous, the Allies had captured from the Germans over 33,000 prisoners and 700 guns. Of the prisoners taken, there fell to the British share some 20,000, in which 1 7 German divisions were well represented. By far the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 159 largest number were taken from the 13th Division, which seems to have been practically annihilated. From tliis Division, the 66th Infantry Regiment lost 8 oflficors and 1,080 men ; the 13th Regiment 20 officers and 9()4 men ; the 16th Regiment 14 officers and 877 men ; the total being 2,763. Previous to the fighting now dealt with, tliis division had suffered heavily on JiJy 4 at Hamel, where 600 prisoners were taken and heavy casualties inflicted. From documents captured, it ap- pears that on the 20th of the month one of the Brigade Commanders asked to have drafts hurried up, as he could not do the work of the brigade on the present strength. The reply captured at the same time included the diary of a man of the 169th Regiment, who recorded in it that on March 16 our airmen absolutely wiped out both village and station of Lon- guyon about 100 miles east of St. Quentin and far in rear of the enemy's front line. In the station an ammunition train laden with 15,000 shells was blown up, and the explosion destroyed another train loaded with aeroplanes. This gives some idea of the damage which our aviators inflicted on the Gemians. On August 19, after a number of fights, the Third French Army carried Fresnieres, wliile more to the south they reached the edge THE SAME STREET AFTER THE •of General von Berries, who appears to have been the Army Corps Commander, stated that the conditions described were known to the division and to the higher authorities, but a supply of drafts could not be expected before August 16. Conditions were even more un- favourable among neighboiiring units, and in the interests of all the situation had to be tolerated. The division then stopped in the front line and suffered the enormous losses above enumerated. It must have been re- duced to the strength of little more than a company. Other divisions also suffered very heavily ; from the 4l8t were taken 2,600 prisoners, while from the 114th came 2,300; the 117th Division yielded up 1,800, and the 109th and 119th something under 1,000 each. Papers BOMBARDMENT. lOHicuti photograph. of Lassigny, won their way through to the eastern side of the Thiescourt wood, and stormed Pimprez on the Oise, thus reaching a point only five miles from Noyon. The advance by Thiescourt kept the upper portion of the valley of the Divettc, and was another danger to Noyon. On August 20 the northern end of Humbert's army captured Bea\ivraignes, another point on the railway from the south to Roye, and which liad formed part of the Gterman line of 1916. The next day La,ssigny was captured, the whole of the ground round Pl^mont occupied, while the French advanced tlwough the wood of Orval and reached the outskirts of Chiry- Ourscamp. These movements of the French Third Army were supplemented by further operations of Mangin's army on the high grotuid z o X < z z o p u z D O E S X u z X H 160 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIt. 161 between the Oise, Ailettti ami Aisno. Tliey extended over a length of 15 miles, and then- object was, starting from the forest of Our- scamp to the region of Fontenoy on tlie Aisne west of Soissons, to carry the higli ground of Ooucy-St. Gobain This formed the central pivot of the German defences in northern France ; but as a preparation for the complete development of the new movement it was nect's- sary to carry ct;rtain preliminary positions which would facilitate the movement. On the morning of August 17, the Grennan lines round the ^•ill(^g(' of Autreches were captiu^d on a front, of about three miles. On the evening of the next da\- gance was ([luli- uMiliinii]i«lifil oven after the events of August 8. The Weaer Zeitwig on Augiwt 8, reviewing what it describes as Foch's expensive offensive, makes the following statement, which is certainly a tribut«i to the accuracy of the (Jerman Intelligence Department : , It is very HigiuficMit that tlio fiiiKliHh only contributetl four divisions as ttioir ciitiro awHistiuico. Tlit-y et^rtainly h'lijithpiieti itirir own front on » siiuhll spotion by f^ivini^ oiw (division, but th« weak clrtarlunpnts given to the French front which wcro pla<:it(l under Gtinoral Kertliolot*» command could naturally only have a sniatl vahio as a n*hcf. IVrhap^ fears of a nt^w Uerinan attack on their front partially (Mrcasioned their attitude of reserve, but the main gnntnd for their keeping important forces from LASSIGNY CHURCH a wider forward movement from the south of Carlepont to the north of Fontenoy won another IJ miles from the Germans. At the same time French troops occupied the plateau to the west of Nampeel, taking Tracy-le-Val and the southern side of the ravine of Audigni- court. Nouvron- Vingr6, not far from Fontenoy, was also captured. The Germans made no strenuous resistance, and 2,200 prisoners were taken from them. On August 19 the Germans were driven out of Morsain and Vassens. On the same day the French Third Army advanced from Rib6court and captured Le Hamel ; thus both from the south and from the west Noyon was being •inproached. As we have seen from LudendorfTs Order, the Germans were beginning to think they had got in a tight place, but their ridiculous nrro- [Frenth o^tcial photograph. , IN AUGUST, 1918. Marshal Foch must bo sought in the fact that General Hrtig is still so greatly weakened by the German spring i>f?ensive. He has every reason to be economical with his forces. There can be no tloubt that early in June if not earlier the Germans had begun to feel the falling off in their man-power ; their rosei-ves were getting used up. This is clearly shown from an Order of General Ludendorff's dat<'d July 9, which is as follows :^ The condition of our resources in men, and the internal economic situation torce us to return men of the active service to fighting units and to proceed with the greatest economy in the use of th'j personnel in tlie auxiliary service [men fit for garrison duty or labour]. All service or personal considerations will be set aside in the face of this urgent necessity. It is clear from reports as submitted to the Higher Command that non-commissioned officers and men fr(m> the active service are still being employed on postw which can, and must, absolutely be occupied by non-commis- sioned officers and men from the aiixiliary service, such as cook.s, orderlies, canteens, salesmen, clerks, etc. For positions in rear of the front requiring vigorou;« 162 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. SITE OF A GERMAN 0ATTERY NEAR LASSIGNY. personnel, men on active service who cannot be employed on the front under the War Ministry circulars of Octo- ber S, 1916 [famiUes who have suil tred severe losses], and November 18, 1917 [men bom in 1875 or previously, and who have served more than six months in the front line], will in the first instance be chosen. A commission has been appointed for each army on the Western front, and for each of the groups of armies of von Mackensen and von Scholtz, in order to investigate these questions and put an end to abuses. The main purpose of the Higher Command is to recover the infantry. Additional notes for the groups of armies of von Mackensen and von Scholtz. Instead of utilising the German personnel of the auxiliary service as reinforce- noents. a greater demand will be made for local personnel. A matter is complaiaed of in the above which has always been a source of trouble to Commanders in the field — ^the tendency to immobilise fighting men in auxiliary duties. Wellington in the Peninsular War complained that his Cavalry was used up to a large extent in supplying orderlies to General officers. Napoleon also drew attention to the waste of men taken from the fighting units for com- paratively useless purposes, and no doubt the disease was extremely prevalent amongst the oflficers of the German Army, especially in the higher ranks, whose dignity in their opinion required the support of a number of underlings. It is interesting to read the German view of the Anglo-French attack which commenced on August 8 : The plan wax to overrun this front of the German defence system, which was only weakly fortified. There had been no time and the claims upon transport material had been too heavy for any but hasty defences to be erected at this portion of the front. The E itente plan was, under the protection of a very short but extremely intense bombardment, to cut lanes through the German infantry and artillery lines for the Tank squadrons. Thereupon their cavalry, supported by Tanks, was to be pushed through the infantry lines in order to reach on the very first day of the offensive the high road from P6ronne to Roye, "The failure of this plan'' is attributed, in the first pla«e, to " the heroic resistance of the trench garrisons, which at many points held on in a hurricano of fire until surrounded on all sides." " All our telegraph and telephone communications broke down and signal rockets were invisible in the thick fog. Our gunners continued to put up a barrage until they suddenly found the Tanks upon them in the fiank and rear. The machine- guns from these played terrible havoc in the gunners' ranks. Quick as lightning gun after gun was turned round to blaze into the Tanks at short range, while other guns maintained the barrage to impede the bringing up of the British reserves. In many batteries the last surviving officers kept up machine-gun fire to the last, some, after hours of tough resistance, even succeeding in fighting their way back to the German lines. " On the second day the British and French recom- menced their oftonsive with Tank attacks, but, weakened by the losses of the previous day, they did not display the same vigour. Caught in the fire of the German batteries, whose shell-bursts raised black fountains around the Tanks, their attack wavered. Several Tanks were hit and burst into flames, while others turned tail. The infantry did not follow up properly, and their attac ks stopped dead Only in the afternoon were the British able, with the help of fresh troops, to renew the attack, " On the entire front from Morlaneourt to the Avr-i deeply echeloned storming waves advanced, headed once more by strong Tank divisions. Air squadrons flew overhead, attempting to smother the German ranks with a hail of machine-gun bullets. A smart parrying counter- attack by the German infantry followed. The fight swayed this way and that, but finally the British, in ^pite of the strong forces employed, were unable to THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 163 make headway on the banks of the Sonxme and the groat Romtm high road, " Farthor south, Kranco-Brit sh assaults on the Roeidres-Arvillers line sucoeedod in gaininf^ ground on a terrain extremely uu8uit«d fordefenoo, so that eventually the battleground on both hanks of the Somnie, which furious British attacks could not capture, waw voluntarily given up." The following account of the proceedings on August 10, the third day of the attack, only needs to be compared with the actual facts as recorded above to put its value in a true light. The German loss in material was enormous. On the third day of their offensive the French launched a frontal attack on the Gorman front between Montdidier and the Matz. As there were only temporary defence works here, the main German troops were withdrawn to a more favourable fighting terrain. The BVench attacking forces, wliich advanced after strong artillery preparation, accompanied by Tanks, only oame into contact with our rearguard, whose machine-guns, however, caused the enemy such severe losses that his attacks were everywhere arrested. After the very sanguinary repulse of the French, whose assaults collapsed with severe losses before our rearguard line, the German rearguard was able with very sli^^ht losses and without the loss of any material to disengage itself from the enemy and to withdraw to the line mentioned in the official army report. North of the Avre, Franco -British forces made the strongest efforts both towards the south with the object of taking the new German formations in the rear and towards the north with the object of rolling up the G»^rman Avre front, but these efforts were quite unsue- <jessful. Gteneral von Ardenne. whose comments on the war from the opening to its close, if col- lected together, would form an amusing volume, contributed to the Duaseldorfer Nachrichten about August 13, contributed a statement in which ho quite rightly says " the Oermans at home want to know how far the German retire- ment is going." His views are of that form which is peculiar to German mentality. To this question, he says, no precise answer is possible, but it would reach its limit if vital parts of the German front as a whole were reached, or if the whole war situation experienced a turn in Germany's favour, a supposition nowise excluded,* and indeed probable. Meanwhile, what oonceriLs the German Command is that the enemy on the whole giant battle line from the Ancre, over the Somme to the Oise and Aisne and away to the Argonne — a distance of 200 kilometres — [124 miles] — has exhaitsted himself in bloody battles costly in losses. Even if the Gorman retireinont should be extended to the line Pdronne- Ham-La Fdre — that is, to the middle Somme and the Crozat Canal — wliich is a military assumption, even then the enemy would have no ground for victorious jubilation. It would not be German ground he would have won, but a French desert which he himself has mainly made what it is. The present battle region is for the German Command no object for protection, it is only a manoouvring ground calling for no payment for compensation for damage done to the floor. His comment on the assistance we derived from the fog is delightful. It enabled us, he said, to effect a surprise, and it will, as the French official photograph, GERMAN PRISONERS, LED BY THEIR OFFICERS. MARCHING THROUGH MONTDIDIER. 164 THE TIMES HISTOB.Y OF THE WAR. season advances, play a still greater part. Ho goes on to say that : A second important factor was the Tanks, which developed into a vahtable variety of the artillerj- arm. The Entente Command sent forward many hundreds of Tanks, partly very light, thinly protected types, as the advanced guard of the infantry storm waves. What the types lack in the strength of their protection is attempted to be made good by an increase of speed to nearly 20 kilometres [12J miles] an GENERAL GILLRAIN. Commanded the Belgian Army opposing the German Marine Corps. hour. The preliminary success of this weapon, which, although not new, had so far not been employed in such strength, was noteworthy. The German infantry's lulaptability, however, succeeded in finding eSective methods in the moment of need against the fire of " the forward-streaming terror." " Of course," he adds, " the Tanks and armoured vehicles which the Germans possess are undoubtedly better," and he finishes up by saying : August 8 brought a new battle avalanche into motioi • In its threatening course it did much damage, but it is to be hoped that it will soon find its end in the glacier crevasses of the German defence. The German wireless report of August 11 remarks : " After the failure of the plan of Foch Xo cut off thte German troops in the ad- vanced positions in the Mame wedge and the sanguinary collapse of the Franco-American attacks against the Vcsle line, the French conunander attempted a similar manoeuvre at another part of the line. The haste with which these two operations had followed one another shows the nervous anxiety of the Entente leadership to maintain the initiative and to intercept the dreaded new German attack." All the retirements which were made about this period by the Germans — for instance, near Montdidier and Albert — were ceirried out to evade the Franco-British attack. Even more remarkable is the statement in this report — it must not be forgotten it was for home consumption — " that in the heavj' fighting between the Ancre and the Avre on August 8 the German aerial forces played a preponderat - ing part ; infantry and artillery aviators were constantly active from morning to evening, notwithstanding the unfavourable weather conditions. Bombing squadrons attacked in the daytime the enemy assembling of troops, Thanks and batteries with observed good results. Anti-aircraft guns not only shot do^vn, in spite of the enemy's counter-measures, six enemy aeroplanes, but also took a successful part, in the earth fighting. At close range they^ directed their fire against attacking infantry and destroyed a large niunber of armoured cars by direct hits. One account alone reported the destruction of seven enemy Tanks. By valu- able reports of indefatigably working balloon observers, who continued their work in spite of the strongest enemy artillery and aerial attacks, our leadership was kept splendidly uniform. The enemy endeavoured by the formidable mas.sed employment of aeroplanes to gain the mastery of the air. German chasing squadrons were able to frustrate his plans. Again and again they threw themselves against the enemy and shot down 33 enemy machines " Now. considering the fact that our attack was so successful on this date that the Germans were driven back helter-skelter, destroyed in large numbers and captured in masses, that their observation balloons did not work at all, and that our aviators simply swept them from the sky — and the truth of all this is proved by the absolute debacle which overtook our opponents — it is inconceivable that anybody could have been found even in Germany to write such ridiculous falsehoods. The enemy was now compelled definitely to assiune the defensive policy laid down by Ludendorf?, and was already commencing to withdraw from his positions about Serre and farther north. As early as August 9, the Germans had begun to withdraw from their forward positions in the Lys Valley, and our line had been advanced on the whole front from the Lawe River to the Bourre north-west of THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 165 Mervillo, a maximmn depth of 2,000 yardH. Our troops held Ivocon, Lo Comet-Malo, Qvientin, Lp Petit-Pacaut and Le Sart. The Bourre flows south-easterly through the forest of Nieppe and joins the Lys at Merville. The Lawe joins the Lys also near that town to the south of it. Le Sart is just a mile to the west and Jje Petit-Pacaut IJ miles, Quentin 2J miles and Le Cornet-Malo 3J miles south, while Locon is about SJ miles to the south-east. On the night of August 8-9, north of Kemmel, our line was pushed forward a short distance on a front of over 1,000 yards and a few prisoners were taken. The most imjjortant indication of Gennan weakness was their withdraw-al on the line from Bucquoy to Beaimiont-Haniel which began in the H6butorne region. Beaumont- Hamel, Serre, Puisieux-au-Mont and Bucquoy were abandoned. The German object here seems to have been to flatten out their salient and thus shorten their line and diminish the danger of flank attacks. The ground yielded was of a very important character, for the position between Beaumont Hamel and Serre was an extremely strong one. The retirement began on the night of August 13-14, and the next day New Zealand patrols pushing forward dis- coveretl it and noticed that the ground waw evacuated from Rossignol Wood towards Puisieux. On the north side of Serre our patrols were held up by strong reargueu^ls, especially at Box Wood just west of Puisieux. Here the New Zealanders, helped by English troops, worke<l forward and completely turned this position, taking it and capturing its garrison. On August 15 the advance was continued. The British crossed the Ancro and the New Zealanders found Puisieux was abandoned ; Beaucourt-sur-Ancre was occupied. On the right, English troops pushed forward 1,500 yards to the south-east of Serre and on the night oi August 15 both this place and Puisieux -were captured. This gave us a total advance of 3,000 yards into the enemy's lines. He, however, still hung on to Bucquoy, and though the advance was for a time held up here, still the success gained was considerable. Nimierous small posts of the usual character — i.e., machine- gun sections carefully entrenched — were passed by, but had to yield to our advancing troops. The Germans on August 16 attacked the [Oj? cial photognph. THE MAHARAJAH OF PATIALA INSPECTS A BIG GUN. The Maharajah visited the Western Front in the latter part of July and the beginning of August. 16(j . THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. British at Dam6ry, but were beaten back with heavy loss. The northern end of the Gennan line was held by the Gterman Fourth Army under Sixt von Armin, the coastal portion being garri- soned by the (Jerman Marine Corps under Admiral von Schroder. This was opposed on our left by the Belgian Anny, with the Second British Anny next it in the Ypres sector. The Belgian Army was under Gieneral Gillrain, and our outer flank was watched by the Dover Patrol imder Admiral Keyes. King Albert of Belgium was in chief command here, and at his disposal was a French Reserve Army under Degoutte which had been brought to this flank. Next to Plumer's army was the Fifth British Army under Gteneral Birdwood, then the First luider General Home, the Third under General Byng, and the Fourth under General Rawlinson. Facing these troops, the Germans had their Sixth Army under General von Quast in the Lille region ; the Seventeenth Army under General von Below holding their line from Vimy to the south of Arras ; then came the Second German Army under General von der Marwitz in the Somme district ; then von Hutier in the neighbourhood of Roye. Opposed to him was Gteneral Debeney's First French Army and the Third French Army under General Himibert. The Grerman troops from the Oise to the Aisne comprised Boehn's and Carlowitz's anny, with Mudra on the right. Then came Eberhardt's force in the Vesle sector. From the Oise to the Vesle the French had in line their Tenth Army under Mangin, the Fifth Army under Guillaumat ; General Gouraud with the Fourth Army about Reims was opposed to von Einem with the so-called Army of Champagne. Farther down on the right was Gallwitz, holding the northern part of Lorraine. By August 18 there was a general backward movement of the German Armies facing the British, not of a very pronounced character, rather one of readjustment of their trenches to repair the damages effected by our advances into their front positions so as to give them a more continuous and better line to resist further encroachments. Their leaders were evidently keeping in their minds the ultimate necessity of being forced to depend on the great Hinden- burg line on which so much labour had been expended. They were gradually coming to the opinion that all in front of that would have to be given up. A CAPTURED GERMAN POM-POM GUN, SHOWING THE CARTRIDGES. THE [AuSiralMti official photograph. DISC WHICH CARRIES THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 167 {French official photograph. MATERIAL ABANDONED BY THE GERMANS AT FRESNOY-LEZ-ROYE. On August 18 when the Fourth Gterman Army lost the Outtersteene hillock on the eastern side of the Becque — a position of some import- ance as it was over 100 feet over country in which the more retired lines of the Gennans lay — ^the 4th and 12th German Divisions holding the edge of the plain in front of Meteren were fully expecting attack and indeed had been reinforced to resist it. But the British troops did not advance at dawn as expected, and the Ger- mans apparently thought that no attack was in- tended for the moment. At 1 1 a.m., however, a screen from smoke shells was thrown upon them, and a heavy barrage began under which om- troops advanced and rapidly carried the tren- ches, and by 1 o'clock the ridge was occupied in strength. At 2 p.m. a heavy bombardment was begun against the line we had won and was continued without ceasing till 9 p.m., when a covmter-attack of infantry was delivered. It was brought to a complete standstill by our machine-gun fire from the newly captured crest and driven back with considerable loss. The result of the entire :novement was that we captured 700 prisoners besides inflicting heavy lo.sses in killed and wounded on the enemy, and won a position which gave us Bonsiderablo observatioii over the surrounding coimtry and deprived the enemy of this advan- tage. The whole front of the British advance between Vieux Berquin and Bailleul measured nearly four miles, and in depth varied from 1,000 to 2,000 yards. On August 19 the press ire was continued. In the MervUle district thi.s village was captured and our line was pushed forward to the north up to the Lawe river near Lestrem. It was a considerable advance and north of Merville our troops reached La Couronne and Vierhouck, so that the new line we now held ran north and south from the east of Merville to the east of Vieux Berquin. Merris, it will be remembered, had been captured a short time before. In the Locre area, still farther north, the enemy's line of defence was also captured and severe casualties inflicted on him. The German Seventeenth Army athwart the Scarpe east of Arras retired on the 18th from before Feuchy, but still clung to the marshes. The Second Army was also pushed near Peronne. We have seen that Field-Marshal Haig, in the middle of August, had determined to transfer his attack to the sector north of the Somme, where it did not seem that the enemy expected attack. There was another reason which largely influenced him, viz., that the success of the Fourth Army in driving back the German forces opposed to it had threatened the left flank of the position then held by the Germans from the south ; yet another reason was the use of tanks, which had played such a great part in the recent fighting. For this, the ground north of the Ancre river, which was not greatly damaged by shell-fire, was very suitable. A successful attack between Albert and Arras in a south-easterly direction would turn the line of the Somme south of Peronne and would thus be a step forward to- wards the great strategic objective — St. Quen- tin-Cambrai. Moreover, from the tactics! point of view, the situation was favourable. The British now held the plateau south of Arras about Bucquoy and Ablainzeville whieli in the time of the former fighting on the Somme had been behind the enemy's lines. The Bri- tish were therefore either across or to the east of the Gennan systems of trench lines which in 1916 it had been necessary to attack fron- tally, and had, moreover, the advantage of 16S THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. [AusraltanoflCial photograph, LAYING A SIGNAL WIRE FROM THE TRENCHES TO HEADQUARTERS. command of view which at that date had been denied to them. It was arranged that on the morning of August 21 an attack should be delivered on the north of the Ancre to gain the line of the AiTas-AIbert Railway, which was believed to be the enemy's main line of resistance. August 22 would then be devoted to the ar- rangement of troops and guns on this front so as to prepare for a further movement, while the left of the Fourth Army was to be brought up .between the Somme and the Ancre. On August 23 the principal attack would be delivered by the Third Army and those divisions of the Fourth Army which were north of the Somme ; the remainder of General Rawlinson's force, while keeping south of the river, would push forward so as to cover the flank of the movement. If the operation were successful, then both the Third and Fourth Armies would press forward with the greatest vigour and make the most of the advantage gained. .Is soon as the Third Army had captured the Mercatel spur, .thereby securing the southern flank of the British while assaulting the German positions on Orange Hill and round Monchy-le- Preux, then the First Army would extend the •British front by attacking to the north of the Third Army ; the river Sensee would serve to cover the left of this force. The right of the First Army would attack east of Arras and tvu-n from the north the western end of the Hinden- burg line, from which the enemy would thereby be compelled to retreat. Sir Douglas Haig hoped that this very gradual extension of the British front of attack would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and would cavise him, for this reason, to throw in his reserves in a piece -meal manner. On August 21, at five minutes to five a.m., the IV. Corps, commanded by Lieut. -Gen. Sir G. M. Harper, and the VI. Corps, commanded by Lieut. -Gen. J, A. L. Haldane, both belonging to Sir Jvilian Byng's Third Army, attacked on a line which, extended froni Beaucourt-sur- Ancre south-west of Miraumont to Moyenneville, a front of some nine miles. Tlie attack was opened by five divisions in front line, viz., the 42nd, New Zealand, and 37th Divisions belonging to the IV. Corps and the 2nd and Guards Divisions of the VI. Corps. With them was a considerable number of tanks. The enemy's front line of . defences was rapidly mastered without much resistance. Thi'ough the leading divisions of the IV. Corps the 5th Division and the OSrd Division, the latter THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 169 under \fajor-Oon. C. E. l-awrio, passed, and throvigh the 2nd and (!uard« Divisions, the ."{rd Division of the VT. Corps under Major-Gen. €. J. Devorell continued the attack. When the assault befjan, it waa covered to some extent by fog. In the second ])liasc of the tnovement, it been me more dense and led to some lo,ss of direction, although this did not have much effect on the battle. As in the fighting south of the Somine, so here the mist helped us. Our artillery fire knew the ranges of its targets, whereas the enemy could not see our infantry advancing. Only a vague outline of the nearest and largest objects was visible, so much so that prisoners or wounded coming back only became visible when they approached within 50 yards. The artillery and our trench mortars were able to pour a mass of fire on the positions to be attacked, whereas the enemy's fire was casual and ill-directed. So superior was our fire and such good work tlid the tanks do that oiy men suffered very little even from the machine-guns of the Germans. The fighting was now more bitter, particu- larly about Acliiet-Le-Petit and Logeast wood. At both these places the enemy counter- attacked with great vigour. Nevertheless our troops - reached the line of the Arras-Albert railway on practically the whole front of attack, captured the two points just named, and alsg Courcelles and Moyenneville. East of these two places they crossed the railroad. The 2l8t Division of the V. Corps aided the movement by clearing" the Gennans-from the north bank of the Aiicre about Beaiicoiu't. Thus the result of the limited attack was completely gained without greatloss, and 2,000 prisoners were taken. These belonged to the 234th tierman Division, to tlie 2nd Guard Reserve Division, the 4th Bavarian, the 183rd and the 16th Jleserve Division. This gave us favour able grotuid from which to .set out for our main attack. The advance was a clear proof of the a<lvant.age we had gained by the German retirement, previou.sly alluded to on page 165, and the occupation of Beaumont Hainel, Serre, Puisieux -au-Mont, Bucquoy and Ablain- zeville. The distances our troops had to move for the first portion of the attack were com- paratively moderate, and imder cover of tlic fog were easily trayersed. No preliminary bombardment was matje, and the artillery fire and infantrj' attack Supported by the tanks took place together' It would appear that the Gormans in a genoi-al sense were expecting to be attacked, but wiien it actually occurred it took them somewhat by surprise. The depth of our advance varied from 3,000 to 5,000 yards. The fighting round Miraumont was more severe than at most parts of the line, especially at a point just north-west of the village known as the Beau -Regard Dovecot, which was on the Miraumont-Puisieux rood. This was ap- parently a home for carrier pigeons, and also was the site for a wireless telegraphy plant. MAJOR-GENERAL C. J. DEVKKHLI,. Commanded the 3rd Division of the VI. Corps. and a field-gun was in position there. The wireless plant was removed, but before the gim could be taken the Gennans counter- attacked and drove back our men. Early in the evening, however, a fresh attack re-coiKiiu'red the Dovecot and the giui was finally taken : but the Gennans did not give up all hope at this point. There was heavy artillery fire through- out the night and at 3 a.m. they put down a hea\^ barrage of gas shells. Tliis was followetl up at 4 o'clock ; a new division of the enemy, the 52nd, attacking, and once more our line was driven back. Our artillery then opened an intensive fire against this point, and at 6 o'clock the position was again captured by us and the gun taken back to the rear. Achiet-le-Grand was another point where a 170 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. severe struggle took place. Here there w€i8 a deep cutting through which the railway ran, the near-side bank of which was organized for machine-guns, while behind the cutting was a n\unber of field guns. This made it difficult for our tanks to get to work, but eventually the troops succeeded in acquiring it. A German division which was concentrated for an attack at 5 a.m. on August 22 farther up the line, was completely brought to a standstill by our artUlery fire, the position being reported to the gims by our aeroplane observers. When Sir Douglas Haig's great offensive began on August 21 the Air Force came into great prominence again. In the early morning a thick mist prevented our machines from taking part in the battle, but as the sun obtained more power the sky grew clearer, and for the rest of the day our aviators took a very active part in the battle. The same system was employed as at the attacks in the earlier part of August on the Somrae. Some of the aeroplanes kept touch with the enemy and reported back to our advancing troops. Others actively supported oiu- infantry with bombs and machine-gun fire, while some acted on the lines behind the enemy attacking the transport coming up and his columns on the march. In many instances they succeeded in silencing the anti-aircraft guns of the enemy by bomb dropping and machine-gun fire. Altogether 12 tons of bombs were dropped by us during the day on several objectives. Twenty-nine Grerman machines were accounted for, against which we had 8 of ours missing. One of the Grerman obsei-vation balloonsalso was shot down. The night of August 21-22 was clear and the moon was full, and this enabled our aeroplanes to do very good work ; large numbers of bombs were dropped over the communications close behind the front and low-flying machines attacked troops and transports on the roads. Some of our bombing machines saw a long column of some 20 German lorries going through a defile in a sunken road. They bombed it and got direct hits, which accounted for eight vehicles. Some of the remaining lorries got away, only to be blocked in another cutting farther along the road. Here again our airmen attacked, and with their bombs and machine-guns wrecked them all. In addition to the attention which they paid to the im- mediate front of action, aviators also bombed many points behind the Gorman front lines. i_L.ana.iuin ojjuia! pnuio^raph. TANKS AND PRISONERS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 171 ■JS-iN r..*^* it-fe'^n'.' A SIX-INCH HOWI Early oa August 22 the III. Corps belonging to part of the Fourth Army assisted by a small number of Tanks, attacked in company with the 47th, 12th and 18th Divisions ; the 3rd Australian Division cooperating on the right of the 38th Division on the left flank. The 18th Division, under Major-General R. P. Lee, successfully forced the river Ancre and captured Albert by a well-executed enveloping move- ment from the south-east. Thus our line between the Somme and the Ancre was ad- vanced well to the east of the Braye-Albert road and the left of the Fourth Army on the Somme was brought up in conformity with this advance and prolonged our line to the south. Over 2,400 prisoners and a few guns were taken by us. The night of August 22 was clear and light almost to the rising of the sim. This enabled our bombing machines to drop 25 J tons of bombs on selected targets. A notable one of these was the bridge at Aubigny-au-Bac on the road connecting Douay with Cambrai. All our machines returned in safety and succeeded in bringing down one of the enemy's night- flying aeroplanes of large size. August 23 saw the beginning of the main attack of Sir Douglas Haig's armies, along a front of 33 miles from the point where we joined on to the French First Army, just north of Lihons, to Mercatel, which is on the Arras- Bapaiune road, about 3^ miles south of the fonner town, and near where the Hindenburg lOguiai phuuttapk. TZEK IN ACIION. line from Bullecourt-Qu^ant joined the old Arras-Vimy GU)rman defences of 1916 On the eve of the operations Sir Douglas Haig issued instructions to the troops under his command, in which he drew attention to the favourable changes which had ttiken place in the Allied position. Well might he do so, for the Germans hmi been driven back all along their line from Kemmel to Soissons and beyond. Sir Douglas emphasiaed the necessity for all ranks to act with the utmost boldness and resolution, and ordered that wherever the enemy was giving way there pressure was to be increased. This was taking a leaf out of the German book, for, as we have seen ever since March 21, it had been laid down by the enemy commanders that where successes were gained there they were to be pushed home, and that troops were not to be vainly sacrificed against points wliich held out. This was, of course, common sense ; where a line is partially and successfully broken small portions which are not conquered for the moment must eventually fall if the line of conquest sweeps on. During the night of August 22-23 tne Germans made two attacks on oiu" positions in the neighbourhood of Baillescourt Farm, east of Beaucoiirt, and a small local attack to the north-west of Bailleul was stopped before it reached our trenches. At a quarter to five on the morning of August 23 the great attack began. More than 100 Tanks were employed on different parts of the 172 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. ROAD-MAKING IN THE RECONQUERED AREA: LEVELLING. [Official photograph. BREAKING UP THE GROUND FOR front ; there was no preliminary bombard- ment, but the artillery supplied the usual barrage. On the right flank and south of the Somme the 32n(l British Division, under Major-Gen. T. S. Lambert, and the 1st Aiistralian Division, under Major-Gen. T. W. Glasgow, advanced and captured HerlevUle, Chuignolles and Chuignes. The position round the two latter villages was a strong one, the woods north of the former and between it and the Somme Canal being stoutly defende<l, and there was a good deal of severe fighting before thby were captured ; but eventually the Germans were repulsed (with a loss of over 2,000 prisoners) and our troops occupied them and proceeded a little farther on to the high ground east of Chuignes. At the same time the 18tli Division from tlie III. Corps antl the right Brigade of the 38th Division, from the V. Corps attacked in the neighbourhood of .Albert, and after hard fighting ca[»tured the high ground east of ' the town known to the British Staf? as the Tara and ITsna hills.* Two companies of the Welsh Regilnent, forming part of the left Brigade of the 38th Division, waded across the Aucre in the neighbourhood of Hamel and prolonged the left of the former attack, holding * While it 18 a practice to give the various hiUn and variou.H ground featiircK dintinguishing names, it is a pity that when dispatches are published maps do not accompany thetr^ showing where these points are, because when they are made known to the pubUc there can be no reawoii for carefully concealing the localities in question. their position on the east of the river against constant counter-attacks by the • Germans. During the morning the other divisions of the V. Corps— i.e., the 17th and 21st Divisions, the IV. Corps, consisting of the 42nd Division,, the New Zealand Division and the 5th and 37th Divisions, and the VI. Corps, comprising the Guards, the 2nd, 3rd, 56th, and 52nd Divisions — attacked along the front north of Albert, directing the cluef weight of their assault upon the German line extending from Mirau- mont up to Boiry-Becquerelle just a little north of Boyelles. The 17th and 21st Divisions pushed up the left bank of the Ancre north of Thi6pval — i.e., on the left of our attack from Hamel — but, although the ground about Thi6pval was apparently occupied, it was not part of the plan to advance to any depth in that direction on this day. The 3rd Division of the VI. Corps moved to the assault at 4 a.m. and captured Gomi^court, taking 500 prisoners, and during the morning the attack spread along the front of the IV. Corps also. The German outpost line was quickly penetrated and their main line of resistance was stormed, our troops penetrating some distance beyond it. Bihucourt, Ervillers, Boyelles, and Boiry- Becquerelle were captured. More than 5,000 prisoners were taken, and a considerable luunber of guns. The Germans were here b(!ginning to show that the continued suc- ces.ses of the British troops were affecting their moral, and signs of confusion and dis- organization became evident. The Arras- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 173 Bapaume main roail wan cut and our forces were closing on Bapaumo both from tho north and north-west. This left the enemy on the Thi^pval ridge salient in a perilous position. It will bo remembered that the 17th and 2l8t Divisions had not made any attempt at groat progress in tliis direction. It was plainly better to outflank tho Germans, as was done by the advance of the IV. Corps, and thereby expose them to being cut off. During the ensuing night (23rd-24th) the action was kept up and went on with great vigour the nejtt moniing on tho whole front from the Somme to Neuvillo-Vitasse. Shortly after midnight tho .3rd Avistralian Division took Bray-sur-Somme and tho 47th Division, under Major-General Sir G. T. Gorringe, with the 12th and 18th Divisions of the III. Corps, comprising London and East County troops, extended o\ir lino right across the high ground between Bray and La Boisselle on the road Albert-Bapaume. In the neighboiu'hood of tho latter village and at some other points the fighting was very severe, and a number of prisoners were captured. Thus our line was complete from the French south of the Somme to a point on the north about Neuville-Vitasse. On the left of the 4th Army the Third. Army «^ain moved forward with tho same divisions, attacked the half-demoralized Grennans and pressed them back with great vigour The hostile positions on the Thi6pval ridge, which in 1910 had been such a cau8c of heavy Iohh to us, were carried by a well-arranged concentric attack which came down from the high ground about Pozi^res. The brigade of tho 38th Division which attacked on the right, crossed the Ancre at Albert during the early part of the night anil formed up close to the German lines on a narrow front between the Albert- Pozi^res line and the marshy ground on the left bank of the Ancre. The left brigade of this division waded through the stream opposite Hamel, notwithstanding that it was breast high and that the troops were under heavy fire, and formed up as a German counter- attack was being delivered against the two companies of the Welsh Regiment wliich ha<l crossed the river at the same point early on the morning of August 23. Other divisions of the V. Corps moved forward on the left of the 38th Division, and between them they drove tlie Germans from the high ground above Ovillers-la-Boisselle and Thiepval. Continuing the advance, the V. Corps gained Courcelette and Martinpuich. Miraimiont, which had held out for three days against our attacks, and the garrison of which had now apparently come to the end of their resisting power, was carried by the 42nd Division, imder Major-General A. Solly-Flood. Many prisoners were captured. Then the division advanced and captured Pys. Major-General J. Ponsonby, with the .'ith Division, captured Irles, then pushed on '^' ..J* ■■r*^'^ ■V "^^ iOgicial pholugrapH. KOAD-MAKING IN THE RECONQUERED AREA: THE SCOOPER AT WORK. 174 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. and, aided by the New Zealand Division, under Major-General Sir A. H. Russell, and some Tanks, which rendered great service, cleared Loupart Wood. New Zealand troops in section took Gr^villers, and reached Avesnes-les- Bapanme, and also aided in the capture of Biefvillers-les-Bapaume by the 37th Division, under Major-General H. B. Williams. On the high ground between Sapignies and Mory the resistance of the Germans strengthened, but our troops pressed up closely to those villages, while the Guards Division, under Major-General G. P. T. Fielding, carried St. L6ger. Still more to the north the 56th Divi- sion, under Major-General Sir C. P. A. Hull, had heavy fighting round Croisilles, and on the high groimd of the spur to the north-west known as Heninel several thousands of prisoners were taken, and many guns and a very large amount of material of all kinds were captured by our troops. To the left of the 56th Division was the 52nd Division, under Major-General J. Hill ; his troops took Henin-sur-Cojeul and St Martin-sur-Cojeul. North of the Scarpe the section of the German front line north-west of Fampoux was taken, and north of the La Bassee Canal our troops penetrated into the old British front line north-east of Givenchy and took some 60 prisoners. During the night our patrols occupied Neuf-Berquin, which had been abandoned by the Germans, who left a considerable! number of dead there, and early in the next morning our line to the north of Bailleul was advanced on a front of a mile. A counter-attack attempted by the enemy later on in the day was completely stopped by our artillery fire. The predominance which the Allied aircraft had obtained in the air was particularly shown dvu-ing the commencement of Sir Douglas Haig's offensive. On August 8 the aeroplane squadrons were in close co-operation with the Army along the whole battle -front throughout the day. They worked hand in hand with the cavalry, giving them information as to where the enemy were and aiding the horsemen by their machine-gun fire and by bombing points which had to be attacked. Our aviators constantly reported the position reached by our attacking forces, while the machines in coiuiexion with the artillery signalled back to our guns the positions of the hostile artillery, infantry, and [OJ^icial photograph. ARTILLERY OBSERVERS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR J76 [OllKial photufrapli. CAVALRY MOVING FORWARD. transport on the line of march. Moreover, special machines supplied our advanced troops with ammunition. Their co-operation with the Tanks was also very thorough. They gave them information as to where the enemy's strong points were, and they attacked these with bombs and machine-gun fire. They rendered another great ser\'ioe, for they dropped smoke bombs along the line of advance, which helped to conceal the approach of the Tanks from the Germans. The actual part in the battle taken by our fighting squadrons was a great one. They bombed the enemy in his retreat, causing havoc amongst masses of troops and transport on roads congested with traffic, and they deluged them with their machine-gun fire. Bombing squadrons flying farther afield and keeping only a few hundred feet from the ground attacked trains, railway junctions and bridges. We lost altogether 49 machines, the larger portion of which were brought down by fire from the ground, which shows how closely our aviators had sought out their targets. On tne other side they brought down 65 German machines and also five hostile balloons. On August 9 the work of our airmen con- tinued without intermission and our balloons followed up close behind the advancing line and carried out continuous and valuable obser- vations. Sixty-one German machines were accounted for, against which we lost 23. Thirty-eight and a half tons of bombs were dropped during thq day and 18 J in the course of the following night. The next day there was severe fighting in the air, chiefly over the area where the fighting was taking place. Sixty-one of the enemy's machines were brought down, against which we had only to set off 12 of ours missing. In their work on the battlefield 23J tons of bombs were dropped, while in the Somme valley, principally upon bridges and stations, during the night of August 10-11 31 tons were let fall. In addition to this, there was, of course, the usual work of reconnaissance and observation for the artillery and the same close connexion between the troops actually fighting on tha ground and those in the air. The amount of small-arm aminumtion that the latter poured down broke all recent records. During the same night two German bombing machines were brought down. The first was a giant with five engines and a heavy load of bombs. Unfortvmately it came down in flames and its bombs exploded when they hit the ground. The result was that very little information was obtsbined with regard to the construction 176 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE. ■• n5;*::i.3X«i'#;Mims-,. - . >.. ■|9!iiW*##i -. re [Official photograph. ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN BUSY WITH THE ENEMY. of the aeroplane. The French were equally active during this period, working in close contact with their attacking forces and engaging the German aviators in many combats. Four- teen of their machines were brought down and nine captive balloons destroyed. During the day 23 tons of bombs were dropped on troops and transport in the battle zone as well as on various points behind the front, and during the night (9th- 10th) seventeen tons of bombs were dropped on stations at Ham, Tergnier, Nesle, Hombleux, and on many of the Grerman bivouacks. The Germans gave the number of machines brought down 'by them on Augast 9 at the same figure as we published— viz., 23. The rest of their reports were chiefly filled up with the records which their airmen were supposed to have obtained. These are quite uninteresting, and would require much more verification than they have hitherto received to be believed. The German report for August 10 states that there was very lively aerial activity over the battlefield, but gives no details. These can be supplied from British reports. Forty-one German machines were destroyed and 20 others driven down out of control, against which we lost 12. On the morning of August 11 the Independent Air Force attacked the railway station at Karlsriihe and also a hostile aerodrome. Ob- servation was difficult owing to cloud", but one large bomb was seen to cause an explosion in the station. Both on the way to their objective and on the road home from it a good deal of fighting took place in the air, the result of which was that we drove down three of the German machines and they accounted for one of ours. In the afternoon of that day a few bombs were dropped on the triangle of railways near Metz, and on the night of August 11-12 our machines attacked two hostile aero- dromes and several ground targets. During the day the aeroplanes in immediate contact with the troops fighting on the battle-front were very active. Courtrai station and siding.s were heavily bombed without our men suffering in casualties, and during the night P6ronne and Cambrai stations were also heavily attacked, and again \vithout loss to us. The enemy had been more active than usual, but the result of the fighting was extremely unfavourable to them. Fifty-three of their machines were accounted for, while we lost only five of ours ; fovur hostile balloons were also shot down in flames. One of the most important raids of the Independent Air Force took place on August 12, when during the daytime one of our squadrons, despite unfavourable weather, succes.5fully attacked and caused great damage to the aeroplane and chemical works at Frankfurt. A large munber of the enemy's aviators endeavoured to ward off our attack, but in THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 177 vain, and going and coming thoy kept up a running figlit for about 30 miles, in which two of their machines were destroyed, whereas all ours returned in safety. Bursts were observed well in the centre of the targets aimed at, and great destruction was caused to them. This was tlie first occasion that a raid on this im- portant seat of international banking had been undertaken, although the French had on the night of October 1-2, 1917, matle a short raid on tlio city. Another of our squadrons attacked the aerodrome at Hagenau, 16 miles north of Strasburg. On their way to then- ob- jective, they were attacked by large numbers of the enemy machines. A severe fight ensued, in wliich four of the latter were destroyed and one more driven down out of control, against a loss of only two to ourselves. The squadron then proceeded towards its objective unmolested, a direct liit was obtained on a large hut in the aerodrome, and the bomb fell on four German machines on the ground near a shed and destroyed them. On the same date the Germans made one of their usual air reports, in which they claimed for the month of July 518 aeroplanes, including 69 shot down by their anti-aircraft guns, also 39 captive balloons, and they went on to state that 239 of the aeroplanes were in their pos- session, and that the rest were seen to fall within the enemy's position. They claimed, too, that they had only lost 129 aeroplanes and 63 captive balloons in the same period - a statement ridiculously inaccurate, as will be seen on comparing it with the numbers given previously on page 132, Chapter CCLXXVIII. There is not even a pretence of truth in the German report. During August 12 our air activity was con- tinued ; with an expenditure of 12 of our own macliines we brought down 37 belonging to the enemy and one observation balloon. The usual routine of our airmen was carried out with great vigour, that of the captive balloons being especially noteworthy. They worked close up behind our advancing line and sent down much useful information. Altogether our men dropped 45 tons of bombs during the 24 hours. The French brought down 11 Ger- njan aeroplanes and also four captive balloons. The American Air Force, too, was active. On August 11-12 they successfully bombed the railway yards at Longuyon, Dommary, Baron- court and Conflans without any loss to them- selves. An attack was also made on Thion- ville in which we lost three of our machines and destroyed two belonging to the enemy. The fine weather of August 14 enabled our aviators to do a great deal of work. The bombing of the Somme bridges, railway lines [Australian o£,cial pttvtcgrapn. A DAYLIGHT PATROL SBARCHING DUG-OUTS AFTER THE GERMAN RETIREMENT. 178 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. [Official photograph. KITE BALLOON WITH PARACHUTES ATTACHED. and junctions, which had been constantly going on, was continued with great vigour, and materi- ally interfered with the arrival of German re- inforcements. The enemy made an endeavour by employing large formations of aerial scouts to interfere with our men and stop their work, which was producing disastrous consequences to him ; but our machines easily dealt with these endeavours, and in the fighting which ensued 31 of the enemy's aeroplanes were brought down and we only lost six. The amount of our work can be judged from the fact that 21 tons of bombs were dropped during the day and 37 by night. An especially successful raid was carried out on a hostile aerodrome by British and American aviators, which resulted in six machines on the groimd being destroyed and the sheds set on fire. The French, too, werf very .successful on this date. On August 13 they put out of action 12 German machines and during the night 13th- 14th dropped 32 tons' of bombs at Tenignier, St Quentin, Ham, Nesle, Noyon and on bivou- acks in the neighbourhood of OgnoUes and the railway stations at Maison Bleu, Guignicourt and Le Chatelet-sur-Retoiirne. At Ham and Noyon, where 15 tons of bombs were dropped, violent conflagrations wore observed. The next day, as a result doubtless of our superiority, the enemy's activity in the air was somewhat decreased. Our men brought down altogether 28 German aeroplanes with a loss to ourselves of 15 Twenty-two tons of bombs wore dropped during the day on P^ronne, Roisel, Engel ammunition dump and Bruges docks. During the night following the Somme bridges were again heavily bombed, as also were the railways at Peronno, Douay and Cambrai, 30 tons of bombs being dropped. Wo brought down one of the enemy's night- flying machines and lost one of oiu' own. In the afternoon of this day our Independent Air Force made a daylight raid on the station at Offenburg in Baden, doing considerable damage. Severe fighting took place with the enemy's aerial force, in which we accounted for four of his aeroplanes without any loss to ourselves. The French also did very good work AN ABANDONED GERMAN GUN WITH BREECH BLOWN OUT, in the air, bringing down 15 enemy macnines and eight balloons. The frequency with which the enemy had been beaten in the air led him to raid Paris during the night of August 15. The Germans succeeded in dropping many bombs and some casualties were reported, but no serious damage of any kind was done. i THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 179 Od August 15 there was less fighting in the air, but we brought down nine German machines and two observation balloons. We lost one aeroplane. The routine work of the Force, inclufling reconnaissance and observation for artillery fire, was carried on successfully, and a considerable number of bombs were dropped during the previous night and this day, amount- ing in all to 22J tons. The superiority of the Allies became more and more marked. Leaving aside for the moment the actual fighting on the battlefield, the Independent Air. Force and French organiz'i- lost seven, but our objective was reached and we destroyed three of the German aviators. Coblenz and Hagenau were also dealt with early in the morning. The German version of the Cologne attack on the morning of August 22 was that five persons were killed aiifl two badly injurctl and not inconsiderable damage ilono to private property, but there was no military or material damage. The French made an important raid on August 22, causing great damage to the aerotlrome at Mars-la-Tour. During the remainder of the :nonth our Tndepen<lent Force constantly raided well into [Official photosraph. STARTING TO WORK WITH THK ARTILLERY. tions of a similar character were constantly engaged in highly successful work. Thus on the night of August 21-22, when the weather was favouiable, Frankfurt and Cologne were heavily attacked and the stations and barracks bombed. Similar treatment was served out to the railway junction at Treves, four hostile aerodromes were attacked and many hangars hit. and the anti-aircraft guns wei-e also at- tacked, especially with machine-gun fire. We only lost one machine. On the morning of August 22 Mannheim was once more attacked, but tliis time, both going and returning, our machines were subjected to fierce fighting, the result of which was that x\u Germany. Frankfiu-t and the chemical fac- tories at Mannheim were again successfully attacked on the night of August 25-26, arul all our machines retiu-ned in safety. The Mannheim attack was conducted at such a low elevation, not more than a height of 200 feet from the ground, that the pilots narrowly escaped running into some of the factory chimneys. The barrage put up was totally ineffective and we lost no machines, but the explosions cavised by our bombs were very heavy and considerable damage was done. On August 30 the Independent Air Force again bombed Conflans and Thionville. 180 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. lOfcuU fluloenpi- CARRYING UP AMMUNITION BY PACK MULES. The weather continued to be fine on August 16, but'the enemy's a\'iator8 displayed no great anxiety to indulge in combat. The con.sequence was we scored hea\Tly against them. Thirteen German aeroplanes were disposed of by our men with a loss of only six to ourselves. During the mornings of both .\ugu8t 16 and 17 the German aerodromes at Haubourdin and Lomme (near Lille) were heaxoly attacked. At the first-named place bombs were dropped from a low height and six hangars Were de- molished, as well as two machines standing in the open. At the latter three hangars were destroyed, and at both'places great havoc was caused in the living quarters, several fires being started. On the night of Augu.st 16-17 the Independent Force attacked four hostile aero- dromes and two railway junctions. The results could not be ascertained as the vosibility was verj' poor. The next night once mbre aerodromes, railway junctions, blast furnaces, trains, and other targets were attacked with success, and our a\-iators descending to a low height used machine-guns freely against many of the targets ; one of our machines failed to return. m CHAPTER CCLXXX. THE CONQUEST OF SYRIA. Turks Expelled from Arabic Vilayets — Opposing Forces in Palestine — Aixenby's Strategy — Batixes of Sharon and Mount Ephraim— The Great Cavalry Ride — Von Liman's Narrow Escape — ^Work of the Air Force— Two Turkish Armies Destroyed — Thb East Jordan Operations — From Galilee to Damascus — Syrian Seaports Seized — Homs Occupied — The Advance to Aleppo — Tasks of Political Department — Marshall's Victory on the Tigris — Two ^'ears at Aden — Surrender of Medina. GEXERAI. ALLENBTS campaign in the autiunn of 1918 did more than free Palestine and Syria from the Ottoman yoke. In conjunction with tlie advance of General Milne from Macedonia to the Turkish frontier near Adrianople, and the new ailvance of General Mars^hall in Meso- potamia, it brouglit about the capitulation of Turkey. General Allenby opened liis offensive on September 19, the Tiu-ks then holding po.sitions at Sinjil, only 16 miles north ot JvTiLsalom. In six weeks the situation was completely transformed. The main Turkish armies were shattered in two days ; by Octo- ber J Damascus had been occupied, and Aleppo fell on October 25. General Allenby wis about to a.1vance on Alexandretta when, on October 30, the armistice wa.s signed. On that day, before the armistice took effect, the Ottoman Division defending Mosul surrendered toGeneral Marshall, while General Milne's force, after an arduous march from the Struma, was reatly to seize Adrianople and advance on Constantinople. A condition of the armistice was that all the remaining Turkish garrisons and troops in the field in the Arabic vilayets of the Empire should surrender to the nearest Allied post. Alexandretta was accorrlingly occupied by General Allenby, and Mosul and other places in Vol. XIX —Part 240 Upper Mesopotamia by General Marshall. The Turkish force which for three years had been encamped near Aden surrendered and was deported The Turkish posts in the Yemen and Asir were likewise withdrawn, and various small enemy posts guarding the Hedjaz railway sout*li of Ma'an were given up to the Arab.?. But at Medina a determined attempt was inarlc to disregard the terms of the armistice, and it was not imtil January 10, 1919, that the Turkish conunander there was forced to capitulate. With the entry of the Hedjaz Arabs into that city, to Moslems second in sanctity only to Mecca, Turkish authority tiiroughoul the Arabic vilayets vanished. In Vol. XVIII, Chapter CCLXVlll, the openine' phases of General AUenby's campaign were briefly outlined, the part taken by the Arab Army under the Emir Faisal being alone given in any detail. AUenby's campaign, one of the most sueoeasful in military- history, can now be treated as a whole. With it, completing the survey of the destruction of the enemy power in the Arabic vilayets, falls for descrip- tion the last campaign in Mesopotamia and the final stages of the war in Arabia itself. At the beginning of September, 1918, General Allenby estimated that the Turkish Armies on 181 182 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. DAMASCUS 'iUSAUU s Beershcba _- -v*.--^- l* Zahle wj^m . RayaF / — J / !re ^Kats arie n.:.<^\ •,-. -. .• . ,fi?"iSS.' HirFsh/ I c"'' laJaauweh J I ^■" ■':■' i.v r-^YJisroenacraKuo Kuteihf/i }:t'~'- V . \-:,0>'s-w^\iBnofJacobsIlaughters) ^ ' "■'■'•'•^•■- • Safcd° #^^^ r r .-■■ ^^^^^ Vf •'/" >^. /. .-/Bethsaida TJawa <?' -^ Caperna|ni|i4! ■ ^, „.■ / ^ ,^>' :.. -"'--i-v ■■f«l^^ "'^ 'Sheikh Sa-ad 6 ,^. TlBERlA^^ malilee . ^^ ^ /^ oeK'.tRoit^ ■f- ■'- ■ -Ji/Ji'srBenatYakub i^l:<> nRAsm. GHAZALeSTA. ifO^ ^^ V. de ,if>^ ^ioNAZAREl MC 'C <7/-\ TABOR "ODtST -^ -^ iDerda A? UV cMegiddo)'* ""Wl^rT^,!'- Sj '" irbicTD- - -/ ErRemte ^Kin^M n\iur iuinni -^ -^^ / i-^^i^L ^^5:^ ■-./■-it. ^ o I'l i 9-Tajyibe y - 0" 'Amman " Beit'uniA "■'"y ■> jBethlehBii l^OuiS/ §1 Belt t^ljjebrin Miles 5 /O ^^?«I^0f Madeba LFBANSTA SLKASTAL- DEAD P SEA^i XL L Railways (asonSepis i9i8) Stinkard Gauge » Metre " Decauville JERUSALEM TO DAMASCUS AND BEYRUT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 188 his front had 4,000 cavalry and 32,000 infantry, with 400 guns— representing a " ration strength' ' of 104,000 men. Tlie German-Austrian con- tingent numbered about 15,000, consisting mostly of technical troops. The enemy forces were in three groups : ( 1) The Vllth and Vlllth Turkish Armies between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, with 27,000 infantry and 268 guns. ( -2) The IVth Turkish Army east of the Jordan, with 6,000 infantry, 2,000 sabri!-', and 74 guns. (3) Tlie 2nd Turkisli Army Corps in garrison at Ma'an — south-east of the Dead Sea — and on posts on the Hedjaz railway north of Ma'an, some 6,000 infantry and 30 guns. Besides these three bodies there were in reserve between Tiberias, Nazareth and Haifa about 3,000 infantry, with 30 guns. The German General Liman von Sanders, com- mander-in-chief of the enemy forcas, had his headquarters at Nazareth. For the defence of Syria, should the armies in Palestine be defeated, the Turks had no adeqiiate force. They had lost the flower of their army in the defence of Gallipoli and in the previous campaigns in Palestine, Mesopotamia and the Caucasus. They had squandered, too, thousands of excellent troops as German and Austrian auxiliaries in the Dobrudja and the Carpathians. On his side General AUenby had in the fighting line a total of " some 12,000 sabres, 57,000 rifles and 540 guns. ... a considerable superiority in numbers over the enemy, especially in mounted troops." His force was, he stated, " made up of two cavalry divisions, two mounted divisions, seven infantry divisions, an Indian infantry brigade, four unallotted battalions and the French Detachment (the equivalent of an infantry brigade with other arms attached)." It was a considerable force, but, as has been shown in Chapter CCLXVIII, a large proportion of the troops consisted of newly raised Indian battalions, the bulk of the European units having been withdrawn for service in France. The last Indian battalions to arrive had only been formed a few months and had not been incorporated into divisions till early in August. While the majority of Allenby's aimy now consisted of Indiaas, its composition was cosmopolitan. The mounted troops were made up of British and Indian (Regular and Imperial Service) regiments. Yeomanry, the Australian Light Horse, New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and a regiment of French cavalry. The iafa^itry, besides some famous British regiments, included the Armerian troops of the Legioa d'Orient, the Tirailleiu^ Alg6rian8, the let Battalion of the Cape Corps (coloured troops from South Africa), the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the British West ludies Regiment, and notably Jewry's contribution — the 38th and 39th (Jewish) Battalions of the Royal Fusihers. In addition mention shoiJd be made of the Italian Detaohmnnt, wliich, though taking no GENERAL LIMAN VON SANDERS. Commander-in-Chief of the Germano-Turkish Forces. prominent part in the campaign, " throughout the operations gave valuable and loyal assistance " ; * of the South African FieW Artillery, the Australian Flying.Corps, Egyptian Infantry Battalions, and, behind the fighting line, of the Egyptian Labour Corps. Canada, too, was not wholly unrepresented, having sent a unit of its Ordnance Corps. If to oil these be added the Arab Army under the Emir Faisal, and the British and French naval squadrons which cooperated, an idea may be g.iined of the mixed character of the forces the Turks had to face. There had been no alterations of special importance in the staff and leaders in the field since General Allenby first succeeded to the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Sir J. L. Bols, a soldier of Belgian descent, remained Chief of Staff ; Sir Philip Chetwode and Sir Edward Bulfin wero the commanders of the two principal infaitry * The Italian detachment returned home in February^ 1919. 240—2 184 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR corps, Sir Harry Chauvel of the Desert Mounted Corps, and Sir Edward Chaytor of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division. Col P. de Pi^papo commaaded the French Detach- ment. Tho moral of the force was excellent ; British and Indian regiments brigaded together worked i.i a fine spirit of comradeship and emulation. In the earlier fighting of 1918 it had been demonstrated that tho Turks could greatly embarrass the British operations in Eastern Palestine by transferring troops from the west to the oast bank of the Jordan. It was on first-class roads. Consequently, considering what it was hoped to accomplish, the opening operations could not safely be postponed to later than mid-September, this notwitlistanding that several of the Indian battalions had had very little chance to get familiar with conditions prevailing on the Palestine front. It may here be noted that any apprehensions felt concerning the Indian and other newly raised battalions wore soon set at rest ; they all showed good fighting qualities, though naturally they Lacked the skill of the veteran troops. ARAB CHILDREN. Waiting their turn to be clothed and fed by the British. highly desirable, on political as well as military grounds, that the Turk should bo cleared from Moab and Gilead, that Medina should bo entirely cut off from any chance of succour, and that no enemy force should be left between Palestine and Mesopotamia. General Allenby realized that th's could best be done by a successful offensive in Western Palestine. Moreover, the destruction of the VTIth and Vlllth Turkish Armies — ^that is, the enemy forces west of the Jordan — appeared to the British commander " to bo within the bounds of possibility." Accordingly he decided to strike at them. The time for opening the offensive was paitly dictated by weather conditions. The rains usually begin in Western Palestine at the end of October, rendering the plains of Sharon and Esdraelon (otherwise Armageddon) impossible for trans^port except The plan of campaign was drawn on bold and simple lines. The main feature was that the cavalry were to pour through a gap rpade for them by the infantry in the enemy lines, and, getting behind the Turks, cut off their retreat by seizing all vital points in their line of com- munications. It was obvious that this manoeuvre would have more chance of success in the coast sector than in the hill country north of Jerusalem, though even on the coast sector the cavalry, to cut off the Turks, would have to cross the western spurs of the hills of Samaria. Allenby therefore made his main attack in the coast plain. The command of the attacking force fell to General Bulfin, whoso corps, the XXIst, had continuously formed the left wing of Allenby's army. This corps, besides the 54th Division (Maj.-Gen. Hare) and 75th Division (Maj.- fl THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR: 185 Gen. Palin), which had fought their way up from Gaza, now included the 3rd (Lahore) Division (Maj.-Gen. Hoskins)* and the 7th (Meerut) Division (Maj.-Gen. Fane). In addi- tion the 60th (London) Division (Maj.-Gon. Shea), from tlio XXth Corps, the French De- tachment, the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Onslow), two brigades of movintain batteries, and 18 heavy and siege- gun batteries were placed at Sir Edward Bulfin's disposal. This , was rendered possible by withdrawing the reserves from the front north of Jerusalem and by reducing to a minimum the forces in the Jordan valley. The composition of General Bulfin's force was as follows : SlTH DIVISION. IGlat Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gon. Orpek-Palmeb. l/4th, l/5th, l/6th, and l/7th Battalions Essex Regiment. 162Hd Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Oen. MuDOE. l/5tli Bedfordshire Regiment, l/lth Northamptonshire lieginient. 1/lOth and 1/1 1th London Regiment. 163rd Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. MoNeill. l/4th and l/5th Norfolk Regiment. l/5th Suilolk Regiment. l/8th Hampshire Regiment. Divisional Troops. 270th, 271st, and 272nd Brigades R.F.A. 7th (MEI3RUT) DIVISION. 19/^ Infantry Bri(/ade. Brig.-Gen. Weik. 1st Battalion Seaforths. 38th, 92nd Punjabis. 125th Napier's Rifles. 2\8t Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Kemball. 2nd Battalion Black Watch. 1st Guides Infantry. 20th Punjabis. 1 /8th Gurkha Rifles. 28ift Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gon. Davies. 2nd Battalion Leicester Regiment. Slst Sikhs. 53rd Sikhs. 56th Punjabi Rifles. Divisional Troops. 261st, 202nd, 264th Brigades R.F.A. 121st Pioneers. 7.-)TH DIVISION. 2'.i2nd Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gon. Hcddleston. I/4tli Wilts Regiment. 72nd Punjabis. 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles. 3rd Kashmir I.S. Infantry. • Major-Goneral Hoskins had been recalled from East Africa to take up coniniatid of this Division {see Chapter OCLXXVI). 233rd Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gon. Colston. l/5th Somerset L.I. 29th Punjabis. 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles. 2/154th Indian Infantry. 23ith Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gon. MACLEA^r. l/4th Duke of Cornwall's L.I. 123rd Outram's Rifles. 123th Napier's Rifles. Divisional Troops. 37th, 172nd, and 1st South African Brigades B.F.A. 60th DIVISION. 179tA Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. HuHFHBEYS. 2/13th London Regiment. 3/151st Punjabi Rifles. 2/19th Punjabis. 2/127th Baluch L.I. 180/A InfarUry Brigade Brig.. Gen. Watson. 2/ 19th London Regiment. 2nd Guides Infantry. 2/30th I-unjabis. l/50th Kumaon Rifles. 181«< InfarUry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Da Costa. 2/22nd London Regiment. l/30th Baluchis. 2/97th Deccan Infantry, 2/152nd Punjabis. Divisional Troops. 301st, 302nd, 303rd Brigades R.F.A. 3bd (LAHORE) DIVISION. 1th Infantry Brigade. , Brig-. Gen. Davidson. 1st Battalion Connaught Rangers. 2/7th Gurkha Rifles. 27th and 91st Punjabis. 8th Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Edwardes. 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment. 47th Sikhs. 59th Scinde Rifles. 2/124th Baluchistan. 9«A Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Luard. 2nd Battalion Dorset Regiment. 1/Nt Gurkha Rifles. 93nl Imlian Infantry. 105th Mahratta L.I. Divisional Troops, 4th. 8th, 53rd Brigades B.F.A. l/34th Sikh Pioneers. Altogether some 35,000 infantry and 383 guna were at Bulfin's service, while the enemy strength opposed to him was estimated at not more than 8,000 rifles and 130 gims. But if the Turks were weak numerically, they had, under German instruction, con-structed very elaborate and strong defences. Their coast sector ran from Jiljulieh (i.e. Gilgal*) to the sea, a distance of some 10 miles. The railway from the north, skirting the foothills of Samaria, * But not the Gilgal of Joshua, where the twelve stones were erected as a memorial to 'the crossing of the Jordan by the Israelites drvshod. 186 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. is built in a slight depression close to the hills, and in this depression Ues Jiljulieh. To the west of this depression the Turks [wrote Sir E. Allenby] had constructed two defensive systems. The first, 14,000 yards in length and 3,000 in depth, ran along a sandy ridge in a north-westerly direction from Bir Adas to the sea. It consisted of a series of works connected by continuoiL^i fire trenches. The second, or Kt Tireh system, 3,000 yards in rear, ran from the village of that name to the mouth of the Nahr Falik. On the enemy's extreme right the ground, except for a narrow strip along the coast, is marshy, and could only be crossed in few places. The defence of the second system did not, therefore, require a large force. The railway itself was protected by numerous works and by the fortified villages of Jiljulieh and KalkiUeh. The ground between our front line at Ras £1 Ain * and these villages was open, and was overlooked from the enemy's works on the foothills round Kefr Kasmi. These were the systems Bulfin's force was to attack. Behind, awaiting the breaching of the enemy's line, were the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divi- sions of the Desert Mounted Corps, the Austra- lian Moxmted Division being, for the time.absent. These cavalry divisions were made up as follows : 4th cavalry division. Maj.-G«n. Barrow. 10th Cavalry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Howard-Vyse and Brig.-Gen. Green. l/lst Dorset Yeomanry. 2nd Lancers. 38th Central India Horse. * The Antipatris of Herod the Great, the Mirabel of tha Crusaders. 11th Cavalry Srir/ale. Brig.-Gen. Gregory- l/lst County of London Yeomanry. 29th Lancers. 36th Jacob's Horse. 12th Cavalry Brii/ade. Brig.-Gen. Wiqan. l/lst Staffordshire Yeomanry. 6th Cavalry. 19th Lancers {Fane's Horse )• DivisioiuU Troopn. 20th Brigade R.H.A. 5th CAVALRY DIVISION, Maj.-Gon. MacAndrew. Idth Cavalry Brigade. l/lst Gloucester Yeomanry. 9th Hodson's Horse. 18th Lancers. nth Cavalry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Clarke. l/lst Sherwood Rangers. 20th Deccan Horse. 34th Foona Horse. 15th Cavalry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Harbord. Jodhpore I.S. Lancers. Mysore I.S. Lancers. 1st Hyderabad I.S. Lancers. Divisional Troops. Kssez Battery B.H.A. It was hoped to take the Turks by surprise, but the difficulty was to conceal from the -enemy knowledge both of the withdrawa^ of. two cavalry divisions from the Jordan valley and of the concentration of a large A GERMAN SCOUT PLANE SHOT DOWN IN SYRIA. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 187 NAZARETH : THE WELL OF THE VIRGIN. force on the coast. There was not, as was the case in Mesopotamia, a great danger from spies on foot ; in Western Palestine German airmen were the eyes of the enemy, and tliey had been very daring. Sir E. AUenby wrote : The concentration in the coastal plain was carried out by night, and every precaution was talcen to prevent any increased movement becoming apparent to the Turks. Full use of the many groves round Ramleh, Ludd and Jai^a was made to conceal troops during tha day. The chief factor in the secrecy maintained must be attributed, however, to the supremacy in the air which had been obtained by the Royal Air Force. Thd process of wearing down the enemy's aircraft had been going on all through the summer. During one week in June 100 hostile aeroplanes had crossed our lines. During the last week in August this number had decreased to 18. In tho next few days a number were shot down, with the result that only four ventured to cross our lines during the period of concentration. When Nazareth was captured a number of enemy aeroplane reports were found, in which constant reference was made to the destructive accuracy of the British anti-aircraft service. As a result (Jerman scouting machines, when they did come over, flew very high, at 14,000 feet or so, relying upon their powerful photo- graphic apparatus for information rather than the eyes of their observers. In consequence of this the en'^my observers were unable to detect any signs of the concentration in Sharon, and even failed to identify General Allenby's great Headquarters camp at Bir Salem, which was reported to be an " infantry camp, two battalions." Further to mislead tho enemy, General Chaytor was ordered to carry out a series of demonstrations to induce the enemy to believe that another advance east of the Jordan, either on Amman or Madeba, was intended. At this time (about September 10) part of the Emir Faisal's army, accoinpanied by British armoured cars and a French mountain battery, was assembling at Kasr el Azrak, 50 miles east of Amman, so that had its rendezvous been discovered (it was not) the Turks would have been strengthened in their belief that an attack on Amman was impending. In any case Liman von Sanders was deceived ; he did not move an additional man to the defence of the coast sector, and he believed that no alteration had been made in the disposition of the British forces. He certainly was expecting the British to move, but apparently anticipated an attack in the hill region north of Jerusalem. Daring bombing raids on Der'aa by the R.A.F., and equally daring raids by the Arab Camel Corps on the railway, north and west and south of Der'aa (September 16-19), must have caused the enemy perturbation, as they completely severed railway communication with Palestine, and when on the night of September 18-19 the 188 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. NABLUS, THE ANCIENT SGHECHEM 53rd Division (Maj.-Gen. Mott) of the XXth Corps (Sir Philip Chetwode's) swung forward its right east of the Bireh-Nablus road,* the Turks probably thought that they had to meet the real offensive on that sector. Chetwode's operations were, however, subsidiary to those of Bulfln, his immediate object being to block the Turks' exits to the lower valley of the Jordan. With one exception the Welshmen captured all their objectives. There was stiff hand-to-hand fighting and over 400 prisoners were taken. The campaign had begun well. The hour had come for Bulfin to strike At 4.30 a.m. on Septemoer 19 his artillery opened an intense bombardment of the enemy lines, the destroyers Druid and Forester helping by bringing their fire to bear on the coast road. Under cover of the bombardment, which lasted only 15 minutes, the infantry left their deploy- ment positions. The enemy artillery (partly served by Austrians) replied energetically to the British guns, " but in most cases his barrage fell behind the attacking infantry," and the Turkish lines all along the Sharon front were ablaze with the green and white lights sent up by the enemy infantry to ask for artillery help. Shortly afterwards, as soon as the light was good enough to enable objectives to be clearly distinguished, Greneral Allenby launched an air attack for the express purpose of destroying ( Ijjicial photograph. * That is, the Jerusalera-Shechera road. The British had buiit a light railway north from Jerusalem to Bireh, which became the advanced base on this sector by means of bombs all enemy signal stations, headquarter telephone and telegraph exchanges, and advanced wireless installations. This was so successfully carried out that the enemy was entirely deprived of all means of communication other than visual signalling, and for days was unable to ascertain the nature or magnitude of the disaster in which he was involved. Going from east to west, the attacking troop- were the French Tirailleurs and the Armenians (in the foothills), next the 54th Division (in the foothills overlooking the railway at Jiljulieh). then the Lahore Division, the 75th Division, the Meerut Division, and finally, along the shore, the 60th (London) Division. In the foothills the enemy put up some opposition ; on the left the Londoners, the Meerut and the 75th Divisions overwhelmed the enemy in their first defensive system and . pressed on, without a pause, to the Et Tireh position. The Londoners reached and passed the Nahr (river) Falik and turned inland towards Tul Keram. The battle of Sharon had been won and a road cleared along the coast for the cavalry. Elsewhere the infantry met resistance more or less stubborn, but by 11 a.m. that resistance was everywhere broken, and dis- organized bodies of Turks began to stream north across the plain, pursued by the 60th Division and the 5th Australian L.H., to which brigade was attached a composite regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique and Spahis. Meantime the Desert Moimted Column had THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 189 begun thaf amazing ride which at once became famous. It was not their business to take a direct hand in the fight in which the XXIst Corps was engaged, but to press north and east and cut off the retreat not only of the Vlllth Tiu-kish Army, with which Bulfin was engaged, but also that of the Vllth Turkisli Army, still facing Chetwode astride the Jerusalem-Shochem road Before Bulfln's divisions attacked, both the 4th and oth Cavalry Divisions had moved out from the concealment of the orange groves around Sarona and had formed up in the rear from Ludd (Lydda), 10 miles beliind the front line. The story of the exploits of the cavalry may be, however, postponed while the fortunes of the XXIst and XXth Corps are followed. In some places, as already indicated, the resistance of the Turks to Bulfln's divisions held been not inconsiderable. Thus at the strongly fortified village of Et Tireh the 75th Division met with determined opposition, while Jiljulieh and neighbouring points were " defended wnth stubborrmess " against the A PACK WIRELESS STATION. These wireless outfits could be taken anywhere on horses, quickly erected and put in operation within ten minutes. They had a ran^e of about a hundred miles. of the Meerut and 60th Divisionst — ^that is, behind the divisions nearest the coa»st. They had had the order to fall in about 2 a.m., and it required some manosuvrmg to get all in readiness in the darkness and contracted space. Im- patiently the men waited the moment ■when, they could advance, many of them being echelonned along the beach under the steep cliffe of Arsuf. The order came sooner than they could reasonably have expected, but to the eager men it seemed an age. As soon as the Londoners had broken tlirough the second Turkish system the command to start was given to the cavalry. The men rode hard and by noon had covered 18 miles. They had then reached Jelameh and Hudeira, and thereafter effectively carried out the task assigned them. Behind them came the Australian Mounted Division, which early in the morning had started out assa\ilts of the Lahore Division. But when by H a.m., these places had been captured the enemy thought of nothing but flight. Tul Keram, towards which the Turks made, is on the railway at the point where it debouches into the plain from the pass leading up to Samaria and Shechem, and was an advanced enemy base. As General AUenby succinctly put it, " great confusion reigned at Tul Keram," confusion which grew continually worse as the 60th Division and the 5th Au.stralian L.H. Brigade pressed on, the Londoners occupying Tul Keram itself durmg the afternoon. By this time large forces of the enemy were trying to escape by the road leading east from Tul Keram to Messudieh and Nablus (Shechem) : — This road, which follows the railway up a narrow valley, was already crowded with troops and transport. The confusion was added to by the persistent attacks of the Boyal Air Force and Australian Flying Corps, from 190 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. which there was no escape. Great havoc was caused and in several places the road was blocked by over- turned lorries and vehicles. Later in the evening an Australian regiment, having made a detour, succeeded in r^'aching a hill four miles east of Tul Keram, over- looking the road. As a result, a large amount of trans- port and many guns fell into our hands. (Allenby.) While the enemy in that direction was already demoralized, the Vllth Turkish At my in the hills still stood firm. They were now dealt with by the XXth Corps and the right wing of the XXIst Corps. Of the troops of the list- named corps, after the morning's fighting, the Mceriit, Lahore and 54th Divisions had turned oast into tho hills of Samaria and by nightfall had made good progress. The main attack on the enemy hill positions was made that night by the XXth Corps. In anticipation of the success of the attack on the coast sector, the two divisions — the 53rd and 10th — had been concentrated in readiness, and as soon as Bulfin's men had broken through Sir Edmund Allenby gave Sir Philip Chetwode liis orders to attack. The 53rd Division was on the right, that is east of the Jeriisalem-Shechem road ; the 10th Division (Maj -Gten. Longley) on the left, in the neighbourhood of Kefr Ain and Berukin, places on either side of the Wadi Deir Ballut, where the 52nd Division (Maj. -Gen. Hill) had had much hard fighting in the spring before leaving for France. The lollowing are the details of the com- position of Chetwode's two divisions : 53BD DIVISION. 15S1A Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Qen. Vernon and Brig.-Gen. WiLBBtooD. 5/6th Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 4/Uth Gurkha Rifles. 3/153rd Rifles. 3/154th Indian Infantry. 159th Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Money. 4/5th Welsh Regiment. 3/152nd, l/153rd, 2/153rd Punjabis. iQOth Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Pearson. l/7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. l/17th Infantry. l/21st Punjabis. 1st Cape Corps. Divisionxil Troops. 266th, 266th, 267th Brigades R.F.A. 10th division. Maj. -Gen. Lonqley. 29<fe Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. SmFth. Ist Battalion Leinster Regiment. 1/lOlst Grenadiers. l/54th Sikhs. 2/ IS Ist Indian Infantry. 30i/» Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Gbeeb. 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment. 1st Kashmir I.S. Infantry. 38th Dogras. 46th Punjabis. I [Official photograph. THE MAIN STREET OF TUL KERAM. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. un AUSTRALIAN CAVALRV RESTING. 'Official f'hoiQ^taph. Z\st Infantry Brigade. Brig.-Gen Mokbis. 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers. 2/lOist Grenadiers, 74th Punjabis. 2/42nd Deoli Regiment. Divisiorutl Troops. 67th, 68th, 263rd Brigades R.F.A. From the night of the 19th to the evening of the 20th the Vllth Turkish Army fought hard. Tlie enemy here was neither disorganized nor demorahzed, and the attacking troops in this the third battle of Mount Ephraim had a stif? task. For one thing, the hill country, as has been sufficiently shown in previous chapters dealing with the Palestine campaign, is very broken and rugged, and it is impossible for field guns to keep pace with the infantry. Roads, in fact, had to be improvised behind the advancing infantry before the guns could be brought up. Again, the enemy had long been expecting attack astride the Jerusalem- Shechem rood, and to meet it had built defences of great strength on successive ridges. The 10th Division, through whose .sector this road lay, was directed to avoid a frontal attack and to make its stroke north-easterly. Even so, its work remained difficult. Chetwode's objective was Shechem, the modern Nabhis, a city closely associated with the history of the Jews from the days of the Patriarchs and to-day the home of the remnant of the Samaritans. It lies in a valley between Ebal and Gerizim, the mounts of cursing and blessing, and has not the commanding position or the strategic importance of the neigh- boiu-ing Samaria, once the capital of the kingdom of Israel, now a small village in the midst of many remarkable ruins. But pos.ses- sion of the high ground north-east of Shechem would enable Sir Philip Chetwode effectually to deny to the Turks the roads leading to the lower valley of the Jordan. All difficulties not- withstanding, good progress was made in the night attack on September 19 and during the succeeding day. The 53rd Division captured Kh.* Abu Malul, and advanced their line in the centre. On their right Khan Jibeit was heavily counter-attacked on the morning of September 20. The Turks succeeded in regaining the hill, but were driven off again after a sharp fight. This incident, and the necessity of making a road to enable the guns to be brought forward, caused delay. The 10th Division advanced in two columns, and by midday on September 20 the right column, after a hard fight at Furkhah, had reached Selfit and was approaching Iskaka, which was strongly held by the enemy. The left column reached Kefr Haris, which was only captured after heavy fighting. The 10th Division had already driven the enemy back seven miles. The artillery, however, had been unable to keep up with the infantry, and little progress was made during the afternoon. On the left of the 10th Division the XXIst Corps had continued its advance in three columns. On the right the Lahore Division advanced up Wadi Azzuii. In the centre the Meerut Division moved on Kefr Sur and Beit Lid. The 60th Division and the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade advanced along the Tul Keram- Nablus road on Messudieh Station. By evening the line Baka-Beit Lid-Messudieh Station-Attara had been reached. The 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Moerut) Divisions encoun- tered a determined and well-organized resistance, which stifloned as the Moerut Division approached Beit Lid. Up to the evening of this day (September 20) the commander of the Vllth Turkish Army appears to have been unaware that Allenby's cavalry had already blocked his line of retreat, but he had been withdrawing his transport on • Kh. =Khirbet =niin. 240-3 192 THE TIMES HIRTOEY OF THE WAR. Shechem all day and his resistance had been virtually broken, notwithstanding the stoutness with which liis troops fought. Diu-ing the night the enemy learned the bitter truth about the British in his rear, and now the Vllth, like the Vlllth, Army took to flight. The enemy rearguards were chiven in early in the morning of the 21st, and all organized resistance ceased. Later in the day the 5th Australian L.H. Brigade, consisting of the 14th, 15th, and 16th Australian L.H. Regiments, with the. French will be recalled, was to seize the vital points in the enemy's line of commimications with Damascus. These were, first, the railway, which from near Samaria ran north to El Afule on the plain of Esdraelon (and seven miles almost due south of Nazareth), thence went south-east along the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan,* where it turned north and followed the Jordan Valley to the south end of the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias). There it crossed the Jordan, going east up the Yarmuk Valley to Der'aa, the TURKISH PRISONERS. [Official photograph. cavalry leading, entered Shechem from the west, the 10th Division entering the town from the south. By the evening the XXth Corps had reached Mount Ebal, while the line of the XXIst Corps ran through the ruins of Samaria. The part played by the cavalry* in the rout of the Turlts igay now be told. By midday on September ID, as has been stated, the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were already 18 miles north of what had . been Bulfin's front line at 4.30 a.m. After a short halt the two divisions went forward again, taking, however, separate routes. Their object, it • That is, not including the mounted troops just mentioned attached to the XXIst Corps, who after- wards rejoined the Australian Mounted Division in time to take part in the advance on Damascus. junction with the Damascus-Hedjaz line. Secondly, there were the roads. Those running north all converged either on El Afule or Beisan. Thence they went by Nazareth, the western shore of the Sea of Galilee and by Bosh Pinah to the old caravan track to Damascus which crosses the Jordan by the famous bridge of the Daughters of Jacob (Jisr Bonat Yakub), .south of the Waters of Merom. In addition there were the roads leading south-east by the Jordan crossing at Jisr ed Damieh to Es Salt and Amman, roads by which the enemy, if beaten, would be certain * The Beth-shean (House of Quiet) of the Old Testa- ment, a place whose history belied its natn^ On its walls the Philistines exposed the body of Saul after liis defeat and death at the neighbouring field of Gilboa. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 193 to try to escape. Of the places mentioned Der'aa had already been dealt with by the Emir Faisal's Arabs ; the task of the cavalry was primarily to capture El Afule and Beisan. They did that and much more. In the morning ride very little opposition had been encountered ; practically every Turk met by the horseiVien as they galloped on at ■'"^'^'^.^'^^mf^i^ GERASA, EAST OF THE JORDAN; TEMPLE OF THE SUN. THE once surrendered. When, in the afternoon, the 5th Cavalry Division (Maj.-Gren. Mac Andrew) moved on north, the 13th Brigade (Brig. -Gen. Kelly) leading, there was still no serious resistance. Presently the division turned east and entered the hills of Samaria at about their narrowest part, near where they join Mount Carmel. After a few hours they were given a rest, getting water, food, oranges and a little sleep. Before long the division was off again, but a good many of the horses were already done up and had to be left behind. The two brigades of the division now separated, the 13th making for Nazareth, the 14th for El Afule. The 4th Cavalry DivisioA (Major-General Barrow), which had also gone north after the midday halt on the 19th, turned east into the hills at a point south of that taken by the 5th Division. It took the valley of the Wadi Arab, which gradually narrows to the pass of Musmus, beyond which the road crosses the northern slopes of the hills to Megiddo, dis- guised by its modern name of El Lejjiui, and thence across the Plain of Esdraelon to El Afule. Awaking to their danger, the Tiu'ks had hastily sent a battalion from Afule to man Musmus. The advanced guard only had reached the pass when the 4th Division rode up and their opposition was quickly overcome. All through the livelong night [wrote one officer] wo had shoved on, sometimes at a gallop, halting only for brief intervals. 1 snatched a moment's sleep with the reins in one hand, my horse meanwhile grazing. All along the road wo encountered abandoned Turkish transport, gun$, wagonfl and horses higgledy-piggledy all over the place. A Turkish officer hiding in a treo fell down and was taken prisoner. The poor man, who wore a splendid fur coat, was terror-struck at tho thought of being left in the custody of Indians. He expected to be murdered at sight, and was astonished to find that some of the Indians were of the same religion as himself. . . . Eventually by a miracle in the morning wo reached the entrance to the plain of Arma- geddon. Had the Turks succeeded in getting to the paiss with a few machine-guns, they would have held us up for hours. The cavalry encountered the rest of the battalion at Megiddo, the scene of many great battles in the history of the Jews, and the Armageddon of the Apocalypse. There was no great fight here in this campaign, but what there was to do was done neatly and success- fully. The 2nd Lancers charged over exposed, LAYING A lofficial phototraph. TELEPHONE CABLE. unoven ground, and in face of heavy machine- gun and rifle fire, and rode through the enemy, killed 46 with the lance and captured the remainder, some 470 men. At Megiddo the 4th Division rested, but early on the 20th was again in the saddle, making for Afule. But the 14th Brigade (Brig.-General Clarke) of the 5th Division beat them by half an hour. They captured Afule at 7.30 a.m., talcing the garrison, about 1,500 men, prisoners. At the railway station were found eight locomotives, two complete trains, 40 lorries and a vast quantity 194 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BRITISH BOMBING MACHINES LINED UP READY TO START ON A RAID. ot stores, uiuong thera " himp sugar, cigars and champagne galore." Shortly afterwards an enemy aeroplane tried to land, ignorant that Afulc had been taken. It was shot down. Tho 4th Division, which arrived at Afule at 8 a.m., rode down the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan, which it reached by half-past four in the afternoon, having covered 80 miles in 34 hours — a fine record. About 1,000 of the enemy surrendered at Beisan. The Australian Mounted Division (Major- General Hodgson) was some distance behind the two cavalry divisions when the great ride began. It was made up as follows : 3rd A. L. H. Brigade (Brig. -Gen. Boyston) 8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments A.L.H. — 4th A.L.H. Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Grant) 4th, 11th, and 12th A.L.H. Regiments — 5th A.L.H. Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Onslow) 14th, 15th, and 1 6th Regiments of A.L.H. The Australians had followed the line of the 4th Division into the Plain of Esdraelon and were now sent south-east to Jenin (En-Gannim = Fountain of Gardens), where the road from Shechem to Nazareth leaves the hUls. Jenin was the headquarters of the enemy air force, and a considerable number of Gorman troops were stationed there. The aerodrome had been incessantly patrolled by British and Australian airmen on the 19th in order to prevent the enemy from making use of his machines to supplement his disorganized telephonic and telegraphic communications. It was also of the first importance to prevent him from getting any news of the advance of the cavalry ; consequently it was necessary to prevent enemy machines from leaving the ground. With this end in view two scouts at a time patrolled over Jenin aerodrome, each carrying four bombs, with which any sign of enemy activity was discouraged. Each pair was relieved while still patrolling over the aerodrome, and on relief came down and fired machine-guns into the hangars, with the result that enemy aircraft were prevented from taking any part in the battle. The Australians had little difficulty in capturing Jenin. The following account of their enterprise is from the pen of Mr. H. S. Gullett, the Official Correspondent with the Australian Forces in Palestine, under date September 21 :• Last night two regimentR of Australian Light Horse, Victorians and Western Australians, about 600 strong, moving rapidly, suddenly enveloped Jenin. Galloping at dusk with drawn swords upon the old stone-built hillside town, they were astonished to meet shouting droves of Turks €idvancing and crying for tnercy and waving white flags of all sizes. The only resistance was from a detachment of German maohino-gunnere, but this was quickly silenced. The Australians captured nearly 7,000 prisoners, including 700 Germans, and a substantial cavalry force, with 900 horses ; also two aerodromes and a huge quantity of war material, including rolling stock, guns, and machine-guns, and complete trains of motor and horse transport. The Germans had fired great dumps of ammunition, petrol, and the hangars and workshops on the aero- dromes at our approach. But one plane was seized intact, and close by was found a big cave containing thousands of bottles of champagne and other wines and spirits. , ^ To-day Esdraelon Plain presented a wonderful war spectacle. From daylight to dusk interminable columns of prisoners came winding across the valley from Nazareth, Beisan, Afule, and Jenin. While these events were happening the 13th Cavalry Brigade had accomplished much farther north. They had started for Nazareth at 6 p.m. on the 19th and had 42 mUes to go to reach their objective. The troops hoped to arrive in time to catch Liman von Sanders napping. The city of the Nazarene, with its sacred memories, had been chosen by the Gtermans as convenient headquarters, and its numerous hospices, schools, and even the churches were turned to military use. And however badly the Turks fared, the Germans had seen well to their own comfort. On this point the testimony of many witnesses might t THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 195 be given, Dut the following extract from a statement by an officer who took part in the operations will suffice. Writing in the Kia Ora- Coo-ee he said : You saw evidence of German super-comfort, super- eqiiiprnont, super-feeding and super-accommorlat.ion everywhere. It struck you first and most forcibly on seeing the droves of prisoners come in. Whore Turkish officers walked, German officers were riding on donkeys, on camels, in gharries, or any vehicles ; you can fairly safely infer that at the time of capture all these means of locomotion were available equally to Turk and -German. . . . Take the matter of food alone. I lived in for three days. There was much captured provender there, Turkisl^ and German. I lived chiefly on German M. & V. and German tinned sausage and dried fruits. I had often heard of this ration in France, but had never tasted it. To taste it was to spurn bully. . . . All the Turkish food consisted in spare supplies of dried legumes. If you base your comparison on quantity alone you will see how well the German fed bj' comparison with "Joe Burke.'* [Here follows a paragraph on the Oennan wine stores, the quantity and variety of liquor found showing " with what resolution the Hun had set out to ' do himself w?ll * at any cost.'*^. . . . Captured lorries and motor cars are German. Captured Turkish transport is the miserable little wagons that a New- foundland dog could almost drag. ... Of clothing and equipment little need bo said. The Turk is in rags of greater diversity than any slum can show. It is the more pathetic beside the comparative splendour of the Geirman uniform. With a guide to lead, the 13th Brigade — the Gloucestershire Hussars, 9th Hodson's Horse, and 18th (Bengal) Lancers — tra- velled by rough tracks through the hills and across small valleys until, about 2 a.m. on the 20th, they reached the Plain of Esdraelon, " wonderfully fertile." Riding across the plain, they stopped to blow up a Section of the narrow-gauge railway to Haifa, thus cutting off the garrison of that port. Then on again, the advanced guard (the 18th Lancers) surijrising and capturing the garrison of a village, about 250 men, who were asleep in barracks. At 5.30 a.m. the brigade trotted up a steep hill which overlooks the little basin in which the town lies, and entered. Nazareth with swords drawn. A scene of great confusion ensued. There was some stiff street fighting, and the brigade had also to face persistent fire from ma^chine-guns posted on high ground north of the town. A troop was sent to find von Liman ; it was led to the wrong house, and when the right hoase was reached it was to find that von Liman had got away by car — ^in his pyjamas, according to an eye-vvdtness — and with him the notorious von Papen, formerly German military attach^ at Washington, who had, however, left behind various incrimmating documents respecting the plots carried out against the United States while Gtermany was still at peace with that country. Von Liraan'a flight had been so hiuried that he, too, left all his papers behind. These and some members of his staff fell into the hands of the British. Von Liman hurried to Damascus and then on to Aleppo and Constantinople, leaving the German Asiatic Corps as well as the Turks to their fate. His conduct was bitterly criticized in Germany, criticism which found public utterance after the revolution of November : The English were not so far wrong [said a writer in the Voasische Zeitung of November 24] when they said ** The German commander is much in advance of hia troops.** General Liman von Sanders had sent his daughters to a seaside place, and it seemed that his chief concern at the beginning of the dibdcle wtks to get these ladies to a place of safety. On the morning of the 20th main headquarters were taken by surprise, officers, nurses and men being caught in bed and led into captivity. . . , There were hardly any orders issued, and when they reached the troops they could not be executed, and the watchword was Sauve qui pent t The German troops gathered in small groups and attempted to fight their way through. . . . The army rescued four guns and its commander and his daughters rescued their baggage. Though deserted by their commander, the troops at Nazareth showed fight, giving a good deal of trouble to the Yeomen and Indians. Over 2,000 prisoners, among them many JOSEPH'S WELL, ON THE ROAD FROM JENIN TO AFULB. German telegraphists, mechanics, and other technical troops, were taken by the Brigade; but as it had ridden 62 miles in 22 hours, it was not called upon to attack the hill positions north of the town. It was, at 1 1 a.m., withdrawn from Nazareth and sent to El Afule, taking with it the prisoners, the captured papers and considerable loot, including £8,000 in gold, and " much brandy, hock and champagne, of which every man had a bottle that night." The 196 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE AT NAZARETH, AFTER ITS 13th BRIGADE. [Australian official photograph. CAPTURE BY THE brigade had no iatention or not completing its work, and the next day (September 21) went back to Nazareth. Going up a very steep track under Mount Tabor, they approached the place from the north, and this time met with no opposition. Some time was spent in hunting out small enemy parties still sheltering in the houses. The enemy resistance on the whole front attacked had by now been overcome. Within 36 hours of the opening of the offensive both the Vllth and Vlllth Turkish Armies had been defeated and all their main outlets of escape closed. September 21 saw the enemy forces west of the Jordan employed solely in seeking to escape by the only possible routes left to them — ^the crossings of the Jordan. It was now that the Air Force distingiiished itself by what was in fact an outflanking movement. In his dispatch General Allenby shows clearly both the plight of the enemy and the value of the work of the airmen. He writes : Since the early hours of the morning [of September 21] great confusion had reigned in the Turkish rear. Camps and hospitals were being hurriedly evacuated ; some were in flames. The roads leading north-east and east from Nablus to Beisan and the Jordan Valley were congested with transport and troops. Small' parties of troops were moving east along the numerous wadis. The disorganization which already existed was increased by the repeated attacks of the Royal Air Force ; in particular, on the closely packed column of transport moving north from Balata to Kh. Ferweh, where a road branches off, along the Wadi Farah. to Jisr ed Damieh. Some of the tran^ort continued *along the road to Beisan. where it fell into the hands of the 4th Cavalry Division. The greater part made for the Jordan along the Wadi Farah. Nine miles from Kh. Ferweh, at Ain Shibleh, a road branches oS to the north to Beisan. A mile beyond this point the Wadi Farah passes through a gorge. The head of the column was heavily bombed at this point. The drivers left their vehicles in panic, wagons were overturned, and in a short time the road was completely blocked. Still attacked by the Royal Air Force, the remainder of the column turned oS at Ain Shibleh, and headed for Beisan. The destruction of the enemy column retreat- ing along this road was an example of the high value of the aeroplane as an offensive weapon. It was impossible for troops to move along the surface of the country in time to stop the retreat of the enemy unless his progress could be delayed. The Royal Air Force not only delayed the progress of the column as required, but almost entirely destroyed it as wdU. All available machines were mobilized forthe attack, and departures from the Ramleh aerodrome were so timed that two machines should arrive over the objective every three minutes, and that an additional formation of six machines should come into action eveiy half-hour. After discharging its bombs every machine then raked the retreating column from a low altitude with machine-gun fire before retiu-ning to Ramleh for more bombs and trays of cartridges. These attacks were maintained from 8 a.m. until noon on September 21, by which hour the troops had come in touch with the remnant of the enemy. The road by this time was completely blocked with the corpses of men and animals and the debris of 87 guns, 55 motor lorries, 4 staf? cars and 932 wagons.* * A con«iderabIe proportion of the abandoned enemy stores never reached the British commissariat. Some were set on fire by the Turks in their retreat, much was looted by the natives, for it was impossible to guard THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 197 Thp Turkish hold of both banks of the Jordan from Umm es Shert northward — httle use as it was to them in consequence of the air attacks — did not last beyond the day. While the scenes described in the extract given from Allenbj''s dispatch were being enacted, General Ghaytor's force * in the Jordan Valley advanced north on a route west of the Jericho-Beisan road, and early in the morning of Septflmber 22 the 38th (Jewish) Battalion Royal Fusiliers captured the bridgehead at Umm es Shert — the first piece of work of note of these Hebrew soldiers Meantime the New Zealand Mounted Rifles got astride the road by the Wadi Farah from Shechem to Jisr ed Damieh, and a few hours later the two battalions of the British West Indies Regiment, in a fine bayonet charge, stormed the bridgehead at Jisr ed Damieh, taking 514 prisoners. The bridge itself was undameiged. The disorganization of the units of the Turkish Annies was even more marked on September 22, and from an early hour parties of Turks began to come into Bciaan and surrender, but the greater number continued their efforts to escape At 08.00 [8 a.m.] a column with transport and guns, 10 miles long, was reported by the Royal Air Force to be moving north along the Ain Shibleh-Beisan more than a fraction of tho sturt. When Jenin, Afule, and other places fell " the Beduin came from every camp and village within 20 miles, and with him cam© his women and children, his parents and grandparents, and camels and horses and asses. To his credit it should bo said that he was not shy of risks. At Jenin I watched hundreds of these people scrambling around a huge burning dump fired by tho Germans. They went boldly on to the edge of the flames, careless of the frequent explosions and showers of debris as tho fire reached shells and bombs. The temptation there was a great supply of German tinned fresh beef, and they laughed and shouted as they ventured their lives for it." (Mr. H. S. Gullott.) * Chaytor*s Force was as follows : AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION. ■ Maj.-Gen Chaytok. let A.L.H. Brigade. Brie.-Gen. Cox. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd A. L. H. Regiments 2nd A. h. H. Brigade. Brig.-Gon. Rykie. 5th, 6th, 7th A. L. H. Regiments. JNew Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. Brig. -Gen MELDBtrai. Auckland, Canterbury, and Wellington M.R. Regiments. Divisional Troops. 18th Brigade R.H.A. A/263rd Battery R.F.A. 195th Heavy Battery R.G.A. 29th, 32nd Indian Mountain Batteries R.O.A. No. 6 Medium Trench Mortar Battery R.A. Nos. 96, 102, and 103 Anti-Aircraft Sections R.A. 38th and 39th Battalion Royal Fusiliers (Hebrew Troops). 20th INDIAN BRIGADE. Brig-Gen. Mukbay. Alwar, Gwalior, and Fatiala I.S. Infantry. 1 lOth Mahratta L.I. 1st and 2nd Battalions British West Indies Regiment. [Officml pnalograpH. THE BLACK WATCH MARCHING THROUGH BEYRUT 198 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Toad, its head being nine miles south of Beisan. The 4th Cavalry Division was ordered to send detachments lowards it, and also to patrol the road which follows the -Jordan on its east bank, to secure any parties which might escape across the Jordan. At the same time the Worcester Yeomanry of the XXth Corps, supported by infantry, wa*! ordered to advance northwards from ;Un Shibleh, and the infantry of the 10th Division along the Tubas-Beisan road, to collect stragglers, and to ■drive any formed bodies into the hands of the 4th Cavalry Division. The Royal Air Force had proceeded to attack the Turkish column, which broke up and -abandoned it« guns and transport. It was now only a question of " collecting " the fragments that remained of the enemy- armies west of the Jordan. The process went on during September 23 and 24, the Turks now coming in to surrender in large niunbers. Opposition was but occasional and fitful. One column of Turks with guns trying to get over the Jordan at a crossing a little south-east of Beisan was caught up by the 11th Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General Gregory), but not before some of the Turks had crossed the river at Makhadet Abu Naj. These were followed, charged, and broken up by Jacob's Horse, few escaping. The others were charged by the 29th Lancers and Middlesex Yeomanry, who killed or captured the whole party, taking also 25 machine-guns from the Turks, who put up a stout resistance, as is shown by the fact that when the Hants battery came into action against them in the open every gun was hit. Over 3,000 prisoners were captured on this occasion. By the evening of the 24th — ^that is, in a period of six days — the two Turkish Annies west of the Jordan had ceased to exist. Over 40,000 men were prisoners in the hands of the British- The victory, too, was not costly in lives. " Our total casualties," said the War Office report of September 26, " amount to less than one-tenth of the number of prisoners captured." The 5th Cavalry Division, which had not taken part in the " collecting " operations, during the same period was employed in occupying the seaports of Haifa and Acre (Akka). Part of the Haifa garrison, realizing that they were likely to be trai)ped, had set out to march across country to Tiberias, on the Sea of Galilee. They were marching through the night and at 1.30 a.m. on September 22 " biunped into " the outposts of the 13th Cavalry Brigade outside Nazareth. The brigade at first took the affair to be an attempt of the enemy to recapture that town. The 18th Bengal Lancers charged the Turks by the moonlight, killing a large nvuiiber and capturing over 300. Few escaped. The next day the 13th Brigade spent quietly, but were DAMASCUS : THE FORTRESS AND TOWN. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 199 ordered to go on the 23rd and capture Acre, the last spot in Palestine held by the Crusaders. This city of many sieges, attacked in vain by Napoleon, who thore was forced to give up his Palestine expedition, fell easily enough to the 13th Brigade. Starting from Nazareth at 3 a.m. (September 23), they had a 25-mile ride, partly through the fertile valley of the Kishon with its pomegranate gardens. Making a detour over the flat plain around the port, the horsemen got to the north of the town to cut off an attempted retreat, and at 2 p.m. received the submission of the small garrison of some 150 men. Haifa garrison, or what was left of it, offered some opposition. Relations hero, as at many other places, between Germans and TurliS were strained. The Gtermans were for surrender ; the Turks bade thefn fight. The position of the town favoured the defence, and a battery of armoured cai's which made a daring recon- naissance on September 22 foiuid the enemy on the alert. The road into the town was barricaded and the cars were met with machine- gun and rifle fire at point-blank range. The cars, returning, marched the 100 or so prisoners they had made before them, fighting the while a rearguard action. On the 23rd the 6th ■Cavalry Division (minus, that is, the 13th Brigade) marched out from Afule, following the road past Harosheth of the GentUes, which as it nears Haifa is confined between the marshes of the Kishon and Mount Carmel. " When the 5th Cavalry Division reached this point on September 23 it was shelled from the slopes of Mount Carmel, and found the road and the river crossings defended by numerous machine-guns. Whilst the Mysore Lancers were clearing the rocky slopes of Mount Carmel the Jodhpur Lancers (Imperial Service troops), ■charged tlvrough the defile, and, riding over the enemy's machine-guns, galloped into the town, where a number of Turks were speared in the streets. Colonel Thakur Dalpat Singh, M.C., fell gallantly leading this charge." In the capture of Haifa 1,350 prisoners and 17 guns were taken. The townsfolk gave a very hearty welconae to the victors ; even the German colonists— at Haifa is one of the Itirgest of the German colonies in Palestine — were pleased to be rid of Turkish exactions. Of Palestine west of the Jordan only the northern part of Galilee remained unoccupied by the British, and that fell to General Allenby in the advance on Damascus, an advance which he now ordered General Chauvel to undertake with the Desert Mounted Corps. Before, however, describing the advance on Damascus, the fate of the IVth Turkish Army, the army east of the Jordan, may be told. It was concentrated opposite the British forces in the lower Jordan Valley, with its base at Amman on the Hedjaz railway. As has been seen, up to September 22 it held the east bank of the river at Jisr ed Damieh and other A HEDJAZ ARAB. crossings. On that day the IVth Army realized that its position was no longer tenable, and it retreated to the tableland of Moab on the 23rd, making for Es Salt and Amman. General Chaytor sent his Australian and New Zealand Mounted troops in pursuit, while the enemy was liberally bombed by the airmen. At 4.30 p.m. the New Zealanders captured Es Salt (making the sixth time the town had changed hands in 1918), taking 380 prisoners and three guns. The pursuit continued, and after two days' obstinate resistance by enemy rearguards Amman, was reached and captured on September 25. The Turks now fled north in disorder, harassed by the airmen and the Arabs and ptirsued by the Anzacs. Over 5,000 men and 28 guns were captured — the greater part of the IVth Army. The rest of the IVth Army fell a prey to the Emir Faisal. As it streamed north the Arabs issued from the Hauran, forcing the Tiu-ks to abandon guns and transport. Next the Arabs entrenched themselves north of Der'aa and barred the enemy's line of retreat. The two forces met on September 27 and sharp fighting went on all day. Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the enemy — among whom were many Germans. Having completely broken up 200 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. what was left of the IVth Army, the Arabs the same day seized Der'aa. After his rapid conquest of Moab General Chaytor's force again concentrated at Amman in order to deal with the 2nd Turkish Army Corps, which held the Hedjaz railway line from south of Amman to south of Ma' an. This corps had not realized the changed situation in time, and it was only on September 23 that the Turks evacuated Ma'an. That place, which had long been an objective of the Arabs, was at once occupied by the Hedjaz force under the Emir Zeid, who continuously worried the rear of the retreating Turks. Five days later the 2nd Turkish Army Corps had reached Leban, a station on the railway 10 miles south of Amman. Here they came into contact with Chaytor's force. The Turkish commander, Ali Bey Wahabi, saw that he could not escape and he had no mind to fight to a finish. The next day, September 29, he surrendered to Chaytor with 6,000 men, who gave up their arms as soon as their safety had been assured by the arrival of the 2nd Australian L.H. Brigade (Brig. -General Ryrie) at Kas- tal, as the Turks were in great peril from . the Hedjaz Arabs and the fellahin of the district. The advance on Damascus was purely a cavalry affair. Sir Henry Chauvel had for this operation the 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions and the Australian Mounted Division, and he received the help of the Emir Faisal's Arab Army. The advance was in two columns ; one column, the 4th Cavalry Division, crossed Jordan at various places south of the Sea of Galilee and marched through the land of Gilead on a route parallel to the Yarmuk river to join the Arabs, who were advancing from Der'aa. It started from Beisan for Damascus — a 120-miles march — on the afternoon of Septem- ber 26, and two days later joined hands with the Arabs near Er Remte, west of Der'8.a. It had had a trying march and twice had had to meet considerable opposition, first at Irbid and again at Er Remte. Chauvel's second column, the 5th Cavalry Division and the Australian Mounted Division, was directed to go along the west side of the Sea of Galilee, cross the Jordan at Jisr Benat Yakub (the BridB;e of the Daughters ot Jacob) and advance then direct on Damascus by the ancient caravan route — the route which from the earliest dawn of history had foimed the highway from and to Egypt. Semakh, where the railway to Damascus touches the south, end ot the Sea of Galilee, had been captured on September 24 by the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (Brig.-General Grant), after a fierce hand-to-hand fight. The enemy, includ- ing a large proportion of Germans, had built a "laager" of engines and other rolhng stock defended by machine-guns, and made a stout resistance. It was only ended by a determined charge, in the course of which many Germans were driven into the Sea of Galilee and there lanced or drowned. The 4th A.L.H. took 350 prisoners. Tiberias— the city built by Herod Antipas and named in- honour of his patron, and whose Palace of the Princes of the Galilee is still in part habitable — was occupied the next day, and it is hardly to be expected that the troopers escaped the visitation of the fleas, whose king, say the Arabs, holds his court here ! At Tiberias the Australian Division concentrated on the 26th. On the same day the 6th Cavalry Division, which had had three days of rest and sea bathing at Acre and Haifa, was marching to join them via Nazareth. On September 27 the two divisions started from Tiberias, having to cover 90 miles to reach Damascus. The Australian troops led, and on reaching Jisr Benat Yakub found the passage of the Jordan disputed. Tlie bridge ijisr) here consists of four stone arches, and the Turks, who knew the strategic importance ot the crossing — the connecting link with Syria by the route from Egypt — had blown up tlie centre arch. They had also sent down from Damascus in motor lorries a mixed Tiu'co- German-Circassian force of about 1,000 men, together with field and machine -gims. The enemy were posted on the steep eastern bank of the river, and they opened a hot fire as the Australian horsemen rode up. A crossing by the bridge was impossible, but the Australians were not baulked. The 6th A.L.H. Brigade swam the river a mile south of the bridge, worked round the enemy's flank and attacked before the rearguard could get away in their lorries. Fifty Germans, 200 Turks, tliree field and sonae machine-guns were captured. After this episode the whole column moved forward, climbing up on to the plateau on the way to El Kuneitra, the centre of the Circassian settlements planted in Syria some time ago by the Ottomans in an endeavour to keep the Desert Arabs in check. The Circassian villagers freely sniped the column as it passed, and at THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 201 ElKimeitra itself opposition was encountertid, and quickly overcome. From that place the march was continued. It was a great test of endurance. The elevation of the region — well over 3,000 feet — made the nights cool, and the troopers were in their summer clothing. As far as possible both men and horses lived on the country, but much of the land they were now traversing was desolate and rock-strewn. Later they came into undulating pasture land, intersected by many of the streams coming down from Mount Hermon, whose dome-shaped simunit, over 9,000 feet high, towered on the left of the column The marches were neces- kopt fit and well The supply service worked excellently, the men's rations never failing. On September 29 the column met enemy rearguards at Sasa, where a bridge crosses a stream which is thought by some authorities to be the upper course of the Pharpar, one of " the rivers of Damascus " of Naaman the Syrian. The Turkish rearguards were driven back after a brisk little fight, and by 10 o'clock on the morni.ig of September 30 the Australians had reached Katana, which is on the Roman road from Csasarea Philippi to Damascus, a road running some miles north of and parallel to the more ancient roati. The Australians TIBERIAS : THE BAZAAR. sarily long, the object being to reach Damascus before the Turks there, with such remnants of the armies frona Palestine as had escaped, should have the chance of pulling themselves together. One squadron of the Gloucestershire Yeomanry were in the saddle for 33 hours out of 36, and the record of other squadrons was equally striking. Many horses were worn out, but, as one officer wrote, " we have to carry on till they fall." Many, indeed, had to be left behind to die, though the wastage was by no means excessive. But the men, both of the 5th Cavalry and the Australian Division, had diverged with the object of closing the exits from Damascus on the north-west, while the 5th Cavalry Division kept to the caravan route in order to close on the city from the south. This the 5th Division successfully accomplished. They entered the verdant oaisis in which Damascus lies, a large plain with many streams and gardens and groves, and encamped for the night. The Australians, however, had found a fairly strong force posted at Katana to oppose their progress, and for the moment they were checked. Turks and Ger- mans in Damascus were quarrelling and 202 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. \Uj;aiut pkctograph. JISR BENAT YAKUB: AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS INSPECTING THEIR FINISHED REPAIRS. fighting one another, but the main anxiety of both bodies was to get away, and retreat was only possible by the roads on which the Austra- lians were advancing. But after some two hours' fighting the Turks at Katana were beaten ; the Australians continued their march and by the evening had blocked the roads leading from Damascus towards Aleppo and the coast. The 4th Cavalry Division and the Arab Army, which had been marching directly north since their junction near Der'aa on September 28, also reached the outskirts of Damascus on the evening of the 30th. The 4th Cavalry Division had followed the track of the dismantled French railway from Damascus, " a weary, desolate road," with the Arab Camel Corps and others who rode sturdy ponies, on its right flank, still " pressing on the heels " of what remained of the IVth Turkish Army. " In this way a •column of Turks some 1,500 strong was driven at noon on September 30 into the arms of the 14th Cavalry Brigade at Sahnaya." To the Tiu-kish stragglers who fell into their hands the- Arabs showed no mercy. No attempt to resist the British and Arab forces was made at Damascus itself. The entry .of the Desert Mounted Column was made at 6 a.m. on October 1, and at 6.30 a.m. a detach- ment of the 10th Australian L.H. Brigade (Brig.- Genoral Wilson) under Major Olden reached the Serail, being the first Allied troops to enter Damascus. The Sheriflan Camel Corps was only about half an hour behind them.* This, the most ancient city in the world still inhabited, did not make a very favourable impression on the British troops — " a dirty, dull town, and evil -smelling" was the general verdict — and by the time their " trivunphal march " was over (it covered som,e 20 miles, start to finish) they were glad to get back to the olive and palm groves in which they encamped. But even while the ceremonial occupation of Dainascus was taking place the 3rd Australian L.H. Brigade had been sent to try to overtake those enemy forces which had left the city before the cordon closed and some troops which had avoided it by a detour to the east. The Australians succeeded, on October 2, in over- taking an enemy column 17 miles north-east of Damascus. They attacked, captured 1,500 prisoners and three guns, and dispersed the rest of the column. General Allenby's bold policy had succeeded * See further for the entry into Damascus Vol. XVIII • Chapter CCLXVIII. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 203 completely, and of the 104,000 enemy troops in Palestine and Southern Syria on September 18 over 80,000— including 3,000 Gennans or Austrians — were prisoners of the British or Arabs by October 2. The remnant which had escaped numbered no more than 17,000, " of whom only 4,000 were effective rifles." As General AUenby said, this body of 17,000 men " fled northwards a mass of individuals, without organ. zation, without transport, and without any of the accessories required to enable it to act even on the defensive." Thf Egyptian Expeditionary Force now entered on the last phase of its strenuous campaigning, which had already lasted over four years and had seen an advance from the Suez Canal to Damascus. General Allenby took full advantage of the destruction of the Turkish hosts, and his subsequent operations expelled the Ottomans from the rest of Syria. Throughout the weir the Syrians — of whom the large majority are of Semitic race and of Arabic speech and culture — bad suffered great persecu- tions, notably at the hands of the notorious Vali, Djemal Pasha. He had spared neither Moslem nor Cliristian, nor Jew nor Druse. Many notables had been hanged, thousands had suffered imprisonment or confiscation of goods. or both, and, aa a result of tho deliberate with- holding of food, famine and ditieaf<e had had full play. In the Beyrut and Lebanon districts only over 200,000 people had perished of starvation Save for some of the alien planta- tions, such as those of the Kurds and Circassians, the Turk had not a friend in Syria. The Syrians themselves, inspired by the newly realized Arab solidarity, desired- freedom, and they looked to Britain and France for help. Both nations, as far as Ottoman rule permitted, had done much to develop the material resources of the country and to spread education. The French, moreover, ever since in 1860 they had intervened in the Lebanon to- put a stop to Turkish atrocities, had maintained political claims in the Levant, and an Anglo- French agreement, made in 1916, had recognized, the special po.sition of France. The country where so many interests were involved was now to be freed from one of them — that of the Turks. Syria is a land of high mountain ranges and narrow valleys. These run in lines parallel to- the coast, which has few good harbours, the chief being Beyrut in the south and Alexandretta in the north. The conquest of the country, if held by a resolute foe, would have involved much hard fighting. But the Turks had nb- BRITISH MOTOR LORRIES BRINGING FOOD FOR TURKISH PRISONERS IN DAMASCUS. 204 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. resolution left, and Allenby'a army had more march'ng than fighting before it. The occupa- tion of Syria was carried out by two distinct forces. The Desert Mounted Corps marched north from Damascus, following the line of the railway to Aleppo, while another column, chiefly infantry, marched north along the coast from Haifa. For the coast operations the 7th (Meerut) Division, which had been already brought to Haifa, was ordered to march on Beyrut, and later the advance, in conjunction with other troops of the XXIst Corps, was continued to Tripoli Leaving Haifa on October 3, the Meerut Division marched past Acre along the Phoe- nician plain and crossed " the Ladder of Tyre," great steps cut in the rock where a spur of the Lebanon runsSseawards. In three days Indian Pioneers turned the " Ladder" into a road fit for wheeled traffic. The appearance of guns and lorries coming from the south amazed tlie inhabitants, who were accustomed to regard the " Ladder " as an impassable barrier in that direction to all save the very lightest of wheeled vehicles. The divi- sion, which was followed up by Yeomanry, met with no opposition, and at Tyre, " whose merchants were princes, whoso traffickers were the honourable of the earth," and at Sidon they were most heartily greeted. The glory has indeed departed both from Tyie and Sidon, but Tyre has still some 5,000 inhabitants and Sidon, which shows some remains of its former greatness, about thrice that number. When the British approached Saida, as Sidon is now called, " the people rushed to tear down palm leaves, built triumphal arches, decorated the houses, and hung out carpets." The infantry could not pass through the narrow streets until the people were induced to betake them- selves to the balconies and roofs of their houses, " where they stayed all day, cheering deliriously and tirelessly. ' This may be regarded as a sample of the way in which the dwellers in the ports welcomed the troops — when Sir Edward Bulfin a little later entered Beyrut " the people threw flowers and sprayed per- fumes in front of his car." After a truly remarkable march the Meerut Division reached Beyrut on October 8. Ismail Hakki Bey, the governor, had on the fall of Damascus received orders to retire, and had handed over the government to the munici- pality, to whom also the Turkish troops who were left in the place surrendered. These troops, some 60 officers and 600 men, were at once handed over to the Meerut Division. The infantry had been preceded at Beyrut by some armoured cars and by ships of the lO^ici'-l pkotcgraph. DAMASCUS : ARAB REGULAR SOLDIERS EXAMINING BEDUIN THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 205 '■<**■.. [Official /photograph. SIKH PIONEERS ROAD-MAKING ON "THE LADDER OF TYRE." French Naval Division of Syria, under Admiral Vamey. Early in the morning of the 7th French ships, together with British destroyers, had entered the harbour and landed a detach- ment of marines. From Beyrut the cavalry of the XXIst Corps was sent forward, together with batteries of armoured oars. The Meorut Division had earned a brief rest. Tho march from Haifa was a splendid achievement [sard Mr. W. T. Massey, writing from Beyrut on October 9]. The Division of Scottish and English and Indian troops which was first in Baghdad [i.e., the Meerut Division] was the first infantry in Beyrut. The Hertford and Lancashire Yeomanry entered tha town yesterday, and French warshij>s were in the port. In seven days the infantry marched the 100 miles from Haifa, making roads half tho way, joining the metalled highway north of Tyro. Only those who have been with the infantry can appreciate the magnitude of their performance. The division's last day's march was 20 miles. Their condition was wonderful. Bulfin's cavalry (tho Lancashire and Hert- fordshire Yeomanry) and armotired cars entered Tripoli, over 40 miles north of Beyrut, on October 13.* They found some of Admiral * Later, on the 18th, tho following troops of tho Meerut Division arrived : Under Brig-Gen. Weir : — the Seaforths (19th Brigade) with the 28th and 02nd Punjabis and the 125th Napier's Rifles. Under Brig.- Gen. Davies : — the Leioesters (28th Brigade), with the 51st and .53rd Sikhs and the 56th Punjabi Rifles. The Seaforth Highlanders marched in headed by their pipers, whose music and appearance stirred tho Tripoli- tans to great enthusiasni. Vamey's ships in the harbour. A note in the Journal des Dehats, on the French naval co- operation with Allenby's force, said : On October 12 the division arrived oft El Mina [on the promontory which forms Tripoli harbour] and landed Marines there. Tho same day our ships reached Tripoli. The chief of the admiral's staff and Governor of Raud Island landed with detachments of sailors. Accom- panied by a crowd numbering several thousands, he visited the public offices, the railway station and the port. On the 13th our destroyers and small boats organized a sea-police service and took part in the operations between Tripoli and Latakia [some 75 miles farther north], "where Marines were disembarked. Tripoli (Tarabulus, the ancient Tripolis, so-called because it was the seat of the federal council of Sidon, Tyre, and Ai'adus) was of special tise to Greneral Allenby, as there is a good motor road connecting it with Homs,'* a town roughly half-way between Damascus and Aleppo, which was occupied by the Desert Mounted Corps on October 15. Sir Henry Chauvel for his advance from Damascus had not the services of the whole of his corps. The greater number of his troops, who had been in the El Afule-Beisan area a fort- night before, were now suffering from malaria ; there were also many cases of influenza con- tracted in Damascus. The Australian Mounted Division remained behind in the neighbourhood * The railway from Homs to Tripoli, only completed in 1911, was taken up by the Turks during the war. 206 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. of that city. The rest of the corps had started out on October 5, the immediate objectives being Rayak and 7ahle, both in the valley between the Anti-Libanus and the I.*banan ranges. Traversing the pass through the Anti- Liibanus followed by the railway, the cavalry occupied without opposition both places on ISMAIL HAKKI BEY. Turkish Governor of Beyrut.' October 6. Rayak is the town where the standard gauge railway from Aleppo joins the metre gauge railways which lead west and east, to Beyrut and Damascus respectively, and Zahle is a station on the line to Beyrut west of Rayak. The last Turkish train north for Aleppo, containing the garrison of the place and also Gierman troops who had abandoned Beyrut, had left Rayak before the cavalry arrived. Besides being an important railway junction, Rayak was also an enemy aerodrome base. It had been heavily bombed by British airmen on the 5th, and when the horsemen arrived on the 6th they found the remains of 30 aeroplanes which the Germans, not daring to try to save, had burned. Much rolling stock— mostly damaged — and large quantities of stores wera also found there. A day or two later the Transport Department had a motor service running from Beyrut to Damascus The railway could be .worked only part of the way, as a big bridge high up on the Lebanon had been destroyed by the enemy. For the first time Allenby had a sea base worthy of the name nearer than Port Said. Having (with the help of the Meerut Di\nsion) opened up communication between Damascus and the sea, the Desert Mounted Column was ordered on October 9 to turn north for Homa. That same day armoured cars had gone ahead and had occupied Baalbek — ^where the Venus- Astarte cult in the temple of Jupiter-Baal caused no small scandal to the Christian Church 1 6 centuries ago. To-day Baalbek, owing to the building of the railway, is known to tourists as well as travellers, who come to see the vast rums on the Acropolis, ruins cleared from large accumulations of debris through the agency of German archfeologists. Here the amaoured cars gathered in 500 Turks who had surrendered to the inhabitants. On the 1 1th the 5th Cavalry Division, which led the advance, also reached Bsialbek. The official reception of the General had taken place the day before — ^the country was already perfectly safe even for civilian TEMPLE RUINS, BAALBEK. travellers. Mr. Massey, the correspondent of the London press, who had come up to Baalbek from Beyrut, wrote : " Over nearly 40 miles of mountain road which I traversed not a British soldier was to be seen, yet an Englishmpn was as safe as in Piccadilly," notwithstanding that every man in the Lebanon was fully armed — if only- to be able to meet the Turkish tax-gatherer. The General [adds Mr. Massey] was received by the Mayor of Baalbek with much heartiness, and an impro- vised band of half a dozen old instruments played THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 207 " God Save the King." A party of young girls sang an •ode of wolcomo in Knglish. (It should be remembered that large numbers of the tourists who go to Baalbek are British and that many of the inhabitants have lived in America.) The arrival of a fine body of horsemen has ■completed the people's feeling of security. The 4th Cavalry Division now came up and was stationed at Baalbek. Much reduced in strength by sickness, it needed a period of rest. Meantime the 5th Cavalry Division went for- ward again, and, crossing a watershed, entered the road, but it could hardly arrive in time. For hours were precious. The Ottoman Govera- inent had at last realized its helplessness, and was already asking the Allies for terms. It was, however, highly desirable that Aleppo should bo wrested from the Turks befcre hostilities ceased. The Emir Faisal had declared Aleppo an Arab city to be redeemed, and a mobile Arab force was even now on its way to Aleppo. As the 4th Cavalry Division 1 STREET SCENE IN JUNIE : SIX the Valley of the Orontes. Riding up that valley, it re-iched Hom.s (the ancient Emesa) on October 15 — over 80 miles from Rayak. The Turks, who had been bombed by the Australian Flying Corps, had beea gone three days, having burnt the railway station before leaving for Aleppo. Homs commands the great north road from Egypt, Palestine and Damascus, and from remote antiquity, when Rameses II. fought the battle of Kadesh, invading armies from the south had been opposed on its plain. The latest invaders found, however, none to bar their way. With Tripoli in his hands, and thus a short route for supplies available, General Allenby determined to go on to Aleppo at once. The difficulty wp,s to find the men to send forward. The Australian Mounted Division was 100 miles Awtvy, by Damascus. It was ordered to take [Official photograph. MILES NORTH OF BEYRUT. was making a compulsory halt at Baalbek, the onlj' British force immediately available was the 5th Cavalry Division, together with the Armoured Car Batteries. Sir E. Allenby judged that the division would be strong enough for the purpose. Of the 20,000 Turkish and German soldiers then (October 15) believed to be in Aleppo not more than 8,000 were com- batants, " and they were demoralized." An enemy cavalry detachment bad been located by the airmen at Er Restan, 11 miles north of Homs, but they were gone when the armoured cars pushed forward . The cars went on, jneeting no opposition, arid on October 20 entered Hama, once a royal city of the Hittites and the Hamath of the Old Testament. It is built on the banks of the Orontes, here spanned by four bridges. A considerable city, and a great mart for the Syrian Beduin, it had been bombed by THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Australian airmen and the enemy fled incon- tinently. The next day, October 21, the 5th Cavalry Division started out from Homs. The armoured cars did not await the arrival of the cavalry. They and the column of the Arab Army on their right made straight for Aleppo. On the 22nd the cars overtook an enemy rearguard at the village of Khan Sebil. The Turks were just moving off in motor lorries when the British cars dashed up, and after a long stern-chase captured a German armoured car, a lorry and some prisoners. After tliis httle scrap the cars on October 23 engaged enemy cavalry near Khan Tuman, only 10 miles south of Aleppo. These were scattered and Aleppo summoned to sur- render at ro o'clock. The Turks refused to comply with the summons and the cars with- drew, only to reoccupy Khan Tuman on Octo- ber 24, and again engage cavalry in the direction of Aleppo and Turmanin These were dispersed and the cars pressed on. But when five miles from their goal the cars were checked by strong Turkish rearguards, and they halted to await reinforcements. These did not arrive till the afternoon of the next day, October 25, when the cars were joined near Turmanin by the 15tb (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade. That night Aleppo fell. By the evening a detachment of the Arab Army had reached the eastern outskirts of the city, and during the night the Arabs forced their way into the central quarters, slaughtering many Turks and Grer- mans. Those of the enemy who could escape fled north and north-west and were joined by the troops who had held up the armoured cars. The 5th Cavalry Division on entering Aleppo in the morning found oiJy 60 Tm-ks left to capture, but they also secured 18 guns. Meantime the Armom'ed Car Batteries and the 15th Cavalry Brigade had not entered the city, but early in the morning (October 26) followed up the enemy, gaining touch with him ' ir t ALEPPO : TWO VIEWS OF THE CITADEL. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi. 209 THE CURN MAKKEl, ALEl'TO. south-east of Haritan, on the Aleppo-Katnia road. Then followed the last fight in AUenby's campaign Tho Turkish rearguard consisted o{ some 2,500 infantry, 150 cavalry, and eight guns. The Mysore Lancers and two squadrons of the Jodlipur Lancers attacked the enemy's left, covered by the tiro of the armoured cars, the Machine Gun Squadron and two dismounted squadrons of the Jodhpur Lancers. The Mysore and Jodhpur Lancers charged most gallantly. A number of Turks were speared, and many threw down their arms, only to pick them up again when the cavalry had passed through and their weakness had become apparent. The squadrons were not strong enough to complete the victory, and were withdrawn till a larger force could be assembled. That night the Turkish rearguard withdrew to a position near Beir el Jemel, 20 miles north-west of Aleppo, The loss of Aleppo was a great blow to the Turks. Though the city has long ceased to be, as it had been for many centuries, the centre for trade between India and Europe, it is still the emporium of northern Syria and, as Mr. D. G. Hogarth has pointed out, the Ottomans had regarded it "as one of the strongholds of their dominion and faith and a future capital of their empire should they be forced [entirely] into Asia." Ten or 11 miles north of the city, at Muslimie, is the junction of the Baghdad railway with the Syrian lines, and, via Muslimie, railway connexion had during the war been established between Aleppo and its seaport Alexandretta. Aleppo, with a population ap- proaching 150,000, was therefore a groat prize for the victors. The 5th Cavalry Division lost no time in seizing Muslimie Junction and thus cutting off the earliest means the Turks had of communication with Mesopotamia. It was RUE BAB-EL-AHMAR, ALEPPO. 210 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. awaiting the reinforcement of the Australian Mounted Division to advance on Alexandretta when the armistice conekided between the Allies and Turkey came into force and put an end to hostilities. As it was the record of this division was remarkable. It covered 500 miles ■between Sept(>mber 29 and October 26, captured [Official photograph. ARMOURED CAR IN ALEPPO RAILWAY STATION. 11,000 prisoners and 52 guns, and lost only 21 ■per cent, of its horses. Clause XVI. of the Armistice provided for " the surrender of all [Turkish] garrisons in the Hedjaz, Asir, the Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied com- mander," and under that clause Alexan- dretta was occupied by British and French troops on November 10. Destroyers belonging to the French Naval Division under Admiral Varney had appeared off Alexandretta on October 14 and had fired on the Konak, whereupon the Turkish flag was lowered. Crowds of townspeople gathered on the quays and waved a welcome to the French sailors. But as the pourparlers for the armis- tice had already begun Admiral Varney was ordered not to take Alexandretta by force. While awaiting its surrender French ships cruised before the port and proceeded to clear the Gulf of Alexandretta of enemy mines. Some little delay occurred in the occupation of the rest of Syria, but it was completed by the middle of December. At Antioch, " where the disciples were called Christians first," mutiny and pillage by enemy soldiery had to be suppressed. It was not till December 10 that -Cieneral Allenby made his formal entry into -Aleppo, when as was fitting, the 5th Cavalry Division lined the streets. After receiving the heads of the religious and civil communities. General Allenby addressed a great crowd which had gathered in the Serail Square. His promise of security and personal freedom for all was enthusiastically acclaimed; There is no need to dwell upon the brilliance of General Allenby's campaign nor the gallantry and determination of all ranks and all arms. "With such men," Sir E. Allenby declared, " any general could win victories." But men- tion should be made of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, whose fine work was of the utmost value. General Allenby's tribute to the Administrative and Medical Services, which overcame all difficulties, was fully deserved. In particular, " the Signal Service, strained to its utmost, maintained uninterrupted com- munication with units of the army as far east as Amman and as far north as Aleppo." The task of the Political Department, which was under Brigadier-General Clayton, was arduous and delicate. In accordance with Mr. Balfour's declaration, full support was given to the Zionist organization ; at the same time the legitimate interests of the Moslem and Christian commimities had to be adjusted and safeguarded. To deal with the vast and intri- cate work involved in administrative and economic questions a Provisional Military Administration under Major-General Sir Arthur Money was created to control the occupied territory and create order out of chaos. One of the most pressing tasks was the feeding of the people, and large quantities of wheat, maize, millet and rice were imported from Egypt. Even when the people had money want was felt, for the Turks had seized the crops and practically no seed had been left to the culti- vators. Cattle, fuel and labour were also scarce. And while the ariuy fed the people, and met the expense out of its own funds, taxes were remitted over large areas. While, too, the people had to bo cared for, the needs of commerce had to be considered, and one phase of the duty of the Political Department was to deal with the requests for concessions, so that in the future Palestine should not be shackled in the development of its resources. In January 1919 it was found possible to authorize a general resumption of trade with Palestine and Syria. Nor were the wider interests of the army neglected. In March, 1918, ap- peared the first issue of The Palestine News, a weekly newspaper which kept the army in- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 211- formed not only about its own doings but of the news of the world. Edited by Lieut. -Colonel H. Pirie-Gordon, D.S.C., and generously sup- ported with literary contributions by all ranks of the army, it was published in English, Arabic and Hebrew, and occasionally issued, to meet the needs of the Indian soldiers, in Hindi, Urdu and Gurumukhi. " Set up," by Greeks, Ai'abs and Italians, The Palestine News was in form and contents worthy of the troops for whose benefit it was published.* One political problem in which the admin- istration was deeply interested was the relation of the Entente Powers to their Arab Allies. This was a matter in which the final decision did not rest with the men on the spot, but their advice was sought. In 1916 Britain, France and Italy had all recognized the independence of the Hedjaz, and in October, 1918, imme- diately after the fall of Damascus, formal official recognition of the belligerent status of all the Arab tribes (not those of Arabia alone) who were aiding AUenby's army was given. This was followed the next month by a joint Franco -British declaration that they were " at * Co). Pirie-Gordon also issued excellent guide books to Palestine and Syria for the use of the army, and with the help of many other officers compiled an official record of the campaign. one in encouraging and ansisting the establish- ment of indigenous governments and adnoiais- trations in Syria and Mesopotamia." * That these Governra3nts would need, for some con- siderable period, the help of their Western Allies was, however, cleeirly recognized by the Arabs themselves. On October 24 (1918), on which day General. AUenby's advanced troops were only five miles from Aleppo, General Marshall renewed ojjera- tions in Mesopotamia. They lasted exactly a week, resulting in complete victory and the surrender of 8,000 Turks on the morning of October 30, the day on which the armistice was signed. There had been little change on. the Mesopotamian front since the close of the Mosul Road operations described in Vol. XVII, Chapter CCLVI. The general situation in the country occupied by the British was satisfac- tory. The incident at Nejef, one of the sacred cities of the Shi'ites, where the political officer. Captain Marshall, had been nuu'dered in March, 1918, had ended in a moral as well as a material victory for Sir William Marshall, owing to the great tact displayed by Lieut. - Colonel A. T. Wilson, D.S.O., the Acting Civil • Morning Post, November 8, 1918. EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE PALESTINE NEWS. A journal published in English, Hebrew, Arabic, Hindi, Urdu and Gurumukhi, at General Headquarters,. March-December, 1918. 212 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. BAGHDAD TO ALEPPO AND JERUSALEM. _ Commissioner, by Brigadier-General G. A. F. Sanders, in command of the troops, and by Captain F. C. Balfour, M.C., the local poUtical oflScer, who gave practical demonstration of the respect of the British for what the Moslems held sacred.* " The dwellers in Mesopotamia," * The incident of the murder of Captain Marshall is given on pages 279-280 of Vol. XVII. In his dispatch of October 1, 1918 (published on February 20, 1919), General Marshall gives an account of the measures taken to exact reparation, and their result. The crime had been traced to enemy agency, and, fostered by German gold, a conspiracy controlled by " The Committee of Rebellion " was organized. To put down the conspiracy and punish the murderers without injury to the city, which contains one of the most holy shrines of the Shi'itea, and is surrounded by a very high wall, was a difficulty. However a strict blockade was established and gradually the blockade line closed in until the bas- tions of the walls and the entrance gates were held. Two attempts of the insurgents to break out were stopped. " Every consideration was shown to the holy TJlema and to the theological students (most of whom were Persian subjects), and had it been necessary to proceed to extremities all these would have been given an asylum. The loyal inhabitants, under the guidance of the Ulema, determined, however, to rid them.selves and their sacred city of these evil-doers, and eventually by April 13 the proscribed persons had been handed over and the blockade was raised. The instigators of the murder and the actual murderers were brought before a military court . . . eleven were , . . executed, seven others were sentenced to transportation, and three were deported ; in addition a number of undesirables were sent out of the country. The firmness with which the situation was handled, the fairness with which the law-abiding inhabitants were treated, and the scrupulous care which was taken to avoid damage to holy persons and places created a most favourable impression on all the surrounding tribes." Subaequontly Sir William Marshall visited Ncjef and was received with every token of honour. on the Persian side as well as on the Syrian side, were, in short, never more in sympathy with the British than they were when General Marshall struck his last blow at the Turks. A bountiful harvest, which yielded 475,000 tons of grain, had been gathered in under army superintendence ; trade with India was brisk and trade with Persia reviving. In many directions the resources of the country were being developed, and in the resultant prosperity the people largely shared. An advance up the Tigris from Samarra to Mosul had hitherto been out of the question because of the length and tenuity of the line of communication. Now there was a regular rail and steamer service from Basra to Samarra and the railway by the beginning of October had been completed to Tekrit, 35 miles from Samarra and 120 miles north of Baghdad. In the middle of that month the advanced troops of the Mesopotamian Force were in touch with the enemy outposts 18 miles north of Tekrit. Farther east, on the main Baghdad-Mosul road, which goes via Kirkuk, the advanced British posts were somewhat south of Tauk, over 120 miles south-east of Mosul. On both river and road fronts the Turks were entrenched in strong positions, and Ismail Hakki Pasha, the commander of the Turkish Army in the Mosul Vilayet, was not a man to throw away his chances. He had, too, at his disposal seasoned troops who fought THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 213 hard and well. But, completely outmanoeuvred, Ismail Hakki was compelled to surrender with his whole force. The total Turkish casualties were over 10,000. The following is Greneral Marshall's own account of the Tigris operations. Victory, it will bo seen, was attained, as ia earlier operations on this front, by bold out- flanking movements of the cavalry : — Operations commenced on October 24 with an attack on the strong Turkislx position at Fathah, where the Tigris flow3 through the Jebol Hamrim. This was carried out by the 17th and the 18th Indian Divisions west and east of the Tigris respectively, assisted by tlio 7th Indian Cavalry Brigade on the oast bank of the Tigris, and the 11th Indian Cavalry Brigade on the west bank. The latter by a march of over 50 miles forced a crossing over the Lesser Zab in face of opposition, and by a further march of about 50 miles got right round the Turks and a>*trido their Brigade joined the llth Indian Cavalry Brigade, and the 53rd Indian Infantry Brigade, moving up the ea^t bank after a march of 33 miloH, was able to support the cavalry in preventing any Turks breaking through northwards. On October 28 the 17th Indian Division successfully assaulted the Turkish Shorgat position, and on the 29th, though exhausted by their continuouj) fighting and marching through the rugged hills, pushed forward and attacked till nightfall the Turk*?, who were now hemmed in. [Part of the enemy force which tried to escape during the night was cut oft by the cavalry and about 1,000 prisoners and much material were captured.] On the morning of the 30th the Turkish Commander surrendered his total force, consisting of the whole of the 14th Division, the bulk of the 2nd Division, and portions of two regiments of the 5th Division, with all their artillery train and administrative services. [Altogether some 7,000 men, besides the 1,000 alreewiy captured.] The fortitude and courage displayed by all the troops was beyond praise and was the main factor in the GENERAL ALLENBY ADDRESSING THE POPULACE AT ALEPPO. lines of commimication at Hurwaish, where they were joined by our Armoured Car Brigade. Outmanoeuvred on the east bank and driven back on the west bank the Turks fell back to their second line at the confluence of the Lesser Zab, a position of great natural strength. On October 25 the 18th Indian Division forced a crassing over the Lesser Zab and drove back to the west bank of the Tigris all Turks who were east of that river, while the 17th Indian Division closed up to the enemy, who were now all on the west bank. The fighting which ensued was of a very severe nature. The hilly ground, indented with* ravines and previously prepared for defence, was all in favour of the Turks, who fought with the greatest stubbornness. Our difficulties were increased by the sandy nature of the soil, which delayed transport, and by absence of water except the Tigris itself. After continuous fighting the 17th Indian Division forced the Turks to fall back on their third position on the hills covering Shergat [50 miles due south of Mosul] on the morning of the 27th. AH that day Turkish reserves tried to break through the llth Indian Cavalry Brigade, who barred the road to Mosul, but without success, though the arrival of the Turkish reinforcements from Mosiil forced that Brigade to draw back its right in order to cover its rear. On the night of October 27-28 the 7th Indian Cavalry defeat of a stubborn enemy holding carefully pre- pared positions in a rugged and difficult country. On the Baghdad-Mosul road the operations were of a subsidiary character. They had begun On October 18, when an enemy cavalry detach- ment was driven out of Tauk, and Kirkuk was captured on the evening of October 25 after sUght resistance. The retreating enemy was followed up to Altun Keupri by armoiu'ed cars which caused many casualties among the Turks. On the 27th the main column was in touch with the enemy troops covering the crossing of the Lesser Zab. These hastily retreated when they learned of Ismail Hakki's fate. Thus ended the Mesopotamian campaign. The remaining Turkish garrisons on the Euphrates above Hit, those on the "iTigris and along the line of the Baghdad railway, all bowed to their fate. Mosul itself was surren- dered on November 1 4. General Marshall 314 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. HIT, ON THE EUPHRATES. received the notabilities of the town, who may or may not have remembered that their city was the modem representative of Nineveh, and lectured them on the municipal short- comings, " I intend to work until it is in a passably clean state. At present the dirt and filth are worse than I have seen any^vhere in the world." On wider subjects Sir Edward told them that " the British Government, as Miles. so 100 300 MUM 1^^— — I Great Hefnd or Red yes ere N E J D ■3 • Tot" Medina w*"' ^MEQCA^ [ you know, makes no distinction between sects and classes but treats all alike," and he called upon them to work loyally with Colonel Lee.ch- man, who had been appointed civil adminis- trator. The Nakib, an Arab, replied, saying the presence of the British troops gave them a feeling of security, and he thanked God " who has given us [ArabsJ liberty to speak our language after being dumb." And the ceremony ended with the Chaldean Patriarch calling for the blessing of God upon, and the intercession of the prophets and saints for, the flag of Britain, which, he said, " wherever it is flown is a sign of justice, civiUzation and well-being " The Armistice terns also required the sur- render of the Turkish garrisons remaining in the Hedjaz, Asir, and the Yemen. The two last- named regions lie south of the Hedjaz, and geograpliically the western half of the Aden Protectorate forms the southernmost part of the Yemen. Since July, 1915, Ali Said Pasha, Governor of the Yemen, and jiart of the 39th Turkish Division, had been encamped in the fertile valley of Lahej, in places little more than a dozen miles from the port of Aden. Since July, 1916, in consequence of the revolt of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, Ali Said had been cut off from reinforcements from Turkey.* The situation was anomalous. The enemy was comfortably settled down in a British protectorate, and living on the country, but showed a wise disinclination to attack the strong defences of the Aden Peninsula. The British garrison for its part was too weak to undertake a serious offensive. COUNTRY BETWEEN ADEN AND JERUSALEM. • For the early Aden operations, see Vol. X, pages- 400-404. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 215 aiu] WHS, ill practice, content with the line it held, wliich fonned an arc about 11 miles from Aden. Moreover, as the Arabs of the Yemen were giving tlie Turks much trouble, such minor operations as were carried out were partly designed to liinder Ali Said giving help to his conn-adi;s. During 1910, Miijor-Oenera) J. M. Stewart, C.B., who had retmned to India from Kast Africa, took over the command at Aden, the troops under liim including Punjabis, Carnatic Infantry and Malay StaUis (juides. In December (1916) an attack was made on Jabir, 15 miles north-east of Aden. Besides inflicfinfe some 200 casualties on the enemy, The next news from this forgotten comer of the war came from the Turks, who managed to get occasitjual information. It was dated March, 1918, and wa« significant in that it admitted fighting with " rebel tribes " in Asir and the Yemen, thoiigli it was claimed tliat the Iman of the Yemen sided with the 'I'urks, " who bqhaved with indescribable gallantry." " Sor- ties attempted by the British from the fortress of Aden to escape from the state of siege established by us complet«ly failed," as did also, the Turkish public were informed, an attempt to land near Hodeida, the chief jjort of the Yemen. Only one more glimpse, officially. ADEN : THE tliis action " prevented the withdrawal towards the Yemen of Turkish troops." Nearly a year then passed before anything more than outpost skinnishos happened, and the capture of Jabir on November 22, 1917, was hardly a greater affair. Apparently, the captors withdrew to their original Ime, for, on January 7, 1918, the War Office announced that, two days earlier, " a strong reconnaissance was made towards Hatum and Jabir." On that occasion the Turks had a sharp lesson, for " aeroplanes co- operated with our artillery; who did great execution on the enemy's infantry in the open with direct observation at effective range.'' The guimei's, that is, had just the target they liked. MARKET. was afforded of the operations. On July 30, 1918, at Bir Saleh, some 20 miles west of Aden, British cavalry discovered a body of the enemy, charged, and scattered them. " Twenty Turks were killed, and five men and 12 camels cap- tured." Such is the scanty chronicle of two years' warfare. Both sides were in reality marking time, and a sort of modus vivendi appears to have been established. There was even, through Arab intermediaries, a trade in the vegetables grown in the Lahej Valley. It was with natural reluctance that Ali Said Pasha obeyed the instructions he received after the conclusion of the armistice on October 30. It was not, indeed, until December 11 that ho and liia 216 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. MOSUL. staff surrendered to the Grovernor of Aden. There were difficulties, too, in getting the enemy forces in Asir and the Yemen to yield, but before the end of 1918, " after a certain amount of peaceful persuasion," they had aU laid down their arms. So, also, had. the small Turkish posts in Northern Hedjaz. At the beginning of 1919 there remained in Turkish hands in all the Arabic vilayets one place only, but that place was Medina. The Turkish Government had sent orders to the commandant, Fakhri Pasha, to surrender, but he saw fit to disobey. He and his troops had been isolated for months by the Arabs under the Emir Abdulla. The Turks had retreated to the centre of the city, and were posted round the groat mosque. In this mosquo is the tomb of Mahomet, and the Kmir Abdullc. would not order an assault for fear of injiuy to the holy place. The situation coukl not be permitted to last indefinitely, and the Tuikish Cabinet was informed early in January that unless Medina was surrendered in a few days the forts of the Dardanelles would be destroyed For all Fakliri Pasha cared, the forts might have been razed. B\it some of his officers were less obstinate. Many of their men were ready to desert, and early in January a party of officers gave themselves up. Others were ready to follow their example, and Fakhri Pasha saw that the end had come. On Janu- ary 8 he dispatched his chief of staff to Abdulla, who insisted on unconditional surrender. On January 10, the formal submission of Fakhri Pasha took place at the Einir's headquarters ; • on the 13th, at eleven in the morning, the Emir Alidulla made his ceremonial entry into Medina. He at once went to the tomb of the Prophet, where he offered the mid-day prayer, from which the name of the Sultan of Turkey was omitted ; the customary sign of a change of tlynasty. The last act in the drama, as far as Ottoman sovereignty in the Arabic vilayets was con- cerned, had been played, and the age-long feud between Turk and Ai'ab had come to its fitting end. Whatever their destiny, neither Syria nor Mesopotamia nor any part of Arabia was likely again to fall luider the blighting power of the Tmk. MOSQUE OF HOSEIN, KERBELA. CHAPTER CCLXXXl. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY : JULY, 1914-NOVEMBER, 19 16. ThK MkANINCI of the VV.Mt FOR THE AUSTBO-HUNGABIAN StATE ThB GeRMAN AuSTRIANS A.SD THE War: the Magyars ; the Austrian Poles — The Subject Nationalities and the Wab? THE YuOO-SlAVS ; THE CzECHO-SlOVAKS ; THE LITTLE RUSSIANS SCHEMES OF CENTRALIZATION AND GeRMANIZATION ; RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AUSTRIAN CABINET ; PROPAGANDA IN FaVOUR OF Central European Union — The Magyars, Austrian Centralism and Mittel-Europa — The Polish iJuestion — Demand for Reassembling Parliament — ^The Murder of Count Stctbgkh AND the Death of the Emperor Francis Joseph I. THE first declaration of war by the Austrian Government was clirected against its own people. On July 25> 1914, trial by jury iii political cases was suspended by an Imperial Order and civilians were placed under military jurisdiction. The Order was imconstitutional, and every single one of the thousands of death-sentences carried out luider it was murder. At a time when other governments were striving to lead their nations, the Austrian Government drew the reins tighter ; when other belligerent States convened their Parliaments, Austria instituted courts -martial. The act was symbolic, and it was logical,; for the Hapsburg Monarchy was not a nation, and not even a State, but a govern- ment, and its aggressive action was primarily based on considerations arising from internal policy. On the battlefields of Serbia and Russia, of Italy and Rumania, it hoped to defeat its own Jugo-Slav, Czecho-Slovak and Little Russian, Italian and Riunan subjects. The leading ideas of tho.se early days of the war were put on record by an authoritative writer when, in 1 9 1 8, on the failure of the last offensive stroke on the Piave, Baron Conrad von Hotzendorf^', Austria's invariably unsuccessful Ludendorff. retired into private life. " He had hoped that Vol. XIX.— Part 241 the hammer-blows which were to have knocked down Austria's enemies in war would re-forge her imier life." The war was necessary because otherwise the Great-Serbian propaganda "would have infected the Slav elements in the Austro- Hungarian Army," declared G«nei-al Conrad liimself in an article published in January, 1919. It was directed against an internal enemy, no less than against foreign Powers. The political forces whose action and inter- action made up Austria-Hungary's internal history during the War may be divided into five main groups : the dynasty and its immediate following, the Supreme Army Command and the bureaucracy, the dominant nationalities, the submerged nationalities, and, lastly, the grey- mass of people to whom war meant notliing but untold suffering. The first three groups wished for victory, the fourth for Austria- Hungary's defeat, the fifth for peace at any price and on any terms. The Hapsburg interest was purely proi)rietary. Their desire wiis to jjossess, to retain that which they possessed, anfl to acquire. As it was said by one of those who knew Austria best, " the key to the Hapsburg heart lay in the words ' more acres.' " The Army Command 2i7 218 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAU. 219 and bureaucracy were their servants and partners ; the Gomian-Austrian and t}ie Magyar aationaHsta were their alhos, for in the dynastic inheritance of the Hapsburgs these nationalities saw their own Imperiahst possessions and were therefore prepared to defend them to the last. The dynasty favoured also the Poles, hoping as a result of the war to join Russian Poland to their own Polish possessions and thus to build up a new kingdom under their sceptre. At times they dreamt even of an Ukrainian secundogenitiu-e, and a junior member of the dynasty, the son of the Hapsburg candidate to the Polish Throne, put on an embroidered Ukrainian shirt, uniforms being the only ex- pression of national ideas comprehensible to German princelings. Within sufficient distance from reaUty not to oi?end the Magyars, the Hapsburgs dallied even with schemes for a Jugo-Slav kingdom. They were omnivorous, tolerant, versatile and patient. To them the World-War was a mere incident of their dyna.stic history ; they wished to turn it to the best account. The servants, military and civilian, naturally had an interest in the Hapsburg possessions, but their interest was not necessarily identical with that of their masters — a fact which accounts for many otherwise inexplicable turns of Austrian policy and diplomacy in the war. To the Hapsburgs it was a matter of com- parative indifference whether they ruled Hun- gary as Emperors of Austria or as crowned descendants of St. Stephen, whether they held Galicia through Austria or as Kings of Poland or the Ukraine, whether Dalmatia and Bosnia were theirs by Jugo-Slav State right or because subject to a<lministrative officers in Vienna. But these were not matters of indifference to the Vienna bureaucracy and to the exponents of Austrian military centralism. The high officials and generals were truer exponents of Austrian official patriotism than the Hapsburgs themselves. Whereas the Hapsburgs could have been monarohs over nations, then: servants could tolerate nothing bvit subjects. The Pastoral Letter issued by. the Vienna Church Synod on June 17, 1849, continued to express their views in 1914 : " The national State is a survival of paganism, and the differences of speech are but the result of sin and apostasy from God." Still, German being the language of command in Austria, the centralists were Gtermanisers. Also most of the places in the Army Command and the high bureaucracy were held by Germans or Germanized Slavs. A large proportion of the German population of Austria sliared the centralist interest — Vienna, which shared it as capital, alone comprised one-fifth of all the Gtermans of Austria. An unbroken chain extended from the Hapsburg following, com- paratively indifferent to nationality, to the extremest Pan-Germans. The war drew them still closer together. Tt was fought in defence BARON CONRAD VON HOTZENDORFF. Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. of the Hapsburg inheritance, and yet was a war between Germans and Slavs in Europe as well as in Austria -Hungary itself. Germany upheld Austria, Austria opened up the road to Baghdad for Germany. Serbia had been singled out for attack because, since the close of the Balkan wars, the Jugo-Slav Irredenta presented the most immediate danger to the Hapsburg Monarchy, but Serbia was at the same tune an obstacle in Germany's path to the East. Some 20 years earlier the Austrian Pan-Germans had agitated in favour of break- ing up the Hapsburg Monarchy and of joining Western Austria to Germany ; during the war they learnt to appreciate the advantages which the Hapsburg Monarchy secured tor Germany. " We wish for Austria's existence because it is of vital necessity for Germany," Herr Iro, one of their leaders, wrote, in 1915. " Hitherto the Pan-Germans have denied this. Herein lies the diffe ranee between the past Pan-German and the ftiture German-Austrian policy. . . ." The " Great-Austrian " patriots, on the other hand, had learned to see that without Germany s support Austria-Hungary 241—2 220 THE TIMES HISTORY OF TtiE WAB. could no longer exist, and that the Germans and Magyars were the only reliable supporters of the Hapsburg Monarchy ; the centrifugal endeavours and Pan-Slav sjrmpathies of the Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs and Little Russians led the Hapsburg following towards a German DK. KAKL RENNER, German- Austrian Socialist Leader, and subse- quently First Chancellor of the German-Austrian Republic, 1918. nationalism no less violent and oppressive than that of the Pan-G!ermans. The German Austrians greeted the outbreak of war with almost hilarious excitement. War, at last ! No more tiring discussions or wrang- lings with the Czechs and Jugo-SIavs, but short, sharp orders. The Germans were to be masters in Austria once more. On July 29, 1914, a patriotic demonstration was arranged under the auspices of the Vienna Town Coimcil, "enthusiastic manifestations of sjonpathy for the war " (begeiafsrte Sympathie Kundgebungen far den Krieg), as they were described in a Vienna paper. Crowds traversed the streets, yelling with joy. "The time has come at last for settUng accounts with the meddlesome, faithless, plotting and greedy Serbia," ran a resolution imanimously adopted on August 1, 1914, by the Christian Socialist (Clerical) members of Parliament, then the strongest party among the German Austrians. " The adherents of my party," Prince Alois Liechten- stein declared in their name, "thank your Majesty from the depths of their hearts for giving them an opportunity to defend the greatness and integrity of the Monarchy with their blood and treasure." And with those of the unwilling subject races, he might have added, but natiu'ally did not. As, however, the courts -martial and the censorship were already at work, his party could presently claim to speak for other nations also. " His Majesty, our most gracious War Lord, has called his nations to the Colours. With flaming enthusiasm have the nations of Austria heard the call. . . . A compact phalanx which no power on earth will be able to break, tin- nations stand together. " And on September 20, 1914, the Prince-Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Pifil, spoke as follows, when addressing a congregation of children in St. Stephen's Cathedral : " Never in your life should you forget the great time through which you are passing as children ! . . , You see the nationalities of Austria united in their love for the Emperor and country. You see once more a great, united Austria-Hungary 1 " Different in tone but no less enthusiastic and aggressive were the declarations of the German - Austrian Nationalists. The war was to be fought shoulder to shoulder with Germany. There had been men who had dared to compare the Triple Alliance to a venerable, played-out clavichord, a piece of furniture which one cherishes but does not use any longer. What a noise they were going to make on that instrument ! At last the German-Austrians could learn the true Berlin manner and drill it into the subject nations — in good German : ea ihnen einpauken. Austria had not been sufficiently conspicuous in the past. It was absorbed by internal struggles. It had few dreadnoughts, no colonies, no Weltpolilik. But now it proved its existence. " I set the world ablaze, ergo sum " — a much more con- vincing proof than Descartes's thinking. Looking across the faded pages of old papers and reviews one can stUl feel the touch of Vienna's midsummer madness of 1914. The Socialists were less affected than the other German Austrians by the W6ir frenzy. Still, even their official party-organ, the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung published an article on August 5, 1914, under the heading "The Day of the German Nation," which began with the sentence, " This day of August 4, we shall not forget." And during the first 2} years their THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •221 leaders tacitly supported Austria's war policy Hiid her G!«rman orientation. They professed to see in the war a struggle of German civili- zation against Tsarist autocracy, and declared it to bo waged by Austria-Hvuigary in self- defence. In quasi-Socialist terms they argued Austria's right to existence. National postu- lates were described as a survival, if not of a pagan, then at least of a " dead ago," and nation- ality itself, if not the result of sin and apostasy from God, then at least was the product of a ruth- less bourgeois hankering after cultured luxuries. The idea of making it the basis of State organi- zation had been developed by the Homo sapiens of the ago of literature and art, but now the age of the Homo economicus has begun, wrote Dr. Karl Remier, an Austrian quasi -Socialist and subsequently the first Chancellor of the German-Austrian Republic. The interests of laboiu" are in the first place economic. Econo- mic development points towards empires, and Austria-Hungary is a natural product of geo- graphical and economic laws, not a mere dynastic inheritance. Composed of many diffe- rent nationalities, it is in reality a model in miniature of the future International. After Austria had broken down, the same men, when demanding a partition of Bohemia, argued that uniform national States alone offer a proper basis for international socialism. More mode- rate in tone, more elaborate in argument than their bourgeois opponents, the leaders of the German-Austrian Socialists were at bottom German Nationalists and Austrian Imperialists. After the Hapsburg Monarchy had collapsed and Germany also, the German Austriaas were at pains to repudiate the spiritual and legal inheritance of the Hapsburg State and to dis- claim Austria's personality and wars. " The state of war in which the Austro-Hungariaa Monarchy has been," declared the government of the German-Austrian Republic at the New Year of 1919, " has no more passed on to German-Austria than it has to the Czecho- slovak State or any other national State arisen on the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. . . . German-Austria claims the position of a friendly Power towards all the States of the world, of a neutral Power towards all belligerents." In reality the German-Austrians had been one of the main moving forces in the war, and this professed indifference towards the Hapsburg Monarchy and the war was merely an ingenious literary after-thought. The Magyar Nationalists, no less than the m ^-^fi I S-. II I « ^i« lil !.u ; !" ^^HUin ' GREAT PATRIOTIC MEETING OUTSIDE THE WAR OFFICE, VIENNA. Addressed by officers from the balcony. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. Gennan-Austrians, had their interest and heart in the war It was to have preserved the Mag3rar imperium in Hungary and upheld their dominion over subiect races. They had no immediato interest in fighting against the Western Powers and naturally regretted their having, by coming into it, spoiled the chances of a German-Magyar victory, but the war against Serbia and Russia, and subsequently against Rumania, was their own war, which they had desired and provoked. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, and one of the main authors of the war, directed Magyar poUcy with a clear eye and a firm hand, and, however hostile different minor politicians may have been to his person, practically all of them stood solidly behind his Imperialist policy and the Gterman 1916. " These laws have formed the kingdom of Hungary and have produced the Austro- Himgarian Monarchy. . . . The final result of this natural and necessary development is the alliance with Germany, which in this war has given proof of a force such as the world has never seen before." In August, 1914, the Magyar hatred flamed up against Serbia and Russia. There was not the hysterical frenzy through which Vienna passed in the early days of the war nor its subsequent dull apathy and listlessness, but the cold and yet energetic determination of a dominant race fighting for the maintenance of its dominion, whatever price that might cost to the world : — One must visit Budapest in order to get a clear con- BUDAPEST: THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT. Alliance. Hungary's integrity was for them the Law and the Prophets, and Germany's power its safeguard against the Slavs and Rumans. " I cannot see the future of the Magyar nation in any other connexion but that with the German race," declared Count Apponyi, a leader of the so-called opposition, in the Hungarian Parliament on June 14, 1916, " for it is the only one which does not aim at reducing Hungary's territory. " " Li ke nature itself, Hun- garian policy remained and still remains under the influence of positive and permanent laws, and no one who acts against them can escape punishment," declared Count JuUus Andrassy,* in a lecture delivered at Munich on May 16, • An etemai candidate for the post of Austro-Hun- garian Foreign Minister. Ho reached the goal of hip continuous strivings and intrigues in October, 1918, just in timo to propose a separate peace to the Allies. ception of how popular a war can b« [wrote a neutral observer in The Timed of February 26, 1915]. No one there will greet you with the words, " We did not want the war, . . . We did not begin the war," which I invariably heard in other cities. On the contrary, they are eager to have you know that this is their war, and that they began the conflict. That the conflagration spread over all Europe and has become the greatest war the world has ever known seems to fill every Magyar heart with pride. This exuberance seems to the visitor like a breath of moimtain air after the dull atmosphere of Vienna. For the Magyars are proving themselves to be the one strong element in the whole Hapsburg realm. . . . Crude, ruthless, domineering, the Magyars, who are a minority in their own country, not forming even one- half of the total population of 20 million people, are displaying in the present crisis all the resource, all the strength that they have been storing up for this great event. " Wo are second only to Germany in moral force." " Germany is our ally." " We feel ourselves in accord with German ideas and ideals." Such phrases as these were repeated to me often, and appear to express accurately the state of mind of the ruling class, though f THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 228 !^iy^.*ftp, -»- BUDAPEST : THE ROYAL PALACE. it seerns probable that their professed friendship for Germany is based more on policy than on understanding or real sympathy. " There is no other nation which can be such a faithful friend to the Germans as the Magyare, provided confidence is shown to them," declared Count Julius Andrassy, in 1916. A world war, in which the partitioning Powers would be ranged against each other had tor a century been considered the one chance of Poland's political resurrection. The Polish schemes for the coalition which was to restore Poland's independence and her dominion over the, Lithuanian, White Russian and Little Russian peasant nations, ranged the entire gamut from the Vatican to Garibaldi, from a Roman Catholic League to Young Europe. Austria was usually included among Poland's allies and an " historic mission " wa-s ascribed to her. Between 1867 and 1873 the Poles had established a satisfactory modus vivendi with the Hapsburg Monarchy ; within its borders their interests were nowhere contrary to those of the Gtermans and Magyars. In the Austrian Parliament they held the balance between the Germans and the Slavs, and, at the price of dominion over the Little Russians of East Galicia (otherwise called Ruthenes or Ukrain- ians), they abandoned the Czechs and Jugo- slavs to the Germans. Moreover a common religion formed a link between them and the dynasty with which, about 1870, they shared the hostility against Prussia and Russia. For these two were invariably treated as Poland's arch-enemies. Polish policy within Austria remained unchanged even after the international regrouping of Europe which occurred about 1879— the compromise with the Hapsburgs secured tangible advantages for the Poles which they had no reason to give up, in fact it was continued until Austria collapsed. But after 1879 the Poles no longer worked for war, and when, beginning with 1909, the danger of a world conflagration arose once more, they found themselves in a most embarrassing position. Were they to come out on the side of Austria and therefore also of Germany, or were they to trust their fate to Tsarist Russia ? Ru-ssia declared her Polish policy in the Grand Duke's manifesto of August, 1914. Austria was prevented by Germany from iTiaking any public pronouncement, and in PROFESSOR T. C. MASARYK. Leader of the Czech Revolutionary movement; subsequently the First President of the Czecho- slovak Republic. 234 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. private conversations only were pronuses made to the Polish leaders from Galicia. But so persuasive proved the power of prophets who had the means to enforce faith, that, whilst in Russian Poland public opinion declared for Biissia, in Austrian Poland the representatives MEMORIAL AT SERAJEVO Marking the spot where the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated. of all Polish political parties gathered in Cracow on August 16, 1914, and declared unanimously for war against Russia and in favour of raising volunteers for it. Million? of crowns were voted for these Polish Legions by the municipalities of Cracow and Lemberg and by other Polish self-governing bodies in Galicia. It was not until after the great Russian victories of September, 1914, that one section of Polish public opinion in Galicia began to waver. The subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary were jio more politically prepared for the War tlian the Entente. It had been part of tlie Austrian scheme to take everybody by surprise. How could the leaders of the Czecho-Slovaks or Jugo-SIavs have assumed the responsibility for striking out a revolutionary line of policy with regard to Austria-Hungary when they did not know what the attitude of the Entente was going to be ? Moreover, in the early moutlis of the war no one expected that it would last sufficiently long for political action or revohi- tionary movements to take effect. The war was looked upon primarily as a struggle be- tween armies and States already in existence, not as a fight in wliich every group and every individual would have to play a part. The Austrian and the Hungarian Govern- ments, which a few months before the war had tried to prepare some kind of compromise with the subject nationalities by means of negotia- tions with the tamest among their politicians — - men without authority or backing — immediately on the outbreak of the war tried to paralyse all possible opposition by an unparalleled reign nt' terror. This attempt at repression soon brought home the meaning of the war to the masses of the people, and their determination, which in the course of the following years hardened into political action, showed their leaders the true line to follow. " It was clear to me that I could not continue to serve Austria-Hungary," declared Professor Masaryk, the first President of the Czocho-Slovak RepubUc, when reviewing his activities during the war, in his address of December 22, 1918. " To begin with, however, 1 had not decided to act. I felt the enormous responsibility and counted the consequences ; but when our soldiers refused to do military service, when they surrendered to the Allies, when mass executions became our daily fate, I found myself forced to take a decision. I consulted my political friends, for political parties had been suppressed. I went to Vienna to speak to the Austrian Germans and to learn what it was which they expected from the war, in case of victory. I was twice in Holland and traversed Germany trying to get my bearings. In December, 1914, I went to Italy, and later on to Switzerland. I thought of returning to Prague in order to transmit the information, but this was no longer possible." His exile began, and with it his revolutionary activity abroad. This statement, clear and simple gives a typical accoimt of the position in which the leaders of the subject nationalities had THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 225 found themselves. They had to study, to seek, and to wait for the mandate which they obtained from their people themselves. Worst of all was the position in the Jugo-Slav provinces and especially in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The assassination of the Arch- duke at Sarajevo, the indignation which it was alleged to have caused, and the proximity of the Serbian front, supplied exceptional oppor- tunities to the Austro-Hungarian Army Com- mand which had planned the war, as a crusade, or rather as a penal expedition, against the Jugo-Slavs. The anti-Serb riots organized by the Austro-Hungarian authorities immediately after the murder were a mere prelude to the campaign of extermination which started on the outbreak of the war. A military dic- tatorship was established in Bosnia and the Herzegovina under General Potiorek, a special political police, the so-called " Safety Corps " {Schutzcorps), was formed with no- .torious criminals in its ranks, and a packed mihtary tribunal was set up, the judges on it cooperating with the public prosecutors. In the summer of 1917, in a joint declaration of the Croat members in the Hungarian ParUsraent, the proHdont of the Provincial Court of Bosnia was quoted as saying that " conviction had hitherto followed the accusation of the State Prosecutor in every case." The slightest sign of sympathy for the Jugo-Slav cause was considered a crime, and frequently baseless denunciations were deemed sufficient proof. When the fatal " p.v." {politiach verdachlig — ^politicallysuspect) was put against a name, imprisonment usually followed and imprisonment only too often resulted in death. In a speech delivered in the Austrian Parhament on October 19, 1917, Dr. Tresic Pavi<fid, the member for the Island of Lesina, gave numerous examples of the methods adopted at those trials. Thus, early in the war, a certain Captain Hadzija, a Jugo-Slav serving in the Austria-Hungarian Navy, was called upon to give evidence against the ship's engineer, Srzentic, who was accused of having expressed Serbophil sentiments. He denied having heard the incriminating words, but added that " at one time or another at table they had criticized the biassed attitude of the Austrian Government towards the Southern Slavs." Thereupon the accusation was extended to the witness also, and both were convicted and executed within THE ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND, WITH HIS WIFE, THE DUCHESS OF HOHENBERG. AND FAMILY. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. tlirwe hours. In some cases the military authorities subsequently discovered that their hasty verdicts had lacked justification, even by their own standards, and then tried to atone for it in their peculiar mamier. Over tlie grave of Onisim Popovi<?, a Bosnian pe{isant executed " by mistake," the regimental band was ordered to play the Austrian Imperied Hymn. Still worse than the judicial murders were the mass massacres, deportations and internments carried out by military commanders even with- out pretence of legal proceedings. The Serb districts of Bosnia and the Herzegovina near the Serb frontier suffered most. In his speech on October 19, 1917, Dr. Tresic- Pavi6i<5 went on enumerating village after village, an endless series of bare facts of which the sum-total formed an impeach- ment such as has seldom been raised against a government. In Samirovac the soldiers in November, 1914, by order of their officers, killed sixteen notables. ... In Celebic . . . the entire male population from 14 to 60 were killed without any form of trial. In the neigh- bourhood of Zubac 82 persons were hanged, in Trebinje, 103 in all, for the conclusive reason that they were local notabilities ; 7 1 persons were hanged in Foca for the same reason. I cannot toll you the numbor of persons hanged in Sarajevo, Bjelina, Srebnica, Zvornik, Avtovao, Visograd, Bilek, etc., a*: I have not been able to make inquiries. What I do know positively, how- ever, is that there, too, the halter has not been spared. A single Hungarian battalion was supplied with a thousand yards of rope when it was sent from Sarajevo to the frontier. Besides, tens of thousands of Bosnians were deported and imprisoned in different gaols or internment camps. They were ill-treated by their guards, the surroundings in which they had to live were unspeakably filthy, spotted typhus soon broke out and the prisoners died off practically without any help being tendered to them. A large proportion died before their cases had ever been examined. According to Dr. Biankini, a Croat member of the Austrian Parliament, 4,300 Bosnians died in the prison of Arad(Himgary) alone. Equally notorious was the prison of Mostar in the Hei-ze- govina, where the gaoler was in the habit of beating the prisoners with an iron crook which he facetiously named Kronprinz. " Hostages (from among the prisoners) were selected at night," said Dr. Tresio-Pavi6i6 in the speech quoted above. " The loathsome face of the gaoler, set in a frame of bayonets that gleamed like mortuary candles, entered silently, when, like a tiger, he sought and pounced upon his MOB DESTROYING THE HOUSES OF SERBIANS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 227 DEPORTATION OF SERBIANS, victims. . . . The hair of more than one of his victims was bleached in one single night with terror. . . . Such as desired to prolong their miserable life for a few days longer indicated by gestures how many banknotes they were prepared to sacrifice." To be taken as a host- age was equal to sentence of death ; hundreds perished in this way. Whilst the selected victims were thus exter- minated in prisons or internment camps the popxilation of Bosnia at large was condemned to starvation. Constant requisitions were car- ried out for the Austro -Hungarian and German Armies in the Balkans, and no regard was taken of the needs of the population. According to Grerman -Austrian sources between 1914 and 1917 the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was reduced from 1,800,000 to 1,300,000, and this, though there had been practically no fighting within its border. " Our own autho- rities have wilfully ravaged our country ; they have raged against everything bearing the name of Slav . . . ," declared a Jugo-Slav member of the Vienna Parliament. " Since Kossovo our nation has not seen or experienced such a catastrophe." Equally severe were the persecutions of the Serbs in Hungary proper. Nor did Croatia escape them because of the show of autonomy which had been left to it in peace time. The activities of the Hapsburg authorities in Croatia are well illustrated by the fact of their having, at the outset of the war, planned the murder of the most prominent members of the Serbo-Croat Parliamentary Coalition in the Diet, including its President, Dr. Meda- kovid. On August 10, 1917, Dr. Ivan Frank, usually a tool of the Austrian Government, whilst defending himself in the Croatian Diet from accusations levelled against him, stated that five days before the ultimatum to Serbia was presented, the Chief of Police in Zagreb (Agram), had telephoned to him requesting him to consider carefully a proposal of a gentle- man who would call on him that day ; he added that he himself (the Chief of Police) approved of it. " As a matter of fact the gentleman did call at five o'clock — giving a false name, as I subsequently ascertained — and laid before me a scheme to murder the aforesaid members of the Croato-Serb Coalition." There seems reason to believe that the Zagreb Chief of the Police was merely carrying out the in-struction of the military Command. But not even the peasantry were safe from persecution : " Our prisons are always packed with political offenders, both convicted and accused," declared S. Radi6, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party in the Diet on July 12, 1916. " People are thrust into prison regard 241—3 228 THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR. a z U X H O H z o < OS O z. o z > 3 Q UJ U < z < a. Z o < a:: < H OS D O U Z f- <: z THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 229 less of age or sex, not excepting the peasant class." Women and girls were sentenced to years of imprisonment " for a mere word or a suspicion that they had spoken in favour of Russia or Serbia." The outbreak of the war was a signal for similar persecutions against the Jugo-SIavs oven in Austria, where in the past they had been comparatively best treated. All their leaders, in fact most of their intelligentsia, were arrested and deported. One single convoy which started froni Dalmatia by way of Fiume to Marburg in Styria included four deputies to the Vienna Parliament (among them Dr. Tresic-PaviSic), five deputies of the Dalmatian Diet, 16 priests, 17 barristers, six doctors, etc. They were treat- ed in the most brutal way both by the guards and by the Magyar and German population at the stations through which they passed. When after three months of imprisonment Dr. Tresi6-Pavici(5 was brought before a judge, the latter said to him : " I do not know what the charge is against you, and you will easily vmderstand this when you consider that in Dalmatia, Istria and Carniola alone we have arrested more than five thousand people." The part which the Gterman intelligentsia of the Jugo-Slav provinces of Austria played in these persecutions was especially shameful. Most of them, eager Pan-Germans, were at last able to give free vent to their hatred of the Jugo- slavs. " Most especially we blame the Ger- mans for this," said Dr. Ribar, another Jugo- Slav member of the Austrian Parliament, on October 7, 1917, " that their intellectual classes have permitted themselves to be used as spies and informers, and in this respect the educated Germans in our country do not differ from their countrymen elsewhere. Teachers, officials, business men, etc., spied upon their neighbours, their friends, and denounced them." " A hint from the German Volksrat, the denvmciation of a spy, is sufficient — and neither protest nor explanation nor appeal is of any avail," stated another Jugo-Slav member. Dr. Ravnihar, on June 6, 1917. "At that time an abyss opened between ourselves and our countrymen of different race " (the Germans), declared yet another Jugo-Slav member in the Austrian Parliament. " This abyss can no longer be bridged." Nevertheless, after Austria had broken down, the Germans of the southern provinces tried to disguise themselves a- " victims " of the ancien regime of which they themselves liad been the backbone. A memo- randum sent by the Carinthian Germans to the .Tugo-Slav authorities at Lubliana (Laibiwli) in January, 1919, claimed tliat they were no more " legal heirs of the past Imperial Austrian Government and of the military Commands than the Jugo-Slavs," and that tliey had " to protest in the most decisive way against being made responsible for the acts committed by those authorities during the war." And they went on to state with calm effrontery that "the Germans in Carinthia had been ill-treated by the late military authorities in exactly the same way as the Slovenes." Possibly some Socialists or pacifists among them may have been, but never the German politicians, late members of the Gterman Volksrat, the organ of anti-Slovene propaganda and espionage, who, after the Revolution, under new names, continued to rule Carinthia. A few weeks before the outbreak of the war the Austrian Premier started private conver^ia- tions with some very unrepresentative Czechs belonging to a party which held exactly one out of 108 Czech seats in the Austrian Par- liament. A list of grievances was presented to the Gfovemment and redress was promised. Not even to these tamest of all Czech politicians was anything said about the war into which the Austro -Hungarian ruling circles were about to draw the Czech nation. Once the war had broken out all idea of con- ciliating the Czechs was naturally abandoned. The civilian Govfemor of Bohemia, Prince Thim, a feudal aristocrat and therefore a faithful adherent of the dynasty, was personally an honourable man, averse from persecuting the Czechs. But he had now to retire into the background ; the line of policy to be adopted was dictated by the military. The frequent mutinies in the Czech regiments supplied the Ai-my Command with an excuse for increasingly severe repression. The Czech nation, which had no illiterates and of which practically every single member was strongly conscious of hi^ nationality and its interests, was resolved not to fight for its German and Magyar enemies ami agaiiist its natural Slav allies, the Russians and the Serbs. In September, 1914, the 8th Regi- ment of the Czech Landwehr, when ordered to the Russian front, refused obedience and attacked its German officers ; the revolt was put down by GJerman soldiers. In the autumn of 1914, the 95th and the 1 1th Infantry Brigades from Prague and the 11th from JiCin had been THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. assigned to garrison the fortress of Cracow but had to be removed, having been found highly unreliable. On October 20, 1914, parts of the 36th and of the 30th Regiments, both from Bohemia, voluntarily surrendered to the Russians. During the very first invasion of Serbia the 21st Land wehr from Prague "suffered a defeat " (to use the words of a secret Austrian military report), and " remarkably many un- wounded prisoners were taken by the enemy " PRINCE FRANZ THUN-HOHENSTEIN. Governor of Bohemia, 1913-1915. owing to the " by no means self-sacrificing or patriotic attitude of the men." During the Serbian campaign of December, 1914, several regiments — the 102nd from Bene5ov,for example — crossed over to the enemy side. Of the 70,000 Austrian prisoners taken by the Serbs in 1914 about half were Czechs who had volun- tarily surrendered. Similar incidents occurred on the Russian front, where special arrange- ments had been made to safeguard the crossing of . the lines for Czech mutineers. The 28th Regiment from Prague and the 35th from Pilsen went over in a body. These are a few examples of a movement which went far to disorganize and defeat the Austro-Hungarian Armies. The attempt to check it by adding at least 40 per cent, of Magyars or Germans to every Czech service battalion was not altogether successful. It rendered wholesale desertions more difficult, but tended to lower the moral of the entire army. The Supreme ^rmy Convmand answered by demanding more and yet more repression. On November 26, 1914, Archduke Frederick, as Commander-in-Chief, addressed a memorandum to the Austrian Premier and a report to the Emperor dealing with Czech disloyalty. Stronger measures were proposed. The Arch- duke complained of " the slowness of the military courts which (at home) have to keep to the peace procedure " instead of adopting the practice of drum-head . courts-martial. "The postal censorship . . . seems to bo insufficiently severe. . . . The general order should be issued admitting only open letters to be handled by the post office. The activities COUNT COUDENHOVE. Governor of Bohemia, 1915-1918, of associations, even if no political tendencies Clin be traced, should be suppressed, or at least very stringently circumscribed, unless they pursue undeniably patriotic aims [i.e., loyal to Austria]. Public meetings should not be allowed at all unless in pursuit of such aims. . . .~ Jingo rags hostile to the State should be suppressed altogether. ... It would in many cases be advisable to dissolve the town and county councils and to replace V THE TIMES HISTOTiY OF THE WAR. 281 them by government commissaries. • . '' The memorandum ends with a demand that the entire poUtical administration of Bohomia, Moravia and Silesia should be put under the Supreme Army Command, -because thus alone " could I secure for inysclf the influence on all administrative measures which is needed for the safeguarding of military interests." Frede- rick returned to this subject on December 5 and again on March 28, 1915, urging his proposals with increasing emphasis. Still the civilian bureaucracy headed by the Premier, Count Stiirgkh, hesitated, quite prepared to carry out the proposals of the military but unwilling to renounce all power in its favour. Prince Thun, the Governor of Bohemia, was dismissed from office, and, on April 1, 1915, was replaced by Count Coudenhove, a bitter enemy of the Czechs, who in spirit, though not in form, enforced the proposals of Archduke Frederick. About 20,000 Czech civiUans were interned as politically suspect, and 5,000 were hanged by the military tribunals. The number of political persecutions grew rapidly. To possess a copy of the Russian proclamation to the Czechs or even the mere fact of having read it was considered sufficient proof of high treason, and a number of people were (xecuted or sentenced to hard labour on that ground. Most of the verdicts in political cases were simply grotesque-^these were not judicial trials but incidents in a war waged against an entire nation. On September 28, 1915 — i.e., at the tinje of the inost severe censorship — the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung reported the following case, which obviously did not strike the censor as extraordinary or unreasonable and therefore as one to be withheld from the pviblic : — " A Letter to America." — Francisca Sefcik, 2.'^, daughter of a cottager, had to answer before the mihtary tribunal of Prague for interference with public peace and order (paragraph 67, Ut. a). In. July, 1914, she had sent a letter to a friend, Rosa Kasanda, in Chicago; the letter was stopped by the censor and was handed over to the Military Court. The accused wtis con- demned to eight months' hard labour. A letter written to Chicago interfered with public peace and order in Bohemia ! Or again, the tailor Smejkal in Vienna was sentenced to six montlis' hard labour for saying " the Government does not want to give us Czech schools in Vienna," or the private (^ipera from Moravia to three years' hard labour for saying " the German Kaiser is responsible for the war." And yet, again and again, military judges were reproved by their superiors for " insufficient energy," their bearing, if they let themselves be restrained by lack of evidence, was described as unmanly and unsoldierlike (unmilitdrisch), and they were even threatened with disciplinary measures should they prove incorrigible. Of public political activity there could naturally be none. Three political parties, those of the National Socialists, the Radicals THE ARCHDUKE FREDERICK. Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hun^arian Army. and the Realists, were dissolved. About three-fourtlis of the Czech press and all the Slovak papers were suppressed, about 90 papers, to count but the more important ones. The surviving journals were compelled to publish articles supplied to them by the official Press Bureau as editorial without being allowed to indicate their origin in any way. Thus on March 25, 1916, the Czech press had to publish an article directed against the Czech leaders abroad under the heading " In Foreign Pay " ; on April 18, 1916, the article, " The Czechs in America against Masaryk's Agents " ; on January 16, 1917, " Our Answer to the Quad- ruple Entente," etc. At first all papers had to publish such articles on the same day and in the same wording ; later on the Director of the Police, who obviously had to be taught the stupidity of that procedxire by actual ex- perience, ordered each article to be pubUshedin one paper and to be quoted by the rest. Even 232 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. PRAGUE, AND THE KARL II. BRIDGE. after the so-called constitutional era had recommenced, in 1917, these practices were continued in spite of repeated protests from the Union of Czech Journalists. The leading Czech Members of Parliament were imprisoned. M. Klofac, subsequently the first Minister of National Defence in the Czecho- slovak Republic, was imprisoned on September 14, 1914, and not until May, 1917, was a charge formulated against him. Dr. EIramarz was at first merely put under strict supervision. He was a statesman of European fame and enjoyed great prestige in Russia. Whilst Russia was victorious the Austrian Government feared to touch him. But when the Russian front broke on the Dunajec (May 2, 1915) the Austro -Hungarian Army Command took courage, and on May 21 ordered Dr. Kramarz's arrest. Even the Berlin Vorwdrts protested against the arrest as a compromising step Decause " the appearance itself that such a comparatively numerous nation as the Czechs is not doing its duty to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy should be avoided." " Should he indeed be guilty of an offence or a crime the Austrian Government will do well to inform the public about the facts and thus prevent the rise of ar unnecessary legend. ... If , on the other hand, there is no good reason for suspicion we hope this conspicuous arrest will shortly be cleared up in a satisfactory manner." It never was. " The military party," said Dr. Kramarz in an interview with The Titnea published on January 23, 1919, " were determined to hang me, but they knew that the Emperor Francis Joseph would never consent to sign the death warrant. Coimt Stiirgkh, the Austrian Prime Minister, who had been for many years my Parliamentary colleague and personal friend, also worked to save me, as did Count Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister." But such was the power of the supreme Army Command that these attempts proved of little avail. After Count Stiirgkh had been assassi- nated, and when the Emperor was dying, the military party decided to force the trial of Dr. Kramarz, hoping to have the warrant signed by the Emperor " when his faculties were failing." " The court-martial was com- posed of renegade Czechs with the object of making it appear that I had been condemned by my fellow-countrjrmen," continued Dr ICramarz. " This manoeuvre defeated itself. The national consciousness of one of these men was awakened by the persecution to which I was subjected, and he insisted upon giving a minority verdict in my favour against the majority verdict that condemned me to death. Under Austro-Hungarian military procedure this entails a further report upon the sentence THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 238 by a higher military authority. Before this report could be written the Emperor Francis Joseph died." The case did not come up for judgment again until the first days of 1917, when Dr. Kramarz was duly condemned to death. In support of the charge against him there was nothing more serious than that ho had communicated before the war with men who during the war became leaders of the Slav cause, articles in his journal which gave promi- nence to news favourable to Austria's enemies, the possession of a copy of La, Xation Tchiqtte, the fact of his having had a conversation with the Italian consul at Prague, Sabretta, in April, 1915, and a letter written at the New Year of 1915 to Prince Thun, the Governor of Bohemia, in which he admitted that, always faithful to his political principles, he refrained from any- thing which might appear as approval of the war. He was condemned not because of any particular act done during the war, but as leader of the Czech nation, which refused its support to the cause of the Central Powers. The Austrian authorities never dared to carry out the sentence. A number of other Czech members of Parlia- ment were arrested at the same time as Dr. Kramarz, among them Dr. Rasin, later on Bohemia's first Minister of Finance. A sig- nificant note appeared in the Neue Freie Prease, the leading Vienna daily, on Januaiy 22, 1916 : "Czech Members Permanently Resident in Vienna. — Last week a few more Czech depu- ties, this time Choc, Burzival and Vojna, meiubers of the National Socialist party, who have hitherto lived at Prague, moved to Vienna and, like other Czech deputies who have been in Vienna for some time, have for the present taken up their permanent domicile in Vienna. The rumour that one of these three members lias broken his residence, which is expected to be permanent, lacks confirmation." One could hardly have wished for a finer and yet more explicit account of their internment. A similar fate befell the most important Czech financiers because the Czech banks and the Czech com- munity had refused to take up Austrian war loans. It has been calculated that to the first loan the Czech majority in Bohemia contri- buted only about one-tenth of the sum sub- scribed by the German minority. Die Schule ist ein Politikum (the school is a political institution) was a famous saying of the Empress Maria Theresa. The war reminded tlie Austrian Government of it. In the Czech provinces the Czechs had gained a considerable influence over the Czech schools. These had bi-od Czech patriots, not Austrian subjects. A . change was necessary. " The imperatively necessary strengthening of the State authority and of the military power is unthinkable without the movements hostile to the Hapsburg Monarchy being destroyed among the nationali- ties and without their being educated in an Austrian spirit," wrote Archduke Frederick io a memorandum dated September 25, 1915. Accordingly in Moravia alone 300 Czech teachers were interned and most of the school books used in the Czech provinces were suppressed, even primers, so that reading and wj-iting had to bo taught without them. The Deutsche Schulbuch- verlag in Vienna was entrusted with the prepara- tion of proper handbooks. " I am an .Aus- DR. KKAMAKZ. A Czech leader ; subsequently the First Prime Minister of the Czecho- lovak Republic. trian " replaced such an objectionable sentence as " The Czechs are Slavs," and " Our Emperor is a Hapsburg " was substituted for a phrase in which the lion — which, incidentally, happens to be the national emblem of Bohemia— was described as " the king of the animal world " The handbooks of Czech national history were now provided with a frontispiece of the Imperial j^alace at Schonbrunn, and with the Austrian Imperial Hymn on the opposite page. Then followed in word and picture the entire gallery of feeble-minded princes and half- witted peasants who constitute Austria's special 234 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. claim to glory — ^not a word, of course, about John Huss or Zizka, the grim Czech fighter. • Seventy years had passed since the fall of Mettemich, but the spirit and methods of the Austrian bureaucracy had remained the same nor had it lost any of its unconscious humour. The Little Russians inhabiting East Galicia, the north-eastern counties of Hungary and parts of the Bukovina, were divided into two political camps, one might almost say into two nations. Whilst one branch considered them- selves part of the Russian nation, the other deemed itself a completely separate nationality, and in order to eliminate the compromising root of " Rus " from its name no longer called them- selves Ruthenians, or Little Russians, but Ukrainians. It had always been an aim of Polish policy to break up the national unity of Russia — the ^tablishment of the so-called Uniat Church in White Russia and the Ukraine in 1596 was, in so far as the Polish Government was concerned, a manoeuvre calculated to separate those Russians who were then subject to Polish dominion from the main stock of the Russian nation. The fact tliat the Ukrainian national movement, having grown strong in East Galicia, turned against the Poles with even greater bitterness than the free Russians ever had done — for now it was a movement of a subject race — cannot change anterior history. As the Central Powers, no less than the Poles, wished for Russia's disruption, they in turn began to favour and support the " Ukrainian " movement ; and that it was possible to use it against the Poles as well, was only a further advantage from the German point of view. The Poles meantime, equally hostile to, and hated by, both these groups, the Russophile and the Ukrainian, were playing thom oS against each other, infusing a poison into East Galician politics which threatened Russia's national life. On the outbreak of war the Ukrtiinian party organizations declared against Russia, demand- ing the separation of all Little Russian land from Great Russia, whilst the leaders of the Russian party, who were known to wish for a reunion with Russia, were promptly arrested Jjy the Austro-Polish authorities. But on entering East Galicia the Russian Armies were received with joy even by the so-called Ukrain- ian peasantry. Historical sophistry could not kill in them the consciousness of Russian national unity, and they, moreover, recognized that they could not free themselves from PRAGUE: FNTRANCE TO THE ROYAL PALACE OF HRADCANY. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 235 tktsr^-^.-:-'-^- !l THE IMPERIAL PALACE OF SCHONBRUNN. Austrian and Polish dominion in any other way than by reunion with Russia. Exasperated by defeats, the Austrian military authorities wreaked their vengeance on the helpless Little Russian population wherever they were able to reach it. The following passages from an Order issued to Stafi officers and Post Commanders well illustrates the methods adopted by the Austrian authorities : — Lemberg, August 16, 1914. The constables still always sufjor from narrow-minded peace ideas (engherzigen Friedenavorstellungen) concerning making arrests and the u^e of arms. It still always happens that in cases of open propaganda or even of well-founded suspicion of treason, reports are made, questions are asked or information is given, mostly for fear of n=tsponsibility or because of the position held by tho suspect. Constables ! Mark what I tell you, and I say it to you for the last time I Wake up from your narrow- mindedness. Free yourselves from the cramping, petty, limiting juridical considerations I There is now but one justice, the welfare of the State, and this you have to support with all your strength, whether or not this is in accordance with cranky, legal tomfoolery I . . . Mark it well, death to every traitor ! In some encounters Rassophile peasants and also priests have betrayed the position and strength of troops under fire to the enemy. The constables wore able to arrest a few, but some of these escaped during the retreat when careful guarding was impossible. In these cases the constables thornselves ought to have imme- diately executed the traitors. In similar cases whore treason is obvious short shrift should bo given, and no considerations applying in peace time should b3 enter- tained. (Signed) Haoauer, Lieutenant-Colonel. Another Order signed by the same man fol- lowed on August 20. It recounted again acts of treason committed by the Little Russian population, and concluded as follows : — No measure is too severe against traitors. Nowadays there is no time for handing over these wretches to mili- tary courts. There is to be a short examination of the accused and of witnesses, a short protocol is taken down, and the accused are shot as deterrent examples for the population. That is how it ought to be done if in one's own country one finds oneself in a worse position than the enemy, and thus alone shall wo be able to defend ourselves against traitors. The third Order of the same date, shorter and still more trenchant, prescribes the immediate execution of " anyone suspect of treason in the face of the enemy " (angesiehts des Feindes ist jeder des Verrats Verddchtige kurz niederzu- inachen). Similarly, in an Order dated Stanislau (East GaUcia), August 14, 1914, the well-known Austro-Himgarian commander, Gteneral Kovess, insisted on the necessity of the troops, in dealing with the Russophile population, " divesting themselves as soon as possible of peace habits," because " inclination to leniency is here per- fectly inadmissible and a downright crime against one's own army ! " These Orders did not remain a dead letter. They were applied during the retreat, and they were applied still more whenever the Austro- Hungarian troops reoccupied Little Russian country. The following case, reported in the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung, in December, 1918, may serve as example : " As to a father I want to tell my woe to you in tliis letter," wrote in August, 1915, Bombardier V. Handiuk, of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, to the deputy representing his constituency in the Diet. His parents were good Ukrainians, and when the war broke out and ho was called up they told him to be brave and do his duty. But then he heard that his father was hanged and his mother had during the past year been dragged from one prison to another. Ho was willing to fight, but he was sorry for his poor mother, who only once in every 24 hours got some soup and boiled maize. On inquiry it was found that his father, a village elder of Hliboka. had been executed 236 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. becsaao he was alleged to have said on the entry of Russian troops into the village on Septem- ber 12, 1914, " Thank God that wo have lived to see the things for which we have waited long," and " Now everything will be Russian, we shall be able to live." But it was not by court- martial tliat Alexa Handiuk was condemned, not even by a drum-head court-martial. He was condemned to death by a corporal of the constabulary, Eugen Klappa, and the verdict trian Parliament, and of five associates of theirs. On August 23, 1915, a military court condemned all seven to death for high treason, though most of them had been in prison since the outbreak of the war and could not there fore have committed acts coming imder the jurisdiction of that com-t. But then the argu- ment of the verdict passed in a.d. 1915 (a docu- ment extending over 49 folio pages) started with the words, " About the vear 1000," and RUE DE PRINCE was carried out by his orderly for a payment of five Austrian crowns (about 4s.). The corporal, moreover, admitted having acted in the same way in three other cases. On further inquiry it was found that his action was justified by orders received from his superiors. It was thus that " Central European culture " fought against Tsarist barbarism. When on the break- down of the Russian revolutionary armies in July, 1917, the Austrians were once more advancing into East Galicia, the Vienna Socialist paper, the Arbeiter-Zeiiung, published a leading article under the significant heading, Nicht hdngen ! (Do Not Hang !). The judicial trials were not much better. It will suffice to mention the trial of Markov and Kurylovitch, Russophile members of the Aus- MICHEL, BELGRADE. analysed the history of East Galicia since that date. The defeats suffered in Galicia and Serbia in 1914 killed German Austria's original enthu- siasm for war. It was succeeded not by despair or grim determination, but by a cold, lifeless indifference. The Viennese watched what seemed to portend the impending destruction of the realm m leisured nonchalance, vacant-eyed, unconcerned. There was no regret for the lost provinces, no sympathy for the homeless refugees from Galicia who by tens of thousands were crowding into Vienna, no faith in Austria's cause and no confidence whatsoever in her Grovernment and army. The total absence of positive qualities in the Austrian ruling classes THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB 257 "WAR PRAYER PROCESSION" IN VIENNA. was brought out with an appalling clearness. But when the Germans broke the Russian front in Galicia, advanced into Poland and Lithuania and conquered Serbia, the story was told once more about Austria's greatness, vitality and future. Hermann Bahr, a leading Vienna litterateur (to give one example from among many), expatiated on The Miracle of Austria : " The greatest of all surprises of the war is that Austria, so frequently declared dead, is still alive, more so than ever. The most stupid of all the cant talked before the war was that con- cerning Austria's coming disruption. It was assumed for certain that Austria's nationalities wished to part and were kept together by external pressure alone. . . . And now ? What a different picture ! All Austria is at one, in will and in its readiness for sacrifice. Glermans, Slavs, and Magyars are brothers ; no more squab- bles, harmony everywhere — Austria exists once more ! It seems a miracle. Who would have be- lieved it ? " And the quasi-Socialist, Dr. Karl Renner.in the Socialist daily,iheArbeiter-Zeitung, echoed this same sentiment in quasi-scientific language : " Austria -Hungary has proved its vital strength and thereby its right to existence." If the German victories had made Austria's continued existence possible, internal victory and reconstruction were to make it German. " The northern, eastern and southern irredenta in Austria and international republicanism have been defeated," wrote in December, 1915, Dr, Franz Klein, one of the most prominent German Austrians, who was subsequently to- become Minister of Justice. " An open and clear acknowledgment of true loyalty is to be- demanded from all the citizens and a renuncia tion of all connexion with foreign countries. ..." Archduke Frederick, in a secret memorandum, dated September 25, 1915, explicitly demanded that " the organization of the Hapsburg Mon- archy, of its States and provinces, be adapted to- the results of the military campaign." Admin- istration, schools and army were all described as in need of drastic reform. But, however much Count Stixrgkh's Government had tried to act in accordance with directions received from the Army Command, it had not succeeded in satisfying its expectations. It was frankly described as incapable of carrying out the required changes. " The Government which had not known how duly to appreciate the numerous signs that tendencies hostile to the State were germinating and growing rapidly in almost all provinces with a Slav or Italian population, and which has proved incapable even in the decisive hour of successfully fighting the destructive consequences of these move- ments, will hardly be equal to the incomparably higher demands of the future." Ever since September, 1914, the German Nationalist parties of Austria, gathered in the so-called Grerman National Union (Deutacher Nationalverband), had been at work preparing. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. their own programme for reconstruction — i.e. for the Germanization of Austria. Recourse seems to have been frequently had to Herr von Tschirschky , the German Ambassador at Vienna ; occasional conferences were held with represen- tative members of the German Reichstag, and, as the leader of the Austrian Pan-Gerraans, Herr H. K. Wolf, admitted in a speech at Teschen in March, 1917, he and some other German Austrian leaders went even so far as to submit their schemes for Austria's reconstruc- tion to the German Chancellor, Her von Bethmann Hollweg, and other prominent German politicians. According to this account, the scheme was approved by " authoritative circles " in Berlin, with the remark that the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hun- gary, in order to be powerful, required in future strong and firm discipline within Austria {es muss in Osterreich eine stramme und strenge Zucht kommen). By the spring of 1915 the German national parties had drafted their list of pro- posals and demands and communicated them to the leading German party of the Upper House, the so-called Verfassungspartei, to the Christian Socialists (the German Clericals) and to the Austrian Government itself. After the proposals had been discussed between the different parties a common programme was agreed upon, and its final draft was signed on September 28, 1915, by Dr. Gross, a German member from Moravia, for the German Nationalists ; Dr. Weisskirchner, the Mayor of Vienna, for the Clericals ; and Dr. Fuchs for the Germans in the Upper House. A common memorandum was thereupon presented to the Austrian Premier, Count Stiirgkh, and also to the Common Austro-Hungarian ministers. But not a word about these developments was allowed to be published. Parliament was not sitting, and an exceedingly severe censorship prevented even the German Austrian press from discussing delicate problems of internal policy. Like most of Austria's history during the first two years of the war, the negotiations which now followed between the Austrian Cabinet, the Supreme Army Command, and the German parties had to remain shrouded in darkness. When on December 1, 1915, a change super- vened in the ministries of the Interior, of Finance and of Commerce, it was not con- sidered necessary in any way to explain them to the public. " At present we are unable to answer the question why sufficient courtesy has A SITTING OF THE AUSTRIAN REICHSTAG. Dr. Gross speaking. (The sitting of the Reichstag was suspended during the period covered in this chapter.) THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 239 not been shown to the public to explain to them the reasons of these changes, be it at least in a few words," wrote the leading Vienna daily, the Neue Freie Preaae, " and why events of such importance are allowed to pass without com- ment." " New ministers, but no new Cabinet .... The policy of the Cabinet remains unchanged," had been the official announce- ment. Still this was not a mere change of persons. The old ministers had all three been of the purely bureaucrat type, men who had never considered it their duty, and who had never been expected, to develop a policy of their own, but had taken their orders from the Court, the Army Command or even the Hun- garian Government. They had been in office since 1911, chiefs of the Civil Service rather than ministers of the West European type. The new men were decidedly more prominent per- sonalities, especially the Minister of the In- terior, Prince Konrad zu Hohenlohe-Schillings- fiirst, a brother of Prince Gottfried, the Austro- Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin. In social questions rather radical, he was an extreme centralist in internal politics and every inch an exponent of the Austrian Staatsidee. From 1888 to 1903 he had served in the political administration of different Austrian provinces, among othei-s of Bohemia. In 1903 he was appointed Governor of the Bukovina, and from 1904 to 1906 was Governor of Trieste, where he excelled in fighting the Italian irre- denta. Appointed Prime Minister in April, 1906, he resigned at the end of two months, perhaps the only Austrian Premier during the last 25 years of her existence who was known to have resigned on a question of political principle. He then returned to the governorship of Trieste and. embarked on an even sharper, almost pro- vocative anti-Italian policy — it was about 1910 that General Conrad von Hotzendorff, as Chief of the Austro -Hungarian General Staff, was press- ing for immediate war against Italy. When in February, 1915, frantic attempts were made by the Central Powers to keep Italy out of the war. Prince Hohenlohe had to vacate his post and, although a man of about 50, took a commission in the army. It seems more than probable that the Supreme Army Command and General Conrad von Hotzendorff, who was once more at the head of the General Staff, had chosen Hohenlohe for the work of recasting Austria's internal policy and administration. The mean- ing of his appointment was rendered still more obvious by the choice he made of an assistant. On January 27, 1916, Baron von Handel, Governor of Upper Austria, was seconded to the Ministry of the Interior as Chief of the Legis- lative Department, " to help in preparing the different bills and reforms in the administration of the State rendered necessary by the events of the war." As the Neue Freie Presse pointed out, it was now for the first time officially stated that " the war and the conditions created by militaiy events necessitated internal reconstruction." The ostentatious way in HERR HEINRICH VON TSCHIRSCHKY. German Ambassador in Vienna. which the announcement was made was^ probably meant to prepare public opinion for far-reaching transformations. About the same time the first measure of so-called " reform " was enacted. In the last days of January, 1916, Coiint Coudenhove, the Governor of Bohemia, published an order excluding the Czech langxiage from internal use in the Civil Service of the Czech provinces. One of the most contentious language problems in Austria was thus arbitrarily settled in the German sense. The changes in the Ministries of Commerce and Finance were not connected with internal reform, but with the coming negotiations for a new commercial treaty with Hungary (the so- called Ausgleich, which, according to the Settlement of 1867, had to be renewed every 10 years) and for an economic rapprochement with •240 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR Germany. " The three new Ministers have one tiling in common," wrote the Neue Freie Presse on December 1, 1915. " In the different phases of their careers all of them have formed numer- -oiis connections with Germany and her political and economic leaders." The new course to be steered was to be German. In December, 1915, after the changes had Ijeen made in the Austrian Government, the joint programme of the German parties was passed for publication. It was part of the new movement for " Central European Union," of wliich Friedrich Naumann was the chief prophet. In the German programme of Sep- tember, 1915, one of the first paragraphs ran as follows : " The alliance with the German Empire, which has proved of such gr(«t value BARON VON HANDEL. Chief of the Legislative Department, Austrian Ministry of the Interior, 1916. in the present hard times, must be adhered to. We must accordingly aim at an intimate ■economic rapprochement between Austria- Hungary and Germany, a commercial and tariff union which is to be established gradually with due regard to economic development. Com- mercial treaties with other States are to be con- cluded in common with the German Empire." The demand of the German Nationalists for a •constitutional union with the German Empire ' thus suddenly took on the guise — or rather •disguise — of a question of economics. The blessings of Free Trade, or at least of freer trade, became obvious to case-hardened Protection- ists — ^but yet these blessings were discerned only in relation to Germany. About Novem- ber, 1916, the Neue Freie Presse, notoriously in the service of Berlin, started a regular cam- paign in favour of a Central European Customs Union, part of the new German course signalled PRINCE KONRAD ZU HOHENLOHE- SCHILLINGSFURST. Austrian Minister of the Interior, 1915-1916. by the changes in the Cabinet. Old diplomats, late Cabinet Ministers, university professors — all wore mobilized to discourse on the question. By the end of the year Mittel-Europa acquired such prominence that the Christmas numbers of the leading Vienna papers published regular symposia on Central-European Union. How- ever much economic questions were kept to the fore, only to the blind could the cloven hoof of political considerations remain hidden. In tho Neue Freie Presae Dr. Marehet, a late Austrian Minister of Education, having re- peated a certain amount of economic platitudes, openly blurted out that there was a connexion between the future relations of the Central Powers and the settlement of the nationality problem in Austria. ..." Austria will have to be formed into a centralized State, in which something higher is put above the different component parta. This is the idea of the Aus- trian State which . . . has to be enforced with energy. The connexion with the deve- lopment of our future relations to Germany is clear ; the idea of German culture precludes one-sided oppression, but demands that par- ticular interests be subordinated to the good and interest ot the whole " — i.e., the national THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 241 interests of tho non-German nationalities to those of the Gorman alliance. And again in tlie Christmas number of the Vienna Zeil, it xvas thus that Herr Ernst Bassermann, leader of the National Liberals in the Gennan Reich- Ktag, pleaded warmly in favour of economic union : " Special importance seems to attach to the general political meaning of the matter. The nations expect ... as close a union as possible and have little imderstanding of formal difficulties. . . . There would be disappointment if after the war things were to remain what they were before. This is especially true of Austria- Hungary, where great things are expected from an economic imion with tho stronger German Empire." How " great " these " expectations " were in the commercial circles of Austria is best shown in the same issue of the Zeit by an article from Herr Giinther, director of the Aus- trian Alining Union. When two great and equally strong parties join in an rcononiic union, then this may be of profit to both sides. But tho weak cannot bear siich cotnmunity with the strong without succumbing, itnless he can gain by the <:ommunity all the advantages which the strong one uses in fighting other people. . . . We cannot, however, expect help from without, not even from the best friend, •becauire economic union in itself does not bring any help, jit least not at first. It does not give us the advantage of low taxes, it does not reduce the freight on our railway lines, it does not bring us closer to the sea, and it does not do away with quarrels which national antagonisms and a petty spirit have so often caused in the past. We can expect help only from ourselves. . . . The closer economic union with the German Empire can be bought finally only at the cost of complete or partial sacrifice of our own production. . . . A.S Count Tisza put it in, a speech delivere<l on January 4, 1916, in which he throw cold water on tho wild political propaganda in favour of Central Europe, economic problems were discus.sed by three tjrpea of men — doc- trinaires, politicians, and practical businoss men, who have to pay for the mistakes made by the other two types. In Austria the politicians were mo.st prominent of all. The union with Germany was to have served as an excuse for Germanizing Aastria and as a safeguard for its remaining German once it had become so. It was argued that before Germany could commit herself to such a close alliance, Austria-Hungary had to be made fit to conclude it — biindnwsfdhig ; its deter- mination to adhere to the alliance was to be placed above all doubt, which could be done in no other way than' by establishing an abso- lute German predominance within Austria. On the other hand, through such an alliance Germany would have acquired an interest in upholding the new distribution of power within Austria. In an interview given to the Neue Freie Presse in June, 1918, the Gferman Vice-Chancellor, Herr von Payer, openly hinted at the salutary effects of such a " deepened " alliance : " Many a worry can be saved to Austria-Hungary, which is frequently torn by its internal national struggles, if it is known that a faithful ally stands by it, interested in its existence as a State and in its welfare." " The changes which liave been found VIENNA: THE FRANZENSRING, WITH THE PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS ON THE LEFT. S42 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. necessary shall be made in the constitution, as also changes in the standing orders of Parlijunent " was another paragraph of the Austrian-German programme of September 1?15. " For the Grermans in Austria the position has to be secured which the interests of the State demand. . . . German is to be made the official language to an extent fully satisfying the needs of the State and of a properly organized administration. The cen- tral administration is to be reformed and the provincial autonomy is to be developed. The German character of the German provinces and districts {Lander und Landesleile), and especially of the Imperial capital Vienna, must be safeguarded." In the thirteenth month of the war not a word was said by the Parliamentary representatives of the German Nationalists and Clericals about the need of summoning Parliament, which had not met aince March, 1914. In fact, they did not want it to meet. Had the Government wished to summon it they would have tried to prevent such a " premature " reassembling. Those unacquainted with the political jargon of German Austria would have hardly guessed what an abundance of schemes lay hidden below the elaborately dark phraseology of the German-Austrian progranune. " Necessary changes " were to be made in the constitution. What were they ? Galicia, and possibly also Dalmatia, outljring provinces which contained no German minorities and in which, therefore, the Gterman nationahsts had but a secondary interest, were to have been excluded from the Austrian Parliament, so that a decisive majority could have been secured in it for the Germans as against the Czechs, Jugo- slavs and Italians. Then at last would the Germans have been able to introduce the same degree of discipline in Austria which the Magyars enforced against their subject nation- alities in Hungary. The exclusion of Galicia could have been most easily carried out by joining it up to Russian Poland — i.e., through the so-called Austrian solution of the Polish Question. For this reason the German national parties of Austria supported the scheme. Whilst there was a possibility of the Germans finding themselves in a minority in the Austrian Parliament, e.g., by the Poles crossing over to the Slav side, they were averse from changing VIENNA: ENTRANCE TO THE HOFBURG flMPERIAL PALACE). THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 243 the standing orders of the Austrian Parliament, which rendered effective obstruction possible. It was the German Nationalists who in 1897 had for the first time successfully defied the rule of the majority and killed Parliamentary life and government in Aastria. But holding most of the posts at Coiu-t, in the high bureau- cracy, and in the Army Command they preferred unparliamentary government to the possibility of a Parliamentary Slav government. Still had the Galician members been removed from the Vienna Parliament ami a Gorman majority been established in it, it would have been to their interest to curb the power of minorities and even to deprive them of legitimate rights. That is why a change in the standing orders of Parliament was to have followed on the " necessary changes " in the constitution. The demand for making German the official language did not envisage exclusively ajsthetic considerations of harmony and uniformity within the State, but was essentiallj"- to the interests of the job-hunting German Nationalist intelligerUsia. Powerful in the central offices, they were unable to monopoUze the smaller posts in the non-German provinces as long as tlxe use of the vernacular was admitted, which the Germans were too proud or too lazy to learn. Once Austria's central Parliament was Ger- manized, it would have been easiest to Germanize the country by a centralization of the Govern- ment and by limiting the powers of local non- German majorities. This, however, could not have been done because of a family feud in the German camp — ^the German Clericals who were dominant in the Diets of the backward Alpine provinces looked upon local autonomy as a bulwark against any possible anti -Clerical majority in the central Parliament. The Ger- man interests in the provinces had therefore to be covered by the peculiar .sentence demanding that the German character of the " German provinces and districts " should be secured. Could anything have sounded more reasonable ? But its meaning was this : that in provinces where the Germans formed a majority the complete dominion of the majority should be established ; in provinces where the Germans formed a minority the German districts should be exempted from the rule of the non-Gterman majority. When in 1918, after the final col- lapse of Russia, an Indian summer came for the Germans in Austria, this principle was put into practice ; by an Imperial Order of May 19, A MAGYAR PEASANT IN NATIONAL COSTUME. 1918, the districts of Bohemia inhabited by the German minority were separated from those inhabited by the Czech majority, but in Styria and Carinthia, where the Slovenes were in a minority against the Gonnans, a similar divi- sion was declared " inadmissible becaase of the conditions of settlement." Of the reforms demanded by the German parties none could have been carried through Parliament. Galicia could not have been excluded because changes in the constitution required a two-thirds majority, which the 344 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Germans together with the Poles did not pos- sess, especially as the German Socialists conld not have been relied upon. But with tlie con- stitution unchanged it would not have been safe to change the standing orders of Parliament. And imder the old standing orders even those legislative proposals which required merely a simple majority could not have been carried. Moreover, the Poles, as long as they remained part of Austria, had an interest in preventing a crushing defeat and the final muzzling of the Czechs, otherwise they would have lost their value as an ally to the Austrian Germans, just a>: the OpTTnan ATistrian<! hnd to koop Iho THE NAIL-DRIVING CULT IN AUSTRIA. The Archduchess Marie Valerie (daughter of the Emperor) hammering a nail into a wooden figure of a Crusader. Each nail represented a small subscription to the Austrian Red Cross Fund. Galician Ukrainians alive in order to have a check on the Poles. What the German Nationalists needed was a strong Austrian Government prepared to carry out the desired coup d'itat in their favour in the manner they desired. But the Govern- ment, led by the Supreme Army Conunand, though no less keen to crush the rebellious subject nationalities, saw its ideal in a central- ized Great-Austrian State, not in a small Germanized Austria. In one direction its ambi- tions went farther than those of the Ger- mans. In his memorandum of Septem- ber 25, 1915, Archduke Frederick had de- manded a change in the organization of the Hapsburg Monarchy, not of Austria alone, and had mentioned its States, not merely its pro- ANOTHER WOODEN FIGURE FOR NAILING. vinces. In other words, he did not stop short of Hungary and the Settlement of 1867. Austria-Hungary was no longer to be eine Monarchic avf Kiindigung — an Empire which could be terminated by giving notice — as embittered centralists described it because under the Settlement it was necessary to renew the agreement with Hungary every 10 years .^ And as far as the mere question of extending the Ausgleich (economic agreement with Hun- gary) over longer periods w£is concerned, the Great-Austrians had the support of the German Nationalists. Hero again the scheme of Mittel- Europa supplied a convenient excuse forchange — before a close commercial alliance could have been concluded with Germany the mutual relations of the two States of the Hapsburg Monarchy would have had to be placed on a more perma- nent basis. As the Gterman- Austrian historian,. Herr Friedjung, put it in an article published in the Vossische Zeitung on March 6, 191 C, there had been a difference of opinion with regard tO' Central-European union between the Austrian and the Himgarian Governments. " The Aus- trian Cabinet was immediately prepared to negotiate for a commercial treaty with Germany extending oVer a long period of years ; among other considerations it was moved by the fact that thereby the commercial and political relations between Austria and Hungary wouM be placed on a permanent basis. This would' be an advantage of very considerable import- I THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 245. ance for the Monarchy. A different view was taken by the Hungarian Cabinet. . . ." The Magyars were a nation of nine millions, one of the smallest nationalities in Europe. Nevertheless their power in Central Europe was second to that of Germany alone. The Magyar State in which their dominion extended COUNT STURGKH. Premier of Austria, 1911-1916. over a non-Magyar population more numerous than they themselves, the Avistro-Hungaiian Set- tlement of 1867 which made them a dominant factor in the Hapsburg Monarchy, and the German alliance of 1879 through which they became the partner of the strongest Empire on the European Continent, were wheels and levers in a most marvellous political machine which enhanced enormously the strength of the Magyar nation. The slightest dislocation could have destroyed its working power Count Tisza, the Calvinist Ironside, knew it as no other Magyar of his day seems to have known — he watched developments with ft deep understanding of the governing forces and of the unavoidable issues, and he watched men with a grim sense of humour. Hungary had to be sovereign and indepen- dent, because thus alone could the Magyars maintain their full power over the subject races. A Hapsburg Empire, a Geaammtmonarchie, raised above the Hungarian State, would have enabled the Vienna Court to play out the subject races against the Magyars and in time to break the Magyar power. A connexion with Austria, if kept within the limits of a constitutional alliance as formed in 1867, was necessary to the Magyars because, without Austria, Hungary would not have been a Great Power. Moreover, Hungary contained the tom-off limbs of several nations of which Austria held other parts. New life was not to arise in the Czech, Jugo-Slav or Ukrainian provinces of Austria or they might have become centres of action against Hungary. The Magyars therefore wished to see the Germans dominant in Austria, but only up to a certain point. The conflict between the Austrian Germans and their subject races was in turn useful to the Magyars because it weakened Austria and secured a predominant position within the union to the strongly centralist Magyar State. The German alliance was neces- sary to the Magyars, for Hungary, having been made a prison-house for other nationalities, was bound to remain a besieged fortress. But Austria was not to be merged into Giermany or the Magyars would have got for neighbour a united empire of eighty millions instead of a mongrel State only slightly superior in number to Hungary. The war-aim of the Magyars was to- defeat Russia, Serbia and Rumania, to gain strategic advantages against these States, but. DR. VON SPnZMULLER. A leading member of the Cabinets of Coimt StUrgkh and Count Clam-Martinic. not to annex any extensive new territories. This might have suited the Hapsburgs, but Hungary as a Magyar Imperialist State was satiirated, if not over-saturated, with foreign elements. A defeat of the Central Powers was certain to- mark the end of Himgarian Imperialism, but an excessive victory of Germany, and still more of the centralist Austrian Army Com- mand, also threatened the Magyars with serioua. 246 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. AUSTRIAN MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY IN THE IBAR VALLEY, SERBIA. dangers. What they wanted was a glorified status quo ante bellum safeguarded by the defeat of their enemies. Throughout the war a silent struggle pro- ceeded between Count Tisza on the one hand and Archduke Frederick, Coprad von Hotzen- dorft and the military Camarilla on the other. The position of a united Army Command for two separate sovereign States and collaborating with two indbpendent Governments was anyhow anomalous. It was still more difficult to work, as ipemories of lost power and the desire for re-establishing it havint«d the Austrian military commanders. On January 1, 1915, Count Tisza spoke as follows alluding to the firmness and vigour which the Magyars had shown during the war : " Hitherto we used to answer those who tried to rob the Magyar nation of its position of equality as against Austria that before 1867 centrahsm had brought the Monarchy to the verge of ruin, from which the Magyar nation saved it. But now we have proved in a positive manner the value which this nation presents for the Monarchy once it has regained its independence." He returned to the subject in his New Year address of 1916 : — As far as Austria is concerned, is it not to be hoped that this war has done away with everything which has invariably impeded harmonious cooperation for common aims t For three-and-a-half centuries the Monarchy tinkered with the difficult problem of how the full force of the Hungarian nation could be made serviceable to its own purposes as a Qreat PoT^er. . . . The attempt was made to subjugate this nation to a centralist Empire raised on the ruins of our national independence, but never as long as a Magyar lives shall we allow ourselves to be pressed into such a formation. And then, turning to the Austrian Germans, he continued : — . . . The national policy of Hungary is always willing to cooperate in the strengthening and the inner con- solidation of the Austrian State, if for no other reason, because it is also our vital interest that the Austrian State be strong and capable of action. Also in our own interest we must strengthen the centripetal forces over there, as against the forces of disruption. . . . The Hungarian nation has tried in the past to fulfil this mission. And in the past complete success was lacking. The reason of that was that Austrian patriotism had not known as yet how to free itself from the old idea« and ambitions of a State including both Austria and Hungary {OesanUreichstendenzen und Oesamtreichsbestrebungen). On January 6, 1916, he delivered one more warning to the Austrian centralists that he was watching them : " Whoever does not want to play the game of the ostrich cannot but see that such currents have existed and still exist in Austria." He never neglected an opportunity of defy- ing and defeating the Austrian centralists. In January, 1915, he succeeded in replacing Count Berchtold, the Austro -Hungarian Foreign Minister, by his own nominee, Baron Burian. With Grermany he negotiated about military matters directly, above the heads of the Aus- trian commanders. In repeated conferences he taught the German-Austrian politicians the principles of Magyar statesmanship. These years of struggle and danger convinced Count Tis7.a of the need to withdraw the mihtary THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 247 forces of Hungary from under the common conuuand and to form them into an indepen- dent Hungarian Army — ^in 1918 the Vienna Court and Supreme Army Command conceded the demand in principle. Nor was Count Tisza prepared to surrender any part of Hun- gary's constitutional, military or economic independence to the Central European Union any more than to the Hapsburg Monarchy. The negotiations for Central European union, difficult as they were, were still further com- plicated by being linked up with the Polish Question. The Hapsburgs might have given in to the German demand for Central European union at the price of Germany's admitting the union of Russian Poland with Galicia as a third kingdom under their sceptre. It has been alleged that in the summer of 1915 Austria- Hungary might have obtained Germany's con- sent to such a scheme, but that the Austro- Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Burian, under Coimt Tisza's influence, de- liberately neglected to do so. Whether or not this allegation was true, it is certain that Tisza, alone among the Magyar statesmen, was at that time opposed to the scheme, and that it took him a long time to get reconciled to it — oven then he never more than tolerated it. He never publicly explained his reasons. He may have considered the economic and military concessions to be made to Germany an excessive price. He may have feareil that the inclusion of Poland in the Hapsburg Monarchy would have upset the basis of its foreign policy with COUNT JULIUS ANDRASSy (on left), Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1918. COUNT STEPHEN TISZA. Hungarian Prime Minister, 1913-1917. regard to Germany and Russia — an approhen sion shared by the leading statesmen of Ger many ; that the inclusion of a large agricul - tural country such as Poland might have injured the interests of the Magyar big landowners whom he represented : lastly, that in the trialist combination Hungary might not have been able to preserve that predominance which it had established over Austria under the Dual System. Germany's opposition to the Austrian scheme hardened as time went on. She would have hked best either to hand back Poland to Russia at the price of separate peace or, failing this, to partition it with Austria. In December, 1915, the division of the country into a (Jerman and an Austrian sphere of occupation, which up to then had been covered by the conception of the spheres of their resjjective Army Com- mands, was put on a more regular basis. Simultaneously, however, Germany officially abandoned the idea of partitioning Ruasian Poland. In an answer to a memorandum pre- sented by Baron Burian, Herr von Bethmann S48 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Hollweg wrote as follows : " Your Excellency has brought forward a number of arguments which demonstrate that to partition Russian Poland between our States would be against their interests even during the continuance of the war, and after the war would give rise to ■constant trouble, and would involve a seriovis danger to our eastern frontiers. I therefore waive that idea." Then, a few more attempts at getting Russia to conclude separate peace having failed, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, in his speech of April 5, 1916, publicly committed himself to the statement that Grermany would never of her free \viU surrender Poland to Russia. This declaration, precluding the second of the two alternative schemes hitherto ascribed to Germany, greatly raised the hopes ■of the champions of the Austrian solution. On April 23 Count Julius Andrassy, the most prominent among them, who had repeatedly spoken and written in support of it, published two more articles on it, one in the Neue Freie Presse, the other in the Frankfurter Zeitung. Burian, who by that time was working strongly in favour of it, hurried to Berlin, convinced that he would now be able to clinch the matter. He failed completely. Glermany could afford to go slow in settling the Polish question. It seems likely that the idea of setting up Russian Poland as a separate State under a joint Austro-German protectorate was already con- sidered in Berlin. Austria's fresh defeats in the sunumer of 1916 and the entry of Rumania into the war ren- dered her absolutely dependent on Grermany. It has been alleged that, with a view to black- mail, Grermany delayed sending troops into Transylvania, and did not do so until she had extorted the consent of the Hapsburgs to her own Polish scheme. At the end of October, 1916, certain Warsaw politicians were invited to Berlin and Vienna officially to present the wishes of the Poles to the Central Powers, and on November 6 a joint manifesto of the two Emperors was published promising that the Polish territories conquered from Russia woula be formed into " an independent State with a hereditary monarch and a constitutional form of A GROUP OF POLISH POLITICIANS. Left to rijht, Gustav Simon (League of the Polish State), Professor Parczewski (Centre Party), Count Adam Ronikier (Centre), Marian Zbrowsk! (National). Count Ronikier was a member of the delegation which went to Vienna and Berlin in October, 1916. THE TIMES HISTORY OV THE WAR. 249 zeicMmet AUSTRIAN WAR-LOAN POSTERS. government.' Its frontiers were not defined as yet, but its future dependence was clearly marked. " In the union with the two allied Powers, the new Kingdom will find the guaran- tees which it needs for the free development of its forces." By this settlement of the Polish question the Grermans had intended finally to close the door on the 'Austrian solution and also to estrange the Poles from the Hapsburgs. For Galicia, if it remained an integral part of Austria after a kingdom of Poland had come into being, would have become for the Poles a terra irredenta like the Polish provinces of Prussia. The Hapsburgs wovild have been in the same boat with the Hohenzollems. With a view to foihng the German scheme, the ruling circles in Vienna decided, simultaneously with the proclamation of the new Kingdom of Poland, to address an Imperial rescript to the Austrian Premier instructing him to prepare proposals for a wide enlargement of Galician autonomy. By decreeing a semi -independent Galicia, the Haps- burgs signified that oven now they did not insist on the Galician Poles being subjects of a central- ized foreign State. Moreover, a semi-indepen- dent Galicia side by side with the new semi-inde- pendent Polish State was bound to render the German settlement untenable. Austria counted on it, that the movement in favour of union. which was bound to arise in these two parts of Poland, would revive the Austrian solution. The autonomy of Gahcia further promised to establish the desired Gorman majority in the Austrian Parliament, and this, of course, was another reason for the rescript concerning enlarged autonomy for Galicia. But whilst these preparations were being made, the period of autocratic rule under which alone the trans- formation of Austria could have been effectively carried out, was fast approaching its end In the autumn of 1916 a strong movement in favour of reassembling Parliament made itself felt in Austria. Some of the leading politicians counted on Parliament to provide a safety-valve for the growing dissatisfaction in the days of defeat. The manufacturers and business men wished it to meet, because they were afraid that the new economic settle- ment, the Atiagleich, which was at that time negotiated with Hungary, if enacted without re- ference to Parliament, would be even more disadvantageous to Austria than it usually was. According to the Settlement in 1867 Hungary had a right to demand that the Ausgleich should be enacted in a constitu- tional manner. If the Austrian Govern- ment proposed to do so without Parliament it would have had to pay for it to the Magyars in new concessions. The actual details of the 250 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. new agreement, of which the outlines were settled whilst Count StUrgkh's Government held office in Austria, were never published, but it was known that it was to have run for 20 instead of 10 years, so as to enable •Austria-Hungary to negotiate an economic rapprochement with Germany ; that the agrarian tariffs were to have been further raised — which would have meant further taxa- tion of the Austrian industrial population for the advantage of the Hungarian landowners, - — and that the financial arrangements concern- ing common expenses, which had always been unfair to Austria, were to have been changed still more to her disadvantage. Coimt Stiirgkh, the Austrian Premier, declared on one occasion that " considering the importance which at- taches to continuing the Ausgleich between Austria and Hungary, it does not matter whether the Ausgleich, as expressed in figures, results to one side or the other in a profit of a few millions a year. The war has proved the bigger imponderable value of the Aitsgleich, and has through it established the international importance of the Monarchy for all future time." Still the Austrian business men, who were to have footed the bill, did not look upon new economic concessions with the same equanimity. AUSTRIAN-POLISH REFUGEES IN GALICIA RETURNING HOME AFTER THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 251 and now for the first time were calling out rof Parliament. Lastly, Count Tisza's opponents, who were powerless against him in the Hungar- ian Parliament, clamoured for a meeting of the so-called Delegations, the committees of the Austrian and the Hungarian Parliaments which had to deal with joint affairs ; they wished to attack Tisza's nominee, Biu'ian. The Hungarian Parliament had clearly a right to demand that the commissions in charge of foreign affairs should meet, but these could not have met without the Austrian Parliament being summoned. Failing their reassembling, the Hungarian Parliament demanded that the Joint Foreign Minister should appear before it, and Tisza was prepared to accede to that COUNT APPONYI, A leader of the Hungarian "Opposition." demand. But this would have been yet a further encroachment by the Hungarian Parlia- ment on joint affairs and yet a further .step towards completing Hungary's independence. Another link would liave snapped between the two parts of the Hapsburg Monarchy. It was this dang(>r which made the greatest impression on the Austrian centralist circles, even on the autocratic Supreme Army Command. In Oc- tober permission was given openly to discuss the question of reassembling the Austrian ParUamont. On October 22 the President of the Lower House, a German Nationalist who had hitherto complacently watched its eclipse, was to have met tl|f leaders of the different parties in a conforenco. But it was in a different way that the unparliamentary " Era Slilrgkh " was destined to com<! to an end. On October 21 Count Stiirgkh was shot by Dr. Friedrich Adler, the son of the distin- DR. VICTOR ADLER, Socialist Leader; afterwards First Foreign Minister of the German-Austrian Republic. guished Sociahst leader, and subsequently first Foreign Minister of the German-Austrian Repubhc, Dr. Victor Adler. The deed was a passionate protest against the cruelty and tyranny which the autocratic Aastrian Govern- ment had exercised diuring the past two years of war and against the indifference and co- wardice with which the people had tolerated it. The shot was against the system, rather than against Coiuit JStiirgkh's person. For this had been altogether insignificant. Xot even the " liberal " Austrian I'ress, however unctuous it was in its usual manner, found it possible to mourn Count Stiirgkh as a states- man. " The life of individual men," wrote the Neue Freie Prease, " coiuifs for less in those tlays of serious changes than in peace time. We must advance, and, now that historic tasks await us, must not look back after those whom fate scatters at the side of the road." Certainly a remarkable obituary notice for the man who had been Austria's Premier at the outbreak of the war and during the first 27 inontlis ot 2f)2 THV: TIMEFJ HTSTOnr OF THE WAB.. THE DEAD EMPEROR its duration ! " Since the outbreak of the war the activity of Co\int Stiu-gkh and his Cabinet," said another article in the same paper, " has come to be purely administrative. The great political events develop elsewhere." " Another Premier will come," was a further priceless remark of the Neue Freie Presse. On November 21, exactly a month after Count Stiirgkh's assassination, followed the FRANCIS JOSEPH. death of the Emperor Fraaicis Joseph. Diu"- ing the last months of his life he had hardly played any considerable part in the government of his Monarchy ; the removal of the old Em- peror and the Prime Minister was important only in so far as it opened the way for the new men upon whom it would fall to deal with the problems which the new, the revolutionary, period of the war was going to miroli. CHAPTER CCLXXXII THE AIR ARM: LAST WAR YEARS. Airship Raids — A Meteorological Mistake — Zeppelin Lairs — Aeroplane Raids by Day- light — Flying in Formation — Moonlight Raids — Group Attacks — Giant Gothas — Northern Lights Raid — Protective Measures — The Question of Warnings — Taking Cover — Precau- tions against Fires — Metropolitan Observation Service — Insurance — Active Defence— Anti-Aircraft Corps — The Gun Babbage— Balloon Aprons — Growth of Aeroplane De- pence — Armament of Aeroplanes — Incendiary Bullets — ^Night Flying in Fast Machines Raids on German Military Objectives — ^The Independent Air Force — Dispersion of P>KnRT- Berlin's Escape. IN Cliapter CLVII. the story of the Gemiaii air raids on Great Britain was brought ilown to November 28, 1916, when for the first time a German aeroplane droppetl bombs on London ; and it was asked whether this incident, coupled with the fact that by that date an incendiary bullet had been in- vented which could be, and was, used with dire effect for the destruction of Zeppelins, presaged the abandonment of the lighter than air machine in favour of the aeroplane. The event proved that though aeroplanes were resorted to in ever- increasing numbers, the use of airships continued nearly to the time when air raids on England came to an end. The first Zeppelin raid in 1917 was made on March 16-17, when sonie airships passed over Kent and Sussex ; but in spite of the usual grandiloquence of the German official account, which stated that bombs had been successfully dropped on London, there was no case of personal death or injury and practically no damage was done. The next airship raid happened on May 23-24, and was of but little more consequence. Four or five airships wandered, apparently rather aimlessly, over a considerable area of Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex and dropped both explosive and incendiary bombs ; but only one man was kille<l and the Vol. XIX —Part 242 -53 damage was insignificant, though the German account spoke of successful attacks on the " fortified places of Southern England - London, Sheerness, Harwich and Norwich." A month afterwards, on June 14, L43 was shot down in the North Sea off Vlielaiid, and in the early hours of June 17, another raid was carried out which' was more serious than those just described, though only two airships actually crossed the coast. One of these made its appearance over Suffolk about 2.30 a.m., and for nearly three-quarters of an hour was sub- jected to heavy gun fire. Finally aeroplane attack brought it down in flames near The- berton. Two pilots, Capt. Saundby and Lieut. W'atkins, claimed the honour of this feat. The account of the latter was as follows : — I was told by Major Hargrave there was a Zeppelin in the vicinity of Harwich, and I was ordered to go up on B.B. 13, 6610. I climbed to 8,000 feet over the aerodrome, then struck oft in the direction of Harwich, still climbing. When at 11,000 feet over Harwich I saw the A.A. guns firing and several searchlights pointing towards the same spot. A minute later I observed the Zeppelin about 2,000 feet above me. After climling about 500 feet, I Rnd one drum into its tail, but it took no cft'ct. I then climbed to 12,000 feet, and fired another drum into its tail without any effect. I then decided to wait until I wa- at close range before firing another drum. I then climbed steadily until I reached 13,300 feet, and was then about 500 feet under the Zeppelin. I fired three short bursts of about seven rounds and then the remainder of the druiu ; the Zep 254 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE WRECK OF ZEPPELIN L48, BROUGHT DOWN IN FLAMES IN SUFFOLK. burst into flames at the tail, the fire ninning along both .side?. The whole Zeppelin caught fire and fell burning. Practically the only damage done in con- nexion with the visit of this airship, L48, was to itself and its crew. Three of the latter, however, escaped alive ; of the remaining 14 five were killed by falling and nine by bximing. But the case was different with the other airship which crossed the north-east coast of Kent about 2 a.m. The official commu- nique credited it with dropping six bombs, arid these were responsible for an enormous amount of broken glass as well as for the demolition of two rows of cottages. Two men and one woman were killed, and there were 16 cases of injury. On the morning of August 21, when a Zeppelin was destroyed by British light naval forces operating off .Jutland, a squadron of airships appeared off the Yorkshire coast and attacked the mouth of the Huniber. Only one, or at most two, of them, however, ventured to come overland. At three small villages near the coast 12 liigh explosive and 13 incendiary bombs were dropped, a chapel was wrecked, some houses were damaged, and one man was in- jured. The German account, however, claimed that bombs were " lavi-shly dropped " on our outpost vessels (it was officially denied that any of the.se was damaged), that good incendiary and destructive effects were observed from large quantities of explosives dropped on Hull, and that bombs were discharged on Lincoln and also on brightly illuminated factories and sheds on the south bank of the Humber near East Grimsby. A raid on Yorkshire and Lincolnshire on September 24-2.5, in which, although a con- siderable number of bombs were dropped, only one woman was injured and the material damage was trifling, was followed by another on October 19-20, which was perhaps the niosr, interesting of the whole series and the most disastrous — to the Germans. Under the com- mand of Capt. Baron Preusch von Buttlaer- Brandenfels, a squadron of II naval airships crossed the Norfolk and Lincolnshire coasts, with the intention of raiding the North Mid- lands, and, according to the German Admiralty StafI, attacked, " with special success," London, Manchester, Bii-mingham, Nottingham. Derby, Lowestoft, Hull, Grimsby and Mappleton. The precision of these details is delightful, for in the light of svibsequent events it became obvious that most of the airships had com- pletely lost therr selves. On thLs occasion the weather conditions were very unusual, and certainly baffled the pro- phetic skill of the German meteorologists. At levels up to 10,000 feet over England and the North- Sea there were only light breezes from the north-west, but above tliat height the wind suddenly increased to 35— 4.5 miles an hour, and at 20,000 feet a gale was blowing THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 255 from the north and nortli-west. In addition there was a great deal of mist, and the acoustic conditions were very peculiar. Sounds did not carry far, and the consequent inaudibility of the engines gave rise to the an-oneous idea that the aii'ships were drifting with their engines cut off, in order to escape notice. In fact they could not have afforded to adopt such an expedient, because at the heights at which they were navigating the cold is so in- tense that their engines, if stopped, would have frozen up. What happened was that as they reached our coasts they had to rise in order to avoid our defences ; none of them was at less than 16,000 feet, and some, it is believed, attained 20,000 feet. The consequence was that they were caught by the strong winds at the higher elevations and blown to the south — in many cases, it would appear, without being aware of the fact. Owing to the mist they could not see the ground, their crews were troubled , with height sickness, and their wireless went wrong, so that they could not profit by directions from their bases. Only one got anjrwhere near the objective aimed at, and that was the L41, which managed to drop five bombs, three of wliich did not explode, on the Austin motor works, near Birmingham. Of the whole number, one reached home straight across the North Sea, three found their way along the Dutch coast or across Belgium, three crossed to France and entered their own country across the Allied lines between Ypres and Luneville, and four failed to get back. All the last four had an eventful Odyssey. Passing over Boston, Bedford, Hatfield, Graves- end and Maidstone, L44 left the English coast between Dover and Folkestone, crossed the Channel to Boulogne, and was carried on to Reims and Bar-le-Diic, to be shot down in flame.? about six o'clock next morning at Chenevieres, in the commune of St. Clement. Another machine, the L4o, passed over I^ondon without knowing that it had done so. The mist shrouded the lights of the city, and incidentally hampered our airmen in going up, and those in charge of the defences, though well aware of the presence of the Zeppelin, pui-posely refrained from turning on the searchlights, in SKELETON OH THE ZEPPELIN BROUGHT DOWN Photographed from the air. AT BH.LERICAY. 242—2 en U H Z D O U z as u H en U Ed X H O Z Q < a f- b < Z < a en U -I M Z z o 3) 3$ =) 3 as <: z H O <: H Z Q U Oi H Oui "1! y Q Z a* z u o en Q O H Q cd U OS O 256 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAA. 257 order not to give it any indicfttion. In passing, it may be mentioned that seven Zeppelins came within view of the London area search- lights, which, if shown, would in all probability liave attracted a sliower of bombs. As it was, of the total deaths caused by the raid, the majority were due to tlu-ee bombs dropped at random by L45 in London — at Swan & Edgar's in PiccatliUy, at Camberwell, and at Hither Green. This airship came in at Withernsea, and after being worried by our aeroplanes passed over Grimsby, Lovith, Leicester, North- ampton, Watford, and Hendon, where it dropped bombs ; then across London from north-west to south-east to Sidcup, and on to the mouth of the Medway, finally leaving Eiiglttn(1 about midnight at Hastings, piu"sued by an aeroplane. It was seen at Amiens about 3.30 a.m., at Macon about 7.30, and at Sisteron about 10. Finally, as it came down at Lfiragne, its port gondola was wronclied off. Thus lightened, it rose again, but was caught by the wind and dashed against the side of the valley, where it was set on fire by its crow Another airship, L49, wandered over Norfolk, and shortly before 10 set off from Thanet for Belgium or Holland. But the wind carried it over Folkestone, Hythe and Sandgate, the ci"ew imagining they were crossing the Belgian coast. Cap Grisnez was reached about 11.40 and thence the vessel passed over Arras, St Qucntin, Reims, Bar-le-Due, and Epinal, French aircraft finally forcing it to land near Bourbomie-les-Bains at 8.45 a.m. The crew tried to set it on fire but failed, and it was captured intact. The L50 also cruised over Norfolk, and after dropping bombs at Thetford, left the coast at Hollesley Bay. Its navigators thought they got well out to sea, as probably they did ; but what they did not know was that they were being blown to the south. About 11 they saw a well lighted port, but did not recognize it as Dunkirk. Then passing over Dixmude and Ypres, they actually crossed into territory in German occupation, without guessing that they could have descended among friends — a nustake that had perhaps some excuse, since there is reason to suppose that they had been fired at by their own anti-aircraft gvms. They next reerossed the French lines in Champagne, passed Chalons about 2 a.m., and wandered about, with a thick fog over the country, until the commander perceived L49 on the ground and thought he had better land too. VVlien, however, he was received with rifle shota and saw French aeroplanes, ho realized he was over hostile territory and went up again. Then he changed his mind, and came down about mid-day at an extreme angle a few miles west of Bourbonne-les-Bains. In the descent the forward car was torn off by trees, and altogether 16 men left the ship. In consequence it shot up, and was carried over Be6an9on (12.30), Dijon (12.55) and Lons-le-Saulnier (1.16). About 4 it drifted over Sisteron, where it provided German officer prisoners, for the second time in one day, with the spectacle of one of their airships at the mercy of its enemies. About 5.30 it was seen near Fr6ju8, drifting out to sea, and no doubt it foundered in the Mediterranean during the night. In the following year (1918), three airships visit|d the Yorkshire coast on March 12-13. Two of them cruised for some hours over remote country districts, dropping bombs on sparsely inhabited areas, and only one ventured to attack a defended place, Hull, whore four bombs were discharged and one woman died from shock. Next night a single raider did much more execution at Hartlepool, killing eight persons and demolishing six houses, besides damaging about 30 others. In another raid a month later (April 12-13) five large airships of a new type were employed. Some of them confined their attentions to Lincoln- shire, but one got as far as Warwickshire and another crossed England to Lancashire, almost reaching the north-west coast. They travelled at a great height, calciJated at 16,000 to 20,000 feot, and the weather conditions made visibility in general very bad, and hampered the action of our aeroplanes. In all 100 bombs — 11 of 300 kg., 30 of 100 kg., and 59 of 50 kg.— were dropped, for the most part at random on open country. There was not much to show for such a lavish expenditure of ammunition ; seven persons were killed and 20 injured, and the material damage was inconsiderable. This was the last airship raid actually suffered by England. On August 5, however, an abortive attack was made on the Norfolk coast with five Zeppelins, but although it was under the leadership of Fregatten-Kapitan Strasser, whom the Germans described as their " best Zeppelin commander," the only result was that one airship was destroyed and another had a narrow escape. Strasser, who was in conmiand of L70, one of the newest and most powerful types then produced, was attacked 258 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. near Yarmouth at a height of 16,600 feet by Major Cadbury, who delivered his assault head on, slightly to port. Concentrating his fire on the bow, he blew a great hole in the fabric ; flames quickly ran the whole length of the ship, which plunged blazing into the sea eight miles north of Wells. He next attacked another of the raiders, L65, his observer. Captain Leclde, opening fire within 500 feet, and causing a fire to break out in the midships gondola. Un- fortimately Leckie's gun jammed, and the crew were able to extinguish the fire, else L65 would probably have shared the fate of L70 The discontinuance of airship raids was probably attributable to the fact that the Germans had been brought to realize that, in face of the means of defence we had devel- oped, the game had become too risky and not worth the candle. After June 19 there was a disposition in some quarters to explain our immunity as due to a raid carried out on that date by Royal Air Force machines dispatched from vessels of the Grand Fleet, which resulted in the practical destniction of the airship station at Tondern in Schleswig. Tondern was generally believed to be at least one oi the chief lairs from which the ZeppeUns sallied forth to the attack of this country, and doubt- less it was occasionally ■ased for the purpose ; L45, for example, which bombed London on October 19, came from it. But when the Allied Naval Commission visited Germany after the asmistice it learned that the Zeppelin raids were mainly launched from a huge airship station at Nordholz, near Cuxhaven, Tondern being rather a centre for scouting operations over the North Sea. At Nordholz the sheds were ranged in pairs rovind a circle IJ miles in diameter, and as each shed held two airships and four pairs had been constructed, the capacity was 16. In addition there was. at the centre of the circle another shed which held two and which could be revolved by electrical apparatus, so that the machines in it could be launched directly into the wind and thus could bo used in weather that would prevent them from leaving or entering an ordinary shed of the fixed type. As already recorded, the first aeroplane raid on London was made about noon on November 28, 1916. Thereafter the metropolis was free from visitations of the sort for over five months. In the interval, however, several attempts of a tip-and-run character were made on the north-east corner of Kent, on March 1, 16 and 17 and April 5 ; the damage was unimportant, though the German public was cheered by imaginative tales about bombs being dropped with good effect on railways and fortresses and on sliips lying in the Downs. About midnight on May 6-7 a single raider reached North-East London without being seen, and dropped five bombs between Hackney and Holloway, killing one man and injuring one FREGATTEN-KAPITAN STRASSER. Killed in Zeppelin L70. man and one woman. Later in the same month, on the 25th, a much more serious attack wn3 made on Kent, and particularly Folkestone Like the five raids that followed it it was the work of the 3rd Battle-Plane Squadron, probably 18 strong, which was attached to the IV, German Army and was commanded by Capt. Brandenburg. About six o'clock on a beautiful sunny evening a squadron of aeroplanes sud- denly appeared in a cloudless sky. They were described as advancing in regular formation, in three flights of five, with an additional machine acting as scout or leader and another flying by itself in the rear. They kept at a great height, and their plan was apparently to drop bombs promiscuously without any very definite aim along a broad line. Some of the bombs fell in the middle of the town, and in one street, which was thi'onged with people AIRSHIP RAID CASUALTIES. Civiliaiw. ■ 1 Sailor* 1 and Soldiorii. Date. Locality. KUIed. Injured. i g 1 "3 S i i 2 "5 1 i s ^ 1 1 ^ 1 o 1 2 'a Jan. 19-20, 1015 Norfolk . . 2 2 __ 4 9 4 2 IS — 1 April 14-15 Northumberland I 1 2 — — April 15-16 Mfisex and Suffolk . — — April 29-30 Suffolk — — May !)- 10 Southend 1 1 1 1 — 1 Mav 16-17 Kiinisgatrt 1 I 2 1 — . 1 — — May 26-27 Southend 2 1 3 3 3 — — May 31-Juiio 1 . . E. Jjondon 1 2 4 7 13 13 7 33 — 2 Jnlit) 4-5 Kent, K'i.sex, K. Riding. . - 3 4 I 8 — — Jxino 6-7 Hull. GWn.sby, K. Riding N'orthuniborland and 5 13 6 24 18 13 7 38 — 2 Omn 15-16 Durhartt 18 • 18 72 ^_, 72 — — Aug. 9-10 Goole, K. Riding, Suffolk, and l>over 1 10 6 17 5 6 7 18 — 3 Auk- 12-13 E. Suffolk and Kshcx . . 4 2 6 5 lU 9 24 — . — Aug. 17-18 Kent, Essex, liondon . . 7 o 1 10 16 20 12 48 — — Sept. 7-8 E. Suffolk and London . . 6 8 6 18 9 IS 13 37 — 1 Sept. 8-9 N. Riding, Norfolk, London 15 3 6 24 50 32 10 92 2 2 Sept. 11-12 E-^sex — — Sept. 12-13 E^sex and E. Suffolk . . __ — — Oct. 13-14 Norfolk, Suffolk, Home Counties and London 31 17 6 54 71 27 9 107 17 21 Jan. 31, 1916 .. W. Suffolk and Midland Counties 29 26 15 70 43 60 19 112 — 1 March 5-6 Hull and E. Riding, Lines, Leicester County, Rut- land, and Kent 9 4 5 18 22 22 8 62 — — March 31-April 1 Lines, Essex, Suffolk . . 6 7 4 17 2 3 4 31 65 .\pril 1-2* Durham County and N. Riding. . 13 7 2 22 67 43 18 128 — 2 April 2-3 E. Suffolk, Northumber- land, London, and Scotland 10 3 13 6 13 6 24 — — April 3-4 Norfolk . . . — — April 5-6 Yorks and Co. Durham . . __ 1 1 3 1 5 9 — — April 24-23 Norfolk, Lines, Cambs, and Suffolk . . 1 1 1 1 — April 25-26 E. Suffolk. Essex, Kent, and London . . . 1 1 — April 26-27 Kent . , , _.- — May 2-3.. Yorks, Northumberland, Scotland 4 3 7 16 8 1 25 2 5 July 28-29 Lines, and Norfolk — July 3I-Aug. 1. . Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambs., Lines. Notts, and Kent . — Aug. 2-3 Norfolk, E. Suffolk, Kent — Any. 8-9 Northumberland, Dur- ham, K. Riding, N. Riding, Hull, and Nor- folk 2 4 4 10 5 5 5 15 — 1 Aujt. 23-24 E.Suffolk — Aug. 24-25 h. Suffolk, K-sscx, Kent, and London . . 3 4 2 9 9 11 5 25 15 Sept. 2-3 E. Riding, Lines.. Notts., Noriolk,Suffolk,Canib., Hunts., Essex, Herts., Beds., Kent, & London 1 2 1 4 6 6 1 12 -._ Sept. 23-24 Lines., Notts, Norlo'k, Kent, and London 24 12 1 4 40 67 44 25 126 4 Sept. 25-26 Lanes., Yorks., Lines. . . 14 17 12 43 7 13 11 31 _ — Oct. 1-2.. Lines., Norfolk, Cambs., Northants, Herts, and London . . ■ 1 1 1 — Nov. 27-28 Durham, Yorks., Staffs., 1 and Cheshire . . 1 3 4 16 14 7 37 , — Mar. 16-17, 1917 Kent and Su.ssex 1 . — Mav 23-24 E-isex, Norfolk, Suffolk.. 1 1 j — June lti-17 Kent and Suffolk 2 1 3 C 7 1 2 14 , 2 Aug. 21-22 E. Riding 1 1 — Sept. 24-25 1 Lines, and Yorks. 3 3 — Oct. 19-2U 1 Midlands, Eastern Co\in- ties and London 3 12 16 31 24 17 1 11 52 5 3 March 12-13, 1918 E. Riding I 1 March 13-14 Durham . . 2 2 4 8 11 19 "9 39 — April 12-13 Lines., Lanes., Warwick- ! shire . . Totals, airship raids 2 4 1 7 10 6 4 20 — — 217 171 110 498 587 431 218 1,236 5S 121 Thu relative proportions of men, women, and children injured in this raid are not known exactly. estimate has heen given. 259 The best available 260 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. shopping, the slaughter was very great. In all 77 civiUans were killed and 94 injured, and in addition 18 soldiers and sailors were killed, and 98 injured. A feature of this raid tliat caused a great deal of indignation locally was the apparent absence of adequate counter measures. Except for the anti-aircraft guns at Dover the raiders worked their will with little or no molestation until on their retizm flight they wei-e attacked by fighting squadrons of the R.N.A.S. from Dunkirk. One of them wa.s destroyed in mid-Channel and two others CAPTAIN BRANDENBURG.. Commanded the German Third Battle-Plane Squadron in raids on England. —large twin-engined machines — -were brought down off the Belgian coast. The next raid, on June 5, was again carried out in daylight, at about 6.30 p.m., and again the number of machines engaged was large, officially estimated at 16 or 18. On this occa- sion the raiders came in over the Essex coast, and after dropping bombs on the open country and on several small towns in Essex, attacked the naval establishments on the Medway. There a considerable number of bombs were dropped, and some damage was done to house property, though little of militaiy importance. The casualties also were not very largp — 13 killed and 34 injured. The enemy, attacked by gun-fire and pursued by aircraft, lost two machines before they started on their journey homewards. That, however, was not the end of their misfortunes. At 6.30 four Royal Naval Air Service pilots patrolling off Dunkirk had perceived them well out to sea off Ostend, steering to the -north-west, on their way to England, and had given chase, though without decisive results. On their return jovu-ney from this country the Grennan raiders were attacked by a naval pilot from a station on the Kentish coast, and two of them were driven down, the pilot afterwards landing at Dimkirk. They were also harried by other Royal Naval Air Service machines from home stations over the Thames estuary. Later 10 naval pilots from Dunkirk engaged them, destroying two, probably destroying two others, and driving down a third pair out of control. Thus this expedition cost the Gtermans 10 machines, yet they pretended such satisfaction with their exploit that a few days later one of the Berlin papers announced in heavy type that the British Government was seriously thinking of moving to some safer place than London. Wednesday morning (June 13) in the follow- ing week saw the first aeroplane raid in force on London. In all 18 machines crossed the Essex coast, but one was detached to bomb Margate and thi'oe others left the main body a little later. The remaining 14 proceeded up the Thames in a diamond formation to London, and in the space of about 15 minutes unloaded over 100 bombs, nearly three-quarters of which fell within a radius of a nule from Liverjjool Street Station. One bomb went tlirough the roof of a large County Council school at Poplar, killed a girl on the top floor and a boy on one of the lower floors, and finally exploded on the ground floor in a room where a number of infants, none over six years of age, were receiving instruction. About 18 children were killed in this school, some of them being blown into imrecognizable fragments, and many more were injured. At Liverpool Street Station a train standing at a platform and another out- side the station were badly damaged, and the fact that soma of the wreckage took fire added to the casualties, which were estimated at about 24. Altogether 162 persons were killed and 432 injured in this raid, all but foiu' of the deaths and seven of the injuries being to civilians. Even in Germany there was at least one paper (the Volkswacht of Breslau) that openly deplored this massacre, but it was rewarded for its unorthodox opinions by being suppressed. A semi-official telegram from Berlin to Amsterdam professed that the grief was not less in (Jermany than in Great Britain that so many civilians, particularly cliildren, should have fallen victims to " this attack for THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 261 military objects " ; but in a telegram of equal authority a couple of days later, England was told that if she wanted to spare civi- lians she could remove them from places like Slieerness, Dover and London, which were storehouses for military requirements. The leader of the raid, Captain Branden- burg, received the distinction of the Ordre Pour Le Merite. The next raid, which seemed to have a really definite military objective, was made on Harwich at about 7 o'clock on the morning of July 4. A squadron of 12 or 14 aeroplanes came in from the north-east, and discharged their bombs on the town without making any attempt to penetrate inland. They were attacked by anti-aircraft guns and also by aero- planes, and in spite of low-lying clouds which interfered with visibility were apparently forced to break up their formation, though none was actually brought down over the land. On their return journey, however, they were intercepted by naval aircraft from Dimkirk, and in an engagement that took place a con- siderable distance from the Belgian coast two of them wfre shot down, while a third was damaged. Tlie casualties in this raid were mainly military ; of the 17 persons killed only tliree were civilians, while aU of the 30 persons injured wore soldiers or sailors except one. What was, perhaps, the most daring daylight raid on London followed three days later, on .July 7. A squadron of about 22 aeroplanes, probably in two parties, appeared over the coast of Essex and the Isle of Thanet about 9.30 in the morning, and after dropping some bombs in the neighbourhood of Margate and pursuing a train on the South-Eastem and Chatham Railway made for London along a course roughly parallel with the north bank of the Thames. They approached the metropolis from the north-east ; then, changing their direction, they proceeded north and west and crossed the city from north-west to south- east, dropping bombs as they went. The morning was bright and sunny, but in the east a light haze gave the sky a leaden tinge. It was out of this haze that observers saw them emerge about 10.30. From a distance they were described as looking like a score of swal- lows. Each machine kept its station accurately as it advanced, and the formation was so regular and the altitude of flight seemed so low that people who had received no warning thought a number of British machines were carrying out a manoeuvre, until the noise of guns and I THE FOLKESTONE RAID: CHILDREN WITH FLOWERS FOR THE GRAVES OF THEIR DEAD PLAYMATES. 262 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. exploding bombs convinced them of their mistake. It was afterwards explained, how- ever, on " high authority " in an official cotn- tniwiqui that tlie idea that the machines wore flying low was a delusion, duo to tlie fact that the Gothas wliich were employed were three times larger than the single-seater machines with which the public were familiar, and there- fore looked as large as the latter though they wore at a much greater distance. It was stated that in fact their altitude was never less than 12,500 ft., as was shown by instruments on the ground and corroborated by the instruments carried on our o\vn machines. The invaders were vigorously attacked by artillery and some of them were engaged by our own airmen over London. The result was that their formation was broken up and for a time they seemed to be scattered in confusion. They, however, managed to rejoin each other, and started off towards the coast in a fairly compact if irregular bunch. None was brought down in the metropolitan area, but one, at- tacked by the Royal Flying Corps, fell into the sea off the mouth of the Thames. Royal Naval Air Sbi'viee machines continued the chase from this coimtry, and engaged the retreating raiders 40 miles out to sea from the East Coast : two were seen to crash into the sea, and a third fell in flames off the mouth of the Scheldt. Dunki rk too was on the alert, and five squadrons went up thence in the hope of intercepting them. In tliis hope they were disappointed, but they e'ncouritered and destroyed three hostile sea- planes and drove down two others. They then returned to their base in order to replenish their petrol, and meeting another patrol brought down one enemy aeroplane in flames and forced another to descend in a damaged condition on the seashore near Ostend. The casualties were much lighter than in the preceding raid on London, but were still suf- ficiently serious, 57 persons being killed and 193 injured. Two of our inachines were lost on this occasion. In one case the pilot, Second- Lieutenant W. G. Salmon, apparently lost con- sciousness owing to being wounded, and his machine came down, spinning sideways, out of control. In the other Second-Lieutenant J. E. R. Young flew into the middle of the 22 enemy aeroplanes and received the con- centrated fire of their machine-guns ; liis SCENE IN A SPECIALLY PROTECTED ROOM AT THE ROYAL WATERLOO CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL DURING AN AIR RAID. The Matron handing out chocolates supplied by Queen Alexandra. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 263 machine then put its nose right up in the air, fell over, and went spinning down into the sea from a height of 14,000 ft. A naval vessel rushed to the spot as quickly as possible, but the pilot's body was so badly entangled in the wires that it coiJd not bo oxtricateil before the machine sank. The observer's body, however, was recovered. The Germans claimed in their were made on the coast. The first of these was on Simday morning, July 22. About 8 o'clock, 16 aeroplanes approached Felix- stowe and Harwich from the north-east, flying, according to one account, in two flights, one slightly behind the other. Some bombs were dropped, but the heavy flre from the anti-aircraft defences disarranged the fonn- THE DAYLIGHT RAID ON LONDON, JULY 7, 1917. The raiders, owing to their great height, had the appearance of a flock of birds. official report that bombs were " freely dropped on the docks, harbour works and warehouses on the Thames," fires and explosions being observed, and semi -officially that Charing Cross Station was hit several times and that London Bridge was struck by a bomb. They admitted the loss of only one of their machines, " which was compelled to make a descent into the sea and could not be saved by our naval forces." For two months after this raid no aerial raider reached London, but several attacks ation, and some of the machines incon- tinently turned tail and made for home. The remainder proceeded south down the Essex coast, harassed by gvm-fire as they went, and finally also dopartod out to sea. They were pursued by British aeroplanes, but without success, visibility being low in the morning haze and observation veiy diffi- cult. Later, however, some of them were en- countered on their way to Belgium by a Royal Flying Corps patrol, and one of them was 242 — 3 264 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. brought down into the sea. The damage to property was insignificant, but 13 persons wore killed (only one a civilian) and 26 injured, three of them civilians. The objective of the next raid, on August 12, was clearly London, but the intention of the raiders was feiled by oiu- defences, and Southend was the chief sufferer. About 5.15 in the afternoon about 20 enemy machines were reported off Felixstowe. They skirted the 4 qr ■mm 4 i SECOND LIEUT. J. E. R. YOUNG. Killed while attacking, single-handed, twenty-two enemy aeroplanes. coast to Clacton, and then divided into two parties. Of these one continued south to Margate, where four bombs wore dropped on the eastern end of the town, without causing personal injuries or more than trivial damage to property. The other party crossed the coast and went south-west towards Wickford, a village eight miles from Chelmsford. Here they evidently concluded that the large J lumbers of aeroplanes sent up against them presented too heavy odds ; they, therefore, turned .to the south-east and made for home, dropping some of their bombs on Bocliford, Leigh, Westcliff, and Southend, and unloading the remainder at sea. At Southend one bomb, which fell in Victoria Avenue, then crowded with holiday makers and churchgoers, killed or injured a score or two of people, and at Leigh 17 houses were destroyed. The total casualties were 32 killed and 46 injured. The German official report boasted of military M'orks being bombed with visibly good results ; the military character of the damage done may be judged from the fact that all those killed, and all but two of those injured, were civilians. Though our aeroplanes undoubtedly pre- vented the raiders from reaching London, they did not succeed in bringing any of them down over land. Over sea, however, the case was different, and in particular one pDot, flying a land machine, had a remarkably strenuous tinae. Ho first pursued au enemy machine, flying at 12,000 ft., from the North Foreland to a point about 15 miles oS Zeebrugge, where he lost it. Returning to the niouth of the Thames he noticed anti-aircraft gun fire in the neighbourhood of Southend, and accordingly flew in that direction, climbing as he went. He then saw eight aeroplanes of the Gotha type, followed by four British macliines, steering north-east. When he reached the enemy machines they were about 2,000 ft. above him, but climbing to 18,000 ft. he started off in pursuit, and attacked them about 30 miles out to sea, though unfortimately without result. Then he perceived a single enemy machine 4,000 ft. below the others but flying with them ; and attacking it from the front drove it down into the water, where it turned over. As one of the occupants was hanging to the tail, he threw him a lifebelt, and also endeavoured to comrnmiicate the position of tlxe wrecked machine to the British destroyers A hostile seaplane was also destroyed off the coast of Flanders at about the same time. Ten days later, about 10.16 on the morning of August 22, 10 Gotha machines approached the coast of Kent near Ramsgate, but, being met by anti-aircraft gun-fire as well as by aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, they were unable to penetrate far inland. A few of them travelled, west as far as Margate and then tiirued home- ward ; the remainder .sldrted the coast to the south as far as Dover, and then departed. At Margate there were no casualties, but Ramsgate and Dover were less fortiinate, and in all 12 persons wore killed and 26 injured. Tliree of the Gothas were brought down by gun fire and aeroplane attack. One fell in flames behind Margate, and another phmged headlong into the sea ; one of the crew of the latter, who was said to have descended in a parachute, was rescued by a patrol boat, but the other two were dro\vned. - A third Gotha was shot down from a height of between 11,000 and 12,000 ft. by THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 265 Royal Naval Air Service machines near the coast at Ramsgate. Ou the other side of the channel a patrol of 10 machines from Dunkirk engaged a flight of about 25 enemy escorting scouts, who were oft the coast awaiting the return of the raiding squadron, and drove down at least five of them completely out of control. The aeroplane raids so far described were carried out by daylight, but it would seem that owing to the excellence of our defences the Germans were now finding this method too costly, and therefore determined to see whether bright moonlight nights would not serve their piu-pose better. A trial trip was accordingly made about 11.15 on the evening of Septem- ber 2, when the moon was full, and a couple of aeroplanes dropped seven heavy bombs on Dover, killing one officer. Encouraged by tliis experiment, the enemy on the following evening sent half-a-dozen machines up the Thames estuary. They dropped a few bombs near Margate with practically no effect, but in the Cliatham district they were more successful, owing to the fact that they hit the Drill Hall at the Royal Naval barracks, in which a mmiber of men were sleeping in hammocks. Here the death-roll was very high, 131 sailors being killed, while 90 were injured, but, although the raiders stayed for nearly an hour over the district and unloaded about a dozen and a-half bombs, the civilian casualties were only one woman killed and six persons injured. Next evening, September 4, another raid was made, and tliis time London was reached. Enemy aeroplanes crossed the South-East Coast over a wide area between 10.30 p.m. and 2 a.m. They apparently travelled singly or in groups of two or tliree, and it was therefore difficult to count them, but probably they numbered about 26. The first bombs were dropped in the London district at 11.45, and from that time until 1 a.m. about 40 were flropped, together with some at several places on the coast. The damage was surprisingly small, considering the severity of the raid, but 19 persons were killed and 71 injured. On tliis occasion a tramcar was wrecked on the Thames Embankment and Cleopatra's Needle scarred. One enemy machine was brought down in the sea near Sheemess. For the next three weeks, until the moon again served, the country enjoyed freedom from air attacks, and then for a week of beauti- ful still autumn weather, with a harvest moon. UNDERGROUND SHELTER IN THE CHALK AT RAMSGATE. Accommodating some 400 persons. 266 THE TIMEU HISTORY OF THE WAR. WRECKAGE OF A GOTHA BROUGHT DOWN IN FLAMES THANET, AUGUST 22, 1917. IN THE ISLE OF theje were raids on every night but two. On September 24 hostile aeroplanes to the number of 21 came in at different points in Kent and Essex soon after 7 o'clock, and a few of them, following the Thames, attacked London about 8. They stayed for about an hour trying to pene- trate the defences, but only one or at most two succeeded in doing so. Nevertheless they killed 21 persons and injured 70. Bombs were dropped, among other places, on the Royal Academy of Arts and near the Ritz Hotel in Piccadilly. Next evening the visit was re- peated, with about half as many maoliines. In fact there was a double raid. The first group that approached London were turned back by gun fire, and not more than two actually pene- trated the defences. These machines dropped a nimiber of bombs in the south-eastern out- skirts about 7.45. A second group which came up half an hour later were driven off. Nino people were killed and 23 injured, most of them bj' a single bomb. No attempt was madfe on September 26 and 27, but on the 28th 20 rniders crossed the coast at various points in Suffolk, Essex, and Kent in a succession of relays. Many of them were turned back by the coastal batteries, and the few that per.severed in their attempt to reach London failed to penetrate the outer defences. Two were shot d6wn, one in the Thames estuary and the other off the coast. No casualties were reported. On the 29th a determined and simiiltaneous attack was made on London by 19 raiders, approaching in throe groups from different directions. All, however, were broken up by gun fire, but fom* machines managed to get through and drop bombs in the north-eastern and south-eastern districts. A fourth group which attempted to approach London later were driven off. The casualties, 14 killed and 87 injiired, were remarkably light, considering that the bombs fell in thickly populated areas. One machine was brought down by the Dover guns. On Sunday evening, September 30, two groups of enemy machines, followed by others flying singly, 25 in all, crossed the Kent and Essex coast between 6.40 and 8, and made for London. About 10 penetrated the outer defences, and four or five got through to London itself. Yet the material damage was not great, and of the 14 deaths only two were in London. The niunber of injured was 38. The last of this series of raids, that on October 1, was in some ways the most deter- mined of all, lasting for about three hours. Four distinct groups of machines, perhaps 18 in number, took part in the attack. The first group, crossing the Essex coast about 7 o'clock and proceeding across Essex towards London, delivered the first attack on the Metropolis from the north-east about 7.45. Most of the raiders were driven back, but one or two succeeded in piercing the defences and dropped bombs in the south-western area about 8.15. The second group, at an interval of about a quarter of an THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 267 hour, followed the same course and attempted to enter at various points in the north and north- west. Thoy, however, iiad no success until shortly after 9 p.m., when a few of them crossed over London and dropped bombs, again in the south-western district. Meanwliile the third group came in over Kent and dropped bombs at various places, but did not get far westward.s. The foiu'th group crossetl the Essex coast about 8.50, and arrived near London about an hour later, but failed to penetrate beyond the north-eastern outskirts. Again the casualties were light — 11 killed and 41 injured. The next full moon saw three raids. Two of them^-one in the evening of October 29 with about 10 macWnes, and the other at 4.30 W^^f in the morning of the 3l8t with only two — were insignificant and were completely repulsed, but the tliird, on the evening of the 31st, was of the most elaborate and persistent character. Seven distinct groups of machines were ein- l)loye<l, each consisting of tliree or four, and, in addition, individual raiders attacked the Kentish coast between midnight and 1.30 a.m. The first group came over the Kentish coast about 10.45, but did not get far westwards, and had to content themselves with bombing various places on and near the coast. Simul- tanooasly the second and third groups steered towards London along the south bank of the Thames. Low, tliin clouds, covering half to three-quarters of the sky, rendered ohserva- A BOMB ON THE ' 'lj:cial f'holcp'alyk. Crofwn copyriski rrstrvM, THA.MES EMBANKMENT: DAMAGE AT THE BASE OF CLEOI'ATRA'S NEEDfLE. 368 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE CAPTURED PILOT OF ONE OF THE RAIDERS OF DECEMBER 6, 1917. He wears the ribbon of the Iron Cross. tion difficult ; yet their altitude was correctly calculated, and just before midnight they ' were broken up by gun fire, on tlie soutli-uasti rn outskirts of London, where they dropped some bombs. A foui'th group coming along the Thames estuary was turned back about halfwaj to London. Meanwhile a fifth group, followed at an interval of about a quarter of an hour by a sixth, came over the Essex coast, and flew in the direction of London along the north bank of the Thames. Some machines out of both these groups managed to get tlirougli to the south-eastern district, and discharged some bombs, and one or two machines also dropped bombs on the south-western outskirts. The seventh group, which approached along the south bank of the river, were dispersed by gun fire before reacliing the outer London defences. Thus, although the weather con- ditions were not favourable for the defence, our gims and aircraft prevented all but about three of the assailants, which niambered 24 in aU, from reacliing the heart of London. Ten persons were killed and 22 injured Five weeks elapsed before the next raid, and when it came, on December 6, it reached London at the unpleasant hour of 5 in the morning and roused people out of their sleep. It started on the Kent coast about 1.30, when the first group of raiders dropped bonabs at various points on and near the coast. An hour and a half later a second group made the land, and proceeded up the Thames and some distance into Kent. Possibly both these attacks were merely feints, intended to draw the gun fire and exhaust the WRECKAGE OF RAIDEH BROUGHT DOWN IN ESSEX, JANUARY 28, 1918. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •2,&J FUNEKAL Al HKIXION OF Killed while on duty in the defences, for the real serious attack did not begin till an hour later. Between 4 and 4.30 two groups of ho.stile machines crossed the Essex coast and three the Kent coast, and proceeded towards London on converging courses, appa- rently with the idea of delivering five simul- taneous attaclcs from the north-east, east, and south-ettst. The scheme, however, failed. The whole of one group were turned back by gim fire, and of the others only some five or six niacliines were able to make their, way into London. Most of the bombs dropped in this " cock-crow " raid were of the incendiary kind, and a number of fires were started but were quickly got under control by the Fire Brigade. Eight people were killed and 28 injureil, and two of the Gothas were brought down by anti- aircraft guns, the six men who formed the two crews being captured alive. The group system of attack was again adopted in the next raid, which was made under a young moon on December 18. Between 6 15 and 6.25 iti the evening three gro\ips of raiders crossed tlie coast of Kent, and three other groups the coast of Essex about the same time. All made for London, but most of thein were turned back by giui fire at various points, and of the whole number of 16 or 20 only about five actually SPECIAL CONSIAULE KING. air raid of December 18, 1917, reached the metropolis and bombed it between 7 and 8. Later, about 9, a single machine made its way in over London. At least one of the raiders was hit by machine-gun fire from one of our aeroplanes over London, and was ulti- mately brought down into the sea off the coast of Kent ; two out of the crew of three were rescued by an armed trawler. Foin-toen persona were killed and 85 injured, the majority of the casuixlties occurring in London. The last raid of the year, on December 22, was an ineffectual affair, in spile of the assurance of the Gierman report that bombs were dropped freely on Sheemess and Dover. There was a double attack. The first was attempted on the Kent coast soon after 6 o'clock in the evening, when, owing to a fresh north-east wind and rain and snow squalls, the weather con- ditions did not seem at all favourable for such an enterprise. The only result was that one raider was forced to descend close to the coast, its crew of three being captured alive. The second attack, about 9.30, was no more success- ful ; a few bombs were dropped in Thanet, but caused no damage, material or personal. For the first four weeks of the following year (1918) the country was left in peace ; then on January 28 and 29, when the moon was full. 270 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. \Offcialpholoi;i,iph. Ch THE DAMAUiiU FKiNTlNC; WORKS IN LONG ACRE. two serious air attacks were made on London. On the first occasion four groups of raiders, each compased of two or three machines, or 10 in all, crossed the coast at different points at about 8 o'clock. The two machines of the first group, which came in at Felixstowe, entered London through Romford, and while one dropped bombs in the east at Stepney and Poplar, the other attacked Lambeth and Wandsworth in the west. The second group, also of two machines, came over by the North Foreland and travelled along the south bank of the Thames ; both got through to London, but while one dropped bombs in Hackney and Hol- bom, the other apparently did nothing. Of the tliree machines in the third group, which came over the coast at Walton and Clacton, one was turned back and one bombed the neighbourhood of Camden Town. The third attacked West Hampstead, and then flew back eastwards, pursued from the east of London by two scout- ing gyroplanes, which finally brought it down in flames at Wickford in Essex. The officers to whom the credit of this feat was due were Captain G. H. Haokwill and Lieutenant C. C. Banks, both of the R.F.C. The fourth group of three machines, which came in at Ramsgate, made no attempt on London, but contented themselves with dropping bombs on Thanet and Sheppey. A good deal later, abo\it 10.25, a single giant raider crossed the coast at HoUesley Bay. Its course was repeatedly changed by aeroplane and gun attacks, but, after passing over Ipswich, Chelmsford and Chingford, it won its way to London, and after midnight dropped bombs in Bethnal Green and in the neighbourhood of Waterloo Bridge and the Savoy. The ordeal of London thus lasted fom- or five hours ; and the total of casualties was heavy — 67 killed and 166 injured. Nearly 40 of the deaths were due to a single 50 kg. bomb, dropped by the giant raider on a printing works in Long Acre, where a large munber of people had congregated for shelter. On January 29 the attack was again pro- longed, and was delivered by three giant and three or four smaller machines. The fu'st batch came over the coast at different points about 9.30, and was followed by a second batch an hour or more later. The results were scanty. The casualties — 10 deaths and 10 cases of injury — were all caused by a giant raider of the first batch, which after passing Hertford and Potter's Bar about 11, visited Islewortli, Kew, Richmond, Chiswick, Barnes, Wands- worth and Camberwell, in its vain efforts to .make its way into the centre of London. It was about this time that the Germans were THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 271 kind enough to explain, d propos of a sa\'ago onslaught on Paris — tho first aeroplane) attack in force on that city — which they made with about 25 machines on January 30, that the object of the raids on London, though partly to cause damage, was chiefly to force us to maintain an enormous barred aerial zone on the East Coast, at the expense of the services at the front. On the other hand, the attack on Paris was merely by way of reprisal for French attacks on open German towns. Tn February, aeroplane raids were reported on three successive nights — the 16th, 17th, and 18th — in favourable weather with the moon in her first quarter ; but they were not on a large scale and were for the most part frustrated by our defences. The last of the three— if it ever took place, which is by no means certain — was a complete fiasco, and no one was killed or injured. On the 17th a single giant aeroplane crossed London from Lewisham to Mildmay Park, dropping a number of bombs as it went. Its methods seemed more scientific than was usual with the raiders, and the cul- mination of its attack, by which much damage was done to the St. Pancras Hotel, appeared a well -calculated piece of work. It was respon- sible in all for killing 21 persons and injuring 32 others. On the 16th there were three giants. One ventured just to put its nose over the land at St. Margaret's Bay, and unloaded 18 bombs, which caused no casualties, and another ranged over Essex with equal ineffectiveness. The third came up tho Blaokwator, and, after turning south-west to the Nore and Gravesend, entered London by Woolwich. There it damaged the Garrison Church, and later it dropped a bomb at Chelsea Hospital, wrecking an old house and killing an officer, his wife, her sister, and three children. Finally it showered eight .50 kg. bombs on some allotments at Beckenham. In March there was only one aeroplane raid, on the night of the 7th, but it covered a wide area, including Kent, Essex, Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire and London. Six giant machines started, but one did not cross the coast. Of the reinaining five tliree reached London. One bombed Hampstead and St. John's Wood, and another left its marks on Golder's Green, Finchley, Mill Hill and Whetstone. The third flew right across London from east to west, and dropped a 300 kg. bomb at Warrington Cres- cent in Paddington, where it damaged 20 houses seriously and 400 slightly. This was the only bomb of that size dropped in the raid, but there were eight of 100 kg. and 25 of 50 kg., five of the former and 10 of the latter falling in the London area. [Ojiiciiil pholograt'h. Crown etpyiiglt nstrteil. WRECKED HOUSE IN THE ROYAL HOSPITAL, CHELSEA. 272 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ''■^fMJ:' THE WHIT-SUNDAY RAID, 1918: A CRASHED BOMBER. Showing an unused bomb, indicated by the arrow. This raid was of special interest owing to the peciJiar meteorological conditions under which it was carried out. Just as moonlight was generally regarded as a certain protection against the visit of Zeppelins, so the belief was widely held that if there was no moon notliing was to be feared from aeroplanes. There were, it is true, prophets who averred that time would show this comfortable faith to rest on an imsound basis, but, in fact, so far no aeroplanes had come except on nights when there was some moon, and the no-moon no-raid theory had been justified. On March 7, however, ^ there was no moon, yet the exception did not disprove the rule, 'for there was something better, in the shape of a remarkably brilliant display of the Aurora Borealis, the light of which, being practically monochromatic, gave even better visibility and definition than bright moonlight. The Germans promptly seized the opportunity, and possibly they cherished the hope that in the absence of the moon our defences would be lulled to false seciurity, though if they did, and expected that oiu: aeroplanes would not be ready for them, they were sadly disappointed. In April the enemy essayed no aeroplane attack on this country, but in May, on the evening of Whit-Sunday, the 19th, they made what proved to be the final effort, for, although on three subsequent occasions (June 17, July 18 and July 20) single aeroplanes appeared by day over the Kent coast, these transient visits did not deserve to be called raids. The Whit- Sunday attack was carried out, in clear still weather, a few days before full moon, with .S3 or 34 machines. Of these 13 reached London 1 hey came by divers routes from the coasi and lavished their attention not only on Kent and Essex but also on widely separated districts of London — from the City to St. James's, from Stratford and East Ham to Regent's Park and Kilbiu-n, and from Catford and Sydenham to Harringay and Kingsland. They dropped five bombs of 300 kg., 35 of 100 kg., and over 100 of 50 kg., and they killed 49 persons and injured 177. But they by no means escaped scot-free. Going up in large numbers our airmen got into touch with several of them and brought down three ; throe were shot dowiT by anti-aircraft guns, at Dover, North Foreland and Southend ; one crashed owing to engine faihu-e ; and three more are said to have crashed in Belgimn. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. •273 The loss of at least 20 per cent, of their raiding force was calculated to increase the Grennans' respect for our defences, and it is significant that after this raid, which, as it hap- pened, coincided with a particularly effective one carried out by the Allies on Cologne, they began to talk about the " senseless murder of women and children " and to suggest inter- national agreement for stopping it. What is perhaps still more significant is that they never ventvu^d on another raid against London, whereas Paris, which was no easier for them to reacli as a matter of flying, continued to suffer their attacks. We may now turn to the defensive measures jthat were adopted against air raids, and deal in the first instance with those which may be classed as protective rather than as counter- offensive. In the case of airships which came by night when there was no moonlight, darkness was recognized as a valuable ally. The illumina- tion of the streets of London and other places was therefore reduced as much as possible, or even abolished altogether, and the exhibition of bright lights from the windows of shops and houses was prohibited, though occasionally acetylene flares were exposed in open places where bombs could do no harm, with the idea of drawing the enemy's fire. This policy of concealment wtis of distinct benefit. So far as London was concerned, no doubt the Thames provided a finger-post that could not be hidden artificially, and it may or may not be true that the crews of Zeppelins, as one of their com- manders averred, felt by instinct when they were near a large mass of human beings ; but it is quite evident that the raiders were often bewildered and without knowledge of their whereabouts, else so much of their ammunition would not have been wasted on uninhabited country. In at least one instance a town suffered severely through prematurely re- lighting its street lamps, and thas revealing itself to a Zeppelin which was wrongly supposed to have departed. Wl^jBn air raids were a novelty they were treated as a kind of spectacle, and people crowded into the streets and upon the roofs of houses in order to watch the attacks. In- creasing familiarity, however, bred caution, not contempt. Gradually it came to be realized that it was safer to be at home or under cover, and that although the inmates of an ordinary house stood a poor chance in the event of a direct hit, still the blast and flying splinters from exploding bombs, not to mention shrapnel and fragments of shell cases from our own guns, made the open streets on the whole more SALVING A GOTHA WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN IN A RAID AND FELL IN THE SEA. 274 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. AEROPLANE RAID CASUALTIES. ' • Civilians. Sailors and Soldiers. Kil od. luju red. Date. Locality. d i § i •6 d 1 2 "3 s o i 1 1914. Dpr. 24 . . Dover __ Dec. 25 . . Kent . . . 1915. Feb. 21 . . E<isez . . . . ' — . April 16.. kent — — — — — — — — Julys .. East Suffolk — , — — — — . — — _,- — . Sept. 13.. Margate — 2 — 2 2 4 — 6 — 191G. Jan. 22-23 Dover 1 — — 1 2 1 3 6 Jan. 23 . . Kent — — — — — . — — — Feb. 9 .. Kent — — . — . — — 2 1 3 Feb. 20 . . Kent and K. Suffolk 1 — — 1 1 . 1 March 1 . . Broad-itairs, Margate . . — . — 1 1 — . — — March 19 Deal, Dover. Margate and , Ran'sgate 1 3 6 10 4 3 8 15 4 11 April 24.. Dover — _ — — — — — — Mav 3 .. Deal — . — — — 3 1 — 4 May 19-20 Kent and Dover — — — — — 1 — 1 1 1 July 9 . . Kent (N. Foreland) — — — . — — • — — -- _- JulvS-IO Dover — — . — — - — ., — — — . Aug. 12.. Dover — — . — . — _ — — 7 Sept. 22.. Kent and Dover . . — — — — — — — — — . — Oct. 22 ., Sheerness — — — — — — — — — — Oct. 23 . . Margate , . — — — — 1 1 2 — Nov. 28.. 1917. March 1 . . London . . — — — -- 4 6 — 10 — — Kent 1 5 March 16 Kent and Margate — — — . — . — — — — — — March 17 Kent — — . — — — . — — T— — — April 5 . . Kent and Ramsgate . — — — — — — — — — — May 6-7.. London . . 1 — — 1 1 1 — 2 — ' — May 23 . . Kent and Folkestone . . 17 34 26 77 28 51 15 94 18 98 June 6 . . E^sex and Kent . . 3 — 3 3 4 1 8 10 26 June 13. , Margate. Essex, London (Id 25 43 158 213 110 102 425 4 7 Julv4 .. E ?8ex and Suffolk 3 — — 3 1 — — 1 14 29 July 7 .. Margate and London 38 9 8 55 95 45 50 190 2 3 Julv 22 . . Essex and Suffolk 1 . — . — 1 1 2 — 3 12 23 Aug. 12.. E^sex and Margate 10 13 9 32 13 19 12 44 — 2 Aug. 22.. Kent 6 1 1 8 4 2 7 13 4 12 Sept. 2-3 Dover — — — — — 4 2 6 1 — Sept. 3-4 Kent — 1 — 1 1 3 2 6 131 90 Sept. 4-5 Home Counties and London 7 8 1 16 20 29 10 59 3 12 Sept. 24-25 Kent, Essex, London . . 5 4 2 11 24 24 2 50 10 20 Sept. 25-26 Kent and London 6 2 — 8 9 9 3 21 1 2 Sept. 28-29 Home Counties . . . — . — — — — — — — — — Sept. 29-30 Kent and London 4 5 4 13 41 34 7 82 1 5 Sept. 30-Oct. 1.. Kent, E^sex, London .,.- fi 4 — 9 17 13 3 33 5 5 Oct. 1-2.. Do. 7 4 — 11 18 19 4 41 — — Oct. 29-30 Essex . — — — — . — . — — — - — Oct. 31 . . Kent and Dover . . — . — — , , — — . — Oct.31-Nov. 1.. Kent, Essex, London . . 4 3 1 8 8 9 4 21 2 1 Dec. 6 .. Do. 1 5 1 7 13 8 6 27 1 1 Dec. 18.. Do. 5 5 4 14 42 23 14 79 — 6 1918. Jan. 28-29 Do. 22 26 17 65 79 50 31 160 2 6 Jan. 29-30 Do. 2 3 5 10 7 2 I 10 — - — . Feb. 16-17 Do. 1 S 3 9 3 — 3 6 3 • — Feb. 17-18 Do. 16 4 , — 20 17 9 — 26 1 6 Feb. 18-19 Do. . — — — — — — — — . — — March 7-8 Kent, Ewex, Herts, Beds. and London . . 8 9 4 21 9 28 2 39 2 — May 19-20 Kent, Essex, London , . 17 20 U 43 57 67 26 150 6 27 June 17.. Kent Totals, aeroplane raids . . — — ■ — ■ — — — — — — * 282 195 142 619 741 685 324' 1,650 238 400 Totals, airship raids Grand Totals . . 217 171 110 498 587 431 218 1,236 58 121 499 366 252 1,117 1,328 1,016 542 2,886 296 621 Total casualties, civilian and militarj'. Airship Raids, 1,913 (556 killed, 1,357 injured). Total casualties, civilian and military, Aeboplank Raids, 2,907 (857 killed, 2,050 injured). Total casualties, civilian and military. All Raids, 4,820 (1,413 killed, 3,407 injured). THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 275 dangerous. This lesson was driven home by the Folkestone raid of May 23, 1917, when many casualties occurred in a street crowded with people marketing, and thereafter the demand for public warnings, to give time for slielter to be found, gathered intensity. Warnings of hostile aircraft reaching the coast were, of course, sent to the military and police authorities in London and other inland places, but for long the Government resisted the proposal to circulate them among the public generally. Tt was pointed out, not with that object. This proposal brought to light another difficulty — that of making the warning effective — for in refusing to adopt it the Cathedral authorities pointed out the un- doubted fact that the bell would be audible only to a very few people. A few days later the Home Secretary, after receiving a deputa- tion of London mayors, stated as the definite decision of the Cabinet that it was not desirable, in existing circumstances, to give public warn- ings of air raids in London. But circumstances n|>psiri'iitly chnnci'd rntluT rnpidlyin tli«> '•fTicinl MOBILE ANTI-AIRCKAFT GUNS Used in the defence of London. without force, that many more raids were threatened than actually took place, and that to give public warning of every possible raid would merely be to cause unneces.sary alarm. Another official point of view was that the result of giving notice would actually be to bring people into the streets. The public feeling was, however, in favour of warnings. After* the London raid of June 13, 1917, the Lord Mayor announced that lie intended to give the citizens immediate notice when he received warnings of impending air raids, and that he was in communication with the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's as to the practica- bility of ringing the great bell of the Cathedral viejv, and on July 13 the Commissioner of Police Lssued the announcement that when he received intelligence that enemy aircraft were flying towards London, police, both regular and special, would be sent through the streets exhibiting a placard with the inscription, " Police Notice. Take Cover." Warning was given in this way for the first time on July 14, but there was no raid, and even before the police had time to leave some of the stations with their " Take Cover " notices, the " All Clear " signal was received. Three days later a tost of sirens as a means of giving warnings was made, but proved quite unsatisfactory. Experiments were then tried with two other devices — one a rocket 276 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. which, bursting at a height of 150 feet, set free a parachute from which was suspended a smoke flare or a series of calcium lights, and the other a sovmd signal which detonated with a loud report at a height of 200 feet. As the second metliod seemed the most suitable of all that had been suggested, it was adopted and put in operation with a precipitancy that contrasted curiously with earlier hesitation. The official decision was published on Saturday, July 21, too late for most people to hear of it, and next day London was awakened at 8.30 from its ■ Sunday morning slumbers by the sound of 237 rockets fired from 79 fire stations. Not un- naturally it imagined that it was hearing the sound of guns which denoted that a raid was in progress, but in fact there was no raid nearer than Harwich. The arrangement finally adopted was that two sound signals or m iroons should be fired at intervals of 15 seconds from fire-brigade stations so selected as to cover the area of the County of London, while outside the County, but within a 10-mile radius of Charing Cross, two signals were to be fired from local police stations. Simultaneously constables on foot and on cycles were to circulate through the streets exhibiting a placard with " Take Cover " in red letters, while similarly at the end of the raid they were to show " All Clear " placards in black letters. This method applied to the London area only, the local authorities in other places being left to make their own arrangements > and the sound signals were used only for raids by day, from half an hour before sunrise to half an hour after sunset, though at other hours the police circulated their " Take Cover " notices. Demands were made from time to time that the maroons should bo fired when night raids were impending, only to be countered by official statements that the who'e question was being reconsidered ; and except ha illuminated motor cars were employed, jvlien available, to carry the "Take Cover" notices through the streets, and bugles were introduced to give the " All Clear," little change was made till January, 1918. It was then announced that the maroons would be fired as late as 11 p.m., but that from that hour until sunrise they would be fired only if there was not time to mobilize constables to carry round the warning placards. Finally, in March it was decided to give maroon warnings at all hours of the day and night. Since the object of these warnings was to clear people off the streets and inducj tliem to get into shelter, it was an obvious corollary to provide places in whicH they could take cover. Voluntary effort led the way. The Corporation of London arranged for the crypt of the Guild- hall and portions of the Central Criminal Court in the Old Bailey to be available for the purpose, and the Lord Mayor affixed outside the Mansion House the notice, " During an air raid persona may take shelter in this building at their own risk " — an example which was extensively followed by the occupiers of other large k^uild- ings. Police stations, public Hbraries, galleries, churches, schools, were thrown open. The stations of the tube railways proved especially popular, and even when no raid had been amiounced or was at all likely were so crowded with people from flimsy houses that the problem of maintaining tliem in decent sanitary con- dition threatened to become serious. In October 1917, when it was estimated that the shelters already available would accommodate about a million persons, a regulation was made under the Defence of the Realm Acts ordering everybody in possession of suitable shelter to place it at the disposal of the public if required. The Government arranged to give sandbags free of charge to local authorities who agreed to provide sand and labour and to place the filled bags in the windows and apertures of shelters, and some local authorities also decorated their street lamps with arrows pointing in the direction of the nearest shelter. Many people sought a more permanent form of cover from night raids by removing them- selves and their families from London to th3 encircling country districts, and one result was that their daily joiu-neys up to London fpr their business purposes congested the rail- ways to such an extent that the issue of season tickets had to be restricted. Concerted measures were taken to deal with the outbreaks of fire which it was one of the objects of the enemy to cause. In May 1915 it was decided to reinforce with motor pumping engines from other districts those areas in wliich under normal conditions fires were most fre- quent and serious, since tlirough the regular interchange of information between th?! fire brigades of London and Berlin and Hamburg the Germans were well aware of those areas and might be expected to pay special attention to them if their aircraft could locate them. The fire brigade, which had been depleted by ahout 300 Reservists at the outbreak of war, was THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 277 Btrengthened by volunteers, turncocks and others, and in order to make the existing resources go as far as possible it was arranged that only one engine should attend a call, instead of the three or more that would be sent out under normal conditions. These dispositions were soon put to the test. In the Zeppelin raid of May 31, 1915, about 40 calls were received within 10 minutes, but an engine was dispatched immediately on receipt of i>ach call, and though 25 explosive and 68 incendiary bombs were December 6, when 276 incendiary bombs fell in the London area, motor engines from points 80 far distant as Twickenham and Wembli-y were used for extinguishing a fire in Shoreditoh, these and other engines having been previously closed in on the hazardous areas in the centre of London. Public authorities, private firms and the London Salvage Corps alike placed their resources at the disposal of the Fire Brigade, and most valuable assistance was rendered by the London Volunteer Rifles, who for 3J years t ONE OF SEVERAL FORMS OF NOTICE TO "TAKE COVER." dropped only fovir or five fires were greater than could be dealt with by one engine. When the positions in which the bombs fell were plotted on a map it appeared that the track followed by the Zeppelin liad been chosen so as to pass over the area which experience indicated was the most dangerous one for fires. After the daylight raid of July 7, 1917, it was thought' advisable to coordinate 90 fire brigades in an area of about 750 square nules and to arrange that they should attend in London diu-ing air raids and act with the London Fire Brigade xinder the direction of Lieut.- ConTinander S. Sladen, From September 1917 to the end of the war engines from outside came into London on 19 occasions, and on maintained a detachment at Fire Brigade Headquarters, attending all large fires and sharing the dangers of regular service. Another body wliich had an important place in the arrangements for meeting attack from the air was the Metropolitan Observation Service. Established in October 1914 by the Commissioner of Police, under arrangement with the Adniiralty, it was intended in the first instance for the detection of suspicious and . conspicuous lights within the Metropolitan Police District, but it soon developed into an efficient agency for gi\'ing immediate informa- tion of the outbreak and position of fires and of the movements of aircraft diu-ing a raid. Its headquarters were at the County Hall, 278 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Spring Gardens, where it was accommodated by tlie London County Council, and it received information from a number of observation posts distributed over a wide area within the County. It contained 1,200 officers and men selected from the Metropohtan Special Con- 6tabular\', members of the L.C.C.. ex-members of the R.N.V.R., members of London clubs. BADGE GRANTED TO LONDON TELE- PHONE OPERATORS (GIRLS) Who volunteered for duty during a!r raids. and volimteors from the large factories on which some of the observation posts were situated. All were ineligible for military service. A Govermnent scheme of insurance against aircraft and bombardment risks was inaugurated on July 19, 1915, the fire insurance offices acting as agents. The rates varied from 2s. per £100 for private houses and their contents up to 7s. 6d. for such risks as merchandise at docks, timber in the open, and oil tanks ; but they were reduced by half on March 1, 1917 — a reduction which it was generally believed the State could very well afford. A further con- cession was granted as from September 1 of the same year, when the Government accepted Uability up to £500 without the payment of any premium. Arrangements were also made to assist the victims of air raids by providing shelter, food and financial assistance from the National Relief Fund. Put at the highest, the defensive measures so far described were merely palliative, and could do no more than mitigate the effects of an attack from the air. To stop the advance of airships or aeroplanes that had reached our shores, or to prevent them from crossing the coast, or, best of all, to establish such condi- tions that they would not dtire to make the attempt, was a military problem the solution of which would have rendered passive protec- tive measures unnecessary. The main elements of such a military solution were perfectly familiar before the war began. Anti-aircraft gvins had been mounted on our warships ; searchlights had long been employed to illumi- nate an objective it was desired to assail ; and the idea of using aimed aeroplanes had been expressed, picturesquely if with some excess of optimism, by Mr. Chiu-chill in March, 1914, when he said that any hostile aircraft reaching our coast during the coming year would be promptly attacked in superior force by a swarm of very formidable hornets. Yet at the outbreak of war all these material elements were deficient alike in quantity and quality — at any rate, so far as the defence of the land against aerial attack was concerned. It followed that, with no material with which to practise, the supply of men properly trained to use these elements not only singly but in combination with each other was also deficient; and further, there was no adequate system of controlling the action and operation of the human and material factors and coordinating them for the attain- ment of the end in view. The success achieved ultimately, as measured by the discontinuance of air raids on England after May 1918, though the Germans made many on other less well defended areas after that time, did not come so much from the invention of any single new super-terrible device (though various new devices were brought into use, such as incen- diary bullets, sound-locating appliances, balloon aprons and wireless telephones) as from the gradual improvemenf in the amount and quality of the equipment, the systematic training of the men, and the centralized direc- tion of the whole machine so as to ensure the harmonious cooperation of all its parts. The guns provided for the defence of London, which, not only as the first city of the Empire but also from the ease with which it could be found, its nearness to German aircraft stations, and the hugeness of the target it presented, alwaj« remained the chief objective of the enemy's attack, at fu-st consisted for the most m THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 279 part of 1 -pounder pom-poms, and the largest was the O-pouiider Hotohkiss. They were mounted on various elevated points in the middle of London, such as the Foreign Oflfice, the Admiralty Arch, Lloyd's IBank in St. James's Street, Cannon Street Station, Waterloo, Blackfriars, and Nine Elms, and each roof station had its searchlight. Later the pom-poms were replaced by heavier weapons — 13-poimders, 3-in., and, for a time at least, some French 75 mm. — which were placed on the ground instead of on the roofs. Admiral Sir Percy Scott did much to bring about an improve- ment in the size and number of the weapons supplied for the defence, of which he was put in charge in September, 1915, and he also recognized that the attempt to defend London merely by guns actually in London was a mistake. As, therefore, the number of gims available increased they were mounted at points selected on a wider perimeter outside, and tliis process went on until London was ringed with artillery. Nearer the coast there were other defences, such as those of the Thames and Medway and of Dover, and the consequence was that a raider coming in from the sea liad to face a number of successive zones of fire from fixed guns, not to mention mobile batteries, on its way to the ca[)ital. The London guns and searchlights were manned by the R.N.V.R. Anti-Aircraft Cor{)8, raised by the Admiralty in October 1914, and composed of City and University men who gave up part of their time, by day or by night, to the duties of the service. At first the corps was on a purely vohmteer basis, but in 1916 " combing out " bsgan, and at the beginning of 1917, when the Admiralty, handed over the defences of London to the War Office, it became a conscriptive unit of the Regular Home Forces. As such it persisted to the end of the war, presenting in its later stages the anomaly of a naval unit serving under Army generals. At first its training was carried out by old naval gumiery instructors and torpedo hands, who combined a rigorous course of squad drill and rifie manual with a very elementary knowledge of anti-aircraft gun-drill. When, towards the end of 1915, the Naval Gunnery School at Chatham had begun to add anti-aircraft problems to its curriculum, officers and men were sent down there to qualify as gun-layers, and they returned from their courses, which were followed by real gun practice at sea, with MOTOR AMBULANCE Built by Inspector Jolly, of the Special Constabulary at Edmonton, for use during air raids. 280 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. the naval rank of " gunlayer III." or " seaman gunner." Under the Army the Navy drill gave way to Army drill, and the officers and men went for their periodical training to Shoebury- ness, not Chatham, and worked under military conditions. The corps came into being at a time when scientific high-angle anti-aircraft gunnery scarcely existed, but it contained mathemati- cians and mechanical engineers who evolved for themselves the first principles of the art, and virtually laid the foundations of the elaborate systems that grew up subsequently. In the earlier d^ys of the corps the idea was to aim at and hit an individual raider held in the beams of the searclilights, and if the guns that were first provided seem rather puny weapons it must be remembered that aircraft then flew at much lower elevations than afterwards became common. Later, as the number of guns increased, barrage fire was introduced. In its fullest development as a " box barrage," tliis plan would have meant that London would have been encircled and closed in with a curtain of bursting high explosive shell, calculated to daunt the most determined pUot. But it must not be forgotten that as compared with an army marching on the ground an aeroplane in the air has an extra degree of freedom of move- ment, and can choose its point of entry not only horizontally but also vertically. Hence, if its passage is to be barred completely, there mast be shells bursting continuously at every elevation up to the highest it can attain. Such a barrage entails a prodigious expenditure of ammunition, and moreover, if the attack is prolonged, the continuous firing wears out the barrels of the gxins and fenders them useless, with the consequence that the defence must break down, unless there is a large reserve of new guns. It is quite possible that the Ger- mans calculated on bringing about this result when they attacked night after night in the last week of September, 1917. There is, however, an alternative in the shape of a partial barrage put up at the point where and at the time when, a hostile aeroplane is expected, not after it has actually arrived. If those in control are successfully to predict the position of the raider, this method evidently requires that they shall receive prompt infor- mation from the observers who are watching the course of the machine ; and, in view of the importance of the telephone as a rapid means of transmitting such information, the reason why the public were repeatedly urged to use the telephone as little as possible during air raids becomes obvious. The partial barrage also explains why in certain of the later raids the gunfire seemed so slight that some people raslJy jumped to the conclusion that the defence was being neglected. Another device which reduced the space that had to be covered by the barrage was tlje balloon apron. A row of kite balloons was sent up, and their mooring cables were joined by cross cables froin which depended wires kept taut by small weights at their ends. Thus a screen was formed extending from the ground up to the height at wliich the balloons were moored, and pro tanto reducing the space available for the flight of a raider. Whether or not a ma- chine could in fact fly through such a screen without serious damage, there was an element of mystery, of ixnknown possibilities, about the arrangement that effectually deterred a pilot from making the attempt, except by inadver- tence. Apart from limiting the area that had to be covered by our guns, and also by our aeroplane patrols, the aprons had the addi- tional advantage of eliminating the chance of a raider flying low and shooting people in the streets at close range ; for even if he dared to come in over their tops and then descend to a low level the risk to which he would be exposed in climbing to get out again would be too great to be faced. The device v/as the answer — or part of the answer— which Major- General E. B. Ashmore, who was appointed to the command of the London Air Defence Area on August 8, 1917, made to the enemy's new policy of big aeroplane raids by night. The idea was originated by him independently, and was not borrowed or imitated from anything done by the Italians at Venice or elsewhere. The other great arm of the air defence, the aeroplane, for many months existed rather in talk than in fact. Our shortage of machines at the begimiing of the war was notorious. Practically all we had were required for use across the Channel, and only a few could be spared for home defence. The performance of those few was in general not good enuugh to enable them to cope with airships, nor were they adequately armed for the attack. But even if large numbers of good machines had been immediately forthcoming, that would not of itself have been sufficient. Aeroplanes require stations where they can be hoxised and looked after, and, if they are to fly by night, lighted THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 281 R.A .F. official pholoiraph. BALLOON APRON. landing places where they can alight ; all these were lacking, as may be judged from the fact that in the middle of 1914 we had just seven aircraft stations in England and one in Scotland. Further, supposing we had had aeroplanes, aeroplane stations and all the necessary mate- rial equipnaent, to repel aircraft by night obviously implies flying by night ; yet we had no pilots trained in night flying. Prac- tically, therefore, the air defence of the country had to be built up fronj nothing, so far as aeroplanes were concerned. Until the war had lasted about a year and a half little could be done, owing to the output of aeroplanes being absorbed by requirements overseas, in the direction of providing macliines of a kind suitable for home defence purposes, and although in that period a few aeroplanes had gone up to the attack of airships they had damaged themselves rather than the enemy. Early in 1916, however, about the time when the Anti-Aircraft Land Defences of the country were conunitted to the charge of Viscount French, a fair number of machines were THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. stationed in the London area, capable of rising to such a height that they could tackle the type of airship then being employed by Germany for raids on tliis country, and the events of the latter part of the year showed that we had machines which covdd attack Zeppelins with success. They were not, however, good enough to grapple with raiding aeroplanes, and MAJOR-GENERAL E. B. ASHMORE, C.B- , In command of London Air Defence Area from August, 1917. for this and other reasons our aeroplane defence did very little in the first great daylight aero- plane raid on London in June, 1917. But reinforcements were obtained, and, as has already been recorded, it was the appearance of a squadron of our machines, on August 12, that decided the enemy to abandon his intention of attacking London and to unload his bombs on Southend instead. The phase of night aero- plane raids that opened in September showed that still better machines were necessary — fast single-seater fighters of the highest standard of performance. To fly such machines at night had at one time been considered impracticable, but it was successfully accomplished when the need came, and, in combination with search- lights systematically directed by the aid of sound-locating instruments instead of being swept at random across the sky, proved an effective antidote to the night raiders. It may be mentioned that as a result of the piecemeal manner in which the machines were got together, and as a reflection of ovu' policy of indulging in the manufacture of a large number of different types, there was a troublesome heterogeneity in the equipment of the London defence squadrons. Diu-ing 1918 steps were taken to remove this defect, and by the time of the armistice a large measure of uniformity had been achieved, Sopwith Camels, with 110 h.p. Le Rhone engines, being the most favoured type. The machines allocated to the defence of London were at first scattered in small separated detachments under the command of the officers commanding different training squadrons ; but concentration was seen to be advisable, and in the spring of 1916 they were formed into a Home Defence Squadron, with aerodromes to the east of London — the direction from which hostile attack was most likely. A little later more squadrons were added under the Home Defence Wing (which successively became the Home Defence Group, the Home Defence Brigade, and finally the 6th Brigade, R.A.F.), and there were also detachments allocated to the defence of important towns in the North. The next development was the decision to establish a chain of aerodromes from the north to the south of the country, a Flight being stationed at each and patrolling between its own aerodrome and those on each side of it. Every three Flights formed a Squadron, under a commander who had separate headquarters about equidistant from each of the three aerodromes under his charge, though afterwards this arrangement was modi- fied and the headquarters placed at the central aerodrome of each group of three. With the advent of day aeroplane raids in 1917 another change was necessitated in the South-Eastern Counties through the formation of additional squadrons, and to accommodate these the Flight aerodromes were raised to the status of Squadron aerodromes. The work of the aeroplane patrols in the London area was facili- tated by the construction of the balloon aprons, because, the lower elevations being barred by these, they could confine their attention to the upper ones. Each squadron had attached to it a searchlight company, connected to the squadron headquarters by direct telephone lines. At first the operations of the detachments round London were controlled from the War Office by direct telephone, but in 1916 the control was placed in the hands of G.H.Q. Homo Forces, and orders were transmitted THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 2tib A SOPWITH from a central operations room, not direct, but tlirough the headquarters of what later became the 6th Brigade. This arrangement applied to the squadrons stationed in the southern half of the country ; in the northern half the squadron conunanders themselves ordered their machines to patrol, acting on information received from the Garrison Com- manders of such areas as the Humber and the Tyne. When the London Air Defence Area was instituted in August 1917, its G.O.C. assunied control of the operations, together with the tactical training of machines with searchlights, so far as the southern service squadrons were concerned, his orders continuing to be trans- mitted through the heaiJquarters of the 6th Brigade. A similar system was introduced for the northern squadrons on the formation of the Northern Air Defences in May 1918, the orders of the G.O.C. passing through the headquarters of the 24th Group at Leeds, A pilot in the air cannot hear the noise of another machine because of the noise of his own ; practically, therefore, he is deaf. By night he is also blind, apart from artificial help ; hence the need, in night flying, for the most careful and systematic cooperation of the searchliglits with him, if he is to spot and attack his quarry. By way of helping him in this task the plan was suggested of projecting =<>archlight beams horizontally close to the ground so as to form a carpet of light against which he would see an enemy machine sil- houetted, if he were above it ; but trials made in 1917 were not very effective even on a fine night, while ground mist would defeat the method, which at best would have been vei-y ex- " CAMEL." pensive. Another suggestion was, iastead of keeping the searchlight beams concentrated, to spread them out into wide bands ; it was supposed that during the few seconds an enemy machine would take to fly through these bands (if it dared to do so at all) it would be observed and then could be picked up by the ordinary searchlights. When tested, however, this plan also proved unsatisfactory, and it was found best to rely on ordinary searchlights, the successful manipulation of which was greatly helped by the atloption of the sound-locating apparatus. It may be mentioned, too, that with the introduction of wireless telephony the pilot in the air no longer remained a lonely and isolated unit cut. off from all communication with the eai'th, but could receive orders by word of mouth. In the early part of the war the aeroplanes engaged in anti-aircraft work carried no gun. Experimentally, it is true, machines had been provided with rifles firing tracer bullets, but it is very doubtful whether these were ever used in action. As armament against airships reliance was at first placed on high explosive and in- cendiary bombs, and a couple of each of these were to be found in aeroplanes early in 1916. Later an apparatus for firing explosive darts was provided. The theory was that the airman would climb above the airship and drop his bombs or darts upon it. But apart from the indifferent performance of the aaroplanes then at the disposal of the home defences, which rendered it unlikely that they would be abla to get above the airship, there was the diffi- culty first of seeing it and then of hitting it, while in the probable event of a miss the bombs 384 THE TIMES HISTOBT OP THE WAB. and dart-s would be exceedingly unwelcome visitors to the people-on the ground below. It must be recorded, however, that Lieut. Brandon used explosive darts when he brought down L 15 in flames on April 1, 1916. The next step was to add a Lewis machine gun. The bombs and darts were retained for a time, but were ultimately dispensed with, not only because they were reahzed to be of little value, but also to relieve the aeroplanes of unnecessary weight In the first instance the guns fired ordinary ammunition, a few drums of wliich , it was hoped, would cause such a leakage of gas from a Zeppehn as to prevent it from getting home, if it had been hit. In the middle of 1916 explosive and incendiary bullets were brought into use, with the idea of inflaming the gas The Brock and Buckingham forms were ROLLS-ROYCE EAGLE 360-hj). ENGINE. the first, and the Pomeroy quickly followed. The last had the defect that it would not detonate readily at low temperatures such as prevail at high altitudes and it is doubtful whether it ever had a share in bringing down a Zappelin. The Brock had the opposite fault of being too sensitive, giving trouble through premature explosions, but it continued in use till the early spring of 1917, when it was super- seded by the Buckingham, the incendiary character of which had meantime been improved. The R.T.S. bullet, invented by Sir Richard Threlfall in August of that year, combined the merits of the Buckingham and the Pomeroy, being more sensitive than the one and more effective than the other. In addition to the Lewis, Vickers guns were also employed, with different forms of mounting to suit dififerent types of aeroplane. With explosive and incendiary bullets unsynchronized firing through the propeller was evidently inadmissible, and therefore either synclironiziiig had to be adopted or the giuis aiTanged so that' they did not fire through the propeller. A great deal of attention was given to the design of sights, esiMscially for night use, and another NAPIER LION 450-h.p. ENGINE. detail that was worked out was a device for eliminating the flash of the Lewis gun, which the pilots found troublesome. From wliat has been said it will be seen that the key to success in dealing with hostile air- craft attack on this country was found in night flying, coupled with an tidequate supply of efficient machines and minute attention to every detail of the subsidiary equipment. Night flying in fast aeroplanes, in fact, became a dis- tinctively British art, and the specialist ex- ponents of it were the 6th Brigade B.A.F., in which was vested the aerial defence of the country over land, the R.N.A.S., down to the MERCEDES 180-h.p. ENGINE. time when, on April 1, 1918, it\was combined with the Royal Flying Corps to form the Royal Air Force, taking its share in the work by patrolling on the coast and over the sea. But THE TIMES HISTOnr OF THE WAB. 2W HANDLEY PAGE MACHINE, BuMt for the bombing of Berlin. th«! 6th Brigaile was responsible for more than manning the homo air defences ; it fonne<l in effect a great school of night flying, and the system of training it elaborated enabled it to provide pilots not only for its own requirements but also for work in France. Thus it furnished the men and machines for a light night-bombing squaflron which went out to the B.E.F. in March 1917, and by June of the following year eight such sriuadrons ha<l been sent out, the pilots and obM<>rver3 and the wastage being supplied by it. Later, after the air raid on London of May 19, 1918, it raised the personnel for a night-flying squadron which did excellent work in France in countering the attacks of hostile night-bombing machines. From its arrival in France towards the end of June until the date of the armistice this squadron shot down 16 hostile night-bombing machines on the British side of the lines and 10 on the enemy's side, flve of the latter being definitely confirmed and five not. Diu-ing that period not one of its pilots or observers was killed or wounded by enemy action. The raids on this coimtry gave rise to constant demands that similar treatment should be meted out to Germany, whether by way of retaliation and reprisal or in pursuance of the TWO OF THE FOUR ENGINES (PORT SIDE) OF THE HANDLEY PACiE MACHINE. policy of destroying the raiders in their nests. The systematic bombing of military objectives by Royal Air Force squadrons began in October 1917, but bombing expeditions into enemy territory were by no means unknown before that time. For instance, in the previous July a Handley Page' bombing machine with Rolls-Royce engines had flown from England and attacked Constantinople — a feat which involved flying a total distance of nearly 2,000 miles, the machine being in the air for just over 31 hours. In the same month there was a raid into Westphalia, which evidently proved very annoying to the enemy, who tried to make light of it, while admitting " nnmerous attacks on the German homeland." About the middle of September the French dropped 15 tons of bombs on Stuttgart and other places in Germany, and about the same time British airmen dropped 143 bombs on a Gorman aero- drome and hostile billet-s and scattered a bofly 286 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. of 2,000 German infantry, from a height of 100 feet, with machine-gun fire. At the end of the same month British airmen repeatedly bombed, by day and by night, the aerodromes at Gontrode and St. Denis-Westrem, near Ghent, the lair of the 3rd Battle-Plane Squadron LORD WEIR, AIR iMINISTER, AND BRIGADIER-GENERAL CRITCHLEY, D.S.O. of the IV. German Army, which carried out the great raids on England in the previous May and June ; at St. Denis-Westrem it is believed that they destroyed 15 Gothas. Military exigencies, and the inability to spare machines from other duties, were offered as the official reason why raids on German towns had not been more numerous ; but in October the difficulties were apparently disappearing, and the word reprisals began to have a sweeter savour on official lips. By October 11 the 8th Brigade R.A.F., with three squadrons, had been established in the Nancy area under Sir Douglas Haig ; a fourth squadron was added in May, 1918. Two of these squadrons were equipped only with short-distance machines, but one of them, whose machines had an air endurance of only 3J hours, succeeded in improving matters by adding extra petrol tanks, which increased the endurance to 5J hours. Down to June 5 this small force carried out 142 raids, 57 of which were made in Grermany, and included day and night attacks on Cologne, Stuttgart, Maiuiheim, Mainz, and Coblentz. Long- distance attacks were also made on Namur, Charleroi and Liege. These four squadrons formed the nucleus of the Independent Force, R.A.F., which in May, 1918, it was decided to constitute in order to undertake the bombing of the industrial •centres of Gtermany. This force was criticized as a dispersion of effort, but Lord Weir turned the point very neatly when he said that he thoroughly agreed, but that the effort which had been dispersed was Germany's ; nothing in the war had caused such a gigantic dispersion of Grermany's effort, of Germany's man-power, as the moral and destructive influence of the work done by the Independent Air Force. Major-General Sir H. M. Trenchard was put in MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H. M. TRENCHArtD, K.C.B. Commanded the Independent Air Force. command, taking over the tactical command from Sir Douglas Haig on June 5, 1918, and the administrative and complete control on June 15. The anti-aircraft defences and searchlights also came under him. On taking up his position he at once set THE TIMFjSI TJTSTOnY OF TJ1K WAli. •-i87 about providing accommodation for a iorv.i' in the nuiglibourliood of 60 Hquftdroiis. Owing to tlio nature of the (country thi.s was a iieavy task, and considerable engineering works were roquirod for the (ionstruction of aorodroines to carry largo inacliinos and large Ijonib load« and for the installation of electrical power. The work was practically <;on\pleted by November 1, 1918, but the number of sc|uadroiiK to be hovised never exceeded 10. The object with which the Independent Air Force was formed was to strike the German Army at its most vital point — its sources of supply, and the question arose how this result was best to b(! acliievetl. There were two broad alternatives : one was to make sustained and continuous attacks on one large centre after another until each had been destroyetl or the industrial j)opulation dispersed, and the other to attack as many of the large industrial centres as could be reafthed. Tlie latter policy was adopted, because the force at disposal was not sufficient for the former, and also because such " dispersal of effort " was calculated to create the most widespread moral effect. It was also decided that the number of day- bombing squadrons should be rather greater than that of night-bombing squadrons, becaus* the greater part of the value of night bombing, without day bombing, would be lost through the enemy making arrangements to work by day and live at a distance by night. Railways were regarded as the target of chief importance, blast furnaces coming next. The total weight of bombs ilropped by the Force between Jiuie 6 and November 10 was .550 tons — 160 tons by day and 390 tons by night. Of this weight over 220 tons were dropped on aerodromes, the object being to prevent the onomy's bombing machines froin attacking our aerodronies and to destroy large numbers of liis scouts, which could not be dealt with on equal terms in the air. The remainder of the bomt)H were distributed over 40 or .")(• places. A few of the more notable expeditions may b(^ mentioned. On June 29-30 the chemical works at Manidieim were attacked, though owing to the weather only one machine reached its goal. On July .") a dozen macliines attacked tlw railway sidings at Coblentz, and on July 31 a squadron on its way to Mainz encountered 40 enemy scouts south of Saar- brucken and lost foiu: machines. The re- mainder dropped their bombs on Saarbruckeu station, but on their way back wen- again set XOffiCial photograph. RAID ON STUTTGART, March 10, 19I«. Knmb hiirsis (indicated hy hiack brackets) are tihown on ttie rjilway and the river hank- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. upon by hostile scouts and lost three more of their number. Immediately after their return another squadron started ofi to Saarbrucken, where it bombed the factories and sidings without loss. On August 11 a big explosion was caused in Karlsruhe railway station ; one of our machines was brought down, and three of the enemy's driven down out of control. Next day it was the turn of Frankfurt, and on their way the 12 machines employed were attacked over Mannheim by 40 scouts, two of which were destroyed and three driven down. On the night of August 21-22 two Handley Page machines dropped just over a ton of bombs on Cologne station, and next day 12 machines made a raid on Mannheim. Two of them had to land under control about five miles over the lines, after driving away eight hostile machines. Immediately before the objective was reached 15 hostile machines made a deter- mined onslaught on the formation, which came down to 6,000 feet, following its leader, who was shot down under control ; 10 of our machines, nevertheless, succeeded in dropping bombs on their objective. Three German machines were destroyed. Another daring raid was made on Mann- heim on the night of August 25-26. Two macliines, in spite of searchlights and anti- aircraft gun barrage, descended among the chimneys of the Badische Anilin vmd Soda Fabrik's works, dropping bombs and sweeping the factories, guns, and searchlight works with machine-gun fire. Another attack was made on the same chemical works on September 7 almost simultaneously by two squadrons, or 21 machines in all, which succeeded in dropping over two tons of bombs on the town, though they were almost continuously attacked on both the outward and return journeys by hostile aircraft in superior numbers. On one night— September 16-17 — seven Handley Page machines were missing, and on the 26th four machines did not return from a raid in which Frankfvu-t received over 1 J tons of bombs. On the night of October 21-22 two squadrons, in very bad weather, dropped several 1,650 lb. bombs on the railways of Kaiserslautern. The Independent Air Force had to write off in all 109 machines as missing. The longest distances flown out and back were 330 miles by day and 342 miles by night, both in August. But the Force was balked of the chance of essaying a still longer flight for which it was making preparations. A Group — the 27th — ^was established in England for the purpose of bombing Berlin, but it did not receive machines that were capable of undertaking the expedition until the end of October, and in spite of all its efiorts could not get them ready for the attack before the armistice was signed on November 11. So Berlin escaped a taste of the aeroplane bombs it had lavished so freely on Paris and London — until its own people gave it the experience in March 1919. CHAPTER CCLXXXIIl. THE ALLIED ADVANCE: AUGUST- SEPTEMBER, 1918. The JiATTi.io OF 15ai'aumi-, co.ntinukd^The Fighting on the Oise — The Battle or the ScABPE — The Dbocoubt-Qu^ant Line Breached — ^The French Advance on the British Right — Development of the Allied Plan — The American part in the Battle of St. MiHiEL — German Views — Aviation Record. WHILE the British force had been ailvancing, as described in Clmpter f'CLXXTX., the French on their right had also been making pro- gress. Lassigny had been captured on August 21, and the Third French Army had made considerable progress. Still more im- portant was the forward movement of Mangin with the Tenth Army, in the region between the Oise, the Ailette and the Aisne. In the evening of A\igast 21, the Germans had been thrust out of the forest of Ourscamp ^nd the wood of Carlepont. The Oise wa^ reachetl at Sempigny and Pontoiso, while a little more to the south Cuts and Camelin were taken. To the north of Soissons the Gennaus were puslied still farther back from the Aisne and Laval was captured, some thousands of prisoners being taken in the coui-se of the fighting. Blerancoiu-t had been taken, and thus the road from Xoyon to Coucy-le-Chateau was cut. The French forces were closing round Noyon, and, on the left of the Tenth, the Third Army had pressed through the Orval wood anil had reached the edge of Chiry- Ourscamp. On August 22, Mangin continued' to press the Germans and occupied Quierzy, on the south bank of the Oise, and extended his right along the road Blerancourt-Coucy by captitfing St. Aubin. In the immediate neighbo\irhood of Soissons, Pommiers, on the northern bank of the Aisne, was occupied. On the next day the Oise was held as far as its jiuiction with Vol XIX— Part 243 the Ailette, and the course of the latter river was occupied as far as the railroad from Coucy- le-Chateau to the east of Selens. French troops also reached the outskirts of Guny and Pont St. Marc. On August 25, the line from Chavigny to Crecy-au-Mont was reached, and thus the out-flanking effect of Mangin's advance became greater and greater. 'J'he next day the Germans endeavoured to attack west of Chavigny, but were not only flriven back with a loss of 26 prisoners and many killed and wounded, but were also compelled U) yield ground, so that the French advanced 1,200 yards east of Domaine Wood on a front of over 1,000 yards. On August 26 Debeney's army again ad- vanced and captured Fresnoye-les-Roye and St. Mard and the neighbouring villages. The environs of Roye were reached in the evening. During the night the Gerfnans abandoned the town and the French patrols, following on the heels of the retreating enemy, completed its occupation. There was considerable artillery activity towards Sempigny. Malhotel fai-m was occu- pied, and on the Vesle the Americans succeeded in getting a footing in Bazoches. We must now return to the front with which the British were more immediately concerned. On August 25, north of the Somme, British troops pi-essed on from Albert towards Bapaume, reached the outskirts of Le Sars and captured Contalmaison and Warlencourt-Eaucourt. 289 290 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 291 The 2nd Division captured Sapignioa and Bohagnies, taking a considc^rahlo number of prisoners, while the 62nd Division mastered Mory. We crossed the Albert-Bajjaume road along its whole length south of Bapaunie and captured Martinpuich, also Le Sars and Lo Barque on the Bapaume- Albert road. To the north of Bapaume. in spite of a stretuious resistance on the part f)f tlie Germans in the neighbourhood of Favreuil and Croisilles, our troops were enabled to make good their advance at these points and also farther noi'th at Neuville-Vitasse. During the day, the counter-attacks were continued, being mostly conducted by rec<'ntly arrived German reinforcements. None of these wore successful, and our armies were, indeed, enabled to make further progress, and took many prisoners. North of the Somme Australian troops early in the morning carried the enemy's lines on the high ground east of Bray ; on their left London and Eastern County Divisions continued their advance towards Carnoy and took Mamotz, while Welsh troops seized the wood of that name. Farther north the Germans also tried a counter-attack against our new positions in the neighbourhood of Givenchy, south of Lens, but were driven back with loss During the early part of the night August 25-26, the enemy made strenuous efforts against' the British position south and north of Bapauine in the neighbourhood of Eaucourt-l'Abbaye and Favreuil, but without any success. North of the latter point our men advanced against the Germans with the bayonet and beat them back with heavy loss, taking many prisoners. Another counter-attack was attempted against us in the same section, but was also defeated. We consolidated otirselves in Favreuil and made further progress beyond the village, wliile to the north of it, our positions south-east of Mory and to the we?t of Croisilles were improved. On August 26 the First Army began to take part in the general advance. It stood on the left of the Third Army, and its front extended from north-east of Festiibert to Nouville Vitasse. It comprised tlu'ee army corps. There were, commencing from the north, the I. Corps, composed of the 5.5th, 16th, and 15th Divisions ; then the VIII. Corps, 24th, 20th and 8th Divisions ; then the Canadian Corps, with the 51st Highlanrl Division, the 3rd an<l 2nd Canadian Divisions. The attack was made only by the light wing — viz., the two Canadian divisions south of the Scarpe — the 5l6t Division north of it. The object of the First Army was to turn from the north the western end of the Hiudenburg line and thus force the Germans to retire from this their great bulwark. The point selected was the junction of the Hiuden- burg and Drocourt-Qu6ant lines, near the latter village. Penetration here would completely turn both lines. On August 26, our troops attacked at 3 a.m. on both sides of the Scarpe river from CroLsillos to the neighbourhood of Gavrelle. On the south bank of the river, the Canadian Divisions, attacking vigorously, passed through the front line of the enemy's defences without much difficulty and captured at one rush the high ground known as Orange Hill. The attack was the more notable inasmuch as a heavy storm of rain was raging for the greater part of the morning, though later on the weather cleared. The CanacUans reached Wancourt and Monchy- le-Preux, completed the occupation of these villages and advanced farther beyond them. Now Scottish troops on the north side of the Scarpe, passing over the same ground on which they had fought in 1917, carried the German front defensive system of trenches south of Gavrelle, reached the outskirts of Roeux and captured the chemical works north of that place. On the right of the Canadians, from the Third Army, Scottish and London troops continued their advance from Croisilles and Heninel. They met with strong resistance, chiefly from machine-gun nests, aided by some German infantry ; but in spite of this, they made considerable progress and captured the high ground between Croisilles and Heninel. Here a good many prisoners were taken. On the more southern portion of the front of operations, the British advance was continued on both banks of the Somme. Austrahan troops took Cappy and advanced to the east of it. North of the Somme, Suzanne was captured. Farther to the north, English troops advanced in the direction of Montauban and Welsh troops captxired Bazontin-le-Graiid. A good deal of desultory fighting took place at a number of points beyond those already mentioned, and some considerable ground was made. Between Maricourt and Bapaume, and also to the north of that town, heavy engagements took place in the afternoon, and notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy, our Une moved steadily forward. English and Welsh troops captured Montauban and then, working along 243—2 292 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. ROYE : THE PRINCIPAL ROAD the crest of the ridge, captured High Wood and proceeded against Longneval, which was en- tered. But our men were unable to hold the village, being counter-attacked with very superior forces, and were forced back towards Bazentin-le-Grand and High Wood. High Wood, it will be remembered, had formed the' scene of very severe fighting in the battle of the Somme in 1916, in which the tide of war ebbed and flowed for some days. On this occasion, as on the former, the German counter- attack came from Longueval. As we have just seen, it had been retaken by the enemy and he continued the movement on High Wood, com- pelling our troops to fall back for a time. At High Wood, however, our troops turned, stopped the enemy's advance, and then again moving forward established themselves on ground well to the east of it. Still the Ger- mans did not at once give up the struggle in thLs part of the field. Another counter-attack was made early in the night against the line our troops now held, but our rifle fire alone was sufficient to prevent the Germans reaching our positions, and they were driven back with heavy loss. They also attacked north of High Wood on the line Ligny-Thilloy, not far from Bapaume, and forced our advanced troops to retire about a quarter of a mile ; GLEAKED FOR [French official phoiograph. TRAFFIC. then the counter-attack was held up and finally beaten back with considerable loss. The New Zealanders reached Bapaume itself in the afternoon and established themselves on the edge of the town, while farther north English troops progressed towards Beugnatre, thus advancing on the northern side of Bapaume, which was now closely threatened on the south, the west, and the north. There was also severe fighting about Croisilles, and more to the north Canadian troops captured the ridge east of Wancourt and advanced beyond Guemappe. North of the Scarpe Scottish troops continued their advance and made considerable progress towards Plouyain. At the southern extremity of our line, the Australian Divisions continued their advance on both banks of the Somme, and made con- siderable progress towards Dompierre on the south bank and around Suzanne on the north. These advances had inflicted further heavy losses on the German Army, which had been compelled to yield up 21,000 prisoners to our men since the morning of August 21. The strategic situation had now changed very much to the advantage of the Allies. They had pressed back the Germans so that all danger of an irruption between the French and British lines was over, and it would have been necessary THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. 293 to recapture a great deal of ground before they coulfl have been again in a position to threaten either Amiens or Hazobrouck. The result of the fighting had shown a considerable diminution of the German moral, and it was known that a large proportion of thoir reserves were used up. Moreover, it was plainly evident that they could no longer maintain the positions they were holding from the right of the French Thii'd Army on the Oiso to the Scarpe on the north ; tlie troops of the Allies wore demonstrably able to push the whole line still farther back. The German position facing the French Armies on the Oiso and Aisno was, indeed, a very dangerous one. Mangin's advance threatened their loft flank ; moreover Bapaumo and Poronne were in imminent danger, and it was a question whether they should be yielded up or their garrison taken prisoners. On the night of August 26-27, the Germans began to yield ground, as the German High Com- mand felt that their troops could not continue in the positions held in front of Chaulnes, Roye and Noyon. Boye was abandoned on the 26th and the Germans began to retire from both sides of the town on a front of about 12 miles. The French followed up the retreat and entered Roye and the neighbouring villages. This was a very important gain to the French. Roye served as the pivot of the German defences in tliat part ; it liad taken 10 days to capture the whole position, and from it roads ran in all directions north, south, east and west, and it is worthy of note, as showing the increased resistance offered by the Germans to prevent the capture of this important point, that although in the early days of the advance 12 miles had been won within two days thereafter the rate of progress was much slower, proving that the reinforcements Itrought up had considerably strengthened the German position. Its outlying defences, Fresnoy, Goyencourt, Laucourt, Beauvraignes had gradually been taken, and when these fell, it was practically impossible for the Germans to retain their position in the town itself, especially when the closer lying posts of Caesar's Camp and St. Mard fell into French hands ; but these points were taken at irregular dates, and tliis, no doubt, accounts for the Germans being able to hang on as long as they did. Caesar's Camp had been in our Allies' hands since August 16 ; Goyencourt was taken on August 16 ; Beauvraignes on August 21 ; Fresnoy was not taken till August 26, on which day St. Mard was also captured. From the time that Beauvraignes was taken, Laucourt was under fire from it and was therefore valueless to the Germans, but it did not actually yield until the morning of the 27th. [French official photograph, A FRENCH BATTERY IN ACTION EAST OF ROYE. 294 THE TIMER HISTORY OF THE WAR. When all theso posit'ons were in the French power, it was evident that the Germans had either to surrender or retreat. They preferred the latter course, and Roye, as we have seen, was completely occupied on August 27. The fighting which immediately preceded the occupation of the town showed the French troops at their best, full of vigour, and with that confidence which believes only in victory. Nor was the German resistance to be despised. But as the French troops began to encircle the town, the outlying defences fell with in- creasing ease, while the capture of the bridges over the Avre enabled General Debeney to transfer his trobps north or south in accord- ance with tactical requirements. The Germans made many counter-attacks to drive back the French from the banks of this river, but all were unsuccessful, although very often the French had to fight with the water up to their waists. There can be no doubt that Roye was given up with reluctance, and although some of the near defences had been taken some days before, it was not until AugiLst 26, when Fresnoy was taken, that it became evident that resistance was slowly dying off. Fresnoy had been a point from which many coimter-atta^ks had been delivered and it had also formed a target for the French artillery, so much so that the village was practically non-existent. Indeed, the ground all round it had been simply swept clear by the heavy shell-fire directed on it. Even the trees on the Paris-Lille road had all been put down. There was not a single one standing. When Fresnoy fell, therefore, the outlook for the German position to the north of Roye was very bad, so was it also on the south of the Avre, where St. Mard, which formed a formidable position, part of the original line of 1914-16, constructed in the usual careful ways of that period, protected by heavy barbed wire and munerous concrete forts, was in French hands. A violent counter-attack was made against this point on the morning of August 27, but it was driven back and the French, continuing their advance, completed the capture of Laucourt by 8 a.m., and the result of this operation was to extend the French flank well to the south of Roye and to capture over 1,100 prisoners. All these events had undoubtedly influenced the moral of the German troops and had given the German commanders serious cause to consider whether it was not time to retreat. Probably the final straw was the capture of iHB*»' -:-5..-s. [French official photograph, FRENCH ENGINEERS SEARCHING THE STREETS OF NOYON FOR MINES. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 295 St. Mard, which was taken on the afternoon of August 26 without groat thfliculty, after a very severe artillery fire, althougli tiie resistance from the machine-gun nosts was, as usual, of a cletennined character. The Ciermana also began to retreat on the lorth of Roye in the region of Hallu, and by the afternoon of August 27 their linf. ran approxin^- ately by Hattencourt, Carrepuis, past Roigliso and west of Verpillicres. The i-etrcat also extended to the south of Roye on a line of over 12 miles, and the whole German here had been held by General Humbert's army since August 22. In the noighlionrhood of Noyon the French occupied Pont I'Eveque to the 8outh, Suzoy to the west and Vauchelles and Porquericourt. The advance to these points was swift and decisive ; 500 prisoners were taken and a great deal of material, including three trains loaded with mimitions. It was evident that Noyon was coming to the end of its resistance, and it fell the next day. ^^'hen the Germans had retired in 1917, they THE PLACE DE L'HOTEL DE VILLE, NOYON. [I'rcucii oljifial photograph. line between Chaulnes and Noyon fell back in accordance with the arrangement which had been inade several days bftfore. The French followed up the enemy, and during the morning of August 28 reached a line which extended from Licoui-e-Potte-Mesnil-le-Petit- Nesles-Crapeaumesnil-Dives. Chaulnes and Nesle were taken and the pursuit was con- tiimed throughout the whole day. It was fairly evident that the enemy did not mean to stand until he reached the line of the Somme and the Canal du Nord. By the evening the Frc^nch atlvance guards had reached this line and Cizancourt on the Somme was occupied, and art the southern extremity they were on the outskirts of Noyon. Both banks of the Divette did no damage to the town beyond blowing a large hole in the main road leading into the city, along which the French came. On this occasion, apparently thinking they were not likely to return again, they determined to per- form their usual reckless and reasonless destruc- tion on the unfortunate city. Innumerable mines and traps of all kinds were placed about the town with diabolical ingenuity. The mines were arranged to be fired by electric leads going back to CrisoUes, a little village some- what over three miles to the north of the town, and it was only when this was captured that the constant explosions were brought to an end. Everything that could be blown down was destroyed, and the damage was added to aftei THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the enemy had left by shell-fire, which was con- tinued steadily for eight days from heavy guns to the east of the town. When these were compelled to retreat, the work of demolition was given a finishing touch by aeroplane bombing. Noyon was a town of considerable liistoric interest with many fine buildings. The magni- ficent mediaeval town hall was almost entirely destroyed, a mere fragment of the beautiful facade alone being left. The house where Calvin was born on the Place was reduced to a shapeless heap of stones. Not a prominent building was left except the Cathedral, which, although severely damaged, was not totally destroyed. The Mayor of Noyon, an octo- genarian Senator, stated that not more than one-tenth of the houses in the town could be repaired. All these ravages, wanton and [French o^ial photograph, NOYON CATHEDRAL AS IT WAS BEFORE THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE. purposeless, were done out of the miserable spirit of German revenge. An excellent example of this was seen in the Cathedral, where a painting of Christ had evidently formed the target for some particularly brutal German's pistol practice. On the 28th the general advance of the Allies was continued and their position was greatly improved. On the soxith side of the river Sonune, Fojitaine-les-Cappy and the woods between it and the river were taken and some hundreds of prisoners made. Vermandovillers also was captured, while, north of the river, the ground to the east of Marioourt was taken, which gave into our hands dominating ground to aid a further movement eastward. Meanwhile the British troops had been pressing forward, too, farther north. On August 27, severe fighting had taken place at Trones Wood, in which the 1 8th Division fought with great gallantry and finally succeeded in [Swaine MAJOR-GENERAL T. A. CUBITT. Commanded the 38th (Welsh) Division. securing firm possession of the wood, notwith- standing repeated counter-attacks of the Ger- mans, including one made by the 2nd Guards Division which came fresh into the fighting. To the south of Bapaume, on the 28th English and Welsh troops made further progress, driving the Germans from Longueval, Delville Wood and Boniafay Wood. These points had been the scene of much severe fighting in the Sommo battle of 1916. Our advance met many counter-attacks in which the Prussian Guard took part, and, generally speaking, it may be said that south awd noi'th of Bapaume the resistance of the enemy was obstinate. Between Croisilles and Bapaume, South English and New Zealand troops repulsed a number of determined counter-attacks by German Divisions brought up specially for the purpose. But not one of these attacks was successful, nor indeed did they even stop the British advance. Very heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy I i THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 297 and he was gradually driven back. Tlio village of Bougiiatn» was taken. Between the Scarpe and the Sensee rivers there was heavy fighting, in which Cana- dian troops captured Cherisy, Vis-en-Artois and the Sart Wood, taking a considerable niiin- of prisoners. On the south of the Canadians, Scottish troops crossed the Sens6e and seized Fontaine-les-Croisilles, taking up a position on the spur south of the village. Here also more prisoners were taken. North of the Scarpe Scottish regiments took Roeux, Greenlaiid Hill, ttavrelle and Arleux-en-Gohelle, wliioh marked the point where the line held since the March retreat joined our former line of works. Part of the German front south of the village was also captured. The fighting all round Longiieval and Delville Wood, where were the 38th (Welsh) Division (ilaj.-Gen. T. A. Cubitt) was particularly severe, both on August 27 and 28, and the same was the case with the 1 7th Division (Maj.-Gen. P. R. Robertson), which attacked north of these troops in the direction of Flex's. On the latter date the retreat of the Germans became more pronounced, and the whole Allied line advanced from the Scarpe to above the Aisne. In the north, the Canadians had severe fighting all day. They drove back the Germans at many points, occupying their trenches, and captured Boiry - Notre-dame and Pelves. A little to the south Croisilles waa taken by London troops after an obstinate resistance. Immediately on the north bank of the Somme British troops captured Hardecourt and Curlu and pressed still farther oast towards Maurepas. Repeated hostile attacks forced us to with- th-aw the advanced posts which had been estab- lished west of Oppy. But this was a matter of small moment. South of the river, our trbops reached the line Herb6court-Fresnes. The Germans were still offering considerable resis- tance at the passages over the river at Peronne and at Brie to the south. During the night of the 28th-29th there was violent artillery fire on the Somine front, wliich appears to have been largely employed to mask the retreat. Aiigast 29 saw the retreat of the Germans con- tinued along the wliole line from the Sensee river in the north to the Oise and the Ailette in the south. There had been some GERMAN {Canadian War R^oras, ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN CAPTURED BY CANADIANS. A pigeon-carrier examines it as he passes. 298 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. sjTnptoms on the previous days of an intention of the Germans to stand on the ground to the eivst of Longu^val and along the villages to Guilleniont, Ginchy, Lesboeufs and Guoude- court to the east and south-east of that point, but on the evening of August 28. thoy seem finally to have abandoned all thought of making a stand at such an advanced posi- tion, which indeed was becoming more and more dangerous by the advance of the French in the south of the figliting line, where Mangin with the Tenth Army, wheeling up to the left, combined with the direct advance of the French Third Ai'my, wa? threatening seriously the German troops on the line of the Oise. Abov(J the Sensee, where the right wing of the British I. Anny Corps was acting, there was very little forward movement, which indeed was confined during the next few days to securing better positions for the attack to bo directed against the Drooourt-Queant line. To the south of Gavrelle, however, our troops advanced into a position more to the east than they had occupied since the war began. The XXII. Corps, consisting of the 11th Division and the 51st Division from the Canadian Corps, was now pushed in between the VIII. Corps and the Canadians so as to cover the left flank of the advance of the latter in their eastward movement. On this date the enemy evaluated Bapaume, which was occupied by the New Zealanders; the 18th Division entered Combles, while, to the north of Bapaume, the 56th and 57th Divisions penctralod the enemy's line as far as Riencourt lez-Cagnicourt. But although they were un- able to maintain their footing in this village they held a line ou the western and northern outskirts of Bullecoiort and Hendecourt. On the south side of the Soinmo, the British made good their hold on the eastern side of the bend of the river and captured Hem on the northern side of it. From this point, the AUied line now extended tlown to tVie east of Noyon, and here the French took Ilapplinoourt to the north-east of it and advanced on the slopes of Mont St. Simeon, taking Landrimont and Morlin- court ; while General Mangin's army was across the Ailette in several places north and south of Champs in spite of vigorous resistance offered by the Germans. The French progress continued up to the Canal du Nord, which was skirted along its whole length (except about Catigny and Sermaize), by the Bois du Quesnoy, north- east of Ecuvilley and Beaurains. In the neighbourhood of Noyon the contest was very FRENCH ARMOURED CAR. rFrnich official phoiogtaph. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 299 S3S* [French official photoRrap'n. FKENCH TROOPS AWAITING THEIR TURN TO CROSS A CANAL UNDER FIRE. severe, and it was only by dint of hard fighting that Noyon had been captured and further progress made north to the southern edge of HappUncourt. In these operations several hundred prisoners were captured, together with some guns and machine gvins. On the extreme right of the French line there were some enemy raids in Lorraine, which were easily driven back, while the French made two similar minor attacks into the German lines in Champagne and brought back soiTie prisoners. August 30. On this date British troops crossed the Somme south and west of Peronne, while on the road from Arras to Cambrai the Canadians advanced to a point close on to the Qu6ant-Droco\irt line and took Haucourt and a good portion of the German lines down towards Hendecourt with numerous prisoners. A little more to the south, however, we were not so successful. London and West Lanca- shire troops took Bullecourt and Hendecourt after severe fighting, but the Germans, being unwilling to give up points so near to their main lines of defences, attacked in great force, and by the evening had driven back our troops to the western outskirts of these villages and to the Gennan trench line between them. Here, however, the enemy was brought up by our fire, but still we had made considerable progress towards the immediate objective of our troops in this part of the field. Roimd Bapaume, also, we were successful. The outskirts of Beugny, on the road to Cambrai, were reached, while, farther north Vaulx-Vraucourt was captured, and to the south of the road, Fremicourt, Bancourt and Riencourt-les-Bapaume taken. More to the north, near to the much disputed point of Moimt Kemmel, the town of Bailleul, on the road to Cassel, was occupied, the G!er- mans having abandoned it, as also the line of the I /awe. The French on the right of our line also made considerable advance. The Canal du Nord was passed by Debeney's army, and Chivilly and Genvry captured, while the French Third Army took St. Simeon to the east of Noyon and made further progress at HappUncourt. Farther to the east, the Ailette was crossed and the village of Champs reached ; while on the high ground to the north of Soissons Mangin's troops captured Chavigny and Cuffies and carried their line forward to the borders of Crouy. On August 30, English troops also carried out a succes.sful operation north of the Arras- Cambrai "road, capturing the village of Eter- 243—3 300 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. NAVAL GUNS CAPTURED pigny, on the east bank of the Sensee, and also an important strong point known as St. Servin's Farm. In the Lys region, British troops occupied Lacouture and the line of the Lawe river, including the villages of Vieille-Chapelle and Lestrem. They further pushed forward to^\'ards Doulieu, captured Bailleul station to the south of Bailleul, which was tlien abandoned by the enemy, and ^f^^ 1 -"MK ■:^ ■'^pt- ' "^iMi ' '" "W^ . M -^. . t'*"'-- ^^^^Hn^^^^^-^ r' 'j'""^- ^ 7 ]^^g ^^^m. WL A iJ m/m m {Official photo fraph. A BRIDGE OF BARRELS. [CunaJr.Vi \l 'ir lieconii. BY THE CANADIANS. the hill to the east of it known as Mont de Lille (in the bend of the road to Armentieres). Our troops entered Drajioutre to the south of Kemmel Hill and also gained ground to the nortVi of it. By night of this day, the 30th, the line of our Fourth and the Third Armies north of the Sonime ran from Clery-sur-Soninie past the western edge of Marrieres wood to Combles- Lesboeufs-Bancourt-Fremicourt and Vrau- court, and thence to the western outskirts of Ecoust-BuUecourt and Hendecourt. This position was such that any further ailvance would threaten the enemy's line south of Peronne on the east bank of the Somme, to which our progress to the north of the river had already forced tliem to retreat. At this time there were indications that the enemy intended to make a further stand. His counter-attacks had increased in number and violence. On the night of August 30-31, how- ever, a brilliant operation by Major-General C. Rosenthal with the 2nd Australian Division put a different complexion on affairs. It was specially directed to the capture of Pdronne. This division had two brigades, the 5th and 6th. Prevented by floods and heavy machine-gun fire from crossing the Somme opposite Mont St. Quentin, the former passed the river at Feuil- lieres, two mUes to the west. Here the bridge had been destroyed by the Germans, but the engineers replaced it by temporary structures, and by 10.15 p.m. the brigade had captured THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 301 the Gomian trenchoa east of Clery, and assembled in thetn ready to turn tlie enemy's positioas from tho north-west. At 5 a.m. on the 31st the assault was con- tinued, and, notwithstanding tho determined resistance of the enemy, Mont St. Quentin and Feuillaucourt were taken. The fighting was of a most severe character. Strong hostile counter-attacks were made on several occasions during the day and were continued durii\g tlie night, but our troops managed to cling to the positions they had captiu-ed. Nearly 1,000 prisoners were taken in the operation. The fate of P6ronne was now sealed. On the same date Mangin's army was engaged in severe fighting in the region of the Canal du Nord and to the north of Soissoiis. Progress was only slowly made, the enemy fighting with the greatest stubbornness. On the side of the Canal du Nord, Campagne was captiu'ed on the r-astern bank, and a severe action took place at Chovilly. Twice the Germans succeeded in pressing the French back from this village, which was an important point on the high ground between Bussy and Campagne on the eastern side of the canal dominating the loop made by the latter in this part of its course. Finally, however, it remained in possession of the French, who captured there about 200 prisoners. Lower dowii the canal, in the neighbourhood of Noyon, the French made further progress to the north of Happlincourt and to the east of Morlincourt. The French advance in the neighbourhood of SoDiSona was also continued ; Juvigny (which was taken by the Americans) and Crouy were carried after a very severe struggle and progress was made to the western outskirts of Leuilly. On the morning of August 31, the left of the Fourth Army, coasisting of the 3rd Australian, the r>Sth, 47th and 18th Divisions attacked towards Bouchavesnes, Ranoourt and Frdgi- court, and our troops reached the outskirts of St. Pierre-Vaast M'ood between Rancourt and Sailly-Saillisel. The resistance at these points had considerably hardened, and it was not till the next day that our troops became completely masters of them. To tho north of the Fourth Army, the Third Army also, on both August 31 and September 1, had very severe fighting, but by the evening of the latter date the troops held Sailly- Saillisel, Morval, Beaulencourt, the high ground at Moeuvres and Rieiicourt-Ies-Bapaume, and also the ridges east of Bancourt, Fr^micourt and Vaulx-Vraucourt and Longatte, and had taken over 2,000 prisoners. Part of the XV'II. Corps, under I.ieut. -General Sir C. Ferguson, completed the capture of Bullecourt and Hendecourt, and following up their advantage took Rien-lez-Cagnicourt. i French official pkolopaph. FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS BROUGHT UP BY MOTOR-LORRY. 802 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. In the north, the Canadian troops carried out a successful operation immediately south of the Arias-Cambrai road, inflicting many casualties on their opponents and capturing 15 machine-guns. Between the Sensee and the Scnrpe, English troops ma^e another advance, pushing forward some 1,500 yards to the Trinquis river. The enem;^ now aban- doned completely the Lys salient, and we occupied Kemniel hill and reached the line of Voonnezeele-Lindenhoek-La Creche-Doiilieu arid the neighbourhood of Estaires, following closely on the retreating enemy and gathering in a number of prisoners. During the day we also made considerable progress in the direction of Le Transloy to the north of Sailly-Saillisel on the road to Bapaume, and during the night of September 1 cleared the enemy from the villages of Longattc and Ecoust- St.Mein to the south-east of Croisilles, taking 100 prisoners. Near Haucourt, in a successful minor operation. 50 more prisoners were captured. On September 1, Australian troops captured P6ronne. At an early hour of the morning, they took the Gterman positions west and north of the town, while fierce fighting was still taking place among the ruined streets of the eastern suburbs. By the evening we held the line P^ronne-Flamicourt and St Denis, and had piujhed forward on the spurs north and north-east of St. Quentin. On the Lys front progress was continued, Doulieii, Le Verrier and Steenwerck were taken, and the troops were in contact with the enemy about Neiive Eglise and Wulverghem September 1 marks the close of the second stage in the British offensive. In the first part of the operations, the enemy had been driven back from the neighbourhood of Amiens by the brilliant success obtained in the east of that town, and thus all immediate danger of an advance pn Paris had been brought to an end. The second period of our advance, which had commenced on August 21 and which Ls usually known as the battle of Bapaume, had been even more successful than the first. The Third and Fourth British Armies and part of the First, ably directed and fighting with their usual bravery, had per- sistently and relentlessly driven back Germans 50 per cent, more than their own strength, without a halt, in 10 days from one side of the old Somme battlefield to the other, thei-eby [Aiialraitun official pnoiolirapH A BARRICADE AT THE ENTRANCE TO PERONNE Which failed to hold up the Australian attack. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 803 turning the line of the river Somrne. They had inflicted on their opponents extraordinarily heavy losses in killed and wounded and had taken from them 34,000 prisoners and 270 gunn. Altogether, in the month of August the British troops had captured 57,318 Ger- mans, including 1,283 officers, and had taken 657 guns, including 150 of the heaviest calibres, more than 5,750 machine-giuis, and over 1,000 trench mortars. Among other spoils were to be counted three complete trains and i) loco- capture of German gims with ample supplies of anununition for them was of the greatest utility. On many occasions they were used with success against their former possessors. Altogether, the battle of Bapaume may be looked upon as the most successful enterprise which the Allies had undertaken since the war began. Equally striking were the results which the French had gained. By able strategy Marshal Foch had been able to conduct strik- 1 us'ralian nfjhr... ■ 'i. AUSTRALIAN SECOND LINE WAITING FOR THE FIRST WAVE OF THE ATTACK. motives, and in addif ion, numerous ammunition and engineer dumps, containing many hundred thousand rounds of gun and trench mortar ammunition as well as cartridges for small arms and immense quantities of war material of every description. The French gains had lieen equally notable ; they had taken 70,984 prisoners, including 1,191 officers, 1,412 guns, 734 trench mortars, 8,033 machine-guns. It will be seen that the German Army had been depleted at the rate of 20,000 men a week since July 18. These huge gains in materia! show that the German High Command had fully believ(!d in its capacity to continue the advance deep into France and even to accom- plish^ its aims against Paris itself, and had accumulated vast stores for the purpose. The ing flank attacks against the enemy wliich had driven him back from the Marne to the Aisne ; paralysed his progress in the direction of Reims and subsequently threatened the left flank of his troops which the British and French were attacking frontally. The militni-y genius which had organized these mo\-ements was plainly of the highest character. The successful operations of both armies were due to the able staff which had directed their movements, notably among the British commanders, General Byng, the Commander of the Third .A.rmy, and, among the French, General Mangin. In the first flank attack which Mangin, in combination with General Degoutte and two American divisions, had delivered, his arrange- ments had been so well made, under the 304 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. superintendence of Gieneral P6tain (in supremo command of that portion of the French front), that they had completely surprised the Ger- mans against whom they were directed. In the second attack, Mangin, acting on the right flank of Debeney's and Humbert's armies, had again by his persistent and strenuous attacks largely contributed to the German decision to fall back before them. In the last few days of August, when the German Supreme Command appears to have felt the necessity for retreat (from about necessary to support them, at points whore our troops threatened penetration, by means of reserves pushed into the battle line where need required them. The consequence of all this was that the order of battle of the Geniian troops had been much upset ; this is easily proved by the captures made, which showed that units of the same division were fighting on widely separated parts of the battle-front — proof positive of the piecemeal way in which the German leaders had been compelled to employ their troops to stop at all X To Durv f -■'9^^; One Mile -A ^ % I •-K \ Hendecourt- /% X leiCdqnicourt: ' Hj Riencourfc § laCagnicourt -'-'S^ VillerswJS) /ezCagnicourti ^^ CsgnicourtMill ''■^^ibraltar Mill t-i .1 . --^pir^ ^inchvw _^-.^ \ . . ///far / •,», ^^N > if ' \ ii^ H.W7S) I German Trenches ."^^a- Wire Entanglements -'.V.'.v ; '"copS&% THE QUEANT-DROCOURT AND HINDENBURG LINES. August 20 onwards), they had apparently endeavoured to take up a rearguard position covering the general retirement of their armies to the Hindenburg defences. The line of the Tortille river and the Nurlu plateau was favoxirable for such a process, and would have allowed them to secure their artillery and remove much of the ammunition they had collected in forward dumps. But our progress had be«n so rapid and our blows so heavy that they had I'esulted in a steady deterioration in the moral of their troops. Their rearguards had become incapable of determined stands, and it had been found hazards an irruption of our forces through their fighting line. The value of the pressure which we had applied to the enemy was particularly shown in the northern portion of the line in what may be described as the Lys front. It has been before pointed out in this narrative that the German troops in rear of their front line had for some considerable time been exposed for long distances to the rear to our artillery fire. At first they had doubtless hung on to this position because it threatened Hazebrouck and therefore the Channel ports, but it be- came evident to them that all possibility of ■5 THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR. 305 such a strategic success had vanished for the time, even although they might be unwilling to admit it had gone for over. More to the south their line had also been thrust back ; it was therefore common sense to retire from the Lys salient. The initial stage of the retirement had commenced as early as July 26, when the failure of the more southern advance had shown clearly to the German Command that they did not ])ossoss troojis in sufficient THE HOTEL DE VILLE, PERONNE- numbers to continue any further forward movement, and from the date in question they had begun the withdrawal of ammvi nition anil stores collected for a further offen- sive. As early as August 5, they had begun to effect local retirement on the southern flank of the salient, and this process was accelerated by the constant progress made on the southern side of the Allied advance. On August 18 we had been able to make a considerable advance opposite Merville, and the next day this place was taken and oiu- line advanced on the whole fix)nt from the Lawe river to the Plate Becque. The nibbling process on the German lines had been continued against the southern and western faces of the Gennan salient, but with- out inrlucing any corresponding withdrawal on the northern side. On the night of August 29-30, however, the notion of any adherence to this projection, which was now becoming a source of great weakness, only to be justified as forming the base of an inunediate offensive, was given up. As we have seen, on August 30 our troops had found Bailleul unoccupied, and the next day the enemy had given up Mont Kommel and Stoenwerck, and the follow- ing day Neuve Egliso was captured. It was the begirming of the end. At the end of August from Kemmel down to Noyon, with the exception of a small space from Givenchy to Lens, the Allies had pressed back the Germans along the whole length of their line. To the east of Noyon, the French out-flanking force was advancing northwards, threatening the whole of the German position back to St. Quentin. Moreover, the enemy had not merely been driven back, he was still retiring except at the point just mentioned, and he had practically lost the gains which lEIIiolt & Fry. MAJOR-GENERAL C. A. BLACKLOCK. Commanded the 63rd Division. he had made in the spring and early summer. Our troops had reached a position where they threatened the main defence of Germany, the Hindenburg line, and that at its most danger- ous point, viz., at the salient where it joined the Drocourt-Qu6ant line to the north. To penetrate here was effectively to turn both lines of defence, and would necessarily have had a great effect on the German general situation. On September 2, the decisive blow was struck 306 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. by troopis of the Fii-st and Third Annies. To the former belonged the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions and the 4th Engh'sh Di\asion : to the latter the XVII. Corps with the 52nd, 57th, and 63rd Divisions. At 5 a.m., the Canadians were sent on a front of about 4t miles against the enemy's position south of the Trinquis brook. They were aided by 40 tanks of the 3rd Tank Brigade and by a mobile force of motor machine-gun units, Canadian Cavalry and armoured cars. The attack was eminently successful, and after seven hours' fighting the Droeourt-Qu^ant line was completely penetrated and in our possession. On the right of the Canadians, the attack was con- ducted by the XVII. Corps, with the 52nd and 57th Divisions in front line. It was directed against the jimction of the Hindenburg and Drocourt-Qu6ant lines, north-west of Queant villngo. This movement v/as equally suc- cessful. The 52nd Division was engaged in very severe fighting in the elaborate German trench system both north and south of Queant, and the progress they made greatly assisted the advance of the Canadians on their northern flank. The 57th Division on the right was also severelj' engaged. Early in the afternoon the 63rd Division (undfer M-ij.- General C. A. Blacklock) passed through our front line and proceeded to improve the success already gained. As the day progressed and our troops ad- vanced, they met with considerable resistance from machine-gun nests at Etaing and on the i-everse slopes of the ridge on which Dury was situated, and there was specially hard fighting on the front of the 63rd Division, now joined by the 4th Division (under Maj. -General L. J. Lipsett). By nightfall the 63rd Division had reached a point on the Douai railroad east of Queant, while the 52nd Division, wheeling round on the north of Queant, threatened both that village and Pronville from the north. Altogether our troops had made an advance wiiich measured over three mUes along the Arras-Cambrai road, and had reached the outskirts of Buissy south of the Arras-Cambrai road. Eterpigny, Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, Cagni- court and Dury had been captured.* Maiiy guns and 8,000 prisoners had also been taken. The victory gained was a very important one, as the penetration of the German lines of defence turned the whole of his organized positions both to the south and in great measure to the north. We were in fact behind his main Hin- denburg lino. South of this special movement, the troops of the Third and Fourth Armies pro- longed the line of attack down to Poronne and made important progress in the face of severe resistance. Moreuil and Villers-au-Flos were * Dury was taken by 8 a.m., and the German town- niajor waft found in bed asleep ! •-.^jji.'j''*!'^ .*.*i«vsnigi^« WfT'cial f>!:ologwpli. QUEANT. THE TIMES HmTORY OF THE WAR. 307 r> V V Tf ICa'wIian War Records. CANADIANS IN THE SUPPORT LINE WATCHING THEIR COMRADES' ADVANCE. taken, and fiirtber progress was made towards Lens. On the French front troops passed over the Canal du Xord to the east of Nesle, while hetweei;! the Oise and the Aisne others which had crossed the Ailette near Champs con- tinued their progress in the direction of Couoy- le-Chateau. Leiiillj' and Teriiy-Sorny were ocoupied, and ground was gained on the north of the Aisne and at Orouy. The i-esult of the fighting up to September 2, especially on the Scarpo, where the British had thoroughly beaten 13 German divisions, taken 16,000 prisoners and 200 guns, had now finally convinced the tJermnn Commanders that the position they had hitherto held was become untenable, and it was better to retire from it. During tho night of Sejitcmber 2-3, along the whole line of battle from the right of the First Army, on the left of our line, to the right of the Third Army, a general retirement of the enemy took place, and on SeptemVjer 3 the general line occupied by him ran along the Canal du Nora from Poronne to Ytres and thence east of Hennies-Inchy-en-Artois- Kcourt-St. Quentin to the Sensee east of Lecluse, and on September 4 the withdrawal was continued from the east bank of the Somme south of Peronne. On the iiight of September 8, the Germans held a line from Vermand- Ep6hy-Havrincourt, and thence along the east bank of the Canal tlu Nori.1. During the night of September 2-3, the result of the Allied victories became more and more evident. Qu^ant had fallen into our hands, and also Barralle, eight miles from Cambrai, for south of the Canadian attack, the XVII. Corps had taken Queant and Pron- ville, and reached Inchy and Moeiivres. The German retreat was particularly rapid between , Queant and Moeuvres. Between Que^it and Peronne our . troops made consiHerable progress to the Hindenburg line east of Beaumetz and Ytres. In the centre our troops entered tlie western outskirts of Lens and on the Lys front Richebourg-St. Vaast was captured. The French on the British right were engaged in fighting from P6ronne to Noyon and from the Oisc to the Aisne, holding the Germans and preventing the diversion of reserves to the more northern area of conflict. French troops ciossed the Somme on Septem- ber 3 and held their position on the eastern bank. To the north of Noyon they had crossed the Canal du Nord ami had occupied Genvry. Salency was taken and the road to Guiscard was thus open. The enemy was now retiring rapidly at this part of the lino of battle on tho northern sifte of the Oise to avoid iurther losses. On September 4, General Humbert, following closely on their tracks, went forward ovei three miles between Libennoat and Apilly, THE TIMES HI^TOIiY OF THE WAR. 809 an'] at the end of the day his troops occupied the lino Libonnont-Guiscard-Apilly. The French also closed on to the outskirts of Coucy-le-Chateau and Juinenoourt and ad- vanced on the north of Soissons, and hero their progress became so threatening to the line of Gennan troops on the Vesle tliat they commenced to fall back from this river on a line of about 19 miles. General Mangin ad- vanced with the 10th Army across the river and pursued the rearguards of the enemy, closing up in the evening to the line thoy held by Chassemy, Brenelle, Vauberlin, Blanzy. The German i^treat was over a long line and involved the abandonment of many important positions and great quantities of material of all kinds, including guns, of which considerable niimbers fell into the Allies' hands. So closely did our troops follow up the enemy that many of hia rearguards were captured, and our artillery was often able to come up to very forward situations whence they were able to bring a devastating fire to boar on the retreating columns and convoys. North of Havrincourt, the Canal du Nord, behind which the enemy's line was now drawn up, fonnad a powerful obstacle against our troops, for the slopes up from the canal were open and swept by fire from the German line. Its capture was therefore an operation of con- siderable difificulty which had to be carefully organized. From Havrincourt to the south the enemy's main line of defence was the Hindenburg line, on which he had lavished enormous labour and great care in every possible means of defence. It ran from Havrincourt south-east across the Beauoamp- La Vacquerie and Bonavis ridges to the St Quentin Canal at Bantouzello, along which it ran to St. Quentin. Strong positions were held by the Germans in advance of the Hin- denburg line at Havrincourt and Ep6hy. It was necessary to take these before the main Hindenburg line could be attacked with any prospect of success. The first object therefore of the British was to capture these advanced works so as to allow their whole force to got within striking distance of the main line. September 12 marked the beginning of the necessary operations. General Byng directed the IV. and VI. Corps from the Third Army to attack on a front of about five miles against the Havrincourt segment. The troops em- ployed were New Zealandera with the .37th, 67th and 2nd Divisions. The village ot Havrincourt was taken by the 62nd Division, while the 37th captured Trescault. Our troops ■ consolidated the positions there, wliich were of the highest importance for further operations against the Hindenburg line. On the right of the British front, the 9th and the Australian Corps continued the forward movement, ap- parently without meeting with great resistance, as the forces employed were light in numbers. By means of skilful manoeuvros and local attacks well driven home, they had by September 17 made themselves masters of A GERMAN TRENCH MORTAR. Holnon village and wood and Maissemy, and were on the confines of Le Verguier and Templeux-le-Gu6rard. These gains cleared the way for an advance on a larger scale, and on September 18, at seven a.m., the Fourth and Third British Armies attacked on a front ot about 17 miles fronx Holnon to Gouzeaucourt, while the French First Army operated to the south of Holnon. The attack, which was made in a heavy rain was greatly aided by a small number of tanks which accompanied the infantry. Our troops were able to pene- trate tlirough the well-organized defensive belt formed by the old British and German lines to a depth of three miles. During the fighting, the 1st, 17th, 21st and 74th Divisions, the latter commanded by Maj. -General E. S. Girdwood, the 1st and 4th Australian Divisions, the latter, commanded by Maj. -General E. Sinclair Maclagan, fought witti great dis- tinction. On the extreme right ot the attack and in the left centre about Ep6hy, the enemy resisted with great determination. In these two parts troops of the 6th, 12th, 18th and 810 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 58th Divisions were obstinately resisted and had to fight with great vigour. When night fell, however, the last important centres of resistance in Ep6hy were reduced ; but both here, and about Gricourt on our right, small local fights continued during the succeeding days, before we secured finally the line we required as a stepping-off place for the further attack on the main Hindenburg defences. With the exception of these two points the whole of our objectives aimed at were gained in the 6rst day's operations. penetrated well into the forest of Coucy, the Gtermans retreating before them without serious resistance. The Americans, acting on the right of Mangin, crossed the high ground to the north of the Vesle and occupied the Aisne from Cond6 to Vieil Arcy. They advanced on the south of the Ailette as far as the line Neviville-sur-Margival and Vregny on the western slopes of the Fort of Cond^. On the west side of the Oise, the First and Third French Armies advanced up the road from Noyon to Ham and crossed the Somme at •S^. 7k..«»:a'n/i. ■ . ■ - . W^4 rtfa J_ Clam, Wi aeo .TaV aj~- ^.-oSs oMargny- ,. oA'i.i^ ■^' le Pave <»AV^court ittplta Frenich«6i ■"Sii \ oBeaatnont Failhuel ,,a/jVeuvM/V<!.„ "j °Bcrlancoijrt' r "'"''""■''/^Guiscard ^^qny ,...,Cr3pesunesml ^i„„-^/i, "Campsfe Letlojfs ^^9"y munrancburto/ Fm Fresnieres Uah^^^;,/ of'?o/fes,- — --j^s^« &?,?^^2^, ■'•■':^- :.■'"?*.♦ V„nr,oqenyr-y./ Grandru „l>naUnyj ItV( "• -3 def^'''^^'^''""/~j4^ehMc'oun ~ Abb'ecoi -Bcrliirr- ^i-swJi-^ Cuv-^'Sif!*';' %*/ -Silency^ ■ '^bvuf ' ' -^ YBichancovrt :'^^4Bafisif\- ...'■*'''-■ .■yUcntignj^ . .Xpiftlrei 1) f.BASSi: S^ TOR^T f -v, o. Gobain ■"-_ ,„ tfievinc ■ .Ribecourt oun -rata Thourott wMontm acq. Pimprei ( B^ly ,,11, St ->. Uger °f, Flessis Brian ,•'.':,, Blerancaurdellt I Nampcel o iudi^nicourt Pinon .\ o S'^Crepiit-aurBois Veiaponi\°Ep3gny„S3?''e.x \\ ^ y,llers« oChavigny \ ) // ""f. cf^REFERENCE. L Line -Aug. 8. »*-*-. " -Sep.6.--. Trosfy-^fireuil Scale oF Miles. 2 3 4 5 S^^ChTrSfffphe-^ou.ron X^^,„„^^^ Braye; Sur-A/3ne <, r^^oy"^' V^^'-' ■ Q'''?<31 / 10 SOlSSOJfJ rouy y'oFort Condi°, (Hiojq THE AREA OF THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN ADVANCE, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1918. In this fighting, which may be called the battle Havrincourt-Ep6hy, 15 British Divisions defeated 20 German Divisions, cap- turing nearly 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns. The efforts of the British and the French Armies from the Scarpe to the Marno during the summer operations had now been so successful that it was possible to develop still further the strategic plans of Marshal Foch. Meanwhile the French had been making further progress. On September 5, the 10th Army entered Coucy-le-Chateau, Coucy-la- Ville, Folembraj', Pierremande and then Falvy and Offoy. The rate of progress was rapid an advance of nearly four miles being made in places. The next day, in spite of the German resist- ance, the advance was continued at an even greater pace, and the French reached the Aisne front at their old positions before Laffaux and Vauxaillon, and captured the whole of the lower forest of Coucy and took many large dei)6ts of ammunition there. The Americans reached the line Vieil Arcy-Rovillon ; their patiols attaining the south bank of the Aisne Canal. The next day the pursuit was again very THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 81) FRENCH TROOPS CROSSING THE ANIZY iFrench oBictat photograph. CANAL. lively, large amounts of ammunition and materials of all kinds being captured, including depots of coal and materials for road-mending, and other things which had evidently been got together for winter purposes. Tergnier was occupied and the canal of St. Quentin crossed at Saint-Simon and near Tugny, both these villages being captured. The French line now ran along Vaulx-Avesne-Jussy, the railroad from Ham to Torgnier-Barisis-Bassoles-Nanteui! -la-Fosse, the Fort of Cond6 and Cond6 itself. September 8, round Laffaux and Saint- Simon, the Gennans made strenuous attempts to stop the French advance and executed many counter-attacks, most of them without result, but they managed to retake Avesne, from which they were promptly turned out. Artemps, to the north-west of Saint-Simon, was also captured bv our Allies. During the next two days, the advance still continued. Mangin's army south of the Oise captured the station at Servais. Between the Oise and the Somme, the French Third Army, after taking the Fort of Liez, reached tlie line Trav6cy-Hinacoiu't and advanced jiarties pushed on as far as Rssigny-le-Grand and Con- tescourt, thus connecting up with the French First Army on the north of the Somme, which had captured Roupy and Etreillers, Thus, by September 11, the Allied Annies were facing the Hindenburg line, and the position was now much the same a-s it had been on March 20, 1918, before the German advance began Indeed, on the left, the British Fifth Army had reached Marquion, a more advanced point ; but facing the French, the Chemin-des-Dames was still held by the Germans. The Germans were now resisting vigorously and the rate of progress was somewhat slower, still the French Tenth Army reached the foot of the St. Gobain height and the plateau of Malmaison. Holding on to the line B^risis- Bassoles, Mangin pushed his right between the Ailette and the Aisne on both sides of the road from SoLssons to Laon, and on the next day further ground was gained in the neighbour- hood of Nanteuil-la-Fosse. Fully understand- ing the danger of tliis out-flanking movement, the Germans made determined efforts to stop it. Two violent counter-attacks were delivered against Laffaux and the Moisy Farm. Both were driven back with heavy loss, and the next day the enenay abandoned the village of AUemant and the important observation point of the Mill of Laffaux, whence a large tract of country had been visible. On the right of the French progress was made to the east of Sancy and to the north of Celles-sur-l'Aisne, S12 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. while to the south of the Aisne, near Merval, the French carried the village of Glennes. Once more, on September 15, the Germans attacked vigoroiisly against the French line of advance, only to be beaten back again, and ths French troops, then advancing, took [CommiUee oj I ublic Information, U,S^. FRENCH 155's FOR THE AMERICAN ARMY. Photographed at the Gate d'Orleans, Paris. the plateau to the east of Vauxaillon, then the ridge to the north-east of Celles. On September 16, the Mont des Singes, which dominated the valley of the Ailette, and the borders of the forest of Pinon were captured, as also was Vailly on the Aisne. On September 17-18, notwithstanding strong counter-attacks, the advance was continued eastward of AUemant-Sancy and Jouy along the centre of the line, on the road to Laon. It will thus be seen thfit General Mangin was now opposite the gap of the Ardon, was between the high gi'ound of St. Gobain and Craonno, and was within striking distance of Laon, The next point in the Allied plan was to attack the forward projection of the German line known os the St, Mihiel salient. This was entrusted by Marshal Fooh to the American Army, which was to drive the enemj' from the St. Mihiel salient on the east of Verdun, and then act west of the Meuse in the direction of Mezieres ; the French, west of the Argonne were to act in close cooperation with this Ameri- can attack and with the same objective ; while the British, on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front, were to move in the general direction of Maubeuges, and the Belgian and Allied forces in Flandjrs in the direction of Ghent. The outcome of this scheme would be that important German forces opposite the French and Ameri- cans would be pressed upon the difficult country of the Ardennes, while the Britisli advance would strike at their principal lines of communication. The movement in Flanders favoured by the weakening of the German forces on this front was int*>nded to clear the Belgian coast by a surprise attack. Success in any one of these ofliensives would very probably lead to the withdrawal of the German forces to the line of the Meuse, but the first point was to overrun the salient of St. Mihiel. The Germans here were in a pecviliar position . They hold a prominent wedge, which came down into the French lines which surrounded it on all sides but the base, and was therefore A CAPTURED GERMAN MORTAR. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 313 GERMAN "BARRACK-LAGER" NEAR ST. MIHIEL. particularly liable to capture by a detennined attack directed against its sides. Hitherto it had not been thought worth while to meddle with if. Tt was held by about six divisions, including two Austro-Hiingarian. It was im- possible to make any advance from it, because the French position hero was particularly strong and had been strengthened consistently and persistently since 1914. The main railway line from Nancy to Commercy was op6n, and it had been supplemented by many field rail- roads so that Allied troops, giins and ammuni- tion could be brought up in large numbers whenever needed. The town of St. Mihicl forms the junction of the roads which cro.ss here over the Meuse and lead to Verdun on the north-ea?t, to V'ipnculles in the salient and to Pont-a- Mousson on the Moselle towards the west. Tt is obvious that an advance up the left bank of the Moselle would cut off the Germans in France from all access to the Bavarian Palatinate, and if the Allies could push on would capture the very important mining liasin of Rriey. The American attack was undertaken by the American First Army vmder General Pershing, and it was the first one on a large scale which had been undertaken by him and his troops. It wa.s divided into two parts ; the principal one was delivered on the south side, while a less important one was sent against the eastern face of the salient. Those two attacks were connected by French troops, who advanced in between the two against the point of St. Mihiel and fonned a con- necting link which kept the two together. Among the divisions in the American First Army were the 1st, the 2nd, the 42nd, the 5th, the 89th, the 19th. The 82nd and another division were in support at Pont-&.- Mousson : the 26th Division was on the western side acting with the French Colonials. The attack was timed for 5.30 on the morning of September 12, and some hours before the preliminary bombardment had been begun in all its intensity. On the south side of the salient, the Americans attacked on a 12 mile front between Xivray and Fey-en -hay a, and by the afternoon they had advanced five miles at some points and had captiu-ed the important point of Thiaucourt and the villages of Pannes, Nonsard and Mount Sec, and their cavalry was moving on to Vigneulles. On the western salient, advancing from Les Eparges, they took Combres on the Vigneulles road. The French meanwhile advanced as far as the remaining camp. By the next day, the German salient had been flattened out and the enemy's line ran from the north-west to the south-east at the edge of the Woevre plain from the Moselle at Pagny back approximately to Bezonvaux. It was a great success. The enemy were severely defeated and lost over 1.3,000 prisoners and many guns and much warlike material, quantit'es of ammimition. 314 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. lA merican offu ial pkctograph. AMERICAN MACHINE-GUNS AND SUPPLY WAGGONS AWAITING ORDERS In a shattered village of the St. Mihiel salient. railway rolling stock and stores of all kinds, and about noon on the 13th the two American attacks had joined hands across the salient. Let us now refer briefly to the German comments on the fighting. The usuivl fatuous reasoning was employed in the German official reports and also in the comments of military writers. Thus Gadke, in the Bremer Burger Zeitung, damns with faint praise the operations initiated by Marshal Foch. He says : " One must do Foch the justice of saying that, in the four weeks from the middle of July to the middle of August, he has done his best with good generalship and strength of decision to put new ideas into ' the trench warfare which has lasted four years without bringing a decision, and to give a change of character which might be decisive to the situation in the West " ; but he goes on to say " His plans have not succeeded. He has had just the same experience as all his predecessors. The difficulties of passmg from trench to open fighting are tremendous and perhaps insuperable. . . The final failure of the Ans;lo-rrench attack on the Amiens- Montdidiep front is also characteristic of the difficulty of the military problem which Generals and their armies have to face. The successes of the first two days here, we must confess [which is really very good of him], but at the same time, they were not great enough and considerably damped the hopes of enemy Command. . . . Even the primary launching of Humbert's army on the third day, the 10th, between the Avre and th? Oise, was a sign that the attack by the wing had not met the desired success. Purely frontal pressure was now exerted, which lacked tlie advantage of surprise. By promptly with- drawing their battle-line, the Germans had already taken the force out of the blow." Now, as we know, the real sober truth was that the enemy was driven helter-skelter back. So far for Herr Gadke. General von Ardenne, who is well known to our readers, endeavoured to show in the Tageblaii of September 1 that for some time past the Allies had been in great numerical superiority. This, of course, we know was not the case, but it serves the General's \)\vc- pose to say so. He therefore adds that the only way of equalizing matters was to inflict on the Allies the greatest possible losses. " This was done by a violent offensive wherein the elements of surprise were fully exploited. The great at- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 815 tacking actions from March 26 to July 15 caused the Allies losses amounting to 1,225,000 men." This is, as we know, a ridiculous exaggeration. The military correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung of August 25 takes a somewhat less rosy view of the position. He admits that the Allies had succeeded in disposing of the threatening German wedge against Amiens, but he suggests, in a half-hearted, doubting manner, that it is doubtful whether the German High (.'ommand ever diverted the French from their line in the Avre — Somme — Ancre salient. How- ever, be this as it may, he admits that the menace has been disposed of for the time by Marshal Foch, who had in addition " succeeded in forcing the German front to withdraw on a broad stretch from halfway between Albert and Arras to near Soissons. 0A not inconsiderable part of the French soil occupied by us in March has thus been given up." However, he solaces his readers by stating that this did not mean a serious failure in German strategy, for German strategy in the West did not aim at the capture of ground ; its object was to weaken the enemy's forces as much as possible." He adds, naturally, being a German, " That there was no com- parison between the aiivance which the Allies had now made and that which the Germans had jnade earlier in the year. However, he was kind enough to say : " The Conunai»der-in-Chief of the Entente has shown at last that he knows something of strategy, and the necessity of con- centrating all available forces for a decLsivo blow is certainly nothing new to him. If his blows nevertheless seem to be less powerful in effect than the corresponding blows of the German Command, this can only be because he simply has not available the necessary numbers of attacking troops and reserves ; or because it requires greater bodies of French and English troops to win a success equal to that won by the Germans. We expect that both are true." Now all this is in flagrant contradiction of Gadke's opinion. He goes on to say that " the enemy has no longer the possibility of carrj'ing through the offensive of destruction or annihila- tion at which he aimed. At most he can gain ground, but this does not at all mean a corres- ponding loss to the German Command." The Military Correspondent of the Nord- deutscher Allgemeine Zeitung boldly states on August 23 that the tanks were a complete failure during the last few days. "Over .TOO of these mon-sters were put out of action in the fighting which took place between the Anere and the Avre by the artillery, by the armour- piercing shells of the German machine-guns, and last, but not least, by the hand-grenades used [AmcTnan ontcai photografh, GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED BY AMERICAN TROOPS Passing through a village in the St. Mihiel salient. 816 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. by our valitmt infantry." Our comment on this is that it is extremely improbable that any hand-grenade ever had the faintest effect on any tank. Certainly no great injury was done to them by this weapon ; however, the Corres- pondent states " that the tanks lay great wrecks scattered over the ground where the French and English Divisions were attacking." And he goes on to say " if defensive attacks carried out by our valiant troops could work such havoc on inanimate war material, what must the losses have been among the divisions, both black and white, which were continually thrown into the fighting?" As the "black" divisions were limited to French Colonial troops, it is difficult to understand why the ENTRANCE TO A FRENCH FIELD HOSPITAL. adjective was used in this indiscriminate fashion. " No wonder that the attacks began to die down and. that the operations which in their initial stages were on a huge scale gradually declined into mere local attacks, which naturally could not cause any important change in the strategic situation." After some disparaging comments on the fighting on the Oise and Aisne, he proceeds " this introductory fighting was followed on August 20 by the enemy's colossal attempt to break through, which we had been expecting for several days past. As the attack developed it attained a width of over 16 miles, and its objective weis evidently to break through in the direction, roughly speaking, of Laon and La Fere. I need not enlarge," -Nieup YP5 "BRUGES pDixmude SpKEyr GROUND RECOVERED between July 16 &. Sep. 18 ^^^ oMalines LaBasseei ^oArnientikres ^ OBRUSSELS ■C LlEGi )ns ?J^-^'^ AiBeinJs ; „Ch5lons\ 10 'ib"30~4o so IH./orr) THE ALLIES' ADVANCE, JULY18— SEPTEMBER 18, 1918. he says, " on the subject of the tremendous importance of this enterprise if it had succeeded. But for this very reason our Command was quite prepared for all eventualities. The battle which now broke out developed just as our Command had wished." [This was certainly a little premature, but military prophets on all sides have not be(in remarkable for the success of their prognostications in this war.] " The French leadership had met our wishes ; in other words, we really dictated the course of the battle although they were attacking and we were defending." Fven the abandonment of Noyon was, according to his account, really a German success ! He then has to admit the success of the British attack which commenced on August 21, but he is quite equal to the situation. A double battle is therefore now going on, but if General Foch is using these separate attacks as a means for united action, and if he still pursues the idea of squeezing the German salient and the forces it contains between his pincers on the north and south, he must have overlooked the fact that over 50 miles of territory lie between his outer wings of attack, and it would pro- bably bo a very difficult matter to maintain a strategic connection between the two sets of operations. Tficy should really only be regarded as operations which happen temporarily to coincide, and wliich are only THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB. 317 cnnnectetl operativoly in bo far as they both attract Gorman reserves to the same front, a fact which docs not disturb «a in the least, as wo have, in the first place, ample forces at our disposal, and in the second place, we are figiiting entirely on the interior lino. Moreover, the Knglish attack which was commenced by violent artillery preparation and which was again preceded by several hundred tanks, was completely shattered at its first assault. When the Bnglish report states that they penetrated the Gorman linos to a depth of three miles and took Courcolles and Achiet-lc-Petit after an obstinate struggle, thoy are simply spreading lies for a special purpose. General Byng, the Commander of the Thin! English .'Vrmy, who led the attack here, knows that for some time past our lines hod been evacu- ated, and when his troops entered Courcellaj and Achiot- le.Potit, not a single shot was fired. . . . When the Bnglish had sufficiently recovered from their astonish- ment, thoy attacked the new Gonnan positions, wliicli are very strong, and suffered a real defeat olong the whole front, which was all the more serious, as the Qennan troops in their oount<ir-attaoks drove them back in many places beyond the territory which had been lately evacuated. \ , . The enemy mode tre- mendous efforts to force a passage across the Ancre in the neighbourhood of Hamol. In this, as in all liis other attempts, he was completely frustrated. The enormous casualties and innumerable tanks he lost once more proved the acourewsy of the Gorman artillery and the power and confidence in victory of the Gorman troops. All comment on this farrago of nonsense in the face of indubitable facts is unnecessary. Intended for home consumption, it accounts for the Prussian Guards on their return to Berlin at the termination of the war being received as victorioas heroes, and the inability of the average Gennan to believe that his armies had been defeated. The superiority of the Allies in the air was becoming greater every day, and during the operations which have been described the ser\-ices rendered by British and French aviators formed an increasing factor in the success obtained. The last days of August were not favourable to aeroplane work. On August 28, for instance, bad flying weather very much hampered the work in the air. Photographing was almost impossible and observation difficult. How- ever, one enemy jnachine was destroyed in air fighting and one by our anti-airoraft guns, against which we lost two machines. An interesting and novel feature was reported by Sir Douglas Haig — viz.. the delivery of smnll- arm ammunition by parachute to British troops fighting in the front line. On August 29 11 German aeroplanes were destroyed and 10 driven down out of control. AUSTIN ARMOURED CAR, OR MOTOR MACHINE-GUN BATTERY. 818 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. A balloon was also destroyed, and during the day bombing machines dropped 15i tons of bombs on Bruges docks and other targets. On August SO, as has been before mentioned, the Independent Air Force bombarded Conflans and Thion\-illo with good success, in addition to which, in the fighting on the front, 13 Grerman Tnachines were crashed and five othei-s driven down out of control. On August 31 six were destroyed and three driven down. Our losses on these two days amounted together to 11. American aero- planes bombarded the railway yards at Barri- court and Conflans. On September 1 the assistance rendered by oar airmen to tho fighting troofis was very great. Acting at low elevations, they bombed and machine-gunned the enemy's troops. This was not without opposition from the German airmen, but we succeeded in destroying eight *' SUPPLYING THE FRONT LINE WITH AMMUNITION FROM AN AEROPLANE. THE TIMES HISTOHY OF THE WAB. 819 [Official photograph. TANKS AWAITING ORDERS. of their machines, besides driving down four others and six balloons were seD on fire. Fight- ing of this character, especially close to the ground, cannot, of course, be carried on without considerable casualties, and altogether we lost eight of our aeroplanes. After the heavy rain on the night of August 31 the weather improved considerably and our atrial service was enabled to carry on its work in a clear atmosphere, although with the disad- vantage of high wind, which fortunately was in a favourable direction. The enemy machines, of course, endeavoured to stop our work, but in 8 ;)itc of this over 1,000 photographs were taken and many important reconnaissances were effected. Moreover, as usual, contact was inaintained with our advancing troops and our observation balloons were pushed forward right up to the front, and they with the artillery observation aviators kept our batteries con- stantly informed as to the targets it was desirable to fire on. The whole area in which the Germans .were retreating was brought imder machine-gun and bomb-fire. The Ger- man infantry was severely dealt with as also was the transport. Many heavy casualties were caused and much confusion arose. Bridges and laihvay connexions likewise were heavily bombed far back in the enemy's area. In the actual fighting in the air 12 ma- chines and six hostile balloons were effectu- ally dealt with, against which we oidy lost eight. The French also liad some notable successes. Four German aeroplanes were shot tlown and one captive balloon was destroyed and numerous points were severely bombed in the region of La Fere, and convoys on the roads on this point and the ridge of St. Quentin were subjected to machine-gun fire. During the night nearly 10 tons of bombs were dropped on various railway stations and bivouacks at Maries, Laon, Ham, Villers-Franqueux and on the railway stations of Maison Bleue and Cignicourt. Tn the latter case very heavy damage was done. On the night of September 1-2 the zone immediately behind the battle-line and far back was heavily bombed, besides which a German aerodrome behind St. Quentin was attacked and direct hits observed. We only lost one boinbing machine. During the 24 hours from the previous evening over 34 tons of bombs were dropped. On the morning of Septeinber 2 the Indepen- dent Air Force attacked the hostile aerodrome at Biihl, so>ith-west of Baden, with very good results, many direct hits were obtained on the. hangars and a hostile machine on the ground was destroyed ; and this was done without any loss to us. In the afternoon the bombardment was repeated, as it was again during the night of September 2-3. Altogether 17 tons of bombs were dropped, and the following targets in addition to Buhl were also attacked, viz., the Burbach works and the railways at Saar- brucken and Ehrang [north of Treves!. Tho effect of these three successive bombard- ments on Biihl was very gieat. Three han- gai-s were totally demolished and direct hits were obtained on many others. Over 15 tons of bombs were dropped on this aero- drome in 24 hours, the majority of which were let loose from elevations varying from 300 to 820 THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAB. 900 foet. The railways at Ehrang were attacked from a height of only 90 feet and every bomb obtained a direct hit. At Burbach good bursts were observed and a fire started, and this was all done without loss to us. During the month of August the British aviators brought down 750 German machines, with a loss of 218. The French accounted for 224 German machines, and the Americans six. The following incidents, drawn from the records of the Royal Air Force, are good examples of the work of our airmen in France: — A two-seater machine was engaged in .special work when it was attacked by seven Gennan machines i which surrounded it, firing at the British machine from all sides. The Germans used explosive bullets. Fighting gallantly against these crushing odds, the British pilot battled his way through the enemy for- mation. In the course of the fight, however, one of his log-i was hit five times, so that the limb was all but severed, and foil among the controls. By a supreme effort the pilot clung grimly to conscio\isness. and some- how managed to disentangle his leg from the controls. Not only so, but he succeeded in landing the machine safely behind the British lines. -Another two-seater machine, while escorting a bomb- ing formation, sighted 20 German fighting planes. The pilot instantly dived to the attack and selected his first victim. He closed, and, putting in a burst of machine-gun fire at a distance of only a few feet, saw the German pilot go down in flames. Alarmed by the suddenness of his attack, the other Germans had scattered somewhat, and the Englishman was able to dive on another. Just a< he came within range. however, his gun jammed, and at the same moment several Germans attacked his machine from the rear. His observer now came into the running, and, opening fire, sent one of the following enemy machines spinning earthwards. Having cleared the jam the pilot, manoeuv- ring at great speed, succeeded in getting a third Hun across his front, where he opened fire at short range and Bent his opponent whirling down, a burning mass. The same day a highly successful raid was carried out on a German aerodrome by combined British and American squadrons. Successive formations, flying very low, released their bombs on hangars, machines on the ground, and hutments. By this bombardment the German petrol and oil store was set on fire, which, in turn, spread to the ammunition dump ; six machines on the ground were destroyed by fire, and two more by direct hits ; two large Gotha and several smaller hangars were envelopod in flames, as well as some living huts of the peraonnel of the German squadrons. The Germans rushed out and desperately endeavoured to put out the flam;s, whereupon the raiding planes im- mediately swooped down again to the attack, and plied the Germans with macliine-gun fire scattering panic- stricken mechanics in all directions, and laying low many of them. Meanwhile, a supporting squadron of British machines unloaded their bombs on to a ch&toau used as officers' quarters, and completely destroyed it. In spite of the exceedingly heavy ground fire to which the attackers were subjected, every machine engaged returned safely. Shortly afterwards a largo scale raid was carried out by British and Australian squadrons, upon another German aerodrome, where — again from a very low height to ensure greater accuracy — a shower of bombs was released, as a result of which three large hangars containing machines were completely burnt out and others badly damaged. The German pilots' mess was blown up, and several fires were started among the mechanics' huts. The airmen next turned their attention to a neighbouring station where Gorman troops were entraining. Coming down in some cases to a bare iiO ft. from the ground, the raiders opened fire with their machine-guns, and did tremendous execution among the Gennan soldiers crowded on the platforms, German Staff officers superintondine the entrainment rushed to their waiting cars and attempted to escape, only to be pursued remorselessly The drivers were apparently hit, for one oar upset in a ditch, while the other ran up a steep bank and overturned. In this case again every machine engaged in the raid returned safely. On September 3, our aviators, working all day in front of the advancing line of battle, did gallant service, notwithstanding that they were attacked by large formations of hostile machines. The positions of the retiring Germans were reported to our artillery, contact was kept up with the infantry and tanks and the concentrations of hostile troops and trans- port on the roads leading back from the German lines were treated to bombs and machine-gun fire ; moreover, hostile anti-tank guns were silenced. Many aerial encounters took place and we accounted for 26 German machines, but the vigour of our attack neces- sarily involved considerable losses and we had 20 machines missing. Again, the supply of rifle ammunition to our infantry formed a feature of the aviators' work and our obser- vation balloons followed closely behind the line of our advancing machines. Some idea of the energy of our aviators' work may be gained froin the fact that 24 tons of bombs were dropped during the day and the following night. American airmen successfully bombed the railway yards at Longuyon, Dommary, Baron- court and Conflans. On the night of September 3-4 the Inde- pendent Air Force again heavily bombed the aerodrome at Morhanges with good effect and also another aerodrome at Boulay and the blast furnaces at Esch, east of Longwy. In each case direct liits were obtained and considerable damage done and all our machines returned in safety. On the morning of September 4 Morhanges was again attacked, for the third time within 24 hours. Excellent practice was made by our bombers and several sheds received direct hits. One squadron also attacked Biihl aerodrome with good results, and all our machines returned in safety. During the daylight the Air Service, work- ing more especially in connection with the droops, also did good work. In addition to their usual duties of reconnaissance and THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 321 THE RETURN OF photography, 23 tons of bombs were dropped during the day on a number of favourable targets. The weather prevented any con- tinuation of the attack after dark. On this day the Germans displayed a good deal more activity than they had lately done in the air, and the consequence was that they suffered great losses. Twenty-five German aviators were crashed down and 14 more driven down out of control ; in addition nine observation balloons were sent down in flames. On our A NIGHT BOMBER. side we lost 16 machines, against which may be set off the return of one which was reported missing on September 2. In the course of the weeks which have elapsed since the commencement of our offensive on August 8, 465 enemy machines were brought down by our airmen, their destruction bsing in every case clearly established. In addition, the total of enemy machines proved to have been driven down out of control (many of which must have actually crashed) is exactly 200. The above figures are oxclu.sive of the considerable number of enemy machines brought down by gun fire from the ground Sixty-one Gennan balloons were set on fire ; 822 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.. [Canadian War Re.onis. A SMALL PORTION OF THE ARRAY OF GUNS CAPTURED BY THE CANADIANS- 911 J tons of bombs were dropped by us. Practically the whole of the air fighting ha-^ taken place on the enemy's side of the line, which is significant of the superiority of our service. The Germans were restricted to a cautious defensive. The number of our machines which have failed to return during this period is 262. September 5 was fine, though somewhat cloudy, and our aviators worked throughout the day both on observation and Actively against the enemy's troops. There was con- siderable activity on the German side with their aircraft, e.specially in the neighbourhood of Cambrai. They were evidently desirous of ascertaining as far as possible what our line of advance was to be. A good deal of fighting took place, and .37 hostile machines were accounted for, as well as three observation balloons. Against this we had to set off l.S of our aeroplanes which failed to return. The night was too bad to allow of bombing. On September 6 our men accounted for 23 German machines and one observation balloon, with a loss to oiu^elves of five aeroplanes. During the day and the following night 22 tons of bombs were dropped by our airmen round various points near the front of the German line. On September 7 clouds and rain-storms limited the work, but our aviators destroyed eight German machines and one balloon. Three of ours were missing. The early part of September the weather was bad, but nevertheless, as we have seen, our airmen were able to put in a great deal of good work. The Independent Air Force on the night of September 6-7 bombed two enemy aerodromes, and on the morning of September 7 they attacked the railways at Ehrang and the chemical works at Mannheiin. The latter raid was not carried out without considerable oppo- sition. Largely superior numbers of enemy aeroplanes fought ours both before and after they reached their objective. One of the squad- rons had a continuous fight for a distance of 70 miles before reaching it, and the fight was- continued for the same distance on the road back. Over two tons of bombs were dropped in Mannheim. Three enemy aeroplanes were accounted for, and we lost fotir of ours. On September 8 the weather was very bad and the work much restricted. It may be well to give a rather more detailed account of the work which our men were doing during the early part of September. During their retirement the Germans have made desperate efforts to ren^ove as much ammunition as possible. A British pilot spotted a train of wagons ■engaged on this work, and descended to 50 ft. so as to make quit« sure of his aim. Getting well into position, he opened tire on the rear wagon, knocking- out two men on the box. Deprived of their drivers and terrified by the winged assailant, the horses bolted,, and, coming into collision with a tree, upset the wagon. Au extremely h^avy fire was by this time being directed upon the airman, and it h.id already wounded him in the knee and severed the pressure feed pipe of his Tnachine. He would not leave his job half done, how- ever, and, again manoeuvring into position, put in another burst, which resulted in the overturning of two more and the stampeding of the remaining wagons. On the same day a British machine working in con- junction with the infantry was attacked by four German scouts. The British contact machine is not primarily de--igned for fighting purposes, but the pilot gave such a good account of himself that one of the attackers was speedily sent down otit of control. During the fight the petrol tank of the British machine was pierced, bringing instant menace of its destruction by fin*. Thereupon the English observer promptly climbed out on the lower plane and successfully plugged the hole with his hand- kerchief remaining on the plane until his pilot succeeded. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 323 in throwing:; off his pursuers and landing IiIh niachino safely behind tho Uriti.sh lines. A British two-seater machino hovering at night ov«r an enemy c()ncent ration centre observed, oaKily di>:tinj;uishable in the bright starlight, a rohinin ot' transport consisting of about lIO wagons. Descending rapidly to 300 ft., he landed two bombs, a hnndrrd- wcight apiece, plumb in the centre of the oUmni. The de.>,trin:tion was enormous, and th'' remnant of th.- column scattered wildly in ail directions. The liriti«h pilot roso again and waited, giving time for the Uerman transport to reassemble. Diving once more, he found it, together with two other large lorries, in a sunken road, where the Huns apparently hoped to escape further attack from tlio death-dealing raider. The British pilot released his remaining bombs from an altitude at which ho could not miss liis target, and tlien, diving lower still, opened fire with his machine-gun^, putting about 250 rounds into the confused mass of wreckage. Gorman observation balloons have had a bad tim^ recently. One British pilot, scouting behind the enemy's lines, pounced on two of these balloons in swift sviccession, and succeeded in setting fire to and destroying both. His petrol was beginning to run low at the time, so he returned to his aerodrome to refill. He set out immediately upon a second quest, sighted two more balloon-, and, tuking advantage of friendly clouds, carefully stalked them. When within a short distance of his prey, cloud cover faiU-d him, and ho was perceived. The Hmis rushe<l to the winches and endeavoured to haul down both balloons. Putting down the nose of his niachine, the British pilot sped earthwards after the swaying mass of fabric, and almost before the German mechanics had t hei r winches working the hunter had secured his first quarry, which fell a blazing mass upon the Huns beneath. The other balloon was rather farther away, and the Germans hauled desperat '!y and succeeded in getting it down almost to the ground before the British pilot arrived above. In spite of furious fire from below, ho dived low enough to pun<p in a bur^t of incondiary bullets, and ha<l the satisfaction of increasing his bag for the day to four enemy balloons totally destroyed. During the next few days the weather was so bad that the work iu the air wem extremely small. On September 12 there were some bright intervals, and during these the usual routine work was done, but at night no flying was possible. On th(> night of September 12- 1. 'J the Inde- peiuleat Aii Force aettnl in eonjiiuction witl; the attack of the American Fii-st Army and bomb(ul the railways at Metz-Sablons and Coiircelles. Metz station, searchlight and transport were all attacked with machine-gun fire. On the night of September 13, in favourable weather, opera- tions were condticted against Metz-Sablons and enemy transport on the battle-front. The weather on September 13 was very irre- gular, clotids and rain alternating with brighter intervals. During these a good deal of work was done% but contact patrol work had to be* carried on at a very low altitiule. On September 14 the enemy, apparently aroused by the predominance which the Allied Air Force had obtained, made more effort than usual to overcome it. There was considerable air fighting. Foiu' (Jerman machines were LAYING A TELEGR4PH WIRE. [Australian official pholo^f^ph. 824 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB. driven down and four of their observation balloons destroyed. During the operations of the 24 hours from the evening of Septem- ber 13 to the evening of September 14, nearly eight tons of bombs were dropped. On September 15 the weather was much better, and the air service was therefore ex- tremely active. The French paid particular attention to the German observation balloons and drove down 16 of them. In the efforts which the German aviators made to defend these, they lost 12 of their number, and during the night of September 15-16 the stations and cantonments behind the enemy's front were freely bombed and suffered important damage. On the British front there was also a marked increase of aerial activity. (Jerman forma- tions of considerable force were met with on their side of the line and active fighting took place ; 36 of the enemy's machines were brought down and a large night-bombing machine was disposed of after dark. On our side we lost 16 machines, including two of the night-flying aeroplanes. Four of the enemy's aerodromes were also heavily bombed, one by day and three bjr night, and altogether 30 tons of bombs were let fall by us. Much useful reconnaissance and observation was done both by our balloons and aeroplanes, and those engaged in observation for artillery fire carried out valuable work.' The Independent Air Force again did useful service on the night of September 15-16. Four hostile aerodromes were severely dealt with and a transport convoy was also hit. Distant raids dealt with the Mainz railway junctions and the docks and sidings at Karlsruhe. Alto- gether 350 bombs, totalling 16 J tons in weight, were dropped, without any casualties to our machines. In the air, as on the ground, the Allies were surely gaining the upper hand over their opponents. CHAPTER CCLXXXIV. VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE WAR. (VIII) Classifying Awards — Three Commanding Officers — EfJGiNEERs' Fine Deeds — Crosses fob Courageous " Runners " — Farmhouse Fights — Territorials' Exploits — Back to Le Cateau — Two Leinster Regiment Recipients — Saving the Wounded — ^The Lancashire Fusiliers Once More — Territorials Again — A Company-Sergeant-Major — Further British Awards — Oversea Soldiers and the Cross^The Australian Imperial Force — Officers' Fine Acts — Three Posthumous Honours — N.C.O.'s and Privates — Attacks on Machine-Gun Posts — A Bomber in a German Trench — Men from Ontario— An Army Surgeon's Cross — A Wounded Fighter — Lieut. Lyall's Great Deeds — More Canadian Heroes — Further Crosses for Zeebrugge — The Decoration as a Fighting Barometer— A Case of Non- Award — An Analysis — The Total Awards. DATES of formal announcements of \'ictoria Crosses became unimportant wlien it was again possible to publish names of places where Crosses had been won and the times of the achievements. ' In the awards which have still to be dealt with it \vill be preferable to analyse and classify the records, to give a better understanding of tlie special nature of the acts performed. With the removal of iTstrictions the stories became complete and clear ; but in some cases names of heroic men who liad been associated with deeds for which the Cross was given were not mentioned, and it had to be a.-isumetl tliat these helpei-s could not be definitely identified. This omis.sion was noticeable in one or two of the splendid bridge exploits of which accoimts were published In Chapter CCLXXII. some of the Crosses given for tlie closing days of the war were dealt with, and the story is continued hert>, dates of gazetting, for the reason just explained, being omitted. The cases of three commanding officers illus trated the inspiring leadei-ship and re.solute Vol. XIX —Part 244 courage which characterizefl the final stages of the great advance These officers v.ere : — Lieut.-Col. W. H. Clark-Kennedy. C.M.G., D.S.O., 24th Bn. Quebec Regt. Lieut.-Col. Harry Gi-eenwood, D.S.O., M.C., 9th Bn. K.O. Yorks L.I. Lieut.-Col. D. G. Johnson, D.S.O., MC. S.W. Bord., attd 2nd Bn. R. Suss. R. The Canadian officer on August 27 led his battalion with great bravery and skill from Crow and Aigrette trenches in front of Wancoxu-t to the attack on the Fresnes-Rouvroy line. The brigade, of which the 24th Battalion was a central unit, came under very heavy shell and machine- gun fire from the very outset, and there wei-e many ca.sualties, especially amongst the leaders. Units became partially disorganized and the advance was checked. The situation was one of jnany which arose and demanded instant and capable handling. Lieut.-Col. Clark-Kennedy was equal to the great emergency, and by sheer valour and leadership he inspii-ed his men and led them forward ; several times leading parties straight 325 826 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. at machine-gtm nests which were holding up the advance, and overcoming these obstacles- He not only did these things with his own battalion, but he also controlled the dii-ection of neigh- bouring vuiits and collected men who had lost their leaders. The officer's disregard of his o\TO life and his energy and resource had made it jxjssible for his battalion by the afternoon to cross the Senate River bed and occupy Occident 'I'l-ench in front of the heavy wire of the Fresnes- l^)Uvroy line. It had been a strenuous and hazardous day for Lieut.-Col Clark-Konnedy, but tliat he had plenty of endurance and spirit left was shown by the fact that vmder oontmuous fire " he went up and dowii his line until far mto the night," improving the position, gix'ing "won- derful encouj-ng(>m!'nt " to his mon, and sending LIEUT.-COLONEL W. H. CLARK- KENNEDY, C.M.G., Quebec Regiment. back very clear reports. On the next hard day he was not so fortunate. Soon aft«r the resumed operations he was severely wounded, but refused aid, and dragged himself to a shell-hole "from which he could oljserve.' He was now comiDelled to realize that his pxliaustcd troops could not advance any farther, so he established a strong line of defence and prevented the loss ot most important ground. He suffered intense pain and loss ot blood, but for more than five hours he refused to be evacuated ; and when he did consent to go he had established the line in a position from which it was possible for the relieving troops to continus the advance. Lieutenant-Colonel Gi-eenwood during two full days of hardest work and danger showed that he was made of the stuff which was expected of l.tifayctU. MAJOR (Acting Lieut. -Colonel) D. G. JOHNSON, D.S.O., South Wales Borderers, attached Royal Sussex Regiment. a senior officer of the fine old 51st Foot. On October 23 the advance of his battalion was checked and a German machine-gun post was causing many casualties. Lieutenant-Colonel Greenwood unliesitatingly and single-handed rushed the post and killed the crew and so like magic cleared awaj' the menace to his troops. After that brilliant achievement he again rushed a machine-gim post, this time at the entiance to the \nllage of Ovillers, and. with the help of two battalion rimners, killed the occupants. When his command reached the objective west of Duke's Wood it was almost surrounded by Gennan macliine-gun posts, and his isolated force was at once attacked by the enemy. But no hostile effort was sucees-sful ; the assault was repulsed and the courageous leader and his men swept victoriously foi-ward and captured the last objective, with 150 prisoners, eight machine- guns and one field gun— a splendid and important haul. That was some of the work done on October 23 by Lieutenant-Colonel Gi-eenwood and his men, and the doings of the 24th wei« in THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 327 many ways a repetition ot the acts. During the attack on the Green Line, south of Poix clu Nor.l, the colonel again showed the utmost bi'avery ir. rushing a machine-gun post an& once more pro\eil, in the face of heavy fire, his good and resolute leadership and liis sltill in handling men in ilangerous situations. He put a high finish to his two days' work when, on the afternoon of the 24*;h, during the further advance on Grand (Jay Farm Road, he handled )iih battalion with a skill and boldness which producetl the nio«t impoi-tant results, not only in "ccuring the flank of his brigade but also in sateguarding the flank ot the division. On November 4 Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson was engaged in the operation of forcine the ;-"««?-.■; ■j!K:et^?r''' LIEUT.-COLONEL HARRY GREENWOOD, D.S.O., Kind's 0„„ Yorkshire Light Infantry, Leaving the Palace after receiving his Victoria Cross. 244—2 328 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. Sanibre Canal, his battalion forming part of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, which was ordered to cross by the lock south of Catillon. This proved to be one of the operations wliich in the very last days of the war gave such luicoininon chances for the lilngineers and those who worked with them to win distinction. The position was strong, and " before the bridge could be thrown " a steep bank leading up to the lock and a waterway alx)ut 100 yards short of the canal had to be crossed. Tho Royal Engineers' as.saulting platoons and bridging parties on reaching the waterway were thi-own into confusion by a heavy barrage and machine-gun fire, and severe casualties resulted. It was at this very critical moment that Lieut. - Colonel Johnson arrived and grasped the situa- tion, its perils and its possibilities. He instantly collected men to man the bridges and help the Engineers, and then he personally led an assault on the Germans. It was a brave attempt, but in spite of all his efforts heavy enemy fire again broke up the assaulting and bridging parties. Unhesitatingly Johnson once more reorganized the platoons and bridging parties and led them at the lock. This time he triumphantly crossed — " after wliich all wont well." During the whole of this period of strain and danger Lieutenant- Colonel Johnson was luider a very heavy fire, but happily he was imtouched, though it " nearly decimated the assaulting columns." Some of the most courageous acta of the war had been performed by Royal Engineers, and saveral of these were in connexion with tho peculiarly important and fascinating military question of bridges. From tho earliest days of the war bridge makers and bridge wreckers had enjoyed amazing opportunities for the display of constructive and destructive genius, and repeatedly there were chances for brave, re.sourceful men to throw across rivers and canals light emergency structures which proved of vital service. Amongst the last of the sappers to receive the Cross were Major Arnold Horace Santo Waters, D.S.O., M.C., and Sapper Adam Archibald, of the 218th Field Company, R.E., the day of their distinction being No- vember 4. Waters, alreaily holding the Dis- tinguished Service Order and the Military Cross, was with his field company bridging the Oise- Sambre Canal, near Ors. From the outset the task had to be attempted under intense close- range ar;illery and machine-gun fire. The bridge was damaged and the building party suffered severely. The major heard that all his oflScers had been killed or wounded, and instantly went forward and personally super- vised the completion of the bridge, woiking on cork floats under the point-blank fire. " It seemed impossible that he should escape being killed," but the officer did escape, the operation succeeding entirely through his valour and example. Archibald also was working on the cork floats, and showed himself a true conipanion for such a leader in such a time of stress and peril. He knew that the bridge was essential to the operations, and LIEUT. (Acting Lt.-Col.) J. N. MARSHALL, Late Irish Guards, attached Lancashire Fusiliers. inflexibly held to his duty until the bridge was finished. The sapper survived the actual missiles, but died from gas poisoning when his gallant work was done. Bracketed with Waters was Lieutenant - Colonel John Neville Marshall, M.C., late Irish Guards (S.R.), attached 10th Battalion Lanca- shire Fusiliers, who also showed extraordinary courage and fine leadership in the attack on the Sambre-Oise Canal, near Catillon, on Novein- THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 3;y SAPPER ADAM ARCHIBALD, R.E bor 4. When a partly constructed bridge came under concentrated fire and was broken before the advanced troops of the battalion could cross, Marshall at once went forward and organized parties to repair the bridge. The first party- was soon either killed or wounded, but so inspiring was the officer's example and so perfect was the confidence of the men in him, that when volunteers were called for they were instantly forthcoming. The passage of the canal was of vital importance, and Lieut. -Col. Marshall encouraged and helped his men to the very utmost. Completely disregarding his own safety he stood on the bank, under intense fire, and when the bridge was repaired he tried to rush across, at the h(-ad of his bat talion. In making that magnificent effort to maintain his leader- ship and example, he was killed. There was nothing in the awards to connect the sappers' cases with that- of Second-Lieu- tenant James ICirk, attached 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment ; but presumably the heroes were associated in the same splendid enterprise. On November 4 the subaltern was attempting to bridge the Oiso Canal, north of Ors, and to cover the bridging he took a Lewis gun. Under intense machine-gun fire Kirk performed a feat the like of which had not been indicated in any previous record of the Crosses of the war — he paddled across the canal on a raft and at a range of only 30 feet expended all his ammunition. More ammuni- tion ^vas paddled across to him, and he con- tinuously maintained covering fire for the bridging party from a most exposed position, never relaxing his heroic efforts until he was killed at his gun. But Kirk's resolution and self-sacrifice had boon crowtied with a great success, for he had prevented many casualties and liad enabled two platoons to cross the bridge before it was destroyed. On November 6 Major Brett MacKay Clout- man, M.C., .5flth Field Company, R.E., T.K., after reconnoitring the river crossings at Pont- sur-Sainbro, found that the Quatres Bridge was almost intact but prepared for demolition. Leaving his pai'ty under cover he went forward alone, swam across the river, and having cut the " leads " from the charges he returned the same way, although the bridge and all the approaches to it were 'swept by German shells and machine-guns at close range. Later in the day the bridge was blown up by other means. LIEUT. (Acting Major) B. M. CLOUTMAN R.E. 380 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. but tlie abutments remained intact. Major Cloutman's cool and highly successful adventure was rewarded with the Cross. A desperate night enterprise at the Canal de I'Escaut, north-ea=<t of Cambrai, was carried out with remarkable success by Captain Coulson Norman Mitchell, M.C., 4th Battalion Canadian Engineers. On the night of October 8-9 he led a small party ahead of the first wave of infantry so that he might examine the various CORPORAL JAMES McPHlE, K.E. bridges on the line of approach and, if possible, prevent their demolition. When Captain Mit- chell reached the canal he found that the bridge was already blown up. Under a heavy barrage he crossed to the next bridge, where he cut a number of " lead " wires. It was totally dark and he was not aware of either the position or the strength of the Germans at the bridgehead, but fearlessly taking all risks he dashed across the main bridge over the canal. This bridge was found to be heavily charged for demolition, and whilst the captain, helped by his non- commissioned officer (whose name was not mentioned) was cutting the wires, the enemy tried to rush the bridge in order to blow the charges. Thereupon Captain Mitchell instantly " dashed to the a-ssistance of his sentry, who nad been wounded, killed three of the enemy, captured 12, and maintained the bridgehead until reinforced." Having done this rousing work tlie Canadian Engineer, e^till under heavy fire, continued his task of cutting wires and removing charges, which " he well knew might at any moment have been fired by the enemy. ' The oflficial recor.l stated that it was entirely due to Mitchell's valour and decisive action that this important bridge across the canal was saved from destruction. A truly splendid tale of high courage and extreme devotion was put on record in the case of Corporal James McPhie, 41Gth (Edinburgh) Field Company, B.E., T.F. On October 14 McPhie was with a party of sappers maintaining a cork float bridge across the Canal de la Sensee, near Aubencheul-au-Bac. The farther end of the bridge was not only under close machine- gun fire, but was also within reach of hand grenades. Just before dawn, when infantry were crossing the bridge, closing up resulted, and the bridge began to sink and break. Ac companied by a sapper McPhie jumped into the water and tried, but unsuccessfully, to hold the cork and timbers together. The cor- poral then swam back, and having reported the broken bridge started at once to collect material for repairs. Daylight came and with it one of the most dramatic episodes of the Crosses of the war. The corporal was perfectly well aware that the bridge was under close fire, and that the far bank was entirely in the Ger- mans' hands ; yet undaunted by any of the obvious and unseen perils he exclaimed, " It's death or glory work which must be done for the sake of our patrol on the other side ! " With this the valiant sapper, axe in hand, led the way on to the bridge. He was at once severely wounded, and, falling partly into the water, he died after receiving several further wounds. But Corporal McPhie had not been sacrificed in vain, for his magnificent conduct enabled touch to be maintained with the patrol on the enemy bank at a most critical period. Four runners io succession baving been killed in trying to deliver a message to a supporting company during the attack on Marou on October 20, Private Alfred Wilkinson, l/5th Battalion Manchester Regiment 'T.F.), vohm teered for the desperate duty. The journey which he undertook involved exposure to extremely heavy machine-gun and shell fire for (iOO yards, yet he managed to escape all perils and to deliver the message, continuing thi'oughout the rest of the day to do splendid THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 831 PRIVATE ALFRED WILKINSON. Manchester Re)>![nenr. during the war won renown in every conccivnble emergency and situation, and iudividuala and sections who were armed with the weapon which hud proved so deadly and efficacious found in the war's lost phase full opportunity of using their powers, especially in moppmc; up and clearing out suspicious places. A case in point was the action of Sergeant Thomas Cal<lwfll, 12th Battalion Royal Scottish Fusi- liers, who, on October 31, in attack near Audenarde, wa." commanding a Lewis gua section to which had been given the dangerous A RUNNER SETTING OUT ON HIS PERILOUS ERRAND. work. Almost precisely similar was the achieve- ment of Private James Towers, 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles (Preston), on October 6 at Mericourt. No fewer than five runners had failed to deliver an important message when Towers, well aware of their fate, volunteered for the duty. Some charm seemed to protect such men as these, who so clearly risked their all on one tremendous stake, for the Cameronian, like the Territorial, in spite of heavy fire opened on him the instant he moved, went straight through from cover to cover and at last triumphantly delivered the message. The Lewis gunners had for a long period PRIVATE JAMES TOWERS, Scottish Rifles. Awarded the Cross for his gallant work as a runner. task of clearing a farmhouse While he was iloing his work in a determined and gallant 882 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. fashion his section came wnder intense close- range fire from another farm ; but the \uidaunt3d Fusilier rushed towards the farm and captured the position, %vith 18 prisoners, the most ainazing part of the achievement being that, as in so many other similar cases, the desperate adventure was carried out single- Iianded SERGT. THOMAS CALDWELL, Royal Scottish Fusiliers. Another splendid farmhouse exploit was that for which the Cross was given to Lance-Cor- poral William Amey, l/8th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment (T.F.), whose fine courage and resource were fully proved on November 4 during the attack on Landrecies. Owing to a fog the leading troops missed many German machine-gun nests. Amey, on his own initiative, led his section against a hostile nest, under heavy fire, and after driving the garrison into a neighbouring farm he captured about 50 prisoners and several machine-guns. Subsequently he set to work single-handed, and scorning heavy fire he attacked a machine-gun post in a farmhouse, killed two of the garrison, and drove the rest of the Germans into a' cellar and kept them there till help arrived. Still pursuing his independent policy, the lance-corporal, unaided, riLshed a strongly held post and captured 20 prisoners, and throughout the dav he main- tained the " highest degree of valour and determination." Another corporal of the Territorials — Lance- Sergeant William Waring, M.M., 25th Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers (T.F.) — showed re- markable enterprise and resource on September 18 at Ronssoy. He began by loading an attack against German machine-guns which were holding up the advance of neighbouring troops. There was devastating fii-o on fiank and front, but single-handed Waring, who had already won the Military Me.lal, rushed a strong point with so much energj' and deter- mination that he bayoneted no fewer tlian four of the garrison, and so filled the rest of the Germans with fear that he captured 20 of them with their guns. Waring's audacity had brought upon himself heavy shell and machine-gun fire ; but, reorganizing his men, ho led and inspired them for other 400 yards, when he fell, mortally woiuided. Single-handed also was the outstanding performance of Private Norinan Harvey, 1st Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, on October 25, near Ingoyghon. His battalion being held up and suffering heavily from German machine-guns, Harvey on his own LANCE-CORPORAL WILLIAM AMEY, Royal Warwickshire Ref^iment. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 883 initiative rusliod forward and engaged the enemy alono, " disposing " of twenty Gerinan.s and capturing two guns. Later, his company being checlced by another enemy strong point, Harvey again rushed forward single- handed and put the Germans to flight ; crown- ing his achievements, after dark, by. volun- tarily carrying out, single-handed, an important reconnaissance and gaining valuable informa- tion. In the memorable region of Le Cateau, on the morning of October 18, Sergeant Horace Augustus Curtis, of the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, came unexpectedly, with his platoon, vmder intense machine-gun fire, and saw at once that the assault would fail LANCH-SERGT. WILLIAM WARING, Royal Welsh Fusiliers. unless the hostile guns were silenced. Accord- ingly the sergeant, without the slightest hesitation, rushed forward through our own barrage and the German fire and killed or wounded the teams of two of the guns, where- upon the remaining four guns surrendered. Having done this the sergeant turned his atten- tion to a train-load of reinforcements and managed to capture more than 100 of the enemy before his comrades joined him. There was a touch of something like Immour in the busi- noss-like wayin which, single-handed, aFusilier, even of an Irish regiment, having put some dfsadly weapons out of action, " turned liis attention " to a " train-load of reinforcements." There was no evidence that Curtis was an Irisliman — as a matter of fact ho came from the little English fishing village of Newlyn, hard by the Land's End ; but at any rate he was imdoubtedly filled with the combatant spirit of the famous old Indian fighters who, under PRIVATE NOKMAN HARVEY, Royal InniskilHng Fusiliers. tlie Territorial system, became the Dublin Fusiliers. Two members of the 2nd Battalion Leinster Regiment — Sergeant John O'Neill, M.M , and Private Martin Moffat — won the Cross on October 14, the sergeant near Moorsoele and the private near Ledeghem. The advance of SERGT. H. A. CURTIS, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, O'Neill's company was checked, not only by two machine-guns, but also by a Gennan field battery which was firing over open sights, so that the position was as dangerous as could be desired But Sergeant O'Neill had no hesitation in hurling himself into the very jaws 334 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. tb^^im f^ 7 i i» ; ft'»f »^ . i BN ftffl TUKNiNG ONh OH THE tiS of death, and at the head of only 11 intrepid men he charged the battery, so overwhelm- ingly that no fewer than four field guns were captured, and two machine-guns and 16 prisoners also were taken. The sergeant had a genius for this special form of work, .for on the morning of the 16th, with only one man, he rushed a German, machine-gun position, routed about 100 of the enemy and caused many casualties. It was told of him that throughout these operations he displayed the most remarkable courage and powers of EMY'S GUNS ON HIMSELF. leadership. Private Martin Moffat's exploit was on the same bold scale, though it differed somewhat in detail, for into his particular fighting there came the element of bombs. On the 14th he was advancing with a hardy little band of five comrades across the open when the party suddenly came under heavy rifle fire at close range from a strongly held house. Here was one of those cases of touch- and-go with death which did not allow of a moment's hesitation ; and Moffat fairly rushed towards the house through a hail of bullets. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 335 LANCE-CORPORAL W. H. COLTMAN, North Sta6fordshire Regiment. throwing bombs, and then worked to the back of the house and rushed the door single- handed, killing two and capturing 30 of the enemy. Nothing but sheer pluck, swiftness of action and initiative could ever have brought a man alive out of such a dangerous situation as this. Noble work in tending and saving wounded under fire gave the Cross to Second Lieutenant James Johnson, 36th Battalion Northumber- land Fusiliers, Lance -Corporal W. H. Coltman, D.C.M., M.M., l/6th Battalion, North Stafford- shire Regiment (T.F.) and Private W. E. Holmes, 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, all in the early days of October. On the morn- ing of the 14th, during operations by strong patrols south-west of Wez Macquart, Johnson repelled frequent counter-attacks, and for six hours, under heavy fire, he held the Germans back. When at length he was ordered to retire, he was the last to leave the advanced position ; but he carried a wounded man with him, and three times afterwards this courageous officer, who showed cheerfulness in very dis- piriting surroundings, returned and brought in badly wounded men, doing this in spite of intense hostile machine-gun fire and with a disregard of danger which inspired all who saw him. Coltman was acting as a stretcher- bearer during the operations at Mannequie Hill, north-east of Sequehart, on October 3 and 4, and unceasingly, for 48 hours, he tended the wovmdod. Hearing that wounded had been left behind during a retirement, he, on his own initiative, went forward alone in the face of fierce enfilade fire, found the wounded, dressed them and on three successive occasions saved comrades' lives by carrying them on his back to safety The Guardsman sacrificed himself in fulfilling this high purpose ; but not before he had been the means of saving the lives of several of his comrades. This was on October 9, at Cattenieres. Holmes had already carried in two men under intense fire and was attending to a third case when he was severely wounded. In spite of his suffering he continued to carry wounded, and was shortly afterwards again woiinded, thistime mortally. Coltman came from Winshill, Burton-on-Trent, and the Grenadier from Didbrook, nearWinclunere, Gloucestershire To the Lancashire Fusiliers' extraordinary roll of Crosses for the war was added Sergeant James Clarke, 15th Battalion, of Rochdale, his remarkable deeds being accomplished with the varied help of bayonet, Lewis gun and Tank and the exercise of uncommon valour and devotion. Clarke was commanding a platoon at Happegarbe on November 2, and was leading his men with great determination when heavy machine-gun fire held them up. The sergeant thereupon rushed forward through a thick ridge which was strongly held, captured four ma- chine-guns in succession, and, single-handed. SEC. LIEUTENANT JAMES JOHNSON, Northumberland Fusiliers. 244 -3 336 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. bayonoted the crews He afterwards led the remnants of his platoon to the capture of three machine-gims and many prisoners. With seven machine-guns and numerous captives to hi.= credit Clarke resumed operations later in the day, when his platoon was held up by machine- guns This time he had managed to get control of a Tank, which he successfully led against the Germans over very exposed ground. On the following day the attack was continued. PRIVATE W. E. HOLMES, Grenadier Guards. and Clarke gained his objective and took many more prisoners, at the same time most skilfully organizing his line and holding up the Grermans. On November 4, in the attack on the Oise- Simbre Canal, Sergeant Clarke, under heavy fire from the canal bank, rushed forward with a Lewis-gun team in the face of an intense barrage, and having brought the weapon into action effectively silenced the German fire, and so enabled liis company to advance and gain their objectives Three Territorials were amongst the winners of the Cross in the later days of October — Lieutenant William Davidson Bissett, l/6th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (T.F.) ; Sergeant John Brunton Daykins, 2/4th Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment (T.F.), and Private Francis George Miles, l/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment (T.F.). Bissett distinguished himself on October 25, when commanding a platoon east of Maing. He had led his platoon to its objec- tive with great dash. Later, owing to casualties, he took conunand of the company and handled it with great skUl when his left flank had been turned by a determined German counter- attack. The danger compelled a withdrawal to the railway, but by carrying out this move- ment Bissett temporarily saved the situation. His men had exhausted their ammunition and the Germans continued to advance in force, so that a critical situation was brought about. Bissett now, under heavy fire, mounted the railway embankment and called upon his men to charge with the bayonet. Such an order was very welcome to the Highlanders, and enthusiastically responding they swept upon the Germans with the steel and drove them back with heavy loss. That splendid triumph was followed by another charge forward, with the result that the subaltern established his line. The church at Solesmes was an objective on October 20, when Sergeant Daykins was carrying out operations with " 12 remain- ing men of his platoon." In face of heavy opposition he worked his way towards the church. Through his prompt action his party were able to rush a machine-gun, and in severe hand-to-hand fighting which followed, the sergeant personally disposed of many Germans and secured his objective, his party taking 30 prisoners and inflicting many casual- ties on the enemy. So far Sergeant Daykins and his gallant dozen had done very well indeed, but that was only part o5 the day's good work, for another machine-gun, which was holding up a portion of his company, was located and had to be dealt with. Daykins now acted alone, and under heavy fire he worked his way to the hostile post, so successfully that shortly afterwards he returned with 25 prisoners, and an enemy machine-gun. " which he mounted at his post." Daykins belonged to Jedbvirgh, Scot- land. The perronnance of Private Miles was bril- liant and successful in every way ; it was, indeed , one of the finest of the achievements which had been credited to Territorials. On October 23, during the advance against the Bois L'Eveque, his company was held up by a line of German machine-guns in the sunken road near the Moulin J. Jacques. The situation was one of great danger and did not admit of any delay, and realizing this Private Miles, acting alone and on his own initiative, went forward under exceptionally heavy fire. Success attended his courageous conduct, for he located a machine-gun, shot the gunner and put the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 887 BAYONET CHARGE ON A MACHINE-GUN POST. weapon out of action. He now observed another machine-gun near by, and again advancing alone he shot the gunner, rushed the gun and captured the team of eight. Private Miles at last stood up and beckoned to his company, and the men, acting on his signals, were able to work round the rear of the line and to capture no fewer than 16 machine-guns with an officer and 50 other ranks. This excellent result